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What is the legal distinction between Twitter banning Trump and Trump blocking individuals? For reference, this recent NPR article contains all of the information that inspired this question. The lawsuits referenced in the above article center on then-President Trump blocking individual users on Twitter from interacting with or seeing his tweets. Lower courts apparently ruled that Trump's twitter feed is essentially a public forum, and therefore, blocking users was unconstitutional because it amounted to viewpoint discrimination. There haven't been (as far as I know) any lawsuits against Twitter for their banning of Trump while he was President. Clearly, any such lawsuits would likely be ruled moot now, but it stands to reason that if Trump isn't allowed to prevent people from interacting with him on social media, then Twitter shouldn't be allowed to prevent people from interacting with him either. One possible distinction here is that Twitter wasn't practicing viewpoint discrimination since they effectively blocked everyone from interacting with President Trump without regard to viewpoint. However, if the President's presence turns a social media account into a public forum, then preventing the president from having an account seems to be a form of viewpoint discrimination in itself. Really, the whole thing is very strange since it seems to suggest that Twitter (a private company) has control over whether or not certain public fora are allowed to exist. To me, that sounds like those fora were never really "public" at all (meaning Trump should be able to block people from his personal account), or if they were, then Trump's viewpoint was being discriminated against and Twitter has an obligation as the purveyor of this public forum to protect his rights. Why are Trump blocking individuals on Twitter and Twitter effectively blocking everyone for Trump by banning him treated differently under the law? | Trump was an officer of the government, and Twitter wasn't. The First Amendment forbids the government and its agents from viewpoint discrimination, but private companies are not bound by it and can discriminate as much as they please. (There was a question as to whether such discrimination might affect whether the company enjoys a shield from liability under 47 USC 230, but even so they have the right to block and censor as they wish if they are willing to risk that liability.) | Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform. | There are a number of misconceptions here. GDPR does not generally impose blanket bans, but things get dicey if you're using data in a way that is not strictly necessary. Consent (freely given opt-in) is a way to continue nevertheless. A website without ads, tracking, or potentially tracking embedded content can probably work without having to ask for consent. Under the GDPR, every processing of personal data needs a purpose. This purpose must be covered by a legal basis. Some processing might be legally mandated or required by a contract with the data subject. It's also possible to base processing on a legitimate interest, but this requires a balancing test that also considers the data subject's rights and interests. As a last resort, consent can be an appropriate legal basis, but this comes with additional restrictions. Once you have a clear purpose that is covered by a legal basis, you can process the minimum data necessary to achieve the purpose. Sometimes, laws prescribe a particular legal basis. This is the case for cookies. You can use cookies (and similar technologies that access information on the end user's device) as strictly necessary to provide a service explicitly requested by the user. If you go beyond that, the ePrivacy Directive says you must obtain consent first. So for example, session cookies, shopping carts, or cookies that remember a “dark mode” preference are all perfectly fine because they are strictly necessary for something the user is trying to do. Also, you can use cookies to remember if the user gave or declined consent. On the other hand, analytics or tracking cookies are not necessary and require consent. If a website embeds third party content, this discloses personal data such as IP addresses to the third party. This disclosure requires a legal basis, most likely consent. There is case law about this regarding Facebook Like buttons on a page (→ Fashion ID case) but the same principle can be generalized to embedded Tweets or Youtube videos, images, or JavaScript files. A common way to handle this is to replace the embedded content with a placeholder, and to only load the embed once the user gives consent. But not all other domains or services are “third party” in the sense of the GDPR. When you engage a company to act as a data processor on your behalf, they are contractually bound to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. The GDPR allows you to outsource processing activities such as serving web content, as long as you have a suitable contract in place. Such “data processing agreements” are common for hosting providers or CDNs. When consent is to be used as a legal basis, it's important to consider the various conditions that the GDPR imposes (see Art 7 GDPR). The core principle is that consent must be freely given. You cannot make access to a site conditional on consent, so a naïve cookie wall or captive portal will be non-compliant. It's fine to force a choice, but “no” MUST be valid and possible. That consent is freely given also means that you must provide enough context for the user to make an informed decision, that the user must give consent through an unambiguous, affirmative action (consent is never the default), and that consent must be specific for a particular purpose (you can't bundle unrelated purposes). That is why modern consent management tools have multiple layers of information and allow the user to give consent for individual purposes (e.g. yes to analytics but no to ad personalization). In your particular context, you could proceed as follows: Figure out what kind of external content you're currently including. Can you enter into a data processing agreement with the external providers? If so, sign that. Can you host the content locally? This can be an easy solution except for video streams. Careful: copyright concerns might make this impossible. Can you replace the content with placeholders that only load if and when the user gives consent? That way, the rest of your site remains accessible without annoying consent walls. If the third party content is an unavoidable and essential part of your page, use an interstitial to inform the user of the risks before they proceed. | There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court. | If you are charged under the laws of Estonia (or Australia or Thailand or the UK) then the laws of the USA have no relevance whatsoever. It makes no difference if you are a US citizen, if the alleged crime happened in the USA or was perpetrated against the USA. If nation X has jurisdiction then you are tried under the laws of nation X. That is what sovereignty means. As to your specific example, Facebook does business in Estonia, therefore they are subject to Estonian law, as a US corporation they are also subject to US law and the law of every other jurisdiction they operate in (see why they need big legal departments?). If a legitimate Estonian warrant was served on them to disclose metadata or anything else then they are legally obliged to do so or be in contempt of court. Oh, and by the way, the first amendment right to free speech does not give you a right to anonymous free speech. | The fact pattern that The public sees this as extremely [objectionable], and it leads to a huge backlash against Eric's company gives cover to Eric to fire Chris. That decision would be, provably, based on the expected impact on the company business, not on Chris’ views. The exact nature of the statement does not matter. For example, any of the following could conceivably snowball into a social media uproar: "homosexual sex is sinful" "pineapple does not belong on pizza" "dogs are better than cats" Of course, that is only the theoretical view when everyone agrees on what happened. In the real world, Chris would argue that Eric fired him for his views, Eric would argue that it was because of the public backlash, and the finder of fact would have to decide which is more credible. Some factors in play would be : if the "social media uproar" is five Twitter accounts with ten followers each, Eric's defense of "there was an angry mob, I had to fire him" will not seem very credible. if Eric unwisely wrote to Chris that they are fired "because of their statement", or worse, "because of your fundamentalist Christian views", that will make Eric’s lawyer job much harder. On a side note (not asked in the OP but raised in comments), Chris’s statement is undoubtedly protected speech under the First Amendment. That means the government cannot take legal action against Chris. However, other people can: Eric can fire him, Twitter can ban him, his buddy can stop going to the pub with him, his girlfriend can dump him, etc. As the trope goes, freedom of speech does not mean freedom from consequences. | A person isn't required to state their evidence that the claim is true when they make the claim, and as a public figure, a defamation suit filed by Trump would be judged under the stronger "actual malice" claim, meaning that the statement was made with knowledge that the claim is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false. You would have to look at the specific statement. It is generally not defamatory to hurl insults like "rapist!", "pedophile!", "criminal!" etc. against a public figure especially a political figure, since such word don't generally amount to an actual accusation of wrong-doing. On the other hand, a detailed but false claim purporting to relate factual events could cross the threshold. Hyperbole is not actionable. | Can a shopowner in Thailand ban someone from entering their shop on the grounds of their citizenship? The first tweet, explains the context properly: I’m at my local hospital this afternoon to get a medical certificate. My work permit expires soon and so I need to run around getting all the documents in order. At the hospital they wanted to check my passport before letting me in to see if I had been abroad recently. Thailand has been very popular with visitors for decades and if laws existed that discriminated against foreigners this would be commonly known. So in this case the 'discrimination' probably not because of citizenship, but more about a faulty assumption that the virus is spread by foreigners. This will have nothing to do with Thai law. The (tweet) OP quotes only another persons claim. The OP states in the first tweet that they checked his passport only to see if he was abroad recently. So he didn't share the same experience of the American. Based on that, this second hand source (that can't be verified) is probably unreliable. Due to the present (global) uncertainties, caused by the Coronavirus, one should look at the whole picture. 2020-02-04: Coronavirus: Chinese targeted as Italians panic - BBC News In Italy and elsewhere, panic is spreading much faster than the coronavirus itself. Chinese businesses are empty, shopkeepers are shutting down and Chinese nationals are being targeted. At a bar beside the Trevi fountain, a notice was put up banning customers from China. So the the situation described by the original (tweet) OP is understandable, but the quoted (but not varified) second hand source as well as the events in Italy are not. The incidents have prompted condemnation from the Italian authorities. Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte reprimanded the regional governors, telling them that they were not competent to make such a call and that nothing justified such fear. Discrimination, solely due to citizenship, would be against Human Rights prevention of discrimination. Special cases may exist for prices that are subsidized and thus only for residents. Dual pricing was common in the Czech Republic until 1999, when it was ruled illegal (but still persisted). Then a foreign resident had to supply proof of residency to avoid paying the higher price. 2007: Illegal practice of dual pricing persists in Czech Republic At the time we assumed that this was legal (it was certainly understandable), but it seems that was not the case. Are the "Human Rights prevention of discrimination" written down somewhere? Also, who enforce them? Universal Declaration of Human | United Nations Human Rights Enforcement Mechanisms of the United Nations | ESCR-Net European Convention on Human Rights - Wikipedia European Court of Human Rights How these international laws/conventions are implemented into national laws will differ from country to country. For Germany they are anchored into the constitution: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany Article 25 Primacy of international law The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory. and are enforced by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and can be passed on to the European Court of Justice (or European Court of Human Rights) should the need arise. Thailand: Part of Section 30 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2007: Unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of the difference in origin, race, language, sex, age, disability, physical or health condition, personal status, economic or social standing, religious belief, education or constitutionally political view, shall not be permitted. |
Who investigates the Kidnapped Sheriff? Assume the mob kidnaps the sheriff of a county of Colorado (18 USC 351 does not apply to the Sheriff, right?) and they never cross the state border. During the kidnapping, the mob's enforcers wound a deputy of the sheriff, but he survives (so 28 USC 540 doesn't apply, right?). Who is responsible for investigating this: FBI, Colorado State Police, or the Sheriff's department? | Because kidnapping is a violation of state law, the Colorado Bureau of Investigation would have jurisdiction to investigate. Assuming the crime occurred in the sheriff's home county, the undersheriff would take over and could also investigate. And if the sheriff is missing for more than 24 hours, federal law assumes that he was kidnapped using the instrumentalities of state commerce, giving the FBI jurisdiction to investigate, as well. Even before 24 hours, the fact that the mob acts as part of a criminal enterprise with an effect on interstate commerce, would also give the FBI jurisdiction to investigate under RICO. | While it is from a different jurisdiction, the following goes to the heart of the matter: Arrest, when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension of a person or the deprivation of a person's liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether the person has been deprived of personal liberty of movement. Directorate of Enforcement v Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440 at ¶46 (SC of India) In your example, the police officer has been deprived of "personal liberty of movement"; if they can still speak there would be no legal impediment to them placing the person who arrested them also under arrest. It would then be incumbent on both parties to deliver each other into lawful custody. The citizen would need to seek out a law enforcement officer to do this; the police officer has already done so, being their own law enforcement officer. After this, comes the paperwork. | I'll use California penal code 837 as an example, though most other states have similar statutes: A private person may arrest another: For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence... 839 says: Any person making an arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to aid him therein. Generally, someone making an arrest is allowed to use "reasonable force" to effect the arrest. The question then becomes, is the act of interrupting a football game a public offense? Once a fan at a football game enters the field, assuming it is a violation of the license granted to the fan, they are trespassing. These fans are often drunk when performing their midfield dance so that is another public offense for which they could be arrested. Once arrested, the interloper must be turned over as soon as possible to a magistrate or peace officer. The person making the arrest is always subject to being sued. It is a question for a trier of fact to determine if unreasonable force was used in effecting the arrest. My guess is that in most of these cases security simply ejects the exuberant fan from the premises and the fan never looks back. If a lawsuit were to be filed it would be based on unreasonable force being applied during the arrest. California penal code 240 defines assault as "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another." Certainly, one could be charged with assault in effecting a citizen's or private arrest but it would go back to the definition of reasonable force and what force was necessary to effect the arrest. If someone resisted arrest I think it more likely that that person could face an assault charge. | This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas). | So, in England and Wales your son assaulted Mario. (From Wikipedia: "Assault is committed if one intentionally or recklessly causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence". I expect Mario expected your son was going to thump him, and that would certainly be unlawful.) You were both trespassers on the property; however it sounds like there was nobody there who could require you to leave, so that probably doesn't matter. Both of these would be true whatever the age of your daughter. Finally, in England and Wales, if you had forced your 16-year old daughter to come with you against her will, you would both have been guilty of kidnapping. (16 is the age at which children become independent in terms of deciding where to go.) She can choose to leave home and live with her boyfriend, and there is nothing you can do to stop her. Edit: The question did not originally mention a jurisdiction. This is an area where the legal situation is likely to be very jurisdiction dependent. | An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all? | You don't know. You can't know. And you can't force the officer to tell you. Detention Status As a practical matter, you have no way of knowing if you are compelled to follow an officer's order because you are being detained unless the officer volunteers that information (your detention status) which they are not compelled to disclose and have every incentive not to disclose. Consider the situation when the officer does not have reasonable suspicion do detain you. If the officer instantly informs you that you are "free to go" then you are likely to leave and end the encounter immediately. However, if the officer says nothing, then you might stay and inadvertently say or do something that would give the officer reasonable suspicion to detain you from that point forward. Your behavior during that detention could lead to probable cause, arrest, etc. Every officer knows they have nothing to gain by being quick to tell you you are free to go. Deceptive Conduct To compound the issue, police encounters are particularly problematic because police officers have a lawful right to engage in deceptive conduct during an investigation including but not limited to lying. You, on the other hand, can be prosecuted for lying to the police conducting an investigation. (See this article for more information.) Hobson's Choice Therefore, all things considered, police encounters present a Hobson's Choice. Either comply with every order in an effort to end the encounter quickly. Or try to press the officer to determine whether you are "being detained" or "free to go." The former course of action voluntarily cedes some of your rights. The latter risks "provoking" the officer into making your encounter more difficult, painful or costly than it otherwise might be. Never Consent to Searches That said, you are never under any obligation to consent to a warrantless search of your home or vehicle. Typically, saying, "I do not consent to searches." is usually sufficient if asked. Evidence obtained from warrantless searches is barred from being used at trial unless you waive this right by consenting to the search. See this question (and answers) if you are concerned about the officer falsely claiming you gave consent if you didn't. Never Talk to the Police As a legal matter, talking to the police can never help your case in court. Anything you say to the police that might help your case (i.e., exculpatory) is not admissible as evidence because it's hearsay. On the other hand, anything you say to the police can and will be used against you. In fact, even if you are completely innocent of all crimes AND you are completely 100% truthful to the police, you can still give the police all they legally need to convict you of a crime simply by talking to them. Whereas, without your statement, they would not have had sufficient evidence to convict. See this Youtube video for more details and examples of how this can and does happen every day. Practical Matters The above analysis presents the reader with some practical concerns. You don’t want to risk being harmed by an officer in fear for his safety. You don’t want to be handcuffed and taken to the police station if you can avoid it. You must obey all unconditional commands of a peace officer. It does no harm to inform the officer that you are willing to comply with all unconditional legal commands and ask him or her if a given command is, in fact, unconditional. Some attorneys go in the opposite direction from the "never talk to the police" rule and advise that, say in the case of a domestic violence dispute, the best course of action is to answer police questions matter-of-factly, never lie and never admit guilt. That course of behavior can avoid a potential trip to the police station in handcuffs in the back of a police car even if you are never ultimately arrested. TL;DR: Police encounters are tricky. It's difficult to know what to do. The best course of action is to educate yourself about your rights and the law and apply judgment and common sense to guide your behavior to achieve the best outcome. I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. This answer is not legal advice. Please consult an attorney to obtain proper legal advice. | (Lots of digging) https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/609.341 The above is a series of definitions for the purposes of criminal statues. Way down (noting that the page notes that this section was amended in 2021, so almost certainly in response to this case, given the amount of attention it has received), as subdivision 22, we have the definition: Subd. 22.Predatory crime. "Predatory crime" means a felony violation of section 609.185 (first-degree murder), 609.19 (second-degree murder), 609.195 (third-degree murder), 609.20 (first-degree manslaughter), 609.205 (second-degree manslaughter), 609.221 (first-degree assault), 609.222 (second-degree assault), 609.223 (third-degree assault), 609.24 (simple robbery), 609.245 (aggravated robbery), 609.25 (kidnapping), 609.255 (false imprisonment), 609.498 (tampering with a witness), 609.561 (first-degree arson), or 609.582, subdivision 1 (first-degree burglary). Thus, it looks like your Minnesota government website is not complete. However, the above seem like the most likely crimes to warrant inclusion on the register. The prominent reason in this instance is the registration will hamper Chauvin from regaining employment as a police officer in Minnesota or any other state. Where I live, there are reports of "problematic officers" being "shuffled" between departments; this would explicitly prevent that. |
Why did the Supreme Court vacate the ruling that Trump could not block Twitter users? In 2019, an appeals court upheld a decision that President Trump violated the First Amendment by blocking users from his Twitter account. Two days ago, the Supreme Court declared the case "moot" and vacated the appeals court's ruling. An article gives the following reason: The high court dismissed the case because Trump is not in office so there is no longer a live case or controversy. I do not understand this reasoning. Why not leave the appeals court's ruling on the record, because it is always possible a future president will try to block users while communicating with a personal social media account? Now if the issue pops up again in the future, a president will be allowed to block users for multiple years while the issue gets re-litigated from scratch. | The case was appealed and taken by SCOTUS. Then the case became moot: Trump was banned from Twitter for life, his account permanently suspended. As the Twitter account that was the core of the controversy no longer exists, Trump can't block any accounts anymore. As Trump is disallowed from making a new account, it can't arise with the same fact pattern. Trump is no longer in office. The SCOTUS may only weigh in on live and active cases of controversy. The case is neither live nor active because it was rendered moot in January. As a result, it had to be dismissed, or the decision to take the case overturned. Speculating why they chose one over the other is moot, as there is no majority opinion given and the judges won't answer such questions. | That's an old idea that has been tried several times before (such as the first, being Unvarnished: Website Lets You Review People (And Trash Them) | HuffPost, which no longer exists); and one of the latest incarnations is Peeple (mobile application - Wikipedia). There are lots of legal liabilities, including defamation and harassment/stalking, even with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act | Electronic Frontier Foundation which (mostly) protects the website owner from others' speech posted on the site (your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction). The only way such a site would survive is to do what Peeple and other sites have done: greatly limit the speech allowed, such as limiting to only positive reviews, giving the subject complete control over what does appear on their profile, only allowing "opt-in" profiles, verify identities, etc. You would have to implement full GDPR compliance; but various lawsuits will either shut you down before you get far enough to launch or soon after and force you to greatly limit the scope of the site. Most lawyers would advise you to find something else to do with your time and money. | It is not a crime to say, "The people want to bring down the regime." This specific tweet is almost certainly not illegal. Even if this guy is subjectively trying to overthrow the government, this would probably be an impossible prosecution for a lot of reasons. First: 18 USC 2385 deals with "overthrow or destruction of the government." Does "regime" mean the government or does it just mean the Trump administration? I'm guessing it just means the administration, and if that's the case, you're dealing with a matter of public concern rather than a true threat of overthrow. Especially because this comes right after the election, you've got strong arguments that this is commentary on a matter of public concern, e.g., "the people want to end the Trump regime," or maybe "the people wanted regime change and therefore voted for Trump, or that you need a change in the constitutional form of government to do away with the Electoral College." Whatever it means, commentary on a matter of public concern cannot be punished under Section 2385. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). Second: 18 USC 2385 deals with overthrow by "by force or violence." To say you want to bring down the regime says nothing about how you want to bring down the regime. Third: The invocation of the Arab Spring could sort of cut in either direction, as it involved regime changes effected both through nonviolent protest and violent revolution. Fourth: Even if we interpret this as Ayloush saying that regime change would be good, that he personally wants regime change, or that other people should want or work toward regime change, that's still not enough to get you into the conduct prohibited by Section 2385, which does not prohibit "doctrinal justification of forcible overthrow." Here's some relevant language from Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961): [T]he mere abstract teaching of Communist theory, including the teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future which is both sufficiently strong and sufficiently pervasive to lend color to the otherwise ambiguous theoretical material. This seems like pretty solidly First Amendment-protected political speech. | First, the relevant term is "precedent". You have misstated the nature of "precedent". Precedent is simply the addition of further information about what the law is. A legislature may set forth a law that say "If A, then (if you B, you will suffer consequence C)". But it is not self-evident in a given instance whether A is true, or B is true, or what exactly C refers to. In addition, law is an integrated system, so Law #39 may seem to contradict Law #12: does that mean that Law #39 doesn't apply, or is it that Law #12 (if #12 is a Constitutional provision, #39 is just wrong – laws exist in a hierarchy). Therefore, laws must be interpreted. "Precedent" refers to the creation of a rule of interpretation, one which is logically consistent with existing rules of interpretation (which are arranged in some logical hierarchy). If the Supreme Court establishes a rule that laws penalizing "hate speech" contradict the First Amendment (R.A.V v. St Paul) and therefore cannot be a law in the US, then any similar law is, by rule, also not actually a law. Creation of precedent itself follows rules, though ones that are harder to discern – this is what "jurisprudence" is about. For example, some justices believe that they should appeal to an inherent feeling of justice; others believe that a law should be interpreted according to perceived legislative intent; still others focus on the wording of the legal text (statute, usually). This does not involve appeal to popular sentiment. It does mean (usually) that law is seen to be a system of rules, and not case-by-case feelings. | The fact that something is illegal does not imply that it is illegal to post pictures of it happening. In general, under U.S. law, free speech protects almost all forms of communications subject to a handful of narrow exceptions and this is not one of them. There are many legitimate reasons one might want to post video of a fight (e.g. to identify crime perpetrators for purposes of prosecuting them), but no legitimate purpose is legally necessary. Surely as a platform Reddit cant hide against it being a platform of free speech in this case? They most definitely can. Reddit is also not responsible for user posted content under Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act, even if it were illegal for the person posting it to post the content | He will be thrown out of office (the "except in case of impeachment" clause means the president cannot immunize a person against impeachment); because he was pardoned by POTUS, he will not be charged of the crime that he was pardoned for – the prosecution does not get a chance to argue anything. They might however prosecute him for some other offense not covered by the pardon (if POTUS forgets a sweeping statement like "any and all crimes related to X"). I don't think a prosecutor is likely to try to argue that the Constitution means "the president cannot pardon a person who has been impeached". | Note the following argument: the landmark 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland, which ruled that state officials cannot obstruct “the measures of a government [the federal government] created by others as well as themselves.” “In other words,” Kalt and Amar summarize, “a single state cannot use its power to derail the functioning of the United States.” (Amar is a Yale constitutional law professor, Kalt, his student) On the other hand, you have the argument by a Hofstra constitutional law professor that the 25th amendment can be applied when the President is occupied with a criminal case, ergo, the functioning of the United States can be carried on unimpared. At the end-of-the-day there is no absolute answer as it is still being argued academically and has never been specifically settled by the courts. | He was jailed for breaching an injunction imposed on the Shard in 2018 which was intended to prevent anyone from climbing it, according to a news report from the Guardian at the time. The actual offence he committed was contempt of court which is a criminal offence. Double jeopardy does not apply here because the crime he was cautioned for was not the same crime he was prosecuted for. It appears there was no precedent set, prior to this private prosecution, about whether or not someone could be jailed for breaching an injunction in this manner, as opposed to merely being fined, etc. Obviously, since he has been jailed, people in the future will be reluctant to copy his behaviour and a deterrent has been set. |
How does a witness get an attorney? Someone who was with George Floyd the day he was killed pleaded the Fifth (source). The Hennepin County Public Defender's Office filed the notice on behalf of Morries Hall, who was sitting in the front passenger seat of a vehicle with Floyd, who was in the driver's seat, when police approached Floyd for allegedly using a fake $20 bill at Cup Foods in south Minneapolis. I understand that people, when accused, get public defenders, but Hall was only a witness in this trial. If I was called to testify and had concerns about self-incrimination and couldn't afford a lawyer, would I have to reach out to the county? Or is one provided when you're called to testify? Or perhaps the prosecution or defense was obliged to refer Hall to a public defender after speaking to him? | They ask for one Everyone has the right to legal representation. If you qualify for legal aid, the government will provide it, if you don’t, you pay for it. | First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not. | Yes The Prosecutor for the local jurisdiction could formally file charges. No complaint by Rock is legally required, and given the video evidence available, Rock's testimony might not be as essential as a victim's testimony often is. But if Rock were to testify that the fight was staged, and no real assault occurred, the case would probably fall apart. That would not be good for the prosecutor's reputation, and might well be a reason not to proceed without a clear statement from Rock. See also: "Pressing charges" - is it needed to bring a charge? | Of course The prosecution just needs to prove that the crime happened (or the defendant believed it to have happened) and you helped (in brief, there will be specific elements of the crime that each need to be proved). This would be easier if the primary crime had a convicted perpetrator but it’s not impossible without. Allow me to illustrate with an example. I will set out facts which are somewhat contrived and would not be so clear cut in a real case but for the purposes of the example please take them as undisputed and fully supported by evidence. John and Jill are in a relationship. This relationship is well known to be argumentative with frequent shouting matches and one or the other storming out. This does not amount to domestic violence by either party. John's friend Alan believes (wrongly) that there is domestic violence. During an argument Jill drops dead of a heart attack. John rings Alan distraught and says "I've killed her." Alan assumes (wrongly) that John has murdered Jill. Alan says "i'll take care of it. You go to your dad's". Alan (alone) disposes of the body. John is not guilty of murder (or indeed, anything). Alan is guilty of accessory to murder even though the actual crime never happened. The fact that Alan believed it happened is enough. | This is normal. It only seems imbalanced because only the prosecutor has been able to call witnesses so far. Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 611: Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. At this point, only the prosecution has put on its witnesses, so it hasn't had an opportunity cross examine anyone, and the defense has been able to lead because it has only been able to cross examine. Were the prosecutor to call the defendant's wife or mother or something like that, he would probably be permitted to use leading questions. And when the defense puts on its case, the roles will reverse: the defense attorneys will have to use open-ended questioning for any witness he calls, and the prosecutor will be able to use leading questions. | The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time. | The law regarding proof of service allows service of summons by publication in case a defendant "is not a resident of the state, but has property therein and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action". Plaintiff must file an affidavit saying that he believes that you are not a resident, and he either mailed the summons to you or states that your residence is unknown. Knowing how to contact a person is not exactly the same as knowing their residence, so the statement in the affidavit might be true. There is a one year limit on your right to defend and reopen if not served personally. The statute of limitations tolls after the cause of action has accrued (which I suppose would be defective service of the summons, viz. perjury in the affadavit). For recovery of real property, the time would be ten years. The court rules allow that "At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued". (This is clearly a matter that your attorney needs to address). | Courts, particularly traffic courts, tend to take a police officer's word over that of an accused person. While legally the limit is 70, the driver has very little recourse if the officer claims falsely that the actual speed was over 70. But the deterant effect of a posted limit is lost, since drivers in general have no way to know that Officer O will ticket anyone going over 60. I suppose that driver D, or D's lawyer, could subpoena calibration records of any radar gun or other measuring devise used, and could insist on its being tested. However, unless they had reason to think there was an issue, I wonder if D and D's lawyer would go through that process. Some speed measuring devices print a paper slip showing the date and time along with the reading. If such a device was used that record would be harder to alter. Some cars are now equipped with devices provided by insurance companies that record speeds and other driving info in a secure way to help judge a driver's safety and allow individual rate setting. It might be that the record from such a device would be admissible to show the speed was under the posted limit. But there is a sense in which the law is what the police and the courts enforce. If anyone who drives the road over 60 is cited and must pay, one could say the effective limit there is 60. |
Can you be fired over behaviour in a second/previous job? This is quite long-winded and I've tried my best to simplify it as much as possible. I'll clarify if needed. Legal jurisdiction here is US and UK law (if there's a difference). There are three scenarios here. "The Employee" is accused of sexual harassment in all three. We need to take into account the following which apply for all scenarios: The Employee is guilty of harassing their co-workers at Company A. Any investigations conducted are done correctly and fairly. The Employee is a publicly visible figure and a figure of authority having a management role. Scenario 1 – Two Simultaneous Employers The Employee is working for both Company A and B simultaneously. They are accused of harassing multiple co-workers. Company A's investigation finds them guilty and they are dismissed. Company B finds out after taking the Employee on as the allegations are made public by the victims. Scenario 2 – Fired and then Hired The Employee is accused of harassing multiple co-workers. Company A's investigation finds them Guilty and they are dismissed. They then get a job at Company B. After starting, B discovers this incident, although there are no grievances against the employee from co-workers at Company B and their disciplinary record at B is otherwise clean. Scenario 3 – Allegations arise after Moving The Employee leaves Company A to start a better job at Company B. Their disciplinary record is clean; i.e., no grievances were made against them before leaving Company A. After working at Company B for a while, former co-workers from A make a statement alleging that they were harassed by the Employee when they worked at A. Company B determines that this behaviour has not occurred with co-workers at Company B. Can Company B dismiss the employee in any of these scenarios, even if they conduct an investigation concluding that the behaviour was not repeated while working with Company B? If they can, should they? Does Company B have any obligation to investigate the employee's behaviour? | I am not knowledgeable about UK law, but since almost everywhere in the U.S. employment is at-will by default, in all three scenarios Company B is entitled to terminate the employee very easily. The assumption that the employee was accurately found guilty of harassment elsewhere precludes more interesting analyses where matters such as defamation and public policy are involved. If the contract between the employee and Company B establishes that termination will be for good cause, the employee has only a mild chance of not being terminated for what he did in Company A. However, I say "mild chance" because in most cases Company B can reasonably argue that it seeks to protect its other employees and/or customers from the possibility that the employee's misconduct may occur in the current workplace. A very detailed analysis of the factual circumstances might be required for discerning whether Company B's decision to terminate the employee is merited. Additionally, in cases where The Employee is a publicly visible figure and a figure of authority having a management role there could be a concern that the employee's misconduct elsewhere may harm the image of Company B. | Almost certainly not. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendez v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 680 F.Supp.2d 357, 375 (D.P.R. 2010) "This incident, however, is not sufficient to constitute direct evidence of discriminatory animus...[Defendant's agent]'s anecdote could be interpreted as emphasizing the importance of a positive attitude, rather than plaintiff's interpretation that it expressed a preference for younger male employees...This benign interpretation seems more plausible...In light of these facts, there does not appear to be any evidence on the record that gives a 'high degree of assurance' that discriminatory animus was behind the decision to terminate plaintiff" (emphasis added). NOTE: OP's original question was simply whether listing 'positive attitude' on a job description was illegal. OP has now changed the question to whether making employment decisions based on a depressed individual's lack of a positive attitude is illegal. Although I have great sympathy for those with mental illness and personally wish the law were different, my answer is still that this is almost certainly legal. Another example of a court finding attitude to be a legitimate reason upon which to base employment decisions is: Martin v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 809 (M.D. Pa 2000). In this case, the court accepted as a legitimate reason for promoting one individual over another that the promoted individual "demonstrated good interpersonal skills." Id. at 817. A third example is Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, the Seventh Circuit explicitly noted that "[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and we will not second-guess that decision." Id. at 601. It then went on to affirm dismissal of the plaintiff's ADA claim because the employer "said that lead drivers must have knowledge of the mechanics of the trucks and be able to manage the other drivers on the truck through a positive attitude and ability to get along well with others. But the supervisors in charge of hiring lead drivers testified without contradiction that [the plaintiff] had a negative attitude that drew complaints from other drivers." Id. at 601-602 (emphasis added). After a relatively exhaustive search, I've found no case to counter these pretty clear statements that basing employment decisions on 'attitude' is legal. FURTHER NOTE: OP has now modified the question again to add the qualification that the lack of a positive attitude "doesn't prevent the employee from doing their job." IF this were actually true, then the answer likely becomes that illegal discrimination has occurred because then the employee would be 'otherwise qualified' (a key phrase in employment law litigation). BUT, there is an inherent contradiction in premises in OP's question now because if X is a requirement of a job, and Y employee cannot do X because of Z, then Z is preventing Y employee from doing that job. In other words, if a job requires a positive attitude, then one can't do that job without a positive attitude. Ultimately, what OP's question is really trying to get at is 'what if the employer makes 'positive attitude' a job requirement, but I don't think it should be a job requirement?' Unfortunately, there's almost certainly no legal recourse for this as long as it's a legal job requirement because, to reiterate the 7th Circuit, "[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and [a court] will not second-guess that decision." Id. at 601. | In general, in the US, Bob may do this. If the second company is a competitor of the first and Bob has access to confidential information from his first employer, then there could be an issue. Some employers require their employees, or some of them, to agree to "exclusive employment", that is to agree not to accept any other employment while employed by the company. If Bob has agreed to such a contract, he would be in breach of it if he took a second job and could be fired if his main employer learns of this. This is not a problem if Bob gets permission for the vacation work from his usual employer. In any case, Bob is not committing a crime, even if he is violating his contract. | An employer has a duty of care to employees and must take steps to ensure their safety. Notably: 125 (1) Without restricting the generality of section 124, every employer shall, in respect of every work place controlled by the employer and, in respect of every work activity carried out by an employee in a work place that is not controlled by the employer, to the extent that the employer controls the activity, ... (y) ensure that the activities of every person granted access to the work place do not endanger the health and safety of employees; (Canada Labour Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. L-2)) If there is a reasonable belief that the other employee is a danger to you, they should take reasonable steps to prevent this. If they choose to ignore this, they may be liable. Whether or not there is a reasonable belief they are a danger to you or others here is unclear. Being annoying or rude does not endanger you and they haven't made threats towards you (I assume, since you'd have mentioned otherwise). | Would breaking a rule in the handbook constitute breach of contract? Generally speaking, yes. Of course, most employment contracts are "at will" so a breach of contract often isn't necessary to terminate employment. Does my employer's updating the handbook constitute a unilateral change of contract? It depends upon what is changed in the update to the handbook. Typically an employment contract would have a term that says something to the effect of "employee shall devote his full time effort to perform the duties he is directed to perform by employer in a satisfactory manner." If the employee handbook says, "part of every employee's duties includes cleaning up his work area at the close of business each day, locking his file cabinets and shutting down his computer", this would typically simply be a definition of the duties of the employee which the employer reserved the right to change in the original employment contract, and not a unilateral change of contract. On the other hand, if the employee handbook says, "vacation days may not be taken during December" when the employee's contract simply said that "you have ten vacation days per year", that might constitute a unilateral change of contract which might not be enforceable for an employee with a fixed term of employment who was not an employee at will, without additional consideration. Locale is UK but (I assume) contract law is pretty universal so answers specific to any region are welcome. I have answered based upon general contract and employment law, but the UK frequently sets mandatory standards for different kinds of contracts and modifies common law rules related to contracts (much more so than the U.S.), so it wouldn't be very surprising if this were modified by a statute of which I am not aware. We have UK lawyers who contribute to Law.SE and they can chime in if there are particular statutes in the UK that apply to this question. | A case can be "dismissed" at (most) any time (however, the further along in the process a case is, the less likely a judge will allow a case to be dismissed without very good reason). A case can be dismissed with or without "prejudice", which in this legal context means essentially "finality". A case dismissed with prejudice cannot be brought again, while a case dismissed without prejudice can be refiled. (Compare the criminal law concept of "double jeopardy", though as phoog correctly notes, "double jeopardy" only applies in criminal trials, while prejudice can be applied in both civil and criminal courts). Many cases are dismissed without looking at the evidence (or even having the evidence admitted to the record); this is called "summary judgement" or "judgement as a matter of law". There are generally three cases when this happens: First, if the prosecution or plaintiff (i.e. the party bringing accusations) has "failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted", i.e. asked for something the court cannot grant. Second, is if the defendant can show, that even if everything alledged by the plaintiff is true, that the necessarily elements of the crime or offense have not been proven. Third, is if there are no facts in dispute, and only a disagreement on interpreting the law. | Ask yourself... What are you trying to achieve? My understanding is an employer is not obliged to provide you a positive job reference. I believe at most, they are only to obliged to confirm that you worked there. Anything above that is optional. The fact that you have left British Columbia only makes it more difficult for the company to chase you - It does not alter your legal obligations. As part of the settlement, both the employer and employee singed an mutual non-disparagement agreement. Why did you sign a mutual non-disparagement agreement if you still disagree? It leads me to believe there could be trust issues between you and others. Why do you think your old employer must abide by the agreement, but you have an exemption? Let's say you make noise - let's say your old employer in BC tracks you down. Ask yourself how an independent third party like your new employer would react when they read that you signed an agreement, then decided to ignore it. Both you and your previous employer have begun new separate journeys. You two crashed once - I suggest you not alter your path or you could crash again. Life is too short. Concentrate on making your new home in your new city and a new job a new start. It will bring you a greater benefit than breaking a signed, sealed non-disparagement agreement. | You can file a lawsuit of course. The question is whether you have any evidence whatsoever that they didn't hire you because of illegal discrimination. As you say yourself, they didn't hire you "for no apparent reason". It is entirely legal not to hire you "for no apparent reason". Without evidence of illegal discrimination that court case will go nowhere. Consider that there are jobs where 100 people apply, and a dozen people are interviewed. Getting not hired three times, when 12 people got interviewed, is just normal. If the same 12 people were interviewed at each job, then you and eight others were rejected each time, because there were 12 good enough to be interviewed, but only one job. Not being hired three times is nothing. Maybe instead of thinking of lawsuits, you might think of some training to do better in interviews. So not only do you not have any evidence of illegal discrimination, it's not even reasonably likely that there was illegal discrimination. Are you really claiming that all the three times where you didn't get the job you were the best possible applicant that was there? Did you check who got the job? Maybe it was a gay black jewish woman in a wheelchair who was just exceedingly good at her job? The point is really: Belonging to some protected class doesn't give you a right to get the job. It gives you a right not to be rejected because you belong to that protected class. It doesn't give you a right not to be rejected for any other reason. And being rejected without being given a reason is no proof, not even an indication, of some illegal discrimination going on. The most obvious and common reason for rejection is that out of all the applicants, you were not the best. |
Did they not require any kind of passport or identity when traveling between countries before the year 1914? During World War I, European governments introduced border passport requirements for security reasons, and to control the emigration of people with useful skills. These controls remained in place after the war, becoming a standard, though controversial, procedure. British tourists of the 1920s complained, especially about attached photographs and physical descriptions, which they considered led to a "nasty dehumanisation".[14] The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act was passed in 1914, clearly defining the notions of citizenship and creating a booklet form of the passport. Source: Wikipedia Prior to 1914, could anyone just travel freely around without having to show any kind of passport or papers or anything? | Passports were required in ancient, medieval, and early modern ages, either for immigration or for emigration or both. However, what was called passport back then might be better characterized as entry and exit visa. As time went on and travel became more common, those mutated into multi-use identity documents. There was a brief period before 1914 when passport requirements lapsed. Immigration control was done by other means, some emigration controls weakened. Read up to the history of Ellis Island for a well-documented example what immigration controls looked like. | There are some statutes that have a section that says "any violation of this action is punishable by . . . ." but the INA is not one of them. Generally speaking, the way it would be imposed would be: (1) to deny entry on a departing commercial airplane flight or ship (which is enforced by the private enterprises involved pursuant to Transportation Department regulations that the private enterprises may be sanctioned for not obeying) and (2) to set up presumptions about the reasonableness of, for example, laws requiring someone to have brought a passport to secure embassy access. One of the reasons that no penalty is stated is because the constitutionality of this statute is doubtful. Geographical restrictions on travel in some cases have been upheld as constitutional with regard to specific countries and in war time, but are even then strictly construed. But, no case has upheld the restriction as applied to travel to a country to which geographical restrictions do not apply. Likewise, I doubt that the provision denying entry to U.S. citizens without a passport, even during times of war, would be upheld today. For example, 215(b) was given a narrow construction (disallowing criminal prosecutions when someone went to Cuba and returned via a third-country while holding a valid U.S. passport) in part out of concern for the constitutional right to travel. U.S. v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481 (1967). See also See L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-15, at 957 n.22 (1978) (arguing that ‘the power approved in Zemel must be limited to the most extraordinary situations'). For background see, e.g. Right to Travel Abroad, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 184, 195 (1984) (student note published anonymously) and Thomas E. Laursen, Constitutional Protection of Foreign Travel, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 902 (1981). The fundamental right of a citizen is to enter his own country so that he is not stateless with no place he can lawfully be, and that analysis has been developed more in the law now than it had been in 1967. Alternatively, could a judge impose a penalty without a statutory basis (beyond the designation of the act as unlawful)? Historically, some U.S. states provided this authority which was called the power to impose punishment for "common law crimes", and there are some that still do and there are others, such as Michigan that don't define key crimes that were crimes at common law, such as murder, other than in case law and simply set punishments by statute for these otherwise undefined crimes. As recently as 1947, a majority of U.S. states had at least some common law crimes. Many states codified their criminal laws in the wake of the Model Penal Code in the 1960s even though all states adapted it to their local needs and only a minority of states adopted a penal code close based upon it. The Model Penal Code made it easier to think of what had previous been an ill defined and massive legislative task into a more manageable and finite project for ambitious reformist legislators (an attitude and approach that was common in the U.S. in state legislatures in the late 1960s and early 1970s). But, the federal judiciary has never had this authority (as formally determined by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1812, just 23 years after the current constitution was adopted), in part, because the federal government does not have plenary legislative authority on all matters and federal courts are likewise courts of limited jurisdiction (while all or almost all states have at least one court of general jurisdiction that can handle any matter that no other court has jurisdiction to handle). From Wikipedia: The notion that common law offenses could be enforced in federal courts was found to be unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). Some have argued that they are inconsistent with the prohibition of ex post facto laws. At the state level, the situation varies. Some states, such as New Jersey, have abolished common law crimes (see State v. Palendrano), while others have chosen to continue to recognize them. In some states, the elements of many crimes are defined mostly or entirely by common law, i.e., by prior judicial decisions. For instance, Michigan's penal code does not define the crime of murder: while the penalties for murder are laid out in statute, the actual elements of murder, and their meaning, is entirely set out in case law. | In short, no. Article 20 of the GDPR covers the “Right to data portability”, which essentially says two main things: The data subject had the right to an exported copy of their personal data in a common format And The data subject has the right to have this data transmitted directly from one controller to another where technically feasible. Neither of these rights as stated in the GDPR require the data controller to provide a button to initiate either a data export or a transfer to another controller. | Yes, the Fourteenth Amendment makes a person born on U.S. soil a U.S. citizen at the moment of birth. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. This is not a "loophole," because it is exactly what the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment were trying to achieve. There are narrow exceptions because of the "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" clause: The children of an ambassador are held to be subjects of the prince whom he represents, although born under the actual protection and in the dominions of a foreign prince. ... Thus the children of enemies, born in a place within the dominions of another sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens. Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. 99, 155-56 (1830). | The short answer, is "it's complicated". I can think of situations where any of the above options you listed might be true. (Another possible option is "The baby has no nationality at birth", and would therefore be considered stateless, and would fall under the birth country's rules regarding statelessness). To find a definitive answer for your specific situation, I would start with Wikipedia: British nationality law Spanish nationality law Although Wikipedia is not authoritative, it does give you a good overview of the situation for both countries. There are then links to authoritative sources in each article. In the case of a British and Spanish couple, their baby would probably be both British and Spanish at birth. Additionally, if the baby is born in a country (such as the US) which follows the jus soli rules, then the baby would also acquire the citizenship of their birth country. | The Indian Citizenship Act, 1955 §8 requires it, so from a legal perspective, you must do it. That law does not specify the consequences, and there isn't a clear limit on the possible punishment. The government does invite you to inquire about your penalty, saying The Indian Citizenship Act, 1955, does not allow dual citizenship. Holding Indian passport/acquiring Indian passport/travelling on Indian passport after acquisition of foreign citizenship constitutes an offence under the Indian Passport Act, 1967, and attracts penalties. The Government of India has prescribed imposition of penalty on a graded scale, depending on number of trips made on Indian passport after acquiring foreign nationality, for the violation of Passport Rules and retention of Indian Passport for more than 3 years after acquiring of foreign nationality. §12 of the Passport Act spells out the penalties (up to 5 years in prison and ₹50,000. If you can avoid being in illegal possession of an Indian passport, you might avoid prosecution under the act (though they probably cannot get you extradited to enforce the penalty). They certainly have the power to revoke your passport, but no provision of the law obligates you to formally apply for a passport revocation when you believe that your passport should be revoked. Unless you officially renounce your citizenship, do the paperwork, and officially surrender your passport, the government can reasonably suspect that you are illegally in possession of an illegal passport, so they are empowered to investigate, including searching and seizing. However, if you have zero interest in India, that may not matter. | You're completely misreading the goals and purpose of the Export Controls Office - Overview. They regulate the transfer of US regulated information and technology, commodities, and software in the interest of national security and economic growth. Transfer and export are not the same as the use of technology that personal devices contain. The simplest thing to do is simply call the Export Controls Office, and they will explain the difference, and tell what you need to do and what is not required of you when traveling. Some countries do prevent the use of some personal tech or Apps, i.e. Russia and Signal, the encrypted phone app; but that has nothing to do with UC. | People can take their personal cars through the Channel Tunnel from Great Britain to France. They don't actually drive their cars through the tunnel, but going by car is a perfectly normal way to travel between those two countries. That's probably the most well-known place where drivers will switch from driving on one side of the road to the other, but there are many more . If driving with a car with the wheel on the "wrong" side were forbidden, these options would not exist, because at least one direction of travel would not work. Now, of course, that doesn't mean a country like Belgium, which does not have to direct way to Britain, couldn't forbid cars with the steering wheel on the right. But at least for EU states, that seems to be forbidden, as Poland and Lithuania learned when they tried to require cars that were to be registered there to have the steering wheel repositioned to the left Consequently, the Court holds that the position of the driver’s seat, an integral part of the steering equipment of a vehicle, comes within the harmonisation established by Directives 2007/46 and 70/311, so that, in the context of the registration of a new vehicle in their territory, the Member States may not require, for reasons of safety, that the driver’s seat of that vehicle be moved to the side opposite the direction of the traffic. It notes in that regard that the legislation at issue provides for exceptions with regard to the use of vehicles equipped with a steering-wheel on the right by people who reside in other Member States, and travel to Poland and Lithuania for a limited period (for example, tourists). That fact shows, according to the Court, that the contested legislation tolerates the risk involved in such use. So even those countries that tried to ensure that registered cars had the steering wheel on the "right" side made provisions for cars that were just traveling through. And the EU does not consider it a valid law to require wheels to be repositioned. |
Does a citizen have to open the door to UK police if they do not give a reason? I just watched a video of English police talking to a lady through her door. She refused to open up unless they told her why they were there. The police refused and told her to open up or they would force the door. She asked if they were going to arrest her and the police refused to answer that. Eventually she opened the door and they arrested her (I think they said for perverting the course of justice, but I can't be sure because it became a scuffle). Does she have to open the door without being told why? I've tried searching for the answer to this but so far I've only found what happens when a search warrant is issued, which seems separate to me, or when an arrest warrant is issued and it's outside a property or the police enter forcefully (as in a drugs bust) but I can't find what happens when this particular situation, a more run-of-the-mill situation. Edit: I can confirm that the police told her they had an arrest warrant. Still, this isn't about her per se but the general rule/right. According to this BBC interview with a police officer, On the street they would have to: explain to you what the grounds of that search is, what the object of the search is. They need to identify themselves. They also need to explain to you that you are being detained for the purposes of a search and your entitlement to have a copy of a search record. It appears that this lady would've had more explanation given to her on the street. This document by the government states: The police arrest procedure If you’re arrested the police must: identify themselves as the police tell you that you’re being arrested tell you what crime they think you’ve committed explain why it’s necessary to arrest you explain to you that you’re not free to leave This seems to assume you've already been arrested or are in the process of being arrested but does not state what should or can happen immediately prior to the arrest. This site says: Search without a warrant The police can enter a premises without a warrant to: tackle or stop a breach of the peace; enforce an arrest warrant; arrest someone in connection with certain serious offences; recapture someone who has escaped from custody; save life or prevent serious damage to property; search a premises where a suspect was during or immediately before their arrest. The search must relate to the offence (or a similar offence) for which the suspect was arrested and they must have reasonable grounds for believing evidence is there; None of these would seem to me to apply. I also can see that the officers wouldn't want to say they're arresting her in case she refuses to open up, but then they could force the door anyway, which brings me back to the question, why should they refuse to say? Any help or insight is much appreciated. Edit, Additional research: Section 28 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), titled " Information to be given on arrest" only states what should happen during or after arrest, it does not mention anything about prior to arrest. I cannot find anything in the PACE act about producing a warrant prior to arrest. Part 17.1 states: a constable may enter and search any premises for the purpose… (a) of executing… a warrant (b) of arresting a person for an indictable offence Which suggests to me you can arrest without a warrant but that is for a breach of the peace and seem to imply some immediate need everywhere I look (I could be wrong). This interesting answer by a lawyer on a competitor Q&A site (boo hiss) says a warrant is required but it's about search, not arrest. I did read earlier (but have somehow lost the link) that the police must produce the warrant if challenged and read it to you if asked but without the link I wouldn't trust my memory! Regardless, I still cannot find anything that deals with this situation where you can communicate with the police through a door. | This helpful video gives the answer, and it's no, you don't have to open your door unless they have a warrant. If you've committed an indictable offence (those considered most serious, such as murder, manslaughter, causing really serious harm (injury) and robbery) they have the power to enter without a warrant (see 17 b of the PACE Act). In the case I saw there was no indictable offence and so the lady didn't (shouldn't!) have opened her door. You can speak to them through a closed door or window and if they try to break in it is they that are breaking the law. | No An arrest is the act of detaining a person or property by legal authority or warrant and has been made when a police officer or another individual makes it clear to the person that they are no longer a free person. A person does not need to be physically touched to be placed under arrest as words alone are capable of bringing about an arrest if they establish that the person is no longer a free person. Now, if a LEO asks you to accompany them, then, so long as you have the choice not to, you are not under arrest. | There are two questions here: Is it really the police, or someone pretending to be the police in order to stage a home invasion? If it is the police they will be wearing uniforms and showing you their badges. I don't know how common it is for criminals to impersonate police officers. Do they have a valid search warrant? Once you have established that they really are police your best course is to stand back and let them in. Arguing about search warrants and "fruit of the poisoned tree" is a job for a lawyer later on. One option might be to quickly dial 911, put the phone down but still listening, and then open the door while saying "are you police, can I see your badge?". If they are police then no problem. If they turn out to be imposters then the 911 dispatcher should be able to figure it out and send the real police around. | You know that a judicial proceeding has been filed against you when you are "served" with notice. In fact, legal proceedings cannot generally proceed without somebody swearing that you were served notice. If a criminal complaint is being pursued against you then you might also learn of this fact when an investigating law enforcement agent contacts you to question you or arrest you. "Filed a case" could mean all sorts of other things. For example, it could be that they filed a police report, or filed a complaint with some company or non-law-enforcement entity. It could be that they have in fact filed a claim in a court of law and whoever is serving process just hasn't been able to find you. In any of these events I don't know of any way that you could proactively determine that without knowing exactly where and how the "case" was "filed." Actually, if a criminal complaint was filed against you and approved then a court in another state could have issued a warrant for your arrest. Contact your local police and they should be able to do a nationwide search for open warrants on you. Police will not typically release information on "open investigations." So even if you knew the exact agency where it was filed they may not tell you anything. If they decided not to investigate it then you might have a right to request the complaint under open-records laws – that depends on the state and the agency. | No. Refusing to tell the address alone is not a reason to detain somebody. But there are situations where the authorities can demand that a person identifies himself or herself, including such details as the address (or lack of a permanent residency). In such a situation, failure to identify yourself can get you locked up. Also, the tone of your posting seems to question the legitimacy of the UK government and legal system as a whole. That is a box you're putting yourself into, and the company you find there is not very pleasant. | england-and-wales The length of time a suspect is held in police custody before being released is unrelated to the police's power (and duty) to sieze potential evidence for further examination or to require e.g. the surrender of a passport as a condition of pre-charge bail (along with the requirement not to apply for international travel documents or tickets etc). If the suspect is assessed to be a flight risk, under section 50A(2)(a) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) they can retain a passport if they see... the need to secure that the person surrenders to custody The retention of property, such as a phone, is allowed under section 22 PACE: (1) Subject to subsection (4) below, anything which has been seized by a constable or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20 above may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above— (a) anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, except as provided by subsection (4) below— (i) for use as evidence at a trial for an offence; or (ii) for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence; and (b) anything may be retained in order to establish its lawful owner, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence. (3) [...] (4) Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose. [...] | E can leave at any time E is not detained and there is no basis to detain her. As a child, that decision can be made by a parent. E can be subpoenaed to testify but she does not have to talk to law enforcement (and would be wise not to). | Yes. At international borders and international airports (because those are the equivalent of a border), US customs officers may do searches of people and belongings without a warrant and without any particular reason to think they'll find contraband. This includes the authority to do some level of disassembly of the car, if they then reassemble it. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149. This is known as the "border search exception." Moreover, police normally don't need warrants to search your car if it was mobile when they found it and if they have probable cause to believe they'll find contraband. This is known as the "automobile exception" or the "motor vehicle exception." It was established in Carroll v. US, 267 U.S. 132. Individual states may have stricter requirements on police searches, but the Fourth Amendment doesn't require police to get a warrant to search your car if, say, you drove it up to a checkpoint and they have probable cause. The difference at a border is that they don't need probable cause and the car never had to be mobile: they can search you on a hunch. |
Can I have a collections report removed from my credit history? I have a collections report on my credit history. The credit card company raised the minimum payment without notifying me or raising the automatic payment I set up for the minimum amount. I hadn't checked on any of my credit card accounts for a while just waiting for the automatic payments to eventually pay them off. Since they raised the minimum payment, I was not making the minimum for months and they sent my debt to collections. I would like to get the collections off of my credit report—not just making it say that the debt is paid, but removing the fact that it ever went to collections. Is there any way to remove a collections report like this from one's credit history? | You have a right to post an explanation of a disputed matter, but not necessarily a right to remove a truthful statement of fact, even if it exists for an understandable reason. | When an entity goes bankrupt, its affairs are subject to detailed court supervision and creditors rights with respect to the bankrupt entity are severely limited by an "automatic stay" that funnels all disputes between creditors and the entity to bankruptcy court. This process, in the case of a medium to large sized business, is very expensive. If lots of creditors of the consolidated group are creditors of an entity that doesn't have any assets, it may not be worth the trouble to go through that process, since those creditors will get nothing, or there may be other reasons that it needs to function as a non-bankrupt entity. The creditors of the non-bankrupt LLC could force an involuntary bankruptcy, if they suspect that some creditors are being unduly favored or if they want more transparency, but they might prefer a non-bankrupt company if it allowed them to pursue their creditor's rights outside of bankruptcy and it had some assets. There are some very tricky collective action problems involved in cases like these, that must be made with imperfect information. It could be that the parent company is looking for a quick reorganization that is insulated from the day to day affairs of the company and involves a restructuring of only long term debt and a subsidiary bankruptcy would complicate a simple, pre-packaged plan. Still, it is hard to know with limited information. | What can you do? Can you sue the debt collector? Can you sue your employer for improperly cooperating? Yes. Also report the debt collector to the appropriate regulatory agency for violation of laws relating to debt collection. Possibly refer the debt collector and/or employer to law enforcement and the DA for theft and fraud. Honestly, this is a pretty rare fact pattern. Far more common is for the debt collector to have a court judgment obtained by default against the debtor and for the debtor to not realize that the debtor has been served with process or for the debt collector to have used "sewer service" in which the process server lied about delivering process to the debtor. More to the point, what needs to be done to halt this process until the matter is sorted out? Probably it could be stopped with a temporary restraining order from the court in which the lawsuits are filed. But a letter to the employer and debt collector pointing out the there is no court order of judgment would probably stop the employer from coooperating. Is is possible to accomplish this pro se, or would you need a lawyer? You need a lawyer. This is very hard to do right pro se. | There is no usury on Credit Cards in the USA Legally, usury is charging interest rates above the mandated maximum. Due to ongoing successful lobbying by card providers, there is no maximum on credit cards. Some protections around disclosure and transparency were passed in 2009, which is why you can so easily quote the figures. However, even in jurisdictions where there are caps, the rates you quote may not exceed them. For example, in Australia, the maximum rate is 48%. | Most creditors don’t turn up at creditors meetings Largely because it’s a waste of their time and incurs further expense on top of the money they will likely never see again. Unsecured creditors have virtually no power to control the bankruptcy. Almost all those who do, do so by proxy - usually nominating the trustee as their proxy. Proxy forms are distributed with the paperwork about the meeting, sign it, stamp it and drop it in the mail and you are “at” the meeting. Attendance is voluntary - not being there in person or by proxy will not invalidate anything done at the meeting. | They recently took me to court (I am now 20) to have me start paying for the bill, under distress I signed paperwork stating that I'd start paying them, however I find this entire situation very aggravating. Short Answer You are almost surely screwed at this point and can't do anything but abide by the settlement that you agreed to when you signed the paperwork. Preface Regarding The Applicable Jurisdiction I am answering based upon the majority rules of law in U.S. states, because there is almost no other country in the world where you could end up in this financial situation due to universal healthcare systems that exist in most countries other than the United States. Also, this isn't an area of law with a great deal of state to state variation, although the law isn't exactly the same in every single U.S. state. The Minority Defense You quite possibly had a minority defense before you signed the paperwork. The minority defense is based upon an inability to give adequate consent to a contract. Whether the minority defense would have worked in this case, however, is a close call, because there are exceptions to the rule that would probably apply in this case. Settlement, Ratification and Duress The legal standard for "duress" in contract law usually means situations where there is literally a gun to your head or they're going to kill your dog or something like that, not the kind of economic pressure or persistent harassing collection efforts that I suspect you are referring to in this case. Of course, if they did steal your dog and threaten to kill it if you didn't sign the paperwork, then you really would have signed it under duress and you should probably both take legal action to repudiate that paperwork (because agreements entered into under duress are generally voidable, rather than void), and you should probably report the incident to the police as a crime. So, anyway, the paperwork you signed is probably enforceable, despite the pressure that they put on you to sign it. Once you sign a settlement agreement as an adult (which is almost surely what you did) you have ratified the agreement made when you were a minor and forfeit any way to fight it. You are stuck with what you agreed to at this point and there is nothing you can do about it short of going bankrupt. I would not recommend going bankrupt over a debts owed to a single medical provider unless that debt is so huge that ruining your credit for seven years and paying a bankruptcy lawyer is worth it to get out of this debt. For most twenty-year-olds facing debts for a few chiropractor treatments this would not make sense. Lesson learned: Talk to a lawyer before you sign paperwork, not afterwards, because once you've signed on the dotted line, there is usually little or nothing that a lawyer can do to help you at that point. Guarantors As a guarantor of the obligation to pay for your care, your mother would no doubt be on the hook in any case, whether or not you settled, and whether or not you went bankrupt. Unless the settlement agreement that you signed says otherwise, they can still attempt to collect the bill from her as well as from you. Of course, as you make payments towards the total balance due, the total balance due goes down. Your mother, as a guarantor, is only obligated to pay the portion of the bills that remain unpaid when they try to collect the debt from her. The Necessaries Exception To The Minority Defense Even though the minority defense might apply in this situation, most states recognize an exception to the minority defense when a purchase of "necessaries" is made by a minor. Bills for medical care would usually count as "necessaries", because you would have had no choice but to buy if you had been an adult anyway, so your lack of consent to pay isn't something that caused you material harm. Honestly, in the medical industry, an agreement in advance to pay a negotiated price is the exception rather than the norm. Often the providers themselves have no real clear idea what their patients are billed for their services, although chiropractors tend to be more informed about the financial arrangements than medical doctors in most cases. Void Contracts v. Voidable Contracts In any case, minority is a defense to a contractual obligation that would ordinarily only make the contract voidable, rather than void. In other words, a minor can repudiate a contract that is voidable on account of minority and successfully get out of it within a reasonable time of becoming an adult (or sooner while you are still a minor through a parent or guardian or next friend), but it is not automatically invalid. There is a good chance that a court would consider a two year delay in trying to repudiate the contractual obligation too long, even if it concluded that the necessaries doctrine did not apply because, for example, the court considered this to be elective, luxury care rather than medically necessary services. Unjust Enrichment Claims Also, in addition to suing for breach of contract, the chiropractor might be able to sue for quantum meruit. This legal theory is not based upon mutual consent the way a contract claim is, although this is sometimes called a "quasi-contract" or "implied contract" claim (it is also sometimes called a "restitution" or "unjust enrichment" claim). As a result, minority is not usually a defense to a quantum meruit claim. Instead, a quantum meruit claim is based upon preventing you from being unjustly enriched, (1) from benefits that you received, (2) that were not unwelcome, (3) from the efforts of someone else who did that work, (4) with a reasonable expectation of being compensated for the work, (5) in situations where there is no binding contract between the parties. (Different lawyers and different courts might break up these elements into more or fewer components, but the gist of the claim would be the same in pretty much any state.) In a quantum meruit case, damages are based upon the fair market value of the services rendered, rather than an agreement of the parties, since there was no mutually agreed price under a contract that they are seeking to enforce. Quantum meruit claims are frequently brought as a backup claim to a claim for breach of contract by failing to pay for services, in cases where the contract claim may be infirm for reasons such as minority. | No, because you are affecting the car's value by selling its parts. The car is collateral to the loan, so if you don't make the payments, the lender has the right to repossess and resell it to recoup their money. If they are unable to recover at least the outstanding balance of the loan through resale, you will be on the hook for the difference. This is called a "deficiency balance". Simply having possession of something isn't adequate basis to decide you can do whatever you want with it. You have physical possession, but the lender is the first lien holder on the title until the loan is satisfied. | The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date. |
Violation of Title Deed Covenants Title deeds in England often stipulate a list of restrictions and obligations. I am unclear though who can enforce them and how. My current title prevents me interfering with people trying to attend a nearby church. Previous ones prevented me storing a boat on my drive or participating in immoral acts. Others prevented me from operating a tannery. My question is — what happens if I do? | A person with standing can sue to enforce them In the UK, standing is interpreted broadly as anyone with an interest in the matter who suffers or might suffer detriment from your breach. | I can answer for the U.S., if that's helpful. The general rule, in the United States, is that covenants not to compete are enforceable as long as they are reasonable. What constitutes "reasonable" varies from state to state. Factors considered generally include: What kind of actual harm will come to the business if you go to a competitor? In other words, is this rote language they include in every contract, or did they put it in yours because you know all the secret formulas and have the customer list memorized? Is it reasonable in time, location, and scope? Something preventing you from taking any job anywhere in the United States for ten years won't be enforceable; something preventing you from taking a job with the exact same title in the same industry in the same town for the next six months might be. The general rule at common law was that covenants not to compete were unenforceable restraints of trade; the fact that they're enforceable at all is later law created by each jurisdiction, and that means it's going to vary based on your specific jurisdiction. If you want to know whether it's okay to take a specific job based on a specific non-compete you signed, you will need to talk to a legal professional licensed in your jurisdiction--and even she may not be able to tell you for sure. | You certainly can't legally steal anything, ever. If it is legal, it is not stealing. In particular, if it is your property, it isn't stealing. The question is really, "is it your property"? This will be jurisdiction dependant. I am familiar with England and Wales, and other common law jurisdictions may be similar. The fact you co-signed for the car definitely does not make it your property. It just means that out of the goodness of your heart, you agreed to reduce the finance company's risk by promising to pay if your ex-friend didn't. In E&W, I don't think it is possible to register a car jointly, but there is a long page explaining that the registered keeper is not necessarily the owner of the car. My guess is that the car probably does not belong to you, so if you take it you will probably end up with a conviction for theft. | What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation. | Two people can have an equal interest in real property without being married, and being incarcerated doesn't affect a person's property rights. What matters is that now your ex-wife has a legal interest in the property. As a separate issue, she presumably also has a legal obligation w.r.t. the mortgage (otherwise the quitclaim deed makes no sense). The easiest solution is for the other party to voluntarily transfer their interest in the property to you via a quitclaim deed. A difficult solution is to use the judicial process to remove a person from the title. This could be done if there was fraud involved in the property transfer process, for example if the quitclaim deed was forged (presumably not the case here). You might sue to correct an error which doesn't reflect the terms of the transaction, via a reformation action, but that doesn't seem to be the case (a party not understanding the consequences of transferring an interest isn't an error in the relevant sense). You need to hire an attorney to solve the problem (he will look at all of the documentation relevant for your case for a possible solution). | I am not a lawyer, I am not your lawyer, I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction I demand you give me your hat! You're not going to, are you? The point of that is that you are not obliged to do anything just because someone demands that you do. Now, if I had a court order that required you to give me your hat ... It appears that there is some confusion over who owns some land in Nebraska. This is a problem; it is not your problem. From my understanding which is entirely based on this: A warranty deed is a type of deed where the grantor (seller) guarantees that he or she holds clear title to a piece of real estate and has a right to sell it to the grantee (buyer). you would be extremely unwise to sign such a deed since it is in no way clear that you (or anyone) does have clear title. Now I take it that you are not interested in owning land in Nebraska and even less interested in getting into a legal battle over it. If that is the case then I suggest that you consult a local lawyer and ask for his advice on the following plan of action: You and your wife will renounce any claim that you may have if: You do not guarantee that you have any claim or title, The person to whom you are making this grant indemnifies you against any legal action that may result, They will prepare the documents, Your lawyer will review them, They will reimburse you for your lawyer's fees. Come back and tell us how this works out. Edit to address subsequent questions Can you be responsible for costs? Well, anything is possible but it would be extremely unlikely. If there was any wrongdoing it was many years ago by someone else! If you approach this in a reasonable way and attempt to assist in reaching a resolution (so long as it doesn't cost you time or money) then it is highly unlikely a court would award costs against you. What about background checks? This would be a civil case. It would not appear in your criminal history. While it is a matter of public record all it really means is that you and someone else had a dispute that required a court to settle; happens all the time. | The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem. | If it says "no pets" in the leasehold, then yes, that is enforceable. It doesn't have to be reasonable (in your opinion, or objectively) to be enforceable. Your choices are to either negotiate different leasehold terms, or to find a different leasehold. |
Alternatives to pleading the 5th that also offers protection I watched a old video (Don't talk to Police) that popped up while looking up information related to cyber forensics and false positives. I gathered the following points: You can't talk your way out of getting arrested. (7:55) Everything you tell the police can be used against you but not to help you. (8:46) More than 25% of DNA exoneration cases had defendants that made incriminating statements, delivered outright confessions or pled guilty. (11:11) People will move to convict based on anything, including mis-speaking, despite knowledge about how human nature and situations can trick people into an incriminating response despite being innocent. (13:20) Knowledge that you didn't like someone is used to convict. The focus is motive and opportunity. (14:50) The 5th amendment was not designed as a shelter for the guilty (despite it often being used as such). It was designed to help prevent you from unknowingly incriminating yourself. (17:00) Even if you are innocent, what you say to the police can be used to crucify you in court if the police don't recall your testimony with 100% accuracy. (17:38) People often forget that "them vs the legal system" is like an "avg person vs a professional boxer". It seems that both defendants and juries are in the amateur vs champion game. (33:00) Police officers still think that if they put a story together, validity that it's close to what happened is confirmed by the other person slumping down in their chair or putting their hand to their face. (33:53) That last point suggest we still live in a world where people think "if they're not looking you in the eye...that means they're lying". Confident, researched, guilty actors get away with murder, and unconfident nervous innocent people get slaughtered. I've seen this once inside the courtroom and many times outside the courtroom. I couldn't watch anymore beyond this point because it was frustrating to see the police officer talking like he had mastered the science of body language and psychology. It's unchecked confirmation bias. With the above in mind: Given people believe "if you're pleading the 5th, you must be guilty" or "if you're innocent you won't have to plead the 5th", is pleading the 5th the only thing people can do to avoid talking to the police and mistakenly incriminating themselves? Are there situations where not talking to the police is illegal or where you can be legally punished for not talking to the police? For example, if you witness a accident or crime and just don't want to get involved? | united-states It is not required for a person to formally assert a fifth- or a first-amendment right when questioned by the police. One can simply be silent, refuse to answer any questions, without giving any reasons. But probably more effective and just as legal is to say "I won't answer any questions until I have talked with a lawyer. I want a lawyer, now." That is perhaps less likely than using the words "plead the fifth" to be assumed to be a confession of guilt, although some people and some police may take almost anything as a confession of guilt. By the way some of the points you distilled from the video (which I have not watched yet) are correct, some are half-truths, and some are quite incorrect. For example: The 5th amendment was not designed as a shelter for the guilty (despite it often being used as such). It was designed to help prevent you from unknowingly incriminating yourself. As a matter of history, this is quite incorrect. It arose historically out of a reaction to government procedures deemed oppressive. See https://law.stackexchange.com/a/63690/17500 for more detail. But helping people avoid unintentionally incriminating themselves is one of its major current functions. You can't talk your way out of getting arrested. Sometimes you can, but it is never safe to count on it. You can't know in advance if it will work, and more often than not it doesn't. Everything you tell the police can be used against you but not to help you. Not quite. If your statement is recorded, as is likely nowadays, the whole statement must be given to your lawyer and entered into evidence if you are eventually charged. (See Brady vs Maryland) Things said in your own favor may be discounted as self-serving, but the judge and jury will still hear them. But they can be very risky. | This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate." | One answer is that you should say "yes", because it is a federal felony (5 years prison term) to say "no", because it is untrue, and you know it is untrue. This assumes that the question simply asks "Have you ever been convicted or arrested; please explain", with no qualifiers like "as an adult". If you are absolutely positive that the record was sealed, an alternative answer is "no", based on a law like RCW 13.50.260(6)(a), which say you can legally "act as if it didn't happen": If the court enters a written order sealing the juvenile court record pursuant to this section, it shall, subject to RCW 13.50.050(13), order sealed the official juvenile court record, the social file, and other records relating to the case as are named in the order. Thereafter, the proceedings in the case shall be treated as if they never occurred, and the subject of the records may reply accordingly to any inquiry about the events, records of which are sealed. California has a similar law. The problem here is that this is state law, so a valid defense for a state charge of lying, but you need to comply with federal law, and states cannot tell the FBI what to do. It is variously rumoured that the FBI does not report sealed records, but it is unwise to count on rumours, and even if it is general discretionary policy for them to delete information about sealed records when reported from the state, it is not guaranteed that the policy is absolutely always followed. You can request an Identity History Summary Check from the FBI. So the safest path is to get an informed opinion, tailored to your facts, from your attorney. | There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle. | There are various ways in which a minor cannot assist a police investigation, and it might be useful to say in what ways any civilian could do so (TV shows notwithstanding). A civilian cannot conduct a custodial interrogation, nor can most of them gather physical evidence (so that a proper evidence log is maintained including relevant information on method of collection, the evidence isn't contaminated etc. – stuff that requires a modicum of training). They cannot execute a search warrant. On the other hand, anyone can provide information that is useful to the police, and it can be done without giving your name or indicating that you are a minor. A minor can serve as a witness at a trial, and it can be helpful to police to know that they have a witness to a crime. A minor can also be used the same way an adult is used, as a confidential informant. There is not a lot of data on that practice given the confidentiality of juvenile records, but there is an article to read ("Juvenile Police Informants: Friendship, Persuasion, and Pretense". The article does suggest that parental consent may be necessary in some cases (such as wearing a wire to a drug transaction). There is a law in Washington requiring every county's prosecutor to have a local protocol for using informants, and there should be guidelines developed by a work group, however the results (if any) of that group's meetings are not available on the internet. It is possible that there are specific restrictions on the use of minors as informants in some jurisdiction. The article explores the subtle distinction between "informant" and "friend", applied to minors. California has a law that limits the use of minors – none under 15, those above with approval of a judicial officer and parent, though those 13 and older can be used as bait in a cigarette or alcohol sales case. New York does not have a blanket prohibition against using a minor as an informant, but there may be relevant guidelines for a particular department. | If the police order you to sit in an interrogation room and you are not permitted to leave, by definition, you have been arrested. Detaining someone against their will for longer than necessary to answer a few questions on the spot (which is a lesser imposition on your freedom called a "Terry stop") is what it means to be arrested. Legally, the police are only allowed to arrest you if they have probable cause to believe that you have committed a crime. I believe that you are confusing arrested (being detained by law enforcement against your will for more than a Terry stop), with being booked, or being charged with a crime. Generally speaking people are arrested first, and then booked next, and then charged with a crime after that, although this isn't always the order in which this happens. In much the same way, if the police observe someone committing a crime, they will first handcuff them which places them under arrest, and then book them sometime not too long later when they arrive at the police station, and then formally charge them sometime after that after a conversation with the prosecuting attorney to see if the prosecuting attorney is willing to pursue the case. Booking generally involves bringing someone to a police station, getting identifying information, taking a mug shot, taking finger prints, and depending upon what the police want to do, searching your person and inventorying your possessions prior to putting you in a jail cell in jail garb. Usually, however, the grand jury or the prosecuting attorney (it varies by jurisdiction) does have subpoena power to compel you to provide information under oath prior to trial as a witness, following the service of a subpoena upon you a reasonable time in advance as set forth in the relevant court rules, unless you invoke your 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination and are not granted immunity from prosecution based upon your testimony in exchange, or you invoke some other legal privilege against having to testify. They can, of course, simply ask you to come to an interrogation room and answer questions, and merely imply that it is mandatory without actually saying that you must and without clarifying the situation. In that case, which is extremely common, their legal right to interrogate you flows from your own consent. If you answer their questions, your answers could provide the police with probable cause to arrest you that they didn't have when they started asking questions. Indeed, often, when police interrogate you before booking you, they are doing so because they need your statements to establish the probable cause needed to legally arrest you. This is why criminal defense attorneys counsel people to immediate ask for a lawyer and refuse to answer any questions other than those needed to establish your identity. You can also ask if you are under arrest and if you are free to leave (which are mutually exclusive). If they say you are not under arrest, you are free to leave, unless you are appearing pursuant to a subpoena. | united-states "I know is it illegal for authorities to question a suspect when their lawyer isn’t present" This is not really true, at least in the US. The suspect must explicitly ask for a lawyer. Even saying "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" (ie Davis v. U.S. (512 U.S. 453 (1994)) isn't enough, they have to say "I want a lawyer". Until they invoke the right, an officer can question all they want (provided they were informed of these rights, except for certain situations which are relatively complicated. See Miranda Rights). So no, an officer questioning you without a lawyer is neither a crime nor illegal. Once you invoke your Miranda right though, they have to respect that. With or without your lawyer, this is called interrogation. You can filter your responses through a lawyer, or waive your right to a lawyer and answer directly. | Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh. |
Is employer responsible to disclose workplace before hiring? I was originally hired to do some in office computer work. During my interviews, I was on the premises 3 times. Employer showed me this “workplace”, my desk, etc. I worked there for about a month, and then out of the blue the employer told me I need to do work in the underground lab. Due to my health condition I’m unable to be exposed to that environment. If I knew I would need to work there, I would NEVER accept the job. Is the employer responsible in any way to show the actual physical work place BEFORE hiring? Now they are saying “we told you”, but I don’t really remember them telling me. Also the job description doesn’t have any of it. I thought employer should show the actual working place , especially if it is not an ordinary one. Is there any law in the U.S. requiring the employer to disclose and show the actual physical work place? | In the US, persons with a disability are entitled to a reasonable accommodation for their disability. There is no requirement to tell an employee everything about their working conditions before a hire, in fact it would be illegal for the employer to ask "Do you have a disability that would prevent you from working underground?". Once hired, you can request an accommodation for your disability. | For cases where this occurred within the United States, with works created on or after January 1, 1978: (the OP has since clarified that their scenario occurred elsewhere) By default, the author (the actual creator) of a work is the owner of the copyright. However, this is not the case if the work is a "work made for hire" for an employer. In that case, the company is considered the author of the work, and owns the copyright. From US Copyright Office Circular 09: If a work is made for hire, an employer is considered the author even if an employee actually created the work. The employer can be a firm, an organization, or an individual. Works are considered to be made for hire in two situations, as described by that circular (emphasis added): a) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment or b) a work specially ordered or commissioned...if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. If no written agreement was signed and no employment relationship existed, then ownership of the copyright to the software would go to the person who wrote it, and they would be able to do anything that a copyright holder could do with a work, including using it however they want or selling it. Do note that this would only apply to software or changes made by the person in this situation. They could not, for example, sell or distribute any other piece of the software written by other people without the copyright holder's permission, even if these pieces are necessary to use the software that this person created. | "Wholly unconnected with your employment" means exactly that. Anything that is not connected to your functions or processes that you use in the course of your employment that your employer would have an interest in either protecting or marketing. Writing a book about software development If you are just a software developer, this would be fine unless you were talking about a process unique to your employer. If you worked in a publishing house that wrote software development books, this would be connected and must be disclosed to your employer. Releasing an open source piece of software not specifically aimed at the industry the company is in Again, this probably fine not to disclose since it would not be something you would develop as part of your employment, or under the umbrella of your company focus market. Release a commercial piece of software not specifically aimed at or competing with the industry the company is in Same as above. Honestly though the best policy is being open. If you come to your company with your idea and tell them that it doesn't have any applications in your industry and would like to develop it in your own time, they would have a much harder leg to stand on in a court case when they finally figured out how to apply it. | It is discrimination. However, it is legal, and generally not grounds for a lawsuit. Discrimination is legal, except when it is based upon certain specific categories, such as race, sex, and religion. For example, it is perfectly legal to discriminate for a position based on the possession of education degrees, skill certification or availability to work specific hours or days of the week. Immigration status (and specifically, needing a H1B sponsor in the future) is not a protected category, and as such it is legal to discriminate against this as a factor. Additionally, there are several downsides for hiring a H1B candidate, and foremost of which is sponsoring someone for an H1B visa is not a sure thing, since the H1B system is run as a lottery; as such, you may not receive a visa or extension, and thus be ineligible to legally work. | IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics. | Yes, your clause specifically limits you to only working for COMPANY, even in your off time. Canada does not have a law protecting your right to work secondary jobs (moonlighting) in your off-duty hours. This means that any contract clause specifically limiting you to work with the employer only is valid, and breaking it is cause for justified dismissal. Based on this, do I need to ask for explicit permission to work on such projects? Yes, you will need to disclose any potential "business or occupation whatsoever". You could play contract games by saying "it's only a hobby" or "it doesn't make any money", but you will be opening yourself up to issues. The best thing to do is to disclose your project to your employer and get in writing their permission to work on it with specific terms that you will not be using company time or resources in any way. See: Patterson V. Bank of Nova Scotia | Quitting before the start date: is the non compete enforceable? The non-compete is unenforceable unless the employer has provided you with material information that you can use to the detriment of the employer. Even in that case, the non-compete as outlined in your description seemingly exceeds the legitimate interests of the employer (see art. 2089 of the Civil Code of Québec). This means that the non-compete clause would be curtailed in court because the employer cannot prove that his business (or market share) encompasses the area depicted in the clause. The reason of being of non-compete clauses is to protect the employer from a potential misuse of information the employee obtained pursuant to his employment, such as trade secrets and information about clients. The fact that you are a fresh graduate suggests that you are dealing with just some typical intermediary who really has no "trade secrets" and who is not providing you with key information, let alone for a job that is scheduled to start five months later. Non-compete clauses that are overly broad contravene public policy in that they would singlehandedly exclude civilians from the labor market and disproportionately impair free trade. | Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job. |
Repercussions of defying the Cookie Law I was wondering what case law is out there on the subject, or, if there is not much, what real repercussions can website owners who defy the Cookie Law expect? Say Bob is not only pissed off by the ostensible (as he thinks) necessity to implement the cookie accept buttons, but, instead of doing that, he is ballsy enough to write this sort of fine print on his website: We will set whatever cookies we want and we won't ever ask your permission. We don't care what you think the law about it is. Take it or leave it (or sue us). How soon would events occur which will make Bob change his mind and give in? What sort of events? I would expect that the likely repercussions would pretty much depend on two factors: Jurisdiction (perhaps the most severe ones would occur in the EU) Popularity of the website (perhaps blog / small forum owners don't need to worry as much as big social network owners) As I think case law on the subject would still be rather scarce, I leave this question jurisdiction-open (please tag your answer accordingly). | european-union (germany, spain, uk) The cookie consent law is the ePrivacy directive, which was implemented as national laws by all EU member states (including, at the time, the UK). Later, GDPR changed the applicable definition of consent so that implicit consent is no longer allowed. A notice in fine print as in the given example is not sufficient to meet this definition of consent, so any non-necessary cookies set in that context would be a violation. But it would be the national ePrivacy implementation that would be violated, not the GDPR. Thus, the GDPR's famous 4%/EUR 20M fines are not relevant here. Instead, each country can set its own fines. In Germany, this would probably be up to EUR 50k (§16 TMG) though German law doesn't implement this aspect of ePrivacy correctly. In the UK, PECR penalties are determined by more general data protection penalty legislation. Notable instances of cookie consent enforcement include the Planet 49 (ECJ judgement, German BGH verdict) case which basically affirmed that yes, the GDPR's definition of consent applies. Thus, any case law regarding GDPR consent is also applicable to the issue of cookies. Furthermore, the Spanish AEPD has issued an interesting fine due to insufficient cookie consent, but due to much more subtle violations than the outright disregard in the given example. E.g. in the Vueling action (decision (Spanish, PDF), summary, listing on enforcementtracker), the Vueling airline's website had a consent banner but ultimately told the user to reject cookies via their browser settings. This violates the requirement that consent must be specific/granular, since the browser settings are all-or-nothing if they're available at all. The airline was fined EUR 30k, the maximum possible under applicable Spanish data protection law. But what kind of risks would some blog run into that just sets cookies without appropriate consent? If the service is outside of the EU, enforcement is difficult. I am not aware of cookie consent enforcement against non-EU services. National data protection authorities can investigate the violation and issue fines, subject to their respective national data protection laws. They generally only do this when there are lots of complaints. Some authorities like the UK ICO have indicated that cookie consent enforcement isn't a priority for them. Independently, individuals can generally sue the service for damages. Some lawyers might send out cease and desist letters to non-compliant websites in the hopes of collecting fees. So aside from the last point, the risk is likely somewhat low, especially for a smaller site. At this point, it is worth reminding that ePrivacy/GDPR doesn't require consent for all cookies, and is not just limited to cookies. It is more generally about access to and storage of information on a user's device, unless that access is strictly necessary to provide the service explicitly requested by the user. Thus, functional cookies can be set without consent. However, consent does become necessary when cookies or similar mechanisms are used for analytics, tracking, or ads. Even though GDPR is involved, the cookie consent requirements apply regardless of whether the cookies involve any personal data. | IANAL. (1) GDPR is certainly relevant. (2) This is certainly "personal data" under the definition in GDPR article 4. (3) Maintaining this data is probably lawful under article 6 sections 1(a) (consent) - provided that the Terms and Conditions of the site make clear that the user by signing up is consenting to this information being held (3) There is certainly an obligation under article 14 to disclose that the information exists, and to say how it used. (4) Article 15 says that data subjects are entitled to see the information and know what recipients or categories of recipient have access to the information (I don't know whether it's enough to just say "moderators", or whether the moderators need to be identified). (5) I can't see any reasons why the obligations under articles 16, 17, and 18 regarding rectification, erasure, and restriction of processing aren't relevant. This is exactly the kind of situation that GDPR is designed to address. If you're restricting the service available to particular users based on a record of their behaviour or on judgements made by moderators, then they absolutely have a right to know, and a right of redress. | We cannot and will not try to answer "what should i do?" questions here. Nothing in the linked page makes me think that the views expressed in the previous question here are any less correct. They certainly have not changed the law on copyright. The linked page is an open forum. Many of the posts o9n that thread express ill-informed and incorrect views of how copyright works, and what it protects. Several google searchs find no trace of the suit described in the thread. Note that in US law no copyright claim may be heard in a small claims court, except for the federal copyright office's small claims tribunal. I am not sure if the same is true in Canada, but it might be that the suit was simply dismissed on such a basis. In any case small claims cases do not establish legal precedents in Canada or the US. Of course it is true that anyone can sue over almost anything, even when there is no valid legal basis for the suit. If the suit had been won by the claimant, or even settled that would be larger grounds for worry. A person seriously worried over publishing a book such as that described in the question might do well to consult a lawyer with relevant expertise. A single consultation plus an opinion letter might not cost very much. But 17 USC 102 (b) is very clear that copyright never protects facts, as are the copyright laws of other countries. Note that reports of the events of sports matches are not protected by copyright, although expressive language and analysis may be. 17 USC 102 (b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Article 2 paragraph (8) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (8) The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. There seems little room for copyright protection of the moves of chess games. | In the US the first amendment protections given to free expression make defamation claims significantly harder to pursue than in some other countries. o-called 'product defamation" claims are generally harder yet. In the case of Dominion Voting Systems some of those sued seem to have made fairly specific allegations, which, if true, would involve probably criminal wrong doing. And please note that none of those suits have yet had a trial on the merits, to the best of my knowledge. We don't know if the statements complained of will be held to be defamatory or protected. Claims that a vaccine is not as safe as it should be, or the regulators were too quick to approve it, are harder to frame as defamatory of the drug companies. Since the government contracted in advance for enough vaccine to give a dose to everyone in the US (as I understand it) damages would be hard to prove. And there would be a risk of a PR backlash. It is not as if any of these companies has tried to file a suit and had it dismissed. They have not chosen to file, for which there could be many reasons. | Is it illegal to ask a company for money in exchange for information on a bug in their software/website? That in itself is legal. Indeed, the company would incur unjust enrichment if it coerced you to disclose your discovery for free. Only if you threatened the company to divulge to others your discovery unless the company pays you, it would be illegal and trigger charges such as extortion (likewise, legislations outlaw the unjustified delivery of programs or instructions for hacking a software/network/etc., although this goes beyond your actual question). Can the company take legal action against me? That seems doubtful, futile, and it could backfire (please note I have not done any research on legal precedents about this). Although the terms and conditions of the website or the End User License Agreement (EULA) of software might prohibit you to reverse engineer (RE)/decompile/etc. the application, anti-RE clauses are unenforceable and the remedies therefor are indeterminate because the sole act of conducting reverse engineering does not subject the company (or third parties) to any losses. The company's decision to take legal action for your discovery could backfire from two standpoints. First, it calls attention to the fact that the software at issue is defective and unsafe. And second, the bug is likely to be detected by someone else anyway, thereby potentially compromising customers' systems. | In the UK, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 includes provisions which are thought to apply to websites, although as far as I know there is no case law on the matter. If a website's use of JavaScript makes it inaccessible to users with some disability, it may fall foul of the DDA. However, there is no law specifically requiring JavaScript-free versions of web pages. | Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive. | Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive. |
Borrow something and return it considered stealing? So I was thinking, if I rode a coworkers bike home and returned it early the next morning before he noticed, is that legally considered stealing? Would this be legally considered stealing in CA? | It wouldn't quite be theft; California theft, like theft in many places following English legal tradition, requires intent to permanently deprive the owner of property. However, it fits section 499b of the Penal Code to a T: 499b. (a) Any person who shall, without the permission of the owner thereof, take any bicycle for the purpose of temporarily using or operating the same, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding four hundred dollars ($400), or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding three months, or by both that fine and imprisonment. | Generally speaking, the police will not return property known to be stolen to someone other than the owner of the property, even if it is illegally seized in a search that violates the 4th Amendment. While stolen property is not strictly speaking, contraband, it also isn't something that the person who would seek its return would be entitled to reclaim. This is particularly true when, in a circumstance like this where the motorcycle's ownership can be confirmed with a VIN number on file with a government agency linking the VIN number to the true owner of the vehicle, so the fact that it is stolen can be confirmed with great certainty. If the police do not return the property voluntarily, which they would not do, the person in possession of it would have to bring a suit for possession against the police who are in possession of it. In the face of a civil lawsuit to regain custody of the property from the police after they failed to return it, the police could insist that the true owner be joined to the action and could also raise the issue of unclean hands or similar defenses. A court filing claiming property known to be stolen by someone who is not the true owner would also provide evidence of the stolen property charge that would probably not be tainted "fruit of the poisonous tree" and instead, would be treated as an independent confession to the crime that was dismissed for lack of evidence after the original seizure under the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule. | I would think that this would be treated the same as lost property. In most places, if you notice lost property (for example because the postman hands it to you) you have the choice of ignoring it (don't touch it, don't accept it from the postman), or you have to make reasonable efforts to find the owner and return it. If you as the sender had no idea who received the package so you cannot contact them, and there was nothing in the package identifying the sender, the receiver would be able to keep the package when their efforts of finding the owner fail. But if you manage to contact them, then the receiver knows the owner, so there is no legal excuse to keep the package. | In general, you cannot contract to do anything illegal. However, ... An argument could be made that permission has been granted to, for example, enter property and remove the item. If permission has been granted, entering property and taking an item is not a crime. | This is a rather elaborate version of receiving stolen property. It is a crime because you know that the property is not yours and you know who it belongs to. The fact that funds were returned mitigates the punishment that might be imposed, but disgorgement of profits as well as principal would be a typical criminal restitution in such a case. A prosecutor could decline to press charges (and often would decline to do so), but would have the authority to do so. An analogous case that comes up more frequently is when an attorney takes client funds out of his trust account (either accidentally or intentionally) and then uses the funds in a way that produces a profit or avoids, for example, a late payment penalty, and then returns the funds improperly withdrawn from the trust account. This is still conduct for which attorneys are routinely disbarred and prosecuted criminally. Even if the person didn't know that the money belonged to someone else when it was used, the true owner of the money could sue for unjust enrichment for both the funds and the proceeds from the funds. For example, if funds were accidentally deposited in your bank account rather than the correct one due to a transposition of numbers in the account number, and you didn't notice this error, you would have liability to return not just the accidentally deposited funds, but also the profits from those funds, because both would be unjust enrichment. But, in an accidental case where there was no knowledge that the funds were wrongfully placed in your account, you could deduct from the amount to be returned any banking charges you incurred with respect to the transactions and it would not be a crime. | While it is not illegal to own, it may still be illegal to ride on public property. Private property owners can ban them even if they were legal and need to be consulted individually. I have been unable to find out if new laws spoken about have been passed in New York since the beginning of the year. Based on what I have found (as of the end of 2015), it would be best to consider that they are illegal to use on public areas just as any other unlicensed motor vehicle. As of November 2015 Some property owners have banned them for liability reasons, as it is easy to see how a rider could trip on a bump or unexpected curb. And although they have taken the Upper East Side and other parts of New York City by storm, the state classifies them as motorized vehicles that cannot be registered, so riding them in public can incur a steep fine. Earlier this week, the NYPD's 26th Precinct tweeted: "Be advised that the electric hoverboard is illegal as per NYC Admin. Code 19-176.2*." and December 2015 some lawmakers were talking about making them legal. Truth or Fiction Collected on: 12/28/2015 gives the following summary A spokesperson for the New York City Department of Transportation has explained that the law’s definition of “electronic personal assist mobility device” was broad enough to include hoverboards, and that they would be regulated as such. In NYC, because the population is above 1 million people, electronic personal assist device riders must be licensed, and the devices must be registered with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. Hoverboards are illegal, the spokesperson said, because the NYSDMV would refuse to register them for legal use: NYSDMV’s position is that these vehicles are likely “Electric personal assist mobility devices.” NYS Vehicle and Traffic Law 114-d defines “Electric personal assist mobility device” as “Every self-balancing, two non-tandem wheeled device designed to transport one person by means of an electric propulsion system with an average output of not more than seven hundred fifty watts (one horsepower), and the maximum speed of which on a paved level surface, when propelled solely by its electric propulsion system while ridden by an operator weighing one hundred seventy pounds, is less than twelve and one-half miles per hour.” NYS VTL 125 generally defines “motor vehicles” as “Every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power.” However, VTL 125 specifically excludes some classes of vehicles from the definition of “motor vehicles.” Under VTL 126(a-1), “electrical personal assistive mobility devices operated outside a city with a population of one million or more” are not considered motor vehicles. However, in NYC, because the city population is greater than one million, NYSDMV considers “hoverboards” that meet the definition of “electric personal assist mobility devices” the same as motor vehicles. Based on that interpretation, it would be illegal to operate a hoverboard in NYC without a valid license to drive a motor vehicle. Beyond that, the motor vehicle would need to be registered by NYSDMV (which NYSDMV will not do), inspected, insured, and otherwise treated as, and subject to regulation like, any other motor vehicle. A person who operates a hoverboard in NYC (or any other NYS city with a population greater than a million) would be subject to arrest and prosecution for myriad NYS VTL violations, including, but not limited to, driving a motor vehicle without valid registration or insurance. | Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure. | The problem with these situations is that you don't get to choose how it goes once it's in the hands of law enforcement. Possible scenarios on bringing a complaint to police or prosecutors: "So you guys had a dispute, but everyone's OK now. We're not pursuing this; we have more important things to do." "Hmm ... that could have gotten ugly. We'll do an investigation and check the records of both you and the bus driver to see if either of you have any priors." "We're trying to make this a more bike-friendly city. And we're cracking down on CDLs especially. Thanks, we'll investigate that driver." "Thanks for the evidence. You're going to get charged with criminal mischief, and the bus driver is going to get charged with assault." Of course, you could also send a complaint to the bus company. They are (hopefully) more likely to worry about what their drivers are doing. The DoT is also concerned with CDL safety, so you can file a complaint with the FMCSA NCCDB. |
Does 18 USC 1542 contain a materiality requirement? 18 USC 1542: Whoever willfully and knowingly makes any false statement in an application for passport with intent to induce or secure the issuance of a passport under the authority of the United States, either for his own use or the use of another, contrary to the laws regulating the issuance of passports or the rules prescribed pursuant to such laws; or Whoever willfully and knowingly uses or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any passport the issue of which was secured in any way by reason of any false statement— Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both. 18 USC 1425: (a) Whoever knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary or other evidence of naturalization or of citizenship; or (b) Whoever, whether for himself or another person not entitled thereto, knowingly issues, procures or obtains or applies for or otherwise attempts to procure or obtain naturalization, or citizenship, or a declaration of intention to become a citizen, or a certificate of arrival or any certificate or evidence of nationalization or citizenship, documentary or otherwise, or duplicates or copies of any of the foregoing— Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both. Neither section addresses false statements explicitly, but courts have found that 1425 has a materiality requirement, namely that immaterial false statements do not violate the statute (see US v. Alferahin). Is it safe to say that a similar analysis would apply to section 1542? Has any court ruled explicitly on this question? | See United States v. Hart, 291 F.3d 1084: This appeal presents the question whether materiality is an element of the crime of making a false statement in an application for a United States passport in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542. We have implicitly indicated that it is not, see United States v. Suarez-Rosario, 237 F.3d 1164, 1167(9th Cir. 2001), and now explicitly hold that proof of materiality is not required for this "false statement" offense. There is, explicitly, no materiality requirement. See also US v. Ramos, 725 F.2d 1322: Properly applied § 1001 requires proof that the false statement be of a material fact, see United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1980), an element not needed for § 1542 where "any false statement" is sufficient. See Neder v. US, 527 U.S. 1 for SCOTUS-level analysis of reading materiality requirements into statutes that don't explicitly impose them. | Note that "pedophilia" is a psycological or social term, and not a legal term. What laws prohibit is the creation, distribution, and possession of child pronography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. This means that there is no offense if no real child is involved, and this is also true of the various other US laws on child porn. Since the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) erotica which appear to depict a minor engaging in sexual activity, but which are not depictions of any actual child are protected speech under the US First Amendment and are therefor not criminal. So called "furry cub porn" might include modified images of actual minors, in which case it would seem to be covered under US laws against child porn. But if the character is totally invented, or is based on an adult rather than a minor, then it would seem to come under the rule of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Note, the law in other countries is significantly different. In particular in the UK a realistic drawing may be considered to be a "pesudo-photograph" even if not based on an actual person, and may be punishable in the same way as an actual photo of an actual minor. Note also, the making, distribution, or posse ion of 'child porn' is a very serious criminal offense. I am not a lawyer, and one should not rely on this post to determine what acts are and are not legally safe. If there is any question, consult a lawyer. Note also that under the above statute (18 U.S.C. § 2251), something may be "child pornography" if the person involved is a minor, even if that person is old enough under local law to consent to sexual activity, and even if the person did in fact so consent, and even if there was no intent to distribute the image or video. So a person taking, say, a cell-phone video of him- or herself having sex with a 17-year-old, intended for personal watching only, in a state where the age of consent to sex is 16, can still be found guilty under this law, and such cases have occurred. | According to USCIS Adjudicator's Field Manual chapter 40.9.2(b)(1)(C)(ii) (on page 73-74 of this PDF), it seems that unlawful presence began to accrue when your 2-year green card expired: The alien begins to accrue unlawful presence as of the date of the second anniversary of the alien’s lawful admission for permanent residence. See id . Also, failure to appear for the personal interview that may be required by USCIS in relation to the Form I-751 or I-829 petition results in the automatic termination of the conditional legal permanent resident status, unless the parties establish good cause for the failure to appear. In chapter 40.9.2(b)(1)(C)(iii) (on page 74), it says that if you make a late filing of Removal of Conditions and it is approved, you are deemed to not have accrued unlawful presence, but if it is denied, you are still considered to have accrued unlawful presence from the expiration of your 2 years. If the late filed petition is accepted and approved, no unlawful presence time will be deemed to have accrued. [...] If, however, the late filing is rejected, the alien begins to accrue unlawful presence time on the date his or her status as a conditional resident automatically terminated. | The linked news story says that the journalist was detailed as a material witness. according to 18 USC § 3144 If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person ... Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. No specific time seems to be specified for which detention is allowed. What a court would consider "reasonable" would no doubt depend on the specific circumstances. | The Supreme Court rules in US v. Wong Kim Ark ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment, which states All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside It is not disputed that said areas are "in the United States". The court found that "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" is intended to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the national government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases,—children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state neither of which are the case in your scenario. Technically, the child is not "eligible" for citizenship, the child has US citizenship, it is just a matter of getting a government official to recognize it (e.g. in issuing a passport). | The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation does not list the digital nature of the evidence as an aggravating circumstance for sentencing / punishment. Rather, it lists: a. repeated commission of crimes; recidivism of offences; b. grave consequences of the commission of a crime; c. commission of a crime by a group of persons or a group of persons as a result of a preliminary conspiracy, by an organized group, or by a criminal community (criminal organization); d. especially active role played in the commission of a crime; e. involvement in the commission of the crime of the persons who suffer from heavy mental derangement or who are in a state of intoxication, or of persons who have not attained the age of criminal responsibility; f. commission of a crime by reason of national, racial, or religious hatred or enmity, out of revenge for the lawful actions of other persons, or with the purpose of concealing or facilitating another crime; g. commission of a crime against a person or his relatives in connection with his official activity or the discharge of his public duty; h. commission of a crime against a woman who is obviously in a state of pregnancy, or against a minor, another defenseless or helpless person, or a person who is dependent on the guilty person; i. commission of a crime with especial brutality, sadism, or mockery, or involving torments for the victim; j. commission of a crime with the use of weapons, ammunition, explosives, fake explosives, specially manufactured technical means, poisonous or radioactive substances, medicinal or other chemical and pharmacological preparations, or with the use of physical or mental compulsion; k. commission of a crime during a state of emergency, natural or social disaster, or during mass disturbances; l. commission of a crime, abusing confidence placed in the guilty person through his official position, or through a contract; m. commission of a crime with the use of uniforms or documents of representatives of the authorities. As a practical matter, this makes sense. Facts are determined based on evidence. If the evidence considered in the totality of the case, gets the finder of fact to a particular conclusion, it should not matter any further what the nature of that evidence was. I also see no logical or practical distinction between, for example, evidence of an act of murder captured by digital camera and that same evidence captured on cinematographic film. | At the federal level, per 18 USC 751, escaping is a crime. In United States v. Allen, 432 F.2d 939 it was held that an arrest need not be lawful in order for an escape to be illegal; Laws v. US states that "This court has said that a sentence imposed for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751 is 'not affected by the validity of the sentences being served at the time of the escape'", giving numerous citations. I don't find cases where the escapee was exonerated; prosecutors have the discretion to not prosecute for committing a crime, so it would be hard to find a case where the legality of such a conviction was upheld (also, hard to find a jury willing to convict in such circumstances). | The way "with intent to lose citizenship" works in US law is extremely demanding; it is very hard to establish it by doing anything short of appearing before a consular officer and formally renouncing citizenship. Other ways include serving in the military of a country at war with the US, being convicted of treason for committing one of the specified potentially expatriating acts (serving in an army at war with the US is sort of a trial-less special case of that, because engaging in a war against the US is treason), or serving in a "policy-level position" in a foreign government. The State Department says as much in the link. Obtaining citizenship is listed as a case where the administrative premise applies; so is swearing allegiance to a foreign state, serving in the military of a state at peace with the US, and serving in lower-level government posts of a foreign state. In those cases, the person retains US citizenship but at some point in the future may be asked by the State Department if they wanted to renounce it. Intent to renounce citizenship is established only by explicit declaration if you've only obtained citizenship in another country. With "policy-level posts" the premise doesn't apply, but then the State Department just decides on a case-by-case basis. You may well lose US citizenship (although the King of Thailand was born in the US, and I'm not sure if he's considered to have lost citizenship), but it's not automatic. Your senior ministers may lose citizenship, but it is likewise not automatic. But the normal citizens? The link explicitly says that the administrative premise covers that. |
How are cryptocurrencies not illegal by the US Constitution? The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8 reads in part, The Congress shall have Power To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin. From this passage, I understand that only Congress has the power to create and regulate currency (a means of payment and a store of value) in the United States. Congress may also delegate some or all parts of this power, which they have done in favor of the Federal Reserve. By that understanding, any instrument used as a means of payment and a store of value not produced by Congress or under Congressional mandate violates Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. A recent example of such a violation is the Liberty Dollar, a privately minted coinage distributed and redeemable within the United States and backed by precious metals. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies? | The Constitution only regulates the powers of the government; it doesn't directly say what the people can and can't do. In particular, it doesn't say directly that nobody except Congress can coin money. However, it does give the government the power to make laws, which are binding on the population. So Congress possibly could make a law forbidding cryptocurrencies, or at least regulating them, under the "regulating the value thereof" clause. However, they haven't done so. In the case of the Liberty Dollar, there are some specific laws that apply. They were convicted of violating 18 USC 485, which forbids the making of physical gold or silver coins that resemble US or foreign money, and 18 USC 486, which forbids creating or passing any physical metal coins as money (as well as other conspiracy charges, aiding and abetting, etc). None of these laws apply to cryptocurrency because they are not physical metal coins. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? The power to regulate includes the power to not regulate. As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies? In a free society, "everything is permitted that is not forbidden". We don't need a law specifically allowing the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies; it's sufficient that there is no law that forbids it. | Yes. In Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 17-24500-CIV-KING/SIMONTON, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100720 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2018), the plaintiff brought class-action securities claims against the developers of a cryptocurrency app. The defendant sought to force the plaintiff into arbitration instead of litigation, but the court held that the smart contract through which the plaintiff had purchased the defendant's cryptocurrency did not require arbitration. | See Article VI of the Constitution: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. This seems to me that it pretty clearly establishes the Constitution as taking the place of any previous laws. In particular, Article XI of the Articles is in conflict with Article IV Section 3 of the Constitution ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union"). The Constitution says that Congress's action is required to create a new state, and doesn't mention any exceptions. The Constitution's terms presumably take precedence. If Canada wanted to become a state, it would have to be admitted by Congress under Article IV Section 3. | If I was sued and had to pay a debt to someone in court, could I use my commemorative coins to pay off part of the debt? Yes, in to a court. As per your quoted section from the Royal Mint's Legal Tender Guidelines: ... a debtor cannot successfully be sued for non-payment if he pays into court in legal tender. And further down it says: We receive a lot of enquiries about our popular silver commemorative coins (including £5 crowns, £20, £50 and £100 coins) and their legal tender status. Each issue is authorised by Royal Proclamation in accordance with the requirements laid down by the Coinage Act 1971. This means that in common with coins in general circulation these coins have legal tender status. [my emphasis] | See Golan v. Holder 565 U. S. ____ (2012). The question was whether Congress could pass a law that caused works in the public domain to regain copyright. The Supreme Court held that: The text of the Copyright Clause does not exclude application of copyright protection to works in the public domain. ... Historical practice corroborates the Court’s reading of the Copyright Clause to permit the protection of previously unprotected works. So, yes, works can come out of public domain and into Copyright protection. What about people who had been relying on the works not having copyright (i.e. people who had created derivative works, etc.)? That depends on how Congress intends the hypothetical law to apply to them. In the law in question in Golan v. Holder, Congress planned ahead for this, and included provisions for it in the law (quoting from Golan v. Holder): Reliance parties may continue to exploit a restored work until the owner of the restored copyright gives notice of intent to enforce—either by filing with the U. S. Copyright Office within two years of restoration, or by actually notifying the reliance party. After that, reliance parties may continue to exploit existing copies for a grace period of one year. Finally, anyone who, before the URAA’s enactment, created a “derivative work” based on a restored work may indefinitely exploit the derivation upon payment to the copyright holder of “reasonable compensation,” to be set by a district judge if the parties cannot agree. Last, could Congress extend copyright for 10,000 years? In principle, the Supreme Court has not said anything against this, but they have indicated that there is some line beyond which a copyright term would no longer be considered a "limited time" as required by the Constitution. In Golan v. Holder they mention in passing hypothetical successive re-applications of Copyright to a work after it expires, calling it "legislative misbehavior": the hypothetical legislative misbehavior petitioners posit is far afield from the case before us. And in Eldred v. Ashcroft, they mention in passing hypothetical unlimited successive extensions of copyright, each of limited time, again calling that "legislative misbehavior": Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress could evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together an unlimited number of "limited Times," the court stated that such legislative misbehavior clearly was not before it. I could imagine a court holding that the "limited times" clause in the Constitution does not permit Congress to extend copyright for 10,000 years, which is longer than the existence of the U.S. or any countries or even civilizations that the founders were aware of at the time of the Constitution's writing. | The authority for the ban is laid out here: all that is required is putting the company on the Commerce Department's entity list. More specifically, under 50 USC 1701 there must be an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat If that condition is satisfied (and it has been: we have the emergency), then 50 USC 1702 grants POTUS broad economic powers, including prohibiting transactions in foreign exchange, or any kind of transaction involving any right regarding any property. Under that order, one implementational step for putting a company on the list is an executive review involving the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Trade Representative, the Director of National Intelligence, the Administrator of General Services, the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and, as appropriate, the heads of other executive departments and agencies There must be a determination that the transaction involves information and communications technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary and that the transaction "is a threat". This last requirement is the tallest hurdle that a Twitter-ban would face, namely establishing that Twitter is controlled by a foreign adversary. | Prompted by this recent similar question, I've revisited this question and deleted my original answer as it was completely off the mark. This is its replacement. It is illegal, and it turns out to be an international standard in the Berne Convention. Article 16 in full: (1) Infringing copies of a work shall be liable to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to reproductions coming from a country where the work is not protected, or has ceased to be protected. (3) The seizure shall take place in accordance with the legislation of each country. Your scenario falls squarely within point (2) and the imported George Orwell book is to be treated as an infringing copy within the UK. The implementing UK legislation for (2) can be found in Section 27(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. | There are a number of issues here. The question mentions: Taxes, which I presume must be authorized and regulated by the US Constitution, but I don't know the details Not exactly. The states existed before the Federal government. They are not created by the Federal Constitution, nor authorized by it. A number of restrictions on state powers and actions are specified by the Federal Constitution, and a number of others are imposed by Federal law. (the Federal courts have found implied restrictions beyond the explicitly stated ones.) But there is no Federal provision granting states the power to impose taxes, only restrictions on that pre-existing power. States cannot impose taxes so as to violate rights federally guaranteed, or to place unreasonable burdens on the exercise of those rights. For example, states cannot impose different taxes or tax rates on a racial basis. States cannot impose different taxes on residents of other states temporarily present in, or doing business in the state. States cannot impose different taxes on people newly moved there from other states, compared to long-established residents. State taxes must not violate the Equal Protection clause. However, states may choose the type and amount of taxes to impose. They can use sales tax, VAT tax, property tax, income tax, excise tax, flat tax, or any combination that their legislatures pass. Different taxes may be imposed on different professions or kinds of businesses. Does the US Constitution guarantee all citizens have the natural right to conduct their own business affairs? Not as such, no. The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses limit to some extent the ability of a state to prohibit a particular business on a whim. But when a state asserts that a particular business is harmful, and demonstrates a plausible basis for that view, so that the law passes "Rational basis" review, the state can prohibit it, or heavily regulate it, or license it. If so, does a citizen lose the right to legally own and operate a business if they cannot afford requisite state or local business license fees? A state may require a license to engage in a particular occupation, and may require a fee, one-time or recurring, high or low, for that license. In addition, a tax may be imposed on those in a particular business or profession, which is not imposed on other kinds of business. For example, in many states, lawyers must pay an annual license fee, or they are not allowed to practice. So must many other regulated professions, such as hairstylist. One who cannot afford the fee may not engage in the business or profession. The state may waive or reduce fees for those too poor to afford them, but need not do so, and many states do not so so. Similarly, the state may charge a fee for a driver's license, and one who cannot pay it may not legally drive. Likewise, does a citizen lose the right to utilize the court system to petition for a redress of grievances, if they cannot afford the requisite court fees? Many states have provisions waiving or lowering court fees for those who cannot afford them, but in most cases this is applied only in severe cases, say where a person would have to go without food to afford court fees. There have been a few federal cases requiring fee waivers for those who cannot afford court fees, mostly in connection with criminal defendants. There is not currently a general federal rule requiring court access for those who cannot afford court fees. Perhaps there should be. A case could be made that Equal Protection requires this, but Federal Courts have not so held. Federal courts have held that holding people in jail or prison because they truly cannot afford fines, bail, or court fees is an unconstitutional denial of Equal Protection. But states need not waive such fees; they can be deferred and charged should the person earn enough money to (just barely) afford them. Even this rule is not yet invariably enforced, and many state courts routinely ignore it. By the way "petition for a redress of grievances" doe snot normally refer to bringing a court case, but to asking a legislature to change a law, or asking an administrator or executive to exercise permitted discretion in a particular way. And lastly, if a citizen is convicted of a crime or infraction, and the sentence requires the convict to utilize government services (e.g. prison services, probation services, registration services, etc.); under the US Constitution, can state government agencies providing these services legally require the convict to pay fees for these services (e.g. prison service fees, probation service fees, registration service fees), if these fees were not explicitly included in the sentence as fines? Yes it can impose such fees, but usually only when neither the convict nor his or her dependents will be impoverished by such fees, as I understand it. If a state attempts to pass or enforce state legislation dictating such fees, should this legislation generally be struck down as unconstitutional? Such laws will not be held unconstitutional by US Federal courts under the Federal Constitution, unless they are found to violate Equal Protection, Due Process, or other specifically imposed restrictions on the state. For example, fees which were in practice imposed on people of one religion, but not those of another, would be struck down. But a fee imposed on everyone will not usually be overturned. "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to steal bread from shops, beg in the streets, and sleep under bridges." -Anatole France |
Are there exceptions to the "reasonable person" standard? In Dominion v. Sidney Powell, the defense has invoked the reasonable person standard. It is my understanding that Powell's First Amendment right is not tested as the plaintiff is Dominion Voting Systems and not the government. Assume Dominion has actually suffered quantifiable damages (loss of business), caused by the Powell assertions. If plaintiff were to assert that Powell's statements were the extremist "dog whistle" that summoned unreasonable persons to cause said damages: How, if in any way, does the defense's reasonable person standard shield Powell? IANAL | Some simplified points of basic defamation law as background: A critical element of defamation law is that the defendant said something false. You therefore can't win a defamation case if it's based on a statement that can't be proven false: "You are annoying." "You are ugly." "You are a bad lawyer." If a statement can't be proven false, it is considered opinion. Statments of opinion are virtually always protected by the First Amendment. Powell's brief relies on this framework to argue that because her statements were statements of opinion, no defamation could have occurred. It's like defending against a murder charge by saying that no one died. Although it isn't generally referred to as the "reasonable person standard," reasonableness comes into this question because part of the calculus in assessing whether a statement is fact or opinion is to ask whether a reasonable person would understand the statement to be making an assertion of fact. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). By leaning into that language, Powell is not saying that reasonable people would not have any reaction or would not have any specific reaction to her statements; instead, she is saying that reasonable people would not have understood her statements to be assertions of fact. Her argument seems to turn on the fact that she was speaking as an attorney representing a political candidate in a lawsuit, and that reasonable people understand statements made in that context to be "inherently prone to exaggeration and hyperbole” and "view them only as claims that await testing by the courts through the adversary process." For what it's worth, that seems to me like a pretty weak argument. While people expect a certain amount of puffery from their candidates, they also expect that lawyers representing the President of the United States aren't going into court with frivolous allegations. More importantly, though, I think she's running the analysis incorrectly. Rather than asking whether a reasonable person would understand her statements to assertions of fact, she's asking whether a reasonable person would think that she was prone to exaggerate in the setting in which she made those statements. As I understand it, a speaker cannot cloak statements of fact from liability by merely refraining from uttering them until she finds herself in a context where people expect some amount of loose speech. Even if you're a partisan hack with no credibility appearing on a TV show hosted by another partisan hack with no credibility, you generally can't accuse your opponent of being a murderer or child molester or something like that. Those are still assertions of fact, even if they're bookended with statements that "Donald Trump is the greatest president this country will ever have." The brief does not rely at all on Hustler or the First Amendment protections for parody that were discussed in the previous answer. These tests are closely related, however, as both defenses claim that the speech was not "false" in the relevant sense. | A lawyer is obligated to accurately state the law as stated in the jury instructions in closing argument (and also not to make a clear and deliberate misstatement of the facts presented at trials, and also not to express personal knowledge of the facts based upon anything other than what the jury has seen). But a certain amount of poetic license is allowed so long as the closing argument is not so misleading, as a whole, that it is likely to lead the jury astray. In this case, the prosecutor is alluding, with poetic license, to the idea that an aggressor or interloper can't assert self-defense. You can't "look for trouble" and then be shielded by that doctrine. A more full quote from that prosecutor makes that more clear: you lose the right to self-defence when you’re the one who brought the gun, when you’re the one creating the danger, when you’re the one provoking other people I have no opinion concerning whether his statement does or does not cross the line. I'm not sufficiently immersed in the case, and don't have enough context from having heard the closing arguments as a whole, to have a confident opinion on that point. If there is an acquittal we'll never know. If there is a conviction and appeal and this is an issue raised on appeal, we might find out. Opposing counsel has a right to object in closing argument if it goes too far, and appealing an argument that a closing argument is objectionable is challenging unless it is preserved with a timely objection at the time. Particularly if the prosecution makes a misstatement in their initial closing, rebutting it in the defense closing may be more effective than objecting. But, if the prosecutor makes a misstatement in a rebuttal period to which the defense can't offer a corrective statement, an objection may be wise in order to preserve an issue for appeal. | In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment "standing"1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term "standing" in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis. | Ultimately this raises a question of balancing two fundamental rights: The right of the accused to a fair trial within due process of law & the right to freedom of expression (or in the case of press publications as in most of the cases cited by this answer, the very related freedom of the press). Both the US & Canada safeguard these rights in their constitutions (Amendments I, V, XIV & Charter ss. 2(b), 11(d) respectively) so any differences would be in their approaches to balancing these rights. United States I've found Some Aspects of the Law of Contempt of Court in Canada, England, and the United States (Jacob S. Ziegel, 1960) to be highly informative on the historical development of contempt of court and provided a good baseline understanding. In reference to Bridges v. California 314 U.S. 252 (1941), it states Although the Court recognized that "free speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization" and that "it would be a trying task to choose between them", it held nevertheless that an abridgment on the freedom of the press was only permitted by the Constitution when there was "a clear and present danger" that the offending publication would actually interfere with a fair and impartial trial. The majority opinion rejected the "reasonable tendency" test which had been applied by the lower courts, and still is the yardstick by which such publications are measured in England and Canada. I'd also like to quote the following paragraph from Bridges as it raises two points I'd like to comment on: What finally emerges from the "clear and present danger" cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious, and the degree of imminence extremely high, before utterances can be punished. Those cases do not purport to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow. The first point is that due to its broad language, the court gives a certain priority to the First Amendment. The second point involves the age of my citations: the "clear and present danger" test is from Schenck v. United States, largely considered to be overruled by the more stringent Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969) "immediate lawless action" test. This does raise the question of whether Bridges can then be considered good law. I unfortunately can't find any good references discussing Bridges in a post-Brandenburg context, however, I would argue it is still valid. While the Schenck test has been overruled, the Bridges citation I gave in fact foreshadows the Brandenburg test by using the language of "imminence" and stating the Schenck test was not necessarily the limit of the First Amendment, but just a minimum bar. I would then argue that Bridges can quite easily be considered good law by simply substituting the Schenck test with the Brandenburg one without really affecting the court's ratio decidendi. Canada Ziegel's article is even more out-of-date when it comes to Canada as it is pre-Charter. For a modern Canadian overview of out-of-court contempt of court I've found A Comment on "No Comment": The Sub Judice Rule and the Accountability of Public Officials in the 21st Century (Lorne Sossin & Valerie Crystal, 2013). The article cites Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. [1994] 3 SCR 835 as directly tackling the balance of these rights. In it the court acknowledged the pre-Charter common law of giving deference to the accused's right to a fair trial, but noting that the Charter now requires a balancing of these rights The traditional common law rule governing publication bans -- that there be a real and substantial risk of interference with the right to a fair trial -- emphasized the right to a fair trial over the free expression interests of those affected by the ban and, in the context of post-Charter Canadian society, does not provide sufficient protection for freedom of expression. When two protected rights come into conflict, Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that fully respects the importance of both rights. A hierarchical approach to rights must be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the common law. The common law rule governing publication bans must thus be reformulated in a manner that reflects the principles of the Charter and, in particular, the equal status given by the Charter to ss. 2(b) and 11(d). Ultimately, the court concluded that a balance of these rights was the following test: A publication ban should only be ordered when: (a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. While Dagenais more clearly explains the balancing of these two rights, the article also cites R. v. Vermette [1988] 1 SCR 985 which is a much more similar situation to Maxine Waters commenting on an ongoing trial. The article summarizes as follows: While the trial was ongoing, the premier of Quebec, René Lévesque, denounced one of the defence witnesses in the National Assembly, despite warnings by the Speaker that such comments would be prejudicial to the accused. The trial decision even contains the following comment from the judge: When speaking in the National Assembly, however, the Premier enjoyed the privilege of Parliamentary immunity. Had it not been for this immunity, he could have been cited for contempt of court. Comparison At a constitutional level, it can be seen that the balancing of these two rights are not the same in the US and Canada. The US gives much greater weight to freedom of speech, while Canada allows restriction of speech if doing so more greatly benefits another Charter right and there is no reasonable alternative. On a practical level, there are also differences in how jury trials are run, maybe even as a direct result of the constitutional differences. In Dagenais, the court quotes the following: Generally speaking, however, the approach taken in the United States seems to be to allow for the widest possible latitude in media reporting of events transpiring prior to and during the course of the trial of an accused person. This is counterbalanced, in the interests of ensuring an impartial and unbiased jury, in a number of ways including, during the jury selection process, by an often searching examination into the attitudes, biases and even the personal and financial affairs of potential jurors and, after the jury selection process has been completed, by the sequestration of the members of the jury while the trial is in progress to reduce the risk of their exposure to the media and other publicity generated by it. In Canada, by contrast, the process of jury selection is neither as prolonged nor as exhaustive as a general rule; indeed the kind of questioning and probing into the affairs of potential jurors that is sometimes seen in the United States would be unlikely to be permitted under our system. Moreover, in Canada the sequestration of jurors throughout a trial occurs only exceptionally. The strong bias of our system is to prevent the dissemination before the conclusion of the trial of media publicity that might be prejudicial to the accused's fair trial. The US & Canada simply follow different constitutional approaches here and have slightly different priorities when it comes to balancing rights. | I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire! | If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear. | Of course it is protected by the first amendment. Everyone in the US is protected by the first amendment. It's possible that some statements published on the site might fall afoul of any of the well established exceptions to first amendment protection, but in general the site is protected. | How is banning such events constitutional with the freedom of assembly? The rights created by the First Amendment are not absolute. They are subject to reasonable restrictions as to time, place and manner, especially if those restrictions are content neutral. Restrictions narrowly tailored to protect against genuine threats public health and safety fall within the exception of the First Amendment even if they are not strictly content neutral, that is commonly described by the rubric that you don't have a right to falsely cry "fire" in a crowded theater (causing a riot that could harm people). For example, suppose that a rope bridge over a deep gorge can only support the weight of ten people, and three dozen people want to hold a protest there. A regulation that prohibited more than ten people from engaging in the protest would be constitutional. Even then, however, a lack of content neutrality (e.g., restricting punishment to false statements likely to incite a riot) can't also be a lack of ideological neutrality (e.g. restricting punishment to anti-Catholic but not anti-Jewish statements likely to incite a riot). If it were a political protest/gathering would this change? Generally speaking political protest/gatherings are still subject to content neutral regulations of time, place or manner, and those narrowly tailored to protect genuine threats public health and safety. So, for example, if there is a genuine COVID-19 risk that public health officials are trying to address, and the regulation of gatherings is not viewpoint or content based, it would be upheld as constitutional in the face of a First Amendment freedom of assembly limitation. But, if the regulation applied, for example, only to Republican and not Democratic party protests or gatherings, which is a viewpoint or content based restriction, it would not survive a First Amendment freedom of assembly challenge. |
Can a copyright holder legally remove another holder from license copyright, then expand it to all contributors? The original author of a MIT-licensed project "merged" a large set of changes I authored, which included an addition of my name to the copyright line of the license. Later on, the original author removed my name, because we had a disagreement and he decided my name shouldn't be there since he never explicitly authorized the addition. The catch is that, although he removed my name, he added "all contributors" to the copyright line. Is the removal of my name legal? edit: I should also note that the original author acknowledged me as co-author of the project after my large contribution (I have historical proof of this). | The MIT License (as distributed by OSI) does not include an attribution requirement beyond the requirement to include the copyright notice in any re-distributed copy including derivative works. The same is true of the description of the license as described in the Wikipedia article. If you sent back to the maintainer a modified version including your own contributions with an MIT license notice and your name in the copyright statement, that is a new work released under that license. The maintainer (or anyone else) may not lawfully use your work or incorporate it into a new derived work without complying with the license terms, which require retaining the copyright notice. By distributing the combined work using a copyright notice not including your name, it would seem that your license is being violated. You could contact the maintainer with a request that your name be included in the notice or your contributions be removed. If that is not accepted, you could use a take-down notice, or file suit. That last would involve significant costs, of course. | It is certainly possible to transfer a copyright or other IP without an explicit charge, indeed it can be a pure gift, and normally would be when it is left by will, as is common enough. From a paid consultant it might be clearer to include a statement that the transfer is part of the consulting assignment, rather than putting a price of zero in a blank. But one could instead convey a permanent non-exclusive license, granting permission to use or modify the work in any way desired, ans saying that this is provided as part of the consulting process. Then there would be no question of what rights the consultant retained, or that the same or a very similar solution could be provided to different clients. Indeed such a license would not be so very different from a CC-BY license, or any of several open source licenses, although I would not use one of those by name. But the legal effect would be much the same, and the wording could be similar. Otherwise there could be a later claim that the right transferred precluded the consultant from using the same solution for other clients. Even if such a claim was not legally sound, and was not upheld, it could be a distraction and costly of time and energy at least. | In general, unless the license contains a clause which allows it to be modified at a later date through some defined means (publication, revocation of existing license etc) then you are free to continue to use the existing version of the software under the original license terms. So make sure you pin your versions! Look out for clauses such as exists in the GPL which allow the recipient of the distributed binary or code to choose what version of the GPL to apply if the original author does not state (GPLv2 Clause 9) as they then allow recipients to bind you, the distributor, to versions you might not agree with (eg the switch to GPLv3 with its patents clauses). | The vendor has available the DMCA safe harbor provisions if you decides to infringe someone else's book – the copyright owner notifies them that they don't have the copyright holder's permission, so they take the book down (independently the copyright owner sues you for infringement). There is a complicated procedure where they contact Amazon, Amazon tell you you've been accused of infringement and they take it down, they you can counter-claim that you have the right to distribute the book, then the owner files a suit against you). If Amazon doesn't comply with the DMCA formalities, they can be sued for contributory infringement. However: the copyright owner is the only person empowered to legally object – simply asserting that a book is "not in the public domain" carries no legal weight. If you are the copyright holder, but someone doesn't like what they can say, they can't do anything about it legally unless what you wrote is defamatory or is "illegal for you to publish" (you publish a fact that you cannot publish under a non-disclosure agreement; it constitutes a gross invasion of privacy...). The "whatever reason" matters very much. The consequence for you is that you will get sues and have to pay a bunch of money, plus the court will probably prevent any further distribution of the book. There are other sanctions in France, which I don't address here, for instance there are laws against publishing racist insults in France that don't exist in the US. | I'm assuming that you are not seeking to change the license, and so it will remain GPLv3. As long as you've built on the original software, that license still applies. You also need to keep the previous copyright notices, including the names of the original people. Assuming that, everything you're doing is legal, which is what's on topic here. There is some etiquette around forks (which is what you're doing), which would be on topic at the Open Source Stack Exchange. I'm puzzled by your desire to have a different license text. You can't change the license from GPLv3, so that has to stay the same. (If the original has GPLv3 "or, at your option, any later version", you can drop the any other version text if you like.) | Course assignments, like practically every other piece of written content created in the past 100 years or so, are copyrighted. You cannot copy or redistribute them without the permission of the copyright holder. In most cases that would be the course instructor, but it could also be the university, or the publisher of a commercial book or other resource where the questions came from. The instructor might be happy to give you permission if you ask - many professors would be pleased to have their creations reach a wider audience. In any case, it is perfectly legal to talk about the assignment you were given, as long as you do not copy or replicate the text of the assignment itself. Reading it verbatim or with trivial alterations would be a problem, but describing it completely in your own words doesn't infringe copyright. A separate issue is what is allowed by your university rules. University rules aren't laws, but you can still be punished academically if you break them (grade penalties, suspension, expulsion, etc). The university might have a policy against sharing, or even discussing, assignments without permission. This might include forbidding actions that the law itself allows. In particular, they might forbid you from talking about your solutions to the assignments, which copyright law would have no problem with (your solution is your own creative work, and the copyright on it belongs to you). So again, ask your instructor what they would allow. Also, academic ethics (which again is not a law, but might be enforced by your university) would generally require that you give proper attribution to the author of the assignment you are discussing. Note that there are plenty of online collections of so-called "open courseware", where the university deliberately makes their course materials public, under some sort of open license such as Creative Commons. MIT's repository is one of the most famous. So if you can't get permission to use the materials from your Penn State courses, you could always make videos about MIT's assignments instead. | You have misunderstood the MIT license. The MIT license requires you to include a copy of "the above copyright notice and this permission notice" in "all copies or substantial portions of the Software." However, this is not the same as requiring you to offer the Software under those terms, and in fact the MIT license explicitly permits you to sublicense the Software under different terms ("including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software"). If you had to offer the Software under the same terms, then the sublicense right would be extinguished, so that cannot be the correct reading of the license. Therefore, you can do exactly what you describe, releasing the software under the GPL. In other words, you have to include the permission notice, but you are expressly permitted to wrap it in terms that state "these permissions don't apply to you, dear end user, but only to people who go and download the original from the upstream source." That's what "sublicense" means. The Free Software Foundation, which publishes the GPL, agrees with this analysis (although they recommend avoiding the phrase "MIT License" because MIT has offered software under other licenses). | Yes. The introduction to the license says "You may adapt — ... build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially". (My emphasis). Note that there is an attribution requirement so you need to find a way to attribute each image to its individual author. For the fine details, you certainly need to read the actual license (rather than the introduction) and you probably need to consult your own, paid-for, IP lawyer - but if you are just scoping the project out at the moment, you should be fine. For contrast, here is a Creative Commons licence that does prohibit commercial use. |
What happens if a judge renders a wrong verdict by misinterpreting the law? There are probably numerous instances, but I'll use the one I'm most familiar with. You sue a debt collector for violating your rights, as illustrated in the linked video. There is a 12 month statute of limitations for you to sue, which extends from the most recent violation. There have been "numerous" violations. The judge wrongly throws out your suit because it has been more than twelve months since the first violation (but not the most recent one, as provided for by law). (See the comments to the video, not the video itself.) Suppose the ruling is incorrect on its face. What do you do to vacate or overturn it? I would guess that this might involve an appeal, although one commenter suggested a motion to reconsider. Is this a relatively routine process of pointing out the error or is it one where the judge might fight "tooth and nail" against having a ruling overturned even if it is obviously wrong? | You file an appeal. In federal courts, the procedure is governed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the process begins with filing a notice of appeal under Rule 4. The process is fairly similar in all the state courts, as far as I know. If you've identified a problem with a ruling other than the final decision of your case, you could also file a motion for reconsideration under Rule 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. You would typically not use this procedure to contest the court's final judgment, as it would likely take so long to decide that your opportunity to appeal would be expired. | I have already contacted a lawyer and paid all the money I had and they didn't help me resolve anything, the guy just talked to me for a little bit. He essentially just took my $600 and no action was made. He said the best thing to do would be to wait it out because the contracts were never fulfilled by them and they can't claim my inventions etc if I am an independent contractor. To me it just sounded like a bunch of BS and not a real solution to this. You paid $600 for expert advice which told you to do nothing. You think the advice is bullshit and intend to go full steam ahead against the advice given. I'd say it is very likely that the lawyer is a better expert than you, so you should follow his advice. You are in a hole, you were told to stop digging, and you intend to continue digging. Don't. There are times where doing nothing is the best advice. In this case, you intend to accuse someone of breach of contract. That has a good chance of landing you in court. A company cannot afford to ignore such a statement. You claim the contract is void and you want to cancel it - but you can't cancel a void contract. It's void. Listen to your lawyer. | Unless you have caused loss to the customer by making the typo, the answer is no. Obviously, anyone can attempt to sue anyone. However, for the court to accept their claim/charge for processing it needs to fall in one of these buckets: They had a contract with you personally and you were in breach of it — obviously this does not apply in your situation; You committed a crime — looks like this is not the case either; You had a duty of care towards them and committed the tort of negligence. This is what the customer must be referring to — making the typo could be regarded as negligence, especially if it caused actual harm/losses to them. | If this judge is truly biased, won't the litigants be all the more glad to have a jury of their peers? You are proposing to abandon your duty to others. At trial you serve the community, not the judge. Back on scope for Law SE: If you refuse to serve on a jury, that could be a separate offense or general criminal contempt, for which you (this all depends on your jurisdiction) could get 30-90 days in jail. Edit: like several others have pointed out, I would not expect much trouble if you politely told the court that you felt you would be biased b/c of past connections. Even if the judge doesn't dismiss you, one of the litigants is likely to strike you. P.S. In most states, no one except a prosecutor (sometimes another state employee) can "take someone" to a criminal court. Individuals can only take someone to civil trial, where one cannot be sentenced, only ordered to pay a judgement. | Only if counsel challenged the point during the trial Difficult as it might be, you can’t allow the judge to be wrong during the trial without calling them on it: very, very politely. For example, there is case law that says you can’t successfully appeal because the judge was asleep through significant parts of the trial; appeals courts are clear that you have to wake them up. If you don’t then you accepted that you didn’t want the judge to hear the parts of the case they slept through, it’s your choice how you present your case. Frankly some cases are better if the judge misses half the evidence. Of course, if the error of law makes it through to the oral or written judgement then you can appeal even if you didn’t take issue with it. | He cannot be given a higher sentence because he appealed. If the appeal is unsuccessful, he will be in exactly the same legal position as if he had not appealed, aside from any legal fees an costs he may incur for the appeal. The worst that could happen to Chauvin at the end of the appeals process, is that all three convictions are upheld, which leaves him no worse off than if there had been no appeal. However, if an appeal is successful, it will probably lead to a new trial. In general, when an accused person is retried after a successful appeal, there is the possibility of a worse outcome. In this case, however, Chauvin was convicted on all counts charged, so the outcome could not get worse. If Chauvin were to appeal and get a new trial, but be convicted in a new trial, he could in theory receive a larger sentence after the second trial. But since the charges would be the same, the range of possible sentences and the sentencing guidelines would be the same. Of course, no one yet knows what sentence the judge will impose after the current conviction. | State governments (and state courts, employees, etc., as part of that government) are generally immune from lawsuits for all liability. See Governmental Tort Liability : 2017 Tennessee Code : Justia. You're really not going to be able to sue the state, the court, the prosecutor or parole officer over what you see as a negligent decision, considering the individuals' previous record or freedom while on parole, and/or whether they are charged as an adult or a minor. Most any lawyer will advise you of this. You could contact a local legal aid clinic Legal Aid/Legal Services | Tennessee Bar Association for more of an explanation and explore the possibilities. | Can a judge change a sentence? No. Once a judge has delivered the sentence the case is finished and the court no longer has jurisdiction. Can the sentence be appealed? Yes. Both the defence and the prosecution can appeal the sentence (with or without appealing the verdict). A sentence appeal will only be allowed if: The sentencing judge has made an error of law; or The sentencing judge was guided by irrelevant or extreme considerations; or The sentence was manifestly excessive (or, if the Crown appeals, manifestly inadequate). In theory, the Crown could appeal on the basis the sentence was manifestly excessive but normally the Crown will have indicated to the judge the punishment they were seeking and it would be rare for the judge to exceed that. That is, the Crown almost always wanted more than they got and may appeal if it’s “manifestly inadequate”. |
The UK GDPA article 17 right to erasure. Can I retain the person's ID number if it no longer identifies them? I manage a small relational database for members of a club with about 600 members. The 'member' table has records holding the memberID , their name, address phone etc. The memberID is then used as a key into in other tables, such as the 'club_officers' table that hold the dates when someone with a particular memberID held certain positions in the club. Under the 'right to erasure', if I delete all the personally identifiable data (name, address, phone etc) from the 'member' table, would I be able to retain the memberID in that table, associated with just a load of blank fields, so that I can still link it to other tables? That way I would still be able to see that, for example, somebody with memberID 1234 was the club secretary between 2012 and 2014, which would be useful. However, since nowhere in my database does that memberID 1234 provide any name, address phone etc. I cannot identify who that person was. Is this sufficient for this part of article 17? | The GDPR has a fairly broad concept of personal data: any information that relates to an identifiable person. This is far more than directly identifiable information! The concept of identifiability is further explained in Recital 26: To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. So indirectly linkable information can still be personal data. In your example, that ID can be easily re-identified with a particular person if you know who the secretary was between 2012 and 2014. It is quite likely that there are members in the club with this knowledge, or that this information can be gained from public sources like newspaper reports. Thus, you should assume that your member IDs are at most pseudonyms, but not anonymous. They are likely still personal data. However, it doesn't necessarily follow that you would have to erase everything. Art 17 comes with lots of caveats and exceptions. For example, if you are processing this personal data under a legitimate interest, and someone requests erasure, you might have overriding grounds to continue processing anyway. E.g. such a legitimate interest could involve security or auditability purposes. There might also be such a legitimate interest for keeping some history for the club, but there would have to be a decision based on the individual circumstances. Furthermore, you can of course retain data e.g. due to a legal obligation, or when this information is necessary for the establishment of or defence against legal claims. I understand your desire to keep some data around. Instead of asking “do I have to delete this?” it might be more productive to consider “under which legal basis can I keep this?”. I think you might have a legitimate interest, but you'd have to carry out a balancing test between the various interests and rights. A really problematic approach would be to hold on to de-identified data in the belief that it no longer were personal data. Such a belief is usually mistaken. True anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is really hard, in particular because you would also have to prevent indirect identification, also by other actors than yourself. There are theoretical models that can help with anonymization, e.g. with k-anonymization methods you'd ensure that there are no unique records in the DB. But this can be tricky to apply correctly, so I'd recommend to only treat aggregate statistics as truly anonymous. In 2012, the ICO has published an anonymization code of practice (PDF). It is no longer up to date with the current legal environment (in particular since the GDPR has expanded the concept of identifiability), but it provides a good overview of both the difficulties of preventing re-identification and an overview of potential solutions. | Yes. Article 4 GDPR Definitions (1) ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; Recital 26 Not applicable to anonymous data The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. | The GDPR applies to such sites if they offer services in the EU/EEA. If they clearly wanted to avoid being subject to the GDPR, they should block visitors from the EEA. For the GDPR, only location matters. Other concerns like residence or citizenship are generally irrelevant. Personal data does not turn non-personal just because it was public. So the GDPR still applies when the data was collected from public sources. However, the data controller (who determines the purpose of processing) often has to balance your rights and interests against other interests (e.g. when using legitimate interest as a legal basis for some processing). For the purpose of publicly displaying your data, only showing data that was already public anyway makes it easier to argue that this is fine. But when the GDPR applies, you have data subject rights. Relevant rights include: a right to access, to see all the data they have about you a right to rectification, to correct wrong data they hold about you a right to restriction, effectively an opt-out a right to erasure (also known as the right to be forgotten) These rights apply both against the website and against Google Search (arguably, both are doing the exact same thing). Google correctly points out that they can't remove information from the Web, but they can hide information from search results. If you feel that your requests have not been resolved correctly, you can issue a complaint with your country's data protection authority. In theory you can also sue them. In practice, GDPR enforcement against overseas data controllers can be quite difficult and has not yet happened. | This will depend partly on what you use the e-commerce website for. If it is simply a point-of-sales and your accounting records are kept elsewhere, then it may be possible to delete their account including associated orders and payments, though you should check that the software doesn't simply update the record by setting the value for a column named deleted or del for short to 1 instead of 0 to identify deleted records, but instead actually deletes the record from the database. You should consider how you will refund a customer if required after doing so!! (i.e. perhaps you acknowledge the request but keep the information for at least as long as the customer is eligible for a refund, and then delete it). If the system is also used for accounting records, then if a customer/user wishes to assert their right to be forgotten, it is likely you'll need to disable the account and apply some kind of pseudonymisation (essentially replacing personal identifiers such as name, email address, date-of-birth, with dummy/null data), in order to preserve the integrity of your financial records. For example, in the UK, there is a statutory obligation on companies to retain financial records for at 7 years. In cases where data cannot be immediately erased due to other legitimate reasons for which it must be kept, once those retention periods expire the data must be erased. You'll need to keep a record of anyone that requests to be forgotten, and remember to follow-up to complete erasure at the appropriate dates if it can't be done immediately, and when the data is destroyed the user needs to be informed. | The GDPR does not prescribe how information should be pseudonymized and does not even define the term properly. Yet, pseudonymization is suggested as an safety measure in various places, so that pseudonymization should be implemented wherever appropriate. The most useful guidance the GDPR gives is by contrasting pseudonymization with anonymization, where it says that pseudonymized data is still personal data because the data subjects can be identified using additional information (see Recital 26 GDPR). In contrast, re-identification is not reasonably likely for truly anonymized data. A common technique for pseudonymization is to replace identifying information with a pseudonym, for example replacing a name with a random numeric ID. However, this can only be considered pseudonymous if the mapping between the ID and the real value is not available to whoever uses this data. Replacing individual fields in a data set might not be sufficient for pseudonymization because apparently non-sensitive fields could still enable indirect identification. This requires careful analysis taking into account the entire context of the data, so it isn't possible to say whether merely removing names + email addresses achieves pseudonymization or anonymization. What you are doing is redacting parts of sensitive data. I think this is a pretty weak pseudonymization method since it still leaks partial information about the true value, and leaks information about the length of the redacted value. It is possible to argue that this is OK (e.g. if you can show that you have multiple similar redactions so that you achieve a level of k-anonymity). But by default, such partial redactions are likely to be unsafe. Completely removing the sensitive data is much safer. The “Article 29 Working Party”, a pre-GDPR EU body, has published an opinion on anonymization techniques in 2014 (PDF). It does not account for the GDPR's specific phrasing, but provides an overview of pseudonymization and anonymization techniques and puts them into context of European data protection law. It considers how such guarantees guard against attacks such as singling out data subjects, linking multiple records of the same individual, and making inferences about the data subject. In this guidance, pseudonymization techniques that are suggested include encrypting or hashing the sensitive data. However, the guidance warns that such techniques do not provide strong protection against singling out or linking records of the data subject. A bit earlier, the UK ICO had published guidance on personal data, including on the matter of anonymization and pseudonymization (PDF) with some good examples. For determining whether a data set has been successfully anonymized (or pseudonymized), they suggest a motivated intruder test: could someone without specialist knowledge or skills re-identify the data subject? In your example, such a person should not be able to infer that a record about Stxxx Axxdxrxn is about a Steve Anderson. In my opinion, your pseudonymization approach would fail the motivated intruder test unless you have multiple records that could all be about Steve Anderson (compare k-anonymity). | Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task. | Yes, their waiver has no legal basis and is invalid under the GDPR. They should have hired a better lawyer. GDPR rights cannot be waived (mrllp.com). The last bit should have been: Therefore, in consideration of my participation in any project, I understand that retaining my name and email address, as described above, does not require my consent and that the right of erasure, as spelled out in the GDRP Article 17 (1) b does not apply. The legal basis for our lawful processing of this personal data is Article 6 (1) f ("processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller"). I.e. there is nothing in the GDPR that compels GitLab to erase this information, but their waiver is bogus. Keeping track of individual contributions in a software projects is necessary for a number of reasons, including security (if somebody contributes code that jeopardizes security, you want to audit everything that person has contributed). | The GDPR allows the right to access to be limited if this access would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others” (Art 15(4) GDPR). However, access to the recording would not give you more information than you've already received during the phone call, so this exemption is quite unlikely to apply in any case. UK data protection law also has a large list of additional exceptions, as summarized here by ICO guidance. These exemptions also cover some aspects of trade secrets, and even mention insurance examples. However, not such exemption is likely to apply in your case: the recording would not give you more information than you already have. If the data controller is concerned about some parts of the conversation, they should provide a redacted copy and explain why the redactions were performed. They should not reject the request outright. If the data controller wants to reject the request entirely, they must do so within the time frame for the DSAR (one month), must explain their reasons, and must inform you that you're allowed to lodge a complaint with your supervisory authority or to sue them. However, ICO guidance is flexible on how detailed the reason for refusal can be: Where an exemption applies, the reasons you give to an individual for not complying with a request may depend upon the particular case. For example, if telling an individual that you have applied a particular exemption would prejudice the purpose of that exemption, your response may be more general. However, where possible, you should be transparent about your reasons for withholding information. Here, I don't see any reason why full transparency would be a problem, so I would expect that the data controller can point to a specific exemption in UK data protection law. If you are unsatisfied with the data controller's response, please consider lodging a complaint with the supervisory authority. In the UK, this is the ICO. On the ICO complaints page, you can fill out the online form about “your personal information concerns”. |
GDPR - Recording simple page views We are currently using google analytics to track our site. The issue we now have with GDPR is we don't have a clear picture of our entrance pages. Our landing page data is messed up badly because the tracking cookies have to be blocked initially until the consent is given. In our case it's a soft opt-in on continual use. So I was wondering. Can I add some in house code directly on the server to record landing page hits. only recording say the page name & time. Maybe even a couple of element clicks. This way no cookies are used and there is 0 chance of identifiable relational data being used other than reading the php session. Which doesn't count as UI. And more importantly I don't need consent and can start getting the data I need right off the bat? | The so called "cookie law" is Article 5(3) of Directive 2002/58/EC: Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user. So this does not only apply to cookies, but to any way to store or retrieve information on/from the equipment of the user. When you use a PHP session, the session ID is stored in a session cookie or URL parameter. If a URL parameter is used, it is also stored on the equipment of the user, so the "cookie law" would also apply to that, but I am not sure about that. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (Art. 29 WP) has written Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption. It considers a session-ID to be exempted from the requirement of informed consent: 3.1 “User-input” cookies The term “user input cookies” can be used as a generic term to describe session cookies that are used to keep track of the user’s input in a series of message exchanges with a service provider in a consistent manner. These would be expected to be first party cookies typically relying on a Session-ID (a random temporary unique number) and expire when the session ends at the latest. First party user input session cookies are typically used to keep track of the user’s input when filling online forms over several pages, or as a shopping cart, to keep track of the items the user has selected by clicking on a button (e.g. “add to my shopping cart”). These cookies are clearly needed to provide an information service explicitly requested by the user. Additionally, they are tied to a user’s action (such as clicking on a button or filling a form). As such these cookies are exempted under CRITERION B. So basically, a PHP session ID cookie does not require consent. However as soon as a session id is used for analytics, it is not exempted: 4.3 First party analytics Analytics are statistical audience measuring tools for websites, which often rely on cookies. These tools are notably used by website owners to estimate the number of unique visitors, to detect the most preeminent search engine keywords that lead to a webpage or to track down website navigation issues. Analytics tools available today use a number of different data collection and analysis models each of which present different data protection risks. A firstparty analytic system based on “first party” cookies clearly presents different risks compared to a third-party analytics system based on “third party” cookies. There are also tools which use “first party” cookies with the analysis performed by another party. This other party will be considered as a joint controller or as a processor depending on whether it uses the data for its own purposes or if it is prohibited to do so through technical or contractual arrangements. While they are often considered as a “strictly necessary” tool for website operators, they are not strictly necessary to provide a functionality explicitly requested by the user (or subscriber). In fact, the user can access all the functionalities provided by the website when such cookies are disabled. As a consequence, these cookies do not fall under the exemption defined in CRITERION A or B. However, the Working Party considers that first party analytics cookies are not likely to create a privacy risk when they are strictly limited to first party aggregated statistical purposes and when they are used by websites that already provide clear information about these cookies in their privacy policy as well as adequate privacy safeguards. Such safeguards are expected to include a user friendly mechanism to opt-out from any data collection and comprehensive anonymization mechanisms that are applied to other collected identifiable information such as IP addresses. In this regard, should article 5.3 of the Directive 2002/58/EC be re-visited in the future, the European legislator might appropriately add a third exemption criterion to consent for cookies that are strictly limited to first party anonymized and aggregated statistical purposes. First party analytics should be clearly distinguished from third party analytics, which use a common third party cookie to collect navigation information related to users across distinct websites, and which pose a substantially greater risk to privacy. So Art. 29 WP does not consider it a privacy risk under the conditions in the last two paragraphs. At least in some EU countries (Like the Netherlands) you would be exempted from the requirement of informed consent because of that. In your question you also mention you use "a soft opt-in on continual use". That is not sufficient to obtain consent. | Yes, their waiver has no legal basis and is invalid under the GDPR. They should have hired a better lawyer. GDPR rights cannot be waived (mrllp.com). The last bit should have been: Therefore, in consideration of my participation in any project, I understand that retaining my name and email address, as described above, does not require my consent and that the right of erasure, as spelled out in the GDRP Article 17 (1) b does not apply. The legal basis for our lawful processing of this personal data is Article 6 (1) f ("processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller"). I.e. there is nothing in the GDPR that compels GitLab to erase this information, but their waiver is bogus. Keeping track of individual contributions in a software projects is necessary for a number of reasons, including security (if somebody contributes code that jeopardizes security, you want to audit everything that person has contributed). | The GDPR allows the right to access to be limited if this access would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others” (Art 15(4) GDPR). However, access to the recording would not give you more information than you've already received during the phone call, so this exemption is quite unlikely to apply in any case. UK data protection law also has a large list of additional exceptions, as summarized here by ICO guidance. These exemptions also cover some aspects of trade secrets, and even mention insurance examples. However, not such exemption is likely to apply in your case: the recording would not give you more information than you already have. If the data controller is concerned about some parts of the conversation, they should provide a redacted copy and explain why the redactions were performed. They should not reject the request outright. If the data controller wants to reject the request entirely, they must do so within the time frame for the DSAR (one month), must explain their reasons, and must inform you that you're allowed to lodge a complaint with your supervisory authority or to sue them. However, ICO guidance is flexible on how detailed the reason for refusal can be: Where an exemption applies, the reasons you give to an individual for not complying with a request may depend upon the particular case. For example, if telling an individual that you have applied a particular exemption would prejudice the purpose of that exemption, your response may be more general. However, where possible, you should be transparent about your reasons for withholding information. Here, I don't see any reason why full transparency would be a problem, so I would expect that the data controller can point to a specific exemption in UK data protection law. If you are unsatisfied with the data controller's response, please consider lodging a complaint with the supervisory authority. In the UK, this is the ICO. On the ICO complaints page, you can fill out the online form about “your personal information concerns”. | Either approach can be GDPR-compliant. An issue to consider is that you as a data controller relying on consent “shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to processing of his or her personal data” (Art 7(1)). This might be simpler if a record of the consent is linked to a user account. On the other hand, the GDPR's data minimization principle would suggest that decentral, offline approaches are preferable. So you do have some flexibility here, as long as you feel comfortable demonstrating that your approach is compliant when investigated by a supervisory authority. In many cases, consent is not an appropriate legal basis to start with. It is one of several options in Art 6(1) GDPR. If a data processing activity is necessary for fulfilling a contract with the data subject, then Art 6(1)(b) is more appropriate. If the processing is necessary for a legitimate interest, then Art 6(1)(f) would work – after conducting a balancing test. Art 6(1)(a) consent is appropriate when the processing activity is not necessary, or when a legitimate interest balancing test doesn't go in your favor, or in some cases when required by law. For example, consent is required when processing special categories of data (such as biometrics), or when accessing or storing information on the end user's device, beyond what is necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user (the “cookie law”, but much more general than cookies). Consent also has heightened compliance requirements compared to other legal bases. The data subject must be able to make a free decision, without any coercion. You must not use dark patterns. You must leave the data subject a real choice. You must not make access to your app conditional on giving unrelated consent (like providing access to a game only when the user gives consent for personalized ads). The data subject must be able to easily withdraw consent later, without suffering detriment for this. The EDPB has issued relevant guidelines that might be helpful here: EDPB guidelines 05/2020 on consent EDPB guidelines 2/2019 on Article 6(1)(b) in the context of online services (also relevant for apps) TL;DR: what is “necessary” for performance of a contract is an objective question, and should generally be considered from the data subject's perspective. It is not possible to circumvent consent requirements by putting unrelated processing purposes like “analytics” into a services' terms of service. The main purpose of this document is to serve as a rebuttal of Facebook's GDPR compliance strategy. But it's perfectly fine to avoid asking for consent for those processing purposes that are actually necessary for the user. I've noticed that you mentioned various Google services like Analytics and Firebase. To the degree that your use of these services implies an international transfer of personal data into the US, it might be impossible to be GDPR-compliant. Be wary of claims that you're only transferring “anonymous” data, as the GDPR has a fairly broad concept of identifiability. | As always, it depends. However, it is by no means certain that any public facing hobby project, such as a web app, is exempt from having to comply with the GDPR. Since the GDPR is only a few days old, we have of course no case law based upon the GDPR itself yet. However, when considering this, one should take the following two facts into consideration. 1. The "personal use exeption" in the GDPR is not new. The personal use exemption is unchanged from the article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. (There as a lot of lobbying for removing "purely" from the sentence – but drafters wanted to keep it.) 2. Case-law under the previous regulation restricts the scope of the exception The ECJ has ruled on the scope of the personal use exception in two cases: C-101/01 C-212/13 In both these cases, the ECJ took an extremely restrictive view, and concluded that the personal use exemption did not apply to the processing done by these individuals. In C-101/01 it can be argued that the hobby project as a blogger was connected to the controllers professional activity (she was a catechist in a local church, and blogged about her work. including her colleagues). But in C-212/13, there no such connection to professional or commercial activity. Here, the controller operated a CCTV to protect his home, but set it up to also capture public space, and that was enough for the ECJ to decide that the personal use exception did not apply. Discussion Case-law based upon Directive 95/46/EC is in no way binding for a future court that need to rule based upon the GDPR. We need to wait for case-law decided under the GDPR to be able to have some degree of certainty about the scope of the "private use exception" under GDPR. However, given what we know about how the ECJ has ruled in these cases in the past, I think it is hazardous to think that just because what you are doing on the web is just a "hobby project" not connected to professional or commercial activity, you are exempt from complying with the GDPR. Conclusion IMHO, you may be exempt, or you may not be exempt. I think it really depends on your activity in your hobby project, and to what extent this project processes the personal data of other people than yourself. | No. As long as you don't see and have no means to access this data, but it is under the control of the user at all times, you are neither the controller or the processor of this personal data, and the GDPR does not apply to you. | The GDPR does not prescribe how exactly consent must be managed, as long as consent was obtained in line with the GDPR's principles. Similarly, the EDPB does not provide concrete recommendations in its guidelines on consent, mainly noting that Controllers are free to develop methods to comply with this provision in a way that is fitting in their daily operations. I would not be too concerned with edge cases like failing HTTP requests, at least not any more than for other HTTP endpoints. If the user indicated consent, and you act on that indication of consent in good faith, that's probably fine. However, remember that you must provide a equally easy way for the user to revoke consent later. If the user changes their mind, they can use the mechanism that you offer to inspect their consent status, and revoke it if they want. But again, how to do that is largely up to you. | The GDPR applies regardless of where and how data is processed. But it is necessary to look at what the processing activities in question are, and who is the controller for these activities by determining their purposes and means. This argument is supported: by the absence of relevant exemptions in the GDPR by the GDPR's broad definition of the data controller by the ECJ's analysis in the Fashion ID case GDPR Exemptions For certain constellations (e.g. controller = natural person, purposes = purely personal or household activities) that processing is exempt from GDPR compliance (see GDPR Art 2(2)). However per GDPR Recital 18, the GDPR would still apply “to controllers or processors which provide the means for processing data for such personal or household activities.” For example, this means that I am able to use WhatsApp to process my friends' contact information for purely personal purposes because I'm exempt from the GDPR with respect to that processing, but Facebook is still subject to the GDPR regarding how they process personal data collected via WhatsApp. Already on the basis of the GDPR providing no exception for processing on someone else's computer, I disagree strongly with the answer you cited (and have already written a competing answer). It seems entirely counterfactual. How to figure out who the controller is. Per GDPR Art 4(7), controller is whoever “alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data”, although other laws might provide more specific criteria for individual purposes or means. We will return to that definition in the next section. The ICO has provided a checklist to figure out if you're a data controller or perhaps a joint controller. Some of the questions are aligned with the above definition, like “We decided what the purpose or outcome of the processing was to be”. Other questions are there as a contrast to the data processor role, e.g. “We have complete autonomy as to how the personal data is processed”. Analysis of the Fashion ID case (ECJ C-40/17) This judgement provides a detailed analysis of who the data controller is, and is therefore relevant to the question. Fashion ID had embedded a Facebook “Like” button on their website, thus causing the visitor's browser to transmit personal data to Facebook. Fashion ID asserted that they were not the data controller, since they had no control over what data was collected by the Like button and how it was subsequently used by Facebook. Fashion ID relied in part of the argument that they weren't the controller because processing happened on the visitor's computer. This ruling was made on the basis of the Data Protection Directive 95/46 which was repealed by the GDPR. However, since the DPD and GDPR have effectively identical definitions of “controller” and “processing”, the court's analysis remains highly relevant. In the following I'll “translate” all DPD references to the GDPR, in analogy to GDPR Art 94(2). The court found that Fashion ID was a data controller for the processing by the Like button, and that it was a joint controller with Facebook for this processing. However, Fashion ID was only a controller for those processing activities in which they played a part, not for subsequent processing of the data that was controlled by Facebook alone. Relevant details from the Judgment (ECLI:EU:C:2019:629): Paragraphs 65–66: The GDPR tries to achieve a high level of data protection through a broad definition of “controller”. Thus, an overly narrow interpretation that counteracts this goal is incompatible with the law. Paragraph 68: An entity is a controller when it exerts influence over the processing for its own purposes, thereby participating in determining the purposes and means of processing. Compare the GDPR Art 4(7) definition of “controller”. case law: C-25/17 Jehovan todistajat, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, paragraph 68: “However, a natural or legal person who exerts influence over the processing of personal data, for his own purposes, and who participates, as a result, in the determination of the purposes and means of that processing, may be regarded as a controller”. Paragraphs 67, 69–70, 82: It is not necessary to have a single controller, there can be multiple joint controllers. The joint controllers can be involved to different degrees. You can be a joint controller without having access to the personal data. case law: C-25/17 Jehovan todistajat, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, paragraph 69: “Furthermore, the joint responsibility of several actors for the same processing, under that provision, does not require each of them to have access to the personal data concerned”. case law: C-210/16 Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein, ECLI:EU:C:2018:388, paragraph: 38: “In any event, [GDPR] does not, where several operators are jointly responsible for the same processing, require each of them to have access to the personal data concerned.” Paragraphs 71–74: Processing can consist of many different individual activities. A controller might only be involved in some of them, and can only be a controller for those activities for which they (jointly) determine purposes and means of processing. Paragraphs 76–79: Fashion ID was able to determine the purposes and means of processing regarding data collection and transmission by the Like button. The act of embedding the button showed that they had decisive influence over the processing: without the embedding, the data processing would not have occurred. To summarize the relevant conclusions: someone is a data controller when they participate in determining the purposes and means of processing for some processing activity for joint controllers, this holds regardless of whether they have access to the data or participate in the processing itself one cannot be a controller for a processing activity for which they cannot determine purposes and means. Conclusion and application to the question This analysis reaffirms my competing answer to the cited answer that it is important to determine who the data controller is. The Fashion ID case shows that is important to perform this analysis on a fairly granular manner, on the level of individual processing activities. For processing on a data subject's computer by a program written by another provider, this means: some processing activities might be solely under the user's control, then they are the sole data controller (or might be exempt from GDPR) for some processing activities, the software developer might decide alone for which purposes and through which means the processing is carried out for other activities, the user and data controller might be joint controllers. This does not require explicit agreement but can result implicitly. This does not require that the software developer has access to the personal data undergoing processing. For example, a spreadsheet application might be used by an end user to process personal data on their own computer (or via a cloud application, with the same conclusions). We can consider different processing activities performed by the software: sorting, transforming, and other processing of the data in the spreadsheet is solely under the end users control, so they are the data controller (if they aren't exempt) collecting usage analytics (where those analytics signals are personal data for which the end user is the data subject) is solely under the software developers control uploading crash reports (where those reports contain personal data from the end user and contain contents from the currently opened spreadsheet) is more complicated. The software developer is definitely a controller. The end user has a dual role here as a data subject and a joint controller (if they aren't exempt) because the crash report processes personal data for which they are the controller. |
Are jurors instructed to not be influenced by the emotions of the witnesses? The 61 year old witness for the prosecution of the Floyd case broke down and cried uncontrollably. Does the judge give instructions to the jurors that they cannot allow the emotions of the witnesses to influence their decision? | No. Jurors generally do not receive such an instruction and it is not a rule of law or evidence. Jurors have to rule in accordance with the law, but how they judge the credibility of witnesses may be influenced by emotional factors. How the witness says something is as much a part of the evidence as what they say. | Yes Deciding a case on a basis the parties have not raised is a denial of natural justice (or procedural fairness) and invalid. The reason is very simple, the parties have not had the opportunity to produce evidence or make submissions about C or D that might have changed the judge’s mind about them. Notwithstanding, to successfully appeal, the aggrieved party must show there were arguments that could have been raised which could reasonably have altered the outcome. That said, it’s the judge’s courtroom and they can say “That’s interesting but what about C and D?” and then the parties can make submissions about them. They do have to be circumspect and make sure that they do not become one party’s advocate - one party might be well aware of C and D and don’t want them brought up because they damage their case and they are hoping the other party misses that - and then the bloody judge come charging in with his bloody duty to wider interests of justice. Non-judicial decision makers like arbitrators, adjudicators and other tribunals need to be even more circumspect because they generally don’t have a duty to anyone but the parties. Unlike in civil law systems, the role of the judge is to decide the dispute between the parties as a referee, not to determine some objective”truth” as an investigator. To keep things simple: if the plaintiff contends that the light was red and the defendant contends the light was green then, assuming there is no evidence opening the possibility, it is not open to the judge to find that the light was amber. Similarly, if the parties agree that red means go and green means stop, it is not the judge's role to tell the parties they are wrong (I'm sure questions would be asked but if the parties are adamant ...): since there is no dispute over this issue the judge would be wrong to agitate one. Now, a judge is free to apply the law that was argued as a whole - if arguments centred on Section 14 of the Relevant Act 1875 but Section 15 is applicable and germane the judge is not wrong for applying Section 15. However, they are on shakier ground if the bring in Other Slightly Relevant Act 1956. | In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded. | The jury ultimately decides if a person is guilty or not. Jury nullification is when the person is clearly guilty or innocent, but for some odd reason the jury (who knows the person is guilty/innocent) gives the "wrong verdict" An example of this in the UK was when a guy was being charged with a spy crime years after his crime happened (I cant remember the case), the jury essentially thought that so much time has passed that it was silly to convict him, so gave a non guilty verdict. There are cases for and against jury nullification. In my personal belief I think in certain cases, such as if edward snowden would be charged, I would find him non guilty as a matter of what is right to ky conscience, regardless of the fact that he clearly did something illegal | The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal. | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. | You can't guarantee a juror's disregard, and some attorneys might utilize the "once it's said, it can't be unsaid" strategy because they know that the jury will still keep it in the back of their mind even though they've been told to ignore it. But there are checks and balances to prevent a remark having an impact on the final decision: Jury deliberation. Chances are, not all jurors will keep the thought in their mind. The jury gets a chance to deliberate after the case has been presented, and it's very easy for other jurors in the deliberation room to point out they're ignoring that piece of information and not let it influence the final decision. Declaring a mistrial. A mistrial is fully at the judge's discretion, but generally anything that affects the jury's ability to remain impartial can result in a mistrial being declared (for example, if an attorney deliberately said something outrageous to influence the jury when they knew it would be withdrawn, the judge will likely declare a mistrial without much thought). Once a mistrial is declared, the case will be postponed and a brand new jury will be selected that hasn't heard the previous remarks - easiest way to erase it from their minds is to not use their minds. | I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts. |
Is the United States federal income tax an indirect tax under the 5th amendment? I'm no American citizen, so I don't know that much about all the ins and outs of the Constitution. I've been watching a movie where one of the characters called the federal income tax "unconstitutional" due to the 5th Amendment. The 5th Amendment reads: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Surfing the web, I found a claim that federal income tax is somehow reckoned to be indirect, which was used to have the 16th Amendment come to be. Indirect taxation is indeed no subject to the highlighted part of the 5th, yet I just can't see how federal tax is not direct. Is federal income tax really indirect? If so, how? If not, how are 5th and 16th Amendments not contradicting one another? | The legal question is whether a tax (state or federal) constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the 5th Amendment eminent domain clause. The Courts have always held that a generally applicable tax does not constitute a taking, so the income tax is not a taking. The Court came to this conclusion because the 5th Amendment takings clause was always understood to refer to government exercise of the power of eminent domain, rather than generally applicable taxes or regulations, even though they might have a negative economic effect on someone by causing their property to be taken for public use or by making their property less valuable. The exclusion of taxes from 5th Amendment takings predates the 16th Amendment. There have always been taxes and taxes are always collected for public use. The direct/indirect tax distinction arises not under the 5th Amendment, but under Article I, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the United States Constitution and governs what kinds of taxes Congress is authorized to impose. This has nothing to do with the 5th Amendment. | There are a number of issues here. The question mentions: Taxes, which I presume must be authorized and regulated by the US Constitution, but I don't know the details Not exactly. The states existed before the Federal government. They are not created by the Federal Constitution, nor authorized by it. A number of restrictions on state powers and actions are specified by the Federal Constitution, and a number of others are imposed by Federal law. (the Federal courts have found implied restrictions beyond the explicitly stated ones.) But there is no Federal provision granting states the power to impose taxes, only restrictions on that pre-existing power. States cannot impose taxes so as to violate rights federally guaranteed, or to place unreasonable burdens on the exercise of those rights. For example, states cannot impose different taxes or tax rates on a racial basis. States cannot impose different taxes on residents of other states temporarily present in, or doing business in the state. States cannot impose different taxes on people newly moved there from other states, compared to long-established residents. State taxes must not violate the Equal Protection clause. However, states may choose the type and amount of taxes to impose. They can use sales tax, VAT tax, property tax, income tax, excise tax, flat tax, or any combination that their legislatures pass. Different taxes may be imposed on different professions or kinds of businesses. Does the US Constitution guarantee all citizens have the natural right to conduct their own business affairs? Not as such, no. The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses limit to some extent the ability of a state to prohibit a particular business on a whim. But when a state asserts that a particular business is harmful, and demonstrates a plausible basis for that view, so that the law passes "Rational basis" review, the state can prohibit it, or heavily regulate it, or license it. If so, does a citizen lose the right to legally own and operate a business if they cannot afford requisite state or local business license fees? A state may require a license to engage in a particular occupation, and may require a fee, one-time or recurring, high or low, for that license. In addition, a tax may be imposed on those in a particular business or profession, which is not imposed on other kinds of business. For example, in many states, lawyers must pay an annual license fee, or they are not allowed to practice. So must many other regulated professions, such as hairstylist. One who cannot afford the fee may not engage in the business or profession. The state may waive or reduce fees for those too poor to afford them, but need not do so, and many states do not so so. Similarly, the state may charge a fee for a driver's license, and one who cannot pay it may not legally drive. Likewise, does a citizen lose the right to utilize the court system to petition for a redress of grievances, if they cannot afford the requisite court fees? Many states have provisions waiving or lowering court fees for those who cannot afford them, but in most cases this is applied only in severe cases, say where a person would have to go without food to afford court fees. There have been a few federal cases requiring fee waivers for those who cannot afford court fees, mostly in connection with criminal defendants. There is not currently a general federal rule requiring court access for those who cannot afford court fees. Perhaps there should be. A case could be made that Equal Protection requires this, but Federal Courts have not so held. Federal courts have held that holding people in jail or prison because they truly cannot afford fines, bail, or court fees is an unconstitutional denial of Equal Protection. But states need not waive such fees; they can be deferred and charged should the person earn enough money to (just barely) afford them. Even this rule is not yet invariably enforced, and many state courts routinely ignore it. By the way "petition for a redress of grievances" doe snot normally refer to bringing a court case, but to asking a legislature to change a law, or asking an administrator or executive to exercise permitted discretion in a particular way. And lastly, if a citizen is convicted of a crime or infraction, and the sentence requires the convict to utilize government services (e.g. prison services, probation services, registration services, etc.); under the US Constitution, can state government agencies providing these services legally require the convict to pay fees for these services (e.g. prison service fees, probation service fees, registration service fees), if these fees were not explicitly included in the sentence as fines? Yes it can impose such fees, but usually only when neither the convict nor his or her dependents will be impoverished by such fees, as I understand it. If a state attempts to pass or enforce state legislation dictating such fees, should this legislation generally be struck down as unconstitutional? Such laws will not be held unconstitutional by US Federal courts under the Federal Constitution, unless they are found to violate Equal Protection, Due Process, or other specifically imposed restrictions on the state. For example, fees which were in practice imposed on people of one religion, but not those of another, would be struck down. But a fee imposed on everyone will not usually be overturned. "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to steal bread from shops, beg in the streets, and sleep under bridges." -Anatole France | The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted. | I am wondering if the government can still implement it and force people to pay even if the decision is challenged in court. Laws are not automatically put on hold because they are challenged. For an action or a law to be halted by the Court before a decision is made, the applicant would have to seek an interlocutory injunction, which are granted only if, as established in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, (i) is there a serious issue to be tried, (ii) will the party seeking the injunction suffer irreparable harm if it is not granted, and (iii) does the balance of convenience favour the party seeking the injunction. The first issue is rarely a problem, especially for a controversial issue like this. I am thinking the government might be able to tax people and then refund people if the court doesn't uphold the decision instead of a court challenge being able to postpone the tax indefinitely. A quantifiable financial harm is rarely irreparable (in private law cases). However there is an important exception for Charter cases where a financial harm is assumed to be irreparable because damages are often not awarded in constitutional cases. Though in this case it might be considered reparable because the quantification of damage and the method of redress are straightforward. For the third question, the Court needs to weigh both sides' interests in the case where the injunction is granted. Even if the damage is deemed irreparable, the Court may (or may not) still find the public interest in health outweighs the financial interests of the unvaccinated. | Don't even think of going there. If you refuse to pay taxes with this argument, the IRS will take this as a "frivolous tax return", and give you a fine of up to $5,000. If you are trying to argue that this is illegal, you only make things worse. The IRS gets about 20,000 to 30,000 frivolous tax returns every year, so every argument you could come up with they have heard a dozen times. | If a friend uses my home address for his tax return, and he owes the IRS tons of money, will I be liable in any way? Assuming that this is an income tax or sale tax return, rather than a property tax return, generally not. The only case where you could be liable is where you were conspiring to help him evade tax collection somehow, or conspiring to evade state sales or income taxes. For example, suppose that your friend had no connection to your home in your state (Nevada) with no income taxes and has never even set foot in your state, and actually lives in a state with high income taxes (California). But your friend is using your address to falsely claim residency in Nevada with your knowledge and cooperation to avoid paying California income taxes. To make it spicy, let's assume that your friend's state income tax liability would be $400,000 in California, but $0 in Nevada. In that case, you might have felony criminal liability under California's tax evasion statutes (for which you could be extradited to California) for conspiring with your friend to evade his California income tax liability. But if you had no idea of what your friend was up to, and simply agreed to forward mail to him at your address (the way a typical mail drop company does), you would typically have no criminal or civil liability (subject to the "willful blindness" exception to lack of knowledge where you strongly suspect that your friend is up to no good but take a don't ask, don't tell approach). Also normally would it be a problem if he filed a tax return with my address, and I filed a tax return with the same address in the same tax year? No. | The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law | Everyone physically present in the US is protected by the US Federal constitution. (In some cases persons not physically in the US also have protection from the US constitution. When that applies is too complex for this answer.) Most of the rights protected by that constitution are available to anyone present, whether citizen, lawful immigrant, lawful visitor, or a person in the US without lawful authority. A few rights, such as the right to vote and to run for public office, are limited to citizens. If a person was arrested but not informed of his or her Miranda rights, then statements made to the arresting officers (or later interrogating officers) would not be admissible in court, unless an exception to the Miranda rules applies, which is unlikely. I can't say if this happened in the particular case mentioned in the question. In general, in the area of criminal procedure, there is no difference between citizens and others subject to US jurisdiction (accredited foreign diplomats normally have immunity). A few crimes can only be committed by citizens (or others owing allegiance to the US) such as treason. A few crimes, such as unlawful entry to the US, can't be committed by citizens, as citizens automatically have a right to enter. But criminal procedure and constitutional rights affecting criminal procedure, are the same for all in the US, citizen or not. (Oh, there are special laws for minors, but that isn't a matter of citizenship.) |
Is it illegal for a hospital to hide the doctor name from patient? I had an ultrasound at a hospital. The doctor over there gave me some recommendations. I wasn’t sure about these recommendations and wrote an email to the management asking other doctors to review those recommendations. They did review and provided an answer. I asked for those doctor’s names. Hospital refused to disclose. Is hospital violating any laws? | In this statement of "Patient Rights & Responsibilities from Nash UNC it is said that: A patient has the right to know the names and the jobs of his or her caregivers. But I do not find any actual law that establishes such a right. Hospitals usually have a policy that doctors and other caregivers must wear name-tags and identify themselves to patients, but that does not necessarily apply to questions after the fact, nor can I be sure that any law mandates such a policy. | 34 CFR Subpart D covers this topic ("Under what conditions is prior consent not required to disclose information?"). This includes The disclosure is to other school officials, including teachers, within the agency or institution whom the agency or institution has determined to have legitimate educational interests so that raises the question of whether there is a legitimate educational interest. Additionally, the question is raised as to the status of an SRO (they are not teachers). Disclosure is allowed to A contractor, consultant, volunteer, or other party to whom an agency or institution has outsourced institutional services or functions may be considered a school official under this paragraph provided... the conditions being that the person Performs an institutional service or function for which the agency or institution would otherwise use employees; Is under the direct control of the agency or institution with respect to the use and maintenance of education records; and Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a) governing the use and redisclosure of personally identifiable information from education records I would take this model memorandum as the most likely agreement, though your district may have a totally different memo where SROs are purely security guards. An SRO is to advance the program objective which include "Education of children regarding the role of laws, courts, and Police in society", which is the hook into "legitimate educational interest". This nothwitstanding the part that says that they "are police officers and not school teachers, school administrators, nor school counselors. The officers will assist teachers with classroom presentations on relative topics when requested and able" (there is no principle that only teachers, administrators, or counselors can have a legitimate educational interest). This model memo does not say anything that indicates that the conditions "Is under the direct control" and "Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a)" are true, but those conditions could be satisfied external to the MOU. There are some additional exceptions of the "if required by law" type, such as a state law "adopted before November 19, 1974, if the allowed reporting or disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve the student whose records are released"; or, after that date, is "subject to the requirements of §99.38" which refers you to §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). If that is confusing, here are the two self-referring sections: §99.38(a) If reporting or disclosure allowed by State statute concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve, prior to adjudication, the student whose records are released, an educational agency or institution may disclose education records under §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). The disclosure is to State and local officials or authorities to whom this information is specifically...Allowed to be reported or disclosed pursuant to State statute adopted after November 19, 1974, subject to the requirements of §99.38. So state law is one possibility; "legitimate educational interest" is a remote possiblity. Massachussetts law does include governmental third party disclosures: 603 CMR 23.07(4)(c) A school may release information regarding a student upon receipt of a request from the Department of Social Services, a probation officer, a justice of any court, or the Department of Youth Services under the provisions of M.G.L. c. 119, sections 51B, 57, 69 and 69A respectively. That does not directly apply to local police, but it is possible that a police officer is operating as a probation officer or an agent of the Department of Youth Services. Under paragraph (e), A school may disclose information regarding a student to appropriate parties in connection with a health or safety emergency if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals. This includes, but is not limited to, disclosures to the local police department Mass. law allows the possibility of treating a police officer as "authorized school personnel" if they are "providing services to the student under an agreement between the school committee and a service provider, and who are working directly with the student in an administrative, teaching counseling, and/or diagnostic capacity" – which is not completely out of the question but is a bit of a stretch (especially in the context of a blanket statement "we share records", not "we may share yours, if you get special counseling"). Tne law also says "Any such personnel who are not employed directly by the school committee shall have access only to the student record information that is required for them to perform their duties", so sharing of all records would not be allowed. | This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer. | Disclaimer: I am not familiar with US law, so this answer is from a general perspective. It should apply in most jurisdictions, though. Are there any laws or regulations which I can use to convince a hospital's billing department to talk to me, despite the fact that they have a clear policy otherwise? No, I don't think so. A company or organization is generally free to decide for themselves who will or will not communicate with you - I don't think there is any law giving you a right to choose. How would this even work? What if the people you ask to talk to are overworked, on vacation or just not qualified? However - you do have another, more important right: To be considered valid, a bill must provide credible evidence that the charges are justified. You cannot just ask someone to give you money, you must actually provide a reason why you are owed money. In this case, this means the hospital must send you a bill that you can understand and verify. To get this: First, stop bugging them over the phone. Once a point is reached where legal action seems likely (like in your case), any information you get is only really useful to you when in writing. So do everything in writing. It's fine to talk to them if it helps solve the problem - but insist on getting things in writing afterwards. The first thing you need to write is a formal letter that you refuse to accept the bill, because you cannot verify it. Outline in details what parts you cannot understand/verify, and ask for the information you need (such as what the codes mean). Once you have received a satisfatory explanation of the bill (which may take multiple letters), you go through it with a fine comb, and dispute any items that you think are unjustified. You may need the help of a lawyer to exercise these steps, but in principle you can probably do it on your own, too. Whether you get a lawyer is ultimately a trade-off (making a mistake may cost you money, but hiring a lawyer costs money, too). A first consultation with a lawyer is probably not too costly (ask first!), and may help you to decide whether you need more assistance. | I did not write "confidential" on my letter, but I assumed a business proposal is automatically considered as a confidential material. An incorrect assumption unfortunately. Unless you have a confidentiality agreement (NDA) with the first company, they and their agents are not under any legal obligation to keep information you share with them confidential. How is the legal situation here? There is none on your side. You lied about a direct question asked and were caught in the lie. Company A had no obligation to keep what you sent confidential. Even if they did, that may not (depending on how the confidentiality agreement is worded) keep the employee of company A stating that they had received the same proposal. Chalk this one up to a lesson on confidentiality and honesty in business. There are no reasonable assumptions of confidentiality in business unless you specifically state that they are confidential or are provided as part of a confidentiality agreement. | No. This is governed by the HIPAA Security Rule which was a regulation that the HIPAA statute required the Department of Health and Human Services to adopt. The Rule does require someone covered by HIPAA to have a "Business Associate Agreement" (BAA) and a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with any cloud storage provider (which would be the usual way that a U.S. health care provider subject to HIPAA would have a foreign server), but the Rule does not require that a server be physically located in the United States. The lack of this requirement is a good one, because when you are transmitting data (which the Security Rule requires be done in a secure fashion), you can't know which servers the information will end up on in a trip from source to destination. Email and all other Internet content travels through what amounts to a pony express. It goes through a variety in intermediate server nodes which can change during the course of a session, and generally speaking, you never know which intermediate nodes are used. You could be seeing this answer via a server in China, for example, and you would never know it. | You give no jurisdiction but in general: First, police have no obligation to be honest. So, yes they can collect this without consent by e.g. taking hair from your hairbrush (with a warrant) or giving you a glass of water while interviewing you and getting it from your fingerprint oils (which may not actually be technically possible but never mind that). No, they can't take it by "force" by sticking a swab in your mouth. Yes, it will almost certainly go into a database. Of course, there are some jurisdictions where police are entitled to decide you are guilty based on the fact that you didn't pay them a bribe. | The rule applies to "A covered entity or business associate", who may not "use or disclose protected health information" except as permitted. The set of covered entities and business associates is pretty large, and certainly covers nurses, also secretaries working for the hospital or insurance company. It is not restricted to the doctor-patient relationship. However, the restriction is not absolute: a patient can consent to the disclosure of such information: but, the consent must be written. This raises an interpretive challenge, in case patient A reveals a medical fact to a friend B who happens to be a medical professional. Person B probably is a "covered entity", since they are undoubtedly A health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter. The information also is "protected": Protected health information means individually identifiable health information: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, that is: (i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii) Maintained in electronic media; or (iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium. (2) Protected health information excludes individually identifiable health information: (i) In education records covered by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii) In records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); (iii) In employment records held by a covered entity in its role as employer; and (iv) Regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50 years. Para 5 on prohibited uses and disclosures explicitly lists the prohibited disclosures (genetic information for insurance underwriting, sale of PHI), so idle gossip is not explicitly prohibited. It is also not explicitly allowed. But again, the regulation says: may not use or disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by this subpart Nothing in the rules limits the obligation of a "covered entity", in terms of how they came to be in possession of PHI. Given the definition of "covered entity", the fact of being a covered entity is a property does not depend on obtaining information electronically. So without written consent, B who is a covered entity cannot gossip about A's medical status. |
What determines the order in which witnesses testify? After day 5 of Floyd case, all of the witnesses thus far appear to be from the prosecution. When does the defense call their witnesses? What determines the order in which witnesses appear in court to testify? | The prosecution chooses the order of its witnesses and must present all of its witnesses before the defense presents its witnesses, and the defense chooses the order of its witnesses. The parties can agree, with the judge's permission, to take a witness out of order (usually for the convenience of a witness who has limited availability on a relatively minor issue). But this is done far more often in civil cases than in criminal cases, because the defense wants to preserve its ability to argue that the prosecution failed to present evidence sufficient to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt in its own case, which can be important in an appeal. If a defense witness is taken out of order, something that a defense witness says could inadvertently tip the balance by establishing some minor but mandatory element of some offense that the prosecution failed to include it its "case in chief". For example, maybe the relevant statute requires that the defendant be over the age of eighteen to be guilty of a crime (e.g. statutory rape), and the prosecution forgets to ask a question about the defendant's age in their case in chief, so the prosecution fails to prove that element of the crime. If a defense witness taken out of order says that "I've known the defendant since I went to his fifth birthday party in 1980.", that could be the difference between having the case reversed on appeal and affirming a conviction on that count. So the defense is reluctant to allow its witnesses to be taken out of order. After the prosecution has presented its "case in chief", and the defense has presented its "case in chief", the prosecution may then present rebuttal witnesses to the testimony of the defense witnesses, and often, the defense may then present rebuttal witnesses to the prosecution's rebuttal witnesses. After the prosecution completes its case in chief, the defense has the right, if it wishes to do so, to present no additional evidence whatsoever. In a criminal trial, the prosecution often presents many witnesses and the defense often presents far fewer witnesses, but that is not a hard and fast rule. Often the defense presents very little evidence for reasons similar to its reasons for not wanting to take a defense witness out of order. For example, suppose a prosecution witness on a key point is not very credible. Offering a defense witness on that point who is also not very credible could bolster the jury's opinion of the prosecution witness's credibility, or could simply help to corroborate that "something" definitely happened that was memorable when the crime was allegedly committed, even if their accounts are not identical. | what is the sequence of proceedings? See Rule 25.9: the prosecution summarizes the case the defendant has an opportunity to concisely identify what the defendant intends to put into issue the prosecution introduces all of its evidence (including all of its witnesses) (and the defence has the opportunity to cross-examine each) the defendant has an opportunity to ask for a directed verdict of acquittal the defendant has an opportunity to summarize the defence case the defendant has an opportunity to introduce evidence, including witnesses (and the Crown has the opportunity to cross-examine each) either side may introduce additional evidence if needed in rebuttal prosecution's closing submissions defendant's closing submissions | RCW 7.04A.170 states that "An arbitrator may issue a subpoena for the attendance of a witness and for the production of records and other evidence at any hearing and may administer oaths", also "All laws compelling a person under subpoena to testify and all fees for attending a judicial proceeding, a deposition, or a discovery proceeding as a witness apply to an arbitration proceeding as if the controversy were the subject of a civil action in this state". There may be states or circumstances where arbitrators are not authorized to administer oaths. | In the united-states, attorneys are almost never placed under oath. Their statements -- whether they are assertions of fact or legal arguments -- are not evidence, and they are not subject to cross examination. There are limited circumstances in which an attorney would be competent to present actual evidence. In such cases, the attorney would be sworn in as a witness and subject to cross examination, but the attorney would likely also be disqualified from acting as an attorney in such a situation under Model Rule 3.7. | I've never heard of a rule specifically addressing this in the united-states, but I expect most courts would disallow it. I suspect a court would believe that the note-taking would be a distraction to the witness, whose focus should be on listening to the questions and providing truthful answers. The note-taking may be perceived as a distraction from the testimony for others in the courtroom, as well. If I were examining the witness, I would probably be entitled to see what the notes say, dragging out the witness's examination. Then the witness would want to take notes about my questions about her notes, and I'd want to see those notes, and you can see how it can get out of control. | Only in a civil case Yes, in a civil case, Alice generally can call Bob as a witness to take the stand. In many cases, this is done very early, locking in their testimony, before expert witnesses or other evidence by the plaintiff are presented to try and undermine the testimony. Alice may ask only questions that have relevance to the case. Let's take for example a dispute about a contract: Alice may ask Bob if he engaged in negotiations to form the contract, about the matter of the contract, if he signed the contract, or how he (or his employees) fulfilled (or not) the contract. Pretty much everything that pertains to the contract or the execution thereof. This does not extend to the settlement of the case or attempts thereof. Alice may not ask if Bob has an affair with Clarice unless that somehow is material to the contract at hand. Alice may not re-ask questions where an objection was sustained in the same way. However, Bob might not need to answer all questions (there are things that are banned from being asked), especially as Bob's attorney will object to questions. A few examples of competent questioning can be seen towards the end of My Cousin Vinnie, though this is a criminal trial. Never in a criminal trial In a criminal trial, not only can the prosecution not call Bob to the stand, he has to elect to go to the stand to even be questioned by the prosecution. That is because he can "plead the 5th". There is a tiny exception for civil cases, where they can do so there too. | One wouldn't be able to make a claim about a driving record without it being testimony. Testimony will be challenged during cross examination. The prosecutor won't be able to bring up prior bad acts (such as previous speeding tickets) but will most certainly be allowed to rebut any claim of no prior bad acts made by a defendant. When the defendant claims a spotless driving record the defendant is introducing character or a character trait into the trial. Once introduced by the defendant the prosecutor will be allowed to challenge the credibility of that statement and, therefore, the credibility of the witness. Imagine the following interaction: Defendant: I have a spotless driving record. Prosecutor: Are you saying you've never been issued a traffic ticket? Defendant: Um, Uh, well... When a defendant goes to court they are facing a specific charge. The prosecutor will present evidence that supports that charge and it is up to the defendant and his attorneys to sow reasonable doubt within the jury, or at least one juror. By presenting character, the defendant may appear to be saying either, "Hey, it was my first time let me off," or, "I've never done it before so I couldn't have done it this time." Either way, it probably won't create reasonable doubt in the juror's mind about the specific charge they're weighing and it has the potential to open a can of worms that would be unfavorable to the defendant. | So, as you say, these witnesses who try to help their buddy out may be committing perjury. Also, D himself, by lining this up, is probably on the hook for conspiracy to commit perjury and being complicit in perjury. Aside from that, I think your question is: would getting people to testify in a way that implies they did the crime lead to an acquittal for the murderer? The answer is: maybe. The jury will either vote to acquit or to convict. If the jury votes to acquit, then it's over. Double jeopardy protects D from being tried for murder again. But, if the jury votes to convict, the fact that D had his friends testifying in the way you suggest isn't going to get the conviction overturned on appeal because "a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts." People v. Young, 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 (Cal. 2005). I haven't done a trial yet, but it strikes me that that might not be the greatest trial strategy. I think generally defense lawyers would prefer to make their client look the furthest thing from gang affiliated as possible. Don't lie to a court or ask anyone to lie to a court for you. |
Do you get to keep a fraudulent money transfer that you are entitled to? Reading this story got me speculating: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-02-17/citi-can-t-have-its-900-million-back TLDR: CitiBank accidentally wired $900m to creditors of a company they were the administrative agent for. The company had wanted to restructure the debt and avoid paying the full amount, but some poor shmuck at Citi made a whoopsie. Citi sued for the money and lost, because of the “discharge-for-value defense”: The recipient is allowed to keep the funds if they discharge a valid debt, the recipient made no misrepresentations to induce the payment, and the recipient did not have notice of the mistake What if the transfer had been fraudulently made by a hacker who had paid off several creditors to make it impossible to pinpoint what creditor he was working for and most recipients genuinely didn't know they were going to get the money they were entitled to, but otherwise 100% criminal. Would the doctrine still apply? | The linked Bloomberg story quotes the rule as: The recipient is allowed to keep the funds if they [the funds] discharge a valid debt, the recipient made no misrepresentations to induce the payment, and the recipient did not have notice of the mistake. If the recipient, or somone acting on behalf of the recipient, hacked the sender to induce the payment, that sounds like a form of misrepresentation to me. If the hacker is unconnected with the recipient there seems no way that the hacker benefits financially, although I suppose a hacker might simply want to cause an amusing disruption. As I understand it this rule only applies when the sender in fact owes a debt to the recipient that the transfer pays off. If the hacker were working for one of a large group of recipients, most of whom are innocent, and subsequent analysis establishes that there was a hacker, but not who the hacker was or which of the many recipients the hacker was working for, I suspect, but cannot prove, that the doctrine would not apply, because the transfer was not a valid but incorrect act by the sender, but was a fraudulent intervention in the sender's procedures. | The relevant part of Texas law is in the property code, §§92.101-92.109 §92.104 allows them to "deduct from the deposit damages and charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the lease or as a result of breaching the lease", and then they must "give to the tenant the balance of the security deposit, if any, together with a written description and itemized list of all deductions" (except when there is uncontroversial rent owed). §92.109 states what the landlord's liability is, namely a landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of this subchapter is liable for an amount equal to the sum of $100, three times the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld, and the tenant's reasonable attorney's fees in a suit to recover the deposit. This requires bad faith, not just being wrong. If you dispute the deductions, you can sue the landlord to recover the deposit. The law also provides that "In an action brought by a tenant under this subchapter, the landlord has the burden of proving that the retention of any portion of the security deposit was reasonable". In order to extract more money from you for putative damages, the landlord will have to sue you and establish that there was an additional $2,000 damages. If the court finds that you did actually did damage the apartment, you may be ordered to compensate the landlord. Until you get such an order, you don't owe them anything; you may be able to recover the damage deposit if the "damage" was insignificant. This sketches the process of suing in Justice Court to get your deposit back, highlighting details like the demand letter that you might not have known you have to write. As far as your credit history is concerned, this is not entirely clear. The Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates the industry of credit reporting, and crucially you can dispute false claims of debts. This does not prevent a person from making such a claim. I do not have an account with the Big 3 reporting services, so I don't know what their standards are for recording a putative debt. However, you can insert a suitable statement in your record disputing the validity of the claim. It is most likely that the landlord would sell the putative debt to a collection agency. That industry is regulated by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and there is a procedure about disputing an alleged debt. | It is basically fraud, and there are two ways in which it could be illegal: it might be a crime, and you might get sued for doing it (you would not be fined or imprisoned, but you may have to compensate the hotel chain for their loss). Whether or not it is a crime depends on the jurisdiction. In Washington, there are very many laws against fraud such as RCW 9.38 (credit), RCW 9.45 (numerous things where a business defrauds others), RCW 9.60 (forgery) but none of them would apply to lying about a material fact to a business in order to get a discount. Texas likewise has a long section on criminal fraud. It is not clear from the wording whether a customer lying to a business (not involving forgery, vehicles, credit, or financial institutions) is covered. 32.42(b)(10) says A person commits an offense if in the course of business he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence commits one or more of the following deceptive business practices... making a materially false or misleading statement of fact concerning the reason for, existence of, or amount of a price or price reduction The question of interpretation that this raises is whether a person who has said "I'm over 70" so that they can get a discount has made a statement "concerning the reason for a price reduction". The ordinary interpretation of "concerning the reason for" would be that it refers to explaining why or under what conditions a price reduction exists. For the moment, I am skeptical that this definition would include the case at hand, but that will require a search through case law and jury instructions. From the lawsuit angle, you would have knowingly made a false material statement in order to obtain a value, which is illegal, and they could sue you to recover the discount. | IANAL. I am not your lawyer. The following is not legal advice. The insurance company, regardless of how you feel about their process, has it appears, to have discharged their duties, namely they have paid out two separate claims. The personal property claim has been paid to the estate as the beneficiary, while the property claim has been paid out with the mortgage company as the beneficiary. The mortgage company seems, to me (disclaimer, I work at a financial institution, albeit in an IT role), to also be reasonable. Six months is an extremely long time without contact or payment (where I work, the loss mitigation department is sent all loans that are 3 months delinquent); the fact that you, the estate executor were not aware of the passing of the debtor is of no consequence. Also, many loans contain clauses that allow the lender to accelerate the loan (i.e. demand "immediate" payment of the whole outstanding balance). So they've started foreclosure proceedings, probably about 3 months ago. As for the foreclosure proceedings: The received $45,000 will be applied to the loan. The property (not just the house, but the entire lot) will be sold at public auction, as all foreclosed houses are in the state of New York. Proceeds from the sale of the house shall be applied to paying off the loan. If the proceeds exceed the outstanding mortgage amount, the estate will be sent the remaining proceeds. If the proceeds are less than the remaining amount, the estate is retains (i.e. owes) the remaining debt. EDIT: As an example of why the noting of jurisdiction is important on this stack-exchange, Nate Eldredge has informed me that in New York, it is possible for a judge to reduce the "remaining debt" of the estate by declaring that the sold house had a higher "fair market value" than it sold for. | Given that this is a UK based company, the most applicable Act would be the Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971 A person who, not having reasonable cause to believe there is a right to payment, in the course of any trade or business makes a demand for payment, or asserts a present or prospective right to payment, for what he knows are unsolicited goods sent (after the commencement of this Act) to another person with a view to his acquiring them [for the purposes of his trade or business], shall be guilty of an offence and on summary conviction shall be liable to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale. This law specifically refers to [unsolicited] charges for entries in directories. You also mentioned that they're misrepresenting that a company is already a customer and sending out invoices on that basis. That would be a breach of the Fraud Act 2006 A person is in breach of this section if he dishonestly makes a false representation As to their enforceability, that answer is no. If this came before an actual judge, the judge would throw it out in a heartbeat. No agreement was made to provide a service in return for a payment and these companies rely on sending threatening letters via (seeming) third-parties precisely because they wish to avoid that level of scrutiny. | Receive it and keep it. If MS wants to be paid they can either charge your card or send you an invoice. They will look really stupid if they sue you over this and need to explain to the judge why they didn't take one of the two options before taking legal action. | Assuming USA law: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2315 If you accept or buy goods that are knowingly stolen you may be fined or imprisoned. If you buy goods and later find out they were stolen you can sue for a refund. However, I'd say the likelihood of getting your money back is incredibly low. | The accusation would be the crime of securities fraud ("insider trading" is legally meaningless), under 15 USC 78j(b). There is a bit more elaboration in 17 CFR 240.10b5-1. That law prohibits using "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in" in connection with a securities transaction. Under 15 USC 78ff, violation of the law can result in a fine of up to $5 million and 20 years, thus it is a crime. As a crime, the standard of proof required is must higher than it in for a civil forfeiture (which can be as low as "reasonable suspicion"). In the US, and pursuant to the Due Process clause, that requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that is (from in re Winship), "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged". The statute itself does not state the elements that must be proven to secure a conviction, but they can be discerned based on jury instructions (which are circuit-specific). The 9th Circuit instruction is here. You can see that there are 4 specific allegations that have to be chosen between, and the prosecutor has to have at least alleged one of those prohibited acts (so that the jury can decide if the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did that thing). The evidence you have presented could constitute "reasonable suspicion", but not "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". If we had a different standard of proof in criminal trials, where it was sufficient to just suspect based on a small bit of evidence that a person may have done something prohibited, then the conclusion could be different. Or, if you had stronger evidence surrounding the sale, your argument might carry a bit more weight. In other words, criminal prosecution is based on quite a lot of specific and objective evidence about what happened. An example of the kind of evidence and allegations required to get the ball rolling can be seen here; for "insider trading" specifically, look here (this case is based on an FBI investigation, where an agent will presumably testify to hearing the defendant state a plan to violate the law). |
Web Application and its Copyrights classification I wanted to know the facts behind the Web Application Hosting and its classification respective to copyrights. I know the streaming of Video / Audio over Internet its comes under OTT (over-the-top) i.e., Internet Broadcasting. I wanted to know the Website (Static/Dynamic web application) Hosting and consuming its comes under the broadcast or Internet Broadcast or from which classification? especially in India and European countries. No where was it clearly defined. | united-states in US copyright law, there are no "classifications" of copyright. A protected work is a protected work. There are a few special provisions for architectural and sculptural works, and quite a few for musical works, but different types of web transmission or hosting make no difference with regard to US copyright law. I don't know what difference such classifications might make in the law of India. | You've really got two questions here: 1) "Is it an invasion of privacy to know that I'm using an ad blocker?", and 2) "Is it discrimination to refuse service based on what software I'm running?". Taking them in order: Because of how HTTP/HTML works, there are essentially two ways for a server operator to know what software you are running. Your browser announces that it's running something. This usually takes the form of a modified User-Agent header. I'm not aware of any privacy laws that consider "Person A told me something" to be an invasion of Person A's privacy. They guess it based on the actions your browser takes. For example, if the website gets a request for a page, and the site's ad network does not get a matching request for an ad, the server deduces that the user is running an ad blocker. Since this is based on things that the server operator could reasonably be expected to be informed of, it isn't an invasion of privacy under any law I'm aware of. Is it discrimination? Yes. But not all discrimination is illegal. In general, only discrimination based on protected categories (race, sex, etc.) is prohibited, and I can't imagine a jurisdiction making "choice of browser add-ons" to be one of those categories, not least because it's something the person being discriminated against can easily change. | Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation. | You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction. | Bulgaria is one of many countries in which intellectual property can be protected with a single international patent filing, in lieu of a Bulgarian specific filing. In generally, you should assume that any patented idea likely to have international application, such as Internet based software, which is patented in the U.S. is also the subject of international patent protection, unless you specifically know that this is not the case. Virtually all patent lawyers know how to make this filing and most would recommend doing so in this case. So, yes, it is something you should worry about, and the better practice, by far, would be to obtain permission from the patent owner if the app is likely to have any meaningful commercial value. Now, if you were sued, there is a good chance that it would be in Bulgarian courts under Bulgarian patent law, which may be somewhat less harsh in some respects like damages awards than U.S. patent law. But, the basis for patent liability for an infringement in Bulgaria would be very similar. | "Personal use only" does not excuse copyright infringement under US law. The uploader does not hold copyright, and neither gives nor denies permission to copy his creation. The law does not require a copyright holder to deny permission, it requires the user to actually obtain permission. So no matter how you slice it (even as fair use) it is infringement for you to copy that video. | Depending on your jurisdiction, such lists may be protected, but not by copyright. For example, in Germany there was a court decision that scanning all the country’s phone books and selling them on CD constituted “unfair competition” and was illegal, while hiring 1000 typists who would manually type in all this information would not be. Databases are protected in many jurisdictions, and a list of the 1000 most commonly used English words could reasonably be called a database. | There is probably no legal reason for this message. These aren't the only two messages that can be displayed. If you look at the source, you see this: {'ADDTO_CREATE_NEW_PLAYLIST': "Create new playlist\n",'ADDTO_CREATE_PLAYLIST_DYNAMIC_TITLE': " $dynamic_title_placeholder (create new)\n",'ADDTO_WATCH_LATER': "Watch Later",'ADDTO_WATCH_LATER_ADDED': "Added",'ADDTO_WATCH_LATER_ERROR': "Error",'ADDTO_WATCH_QUEUE': "Watch Queue",'ADDTO_WATCH_QUEUE_ADDED': "Added",'ADDTO_WATCH_QUEUE_ERROR': "Error",'ADDTO_TV_QUEUE': "Queue",'ADS_INSTREAM_FIRST_PLAY': "A video ad is playing.",'ADS_INSTREAM_SKIPPABLE': "Video ad can be skipped.",'ADS_OVERLAY_IMPRESSION': "Ad displayed." Looks to me like some messages to help with debugging. |
Is a non compete clause in an offer letter enforceable in Texas? Can a company enforce a non compete only mentioned in an offer letter in Texas ? Suppose that the offer letter made mention of non compete/ non solicitation once: “A 6 month non-compete/solicitation is required.” Suppose that the employee never signed a proper multi page, countersigned non compete contract. Suppose that the employee signed the one page offer letter, filled out a paper application and agreed to permit a background check company to start their process. On starting work the employee signed 3 manuals (policy, hr manual, etc). The offer letter itself states it is not a contract of employment rather a document to communicate the job offer to the employee. Under these circumstances, can the employer, located in Texas, enforce the 6-month non-compete provision? | It is very unlikely that such a sentence ("A 6 month non-compete/solicitation is required") is enforceable, because it is way too broad. The reasonable interpretation of the sentence is that the employer has thereby put the employee on notice that such an agreement will be required, and the actual terms of that agreement will be spelled out at that time, but that sentence does not constitute an "agreement". Ad actual agreement has to be supported by consideration, and have a reasonable scope (including place and activities). Texas law disfavors restrictions on job-changing, so an agreement would have to go beyond just saying that "a non-compete is required". Since the letter asserts that it is not a contract, there is no clear contractual obligation (they can fire you anytime they want, it seems). | The relevant law in California is here. In your situation, it is presumed (as you both agree) that you have a month to month agreement. §1946 states that A hiring of real property, for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of that party’s intention to terminate the same, at least as long before the expiration thereof as the term of the hiring itself, not exceeding 30 days; In other words, the landlord has to give you 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease, and you have to give 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease (and it must be written notice). The section continues: provided, however, that as to tenancies from month to month either of the parties may terminate the same by giving at least 30 days’ written notice thereof at any time and the rent shall be due and payable to and including the date of termination. which effectively says the same thing, specifically appliedd to month to month leases. There is some leeway on terminating a lease: It shall be competent for the parties to provide by an agreement at the time the tenancy is created that a notice of the intention to terminate the same may be given at any time not less than seven days before the expiration of the term thereof. The notice herein required shall be given in the manner prescribed in Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by sending a copy by certified or registered mail addressed to the other party. But you would have to establish that there was such an agreement (I assume there was not). §1946.1 asserts that a hiring of residential real property for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of his or her intention to terminate the tenancy, as provided in this section. That is, a lease is automatically renewed in your situation unless notice has been given. Moreover, A tenant giving notice pursuant to this section shall give notice for a period at least as long as the term of the periodic tenancy prior to the proposed date of termination. What you are proposing contravenes this provision of the law – from your description of the facts, you did not give notice 30 days before now. So your obligation to the landlord exists to the end of May. Bear in mind that the law imposes obligations on both landlord and tenant: just as the landlord cannot throw you out without proper notification, you cannot walk away from your obligation without proper notification. §1951.2 addresses breach of lease and abandonment by lessee (you) if a lessee of real property breaches the lease and abandons the property before the end of the term or if his right to possession is terminated by the lessor because of a breach of the lease, the lease terminates. Upon such termination, the lessor may recover from the lessee: (1) The worth at the time of award of the unpaid rent which had been earned at the time of termination; (2) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination until the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could have been reasonably avoided; (3) Subject to subdivision (c), the worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could be reasonably avoided; and (4) Any other amount necessary to compensate the lessor for all the detriment proximately caused by the lessee’s failure to perform his obligations under the lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result therefrom. There are, also, no special exceptions about landlords selling their property that allow instant termination. That is, you still owe the month's rent, even though the lease is ending at the end of the month. You could of course ask the landlord to forgive you that last month's obligation. I am assuming that the lease was terminated properly by the landlord. If it was not, the landlord has not legally terminated the lease and it will continue until someone does properly terminate the lease. That might provide incentive for the other party to just forget the last month's rent, but it also might not. | The court clerk was right. A judge is not supposed to interact with a party (at least not in the absence of the adversary) except during court hearings for which the adversary was notified and given an opportunity to attend. Also, there is no need for you to prove the mere fact that you went to court. That in itself is either inconsequential or palpable from the hearing transcripts. When you file in court papers such as a motion or a response to a motion, you may --and should-- bring an extra copy for the clerk to stamp it. That a clerk does with no objections. The stamp reflects the date on which you file your document(s). That stamp incidentally evidences that you or someone on your behalf went to court but, again, that sole fact is inconsequential. There is no such thing as "motion to appeal". A litigant may initiate an appeal, or appellate process, once the judge has decided a case in its entirety or in part. If the ruling to be appealed does not close the case, the upper court might refuse to review the issue(s) appealed until the whole case has been decided (that refusal is known as denial of the appellant's leave to appeal). Your description nowhere indicates that the judge has already made any rulings or that there have been any hearings on your matter. Your mention of prior motions suggests that you should gain acquaintance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and of Appellate Procedure. Those rules cover several aspects of litigation, including motion practice, the allowed methods of service, and the requirements to file an appeal in upper courts. | Concerning the requirement to interview US workers before hiring workers for H-1B visas, this is covered in 8 USC §1182 (n)(1)(G)(i): (i) In the case of an application described in subparagraph (E)(ii), subject to clause (ii), the employer, prior to filing the application— (I) has taken good faith steps to recruit, in the United States using procedures that meet industry-wide standards and offering compensation that is at least as great as that required to be offered to H–1B nonimmigrants under subparagraph (A), United States workers for the job for which the nonimmigrant or nonimmigrants is or are sought; and (II) has offered the job to any United States worker who applies and is equally or better qualified for the job for which the nonimmigrant or nonimmigrants is or are sought. "Industry-wide standards" for the recruitment process typically means posting advertisements and conducting job interviews. Of course, if the company never intended to hire anyone but the H-1B candidate, that's not really "good faith", but this can be difficult for the feds to prove. Note that this requirement doesn't apply to all employers. Section (E)(ii) says that this rule only applies to those employers who are "H–1B-dependent" (which amounts to having a certain number of employees working under H–1B visas) and to those who have been caught willfully violating these rules within the past five years. I am unsure about the rules surrounding federal contracts, so folks should feel free to edit this answer to include such information. | It depends to a large degree on local employment laws. Depending on how the counteroffer was worded, it might have constituted anything from a binding legal contract for employment for some reasonable minimum term, or a totally non-binding suggestion that was worth less than the air breathed while pronouncing it. Some things to consider would include: What are local employment laws like? Do they require that termination be for cause? If so, what are causes for termination? Does termination require any kind of remediation beforehand? Note that in an at-will, right-to-work state in the US, odds are that the employee can be fired for any time and for any reason, supposing the employer hasn't accidentally entered into a contract by extending the counteroffer. What did the counteroffer say? Did it stipulate that the offer was not for a definite term and that the company reserved the right to terminate the employee for any reason, or no reason at all? Odds are any sufficiently serious business in an at- will, right-to-work state would use standard legal language in any offer or counteroffer to ensure that they are on the right side of this, so odds are the counteroffer was accepted with no obligations at all on the company. Does the termination affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? I would say most likely not, as the termination would probably be recorded as being for no reason legally speaking (if they admitted to terminating the employee for seeking other employment, interested government officials could take a dim view of the company's actions). You'd probably have at least some unemployment compensation coming your way. Some professional - not legal - advice. Never accept a counteroffer. Only get another offer in the first place if you are committed to leaving your current employer no matter what. If your company really insists, you should insist on a minimum definite term of employment written into a legal contract which is signed by an executive and notarized. No company will agree to this (unless the term is shorter than you'd want as a full-time W-2 anyway) but if they do, hey, you have some security (if the company agrees to this, have your own lawyer - whom you pay with your own money - review the document). Even then, I would be very, very careful about staying at a company after getting a counteroffer. Don't do it. Ever. Never accept a counteroffer. One comment asks why I recommend never accepting a counteroffer. There are at least two reasons: The reason you are looking for a new job should be that there is something about your current job that isn't completely satisfactory and that you haven't been able to fix. Either you have grown out of the position, don't like the work, feel you're underpaid, don't get along with somebody, etc. If you were unable or unwilling to fix any of these issues without having another job on the table, having another job on the table shouldn't be what makes you willing and able to fix them. Why work somewhere that you'd constantly need to go job hunting to address workplace issues? Unless the company makes firm agreements about how long they're going to keep you around, you have no guarantee that they'll keep you. Presumably, you didn't have one before, and you don't have one at the new job, but the fact that you are currently employed might support the assumption that your employment would be continued at your current employer and the offer might support the assumption the new employer plans to employ you indefinitely. When you put in your notice, it makes the company more aware of the fact that you could leave at any time; while a perfectly rational actor would realize that this doesn't change the situation at all, companies are run by people and people often act irrationally. Perhaps your manager is vindictive, perhaps your manager is scared that you will still leave after accepting the counteroffer. Maybe your manager knows there are layoffs coming but needs you for the busy season. Hiring replacements can be time-consuming and expensive - and employees who are getting offers of employment elsewhere and putting in notice might be seen as risks. I'm not saying that accepting a counteroffer has always turned out badly. Falling coconuts kill 150 people every year. Still, I am not going to add a coconut rider to my insurance policy and I am not going to accept a counteroffer. | are contract terms enforceable that say the employee has to pay the employer if they leave without giving notice? Yes, as long as the penalization is not of punitive nature. The doctrine of at-will employment is only the default condition, but a contract may supersede it. As for the extra question, reciprocity of sanctions (as in leaving without notice) is not a requirement for enforceability of a contract. In general, the lack of reciprocity only signals that there is a difference in the parties' bargaining power, but usually that does not affect enforceability. | This is largely a contract law issue, with little to do with intellectual property. Let's take a closer look at Offer and Acceptance of a Contract. An Offer or Acceptance can be made: Orally In writing By conduct First, you offer your client a written contract, with terms and conditions. Your client refused to accept. There is no contract. Then, your client offers you another contract, orally: We still want you to move forward with the project. We will give you $X as deposit, and then you will begin work. After the project is completed, we will deposit another $Y to you. It is irrelevant whether $X and $Y are the same as in the written contract or not. This is a separate contract, and the original terms you proposed does not apply. Did you accept this contract? From Felhouse v. Bindley (1862): Acceptance must be communicated clearly and cannot be imposed due to silence of one of the parties. Since you accepted the deposit and began work, you have accepted the contract by conduct. This is a contract where there is no terms and conditions besides that one sentence mentioned by your client. Furthermore, you intent to carry on this contract (you wish to complete the project and get the money). This contract has benefits to you for Consideration. Would it have made a difference? Suppose that your client's response is: We are sorry, our company has a weird policy about accepting contracts in writing, 30 people have to approve it and it takes 3 months. Would you take a verbal acceptance? We will give you $X as deposit and you will begin work, after work is finished we will give you $Y, as stated in the contract. Then this would be an oral acceptance of the original (written) contract with terms and conditions. But that cannot happen, since the client explicitly refused your offer. An acceptance must be unconditional. Qualification of terms of offer means to destroy the original offer. Counter-offer means to reject the original offer. Can the client use the deposit as evidence that there is a verbal contract? Yes, certainly. But this contract is not the un-signed contract. Read this conversation, again, carefully: We still want you to move forward with the project. We will give you $X as deposit, and then you will begin work. After the project is completed, we will deposit another $Y to you. There is no mention that your proposed terms and conditions apply, is there? Even if the client, after 2 weeks, come back to you and says: Sorry for refusing your offer earlier. After due consideration, we think your company's proposal is best. We would like to move forward with you. It will be $X for the deposit, and $Y after completion. All your proposed terms and conditions apply. Deal? This time your client is making an Offer. If you accept, it will be a new contract, not the same one you offered to the client earlier. About the money. This is really a case by case situation. Depending on how much the entire project is completed and the nature of the project, results can be different. A deposit is necessary to begin work. The deposit secures the client's intention to carry on the project. The final payment is make after work is finished satisfactorily. Isn't the current situation exactly what a deposit is for? | Are arbitration agreements subject to a 6 year statute of limitations in NJ? Yes. Remember the precedents from NJ that I cited in response to one of your recent posts: a state may not "subject an arbitration agreement to more burdensome requirements than those governing the formation of other contracts" This implies that the statute of limitations for arbitration agreements is the same as for contracts in general. If it were otherwise, that departure would constitute a greater burden on whichever party happens to oppose the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. |
Is "canceling" people tortious interference? Is "canceling" people tortious interference? As a concrete example, Richard Stallman (RMS) is/was employed by the Free Software Foundation (FSF), MIT and other organizations. He voiced opinions that some found disagreeable (For example, he publicly opposed the use of singular "they", and of the term "sexual assault" when applied to underage sex) Ostensibly for this and possibly other reasons, various individuals and organizations are trying to pressure the FSF and his other employers to fire Stallman. Can this be tortious interference? From the RMS-open-letter: There has been enough tolerance of RMS’s repugnant ideas and behavior. We cannot continue to let one person ruin the meaning of our work. Our communities have no space for people like Richard M. Stallman, and we will not continue suffering his behavior, giving him a leadership role, or otherwise holding him and his hurtful and dangerous ideology as acceptable. We are calling for the removal of the entire Board of the Free Software Foundation. These are people who have enabled and empowered RMS for years. They demonstrate this again by permitting him to rejoin the FSF Board. It is time for RMS to step back from the free software, tech ethics, digital rights, and tech communities, for he cannot provide the leadership we need. We are also calling for Richard M. Stallman to be removed from all leadership positions, including the GNU Project. We urge those in a position to do so to stop supporting the Free Software Foundation. Refuse to contribute to projects related to the FSF and RMS. Do not speak at or attend FSF events, or events that welcome RMS and his brand of intolerance. We ask for contributors to free software projects to take a stand against bigotry and hate within their projects. While doing these things, tell these communities and the FSF why. While the anti-RMS sentiment dominated the headlines, it appears to voice a minority opinion, as the pro-RMS letter currently has more signatures. Nevertheless, some corporate sponsors, such as RedHat/IBM withdrew their support of the FSF. | "Cancellation" is generally a result of some statement or action a person made becoming public or having been made in public. Tortious interference requires that the defendant's actions are independently wrongful, such as defamation or criminal acts against the plaintiff. Truthful speech and opinions which do not allege facts are protected by the First Amendment (as well as state constitutions) and thus cannot be wrongful conduct. To apply that here, anyone can react to public knowledge about a person and call for that person to be fired, that is protected speech. As far as I know in this particular petition's case, RMS does not dispute that he made the statements they are attributing to him and using as evidence for their call to remove him from the board. | The issue is that "decompile, reverse engineer, disassemble" is probably too narrow, so they need a broad expression that means "and things like that", but "things like that" would be too vague. I don't know what other alternatives are out there, but this might not explicitly prohibit an instruction-trace on the executing code, and they may want to (although I am not sure what the exact scope of "reverse engineer" is). In saying "reduce the Software to a human-perceivable form", the choice of the word "reduce" is no doubt significant. A reasonable man would conclude that an effort to simplify the raw binary code into something more graspable (such as opcodes) is a reduction to perceivable form. However, a screen dump via cat or a hex print doesn't affect the informational content of the file, it just changes the mode of representation: it makes it perceivable, but does not reduce the software in any way (does not reduce the entropy of the bit pattern). If they had intended to say "render it in a human perceivable form", they could have, so we should focus on the impact of "reduce". I don't believe the courts have given a ruling on the legal meaning of "reduce". | First, read the definitions of defamation and libel be sure you understand them: Defamation | Wex Legal Dictionary | Cornell. Yes, posting to Twitter and Reddit is publishing, and people can post provably false facts on those services and defame someone in a civil law sense. But Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (Electronic Frontier Foundation) mostly protects those services from defamation claims based on statements made by users of such a service. (Things are different if the case is criminal as a result of clear threats of violence, terrorism, etc.) ...what are the steps for them to exact damages in a civil court case? Find a lawyer, convince him/her to take the case, and file suit. if you don't know the person's real name, your lawyer will have to sue "John Doe" and point that out in the suit (and subpoenas) with the alleged Twitter handle or Reddit user name. How would a person compel Twitter/Reddit/etc to disclose the ISP information on their account? Read the various legal aspects of each service, i.e. Twitter Legal FAQs and User Agreement - Reddit and others. Your lawyer can explain that you can only try to compel them to disclose the IP and the ISP used with a subpoena during your lawsuit. How would a person compel an ISP to disclose the subscriber information (address, name) on the IP address? Since most ISPs protect their customer data, you will probably have to subpoena the ISP during your lawsuit. But your ability to do this can depend on if the ISP is a private company or a government entity, such as a university. State laws may come into play. Is obtaining the ISP subscriber's information enough to bring a lawsuit against them? Would they able to argue they didn't post the messages and bear no liability, even if it originated from their network? If it originated from an open wifi hotspot, would the proprietor bear responsibility at this point? Yes, you can sue an individual with such information; but there's no guarantee you'd win. Sure, because they can claim anything, such as someone else was using their computer or IP. No, owners of hotspots are generally not liable, and they protect themselves with TOS you agree to when you use the hotspot. Can the extensive legal costs of pursuing the case to it's conclusion be added to the damages sought easily? Legal costs can possibly be added, depending on jurisdiction. But seeking damages and actually winning them through a jury verdict are completely different things. | Please Note: This was written before the title change of this question and may no longer be applicable According to the Harvard website: In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 US 340 (1991) the United States Supreme Court held that copyright does not extend to a mere compilation of facts. In this case, it was a telephone directory much the same as the one in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the Court also ruled that something more than simple "sweat of the brow" labor was required before copyright protection would ensue, with some modicum of authorial originality necessary. Accordingly, it was held in Feist that copyright did not extend to a telephone directory, no matter how laborious a task its compilation was. The decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) is highly significant, therefore, in that it permits copyright or quasi-copyright protection to be extended to non-copyrightable material through the use of contract. One would have to consider each meta tag independently. For example, the "description" tag could by copyrightable since it is written for more than just the 'facts', such as a subtle advert for the site that is more than an objective description. However the 'og:type' would not be copyrightable since it would just be considered a fact. Now, if you are using it on another website and sourcing it properly, you could probably use it under "Fair Use" Uses That Are Generally Fair Uses Subject to some general limitations discussed later in this article, the following types of uses are usually deemed fair uses: Criticism and comment -- for example, quoting or excerpting a work in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment. News reporting -- for example, summarizing an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report. Research and scholarship -- for example, quoting a short passage in a scholarly, scientific, or technical work for illustration or clarification of the author's observations. Nonprofit educational uses -- for example, photocopying of limited portions of written works by teachers for classroom use. Parody -- that is, a work that ridicules another, usually well-known, work by imitating it in a comic way. A copyright would exist on the image. One would have to know what license currently applies to the image to know for sure, however, the "Fair Use" to copyright would still apply. With Fair Use, the entity type that uses the image is important. There is much more leniency when a non-profit uses copyrighted information than when the information is used in commercial activity. (With, of course, more exceptions.) | I finally found the actual transcript of the voir dire part of the case mentioned in the question. http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2012090614295190 As can be evidenced from the transcript, the judge has specifically instructed the two jurors working as engineers at the local tech companies that they'd have to "forget" what they know about both the software engineering and the patent law itself, too, starting their work on the whole case with a completely clean sheet, using a very simple criteria for making decisions: One side or the other is going to have the burden of proof on -- one side has the burden of proof on some issues, the other side has the burden of proof on other issues. When you go into the jury room to deliberate after you've tried your hardest to understand the evidence, if they haven't educated you on it or if they haven't persuaded you, the party with the burden of proof loses. It's that simple. You don't have to -- you have to make a good faith effort to understand it, but if the party with the burden of proof has failed to do that, the party with the burden of proof loses. That's the standard. You have to -- you, the jury, decide. Now, what you cannot do is bring to bear something that you've learned in some other case, some other patent case, about how some piece of equipment works or something like that. You can't do that. It has to be based on the record here. Then, after a short break and a consultation with the lawyers, where Oracle seems to have expressed some concern to having the computer experts be on the panel, which subsequently prompted the judge to declare the following to the two potential jurors who worked at Cisco and HP: So this is really going to be directed at both of you, but, you know, you come to the party, so to speak, with some prior training that bears upon the subject matter we're going to be hearing a lot about here. That's okay. That's not disqualifying, but you -- it's okay to use your common sense when you render a verdict, but you cannot add to the record in court something that you know about the way software programming works that the witnesses didn't actually testify to. You see what I'm saying? You've got to decide the record -- the case based on the record made here as opposed to adding into it what else you may have known about the way programming and software works. Since both jurors had so much software and patent experience that they couldn't disregard it easily, they were thus both excused (page 95 of 224). All right. I think it would be too hard for you to sit in this case and sort out what you knew already against what is proven or not proven here, and itwould not be fair to the parties to have that extra burden even though you two actually know something about the subject. It's in a way too bad, but it's for the best. So you two are excused to go back to the jury assembly room. Thank you. The other instructions that the judge gives to the potential jurors is also worth reading (starts on page 36 of 224) The full transcript is at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/OraGoogle-942.pdf. In summary -- jurors are only allowed to talk to one another when the deliberation process starts, and, no, they are not allowed to bring any "baggage" to the case at stake. | It is reasonable to interpret the statement in their Github repository README.md as a "public domain" license for anything contained there. However, their "usage guidelines" backpedals a bit ("generally are not copyrighted", the misleading implication that content used commercially is subject to restrictions that educational and personal uses are not subject to). Although it is true that works "created by the US government" are not protected by copyright, not everything associated with a government agency is created by the US government. An agency might have a policy that they will not post material that is not copyright-free, there is no practical means of knowing if an item is an actual government work, versus a government-supported or government-hosted work (where copyright is held by someone else). If you trust their implication that all of those items in the repository are indeed government works, then they are free of copyright. I don't know any reason to not believe them, although sometimes the government is wrong and they end up liable big-time for infringement. However... NASA Open Source Agreement Version 1.3 (another copy on a NASA web page) on first glance seems to contradict the "government work" theory. Here, they claim to grant certain rights to users and also impose impose restrictions (including obligatory registration). This does not make any sense for a work that is in the public domain. The license is legally defective in that it fails to fill in relevant blanks (agency name, title of work, URL for obligatory registration). Also notice that the license is only for software. The scope of that license therefore has to be something narrower – it applies only to software, and presumably software that is not "a government work". I have no idea what software NASA could legally give away and is not a government work which is therefore not protected by copyright. | united-states Under US law, unions and employees enjoy a set of protections codified under the National Labor Relations Act. Some of those rights specifically pertain to strikes, and in particular, employees engaged in "lawful" strikes cannot be fired merely for striking (but they can be replaced). Stack Exchange, Inc. takes the position that moderators are not employees and are not subject to the NLRA. Their reluctance to use the word "strike" likely stems from this position. If the moderation strike were a "strike" within the meaning of the NLRA, that would imply a large and complex set of restrictions on how Stack Exchange may respond to the strike. It would also suggest that moderators, as employees, have a right to discuss their "workplace conditions" with each other or the public - which might be construed to include some or all of the moderation policies that Stack Exchange has distributed in private (but I'm somewhat doubtful of that). Of course, it would also raise serious problems under the Fair Labor Standards Act (moderators are unpaid and the FLSA sets a minimum wage), but that is a different law, and it is theoretically possible that a court would rule that moderators are employees for NLRA purposes but not for FLSA purposes. I have never heard of such a ruling actually happening, and it is far more likely that moderators are not employees for either purpose. Still, it might be unwise to refer to the strike as a "strike," just in case the issue gets litigated. | Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability. |
Is it legal in the UK to 3D print a firearm design if it is made impossible to fire? In the UK firearm regulations are very strict, but I would like to learn about them like in the other countries. Is it okay to print 3D gun designs if I make sure none of the parts can shoot real bullets by using weak plastic that would explode in the hand if fired with a real bullet? | Is it legal in the UK to 3D print a firearm design if it is made impossible to fire? Maybe, maybe not If the result is merely a toy, trinket etc then there is no offence per se. However it will be unlawful if it meets the definition at s.57 of the Firearms Act 1968 of a firearm, or used as an "imitation firearm" to commit any number of offences in the Act: (1) "firearm” means- (a) a lethal barrelled weapon ... (c) a relevant component part in relation to a lethal barrelled weapon ... 3(1B) In subsection (1)(a), “lethal barrelled weapon” means a barrelled weapon of any description from which a shot, bullet or other missile, with kinetic energy of more than one joule at the muzzle of the weapon, can be discharged. (4)(b)...“imitation firearm” means any thing which has the appearance of being a firearm ... whether or not it is capable of discharging any shot, bullet or other missile | The US does not provide copyright protection for font design. As long as you dont distribute font generating programs, that would themselves be copyrighted, you are not infringing. Your derived information is okay because it is derived from a non-copyrightable work and is therefore not a derivative work. https://law.stackexchange.com/a/25673/1340 | The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted. | Copyrights don't apply to the names used. You mean trademarks. You copyright your game and you trademark the name. http://www.reddit.com/r/gamedev/comments/11v69k/using_a_guns_name_in_your_video_game/ Basically, it wouldn't be wise to use trademarked names in your game. Even though it's unlikely you would be sued and even if you were, you could possibly fight it under Fair Use, but do you want to take the chance? If some gun company decided they didn't like how you used their name, even if they have little to no grounds for a case, they can STILL sue. Anybody can sue for pretty much any reason where there is doubt. If they have enough money to throw around, they can drag you through the mud, ruin your business and then just lift their lawsuit. They don't need to win in court, just destroy you. Keep in mind that even if you don't use the name, if the gun in your game is an accurate replica of the real thing, it could still be a trademark issue. EDIT: Something you could consider though is asking permission. You never know. They may simply not care. You might even try propositioning them to pay YOU to have their gun showcased in your game. It's not entirely uncommon for companies to be willing to pay for a bit of endorsement advertising. | Not only can’t you trademark it, you can’t use it The original logo is covered by copyright which belongs, prima facie, to the original artist. It doesn’t matter that they are based in Russia; Russia and the US are both signatories to the Berne Convention which means they protect each other’s copyright. That means you can only use it if it is fair use (it isn’t) or if you have the copyright owner’s permission (you don’t). Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Not if the seller didn’t have permission to make those changes. Creation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights copyright gives. The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. See above. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. They already have copyright. They would need to register it in the US before they could sue but there is no impediment to them doing so. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bounded by any terms of the stock photo website Makes no difference. Just because you didn’t steal the car, that doesn’t make it ok for you to drive it. The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. Not relevant at all. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image. You can’t sell something you don’t own. If the seller had no right to upload the photo (as it seems they didn’t), the terms of the website don’t matter. The true owner never agreed to those terms and isn’t bound by them. | What they teach in self-defense courses is legally irrelevant, though has a practical basis. Under the law, options 1 and 2 are "preferred" because those actions cannot be considered criminal. Shooting a person is potentially a crime (assault or homicide): but it can be legally excused under those circumstances deemed to be "self defense". If shooting a person is justified in self defense, it isn't assault or murder. It is legally "better" to main than to kill, because maiming is less force than killing, and the general rule is that one should use the least force necessary to defend yourself. That is because on the one hand you should not use force against another person, but on the other hand you have a right to live and if a person attempts to deprive you of your life, you are justified to use force to stop them. The degree of force allowed is related to the threat posed. Every legal system encourages putting "shoot to kill" in last place – no jurisdiction favors using maximum possible force in self defense. I think what is confusing you is that as a practical matter, shooting to maim is riskier, and the consequences of erring in favor of less force may be your death. It has nothing to do with killing witnesses (which is illegal), even if that is what they taught you in your self defense class. Brandishing a weapon is also illegal but involves even less force, and is even less effective as a means of self defense. | I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire! | In general this is protected by the first amendment. It is not in general a problem describing how one can one can do something illegal. But there are special cases to be careful with. You might want to do some research into the limits on free speech. It would be hard to provide an answer that fully covers all your different cases and you would need to be more specific about what illegal activity you want to describe. In describing how to do something illegal, you might accidentally share information that you are not allowed to share. When you post things online, this can be considered as publishing or exporting. Therefore certain export restrictions might apply. Also, It is illegal to publish bomb making manuals, with the knowledge or intent that this information be used to commit a federal crime of violence. See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/842. There are restrictions on publishing material relating to cryptography without having an export license. Granted, this isn't necessarily related to publishing things that are illegal, but just to give an idea about how publishing/exporting knowledge can causes problems. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the_United_States ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) sets restrictions on what you can publish about arms. What you publish can't be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” See for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandenburg_v._Ohio. One might imagine that you could get into trouble if someone interprets what you do as inciting or producing a lawless action. It might sound obvious, but you want to make sure that you have the right to share the information that you have. The information that you are providing might be copyrighted in some way. |
Is barter of firearms illegal per se? I want to know if it is presumably/presumptively/normally illegal to barter using firearms. Is it illegal to barter one firearm for another firearm? Can services or goods other than firearms be rendered in exchange for firearms when no money is exchanged? I'm not concerned with the tax implications here, just for the sake of simplicity. I'm also not concerned with the precise definition of money, for the same reason, unless everything is money in a legal sense once a barter happens. For a concrete example, could I legally manufacture and exchange a firearm with another adult for furniture, routinely or even once? This all assumes: No party is a known criminal No party inspects the ID of the other or performs a background check Each party is known to be or appears to be old enough to own a firearm legally One party barters regularly in this manner using firearms and firearm components No party is licensed to sell firearms If this is legal only under narrow circumstances, I would appreciate knowing the nuances. | As far as I am aware there is no prohibition against bartering firearms in general. This would be an odd prohibition since it is legal to gift and lend firearms. However, some of your situations change this. could I legally manufacture and exchange a firearm If you manufactured a firearm with the intent to sell you would be required to have an FFL. If this was a one-off sale of a firearm you manufactured at some point in the past for personal use this can be legal without an FFL. There are some additional requirements for the transfer. No party is a known criminal It is illegal to sell or give a firearm to someone you know to be a prohibited possessor. Not all criminals are prohibited from owning firearms, but this helps keep you safe. No party inspects the ID of the other or performs a background check This is state dependent. Some states make you go through an FFL for all transfers, others are much less strict. New Hampshire does not require private sales to go through an FFL if you know the buyer personally. Each party is known to be or appears to be old enough to own a firearm legally This is required for your scheme to be legal. One party barters regularly in this manner using firearms and firearm components This person is now engaged in the business of selling firearms and must be a registered FFL and jump through all the corresponding hoops. No party is licensed to sell firearms Not typically required, unless you do this in a regular basis. | A financial institution (including a pawnbroker) cannot unilaterally change the terms of an agreement and obeying the law. This section in particular limits the interest rate to 2% per month. It would be illegal and a misdemeanor to raise the interest rate above the statutory limit. They also cannot change (shorten or lengthen) the maturity date of the loan, nor can they obligate you to wait until the maturity date to pay off the loan. They are in a bit of a bind if they lost their FFL. There is nothing illegal about transferring inventory to another store. They cannot compel you to redeem the item immediately, and you cannot compel them to violate the law and keep the item without the required license. In case what happened is that you went past the original maturity date because there is no viable public transportation to the new location and you've gone over the 30 day "grace" period (hence the extra charges), you might successfully argue in (small claims) court that the shop is responsible for your tardiness. The fact that the item is located 40 miles away is not per se an unconscionable burden on you, but if it is impossible or very expensive for you to get there because of the new location, they could have some responsibility to mitigate the situation (e.g. give you a ride to and from). | Generally a person can leave money to any person or organization that the testator pleases. In some US states, a minimum portion must be left to family (spouse and/or children). Aside from that, there is no requirement and no exclusions. US law prohibits gifts (and other support) to a few specific organizations which the government has officially listed as terrorist, and I suspect the Taliban is one of these. Gifts by will would be covered by this law just as gifts from a living person. But if a living person in the US can lawfully make a gift to an organization, a similar gift may be left by will. Even if a particular bequest was unlawful, that would not make the will as a whole invalid. Edit: It seems that the Afghan Taliban is not on the list of terrorist organizations maintained by the US, and so there would be no bar to a US citizen leaving money to that group. There would be to groups actually on the list. The general principle above holds. | Potentially -- this is almost exactly how Pachinko parlors in Japan operate, with non-cash prizes being given out, but with "known" nearby establishments (sometime located in the same physical building) that will buy them for cash. Other options include the giving of vouchers/gift cards as prizes. Whether this is legal or not is a question of if the buyer is "truly" acting independent of the gambling establishment. The general legal term for this is "arm's length transactions". A completely unrelated organization is presumed to be acting in its own best interest, in an "arm's length" manner, though this can be overcome with evidence of collusion. If the casino is willing to "buy back" its marker at a given price (much like Las Vegas casinos are required to do), this can be done with independent intermediary negotiators in a legitimate arm's length transaction. In the Japan example above a "three-shop system" of nominally independent shops circle goods between them to effectively "legalize" (or at least not draw the ire of authorities over) cash gambling payouts. | Generally, "yes", but it isn't a constitutional or federal right. It is a right that flows from the right of the owner of real property to determine who is allowed on real property, and the fact that generally speaking, a concealed weapon carrier isn't a protected class that cannot be discriminated against. Thus, while this is the default rule in the U.S. and the predominant rule in the U.S., a state has the authority to prohibit businesses that are otherwise "public accommodations" from discriminating against concealed weapon holders if a state wishes to do so. I wouldn't be surprised if there were some exceptions, either for all concealed weapon holders, or for some subclass of them (e.g. undercover police officers). For example, a law review note, a.k.a. student written law review article, cited in the comments notes that some states require a business owner to post a sign prohibiting concealed carry in order to have the right to remove someone from the premises of their business for this reason. | If the police confiscate a weapon that isn't owned by the suspect, would they have grounds to keep it? Not forever. For example, let's say the gun was owned by a friend or parent? What if the gun was owned by a Trust with several trustees? Third party owners of property lawfully seized from someone else can recover it. For example, I once took legal actions to recover a gun for a client that was in a gun repair shop that was seized in a criminal investigation because most of the inventory of the shop where it was being repaired consisted of stolen firearms and the primary business of the gun repair shop was fencing stolen property (a fact of which my client was completely unaware and shocked to discover). But, that was only possible once the trial was over because the guns seized were part of the evidence in that trial. A similar process applies when there is a civil forfeiture of property owned by a third-party. Could the owner (personal or trustee) recover the gun from police custody independently of a court finding on the suspect? Sort of. But it isn't entirely independent, since the firearm might be needed as evidence or might need to be kept out of the possession of the person from whom it was seized to effect the red flag order while it was in place in a way that that the third-party owners would have to assure. An example might be where a gun is confiscated via red-flag law, where no crime has been committed, but the suspect won't get his day in court for 6 months. Would the true owner, or partner owners if in a Trust, be denied their property or could they go ahead and recover it pre-trial (ie. the day after it was confiscated)? In the case of a red-flag seizure, the existence of the gun wouldn't be evidence in the court proceeding, so it wouldn't have to be retained for that purpose prior to trial. But, the owner of the gun would probably have to petition the court to regain possession and would have to demonstrate that the red-flag order would continue to deny the person who had the gun possession of it until the red-flag order period expired (if ever). If the trustee was the red-flag order target, or was someone related to him (or her), that might be a showing that the trustee could not make. Caveat Of course, red-flag laws are specific pieces of state legislation. Each one is different. Many would provide a specific statutory procedure for how this issue would be handled. For example, in some places, the proper means to regain possession of property held by law enforcement in connection with a criminal case is a motion filed by a third-party intervenor in the criminal case, while in others, the property process is to bring a civil action for replevin (a lawsuit to regain physical possession of particular items) against the law enforcement officer in possession or constructive possession of the property in question. | The general story is that one state does not have jurisdiction over an act carried out in another state. The Wiki on state gun laws claims that ownership in Illinois requires a permit, but the law is here, and in fact the law addresses possession and acquisition, but not ownership, for example 430 ILCS 65/2: No person may acquire or possess firearm ammunition within this State without having in his or her possession a Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued in his or her name by the Department of State Police under the provisions of this Act It is legally immaterial that the word "Owner" is in the name of the card. It is likewise claimed that Massachusetts requires a license to own a gun, but from what I can tell the requirements pertain to licenses to possess or purchase, and not just to own. So there seems to be no impediment to actual ownership in the US. | Yes If it is illegal to transfer money between the jurisdictions then any contract that requires that to happen is unenforceable. This is a subset of "sovereign risk" in a trans-national deal. |
Is the requirement to have any type of degree or certain amount of years worked discriminatory? I am mostly curious about qualified candidates that cannot prove their skill, because they cannot get it to the interview. I'm a developer, but the question is not focused on IT. I've had two cases to be curious about this topic. One time I got a refusal to attend an interview from a recruiter, because I had 2.5 years' of experience with certain technology, but they searched for somebody with 3+ years. But in my opinion it does not even qualify the skill in that particular field, because one can work on side-project for 4 hours a week for 5 years with that technology: that is far less experience in comparison to somebody, who worked a full-time job, plus a part-time job, plus some courses for 2 years. Another case is I was refused an interview was because I haven't got a bachelor's degree. But on the other side, I have almost 4 years of employment in industry and chances are my qualification would probably suit the position. My guess is that some positions require a certain type of degree by law, but is it the case for all positions and does it even happens often? I'm residing in Ukraine and these were Ukrainian companies, but it is generally interesting about laws for such cases in different countries. | Yes. But it isn't illegal discrimination in many places. Laws against discrimination prevent the discrimination based on forbidden categories. Take the national Olympic team: They are allowed to discriminate based on athletic performance, obviously. They are allowed to discriminate based on gender. There are men's teams and women's teams, and men cannot simply apply for a slot on the women's team. They are not allowed to discriminate based on sexual orientation. Discrimination based on a minimum age might be legal, discrimination based on a maximum age probably not. For an employer, it is legal in many places to discriminate based on (formal) qualifications, but not to discriminate based on sexual orientation or race. (It may be legal to discriminate based on nationality, however ...) | To my knowledge, using protected post nominal letters that are related to a professional organization, like M.D. or P.Eng. are enforced by state/provincial organizations that can take legal action against anyone using that title improperly. But with BA, BS, BBA, or others there is no organization that protects these, so what are the legal ramifications here? In the U.S., there is no generalized governmental regulation of degree quality. There are private accreditation bodies, and in some fields, a degree from an accredited institution from a body that the government recognizes as legitimate is necessary to obtain licensure. This said, using post-nominal letters for an undergraduate degree would be a "yellow flag" in the U.S. and is rarely done (and when done is probably most often done for a Bachelor of Fine Arts, BFA, which presents particularly tricky questions of what is a legitimate degree or institution). Likewise, one would need to distinguish between "degree mill" degrees and honorary degrees awarded by institutions to recognize someone's non-educational life achievements, rather than their earned degree work. More often, in the U.S., a degree would be listed only in a resume or website biography. Of course, this is strictly a matter of regional custom. In Tanzania, for example, it is common to use as many post-nominal letters are possible, often including post-nominal letters for a high school diploma and short certification classes (e.g. CPR training), as well as a primary professional certification, and it is common practice to include both a post-nominal professional certification and the degree qualifying one for it, rather than only the former as in the U.S. (e.g. "J.D., Esq.", rather than merely "Esq.") Would using the post-nominal letters, B.A. be illegal in anyway? If the person didn't actually get the degree from the degree mill, it would be fraud, but if they did get a degree, even from a dubious institution, it would be legal in the U.S. Note that this is just how the law happens to be right now. The U.S. Fair Trade Commission (FTC) or Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), or a state deceptive trade practices act, could easily make it illegal to claim a degree from a degree mill without full disclosure that it is a degree mill (the law can't completely bar truthful speech under the 1st Amendment in the U.S.) by defining what sort of accreditation an institution must have to qualify to be described by an unexplained representation. Would it give legal grounds for firing? The vast majority of non-union, private sector, non-senior management employment in the U.S. (outside Montana) is employment at will. An employee at will can be fired at any time for any reason that is not a violation of a discrimination law (which this reason would not be). If an employee were in a protected class and alleged discriminatory firing based upon membership in that class, and the employer asserted that the diploma mill degree was the reason for firing, which on its face is non-discriminatory and not based upon a protected class, a finder of fact would have to determine if the diploma mill degree basis for firing was sincerely the reason that the employee was fired, or was merely a pretext for an actual illegal discriminatory reason. If it was the sincere reason for firing someone rather than a discriminatory reason, the employer would not have employment discrimination liability. The only ramification of firing someone without cause is that they are entitled to unemployment insurance benefits, which someone fired for cause, or someone who voluntarily quits, is not entitled to receive. But the discovery that someone has a degree from a degree mill, while not illegal, might still be considered misleading enough to constitute good cause for firing, so unemployment eligibility if someone were fired for this reason in the U.S. (outside Montana which does not have employment at will and requires severance payments if someone if fired without sufficient grounds to do so) would be 50-50. Montana In Montana, in contrast, the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act passed in 1987 sets forth certain rights and remedies with respect to wrongful discharge. The act declares a discharge is wrongful for employees who would be employees at will in other states, only if: It was in retaliation for the employee’s refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy; The discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer’s probationary period of employment; or The employer violated the express provisions of its own written personnel policy. An employee’s failure to adequately perform the task for which they were employed, an employee’s negligence to working lawfully, the employer’s company being dissolved or the interruption of business for any other reason are all lawful excuses for firing an employee. In Montana, for purposes of this statute: "Good cause" means reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business reason. The legal use of a lawful product by an individual off the employer's premises during nonworking hours is not a legitimate business reason, unless the employer acts within the provisions of 39-2-313(3) or (4). It isn't obvious if an employee representing that the employee has a degree mill diploma in an application that is not fully disclosed would or would not qualify "good cause" so it would be determined on a case by case basis under the relevant case law (if any). The remedy for wrongful discharge in Montana under the state act alone is a severance payment, rather than reinstatement or the greater damages awardable in a discrimination lawsuit. What about suing for damages against a consultant? Not clear what is being asked in this question. Who is the "consultant" in relation to whom? If the "employee" were actually an independent contractor (i.e. a "consultant") for the "employer", the "employer" would not have grounds to sue the independent contractor based upon the degree representation (if factually true, even though it was deceptive) and the independent contractor would probably have grounds to sue for breach of contract if fired for this reason (unless the contract has a termination without cause provision). An independent contractor fired without cause is not entitled to unemployment insurance in the U.S. in most cases, outside the pandemic specific unemployment program for gig workers. Also, the "employer" would be hard pressed to show damages from the misleading representation. Of course, there would also be exceptions. Under a variety of circumstances, when there are damages (e.g. if a client of the employer cancels its profitable contract with the employer upon learning that the employee providing high end consulting services to it had a degree from a degree mill) even a factually true statement that is misleading can be actionable. Among the circumstances where this can happen are: State deceptive trade practices act often raise a higher bar. Representations made to someone in a "confidential relationship" with the employee (e.g. a close relative, a parishioner at a church where the employee is a member of the clergy, a beneficiary of a trust where the employee is a trustee, etc.) are held to a higher standard. Representations made in connection with the sale of securities (e.g. stocks and bonds of a business sold to a passive investor, in which the employee's credentials are listed in a way that tends to mislead) are held to a higher standard. The employee actually knows that the employer has a misapprehension regarding where the employee got a degree (often degree mills have institution names that are confusingly similar to well respected colleges and universities) and fails to correct. For example, say that the employee got a bachelor of science in mathematics degree from "Columbia College" a for profit college in Aurora, Colorado, based upon three and a half years of "life experience" credit that wasn't even verified and three classes which 50 pages textbooks and an easy and short final exam with half a dozen basic high school level math questions each. But at an interview, the employer says, immediately after the employee names the institution from which the employee dot the degree, "so how did you like living in Manhattan for four years" (where the employee never lived, but where prestigious Columbia University is located). The employee might have a common law duty to disclose that the interviewer was confused. On the other hand, there is a "shame on you, shame on me" aspect to the law of misrepresentation, where the employer can be faulted for failure to exercise due diligence regarding a point that is material to the employer. Also, some sort of damages claim would be only authorized if the misleading statement was material. If the employee is a maid in a hotel, or flips burgers, it isn't material. If the employee is a management consultant who provides services on behalf of the employer, or a degree is listed as a job requirement in the posting for the position, it probably is material. If the "consultant" were the person who helped the employee get the degree mill degree, or advised the employee to use it, the employee would have grounds to sue the consultant only if the consultant engaged in some sort of deceptive trade practice or misrepresentation in marketing the degree mill degree. It isn't impossible that such a suit could prevail (often degree mills are misleading themselves to potential purchasers of degrees). But the OP has no facts that suggest this possibility and the degree mill probably has few assets from which a disgruntled consumer who prevails could collect. Also, the degree mill would have a credible defense that it didn't claim accreditation from an institution that didn't accredit it (if true, not that often degree mills create bogus accreditation organizations to endorse them), and that the employee was not justified in relying on the belief that a degree obtained without doing real college quality work for a nominal price would be treated the same as a degree from an ordinary college with a respected accreditation body. Comparative Law, In General Some countries are much less lax about claims of degrees than the U.S. For example, in Germany (and a number of neighboring central European countries like Austria and the Czech Republic) representations about degrees earned are highly regulated and it is usually both a crime and a tort to violate those regulations, and there have been a number of high profile cases of misrepresentations of this kind in business and among elected officials. This is in the context of an economy where almost every occupation (even, e.g., waiting tables in a restaurant in some places) requires a professional certification, regulation of business is more pervasive, and free speech protections are not as absolute. In the 19th century and early 20th century, U.S. and U.K. legal protections for employees were weaker, and regulation of fraud was even more lax than it is today, so the likelihood of a legal remedy for any party in this situation was even smaller. Many countries in the developing world have levels of economic regulation, in practice at least, similar to the U.S. and U.K. in the 19th century. Canada Canada doesn't have employment at will for non-management, non-union, private sector employees who have been employed for at least twelve months, so the "unjust dismissal" analysis or wrongful dismissal analysis there would be different. Federally regulated employers in Canada are subject to the "unjust dismissal" regimes below (which the grounds undefined for the most part and a reinstatement remedy possible), while other employees are entitled to remedies for wrongful dismissal (for which reinstatement is not a possible remedy). The federally regulated employees are: Air transportation Banks Grain elevators, feed and seed mills, feed warehouses and grain-seed cleaning plants First Nations Band Councils Most federal Crown corporations, for example, Canada Post Corporation Port services, marine shipping, ferries, tunnels, canals, bridges and pipelines (oil and gas) that cross international or provincial borders Radio and television broadcasting Railways that cross provincial or international borders and some short-line railways Road transportation services, including trucks and buses, that cross provincial or international borders Telecommunications, such as, telephone, internet, telegraph and cable systems Uranium mining and processing and atomic energy The Canadian Unjust Dismissal statute is as follows: Unjust Dismissal 240 (1) Subject to subsections (2) and 242(3.1), a person who has been dismissed and considers the dismissal to be unjust may make a complaint in writing to the Head if the employee (a) has completed 12 consecutive months of continuous employment by an employer; and (b) is not a member of a group of employees subject to a collective agreement. (1.1) A person shall not make a complaint under subsection (1) if they have made a complaint that is based on substantially the same facts under either subsection 246.1(1) or 247.99(1), unless that complaint has been withdrawn. (2) Subject to subsection (3), a complaint under subsection (1) shall be made within ninety days from the date on which the person making the complaint was dismissed. (3) The Head may extend the period set out in subsection (2) (a) if the Head is satisfied that a complaint was made in that period to a government official who had no authority to deal with the complaint but that the person making the complaint believed the official had that authority; or (b) in any circumstances that are prescribed by regulation. 241 (1) If an employer dismisses a person described in subsection 240(1), the person who was dismissed or the Head may make a request in writing to the employer to provide a written statement giving the reasons for the dismissal, and any employer who receives such a request must provide the person who made the request with such a statement within 15 days after the request is made. (2) On receipt of a complaint made under subsection 240(1), the Head must endeavour to assist the parties to the complaint to settle the complaint. (3) If a complaint is not settled under subsection (2) within the period that the Head considers to be reasonable in the circumstances, the Head must, on the written request of the person who made the complaint that the complaint be referred to the Board, deliver to the Board the complaint made under subsection 240(1), any written statement giving the reasons for the dismissal provided under subsection (1) and any other statements or documents that the Head has that relate to the complaint. (4) If the person who made the complaint does not reply to a written communication from the Head within a period that the Head considers to be reasonable in the circumstances and a period of at least 30 days, or any longer period that may be prescribed by regulation, have elapsed from the day on which the complaint was made, the Head may give written notice to the person who made the complaint that they have the period of 30 days, or any longer period that may be prescribed by regulation, set out in the notice to make a written request that the complaint be referred to the Board. (5) Subject to the regulations, if the person who made the complaint does not, within the period set out in the notice, make a written request that the complaint be referred to the Board, the Head may deem the complaint to be withdrawn. 241.1 (1) If the Board is satisfied that the complainant must take measures before the Board may continue to deal with the complaint referred to it under subsection 241(3), it may, at any time, suspend consideration of the complaint, in whole or in part. (2) If the Board suspends consideration of a complaint, the Board shall notify the complainant in writing and specify in the notice (a) the measures that the complainant must take; and (b) the period within which they must take those measures. (3) The suspension ends when, in the Board’s opinion, the measures specified in the notice have been taken. 241.2 (1) The Board may reject a complaint referred to it under subsection 241(3), in whole or in part, (a) if the Board is satisfied that (i) the complaint is not within its jurisdiction, (ii) the complaint is frivolous, vexatious or not made in good faith, (iii) the complaint has been settled in writing between the employer and the complainant, (iv) there are other means available to the complainant to resolve the subject matter of the complaint that the Board considers should be pursued, or (v) the subject matter of the complaint has been adequately dealt with through recourse obtained before a court, tribunal, arbitrator or adjudicator; or (b) if consideration of the complaint was suspended under subsection 241.1(1) and if, in the Board’s opinion, the measures specified in the notice under subsection 241.1(2) were not taken within the specified period. (2) If the Board rejects a complaint, it shall notify the complainant in writing, with reasons. (3) Subject to subsection (3.1), the Board, after a complaint has been referred to it, shall (a) consider whether the dismissal of the person who made the complaint was unjust and render a decision thereon; and (b) send a copy of the decision with the reasons therefor to each party to the complaint and to the Minister. (3.1) No complaint shall be considered by the Board under subsection (3) in respect of a person if (a) that person has been laid off because of lack of work or because of the discontinuance of a function; or (b) a procedure for redress has been provided under Part I or Part II of this Act or under any other Act of Parliament. (4) If the Board decides under subsection (3) that a person has been unjustly dismissed, the Board may, by order, require the employer who dismissed the person to (a) pay the person compensation not exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to the remuneration that would, but for the dismissal, have been paid by the employer to the person; (b) reinstate the person in his employ; and (c) do any other like thing that it is equitable to require the employer to do in order to remedy or counteract any consequence of the dismissal. 243 (1) Every order of the Board is final and shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court. (2) No order shall be made, process entered or proceeding taken in any court, whether by way of injunction, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto or otherwise, to question, review, prohibit or restrain the Board in any proceedings under section 242. 244 (1) Any person affected by an order of the Board under subsection 242(4), or the Head on the request of such a person, may, after 14 days from the day on which the order is made, or from the day provided in the order for compliance, whichever is later, file in the Federal Court a copy of the order, exclusive of reasons. (2) On filing in the Federal Court under subsection (1), an order of the Board shall be registered in the Court and, when registered, has the same force and effect, and all proceedings may be taken in respect of it, as if the order were a judgment obtained in that Court. 245 For the purposes of this Division, the Governor in Council may make regulations (a) defining the absences from employment that shall be deemed not to have interrupted continuity of employment; (b) prescribing circumstances for the purposes of paragraph 240(3)(b); (c) prescribing periods for the purposes of subsection 241(4); (d) prescribing the circumstances under which a complaint is not to be deemed to be withdrawn under subsection 241(5); and (e) prescribing the conditions that are to be met before a complaint may be deemed to be withdrawn under subsection 241(5). 246 (1) No civil remedy of an employee against his employer is suspended or affected by sections 240 to 245. (2) Section 189 applies for the purposes of this Division. The statute itself is vague concerning what constitutes "unjust dismissal". Apart from federally regulated employees, in Canada, a private sector employer who is not federally regulated has the right to terminate a non-union employee in one of two ways: a) for cause without notice (getting fired), without payment of a severance package. b) termination without cause, after giving the employee reasonable notice or payment of severance package. One of the main relevant statutes is Canada’s ESA (Employment Standards Act) (British Columbia's version is here). The operative section of the statute states: Liability resulting from length of service 63 (1)After 3 consecutive months of employment, the employer becomes liable to pay an employee an amount equal to one week's wages as compensation for length of service. (2)The employer's liability for compensation for length of service increases as follows: (a)after 12 consecutive months of employment, to an amount equal to 2 weeks' wages; (b)after 3 consecutive years of employment, to an amount equal to 3 weeks' wages plus one additional week's wages for each additional year of employment, to a maximum of 8 weeks' wages. (3)The liability is deemed to be discharged if the employee (a)is given written notice of termination as follows: (i)one week's notice after 3 consecutive months of employment; (ii)2 weeks' notice after 12 consecutive months of employment; (iii)3 weeks' notice after 3 consecutive years of employment, plus one additional week for each additional year of employment, to a maximum of 8 weeks' notice; (b)is given a combination of written notice under subsection (3) (a) and money equivalent to the amount the employer is liable to pay, or (c)terminates the employment, retires from employment, or is dismissed for just cause. (4)The amount the employer is liable to pay becomes payable on termination of the employment and is calculated by (a)totalling all the employee's weekly wages, at the regular wage, during the last 8 weeks in which the employee worked normal or average hours of work, (b)dividing the total by 8, and (c)multiplying the result by the number of weeks' wages the employer is liable to pay. (5)For the purpose of determining the termination date under this section, the employment of an employee who is laid off for more than a temporary layoff is deemed to have been terminated at the beginning of the layoff. (6)If, after 3 consecutive months of employment, an employee gives notice of termination to the employer and the employer terminates the employment during that notice period, the employer is liable to pay the employee an amount equal to the lesser of (a)an amount in money equal to the wages the employee would have earned for the remainder of the notice period, or (b)an amount in money equal to the amount the employer is liable to pay on termination. Like "unjust dismissal", the term "just cause" for a dismissal is not well defined in the statute itself, although case law and regulations may provide further guidance. The act prohibits misleading statements by an employer in hiring, but doesn't expressly regulate misleading statements by an employee in hiring. | Does "in the course of providing services" mean "during the same time as providing services" or "for the purpose of providing services" or something else? I ask because I am a programmer who will be working on my own project during the same period as I am providing services to this Client, but after-hours and not for the same purpose or business. I want to make sure that what I create for myself I will own. The best definitions that come to mind off the cuff are "related to" and "in connection with", and both of those phrases appear in the same sentence, so that is quite close to the mark. Black's Law Dictionary (5th edition 1979) (from my hard copy edition) defines "in the course of employment" as follows (citation omitted): The phase "in the course of" employment, as used in worker's compensation acts, related to time, place and circumstances under which accident occurred, and means injury happened while worker was at work in his or her employer's service. Dictionary.com defines "in the course of" as: during the course of. In the process or progress of The best definition I gleaned from relevant case law is as follows: [A]n invention made or conceived in performing, or as a result of performing, the work required by a contract is made or conceived "in the course of" that contract. That would be true even though the invention was not specifically sought in the terms of the contract. An invention is made or conceived "under" a contract when it is made or conceived during the life of the contract and the invention is, in whole or in part, specifically provided for by that contract. Fitch v. Atomic Energy Commn., 491 F.2d 1392, 1395 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1974). The law which forms the background against which the contract term in question is drafted is discussed in the following language from a Federal Circuit patent law case: The general rule is that an individual owns the patent rights to the subject matter of which he is an inventor, even though he conceived it or reduced it to practice in the course of his employment. There are two exceptions to this rule: first, an employer owns an employee's invention if the employee is a party to an express contract to that effect; second, where an employee is hired to invent something or solve a particular problem, the property of the invention related to this effort may belong to the employer. Both exceptions are firmly grounded in the principles of contract law that allow parties to freely structure their transactions and obtain the benefit of any bargains reached. Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A similar contact is applied in the case Greene v. Ablon, 794 F.3d 133, 142 (1st Cir. 2015), but the term was not defined or disputed in that case. This case is still useful, however, for purposes of seeing the kind of issues that are typically raised in a case like this one and to assure yourself that the contract probably is enforceable. For the purposes of this question, the difference between an employee and an independent contractor is immaterial. | This question concerns Dutch law. Specifically, the Wet op het hoger onderwijs en wetenschappelijk onderzoek ("WHW") is applicable, as well as further rules seth forth by the Board of your university. Pursuant to Article 7.10(2) WHW, a degree is completed once all study elements (individual exams) of the degree program are graded/completed, insofar the examencommissie (Examination Board) has not called for an additional investigation into the knowledge, understanding and skills of the candidate. Once a degree is completed, the University Board must grant the candidate the applicable degree pursuant to Article 7.10a WHW (e.g. by declaring that you are now a Master of Science). Pursuant to Article 7.11(2) WHW, the examencommissie (Examination Board) must grant a diploma after completion of all study elements of the degree and after the University Board has declared that all procedural requirements for grant have been met. From Dutch parliamentiary history (Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 31 821, nr. 3, p. 57-58 (MvT)) (which is an authorative legal source for explaining provisions in Dutch legislation), it is clear that with "procedural requirements", the lawmaker referred to obligations such as the payment of tuition fees. The University Board is allowed to make such procedural rules. Therefore, the University Board must grant you a degree if you have completed all ECTS, however the Examination Board may not grant the diploma if it deems that procedural requirments (different per university) were not met. It would thus be advisable to find out (via the university website) what these procedural requirements are. If you request the University Board in writing (ex Article 4:1 and further Algemene wet bestuursrecht ("Awb")) to grant you the degree pursuant to Article 7.10a WHW and to make the declaration pursuant to Article 7.11(2) WHW, the University Board is obliged to make a written formal decision on your request, generally within 8 weeks at the most (ex 4:13(2) Awb). You have the right to appeal this decision before an administrative body. Please note that amicable setlement with the university is in any case preferable. If that doesn't work however, I would advise you to contact a Dutch lawyer. | Are all interview questions that don't apply to essential functions illegal? No. Not all such questions are illegal, but see one exception from California legislation as pointed out by @GeorgeWhite and others in section 432.7 of the state Labor Code. Other jurisdictions very likely have equivalent prohibitions, but questions like the one you envisioned ("What music do you like") would not infringe statutory provisions. Generally speaking, it is lawful for an employer to assess candidates' personality & non-essential skills under casual and not-so-casual scenarios through the use of questions with no relevance to the job at issue. Only in very specific circumstances certain pattern(s) of questions may lead to a finding of harassment or discrimination. Questions related to categories which the Civil Rights Act protects are risky because a rejected candidate would have at least some grounds for a claim of discrimination. Those categories are [candidate's] race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Questions on those protected categories are not illegal, but the employer will have the burden of proving that its challenged practice (i.e., making seemingly discriminatory questions) "is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity" (see 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)) rather than for purposes of unlawful discrimination. | Employment discrimination based on the initial or native language of a prospective employee is probably not lawful under US federal law. Requiring the English-language skills actually needed for a particular job is lawful. Doing "editing, writing, or translation" obviously requires language fluency. But unless a business can demonstrate that it is impossible for non-native speakers to achieve fluency comparable to native speakers needed for a particular position, demanding a specific native language would be demanding a particular national origin, and thus be an unlawful practice. According to 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–2 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (emphasis added) The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has a page on "Immigrants' Employment Rights under Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws" which says: The law protects people against employment discrimination on the basis of their national origin. Following are some examples of employment discrimination based on national origin. ... Unlawful national origin discrimination may include discrimination because of a person's looks, customs, or language. ... Treating employees differently because they have a foreign accent is lawful only if accent materially interferes with being able to do the job. .... According to Nolo's page on "Language and Accent Discrimination in the Workplace": A job requirement that an employee must be fluent in English is legal if fluency is required to effectively perform the position. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency that interprets and enforces the laws prohibiting discrimination, has pointed out that the degree of fluency required varies from job to job, even within the same company. Therefore, blanket fluency requirements that apply equally to the customer service department and the warehouse workers might not be legal. According to Workplace Fairness's page on "Language Discrimination": Language discrimination is a subset of national origin discrimination. Language discrimination refers to the unfair treatment of an individual based solely upon the characteristics of their speech; such as, accent, size of vocabulary, and syntax. It can also involve a person's ability or inability to use one language instead of another. Because language discrimination is a form of national origin discrimination, the same body of law prohibits it. ... Language discrimination is the unfair treatment of an individual solely because of their native language or other characteristics of speech, such as accent, size of vocabulary, and syntax. ... Some courts and government agencies have said that discrimination based on language is a form of national origin discrimination because primary language is closely related to the place a person comes from ... In "What Recent Court Cases Indicate About English-Only Rules In The Workplace" by Rosanna McCalipst (U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, volume 4 issue 2) it is said that: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is unlawful to discriminate in the terms or conditions of employment based on one's race, religion, sex or national origin. There are two ways a plaintiff can prevail. Either the plaintiff can prove disparate treatment, meaning the employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of one of the protected grounds, or disparate impact, meaning a seemingly neutral employment practice puts an undue burden on members of a protected class. ... The disparate impact analysis was first set out by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). From that case and the decisions of various courts interpreting the holding, a burden shifting analysis has emerged. There are three steps to the analysis. First, the plaintiff must establish that the policy in question has a disparate impact on a protected class. Next the employer must defend the policy by proffering a legitimate business purpose for it. Last, the plaintiff can still prevail if it shows there is a less discriminatory method by which the legitimate business goal can be obtained. According to "Avoiding Claims of Citizenship and National Origin Discrimination When Interviewing, Hiring, and Onboarding Foreign Workers" by the Dickinson Wright law firm: National origin discrimination includes, but is not limited to, discrimination due to place of birth, country of origin, ancestry, native language, and may be based on a perception that the individual looks or sounds “foreign,” or any other national origin indicator. I should add that if an employer is using "native" simply to mean "a very high level of fluency and skill with the language" then such a requirement is not discriminatory under 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–2, and quite likely not under any US law. If the employer is using "native" to mean "a very high level of fluency and skill obtained by learning the language as a young child" then the case is less clear, and most of the precedents cited above will be of only limited significance at best. I could not find a case squarely on point where a requirement for a "native speaker" in either of these senses, or indeed in any sense, was challenged. | the company does have the right to "verify the eligibility of the person and terminate the service to the ineligible at any time" is pretty unambiguous. They have assessed your eligibility, determined you don't have one and have terminated the service. They are completely within their rights to do this. If you feel that they have assessed your eligibility wrongly then you can dispute their assessment - either through whatever dispute resolution is detailed in the contract or by going to court if the contract is silent. The fact that they previously assessed you as eligible (or didn't actually make an assessment) is irrelevant. | Read it carefully. "Work additional hours as required by the nature of your work assignments". Does the nature of your work assignments require additional work hours? That's very unlikely. It may be that your boss wants you to do three weeks work in two weeks, but it's not in the nature of your work assignments that they take two weeks. If it's three weeks of work, then it is actually in the nature of your work assignments that it takes three weeks. It may be in the nature of a work assignment that once it is started it must be finished quickly. For example if you are a plumber, it may very well be that once you start a job and unscrew the first screw, that job must be finished. In that case, you can't go home after 8 hours and leave a job unfinished which could be a major problem for your customer. Are you in a similar situation? If your company is too tight to hire enough people to do the job, and deadlines will be missed if people work 40 hours a week, that is not in the nature of your work assignment - it's because your company is too tight to hire enough people. |
Is employment discrimination against obese people legal? Some scientists have proposed links between obesity and personality traits, e.g. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2914627/ More self-controlled boys and girls are less likely to become overweight as they enter adolescence. The ability to control impulses and delay gratification enables children to maintain a healthy weight even in today's obesogenic environment. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6209053/ Better behavioral working memory and better self-reported inhibition skills in daily life were predictive of greater weight loss. Is employment discrimination based on these legal? | Such discrimination will in SOME cases probably be unlawful An employer refusing to hire a person because of obesity might be in violation of the California CFEHA, or the Federal ADA, or both. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (CFEHA) will in some cases prohibit such discrimination. Specifically, CA Code section 12940 says: It is an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or, except where based upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the State of California: (a) For an employer, because of the race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or veteran or military status of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to employment, or to bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training program leading to employment, or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. (Emphasis added) CA Code section 12926 defines "physical disability": (m) “Physical disability” includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: (1) Having any physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss that does both of the following: (A) Affects one or more of the following body systems: neurological, immunological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory, including speech organs, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. (B) Limits a major life activity. For purposes of this section: (i) “Limits” shall be determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medications, assistive devices, prosthetics, or reasonable accommodations, unless the mitigating measure itself limits a major life activity. (ii) A physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss limits a major life activity if it makes the achievement of the major life activity difficult. (iii) “Major life activities” shall be broadly construed and includes physical, mental, and social activities and working. (2) Any other health impairment not described in paragraph (1) that requires special education or related services. (3) Having a record or history of a disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health impairment described in paragraph (1) or (2), which is known to the employer or other entity covered by this part. (4) Being regarded or treated by the employer or other entity covered by this part as having, or having had, any physical condition that makes achievement of a major life activity difficult. (5) Being regarded or treated by the employer or other entity covered by this part as having, or having had, a disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health impairment that has no present disabling effect but may become a physical disability as described in paragraph (1) or (2). (6) “Physical disability” does not include sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from the current unlawful use of controlled substances or other drugs. Serious cases of obesity would probably be included in 12926 (m) (1). Less serious cases might be included in 12926 (m) (4) or 12926 (m) (5). In addition, the US Federal Americans with Disabilities act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101) provides in section 12112 that: (a) General rule No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. (b) Construction As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term "discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability" includes (1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee; (2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing training and apprenticeship programs); (3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration (A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; (B) that perpetuates the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control; The ADA defines disability in section 12102: Sec. 12102. Definition of disability As used in this chapter: (1) Disability The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)). (2) Major Life Activities (A) In general For purposes of paragraph (1), major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working. (B) Major bodily functions For purposes of paragraph (1), a major life activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions. Whether a particular obese individual will be regarded as having a disability under either the CFEHA or the ADA is a matter of individual determination. Not all obese people will be considered to have a disability as defined by either act (and note that the definitions are quite similar). If a person is so regarded, then to refuse to hire that person because of that disability is unlawful. Note that if a person is unable to perform the essential duties of a job, even with a reasonable accommodation, an employer is free not to hire such a person. There are other limitations and exceptions in each act. To determine if a particular person is protected in regard to a particular job would require an employment lawyer or other employment professional with access to the specific facts of the case. | I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify. | That’s legal The New York Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination on the basis of “age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, marital status or disability”. Federal law prevents employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, or gender identity), national origin, age (40 or older), disability and genetic information (including family medical history). What law school you went to is on neither list. If Harvard’s policies break the rules, that’s not the firm’s issue. However, AFAIK, Harvard is scrupulously fair in their admissions program - so long as you have the grades and the money, they’ll let you in. It’s not Harvard’s fault that most of the people who get the best secondary education and have the most money are predominantly white, Christian, and US born - that’s do to politico-social-historical-economic factors beyond Harvard’s control. | Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise. | As Tom says and these guys reiterate (I'm quoting those guys), "Employment relationships are presumed to be “at-will” in all U.S. states except Montana. The U.S. is one of a handful of countries where employment is predominantly at-will". Montana (Dept. of Labor and Industry) also states that they are the only ones in the US like that. Montana Code 39-2-904(1)(b) states that a discharge is unlawful if "the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of employment". (2)(a) then states that "During a probationary period of employment, the employment may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the employee on notice to the other for any reason or for no reason". There is a presumptive 6 month probationary period in case an employer say nothing, but it could be longer or shorter (it can be 7 years for university professors, and I don't find anything in the code preventing an employer from setting the probationary period at 50 years). | If being able to distinguish colors is a bfoq - Bona Fide Occupational Qualification - then you may ask about it or test it and disqualify people from hiring based on the results. In fact, a Jury found that color vision is a BFOQ for police but demanded accommodation and in that case the Appeals court denied accommodation is necessary. Other courts found that at times color blindness doesn't count under the ADA at all. Some federal regulations even demand specific ability to have some 3-color vision, as you need to distinguish Red-Green-Amber. Remember Different color blindnesses see differently, and the following picture illustrates this at a traffic light. Deuteranomaly alters the color picture different than Protanopia, which is different from tritanopia, and then there's the unpictured achromatopsia, which is totally Black-White, among many many other types of color-blindness known to man: Can someone with any of the three pictured color visions distinguish the traffic light colors but or the position in the traffic light? That is the question that the federal regulation for color vision above demands, making it a requirement for truck driver licenses. What does that mean?! For example, a job that relies on distinguishing colors would be sorting or quality control based on the paint of a product. Take for example this sample from the AOA (American Optometry Association) for testing color blindness: Assume the products come only in the colors of the second row, and only those. If you can't distinguish between the ca. 6 greens, yellow, and about 7 variants of red, then they could not have the qualification, no matter what other qualifications you might have, you could not fulfill the required qualifications for the job of evaluating the color of these items. On the other hand, a colorblind person can be especially valuable when you deliberately look for color combinations that are still well distinguishable even to people with color distinguishing impairments - and then being normal does not qualify the Bona fide occupational qualification. | There are two kinds of evidence for discrimination. The primary evidence is direct, that is, statements by an employer, for example "We need to make sure not to hire a ___ for this position". The act of hiring a person that has a certain demographic property is never evidence for discrimination, because discrimination law treats all races and religions (etc) the same, so hiring a European is not intrinsically discriminatory, nor is hiring an African or Asian. Discrimination is also not defined in terms of the sameness or difference of an employee and a supervisor. Another possibility w.r.t. a discrimination claim is demonstrating a discriminatory pattern. However, the law does not demand exact proportional representation of all protected demographic classes. It is possible that certain circumstances would be compelling enough that illegal discrimination could be established, but this would require showing a pattern, and would not be useful in an individual action. There is no law requiring employers to be up-front about hiring decisions. There is also no law requiring posting a job (I assume this is not a government job), and no law requiring consideration of more than on candidate. It might be contrary to company policy. This is not murky from a legal perspective, even if it is scummy from an HR perspective. | Here I assume from your cases that you are interested in the regulation of private activities (with human rights code etc.) instead of constitutional restraints on the government (under the Charter). The constitution only prohibits discrimination in law (or government policies) based on enumerated or analogous grounds. Which acts apply? To my understanding the Human Rights Act always apply, then more specialized acts (such as the Residential Tenancy Act, Labour law) apply depending on the context. Canada is a federal country with 10 provinces and three territories each having the powers to legislate under the constitution (for the provinces) or under federal devolution acts (for the territories). They all have different laws. And in constrast to the United States which is often thought to be less "centralized", in the domain of properties and civil rights (including human rights, employment and housing etc.), the federal government in Canada cannot legislate over these areas generally but it can regulate these things in domains where otherwise belong to the federal jurisdiction (e.g. airlines, interprovincial railways, banks but not credit unions, telecoms, the postal service, the armed forces). Federal laws regulating human rights and employment like the Canadian Human Rights Code and Canada Labour Code apply only to those under federal jurisdiction. In most situations, provincial laws apply and are different for each province, including the list of protected characteristics (e.g. citizenship or suspended criminal records are not protected, at least not directly, in all provinces). So you will have to look at the law in your province of interest. Generally the human rights Code or Act should be comprehensive, but exceptions may arise in other special laws (e.g. union memberships are often protected in the Labour Code; disability accommodations may have separate laws). In general does something .... count as illegal discrimination? Another point is that discrimination is not generally illegal; you are free to buy Pepsi instead of Coca Cola. Discrimination based on protected characteristics is not necessarily illegal; a gay man can choose to have a man instead of a woman for his partner. In Canada, both federally and in each province, what is generally illegal is when individuals are adversely differentiated due to a protected characteristic in the course of providing a good, service, facility or accommodation available to the general public, or in relation to housing and employment. Even then, discrimination based on protected characteristics can be legal if certain requirements are met. These usually include employment or service requirements in good faith, programs designed to improve the circumstances of socially disadvantaged individuals and groups ("affirmative action"), and "traditional" exceptions (e.g. age-based discounts). Religious organizations can also discriminate based on their sincerely held religious beliefs, at least when they are not carrying out commercial provision of goods and services available to the general public. For example, it is not against the law for an employer to provide gender-separated bathrooms (it may even be a requirement). In many if not all provinces, it is not illegal for businesses to give child or seniors discounts. In some provinces, a landlord who will be living on the same premises with shared bathrooms and kitchens is not subject to human rights laws or have reduced burden to accommodate. Insurance companies also often have greater leeway in their business decisions, since their business model is usually and inherently built on discrimination (of risks which can correlate with protected characteristics). There are also social expectations and conditions that "rank" a hierarchy of grounds and circumstances (justifiably or not) which may lead to more or less scrutiny over different grounds of protection and areas of service (e.g. an insurance policy discriminating on race is socially absolutely not acceptable where discrimination due to age in insurances are acceptable and discrimination due to gender is controversial; addiction-based disability claims may also attract more scrutiny; employment and housing are considered much more important and in detail compared to retail discounts). Public policy overwhelmingly favours or at least more carefully consider claims from the traditionally socially disadvantaged groups. that applies to everyone but negatively affects a protected class more In Canada, the discrimination you are thinking of are often referred to as "adverse effect discrimination", sometimes also called "indirect" discriminations, where a practice neutral on its face adversely impact individuals based on a protected characteristics. It is not necessarily separately or explicitly spelled out, but results from the purpose of human rights legislations. The Code aims at the removal of discrimination. This is to state the obvious. Its main approach, however, is not to punish the discriminator, but rather to provide relief for the victims of discrimination. It is the result or the effect of the action complained of which is significant. If it does, in fact, cause discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one person or group of persons obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the community, it is discriminatory. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 536 But not all policies that cause disproportionate impacts are necessarily illegal. Insurance rates based on postal codes may discriminate against areas where a racial, ethnic, religious, age etc. group concentrates. But it can be justifiable as a reasonable good faith business requirements if the discrimination is based on an objective, reasonable criteria (e.g. flood risks or claim rates). The extent that a protected characteristic is relevant to the impacts must be considered. An arbitrary, artificial, stereotypical policy are more likely to be illegal than a considered, reasoned, well-founded one. Does intent matter? A discriminatory practice is "objective" and a good or neutral intent does not prevent a practice from being illegal discrimination. However, evidences of intent of discrimination are often illegal discrimination in itself and in any case, they can be used as evidences to prove discrimination cases and undermine the on-the-face neutrality of an action in question. Malicious intent or lack of can also be relevant in determining appropriate damages awarded to the complainant. Newfoundland and Labrador for example makes this explicit in their human rights law: Discrimination in contravention of this Act does not require an intention to discriminate. Human Rights Act, 2010, SNL 2010, c H-13.1 But the reasoning has been established by the Supreme Court going back at least to 1985 and apply to the interpretation of all human rights codes in Canada (unless an intent is specifically required): The intent to discriminate is not a governing factor in construing human rights legislation aimed at eliminating discrimination. Rather, it is the result or effect of the alleged discriminatory action that is significant. The aim of the Ontario Human Rights Code is to remove discrimination ‑‑ its main approach is not to punish the discriminator but to provide relief to the victim of discrimination. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 536 However, intent or reasons also matter for the proper course of remedy. If a policy that is neutral on its face causes adverse effects on individuals due to protected grounds, it must be eliminated if there is no rational reason for the policy to exist. A neutral policy that are genuinely established for proper business reasons is also not illegal if upon request reasonable accommodations to the requirements are provided or attempted to the point of undue hardship. In general, human rights laws impose a duty to accommodate upon persons subject to them like service provides, employers or landlords so that actions are taken, if possible, reasonable and not posing an undue hardship to the provider, to to eliminate or reduce the negative impact an individual suffers due to a protected characteristic. I heard some residential leases prohibit any open flames including candles. Since many religions use candles, wouldn't this be an illegal form of discrimination of a protected class? Or does that not apply because the rule is applied to everyone equally. The first step is to determine whether using candles are in fact part of a sincere religious practice, the hindering of which would violate the rights of the believer. Simply liking the scent of candles when they read the Book is likely not enough to establish that the freedom of religion would be violated. Lighting Shabbat candles on the other hand is much more likely to be recognized as a religious practice. If a discrimination practice is established at first view, the landlord would need to justify its decision, e.g. fire safety. It is not exempt just because "the rule is applied to everyone equally". If the reason for the discrimination is justifiable and reasonable accommodation is not possible, it is not illegal. Conformation to e.g. legal requirements like fire or health and safety codes is often a defence for private individuals (though the complainant may raise claims against the government). However, a duty to accommodate (to a reasonable extent) still exists, e.g. the landlord may need to consider the tenant in priority for similar properties under its constrol that allow open flames (if available). IIRC they came out with a gaming console that had a video camera to monitor the user's movement. It didn't register well for people with dark skin (e.g. black). Like said above, adverse effects based on protected grounds can be illegal discrimination and can give rise to a duty of accommodation. But this case is more tricky and I didn't find any clear case law on similar situations. It would depend on if the company did all it commercially reasonably could do to eliminate or reduce the impacts. A physical limitation caused by hardware (e.g. filter lenses) may be more easily justified than a lack of darker-skinned training samples in their statistical learning algorithm. Even if a successful discrimination claim is established, the damages may also be limited in this context (but an automatic system that decides on home mortgages and are discriminatory unjustifiably can lead to significantly more damages). |
How to Search Convictions by Statute Section Where online can one find a database of convictions that allows one to search convictions by statute section? I am in Oregon, and am trying to find conviction records held by state court or government agencies filtered by statute section. So far everything I’ve searched only allows to enter by criminals name, in this case I don’t even care about the criminal’s name, I just want to see what the convictions and final fines and things are that resulted from similar cases based on section statutes to get an idea of how a county or state sentences other similar cases for the same statute section. So for example, I would like to see the convictions for say statute section 163.125 Manslaughter in the second degree, and be able to see how the county or state convicted the perpetrator. See list of other statutes. Thanks! | Short Answer Where online can one find a database of convictions that allows one to search convictions by statute section? This doesn't exist. Long Answer Typically, the way the records a kept by the courts in the ordinary course will involve statistical categories that assign one category expressed in words to a case, that may encompass multiple statutory sections or subsections, and that don't capture secondary charges in a case. For example, suppose that someone is charged with robbery, trespassing, burglary, theft, theft by use of a stolen credit card, and tax fraud. In all likelihood, in both most state court systems, and in the federal courts, this would be coded as a robbery cases for statistical purposes, regardless of the actual offenses of conviction. Similarly, the statistical record keeping process might not distinguish between half a dozen different fraud offenses on the books and simply categorize all such offenses as "fraud". Worse yet, it would be common place for the statistical categories used by the judicial branch to be different from the statistical categories used by the department of corrections. In addition, each local jail would typically have its own separate statistical database for people held in its facility which would not have consistent categories with other databases in the state. At the federal level, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, has yet a third (and most detailed) approach to maintaining these records statistically for federal offenses. Also, it isn't uncommon for there to be more than one set of records maintained independently in a single state. This statistical information is typically reported in an agency annual report and sometimes in additional special reports or responses to legislative inquires (usually for budgeting purposes). For example, in Colorado, criminal cases in state courts are maintained i a common database, but most municipal court ordinance violation cases are maintained in separate municipal court databases for each separate municipal court, with the exception of additional state databases for traffic offenses that count as "points" against your license handled by the DMV, and a separate state database where domestic violence offenses that disqualify someone from gun ownership are registered. In rural lower courts, the record keeping is often solely on paper or is in a computerized database that isn't even connected to the Internet. In urban areas and in federal courts, the records are kept electronically, but still aren't indexed or searchable in the manner you would like. With the exception of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, only commonly charged crimes have statistical categories to assign them to at all, with most crimes on the books which are only rarely prosecuted simply lumped into "not elsewhere classified" or "miscellaneous". In addition to those records, the U.S. Justice Department does two kinds of surveys each year which use different categories still. One it does directly in a random statistical survey with a large sample size of crime victims. The other is done through an annual survey of most (but not all) law enforcement agencies in the U.S. on a standard justice department form that gets filled out by some police department middle manager or administrator in each responding agency. Murders are also kept track of in an independent vital statistics records maintained by coroner and forensic examiner's offices. U.S. immigration officials also keep a tally of deportable offenses reported to them and actions taken on those offenses. The contents of the mittimus in a criminal case, which is the final summary statement of the precise offenses for which a criminal defendant was convicted, the sentence imposed for each offense of conviction, and the total sentence in light of which sentences are to be served consecutively and concurrently with each other, would generally not be included in a searchable database. There would be a databased from which you could pull the mittimus in a particular case for a particular offender, but the contents of the mittimus usually wouldn't be searchable. Maybe Oregon has better information systems than most, but I doubt it. To get that kind of information, you'd need to do a freedom of information act request or the equivalent (and pay a state employee hefty hourly research fees), or have a legislative committee or administrative officer within the judicial branch or department of corrections authorize the search. All of this information is a matter of public record (except in "sealed" cases). But gathering the information is very cumbersome. There are a couple of social science databases maintained by particular academics, news organizations, or non-profit organizations, for particular purposes on a sporadic and incomplete basis that have some of this information, but the extent to which the manager of those databases will allow you to access that data varies wildly, and often that is also not complete. For example, my small town hometown newspaper growing up, which published weekly, reported the offense of conviction (by name, not statute number) and the sentence imposed, for every conviction in the city's municipal court in the past week, with the name, age, and address of every convicted offender. Often the prosecutor's office, the public defender's office, and the leading criminal defense lawyers in a particular county maintain private databases of this information that is more specific, and is almost never shared. | On the contrary there are hundreds of federal statutes that sanction civil forfeiture, as well as 18 U.S.C. § 983 (and other subsections inter alia) that governs civil forfeiture. What you seem to be more concerned with is the judicial oversight and regulations around civil forfeiture. The burden of proof varies between, and within, states - in some, prima facie/probable cause is all that is required, in others, a preponderance of evidence, or clear and convincing evidence is required. Just three states require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and civil forfeiture is only illegal in New Mexico. Civil forfeiture is subject to judicial review: a list of notable cases in civil forfeiture is available on Wikipedia. Here's some of the more interestingly-named ones: Marcus v. Search Warrant One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania Marcus v. Search Warrant held that the search and seizure procedures in that case lacked safeguards for due process, freedom of speech, and freedom of press. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania held because the vehicle was searched without a warrant, and the untaxed liquor found thereby was used to invoke the forfeiture, the forfeiture was illegal (the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures). So, what is the legal framework? Broadly speaking, 18 U.S.C 983, as well as state legislation. What recourse is there? Judicial review. However, the procedures vary between jurisdictions. | Likely an extremely hard or impossible question to answer, and may very well be one that may, barely anyone would go to appeals for a sub-1 day sentence, and it searching superior court decisions is far from well-digitized, and there are over 3,000 counties in the U.S.. Since they generally have no binding effect on future cases there is no incentive in digitizing older cases at all. I would not be surprised if during the history of the U.S., certain courts would have lost their past records for example in fires, earthquakes or other acts of God, including of such cases that no one remembered at the time, and no other record existed of any more. If you're lucky, some historian may have somehow answered this question, and is somewhere as a trivia. Also, I have never heard a sentence to be expressed in hours, minutes or seconds, so likely the answer will be a single day which plausibly could have happened where other remedies were not appropriate (defendant not having money and incapacitated from being able to do community service or engage in labor or service in servitude per a sentencing). UPDATED — There is record, in fact, of a 1906 case where a judge sentenced a man for 1 minute in jail for "being drunk and disorderly" "what was probably the lightest sentence ever given a prisoner, that of one minute in the county jail[;]" (The One Minute Jail Sentence) but of course, even less than a 150 years in the existence of the Union, they could not assert that with certainty. | At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case. | In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless. | One place to look is the incest statute, 18-6602, which says: Persons being within the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are declared by law to be incestuous and void, who intermarry with each other, or who commit fornication or adultery with each other, are punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not to exceed life. The relevant statute pertaining to consanguinity and marriage (32.205) states: Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and descendants of every degree, and between brothers and sisters of the half (1/2) as well as the whole blood, and between uncles and nieces, or aunts and nephews, are incestuous, and void from the beginning, whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate. A literal reading of the law with attention to the bold part tells you that the prohibition of marriage between brothers and sisters of full or half blood does not preclude marriage between blood-unrelated sibling. It does, however, not grant the same right to aunts and nephews etc. (including those by adoption), which could engender competing claims about legislative intent. It would then be relevant to look at the Washington analog of this statute, RCW 26.04.020, which prohibits marriage: (1)(b) When the spouses are nearer of kin to each other than second cousins, whether of the whole or half blood computing by the rules of the civil law. (2) It is unlawful for any person to marry his or her sibling, child, grandchild, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew. Here, the blood-relation rule applies to (second) cousins and is absolute for aunts and sibling. It would seem that various legislatures had different intents, in forming these statutes. In Oregon, ORS 106.020 prohibits marriage When the parties thereto are first cousins or any nearer of kin to each other, whether of the whole or half blood, whether by blood or adoption, computing by the rules of the civil law, except that when the parties are first cousins by adoption only, the marriage is not prohibited or void In this case, the Oregon law explicitly equates blood and adoption, and then could cast doubt on the concept of "whole or half blood" as actually referring to blood relationship (although, Oregon is not Idaho, or Washington). Given the literal reading of the Idaho statutes (and without there being any clarifying case pertaining to relationship by adoption), it may take a court order to compel the county clerk to obey the law, especially if the clerk is dispensing life choice recommendations. That is especially so if the law is not clearly established. Montana likewise restricts (40-1-401) a marriage between an ancestor and a descendant or between a brother and a sister, whether the relationship is by the half or the whole blood, or between first cousins That statute also says Parties to a marriage prohibited under this section who cohabit after removal of the impediment are lawfully married as of the date of the removal of the impediment. However, there is no obvious way to get legally unadopted, especially when the parties are adults. An additional wrinkle is that in Idaho under 32-209, valid marriages entered into elsewhere are valid in that state unless they violate the public policy of this state. Marriages that violate the public policy of this state include, but are not limited to, same-sex marriages, and marriages entered into under the laws of another state or country with the intent to evade the prohibitions of the marriage laws of this state. But it is established law that same-sex marriages are legal. The bold section is clearly unconstitutional; the question then is whether if you took this to SCOTUS, they would strike down the entire statute (a number of states still have such language on their statute books, e.g. Montana still declares that marriage is between a man and a woman). At any rate, a lawyer is probably mandatory. | Germany If we actually talk about criminal law, your question is answered by §§ 1 and 2 StGB (the German penal code) – official but of course not binding translation: § 1 [No punishment without law] An act may only be punished if criminal liability had been established by law before the act was committed. § 2 [Jurisdiction ratione temporis; lex mitior] (1) The penalty and any ancillary measures shall be determined by the law which is in force at the time of the act. (2) If the penalty is amended during the commission of the act, the law in force at the time the act is completed shall be applied. (3) If the law in force at the time of the completion of the act is amended before judgment, the most lenient law shall be applied. (4) A law intended to be in force only for a determinate time shall be continued to be applied to acts committed while it was in force even after it ceases to be in force, unless otherwise provided by law. (5) Subsections (1) to (4) shall apply mutatis mutandis to confiscation, deprivation and destruction. (6) Unless otherwise provided by law, measures of rehabilitation and incapacitation shall be determined according to the law in force at the time of the decision. (Note that the last section has been voided in part by the Federal Constitutional Court but this is not relevant here.) which is a legal principle given by the German constitution, in particular by Article 103 para. 2: An act may be punished only if it was defined by a law as a criminal offence before the act was committed. To answer your specific questions with the above rules in mind: The law you are sued for is deleted while your process is going In that case you would not be punished. The law you are sued for is deleted before a case is raised against you (what you did was illegal while you did it) Same answer, you would not be punished. The law you are sued for is deleted after your process is finished (could you question the judgement?) You are out of luck. Only if there would be a new decision for an unrelated reason, your punishment would be taken back. There is a new law while your process is going The new law has no relevance at all. There is a new law after your process is finished (could you question the judgement?) Again, no relevance to your case. In another areas of the law the answers to your questions could actually be different but there would be too many cases to consider for a comprehensive answer. | State governments (and state courts, employees, etc., as part of that government) are generally immune from lawsuits for all liability. See Governmental Tort Liability : 2017 Tennessee Code : Justia. You're really not going to be able to sue the state, the court, the prosecutor or parole officer over what you see as a negligent decision, considering the individuals' previous record or freedom while on parole, and/or whether they are charged as an adult or a minor. Most any lawyer will advise you of this. You could contact a local legal aid clinic Legal Aid/Legal Services | Tennessee Bar Association for more of an explanation and explore the possibilities. |
"accept and agree to be bound by its terms, as amended and supplemented from time to time by Citibank" From a Citi's brokerage services contract: "accept and agree to be bound by its terms, as amended and supplemented from time to time by Citibank" Is it normal to impose requirements like this? As much as I understand, they can change the contract in whatever way they want and don't even ask my permission to do so? | Yes. It is normal. Almost all credit card agreements are drafted in that way. Implicitly, however, changes in the credit card agreement must be prospective only and cannot alter rights that vested under prior versions of the agreement (e.g. charging a lower interest rate). A key factor is that a credit card agreement is terminable at will with respect to new transactions by either party by ceasing to make new transactions under the new terms, or ceasing to authorize further transactions under the old terms. | It is legal and quite common. Your choice as consumer is at the point of selecting insurance company. If you dislike ES enough, that would be a reason to select a different insurance company. It would be surprising if your ES contract disallows pharmacy pick-up, but even if it did, that would also be legal. This does not mean that the government doesn't have the power to break up Express Scripts, under anti-trust laws. There is no clear rule regarding how successful a company can be in attracting customers. | Contracts are generally assignable, meaning that one company can assign their rights, duties and obligations under the contract. Assignment may be specifically barred by the contract, or it may have certain terms (prior written consent, etc.) attached, but if not, a contract is likely freely assignable. Though a contract is not necessarily "automatically transferred" the reason Company C buys Company A is for its ability to earn Company C over time, which includes the contract between A & B. So unless the original contract has a "no assignments clause" or if an assignment is otherwise impossible or illegal, it is likely that A can freely assign the contract to C. | They cannot force a contract on you after the fact. You should leave these numbskulls alone, they are clearly up to something that makes them likely to be sued. I am adding the following: it's not illegal as far as I know to declare anything you want to a person as long as it isn't a threat. "You are now beholden to give me your firstborn makle child." lol, no. | You can obviously write anything into a contract that you like. However, the laws of your country always apply, and the laws can tell you that some things are not valid, even if they are in a contract. Such things cannot be enforced. Things in a contract that are valid according to the laws can be enforced. An extrem example would be a contract saying "user6726 pays gnasher $20,000, and gnasher kills user6726's spouse". Since killing your spouse is a very serious crime, even if we both signed it, and even if you paid the $20,000, you couldn't enforce me doing my side of the contract. What does it mean if we say a contract can be enforced? It means if we both sign a contract, and you do your side of the bargain, and I don't do mine, then you can take me to court. If the court agrees, the court can order me to do what the contract says, and/or to pay you damages. If I refuse, the court has ways to "convince" me to do my side of the bargain. For example, they could send bailiffs to my home, who take my property and sell it in an auction to pay for what I should have paid. They can not in most countries send me to jail. Sometimes one side cannot fulfil their side of the contract. If there is a contract that you build a brand new home for me, and I pay you a million dollar, but I not only don't have the money but am hugely in debt, then I can't pay you. Some people will say that you can't enforce your contract which is legally imprecise. You can take me to court etc., but you can't take money from my empty pockets. I might be in trouble though if I signed the contract knowing that I can't pay you; that could be criminal fraud and I might go to jail if a judge and jury believe that I committed fraud. | While it is true that cash is legal tender, this can still be overridden by mutual agreement (i.e. in a contract). So the legal tender status only matters if payment methods were not agreed upon before entering into an agreement. In other words: If a restaurant lets you eat without telling you they do not accept cash, they will have to accept cash. However, if they explicitly tell you they only accept card payments, they can insist on this later. This applies in both the United States, in Germany, and in Canada (see e.g. It may be legal tender, but more businesses are snubbing cash). So to address your points: As I understand the legality would work something like this: 1) I accept the the contract where I agree to pay with card in exchange for food Yes - however, in accepting the contract you also accept that the restaurant is "cashless" (assuming the restaurant clearly tells you so, e.g. by putting up a sign or by saying it in person). I attempt to fulfill the contract to the best of my ability, but am prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond my control Yes. Since you attempted to fulfill the contract, you did not commit the crime of theft (which requires intention not to pay). However, you still owe what you promised when entering into the agreement, which is to pay with a card. At this point I owe the restaurant the money, but since the original transaction failed, this is a debt, which I offer to settle with legal tender No. As explained above, if the agreement stipulates a specific payment method, this generally overrides the "legal tender" aspect. In short: You agreed to pay with a card, so you are required to pay with a card. If you cannot pay with a card, you have not fulfilled your part of the agreement. It is is arguable that it is not your fault, but this does not change your obligation. Now you must either negotiate a suitable alternative (cash, cheque, golden watch...), or come back to pay later with a card. Also, the business may be able to charge you additional costs, such as extra accounting work or interest because of your non-standard payment - that would depend on the details. | What does the contract say? If it says that they have the right to unilaterally alter the terms by providing you with notice by email, then they have the right to unilaterally alter the terms by providing you with notice by email. These types of service contracts typically have such terms. | canada1 The judgment you have read about is South West Terminal Ltd. v Achter Land, 2023 SKKB 116. The judge did not hold that "👍" is categorically considered to be binding agreement. The judge applied the modern approach to contractual interpretation outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53 and Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral v. Aga, 2021 SCC 22. This requires judges to interpret the text of the contract and indicators of acceptance in light of the surrounding circumstances. Regarding interpretation, see Sattva: a decision-maker must read the contract as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract. Consideration of the surrounding circumstances recognizes that ascertaining contractual intention can be difficult when looking at words on their own, because words alone do not have an immutable or absolute meaning Regarding formation, see Aga (internal citations removed): [36] For present purposes, it will suffice to focus on the requirement of intention to create legal relations. As G. H. L. Fridman explains, “the test of agreement for legal purposes is whether parties have indicated to the outside world, in the form of the objective reasonable bystander, their intention to contract and the terms of such contract”. This requirement can be understood as an aspect of valid offer and acceptance, in the sense that a valid offer and acceptance must objectively manifest an intention to be legally bound. [37] The test for an intention to create legal relations is objective. The question is not what the parties subjectively had in mind but whether their conduct was such that a reasonable person would conclude that they intended to be bound. In answering this question, courts are not limited to the four corners of the purported agreement, but may consider the surrounding circumstances. See also Owners, Strata Plan LMS 3905 v. Crystal Square Parking Corp., 2020 SCC 29, para. 37: the offer, acceptance, consideration and terms may be inferred from the parties’ conduct and from the surrounding circumstances The conclusion about the 👍 emoji was case-specific. See paras. 62-63: [62] ... Again, based on the facts in this case – the texting of a contract and then the seeking and receipt of approval was consistent with the previous process between SWT and Achter to enter into grain contracts. [63] This court readily acknowledges that a 👍 emoji is a non-traditional means to “sign” a document but nevertheless under these circumstances this was a valid way to convey the two purposes of a “signature” – to identify the signator (Chris using his unique cell phone number) and as I have found above – to convey Achter’s acceptance of the flax contract. 1."Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions – while it might not answer your question directly, your question will be here for others who may be from those jurisdictions." |
Is the requirement to have positive attitude discriminatory? Many companies list "positive attitude" as a requirement for the candidates, including job positions that have nothing to do with customer service or management (for which jobs it could be reasonably justified). However, some people have major depression or an anxiety disorder that makes it impossible to maintain a positive attitude due to the mere nature of the illness. Would it violate the Americans With Disabilities Act or any other law to discriminate against such a person for their failure to maintain a positive attitude, given that the disability doesn't prevent the employee from doing their job? (I have to emphasize this part, as many answers simply ignore it). Positive attitude, from the top definition in Google: "In general, having a positive attitude means being optimistic about situations, interactions, and yourself." A few things that I have to clarify due to common misconceptions: having major depression isn't same thing as "being grumpy", as some people here suggested. Both major depression and anxiety disorders are among the most severe mental disorders and often result in a disability to some extent. not having having positive attitude doesn't necessarily mean having negative attitude; there is the third case in this false dichotomy - maintaining the neutral point of view even when someone's attitude is negative (i.e. pessimistic), that doesn't mean that they tend to be quarrelsome or unable to get along well with their coworkers about 3-4% of people in the U.S. have had more than one major depressive episode in their lives, but with proper treatment the illness can be successfully managed in some 60-70% cases (don't think of curing it completely, though. usually it's more like treating type 1 diabetes with insulin, or the ability to move around using crutches for a person with limited mobility), or at least well enough to be employed. the point above proves that there are at least 5 million people in the U.S. who have major depression (and even more who have anxiety disorders), but are able to get their job done without having "positive attitude". answers that imply that the candidate can't perform the job or doesn't have a disability are irrelevant, as ADA does require both. summing all this up: I think that the requirement for "positive attitude" is simply a pretext for discrimination. | Almost certainly not. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendez v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 680 F.Supp.2d 357, 375 (D.P.R. 2010) "This incident, however, is not sufficient to constitute direct evidence of discriminatory animus...[Defendant's agent]'s anecdote could be interpreted as emphasizing the importance of a positive attitude, rather than plaintiff's interpretation that it expressed a preference for younger male employees...This benign interpretation seems more plausible...In light of these facts, there does not appear to be any evidence on the record that gives a 'high degree of assurance' that discriminatory animus was behind the decision to terminate plaintiff" (emphasis added). NOTE: OP's original question was simply whether listing 'positive attitude' on a job description was illegal. OP has now changed the question to whether making employment decisions based on a depressed individual's lack of a positive attitude is illegal. Although I have great sympathy for those with mental illness and personally wish the law were different, my answer is still that this is almost certainly legal. Another example of a court finding attitude to be a legitimate reason upon which to base employment decisions is: Martin v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 809 (M.D. Pa 2000). In this case, the court accepted as a legitimate reason for promoting one individual over another that the promoted individual "demonstrated good interpersonal skills." Id. at 817. A third example is Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, the Seventh Circuit explicitly noted that "[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and we will not second-guess that decision." Id. at 601. It then went on to affirm dismissal of the plaintiff's ADA claim because the employer "said that lead drivers must have knowledge of the mechanics of the trucks and be able to manage the other drivers on the truck through a positive attitude and ability to get along well with others. But the supervisors in charge of hiring lead drivers testified without contradiction that [the plaintiff] had a negative attitude that drew complaints from other drivers." Id. at 601-602 (emphasis added). After a relatively exhaustive search, I've found no case to counter these pretty clear statements that basing employment decisions on 'attitude' is legal. FURTHER NOTE: OP has now modified the question again to add the qualification that the lack of a positive attitude "doesn't prevent the employee from doing their job." IF this were actually true, then the answer likely becomes that illegal discrimination has occurred because then the employee would be 'otherwise qualified' (a key phrase in employment law litigation). BUT, there is an inherent contradiction in premises in OP's question now because if X is a requirement of a job, and Y employee cannot do X because of Z, then Z is preventing Y employee from doing that job. In other words, if a job requires a positive attitude, then one can't do that job without a positive attitude. Ultimately, what OP's question is really trying to get at is 'what if the employer makes 'positive attitude' a job requirement, but I don't think it should be a job requirement?' Unfortunately, there's almost certainly no legal recourse for this as long as it's a legal job requirement because, to reiterate the 7th Circuit, "[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and [a court] will not second-guess that decision." Id. at 601. | No The argument is vacuous in any event because AFAIK all jurisdictions that enforce sex discrimination laws have parental leave (paid or unpaid), not maternity leave so a man is just as likely to need it as a woman. This, of course, raises the issue of discrimination by marital status (on the basis that unmarried people are arguably less likely to have children) or age (on the basis that people outside 'childbearing' age are less likely to have children; fortunately these types of discrimination are also illegal. Notwithstanding, the loopholess you think there are in the laws are simply not there. For example s14 "Discrimination in employment or in superannuation" of australia Sex Discrimination Act 1984 starts with: (1) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a person on the ground of the person's sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, marital or relationship status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy, breastfeeding or family responsibilities: Later in s30 "Certain discrimination on ground of sex not unlawful" it says: (2) (a) the duties of the position can be performed only by a person having particular physical attributes (other than attributes of strength or stamina) that are not possessed by persons of a different sex from the relevant sex; If the job requires excessive strength or stamina, then you test your recruits for the level of strength or stamina the job requires. | Article 15 of the Indian Constitution states that "The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them", thus a government hospital could not discriminate based on religion. There are also specific statutory non-discrimination mandates such as The Equal Remuneration Act 1976, The Maternity Benefit Act 1961, The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016, primarily addressing matters of employment. The HIV/AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act prohibits discrimination based on HIV/AIDS status in the realm of employment, service accommodations, property rentals, and insurance. But India does not have a comprehensive law that outlaws discrimination on religious grounds that applies to private parties. The protection offered by law is solely protection against the government. | Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination. | It is entirely legal to discriminate on arbitrary grounds. What is not legal is to discriminate on the basis of a protected category, for example race. The law say that you cannot favor or disfavor a customer because of their race. Federal law specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, but not age or gender (disability is more complicated). Moreover, the grounds are not arbitrary. The establishment is at legal risk if a customer does not wear eye-protection, and you have no right to compel them to assume that risk: it's a perfectly normal business decision. The law states that "Customers are not allowed to use a tanning device unless the customer uses protective eyewear", and verifying that you have such eyewear is the minimal way of assuring compliance with the law. | You don't have to interact with people if you don't want to If you don't want to talk or otherwise interact with somebody in a personal capacity, you don't have to. Your reasons for doing so are your reasons. Some of the congregation may have roles that require them to interact with Jane in what I will loosely call an "official" capacity. For example, if one of the congregants is a government employee and government business requires the interaction, they would have to do so. It gets a little tricky when there is not a clear legal duty to interact. For example, if a congregant is an employee of a company with which Jane has business and who would normally be the person to interact with Jane, they might reasonably claim that they have a religious belief that prevents them from doing so. Anti-discrimination law may require the employer to make reasonable accommodations for that belief, for example, by getting a different employee to interact with Jane. | Businesses can discriminate against their customers on any basis they like provided that such discrimination is not on an illegal basis like race, sex or age. They do not have to serve you if they don't want to. | No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation. |
Why did the judge allow the state to present the personal side of George Floyd to the jury? I just saw the opening statements for the George Floyd case. At the end of the opening statement of the State, they presented a slide with several bullet points that gave personal information about George Floyd. For example, one being he's a father and brother, etc. All of the information on the slide was completely irrelevant to the case. The state is obviously trying to emotionally manipulate the jury into thinking that Floyd is a "good guy". Why would the judge permit the State to present irrelevant information to the jury? | Opening and closing statements are to state the reason we are in court today and thus are more emotional appeals than factual summations. Consider writing a term paper or five-paragraph essay. You do not use your opening or final paragraph to present factual evidence or cite sources, but rather state your objective and core arguments and what you intend to show in your paper. The prosecution's listing of Floyd's positive qualities is to remind the jury that while the defense will rely on Floyd's criminal past and alleged engagement in unlawful activity immediately prior to his death, Floyd was still a human being and while his crimes did happen, Floyd was important to people and his death leaves a huge hole in the lives of those who knew him as more than just a criminal and the jury should keep this fact in their mind as they hear all sorts of nasty evidence. They are in effect reminding the jurors of a principle Shakespeare said way better than I could: "The evil that men do lives after them; The good is oft interred with their bones;" The Tragedy of Julius Caesar, Act III, scene 2 On the other side of the coin, the defense will have time to give counter statements to the effect of Floyds character as well as discuss the better angels of their client's nature as well. They are summing up the points they intend to show and the facts they wish to demonstrate for the jury so the jury is primed to know what to look for with the evidence. | That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this. | There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement. | If a person A, speaking by telephone to an election official B in Georgia, attempts to influence that official to improperly alter an election result in a way that would constitute frauds or otherwise be a violation of Georgia law, then the person A has committed a crime in Georgia. There are various ways to commit a crime in a place without being physically present in that state. Since there is no question what was said on the telephone call in question (because it was recorded) the question to be determined would seem to be whether it constituted a crime under Georgia law, and whether the Georgia officials think it is worth prosecuting. It is true that a trial for a criminal accusation is normally held in the state where the crime was committed (or allegedly committed). But that need not be in a state where the person was ever physically present. If a person living in State C does business is state D, and is requires to file a tax return with the authorities in D, and it is alleged that the return was false, then the person is being accused of a crime in D, committed when the false return was received in D. | You are correct. A judge may only issue a warrant when it is supported by an affidavit, in which the officer seeking the warrant swears under oath to the facts supporting the warrant. Lying on the affidavit would constitute perjury. But judges very frequently just rubber-stamp the warrants without meaningfully reviewing the affidavits, so the primary form of oversight would be the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge asserting that the warrant wasn't supported by probable cause. If a judge does review the warrant application and finds the officer's statements not to be credible, he can refuse to sign the warrant, and he is free to also carry that credibility determination to subsequent warrants sought by the same officer or other officers in his department. | “Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all. | To what cases is the judge referring to here? None: neither the quoted article (2023-06-02 05:57: Prozess gegen Lina E.: Stadt Leipzig verbietet Solidaritäts-Demonstration) given in the english version of Wikipedia nor the german Wikipedia version (Dresdner Linksextremismusprozess – Wikipedia uses the quote given in the english version. In the article itself, the name 'Hans Schlueter-Staats' is used only once: The arrest warrant against them will be suspended against conditions, said Hans Schlueter-Staats, presiding judge of the State Protection Chamber at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, on Wednesday evening at the end of the verdict. She only has to serve the remainder of the sentence if the verdict becomes final. Assume that, for whatever reason, someone added a fabricated quote, in the Wikipedia page, that is not contained in the given source hoping that nobody would notice (either because the reader can't read German or simply wouldn't look). It would be very strange for a judge whos primary duty, in a civil law system, is to read the law as written, to give a personal opinion about previous rulings (which was the reason I looked: to read the exact German text). Whoever fabricated that quote was obviously unaware of this or didn't care hoping that others would simply assume it to be correct due the given source of a newspaper that has a reputation as being a reliable source. | An indictment is issued by a grand jury when they are convinced, on the basis of evidence presented to them by the government, that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime. However, the indictment only has to state the charges, i.e. the grand jury's conclusion; it doesn't have to describe the evidence that led them to this conclusion. In particular, the grand jury can hear the testimony of witnesses under oath, and has subpoena powers to compel testimony. But testimony before a grand jury is sealed and must not be revealed by anyone except the witness themself. A good source for learning more about the grand jury process is the Handbook for Federal Grand Jurors. The authoritative source is the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title III. So, there must have been some evidence that he committed a crime, at least in the grand jury's view. But we, the public, don't get to see it at this time. If the case goes to trial, evidence will be presented publicly at that time, though it won't necessarily be the same evidence that convinced the grand jury to indict. (Note that this answer is about the US federal criminal justice system, since that's what's involved in the Collins case. Some states may have a similar system; others may not.) |
Can a landlord refuse rent payment with the intent to evict a tenant? I've been renting a room in California, USA for like 4 years. The rent is $650/month. For the last 10 months, there has been serious noise issues coming from the landlord's household. Those are: loud talkers, kids' screaming, kids' crying, yelling at kids, kid jumping in the bathtub,....that sort of things. It has worsened to a point that's intolerable. Last week, I gave the landlord a complaint letter regarding their noises, and he didn't seem quite happy and willing to fix the issues. Chances are he might turn into hating me, and refuse my rent payment to create a not-paying-rent cause, then file an eviction lawsuit against me. Is that legal? And if that happens, how can I prove to the court that I offered him the monthly payment, but he refused to take it? | This would be pointless and wouldn't work. Eviction due to defaulting on rent requires the landlord to give 3 business days notice, in writing. This must include a method by which the tenant can settle their debt. Either the landlord would be forced to accept a payment or this would not be valid. Source Additionally, in this case, there is nothing stopping you physically handing an envelope of cash to the landlord as they live upstairs. However, there is no reason for your landlord to do this. If your landlord hates you that much it would be far easier for them to simply give you 60 days notice and terminate your tenancy that way. | Inferring from the question, it appears that: The tenancy is an Assured Shorthold Tenancy. The tenancy agreement started on 16 December 2014. The initial fixed term was for 12 months. (Please comment below if any of this is incorrect). A Section 21 order gives notice that, unless the tenant leaves by the date given in the document, the landlord will begin legal proceedings against the tenant, in order to obtain a court order forcing the tenant to leave. To answer the OP's questions: Does it mean that she wants to use her right to cancel the contract after 2 months? It looks like that to me but I am not 100% sure. Yes - but if this is before the end of the fixed term (which I'm assuming is 15 December) there must be a clause in the tenancy agreement (normally called a "break clause") allowing the fixed term to be terminated early. If there is no break clause, then you cannot be asked to leave before the end of the fixed term. What does it mean "after 16/11/2015"? After can mean anything... even end of contract in December. Yes. The landlord would like you to leave before the date shown - but if you don't, the landlord can begin legal proceedings any time after that. Is this a legal document or just something she made up? It is a legal document. Section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 allows a landlord to ask a tenant to leave without having to give a reason. The landlord must meet certain conditions in order for the notice to be valid. What happens if I want to leave the house later because I don't find alternative? You'll need to discuss that with the landlord. However, if you don't leave by the end of the fixed term, you are entitled to stay (and pay rent!) until a court (not the landlord) orders your eviction. EDIT: This website goes into a lot more detail about the whole Section 21 procedure. | I do not have a written agreement of her saying she will pay 1/5 of utilities cost. Can I still take her to small claims court to get my money back? Yes. This type of agreements does not need to be in writing. Proving the other roommates' timely payments is strong evidence that also she is under a similar agreement. You did not elaborate on the form of her refusals. If these are stated in writing, they might evidence elements that further weaken her legal position. For instance, these might reflect her inconsistencies and/or bad faith. Even if you were unable (which seems very unlikely) to prove that there is an agreement to the effect of splitting costs, you might still prevail on grounds of equity. | There are two separate issues here. Firstly, the deposit. Any deposit is required by law to either be placed in an approved deposit scheme provider at the start of any tenancy, or be insured with a provider. Either way, the landlord (or their letting agent) is required to issue the tenant with certain prescribed information within a certain period, as well as meet a few other requirements. Failing to do this can result in the landlord having to return the deposit and pay a fine to the tenant - if the tenant is willing to take him to court. If the landlord has done everything by the book, they don't owe you anything. (If they've paid the deposit into a scheme, then they will not receive any interest, as it's kept by the scheme provider to pay for their services.) Secondly, the renewal fee. These are legal and commonplace. However, you're never obliged to renew your tenancy, as if the fixed term expires and you don't leave, then it automatically becomes a statutory periodic tenancy (often called a "rolling tenancy"). With a periodic tenancy, you can leave by giving one month's notice in writing; or your landlord can request that you leave by issuing a section 21 notice, which gives you two months to depart or face legal action. If you tell the landlord that you would like to change to a periodic tenancy when the current fixed term ends, then no-one has to do anything (though the letting agency may charge you an admin fee). The landlord cannot impose a new tenancy agreement, but they can issue a section 21 notice. Or, as you suggest, you can request a longer fixed term. This provides more security for you and the landlord - though it makes it harder to leave early, as you're potentially liable for the rent for the whole term. | Are the reasons (mom can't stay because of covid-19 and the son is too young to live by himself) legally justifiable reasons? Unfortunately, not in this case. The landlord can prevail by arguing that the mom, insofar as a holder of a non-immigrant visa, knew or should have known of the risks of being denied entry in the US. In terms of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 154 (a) & (b), the mom is the "Party [who] Bears the Risk of a Mistake". Since the risks of which the mom was aware include even arbitrary ones such as the USCIS officer's discretion, an allegation of "supervening circumstances" as per the coronavirus crisis is very unlikely to add any merit to the mom's legal position. Is the 8 months compensate reasonable? Although this is admittedly subjective, at first glance it appears reasonable or perhaps even generous (the landlord is proposing the midpoint: half of the remaining 16 months) considering that the landlord is entitled to the completion of the lease. The "8 months as compensation" is essentially the landlord's proposal to settle his otherwise viable claim of breach of contract. You as lease holders can always attempt to negotiate and make alternative proposals, which is what you are doing already. Here, the landlord seeks to obviate court proceedings that can be a drag for both him and especially for the mom because she would be unable even to present her arguments in court and/or quasi-judicial proceedings. A settlement would benefit the landlord also from the standpoint that he would no longer be required to prove mitigation of damages (if that is a requirement in his jurisdiction). And, unless the settlement provides otherwise, the landlord would be free to immediately re-rent the unit without having to reimburse the mom (or the person(s) whose name is in the lease). That being said, it is important for the lease holder(s) to secure in writing (specifically in the settlement document) a statement from the landlord in the sense that, by virtue of the agreed compensation, the landlord waives any and all claims related to the early termination of the lease. It is always smart to be cautious and preclude the landlord from eventually bringing a claim alleging that the agreed compensation was for something else or that it did not fully settle the controversy(-ies). | Your contract is between you and your landlord. Separately, the landlord has a contract between himself and the agency. Your obligation to pay rent is owed to your landlord, not to his agent. Ask your landlord to send you an email (if you don't already have one) which requests you to pay rent from X date onwards to him directly. Then pay him the rent in the way he has requested. Barring some unusual terms of the contract (which you haven't provided a copy of), the agent will not have any grounds to sue you. | However, he wants a new security deposit and a month's rent for the time we will use it in March, claiming that the sale process makes us new tenants. What are the legal rights and legal obligations of an estate in a month-to-month rental situation? The estate is just starting the probate process, and I am unclear on whether the landlord is a "traditional" creditor or in a unique situation since the money he is owed for rent continues to accrue after death. The decedent's security deposit, less valid deductions, is property of the estate, so if the landlord takes a second security deposit he is double dipping. Generally speaking, after someone dies, money judgments that have not been reduced to judgment liens, and unsecured debts (i.e. debts not supported by collateral) only have a right to be paid via submission of a claim to the probate estate in the probate process with claims made paid according to a priority schedule set forth in the probate code. But, generally speaking, death does not impair the property rights of third parties, so the fact that a debtor's estate is in probate is usually not a basis upon which a foreclosure or repossession of collateral for a default on a secured debt, or an eviction due to the termination of a lease, may be postponed while the probate case runs its course. Probate does not have the equivalent of the "automatic stay" in bankruptcy that prevents any creditors, secured or unsecured, from engaging in any collection activity against an estate, and probate estates are not allowed to file for bankruptcy either. If you really wanted to play hardball and only needed the apartment for a few days in March, the estate could simply continue to occupy it for that period of time and they pay the landlord the extra month's rent but not the additional security deposit when it was done. The landlord can't begin a foreclosure proceeding until there is a default which can't happen sooner than the last day of February. Even if the landlord is really on his toes, the landlord will be hard pressed to get a notice to vacate served on the estate and then to prepare and serve an eviction lawsuit on the estate and get that case in front of a judge before the estate will be ready to move out anyway. The estate might incur some attorneys' fees in the process if it did that, but the attorneys' fees would be an unsecured claim of the landlord that would have to be collected through the claims process in the probate proceeding which is usually a fairly favorable forum for the estate, instead of the usual court where small landlord-tenant disputes are handled. The probate estate could simply deny his claim for attorneys' fees and then, if the landlord wanted them after making a claim, the landlord would have to bring a lawsuit on fairly tight deadlines in the probate court to have the disallowance of the claim overturned. If you wanted to be even more aggressive, rather than paying the last month's rent, the estate could just holdover into March without paying rent or a new security deposit (vacating before the eviction process can run its course), effectively forcing the landlord to use the security deposit for March rent, and then forcing the landlord to use the probate claims process for both damages to the property claimed and for an attorneys' fees. If the estate is insolvent, or if the claim wasn't filed by the landlord (who may not even know that it is necessary to file a claim in probate) within the short deadline for probate claims arising after death, those expenses just wouldn't get paid at all. | A tenant has a right to "live in a property that’s safe and in a good state of repair". There are additional regulations possibly applicable in your situation if this is a "house in multiple occupation", summarized here. "Hazards" are explained here. However, these rules pertain to the condition of the building, not other tenants (except that "overcrowding" is also a hazard). They also say you should "report anti-social behaviour to your local council". It is legal to rent a room in the UK to a person convicted of a violent crime, so it would also be legal to rent a room to a person who hasn't committed a crime (assuming he is legally in the UK). If the person did not engage in actual anti-social behavior towards you, there is nothing to report to the local council. The landlord has no affirmative duty to disclose such a fact, and it might be illegal to do so under the Data Protection Act, since this is "sensitive personal data". |
Is it a copyright/trademark violation for indirect use of famous brand names in product taglines? Is there any copyright or trademark violation if a company uses a tag line 'Inspired by [Some Famous Brand]' (Note: This is for the marketing tag line, not logo) The objective is to associate one's design, quality etc to a well known famous brand. Example: 'Technology Inspired by Google Search Engine' 'A film inspired by the Starwars Saga' 'The next Reddit style forum' 'A google style search for your ecommerce platform' Note, the product is not in direct competition with the famous brand. Its just a marketing strategy. | The rule on a tagline is really not significantly different from that on a logo, or brand name. If anywhere in the packaging, advertising, or promotion of a product or service, a registered or protected trademark of another is used, without permission from the holder, in such a way that a reasonable consumer might plausible believe that the product is made by the same maker, or comes from the same source, as the product associated with the trademark, or that the product has been approved or endorsed or sponsored by the mark holder, that would be trademark infringement. Phrases such as "inspired by" or "google-style" might have such an effct, depending on the whole of the circumstances. A disclaimer, such as "This film is in no way approved or enforced by the creators of Star Wars, it merely uses similar ideas" might, if sufficiently prominent, help avoid possible confusion. Comparative advertising such as "far more exciting than Star Wars ever was" generally makes it clear that the item is not endorsed, and indeed is to some extent competitive. That is generally considered an example of nominative use and is not infringement. But the more similarity is implied, the more consumer confusion is invited, and the more the new product seems to trade on the reputation of the established product. That is exactly what a trademark is intended to prevent. | This is known as "film novelization"(For example, the novelizations of the Star Wars movies are film novelizations, created under license), and is copyright infringement unless made under a license from the copyright holder. Specifically, you would be making a derivative work of the original, by changing the medium. One of the rights provided by copyright is the right to control the transference from one medium into another. This, in my (non-lawyer) opinion, is unlikely to be found as fair use. There are four test factors for determining fair use(source), decided on a case by case basis: Transformative Character of the Derivative Work: Unlikely to be found in your favor, as nothing is transformed ("I don't change anything, the name are the same, everything is the same, it's just a conversion to textual form"). Nature of the Original Work: A narrative entertainment film, thus unlikely to be found in your favor. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Taken: You've taken all of it; not in your favor. Effect on the Potential Market: You are essentially providing a free version of what copyright holders can often charge for; negative effect on their potential market. Not in your favor. | A statement by a fictional character is part of the fiction, and so is normally protected by copyright. A short exclamation such as "You are not prepared!" might be ruled to be too short and not sufficiently original to be protected if it were used separately, but that would apply just as much to a short statement that was not a quote from a character. But something like one of Gandalf's speeches on "mercy and pity" to Frodo in Chapter 2 ("The Shadow of the past") in book 1 of The Lord of the Rings would clearly be protected. The longer and the more distinctive such a text is, the more clearly it would be protected. Whether it is put in the mouth of a character or is part of the narration makes no significant difference. Note, in a copyright sense a statement does not "belong to a particular universe", rather it belongs to a copyright owner, often the author, or in the case of a video game quite likely thy publisher. As this comment by Kevin mentions, and as I should have mentioned, reproducing a short quotation from a work of fiction, particularly if properly attributed, is quite likely to be fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more specific details. See also the threads tagged fair use If a quote is used for a different purpose than the original, in what is called a "transformative" manner in copyright cases, then it is more likely to be held to be fair use. The smaller of a percentage of the source item the quote is, the more likely it is that it will be considered to be a fair use. The less the use of a quote serves as a replacement for the source, or harms the market for the source, the more likely it is to be considered a fair use. See the links above for more detail. | More generally, can anyone just copy an existing website (without copying the code or images)? Yes. Could I make a website that lets people post pictures like Instagram but call it MyPics? Yes. In general, copyright protects particular expressions of ideas, not higher level ideas or concepts. | Copyright is irrelevant, because names are not protected by copyright. Trademark is relevant: a name can be protected by a trademark. "Yoda" is a registered trademark owned by Lucasfilms, a subsidiary of Disney. There is a list of goods and services where the property right is asserted, so for example you could get sued for peddling art books under this name. It just depends on what your business does. For instance, a plumbing business isn't competing with Lucasfilms w.r.t. that class of goods and services. | The purpose of such a statement is to disavow the reading of any impression that the person making the statement is affiliated with the trademark owner, because the gravamen of a trademark infringement suit is that the person using the trademark mislead a consumer into thinking that the person using the trademark was endorsed by or affiliated with the trademark owner. | Yes. There is no requirement that a company name be accurately descriptive. One could call such a company "Horror and Fury Brewing" if one chose to, or "Joe's Eats". Such a name might well reduce book sales, but there is no law against poor business decisions. As long as the name does not violate any existing trademarks, it should be OK unless there is some specific law in the local jurisdiction that regulates company names, which seems unlikely. | All of your works would be considered to be a derivative work. This is because your work, is based on the work of someone else's. A good test for this to see if something is a derivative work is to see whether the new work can effectively exist without the original. Most copyright laws worldwide are similar, thanks to the Berne Convention for copyrighted works. Since derivative works are normally a right that is exclusive to the copyright holder, you can't make such works without permission (generally through a license or expiry of copyright). So now, let's take a look: The Mona Lisa was made hundreds of years ago. It's definitely in the public domain. You're in no breach of copyright laws here. Yes, of course. Microsoft retains copyright on their icons, and possibly trademarks as well. However, they may have trademark guidance that allows you to use their icons - as long as you follow it. Likely the same as microsoft - you can assume it's similar for most large companies. Code is copyrighted as a literary work - the layout and visual aspect is copyrighted as an artistic work. That artist retains copyright, unless you obtain the work with a license, or the copyright is expired. If you create a derivative work, you infringe on their rights. |
Can I name a business (restaurant) after a fictional character (Jughead Jones from Archie Comics) I'm far from ready to start a business at the moment, but I'm definitely considering it and working towards being more ready. That being said, I'm mostly considering starting my own restaurant, and I'm thinking of naming it "Jughead's Malt Shop", "Jughead's Diner", just "Jughead's" or something very similar (I can format it in a different fashion, such as Jug Head's, if that helps the legality of this). I'm worried about the Jughead part of the name mostly - the name would be inspired by a very iconic comic book character that's copyrighted by Archie Comics. They would most likely never become aware of the business and seeing that they don't publish comics in my country and haven't done so since 1997 they might not even care...but I don't want to take my chances. (I'm based in Finland - I feel as if this might be very useful information) (Jughead's Diner might be the worst name out of those three to choose because it's both the most boring one as well as the title of a comic book that has been published) | Probably not, without permission. Images of the character are usually copyrighted. The characters themselves are usually protected by trademark. Using the name of a fictional character without permission would imply endorsement by the firm that published works with that character. I've taken day long seminars focused mostly on all of the things that comic book companies do to protect their intellectual property rights in their characters. Of course, if you live in Finland, it is likely that no one in the U.S. would decide to take up the case for a U.S. media property, either because they aren't aware of it, or because it isn't economically worthwhile to pursue. | Generally speaking pop-culture references, like literary references, are neither trademark infringement nor copyright infringement. Trademarks Often a referenced item is in fact not a trademark. Most character names, for example, are not protectable as trademarks, because they are not used to identify the product or service, nor to advertise the product or service for sale. Similarly many pop-culture references which are associated with various groups, events, or products are not being used to identify or promote those things, and so are not protectable as trademarks. Even when a reference is (or includes) a trademarked phrase, it is unlikely to be trademark infringement. As long as the user of the trademarked term or phrase is not using it so as to identify the product or service where it is used, is not using it to advertise or promote that product or service, is not using it in such a way as to cause confusion by reasonable people on what the source of the product or service is, and is not using it so as to falsely state or imply that the product ore service is endorsed, sponsore, or approved by the owner of the trademark, then the use is not in fringement. One may use a trademark to identify a related product or service, to indicate compatibility, or to make comparative claims, and that is nominative use (using the mark as the name of the thing marked). Nominative use is specifically not infringement. Copyright Names, taglines, titles, mottos, and other short phrases are not protected by copyright at all. See the US Copyright office Circular 33 -- Works Not Protected by Copyright, where it is stated: Words and short phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans, are uncopyrightable because they contain an insufficient amount of authorship. The Office will not register individual words or brief combinations of words, even if the word or short phrase is novel, , distinctive, or lends itself to a play on words. This circulart includes as exMPLES: The name of a character Catchwords or catchphrases Mottos, slogans, or other short expression As I wrote in https://writing.stackexchange.com/questions/60965/what-are-the-fair-use-rules-in-the-usa-for-short-quotes-from-books-or-song-lyric Literary references, including short quotes, to other works of fiction are commonly allowed as fair use. They are usually appropriately attributed. There are several reasons for this. Such references normally do not serve as a replacement for the original. They normally do not harm the market, actual or potential for the original. And they are often transformative, that is, they re-user has a different purpose and achieves a different effect from the original. All of these factors are important in fair-use decisions, and all lean toward fair use for literary or pop-culture references. In fact, there are few cases to cite on such references, because it is so widely accepted that they would be fair uses that no on ever sues over them. | Words themselves are not protected by copyright. Curated lists of words, however, are (what's protected is the artful collection of words chosen for a purpose). Hence Hasbro owns the copyright in the list of playable words, though it is a matter for future possible litigation to see if the courts agree. If you have permission from the copyright holder, that permission (license) should state how you can use the list (it does not matter if there is a title). However, you may need to obtain the list from the copyright holder. The website operator presumably already has a license, the terms of which may allow them to prevent you from copying from the website. E.g. the author may have granted the website operator the right to use the list as long as they don't restrict redistribution; but that license may also require restricting redistribution. So you also have to study the website terms of use – or get a copy directly from the copyright holder (assuming that that is the original author). | No When I go into my grocery store, I can use the lettuce if I pay for it. The grocer does not explicitly state that I can't use the lettuce if I don't pay for it but that doesn't mean I can. Replace "lettuce" with "software" (or any other property you don't own) and you have the same situation. | No, this is not true. Copyright can be enforced selectively. You are confusing copyright with trademark. Company can lose its trademark if they aren't protecting it. All the meanwhile they can choose to ignore some copyright infringement while enforcing their rights on others with no legal problems what-so-ever. In order to illustrate the difference: for example, if someone would make a clone of Super Mario and would call their clone as well "Super Mario" and maybe even would call themselves "Nintendo", even if they have programmed the whole game by themselves from scratch and the art and music would be all different, they wouldn't be infringing the copyright but challenging protected trademarks. In your case, the naming was identical, the art and everything was too similar to the original and therefore the clone was challenging the trademark that needs constant protecting. | More generally, can anyone just copy an existing website (without copying the code or images)? Yes. Could I make a website that lets people post pictures like Instagram but call it MyPics? Yes. In general, copyright protects particular expressions of ideas, not higher level ideas or concepts. | Plagiarism is an academic concept, not a legal one. The issue you are concerned about is copyright infringement. A work based off of another copyrighted work is a derivative work. This requires permission of the copyright holder. Simply listing your source and saying "no crime intended" does not help. However, recipes are generally not copyrightable (at least in the UK/US). This is because they are a list of ingredients and instructions which is not sufficient for a creative work. The presentation of the recipe can be copyrighted, as can any descriptive text surrounding it. If you're just taking the actual recipe, making a better recipe from it, and presenting that recipe in a better way, you should be fine. | If you create a new work that is derived from or based on someone else's work, it is a derivative work, and you cannot do so without permission from the original copyright holder. If the original work is made available under a CC-BY_SA 4.0 license, you have permission, but it comes with conditions. One of those is that you must attribute the original work -- you must say what work yours is based on and who created it. Another is that you must license your own derived work under the same CC-BY-SA license (or a compatible one). This does not mean that your work is not copyrighted -- it is. But it does mean that you must grant to others the same rights that the creator of the work you used granted to you. That is what the "share alike" or SA part of the license means. if you don't like that, you should not use a work licensed under CC-BY-SA terms to create your own work. If you publish your work but fail to grant that license to others, you are infringing the copyright of the work you used, and could be sued. Note that if you had created a compilation rather than a derived work -- for example if you created an album of images from various sources, some of them under CC-BY-SA licenses, you would retain a copyright on the collection as a whole, and that would not have to be under CC-BY-SA. But in this case you say that you used the other person's image as a background for your own illustration. That is creating an "adapted" or derivative work, i am fairly sure, and invokes the share alike clause of the license. You might also want to consider the different case mentioned in If I include an unmodified CC-BY-SA work in a book, does the whole book have to be CC-BY-SA? |
Neighbor Suspected a Leak and Opened Up Their Ceiling - Am I Responsible for Repair? Downstairs neighbor suspected a leak in their bathroom and opened up their ceiling to see where the water is coming from. It would appear that a small leak is coming from below my bathtub, this was not known or visible to me otherwise. There is no water leak or damage upstairs, issue seems to be in the piping between 2 floors. Of course I will fix the leak problem. But the neighbor is also asking me to replace their ceiling that they opened up without my knowledge. The neighbor is also insisting on doing repair work themselves and just having me pay for it which I am not comfortable with. Am I responsible for fixing the neighbor's ceiling that they demolished themselves even though the leak came from my apartment? (the question is only about the ceiling damage that neighbor himself caused) Additional details requested from comments: this is in US / Florida I am a tenant Building is a condo with many units | The person responsible for the leak pays This is a general principle that if your stuff causes harm, you are responsible for it as well of the costs of doing what’s necessary to stop it. This might or might not be you. Assuming the water is normal “splash” that is making its way into the unit below then it will be the person who is responsible for maintaining the waterproofing in your bathroom - that might be you or it might be the common property owner, you would need to check your by-laws. Of course, this assumes your building is new enough to have waterproofing - older buildings just relied on the tiling. If so, this is almost certainly your responsibility. If instead, it’s a leak from a pipe or fixture, then the owner of that is responsible. That could be you or the building owner or even your downstairs neighbour. Again, check your by-laws. Edit The OP has indicated they are a tenant, not the owner. In this case, it’s nothing to do with you unless your lease says you are responsible for building maintenance or you have been negligent. Residential leases almost never do the former and, unless you did something stupid, like allowing the bath to overflow or having water balloon fights, you probably haven’t been negligent. Refer the matter to your landlord and ask your neighbour to direct all future correspondence to them. | Under the Residental Tenancies Act of 2004, the landlord is obligated to carry out necessary repairs to both the structure and interior of the dwelling. The Act provides that this obligation (as with others) cannot be "varied, modified, or restricted" by a rental contract. Meanwhile, the tenant is obligated to not do any act that would cause a deterioration in the condition the dwelling was in at the commencement of the tenancy (with "normal wear and tear" explicitly disclaimed from the tenant's responsibilities). The landlord is not obligated to repair damages caused by the tenant violating that obligation. So the landlord is generally responsible for repairs (and, in fact, if the tenant had needed to arrange for the door to be repaired themself, they would have been able to deduct the cost from rent). If the tenant had broken the door, it would have been a breach of their responsibilities. But if a neighbor, or even the tenant's partner, had broken the door, it would not have violated the tenant's obligation and so the landlord would remain responsible for the repair. | From a comment on the question: They did damage the trailer door and headlight is smashed This seems like the best thing to focus on, especially if you can show that it was not damaged before they towed it. The unusual method of towing (with video evidence) may be a factor in whether they are considered negligent. If the damage to the door looks like they caused it directly by breaking in, that would also help your case. You also asked in your comment if you should go to the police or to a lawyer first. Might as well go to the lawyer and see what they tell you to do. I'm not sure what the police would do if there is no clear crime that has been committed. (The lawyer should have better advice about whether/why to go to the police.) | The difference is that the person was originally invited to live there, so they do have a claim of residency. A tenant recently allowed someone to move into his apartment as his caregiver. This is the problem here, the person was invited to live in there in exchange for a service. This person now has a legal right to occupy the property and the eviction process must be followed. If the person broke into the house and occupied a room, that is trespassing since there was no original legal right to occupy the property. The trespasser cannot claim any legal right to the property and therefore is trespassing. Can it really be so that he is legally bound to allow these strangers to share his apartment with him because of a technicality that classifies them as "squatters"? Unfortunately yes. This should be a lesson to the tenant that they need to properly run background checks and have solid contracts with live-in caregivers/roommates. Unfortunately this is not only inconvenient, but will probably be an expensive lesson as well. | Do I have recourse against seller? Is the seller liable or obligated to disclose this and if so what are my options? Probably not. The general rule is that you accept any condition which could be discovered with reasonable inspection. When "At the time of sale I waived inspection and did As-Is" you are greatly limiting your claims. If the seller believe that the work done fixed the problem, you probably have no remedy. It could be that the seller made a false representation in the disclosure (you'd have to look at the exact language) but even then proving it with only the kind of circumstantial evidence provided would be very challenging. In particular, as a practical matter, it isn't really economic to sue in a $10,000 non-disclosure case without open and shut clarity of fault, as opposed to some suggestive but ultimately inconclusive indicators. You could always ask and state the case in a demand letter, but if you came to me as a potential client, I wouldn't take your case because the high cost combined with the low likelihood of success would make it unlikely that an attorney could bring the case in a way that would generate net value to the client. | It isn't precisely clear which jurisdiction you are located in (recall that this website handles matters from everywhere in the world). But, generally speaking, in the United States, you have no right to limit someone's existing tree on their property merely because it casts a shadow on your solar panels. The installer should have known better. A minority of U.S. states, including California, consider new construction that blocks the view of existing structures a form of "nuisance" that can be abated if it unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of the existing property. But, that protects existing structures, rather than new ones. In Japan, there are building code requirements designed to insure that key portions of every home get natural sunlight daily. Again, this only applies to the construction of new buildings. I know of no law that gives someone who newly installs a solar panel a right to remove or trim a neighbor's tree simply by virtue of doing so. And, without knowing whose law is involved it would be impossible to determine with any reliability. The property with the solar panel could seek to buy the right to an unobstructed view from the property with the tree, in what would probably be called a "view easement", but that would only happen if the terms were such that both consented and it was written up in a legal document to that effect. | Agreement You say: my landlord added a clause stating: "All moving must be done in rear of driveway or pay $250 (near basement door)" Was this addition made at the time you signed the lease or subsequently? This matters because the terms of a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, they must be agreed. If the change happened after the lease was signed then , unless you agreed to it, it has no effect whatsoever. Since that resolution is boring; I will assume that it was always there. Enforcability Is this actually enforceable, since I did park in a public space and not necessarily on his property? Yes, it is enforceable. People can agree in a contract to do (or not do) anything so long as that thing is not illegal - that is what a contract is; a legally enforceable agreement for two people to do certain things. You agreed "All moving must be done in rear of driveway ... (near basement door)" and you didn't do what you agreed to do. Therefore you broke a term of the contract. It doesn't matter that you don't know why he wanted you to do this or if it was reasonable or if it meant that you couldn't use your parent's truck - if these were issues for you they should have been raised before you agreed to do it. If the clause said "When moving out you will wear a blue double breasted suit with a yellow and purple bow tie" then that is what you must do. Consequences There are a number of options open to the wronged party when the other party breaches a term of a contract. The most relevant in these circumstances is to sue for damages. So how much are damages? Well, they are an amount to restore the wronged party to the position they would have been in if you hadn't broken the agreement. In situations where damages can be hard to calculate, contracts can make a provision for liquidated damages; a pre-agreed amount of what the damage will be: in this case "$250". However: In the United States, Section 2-718(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that, in contracts for the sale of goods: Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty. This largely mirrors the common law rule, which applies to other types of contracts under the law of most US states. On the face of it, it would appear that $250 may be "unreasonably large" given the nature of the breach where it appears that the landlord has actually suffered no damage. | do I have a case against them in small claims court? Yes. Your description altogether indicates that there is --at least-- an implicit contract between you and the roommates. That implicit contract is palpable from the roommates' subsequent conduct, which includes --but is not necessarily limited to-- their excuses and promises. Although there is no written contract between you and the roommates, evidence that you have paid utilities in full places on your roommates the burden of disproving the default (and common sense) presumption that bills would be split among all four roommates. Your landlord can testify via an affidavit what he knows about that arrangement and/or what he informs each new roommate on the issue of how utilities are paid. You might want to email your roommates a reminder [to pay you] in such a way that prompts them to reflect their excuses/promises/admissions in writing. The terms of their written response might evidence an oral agreement. In the alternative, the roommates would have the burden to prove that they paid you, or that you promised to cover their utilities for free. The former scenario is precisely why a reasonable payer typically requires --or should require-- a receipt when making payments (as opposed to the payee when receiving them). Regardless, your description suggests that your roommates would be unable to prove either scenario. Also the landlord could include in his affidavit that the roommates have defaulted on their rent payments as well. If the landlord refuses to produce an affidavit, you can always visit the court where eviction proceedings are taking place and obtain copy of the relevant records. With those records you would evidence the roommates' pattern of lack of payment. Although obtaining copies from the court makes your landlord's affidavit somewhat unnecessary, it is in the landlord's best interest to cooperate with you because (1) it would be unreasonable for him to alienate himself from the only tenant who honors his lease, and (2) he might need your cooperation as witness at some point. Even if the roommates were successful in proving that there was neither a verbal agreement nor an implicit contract but only "unfounded expectations" on your part, you could ask for a ruling in equity in case your claim of breach of contract fails. In terms of mere "expectations", it is much more reasonable for you to expect them to pay their share than for three three individuals to presume an unrelated roommate will cover their utilities for free. The latter just departs from common sense and common practices. how do I prevent this from happening again with future roommates? Strictly speaking, it is impossible to absolutely prevent that situation from occurring again. However, you may take the following precautions to reduce your exposure. Have your roommates sign an agreement that reflects each party's obligations and deadlines. Your agreement should also state that it is each roommate's responsibility to keep his/her receipts --or akin evidence-- in case a dispute for non-payment arises. This would streamline the production of evidence if the matter ends up in court. Consider whether or not asking each party for an aval or endorser is practicable. This provides some sort of "insurance" of roommates' default risk. Lastly, do not wait for a party's debt to accumulate that much before taking legal action. The longer you wait, the unlikelier you are to recover that money because the party may go broke or simply disappear. Moreover, keep in mind that if a party's debt exceeds the maximum amount handled in Small Claims Court, your litigation will become more involved because it would have to be in a court of general jurisdiction (meaning a circuit or district court). |
Why can you be convicted for conspiring to project indecent images into the night-time sky, but not conspiracy to defraud a dead person? I don't understand the difference between these two examples, because in both cases, the goal is scientifically impossible! What does "if the means used to achieve the purpose are impossible" mean? 4.5 Impossibility and Common Law Offences According to the House of Lords in DPP v Nock126 impossibility is a defence to a charge of common law conspiracy. However, this is only where the conspiracy could never be achieved: impossibility is not a defence if the means used to achieve the purpose are impossible [emphasis mine]. So if A and B conspire to project indecent images into the night-time sky, the fact that such a display was not scientifically possible would not prevent the possibility of a conviction for conspiracy to corrupt public morals. An example of where impossibility would be a defence to a common law conspiracy is where A and B intend to defraud V, while V had already died. It should be stressed that impossibility is assessed at the time of the agreement. The fact that the plan subsequently becomes impossible (e.g. the company it was planned to defraud has ceased to exist) does not prevent the original conspiracy being committed. 126[1978] AC 979 (HL). Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2020 9 ed). p 824. | I read it as that in the first case, their purpose (displaying indecent images to the public) couldn't be achieved by the means they had in mind (projecting into the night sky), but it could be achieved by other means (say, by having an airplane tow a banner around). So had they kept conspiring for longer, they might eventually have come up with some means to achieve their illegal purpose. Such a conspiracy is illegal. On the other hand, defrauding the deceased V could never be achieved, no matter what means were used. | A fact cannot by itself constitute reasonable suspicion; the word "reasonable" describes not only the relationship between the fact and the possible existence of a crime, but also the officer's knowledge about the fact. The officer must not only sincerely believe the truth of the facts constituting reasonable suspicion, but must also reasonably believe it. I do not know whether a hallucinatory experience may be found reasonable for this purpose; I suspect that it would be a matter of dispute at trial. The first example is perhaps more straightforward, as there are probably a few possible explanations for the officer's failure to notice the turn signal. Still, are they reasonable? If the officer could not see the turn signals because something blocked the line of sight, it would not be reasonable for the officer to conclude that the driver had failed to use the signal. Rather, the officer has no evidence one way or the other, and absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The question deals in hypotheticals, where we can assume that the officer is sincere. But in a trial, the jury (or judge in a bench trial) cannot do that. They will look at the evidence, including the officer's testimony, and assess the officer's credibility. They will form an opinion about whether the belief was sincere and reasonable before they look at whether the facts, as the officer believed them to be, reasonably indicated that a crime was being committed or was imminent. | IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed. | Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side. | I think it's ultimately a natural extension of the basic concept from Roman Law: ignorantia legis non excusat, i.e "ignorance of the law excuses not" and that in order for that to be workable laws can only truly obtain proper binding force when they are promulgated. In simple terms someone can't claim innocence through ignorance because the knowledge of what the law is has been made easily available to them. Thus the law can operate on the presumption that the people it applies to are aware of them. Indeed there have been occasional instances in history where someone could not have been reasonably expected to know that what they did was against the law and this has been taken into account. | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | In part, we don't know because there are currently no rules that address certain outcomes, so it will depend on who is on the Supreme Court when the issue is raised. A warrantless search will not be legal beyond current doctrines regarding crime in progress and imminent danger, even if it involves time travel. So you will need a warrant, and you will need probable cause to get it. Currently, if you break into a person's house to discover that there is a body there, you can't get a warrant to legitimize that illegal search. Adding time travel does not change anything. In situation 1, I assume they have probable cause and a warrant but the evidence was destroyed by the time of the search at time T+n. As long as prior time T is still after the crime, a warrant to search at time T would not be a problem. In scenario 2, there is nothing preventing them from stopping the crime or arresting the perpetrators in the act. However, if they travel back in time and break in to a suspect's house in order to witness the crime, that is an illegal search. You could likewise arrest a person before he escapes to the phantom zone, if you have probable cause that he had committed a crime – by the time of the arrest. Forward time travel poses a more serious challenge, as articulated in Minority Report. It would, or should, be very difficult to issue an arrest warrant at time T based on knowledge of a crime committed at T+n. Because of the arrest, the crime was not committed and there was no probable cause, so there should have been no warrant (oh no, paradox). | Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal). |
We moved out two months early and still have a lease with the property I just found out this morning that the landlord has been living there We moved out two months early, we were fully prepared to keep paying the rent even though we aren’t living there because of the lease. He told us if we could find somebody to take over the lease that we wouldn’t have to pay the rent but I could not find anyone. We are responsible for lawn care so I have my dad go over there and mow the lawn for us I just got a call from him this morning saying someone has been living at the house. I sent him a picture of my landlords business card and I asked him if that’s the guy he saw living at the house. Turns out the landlord has been living there for a week. Is this allowed? Am I still expected to pay rent if he is living there? | the landlord has been living there for a week. Is this allowed? Am I still expected to pay rent if he is living there? Generally speaking, no. But you need to verify that your lease contains no language that overrides certain basic assumption about leases. My understanding is that (1) you delivered the property, and (2) the landlord was not entitled to live there during your tenancy. Usually one basic assumption in a lease is that only the tenants and their beneficiaries/guests ("tenants", for brevity) are entitled to use the property. It appears that the landlord is neither. Your delivery of the property enabled the landlord to reassign the tenant's exclusive right whenever the landlord deems it fit. The scenario of you finding someone to replace you in the lease is merely one alternative from which the landlord can make the informed decision to reassign that right. The event of reassignment automatically releases you from subsequent payments related to your early move-out. Accordingly, the landlord's informed and willful reassignment (in this case, to himself) of the aforementioned exclusive right forfeits his entitlement to subsequent payments from you. This renders the [rest of the] lease voidable by you. In this regard, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 151 and 153(a). There is also an issue of fraud and quantum meruit (see also unjust enrichment) insofar as the landlord benefited at your expense (in the form of your father's work on behalf of you) without informing you that reassignment had taken place already. The landlord knowingly and intentionally deprived you of the opportunity to decide whether to keep taking care of property about which you no longer had any obligation. I presume you already are mindful of this but I should still mention it: Make sure you can prove the landlord was actually using the property rather than inspecting/enhancing/managing it. | If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money. | No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement"). | Landlord-tenant law is an area that is heavily statute-based, jurisdiction-dependent, and far from uniform across the country. A complex, specific, multi-part question like this one is not going to get a simple answer. In general, though, I can clear up some of the confusion with a quick example. Let's say you abandon your lease, but as you do so, you write a letter to the landlord saying: "While I won't be living there any more, my friend's band needs a place to practice. They have agreed to pay half my rent if you let them play there 4 nights a week. They'll be starting on Tuesday at 11 PM: please have a set of keys waiting for them at the front desk." The landlord does not give your friends the keys. They re-key and clean the apartment and rent it two months later. Are you going to stand up in court and argue, with a straight face, that you should only be liable for half the rent for those two months because of the landlord's "failure to mitigate"? Again, jurisdictions differ, but the duty to mitigate is not absolute. If the landlord could rent out a $1,000/month apartment for $5 a month, it doesn't have to do that, and you can't make the Court take $5 a month off their damages if they refuse to do so. Also, you seem to be confused about what subleasing is. A sublessor owes duties to you; you still owe the duty to your landlord to get the rent paid. A sublease is an agreement between you and a third party to pay you rent. It does not affect your relationship with the landlord at all, unless it's a breach of your agreement with the landlord or of local law protecting the landlord from unauthorized subleasing. | Charlie is not a party to the contract between Alice and Bob Alice and Charlie have no contractural relationship and Alice cannot require him to do anything nor is he liable to Alice in any way. Alice’s issue is with Bob who has clearly breached his contract. Alice can sue Bob for damages and may be able to end the lease. There is no trespass because Charlie is there with the permission of the leaseholder. From Charlie’s position there is no reason to believe that Bob does not have the authority to give this permission so Charlie is not in breach of the law. The police will see this as a civil matter and won’t intervene. | This is a very difficult situation. Discrimination is not the right frame within which to view this as your roommate doesn't have authority over you the way that an employer or landlord would. The basic legal issue would be whether your roommate is constructively evicting you from you residence without valid justification for doing so. And, the answer might very well be yes. But, even if that is the case, since the roommate is not an agent of the landlord, your roommate's actions probably don't relieve you from your duties under the lease. So, your relief might be to vacate the premises and then to sue the roommate for the rent you have to pay without receiving anything in return. This is expensive relative to the likely returns, and there is no certainty that you would win or that you would get your attorneys' fees if you prevailed. This would also be a slow solution taking several months at a minimum. Or, in the alternative, you could leave and cease paying the rent, forcing the roommates who remain to pay it if they don't want to be evicted as they are probably jointly and severally liable for the rent. (If they sued you for your share of the rent, constructive eviction by one of them would probably be a good defense.) The landlord could sue all of the roommates if they don't pay, causing them to be evicted and you to be on the hook for any rent or other amounts that they owe, including the landlord's attorneys' fees (and hurting your credit). You could probably cross-claim for indemnification of any amounts you were required to pay in that lawsuit against your roommate. But, this too would be an expensive, complex and slow solution if the remaining roommates don't decide to simply keep paying the rent. It would be very hard for you to evict your problem roommate for breaching the lease by denying you your equal rights to the premises, since you are not the landlord, although it isn't impossible that a court would allow this relief and it would be relatively quick. It would also leave open the question of who was responsible for the evicted roommate's rent. The remaining roommates would be liable vis-a-vis the landlord, and would face eviction if they don't pay, and probably couldn't get a new roommate without the landlord's permission. And, the evicted tenant would probably remain on the hook vis-a-vis the landlord, but might not have a duty to indemnify the roommates who stayed. Also, in any lawsuit where you sue the roommate, the roommate would likely counterclaim against you for non-disclosure of HSV2, and while that would probably not prevail in the end, it would make the legal process hellish for you. The trouble is that there are really no good solutions that you could easily impose on them. A mutual agreement between the landlord and the other tenants to release you from the lease so you could find somewhere else, or to release the problem tenant from the lease so that you and your other roommate could replace that person, is probably the best solution, but that takes mutual agreement of multiple parties. | Approach the neighbor in your yard and ask him to leave. You are the tenant, you have full rights to do so. Once he refuses to leave he is a trespasser and you can call the police to take care of him, let alone if he makes any threats. Regarding the landlord, just ignore them and take care of the yard and the house as the lease terms bind you. Require them to give 24 hour notice before any appearance as the lease terms bind them. | See Brindley Twist Tafft & James LLP, "Focus on the Mortgage Repossession (Protection of Tenants Act etc.) 2010 [sic]". If the tenancy was an authorized tenancy under the terms of the mortgage: The Bank may still take possession of the property but they may have to do so subject to your occupation. The practical effect of this is that you would be allowed to remain living in the property subject to the terms of your tenancy agreement but you would see a change in the identity of the Landlord. It is possible for the tenancy to be brought to an end but in accordance with the terms of the tenancy agreement. If the tenancy was not authorized: Under the Mortgage Repossession (Protection of Tenants Act etc) 2010 [sic] (the “Act”) an unauthorised residential tenant is however entitled to request that possession be delayed for up to two months during which time they should try to find alternative accommodation. |
Can an employment contract exclude "reasonable notice at common law"? In an employment contract, is this enforceable? The Company may terminate your employment at any time, without just cause, by providing you with the minimum notice or pay in lieu, that you are entitled to under the Employment Standards Act. You agree that your right to notice of termination of employment will be limited to the notice provided for in this Agreement. You further understand and agree that by complying with this paragraph 5(c), the Company satisfies its entire obligation to you, and you will not be entitled to receive any further severance pay, notice, pay in lieu of notice, compensation or damages of any other kind, including reasonable notice at common law. 5(c) states "if a term is found to be unenforceable, the remainder will remain in affect". Also can the same contract require the employee to give at least 2 weeks notice or is that too one sided? | canada ontario Speaking from the perspective of law in Ontario, Canada, the clause may indeed be defective, contrary to the currently accepted answer. Consider what is mentioned at Termination Clauses and Continuation of Benefits: A Warning and Reminder for Employers in Ontario (August 2015): Employers often seek to limit their termination liability with termination clauses. If a termination clause does not meet the minimum requirements of the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (“ESA”), then the termination clause will not be valid and an employee will be entitled to reasonable notice at common law, thus increasing an employer’s liability [...] [...] The ESA requires employers to continue benefits during the ESA notice period when terminating employment without cause, whether or not working notice is provided. Where an employer fails to expressly state in a contract that an employee’s benefits will continue throughout the ESA notice period, the termination clause may be unenforceable. [...] In Stevens v Sifton Properties Limited (2012, ONSC) (“Stevens”), the termination clause stated that payment in lieu of notice in accordance with the ESA would be provided where the employer terminates the relationship without cause. The termination clause stipulated that such payment satisfied all future claims against the employer. The Court determined that the clause, in addressing benefits implicitly, did so in a way that “purports to take those [rights of benefits] away upon mere payment of the required pay in lieu of notice.” The Court held that this was contrary to the ESA, as the language denied benefit continuation during the ESA notice period and the termination clause was therefore void. Also, on the saving clause attempt, see Ontario Court of Appeal rules “saving clause” in employment agreement unenforceable (December 2019). Consider what's mentioned in Why employment contracts are now being rewritten all over the country (December, 2020): The Court of Appeal for Ontario has determined that all ambiguous language must be read in the employee’s favour and the presence of ambiguity will nullify a termination provision. Any ambiguity will be fatal. For example, simply stating that the employee will get the greater of their employment standards entitlements or some greater amount, if not worded precisely and correctly, will not hold up because the courts will find the language to be ambiguous. Also, see Ontario Court of Appeal Limits Severability of Termination Clauses in Employment Contracts (August 2020), which says: In addition, the Court of Appeal refused to give effect to the employment contract’s severability clause. The Court stated that a severability clause cannot affect clauses that have been made void by statute. Having concluded that the termination provisions must be considered together, the severability clause in this case could not be applied to sever the offending “for cause” portion of the termination provisions. All emphasis above is mine. I am not a lawyer. | Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job. | In the UK, you would need a new contract, because the old company will not be able to pay you and will possibly cease to exist, but that contract must not put you at any disadvantage. Basically, all terms would have to be the same, and the time at the previous company would have to count as continuous employment. | Restraint clauses, restrictive covenants, or non-compete clauses are fairly standard in professional contracts. You would usually find, in a well-drafted restraint clause, cascading duration and geographic limitations. For example, it might read: ... as a potentional customer or client of EMPLOYER. This shall apply: For 12 months; or, if that is found to be unenforceable, For 6 months; or, if that is found to be unenforceable, For 3 months; or, if that is found to be unenforceable, For 1 month and within a radius of: 20km; or, if that is found to be unenforceable 10km; or, if that is found to be unenforceable 5km; or, if that is found to be unenforceable 1km from the work location. These cascading clauses are designed to protect the employer in situations where a court finds the original restraint to be unreasonable and unenforceable. The usual remedy for an unreasonable restraint clause is that a court will simply nullify it, or reduce it to a more reasonable time and geographical scope. However, if it materially changes the nature of the contract, then the contract as a whole may be voided. | Your boss is totally wrong. Legally, there is no such thing as a "probation period" in the UK. You have the right to your holiday payment, according to the days that you worked. What can happen: The legal minimum is I think 28 days per year including bank holidays, but most companies give 23 or 24 days PLUS eight days bank holiday. Your contract may say that the first three months are called probation period, and during that time you only get the legal minimum, and after that the much more common higher amount. That would be legal. But even so, you would be entitled to seven days, minus any bank holidays where you didn't work. | I would recommend talking to an adult person in HR. I'm quite sure they will notice that what your manager wants to do is more than dodgy, and doing something dodgy may be in the interest of your manager, but not in the interest of the company. The best thing is to go to HR, acting as if a mistake has been made, and point out to them what your start date was, and that the new contract has the incorrect starting date, and they need to fix this mistake or you can't sign the contract. If they insist you sign it, then you DON'T sign it. If they say you will be fired if you don't sign it, then you tell them that in that case you would get legal advice. BTW. You definitely don't sign this as it is. PS. This answer was posted on workplace.stackexchange, not law.stackexchange, so please don't complain if there is no legal content. | Yes, they can do that, as long as they tell you about it in advance. Your employer can require you to take all or any of your holiday at a particular time, as long as they give you the right notice at the right time and take into account certain agreements between you. Source Employers can: tell their staff to take leave, eg bank holidays or Christmas restrict when leave can be taken, eg at certain busy periods The notice period for this is at least twice as long as the leave they want their staff to take. Source (official government site) | At what point passed the original ETA is the contract still valid? There is no hard limit or deadline other than the one (if any) the contract itself provides. The contract remains valid regardless of a party's breach or non-performance. The remedies that would be available to you are in the form of rescinding the contract --without having to pay the cancellation fee--, or forcing the store to deliver the furniture soon. The longer the delay, the clearer your entitlement to either remedy. The manager's allegation about other customers is unavailing: Your description does not reflect that the contract or estimates are in terms of the delay that non-parties tolerated. Their contracts are totally unrelated to yours. The contracts might not even be comparable. The purpose of estimates is to give the counterparty some rough information that is known to likely influence his decision-making. Accordingly, a huge departure from the estimate supports the finding that the store deprived you of information that was material to your decision. The store's failure to timely inform you strikes the contract law tenet that you entered the contract knowingly. Furthermore, the store's deliberate act of specifying even the day of the month [mis-]led you to rule out that the delivery might actually take years. Typically furniture is purchased with the expectation of being able to start using it relatively soon, not years later. In addition to breach of contract, the store might also be in violation of statutes against unfair and misleading practices. |
In the USA, why are witnesses who demonstrated prejudice and bias not immediately removed and disqualified? I just saw the witness examination of the George Floyd case. The 18 year old female witness went on to ramble about how she felt so sorry for Floyd and that her father and brothers are all black just like Floyd. Any reasonable person would agree that she is prejudiced and biased. So then, what is the theory that justifies allowing prejudiced and biased witnesses to testify? After all, prejudiced and biased citizens are not allow to serve as jurors. | Prejudice and bias goes to credibility The trier of fact has to decide how much weight to give each piece of evidence including witness testimony. A clearly prejudiced or biased witness will, all else being equal, deserve less weight than a more unbiased or less prejudiced witness. Or, at least, one who is less obviously biased and prejudiced - because everyone is biased and prejudiced. A witness who clearly and unequivocally declared their bias and prejudice probably deserves more credit than one who reveals it unwillingly during examination. The witnesses you use are the people who were there - you don’t get to choose their character. | One option would be for an attorney to spend one of their peremptory challenges, which they could do as long as the juror is not a member of a racial minority (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79). Even then you can, you just have to give a valid reason other than race. Otherwise, the side wishing to strike for cause has to show that there is reasonable doubt that the prospective juror can be impartial (basing their decision just on the evidence presented and the law as explained by the court). Turning the accused / juror relation around, one might be able to strike for cause if the stripper was accused of some form of grave immorality and if the spinster was a leader of a radically puritanical religious sect that held that strippers must fry for said grave immorality crimes. The underlying assumption is that any prospective juror will be impartial, unless they say (or said, or have done) something that shows otherwise. | united-states Perjury only applies to someone who actually does testify and is untruthful. A person who refuses to testify at all, when ordered to do so by a subpoena, is committing contempt of court. It is possible, in principle, for the court to order them jailed indefinitely until they do testify (civil contempt). It is also possible for them to be prosecuted criminally afterward (criminal contempt). | Different exclusionary rules have different reasons. Hearsay is frequently inadmissible because it's less reliable for the court to hear Alice saying "Bob told me that Carol hit him" than to hear Bob saying "Carol hit me." Another even more critical problem with hearsay testimony is that the defense cannot cross examine the person who made the statement in court. If Bob is there, the defense can ask questions such as "where did Carol hit you" and "did Carol use her right or left hand" to clarify the testimony or call its veracity into question. Alice, not having been a direct witness to the act, will not be able to respond to many of these questions. united-states Evidence obtained in violation of a constitutional right is inadmissible because admitting it amounts to allowing police or prosecutors to violate people's constitutional rights in order to obtain convictions. Not only does an unconstitutional search itself violate the rights of the person being searched, but so does the use of evidence acquired in such a search. See Fruit of the poisonous tree at Wikipedia and the cases linked therein, especially Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States and Nardone v. United States. | Could the person on the stand refuse? Yes. The witness may refuse to read it aloud, which does not mean he cannot be compelled to do so. The witness may object on grounds you mention (prejudice) only if he is the defendant. Either way, the judge will make a decision on how that evidence is to be presented to the jury. Regardless of who reads the evidence, the witness may be ordered to answer the question of whether or not he authored that document. Defying that order could result in contempt of court or, depending on the context, the entry of an adverse inference. | Generally, irrespective of charge, there is no 'shield laws' in the UK legal system. Any such provisions are a matter of discretion for the judge on the same grounds as the admissibility of evidence. Though the following case relates to a murder case rather than rape, it does provide justification for the lack of 'shield laws'. In R v Davis [2008] UKHL 36; [2008] 1 A.C. 1128 (henceforth Davies), as described in para 3, per Lord Bingham, the witnesses were subject to extensive protective measures, as 'they claimed to be in fear forth their lives if it became known that they had given evidence against the defendant'. [Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (2011 Penguin) 99]. The case addresses issues at the time of the original hearing. However, more recently, there have been statutory provisions for anonymity of witnesses, specifically section 86 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This enables witness anonymity orders to be made, however there are specific requirements that can be found in subsequent provisions of the Act, but there is no common or absolute protection of victims or witnesses. A closing note regarding the 'victim' in the rape case, it should be noted that in the UK legal system, as criminal cases are brought by the CPS on behalf of the Monarch, not the victim and as such the victim is, for all intents and purposes, a witness. | Yes, One Can In the United States, one may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify or otherwise give information that might tend to implicate the speaker in a crime. This is true in any court proceeding, civil or criminal, whether the person asserting the privilege is an accused, a witness, or a party to a civil case. It may be asserted in a Grand Jury or trial proceeding. One may also assert the privilege under police interrogation, or in an administrative proceeding. One may also assert it when testifying before Congress, a state legislature, or any local legislative body. One may also assert it when testifying before a government agency, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission. Asserting the privilege is often informally called "pleading the Fifth", although strictly speaking "pleading" is something that only an accused does (as in "I plead not guilty"). The availability of the privilege in civil cases has been true at least since the Saline Bank case of 1828 (see below). The privilege is not available when no criminal prosecution is legally possible, such as when the statute of limitations has expired, or when the law invoked has been held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, and no other valid law applies. Thus, if an authorized government official (usually a prosecutor) offers a grant of immunity, the privilege is no longer available on matters covered by the grant, and the person asserting it must then testify on such matters. The privilege may be asserted when the person doing so is actually guilty, or when the person is not guilty, but has a reasonable belief that the statements asked for might be used against the speaker in some current or future criminal proceeding. A person who has been tried for a crime nut had the case end in a mistrial, or a dismissal without prejudice, could still be re-tried for that accusation, and so may assert the privilege. Any assertion must be clear, but need not use a specific form of worfs. The standard form advised by many lawyers is I decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me. but less formal wording such as 'I take the Fifth" will also serve to assert the privilege. When the privilege is asserted in a court case, the Judge may question the person asserting it in private, off the record, to determine whether the fear of incrimination is reasonable. Case Law Saline Bank (1828) In the case of United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. 100 (1828) Chief Justice Marshall wrote: It is apparent that, in every step of the suit, the facts required to be discovered in support of this suit would expose the parties to danger. The rule clearly is that a party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to penalties, and this case falls within it. [This case was cited in Murphy, below] Saline Bank was a civil suit by the US treasury in Federal curt against an apparently unincorporated bank, but a Virginia state law of the time made it a crime to operate or participate in a bank without a proper charter. Thus the Marshall Court held that a witness in a civil suit could assert the privilege against the future possibility of a state criminal proceeding. Kastigar (1972) In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) the US Supreme Court wrote (footnotes omitted): It [the privilege against self-incrimination] can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has been zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the privilege [Citing the Miranda case in a footnote]. (Kastigar was a case in which people subpoenaed before a Grand Jury asserted the privilege, were granted immunity, and still refused to testify, alleging that the grant of immunity was not enough to revoke the privialge. They were held in contempt, appealed, and the Court held that the immunity was sufficient to allow the witnesses to be compelled to testify. In the court of its opinion, the Kastigar Court reviewed the history of the privilege and of immunity statutes in some detail.) Murphy (1964) In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) the US Supreme Court wrote: We have held today that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be deemed fully applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. ... Petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor concerning a work stoppage at the Hoboken, New Jersey, piers. After refusing to respond to certain questions about the stoppage on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminated them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey and New York. [Footnote 2] Notwithstanding this grant of immunity, they still refused to respond to the questions on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law, to which the grant of immunity did not purport to extend. [This case was cited in Kastigar above.] McCarthy v. Arndstein (1924) In McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (footnotes omitted, boldface added) The US Supreme Court wrote: The case is now before us on rehearing, granted in order to permit argument of the proposition, not presented by counsel before, that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to an examination of the bankrupt made for the purpose of obtaining possession of property belonging to his estate. ... The contention now is that the privilege against self-incrimination ought to have been disallowed because, under the Constitution, it does not extend to the examination of a bankrupt in a bankruptcy proceeding. The government insists broadly that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in any civil proceeding. The contrary must be accepted as settled. The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. The privilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also a party defendant. It protects likewise the owner of goods which may be forfeited in a penal proceeding. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 142 U. S. 563-564. The government urges more strongly a narrower contention. It claims that the constitutional privilege does not relieve a bankrupt from the duty to give information which is sought for the purpose of discovering his estate. It asserts that, in England, such an exception to the common law privilege prevails, and that the exception had been established there prior to the Declaration of Independence. Whatever may be the rule in England, it is clear that, in America, the constitutional prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination has not been so limited. | One might be enough, 10,000 might not be enough In some cases, no eyewitnesses may be enough. The trier of fact (the jury if there is one, the judge if there isn’t) decides what weight to give to the evidence or any part of it (including the testimony of any given eyewitness) and decide if that is enough to meet the prosecution’s burden of beyond reasonable doubt on each of the elements to be proven. From the outset, however, you should understand that you are the sole judges of the facts. In respect of all disputes about matters of fact in this case, it will be you and not I who will have to resolve them. In part, that means that it is entirely up to you to decide what evidence is to be accepted and what evidence is to be rejected. For that reason you need to pay careful attention to each witness as their evidence is given. You should not only listen to what the witnesses say but also watch them as they give their evidence. How a witness presents to you and how he or she responds to questioning, especially in cross-examination, may assist you in deciding whether or not you accept what that witness was saying as truthful and reliable. You are entitled to accept part of what a witness says and reject other parts of the evidence. Recommended instruction to the jury from the NSW Criminal Trial Bench Book |
Fair Use and DMCA My project (EditVideoBot) is an automated 'Twitter bot' program that allows users to edit videos within Twitter (they can add music to the video, or their own text, etc). My first account I ran this project on was suspended at 31,000 followers after being pursued by UMG and Sony with their DMCA complaints, regarding music that my program added to some videos. I'm just a 15 year old student developer, but I'm looking to find out what I can do in order to prevent things like this from happening. It seems that everything I've tried hasn't worked. I should also note that this isn't a commercial project, it's just a hobby of mine. Here's what I've tried so far: Submitting DMCA counter-notices to Twitter In these counter notices, I've given all the required statements, as well as extra detail into their Fair Use Policy, explaining that my program is compliant with all the points detailed at that link. Twitter says the following in their emails when they confirm they've received my counter-notice and forwarded it to the complainant: If we don’t receive a notice from the complainant within 10 business days, we’ll cease withholding the material. The complainant’s notice must confirm that they’ve sought a court order to restrain you from engaging in infringing activity relating to content on Twitter. In every case where I've received this email, I have never received a further notice from the complainant, but Twitter never ceased withholding the material after 10 business days either. I receive no further communications from both Twitter and the complainant. There's no proper formal way for me to directly contact Twitter that I know of - communication is basically one-way. Contacting the complainant directly This turned out very bad. Not only did I receive no reply back from them, they then appeared to increase the number of DMCA complaints my account got. I was receiving at least 5 complaints a day from then on - way faster than I could counter them. Within a matter of days after contacting them, my account was just automatically suspended by Twitter - no way to counter it, nothing. I tried submitting counter-notices after my account's suspension, but I never even received a single email back. So I have 2 questions: Am I in the right here? I clearly have no commercial or malicious intent to violate copyright laws. The material uploaded by the program is very short and insubstantial. Everything it uploads has zero impact on the original work's value. It's pretty easy to tell that just by visiting my account and looking at its content. What further action can I take in order to prevent this from happening in the future (and perhaps get my original account back)? I've just added a feature that automatically processes the audio to check if it contains proper music, and then gives credit to the record label it belongs to. Would that help in mitigating further complaints? AFAIK, Fair Use isn't a law, so I'm not sure I can counter the takedowns based on that. What else can I do? It's pretty crappy that they're trying to ruin someone's fun hobby while actual PIRACY is so rampant. There has to be something I can do. I appreciate any advice. Thanks in advance! Edit: I don't see why my program would be considered a 'piracy tool' when a program such as youtube-dl (which is in fact the tool my program utilises in order to download music) is able to successfully be reinstated after a DMCA complaint from the RIAA. Doesn't that program enable users to download copyrighted material from YouTube and other sites? Just because a tool could potentially be used to violate the DMCA, does that mean it can get taken down? Not in youtube-dl's case, and I don't see a difference with mine. How could anything helping users to add music not be used to facilitate adding without consent? I like what @josh3736 referenced (from the Betamax case) and I think it's a good response: the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible should not be stifled simply because the equipment is used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions of respondents' works.... EditVideoBot is an automated program that automatically edits videos based on commands provided by other Twitter users that mention the account - I am providing the service, other people operate and produce the material with it. I don't see why I need to take the fall. Is my program not just one that provides a video editing service? It's purpose is not to infringe on any laws. Edit #2: I just got my first ever reply back from Twitter saying they ceased withholding a video from my account! Maybe Twitter's counter-notice process is just really slow, but hopefully this means that I get more soon! | Twitter don’t have to host your account UMG’s and Sony’s business is probably more important to Twitter than yours is. It seems Twitter have made a commercial decision to close your account down. They can do this: We may suspend or terminate your account or cease providing you with all or part of the Services at any time for any or no reason, … What’s happening is not fair use Fair use is a lot narrower than you think it is. UMG and Sony (and every other music label) get paid when people use their music on a commercial platform like Twitter. Which means, you enabling people to avoid this is directly reducing their market so this is not fair use. Giving credit does not help. Now, if your program blocked the use of copyrighted songs that might be ok. Your program looks exactly like a piracy tool I’m sure you have the best intentions but your tool readily enables copyright violations by others. That’s moving out of the realms of civil breach and into possible criminal sanctions. I wouldn’t push this if I were you. Your understanding of copyright is flawed This video is a good primer on copyright. | Public domain means that there is no (longer) copyright in the given work. This means that all rights associated with copyright are not controlled by anyone and there is no way to run afoul of copyright laws (note that in some countries a true "public domain" doesn't exist). Assuming you're correct that these works are in public domain, answers to your particular questions are: Does that mean I can play the video's as much as I want to any size crowd I wanted? Could I charge money to watch the videos? Yes and yes. If something is in the public domain does that mean all the parts of that thing are? This kind of begs the question. A work in public domain has no copyright in it. If one of its part has copyright, then it's not really public domain is it? What about the characters in the videos, could I make a new Bugs Bunny or Might Mouse animation on my own? If I wanted to use Popeye or Betty Boop or daffy duck in a video game could I? Copyright isn't your issue here, trademarks are. The characters are most likely trademarked, meaning you generally can't use them in your own works without licensing. | There are several things going on with Akinator and their use of trademarked names and characters. If you look at akinator.com Legal Notices it says: 2 – Copyright – Reproduction rights All the content of this site falls under French and international legislation on copyright and intellectual property. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part of this website, in any form or by any means is strictly prohibited without prior authorisation of the publications director. All products and trademarks mentioned are property of their respective owners. (emphasis mine) The fact that they mention that all trademarks belong to their respective owners is good, but it's a formality. What it appears the site really relies on for use of trademarked characters is what's called Nominative Use, which is a type of "trademark fair use." The product or service cannot be readily identified without using the trademark (e.g. trademark is descriptive of a person, place, or product attribute). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominative_use Akinator has to use the names and trademarks to identify those names and trademarks. Akinator could possibly be sued to establish their type of fair use is not valid in their case, but it's probably not worth it for the companies to pursue. And, most companies would rather people use and see their trademarks in a marketing and money-making fair use sense rather than sue to stop their use. See In the US, when is fair use a defense to copyright infringement? for a full description of Fair Use. Now, when you get to the "answer" part of the game, you will see a "copyright" link. Part of that resulting page says Displayed pictures are accessible from the web. It is Elokence's policy to respond to notices of alleged copyright infringement that comply with applicable international intellectual property law and make the necessary changes. In respect of Elokence's Intellectual Property Policy, Elokence operates a complaints procedure accessible via the form below. So the company has given itself a further bit of protection by only using images on the web they can link to (at least in the web browser game; I don't know about the App), so that means the image is already "out there", uploaded by someone else, and Akinator can claim they didn't upload it. And, further, there is a contact form for trademark holders to send DMCA takedown notices for their work. It's a belt and suspenders approach to the use of trademarks in their game. | Is it legal to make a video compilation of websites that use our product for promotion of our company? [...] We would only be showing brief clips of client's products, strung together for a short video. This will most probably be both copyright violation and trademark infringement. Copyright is generally violated if you copy a creative work produced by someone else - which is what you want to do. Trademarks are generally violated when you use someone else's trademarks (such as their logo or company name) to promote your product - which, again is what you want to do. There are various exceptions available - copyright may not apply if the work is very simple, trademark use may be allowed e.g. in comparative advertising, etc., etc., but the rules for this are complex, unclear and very different in various jurisdictions. You could risk it and hope no one sues you (and maybe no one will), but the safe route is to ask permission first. | Yes, you did something wrong; you used both the university's trade mark and copyright without their permission. I don't know the law in India, however, if it is similar to Australia it is unlikely that the police will be interested in doing anything about it. While it is technically a crime, criminal prosecution is usually reserved for egregious breaches on a for profit basis. I suggest you apologise and agree to stop distributing your app. | The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage. | There are multiple issues with what you are trying to do, including issues with copyright, personality rights, and data protection. You are trying to use other people's content and likeness for your advertisement. Unless you are certain that you can do this in your relevant jurisdictions, without their consent, this sounds like a very bad idea. At least under GDPR, “but they made it public” is not an excuse. Personal data is personal data regardless of how you acquire it. The GDPR also has a very broad concept of identifiability that goes beyond direct identifiers or PII. If you want to use other people's personal data, you need a legal basis, and must provide them notice about your processing. Consent (informed opt-in) is one legal basis, legitimate interest (opt-out) another. You are suggesting to avoid this by blurring PII, but you may also have to blur other content that is indirectly identifiable. Real anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is a really hard problem. In some cases, a legitimate interest is able to avoid such problems. E.g. if I make a video with commentary about a Tweet, it would likely be OK to show surrounding personal data like the responses including the identities of the various accounts, to the degree that this is relevant to the commentary and/or necessary for proper attribution. However, that commentary likely has strong protections under freedom of expression. At least from an European viewpoint, a tutorial, demo, or advertisement would not have a freedom of expression argument that would shift a GDPR legitimate interest balancing test in your favour. Instead of blurring almost everything in your video or working on GDPR compliance, content licenses, and release forms, you should consider a different solution: create dummy content just for your videos. You can use your own content, and maybe add a dummy profile. | It is, in most jurisdictions, not a crime to download YouTube videos. For criminal law, the answer is that it is not illegal. In many jurisdictions, downloading music or video of any kind from the internet is not a crime. Thus, police has no power to punish you for downloading, and even less power to shutdown such "downloader" websites. YouTube's Terms of Service seem to disallow such downloads so YouTube has the right to terminate the agreement with the downloader. They may prevent you from viewing any more videos, for example. However, I think Google does not even have a technical measure in place to do that. Google is not interested in preventing you from using YouTube (its servers can handle that) and that is pretty much the only punishment it can use. Google could use the Terms of Services to say that the downloader-websites are breaking them and thus should not have access to YouTube. The websites could be sued for breaking the Terms of Services (and the court could order them to stop) and Google can block those websites from accessing YouTube by technical measures. It appears it did so in at least one case. Google could sue you (or the websites) for advertisement revenue loss, but it is unlikely. In theory, Google loses advertisement revenue from the video playbacks you would have done on YouTube but did not play because you downloaded the video and played it offline (contrary to the Terms of Service). Google might attempt to sue a downloader website on this basis and try to make it give it money. It would be difficult for Google to prove that it deserves such money, though. I cannot imagine how it would prove that "you would have played the video online, again, with advertisements, if you didn't download it. Note that when you replay a video from browser cache, advertisements do not replay. Why Google doesn't sue downloader-website more often? It's expensive. Google could pay a lot of money to shut down a website via court order but if it really wants to do so, they can apply a technical measure (such as IP block) instead. It is much cheaper and has the same effect. This may change in the near future. There's a some talk around about European court rulings and directives that may change this. It is quite possible that in the near future, even viewing illegally uploaded music on YouTube will be criminal. I find this doubtful because of the difficulty of proving knowledge ("How was I supposed to know that it wasn't an official clip?"). As for whether downloading to a file (as opposed to downloading to the browser cache) will become criminal, I really doubt that. |
Fair Use of Photo as a Derivative Work - copyright photograph with substantial new elements This is a real instance, but I'm going to avoid names. I downloaded a photograph found via Google - a still from a famous show. This is an image of a television character in a known location that was part of the show. The credit for the photo is [photographer/[famous TV company]. To that I superimposed two additional characters - my own photography & green-screen process - to make it look as though they were part of the same scene. To be clear, the original character and location are still recognisable and unadulterated. The only change is it now appears that there are two other 'matching' characters in the scene. There is no hint of any defamation or ridicule of the characters, it is a simple set of 'hero poses' in a known film set location. This derivation was used for a family calendar in a print run of maybe 6. I'd call that 'fair use'. However, I'd now like to be able to post that up online. There is no hint of any profit being made, merely a 'Hey, look what I can do in Photoshop'; but let's assume I wanted to post it to Stack Exchange, which would assign a CC BY-SA 4.0 license. [As far as my limited knowledge goes] I can't do that because I don't have the right to reassign the original work. If I wanted to post to social media, Facebook etc I really don't know what license they would use… if any. It all seems a bit cavalier. I contacted the original photographer to see if he would allow this usage - however, he got back to me quickly & nicely, only to explain he doesn't own the rights himself, they were assigned to [famous TV company]. My attemps to contact [fTVc] have drawn a blank. Am I just plain out of luck? Is there still any case for it being legally considered 'mine because it is derivative or fair use' or am I still hard up against the rights of the original owner whom I cannot contact? I don't want to just 'post & be damned', I'd rather do this properly [or not at all]. I'm in the UK, additional images & manipulation done UK, original photograph taken in Northern Ireland [again UK], [famous TV company] is American. | First of all there is no such thing as "fair use" in the UK, that is a specifically US legal concept, and it does not apply in the UK. The UK has a legal concept that is somewhat similar, known as "fair dealing" but it is much more limited than the US concept of fair use. See this Wikipedia article and this page from the British Library In general Fair Dealing is an exception to copyright that permits use for: purposes of research or private study; purposes of criticism, review or quotation; purposes of reporting current events (this does not apply to photographs) None of those seem to apply to an image from a TV show or film modified to add two additional characters as if they had appeared in the original. Unless somehow this is being used for criticism of the original, but the question does not mention any such criticism. The Wikipedia article says: Under United Kingdom law, an infringer relying on fair dealing as a defence must show that their actions fall into a specific category of acceptable use, as opposed to the "illustrative open list of purposes" in US law.[4] The fair dealing exceptions had previously been formalised in case law as "fair use" forms, but this was eliminated by the Copyright Act 1911. The use as described in the question appears to be a case of copyright infringement by creating a derivative work. It does not seem to come under fair dealing in the UK, and might well not be a valid fair use under US law, either. Whether any profit is made by the infringer is not relevant. Whether the market for the original is harmed is relevant, but not decisive. However, when used for a small private circulation of less than 10 copies, it is unlikely that the copyright owner would sue, or indeed would ever learn of the existence of the infringement. if posted to the net, however, this is much less safe. Programs exist to make automated searches of the web or of images listed on search engines for images similar to a copyrighted work. If such a search finds a similar image, the copyright holder might choose to file an infringement suit. This is entirely up to the copyright holder. Such a suit might result in significant damages. It is not, however, likely to lead to criminal prosecution unless mass commercial infringement is discovered. One of the things copyright protects is the right to create, or authorize the creation of, derivative works. Thus it is never correct to say that something is "mine because it is derivative". If the derivative work is made without permission, and the original is protected by copyright, than simply making the derivative work is a copyright infringement, jsut like making an unauthorized copy of the original. Fair use (in the US) or fair dealing (in the UK) is such an exception to copyright. Several of the EU nations have exceptions similar (but not identical) to the UK fair dealing. These are often called "fair dealing" when discussed in English. Most include exceptions for criticism and classroom instruction. None are as broad as the US fair use concept, to the best of my understanding. The only way to be fully lawful about this would be to contact the copyright holder and request permission for the derivative work, and get it. I cannot say if the holder would grant such permission, or on what terms. The holder has no duty to grant permission on any terms, or even to reply to a request. No reply must be treated the same as a reply of "No!", I am afraid. | It depends on what rights the copyright owners choose to grant. In the case of the skillet, assuming that it was properly licensed, it seems safe to assume that LucasFilms or their agent intended that it be used to create cookies using an image of Darth Vader, so that use was approved by them. Whether commercial use of the image, by selling cookies, was included in such a license, cannot be determined from the info in th4 question. Quite possibly not. Even if such a license was granted, it would be hard for one who bought the skillet second hand to prove that, in the face of a challenge from LucasFilms . So if they brought suit over such a use, they might well win. As to the bakeries where cakes and other good with images of cartoon and movie characters are sold, they should have bought rights that allow them to make and sell such products. They may have. Or they may be infringing, but the copyright or trademark owners choose not to sue. It depends entirely on what agreements the various bakeries may have entered into, and those are not normally public. | The book teaches you how to draw horses. Once you learned how to do it, and you draw a really nice horse, you have drawn it yourself. You have the copyright. You use it any way you like. Of course it's different if instead of drawing the horse yourself you just make a copy of an image in the book. That would be the author's copyrighted drawing. Added since the question reappeared: One way to learn drawing horses is to start by making copies by hand of others' good drawings, practicing, practicing more, until eventually you can draw your own horses, which was the purpose of the book. So these copies made as part of the learning process might be treated differently. And the might not actually be copies, just your best attempt at making a copy. On the other hand, taking this book, making ten copies using a scanner, framing and selling them, is obvious copyright infringement. | If I lock you in a room without access to anything and tell you "Write a novel" and you write a novel with characters, you have copyright in the work. But it's not absolute: If you use your own characters, you own all the copyright in the work, but not in the idea, as ideas are not copyrightable, see Feist v Rural. If you use someone else's characters extensively (as in more than a short hommage/cameo), you very likely make a derivate. You own a copyright in your part, as in the expression of the story or pictures you created, but you do not gain property interest in the existing characters' expression. Since the copyright to the characters lies with the owner of their IP, you need their OK to release (and also to even make) your work - as with the owner of a copyright is the sole right to decide on distribution and creation of derivates under 17 USC § 106 (2). Also remember that making an unlicensed derivate work risks having nothing you can sue for in case the original copyright owner lifts your ideas and scenes-a-faire parts and adapts them for their own derivate, see Anderson v Stallone The strange case of fanfiction chains... Now, there is a strange situation when a work is based on a work which is based on a work... Then, publishers and editors start with red ink and the result is, that what people know as Twilight now has nothing to do with the fanfiction it started as (It wasn't Vampires in the original draft), and 50 Shades of Grey ended up striking any and all supernatural from it, despite it having been a Twilight fanfiction originally. By making own characters and own expression of the world, there could be no copyright infringement. US law vs Egypt law? Both Egypt and the US have signed the Berne convention, meaning that copyright is very very similar in the broad strokes that the right to allow or disallow derivates is with the copyright holder. Also, since Ben10's copyright owners are to the best of my knowledge in the US (Cartoon Network Studios & Men of Action Studios), they will sue in a US federal court. | Yes, you may The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.). The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply. You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board. | You can make a derivative work if: the original is not under copyright, you are the copyright owner, you hold a licence from the copyright owner that says you can, or your usage is fair use or fair dealing as applicable. For your proposal, the image is copyright, you don’t own it, you don’t have a licence and what you propose is neither fair use nor fair dealing. You can’t do it and you can be sued if you do. | No. This is fair use under U.S. Copyright law, which allows you to use portions of a Copyrighted piece as long as you are able to demonstrate that you are using the quote in a transformative manor (presumably a character is a fan of the movie and is quoting it because it institutionally appropriate). Consider Arnold Schwarzenegger's catchphrase "I'll be Back" which is worked into almost every movie he's done. The original line was written by James Cameron for the 1984 Terminator Film. At the time of writing, Arnold didn't really think much of the line. Cameron said he thought that the line would be funny only upon repeated viewings and was surprised that it first time audiences laughed at it, having already anticipated the titular character's penchant for machine like understatements. Since then, the use of the phrase was used in Every Terminator Movie (including one where Arnold was not available for filming due to being governor of California during filming... it was said by John Connor (Christian Bale)) and most, if not all movies Arnold has a significant role in, as a sort of in joke for the audience with little suit from James Cameron or the Franchise owners. In addition, no Arnold Parody is complete without some use of the line, and almost everyone has an "Arnold" parody. Fair Use is an affirmative defense, meaning you must say you're going to use it as a defense (and then prove why it falls under Fair Use) rather than assume courts will enforce it for you. | Game mechanics are not copyright able. However, the images, words used, description of the rules are all copyright. If the original games is the source of the video game then the video game is a derivative work. If the original game is only the inspiration and the look and feel is different then this is OK. Which is which will turn on the actual facts. |
Is the creation of a cookie with a anonymous id a violation of GDPR even if it's not used until consent? We run a website with a global user base and need to respect GDPR compliance for those visitors that the law applies too. Since we are on Shopify we are currently making a front-end request to check the visitors GDPR profile and if they are in a non-applicable area, we then load tracking (GA, Optimizely, Heap, etc.). Unfortunately since Shopify only allows client-side manipulation, the call to check visitor GDPR requirements severely delays the JavaScript we need to run A/B testing without massive flicker. To avoid this with other clients we have loaded Optimizely upon landing, which creates the anon cookie, however, we configure this to hold all tracking/events until consent can be given. If it is not given the cookie is deleted and Optimizely is unloaded. Does this approach comply with GDPR? Note: Optimizely does not track any PII or full IP addresses. | The cookie consent requirement comes from the ePrivacy Directive, not from the GDPR. While the GDPR defines consent, cookie consent is required regardless of whether the cookie actually contains personal data. Instead, it says we can access information stored on an end users device under the following circumstances. Technical access to the information is used for the sole purpose of performing a transmission over a network, e.g. using a browser cache. Accessing the information is strictly necessary for providing a service explicitly requested by the user, e.g. session cookies or a consent-declined cookie. The user has given consent to the access, where consent is defined by the GDPR (freely given, informed, specific, …). The first scenario likely doesn't apply because your cookies aren't likely to be “technical storage or access” in the sense of ePrivacy, and because the tracking cookies wouldn't be used for the sole purpose of carrying out a transmission. The second scenario doesn't apply because tracking cookies are not strictly necessary to interact with the webshop, as evidenced by the possibility to opt out. The service explicitly requested by the user is the webshop or website, not the A/B testing. This only leaves consent as possible grounds for storing or accessing information on the user's device. It is already the storing or access that is covered by ePrivacy, not only later use as a persistent identifier. Your suggestion – to first set the cookie and then delete it if it shouldn't have been set – is more compliant than many set-ups I've seen, but is still technically non-compliant. It is also likely to fail in practice under non-ideal network conditions: if the request to see whether GDPR applies times out, or if the user closes the browser tab before the cookie will be deleted, the tracking cookie will remain without consent. I would instead suggest to consider the following points. It seems that by itself, Optimizely Web cannot be used in a compliant manner since it doesn't provide sufficient control over how cookies are managed. Thus, you should avoid loading such tracking scripts unless consent has been given, or unless this processing falls outside of EU/UK law. Currently, you defer loading of tracking scripts until you know if you have to ask for consent. This can be avoided if you always ask for consent :) This can also be avoided if you load the tracking scripts from a server that can independently determine whether the requests comes from the EU. For non-EU requests and for users with opt-in, the server can return the original tracking scripts. Otherwise, the server returns a dummy script. This server can be independent from your website's hosting. By combining the jurisdiction decision with the loading of the script, one roundtrip is saved and latency is reduced. Finally, no one is forcing you to use Shopify, and ePrivacy/GDPR is not required to accommodate their limitations. You do have different choices: use Shopify, at the cost of slow pages and limited A/B tests use a different A/B test provider that can be used without setting cookies use edge computing to do stuff in between of the browser and the original server use a different webshop platform ignore EU laws Well, one of them is clearly unethical. But you do have choices, and which choice you take is a business decision. Slow pageloads and consent banners are likely costing you conversions, but Shopify might be providing massive value that outweighs all that. | How to properly ask for consent is an evolving issue. Your general consent flow is very common, but I don't think it's entirely compliant. Legal background on consent Consent is one of the Art 6 GDPR legal bases for processing. The ePrivacy directive (ePD) also mandates consent for accessing information on a user's device, where such access is not strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user. For example, this means that analytics cookies require consent. Consent is defined in Art 4(11) as: any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her Further conditions for consent are given in Art 7, such as that “It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent”. The EDPB guidelines 05/2020 on consent provide extensive interpretation of the GDPR that should be considered as effectively binding. First layer: accept / change preferences The first consent layer provides general information about the purposes that consent is being sought for. This seems to be mostly compliant, but I have some doubts. Consent must be freely given, and withdrawing consent must be as easy as giving it. I would therefore recommend having a “continue without consenting” option that is given roughly equal prominence to the alternatives. Consent must be informed. Even in the first layer, you must give basic information. In the EDPB guidelines, the following items are identified: controller's identity purposes of processing what type of data will be collected existence of the right to withdraw consent if relevant: that the data will be used for profiling/automated decision making if relevant: possible risks if international data transfers are made under Art 49(1)(a) I think this makes it difficult to collected an “agree to all” style consent that covers all purposes. It would be better to clearly distinguish between the analytics and advertising purposes even in your first layer. Consent must be specific to a purpose. You try to make this possible via a second layer where granular choices can be made. This isn't entirely bad, since you also need to make the consent flow simple enough as to avoid click fatigue. But since you only have two processing purposes, it would be better to show them separately on the first layer. You cannot generally make access to the app conditional on unrelated consent. The statement “This app uses tracking identifiers” suggests that there is no choice. It would be better to make it clear that the user can voluntarily consent to such processing. Together, this would mean that a design like the following could be more compliant. Text in [brackets] indicates buttons or links. Your privacy choices To support and improve this app, you can choose to give us access for the following purposes: Analytics: understanding how you use this app We would like to collect information on how you interact with the app, and store cookies on your device for this purpose. [more information] [decline / agree] More relevant advertising We will always show ads, but if you want we can build an interest profile to show you more relevant ads. [more information] [decline / agree] You can always change your choices in the app settings, but past use of your data remains legal after withdrawing consent. ExampleApp is provided by ExampleDeveloper Ltd. [full privacy notice] [continue] Second layer: detailed information about all services Your second layer sounds good, as it provides granular controls and more detailed information. As already mentioned, I would move some of this to the first layer. But one of your questions pertains to the defaults on this screen: It is OK if I set all of the options to enabled the first time that the user goes to the preference screen (enabled by default) ? No, this is not OK. Consent means opt-in, and requires an affirmative action by the user. You cannot have pre-checked checkboxes. The default is that no consent was given. If you have an “enable all” button, I would also expect a “disable all” button. Else, consent might not have been given freely. You also cannot rely on the consent until consent has been actually given. So you must not start collecting analytics in the background while the user is still on the consent choice screen. In addition to being non-compliant by itself, loading pre-ticked checkboxes increases the risk that your application accidentally considers the consent as already being given, which could easily lead to illegal processing if there's a bug in your app. You might have processing purposes that are based on a legitimate interest instead of consent. These can be enabled by default, but you generally have to make it possible for the user to object. Your relationship with third parties When using third party services, it is crucial to understand if they are a processor who is contractually bound to only use the data on your behalf, or a separate processor. You must disclose processors (or at least categories of processors) in your privacy notice, but not really during the consent flow. The GDPR does not distinguishing between doing processing activities yourself versus outsourcing them to a processor. In both cases, you are the controller, and only you are asking for consent. Thus, it's also superfluous to show third party privacy notices. It's your obligation as the controller to provide all necessary information. If you are collecting consent for other controllers with whom you have joint processing activities, you must make this much more prominently. You would have to disclose in the first layer that you are sharing the data with other controllers who can use the data for their own purposes. This sharing is part of the processing purpose. This is quite tricky to do correctly when it comes to ad networks, since ad networks generally won't be your data processor and can have many intransparent members. Demonstrating consent As the data controller, it is your obligation to be able to demonstrate that valid consent has been given. This implies process-level obligations such as being able to show that your consent flow is non-coercive and makes it possible to decline consent. This also implies individual-level obligations such as being able to show when a given user has given or withdrawn consent for which purpose. If you have a backend anyway, it could be sensible to store information there about consent/withdraw events. When the user returns to the consent management screen through the app settings, you could show a timestamp like “you consented to this purpose on 2021-08-22 17:14:23”. I have recently written a more detailed discussion about demonstrating consent. | The question says: But by hashing a IP address you process the personal information and that you can't do without the user's permission! But processing personal data (PI) is covered not by the e-Privacy Directive (ePD) but by the GDPR. Under the GDPR processing may be lawful if it is done under any of the six lawful bases specified by Article 6. Consent is one of these. But paragraph (f) permits processing when: processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject ... This is generally known as the "legitimate interest" basis for processing. It normally requires a balancing against the privacy interests of the data subject. Where, as here, the processing is specifically to remove any traceability of the subject, and hence to protect the privacy of the subject, there doesn't seem to be much conflict, so I suspect such processing would be lawful. I have not found, after a brief search, an actual case where this has been tested, so my conclusion might be mistaken. Personal Data under the GDPR and hashing GDPR Quotes Article 4 of the GDPR defines "Personal data" (in paragraph (1) as follows: personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; The term "pseudonymisation" is defined in paragraph 5 of article 4 as follows: ‘pseudonymisation’ means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person; GDPR recital 26 reads: The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes. Hashing If a cryptographically secure hash function is used to convert an identifier, such as an IP address, into a replacement hash, there is no practical way from the hash value alone to recover the identifier. However, if a particular identifier value is compared with a stored hash value, it is easy to tell if there is a match. Finding a match does not prove that the identifier is the same -- depending on the length of the hash value being used and of the identifier, there may be many values that would give the same hash. But the chance of two random IDs having matching hashes is very small. Thus, if a controller were to store hashed versions of the IP addresses, no one could convert that back to a list of visiting IP addresses. But if soemoen had the IP address of a suspected visitor, and access to the hash function, it would be easy to check if that IP was on the list. If a keyed hash function were used, only someone with access to the key could perform this check. It is not feasible to hash all possible IP addresses as there are over 4 billion possible IPv4 addresses, and over 10^38 IPv6 addresses (over one thousand decillion). Thus creating a table to reverse the hashing in general is not feasible. Whether the possibility of checking for a match makes a hashed IP "reasonably identifiable" as representing a specific natural person under the GDPR and related laws has not, as far as I know, been authoritatively decided. Note that at most it would reveal that a person using a certain internet connection had (probably) visited a particular site. | For reference, the cookie law you refer to is officially known as Regulation 6 in the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003. Quotations in my answer are excerpts from public advice on this topic published by the UK data protection authority, The Information Commissioner's Office. If a user has explicitly stated that they do not accept non-essential cookies, then any existing non-essential cookies placed by the website should be immediately removed, and this preference remembered so the cookies are not simply recreated a short while later. While a user may not have explicitly accepted cookies when asked, it is possible that the website is operating on the basis of implicit consent - i.e. assuming you accept unless you take action to state otherwise. The idea of implicit consent being allowed is to help make the implementation of cookie questions/banners less disruptive to end users' website experiences. "Consent does not necessarily have to be explicit ‘opt-in’ consent. Implied consent can also be valid. If you are relying on implied consent, you need to be confident that your users fully understand that their actions will result in cookies being set. However, in some circumstances (for example, collecting sensitive personal data such as health details) it is likely that explicit opt-in consent is more appropriate." Ref: Guide to PECR: Cookies and Similar Technologies - What counts as Consent? There are a few exemptions where consent for cookies is not required, and so a couple of examples for cookies that could be stored regardless of consent might include: (a) a first-party cookie to remember the user's preference approving or disapproving the use of cookies (otherwise every time a new page is opened they would be asked the cookie question again); (b) a first-party session cookie to remember who the user is after they have logged into the website; or upon interacting with an e-commerce website, to remember which products they have added to a cart. These would be considered essential for the website to function. Non-essentially cookies, such as third-party tracking cookies would not be exempt. "There is an exemption if: (a) the cookie is for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network; or (b) the cookie is strictly necessary to provide an ‘information society service’ (eg a service over the internet) requested by the subscriber or user. Note that it must be essential to fulfil their request – cookies that are helpful or convenient but not essential, or that are only essential for your own purposes, will still require consent. This means you are unlikely to need consent for: (a) cookies used to remember the goods a user wishes to buy when they add goods to their online basket or proceed to the checkout on an internet shopping website; (b) session cookies providing security that is essential to comply with data protection security requirements for an online service the user has requested – eg online banking services; or (c) load-balancing cookies that ensure the content of your page loads quickly and effectively by distributing the workload across several computers. However, it is still good practice to provide users with information about these cookies, even if you do not need consent." Ref: Guide to PECR: Cookies and Similar Technologies - Are there any exemptions? It is worth noting that guidance was not very specific/clear on how this legislation should be implemented, and so there are vast differences in websites approaches to this challenge. Also remember that some websites may actually be non-compliant with this legislation: (a) through poor implementation - even if they ask the question if the website source code behind the scenes doesn't appropriately observe the end-user's preferences, or by appearing to be compliant while storing cookies which are not explained/justified in the privacy policy; or (b) through conscious deliberate decision - deciding they did not want to comply with legislation they do not agree with on the basis that to implement a cookie question/banner might cost them customers by being unnecessarily disruptive to the user experience; (c) through ignorance - there's always the possibility of a website owner being unaware this legislation exists if their webdesign company didn't tell them and they don't follow related news, or perhaps they have forgotten about it, etc. | The GDPR does not outlaw such processing of personal data. It merely regulates how and for what purposes you can process personal data. In general, you can conduct any processing activity as long as it has a clear purpose and a legal basis. Here, the purpose would likely be something like “conducting business with my clients” and the legal basis would be a “legitimate interest”. A legitimate interest always requires a balancing test that weighs your interests against the interests and rights of the affected persons. For example, can the affected persons reasonably expect such processing activities? In a professional setting, it can probably expected that business partners keep notes about contact persons so your intended processing could be fine. The GDPR does impose some general constraints. There are general principles like data minimization and storage limitation – you should only collect data that is necessary for your purpose, and shouldn't store it for longer than necessary. You should think about appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to protect the processing activity, for example about how your CRM is hosted, how backups are made and how security updates are installed, who has access to the personal data, and how the people with access to the personal data can be trained. For example, such training might inform your employees that they can only use the data in the CRM for business purposes, but absolutely not for personal purposes like asking Gina from reception out for a date. | It may be legal or it may not For example, if any of the users are in the European Union, then the GDPR applies and the person storing the information is a data controller and has legal obligations. These include, having a legitimate reason for storing them, storing them only for as long as necessary for that reason, notifying the individuals that the data is being stored and why, deleting it upon a users request etc. | Yes, but it doesn't matter. This answer discusses gdpr implications. Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable person. The GDPR has an extremely broad concept of identifiability, also covering indirect identification using additional information and with the help of third parties. Even just being able to single out one data subject, i.e. being able to distinguish different users from another, counts as identification. If you already have a concept of user accounts, any information that is linked with the user accounts and somehow relates to those users would also be personal data. Since you have distinct push tokens per user, it seems like this criterion would be met. Additionally, those unique tokens might be directly identifying by themselves. The GDPR does not allow for semantic games like “it only identifies the device, not the user”. The key here is that the definition of identifiability does not hinge on your intentions, but on objective capabilities: if you or someone else who can come into possession of this data were to attempt to identify the user (such as singling out users from another), would they be reasonably likely able to do that? Since most devices are single-user, being able to identify a device would imply that you're reasonably likely to also identify users. Just because something is personal data doesn't mean you're forbidden from using that data. It means that you'd have to comply with GDPR rules, if you're otherwise within scope of that regulation (e.g. if you're EU/UK-based, or are targeting your services to people who are in UK/EU). For example, basic GDPR compliance steps include having a clear legal basis for your processing of personal data (such as necessity for performing a contract to which the data subject is party, or necessity for a legitimate interest, or consent), providing a privacy notice, and taking appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to ensure the compliance and security of processing. For example, TOMs regarding these push tokens could involve encryption, access controls, and a plan for installing security patches in order to prevent data breaches. Using push tokens is already a good measure in this context, since they are effectively pseudonymous and prevent linking additional information via that token (two sites/apps pushing notifications to the same person will have entirely different tokens). However, the push notification provider (e.g. Google, Apple, Mozilla) can resolve the pseudonymous tokens and link them to a person, indicating that these tokens are ultimately identifying (even if you can't perform that linking yourself). Note that if GDPR applies, then other EU/UK rules might apply as well. For example, sending electronic messages (such as emails) is subject to anti-spam rules (EU: ePrivacy, UK: PECR). These rules apply regardless of whether personal data is involved. Since the rules are not technology-specific, it is likely that regulators would consider user-visible push notifications to be equivalent to more well understood technologies like email and SMS. | The GDPR does not prescribe how exactly consent must be managed, as long as consent was obtained in line with the GDPR's principles. Similarly, the EDPB does not provide concrete recommendations in its guidelines on consent, mainly noting that Controllers are free to develop methods to comply with this provision in a way that is fitting in their daily operations. I would not be too concerned with edge cases like failing HTTP requests, at least not any more than for other HTTP endpoints. If the user indicated consent, and you act on that indication of consent in good faith, that's probably fine. However, remember that you must provide a equally easy way for the user to revoke consent later. If the user changes their mind, they can use the mechanism that you offer to inspect their consent status, and revoke it if they want. But again, how to do that is largely up to you. |
How does Qt accomplish both GPL and commercial licensing? In Qt there are some modules which are licensed with GPL or commercial license: https://doc.qt.io/qt-5/qtmodules.html#gpl-licensed-addons How I read this: I can use those modules in SW that I sell and I don't have to publish the source code, if I buy the commercial license (because there's the word "or" -> I can pick either GPL or commercial license). If I'm right so far, my next question is: How do they accomplish this? In case they use the GPL licensed code in their libraries, GPL says that they should publish the source code and so should I, right? So I guess they must have coded their own versions of those libraries and sell those under commercial license? Please explain this like to a 5-year old. | Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence. | It depends on what you are selling to the enterprises. You could be selling just a licence to use the program, and retain all the rights on the source code. You could be selling the rights to the source code. For #1, the source code is yours and you can do what it pleases with it1. In fact many programs offer both an open-source licence (which usually forces the user to make its changes to the code publicly available) and a commercial one (which allows the user to keep the modifications of the source code for themselves). For #2, the source code is no longer yours so it is not up to you to decide what to do with it. 1I am assuming no other agreements imposing limits on those; for example that none of your contracts to your customers have a clause forbidding you from making the code available to the public. | If your own software includes software covered by the GPLv2 (for example by copying source code, or by linking dynamically) then your own software is also covered by the GPLv2, and you will have to provide the source code. This is called a "work based on the Program" on the GPLv2. In this case, however, it seems that your own software does not include software covered by the GPLv2, but you want to put it onto an SD card together with software covered by the GPLv2. That would most likely fall under "mere aggregation of another work", as long as your software and the other software do not interact very closely (such as dynamic linking). To quote the GPLv2: In addition, mere aggregation of another work not based on the Program with the Program (or with a work based on the Program) on a volume of a storage or distribution medium does not bring the other work under the scope of this License. So in that case the GPLv2 does not cover your program. You will still have to supply the source code for the GPLv2 software on the SD card. This is covered by section 3 of the GPLv2. Basically, you have two options: send along the complete source code for all the software (would be quite bothersome for a complete distro) or provide a written offer to provide the source code on demand to anyone who asks (you may charge for this, but only to cover your cost) GPLv2 contains a third option, but that only applies to non-commercial distribution. Practically speaking, it should be enough to include a README.txt or similar explaining that the SD card contains software covered by GPLv2, and that you will provide the source code on demand for a certain, reasonable fee (say $5 or $10 per CD). In practice, it is unlikely that anyone would ask for this, as the source code can usually be downloaded for free elsewhere, but if someone does ask, you just charge them $5 and send a CD. Of course, to reduce legal risks it may be prudent to contact a lawyer for your jurisdiction, as this is only general advice. | It seems that you don’t understand what parody is. If you do understand, please explain how it’s even possible to parody computer code. What you can do with “open source” code depends on the licence the copyright holder(s) release it under. For some very permissive licences you can do what you suggest, for most, you can’t. | You can licence your copyright under as many licences as you like to as many people as you like It's your copyright - you can do what you want with it. What you can't do is give someone an exclusive licence and then give licences to others - that would be a breach of contract with the exclusive licensee. How you let people know about the available licences is also up to you - your bio on Stack Exchange is fine. | Recall the basic principle of copyright law, as detailed in 17 USC 106: The copyright holder has the exclusive right to make copies; prepare derivative works; or distribute copies by sale, rental, lease, or lending. Other people can legally do these things only if they are given permission by the copyright holder, typically via a license. (Remember, the literal meaning of the word license is permission.) Often, the copyright holder will require a prospective licensee to accept various terms and conditions before the license will be granted. If there is "no EULA", or if there is one but the purchaser has not agreed to its terms, then the purchaser has not been granted any such license, hence does not have permission to do any of the things listed above. If they do so anyway, it is illegal copyright infringement and they will be liable for damages. To use a firewall analogy, copyright law is "default deny". So let's take your questions one by one: Do they own the software? US law has no concept of literally owning software. The closest thing is owning the copyright, which the purchaser certainly does not. It still belongs to the vendor that wrote the software (or whoever they may have later transferred it to). Can they legally alter the code of the program they purchased? No, that would be preparing a derivative work. The copyright holder has not granted them a license to do that. (There are some exceptions for purposes such as reverse engineering and interoperability, see 17 USC 1201(f)). Can they legally redistribute it No; again, that is the exclusive right of the copyright holder, and the purchaser has not received their permission. or transfer ownership? Maybe, if the first sale doctrine applies. Its application to software is complicated. The user has a better case for being able to sell the software if it exists as some tangible object which is transferred (physical media, pre-installed on hardware, etc). Can they legally modify the code of the program for others who have also purchased the same package? No, that would be preparing a derivative work. Can they take that software and install it on a secondary machine? No, that would be making a copy. | To use an API over a network connection (as opposed to, e.g., the Windows API), a user communicates a request to the API host, or server, and awaits a response. The host of the remote API can refuse to serve requests from users for probably any reason. Such services often require users to accept a license as a condition of using the service, and they may charge a fee as a condition of the license. A license to use a service is obviously not necessarily bound to a license for the use of its source code, just as the ability to reach the service is not dependent on the ability to see (let alone use) the code in any format, whether it be the source code or some compiled form of the code. In essence, source licenses and service licenses have different primary goals, at least inasmuch as the source license seeks to restrict someone who has actual physical access to compiled code, and possibly source code. Service licenses do not have that concern, though I have seen service licenses that also prohibit decompiling. This is probably the result of a CYA attitude among lawyers: the language is already in the standard software license text, and it doesn't hurt anything to leave it in, and it could help if a service user somehow managed to download the program code. | Stack Exchange questions are not public domain, they are protected by copyright. Authors have granted a license under Subscriber Content, specifically content is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC BY-SA 4.0) As long as you comply with the terms of the CC BY-SA 4.0 license, you may copy user content. |
Can I ask a potential employee if they are colorblind? We have an inspector's position open. The job duties are to perform detailed inspection on parts we manufacture. Our customer requires that their parts be inspected by someone who is not colorblind. Can we ask, in the initial screening process, if they are colorblind without violating any laws? Edit: I should add that if it wasn't for the customer's requirement, a colorblind person can perform all other job duties. They would pass our practical test. | If being able to distinguish colors is a bfoq - Bona Fide Occupational Qualification - then you may ask about it or test it and disqualify people from hiring based on the results. In fact, a Jury found that color vision is a BFOQ for police but demanded accommodation and in that case the Appeals court denied accommodation is necessary. Other courts found that at times color blindness doesn't count under the ADA at all. Some federal regulations even demand specific ability to have some 3-color vision, as you need to distinguish Red-Green-Amber. Remember Different color blindnesses see differently, and the following picture illustrates this at a traffic light. Deuteranomaly alters the color picture different than Protanopia, which is different from tritanopia, and then there's the unpictured achromatopsia, which is totally Black-White, among many many other types of color-blindness known to man: Can someone with any of the three pictured color visions distinguish the traffic light colors but or the position in the traffic light? That is the question that the federal regulation for color vision above demands, making it a requirement for truck driver licenses. What does that mean?! For example, a job that relies on distinguishing colors would be sorting or quality control based on the paint of a product. Take for example this sample from the AOA (American Optometry Association) for testing color blindness: Assume the products come only in the colors of the second row, and only those. If you can't distinguish between the ca. 6 greens, yellow, and about 7 variants of red, then they could not have the qualification, no matter what other qualifications you might have, you could not fulfill the required qualifications for the job of evaluating the color of these items. On the other hand, a colorblind person can be especially valuable when you deliberately look for color combinations that are still well distinguishable even to people with color distinguishing impairments - and then being normal does not qualify the Bona fide occupational qualification. | Welcome to LSE. Here are some answers to your question: No! It's not even close, but something like it is. The OSHA standard you cite is for mercury in the air in the workplace. You ask about "injections," which do not involve mercury in the air, so: this standard does not apply to injections. You ask about "injecting your employees with thiomersal." With only a few exceptions (for those helping diabetics, etc, and emergencies), all states require that licensed health care professionals administer injections, and then, only under a prescription. (For example, thiomersal is mostly used in vaccines. All states require licensed health professionals to administer vaccines.) So: Unless you are a licensed health professional with a prescription, you cannot inject your employees with thiomersal. However, OSHA has interpreted its rules and regulations to allow employees to require vaccines in some circumstances, such as a pandemic. To the extent these vaccines contain thiomersal, employers can require employees to get injected with thiomersal by a licensed health professional. | Almost certainly not. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendez v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 680 F.Supp.2d 357, 375 (D.P.R. 2010) "This incident, however, is not sufficient to constitute direct evidence of discriminatory animus...[Defendant's agent]'s anecdote could be interpreted as emphasizing the importance of a positive attitude, rather than plaintiff's interpretation that it expressed a preference for younger male employees...This benign interpretation seems more plausible...In light of these facts, there does not appear to be any evidence on the record that gives a 'high degree of assurance' that discriminatory animus was behind the decision to terminate plaintiff" (emphasis added). NOTE: OP's original question was simply whether listing 'positive attitude' on a job description was illegal. OP has now changed the question to whether making employment decisions based on a depressed individual's lack of a positive attitude is illegal. Although I have great sympathy for those with mental illness and personally wish the law were different, my answer is still that this is almost certainly legal. Another example of a court finding attitude to be a legitimate reason upon which to base employment decisions is: Martin v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 809 (M.D. Pa 2000). In this case, the court accepted as a legitimate reason for promoting one individual over another that the promoted individual "demonstrated good interpersonal skills." Id. at 817. A third example is Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, the Seventh Circuit explicitly noted that "[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and we will not second-guess that decision." Id. at 601. It then went on to affirm dismissal of the plaintiff's ADA claim because the employer "said that lead drivers must have knowledge of the mechanics of the trucks and be able to manage the other drivers on the truck through a positive attitude and ability to get along well with others. But the supervisors in charge of hiring lead drivers testified without contradiction that [the plaintiff] had a negative attitude that drew complaints from other drivers." Id. at 601-602 (emphasis added). After a relatively exhaustive search, I've found no case to counter these pretty clear statements that basing employment decisions on 'attitude' is legal. FURTHER NOTE: OP has now modified the question again to add the qualification that the lack of a positive attitude "doesn't prevent the employee from doing their job." IF this were actually true, then the answer likely becomes that illegal discrimination has occurred because then the employee would be 'otherwise qualified' (a key phrase in employment law litigation). BUT, there is an inherent contradiction in premises in OP's question now because if X is a requirement of a job, and Y employee cannot do X because of Z, then Z is preventing Y employee from doing that job. In other words, if a job requires a positive attitude, then one can't do that job without a positive attitude. Ultimately, what OP's question is really trying to get at is 'what if the employer makes 'positive attitude' a job requirement, but I don't think it should be a job requirement?' Unfortunately, there's almost certainly no legal recourse for this as long as it's a legal job requirement because, to reiterate the 7th Circuit, "[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and [a court] will not second-guess that decision." Id. at 601. | Note that while a person can request a specific accommodation, an employer or potential employer is not required to grant the specific accommodation requested. Some other accommodation which (the employer claims) will meet the expressed need can be offered instead. Also no accommodation need be offered if it would impose an "undue burden" on the employer. The normal expectation is that there will be a back-and forth until the employee (or applicant) and the employer agree on an appropriate accommodation. Where there is agreement but the agreement is then violated, the normal first response is to make such adjustments as will restore the agreed accommodation. Only if that fails will a legal complaint be heard. There is no automatic penalty for violation of an accommodation agreement, it will depend on the facts ass assessed by the Commission and perhaps later by a court. Possible penalties can include an order to employ or reinstate a complainant, back pay, costs and legal fees, and money damages, which can be up to $75,000 per violation, as the court deems just. The relevant law is 42 U.S. Code § 12112. This provides (in relevant part): No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. The section goes on to define “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” as including any of several acts, including: (b) (5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; ... (7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are the factors that the test purports to measure). 42 U.S. Code § 12111 defines "Reasonable accommodation" and undue hardship” as follows: (9) Reasonable accommodation The term “reasonable accommodation” may include— (9) (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (9) (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. (10) Undue hardship (10) (A) In general The term “undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B). (10) (B) Factors to be considered In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include— (10) (B) (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; (10) (B) (ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (10) (B) (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (10) (B) (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity. Under 42 U.S. Code § 2000e–5 and subsequent sections informal measures are normally first attempted to remedy any violation. If those fail, remadies can include injunctions against continued discrimination, awards of back pay (not relevant when the person was never an employee) orders to employ a person, awards of costs and legal fees, and other damages. No specific remedy is automatic, there is wide discretion. | The parenthesized part means that if you are being compelled by law to disclose some confidential information, you must promptly notify the company of that fact. They could they respond by trying to get you excluded as a witness, or to limit your testimony, but you don't have to care what they do once they've been notified that you were subpoenaed. It may well be that every time the opposing side asks you a question, "your" side will object, and the judge will decide whether to sustain or overrule the objection. The only way in which you would defer to the company lawyer is by not answering the question before the question is finished (i.e. give the attorney 2 seconds to voice an objection). You would not have to "bring" the employer's lawyer along to a deposition, but that lawyer would probably be present and would similarly raise objections, if he felt like it. Your duty is simply to tell the company that you are being compelled to testify. In case the police or a detective agency are investigating the matter and they come to interview you, you are not compelled by law to answer (or to hand over documents), therefore you are supposed to decline to answer (and you are not obligated to inform the company that someone asked a question). As for an administrative subpoena, the perhaps tricky part will be knowing whether you are being compelled to testify, or invited to testify. The wording of the paperwork should inform you whether this is compulsory. | Question: Do I need a EU passport or EU ID card to legally work in the EU (or establish that I have the right to work in the EU)? Or is a certificate of citizenship sufficient? Legally, your right to work is not contingent on this and there is no Europe-wide rule that makes holding any document mandatory. Importantly, if you do start working anyway, you are not committing a crime and cannot possibly be banned or forced to leave the country. You do have the right to work from the day you became an EU citizen and if any doubt arises down the line, you should be able to clear it up later. In practice, employers are sometimes supposed to check you are allowed to work (and for that would require some proof of your citizenship) but they don't necessarily need a passport or ID. What's typical on the other hand is that you have to provide an official proof of address (in the countries where you have to register your address with the authorities) and the local social security, insurance, or national tax number. Both of these will require dealing with the authorities and will be considerably more difficult, if not downright impossible, without a national ID card or passport (in fact it can even be difficult with a passport). I worked in multiple EU countries and I don't recall always having to present my ID to employers. I recall at least one instance (in Germany) where I could start working without one (it had just been stolen) and another one (in the Netherlands) where I started on the day after I arrived, without official address nor tax number (BSN). In both cases, I was expected to solve these issues within the first month and you risk a fine if you don't register within a week or two but it was neither illegal nor impossible to start working before all the formalities were completed. None of this means I would be completely comfortable about being months without a passport. But the main issue for you will be entering the country and what your employer's HR department is prepared to tolerate, not any sort of legal obligation to hold a passport to work. Note that in one of the cases I described above I went to the local consulate to get an emergency passport. It wouldn't have been possible back in my country of citizenship but there are some special procedures when you reside abroad. These rules change all the time and depend on your country of citizenship but that could be worth a try. | The statute in question is section 26708 (13)(B): A vehicle equipped with a video event recorder shall have a notice posted in a visible location which states that a passenger's conversation may be recorded. It doesn't require it be visible to all passengers and doesn't make any provision for visually impaired passengers. I am not licenced to practice in California but know of no cases clarifying how "visible" the notice needs to be. I wouldn't suggest trying to hide the notice, though. | A doctor can choose their patients A doctor has a professional duty to render aid in an emergency. However, apart from this and assuming the decision is not made for a prohibited or unlawfully discriminatory reason, they can refuse to see whoever they want. What you have here is poor customer relations, not illegally. Find a better doctor. |
Does a gun control ordinance imply police duty to protect? It has been established multiple times that police has no duty to protect, except for the situations where the police actions put a person in a harm's way. There were several cases affirming that. A cop arrested a husband driver and left his wife stranded and she was raped; another cop alerted a violent man that the neighbors complained about him and he slaughtered them when the cop left; another cop took a motorist's keys away in the middle of a snowstorm and the motorist froze to death; in all those cases the court decided that the cops were liable despite the general lack of duty to protect. Now, suppose a city enacts an ordinance precluding weapon carry. A licensed gun owner is thus prevented from carrying a gun for protection. She gets assaulted because she wasn't able to protect herself without a weapon. Does the gun control ordinance make the city liable for failing to protect her because said ordinance put her in a harm's way? | No For the same reason that requiring a licence to drive might, in some circumstances, result in harm to a person who cannot drive because they don’t have a licence. The city (or any government) has legislative immunity for the laws they put in place even if those laws have negative consequences to some people. All laws have negative consequences to some people, for example, laws against theft are extremely prejudicial to thieves. Similarly, the executive is immune for exercising their discretion in the enforcement of the law. This is the basis of the police not having a general duty to protect. However, police have a specific duty to protect when they have taken an individual into their care and control. | united-states "I know is it illegal for authorities to question a suspect when their lawyer isn’t present" This is not really true, at least in the US. The suspect must explicitly ask for a lawyer. Even saying "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" (ie Davis v. U.S. (512 U.S. 453 (1994)) isn't enough, they have to say "I want a lawyer". Until they invoke the right, an officer can question all they want (provided they were informed of these rights, except for certain situations which are relatively complicated. See Miranda Rights). So no, an officer questioning you without a lawyer is neither a crime nor illegal. Once you invoke your Miranda right though, they have to respect that. With or without your lawyer, this is called interrogation. You can filter your responses through a lawyer, or waive your right to a lawyer and answer directly. | The policeman ordered, right as he took a step out of his car "Turn it off!" - which is a lawful demand to prevent the biker from possibly kicking the gas and running. As the driver did not seem to comply (from the policeman's PoV) during his walk over to the bike, he enforced the order himself by turning off the bike and confiscating the key for the moment. Having made it safe that the driver couldn't leg it, he guided traffic around him so he could get to the side of the road. We don't know what happened after the driver reached the curb to be lectured and/or arrested, the bike could be impounded or the confiscation might be temporary. So all we can do here is discuss the action of demanding that a motor vehicle be turned off, the doing of such and taking the keys. Demanding a vehicle to be shut off is standard procedure in police stop, as it is ensuring the safety of everybody involved. In a somewhat recent case (trying to find it again!), a driver did not shut off the car and had to stand on the brake to keep it where it was. As commands came conflicting (keep your hands where we can see them, get out of the car!) and he could not comply or the car would jump forward and ram somewhere, things escalated and the driver was shot. But back to the first step. Was the stop lawful? ACLU in NY tells us: Police may stop and briefly detain you only if there is reasonable suspicion that you committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime. Don’t bad-mouth a police officer or run away, even if you believe what is happening is unreasonable. That could lead to your arrest. There was a crime committed: Splitting is illegal in NY (among others: Section 1122, overtaking on the right), so the stop was justified under NY CPL 140.50. From my own experience, it is not uncommon for bikers to try to evade police by swerving back into traffic and using their higher mobility to get away. On its face, this makes it reasonable to demand the bike be shut off as the policeman advanced, and I'd like to congratulate the officer for taking the less escalating step and just turning the bike off himself on the noncompliance instead of drawing his gun and possibly escalating it to a use of force. Most lawyers suggest to drivers pulled over to do things akin to "After you brought your car to a complete stop [on the curb], roll down your window and shut off the engine". Like this one. Possibly confiscating the keys might be an overreach by the policeman, but the demand to turn it off clearly is not. | Was Derek Chauvin protected by Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)? No. Derek Chauvin, the police officer whose affirmative physical acts caused the death of George Floyd is not protected by this precedent. Castle Rock v. Gonzales holds that the police do not have a duty to enforce the law that may be enforced by a private party in a civil action. Police instead have broad discretion regarding whether they will or will not take action to enforce a law. But, when a police officer does take action affirmatively, this case does not apply. Instead, the question then, is whether the affirmative use of force by the officer was justified by the applicable substantive criminal law. If Chauvin had not touched Floyd at all, would Chauvin be protected by Castle Rock v. Gonzales? Meaning no attempt at arrest, no confrontation, nothing. Just let Floyd leave with his cigarettes. Yes. (A much more complicated analysis applied if a fellow officer did what he did and he stood back and did nothing, but that is beyond the scope of this question as I understand it and would call for a separate question.) Given the apparent huge disparity in the risk-reward calculation of a police officer taking action versus just sitting in the car, why don't all police just sit in their car all day? Police officers who do that are routinely fired and given bad recommendation by their superiors when applying for a new law enforcement position. Law enforcement supervisors routinely punish police officers for inaction construing that as being a "coward" but are much less likely to punish a police officer for being unlawfully overzealous without strong pressure from civilians in the relevant government agency or local government. Empirically, sitting in their car all day is not how police act. They are much more likely to be overzealous than to be docile. This said, there is some statistical evidence that has been construed to show that following the announcement of the Chauvin prosecution and related protests before and after that was done, that police took a less active role in policing that led to higher crime. | Examples Detention: A person suspected of a felony can be detained at gunpoint (and, in many jurisdictions, subject to "citizen's arrest"). A more clear example is when you encounter someone committing a felonious assault. You can brandish your gun and order them to stop. If they do stop, then you cannot shoot them unless there is no alternative to preventing them from inflicting grievous bodily harm on another. Defense: If you reasonably feel that another person poses a real and grievous physical threat, you can brandish a gun in defense. A common example is the slight woman followed into a vacant alley by a large man. She can brandish a gun to keep him at bay, but she cannot shoot him if he is not making explicit threats and (supposing one accepts the "Tueller rule") makes no aggressive motion within 21 feet of the woman. Law One helpful explanation of the distinction, by a MO attorney citing the MO Supreme Court: While deadly force can only be used to meet the threat of deadly force, the threat implied by brandishing is justified by a low level threat. “When a person has reasonable cause to apprehend on the part of another a design to inflict a great personal injury, and there was reasonable cause for him to apprehend immediate danger of such design being accomplished he is justified, and has the right, ‘to avert such apprehended design,’ and in proper circumstances the right of attack may be essential to the right of self-defense.” More detailed analysis can be found of California Penal Code 417 (California's law against "Brandishing," which is similar to brandishing laws in most states): [I]f you were lawfully defending yourself or defending another person, California's self-defense laws will excuse your otherwise criminal act. You lawfully act in self-defense or in defense of others when you reasonably believe that you or another person is about to suffer imminent harm, and you fight back with no more force than is reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. I.e., sometimes it's enough to say, "Stop!" But sometimes it's necessary to present a gun for the bad guy to get the message. Additionally: Simply drawing or exhibiting a weapon isn't enough to justify a conviction for 417 PC. In order for prosecutors to convict you of brandishing a weapon or firearm, you must do so in a rude, angry, or threatening manner. The same law review provides illuminating comparisons with the related offense "Assault with a Deadly Weapon" (ADW — CA 245 PC). | How far can one go to defend him/herself from an unreasonable search and seizures, in the same sense of one defending him/herself from an unlawful arrest? Not very far. Basically all you can do is try to talk the officer out of it. He thinks he sees evidence in sight... If the police officer reasonably believes that there is evidence of a crime in plain view, then the officer can proceed to seize the evidence. If the property owner tries to use force to prevent the seizure, then the officer can arrest the property owner. ... the property owner ... highly believes there is no possible way he could have seen the evidence from outside his property. It doesn't matter what the owner believes (unless the owner can somehow convince the officer before the search). What matters is what the court believes. But the owner cannot bring the matter to court before the officer enters the shed. If the officer insists on entering the shed and the owner can establish in court that the officer couldn't see the evidence and that there was no other lawful basis for a warrantless search or seizure, then the evidence will be inadmissible. The owner might also be able to prevail in a civil suit for the violation of civil rights, but the bar for such a suit is very high, so the likelihood is very small. | In the United States, the government has, multiple times, destroyed homes while trying to catch a fugitive. And the homeowner sometimes makes a claim in federal court that this is an unconstitutional taking without compensation in violation of the 5th Amendment. In Lech v. Jackson, the 10th Circuit decided that the police and city were not liable for destroying a house while trying to arrest a criminal who had fled there. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. But in Baker v. City of McKinney, Texas, less than 3 months ago, a district court declined to dismiss a case in which police destroyed a home to catch a fleeing criminal. Allegedly, in this case the police were given a key to the door, a garage door opener, and the code to the back gate by the homeowner - and instead of using those, they used explosives on the garage door and used a BearCat to knock down the fence and the front door. I'm not sure to what extent those facts, perhaps showing that the scale of the destruction was unnecessary, matter. To the best of my knowledge the case is still ongoing. | To provide an initial answer, without getting to the specific of the 51 statutory standards for self-defense in U.S. states and the exact Canadian standard, as applied to your examples, I'll make some general observations: Self-defense is a justification for doing something that would otherwise be illegal (intentionally using force against someone else). Self-defense justifications include a sense of proportionality. It isn't proper to use more force than is reasonably necessary to achieve the defensive objective. There are basically two levels of self-defensive force: Deadly Force and Non-Deadly Force. Preventing some crimes and harms is statutorily justified to do using deadly force (e.g. to prevent a murder). To prevent other crimes and harms statutes only justify the use of non-deadly force (e.g. to prevent shoplifting). The exact list of crimes in each category varies somewhat. Historically, for example, there have been some U.S. states that have authorized the use of deadly force to prevent a rape that does not put the life of the victim at risk, and others that have not authorized the use of deadly force for that purpose (I don't know if that is still the case). Typically, law enforcement officers are also authorized to use deadly force in some circumstances in which a non-deputized civilian could not. As a practical matter, a use of force that causes death is presumptively considered to be deadly force, even if the means used are not inherently deadly in all circumstances. Meanwhile, a use of force involving the use of a "deadly weapon" such as a firearm, is presumptively considered to be deadly force, even if it doesn't actually kill someone. But both of these "presumptions" (and I am using that term loosely in this answer, rather than with its precise legal meaning), can be overcome with relevant evidence. Mildly shoving someone with hemophilia (or tossing a dish full of peanuts in the face of someone with a severe peanut allergy), without knowing that this person suffers from this condition, is not a use of deadly force within the meaning of laws justifying self-defense, even if it actually ends up causing their death. Similarly, proving that you intended to and did, shoot out the tires of someone's car, or shot their foot, instead of shooting to kill, would not always constitute a use of deadly force for purposes of statutes justifying the use of force in self-defense. Getting to the specifics of the question, the majority rule would be that the use of deadly force is justified in most circumstances to prevent a home invasion burglar from harming you or other people in the residence, and to repel the home invasion burglar from the residence, although some jurisdictions would qualify this in one respect or another. The case that the use of deadly force is justified would be stronger if the home invasion burglar was armed than if he was not, and would be stronger if the homeowner was not physically competent enough to be confident of an ability to dispatch the invader in a non-deadly manner. If deadly force was justified in that circumstance, it wouldn't really matter how you killed him, nor would it matter that you intended to kill him to defense your home and the people in your home. If the law only authorized the use of non-deadly force in the circumstances, for example, because the burglar had seized an envelope full of cash and was fleeing the house, so you were really only using force to protect your property, rather than to protect your home or the safety of the people in it, at that point, then the analysis would get tougher. If you intended to kill the fleeing thief in circumstances when only non-deadly force was authorized, the weapon you used wouldn't matter. You intended to use deadly force, the force you used caused the intended death, and you did those things even though the law didn't authorize you to do so in those circumstances. If you didn't intend to kill the fleeing thief in circumstances when only non-deadly force was authorized, but you ended up killing him anyway (so that you didn't have a prohibited intent behind your actions), then the question would be whether your intent and belief that your actions would not kill him was reasonable under the circumstances. If you caused his death with your bare hands, or with a less lethal weapon (in truth, there is no such thing as a non-lethal weapon), your belief that the thief wouldn't die from your use of force would be more likely to be seen as reasonable. If you caused his death with a lethal weapon, your belief that the thief wouldn't die from your use of force would be less likely to be seen as reasonable. If the jury (or a judge in bench trial) didn't believe you were reasonable in your use of force which you didn't intend to be deadly, then the jury (or judge as the case might be) would not allow a self-defense argument to prevent them from convicting you of some kind of homicide crime. So you would probably be convicted of some form of homicide (perhaps heat of passion manslaughter), although you might still not have the requisite intent for first degree murder in circumstances like that (so that your self-defense argument might end up providing you with an incomplete defense). |
Is it illegal in Germany to pretend being sentenced for committing homicide? People often want you to tell them a story. For me this question is overreaching and I feel uncomfortable. So I was wondering to what extend it is legal to make up a story I am fine with. | §145d StGB makes it illegal to pretend that a crime did happen or will happen, but only if one deceives the police or a similar agency. It is also a crime to deceive about the participants of a crime. Pretending to have been sentenced and presumably to have been released after serving a sentence does not quite fit that law. | Germany would not extradite to Saudi Arabia. India and Kuwait might, because they and a few other countries have extradition treaties with KSA. To put this squarely in the realm of illegal (it's not clear that accidentally encountering Shiite material online is a crime in KSA), assume that the person deliberately watched porn then fled to India. Generally speaking, this is a severe enough offense to allow extradition under the India-KSA treaty. However, India gets to review the request for exceptions. Under article 3, the central question is whether this is a political crime. There are enumerated acts that are not deemed to be political. Watching porn is not a listed exception. Accordingly, India could determine that this is a political crime, and refuse to extradite. If the crime is advocating atheism, however, then under Article 3 (1)(j), this is presumably not an excludable offense, because atheism is officially terrorism in KSA per Royal Decree 44 (I can't find an official copy). On the third hand, India may still reserve the right to apply their definition of terrorism. Even if there were an extradition treaty between Germany and KSA, German law Act on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters of 23 December 1982 §3(1) would currently preclude extradition because Extradition shall not be granted unless the offence is an unlawful act under German law or unless mutatis mutandis the offence would also constitute an offence under German law. There might be acts that are offenses in both countries, but not e.g. "watching porn" or "advocating atheism". The boundaries of blasphemy under German law are not clear to me. Section 166 of the Strafgesetzbuch imposes a maximum of 3 years in prison for blasphemy, so it could be an extraditable offense. Sect. 6 of the "Cooperation" law also sets forth exclusions for reasons of political and religious persecution. Also, KSA would have to assure Germany that the death penalty would not be imposed. | In the US, it is not illegal to lie in general. This includes lying about someone: it's not illegal per se to lie about them. What is illegal is slander and libel: lying about someone in a way that hurts their reputation. The defamation doctrine in the US is generally a common-law doctrine (i.e. the rules and limits are based on court decisions, rather than on laws passed by legislatures), although it may differ state-by-state. Depending on the state, some defamation may be criminal; there is no federal criminal defamation. US defamation law is largely defined through its interaction with the First Amendment. While libel is not constitutionally protected, punishment for libel is seriously limited by the need to avoid either punishing protected speech, or chilling potential protected speech (i.e. discouraging people from saying something that would in fact be protected, because they aren't sure whether or not it's protected). Libel in the US only applies to a false statement of fact, or an opinion which implies some false fact. If it can't actually be proven incorrect, it can't be libelous in the US. The question of whether it's a statement of fact doesn't just depend on the literal speech; it includes things like the context, and is a question about what a reasonable person would think. If I were to claim that someone was "literally Hitler," for instance, no reasonable person would think I was seriously claiming that the person was the former leader of Nazi Germany. Now, no reasonable person who is familiar with Twitter would ever assume that the tweet meant Obama literally stood up in front of the UN and said "Please accept this nothingburger in place of a respectable climate plan." So, it only counts as libel if a reasonable person would think it implies some fact. But a reasonable person familiar with Twitter would most likely think Miesel is saying "The president's pollution plan is a pointless piece of political puffery planned to placate principalities and potentates." This is basically a matter of opinion. Even to the extent that it's not a matter of opinion, public figures in the US cannot win a defamation suit unless they show "actual malice:" the speaker must actually know or actually strongly suspect that their statement is false in some material way. It's not enough that a reasonable person would think "this might not be true;" the speaker themselves must doubt the truth of it (they must be reckless, not just negligent). Courts are also extremely deferential to defendants in these cases. While it is technically possible for a public figure to prove defamation, it is exceptionally difficult. If the person didn't know they were falsely attributing the quote, and honesty thought it was correct, they're in the clear. If the quote isn't supposed to be a statement of fact, but it implies false facts, but the speaker honestly thinks those facts are true, they're in the clear. Private figures don't have to meet the actual malice standard to prove defamation. They still need to show that the statement is a statement of fact or something implying false facts; if it's obviously a summary of something they really said, possibly with added editorial comment, they can't prove defamation. | In England and Wales, under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by section 59 and Schedule 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) it's a criminal offence to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting someone to commit suicide. I think that applies to Scotland too, and there is similar law in Northern Ireland. Encouraging suicide is also a criminal offence in some other common law jurisdictions, e.g. in Australia. While in other common law jurisdictions, if there isn't such a law, the person might instead be prosecuted for manslaughter - or not at all. The minimum, maximum and recommended penalties may well differ between jurisdictions. I don't know what you mean by "vengeance rampage" but I'm not aware of any jurisdictions where it is lawful for a person to cause harm to someone for revenge. States tend to reserve for themselves a monopoly on the use of force. | Relying on this version, proof of truth is only allowed in order to establish a "public interest" defense or for a "necessary defense"; but also "if an official is charged with the commission of an act in the exercise of his office". Good luck with "necessary defense". It is not a defense to say "But what I said is true". However, if the defamed person has been convicted in court of said act (the defamatory statement) then there can be no punishment. | Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies. | Firstly, there is no jurisdiction in the US where rape is a potentially capital crime, and murder is not - so you are discussing a hypothetical (and rather implausible) jurisdiction. Given your jurisdiction is hypothetical, you can make the law be what you would like. Secondly, duress is accepted in almost all jurisdictions as a defence to a charge of anything except homicide (and some jurisdictions allow it to reduce the severity of a homicide charge). Courts can be reluctant to accept a charge of duress, but a bullet wound would probably be persuasive. I don't know if someone who had just been shot would be physically able to perform though. The precise crimes the perpetrator is guilty of would depend on your specific jurisdiction, but I would expect at least: rape (because they organized it) kidnap shooting the brother | It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on. |
Is it legal in Austria for somebody to send threats of legal action in court if money is not paid and not follow through? I have received a cease and desist letter from a lawyer in Austria demanding I remove a number of facebook posts that asks critical questions about the (non) functioning of their product. After this letter had been delivered the client continued to contact me personally via phone and email ( neither which I had given him ) demanding private conversations. Even though his lawyer had already sent a letter threatening legal action a week later he sends me an email from his company account again demanding a private conversation and threatening legal action. This feels like harassment and threats. I have explained that I have no intention of a private conversation and that any discussion about his product should happen in public if he wishes to answer the questions I have put. My conclusion from his actions is that his lawyer has rightly told him he has no case. He is selling a device that he claims to be a "chip" yet I bought one and dissected it and it had no components and an empty circuit board with some magnets glued on. Would a lawyer advise their client to keep contacting the defendant in this case? What I am mainly curious about is that this original legal letter came with a demand for money. 360 euros to be precise. Is this legal in Austria? If there is no real intention of legal action is it just a shakedown attempt? Do I have recourse to go to the Police? | There are answers between black and white. One might honestly believe to be owed €360, and demand that money in a lawyers' letter, and be prepared to write that demand off if the other party does not comply. Going to court has an uncertain outcome even if one is objectively right, and it will take effort and money. As you describe the events, it looks like an intimidation attempt, but the other side will have their narrative as well. Regarding the phone and mail communications, this could be harassment or an attempt to reach a pre-trial settlement. Again, it depends on details. If you feel harassed, talk to a lawyer. | No employer has ever the right to withhold your pay check for work you have done. It is strictly illegal. Even if they had 100% evidence that you caused damage and were responsible for that damage, they still can't withhold your pay. They have to pay you, and then they can try to take you to court. The reason for this law is exactly cases like yours, where people try to avoid payment. If the "powerful attorney" tells you that you are not getting paid, then that "powerful attorney" is making a big mistake, because any lawyer would love to take your case to court and see the judge cutting the "powerful attorney" down to size. If you don't want a lawyer now, then you can write a letter by registered mail telling them that you worked for them, how much the payment due is, that they are legally required to make that payment, and that you will take them to court if they are not paying. If there is a conflict between law and a "powerful attorney", the law wins, and the law is on your side. | Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character. | A person that fails to comply with a copyright licence does not have a licence to use the copyrighted material. The owner of the copyright can take all the normal actions for copyright violation including seeking an injunction to stop the breach and/or suing for damages. Additionally, if the breach constitutes criminal activity, then the state can enforce those sanctions. However, suing a Chinese company in a Chinese court is generally a hiding to nothing. I won't say the Chinese legal system is biased towards its citizens but I wont say it isn't either. However, a case can be brought in any jurisdiction where the breach occurs (e.g. the USA) and enforcement action can be taken against any assets located in that jurisdiction. | This depends on the nature of the "ban" ---i.e., who issued it, what legal power they have, and what it actually requires you to refrain from doing. You say it is "their ban" so I am going to assume that this is just a decision that the store has made not to allow you entry. If it is indeed the store itself that has "banned" you, this would not prevent you from calling them to apologise for whatever you did. Calling a business on the phone cannot generally be considered a trespass --- at most, if you were to repeatedly call and harass a business over and over again, it might give rise to a nuisance suit. Unless you have extremely strange laws in your jurisdiction, it is almost certainly not against the law for you to call a business that has banned you, a fortiori if this phone call is made for the purposes of apologising for whatever you did that led to the ban. Although it does not appear to be the situation in this case, if this ban was an actual restraining order of some kind issued by a Court, then it might indeed prevent you from contacting the business (in which case breaching it would lead to an action for contempt of court, not trespass). If a Court were to issue you with an injunction or restraining order of some kind to ban you from a business, then that instrument would specify what you are prevented from doing. You would then need to be very careful to comply with that order. In short: there is a great deal of difference between a "ban" made by a store as the owner of property, and a ban issued by a court through an injunction or restraining order. | The warning notice is intended for viewers and participants, not for the court to make its own official record of the proceedings. Presumably, it was this court record that the judge released for educational purposes under his own Order via Twitter. In which case, there has been no contempt of court. | Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place. | Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable. |
Why do UK Supreme Court Justices read aloud their judgments? All UKSC (and Privy Council) judgments are published and can be read and downloaded for free. So why do Justices read parts of them aloud, as you can see on UKSC's official YouTube channel? I'd certainly think that lawyers can read for themselves! Are they intended for the illiterate? As you can also see, very few people attend these declamations, barring the landmark cases. | Because it’s the default The law requires: Judgment A judgment may be— (a) delivered in open court; or (b) if the Court so directs, promulgated by the Registrar | Contemporary decisions of domestic British courts (e.g. the Supreme Court) are not binding in foreign jurisdictions. They may be persuasive for courts there, because there is a common legal tradition and the U.K. judiciary is often considered to be quite good. Some countries have preserved a right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (aka "The Queen in Council"). This body is basically the same judges as the Supreme Court but sitting in a different room. As the JCPC their decisions are precedential in wherever the appeal came from, and potentially elsewhere if the law in question is the same. Corollary: JCPC decisions are not precedential for British courts, unless the JCPC goes out of its way to say so. In these cases, the JCPC applies the law and constitution of the origin country, which can include retained pre-independence British laws as well as the common law. That country could pass a subsequent statute or constitutional act overriding the JCPC's decision (as Parliament could in the U.K.), so that country retains ultimate control even though one of "its" courts is a shared one sitting in London. This arrangement can cause dissonance. For example, some Caribbean countries would like to execute people, but that is prohibited in the U.K.; the JCPC continues to permit executions to go ahead in some cases, even though that would be illegal if the same judges were in a different room hearing a British case. There are very occasional cases from Brunei, whose law is determined by the Sultan and includes aspects of Islamic law not known in the U.K. legal tradition. | No The case was dismissed on procedural reasons. Like this. Well, perhaps not so pedantic but there are things that have to happen before the Supreme Court can get involved and they haven’t. For example, the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction in a limited classes of case; if this isn’t one of those (and it isn’t) it has to be heard in a court that does and then get appealed up the chain. When they have, the court will make a decision on the merits. | Different courts have different practices, but I believe the general practice is for plaintiffs to use exhibit numbers, and for defendants to use exhibit letters. As with most procedural questions, the final decision belongs to the judge. The repetition in letters comes in when you get to the end of the alphabet. After you've used A-Z, you go to AA, BB, CC ... ZZ, then AAA, BBB, CCC, and so on. | If six justices decided that the case were sufficiently important, they could refrain from recusing themselves so as to be able to hear it. If that didn't happen, the lower court's ruling would stand, as you suggest. If I understand this rule correctly, if four justices had conflicts of interest, the court would lack a quorum. That's more likely, though admittedly very unlikely. However unlikely it may be, it has actually happened (for example, Shao v. Roberts). | If you're in the USA, this almost certainly falls under fair use, or if you are in another jurisdiction, it almost certainly falls under an analogous exception for educational use. The fact that the excerpt is short contributes to this conclusion. You can also avoid having to rely even on these exceptions by choosing sources that are in the public domain. The specific date before which a work is guaranteed to be in the public domain depends, again, on your jurisdiction, but it's probably sometime in the early 20th century. For example, you're certainly on solid ground if you use Dickens. | All precedents are made in court judgements Courts exist in a hierarchy which means there are two kinds of precedent: binding and persuasive. A binding precedent is one set in the same hierarchy by a higher level court. A persuasive precedent is one set at the same or lower level in the hierarchy or in a completely different hierarchy. For example, a precedent set in the Supreme Court of New South Wales sitting as the Court of Appeal is binding on the Supreme Court of NSW in general session, the District Court and the Magistrates Court (lower courts), persuasive on the Supreme Court of New South Wales sitting as the Court of Appeal and all courts in Victoria and Queensland (different hierarchies) and is not a precedent for the High Court of Australia (higher up). In general, while a lower level court can, in theory, set a precedent, such cases are rarely reported so nobody knows about them and, in any event, they would only have limited applicability. Therefore most precedents come from higher level courts which means, they are usually set in appeals rather than trials of first instance. In addition it is only the ratio decidendi that sets binding precedent. Anything in the judgement that is obiter dicta is merely persuasive. Bear in mind that the overwhelming majority of cases do not create precedent - they follow it. Or, if they don’t follow it, the judge was wrong. It is also a legal fiction (i.e. something pretending to be true that everyone knows isn’t) that judges do not create law by precedent - they merely find the law that was already there. Since the role of judges in common law jurisdictions is to only decide cases, they cannot and do not offer opinions on what the law is outside of that. This is a long-standing tradition in English law and the first Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court confirmed that the Constitution did not change this. Therefore, the only way to test the validity of a new law is to have a trial that uses it. That said, governments have lawyers review legislation and regulations before they are promulgated to check for things like legality and workability but these are only professional opinions and are not binding. Furthermore, sometimes legislation is drafted quickly for political reasons. One hopes that legislatures take proper care when drafting legislation that it is legal, is workable and actually makes sense: one is often disappointed in that hope. | One important formal difference is that self-represented litigants cannot claim the same costs if they prevail in a civil case. Costs are capped at 2/3 of what they would have received, had they been represented. ("Disbursements", such as court fees, are not subject to the same limit.) Moreover, their deemed hourly rate is £19/hr, unless it's possible to demonstrate that they've incurred greater financial loss as a result of doing the work. This is much less than the billed rate for qualified counsel. A less practical privilege is wearing gowns and wigs. Self-represented litigants are not allowed to pretend that they are barristers by donning their finest horsehair, or going on about "my learned friend". Solicitor-advocates are "my friend" but laypeople should not use this language at all. Outside of the courtroom, ordinary people can in principle do their own conveyancing (for example), but there are many practical obstacles. One is being fully exposed to the costs of mistakes. Mortgage lenders will often refuse to let random members of the public take care of the legal intricacies, and some solicitors on the other side will advise their clients not to bother. There are also a few technicalities which are easier for practicing solicitors, such as access to DX (a specialist private postal service) for shuttling reams of paper documents across the country. Case law (Domb v Isoz [1980] 1 All ER 942) lets solicitors effect an exchange of contracts by telephone, but this has not been recognised for other people, who continue to have to do it physically. |
Did the Buckingham Palace intruder commit a crime? Having just watched the episode of The Crown (Netflix series) dealing with the break in at Buckingham Palace in 1982 by unemployed man, Michael Fagan, I looked up the Wikipedia entry on the matter and was surprised to find the following: Since Fagan's actions were, at the time, a civil wrong rather than a criminal offence, he was not charged with trespassing in the Queen's bedroom.He was charged with theft (of the wine), but the charges were dropped when he was committed for psychiatric evaluation. In late July, Fagan's mother said, "He thinks so much of the Queen. I can imagine him just wanting to simply talk and say hello and discuss his problems." He spent the next three months in a psychiatric hospital before being released on 21 January 1983. It was not until 2007, when Buckingham Palace became a "designated site" for the purposes of section 128 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, that such an offence has become criminal. Although there is no criminal law of trespass in the UK, I was always of the understanding that there was a law against "housebreaking" (or is it "breaking and entering"?) and that if it took place after dark it was a more serious offence of "burglary". Though I can well appreciate that if no goods were taken it would unlikely qualify as burglary. But there was evidence that Fagan broke a window to get into the building, after shinning up a drainpipe - at least on the second of the two occasions. Why would he not have been charged with "housebreaking"? | Why would he not have been charged with "housebreaking"? In england-and-wales neither "house breaking" nor "breaking and entering" are legal terms: the offence is called burglary contrary to s.9 of the Theft Act 1968 which in 1983 was: (1) A person is guilty of burglary if— (a) he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser and with intent to commit any such offence as is mentioned in subsection (2) below; or (b) having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser he steals or attempts to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or attempts to inflict on any person therein any grievous bodily harm. (2) The offences referred to in subsection (1)(a) above are offences of stealing anything in the building or part of a building in question, of inflicting on any person therein any grievous bodily harm or raping any woman therein, and of doing unlawful damage to the building or anything therein. There is no difference between nightime and daytime entry, and there is no requirement for a forced entry. All that's needed is to go in without permission intending or attempting to do one of the relevant offences. I can only surmise that the reason(s) theft, rather than burglary, was charged was a (pre CPS) prosecutorial decision based on the admissible evidence, Fagan's mental state and what was in the public interest because the quoted text seems to meet the criteria for burglary. (ETA subject to the actual circumstances surrounding the alleged theft of the wine, which are not clear from the quoted text.) | The primary legal question is whether the resident (tenant) has breached a duty of care. There are all sorts of laws establishing duties of care, such as between doctor and patient, which may be created by a legislature or may be part of common law tradition. There is a duty of care imposed on a landlord w.r.t. the tenant, requiring that the premise be "secure", therefore a landlord might easily be held liable if the main door into the building was not locked. This duty is a specific instance of a general duty from tradesman/businessman to customer. As far as I can determine, there is no such statutory duty imposed on tenants in Washington state, and none from case law being revealed by a few cursory searches. In order to be subsumed under general "everybody has a duty to everybody else" law, the damage would have to be foreseeable. It is said that "If something is foreseeable, it is a probable and predictable consequence of the defendant’s negligent actions or inaction". This mean that a reasonable person would have known that, under the circumstances, the damage is likely to result. Circumstances vary quite a bit, and there is no general rule about holding the door open for another person. If there is abundant signage reminding tenants to never ever let in a stranger no matter that their excuse and/or if the premise is in a crime war-zone, the outcome is more likely to be considered to be foreseeable. | So, in England and Wales your son assaulted Mario. (From Wikipedia: "Assault is committed if one intentionally or recklessly causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence". I expect Mario expected your son was going to thump him, and that would certainly be unlawful.) You were both trespassers on the property; however it sounds like there was nobody there who could require you to leave, so that probably doesn't matter. Both of these would be true whatever the age of your daughter. Finally, in England and Wales, if you had forced your 16-year old daughter to come with you against her will, you would both have been guilty of kidnapping. (16 is the age at which children become independent in terms of deciding where to go.) She can choose to leave home and live with her boyfriend, and there is nothing you can do to stop her. Edit: The question did not originally mention a jurisdiction. This is an area where the legal situation is likely to be very jurisdiction dependent. | colorado Short Answer This woman was engaged in legally permitted self-defense when she killed the man with a knife in the kitchen under Colorado law, and she has not committed any crime. Her conduct would also not provide a basis for a valid lawsuit for money damages against her. Long Answer Applicable Law In Colorado's state criminal code, the relevant statutory section, Colorado Revised Statutes, § 18-1-704, states, in the pertinent parts (emphasis mine): Use of physical force in defense of a person - definitions. (1) . . . a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself . . . and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: . . . (b) The other person is using . . . physical force against an occupant of a dwelling . . . while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit . . . sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000. The referenced definition of burglary as relevant to this fact pattern is that: A person commits . . . burglary, if the person knowingly breaks an entrance into, enters unlawfully in, or remains unlawfully after a lawful or unlawful entry in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit therein a crime against another person or property. Note also that it doesn't matter for purposes of the burglary statute, if this is her kitchen, or someone else's, so long as it is not his kitchen. Also he need only be "attempting to commit burglary", so even if he was trying unsuccessfully to get into the house and assaulting her from just outside a door or window, her use of deadly force to prevent burglary would be justified. On the other hand, if he was lawfully present in the home (perhaps a husband or roommate), the burglary justification for the use of deadly force would no longer be present. The referenced sexual assault statute states in the pertinent part that it is committed if: Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: The actor causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will . . . [which includes any case in which:] The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application of physical force or physical violence[.] Even if he does not "reasonably appears about to commit" sexual penetration or intrusion (which are necessary for the crime to be sexual assault for purposes of the use of deadly force law in Colorado), unlawful sexual contact is a crime against a person in an occupied dwelling, so it constitutes burglary that justifies the use of deadly force, even if it doesn't constitute sexual assault. Under these circumstances, the woman may use deadly physical force if she reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate to cause the rapist to cease committing sexual assault, and any other crime against person or property in the home. Application Of Law To Facts There is no reasonable doubt that the man is, at a minimum, in the process of committing burglary, and very likely sexual assault as well, although the language of the question is somewhat coy on this point as relevant to the Colorado definition of sexual assault. He has proven himself capable of physically overpowering her efforts to resist him with non-deadly force without success. This demonstrates that non-deadly force was inadequate. She used a knife to kill him for the legally authorized purpose of ending a burglary and probably also a sexual assault. Therefore, her use of a knife to kill him is almost certain be a use of deadly force for purposes of self-defense which is permitted by Colorado law. As a result, she would not be legally guilty of any crime for killing him with a knife in these circumstances. Incidentally, she would also have no civil liability in tort for money damages in this situation in Colorado. Application To Other U.S. States The exact wording of self-defense statutes differ from one U.S. state to another and I don't personally know every fine statutory detail of every one of them. But, Colorado's statute is quite typical. A state where her actions did not constitute legally justified in these circumstances would be an extreme outlier in U.S. law. I would be surprised if there was any U.S. state in which her actions would not constitute legally justified self-defense. Historical Note Suppose that the man in the question were the woman's husband in their own home where they were both lawfully present. Prior to the 1970s, marital rape was legal in every US state. It was partially outlawed in Michigan and Delaware in 1974, then wholly outlawed in South Dakota and Nebraska in 1975. The court case Oregon v. Rideout in 1978 was the first in which someone stood trial for raping his spouse while they lived together. By 1993 marital rape was a crime nationwide. (Source) Under current U.S. law in every U.S. state, the sexual assault justification analysis would be no different because there is no marital immunity for the crimes of sexual assault, although the burglary justification would no longer be present, so an intent to commit unlawful sexual contact without penetration or intrusion would not justify the use of deadly force. But, when marital immunity to sexual assault was part of the law, as it was in every U.S. state prior to 1974, and as it was in some U.S. states until 1993, she would be guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter. The distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter in that case would hinge upon whether she had an intent to kill or only intended to harm (as in a case cited by Jen in her answer). Also, she would have a good argument for manslaughter due to provocation by the victim that was not sufficient to justify the use of deadly force, even if jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that she did intent to kill him. Colorado's self-defense statute (in a subsection omitted because it was not applicable to the facts in the question) also permits the grade of a criminal offense caused in the course of conduct intended as self-defense that does not meet the statutory standards for self-defense (e.g. because non-deadly force would have been sufficient) to downgrade the severity of the offense for which the person may be convicted, in a manner similar to the "heat of passion" defense. But, these facts present no plausible justification for a first degree murder, which is often a charge punishable by death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of parole, since it was not premeditated or committed in connection with a crime by the perpetrator. Realistically, under the circumstances of the question, if he was her husband and they were in their own home, during a time frame when there was marital immunity from sexual assault charges, she would most likely be convicted of manslaughter under these circumstances. Side Observation The U.S. Supreme Court has held in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) that the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution, directly and as incorporated against the states under the 14th Amendment, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for a rape not resulting in death (even the rape of a child). The death penalty has been unconstitutional in cases involving the rape of an adult woman in the U.S. since U.S. Supreme Court case of Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). There are many serious felonies (including some omitted from the Colorado statute above because they were not applicable to this fact pattern) for which the use of deadly force in self-defense is authorized even though the U.S. Constitution prohibits the use of the death penalty upon a conviction of that offense which does not result in someone dying. | Disclaimer: I was the person who originally had the debate with the OP which prompted this question. My answer is based on the UK jurisdiction. Short answer (TLDR) If the action is deliberate, then under UK law it is likely that a crime of theft has been committed. Under the statutory definition of theft, five elements need to be established: dishonesty, appropriation, property, belonging to another, and intention to permenantly deprive. The first four are easy to satisfy. To establish intention, it is not necessary that the money be spent. It is only necessary to establish that at the moment that the recipient realised the mistake, they intended not to return the money. Even if they do plan to eventually return the money, it can still amount to an intention to permenantly deprive. In A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983), the Court of Appeal held that theft could be committed in a case where an employer had mistakenly paid £74.74 to an employee for hours they had not worked. The obligation to return the money arose at the moment the employee realised the mistake. Whether or not the money was spent was not an issue (it was not even raised). Full answer I'm starting from the assumption (stated in the question) that the action is deliberate, as opposed to the recipient simply not noticing they have received the money. If it was accident or unnoticed then it is unlikely a crime has been committed as the necessary intention will be lacking. By deliberate I mean the person notices the money being received, realises it was an error, knows who the sender was (or can reasonably find out), and does nothing to rectify it. If the action is deliberate then this is likely to amount to the crime of theft under the Theft Act 1968 ('TA 1968'). Note, whether or not the prosecution could actually prove the crime is a separate matter. The question is not asking how easy it is to prove the elements, only whether or not the crime has been committed. Statute Theft is defined as "dishonestly appropriat[ing] property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it" (Section 1(1) TA 1986). Your motivations for appropriating the property (including whether or not you spend it) are not a relevant factor: "It is immaterial whether the appropriation is made with a view to gain, or is made for the thief’s own benefit." (Section 1(2) TA 1986). The important thing is whether or not the five elements of theft are present. These elements appear in the statutory definition of theft and are further elaborated in the Act: dishonesty (section 2 TA 1986), appropriation (section 3 TA 1986), property (section 4 TA 1986), belonging to another (section 5 TA 1986) and intention to permenantly deprive (section 6 TA 1986). Dishonesty: Defences include believing there is a legal right to deprive the other of the property, believing there was consent, or believing that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be reasonably discovered (section 2(1) TA 1986). None of these exceptions apply here, given the premise of the question. However if one of these beliefs were instead present, it is worth pointing out that "belief" is assessed using the subjective test (what the defendant genuinely believed), not the more common objective test (what a reasonable person would have believed in the circumstances) (R v Robinson. [1977] Crim LR 173). If none of the exceptions apply, then there is two-stage test for dishonesty: an objective test and a subjective test. However, if the objective test is passed then the subjective one is likely to as well: "In most cases, where the actions are obviously dishonest by ordinary standards, there will be no doubt about it. It will be obvious that the defendant himself knew that he was acting dishonestly. It is dishonest for a defendant to act in a way which he knows ordinary people to consider to be dishonest, even if he asserts or genuinely believes that he is morally justified in acting as he did." (R v Ghosh, [1982] QB 1053). Appropriation: "Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, and this includes, where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner." (emphasis added) (section 3(1) TA 1986). That very clearly applies here. Property: "'property' includes money [and] things in action" (Section 4(1) TA 1986). A bank balance is not money but a "thing in action" (a debt from the Bank to the customer) (A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369). Belonging to another: "Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make restoration (in whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof, then to the extent of that obligation the property or proceeds shall be regarded (as against him) as belonging to the person entitled to restoration, and an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of the property or proceeds." (Section 5(4) TA 1986). Note that it is not necessary that the customer be under a contractual obligation to return the money to the bank. Such an obligation can arise anyway under the law of restitution. It also arises in the law of equity - a person who gives property by mistake retains an equitable interest in that property (Chase Manhattan Bank v Israel-British Bank [1981] Ch 105). This principle has specifically been applied to bank errors (R v Shadrockh-Cigari [1988] Crim LR 465). Intention to permenantly deprive: "A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal." (Section 6(1) TA 1986). There are two important things to note here: firstly, an intention to take and then return an item can still amount to theft. Secondly, it is the intention at the time of the appropriation which matters. If the person intended to keep the money (in our case, by hoping it will never get asked for) at the time they became aware of the mistake then it doesn't what their later intention is after the event (e.g. they later decide to return the money because they have been asked for it). See also the reference to intention above in relation to "belonging to another". Other relevant case law Hibbert McKiernan [1948] 1A, ER 860: Property can cease to belong to another if abandoned. However the threshold for this is very high. Property is not abandoned just because the owner has stopped looking for it. You are therefore unlikely to be helped by the fact that the bank does not attempt to recover the money. R v Scott [1987] Crim LR 235: The defendant stole a pair of curtains from a shop but planned to return them the next day (to claim a fraudulent refund). Held: intention to permenantly deprive was present at the moment they were taken from the shop since the defendant treated the item as theirs to dispose of (see statutory definition of intention above). It didn't matter that defendant intended to return the item, even within a short timespan. Now you may argue that on the face of it it appears that you don't treat the bank balance as yours to dispose of because you leave it untouched. But remember you are under an obligation to return it as soon as you notice the error, which you fail to do. A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369: the defendant (R), a police officer, was mistakenly paid by bank transfer £74.74 for overtime she had not worked. The police made no demand for repayment. Held by the Court of Appeal: (1) section 5(4) TA 1986 applicable, (2) the legal obligation to return the money commenced as soon as R became aware of it, (3) satisfactory proof that R had no intention of making restoration to the police would be proof of an intention permanently to deprive. Note that whether or not the money is spent is not a factor (nor was it examined in the case): it is the intention that matters. Judgment excerpts: 186: "There was some evidence before the jury that she had decided to say nothing about this unsolicited windfall which had come her way, and had decided to take no action about it after she discovered the error. No demand for payment of the sum was made by the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police or anyone else." 189: "there was a legal obligation upon the respondent to restore that value to the receiver when she found that the mistake had been made" 189: "once the prosecution succeed in proving that the respondent intended not to make restoration, that is notionally to be regarded as an intention to deprive the receiver of that property which notionally belongs to him." Other points raised in the question "merely failing to inform the bank of its own mistake does not rise to the level of intent to deprive, and no crime is committed unless/until the customer takes further action (such as spending the money). Am I wrong?" Yes. For most crimes (other than absolute or strict liability crimes), you need to establish two things: actus reus (an action) and mens rea (a state of mind). A failure to inform the bank is part of the actus reus (it is an action, not a state of mind). It therefore has nothing to do with intention. The intention is the reason why you carried out the action. In our case it is the part in bold here: "they decline to mention this to the bank, hoping that the deposit will not be reversed". It is that hope which establishes intention. "Even if it is technically illegal, as a practical matter I assume that no bank would pursue this over merely reclaiming the funds." It is not necessary for a civil entity to pursue a criminal conviction. That is handled generally by the Crown Prosecution Service or by other government agencies that are empowered to prosecute. The bank's co-operation is only needed if their evidence is required to prove the case. Even then, a witness can be compelled to assist the case against their will (section 2, Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965 and Part 17, Criminal Procedure Rules and Practice Directions 2020). Note that it is unlikely that a bank would refuse to cooperate. In any case, whether or not a crime will actually be prosecuted is not relevant to whether or not a crime has been committed (see my opening remarks about proving a case). "Is there any precedent for someone being punished purely for failing to report a bank error?" There are plenty of cases reported in the media involving convictions for failing to report and then spending money resulting from a bank error. See 1, 2, 3 for some examples. I was unable to find any precedents specifically relating to cases involving a bank error where the money was not spent. However, A-G's Reference above is essentially the same scenario, just involving an employer instead of a bank. In any case, the lack of an identical precedent does not mean that the courts would acquit a person in these circumstances. What matters is the statutory rules and whether or not the court would apply the existing precedents to the facts. | If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment. | It obviously varies by jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions I am familiar with have something like a "Statute of Limitations" where crimes cannot be prosecuted after a certain length of time because it was "too long ago". The logic is firstly that if you prosecute a pensioner for stealing a bottle of beer from a shop when they were 18, the person you are prosecuting is very different from the person that committed the crime. Secondly, it is very hard to obtain a fair trial after the passing of a long period of time. As far as I know, all jurisdictions vary the length of time depending on the severity of the crime, and the most serious crimes are never time-limited. Rape usually falls into the category of "never time-limited". Of course, although murder and rape can be prosecuted after 15+ years, the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial, and of producing evidence from that long ago, means that they may not be. Finally note that "prosecution" of the accused is often not the primary aim of accusers. They just want to say "this was wrong". Abused individuals often find it very hard to speak out about the abuse; the current scandals have made it that bit easier, by reassuring them that it isn't just them (see the #metoo campaign for example). | Fraud new-south-wales There are a number of offences that fall under the broad category of fraud. The most relevant for this type of behaviour is in s192E of the Crimes Act 1900: "Obtain financial advantage or cause financial advantage by deception" which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years. In order to understand what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt it is useful to look at the suggested jury direction from the Criminal Bench Book (a crib sheet for judges): [The accused] is charged that [he/she] by a deception dishonestly [obtained a financial advantage for himself/herself] or [kept a financial advantage that he/she had]. The Crown contends that the financial advantage is [set out the financial advantage]. It does not matter whether the financial advantage alleged was permanent or temporary. The deception that the Crown alleges that the accused perpetrated was [set out the deception]. It must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the financial advantage was obtained as a result of that deception and that the accused perpetrated that deception intentionally to obtain the financial advantage or acted recklessly in that regard. Here reckless means foreseeing the possibility that as a result of the deception [he/she] would [obtain a financial advantage] or [retain the financial advantage that he/she had] and carrying on with the deception notwithstanding that possibility. However, the Crown does not need to prove a particular person was deceived. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in [his/her] deceptive conduct. Dishonest in this context means that the accused acted dishonestly according to the standards of ordinary people. You as ordinary members of the community determine what is dishonest conduct in this regard. You must not only find beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in deceiving [the victim] but also that [he/she] knew that [his/her] conduct was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. It is not enough that a person is shithouse at delivering on their contractual obligations: even repeatedly so. That just makes them a bad business person, not a criminal. They must have acted dishonestly and deceived their victims from the get-go with the intention of not fulfilling their bargain or have been reckless as to their ability to do so. If you believe that you have knowledge of criminal fraud, you should report it to the police who have the discretion to investigate and prosecute. As a general rule, police devote fewer resources to non-violent crime than they do to violent crime and less to crimes where the victim has handed over property/money than those where it was taken from them involuntarily so fraud tends to be lower on their radar. |
In the US are jurors actually judging guilt? Is it true that in US law jurors are not actually judging guilt, but rather whether the case against a person has been made in accordance with the concepts of all reasonable doubt? This meaning that US laws allows the possibility for an innocent person with an inept defense to be found guilty and also a guilty person faced with an inept prosecution being found innocent. Is this concept discussed somewhere in the US Constitution maybe? | Short answer, yes, jurors will typically render a decision of guilt vs. innocence. This is pretty common in nations where the legal system is derived from British Common Law (about 2 billion people world wide live in a Common Law nation). The U.S. is unique in that it uses juries for Civil Trials as well as Criminal Trials. The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution in which the 6th amendment guarantees the right to trial by impartial jury (contrary to popular opinion, it is not a jury of peers, as this alludes to the Peerage systems, which the U.S. never adopted). That line is from the Magna Carta which was influential in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights. A jury usually consists of a panel of 12 people pulled from the locality of the crime, unless a change of venue has been granted because the alleged crime is so well known an impartial jury cannot be seated from the population. The jury will hear all the evidence from both sides, as well as opening and closing arguments. They will be provided "jury instructions" by the judge and must find if the evidence presented (The Facts) meet the criteria for a conviction of a charged crime (The Law). In all Jury Trials, a Jury fills the role of "Trier of Fact" while the Judge fills the role of "Trier of Law." While the judge has the education background to understand what the law says constitutes a crime and how to find that law as well as how to make sure the defense and plaintiff/prosecution make fair arguments, any random group of 12 people can understand facts and put together whose story they believe, the defense's or the prosecution's. In the case of an innocent person being convicted due to inept defense, this does happen and is horrible, but there are recourses in the form of appeals courts, which can overturn a trial and order that a new one be held (a mistrial, essentially, the original trial never happened and the person is legally innocent. Try again and do it proper this time.) Ineffective assistance of counsel is a valid grounds for appeal of a conviction and does happen. In the other scenario, an inept prosecution, this does happen as well and it's not the fault of the jury that the guilty person went free, but for the prosecution. The prosecutor is at a disadvantage in every criminal case to balance out the fact that their office has more resources to bring to bear then most defendants. Among these handicaps is that their "story" about what happened must not have any "plot holes" in it (beyond a reasonable doubt evidentiary standard of proof) and that the prosecution has to convince 12 people that their story is the only way this could happen (try convincing 12 random people to agree to anything more complicated than "the sky is blue and grass is green") and they only have one shot to do it (Double Jeopardy essentially bars the prosecutor's office from initiating the appeals process... and blocks someone who is declared innocent from doing it because why the hell would you want to?!). Here, the problem is that the Prosecutor doesn't have to charge the accused right away and has a bit of generous time to investigate (depends on statute of limitations on particular crimes) ... but the right to a speedy trial means that once charges are filed, the clock starts on how long the prosecution has to bring the case. Delay to long and the judge will give a directed verdict that the person is innocent because the prosecution wasn't ready. The importance of this fact that is a staple belief of Common Law is in the "Blackstone Ratio" which states: Better that 10 guilty people go free than a single innocent person suffers So the jury finding the prosecution inept is certainly the prosecutor's problem, not the jury's problem. It's a feature not a bug. If an innocent person does suffer, then we have a bug and we must see that it is corrected. As a final note, the jury also has the power of Jury Nullification of the Law. In the U.S. it's not really certain if Jury Nullification invalidates the law completely but in effect, it allows the Jury to declare a person innocent because, while they believe the prosecution's story that the defendant did what they were accused of, they don't believe this person should be convicted because they believe the crime they're accused of should have never been a crime in the first place. | The burden for proving claims in civil actions is "preponderance of evidence," i.e., merely that "more than 50% of the evidence favors a conclusion." However, the standard for conviction of any crime is "beyond a reasonable doubt." I.e., if the defense can raise reasonable doubt about one's guilt then the defendant should be acquitted. There is quite a bit of space between the two standards, which is compounded by prosecutorial discretion to even bring criminal charges. | If this judge is truly biased, won't the litigants be all the more glad to have a jury of their peers? You are proposing to abandon your duty to others. At trial you serve the community, not the judge. Back on scope for Law SE: If you refuse to serve on a jury, that could be a separate offense or general criminal contempt, for which you (this all depends on your jurisdiction) could get 30-90 days in jail. Edit: like several others have pointed out, I would not expect much trouble if you politely told the court that you felt you would be biased b/c of past connections. Even if the judge doesn't dismiss you, one of the litigants is likely to strike you. P.S. In most states, no one except a prosecutor (sometimes another state employee) can "take someone" to a criminal court. Individuals can only take someone to civil trial, where one cannot be sentenced, only ordered to pay a judgement. | Criminal conviction by a judge after acquittal by a jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. A criminal conviction involves both a finding of fact and the application of the law, and a judge (unless this is a bench trial) doesn't find facts, he makes judgements of law. Overturning an acquittal after a jury trial would thus be in essence a whole new trial (moreover one where the defendant was not given a renewed opportunity to defend himself). | Are there any legal constraints on the number of times that a defendant can be retried following mistrials due to hung juries? No. A fairly recent case in Louisiana, for example, involved someone who had been tried perhaps half a dozen times resulting in a mix of hung juries and reversals of convictions on appeal. Or is the only practical constraint the willingness of the prosecutor to expend government resources (and perhaps political capital) pursuing a conviction? Yes. This is the only practical limitation. | Can defense request findings of fact before resting? Is it possible for the Defense to avoid presenting affirmative defenses (like Self Defense) before the Court has found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime? If so: How? No, no and not applicable. A verdict is a singular declaration by the jury (or judge) that the state has or has not proved their case. Affirmative Defence These are all affirmative defenses which defeat or mitigate the consequences of the unlawful conduct and the onus of proof lies with the Defence, not the Prosecution. An affirmative defence must be pleaded in a timely manner. If the Prosecution fails in their burden to prove the unlawful conduct the affirmative defence does not get engaged. This is a threshold decision point for the trier of fact and the judge should so instruct the jury. Of necessity, affirmative defences require some admission of fact, however, these facts may not be in contention anyway. Where they are in contention, it requires a strategic choice by the defendant as to whether to use the affirmative defence or not. Is there some theory or principle that illuminates why this is not considered a violation of the Defendant's fifth-amendment rights? Because the defendant is not compelled to make these defences. | united-states Procedures differ on such things. The closest I know of to an outcome of "not enough evidence" is the classic "scotch verdict" of "Not Proven. In the US, the prosecutor can wait to proceed with a criminal case while s/he does (or has done) as much investigation as s/he thinks is advisable. But once the trial starts, it normally proceeds to a conclusion. If there is not enough evidence to convict, the result should be "not guilty" and that will bar any future trial of the same person for the same offense under the doctrine of Double Jeopardy. Circumstantial evidence, as described in the question, can be enough to convict, if the jury (or judge in a bench trial) is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. Exactly how much evidence it takes to convince a Jury varies, and there is not a clear standard other than the phrase " beyond a reasonable doubt". The judge, or a later appeals court, can set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, but only by finding that no reasonable jury could have convicted on the evidence pre3sented, taking it in the light most favorable to conviction. Judges are reluctant to set aside jury verdicts unless they appear badly wrong. If further evidence is found during the trial, which tends to show the accused is not guilty, the prosecutor can request that the trial be halted. This may or may not bar a future re-trial of the same defendant, depending on whether the dismissal is 'without prejudice", a decision the Judge makes. But once evidence has been started to be presented, dismissals are usually "with prejudice" meaning that double jeopardy applies. The defense can also request a dismissal, most often at the end of the prosecution case. In rare circumstances the Judge may dismiss without a request from either prosecution or defense. These will most often be "with prejudice" It is possible for the trial to be recessed while new evidence is evaluated or sought, but this is rare and usually only for a short time -- a day or two, perhaps. In general a prosecutor is not supposed to schedule a trial if there is any reasonable chance of additional evidence coming to light. It can and does happen, but the system tries to avoid it, and does not easily accept that it has happened. This answer is US-Specific, and different answers may apply in other places. | Without being omniscient, it is impossible to pin down an exact percentage, and there are a lot of context specific reasons why some kinds of "easy" cases are more likely to go to trial than others. But, there have been quite a few serious efforts to answer this question with data (putting aside the normative issue of whether you should go to trial when you are likely to lose). One of the best statistical estimates comes from an analysis of criminal jury trials in Sarasota, Florida and the race of the jurors on the jury pool. Based upon that study, it is possible to infer statistically that an average juror of either race would reach the same aquittal or conviction decision in about 55% of cases involving black defendants and about 68% of cases involving white defendants. But, there are many other cases that are close enough on the merits given the likely available that the outcome depends upon the race of the jury, which basically means that the evidence can be reasonably viewed in different lights to reach different conclusions based upon your predispositions before seeing it. For the sample as a whole, about 68% of cases where convictions results and a minimum of 14% of cases that produce acquittals, are sufficiently clear than the racial composition of the jury doesn't matter. Given that something like 90% of cases produce plea bargains generally, and that plea bargains are usually made before a jury pool is drawn, the random impact of the racial makeup of the jury pool that is selected for a case in Sarasota, Florida only directly matters in about 2% of all criminal prosecutions. My criminal procedure professor from law school made one of the most comprehensive surveys of data pertinent to estimating wrongful conviction rate ever prepared. He concludes that wrongful conviction rates for murders and rapes are on the order of 2.3%-5%, and that wrongful conviction rates for other serious felonies are probably somewhat lower (since weak cases are less often pursued) but that it is harder to determine precisely what error rate is involved since the legal process and civic activism rarely takes the time and resources necessary to consider wrongful juvenile convictions or wrongful convictions for less serious crimes. Other sources have suggested that wrongful conviction cases, and studies comparing jury outcomes with conclusions of the presiding judges in the cases regarding where the jury does and does not agree with the judge regarding the correct outcome generally speaking point to a similar level of uncertainty in decision making accuracy. suggest that as many as 10-20% of jury determinations are erroneous, although this is to some extent a product of samples biased for cases with a high risk of wrongful convictions. For example, analysis of a special set of state court cases in 2000-01 from four jurisdictions in a study by the National Center for State Courts (Hannaford-Agor et al 2003) suggested that approximately 17% of jury verdicts were inaccurate, 7% of the all jury verdicts were wrongful convictions and 10% of all jury verdicts were wrongful acquittals, with corresponding rates of 10% wrongful convictions and 1% wrongful acquittals for the judges' verdicts (Spencer 2007). Similarly, an abstract of one study stated that: "I examine . . . how the criminal system in the United States handled the cases of people who were subsequently found innocent through post-conviction DNA testing. . . . The leading types of evidence supporting their wrongful convictions were erroneous eyewitness identifications, faulty forensic evidence, informant testimony, and false confessions. . . . . few innocent appellants brought claims regarding those facts, nor did many bring claims alleging their innocence. For those who did, hardly any claims were granted by appellate courts. . . . courts often denied relief by finding error to be harmless on account of the appellant's guilt. Criminal appeals brought before they proved their innocence using DNA yielded apparently high numbers of reversals—a fourteen percent reversal rate. However, . . . the reversal rate is indistinguishable from the background rate in appeals of comparable rape and murder convictions[.]" Another way to judge the ratio of easy to hard cases is to look at conviction or verdict rates in cases that go to trial. While the vast majority of criminal charges brought result in conviction of something and the vast majority of civil cases brought result in a judgment for the Plaintiff, in an hypothetical ideal world where the lawyers and parties on both sides of cases are rational actors with the best available information and there is no bias in the availability of information, you would expect pre-trial settlements to resolve, on average, all of the cases with an objective lean one way or the other, leaving only the cases that are, on average, coin flips left to go to trial, with 50-50 outcomes, regardless of the mix of cases originally filed. And, that model isn't horrible. Less than 2% of civil cases and less than 10% of criminal cases go to trial. Civil case outcomes vary by type of case, but the overall result in those the go to trial is close to 50-50. But, in criminal cases, convictions greatly outnumber acquittals, because "easy cases" where a conviction is likely often still go to trial, because neither side is paying for their lawyers from their own funds in most cases, because there is little incentive to offer favorable settlements in close cases, and because, as discussed below, there is a significant irreducible risk of an inaccurate outcome. In federal criminal cases that actually go to trial, the Pew Research Center’s data shows that defendants who pursue a trial experience different outcomes based on whether they choose a bench or jury trial. The acquittal rate in bench trials is 38% (a very small and unrepresentative sample), whereas it’s 14% for juried trials (the vast majority of cases). This would suggest that about 72% of federal jury trials are "easy" cases, while about 28% are "hard" cases, in line with the Sarasota study in order of magnitude. Note that this is different from "conviction rates" which compare the percentage of cases charged that produce guilty verdicts or plea bargains, rather than conviction rates in the subset of cases that go to trial. The percentage of people charged with some federal crime who end up being convicted of something is very, very high, compared to state court, but that is almost entirely due to the ability of federal prosecutors to cherry pick strong cases with high mandatory minimum penalties and to secure plea bargains as a result, rather than from different rates of criminal jury trial outcomes. Still, in "2018, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that among defendants charged with a felony, 68% were convicted (59% of a felony and the remainder of a misdemeanor)" and the conviction rate at trial is lower than the conviction rate of all people charged criminally with felonies, since plea bargains are more common than unilateral government dismissals of all charges. But, in almost every court system, more than 50% of criminal trials result in convictions. So, the percentage of "easy" criminal cases going to trial in state courts is still significantly lower than in federal courts. Maybe the percentage of state criminal cases going to trial that are "easy cases" in the range of 5%-20% in this kind of analysis (which is quite a bit lower than the more rigorously designed Sarasota study). The challenging thing, of course, is knowing in advance which cases judges or juries will get wrong. I typically conceptualize the issue as a certain irreducible uncertainty of outcome any time you actually roll the dice on going to trial on the order of 10%-20% whether you are in front of a judge or a jury, and an additional uncertainty in cases where there is some specific reason to think that the outcome is a close call, or that special risk factors for inaccurate verdicts (like heavy reliance on cross-racial eye witness identification of suspects) is present. From the perspective a client, even in a seemingly secure case, this impacts how plea bargains and settlement offers are evaluated. If your client is actually in the wrong and facing very severe punishment and there are no offers to settle that don't also involve very severe punishment, going to trial and hoping to benefit from the irreducible inaccuracy of trial determinations can be rational even in a quite weak case. Likewise, in either a civil or a criminal case, if getting some win is much more important for the person bringing the case, than getting a "home run" maximal win, making a lenient deal even in a fairly solid case can make sense to avoid the risk of rolling the dice and the irreducible risk of error any time there is a trial. Also, of course, lots and lots of parties to both criminal and civil cases are not rational actors and make bad decisions. These characteristics of parties to legal cases frequently play a large part in the fact that these parties ended up having to deal with the legal system in the first place. One of the difficult systemic and institutional issues, however, is that the behavior of people who are irrational because they are dumb or crazy, and the behavior of people in the system who are innocent and have excessive but not necessarily unreasonable trust in the accuracy of the judicial process, can look very similar. People who are factually innocent systemically insist on going to trial even in the face of lenient plea bargains at rates much higher than people who are factually guilty, even in cases that seem to have identical strength before a neutral third-party, and are, as a result, over represented in the ranks of people who actually go to trial. |
How long can an employer keep financial details after employee has left under GDPR? I finished a job in 2019, but just received notification of a data breach at that job in 2021, and my bank account number, sort code, national insurance number, full name, address and date of birth were compromised. As far as I know under GDPR data controllers can only hold data for as long as they have grounds to process it - does anyone know what this means in practice for HR and financial records? (e.g. why would they need my bank details for over a year after they had stopped paying me?) I'm wondering whether I have grounds for compensation or to sue my ex-employer for keeping such sensitive data for so long and letting it be compromised. Jurisdiction is England and Wales. | The retention periods depend on the exact legal basis for keeping such records. For example, accounting records might reasonably involve at least your bank account number, sort code, full name, and address. Under Section 388 of the Companies Act 2006, accounting records must be kept for three to six years, depending on the type of company (private or public). This would indicate that the company was within its right (and duty!) to hold records relating to at least the 2018 fiscal year. | gdpr The obligation to provide a privacy policy stems from GDPR Articles 13 and 14. When the information has to be provided depends on when personal data is obtained. Information under Art 13 (data obtained directly from the data subject) must be provided at the time when the personal data is being obtained. Since most websites will obtain personal data pretty much continuously, they will likely have to keep this information available continuously as well. Information under Art 14 (data obtained from other sources) must be provided within a reasonable time after obtaining the information, but at the latest when the data subject is contacted. So this depends very much on when data is obtained, and whether personal data is obtained directly from the data subject. E.g. a website generally obtains some personal data directly from the data subject every time a user visits the page, thus it will likely have to keep a minimal privacy policy available all the time, for all visitors (whether registered or not). In contrast, for individual instances of personal data processing, it may be sufficient to provide the information only once. For example, if we ask a user to enter information to enter a raffle, the privacy policy regarding the raffle might only have to be shown in context of the form where the user can enter data. However, all such approaches stink. Doing the bare minimum that's explicitly required is an easy way to run afoul of more foundational GDPR principles, e.g. the Art 5(1)(a) requirement that all data processing must be transparent (compare also Art 12(1)), and the Art 5(2) accountability principle: the data controller must be able to demonstrate how what they're doing is compliant. The Art 13 and 14 time frames are the latest point in time at which this information has to be actively provided to the user (compare also the guidelines on transparency WP260). But it would be entirely possible for a court to argue that the transparency principle implies that all such information must be available to the user for the duration of all related processing activities, possibly both before and after the data subject was explicitly informed. The WP260 document also emphasizes that the data controller must take the reasonable expectations of the users into account, and most users expect a “privacy policy” link in the footer of every page. As a more general point, the GDPR never requires that data subjects agree to a privacy policy. A privacy policy is largely unidirectional information, not a contract. Under some circumstances, the data controller may rely on consent as a legal bases for processing, and will then have to obtain consent from the data subject. In the course of this, it is necessary to provide information about the specific processing activities for which consent is being asked. Usually, this is done by a short summary with key information, and a link to the privacy policy for the full details (a layered privacy notice, compare the WP260 document and the EDBP guidelines on consent 05/2020). But valid consent can only be obtained for specific processing activities, not for a bundle of processing activities or a privacy policy in its entirety. | That GDPR Disclaimer is no protection in some jurisdictions: the applicable laws to that situation in germany for example don't care about the GDPR: Cold calling, mailing, or e-mailing private people to advertise services all is handled by the same law: Without the consent it is expressly illegal under §7 of the law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG) and such cases are rather Slam-Dunk if the origin can be made out. The punishment can be a 300.000 € fine. The fact that to email someone you need their e-mail address and that e-mail addresses and private addresses are by default considered personally identifiable information is making it worse for the advertizer: Without either an exception (there is none available to cold-emailing) or special allowance of the person the data belongs to, you violate §4 of the federal data protection law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes BDSG) just by handling their e-mail address. That's a separate crime from the UWG one, adding up to another 300.000 € fine under §43 BDSG - or even up to 2 years in prison under §44 BDSG! Oh, and if the email does not contain a proper sender's address, that's another chance for a huge fine under the UWG... So, GDPR is your least trouble, if you violate the marketing laws of a country, or their own data privacy laws. A disclaimer means nothing as the act of sending the mail, even to an unintended addressee, is what is illegal and the law as written does not give a damn about 'I didn't want to advertise to that person' when in fact you sent them unwanted advertisements. Oh, and the very repository you suggest? It would violate the very same §4 BDSG and be illegal for processing private data if it was not actively asked to do that by the end user. As a result, that database is useless: It does kick back all people not in its database. Its database is incomplete because only few people give their address to that database as people not aware of the database never add their data on their own. So it regularly violates §4 BDSG with every German citizen's e-mail address it gets and kicks back, and claiming those addresses would be OK, it throws the company trying to check the database under the bus because they rely on data that is impossible to be reliable. tl;dr Don't do cold-(e)-mail marketing. You throw yourself into boiling oil with a lit torch in hand. further reading Other laws banning such behavior I had listed here, and I quote myself: The US has the CAN-SPAM-Act, which illegalizes sending unsocialised advertisements. You may NOT send a mail if any of the following is true: it has no opt-out the email was gained by 'harvesting' contains a header not matching the text contains less than one sentence the adressee does not have any relation to you In fact, you are liable for a 5-digit fine per infringing e-mail in the US. The FTC itself suggests to never buy e-mail lists - as E-mail harvesting or generating any possible e-mail adress itself is illegal. | a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days. | The way you describe this UUID, it is pseudonymous data (see GDPR Art 4(5) and Recitals 28–29). That is, it is not directly identifying, but you have a mapping between pseudonyms and identifiers that can be used to re-identify this data. Effective pseudonymisation requires not only that the data is logically separate, but that there are effective organisational and technical measures preventing re-combination by unauthorized persons. Alongside with encryption, pseudonymisation is one of the safety measures that the GDPR explicitly requires whenever appropriate (see Art 25, Art 32). Pseudonymous data is still personal data, because you can easily re-identify the data. The PII concept is US-specific and is misleading in a GDPR context, where it is not the inherently identifying characteristics of the information that matters, but the realistic ability of the data controller to single out data subjects to whom this data relates (compare Art 4(1) and Recital 26). However, were you to irrevocably erase the UUID–email mapping, things are more tricky. There is no longer any connection with directly identifying data, so this data might be anonymous. On the other hand, such a persistent UUID still allows you to recognize/distinguish persons, so it might still be personal data. This might be the case especially when the UUID is used in long-lived cookies of website visitors, thus matching the GDPR's concept of an “online identifier”. This conclusion could be avoided by limiting reuse of UUIDs, e.g. creating a new UUID after some context-dependent appropriate duration. The GDPR does not require all data to be stored in the EU, but requires international transfers of personal data to have sufficient protections. If you're processing these data in countries without adequate legal protections (like the United States), additional safeguards have to be used. Pseudonymisation could be part of such safeguards, and has been suggested by some data protection authorities in the wake of the Schrems II ruling. However, pseudonymisation alone does not make the international transfer legal, it is more of a strategy to reduce remaining risks. I think that your systems has a good chance of being OK, but not neccessarily so. If in doubt, perform a DPIA and possibly consult your data protection authority under GDPR Art 36. If feasible, storing/processing data only in the EEA or in countries with an adequacy decision will simplify compliance. Safeguards such as pseudonymisation could be strengthened by rotating UUIDs, and by restricting access to the table with identifiers. | Contacting a business email about a business matter is usually fine, but in this case we have an unsolicited marketing communication (spam), not really a business matter. The client's jurisdiction likely has more specific rules about spam. Also, it is unusual (read: presumably illegitimate) to contact individual employees rather than the company's official address with the offering. From the GDPR perspective, every processing of personal data (such as email addresses that might identify natural persons) needs a legal basis (Art 6). Let's go through them: consent? No. necessary for performance of a contract involving the data subject? No. legal obligation? No. vital interests? No. public interest? No. legitimate interest? Perhaps. The client has a legitimate interest to conduct their business. However, this legitimate interest must not be overridden by the data subject's interests, rights, and freedoms. Such as the interest in not being disturbed by spam mails. It is the Data Controller's (your client's) responsibility to balance the legitimate interest themselves to determine whether they have a legal basis, but I really don't think that they do. In conclusion, your client's idea is a bad idea: They likely do not have a legal basis for this under the GDPR. They are likely violating more specific anti-spam laws in their jurisdiction. They are working hard to get their domain put on spam filter lists. Note that already the step of collecting employee email addresses is personal data processing and needs a legal basis. Of course, the GDPR does not apply when the client is not established in the EU and only processes the addresses of persons that are not in the EU. | Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG. | The data controller is obliged to use “all reasonable measures to verify the identity” of the person exercising their data subject rights (GDPR, Recital 64). That sentence has caused a lot of confusion: “all reasonable”: does this mean all measures the controller can be reasonably burdened with, or all measures that are necessary for identifying the data subject with reasonable certainty? “identity”: does that mean the identity of a natural person, or just a check that the person exercising their data subjects rights is identical with the data subject? So depending on how the company interprets this, there is a lot of leeway regarding which info may be requested from you. In general, being able to log in to the service should be all that is necessary (compare also Recital 57). Note that the company doesn't just have to satisfy your data subject rights, they also have to protect your data against unauthorized access. Giving an attacker access just because they control a particular email address might not be secure enough (but is in practice because the attacker could use a password-reset functionality to get the full credentials anyway). You do not lose your data subject rights if you used pseudonymous/fake data: the service may still contain other personal data regarding you, for example usage profiles. You are still a data subject. Pseudonyms can also be identifying data, e.g. Art 4(1) calls online handles out as a kind of personal data. However, this does lead to complications with companies that interpret identity verification as ensuring that the person making a request is a particular natural person. If the controller isn't sure about your identity, they can request additional information (Art 12(6)). If the data subject cannot be identified, the data subject rights do not apply (Art 11(2)). However, that describes a subtly different scenario: that the data held by the controller lacks identifying data. You do have a right to access and a right to rectification (correcting the data they hold about you). However, they require the exact same identity verification as the right to erasure. That you were underage at the time of account creation is likely irrelevant now, if the data in the account doesn't indicate your true age. Unless the subject matter of the online service makes an age restriction necessary, the relevant age limits are 13-16 years (Art 8 GDPR, subject to EU member state laws) or 13 years (COPPA, U.S.). If you believe you have provided all data that is reasonably necessary to verify your identity and your data subject rights are denied to you, you can issue a complaint with your local data protection authority. In Germany, each Bundesland has their own Datenschutzbeauftragte agency. Below, relevant GDPR excerpts used in this answer. “Erasure” is Art 17 but Art 12 covers modalities for exercise of data subject rights. Recitals are explanatory but not normative. Art 12(6): Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. Art 11(2): Where […] the controller is able to demonstrate that it is not in a position to identify the data subject, […] Articles 15 to 20 shall not apply except where the data subject, for the purpose of exercising his or her rights under those articles, provides additional information enabling his or her identification. Recital 57: Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. Recital 64: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. |
Is It Legal to Mention “The Creator” in U.S. Public Schools? I give lots of guest presentations to K-18 schools/universities all over the world. Since the subject is Space exploration, I frequently feel the need to invoke (using one of these very "generic" terms) "The Almighty," or "The Creator" (i.e. I NEVER use the terms "God," "Allah," "Bhagavan," etc). When presenting in the United States at a public school, is it "legal" to do so? Being unsure, in the past, I generally have avoided the subject altogether. | It is legal. What would be illegal is for a public school to promote or inhibit a religion. You can teach all sorts of facts that touch on religion (millennia of Western history) and you can e.g. survey the major religions of the worlds as a cultural phenomenon. You can use circumlocutions or proper names. It's not illegal to confess to having personal beliefs. This is about public schools, which is an arm of the government. A person who is in a school, for example a student, is not prohibited from promoting or demoting a religion, therefore a student who clearly and openly advocates the Pastafarian faith is not to be sanctioned, except insofar as the conduct is objectively disruptive. This is because the student is clearly not acting as an agent of a government institution. Things are a little murky when it comes to teachers and guest speakers. Teachers do not lose their First Amendment rights when they enter the classroom. Here is a summary of pertinent court rulings. The main principle that comes from such cases is that school districts can direct teachers to refrain from certain actions when there is a reasonable belief that the actions would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Individual teachers have been ordered to not engage in silent reading of prayers in school (Roberts v. Madigan). Case law on guest lecturers is probably close to zero, since guest lecturers don't have the same kind of property right to be at the school expressing themselves as teachers do. | As for plagiarism, that is not a legal concept, so he can define plagiarism however he wants. It certainly isn't, under any definition I have ever seen on Earth and I have seen many (it has to do with "claiming someone else's work as your own"). As for copyright, a set of questions is (potentially) protected by copyright. If they are copied from somebody else's book of questions, then the book author (or publisher) holds copyright. Let's say that QM invented the questions, such as "What is the Turkish word for Janissary?", "What is the most prominent feature of Jannissary garb?" and so on. Then that set of questions, when put down in fixed form, are protected by copyright, and cannot be copied without permission. | united-states In the US it is not unlawful to produce and display a video arguing for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, whether the intent is to support that invasion or to document the claims of those who do support it, and argue that they are invalid. Such a video would be protected by copyright, and copying it and redistributing it with subtitles might well be an infringement of that copyright, if done without permission. On the other hand, doing so with the intent of educating others about Russian claims might constitute fair use. If so, it would not be copyright infringement under US law. Aside from the copyright issue (which would be up to the copyright holder to take action on) US law does not really care what the motivation for posting such a sub-titled video might be. Whether or not it is "beneficial for the whole human civilization" is not relevant to US law. It is protected by the First Amendment against government suppression. That would not affect YouTube, as a private actor,, determining not to host it on their site. | You can always be sued, but truth is an absolute defense to libel. Your actions could be perceived in any way imaginable. What usually matters for legal purposes is how a "reasonable person" would perceive them. As an example, Pennsylvania's Megan's Law Website warns: Any person who uses the information contained herein to threaten, intimidate, or harass the registrant or their family, or who otherwise misuses this information, may be subject to criminal prosecution or civil liability. It further clarifies: Public access to information about registered sexual offenders is intended solely as a means of public protection, any other use prohibited. | tl;dr No, N.Y. Times v. Sullivan established the actual malice standard in the context of defamation. It is not illegal for a public figure to claim the sun revolves around the Earth unless some other law intervenes (maybe something fact-dependant like fraud or lying under oath). Background Here's an example of how N.Y. Times would work in California. Under California law, slander, along with libel, are the defamation torts. See Cal. Civ. Code. § 44. The First Amendment limits California’s slander law by requiring public figures prove actual malice when they want to sue someone for defaming them. Khawar v. Globe Int’l, 19 Cal. 4th 254, 262 (1998). (The Supreme Court got involved in N.Y. Times in the first place because of the First Amendment implications on the States' defamation laws.) In turn, "actual malice" means a statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false." Khawar, 19 Cal. 4th at 275 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)). As to knowledge, California courts consider only actual—not constructive—knowledge. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 398 (2001). In turn, actual knowledge "consists in express information of fact." I.E. Assoc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 39 Cal. 3d 281, 285 (1985). This is a bunch of lawyer-speak, but it basically sets up a pretty high bar for the public figure who is trying to prove defamation. Again, N.Y. Times doesn't have to do with barring public figures from making non-defamatory false statements. You'd have to look to other areas of law about false representations or lying under oath for a claim against the politician. california | An affirmative defense In the US, fair use (17 USC §107) "is an affirmative defense" (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569 (1994)). It need not be raised unless the plaintiff establishes that the defendant's activity would otherwise be infringing. When fair use is raised as a defense, the burden is on the defendant to prove the elements of fair use. A four-factor balancing test Here is the text of 17 USC 107: Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. "Congress meant §107 to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way and intended that courts continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication." (Campbell, quoting from H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476). Factor 1: Purpose and character of use The statute explicitly lists several purposes which would weigh in favor of a finding of fair use: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research. However, that list is only illustrative, not exhaustive. Commercial use weighs against fair use. Nonprofit use weighs in favor of fair use. Parody is another purpose which greatly affects the analysis, especially as it interacts with factor 4. Factor 2: The nature of the copyrighted work "[T]he scope of fair use is generally broader when the source of borrowed expression is a factual or historical work" (Campbell). "[I]nformational works, such as news reports, that readily lend themselves to productive use by others, are less protected than creative works of entertainment." (Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)) Factor 3: Amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole "The extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use." (Campbell) For example, full reproduction of an entire work was allowed in Sony. However, in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), taking just 300 words from a 7,500 word excerpt of President Ford's memoirs was not found to be fair use because it took the "heart of the book". The amount and substantiality of the taking is judged with respect to the original work. How much of the original was taken? "A taking may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial with respect to the infringing work. As Judge Learned Hand cogently remarked, 'no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.'" (Harper & Row) Factor 4: Effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work If the use new work takes the place of the original, thereby decreasing its market or value, that weighs against a finding of fair use. However, parody or criticism, simply by decreasing the value of the work it is critical of, does not suffer the same fate. "The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop. [...] [T]he law recognizes no derivative market for critical works." (Campbell) Parody and criticism might decrease the value of the original, not by taking its place, but rather, by saying something negative about it. Protection of that type of speech is one of the goals of the fair use defense. Transformativeness The four factors are not to be "treated in isolation, one from another." "All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright." (Campbell) However, the court recognizes that "[t]he central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's words, whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation", "to what extent the new work is transformative". "[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use." (Campbell) Case-by-case analysis "The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis." (Campbell) In general, it is not possible know ahead of time whether a fair use defense would be successful in a particular case. Example cases Perhaps the best way to learn how the courts apply these four factors is to look at example cases. The US Copyright Office hosts a Fair Use Case Index that lets you browse by subject matter and jurisdiction. Stanford hosts a smaller collection of examples. | If one is writing about a work of fiction, one may describe the work, and use terms from the work in doing so. One might write, for example: In Spaceman Sam the characters use "blasters" as weapons, while in Jack of the Galaxy "contragravity" is used to propel "aircars" These are facts, and copyright may never be used to protect facts. Moreover, such uses as reviews and criticism are particularly likely to constitute fair use under US law, or another exception to copyright under the law of some other country, even if some otherwise protected content is quoted. If something appeared in that sci-fi universe prior to me re-iterating it; does that mean it's fair game for me to use? If the "something" that appeared earlier is an "idea" or a name, it is indeed fair game. This is true whether it is obscure or well-known. In any case describing the facts of the fiction, even in detail, is generally not an infringement. If "re-iterating" something from an existing work in a new fiction involves an extensive quotation, or a detailed, point-by-point reuse of a fictional element, that might constitute infringement, unless fair use or another exception to copyright applies. Does intellectual law protect very specific plot concepts? No, it doesn't. A plot concept is an idea. In the US, 17 USV 103(b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Laws in other countries are similar on this point. This is sometimes known as the idea/expression distinction. This means that while the expression used to embody a concept is often protected by copyright, the concept itself never is. Are you allowed to borrow names of different generic sci-fi inventions that aren't super-important to the story. Yes. In fact even the names of fictional technological devices that are very important to a story may be, and often are, reused in different works by different authors. For example Ursula LeGuin used "ansible" as the name of a faster-then-light communicator, in fact an instantaneous communication device, in her "Hanish" series, particularly in The Left Hand of Darkness, The Dispossessed, and The Word for World is Forest. (She wrote that the term was derived from the word "answerable".) The term and concept were reused by Vernor Vinge in "The Blabber" and A Fire Upon the Deep, and by Elizabeth Moon in the "Sassanek" series and more centrally in the "Vatta's war" series starting with Trading in Danger. Moreover, the names of fictional characters are not protected. An author might introduce characters with names borrowed from Tolkien, Heinlein, or other well-known (or obscure) fictional works. US Copyright Office circular #33 "Works not protected by Copyright" says that "names, titles, and short phrases" may not be protected by copyright, and will not be separably registered. However, if a character has not only the name of a previous character, but a detailed, point-by-point similarity in distinctive elements to a character in a protected work, that may be enough to make the newer work a derivative work, and thus be infringing if permission is not obtained from the copyright holder on the source work. The same is true of the detailed reproduction of a distinctive setting from a source work. But a mere name and broad, general description is not enough tom make a later work derivative. The more details are reproduced, and the more distinctive and specific those details are, the more likely the newer work is to be found distinctive. | Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html |
Is the fair market value of "pro bono" work tax deductible? If a person contributes a car, art, clothing, or other items of value to a charity, that person gets to deduct the fair market value of the contributed goods from their taxable income. Suppose, instead, a lawyer did pro bono work for a recognized legal charity such as a law clinic or legal aid group directed at say, elderly people. Would the lawyer be able to deduct the value of the hours contributed (at the lawyer's hourly rate)? | No IRS Pub. 526, Table 1, lists "Value of your time or services" under "Not Deductible As Charitable Contributions". This is repeated several other places in the document. However, expenses incurred in the course of providing the services can be deductible in some cases. There's more specific information for lawyers at https://practice.findlaw.com/practice-guide/tax-deductions-for-lawyers-providing-pro-bono-services.html. | The official judgements do not reveal the funding for these lawyers; so where can I find this information? Nowhere. The commercial arrangements between lawyers and their clients are private and confidential like any other business transactions. You have no more right to know this then you do to know how your neighbour pays their mortgage. how could she have funded litigation in the EWHC and then EWCA before the UKSC? She may have rich parents or another benefactor who has in interest in her or the outcome of the case. She may have won the lottery. She may be the heiress of a dead rich uncle. By the way, "having" student loans does not mean you "need" student loans. Interest rates on student loans are cheap - if I need to pay $10,000 for a course and have $10,000 earning 5%, I would be nuts to use that if I could take out a loan at 3%. | The party that made the overpayment would have the right to sue you for "unjust enrichment" or "breach of contract" (since the terms of service no doubt provide or strongly imply that you are entitled to only one payment per sale), if you didn't voluntarily return the overpayment following a demand to do so, even though you received it through no fault of your own. Most of the core cases involve clerical errors in the bank account number used for a bank deposit. In general, there is a right to recover an accidental transfer of property to another, even in the absence of a clearly applicable contractual arrangement. As another example, if you were accidentally given a valuable coat at a coat check by accident and didn't notice it until later, the true owner would have a right to have it returned. The FTC regulation applies (as demonstrated by the link cited in the question) to intentional unsolicited deliveries of merchandise (which would always be tangible personal property by definition) to you through the mail. It does not apply to transfers of money, or to the accidental mis-delivery of property to the wrong person or the wrong address. The law in question is as follows: 39 U.S. Code § 3009 - Mailing of unordered merchandise (a) Except for (1) free samples clearly and conspicuously marked as such, and (2) merchandise mailed by a charitable organization soliciting contributions, the mailing of unordered merchandise or of communications prohibited by subsection (c) of this section constitutes an unfair method of competition and an unfair trade practice in violation of section 45(a)(1) of title 15. (b) Any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the exceptions contained therein, may be treated as a gift by the recipient, who shall have the right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation whatsoever to the sender. All such merchandise shall have attached to it a clear and conspicuous statement informing the recipient that he may treat the merchandise as a gift to him and has the right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation whatsoever to the sender. (c) No mailer of any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the exceptions contained therein, shall mail to any recipient of such merchandise a bill for such merchandise or any dunning communications. (d) For the purposes of this section, “unordered merchandise” means merchandise mailed without the prior expressed request or consent of the recipient. | Your assumption about charities, "that legally you cannot use any of the money raised/created for anything but charitable purposes" is incorrect. For example, a charitable organization can have an office, and can pay rent for that office; it can pay a janitor to clean up, a secretary to do correspondence, and a CEO to run the operation. The basic generalization for a 501(c)(3) organization is To be tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, an organization must be organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes set forth in section 501(c)(3), and none of its earnings may inure to any private shareholder or individual. Specifically, A section 501(c)(3) organization must not be organized or operated for the benefit of private interests, such as the creator or the creator's family, shareholders of the organization, other designated individuals, or persons controlled directly or indirectly by such private interests. No part of the net earnings of a section 501(c)(3) organization may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. A private shareholder or individual is a person having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization. Accordingly, the organization cannot be created with the purpose of benefiting John Smith, or the board of directors of the organization, or shareholders. This does not preclude spending money to operate the charity. | When starting self-employed work, there are a number of consequences. If the activity is gewerblich but not freiberuflich, it is necessary to register with the Gewerbeamt (~ trade office). This obligation is specificed in §14 GewO. Per §146 GewO, failure to perform a registration is a misdemeanour that can be fined with up to €1000. This assumes that the business has to be registered but not authorized. For any self-employed work, it is necessary to fill out the Fragebogen zur steuerlichen Erfassung with your tax office. This is specified in §138 AO. I can't find information about a concrete fine, but misdemeanours are generally fined with between €5 to €1000, in proportion with the severity. As a self-employed person, you are required to file taxes. Delayed tax filings are penalized (see §152 AO) with 0.25% interest per month on the due tax (at least €10 or €25 per month), but is capped at €25000. However, the surcharge can be dropped if no tax is owed. Note that without any tax filings, the tax office is required to estimate your earnings – and is allowed to assume the “worst case” of maximal reasonable earnings (§162 AO). You are required to inform your health insurance about any changes to your employment, including taking up self-employment. If you are insured through statutory health insurance, they will recalculate your past insurance premium. The good news that premiums depend on your income, so low additional income will lead to moderate additional payments. If you draw any kind of public benefits or social security payments (including Bafög or Arbeitslosengeld I/II), you must notify the respective office. You may be required to repay part of these benefits (with penalties). However, this will depend a lot on how much you earned. Given that we're talking about low sums, there might be some exceptions from having to register as self-employed. If your activity were revenue-neutral or -negative, there might be an argument that it's not a business but Liebhaberei, i.e. a hobby (but it depends on the details). Services as part-time tutor, artist, or caregiver might be tax-free for up to €3000/year (but it depends on the details). That the self-employed work was carried out through a computer makes absolutely no difference. | Contributing cash to a company is not tax deductible It’s either a capital contribution or a loan; either way it’s not an expense deductible to the individual (nor income to the company). | Almost certainly the answer to this is no because SB.8 talks of the $10K as being (minimum) statutory damages. (The actual provision 171.208(b)(2) is for damages "not less" than $10K, i.e. the court can award more in the first suit.) If e.g. someone breaks the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by making spurious claims against a group of people, they are each entitled to up to $1,000 statutory damages each (and class action is specifically allowed/mentioned). Generally, you can't avoid paying damages to an injured party by paying them to someone unrelated (before). There's nothing in SB.8 to suggest otherwise, the wording is: a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed Only proof of payment (not even having lost another suit on the same incident in another county) precludes a judge from awarding the statutory damages. (Claimants can file suits in their county of residence per 171.210, which me not knowing the Texas civil procedure too well, seem to allow multiple parallel lawsuits to proceed.) Now SB.8 is special in that limits relief to the first who sues (or maybe the first who wins) while enabling a very large class to claim injured status and sue... which in itself doesn't make a lot of sense when speaking of statutory damages, but it's a novel kind of relief, so who knows what courts may decide. (It would be interesting if a court determined that that first-claimant limit in SB.8 is unconstitutional, under either Texas or federal constitutions. In some other state laws, there is sometimes a limit on the total amount of damages out of a single incident, but it's not awarded on a first-winner basis, instead there's a provision to "allocate to each claimant his equitable share of the total".) Granted a defendant could come with a legal strategy that look something like: when sued in Texas county arrange for a "friendly" organization (members) to immediately sue in another county. Fight the first lawsuit so as to delay judgement, but immediately concede the one from the "friendly" organization members, so that only the "friendlies" get the statutory damages (first), possibly e.g. donating them back to the defendant thereafter. Whether this would work really depends on details in the Texas civil procedure law, which I'm not too familiar with. | Although your "title" may not of itself have legal force, that doesn't necessarily mean you can do as you please in every situation without fear of liability. For example, if you falsely claim to be a medical doctor or lawyer, you could find yourself liable for civil damages to defrauded clients; you may also violate criminal laws. (An anonymous bureaucratic form probably won't create that problem, because as another answerer pointed out nobody really cares or pays attention to titles most of the time. But stranger things have happened; and by "form" you could mean "tax form" or some declaration made under penalty of perjury. Lawyers generally avoid blanket "that's fine" answers, because there are almost always many ways that it might not be fine.) |
What is the point of adding a few years of probation to a death sentence? I read (mirror): A total of 44 Japanese drug-related criminals were arrested by China in 2014, 33 of which have been given corresponding sentences, five people were executed, and six were given death sentence with two years' probation. What is the point of adding a few years of probation to a death sentence? | This is a traditional Chinese sentence which in practice is similar to a suspended sentence: Mainland Chinese courts hand down the sentence of "death sentence with two years' probation" (Chinese: 死缓; pinyin: sǐ huǎn) as frequently as, or more often than, they do actual death sentences. This unique sentence is used to emphasize the seriousness of the crime and the mercy of the court, and has a centuries-old history in Chinese jurisprudence. It is almost always reduced to life or 10 to 15 years imprisonment if no new crime is intentionally committed during the two year probationary period. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_punishment_in_China | Do these offences exist,... None exist for civilian offences since 1976 and for miltary offences since 1999. All death penalties have been lowered to life imprisonment and for any conviction after that point in time only the lower punishment would apply. Since 1963, all convictions where the death penalty did apply, were commuted to life imprisonment. So there are no cases open where the death penalty would still apply. You cannot be convicted for a crime that no longer exists (repealed). You cannot be sentenced to a punishment that no longer applies (lowered). Nulla poena sine lege (no penalty without law) - Wikipedia After the Confederation period (1867), the number of offences punishable by death were reduced to three: murder, rape, and treason. The last execution took place on the 1962-12-11. After that all death sentences were commuted as a matter of policy. The abolition of the death penalty for murder, treason, and piracy came into force on the 1976-07-26. Other military offences (cowardice, desertion, unlawful surrender, and spying for the enemy), if committed traitorously, still existed until September 1999 (the last one was carried out in 1945). Capital punishment in Canada - Wikipedia The death penalty was de facto abolished in Canada in January 1963 and de jure in September 1999. | After a defendant is convicted at trial in a federal court and when the death penalty is off the table (if it's on the table there's a different process), a sentencing process starts. This process is based around the US Sentencing Guidelines, which is a book of rules to calculate how serious all of the defendant's conduct was (on a scale of 1 to 43) and how to combine that with their criminal history to determine a recommended sentence range. The federal probation office investigates the details of the crime and produces a report applying the guidelines to the defendant; each side can make objections to this report (e.g. the defense might claim the defendant really had a minor role in the crime, while the prosecution might claim that he abused a position of trust), and the report and objections go to the judge. The probation office might also produce a sentence recommendation, which goes to the judge and might or might not go to the parties (it depends on the court). At sentencing, the judge reviews the report and gives each side a chance to comment on it. She has to consider all of this in issuing a sentence, and if there are any disputes she has to resolve them. However, she's free to make her own decisions on applying the Guidelines even if the probation office, prosecution, and defense all agreed on something else. Also, she can depart from the Guidelines range under rules laid out in the Guidelines, or she can set it aside entirely and issue what she considers to be an appropriate sentence between the statutory minimum and statutory maximum. For plea bargains, it can work differently (but doesn't have to). Most plea bargains will say something about sentencing, but it can be either a recommendation or a binding agreement. If it's a recommendation, the judge will consider it but can make her own decisions just like if the defendant was convicted at trial (and this isn't grounds to withdraw the plea). If it's binding, the judge can still choose to accept or reject the plea bargain. If she accepts it, she has to sentence based on the agreement; if she rejects it, the defendant can withdraw his plea. | I would just like to clarify, in addition to the other answers and what Dale M alluded to, one important detail: Unless you are carrying out the death penalty, no one under any circumstances is allowed to kill anyone else. What you are sometimes authorized to do, is to use deadly force. There is an important distinction between the two. When using deadly force, you are using extreme force to stop someone doing something, which may result in getting that person killed, but killing isn't the point, stopping whatever he is doing is. If instead of a knife you had a gun on the train, you shot the guy in the face, his crime spree came to and end, yet he was still alive but unconscious, and you decided to "finish the job" and shoot him some more, you'd be going to prison. The language is important. Even if in self defense situations, if you say that you were shooting to kill, you're going to be in serious trouble, but if you say you were shooting to stop, you're in the clear. | The Justice Department prosecutes all crimes prosecuted by the U.S. federal government regardless of which agency has jurisdiction over that kind of regulatory activity. The Canadian government could prosecute for passport fraud or forgery. The offshore account country could prosecute for bank fraud or forgery. The U.S. federal government, the Canadian government, and the offshore jurisdiction could probably all prosecute for attempted money laundering or attempted tax evasion (or worse, such as attempted material support of terrorism). Realistically, none of this is terribly likely to happen if there is no harm, and even if there was an arrest and a conviction, the sentence would probably be mild for such a victimless white collar crime (probably probation and a fine or a few months in jail at most unless there were larger aggravating factors). But, harm is not required for a criminal prosecution. Or, more precisely, the violation of the criminal law per se is the harm. 18 U.S.C. § 1543 states: Whoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or alters any passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, with intent that the same may be used; or Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any such false, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, or any passport validly issued which has become void by the occurrence of any condition therein prescribed invalidating the same— Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both. This statute clearly applies to both U.S. and non-U.S. passports. But, it isn't obvious that the crime would apply in this case, because the crime may have taken place outside the U.S. and with a target outside the U.S., one or the other must be true for the U.S. to enforce its criminal laws - U.S. citizenship isn't sufficient. The offense in this particular statute is making with the intent that some use it, using or attempting to use a passport. The crime was directed at the offshore location. But, it wouldn't be such a stretch to assume that if the fake passport was made or used by the defendant in a U.S. living room that it was used there even if only to send it over the Internet to a foreign country. On the other hand, if the fake passport were made or used in a hotel room in Montreal by a U.S. citizen and was directed at the Cayman Islands, the U.S. might lack criminal jurisdiction over the case. The maximum offense would be 10 years and a fine for a first or second offense, but the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines would very likely call for a much milder recommended sentence, and any excess punishment over this recommendation would have to be justified by the judge. | Do criminals really "have no recourse" if their ill-gotten property is stolen by a third party? Basically yes. At sentencing, they can argue that restitution or fines should be limited because the money was in turn stolen from them and they don't have it. For example, I once had a client who was the sole heir to the estate of someone who had a substantial amount of illegal drugs in their possession at the time of the decedent's death (worth perhaps $100,000 USD), but the illegal drugs were stolen after the death of the decedent by someone known to my client. There was no legal way for my client to gain possession that stolen property or its worth. | Short Answer There were 30 House of Lords convictions of peers resulting in a punishment for the peer (in 29 cases a death sentence, and in the one final case, in 3 months of imprisonment) from 1499 until the practice was abolished in 1948, a time period covering all but the first 158 years of the 607 years during which House of Lords trials were available and the process was formalized. Of those convicted peers, 30% were pardoned or commuted by the monarch. There was no appeal from a House of Lords conviction other than a royal pardon or commutation. Modern criminal appeals did not exist in ordinary criminal cases either, in any part of the time period during which peers were convicted by the House of Lords of crimes for which we have good records (i.e. from 1499 to 1901). Ordinary criminal procedure compared This should also be viewed in the context of the history of ordinary criminal procedure in England (this link is the source applies to all of the discussion in this section). Prior to the year 1700, appeals consisted of a petition to the King or Queen resulting not in a pardon or commutation, but in a direction by the monarch for officials to determine if there were any serious errors in the process by issuing a discretionary writ of error, so it basically, another form of pardon type relief. The Writ of Error and some other procedural remedies short of an appeal existed from 1700 to 1907 in England but evolved over time. Initially, review other than discretionary review by the monarch was limited to a determination that the judge was really a judge in good standing with jurisdiction over the case, that the indictment described a crime, that a correct number of eligible jurors were seated and rendered a verdict, that the sentence was consistent with the sentence authorized by law. This kind of review of criminal convictions was similar to 18th and early 19th century habeas corpus review of convictions in the United States. Writs of error were also used discretionarily in the U.K. in this era in cases where the prosecution wanted to admit that it made a mistake and vacate a conviction. A detailed record of the proceeding that would make a more substantive review possible, however, was not available until 1886, and that was replaced, 21 years later, by the modern direct appeal of a criminal conviction based upon a trial court record include a transcript of the proceedings and all exhibits that had been admitted in the case. True formal direct appeals of criminal convictions in the modern sense, however, did not exist in England prior to 1907, after the last verdict of conviction was made by the House of Lords. So, there weren't true direct appeals in ordinary criminal cases either, in the time period when it would have been potentially relevant to appeals of House of Lords convictions. Of course, the monarch had the power to pardon or commute the sentences of people convicted of crimes in the U.K. in ordinary criminal cases, "since times immemorial", just as in House of Lords cases. But, people with ordinary criminal convictions, unlike peers convicted in the House of Lords, did not have the right to demand an audience with the monarch in the way that a peer did, which made the process of seeking pardons and commutations much less effective for commoners. Long Answer The right to be tried by other peers was established around the time of the Magna Carta, formalized in 1341, and formally abolished in 1948. Prior to 1695 it was before only a jury of nobles hand picked by the monarch to rule as the monarch desired, when parliament was not in session, but after that the entire House of Lords participated in each trial. From 1547 to 1841, there was no punishment after a first offense other than treason or murder, which was just a strike to open up the possibility of punishment for a second offense, and greatly reduced the need for an appeal. According to Wikipedia (references omitted): The right of peers to trial by their own order was formalized during the 14th century. A statute passed in 1341 provided: Whereas before this time the peers of the land have been arrested and imprisoned, and their temporalities, lands, and tenements, goods and cattels, asseized in the King's hands, and some put to death without judgment of their peers: It is accorded and assented, that no peer of the land ... shall be brought in judgment to lose his temporalities, lands, tenements, goods and cattels, nor to be arrested, imprisoned, outlawed, exiled, nor forejudged, nor put to answer, nor be judged, but by award of the said peers in Parliament. The privilege of trial by peers was still ill-defined, and the statute did not cover peeresses. In 1442, after an ecclesiastical court (which included King Henry VI of England, Henry Beaufort and John Kemp) found Eleanor, Duchess of Gloucester, guilty of witchcraft and banished her to the Isle of Man, a statute was enacted granting peeresses the right of trial by peers. By the reign of Henry VII of England [reigned 1485-1509], there were two methods of trial by peers of the realm: trial in the House of Lords (or, in proper terms, by the High Court of Parliament) and trial in the Court of the Lord High Steward. The House of Lords tried the case if Parliament was in session; otherwise, trial was by the Lord High Steward's Court. In the Lord High Steward's Court, a group of Lords Triers, sitting under the chairmanship of the Lord High Steward, acted as judge and jury. By custom, the number of Triers was not fewer than 23, so that a majority was a minimum of 12, but in fact, the number ranged from 20 to 35. The power to choose which peers served as Triers lay with the Crown and was sometimes subject to abuse, as only those peers who agreed with the monarch's position would be summoned to the Court of the Lord High Steward, thereby favoring the desired verdict. This practice was ended by the Treason Act 1695, passed during the reign of King William III. The Act required that all peers be summoned as Triers. All subsequent trials were held before the full House of Lords. In the House of Lords, the Lord High Steward was the President or Chairman of the Court, and the entire House determined both questions of fact and questions of law as well as the verdict. By convention, Bishops and Archbishops did not vote on the verdict, though they were expected to attend during the course of the trial. They sat until the conclusion of the deliberations, and withdrew from the chamber just prior to the final vote. At the end of the trial, peers voted on the question before them by standing and declaring their verdict by saying "guilty, upon my honour" or "not guilty, upon my honour", starting with the most junior baron and proceeding in order of precedence ending with the Lord High Steward. For a guilty verdict, a majority of twelve was necessary. The entire House also determined the punishment to be imposed, which had to accord with the law. For capital crimes the punishment was death; the last peer to be executed was Laurence Shirley, 4th Earl Ferrers, who was hanged for murder in 1760. From 1547, if a peer or peeress was convicted of a crime, except treason or murder, he or she could claim "privilege of peerage" to escape punishment if it was his or her first offence. In all, the privilege was exercised five times, until it was formally abolished in 1841 when James Brudenell, 7th Earl of Cardigan, announced he would claim the privilege and avoid punishment if he was convicted of duelling. He was acquitted before the introduction of the bill. The last trial in the House of Lords was that of Edward Russell, 26th Baron de Clifford, in 1935 for manslaughter (he was acquitted); the following year the Lords passed a bill to abolish trial by peers but the Commons ignored it. The right to trial by peers was abolished when the Lords added an amendment to the Criminal Justice Act 1948, which the Commons accepted. Now peers are tried by juries composed of commoners, though peers were themselves excused from jury service until the House of Lords Act 1999 restricted this privilege to members of the House of Lords. The right to be excused was abolished on 5 April 2004 by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Peers were and still are, hypothetically, subject to impeachment. Impeachment was a procedure distinct from the aforementioned procedure of trial in the House of Lords, though the House of Lords is the court in both cases. Charges were brought by the House of Commons, not a grand jury. Additionally, while in normal cases the House of Lords tried peers only for felonies or treason, in impeachments the charges could include felonies, treason and misdemeanours. The case directly came before the House of Lords, rather than being referred to it by a writ of certiorari. The Lord High Steward presided only if a peer was charged with high treason; otherwise, the Lord Chancellor presided. Other procedures in trials of impeachment were similar, however, to trials before the House of Lords: at the conclusion of the trial, the spiritual peers withdrew, and the temporal Lords gave their votes on their honour. The last impeachment was that of Henry Dundas, 1st Viscount Melville, in 1806 for misappropriating public money (he was acquitted). Since then, impeachment has become an obsolete procedure in the United Kingdom. The ultimate appeal was to the King or Queen personally, and the right to personally petition the sovereign called "access to the sovereign" is one of the traditional privileges of peerage that U.K. nobles held: according to Sir William Blackstone in 1765, "it is usually looked upon to be the right of each particular peer of the realm, to demand an audience of the King, and to lay before him, with decency and respect, such matters as he shall judge of importance to the public weal." The privilege of access is no longer exercised[.] In the time period from 1499 to 1901 there were 30 convictions of peers by the House of Lords that were not excused by peer privilege (there were no other convictions after 1901), all of which except a 3 month sentence in 1901, were death sentences. Seven of those convicted were pardoned by the monarch (most recently in 1746). Two peers had a death sentences commuted by the monarch to imprisonment in 1603. Two more escaped before being executed in 1716, and one died of other causes before he could be executed in 1589. Only three death sentences were carried out following House of Lords convictions since the last royal pardon in 1746. (There were five other House of Lords convictions for offenses other than murder or treason prior to 1841 and punishable by a sentence other than death, but in all five of those cases, the "privilege of peerage" was used to vacate any punishment for the crime of conviction because it was a first offense, so no appellate review or royal pardon or commutation was necessary.) Thus, 30% of peers convicted and sentenced to death by the House of Lords were pardoned or had their sentences commuted by the monarch. There was no forum outside of the House of Lords other than a royal pardon to which an appeal was available. Incidentally, 30 convictions of offenses limited to murder and treason in this time period isn't vanishingly low. Before the recent contraction of the House of Lords, it had about 730 peers at any one time, so in the 449 year period for which we have records, there were about 328,000 person years of potential defendants, with a conviction for murder or treason every 11,000 or so person years. This is quite high by modern standard for an exceedingly privileged and carefully socialized group of people who didn't have access to firearms for most of that time period. | Yes, because the crimes are different instances. Let's remove the guilty plea and the fact that it is murder: can a person assault a person, be tried and imprisoned, then assault the same person later – and get off by declaring "Double jeopardy!". No, it's not the same crime. It's the same type of crime, and involves the same victim, but it is still a different crime. The same with your proposed scenario. (Incidentally, your first line is wrong: the woman wasn't murdered, she was thought to have been murdered). |
Is there an implied consent to a frisk in a stop in the US? This question regards US law, and the Fourth Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. Suppose I am walking on the sidewalk, when a police officer stops me. He then says the following: "I will frisk you, ok?". He has no search warrant. If I say "no", he will not be able to frisk me, and if he does and find evidence of a crime, that evidence will be subject to the exclusionary rule, right? If I say "yes", and he finds evidence of a crime, that evidence can be lawfully used against me in court, right? What if I say or do nothing, and he proceeds to frisk me and find evidence of a crime? Is there an "implied consent" here? | If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ("Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.") If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) ("If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.") The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves. | No. The police have no affirmative legally enforceable duty in the U.S., to the general public, or any particular person who invokes their assistance, to take action to enforce the law. The leading case on point is Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (full text here). In this case, despite the urgent requests of the beneficiary of a Colorado domestic violence restraining order and the warning that a violent crime was imminent, the police in the Town of Castle Rock blew the woman off, and did nothing to prevent ex-husband who had illegally abducted her three daughters from murdering them even though they could easily have done so. The conclusion of the majority opinion by Justice Scalia states that (some citations and footnotes omitted): We conclude, therefore, that respondent did not, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, have a property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband. It is accordingly unnecessary to address the Court of Appeals’ determination that the town’s custom or policy prevented the police from giving her due process when they deprived her of that alleged interest. In light of today’s decision . . . the benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its “substantive” manifestations. This result reflects our continuing reluctance to treat the Fourteenth Amendment as “ ‘a font of tort law,’” . . . but it does not mean States are powerless to provide victims with personally enforceable remedies. Although the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (the original source of §1983), did not create a system by which police departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes that better policing might have prevented, the people of Colorado are free to craft such a system under state law. Despite this concluding statement, there was a very solid argument that the law of the State of Colorado at the time had already been intended to do just that, but was not and would not be given effect. This U.S. Supreme Court case dealt with claims under federal law. There is no affirmative constitutional right to reclaim a stolen car or try to prevent your car from being stolen by a private individual, even if you have a legal right to do so under state law. So, you can't bring a federal civil rights action to enforce a deprivation of that right. The situation is even worse under state law, where police have absolute immunity from liability for all tort claims (i.e. roughly speaking, lawsuits to enforce rights other than contractual rights), unless it comes within a specific exception (of which are there are several) for cases of ordinary negligence such as car accidents when just driving around and not having emergency lights illuminated, or failing to clear ice from a sidewalk on police department property. Their boss may not take kindly to their indifference, but that is a purely discretionary issue for their boss in the context of an employer-employee relationship (often further limited by civil service protections for public employees and/or protections as members of a law enforcement union). The primary exception, not applicable in the example in the question, is that law enforcement officers have certain obligations to protect people who are in law enforcement custody from harm. This obligation is stronger prior to a criminal conviction, and is weaker after someone has been convicted of a crime and is serving a sentence of incarceration for that crime. If you brought a lawsuit of the type described in the question, you would probably lose the case on a motion to dismiss filed swiftly after you filed your lawsuit, and there is a very good chance that you would be compelled to pay the legal fees of the people whom you sued. Comparative Law Footnote Incidentally, while this rule of law is widely shared in countries with "common law" legal systems derived from English law, it is not the case with nearly the same degree of clarity in "civil law" legal systems based upon the civil codes found in Continental Europe such as France, Germany, Spain and Italy. Almost all countries in Latin America, most countries that are not former British colonies in Africa, and most countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia, are civil law countries. In civil law countries there generally are both statutory obligations and human rights law obligations for which the government or government officials can have liability for willfully refusing to enforce criminal laws. But even there it is, as a practical matter, difficult to enforce this obligation and is possible only in the most stark circumstances (such as the one described in the question where there is open defiance of this obligation without any understandable and legitimate contravening reason for failing to act). | Keep in mind that a warrant doesn't require proof that you stole the property or have the property. Instead, the warrant is just authorization to look for that proof. The standard for securing a warrant is probable cause, which is a much lower bar to clear than people seem to think. It just requires that given everything the officer knows, there's a "substantial probability" that a piece of evidence will be in a given place at a given time. If the officer swore to a judge that a reliable source had told him that the letter was stolen, then seen in your front yard, and not seen since, I wouldn't be at all surprised if the judge gave him a search warrant. | united-states It is not required for a person to formally assert a fifth- or a first-amendment right when questioned by the police. One can simply be silent, refuse to answer any questions, without giving any reasons. But probably more effective and just as legal is to say "I won't answer any questions until I have talked with a lawyer. I want a lawyer, now." That is perhaps less likely than using the words "plead the fifth" to be assumed to be a confession of guilt, although some people and some police may take almost anything as a confession of guilt. By the way some of the points you distilled from the video (which I have not watched yet) are correct, some are half-truths, and some are quite incorrect. For example: The 5th amendment was not designed as a shelter for the guilty (despite it often being used as such). It was designed to help prevent you from unknowingly incriminating yourself. As a matter of history, this is quite incorrect. It arose historically out of a reaction to government procedures deemed oppressive. See https://law.stackexchange.com/a/63690/17500 for more detail. But helping people avoid unintentionally incriminating themselves is one of its major current functions. You can't talk your way out of getting arrested. Sometimes you can, but it is never safe to count on it. You can't know in advance if it will work, and more often than not it doesn't. Everything you tell the police can be used against you but not to help you. Not quite. If your statement is recorded, as is likely nowadays, the whole statement must be given to your lawyer and entered into evidence if you are eventually charged. (See Brady vs Maryland) Things said in your own favor may be discounted as self-serving, but the judge and jury will still hear them. But they can be very risky. | Does this practice contravene any state statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence? Generally not. States could adopt a statute that says otherwise, but I'm not aware of states that do. States often have regulations limiting police use of biometric data for general, non-probable cause based searches for criminal suspects. For example, many states don't make fingerprints obtained for professional licensing background checks available for searched by law enforcement without a warrant and probable cause. I suspect that states may start to do so with rape kit DNA, but it hasn't previously been identified as an issue, so there aren't statutes that prohibit this in most cases (e.g. victim's rights bills have not thought to address the issue). The reason for concern that could lead to future statutes is two fold. First, including rape kit DNA in searches discourages people from reporting crimes because it might put them at a disadvantage in an unrelated criminal proceeding. Second, the risk of false positives is vastly higher in a random search of biometric data from people with no articulated connection to the crime than it is when isolated individual suspects who there is probable cause to believe committed a crime are investigated. The chance of a false positive for someone in a database with millions of people is non-negligible even if the risk of a false positive in any one isolated comparison is tiny. Even a 1 in 10,000,000 chance of a false positive in a database of 40 million people will routinely produce false positives in random searches. And, while DNA evidence is very accurate, partial forensic DNA samples aren't absolutely incapable of producing false matches to nearly the same extent as a comparison of two complete whole genome samples. So, states may adopt such statutes in the future now that the issue is in the spotlight. contravene any federal statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence? No. violate any state constitutions or the US constitution? No. At least under current jurisprudence. The relevant provisions are vague legal standards that are applied with great discretion by courts. Evolving understandings of the situation could change that view in the future. Footnote: Does doctor-patient privilege or HIPPA control? There is a doctor-patient privilege recognized in every U.S. state and in the federal courts. Forensic DNA obtained from a rape kit from a potential suspect isn't protected by the privilege since the suspect isn't a patient of the medical provider in that medical procedure. There is an arguable case that the rape victim is a patient of the medical provider who gathers the DNA, including the rape victim's DNA for the rape kit, and that the patient has not waived the doctor-patient privilege merely by permitting the medical professional to use the rape victim's DNA profile to distinguish between sample material in the rape kit that is her own from material from a suspect. Moreover, such a waiver of doctor-patient privilege would probably not be legally valid unless the rape victim provided informed consent to that release. The rape victim might also have federal HIPPA protections for the privacy of her DNA profile collected as part of her medical records under a similar theory. Mostly, this hinges on how the relationship of the rape victim to the person administering the rape kit is characterized, and in particular, if gathering evidence in a rape kit is "medical treatment" that is privileged. To the best of my knowledge, there is no case law interpreting either the doctor-patient privilege or HIPPA in a rape kit DNA fact pattern. If it is considered to be a doctor-patient relationship for medical treatment within the meaning of the evidentiary privilege and HIPPA, and the DNA was shared on a database which law enforcement has access to without a warrant without the victim's informed consent, this evidence and all "fruit of the poisonous tree" derived from it, could probably be suppressed in a criminal proceeding against the rape victim, even if the evidence conclusively linked the rape victim to the crime. Under the circumstances, and given the policy considerations and the lack of other controlling law, this would be an attractive interpretation of the existing law for a court to adopt. If evidence completely independent of the blind database match provided probable cause that the rape victim committed a crime, and the crime was one in which there was forensic DNA evidence, law enforcement could probably get a search warrant to take a legally untainted DNA sample from the rape victim to compare to the forensically collected DNA evidence, however, just as it could with any other suspect. | Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible. | Police are authorized by statutes to carry out the functions of law enforcement. I.e., they are granted by law the authority to: Investigate alleged or apparent crimes Detain and arrest individuals when there exists "probable cause" to believe they have committed a crime. There are a plethora of details encompassed by these general descriptions. For related inquiries see also: How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions? search-and-seizure In the specific example you cite you are in a public place, albeit on private property. If the property owner asked the police to leave they would have to meet a higher statutory threshold to legally remain and pursue their investigation. In practice, however, they may do whatever they want. Publicized incidents suggest that the best chance you have of ensuring your rights are protected in a police confrontation are to: Have the incident recorded in audio and video in as detailed a fashion as possible, and seen by as many witnesses as possible. Avoid actions that could escalate the incident or serve as a pretext for escalation by the police. Try to get higher-ranking police on the scene. E.g., if you can safely access your phone you may want to both start video recording and call 911 to ask the dispatcher to send the officer's superior to the scene, while making it clear to the dispatcher that you intend to comply with all lawful requests but that you feel threatened or unsafe. | The Likely Ruling Assuming points 1 and 2 in the question, all the evidence from the trunk would be inadmissible, and if there really is no other evidence against Bob, then Bob would go free. This is highly improbable; the prosecution would find some grounds to dispute the unlawful nature of stop and search, even if ones the court would not accept. A better version might be "The judge rules that the stop and search were unlawful, and is upheld by the appellate court". That is more realistic and has the same result. Inevitable Discovery The only grounds I can see for any other result is "inevitable discovery". If other police were, say, already staking out Bob's house with a warrant to search the car, and Bob was on the way to that house at the time of the stop, then the prosecution could argue that they would inevitably have conducted a legal search of Bob's car and found the same evidence. The conditions for invoking this doctrine rarely occur, but it is possible. After the Trial There is no way that Cal's body can be Bob's property, so it would be released to Cal's next of kin or legal executor. Unless Bob was Cal's next of kin, it is hard to see any way that the body would be handed over to Bob. Cal's clothes are almost surely part of Cal's estate, although it is in theory possible that they are Bob's property. No claim of ownership can be used against Bob in a later trial, because any later trial would be barred by double jeopardy. In any case, while evidence from the trunk would all be inadmissible in a trial of Bob, it might be admissible in a possible later trial of Joe, Bob's alleged accomplice. Therefore the police might well retain all the items (except the body) as possible future evidence. Terminology This is actually about the exclusionary rule itself, not about the "fruit of the poison tree" doctrine. What is the difference? If an unlawful search finds evidence, that evidence is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. If an unlawful search merely finds a lead, evidence later found via the lead is considered as "fruit of the poisoned tree" and is therefore inadmissible. For example, if the murder weapon is found in Bob's car after an unlawful search, the exclusionary rule applies. But if a note saying "stuf at 1234 Elm" is found during the unlawful search, and the police visit 1234 Elm Street, and find the murder weapon there, that is "fruit of the poisoned tree". Why does it matter? Because if the police find a different lead to 1234 Elm, so that the investigation or search at that address is not based solely on the results of the unlawful search, then the evidence found at 1234 Elm may be admissible, while corroboration will not save the evidence actually found by the unlawful search. It is a subtle but sometimes important distinction. |
Is marriage automatically cancelled for immigration violation? I met my husband in Laos when I was traveling there in 2017. We got married and he came to the U.S. K-1 visa in 2018. He got his temporary green card in 2019, which is good for two years. In the year 2021 things didn’t work out between us, and we separated. I did not file an application for his green card extension, so his green card expired already. Now he’s technically on no visa and no green card. He’s going back to his country. Does this mean our marriage is automatically cancelled? Once he goes back to his country, he can’t come back because of this visa violation. | Marriages are controlled by state law, immigration is governed by federal law. In no state is a marriage automatically "cancelled" for committing a crime, much less for violating an immigration regulation. So you will remain married until you or he changes that. | If the U.S. adds a new territory, are the people currently living there able to become president? No. Or does the territory have to become a state in order for the people to be eligible to become president? Not necessarily. What does "natural-born citizen" mean? The meaning of the natural born citizen clause of the constitution is unclear in many respects, but virtually all scholars agree that a person who was a US citizen at birth, and who has remained a US citizen until present, is a natural-born citizen. There is a small minority of scholars who insist that a US citizen at birth is only a natural-born citizen if they were born in the US (for example, Ted Cruz would not be considered a natural-born citizen). There is an even smaller minority who insist that a person must have at least one US citizen parent in order to be a natural-born citizen. But for all practical purposes, these minority viewpoints are irrelevant. The only thing that matters is whether someone was a US citizen when they were born. Citizenship of people living in US territories When a US territory is created, the people living there don't automatically become US citizens, and if Congress eventually gives them US citizenship, the canon of presumption against retroactivity applies: a statute should not be read to be retroactive unless there is evidence that it was intended to apply retroactively. That means the people who get US citizenship under the statute don't become natural-born citizens; they're considered to have been automatically naturalized when the statute went into effect. But if there's a statute saying that people born in the territory are US citizens at birth, then people born in the territory after the effective date of that statute are natural-born citizens, since they are citizens at birth. I will use Hawaii as an example. Hawaii became a territory in 1898. Citizenship was granted in 1900. Statehood was not granted until 1959. 8 USC §1405 governs the citizenship of people born in Hawaii: A person born in Hawaii on or after August 12, 1898, and before April 30, 1900, is declared to be a citizen of the United States as of April 30, 1900. A person born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900, is a citizen of the United States at birth. A person who was a citizen of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898, is declared to be a citizen of the United States as of April 30, 1900. So, Hawaiians didn't become US citizens when Hawaii was annexed. They were granted US citizenship 2 years later. A person born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900 is a natural born citizen. Applying the presumption against retroactivity, we see that a person who was born in Hawaii between August 12, 1898 and April 29, 1900, or who was a citizen of independent Hawaii when it was annexed by the United States, was not a natural born citizen and could not have become President. In addition to the presumption against retroactivity, there is also another canon of construction that applies here: Congress could have used the "is a citizen of the United States at birth" language for the other two categories of Hawaiians too, but chose to omit it. Presumably, Congress acted purposefully in doing so, with the intent of granting citizenship at birth to only one of the three categories. (I can't remember whether this canon has a name.) Can Congress grant natural-born citizen status retroactively? If the US were to acquire a new territory and saw fit to bestow citizenship retroactively to birth on some natives of that territory, would those people be eligible for the presidency? No one knows the answer to that question. As an example of when Congress has granted citizenship retroactively, the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 created 8 USC §1401(h), which granted citizenship retroactively to birth to individuals who had been born outside the US to a US citizen mother and alien father prior to May 24, 1934. This act was necessary because, prior to that date, only US citizen fathers could transmit citizenship, not US citizen mothers. A person granted citizenship under this statute would be over the age of 89 now, so we're unlikely to see one run for president. It's an open question whether someone who obtained US citizenship through this statute would be considered eligible for the presidency. One could argue that "natural-born citizen" implies a person who actually was a citizen when they were born and that retroactive grants of citizenship are a mere legal fiction that cannot override the meaning of the constitution. | As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there. | You don't need to "report" it to anyone in the US or do anything else. The US doesn't have any national registry of marriage. Any marriage or divorce conducted anywhere in the world is automatically recognized anywhere in the US (with some exceptions like polygamous marriages); the same is true in many other countries. How does the U.S. find out, for tax or insurance purposes? Obviously there's a little box that says [] Married but how would they know if I lied if I'm not registered in the United States? They don't, and don't need to. (The same is true for marriages in the US -- they don't directly "know".) You are required to use an appropriate filing status for your marriage status at the end of the year for each year's tax returns. If you don't, you are committing fraud. There are lots of things that you can intentionally lie about on tax returns, and they may not immediately "find out"; but when they do, you are in big trouble. Am I legally required to report it when I return? No. Would the Canadian/provincial government inform the U.S./state government? No. | I don't think that un-revoking your grandfather's German citizenship would help you, since your father naturalized to obtain British citizenship before your birth, and German citizenship is automatically lost upon voluntary acquisition of a foreign nationality, so even if your grandfather's German citizenship had not been revoked, the German citizenship your grandfather passed onto your father would have been lost before your birth. There might be another route to get German citizenship through your mother, if she was a German citizen at the time of your birth. Since you were born before 1975, and thus could not get German citizenship from your mother at birth, you qualify for a special naturalization process if your mother was a German citizen at the time of your birth, and you are fluent in German and have other ties to Germany; you do not need to renounce your existing nationalities to get German citizenship through this process. See this and this (both in German). However, there are complications with that since I believe German women generally automatically lost German citizenship if they married a foreigner before 1953, so she may not have had German citizenship when you were born since she married your father before your birth. | Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide). | Sample answer: Be a US citizen - automatic US tax residency Own a UK property and live there for 91 days to gain UK tax residency Spend 60 days in India plus a total of 365 days over the previous 4 years Spend 62 days in Norway, having been tax resident there the previous year. If I understand correctly, this status can be maintained indefinitely by spending 62 days there per year once first gained. Spend 120 days in Paraguay On the last day of the tax year, start working in the Philippines on an indefinite contract Spend 183 days or more in Singapore during the prior tax year Spend a total of 270 days in Mauritius over the current tax year and the previous two years (our calendar is getting pretty constrained at this point but I think this is still all technically possible) Have access to a spare room that a friend informally keeps available for you in Germany Be a member of the crew of a vessel registered in Mozambique Have at least one essential connection to Sweden, having been tax resident there less than 5 years previously Have a spouse who lives as a permanent resident in Spain and is somehow a contributing member of the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (triggering Australian tax residency) Total tax residencies: 13 Total marginal income tax rate after double tax treaties and reliefs for the tie break: no idea | Statelessness is a very serious condition. It is quite likely that a person such as you describe may be required to board an aeroplane to that country but will not be permitted to pass through immigration on arrival - Mehran Karimi Nasseri lived in Charles de Gaulle airport for 18 years in this condition. There are many people in the world who are stateless and this may or may not affect their lives. Citizenship is generally only an issue when crossing international borders or in employment situations, the latter is significant in advanced countries but less of an issue in countries with less-developed economies. |
Can a covert recording be used as evidence in UK civil court? I have a court case against my landlord for disrepair. At the end of last year I had enough of waiting for him to respond to all the issues we have in the property, and I've sent him a letter of claim. After that he came to inspect the property (with his father posing as a building expert) and he was very arrogant, threatened me with eviction and skyrocketing rent if he does any repairs. He talked down to me and in general his visit was extremely unpleasant. I recorded it all on my iPhone voice recorder and made a transcript of this conversation, but I didn't tell him that I'm recording it as I know that the only way to show his true colours is to do it without his knowledge (example: he phoned my solicitor after she contacted him to tell him, that we will commence legal proceedings against him and said to her, that he is an innocent victim here, that I was very happy with everything until 6 months ago and he didn't know about any problems in the property, which is a lie as I have tons of evidence to prove otherwise). So my question is: can I ask for admission of this recording in a court, as I believe it is highly relevant and probative? | Yes, you can ask permission from the court. From this page (by a firm of solicitors): Recording a conversation in secret is not a criminal offence and is not prohibited. As long as the recording is for personal use you don’t need to obtain consent or let the other person know. [...] A private recording can be submitted as evidence, but with some conditions: A recording may be relied on in evidence if the court gives permission An application for permission should be made on form C2 The recording should be made available to other parties before any hearing to consider its admissibility. So yes you can probably use it, but you can't play Perry Mason and suddenly produce it in the middle of the court hearing. Talk to your solicitor. | Probably not. It appears that in the case in question, your lawyers, while they were representing you, agreed to a protective order that kept certain information including settlement offers made to them by the opposing parties' lawyers (even if those offers were rejected) confidential. You are bound by the agreements made by your lawyers if they are your lawyers at the time, even they later cease to be your lawyers. So, if you were to make the disclosure of this information subject to a protective order, the court involved could hold you in contempt of court and issue sanctions (including fines and incarceration) for failing to honor the court order to seal the case, because this protective order was binding upon you, because you agreed to it through your lawyers who were acting as your agents at the time. The fact that you are no longer represented by those lawyers doesn't vacate the protective order. CAVEAT: This is an interpretation of the facts made with incomplete information. A truly reliable answer would require review of the exact documents in the case filed with the court which is beyond the scope of Law.SE. | Yes, you may call a defendant as a witness and compel the defendant to testify in a civil case. If you need this testimony to prove your case, you should have the clerk issue a subpoena for trial to the defendant and have that subpoena personally served by a process server upon that defendant (sometimes a witness fee, a mileage allowance, and a copy of the relevant statute must also be included in the package). There should be a standard court form available to do this. The subpoena to appear and testify at trial must be delivered to the defendant by the process server a certain amount of time in advance (usually two days, but court rules vary). Also, when you call a defendant as a witness you may generally examine the witness with leading questions, which is something that you are not usually allowed to do with witnesses that you call in your own case. Forcing a defendant to testify to the indisputable facts is a good way to meet your burden of proof towards establishing those facts. But, when you call a defendant as a witness, you should limit your questions to those you know the answer to and can ideally prove with other evidence if the defendant lies. Don't try to tell the entire story of the case with the defendant, just the undisputed facts. The one narrow exception to this would be a criminal contempt of court proceeding (i.e. one seeking the remedy of throwing the offending party in jail where there is no way to obtain relief by taking the action requested) prosecuted by a party within a civil case, to which 5th Amendment protections would apply. But, this would not apply to the kind of case described in the original post. | How exactly would the court determine this to be the cause of divorce? 99.99% of the time, this would be purely a "he said she said" situation, for how can someone prove refusal to engage? You can prove the opposite if there are children born to both parents, but how can one prove a negative? Or is the statement by the divorce initiator considered sufficient for the judge? Testimony under oath is evidence. Judges resolve "he said she said" situations every day on a routine basis with witness testimony alone by judging the credibility of each witness before them. See also an answer by @Jen about the subject of how things are proved in court in general. In the appropriate case, testimony under oath with no other corroborating evidence can even support a murder conviction as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It can certainly suffice to prove marital fault in a civil lawsuit for a divorce. If the judge finds that witness testimony under oath between more than one witness is irreconcilably different, and each witness is equally credible, and that it is impossible to tell which person is telling the truth, then the person seeking relief from the court has failed to meet their burden of proof to obtain relief from the court. But, this is rare. Usually, when witnesses are both testifying under oath and disagree about what happened, the judge will find that one witness is more credible than the other. And, in truth, while people certainly do lie in open court under oath, and probably are more likely to lie in that situation than when speaking to someone not under oath outside of a courtroom, most of the time, people don't lie and the testimony of all of the witnesses are consistent with each other subject to limitations based upon what they could perceive from their perspective and the limitations of imperfect memories. This could come down to demeanor in court, hesitation in answering, "tells", inconsistencies in their testimony, corroboration from other evidence and other witnesses (e.g. what someone said to a friend or wrote in a diary at the time), evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime of deceit in the past, use of language that suggests coaching about their testimony, or common sense judgments about whose story seems more plausible under the circumstances of the parties in front of the judge. | The jury would never hear the recording The recording and its provenience would be provided to the prosecution who would, rightly, have issues with its admissibility. The defence and prosecution would make submissions on this to the judge, normally well before the trial date and the empaneling of the jury. If the recording had genuinely emerged during the trial, such submissions would be made without the jury seeing them. The submissions would typically be in writing rather than verbal. If the judge decided the evidence was inadmissible the jury would never see it and never know of its existence. If the jury somehow found out about it anyway, this would be grounds for an immediate mistrial and we would start again with a new jury. Illegally obtained evidence is not automatically inadmissible Hong Kong is not the United States - admitting or excluding illegally obtained evidence is at the discretion of the judge based on where the interests of overall justice are best served. In any event, the absolute prohibition in the US applies only to prosecution evidence - evidence illegally obtained by the defence is subject to the same rules as in Hong Kong; the judge decides. | The document may, but probably doesn't say what it is you are witnessing. For example, a person witnessing a statutory declaration in NSW attests: their qualification to be a witness (JP, solicitor etc.) that they actually saw the declarant sign it that they asked the declarant if they believed their declaration was true that they have known the declarant for more than 12 months OR the declarant provided a photo ID and either their face matched the photo or they had a valid reason for not showing their face. If it doesn't say then what you are witnessing is that the signature was made by a person whom you could identify if necessary (e.g. if the person denied the signature). | No Voluntary disclosure, even accidental, by the client ends privilege. The information may still be confidential (inadmissible) if it happened in the appropriate circumstances, for example, as part of a mediation. Edit A recent decision of the High Court of Australia has determined that a litigant can use material that comes into its possession that would have attracted privilege irrespective of how this happens. In that case, the law firm was hacked by an unknown party, the information was given to a journalist and published and the litigant wanted to use it in their case - they were allowed to do so. The court decided that privilege is not a legal right that could found a course of action. Basically, it only prevents the compulsory production of such information - it doesn't protect the information itself. | The judgment linked to by the article says: During the period from 5 October 2007 to 11 April 2008, Mr Ryneš installed and used a [continuously recording] camera system located under the eaves of his family home. The camera was installed in a fixed position and could not turn; it recorded the entrance to his home, the public footpath and the entrance to the house opposite. [my emphasis] That is the context of the case. He hadn't obtained consent from his neighbour to film the entrance to their home and therefore their family. He hadn't obtained consent from passers-by or warned them by means of a sign that there was a surveillance system monitoring that part of the public space. The court ruled that: The second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that the operation of a camera system, as a result of which a video recording of people is stored on a continuous recording device such as a hard disk drive, installed by an individual on his family home for the purposes of protecting the property, health and life of the home owners, but which also monitors a public space, does not amount to the processing of data in the course of a purely personal or household activity, for the purposes of that provision. [my emphasis] If you recorded or took photos of your family members enjoying walking through Trafalgar Square, a very busy public space, it's likely you could successfully claim it was a purely personal or household activity - if the authorities were at all bothered by it (which they are not). |
What are the legal consequences for serving in a jury if you are not eligible because you are not a citizen? I got a jury summons letter last week and was asked to be in court Monday. I went and was there for 5 - 6 hours deliberating with other jurors whether or not this guy should've gotten a speeding ticket or not (really trivial stuff). Anyway, we made our ruling and I headed home. I wake up the next morning and went to work and was discussing this with my coworker and he brought up people who couldn't serve in a jury. Now, I've been living in the US for 15+ years and I am only a permanent resident (not a citizen) I looked into this further and found that in Texas, non US citizens could not serve in a jury. What are the consequences (as I did not know at the time) for serving in a jury if you are not a citizen? Should I call the court house and tell them? I thought they only picked citizens! UPDATE I wanted to update you guys on this strange insistence. Didn't want to leave you guys guessing lol. Anyway I explained the situation at the court house and I was forgiven without any penalties but they did declare a mistrial on the case I was involved in | The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available. | First, while Law and Order should not be taken as an accurate depiction of a New York trial, it especially should not be taken as an accurate depiction of an Australian trial. Australian law, while it has some major similarities with US law (both ultimately derive from the law of England), is not US law. With procedural matters (such as "may jurors ask questions of witnesses"), it can potentially differ from court to court. In general, jurors may not simply ask a witness a question. The jury's job is not to investigate and figure out if the defendant was guilty or not; it's to evaluate the cases presented by each side. US (and Australian, as far as I know) courts use what's known as the adversarial model, where the prosecution and the defense both present the best cases they can and a neutral third party decides which case was stronger. In a US criminal trial, the state is expected to justify why someone should be in jail; the jury shouldn't be helping them justify it. This isn't how all jurisdictions around the world work, but it's how the US does. One concern with juror questions is that it has the risk that the juror will not be impartial. Jurors are not supposed to get into arguments with witnesses, or to go after them to try to prove a point. In your case, the juror might be introducing an entirely different line of reasoning from the one either side is presenting, and that's simply not their job. People have raised the concern that a juror thinking up questions might be deciding the case before they hear all the evidence, and might give too much weight to the answers to their own questions (or read a lot into it if a question is denied). There are also rules on what questions may be legally asked; lawyers know these and jurors generally don't, which is why jurors may almost never directly ask a question to a witness. Where they can ask questions, it's virtually always written questions, which the judge reviews, gives to both sides to see if anyone objects, and then reads to the witness in a neutral tone. | I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking. | Some of the documents are here. As document 61 of the trial, the government motion for bench trial, argues, There is no constitutional right to a jury trial for criminal contempt charges resulting in a sentence of imprisonment of six months or less. Arpaio responds in document 62 that Defendant Arpaio acknowledges that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for defendants charged with “petty” offenses where the maximum sentence does not exceed six months imprisonment, but continues the argument (the point being that there is no question that there is no absolute right to a jury trial, esp. in the instant case). He argues Many of the actions of the referring judge will become an issue in the case, calling into question the objectives and motives of Judge Snow. A public official’s actions and motives should and must be decided by an impartial jury of the elected official’s peers. The court order is document 83. There, The Court finds that this case is appropriate for a bench trial. This case focuses on the application of facts to the law to determine if Defendant intentionally violated a court order. Essentially, since there is no right to a jury trial and no compelling reason to grant a jury trial (e.g. the court found no merit to his argument that there would be the appearance of impropriety), the motion for a bench trial was granted. The order cites case law regarding the "not longer that 6 months" rule from Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454; United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488; United States v. Aldridge, 995 F.2d 233; United States v. Berry, 232 F.3d 897. | Perjury is not 'not telling the truth'. It requires (in most jurisdictions) being proven to have deliberately lied under oath. As Xavier pointed out, you are not on oath when entering a plea (among other reasons, you would be required to incriminate yourself). Secondly, "I am not guilty" could mean anything from "the prosecution wrongly think that what I did is illegal" to "this law is unconstitutional" even if the facts are not in dispute; either may be mistaken without being a lie. If the facts are in dispute, the jury will have to deliver a verdict that implies (it does not state, let alone prove) that they disbelieve one party; deliberate falsehood, whether by a defendant or a police officer, would be several steps beyond that. | @DaleM isn't wrong, but some elaboration is in order. You (almost always) gain your citizenship (or nationality) in the first instance, at birth, without the agreement or assent of you or your parents. It is thrust upon you. Usually, your country of citizenship must consent to end your citizenship (or authorize you to do so unilaterally) under that country's laws. Once you have citizenship or nationality, in practice, in most countries, you can generally only renounce your citizenship if you contemporaneously or already have a citizenship somewhere else. You are at a minimum strongly dissuaded from doing so and are not a sympathetic candidate for relief under laws related to statelessness if you willfully put yourself in this position knowing the consequences. This is a feature of the citizenship laws of most countries in order to implement international treaties designed to prevent statelessness which are widely adopted. When an adult is naturalized as a citizen of a new country, usually, their old citizenship is revoked by operation of law under the laws of their old country. In many countries, including the U.S., there are high fees and tax consequences for renouncing your citizenship. Any potential tax liabilities in the future that were not yet due under U.S. law (e.g. capital gains taxes an appreciated assets not yet sold, and estate taxes that would be due if the person renouncing their citizenship had died on that date) are owed immediately upon applying to renounce your citizenship. A stateless person is, subject to quite narrow exceptions, still subject to all of the laws of the place where they are located, including almost all of its criminal laws (except treason) and its tax laws (at least on income earned in that country). A stateless person lacks many rights. They can't travel internationally (there are exceptions under treaty in some cases, but obtaining those rights is cumbersome at a minimum). They can't vote. They typically aren't entitled to domestic welfare state benefits like national health insurance, disability payments, unemployment benefits, subsidized housing, old age or retirement benefits, etc. They can't work in a licensed or regulated profession. They may not even be able to sign a lease. They may not be allowed to own a company or serve as an officer or director of a company or as a trustee of a trust. They aren't entitled to diplomatic assistance. There are many fraudulent legal movements such as the "sovereign citizen movement" (and the Moorish Sovereign Citizens) that assert that citizenship is voluntary and that just by disavowing it in some official feeling way, they can be exempt from taxes, court jurisdiction, and/or other laws. This is false and people who act on this fraudulent misinformation often suffer serious legal consequences as a result. | I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at *11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on. | In many jurisdictions, there is a "witness fee" that one is required to pay, as a token recognition of the value of a person's time. Fact witnesses can often be obligated to appear and testify, for minimal compensation, but not against themselves. In federal cases, Rule 17(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure permit the defendant to apply to ask the government to pay the witness fee if they cannot afford it and the presence of the witness is necessary for an adequate defense. The other side of a case (in this example, the prosecutor) could try to impeach the witness's testimony (i.e. make him seem less credible in the eyes of the jury) by demonstrating that the witness is a "professional witness" (i.e. fees from saying things in court are a major part of the witness's regular income). That doesn't seem to apply to the facts you've listed, where the witness just happened to be in that place and time to observe what happened and (assuming for this question) accurately testified as to what he saw. Personally paying the police officer or judge for a favorable result is a different question with a different answer. |
Is ebay legally allowed to instantly suspend my account (with no possibility of appeal) without a valid reason? (Actual reason is: AI algo gone rogue) I received an email out of nowhere from ebay claiming that my account has been suspended for selling "prohibited items" and there is no possibility of appeal. The items they identified as "prohibited" were A rare Syriac bible. A vintage keyboard. A Greek new testament. A commemorative physical bitcoin. We are clearly not talking drugs, weapons and child pornography here. I was baffled and contacted ebay via their online chat. The representative was completely unhelpful, refusing to offer any explanation for the suspension and simply repeating over and over again that "I'm sorry, but this suspension is permanent." This is ridiculous. This is clearly and obviously unfair, unjust, hateful, bigoted, discriminatory and draconian, but my question now is; are they legally allowed to do this? update: I kept talking to chat-help representatives and they literally were copy pasting stock responses at me. Very dehumanizing. Anyway I managed to gather from the representative that my account was picked up on the basis of some artificial intelligence algorithm identifying my account as suspicious, and therefore they don't actually know the exact reason why the account was suspended. Ok, fair enough, but that being the case, why on earth is there no possibility of appeal? Clearly there's a rogue AI on the loose here. | Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful. | I will try to answer some of my questions based on recent developments and other information I've seen. Yes. 2. No. On page 23 of this Commerce Dept. memo on TikTok, it describes: This prohibition would remove the TikTok app from U.S.-based mobile app stores, preventing mobile users from being able to download the app to their devices or receive updates. As scoped, this prohibition would only apply to app stores accessible in the United States, thus users would still be able to download the app while outside the United States. On page 15 of this Commerce Dept. memo on WeChat, it describes: This prohibition would remove the WeChat app from U.S.-based mobile app stores, preventing mobile users from being able to download the app to their devices or receive updates. As scoped, this prohibition would only apply to app stores accessible in the United States, thus users would still be able to download the app while outside the United States. 3,4,5. No for WeChat. In letters sent to the opposite party in a lawsuit and filed with the court, the US government has provided assurances that WeChat users will not have any civil or criminal liability for downloading or using the app for personal or business communication. we can provide assurances that the Secretary does not intend to take actions that would target persons or groups whose only connection with WeChat is their use or downloading of the app to convey personal or business information between users, or otherwise define the relevant transactions in such a way that would impose criminal or civil liability on such users. In other words, while use of the app for such communications could be directly or indirectly impaired through measures targeted at other transactions, use and downloading of the app for this limited purpose will not be a defined transaction, and such users will not be targeted or subject to penalties. I'm not entirely sure for TikTok, but the same may be true for TikTok since the prohibited transactions for both are essentially the same. No. The regulations on prohibited transactions do not require the blocking of traffic from the apps. Simply carrying the traffic of the app is not one of the prohibited transactions, as long as the company does not have a contract for internet transit or peering with ByteDance/Tencent, nor are providing hosting or content delivery services to ByteDance/Tencent. On page 23 of the Commerce Dept. memo on TikTok linked above, it says: User data could still be served by data centers, [redacted] operating outside of the United States. On page 7 of this declaration by a Commerce Dept. official further explains that WeChat traffic will still flow through the US: Moreover, this prohibition would not affect Internet transit or peering services in the United States that are not “directly contracted or arranged” by Tencent, and thus would leave the overwhelming majority of Internet traffic, including WeChat data, untouched. | It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter. | Yes. In the United Kingdom it is illegal under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. In other jurisdictions there may not be a law directly aimed at computer crime but if you sell it knowing that a crime is going to be committed with it that makes you an accomplice. Most computer crime is prosecuted under laws not directly aimed at computer misuse. | In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order. | When does it become illegal to exchange bitcoin for cash? When the transaction purposefully skips the controls in place regarding anti-money laundering. Generally speaking, the issue is not the mere involvement of cryptocurrency in a transaction, but the crimes a wrongdoer seeks to camouflage or conceal by means of cryptocurrencies. Such crimes typically involve money laundering, identity theft, stolen card numbers, and the like. As quoted in one of the links you provide, "[t]he use of bitcoins in the transactions is a new technological flourish to this very old crime". Is there any direct source or any laws with numbers? Apropos of your first link, mentioning that "a Florida judge threw out money transmitting charges against a bitcoiner" (see also here), I will point out that the court's dismissal of charges against that defendant has been reversed early this year. See State v. Espinoza, 264 So.3d 1055 (2019). Although the judges' narratives of a case are questionable and/or sloppy and to be taken with a grain of salt, the appellate decision cites language from Florida legislation as applicable to virtual currencies (and, impliedly, cryptocurrencies). You will notice that the focus in the Espinoza decision is the interpretation of Florida Statutes in its sections 560.125(1) and (5)(a) (regarding unauthorized vendors), and 560.103(21), (29) (defining monetary value as "a medium of exchange, whether or not redeemable in currency"). As usual, each legislation may present subtle and/or fundamental variations. For instance, the court in Espinoza at 1065 identified that federal law is inapplicable there in that 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) contemplates that "the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency to another location or person by any means" (emphasis added), and Espinoza's transaction(s) did not involve a third party. By contrast, the Florida statute does not allude to third parties in that transmission of monetary value, hence preventing the statutory sanctions from being preemptively foreclosed in the matter of Espinoza. What about when someone buys with stolen money or money from illegal proceeds. Did you commit a crime if you sell bitcoin to someone and the money is stolen, or the gift cards are stolen? That also depends on the jurisdiction and the facts of the case. In Espinoza, he was allegedly informed that the cash he received (or was about to receive) in exchange for bitcoins "derived from engaging in illegal activity and that [the buyer] was planning to use the bitcoins to engage in further illegal activity", Espinoza at 1058. The court highlighted the State's argument that "dismiss[ing] a charge of money laundering is improper because money laundering requires intent" (emphasis added), which is sanctioned by section 896/101(3)(c). | In the United States, no. For something to be illegal in any meaningful way, you have to be able to point to a law that makes it illegal. If there's no law to break, it's not illegal. I would wonder if your colleague was thinking about question of whether cryptocurrencies are legal tender. For something to be "legal tender," there would need to be some kind of law or regulation requiring people to accept them as payment. There is no such requirement in the United States, so Bitcoin, for instance, is not legal tender. But that doesn't make it illegal tender; it just means that people can decide whether to accept it or not. | It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages. |
Accountability for Attorneys - does it exist? I’ve had a number of initial consultations with various attorneys for estate planning and entity structuring, and almost every one of the opinions I’ve heard is different and often contradictory. If I just choose one on a hunch to proceed with and they turn out to be wrong (e.g. results in higher tax liability than they claim or doesn’t protect my assets as they claim) is it possible to recover “damages” from them (e.g. make a claim on their E&O insurance)? It seems like the engagement agreements I’ve been presented with suggest no guarantees, no warranties. One even says the company isn’t in the business of providing legal services, and if considered to be legal services they retain the right to facilitate use of attorneys to complete the work (even though it also says all members of the company are licensed attorneys, and they have even emailed me with a note stating that communications are under attorney-client privilege). I assume these are ways they avoid any liability if they are wrong, so how can you hold an attorney accountable? | Yes. Lawyers are generally subject to a malpractice lawsuit, essentially the same as doctors and other professions. A successful claim generally requires proof that the lawyer's services fell below the standard of care for attorneys, and that it resulted in some injury to you. | Often one chooses your accountant, your financial advisor, or your lawyer. Another option is to appoint the trust department of a bank. I personally, as a lawyer, have a policy of not consenting to do that except in rare cases like the one in this question, of a client who just doesn't have anyone and has an estate sufficiently small that a bank trust department would not be cost effective or well suited to handling some aspect of the executorship. But, I have done it a few times in those cases. Most lawyers I know of take a similar position. If no executor is designated, your estate will usually be administered either by a large unpaid creditor, or by the public administrator (whose job is primarily to administer estates in cases where there are no next of kin, no executor has been designated, and there are no unpaid creditors who have stepped up to do the job). | As a preface, while the best course of action isn't always clear and the reality of implementing some solution is often rocky, the bipolar diagnosis situation you describe is probably the single most common situation in which legal arrangements must be made for an adult child, and is almost as common as the need for children to make legal arrangements for the care of their declining parents. You aren't the only one going through situations like these. Probably 0.5%-2% of people in any given area experience bipolar, usually starting in adolescence or young adulthood, and difficulties managing it of the kind that you describe are the rule and not the exception. Also, just ignoring the problems you describe is a very bad idea. Premature death either from suicide or bad judgment related to the bipolar diagnosis is all too common in these situations. It is serious business, not something that should be thought of as bad character, or futile to do anything about, or blameworthy. It just is, and if someone doesn't do something when the plan gets off course, serious consequences often follow. There are really several intertwined issues present here. Realistically, given the nature of the concerns expressed, a limited guardianship may be necessary to accomplish the goals expressed. What Are Medical Powers Of Attorney? A healthcare or medical power of attorney gives the person who holds it (who is called an "agent" or "proxy") the authority to make medical decisions for someone called the principal (i.e. John Smith) when the principal lacks the capacity to give informed consent at that very moment to do so. This is because a power of attorney is an inherently revocable document expressing the wishes of the person writing it. You generally can't bind yourself in the future without court approval or a contractual relationship with a third party which a power of attorney is not. It isn't uncommon for medical personnel to decide on the spot when to and not to listen to someone with a medical power of attorney based upon how mentally competent the patient seems at the time on a decision-by-decision basis. For example, they might defer to the medical power of attorney agent when the patient is unconscious or heavily drugged, and listen to the patient when the patient is conscious, not drugged, and not acting erratically. Parents, incidentally, do not automatically have this authority, nor do spouses. A medical POA is a document that allows the agent to say "yes" when the patient (i.e. John Smith) cannot. Another name for a document that is very similar and sometimes used is a "health care proxy." It would typically cost a few hundred dollars to $1,000 to have a medical power of attorney drawn up after discussing the situation and the principal's needs in a meeting with a lawyer and might take an initial meeting and then a second one at which the document is signed after it is prepared following the initial meeting. Other lawyers might manage this in a single meeting and draft it while you wait. If all you need is a power of attorney, don't be penny wise and pound foolish by doing it yourself, unless the form is provided to you by the health care provider you will spend most of your time dealing with and they prefer their own form. Otherwise, the likelihood that you will have to pay more to a lawyer later cleaning up your own mistakes probably exceeds any money that you will save. Other Kinds Of Authorizations Many medical providers will allow someone to act on behalf of a patient in matters other than matters that call for the kind of medical decision that would normally require the informed consent of the patient, even when the patient is not manifestly incapable of making medical decisions at that very moment. This could simply be a note in the file that the patient has given that person authority to do so, it could be a written authorization to access HIPAA protected personal health information of the patient, and it could be a variety of other things (e.g., authority to make financial arrangements). Some of this is often incorporated in the same document as a medical POA. Picking Up Controlled Substances A Medical POA may, or may not, necessarily be sufficient to authorize someone to pick up a controlled substance on behalf of a patient if the patient is physically able to do so, without the presence of the patient. I don't know what the true rule of law under the controlled substances acts and pharmacy regulation is, but I do know that practice in real life varies quite a bit. The best practical solution to the issue of picking up controlled substances would be to ask the usual pharmacist what they require and to comply. (A legal guardian would generally have the power to pick up controlled substances for a ward.) Guardianships and Limited Guardianships What Is a Guardianship? A guardian of the person is someone appointed by a court who has the authority to make medical decisions and other personal life decisions for their ward (i.e. John Smith), even contrary to their apparent stated wishes. A guardian has the authority to say "yes" and also to say "no" to the expressed wishes of the ward, overruling the ward. A guardianship of an adult can be general, or can be limited on a customized basis. A guardian must be appointed by a court with jurisdiction over these cases, usually in the county where the ward resides. But, a guardianship can be requested by the ward as opposed to contested. Realistically, a court would be unlikely to grant a full guardianship or a contested guardianship in these circumstances, but might grant a limited guardianship with the consent of the ward in these circumstances. The parents and possibly any siblings, would have a right to notice of the proceedings and to object or to seek to be appointed instead. What Process Is Involved In Having a Guardian Appointed? This would realistically be a proceeding that should ideally involve a specialist lawyer (with experience in mental health or elder law and guardianships) and at least one medical professional's statement (probably a treating psychiatrist or psychologist). There would also probably be a court investigator or guardian ad litem appointed at the ward's expense, to confirm that the facts represented in the petition to have a guardian appointed really reflect the ward's intent. Usually, a proposed guardian selected by the adult ward during a lucid interval would have priority for appointment. The medical professional and lawyer should be able to provide good suggestions regarding what the scope of the limited guardianship needs to be, although don't ignore or fail to give full credit to your own layperson's practical understanding of the situation either. The guardian would have to provide information to the court in connection with the petition showing eligibility to serve (e.g. criminal record check, credit check, CV, nomination by ward). Often the guardian would have to demonstrate good intentions towards the ward in some way, especially if the guardian is a third party and not someone who serves as a guardian as a livelihood. Some courts would require the guardian to have insurance for liability in connection with the task or a surety bond up to some dollar amount. The final decision would usually be made in an in-person hearing at which the ward, the proposed guardian, the proposed guardian's lawyer, the medical professional, the guardian ad litem or investigator, the judge, a court clerk, a court reporter, and any family members who chose to appear (with their lawyers, if any), were present. If the guardianship was granted, perhaps with modifications requested by the judge to the terms of the guardianship, then the Court would issue what are called "Letters" that formally appoint the guardian to the post. Once appointed, the guardian would have to file periodic status reports with the court and would also be subject to the court's jurisdiction in the event of any future dispute regarding the guardianship, or any allegations of misconduct by the guardian, or any circumstance that requires court approval such as a change in the terms of the guardianship or in the person serving as guardian. The procedural details I am describing are approximate and aren't necessarily up-to-the minute correct, and might vary somewhat even from court to court within California under local rules and customs of practice; but they give you a gist of what the process would be like if it is working properly and with best practices. Typically, this might cost $3,000 to $10,000 all in for an uncontested proceeding, and many times that much in the event of a contested attempt to have a guardian appointed. Health Insurance Eligibility I'll defer to someone else's answer regarding health insurance eligibility, as I don't have time to look into that at the moment. My instinct is that this wouldn't be a problem in any case except a guardianship and probably wouldn't be a problem even in a case with a third party guardian, but I can't confirm that without doing research. | What should I do? Don't get intimidated, don't sign/accept/submit to his "agreement" now that you are securing employment elsewhere, and make sure that henceforth all your communications with the CEO & his startup be --or continue to be-- in writing. The CEO's attempt to be reimbursed is pure non-sense because hitherto there is no mutually agreed clause between you two to that effect. Generally speaking, compensation is for the professional's work, not for his employment spanning "n" pay periods. Having there been no employment/founders agreement of any type, he will be unable to prove that this was agreed any differently in your case. Furthermore, the CEO's threat to seek reimbursement of your earned compensation unless you submit to his "mutual" agreement not only amounts to extortion, but it also reflects his cluelessness about contract law. For instance, that contracts which are signed under hardship or duress are voidable. By contrast, submitting to his conditions will needlessly impose on you the burden of proving duress once you decide the situation is unsustainable. This is in addition to the legal weight with which your acceptance and subsequent conduct would support the CEO's allegation(s) that you two have "at all times" been in a cognizable contractual relation. Being realistic, it is highly doubtful that a startup which pays you weeks late is able --or even willing-- to spend money on a lawyer for nonsense like this. | My understanding of contract law is the original fees are implied if no new explicit agreement is signed and therefore the invoice amount should be $1,000. Is that correct? No. At the outset, the presumption that the price would be equal to that of filings covered in the engagement letter is inaccurate. The actual terms of the engagement letter might support a different conclusion, though, which is why I asked about them. The offer in the engagement letter seems to be just a marketing practice, and as such it is neither uncommon nor unlawful. The rationale for that marketing practice is that offering [in this case] the first two tax filings at a lower price is likelier to persuade new customers to try the services the company provides. Thereafter, those customers will be billed what the company would call a normal or ordinary price. Statutory law does not provide specific constraints to how greater the ordinary price. But the details would help ascertain whether an excessive, unannounced increase amounts to what is known as unfair and misleading practices or otherwise contravenes consumer protection laws. These laws vary by jurisdiction and might or might not defeat the argument that the customer bears the risk of mistake. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §154(b). | Not in jurisdictions I am familiar with. A "Power of attorney" is a power to act as an attorney-in-fact, not to act as an attorney-at-law. A layperson practicing law for someone other than herself is usually the unauthorized practice of law and is illegal in most jurisdictions. It would be permissible if a jurisdiction carved out an exception for a particular kind of case, but they generally don't and are very unlikely to do so in a criminal case. For example, in Washington State "Limited Practice Officers" can assist people with one of a very limited set of civil legal forms that do not need modification. There may be some exceptions, but they would be more likely to occur before a matter becomes criminal. For example, the accountant who represents a taxpayer before the IRS, or the agent who files a form containing perjury to a federal agency like the post office or homeland security on your behalf. So it is very unlikely, but if it is important to you you can ask someone familiar with your kind of case in your jurisdiction. | There is a firm difference between giving advice on "what the best decision is likely to be" and "what decision to make". The former is what lawyers must do, which comes from: Conduct and Client Care Rules: Whatever legal services your lawyer is providing, he or she must— discuss with you your objectives and how they should best be achieved: give you clear information and advice: Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006: legal work includes— advice in relation to any legal or equitable rights or obligations: So, there is nothing in the law that requires lawyers to advise you on "what decision to make". Instead, they explain to you the range of possible decisions and what ramifications / implications / consequences they have. They won't make the choice for you — it's always yours. Is it legally correct that a lawyer is not permitted to provide advice on what decision to make It is not strictly true that a lawyer "is not permitted". Rather, they are not obliged to do so. And they have a damn good reason not to: there is a huge difference between being responsible for legal facts based on which you make decisions, and being responsible for decisions themselves. | Attorney-Client privilege is a one-way duty: The Attorney has to maintain protected information in confidence. It's a professional duty supported in law. There is no corresponding duty for the Client to maintain anything in confidence. The client can waive the privilege at will. Some sample limitations to waivers are governed by Federal Rule Evidence 502. (Granted, in this scenario the concerned board member may be bound by some confidentiality agreement or fiduciary obligation as a consequence of service on the board, or membership in the association, but that's a different matter.) The ABA points out , in its article "How to Lose Attorney-Client Privilege" that: Either voluntary or inadvertent disclosure to outside or non-covered recipients, professional advisors outside the privilege, and experts and consultants, can result in waiver as a matter of law. In this "Ten Things" article the author points out: Business advice, however, is never privileged and – for in-house counsel in particular – the line between the two can appear blurry. ... If a document that is otherwise privileged is shared with third parties, then the privilege is lost. ... A common misperception among the business is that all confidential information is privileged or if they label the communication as privileged they can keep the documents out of the hands of third parties. As we’ve seen, this is not correct and the fact that there is a non-disclosure agreement or other type of confidentiality agreement in place will not make a document privileged nor will it preserve the privilege if it is disclosed to a third party. |
Would someone actually sue me for attributing them? Imagine my goal were to openly copy copyrighted work in a perfectly legal way. Sometimes people go to court to debate whether someone copied part of a work or made it from scratch. We'll assume I copy part of a copyrighted work. I'm told by @K-C that given several conditions anyone can openly make and use modifications of a part of a copyrighted work. Based on an answer to a previous question, Here are the conditions: I can use part of a copyrighted image given one of two conditions I've only taken an insubstantial portion of the copyrighted image This insubstantial portion is not the "heart" of the image User @K-C cites Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises (1985) My new work is a substantial transformation from the original The idea or the expression could be substantially different User @K-C cites Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s (1977) Here's my example: So I take an insubstantial three pixels from a Mario Sprite, and I make a substantial transformation on the cropped pixels. This is the safest example imaginable. I refuse to believe that Nintendo could legitimately have grounds to claim copyright infringement if I take three pixels from their character and use those NINE BYTES(note) of information to make my own icon. Now imagine I use the three slanted stripes above as the logo for my company. It seems from what I have learned so far that this informal disclaimer would do nothing at all but invite lawsuits: The colors in my logo are from a sample of a 1985 sprite owned by Nintendo. If I had given no such disclaimer, no one would have ever suspected that the colors in my logo were copied from a Mario sprite. Here are my questions: As soon as I make it known that a logo came from a tiny part of an image owned by someone else, is it possible that the company who owns that image would have any stronger basis for a lawsuit? Would I be less legally protected making the truth public than I would be if I just deceptively allow people to assume I imagined those three colors from no identifiable source of inspiration? | Admission of copying proves one of the elements that the plaintiffs would normally need to prove in an infringement suit, making a law suit less risky from their perspective. This may very well invite lawsuits that would otherwise not be filed. But, this is pure speculation. Your legal rights are the same, independent of how much you choose to reveal in advance of a lawsuit. If your copying doesn't amount to a substantial taking, then it isn't infringement, whether you admit to copying or not. | Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display. | Monopoly is a trademark of Parker Brothers. You would need to get permission to use that trademark. The artwork of the game is copyrighted and cannot be duplicated without violating that copyright. In general, the labels meaning phrases like "Go to Jail" and "New York Avenue" are probably copyrighted and some court decisions have decided that labels are a copyrightable element. However, there is some gray area. The game mechanics are not copyrightable and can be duplicated. What this means is that if you clone the game and use new labels (like new property names and card titles) then you are probably fine. You would have to make a novel board design. If you clone the game, but use the game's labels, then you could potentially lose in court. Of course, remember that corporations will sometimes sue just to intimidate people, even if they have a losing case. Just because your clone is non-infringing doesn't mean they won't sue you. It costs them money to sue people, so if your clone is obscure or not used by many people it could fly under the radar and be ignored by the company. If your clone was a success and became widely used, that would significantly increase the chance you could get sued. In most cases a company will threaten infringers before they sue them, because it is a lot cheaper to threaten somebody than sue them. Therefore, you could make your clone and just plan on discontinuing it if they threaten you. Of course, there is a small risk they would sue you anyway. If you made no money then you are probably safe because it would be a lot harder for them to argue that you commercially damaged them if you made no money. | First I should point out that the Google question is about a different situation, the "snippet" issue where a tiny part of a web page is redistributed, where the issue of resolved in the US by appeal to the "fair use" defense. The proposed scenario as written here is broader since it would go beyond a couple of lines, and goes up to the limit of copy an entire web page. That is copyright infringement, with or without an associated link. Copyright protection is not just about attribution, it is about control. If you can limit your copying appropriately, you may survive under a fair use analysis; but you need to hire a lawyer with experience in copyright litigation to vet your notions of what is "a small amount" etc. | The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed. | To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law. | The film you want to base your game on is probably covered by copyright and likely trademarks. For purposes of the question I'll assume it's not in the public domain (if the film was made before 1926 for example). If you used the film to create your game, it would be a derivative work. Derivative works require the consent of the copyright owner. Distributing it without their permission would leave you open to lawsuits for copyright infringement, unjust enrichment, and possibly others. Fair use/fair dealing likely doesn't apply here. This isn't criticism, parody, or a transformative use. You may be able to get away with this by flying under the radar if you don't distribute it for profit or on any large scale. Some studios are more litigious than others and some accept that leaving fan works alone is better than the bad publicity that comes with shutting them down. However, this is entirely reliant on the goodwill of the studio. The legal way to do this is to get in touch with the copyright holder and ask permission. This may be in return for something else- usually money, royalties, and/or some creative control over your work. This may not be feasible though as a large company may simply ignore such requests from random people. Note that a lack of a response in this case is not permission. | Copyrights protect the mark as is, and derivatives of it, but does not protect the brand from look a likes or from new trademarks that would be confusing. Consider the Pepsi logo: I could easily draw a circle half red and half blue with a white line straight across, vertically, or diagonally. In fact: © 2018 A. K. all rights reserved. There it is my new logo for my cola company called Hep-C (I'm raising awareness). Under copyright law Pepsi could not come after me because the logo is my own creation. I could even call it Pepsi and it would not be a copyright violation as you cannot copyright words. However, Pepsi has better lawyers than that and with my trademark so similar to theirs and the name sounding so similar (and my new name being potentially disparaging to Pepsi) it would likely confuse consumers between what was Pepsi and what was Hep-C thus under trademark law it would be disallowed for commerce. Now you would have common law trademark protection by virtue of using your mark in commerce, but it would only be for the states in which you used it. Additionally a lack of a registered trademark would disallow you from seeking statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117. |
Are orders to be followed only to the extent practical and doable? If a competent authority issues an order that is (technically or financially or economically or legally) infeasible or absolutely impossible does an organization have to follow it? For example if a party A maintains a document that is requested by order under a law, but the document belongs to party B and is stored in a way only accessible to B following contract or industry standards? | There are two kinds of competent authorities: courts, and government enforcement agencies (tax offices, building inspectors, etc.). A court might order X to do something if Y petitions, but X is notified of the proceeding to which they are a party, and X will (should) object to the petition on the grounds that the petitioned relief is impossible or imposes an extreme burden on them. If, having objected that it is impossible to comply the court still orders you to do the impossible, you have to appeal the ruling. Ultimately the Supreme Court may order you to squeeze blood from a stone, and there is nothing practical that you can do – you must do the impossible, or suffer the consequences. However, courts do not order people to squeeze blood from a stone. A government agency may make such a demand, with minimal opportunity for you to object. Your recourse is very similar to the case where a party petitions the court to order you to do something. A law may exist whereby an agency is authorized to "order" a person to act in a certain way: there may be a requirement for a hearing, or you may have to sue the agency to overrule their demand. It is possible that you can appeal agency-internally that it is impossible, or too burdensome, to comply, or you may have to make that argument in court. It is usually best to persuade the agency that they are asking the impossible, since the courts tend to defer to government agencies that issue orders, unless your case is particularly egregious. "It would be inconvenient for us" is generally not a viable defense. The general rule is, you must follow the law, period. | Not for normal correspondence There are laws that require a specified channel of communication for specific purposes such as a physical address for the service of legal notices, but there is no general requirement. How, or if, a company communicates with its customers about complaints will either be specified in the contract or up to the company to determine and advertise. For example, this site specifies “ will be deemed to have been duly given when received, if personally delivered or sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested; when receipt is electronically confirmed, if transmitted by facsimile or e-mail; or the day after it is sent, if sent for next day delivery by recognized overnight delivery service” - any other method of delivery (Whatsapp, Facebook, even their own chatrooms etc.) is not a valid method of service, if you use those methods, then legally, you have not communicated. So, if the company requires complaints to deal with by online chat, they can safely ignore any letter or email you might send them. | Everything is allowed unless the law says it isn’t Common law systems like the USA are ‘exceptions based’ - the law permits everything except what it prohibits. So, your question is backwards - rather than looking for laws that allow it, you need to look for laws that prohibit, restrict or regulate it. There are laws that regulate this but none that prohibit it. | should you tell the third party to sign it using the standards of the U.S.? In most cases signing a contract is not subject to country-specific standards. All that matters is that it can be ascertained from the contract who the parties are as well as and their willful, informed formation of that contract. It is more typical for a contract to specify that it is governed by the laws of country X and/or jurisdiction Y. That places on the counterparty(-ies) the burden of ensuring that they know the legal framework that underlies the contract at issue. Lastly, note that a party entering a contract is "by definition" not a third party. At most, a third party might sign a contract in a witness capacity, not than in the capacity that implicates rights and duties pursuant to that contract. | From point 4: transferring all rights and obligations of Company A to Company B Among those rights and obligations are the rights and obligations arising from Company A's agreement with Employee. Employee is therefore still subject to the agreement, which is enforceable by Company B. If the agreement is carefully drafted, it will make explicit mention of Company A's "successors in interest" or some similar phrase or phrases. Even if there is no mention, the rights and obligations associated with this agreement will transfer (perhaps unless the agreement explicitly provides that they will not, but, let's be realistic, of course it does not so provide). | The executive branch of the US government, or specific parts of it, can demand that a person do particular things, when a statute has authorized such a demand. Such demands are not usually made at the level of the President of the United States, but the president could order a specific official to take such action. For example a National Security Letter orders a person to turn over specific information, and not tell anyone about doing so, as described in this article from The New Yorker. 50 USC 3162 provides that: (a) Generally (1) Any authorized investigative agency may request from any financial agency, financial institution, or holding company, or from any consumer reporting agency, such financial records, other financial information, and consumer reports as may be necessary in order to conduct any authorized law enforcement investigation, counterintelligence inquiry, or security determination. Any authorized investigative agency may also request records maintained by any commercial entity within the United States pertaining to travel by an employee in the executive branch of Government outside the United States. ... (2) Requests may be made under this section where— ... (B) (i) there are reasonable grounds to believe, based on credible information, that the person is, or may be, disclosing classified information in an unauthorized manner to a foreign power or agent of a foreign power; (ii) information the employing agency deems credible indicates the person has incurred excessive indebtedness or has acquired a level of affluence which cannot be explained by other information known to the agency; or (iii) circumstances indicate the person had the capability and opportunity to disclose classified information which is known to have been lost or compromised to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. "authorized investigative agency" is defined as: an agency authorized by law or regulation to conduct a counterintelligence investigation or investigations of persons who are proposed for access to classified information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such information; Accordingn to this ACLU page: In April 2007, the ACLU filed a FOIA request seeking information about the Department of Defense and CIA's use of National Security Letters. After filing a lawsuit, the ACLU received over 500 documents from its request. According to this ACLU page: An ACLU lawsuit revealed that the CIA has also used National Security Letters to demand Americans' personal financial records without prior court approval. The CIA has acknowledged using National Security Letters "on a limited basis" to obtain financial information from U.S. companies. According nto this NY Times article from Jan 13 2007: The C.I.A. has also been issuing what are known as national security letters to gain access to financial records from American companies, though it has done so only rarely, intelligence officials say. There are other circumstances in which an executive branch government official may order a private citizen to take specific action. Indeed, this happens in almost every case of a police arrest, except those done by an arrest warrant (which is a court order). During the Korean War, President Truman issued an order seizing a number of steel mills, to be operated by the government, in order to stop a strike which was, he said, impeding the military effort and thus the security of the United States. This order was challenged in the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) and was overturned on the ground that the President was not only not-authorized by any law, but had failed to follow the provisions of a law dealing with situations of the kind at issue. In that case the Court made it clear that such a seizure would have been permitted if done in conformance with a statute, and might have been permitted had no law dealt with such cases. | At this point, since it's been more than four weeks since the order was issued, you are able to enforce the order. The delay is just to allow appeals or corrections. It is up to you to arrange enforcement, so at a high level your choices are to do nothing, or to proceed. If you do nothing then you will not get any money. If you proceed then you will spend more money, which you may or may not get back, as with the original sum. The Scottish procedure is conceptually similar to the English one that is more normally described in online resources, but the words are different. To decode things a bit, You are now trying to proceed with "diligence", which means enforcing the court order. The court itself is not involved, having moved on to other things. There are several ways the money could come to you, such as "arrestment", "attachment" and "inhibition". Or, X might give you the money voluntarily. The next steps must be taken by a "sheriff officer" on your instruction. Despite the name being similar to "sheriff" as in "Sheriff Court", these officers are private practitioners who are licensed by the courts to pursue debtors. You can use https://smaso.org.uk to find a sheriff officer you like. Most likely you will be able to give them all the information online. Then, they will go ahead with the first step, formally serving a "charge for payment" on X. Then, X has 14 days to come up with the money; if they don't, then the sheriff officer can proceed with more drastic steps. They will be able to advise based on the particular circumstances, but some broad possibilities are "arrestment" of X's money directly from their bank, or "attachment", which is seizure of X's property to be auctioned off. If X is an employed person (rather than a business, say) then you might also arrange "arrestment of earnings" whereby the employer diverts a sum from X's pay to you, for whatever necessary period of time. All these come with their own rules and timescales, including processes if X's bank or employer does not comply. The sheriff officer will have to be paid for all this. The usual way is that you pay them up-front, and then that fee can be added to the diligence. All officers charge the same rates, but the fee schedule is a bit complicated depending on exactly which services are involved, how long it takes the officer to do the work, and their travel time. It is up to you to make the decisions about how much you want to spend in pursuit of the money, also taking into account the likelihood that you will actually get it. For the sheriff officer, since this is a completely routine part of the job, they will be able to give you their impression of the range of outcomes based on the specifics of X's situation. | The internal organizational documents and practices of the company would determine this in terms of actual authority and would vary from company to company even within the same jurisdiction of organization and entity type. For example, one company might give that authority to the general counsel, another to the corporate secretary, a third to the Vice President for Information Technology, and a fourth to their Chief Innovation Officer, yet another might allow any officer of the company to do so, or might allow any employee of the company to do so. Usually, the more often a company does something and the more routine it is to do that, the lower down in the organization the authority is allocated. Anyone who appeared to have the authority to do so to a reasonably third-party, however, could bind the company even if they didn't actually have the authority to do so. |
Can you take decisions of mental health tribunals to the High Court or the Court of Appeal in the UK? My Legal Skills book by Stefan Fafinski and Emily Finch, says it's possible to take decisions based on tribunals for: immigration, social security, child support, pension, tax, and land to: High Court: Administrative Court Court of Appeal: Civil Division I was wondering does this include mental health tribunals, possibly under the social security banner? | The first venue for an appeal from the Mental Health Tribunal is the Upper Tribunal in the Administrative Court. | This would be virtually impossible to do from scratch. If you had the guidance of someone who successfully pursued a similar legal action it might be possible. In theory you should be able to pursue grievances in court by becoming well versed in the applicable laws and rules, having impeccable attention to detail, exceptional deductive and writing skills, and getting lucky enough to run your filings through patient clerks who will tell you every time you're missing something or doing something wrong. New York Courts even offer this encouraging CourtHelp website for pro se guidance on common actions. But if you really want to attempt a pro se civil action, especially against a government entity, or other entity with essentially unlimited legal funds, you not only need all of the above but also some sort of assistance from somebody who knows the system. I would spend as much time looking for sympathetic advocacy groups and lawyers offering pro bono service as I would reading relevant law and procedure. (One more thing: The word "quick" is never used in conjunction with formal legal actions, except in jest ;) | Judges and justices can file lawsuits like anyone else, but ordinarily the judges who are colleagues of the judge or justice would recuse themselves and it would be assigned to another venue at trial (in the case of a trial court judge), and on appeal would be assigned to judges who don't have a personal relationship with the judge (possibly sitting by assignment from another appellate jurisdiction or by senior judges who weren't on the bench when this judge was on the bench). A U.S. Supreme Court justice's suit would not be considered recusal worth by an unfamiliar lower court judge who is only theoretically in the jurisdiction of the justice and no suit by a U.S. Supreme Court justice has ever been deemed cert worthy. If it did reach the U.S. Supreme Court, the Justice would be expected to, but not required in any enforceable way, to recuse from hearing the case. | I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case. | There is a clinical difference between insane and mentally ill. An insane person is "so irrational in their behavior, or so unable to control it - so unlike 'us'" that they are not criminally liable (from earlier in the chapter). Mental illness is "substantial disorder of thought or mood that substantially impairs judgement ..." (from near your link). Clearly this is a subtle clinical distinction and will hinge on the expert evidence and the applicable law. | Generally speaking, a decision from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is binding only in the District of Columbia. Courts of other jurisdictions are not required to adhere to its decisions. If the issue came up again in Virginia or Maryland, courts there would have no obligation to follow it. Virginia tort law is different from D.C. tort law, so Virginia courts would need to determine whether their law is different on this particular point. | Yes, this has come before the Court. Some prominent examples are - Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium (1987), the first time Article 3 was before the European Court of Human Rights, on the complex Belgian system of balancing French-speaking and Dutch-speaking electoral institutions Matthews v United Kingdom (1999), on whether people in Gibraltar should be able to vote in elections to the European Parliament Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (2005), on whether the UK could have a blanket ban on voting applicable to all prisoners Riza and others v Bulgaria (2015), on selective interference with the electoral count In all but the first of these, the Court found a violation of Article 3 of the Protocol. At other times, it has given deference to a State's particular processes, or ruled that a complaint was inadmissible because it did not pertain to the covered type of election. You may be interested to read the Court's guide to its case-law on the topic (a 34-page PDF) which includes many more citations, and an explanation of the legal reasoning involved. | If this judge is truly biased, won't the litigants be all the more glad to have a jury of their peers? You are proposing to abandon your duty to others. At trial you serve the community, not the judge. Back on scope for Law SE: If you refuse to serve on a jury, that could be a separate offense or general criminal contempt, for which you (this all depends on your jurisdiction) could get 30-90 days in jail. Edit: like several others have pointed out, I would not expect much trouble if you politely told the court that you felt you would be biased b/c of past connections. Even if the judge doesn't dismiss you, one of the litigants is likely to strike you. P.S. In most states, no one except a prosecutor (sometimes another state employee) can "take someone" to a criminal court. Individuals can only take someone to civil trial, where one cannot be sentenced, only ordered to pay a judgement. |
How far can the meanings of commonly used words be redefined by a legislature? Most people understand "operating a motor vehicle" as driving, until they are arrested for DUI while sleeping off in their turned off car. Most people understand "loaded weapon" as a gun with bullets in it, until they are charged in NYC with possession of a loaded firearm despite having the gun and the bullets in separate locked containers. How far can such redefinitions of common words divert from the common usage? | As much as they like Most pieces of legislation have a “dictionary” detailing, for the purposes of that legislation (or generally) what specific words and phrases mean. This can broaden (or narrow) the definition compared to how they are used in normal English. The purpose of this is not to set a trap for the unwary, although this may happen, but to introduce precision and to allow a short defined term to be used in the drafting rather than having to explain what is meant verbosely every time it’s used. Of course, they can’t redefine terms so that they give themselves jurisdiction when they otherwise wouldn’t have it. For example, in australia, the Constitution gives the Federal Parliament the power to make laws about, among other things, “external affairs”. A law that tried to define “external affairs” more broadly than the Constitution does (which it doesn’t, so we fall back on what it means in English) would be invalid. | The general story is that one state does not have jurisdiction over an act carried out in another state. The Wiki on state gun laws claims that ownership in Illinois requires a permit, but the law is here, and in fact the law addresses possession and acquisition, but not ownership, for example 430 ILCS 65/2: No person may acquire or possess firearm ammunition within this State without having in his or her possession a Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued in his or her name by the Department of State Police under the provisions of this Act It is legally immaterial that the word "Owner" is in the name of the card. It is likewise claimed that Massachusetts requires a license to own a gun, but from what I can tell the requirements pertain to licenses to possess or purchase, and not just to own. So there seems to be no impediment to actual ownership in the US. | RS 14:95.2 applies to everyone, and defines a particular kind of crime. The housing contract overlaps that law in a small way: the legislature did not make it a crime for a student to possess a firearm in his dorm room. But the university makes it a lease condition, in the same way that having a pet is not a crime, but is grounds for terminating the lease. | In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect. | This ultimately is a matter of Statutory Interpretation. One of the principles of statutory interpretation is that all words are interpreted in their context. For your example, that means we look at the title of 1464, "Broadcasting obscene language". From this it becomes apparent that radio is used in its common meaning of AM and FM radio broadcasts. Statutory interpretation is broader than that single rule, though. Legislative intent is another important factor, and that is rather effective in eliminating absurd arguments. Via the link above, from New Mexico's State Court: words have their ordinary meaning "as long as the ordinary meaning does not render the statute's application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust." In other words, absurdity is so bad that the court will prefer an alternative interpretation of the offending words. | In this context, the phrase "use all means necessary and appropriate" should be viewed as a single phrase rather than words in isolation, and it essentially simply confers discretion on the President to decide what is necessary and appropriate, rather than being a limiting direction. The word "appropriate" is included in the phrase to avoid a crabbed construction of the word "necessary" to mean "only if absolutely necessary", and to instead mean "related to carrying out the objective" even if the means chosen are not actually the only way that the objective could be accomplished. It is a close relative of the constitutional grant to Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution to enact legislation "necessary and proper" to carry out the enumerated powers of Congress set forth in that section, and has a very similar meaning. Taken as a whole, the primary limitation imposed by "necessary and appropriate" it to prohibit the President from using this statute as a grant of authority to do something completely unrelated to getting someone out of International Criminal Court custody (e.g. providing disaster relief to fire victims in California, or ignoring an environmental regulation in connection with building a border wall with Canada). | The statute of limitations sets out the period of time after a crime has been within which formal criminal proceedings must be commenced. If the police or DA were to request and receive an arrest warrant that met the requirements of the Fourth Amendment then the person would be a fugitive and time spent as a fugitive does not count. From Groh v Ramirez: The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The requirement is that the person to be seized must be "particularly described" - that is unambiguously identified. A name will do that but so will a commonly used alias. | Generally, "yes", but it isn't a constitutional or federal right. It is a right that flows from the right of the owner of real property to determine who is allowed on real property, and the fact that generally speaking, a concealed weapon carrier isn't a protected class that cannot be discriminated against. Thus, while this is the default rule in the U.S. and the predominant rule in the U.S., a state has the authority to prohibit businesses that are otherwise "public accommodations" from discriminating against concealed weapon holders if a state wishes to do so. I wouldn't be surprised if there were some exceptions, either for all concealed weapon holders, or for some subclass of them (e.g. undercover police officers). For example, a law review note, a.k.a. student written law review article, cited in the comments notes that some states require a business owner to post a sign prohibiting concealed carry in order to have the right to remove someone from the premises of their business for this reason. |
Would Trump's defence work in other courts? Donald Trump's defence against incitement is essentially the ambiguity of his language: he never explicitly told the crowd to violently attack Congress, but he did use ambiguous words such as "fight", which many in the crowd understood as an instruction to do just that. This seems to me to be akin to a mafia don's method of ordering a hit: he uses ambiguous language such as "peacefully deal with the problem". Even if this is secretly recorded, in court his defence against a charge of soliciting murder is that he never actually gave any such order, and some overzealous underling misunderstood. In general, does such a thing work? How does the prosecution in such a case get over the hurdle of proving that an order was given when the language used is always couched in euphemistic codes? Edit in response to various comments and answers: I do not want answers that argue about the precise semantics of words like "fight". I'm interested in the legal principles used to resolve such ambiguities, not the particular ambiguities used by Trump in the lead-up to 6th January. | In all cases of speech in U.S. Jurisprudence, the speech uttered is presumed First Amendment Protected unless proven otherwise. Critical to this proof is the intent of the speaker and his/her word choice and usage. In order to prove that Trump uttered unprotected speech, the prosecution must show that the language was deliberately spoken by Trump to promote Imminent Lawless Action (Brandenberg v. Ohio). That means that not only must the actions come with a defined time of action, but it also means that you have to prove Mens Rea - that Trump knew in his mind at the time he spoke that the words would incite. Finally, you cannot cherry pick a quote but rather must view the totality of the events in question. Trump did make statements against violence prior to and following the speech in question, which suggests he was not advocating for violent actions taken that day. The word "fight" which does not always mean a violent. Miriam-Webster's definition of "to fight" is: 1 : to struggle in battle or in physical combat. 2 : to argue angrily : quarrel. 3 : to try hard While the first definition of the word does indicate physical violence, but the second and third are possible to do with no violence whatsoever. The concept of fighting for something is often used by people at constitutionally protected protests and gatherings and the use of the term has never been used to convict the speaker for the misinterpretation of the words by the person who hears them. If this were the case, you can expect the Beastie Boys to get slapped with criminal charges for their advocacy of fighting for the right to Party (incidentally, the song never once advocates for violence in the pursuit of wild teen parties... it's merely a list of the restrictions and hypocrisies of the rule makers and enforcers). What's more, Mafia Dons don't normally go down for specific instructions to "kill the mook" but rather for RICO charges. Their whole organization is corrupt and thus they can be held responsible for the corrupt actions of people in their chain of command in the organization. There has yet to be any evidence supporting that Trump knew and participated in the planning of the assault on Congress. Yes, there was planning prior to the events, which means people would have done this without Trump's speech... which means they were not instructed specifically by him at the time. Trump could have said something different and the results would be the same. On top of that... the violence at Congress was started during Trumps speech, not after it... and the place where the speech was given was far enough away from Capitol Hill that it would be difficult to argue that the first wave of rioters even heard the speech let alone were influenced by it. You can believe this was Trumps goal all you want, but the fact of the matter is the law says that Trump does not have to do anything to prove his intent. The burden of proof rests with he who doubts is enforce and in order to prove the speech was unprotected, you have to show clear evidence Trump did intend for the riot to happen. | The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate. | First, I don’t believe the author is using quotation marks to indicate an actual quotation, it is being used for emphasis and to group the words as a concept. That concept is that while it may seem undemocratic for a judge to overturn a law enacted by a democratically elected assembly, the “higher democracy” is that it protects the democratic institutions themselves by limiting the power of the legislature to what the higher law of a constitution allows. | Art. 19 of the Indian Constitution states that (1) All citizens shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression... from which is follows that you may advance any argument that you want in support of an idea. The courts have never questioned this. There is a potential grey area regarding verbal acts that cause the use of violence, but in terms of presenting reasons that such-and-such acts are good (or bad), that form of expression is absolutely protected. The grey area comes from clause 2: Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence whereby a law against inciting to violence might pass constitutional muster. "Justification" of an action is very different from "inciting" to do an act. | Maybe, but we'll probably never know for sure. Officially, of course, he was not punished for his speech. He was punished for selling explosives without a license, which he admitted to. (He was also charged with illegally storing explosives and illegally mailing 'injurious material," but those charges were dropped in exchange for his guilty plea on the first count.) Whether those charges were a pretext to retaliate is probably unknowable. While it's a well-known fact that law enforcement frequently retaliates against people for exercising their right to free speech, this guy's story doesn't sound very credible. There is precedent for a prosecution for distributing Pest Control Report 2000, including the prosecution of white supremacist Leo Felton, a sad-sack loser who used the same material to build a bomb around to incite a "racial holy war" the same time. And just about a month after Ver's conviction, the man who owned the company that manufactured the product was convicted of violating federal explosives and transportation laws. Several months after that, he and his company entered into a consent decree with the Consumer Product Safety Commission ordering them to stop manufacturing Pest Control Report 2000. | The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se. | E. Jean Carroll first sued Donald Trump in 2019 for defamation in connection with his statements in 2019 denying a prior assault upon her in the 1990s in response to her 2019 memoire asserted that he had done so in the 1990s. The statute of limitations in that case ran from the time that Trump made the statement. The first lawsuit is still pending because of issues over whether Presidential immunity from lawsuits applies to it: The Justice Department has argued Trump was acting as the president while responding to Carroll’s allegations and said the United States, rather than Trump himself, should be the defendant. If the courts agree, it would probably torpedo Carroll’s claim because the government cannot be sued for defamation. The issue remains unresolved. The D.C. Court of Appeals heard arguments on the case but essentially punted on the issue this month, sending it to another court. The criminal statute of limitations on this underlying conduct in the 1990s expired long before the lawsuit was filed. She did not press criminal charges at the time. Last year [i.e in 2022], Carroll filed a second lawsuit, this one accusing Trump of battery and defaming her again after he left office. That lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, is the one scheduled to go to trial on Tuesday [i.e. last week]. The suit was filed in November 2022 as a New York law known as the Adult Survivors Act took effect. That law allowed sexual assault victims to sue years later, which proponents said was necessary because it can take considerable time for survivors to feel ready to speak out. All of the factual statements in this answer, including all quotes material, are from an April 24, 2023 article in the Washington Post. As a practical matter, a final resolution of the second lawsuit will resolve essentially all issues in the first lawsuit except Presidential immunity (and arguably a slight amount of damages), under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (a.k.a. issue preclusion). A defense verdict from the jury in the pending case would render the Presidential immunity issue in the first case moot. Sources including this one have concluded that the Adult Survivors Act (ASA) is likely to withstand a constitutional challenge. This is because a similar law passed on 2019, the Child Victims Act (CVA), was upheld as constitutional. The ruling in the CVA cases, in turn, relied heavily on a 9-11 related statute of limitations revival act which was upheld by New York State's highest court in 2017: Shortly after the passage of the CVA, lawsuits were filed with the state and federal courts of New York arguing that the CVA was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. Decisions have been rendered in state and federal courts holding that the CVA was constitutional. Both courts relied on the legal standard enumerated by the In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 30 N.Y.3d 377, 400 (2017). which established that for a revival statute to be deemed constitutional under the Due Process Clause, there must exist an identifiable injustice that moved the Legislature to act," and second, "in each case, the Legislature's revival of the plaintiff's claims for a limited period of time was reasonable in light of that injustice." | You've basically described two of the ends of the pole in theories of jurisprudence (there are dozens of ends). There is no theory of law that relies purely on "spirit" (also no theory that actually relies on the letters uses=d in writing law), instead, everybody interprets the text (the words enacted by the government) and some people supplement their interpretation with consideration of "other factors", such as assumed legislative purpose. Certain scholars and judges are inclined to put most weight on the actual wording of the law, while others are inclined to let purposive considerations dictate the interpretation of a law. Interpreting law by W.N. Eskridge is an informative guide to supplementing a reading of the statute with anciliary considerations. Antonin Scalia is the best-known proponent of the textualist approach. |
Can cops turn their siren on with no warning? Okay so this just happened to me minutes ago,my mom was in the middle of a turn when a police car was coming head on, there was no indication or anything he was just driving like normal but before he got to the stop. Just about a little less than halfway he flipped on lights and his sirens no warning what do ever we had to slam on our brakes to avoid hitting him or vis versa. I was wondering if he could do something like that, I live in California and it happened in Modesto. I personally don't think he should've done that and that it was probably illegal for him to do so, it could've caused an accident. | Yes A police officer (or other emergency service driver) will turn their lights and siren on as soon as they have a need to do so. This may be in response to something they've seen or in response to an emergency call. Since you can't see and hear what they can see and hear this may seem sudden or arbitrary to you. Your obligations, as spelled out in the 2019 California Drivers Handbook (p. 74) are: Emergency Vehicles You must yield the right-of-way to any police vehicle, fire engine, ambulance, or other emergency vehicle using a siren and red lights. Drive to the right edge of the road and stop until the emergency vehicle(s) have passed. However, never stop in an intersection. If you are in an intersection when you see an emergency vehicle, continue through the intersection and then, drive to the right as soon as it is safe and stop. ... You have to get out of their way. However, they are still obliged to drive safely subject to the circumstances (e.g. that they are on the wrong side of the road traveling fast) and, in the event of a collision, you may not necessarily be at fault. | There isn't any indication in that news story that the disabled son was anywhere nearby. I agree the situation you describe sounds like a legitimate use of the placard, but it seems in this situation, the placard was being used in a manner totally unrelated to the transport of a disabled person. My guess is that the cops cited her because the son wasn't in the car, and was not inside the establishment at which she parked. California code has this to say: A person to whom a disabled person placard has been issued may permit another person to use the placard only while in the presence or reasonable proximity of the disabled person for the purpose of transporting the disabled person. So as long as the disabled person is within a "reasonable proximity", and the placard is being used to transport them, they do not have to be inside the car to make using the placard legitimate. In this case, the woman was just transporting herself and using the placard anyway, which is illegal. | if the child exchange time and locations are fixed, and the husband can no longer legally drive, does this effectively nullify his visitation rights? No. He can get a ride from someone or get an Uber or Lyft or Taxi or take a bus. The drop off location is near her house, not his, and even if public transportation were an option he would not be the type to use it. He's more the type that would ignore the suspension of his license and go pick up the kids in his car anyway. He is also the kind to try to attempt to manipulate the wife into doing what he wants regardless of what a court order says. Emotional abuse and manipulation were a big part of his game, but fortunately she has gotten much better at ignoring it. What he is inclined to do and why have nothing to do with whether or not it is legal. If he has his license revoked and attempts to pick up the children as always, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she allows him to pick up the kids? Practically speaking, no, particularly in light of a court order to transfer custody. Theoretically, it is remotely possible, even though it is very unlikely. In theory, she could be held liable for negligent child neglect by allowing this to happen, particularly if the children were then harmed in an automobile accident. If he was visibly drunk or intoxicated at the time of the transfer, however, her risk of criminal liability would be considerable. Would there be any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses to allow him to pick up the children himself with a suspended license/registration? Potentially, she could be held in contempt of court for refusing to follow a court order. Her better course would be to call the police when he arrived to report that he is driving with suspended license, to not transfer the children and wait until they arrive (seeking cover inside a home and advising the 911 operator again if the situation starts to escalate into a potentially violent situation), and to explain to the police that he is also attempting to endanger the children by trying to drive with them on a suspended license. There is a good chance that he would be arrested and that the police would leave her with the children. The police might, rather than arresting him, drive him home with the kids and tell him not to drive and cite him for driving with a suspended license. Then, she should make an emergency motion to the court, regardless of how it is resolved by the police, seeking permission to formally give her a right to refuse to transfer if he arrives unaccompanied with a suspended license. If he attempts to convince her to drop the kids off somewhere else (presumably at his house) due to the suspension of his license, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses? Probably not. This time he's not following the court order, not her. It would still be advisable for her to file an emergency motion with the court explaining the situation. | The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal. | The nuisance of potentially waiting for all the traffic on the main road is a notion alien to the law. Seeing the red light, y correctly does not enter the intersection, because it would block the intersection, § 11 Ⅰ StVO. Keeping intersections clear is a general consideration, say for emergency services. Nevertheless, if safely stopping required entering the intersection, it’s not an issue here, § 4 Ⅰ 2 StVO. Stopping before entering the intersection is not a hard requirement, because the traffic lights do not regulate the intersection but an “isolated” pedestrian crossing. § 37 Ⅱ StVO concerns traffic lights at intersections. x has to yield traffic as indicated by the sign, § 8 Ⅰ StVO. Making a U‑turn or right-hand turn would be no issue, since this would not interfere with traffic (assuming properly dimensioned streets). Going straight is permissible if done with caution, § 8 Ⅱ StVO, but I would not recommend that. y might decide any moment “Eff it! I’m taking B street [Am Falkplatz].” and boom! Going left, however, is not allowed, since x had to stop short of the traffic light, which is frowned upon (blocking the intersection), but moreover it would take y’s right of way. | UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence. | In New South Wales it is entirely legal to film police (or anyone else). However, as discussed (What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?) audio recording is more restricted: you must either have the permission of all the participants in a conversation or be a party to the conversation. I do not imagine the law is any different in Victoria. | let's look at the referenced Section 28085 ARTICLE 13. Theft Alarm System [28085- 28085.] ( Article 13 added by Stats. 1977, Ch. 993. ) 28085. Any motor vehicle may be equipped with a theft alarm system which flashes the lights of the vehicle, or sounds an audible signal, or both, and which operates as follows: (a) The system may flash any of the lights required or permitted on the vehicle. (b) The system may sound an audible signal. (c) No vehicle shall be equipped with a theft alarm system which emits the sound of a siren. (Amended by Stats. 1994, Ch. 516, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 1995.) This tells us what is allowable as a theft alert system. It may use sound(b) and turn the car into a goddamned Christmas tree(a), provided it is not: a siren sound(c) not audible(b) or a non-permitted light like Emergency Vehicle Lights(a). It does not regulate when it may fire, only that the sound alert has to be audible (preventing infrasonic make-your-ears-bleed or dog whistle sounds) and that the lights have to be an allowable part of the vehicle. So you could set the alert to honk or play imperial march or berate the wannabe thief or use painful loud music, all provided that it is audible and does not violate other laws. So, what is the correct operation of a car theft alert? Nothing in the article says, that you may just use the signals and honking for alerting in the case of theft, but that the system may use all the things in A and B under condition C to operate. Operation is "effect brought about in accordance with a definite plan". The definite plan for the alarm system is as follows: initialize alert the owner that it has correctly initialized wait for theft attempt or shutdown in case of theft: alarm everybody in case of shutdown: shutdown How the alertion and alarm are set up is up to the manufacturer's discretion, as long as the Article 13 is not breached. Example: My Ford Fiesta does a double-flash of the turn lights and a low key beep overpowered by the lock operation on locking and a single flash on unlocking. That is the factory setup (for my area) afaik. The manufacturer (or if I wanted to go to a car shop) could under Article 13 set the activation to trigger a short honk or any other audible to signal proper initialization as part of the normal operation. The failure of the sound coming after locking the car would alert me that something is amiss and it is not operating. The top 3 causes are most likely that the car key battery might be dead, a malfunction of the car alert or someone jamming the frequency of the key. As it is clearly part of the operation of the alert system, which is marked as a legal use of the horn of a car in Article 12 under Section 27001 b, yes, the alert may honk. INAL, so only my layman reading. |
Would I be violating copyright by transcribing music that was written over 100 years ago, but published in 1992? A particular set of piano rolls were recorded before 1913, but to my knowledge were not published until 1989. The recordings are piano transcriptions of symphonic works, performed by their composer/arranger. The symphonic works in question were published well before 1910 and are currently in public domain. I am interested in transcribing the rolls to study the arrangement techniques of the composer. I would be using this information to reconstruct his arrangements of other works, and am interested in publishing my findings as it's for a thesis project. If I were to refrain from publishing the direct transcriptions, and considering that the symphonic works are in public domain, would I be violating copyright by transcribing the rolls for study? Is it possible that the rolls could be considered public domain as they are arrangements of public domain works published postmortem? | First: the real answer to your questions is "consult your academic library staff." If this is for a thesis project, then you're presumably affiliated with a college or university, and the librarians at such institutions are used to helping sort out copyright claims and helping researchers obtain the necessary clearances. There are two questions you're asking, really. Are these works in the public domain? Possibly, but not for the reasons you think. In the US, copyright in unpublished works lasts for the life of the creator + 70 years. After that, they pass into the public domain. This means that if the composer/arranger died before 1919, then the works passed into the public domain before the formal publication in 1989, and they are still in the public domain now. However, if the creator died after 1919, then their 1989 publication effectively "resets the clock" on the copyright, and they will not come into the public domain until (according to the above link) 70 years after the death of the creator or 2048, whichever comes later. What doesn't matter is that the original symphonic works were in the public domain. Even if the 1812 Overture is in the public domain, I could write an arrangement of it for accordion quintet and I would have the exclusive right to publish it and profit from that arrangement for the standard term. In your case, if the work really is a straight transcription, it might not have a copyright; but if the work required some amount of creativity and artistic decision-making (which a piano transcription of a symphony certainly would) then the arrangement gets its own copyright when it's published. Can I make transcriptions of them if I don't publish them? Probably, but you should really consult your librarians. It's entirely possible that your proposed copying would fall under "fair use"; it would be for scholarship & research and you're not planning to include the transcriptions in your final published work. On the other hand, you're talking about effectively copying a substantial portion of a creative work that is still in print, which argues against fair use. Fair use rules are notoriously flexible/vague, and so it would be worthwhile to consult with an expert on the subject (i.e., your school's library staff.) | Yes The US constitution is in the public domain. Anyone may publish a version of it, including an altered version. No US law forbidding publication of an altered version would itself be constitutional -- the First Amendment would prevent such a law. However, if an altered version were sold under such conditions that a customer might reasonably believe it to be an unaltered version, that might be false advertising, or perhaps fraud, because the seller would be deceiving the customer as to what the product is. | Copyright law treats computer files containing text as "copies" and computer files containing sound as "phonorecords". Indeed it must, otherwise there would be no copyright protection for ebooks and for downloadable music. Thus, I would take 17 U.S. Code §121 to apply. The word "material" in copyright law has been held to include "stored in electronic form on any storage device" so that the key requirement for an initial copyright, that the work be "fixed in a tangible form" or "fixed in any tangible medium of expression" is satisfied by a computer file, see 17 USC 102 17 USC 121 reads: it is not an infringement of copyright for an authorized entity to reproduce or to distribute in the United States copies or phonorecords of a previously published literary work ... if such copies or phonorecords are reproduced or distributed in accessible formats exclusively for use by eligible persons. Note that the page "Copyright and Digital Files" describes computer files recorded in a computer or on disk as "copies" as in deed does 17 USC 117 This establishes that such files are copies, and thus consist of "materiel objects". The official US copyright office page on "Can I Use Someone Else's Work? Can Someone Else Use Mine?" reads: Whether or not a particular work is being made available under the authority of the copyright owner is a question of fact. But since any original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium (including a computer file) is protected by federal copyright law upon creation, in the absence of clear information to the contrary, most works may be assumed to be protected by federal copyright law. (emphasis added) Copyright Office Circular 1: "Copyright Basics" reads: A work is “fixed” when it is captured (either by or under the authority of an author) in a sufficiently permanent medium such that the work can be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a short time. A computer file is petty clearly "sufficiently permanent" for this purpose. Also consider Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc 886 F. 3d 1179 As this web page reports: In a 6-2 decision, the Supreme Court has ruled that Google's use of Oracle's software code in developing the Android operating system constituted a fair use under §107 of the Copyright Act. The use would not have been fair use unless the code was protected by copyright, and the code almost surely existed only in the form of computer files. Thus the US Supreme Court has treated computer files as "materiel objects" for purposes of copyright law. (Note also that the use was declared to be infringement unless fair use applied, which leads even more directly to the same conclusion.) | You don't need to "publish" your song to obtain copyright protection. Original works are protected by copyright at the instant they are fixed in a tangible medium. This means that if you type the lyrics, write an arrangement of notes, or record yourself playing the song, the song is copyrighted. | With respect to the Table of Contents - in the US: https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf What Is Not Protected by Copyright? Copyright does not protect • Ideas, procedures, methods, systems, processes, concepts, principles, or discoveries • Works that are not fixed in a tangible form (such as a choreographic work that has not been notated or recorded or an improvisational speech that has not been written down) • Titles, names, short phrases, and slogans • Familiar symbols or designs • Mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring • Mere listings of ingredients or contents For more information, see Works Not Protected by Copyright (Circular 33). In the UK (here) : Copyright protects only the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. For example, two artists may paint the same scene but portray them in ways that are slightly different, without infringing each other’s copyright. At the same time, the fact that the series Lost is copyright protected does not prevent you from writing a story about a number of people who are forced to live on a remote island after a plane crash. Taking inspiration from someone else’s work is therefore acceptable, but in order to have copyright in your work and avoid infringement you need to create something original by using your own skill, labour, judgement and effort. Using another’s work is copyright infringement when ‘the work as a whole or any substantial part of it’ has been copied. Unfortunately, the precise meaning of these concepts is defined on a case-by-case basis. In deciding cases like this, courts will weigh the potential impact upon the originator’s ability to market their work with the concern that other people should be able to use it in order to draw inspiration for future work. Now - just to dive a bit further in and have a thought experiment. Using those titles in your question as your titles, would be fairly anodyne and would likely NOT constitute a breach of copyright as they are merely describing what most study guides have at the beginning of their contents page! Substantial material has not been copied. However - if we engage our law heads and accept that this may not be a criminal issue, but rather a civil tort/wrong that could lead to a law suit if the book owner were to discover your copying of their exact titular layout in order to structure your course. If you made a full course, with say 50 topics that are mapped exactly to the same topics, in the same order - it could be argued by a lawyer that you are stealing someone's creative structuring of a study guide. They would then have to persuade the court that this was the case. You might argue that these topic headings were common to most study programmes for Python and represent fair communal use - see [here][2]. It is also hard to argue 'creativity' and expression in a fairly standard TOC page. There are exceptions to copyright in some educational circumstances ([here][3]). I would have said that a simple remedy would be to rename and restructure the titles as much as possible to prevent such a link from being made - thus showing you have put your own effort into constructing your own course outline. However you have also included "and the main ideas" - this might take us down another road entirely if you mean the main ideas from within the chapters themselves.... see [here][4]. When creating new work, it is natural to be inspired by the work of others. However, there is an important distinction between simply being inspired and unlawfully copying. In order not to infringe someone else’s copyright – meaning that you trespass on or otherwise interfere with their rights – you need to make sure that your work is substantially different to the work that inspires you. According to UK copyright law, your work is considered original – and thus protected by copyright – if you use your skill, labour, judgement and effort to create it. Using another’s work is copyright infringement when ‘the work as a whole or any substantial part of it’ has been copied. The meaning of ‘substantial’ changes is defined on a case-by-case basis. Usually the court focuses on the quality of the parts taken, not necessarily the amount, and the circumstances of each case. [2]: https://www.bl.uk/business-and-ip-centre/articles/fair-use-copyright-explained#:~:text=The%20concept%20of%20fair%20usage,s)%20or%20infringing%20their%20interest. [3]: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/375951/Education_and_Teaching.pdf [4]: https://www.copyrightuser.org/understand/rights-permissions/using-reusing/ | As for the subject matter (what can be protected), amplitude, frequency, harmonic pattern, duration etc. are all physical facts, and there is no protection for physical facts. The basic requirement is that the thing protected must be "creative". Once you have a creative composition (assuming it is a composition, where infringement is harder to establish), the question arises whether a particular other composition infringes, or is an independent creation deserving its own protection. Again, the law does not deal in technical acoustic properties, and "similarity" is dealt with in an essentially subjective manner. The find of fact, who is an ordinary observer, has to weight all of the evidence and decide whether there is substantial similarity (or striking similarity) which could be evidence of infringement (substantial similarity is not against the law, copyright infringement is). Both parties to the litigation will present testimony supporting their contention and refuting the others' contention. At some point, one side is likely to introduce expert testimony to the effect that there are only so many possible melodies, which if persuasive can overcome a feeling that two compositions are rather similar. The law only addresses the logic of that judgment, and not the scientific facts. For example, in the case of Testa v. Janssen, the legal premise is set doen that "proof of direct access is unnecessary where striking similarities between two works are present". HOw then do you know if there are striking similarities? To prove that similarities are striking, plaintiffs must demonstrate that "such similarities are of a kind that can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence, independent creation, or prior common source." Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (S.D.N.Y.1973) citing a previous ruling on that point. Ultimately, the courts cannot not dictate a scientific procedure for making that determination. | It's Problematic The castle is both copyright and trade mark of Disney. As a trade mark, you are not permitted to use it in a way that indicates that yours is a Disney product or affiliated with Disney - you are probably OK here. As a copyright, Disney has the exclusive right to make derivative works which is what your mosaic is. So, you either need Disney's permission or the work needs to fall under the fair use exemption. As a single domestic work which substantially changes the original it probably does but the only way to know for sure is get sued and win. If you go ahead I would ask your client to indemnify you, however, this is only effective to the extent that your client has the financial resources to defend the lawsuit or pay the damages. However, there is an alternative. The Cinderella Castle was inspired by real architecture, all of which is public domain. If you copy one of these castles (e.g. Neuschwanstein Castle) you have no issues with Disney and only a true fanatic would notice the difference. | As always, it is hard to prove a negative, but there is no copyright in a work that has not been fixed. Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression... (17 USC 102) Further, a fixation is only a fixation if it is "by or under the authority of the author" (17 USC 101). This post from an attorney at Vogels & Assoc. agrees that without fixation there is no copyright. Unauthorized fixation (the rogue audience filmer) and distribution of unauthorized fixations is prohibited: Whoever, without the consent of the performer or performers involved, knowingly and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain— (1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance in a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a performance from an unauthorized fixation; ... (18 USC 2319A, and see also 17 USC 1101) This is sometimes called a "fixation right" that performers own. It's also referred to as the "anti-bootlegging" statute. US v Moghadam calls this a quasi-copyright protection. To answer your question, where there is no fixation, there is no work to infringe, and whatever you would make wouldn't be a derivative work. Unauthorized fixation of the live performance is prohibited, and so is unauthorized distribution and reproduction of that unauthorized fixation. The performer doesn't get a real copyright in any element of the performance unless they fix it or authorize it to be fixed. Related Reading Hughes, Justin, Understanding (and Fixing) the Right of Fixation in Copyright Law (March 29, 2014). 62 J. Copyright Soc'y USA 385 (2015); Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2014-10. US v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) |
Is it a HIPAA violation to use a personal email to set up a medical billing account at work? This question from the workplace stackexchange asks: I recently resigned from my job ... in NY ... Now I am being asked to tell them all my usernames and passwords for websites I used for my job as a medical biller ie, insurance websites, Medicare, eligibility websites and so forth ... Do I have to give them this information? We don't have company email accounts. So I had to use my personal email to set them up. My response was that there were probably HIPAA violations involved in this, and she shouldn't give them any information without consulting a lawyer. I've gotten quite a bit of pushback on this of the "you're not answering the question asked" variety, with explanations of "frame challenges" and the like. But I was concerned that the OP was opening him/herself up to potential legal problems, so I thought I would ask on this site. I realize that there isn't enough information in the question to make a determination as to whether HIPAA violations exist, but does this question suggest that the company has some underlying issues with data security that could rise to the level of HIPAA violations? And could the OP be providing evidence of complicity (albeit unwitting complicity) in such by providing the usernames and passwords they request? And would it be a good idea for the OP to seek out legal advice before doing as the company asks? | HIPAA imposes obligations on some people, but not all people. In the case of security and privacy questions, you would consult 45 CFR Part 164. A patient's actions are not subject to government sanctions, so a patient can provide or decline to provide email addresses following their own judgment. A healthcare or insurance provider would be required to securely keep PII under wraps. The regulations also do not impose obligations on unknowing potentially involved third-parties, i.e. no obligation is imposed on Google to know that an individual is using a Gmail account to transmit PII-related information. The medical provider has an obligation to store and transmit such information securely, which would mean for example that they do not send insecure plain text emails saying "Sally Jones at 12345 67th Ave SW was treated for a loathsome disease, we're coding that as 0102, and we want $500". That obligation is passed on to employees via employment-contractual obligations, for example that may dictate what computer or software you can use to do the job. If the provider passes the buck to the employee (and I assume that the employee is just an employee), they have violated the security rule. In that case, they may be attempting to mitigate the consequences of their actions or at least check if there were identifiable violations of the privacy rule. In the scenario where SmithMed provides all of the infrastructure needed to bill insurance companies, it is not a HIPAA violation to inspect computer logs, email etc. to verify that the employee has been complying with security and privacy policies. It would likewise not be a HIPAA violation to inspect third-party accounts (Gmail etc) to determine whether there has been a security / privacy rule violation. That is as far as HIPAA takes you. Whether or not the ex-employee has an obligation to turn over their email account information is mostly determined by the employment contract, but it is highly unlikely that any such contract has a "gimme your personal email on termination" clause. It is not inconceivable that the employee negligently used their personal account rather than opening a new billing-job only account. Also depending on the email service provider, it may well be a violation of the terms of service to hand over your account information. (Instead, for a certain email provider, the company is expected to set up and pay for a company account). Those are considerations bearing on possible legal impediments to turning over the email information. Needless to say, don't share passwords etc. because that exposes you legally, but that is not about HIPAA. | Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual. | Could the GoDaddy employee self-phishing test constitute a breach of contract? No. There is no contract. It was only the announcement of a gift. That gift might have been unexpected, especially if no similar bonus was given in previous years. The employee's act of filling in his information does not seemingly amount to "consideration". Filling the data was portrayed as the step to facilitate the delivery of the bonus. Your description --or the article you shared-- has no indication that the employee's fill-in details were devised to benefit the company. Had the company's message been drafted in a way that qualifies it as an offer of contract, the description would be inconclusive because there are no details about: The exact URLs for "(Link for US)" and "(Link for EMEA)": If the URLs were an alteration of the company's domain, it would be unreasonable for the employee to presume that the offer was legitimate. What data the "failed" employees filled in: Being asked to provide information unrelated to the alleged bonus should have raised suspicions. The contents of the Security Awareness training and what alertness could be reasonably expected from the email recipients even if no training were provided. In the case of companies such as GoDaddy (being in the business of web domains and hosting), one would expect many of its employees (except janitors, etc.) to be more careful or judicious on matters of social engineering than in other industries with less exposure to Internet scams. | The tort for this kind of activity is called public disclosure of private facts, and almost every U.S. state recognizes that this tort is invalid under the First Amendment in the absence of a legal duty not to disclose of the type existing between an attorney and client, or a psychotherapist and a patient, or a contractual non-disclosure agreement, that does not exist between roommates. There is nothing illegal about your roommate's conduct. Your best move at this point is to take responsibility for your own conduct, to repent and to convince the world that you're doing your best to get on the straight and narrow going forward. If your former roommate insisted on payment for not disclosing the information, that would be extortion, but there is nothing wrong with going ahead and disseminating it without trying to obtain something of value from you for not doing so. | You violated Facebook's Terms of Service, and it's entirely within your contractual agreement with them for them to close your account. You agreed to abide by the contract you "clicked through" when you signed up and opened a Facebook account. They didn't break any laws when you broke your contract with them. You clearly broke the contract by violating the TOS. They are not breaking any laws by not restoring your account. What you see as the value of your personal or business data doesn't really mean anything; it was your choice to use Facebook in the first place, and your mistake to break the TOS. You could try hiring a lawyer to make a case that you see a difference between the personal data you want to retrieve and the business data that caused the violation, but that's up to you; Facebook is under no legal obligation (this could be different, according to your jurisdiction and national laws) to restore any or all access to your account or data, but it's possible they could be persuaded. | This notice has no legal power what so ever. This has been, and is being, used as a legal backup and a scare tactic. For the most part, if someone gets some sort of "sensitive" information in an email, and it was not intended for them - this notice will serve as a scare tactic to make people get rid of it because of the legal sound of the disclaimer. Also, the senders are preparing themselves for a legal battle by having the notice in email’s body. In case that the sender sent some “sensitive” data to the wrong recipient, they can be potentially held liable for privacy breach of information similar stuff. So, when they show up in court they can potentially use the argument that they did everything within their power to protect the information by adding the disclaimer and the fact that the privacy breach happened is due to a natural human error. Basically, there is no disclaimer that can protect against actual libelous or defamatory content. The most a disclaimer can accomplish in this respect is to reduce the responsibility of the company, since it can prove that the company has acted responsibly and done everything in its power to stop employees from committing these offenses. [1] If you as an employee of a company shared sensitive information or personal information by mistake, you, and the company are still liable for your own action. It can be argued in court that the recipient’s email was not verified, that a human error is not an excuse because the information could have been encrypted with a password, the information could have been transmitted via a phone call or in person, and a bunch of other excuses that will hold the company liable for damages. There is no legal doctrine or theory under which an email confidentiality disclaimer is enforceable in a circumstance like this. There is virtually no scholarly analysis of the impact of email disclaimers and very little analysis by non-scholars. One of the few authors who have commented on the subject suggests that the misconception that email disclaimers have validity may arise from the mistaken belief that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) somehow applies. Michael Santarcangelo, “Do Email Disclaimers Matter?,” Sec. Catalyst (Oct. 17, 2007). But, as this author points out, the ECPA prohibits only “intercepting” emails. Emails that arrive at their destination—even if the sender did not intend that destination—are not emails that have been intercepted in transit, and the ECPA is therefore inapplicable. In short, the ECPA is focused on the criminal intent of the interceptor, not the ability of the sender to execute his or her own intentions. With regard to communications with lawyers, the rules are a little different. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) states, “A lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.” It is noteworthy that the rule requires only notice and doesn’t require refraining from reading the document or prohibit other use of the document. And a number of states haven’t even adopted Rule 4.4(b), so there may not be a requirement even to notify the sender in certain states. Nonetheless, if a court is examining “fairness” in connection with waiver of privilege, a disclaimer on an email sent to a lawyer might help. [4] | It would merely be a "jerk move". HIPAA only applies to "covered entities": Healthcare Providers Health Plans Healthcare Clearing Houses (i.e. Paying for your health care) Business Associates of the Above) Source: CDC page on HIPAA | In the absence of a contractual agreement saying otherwise, the lawsuit would probably just be subject to normal rules of tort liability. In that case, the contractor would probably lose his case unless he could prove that the one worker infected another through an act of negligence or could otherwise prove that the infected worker knew he was infected and posed a risk to others. In the basic negligence situation, the contractor would likely rely on the general duty we all have to avoid creating unreasonable risks of injury to third parties, and he would need to argue that Worker A somehow breached that duty. Coming to work knowing you're infected would almost certainly satisfy that standard, but it might be enough to simply show that Worker A was at a large gathering of unmasked people whose vaccination status was unknown. From there, he would also need to prove that breaching that duty caused him some injury, presumably by infecting Workers B through M, causing a work slowdown, causing missed deadlines, causing late fees, etc. The contractor might also pursue a claim for reckless, rather than negligent, conduct, if Worker A knew he was infected and came to work just the same. Or he might pursue an intentional tort claim if there was some reason to believe that Worker A was actually trying to get other people sick, as opposed to just ignoring the fact that such a risk existed. As I understand it, several states have also passed laws limiting liability for exposure to COVID in the workplace, so it's possible that none of these claims would be viable, no matter how strong the evidence. |
Can an employee be penalized for missing work due to medical appointment? Can an employer discipline an employee for taking time off work for a medical appointment? What if the employee is still on the probation period? I won't get into specific details, but a somewhat urgent need for me to see a specialist came up and the soonest appointment he has conflicts with my work schedule. The manager is saying he cannot change the schedule. | BC employers are required to give workers three days of unpaid personal illness & injury leave per calendar year. However, this protection only applies to workers who have held a job for more than 90 days. If you have not held the job for that long, it does not appear that any protections apply to you. Note that (as of March 2021) there are separate rules concerning COVID-19 exposure & illness. There may also be protections that apply to you if you are a union member, or if you work in a federally regulated job (banks, national trucking companies, airlines, and some others.) | It is not illegal to treat the employees differently. As long as nobody is being paid for less than the time worked, this is legal. Treating employees differently because of protected characteristics is unlawful discrimination. However, the duration you have worked there is not a protected characteristic. It is perfectly legal for the employer not to mandate new employees clock in and out. It would even be legal (if not a great idea) to hire new employees for twice as much. | Provincial jurisdiction may need to be specified. But in general, assuming you are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, you can be terminated for any reason or even no reason, as long as the contract is followed, the actual or apparent reason is not discriminatory or otherwise illegal and the termination procedure meets the provincial employment standards. The labour law usually provide requirements for notice periods or severance pay (or both), unless there exists a just cause (e.g. extreme disregard of duty, theft, repeated insubordination, etc.; lack of funds on the part of the employer is not a just cause). shouldn't the employer be fully responsible for the salary coverage of his employee in the course of his contract? Yes, but the contract is saying it can be terminated under certain conditions, after which time you are no longer "in the course" of your contract. Termination due to lack of funds is usually not considered discriminatory or otherwise illegal. You remain entitled to wages for any period you have worked. Additionally, the employer needs to respect the required notice period or severance pay under the provincial employment standards related to termination with or without cause, regardless of the funding situation. | A company had me sign two conflicting documents about two years apart. Which one would apply? Possibly both because actually there is no conflict. What you describe does not reflect that these documents are incompatible or inconsistent. There is no indication that the second document impliedly or explicitly replaces the first one. The second document seems just redundant so far. Employees could likewise be required to sign a third document that only says "no drugs or alcohol on the job site on Wednesdays", and that does not mean that any previous documents they signed expire. | You identify basically two issues. Non-Responsiveness and Failing To Meet Deadlines One is that he's taking longer than planned to get your work done, and might have abandoned you. The sad but true reality is that lawyers frequently do get busy and sometimes fail to meet the deadlines that they have set for themselves. In this respect, the legal industry is a lot like the construction industry. Lawyers try to meet deadlines on time, and usually they do, but it isn't unusual at all for a lawyer to fall behind schedule in some of his cases. In part, this is because lawyers have little control over their own schedules because things can come up that suddenly require their total attention and get them off track on a regular basis. Sometimes, they have trouble getting back into the flow of work that they were before the interruption came up. Can I do anything else now? In that case, usually your best solution is to nag the lawyer regularly even to the extent that it is a little bit uncomfortable, but to demonstrate no hard feelings when he turns his attention back to your project. But, if he just totally abandons you, you need to find someone else to do the work and fire him. If he never contacts me and I find out next year that someone is doing exactly the same thing, can I sue him for the money I lost for not being able to complete this business? Realistically no. If he blows you off entirely you need to fire him and find someone else to do the work. You are very unlikely to be able to win compensation for him delaying the start of your business. These damages would usually be considered "too speculative" to allow for a recovery in a case like this one. Does he have some responsibility to do the work that we agreed to, or can he somehow talk his way out of it? He does have some responsibility to do the work. If he doesn't he has breached his contract with you and may owe you a refund of your fees. Truly abandoning a client and neglecting his or her case is also a violation of professional ethics. This is a pretty minor offense compared to the offenses involving idea theft if it happens in isolation, which might result in a minor slap on the wrist like a private reprimand that would be held against him if incidents like this surfaced again in the future. But, this routinely leads to an attorney being disbarred (often on an uncontested basis) if an attorney one day just stops working for almost all of his clients and walks away from his practice (often due to a psychological breakdown, despondency after a divorce or an affair, dementia, untreated mental health conditions, a personal tragedy in life such as the death of a spouse or a child, or substance abuse). There is a small but persistent trickle of cases with that fact pattern. It is hard to know from the perspective of an individual client if he just got busy and overlooked a case or two including yours, or if he totally shut down or walked away from most of his practice. Can I get a court order requiring him to do the things he offered to do in the email that I agreed to, for the price we agreed to? No. You can sue for the money damages you suffer from his breach of contract (but probably not speculative lost profits), but you can't get a court order forcing him to do what he promised to do (among other things, it would violate the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for a court to do that). Idea Theft The second issue is what happens if your lawyer steals your ideas. Regardless, I'd like to know what I can do if he does not complete the work and starts a company that does the same as what I had planned to do. This is very unlikely and a very unwise choice for the lawyer. An Analogy In terms of likelihood and severity of consequences if a lawyer does so, this would be on a par with a lawyer beating up his client severely with a baseball bat. Beating up a client physically is a type of lawyer misconduct that is very infrequent, but isn't entirely non-existent (for what it is worth, most of the rare cases of physical assaults by lawyers on their clients seem to take place in Kentucky or Texas; physical assaults by clients on their lawyers, in contrast, are thousands of times more frequent and happen all over the United States). But, it is punished very severely when it happens (even though there isn't a rule of professional conduct for lawyers that prohibits this kind of misconduct by lawyers with great specificity). Civil Liability He would have legal liability to you for breach of fiduciary duty probably requiring him, among other things, to disgorge all of his profits to you and pay you for any lost profits you could demonstrate (which might be less speculative if his business didn't fail). He could also face civil liability including statutory damages or punitive damages for theft of trade secrets. Suspension or Loss Of A Law License He would probably also face a very high risk of being suspended from the practice of law for a prolonged period, or being disbarred if you complained to attorney regulatory authorities. Attorneys have ethical rules related to confidentiality and related to business ventures or making profits that involve clients or client information that are very strict and are taken seriously by lawyers. If he were caught breaching these obligations the consequences would be harsh for him. Criminal Law Consequences He could even face a criminal prosecution for theft of trade secrets under either state or federal law. I wouldn't be very surprised at all if criminal charges would be brought in a case like the one that you are worried about. The closest analogy (which is much more common) is when an attorney pockets money from the sale of client property instead of turning it over to a client. Those cases routinely result in significant prison sentences for the perpetrator. For example, I have a client whose former attorney was convicted and sentenced to about eight years in federal prison for stealing about $600,000 of proceeds from the sale of client property. These cases are much more common because a lawyer under extreme financial pressure can have a one time impulsive lapse and temporarily solve the problem created by the financial pressure. But, in this case, the lawyer needs to engage in years of sustained, publicly visible activity based upon the misconduct that is unlikely to produce huge sums of money right away and might even require an additional investment on his part, not a single, quick, lapse of judgment after which the wrongdoing is over and the impulsive need is met. This Almost Never Happens A busy lawyer with a successful specialized practice would very rarely risk those kinds of consequences when he already has a successful enterprise practicing law. A "typical" case where that might happen would involve someone whose family members were kidnapped and facing imminent death if he didn't comply by a foreign government trying to steal military secrets or a drug cartel. This isn't something that a lawyer would do out of mere greed. Lawyers with the kind of sophisticated tech industry legal practice that you describe often invest in their clients' businesses in ways that strictly comply with the relevant ethical rules (which the scenario that you are worried about would not). Sometimes lawyers get in trouble when they substantially comply with the rules but don't do so strictly (e.g. providing fully disclosure and consent but not getting it in writing). But, I can only think of a single case in twenty years or so of practicing law where I've ever seen even an accusation of something like what you are worried about happen, and I've never seen a case like that in case law reports, or news coverage in either the popular press, or trade journals. The case where I did see that accusation wasn't entirely implausible, but it wasn't an entirely clear case of misappropriation either, and the client making the accusation, realistically would have been hard pressed to have made the business idea allegedly stolen work himself. Theft of business plans isn't all that uncommon in and of itself, but an attorney for the person whose plans are stolen is very uncommon as a perpetrator. Far more often it is another business person who had some minor or major involvement with the tech venture, or someone to whom the venture was pitched. This is the sort of thing that venture capital guys and start up company executives with little money of their own in the venture usually do, not the tech firm's own lawyers, in most cases. The kind of betrayal that you are worried about would be extremely unusual conduct for a lawyer in this situation. It would be almost as uncommon as a criminal defense lawyer engaging in sustained leaking of incriminating privileged evidence to prosecutors in a death penalty murder case. Either kind of betrayal isn't impossible, but it just almost never happens that way, even though lawyers commit all sorts of other kinds of misconduct now and then, and that sometimes hurts clients badly. Clients are much more often harmed by neglect and incompetence than by such a direct betrayal from their lawyers. Proving Misconduct Would it matter whether I could connect him to that copycat company? Yes, it would matter. You wouldn't necessarily have to show that he was being compensated by the company, but you would have to show that he was, at a minimum, helping another client with information obtained from you, either in his capacity as their lawyer or as someone involved in their business in some other way. If a copycat business appears that you can't demonstrate has any connection to him of any kind, then you have no way to prove that he did anything wrong. Not infrequently, great minds think alike and someone comes up with a very similar idea to yours, independently, at about the same time that you do. | Raise the question with your employer If you believe that you are an employee and not a contractor then there is presumably something you want from your employer. This may be additional wages and entitlements that you would have or will become entitled to for past or future work respectively. Or you may have been injured and want workers' compensation. Or terminated and you want redundancy pay. Whatever it is, work it out and raise the issue with your employer. You might want to consult an accountant or union to help you. They may acknowledge that you were incorrectly classified and give you what you want. Winner, winner, chicken dinner! Or they may dispute it. If so, you need to follow the dispute resolution processes at your workplace. These typically involve informal discussions, escalating to mediation and then to a workplace tribunal run by the government. You will almost certainly want to consult a lawyer or union to help you - given that you don't know where to start the learning curve is likely to be too steep. In virtually every jurisdiction if people are employees at law they can't choose not to be. in british-columbia the relevant law appears to be the Employment Standards Act although it's not unheard of in edge cases for a person to be an employee under one law (e.g. workers' compensation) and a contractor under another (e.g. income tax). From the linked site: The overriding question is “whose business is it?” Is the person who is doing the work doing it as a person in business for themselves? If you are working "for" your own business you are probably a contractor. If you are working "for" your employer's business you are probably an employee. For example, if you are an accountant with several dozen clients, maintain your own business premises and charge for your advice based on the amount quoted rather than by the hour, you're a contractor. If instead, you have 2 clients, work from their premises at set hours and get paid by the day or week, you're an employee with 2 jobs. In edge cases these are not cut and dried - Google are Uber driver's employees. In Australia: no. In California: yes. In the UK: yes. | A company can mandate getting a flu shot as a condition of employment. The government can do the same (for its employees) – Washington state has done so at least for covid. Some individuals qualify for a disability accommodation, so they would be exceptions (e.g. they could be moved to working away from the public). A sincere religious conviction also gives rise to a religious-accommodation exemption. This guidance addresses the question of what constitutes a sincerely held religious belief. | Would breaking a rule in the handbook constitute breach of contract? Generally speaking, yes. Of course, most employment contracts are "at will" so a breach of contract often isn't necessary to terminate employment. Does my employer's updating the handbook constitute a unilateral change of contract? It depends upon what is changed in the update to the handbook. Typically an employment contract would have a term that says something to the effect of "employee shall devote his full time effort to perform the duties he is directed to perform by employer in a satisfactory manner." If the employee handbook says, "part of every employee's duties includes cleaning up his work area at the close of business each day, locking his file cabinets and shutting down his computer", this would typically simply be a definition of the duties of the employee which the employer reserved the right to change in the original employment contract, and not a unilateral change of contract. On the other hand, if the employee handbook says, "vacation days may not be taken during December" when the employee's contract simply said that "you have ten vacation days per year", that might constitute a unilateral change of contract which might not be enforceable for an employee with a fixed term of employment who was not an employee at will, without additional consideration. Locale is UK but (I assume) contract law is pretty universal so answers specific to any region are welcome. I have answered based upon general contract and employment law, but the UK frequently sets mandatory standards for different kinds of contracts and modifies common law rules related to contracts (much more so than the U.S.), so it wouldn't be very surprising if this were modified by a statute of which I am not aware. We have UK lawyers who contribute to Law.SE and they can chime in if there are particular statutes in the UK that apply to this question. |
What kinds of insults would result and have resulted in someone being imprisoned in Germany? Just read in the Wikipedia Article on Insult that you could be punished for up to one year in prison for insulting someone in Germany. What kinds of insults, assuming that they are free of false accusations or any accusations, can get you in jail in Germany? Would making fun of the way a politician looks, done routinely in the US, for example, fall under this category, assuming that the politician presses charges? Calling someone a bad word? | Here are a few examples (sorry, they are in German) https://www.echo24.de/region/kuenzelsau-24-jaehriger-verurteilt-gefaengnis-beleidigungen-instagram-13181018.html https://www.mainpost.de/regional/main-spessart/beleidigung-bringt-34-jaehrigen-ins-gefaengnis-art-8445139 https://www.maz-online.de/Lokales/Brandenburg-Havel/Gericht-verhaengt-Gefaengnis-wegen-Beleidigung-und-Noetigung https://www.wochenblatt.de/archiv/fuer-beleidigungen-wieder-einmal-ab-in-den-knast-154472 So it does actually happen, but it's fairly rare. It typically involves abusive behavior: frequently repeated insults, defamation, and threats and also ignoring any cease and desist orders or requests to stop the behavior. There is also a pre-existing criminal record: it's not the first time they stand in front of a judge for this type of thing. The guy in the last article had already 12 previous offenses so the judges felt that a fine or probation is just not working. So it's not so much the exact type of insult but more about relentlessly barraging the victim and having an existing pattern of bad behavior and related offenses. | Yes, a statement made to only a single other person can be defamation, at least in the US (you don't mention the jurisdiction that you or the accused person are in, and it may matter). Only the accused person can normally sue, and that person would need to establish that the statement was made, and that it was false. In most cases actual damage to reputation also needs to be established. However, a few limited categories are considered defamatory per se. these include an accusation that a person is guilty of a serious crime. (The exact line for defamation per se will depend on the jurisdiction.) If a statemant is defamatory per se actual damage need not be proved. Strictly speaking saying that someone "is a pedophile" only says that that person is sexually attracted to children, but it is usually taken to mean that the person has in fact sexually abused children, which is a crime, and would I am sure be considered defamatory per se. Even so, proof of actual damage to the reputation of the person defamed might be important to the measure of damages to be awarded. often the number of people to whom an accusation is made is relevant to the degree of damage to the reputation, and thus to the damages to be awarded, but the relation is not always 1-to-1. Particularly with a very serious accusation, the damage to reputation could be significant, even if only one or a few people heard the false statement. By the way, the word is spelled "pedophile" (or paedophile in UK English), it is from two Greek words meaning literally "lover of the young". A now obsolete related term is "pederast", with much the same meaning. | In the United States, I would strongly expect that an accurate depiction of historical fact (even if uncomfortably graphic) would be protected under the First Ammendment. Otherwise, the government could functionally censor the worst parts of history (as being too awful to discuss or depict), which is exactly the kind of thing the First Amendment is designed to prevent. There are three important categories of speech that are not protected: (1) "fighting words" directed at a person intended to provoke a fight, (2) words that infict emotional distress such that it qualifies as a tort, and (3) speech that court finds to qualify as "obscenity". Of these three, your game probably will not qualify for the first, since it generally requires speech directed at a specific person or people. I also suspect (less confidently) that an emotional-distress tort would not succeed since your game is not directed at any particular living people. Even if the game caused emotional distress to someone, your public release of the game probably could not qualify as a tort against that specific player who happens to experience emotional distress. The Miller test is used to determine if a work is obscenity. Wikipeida summarizes its three parts, all of which must be satisfied to constitute obscenity: Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards", would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law, Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The first two are explicitly sexual in nature. I don't know if there is any similar prohibition against hyper-violence, but even if there were, as long as your game does not run afoul of the "lacks serious artistic value" condition, you will be on the safe side of the line. Note that none of this stops anyone from initiating legal action against you (which may cause headaches for you); it only stops those legal actions from succeededing. | Sometimes In general, intentionally false speech gets less protection than other speech, and in some cases it is unprotected. The classic example of speech that is unprotected is "Falsely shouting FIRE in a crowded theater". Note that this is both intentionally false and highly likely to be seriously harmful to multiple uninvolved people. On the other hand, the classic case of New York Times vs Sullivan said that, at least when the subjects were public officials (later broadened to public figures) it was not enough to prove simple falsehood in a defamation case, one must prove "actual malice" (an unfortunate term) which in this context means statements that are either knowingly false or are made with reckless disregard for the truth. The court in that case said, in effect, that if a newspaper had to be sure that its every statement could be proved true in every detail, it would be unwilling to vigorously report on matters of significant public concern (this is a paraphrase, I'll add a quote later). Opinions are considered legally not to be either false or true. "President Jone is the worst leader the US has ever had" Is a statement of opinion, and so is not defamation. Moreover, in political contexts, attempts to punish false statements of fact that are not defamatory have been held unconstitutional. One example was the "Stolen Valor" act, which punished falsely claiming to have been awarded a medal by the US armed forces. This was held to be against the First Amendment. In general, regulation of speech (which here includes writing and other forms of communication) must be fairly narrowly drawn and must have good reasons behind them to survive a court challenge. How much so depends on the nature of the law, and particularly whether it is "content-neutral" or not. Details and cites to come when i have a little more time. | That depends on several things: Do the authorities have solid evidence of what happened? Authorities in which country? A screenshot is not evidence, that would be easily faked. It takes access to the metadata. Does the country where the perpetrator lives consider it a serious crime? Note that when two people exchange such messages, who is the criminal and who is the victim can depend on the ages of both, and the exact rules of who is guilty of what may differ from country to country. There are countries which prosecute child abuse by their citizens or residents abroad once they come back. So it may be that nothing happens, or it may be prosecuted. | can really anyone in Germany call the police on others without proof of anything? Anyone anywhere can call the police without proof of anything as long as they have a phone. The question is, what will the police do about it. Police in Germany are more professional and less corrupt than in many countries in the world (e.g. they are much less corrupt than police in much of the United States or police in Southern Italy or Mexico, or in much of the "third-world"). Most German police are unlikely to exercise their power unless they are genuinely deceived into thinking that you committed an actual crime. But, German cops are human too. Some German cops are bad cops and even good cops aren't perfect truth detectors or bias free. and if so what are my rights? There has to be some evidence to arrest you or prosecute you, but testimony from people who claim to be eye witnesses is a form of evidence and proof. People are routinely convicted of crimes (everywhere in the world) based solely upon the testimony of other people with no additional proof. This is usually a good rule. As a society we don't want the criminal justice system to let people who commit crimes that are witnessed by lots of truthful witnesses and testified to, to go free just because there is no non-testimonial evidence. But because people lie (or are simply mistaken about the truth) sometimes, it isn't a perfect way of determining who is guilty and who is innocent. You also have the right to lodge a complaint of criminal defamation with the police in Germany and in Germany hundreds of thousands of such cases are prosecuted by police every year. Making false accusations against you (or even just insulting you in an extremely offense manner) as they did is a minor crime in Germany. and the person I mentioned had 2 of his employees with him but I am sure and I know for a fact they are on his side and I had no witnesses with me so how can I prove I am innocent? if they agreed on making up a story against me? The possibility that people will be wrongfully arrested and wrongfully convicted of crimes because people lie and authorities believe the people who are lying is a constant risk. The best you can do is to tell your story consistently and honestly and hope that you are believed. But it is impossible to eliminate the risk that people will lie and be believed and that you will suffer the consequences, even if you are doing everything right. In the long run, you may want to avoid people who you think would lie and make false accusations around you, and to have the presence of either friendly witnesses and/or audio/visual recording at times when you are in their presence. You may also, as a long run strategy try to figure out if there was anything you could have done to prevent them from being out to get you so badly that they would make false accusations against you. While I don't want to blame the victim, and often enough, especially for example, if you are a foreigner or otherwise different in a homogeneous community some people are doing to hate you for no reason, sometimes their real motivation may be a failure to follow social norms that are not actually illegal, or a misunderstand that could be cleared up. | If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment. | DUI is a crime under Massachusetts law so Kurt would be prosecuted there by that state. Germany would offer consular assistance but this would not extend to preparing or paying for his defence. If convicted, and after serving his sentence, Germany and the USA would coordinate his deportation. The UK would offer consular assistance for the repatriation of Alice's body and for the participation of her family in the trial, again this would not extend to paying for it. They would not assist in any civil action Alice's family might take against Kurt in a Massachusetts court. While DUI is a crime in both Germany and the UK AFAIK they are not extraterritorial: that is the crime must be committed on their territory for them to prosecute it. Some crimes do have extraterritoriality but not DUI. Similarly, their courts would probably not hear a civil case because the correct venue is Massachusetts and they would probably entertain a motion to dismiss on that basis. Even if they did hear it, it would be heard under Massachusetts law. |
What is the furthest point from land at sea where individual U.S. state laws apply? I wondered to myself if there was a specific point within the 12 mile US territorial sea where individual U.S. state law ends and only federal law applies. For example, could an individual/business create an offshore site that is just outside of the local state's legal reach but still under federal law? To my surprise I could not find anything general like: "State law ends 3 miles from shore" or "State law ends 1 mile from shore". Apparently there's ambiguity. Found a summary here: There has been tension for decades between the federal government and the states over who has control of the waters out to the three-mile — and more recently 12-mile — limit. The tension has been largely over control of mineral rights rather than how other laws are applied. Offshore wind and state laws Is there a line at all? I'm confused... if it's unclear where state laws end and federal law begins how do local authorities even know when to call the feds when they find something suspicious/"criminal" offshore? How do individuals even know which, if any, state laws apply when they are offshore? But remember that my question is about the border line(s) so saying simply that there's a list of water patrol laws for a particular jurisdiction would not (in my view) answer the question. I found an example of a kind of border in "The Marine Unit members are also cross-certified Immigration and Customs Enforcement Officers, and are empowered to enforce federal regulations far beyond the limits of State of Florida jurisdiction." Marine Unit, manateesheriff.com. But it doesn't really answer the question. | The answer is more complicated than you may think. The over riding controlling authority is the Law of the Seas treaty signed by almost all nations but not ratified by the US (mainly because the LOS requires equal distribution of mineral wealth in the oceans). A lot of what the LOS covers is what is called the COLREGS which are basically traffic laws for vessels on the oceans. But COLREGS are applicable in some, but not all US federal, state, and local harbors. While the US Coast Guard is the primary enforcer of these laws in the US plenty of other law enforcement agencies have agreements with the USCG to enforce the rules. While you mentioned a local county agency that has agreements to enforce this, and other laws, so do a host of other agencies. In Florida the FWC is the primary enforcement agency for Florida laws and has an agreement with the USCG and other federal agencies to enforce not just Florida laws but US laws as well. One historic area of conflict has been fishing laws. The US claims a 200 mile economic zone and enforces fishing laws, which sometimes conflict with Florida laws (things like how big a fish must be and how many you can catch and when you can catch them). The FWC has a much greater presence on the water and the USCG does not really deal that much with fishing. On the other hand the USCG spends lots of time with drug interdiction and illegal alien interdiction. As an example of how convoluted this can get I was in the Dry Tortugas when the FWC boarded a commercial fishing boat anchored close to me. The Dry Tortugas is a National Park so under federal jurisdiction and the fishing boat had anchored rather late at night and turned on it's working lights and and was loudly running a water pump during turtle egg laying season so the rangers in the park called the FWC to come down hard on the boat. The only violation the FWC found was a pistol on the commercial boat (firearms are prohibited in the National Park). Another example is that according to Florida Law a boat in a recognized anchorage on a mooring ball does not need to display an anchor light after sunset. While Boot Key Harbor in the Keys is a recognized anchorage run by the city of Marathon it is under COLREGs and you must display an anchor light on a mooring ball; something that I have seen enforced by both USCG and FWC. On the East Coast of Florida in the crowded ICW both city and county LEOs in boats enforce things like speed limits and boating while under the influence; not to mention drug enforcement. Bottom line is while federal, state, and local laws are not always the same there are wide spread agreements that agencies from all three levels of government can and do enforce each others laws. | There are a number of issues here. The question mentions: Taxes, which I presume must be authorized and regulated by the US Constitution, but I don't know the details Not exactly. The states existed before the Federal government. They are not created by the Federal Constitution, nor authorized by it. A number of restrictions on state powers and actions are specified by the Federal Constitution, and a number of others are imposed by Federal law. (the Federal courts have found implied restrictions beyond the explicitly stated ones.) But there is no Federal provision granting states the power to impose taxes, only restrictions on that pre-existing power. States cannot impose taxes so as to violate rights federally guaranteed, or to place unreasonable burdens on the exercise of those rights. For example, states cannot impose different taxes or tax rates on a racial basis. States cannot impose different taxes on residents of other states temporarily present in, or doing business in the state. States cannot impose different taxes on people newly moved there from other states, compared to long-established residents. State taxes must not violate the Equal Protection clause. However, states may choose the type and amount of taxes to impose. They can use sales tax, VAT tax, property tax, income tax, excise tax, flat tax, or any combination that their legislatures pass. Different taxes may be imposed on different professions or kinds of businesses. Does the US Constitution guarantee all citizens have the natural right to conduct their own business affairs? Not as such, no. The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses limit to some extent the ability of a state to prohibit a particular business on a whim. But when a state asserts that a particular business is harmful, and demonstrates a plausible basis for that view, so that the law passes "Rational basis" review, the state can prohibit it, or heavily regulate it, or license it. If so, does a citizen lose the right to legally own and operate a business if they cannot afford requisite state or local business license fees? A state may require a license to engage in a particular occupation, and may require a fee, one-time or recurring, high or low, for that license. In addition, a tax may be imposed on those in a particular business or profession, which is not imposed on other kinds of business. For example, in many states, lawyers must pay an annual license fee, or they are not allowed to practice. So must many other regulated professions, such as hairstylist. One who cannot afford the fee may not engage in the business or profession. The state may waive or reduce fees for those too poor to afford them, but need not do so, and many states do not so so. Similarly, the state may charge a fee for a driver's license, and one who cannot pay it may not legally drive. Likewise, does a citizen lose the right to utilize the court system to petition for a redress of grievances, if they cannot afford the requisite court fees? Many states have provisions waiving or lowering court fees for those who cannot afford them, but in most cases this is applied only in severe cases, say where a person would have to go without food to afford court fees. There have been a few federal cases requiring fee waivers for those who cannot afford court fees, mostly in connection with criminal defendants. There is not currently a general federal rule requiring court access for those who cannot afford court fees. Perhaps there should be. A case could be made that Equal Protection requires this, but Federal Courts have not so held. Federal courts have held that holding people in jail or prison because they truly cannot afford fines, bail, or court fees is an unconstitutional denial of Equal Protection. But states need not waive such fees; they can be deferred and charged should the person earn enough money to (just barely) afford them. Even this rule is not yet invariably enforced, and many state courts routinely ignore it. By the way "petition for a redress of grievances" doe snot normally refer to bringing a court case, but to asking a legislature to change a law, or asking an administrator or executive to exercise permitted discretion in a particular way. And lastly, if a citizen is convicted of a crime or infraction, and the sentence requires the convict to utilize government services (e.g. prison services, probation services, registration services, etc.); under the US Constitution, can state government agencies providing these services legally require the convict to pay fees for these services (e.g. prison service fees, probation service fees, registration service fees), if these fees were not explicitly included in the sentence as fines? Yes it can impose such fees, but usually only when neither the convict nor his or her dependents will be impoverished by such fees, as I understand it. If a state attempts to pass or enforce state legislation dictating such fees, should this legislation generally be struck down as unconstitutional? Such laws will not be held unconstitutional by US Federal courts under the Federal Constitution, unless they are found to violate Equal Protection, Due Process, or other specifically imposed restrictions on the state. For example, fees which were in practice imposed on people of one religion, but not those of another, would be struck down. But a fee imposed on everyone will not usually be overturned. "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to steal bread from shops, beg in the streets, and sleep under bridges." -Anatole France | The Answer Depends Upon The Facts Of The Case Related To The Forum Where The Suit Is Commenced The analysis depends upon some key facts that a person asking a question might not know, because they are not intuitively obvious and have actually changed in the last few years, without knowing the relevant law. When The Forum State Has General Jurisdiction Over All Defendants The most important question to consider is this one: Is the state in which the class action suit is brought is home to the headquarters of the US manufacturer (or a state where the manufacturer has a substantial equivalent to a headquarters)? This question matters because, if and only if the answer to this question is "yes" then, "general jurisdiction" would be present under a U.S. Supreme Court precedent established in 2014. If a forum state's courts have "general jurisdiction" over a defendant, this means that the defendant can be sued in that forum on any cause of action against that defendant arising anywhere in the world, regardless of any other relationship that the claim has to the forum state (except for claims in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts which can be brought in a U.S. District Court located in the same state, or in an arbitration forum pursuant to a valid arbitration clause that binds the parties, an issue beyond the scope of this question and answer). Until recently general jurisdiction over a defendant (i.e. jurisdiction over any lawsuit against a defendant without regard to the particular facts of the case) was present in any state where a company has a permanent office for the conduct of business, under half a century of precedent on the issue that traced back to a U.S. Supreme Court case known as International Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In the case of large corporations doing business nationwide, this usually meant that a plaintiff had a large number of states to choose from in which a defendant could be sued on any matter whatsoever which also facilitated the filing of class action lawsuits with plaintiffs from all over the world covered by a single lawsuit. But, in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___ (January 14, 2014), general jurisdiction was limited to the state where the headquarters of the business is located, or another state the defendant is otherwise equally "at home." (For example, the state where Amazon.com chooses to locate its proposed "HQ2" in the case of a lawsuit against Amazon.) If so, the foreign plaintiff member of the class can probably join the lawsuit, since general jurisdiction is present. When The Forum State Does Not Have General Jurisdiction Over All Defendants But, if the forum of the class action lawsuit is not one of the typically one or two states where the defendant is "at home", then a U.S. Supreme Court ruling from June of 2017 that significantly changes the law of "specific jurisdiction" probably bars the joinder of the foreign plaintiff as a member of the class. This case holds that specific jurisdiction over a defendant arising solely from the fact that it sold a defective product in a particular state or country which it caused an injury to be limited to plaintiffs who actually purchased the product or suffered an injury in that state. So, if there is more than one defendant, the forum state must have general jurisdiction over all of the defendants, or must have specific jurisdiction over all defendants over whom it does not have general jurisdiction for a reason that applies to all members of the class bringing the lawsuit. For example, if the defective product was an airplane that crashed in California as a result of a defective product, everyone hurt in the crash could sue in a single action in California because that is where the injury occurred to all of them, even if the people on the plane who were injured or died came from different states and countries. Similarly, if the product was defective as a result of design work conducted by multiple large corporate defendants with different home states outside Colorado that took place entirely at a design collaboration workshop at the University of Colorado at Boulder, a class action including all persons injured globally by the defective products could be brought in Colorado, even if the injuries were dispersed all over the world at places where the defective products were delivered. The case adopting this radical change in the law of specific personal jurisdiction is Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty. (U.S. June 19, 2017) in which the court finds that "specific personal jurisdiction" (as opposed to "general jurisdiction") is lacking with regard to the claims of members of the class of plaintiffs who are not California residents in this case brought in a California state trial court (in an 8-1 decision with Justice Sotomayor dissenting). According to the official syllabus of that case: A group of plaintiffs, most of whom are not California residents, sued Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS) in California state court, alleging that the pharmaceutical company’s drug Plavix had damaged their health. BMS is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York, and it maintains substantial operations in both New York and New Jersey. Although it engages in business activities in California and sells Plavix there, BMS did not develop, create a marketing strategy for, manufacture, label, package, or work on the regulatory approval for Plavix in the State. And the nonresident plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained Plavix from a California source, that they were injured by Plavix in California, or that they were treated for their injuries in California. The California Superior Court denied BMS’s motion to quash service of summons on the nonresidents’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that BMS’s extensive activities in the State gave the California courts general jurisdiction. Following this Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___, the State Court of Appeal found that the California courts lacked general jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeal went on to find that the California courts had specific jurisdiction over the claims brought by the nonresident plaintiffs. Affirming, the State Supreme Court applied a “sliding scale approach” to specific jurisdiction, concluding that BMS’s “wide ranging” contacts with the State were enough to support a finding of specific jurisdiction over the claims brought by the nonresident plaintiffs. That attenuated connection was met, the court held, in part because the nonresidents’ claims were similar in many ways to the California residents’ claims and because BMS engaged in other activities in the State. The high court finds that the absence of an in-state injury or injury to a resident plaintiff is controlling. It is not sufficient in the high court's analysis that the corporation is already subject to suit in California as a result of its conduct in California to most of the people in the suit. Instead of analyzing whether California has jurisdiction over the product liability situation, in general, the high court decides that the determination regarding whether California has jurisdiction over a suit against a particular defendant must be made on a plaintiff by plaintiff basis when "specific jurisdiction" rather than "general jurisdiction" is involved. Sotomayor's dissent in this case emphasizes implications of this ruling in the kind of situation posed by this question at Law.SE: Three years ago, the Court imposed substantial curbs on the exercise of general jurisdiction in its decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___ (2014). Today, the Court takes its first step toward a similar contraction of specific jurisdiction by holding that a corporation that engages in a nationwide course of conduct cannot be held accountable in a state court by a group of injured people unless all of those people were injured in the forum State. I fear the consequences of the Court’s decision today will be substantial. The majority’s rule will make it difficult to aggregate the claims of plaintiffs across the country whose claims may be worth little alone. It will make it impossible to bring a nationwide mass action in state court against defendants who are “at home” in different States. And it will result in piecemeal litigation and the bifurcation of claims. None of this is necessary. A core concern in this Court’s personal jurisdiction cases is fairness. And there is nothing unfair about subjecting a massive corporation to suit in a State for a nationwide course of conduct that injures both forum residents and nonresidents alike. . . . It “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,’” International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316, to permit plaintiffs to aggregate claims arising out of a single nationwide course of conduct in a single suit in a single State where some, but not all, were injured. But that is exactly what the Court holds today is barred by the Due Process Clause. This is not a rule the Constitution has required before. I respectfully dissent. The most serious issues arise in one of the situations that Justice Sotomayor addresses which the majority does not adequately consider in the rebuttal in its own opinion, which is the situation where there are multiple possible defendants with different home states, whose relative liability is unknown or independent or mutually dependent. For example, suppose that the product has two kinds of defectively manufactured components manufactured by companies with two different home states in the U.S. (e.g. an electronic device charging bay and a battery) that are assembled by the customer after they are delivered independently, which, when acting together, cause the assembled product to be dangerous and cause injury even though the design itself is not defective. Under Bristol-Myers, there is no U.S. forum with jurisdiction over all injuries caused by these compound manufacturing defects that can allocate responsibility between the responsible manufacturers on a consistent basis. Why Didn't It Matter That The Drugs Were Distributed By A California Distributor? The high court is also unimpressed with the fact that the drug giving rise to the product liability was distributed by a California company, presumably because the cause of action in question in the case was brought against the manufacturer as a strict liability defective product claim, rather than as a claim against a seller of the product arising from a warranty that the product was free of defects arising under the Uniform Commercial Code or an express warranty. This makes sense if the California distributor was a wholesale company not in direct privity with the retail buyers of the products from retail pharmacies who were injured by the products. The wholesaler could be sued under the Uniform Commercial Code on its warranty to the buyers of the drugs, only by the intermediate wholesalers or retail pharmacies that bought the drugs. The wholesaler could also be sued on its warranty only if those direct buyers themselves suffered injuries as a result of the defective product. For example, a retailer might have injuries in the nature of breach of warranty liability in suits brought against retail sellers by injured consumers under the Uniform Commercial Code that the retail sellers would be seeking indemnification of from the California based wholesale distributor. But, Bristol-Meyers does mean that it is basically impossible for injured consumers who were not injured in the forum state to sue both the manufacturer of the defective drugs (where jurisdiction would be present in New York and New Jersey) on a tort theory, and the distributor of the defective drugs (where jurisdiction would be present in California) in the same action. So, it is effectively impossible in this case for all people injured by the defective drugs to sue all of the potential Bristol-Meyers case defendants in a single lawsuit. Statutory Considerations Existing statutory limits on federal court jurisdiction limit the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Courts in most cases of cases to cases in which a state court in the state where the U.S. District Court is located would have either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction of the defendant (without regard to the fact that the case might be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction which pertains to the nature of the cause of action asserted rather than the ties of the defendant to the forum state). But, the decision leaves Congress with the option of potentially changing that statute which currently limits the personal jurisdiction of federal trial courts to that of a state court of general jurisdiction in the same state, as it already does in cases that are predominantly "in rem" (e.g. interpleader cases and interstate boundary and real property title disputes), in bankruptcy cases, and with respect to the subpoena power of U.S. District Courts. The official syllabus also notes that: The Court’s decision will not result in the parade of horribles that respondents conjure up. It does not prevent the California and out-of-state plaintiffs from joining together in a consolidated action in the States that have general jurisdiction over BMS. Alternatively, the nonresident plaintiffs could probably sue together in their respective home States. In addition, since this decision concerns the due process limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, the question remains open whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court. Constitutionally, Congress still has the authority to vest all U.S. District Courts with jurisdiction over any case in which the United States treated as a single state for purposes of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction analysis. This would leave the question of which particular U.S. District Court was the proper one to file in as a question of venue (which does not have a constitutional dimension) rather than a question of jurisdiction (which is subject to constitutional considerations), and many legal scholars have urged Congress to do just that. But, so far, Congress has not altered a status quo that does not give U.S. District Courts the maximal jurisdiction allowed under the United States Constitution. But, so far, Congress has instead taken an intermediate position on the geographic scope of federal court jurisdiction in the jurisdictional portion of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (which also limits the extent to which "coupon settlements" of class action cases are permitted). In particular (per the link in this paragraph): The Act permits federal courts to preside over certain class actions in diversity jurisdiction where the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million; where the class comprises at least 100 plaintiffs; and where there is at least "minimal diversity" between the parties (i.e., at least one plaintiff class member is diverse from at least one defendant). The court, however, may decline jurisdiction under certain circumstances, and is required to decline jurisdiction in certain others. But, while the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 allows many class action lawsuits which would otherwise be brought on exclusively state law claims in state court to be brought in federal court, or removed from state court to federal court, it does not authorize class action lawsuits that could not be brought in a state court which a U.S. District Court is located due to lack of either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction from being brought in that federal court either. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 was favored by businesses likely to be defendants in future class action lawsuits (such as manufacturers), because state civil procedure law in some U.S. states such as California, is more favorable to class action plaintiffs than federal civil procedure laws related to class actions. | There are multiple police forces in the US: city, county, state and national, and each is responsible to a relevant executive. Typical "police" are city police, who are responsible to a chief of police, who is appointed at the municipal level. Counties usually have an elected sheriff, and a set of deputies; at the state level, they are usually called state troopers. The typical protocol is that decisions are made at the lowest applicable level, so Seattle police enforce or refuse to enforce laws within Seattle, and King County police enforce or not in remaining unincorporated locations in the county. Individual city officers do not then decide to ignore the chief of police and instead follow orders from the county sheriff or the governor. However, each state grants vast powers to their governor, so it is possible that in the case of a state of emergency, the governor can take command of all law enforcement in the state. Governors "can't" deploy police to oppose federal law enforcement in a shoot-out, except that they might actually do so on some theory that federal law enforcement officers are violating the law. In general, you are not immune to arrest for illegal acts just because you are a law enforcement officer. The governor of Washington could easily (in the legal sense) declare an emergency and order state troopers to prevent federal officers from effecting arrests. Of course, resolving these disputes in court is another option. | You are looking for extraterritorial jurisdiction: As the term indicates, it connotes the exercise of jurisdiction, or legal power, outside territorial borders. This can include nations claiming jurisdiction over crimes in nearby bodies of water and to specific categories of crimes (such as sexual offenses against underage victims) committed by or against citizens while abroad. Wikipedia has a summary, including a few different nations' application of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Cornell Law Review has a very extensive essay, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction? | In Connecticut, this is covered by the firefighter's rule. Police and fire personnel entering a property as part of their official duties are considered licensees, which limits the duties of the landowner. The rules are as follows: You can't intentionally hurt or lay a trap for the licensee. If you know or should know the licensee is there, you need to exercise due care with them. You don't have to worry about obvious hazards (but keep in mind that it's harder to see stuff at night). If you're doing something dangerous, you need to watch out for them. If you know about a hidden hazard, you must warn them. I'm not sure how in-depth you need to go with the warnings; various things I find suggest the duty to warn might only be there when you know or should know the licensee is present, but signs are a good idea regardless. On the other hand, if you do need to warn them, you might need to mention the specific locations of the pits you actually know about. However, there's no duty at all to proactively look for possible hazards. This rule originated as a rule for professional firefighters responding to a negligently-started fire: the idea is that professional firefighters sign up to do a dangerous job, and letting them sue for hazards inherent in their job (they aren't called without a fire) is a bad idea. Also, since they cannot be denied entry, go in places not open to the public, and can arrive at any hour, needing to keep the property safe for them is an unreasonable burden. Of course, there's an exception if a law is passed to protect their safety, because statutes override common law. The rule has since been extended in some states to police, and to situations besides the very problem they were called for. Other states have abolished it. In any event, this is for civil liability only: this is when cops can sue for injuries caused to them. | The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission has a page which explains who needs a license. Generally, a license is required for all saltwater and freshwater fishing, but there are various exemptions described on that page. There is no specific exemption for homelessness or low income per se, but it is possible that one of the other exemptions listed there might apply to your hypothetical individual, such as for instance the following: You are a Florida resident age 65 or older possessing proof of age and residency (a valid Florida Driver License or Florida ID Card meets this requirement) or possessing an optional Resident Senior Citizen Hunting and Fishing Certificate. Residents age 65 or older may obtain, at no cost, complimentary hunting and fishing certificates from some county tax collectors' offices. You have been accepted as a client for developmental services by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. The agency must furnish proof to such clients. [Saltwater fishing only] You are a resident who is saltwater fishing from land or a structure fixed to land who has been determined eligible for the food stamp, temporary cash assistance, or Medicaid Program by the Department of Children and Families (DCF). Proof of identification and a benefit issuance or program identification card issued by DCF or the Agency for Health Care Administration must be on your person when fishing. A license is required when fishing from a vessel or when swimming or diving. You are a resident who is fishing with live or natural bait, using poles or lines that are not equipped with a fishing-line-retrieval mechanism, and you are fishing for noncommercial purposes in your home county. However, you must have a valid fishing license to fish by any method in a fish management area. If none of the exemptions applies, your individual could get a shoreline fishing license, which is free of charge to Florida residents. This license would appear to cover his activities (fishing for a saltwater species from land or from a structure fixed to the land). | "Law" refers to rules; "jurisdiction" refers to the situations in which those laws apply. For example, the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the United States of America. But for the most part, it only applies within the territorial jursidction of the government that enacted it, i.e., places inside the borders of the United States, or to those over whom the United States has personal jurisdiction, i.e., United States citizens, permanent residents, those currently inside its borders. So the United States Congress could pass a law outlawing the sale of dogs, but it would have no effect on dogs in Canada, as Congress has no jurisdiction over dogs in Canada. Similarly, if a Canadian terrorist (the most dangerous kind, really) launched a missle over the border into the United States, the FBI could not arrest him in Toronto, as they lack jurisdiction to enforce the law outside the United States. "Jurisdiction" is also a concept that limits the powers of courts to hear cases. "Subject matter jurisdiction" refers to limits on the types of cases the court may hear, and "personal jurisdiction" refers to limits on whose cases the court may hear. For instance, if the New York Legislature established a small-claims courts to resolve claims for less than $10,000, your case might be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction if you sued someone for $10,001, or it might be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction if you sued someone who had no connection to New York. These explanations are admittedly incomplete and imprecise to provide a basic understanding of the concepts, rather than an overwhelming -- and boring -- exposition of the precise meanings of these terms. |
Preparing for Motion for New Trial What is needed to prepare for a Motion for New Trial Hearing? My understanding is I will get to make an opening statement, opposing counsel will list reasons to deny and then I will get to discuss my factors listed for why I believe it should be granted. | The first thing you need is a lawyer. Your lawyer will need to understand the standard for granting the motion and be prepared with an explanation of why your case satisfies that standard. If the lawyer can cite to other cases where similar facts led to the outcome you're asking for, that will also be helpful. | Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare | In general, court hearings are held in public; and anyone is free to make a fair and balanced report of the proceedings. It is important that justice is seen to be done. However, in some circumstances that is not true—the obvious example is if a child is involved. It is not sufficient though merely that "[the claimant] wants to keep his/her identity confidential". Have a look at the Civil Procedure Rules (part 39): 39.2 General rule – hearing to be in public The general rule is that a hearing [including a trial] is to be in public. ... A hearing, or any part of it, may be in private if – (a) publicity would defeat the object of the hearing; (b) it involves matters relating to national security; (c) it involves confidential information (including information relating to personal financial matters) and publicity would damage that confidentiality; (d) a private hearing is necessary to protect the interests of any child or protected party; (e) it is a hearing of an application made without notice and it would be unjust to any respondent for there to be a public hearing; (f) it involves uncontentious matters arising in the administration of trusts or in the administration of a deceased person’s estate; or (g) the court considers this to be necessary, in the interests of justice. The court may order that the identity of any party or witness must not be disclosed if it considers non-disclosure necessary in order to protect the interests of that party or witness. https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part39#39.2 If you can satisfy the court that one of (a) to (g) apply, the court may make an order anonymizing proceedings (for instance, you would only be referred to as "AB" in reports and judgements) or it might hold the hearing in camera (in private). However the other party may well wish to oppose your application. Indeed, even a newspaper hearing of your case but unable to report it is entitled to object: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/1.html (In re Guardian News) Conclusion In these circumstances, when carrying out the ultimate test of balancing all the factors relating to both M's article 8 rights and the article 10 rights of the press, we have come to the conclusion that there is indeed a powerful general, public interest in identifying M in any report of these important proceedings which justifies curtailment, to that extent, of his, and his family's, article 8 Convention rights to respect for their private and family life. For all these reasons, we would set aside the anonymity order in respect of M. ... Therefore, A, K, M and HAY will be named here and in the judgments on the substantive appeals, as Mr Mohammed Jabar Ahmed, Mr Mohammed Azmir Khan, Mr Michael Marteen (formerly known as Mohammed Tunveer Ahmed) and Mr Hani El Sayed Sabaei Youssef (or Hani al-Seba'i), respectively. | It is somewhat understated, because your silence can also be used against you. In Salinas v. Texas, defendant Salinas was "just talking" to police, not in custody, and his silence (as opposed to shock and outrage) at the question of whether shell casings found at the crime scene would match his shotgun. This "adoptive admission" was introduced as evidence against him. In order to prevent your silence from being used against you, you must invoke the 5th amendment. There are two exceptions to the rule that you must invoke the 5th to be protected by it. First, a criminal defendant need not take the stand and assert the privilege at their own trial. Second, a witness’s failure to invoke the privilege must be excused where governmental coercion makes their forfeiture of the privilege involuntary (Miranda). In lieu of coercion, you must preface your silence with an invocation of your 5th amendment rights. | This is a general answer based on the state of affairs in various jurisdictions. By that I mean it's not legal advice. Do not assume that the 20 days is the arraignment. Often the thing that happens when you show up at the 20 days is you talk to a D.A. (and I use that term lightly) who asks you if you are going to pay. Maybe offers you a "deal" which is mostly requiring you to pay the full amount but reduce or eliminate the record. If you try to talk to this DA she will act like she's not a DA and say that she can't discuss the facts. If you don't pay she'll schedule your arraignment and THAT's when you plea. Your best bet is to tell her that you are requesting evidence and in likelihood she'll put your date out far enough. You should consider the deferral and the safety course as offers. Offers the DA makes before you get all the evidence. No, you do not have a right to see the evidence before accepting an offer. You have the right to say no to the offer. That's the reason the offer is made; to save the DA the time of the process. (The song and dance I mention above is the pre-arraignment offer for low-level cases) If you reject the offer and get arraigned before you see the evidence you need to tell the judge this before you enter your plea. (Be prepared to show her the written requests) One thing - this stuff is all way easier if you have an attorney. And this is not the "consult an attorney..." disclaimer (although that applies!). Attorneys will short cut all of this for you. They know the clerks, they get you the front of the line at any appearance, and they generally give your argument credibility. It's totally unfair and it's totally the way it works. Walk into a courtroom at 8am and see 30 people waiting. No clerk, no one, just defendants. Between 8 and 8:10 various people in suits will walk past the bar and start rifling through folders on the clerk's desk. They'll read a folder and put it back. See, they're looking for their client. If you do this the sheriff will handcuff you. | A courtroom is not a podium A court is a forum for resolving a specific dispute. Testimony is restricted for a number of reasons the most all encompassing of which is relevance. For testimony to be admitted it has to go to the issue in dispute. For a person charged under the laws of, say, India, it cannot be in any way relevant what the laws of, say, China have to say about the issue. Similarly, for a person charged with a Federal crime, state law is irrelevant (and vice-versa). There is no free speech issue here because testimony is given only for the purpose of resolving the case. If it’s not relevant to that you can’t introduce it and, if you persist in trying the court can hold you in contempt. | For Mr. Petersen, the questions in general should have been elementary. The fact he did not know them is actually quite deplorable. To your questions specifically: Should Mr. Petersen, as a Juris Doctor, know of those things in his sleep? This is the wrong question. The question is: should an individual who has accepted a nomination to serve as a federal judge on the U.S. District Court know of those things in his/her sleep? The answer is unequivocally yes. One could almost argue - one would likely be scoffed at, but one could - that an appointment to a higher court, the U.S. Circuit, could get away not knowing those things 'in his/her sleep,' because appeals courts would not deal with, e.g., abstention doctrines or whether to admit expert scientific testimony, as often as a trial court does. Simply put, lawyers should at least have heard of those things (he looked/sounded absolutely dumbfounded at the words that were being said to him), litigators should know them, and federal trial court judges absolutely need to know those things to do the job. Is his excuse valid when he says that he has no background in the field(s) (he mentioned litigation once) the terms are corresponding to? If he was just some lawyer talking to some guy at a bar, sure, totally valid. If someone is a corporate M&A or project finance attorney, sure, don't expect him to win any trial court vocabulary contests. However, when sitting before a panel of U.S. Senators carrying out their Constitutional duties of "advice and consent" on presidential appointments, not knowing those things can, should, and indeed did end in complete humiliation for the person ignorant enough to try and go through with that. I'm sure his hearing was scheduled some time in advance. The fact he obviously made zero attempt to know anything is actually insulting to everyone involved. For context, I wrote a motion in limine at my first internship. If I live to be 1,000 and never step foot in a court room, I'll still be able to say more about a motion in limine than "I would probably not be able to give you a good definition right here at the table." | it would be a lot of work to formulate a bullet-proof response. Wouldn't that defeat the whole purpose of motion for protective order? No. The purpose of objections --and of motions for protective order-- is not to avoid doing "a lot of work", but to protect information the party considers unreasonable or which ought to be protected from discovery. Elaborating on an objection to interrogatories and/or requests does not provide the information sought to be discovered. Therefore, objections do not defeat the purpose of a motion for protective order. The difference (or one difference) between a motion for protective order and an objection is that the adversary can overcome the objection by rephrasing the interrogatory or request, whereas a protective order is intended to preclude all attempts to skirt the substance of that order. I never found anything that "stays" the discovery pending the hearing of motion for protective order Because there is no need to. Complying with the discovery request would render the motion for protective order a moot issue. Therefore, it is understood that that particular item of discovery essentially would be stayed while the judge has the occasion to rule on the matter. This is especially important for "request of admissions" There are three possible answers to each item in a request of admissions: Admission, denial, or objection. Since objections are allowed (with the proper justification therefor), there is no need to stay discovery. The party just needs to file his responses within the deadline. Moving for a protective order is an odd, and seemingly useless, way to address requests for admissions. |
Are there any major changes in patent law, besides AIA, in the past two decades? I'm referring to important rulings or legislation changes that impact how firms apply for patents or how they approach patent strategies. | There has been lots of U.S. Supreme Court action in patent law, which has collectively mostly weakened patent law, with some exceptions, although there has been little major patent legislation since 2011. (A background report for Congress from the Congressional research service can be found here.) Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court rebuffs the Federal Circuit on a patent law issue related to patent claims in products (basically drugs) biologically similar to products subject to an existing patent making it harder to "puppy guard" such a patent. Impressions Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. Reversing the Federal Circuit to weaken the rights of patent holders, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the first sale doctrine terminates all patent rights in an item, both in the case of sales in the U.S. and sales outside the U.S., even if the contract of sale purports to reserve patent rights in that particular item produces using the patent. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC In 1990, the Federal Circuit held that due to an amendment to the general venue statute that patent lawsuits could be brought in any district that has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This gave rise to extreme forum shopping by patent trolls with the Eastern District of Texas arising as a very plaintiff friendly venue in which many patent infringement cases were brought, despite it having only minimal contacts with the patent holder. This 8-0 decision overrules the 1990 decision of the Federal Circuit and holds that the 1957 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that patent lawsuits may be brought only in the state where a defendant is incorporated remains good law. SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC the equitable doctrine of laches cannot be used to bar the recovery of patent infringement damages incurred within the six year statute of limitations; this follows another recent ruling that laches does not bar the recovery of damages for patent infringement incurred within the three year statute of limitations. Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple, Inc. In the case of a multicomponent product, the relevant “article of manufacture” for arriving at a [35 U.S.C.] §289 damages award need not be the end product sold to the consumer but may be only a component of that product. Alice v. CLS Bank, Int'l., prohibited software that generically applied an abstract idea that is not otherwise patentable, have made it dramatically more difficult to obtain patents, particularly the subset of patents called "business method patents" which include most software patents. In January of 2004, only a little more than 2% of patent applications were rejected (on Section 101 grounds which governs what is patentable). By July of 2015, that percentage is about 15%. Before Alice in July of 2014, about 31% of business method patent applications were rejected on Section 101 grounds (already a major increase from 2007 when the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a more expensive definition of "obviousness" under Section 101 for patent law purposes in KSR International v. Teleflex (see below), and 2010 when the U.S. Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos (see below) articulated a new (and functionally more restrictive) legal standard for granting software patents (although not as restrictive as the federal circuit case it reviewed which is linked), while affirming that software patents could still be obtained). After Alice, 82% of business method patent applications were rejected. Limelight Networks v. Akamai Technologies liability for inducing infringement could not exist when there was no direct infringement (the conduct in question involved part of a patented process being carried out by one party, who allegedly urged customers to carry out the balance of the patented process themselves, so that no one person infringed) Nautilus v. Biosig Instruments the Court rebuked a standard for what kind of patent description was excessively vague that was absurdly indulgent to the patent applicant. Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. (2014) (unanimous) and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Management Systems (2014) (unanimous) (the Federal Circuit had set too high a standard for the recovery of attorneys' fees for frivolous patent prosecutions) Medtronic v. Mirowski (2014) (unanimous) (burden of proof wrongly placed on someone other than the patent holder) Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (2013) (unanimous) (invalidated patents on naturally occurring DNA sequences) Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (2012) (unanimous) (district court's factual findings made clear that drug monitoring device patent merely restated a law of nature and was invalid) Caraco v. Novo (2012) (unanimous) (alleged infringers right to bring counterclaims expanded) Global-Tech v. SEB (2011) (8-1) (added knowledge of infringement element in claim for induced patent infringement) Bilski v. Kappos (2009) (unanimous to reverse, complicated holding as to extent of new law) (analysis to determine validity of business method patents tightened, dramatically narrowing their availability) Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. (2008) (unanimous) (disavows Federal Circuit doctrines allowing patent holders to limit use of patented device after a first sale) KSR v. Teleflex (2007) (unanimous) (tightened standard for obviousness in order to qualify for patent protection) MedImmune v. Genentech (2007) (8-1) (allows for contests of patent validity without risking liability by infringing patent prior to legal ruling on question) Microsoft v. AT&T (2007) (7-1) (U.S. patents laws don't have extraterritorial application; U.S. patent law doesn't apply to software copied abroad and not repatriated.) eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. (2006) (unanimous) (sets higher standard for obtaining injunctions once infringement is established) Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (2005) (unanimous) (exemption from patent infringement applies to use of patented drugs for narrow purposes of research associated with FDA drug approval process) Bowman v. Monsanto Co. (2012) (unanimous) (first sale doctrine does not invalidate ban on reproducing crops grown with patented GMO seeds) Kappos v. Hyatt (2012) (unanimous)(expanding ability of applicant denied a patent to challenge the denial with additional evidence) Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership (2011) (unanimous) (presumption of validity of patent continues to apply during patent re-examination process conducted by PTO). Stanford v. Roche (2011) (a case over who is entitled to a patent between two potential patent holders) Gunn v. Minton (2013) (unanimous) (overruling Federal Circuit precedents which had held that federal courts have broad jurisdiction over claims of malpractice in attorney malpractice cases where the underlying malpractice involved patent law, while reviewing a Texas Supreme Court ruling). Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP (2020) (7-2), the Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit and held that the PTAB’s decision on whether a petition for inter partes review is timely is not judicially reviewable replying on Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, the United States Supreme Court decided an important aspect of procedure in IPR cases holding that once an inter partes review is instituted by the Director of the USPTO, the PTAB must decide the patentability of all of the claims challenged. A major case deciding the constitutionality of part of the AIA and the remedy if it is unconstitutional is pending in Arthrex which has had oral arguments but not decision on the merits yet. The AIA eliminated tax strategy patents (a case to resolve the issue had been pending when the legislative fix arrived). | Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter. | This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know. | To pick up on your comment 'Does this mean if I wish to build a chair for personal use, then since trade of chairs exists between states, Congress has the authority to outlaw possession or manufacturing of chairs?': Yes. For example, the US Congress can legislate to prohibit a farmer from growing wheat for use on his own farm, on the basis that there is interstate trade in wheat and therefore the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the growing of wheat: Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. If you grow marijuana, or build a chair, or whatever, you conceivably affect the number of marijuanas, chairs, etc that are traded between states. Therefore you affect interstate commerce. Therefore the US Congress can regulate you. The fact that your marijuana or your chair or your what is trivial in the scheme of the national economy is irrelevant if the aggregation of all regulated marijuana, chairs or wheat is significant: 317 US 111, 127-128. If the law didn't prohibit possession of marijuana absolutely but instead prohibited, say, the carrying of marijuana in schools, then the US Congress might have trouble relying on the Commerce Clause: see United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549 and replace 'marijuana' with 'handguns' (OK the marijuana/handgun analogy is bad but hopefully this illustrates that there are at least some limits on Congress' power -- it's not just 'any physical object that relates whatsoever to interstate trade therefore unfettered federal legislative power'). | The relevant section of US patent law was already posted in an answer on one of the questions you linked, but I'll repeat it: 35 USC 271 (a): Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. Merely making a patented invention is infringement; it isn't relevant whether you sell it. It is also infringement if you use it yourself, regardless of who made it or whether you paid them, or whether you would have otherwise bought it from the patent holder. There are some special exceptions for things like certain kinds of pharmaceuticals, but I browsed the rest of 35 USC Chapter 28, and didn't see anything that would appear to be relevant in this case. | Congratulations, intrepid legal enthusiast or learner! What you'll need A legal dictionary, especially if you're just getting started. If you don't own one, you can try Black's Law Dictionary A little bit of patience and time. Or maybe a lot, depending on the particular case and the particular question you're trying to answer. Maybe a normal dictionary, too. Again, if you don't own one, there's plenty online. Onelook is a dictionary search engine, so it'll search a lot of dictionaries at the same time. Okay, I've got those things, now what? Alright, there's a few things you should know. Firstly, decisions of superior courts are binding only on those inferior courts within the same hierarchy. This means that you can appeal to a higher court so long as it has appellate jurisdiction. Generally, a state (meaning a country) will have a supreme or highest court, with appellate jurisdiction over all other courts - in Australia, this is the High Court of Australia, in the United States, this is the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the United Kingdom, this is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Secondly, decisions of a court are generally binding only on the matter in dispute. For example, if in a case, the matter of whether the police owe a duty of care to citizens in detecting crime, a comment on whether the police had correctly parked their vehicle is not binding - it is called obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta). What we're looking for in a judgement is the ratio decidendi (plural rationes decidendi), which is the reason for the decision. This is what is binding, and would be considered in future decisions. The problem? It's not always easy to tell the ratio from the obiter. Finally, often, the only way to know whether our interpretation of a case is right is to see whether it is applied in a future case, or overruled. Examples, examples! Sure. Let's try something easy to start with. Do product manufacturers owe a duty of care to their customers? Yes. The decision in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 found that product manufacturers - in this case, a ginger beer manufacturer - have a duty of care to ensure their products are safe for use or consumption. Lord Atkin said: The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. Okay, so the answer to this question is yes. How do I verify it? Get the source of the judgement. Without this, you're going to be relying on hearsay. The next best thing is a subsequent judgement that applies the one you're looking for, because if the judgement says what it's supposed to, it'll be mentioned in the subsequent judgement. I've found this one. Decide whether the matter in dispute is actually being decided. In our case, it is. But if I was quoting this from a judgement on whether product manufacturers have an obligation to transfer title for goods supplied on a credit agreement, it wouldn't be binding. Find the quote. If you've been given a quote. Otherwise, grab a cup of tea or coffee and get ready to read. A lot. If you can't find something that says, or means, what it's supposed to, it's probably not accurate. Make sure the judgement hasn't been overruled This is tricky, unless the judgement database you're using has a way of searching it. Most do. In any case, it's much like trying to prove a negative. In fact, it's exactly that. But always check whether the judgement has been overturned on appeal. Make sure the judgement hasn't been obsoleted by statute Again, this is tricky. It's proving a negative, again. And trying to find statute might be an answer for another time. Is that it? Pretty much, I think. These are at least the main points. There's a whole laundry list of things you shouldn't do with judgements, but they're more about reasoning than legal principles. It's a skill you can really only develop by using, and I'm constantly practising myself. Many discussions about cases are precisely about what their effect is. Yes, the decisions and orders are usually pretty clear-cut - for example, the decision is that the manufacturer has a duty of care, and the orders are for damages and costs to be paid. But what it means beyond that can be murky. Luckily for us, judges have become better at writing their judgements so that others can understand. Also, for more important cases, where the entire country, or world, is watching, others will interpret it for you - consider Obergefell v Hodges, for example. Not everyone can be trusted, but everyone, taken together, is a much more trustworthy source than just one person. In the end, there's not a mathematical formula for determining what judgements mean. There's some interpretation involved, some judgement. There's not always going to be one judgement that's enough to prove your matter. I'm struggling to end this post neatly so I'll just finish it with a cliff- | You need to check if the original game developers patented the mechanics/rules of the game. For your example, Monopoly was patented, but expired in the 50s and while it would not be a copyright violation to mimic the rules/mechanics, it would be a different intellectual property violation (patent infringement). Spry Fox vs LOLAPPS is also relevant as it extends copyright protection to the implementation of an idea, but ideas (like rules/mechanics) cannot, by themselves, be copyrighted. This means that there is an avenue for the original developer/company to sue even if the visual/audible aspects are different, but the overall gameplay is the same. Also see Tetris Holding LLC vs Xio Interactive Inc. as it relates to the visual aspect of the game. | Does this mean that if the employee leaves the company, and then creates or gain an intellectual property right, does the company own that right ? No. The reference to "the future" pertains only to the IPRs of inventions that ensued in the course of his employment. Even if the employer alleged that the clause also encompasses post-employment creations and/or post-employment acquisitions of IPR, such extension would be unconscionable (and therefore null and void). |
What can be done regarding gathering possessions from a rented student house where someone is unable to visit due to bullying? A bit of strange circumstance: I have already looked online on various Housing charities and legal forums, but I haven't been able to get an approach that meets the specific circumstances as this issue is quite sensitive. During the past academic year a friend has not been able to stay in the house they are paying rent on due to the consistent breaking of covid rules by other tenants and bullying. My friend stayed with another friend for a while but has now returned home to complete the academic year. They have a typical student type agreement with the landlord which is coming to an end by the end of the academic year. As it stands my friend has all their belongings still in the house and is mentally not able to face going to get them due to the other tenants, or able to communicate with the other tenants for the same reasons. My friend has approached the letting agent, explained the above in greater detail, and asked them to speak to the other tenants to arrange a time where the house would be vacant to gather the belongings (possibly over the Easter break), so far the letting agent has simply replied that it hasn't been possible. What we are trying to find out is: What are the lettings agent's (or landlord's) responsibilities to a situation like this? Can my friend ask for additional time at the end of the agreement to empty their things? If the letting agent refuses to help what options does my friend have? Given they are not the lead tenant how do they go about getting any deposit remaining back? For clarity my friend is a British citizen living in the UK, in case of any regional variations to possible laws. | The agent/landlord responsibility is to ensure that the residents have "quiet enjoyment" of the property during the period it is let. As long as your friend has access to the flat he has that. He can ask, but the agent/landlord have no obligation to provide it. Could your friend appoint someone else to go and get their property? There is no reason why he has to do it in person. He should provide this person with a signed letter of authority (just "I, Joseph Bloggs, hereby authorise John Doe to collect my belongings from 123 Cherry Tree Crescent on my behalf", signed and dated) and also send a copy to the agent. Your friend must have a contract with somebody. If he paid a deposit then it should have been kept in a proper deposit protection scheme, and he should have paperwork to that effect. If that wasn't done, then he can sue the person he has the contract with for (in effect) punitive damages in addition to getting his deposit back. You say your friend was "not the lead tenant", so it sounds like one of the tenants was sub-letting, but its not clear; it may be that this "lead tenant" was just acting as a point of contact for stuff like rent collection. Your friend should have some kind of written tenancy agreement; he can sue the person or company named named on that. If the tenancy was a verbal contract then he can sue the person he handed the deposit to. | The usual default rule is that a purchaser is bound to honor a lease on the same terms as the previous owner, and that purchase agreements are subject to existing valid leases. However, the Ontario Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 (S.o. 2006, chapter 17) section 49 (2) says: If a landlord who is an owner as defined in clause (a) or (b) of the definition of “owner” in subsection 1 (1) of the Condominium Act, 1998 owns a unit, as defined in subsection 1 (1) of that Act, that is a rental unit and has entered into an agreement of purchase and sale of the unit, the landlord may, on behalf of the purchaser, give the tenant of the unit a notice terminating the tenancy, if the purchaser in good faith requires possession of the unit for the purpose of residential occupation by, (a) the purchaser; (b) the purchaser’s spouse; (c) a child or parent of the purchaser or the purchaser’s spouse; or (d) a person who provides or will provide care services to the purchaser, the purchaser’s spouse, or a child or parent of the purchaser or the purchaser’s spouse, if the person receiving the care services resides or will reside in the building, related group of buildings, mobile home park or land lease community in which the rental unit is located. 2006, c. 17, s. 49 (2). I take that to mean that IF the purchaser intends to reside in the unit (or have one of the people in (2)(a)-(d) reside there), then and only then, you can be given notice to leave. Acceding to par (3) of the same section the notice must be at least 60 days, and must be to the end of a rental period (probably a month), and that 60 days may not start until after the landlord has actually signed a sales agreement for the unit. And the landlord can only do this if the new owner has specifically indicated a requirement for possession of the unit as a residence, not to rent to someone else. You may want to seek out a tenants assistance organization, or possibly a lawyer, since it sounds as if the landlord is going beyond what the law permits. EDIT: As to showing the unit, section 26(3) of the same act provides that: Entry to show rental unit to prospective tenants (3) A landlord may enter the rental unit without written notice to show the unit to prospective tenants if, (a) the landlord and tenant have agreed that the tenancy will be terminated or one of them has given notice of termination to the other; (b) the landlord enters the unit between the hours of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.; and (c) before entering, the landlord informs or makes a reasonable effort to inform the tenant of the intention to do so. 2006, c. 17, s. 26 (3). and section 27 (2) and 27 (3) further provide that: (2) A landlord or, with the written authorization of a landlord, a broker or salesperson registered under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, may enter a rental unit in accordance with written notice given to the tenant at least 24 hours before the time of entry to allow a potential purchaser to view the rental unit. 2006, c. 17, s. 27 (2). (3) The written notice under subsection (1) or (2) shall specify the reason for entry, the day of entry and a time of entry between the hours of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. 2006, c. 17, s. 27 (3). So it seems that the landlord may show the unit to prospective purchasers during reasonable hours. However another provision says that the landlord may not interfere with your "quiet enjoyment" of the premises, so the frequency of showing probably must be reasonable. | No The tenant is liable if they break a contract: there is no contract here. One of the tests for a contract is that there is an offer that if accepted will create a clear, unambiguous contract. Looking at the enumerated facts: Alan advertises a room to rent in a joint tenancy property in which they are lead tenant - not an offer, this is an invitation to treat Zoe views the room and verbally expresses an interest in renting it - not an offer, this is the opening of negotiations Alan passes on Zoe's contact details to the estate agent - not an offer, this is communication between one party and their agent The estate agent contacts Zoe by email, providing a draft contract and asking for further information in order to complete her details - not an offer, the contract is a "draft" Zoe provides the requested details, again by email - not an offer, just a transfer of information The contract is drawn up and the estate agents inform both Alan and Zoe that it is ready to be signed - this is an offer A week later (having not yet signed), Zoe informs the estate agent that she no longer wants to take the room - ... that was not accepted Further, the tenant is liable if they are promissory estopped - they have withdrawn a promise made to a second party if the latter has reasonably relied on that promise. Zoe has made no promises other than one to negotiate - she has negotiated. | As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine. | The precise details (and citations) will vary with jurisdiction, so this answer deals only with principles. If you pick up and "take possession of" property belonging to somebody else, you are a thief. [Note that 'taking possession' rather than picking up to restore to the owner/correct place is what makes the difference, which is why in real life nobody who cannot prove your intention will take action; but your question explicitly concedes the point.] If the property does not belong to the supermarket, you are not stealing from them, but from the currently unidentified owner: this makes no legal difference. You might conceivably have a defence if you can prove that the owner has abandoned the property, whatever the definition of "abandoned" is in your jurisdiction (note that it is up to you to show this, and possibly that you knew it before you picked up the property). If it belongs to the supermarket, this cannot be true; if a box of matches has fallen out of someone's pocket, it might possibly be (whatever the laws are, it is very unlikely that they have ever been applied in such a trivial case, so there may be some uncertainty). in any case, the shop is undoubtedly allowed to throw you out, ban you from returning to their premises, and inform other shops and the police that they believe you to be a petty thief, based on their experience. | You have not mentioned your jurisdiction or details on the lease, but generally tenants are jointly and severally liable - which means that if he does not pay his share, the landlord can pursue you for it. In turn, you should be able to pursue him for the courts for his share of the rent. (This does not mean you will get paid - but does mean you can try and get the money off him). | Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough). | B and C have a contract with A In return for paying 3 months rent, B and C will remove A from the lease. This has all the required elements to be a contract. B and C have fulfilled their obligations and A hasn’t. B & C could sue A for damages. They would need to prove that there was such an agreement and that they agreement was a legally binding contract. Is this agreement written down? Was it witnessed by impartial third parties? What evidence of this agreement do you actually have? If A says they agreed to X, yet B & C say they agreed to Y: what evidence exists to show who is right and who is wrong? Failing to fulfill the obligations of a contract is not fraud. For there to be fraud, B & C would have to prove that A never intended to comply by the terms of the agreement. Given that the terms of the agreement are somewhat ambiguous, this would be very difficult. This seems to be more of a case where [Hanlon's Razor]: "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity." That is, A's actions are more likely to be the result of a misunderstanding (by A, or B & C, or both) than a deliberate plan of deception. The landlord is not involved - they removed A from the lease at the request of A, B & C; they’ve done what they’re required to do. |
Do search engines need permission to start searching? I was talking to my friends a few days ago about search engines and we started discussing whether or not they need permission from websites to crawl them. I looked this one up and it said on Quora that you don't really need permission to crawl them since they are present in public domain and are public property. If the websites want privacy, they can change their settings appropriately. However, later on, I talked to a few other people who said that search engines like Google and Bing don't just crawl all websites. They only crawl websites which are registered on their SEO or are on their radar and ranking–I didn't really understand this part very much–but that doesn't make much sense either since they'd still need to crawl other websites to be updated. My question is: If I had a search engine that worked roughly like Google, Bing, etc., do could I just start crawling and displaying results, or would I need get special permission from the trillions of websites out there before I can actually run my search engine? | "Public domain" refers to things in principle copyrightable but where protection has lapsed, been repudiated, or is a statutory exception (such as government works). A website is not "in the public domain". The idea that a website is "public property" is (*cough*) mistaken. There are basically two ways in which a web interaction could be illegal. The first regards whether accessing another person's computer is illegally accessing a computer, which is a crime. Authorization essentially comes down to "permission": if the owner permits me to access the computer, I am authorized. Putting stuff out there on a web server is an open-ended grant of permission to look at a web page. That simply means that if I create a web page (with a bunch of links or not), I am granting you permission to interact with my computer to that extent. It does not create permission to hack into a password-protected subdirectory. An ordinary web crawler automates what a clicking human does. Copyright law is also relevant, in that the stuff I put on my webpage is not to be copied without permission. Any webpage access necessarily involves automatic copying from machine to machine: in putting stuff out there for the world to see, I am saying that the world can do that level of automatic copying that arises from normal html-and-click interactions. It does not mean that you can download and do stuff with my copyrighted content (i.e., it is not an abandonment of copyright: I did not put that stuff in the public domain). Putting a web page out there in an unrestricted fashion means that you've given a certain level of permission to "copy" (at least in the automatic server-to-browser viewing sense). I may want to impose conditions on peoples' access to my stuff, so I can impose terms on such material. For instance, I may require users to agree to certain conditions before accessing the CoolStuff subdirectory. Users then have to jump through a minor hoop and agree to those terms. In that case, my permission is conditional, and if you violate the terms of that agreement, I may be able to sue you for copyright infringement. It could then be a violation of my terms of service (TOS) if I say "you may not crawl my website" (in less vague language). A TOS gets its legal power from copyright law, because every webpage interaction involves copying (I assume that technical point is obvious), and copying can only be done with permission. You may technologically overcome my weak click-through technology so that the bot just says "sure whatever" and proceeds to illegally use my web page: I can sue you now for copyright infringement. The robot-specific methods of meta-tags and robots.txt have no legal force. Although there is a way to say "no you may not," which is tailored to automated access, the meaning and enforcement of these devices has not yet reached the law. If my page uses NOFOLLOW and your program doesn't know or care, you (your program) do not (yet) have a duty to understand, detect and respect that tag. Prior registration is also not a legal requirement, and very many pages that are on the master crawl list get there from being linked to by someone else's web page. Again, there is at present no legal requirement of pre-registration (and there is no effective mechanism for verifying that the site owner has registered the site). Archiving and especially re-displaying someone's content is, on the other hand, not legal. It would be plainly copyright infringement if you were to scoop up someone else's webpage and host it. You can analyze their material and somehow associate it with some search terms, and display a link to that page, but you cannot copy and republish their material. You can put very short snippets out there taken from a web page, under the "fair use" doctrine, but you can't wholesale republish a webpage. (It should be noted that the archive.org is an internationally recognized library, and libraries have extra statutory powers to archive). | a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days. | Simply use a cookie to store consent. First consider the opposite. If a user does not agree to store cookies, a cookie is the only way to remember this, as you want to avoid a new pop-up on every page-load. Because this use of a cookie is functional, you don't need permission to store that cookie. You seem have the impression that you have to prove towards the ICO if someone has provided consent. However I think it would be sufficient if you can demonstrate how your website works technically. In particular whether consent is handled properly. You might need to create screenshots or a screencast to do so. Add new proof after each major update of your website. Storing consent server-side would violate the data minimization principle of the GDPR I think. In particular because you would need to do something to be able to identify users. That would violate Art. 11(1) GDPR: If the purposes for which a controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation. Notice it is possible to configure google analytics in a way so you don't need any consent. See my answer to this question. Just IP anonymization is not sufficient. | The notice has a lot to do with legacy requirements in the United States to claim the copyright to a work. Up until 1989, the copyright notice was required. Today, the statements are mainly maintained to protect against "innocent infringement" which might reduce what a content owner can get in court. What exactly do those terms entail? That the owner stated owns all rights and you may do nothing with the content. My biggest concern is this: by writing that, is the company claiming to own everything on the website, even potentially copyrighted user-submitted material? That's exactly what they are doing. Depending on the terms of the specific site, content contributors generally either assign copyright to the site owner or license the content in a way that allows the site owner to do exactly what they want with it. Site creators with the smarts or money to do it right/get someone to do it right usually state something like: Copyright [Site Owner] and contributors. Other sites (like this one) state specifically what they hold the copyright to: site design / logo © 2015 Stack Exchange Inc THIS IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE. CONSULT AN ATTORNEY REGARDING YOUR SPECIFIC SITUATION. | There is nothing in the GDPR requiring you to collect individual personally identifiable information. If the website has no need, and the website owner no desire, to collect such information, there is no requirement to do so. The GDPR requires that if such information is collected, that there is a lawful basis, and that it be handled appropriately and stored securely, and deleted when there is no longer a need to retain it, or on a proper request. If no such information is collected in the first place, all the rules about how to handle it do not apply. It is possible that some law of an individual country in the EU might mandate collection of some particular information, but I have not heard of any such requirement. | Laws against such actions are not stated in terms of popular and fluid concepts like "computer virus", they are stated in terms of clear concepts like "unauthorized access". There are federal and state laws against this. This web site lists and links to all of the state laws on the matter. There is also a federal law: a detailed legal analysis by DOJ is given here. There are some limits to federal jurisdiction, for example "protected computers" include "computers used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication". The term "affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication" is widely used in federal law, and can be used to prohibit growing feed for your own animals. Anything that you "send" clearly affects interstate commerce (the internet is internationally connected). 18 USC 1030(a) says Whoever ... (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains...(C) information from any protected computer Essentially, a computer connected to the outside world is protected. The key here is "without authorization". If you authorize MS to report back stuff about your computer, that is not unauthorized. It may not be possible to use their product without giving such authorization, in which case you can use a different product that doesn't require that you grant authorization. There is also the possibility that some software producer has technically violates the law because they think that it's okay for them to access the computer as long as they do no harm. Typically, people are not aware that they have granted software publishers access to their computer. The concept of "harm" is pretty much irrelevant to computer-crime criminal law. It would be relevant, though, if a plaintiff were to sue someone for sniffing around their computer: then you'd have to show that you were damaged. | You generally can request data for free, but keep in mind that the Act does not require every set of data to be published or released. For instance, it applies only to data that is subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act. This means that it has no effect on the Delaware Business Search database, because that data is not controlled by a federal agency, and therefore not subject to FOIA. There have been requests for bulk access to this data in the past, and as far as I know, they have all been rejected. Given the state's economic reliance on its very sketchy business laws, I would but expect that to change any time soon. You would suddenly have journalists and the like scouring the database making all sorts of connections and uncovering all manner of unsavory activity, and no one in a policy making role wants to have to deal with that. | As far as I can tell, whenever GitHub redistributes code, it adheres to all of the requirements of the GPL/BSD etc. For example, it never gives away code without including the license text, and it doesn't claim to add unpermitted restrictions to the code. The section you're concerned about is this: That means you're giving us the right to do things like reproduce your content (so we can do things like copy it to our database and make backups); display it (so we can do things like show it to you and other users); modify it (so our server can do things like parse it into a search index); distribute it (so we can do things like share it with other users); and perform it (in case your content is something like music or video). That section isn't worded very precisely, but I understand this to mean they want to reproduce your content in full, not just the code without the license text attached. They want to display your content in full, as you provided it. They want to modify it internally (i.e. they are not redistributing this modified form) in order to allow searching. To the extent that they display code-snippets as search results, that is likely defensible as fair use (search engines are frequently cited as examples of successful fair use defenses). GitHub appears to be acting consistently with the GPL when it reproduces, displays, modifies, and distributes code that you upload. If I'm correct about these facts then nothing that GitHub does with the code goes beyond what the many contributors to a GPL project have explicitly permitted, or what is otherwise permitted by fair use law. If you had some code with a more restrictive license, you might not be able to simultaneously comply with that restrictive license and GitHub's License Grant. Consider the scenario where you have some code that is licensed exclusively to you, and you are not given permission to reproduce or distribute it. In that scenario, the code's license prevents you from agreeing to GitHub's request for a license grant. |
What if you made the fine print of a contract too small to read? I was talking with a friend the other day and they asked me what would happen if you made the fine print of a legally binding contract too small to read? Would the person who signed it be able to sue you? Are there any laws against this? | what would happen if you made the fine print of a legally binding contract too small to read? The contents of unreadable fine print would be unenforceable. That is because it does not meet the tenet that parties enter the terms knowingly. Even if the draftsman alleges the counterparty "unreasonably" declined to ask for legible print, the fact-finder be unable to ascertain the parties' legal position pursuant to unreadable print. The rest of the contract is binding and enforceable. Would the person who signed it be able to sue you? No. It would be pointless. The unreadable print is nothing but meaningless scratch/mark/sign that gives neither party a cause of action. | Can a business put whatever they want into a contract? No. There are some things a business cannot put into a contract. But I don't see anything stopping them from putting this into a contract. It's not reasonable to assume that you have to cancel before the 20th every month. It's not reasonable to assume that - except there's no assumption needed. The contract states it flat out. You are most likely stuck paying. Requiring cancellation about 10 days in advance of the month doesn't seem like it would be an unconscionable clause. (Requiring cancellation 10 months in advance would be a different story.) Michigan law does say the following is prohibited: Taking advantage of the consumer's inability reasonably to protect his or her interests by reason of disability, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language of an agreement presented by the other party to the transaction who knows or reasonably should know of the consumer's inability. But I doubt that applies in your case. It also prohibits: Gross discrepancies between the oral representations of the seller and the written agreement covering the same transaction or failure of the other party to the transaction to provide the promised benefits. So if you were promised you could cancel at any time without notice or penalty, but you later found out the contract said differently, this law may apply. | What would the implications be if an employee were to refuse signing an amendment and insist on what was stated in the original signed contract, even if he/she knows it's a mistake? The contract is voidable unless the employer's subsequent conduct reinforces its legitimacy. The employee's attempt to take advantage of something he knew was a mistake contravenes the covenant of good faith and fair dealing on which contracts are premised. South African contract law is not an exception to this: The law of contract underpins private enterprise in South Africa and regulates it in the interest of fair dealing. The employer can resort to records of prior communications between the parties to prove that the stated compensation was intended as yearly, not monthly. Even if those records are not available in a judicial dispute, the employee would have a hard time persuading a court that the salary that was agreed upon is 12 times --or exceeds by a factor of 12-- the market rate for a job position of similar type. | Hypothetically speaking, if a program doesn't come with a EULA, does that mean someone in possession of it (who isn't the owner) would be breaking the law if they used it? If the copy on the stick was lawfully made with permission of the copyright holder, then you can lawfully use the software. Someone who lawfully comes into possession of a lawfully made copy of the software (that was not a backup) has the right to use that software in the ordinary way. For example if someone found a USB stick lying on the ground and it had software on it but no EULA, could they use the software? Maybe, but it would be hard for them to know whether they could or not. It might be a backup. It might be an unlawful copy. There was a case where a person found a CD in the trash that was clearly an original. The package had a shrink wrap agreement, but he found the CD without the package. The court held that he had every right to use the software on the CD (since it was a lawfully-made copy and not a backup) and was not bound by the EULA (since he hadn't opened the package). But he was very fortunate in being able to demonstrate these facts. | It's a contract violation if you're under the EULA. It may be a contract of adhesion, but such "clickwrap" contracts been found to be acceptable and enforceable in software EULAs out of necessity. However, there may be some limits. If you're not under the EULA, as you argue, then you lack a license to use the software at all and it's an outright copyright violation and/or a theft or misappropriation of the software. Whether or not you can be sued depends in part on what you do with it — if you don't release the material or otherwise cause damages then there's not much to sue for... Added for clarification: to answer the framing question, supposing neither contract or copyright applied, one could be sued in tort or in equity (i.e. for unjust enrichment). | None The contractual chain is you <-> warranty company <-> (potentially others you don’t know about) <-> service provider. Should something go wrong, you would sue your warranty company who might (it is up to them) then sue the service provider. Notwithstanding, it’s likely the service company owes you a duty of care and would be directly liable to you for a negligence claim. | Do you have a contract? It depends on the website’s terms but almost certainly not. It is standard practice in e-commerce terms and conditions that your selecting “buy” and giving the vendor money does not create a contract; you are merely making an offer that the vendor can accept or reject. For example, Amazon’s terms are clear that the contract only comes into existence when they dispatch the goods, until then they are free to cancel your order and return your money. Here the vendor rejected the offer. Is this false advertising? Maybe. It would depend on the specifics of the ad and whether, overall, a reasonable person would be mislead or deceived. It’s possible you misunderstood but that doesn’t necessarily make it misleading or deceptive. I misunderstand a lot of things; that doesn’t mean they were objectively misleading or deceptive. Notwithstanding, a business does not have to make good on false advertising. An incorrect advertised price does not force the business to anccept offers of that price. It may force a correction and may require the item to not be sold until the price is corrected and it may expose the business to fines, but it does not give anyone the right to buy at that price. | It is possible that a court would hold Comapny X's agreement with Bob to be unconscionable for overbredth and therefore void. This would depend on the state having jurisdiction, and on the specific facts of the case and the language of the contract between X and Bob. Some states do not favor such broad agreements on automatic assignment of IP rights. If the Contract between X and Bob was held to be void, then Sam would own the rights. Otherwise X would own the rights, as their contract came first. As the answer by Dale M says, Bob entered into the contract with Sam fraudulently, by concealing a materiel fact (Bob's existing employment with X). Bob would potentially be liable to Sam for damages. One possible measure of damages would be what it would cost Sam to buy the rights from X. |
Book Publishing and Republishing I had a two-year contract with a publisher that has since expired (expired Jan 2015). The contract granted the following rights (excerpted): [[ WHEREAS the Author is the sole composer and copyright holder of the literary Work presently known as [deleted]. Author hereby grants Publisher the rights to print and distribute the book to the marketplace limited to two (2) YEARS. Author agrees that all subsidiary rights shall be divided 50% to the Author and 50% to the Publisher. DISSOLUTION: At the dissolution of this agreement, Author agrees that all bound copies shall be delivered to the Author at 60% discount and Author may dispose of these copies and retain all proceeds. Should the author elect not to purchase the remaindered books within 30 days, Publisher would dispose of such copies without reporting further to the author. ]] DETAILS FOLLOW SUPPORTING MY QUESTIONS BELOW: a) My book continues to be sold by Amazon.com for $18.00 (now 6 years later) and I've not been able to get anyone to tell me who is printing the book - nor am I seeing any of the royalties that would come from sales. Nor did I get the option to buy the remaining books at the 60% discount as stated in the contract. b) Last week, my new publisher published the sequel to the book - and with new attention from this publication, I'm getting requests for the books as a set/series. QUESTIONS: Based on the contractual elements above, I want to better understand my rights as I move to have the first book republished. 1) Shouldn't I be a part of the decision if the first publisher decides to continue to print the book? 2) Shouldn't I be receiving royalties if the publisher is still publishing the book for Amazon.com? 3) If I have it republished next month, is there any legal exposure on my end? Any help would be appreciated. Patricia | Suppose Publisher printed 10,000 copies under the terms of the contract, and within those two years they sold 7,000 copies (and paid royalties). If you did not receive leftover copies at the end of the 2 years, then either (1) they broke the contract or (2) at the last minute they sold the remainder to some third party. If the latter is the case, they would be obligated to pay royalties on that last sale, and the numbers should add up (assuming you know how many were printed initially). If they failed to pay royalties, or they continued to sell the book, you would need to send your lawyer after them. Another possibility is the lost-email excuse – "We emailed you asking if you wanted the books, and you didn't reply, so we sold them" (disposing of does not necessary mean "destroy"). The burden would be on them to prove that they offered you the remainders and you elected not to purchase (if that is the wording – the contract could have required a specific refusal, not just a failure to respond). Under the contract, Publisher can't just decide to keep printing the book, nor can they continue to distribute it (but a third party could distribute existing copies forever). You would have "legal exposure" i.e. some risk of being sued if you republish, but it might be minimal – definitely get your attorney to advise you on that. Vendors might refuse to sell the republished work if they think it is an unauthorized edition. | Copyright protection exists for any work (picture, paragraph, song etc), and persists for many years until it expires. Unless the work was created a long time ago, or was created by the US government (not the same as "funded by government money"), you should assume that the work is protected. That means that you must have permission to copy it. Sometimes, a work has associated with it some such permission, in the form of a "license". Without such a license, you have to request the copyright owner for permission to copy – whether or not they say that the work is protected by copyright (because by law it is protected, so they don't have to say that it is). If you request permission to copy, and do not receive the required permission, then you cannot legally copy the work. The copyright holder has no obligation to explicitly deny permission. You can certainly list the URL for an image, you just cannot copy the image in your book. | This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta. | 20th Century Fox have a trademark on "Simpsons." They have trademarks on "Bart Simpson", on "D'oh", on "Duff Beer". I would assume that they take their trademarks seriously. What you can't do is to use someone else's trademark to make people believe your commercial product is related to theirs. It's quite reasonable to assume that someone seeing your book in a store would think it is written by the makers of The Simpsons show and therefore buy it. Even if you say that isn't your intention, it is what would happen. I'd try coming up with some different titles, maybe "How to write animated TV shows" with "Example: The Simpsons" (well, you are the writer so you should come up with something better), and take them to a lawyer. And then contact the makers of the show (again asking the lawyer for advice how to do this) because even if your lawyer says the title is fine, that doesn't mean you can't be sued. | This appears to mean that the author, while retaining copyright, is allowing anyone to make copies without asking permission from the author. This would seem to be similar to a CC-BY license, or perhaps more exactly a CC-BY-ND license, as the author has apparently not granted the right to create modified versions or other derivative works. This does not require one who makes such copies to distribute them free of charge, unless there is another provision not mentioned in the question. Amazon, or anyone else, would be free to sell copies at any price they cared to ask. If the author wanted to limit the sales price, that would take another provision, and might not be enforceable. | A book (or any other creative work) published in the 1800s is now in the public domain everywhere in the world (excepting odd cases like Peter Pan where a special rule applies in some jurisdictions.) Anyone may legally quote from such a work at any length with no legal requirement for permission. In fact there is no legal requirement to attribute the quote to the author (although there is an ethical requirement). In fact one may publish a new edition of such a work, unchanged or modified in any way one chooses, with no legal need to obtain permission from anyone or to pay any royalties or fees. If the work were recent enough to still be protected by copyright, a limited quote could be used under fair use, fair dealing or another exception to copyright under the laws of most countries. The exact rules vary by country, and are often highly fact-dependent, so the exact details will matter. If one wanted to quote enough from a recent work that permission is required, the copyright holder, who is often not the publisher, would need to grant permission. That is often the author or the author's heir, but it can be a person or firm to which the author transferred the rights. Sometimes the rights-holder can be hard to identify. Update: it would be possible for a work published in, say, 1890 by an author then young who lived to a fairly old age, dying in, say 1960, to still be protected in some countries, although not in the US. (Anything published before 1925 is now PD in the US.) But Charlotte Bronte died in 1855, and all of her work has long been in the public domain | I know of no cause of action related to "misrepresentation of intellectual property" (I believe it may be a phrase used colloquially in the context of academic integrity). If such a cause of action exists, I'll leave it to another answer to discuss. This answer approaches your question through the lens of copyright infringement and moral rights. A reproduction is an infringement if it substantially reproduces the original. Short quotes, properly attributed, will often be fair use, even if exactly reproduced. If an exact reproduction is not an infringement (e.g. because it copied too short a phrase) or if it is fair use, then a slightly altered reproduction a fortiori would also not be an infringement or would be fair use. In jurisdictions that recognize moral rights, there may be circumstances where an alteration, even to spelling, would be a violation of an author's moral rights. But to make out a violation of an author's moral rights based only on a spelling alteration, the spelling would have to be critical to the integrity of the work (e.g. perhaps the choice of dialect) and the alteration would have to be prejudicial to the author's honour or reputation. | Yes, a work with no license is All Rights Reserved, reserved meaning the creator of the work. Who is the creator of the work ? Everyone who contributed it, unanimously. Yes. If people contributed any copyrightable part of your work, in theory you cannot add any license or grant any right to use/reproduce/whatever the work without their unanimous agreement. That's very cumbersome, and almost nobody really does that, but it's what the law is. Big serious companies and repos require contributors to waive their rights on the code they contribute, by agreeing to a contributor's agreement. For example, python/cpython requires you to give your contribs a license allowing the python org to do essentially what they want with it, even though you retain copyright over them. If your project is not so serious, I suggest it should be enough to make the license clear, and that by contributing people are agreeing to place their contribution's code under the license. If it's a free license, that's all you need. |
Is forced cunnilingus or analingus rape? Is forced cunnlingus or analingus, "legally" considered rape or is it sexual assault? Any case would involve the The perpetrator forcibly performing cunnlingus/analingus on the victim or The perpetrator would force the victim to perform cunnlingus/analingus on them Obviously either two of these scenarios would be a crime one way or another. So most rape laws (I think in US states and UK especially), require penetrative acts to be unwillingly forced on the victim. So either of these cases would not be classified as "rape" if that were the case. Are there any jurisdictions where this is not the case? Is the severity of the offense (1) or (2) equivalent to that of forcible penetrative acts or is it a lesser offense? Although I have no specific jurisdiction in mind, what is the case in most jurisdictions? | In the United States, each state is free to define their own version of what is rape and what is sexual assault. Many States view rape and sexual assault to be of "equal severity", but they are punishable under different laws. For example, Kentucky defines rape as any non-consensual intercourse and includes anal sex and object penetration in the definition of intercourse. Alaska does not define rape in its criminal code but all forms of unwanted sexual penetration (by object or other) under sexual assault charges. New York defines rape as sexual intercourse without consent and all other unwanted contact under sexual assault. Source: takepart.com As you can see, the definition of rape and sexual assault is either combined or broken out into separate laws. In most States though, the punishment for either rape or sexual assault is considered the "same severity". Under Federal crimes, rape is not defined but is grouped under 18 US Code 2241-2248. Punishment for these crimes range from a fine through life imprisonment. So for the United States, your (1) and (2) either may be classified as "rape" or "sexual assault" but the severity of the offense and the punishment is usually equal under the eyes of the law. Taking New York for example... Sec. 130.00 defines terms Sec. 130.50 Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree Sec. 130.52 Forcible Touching Sec. 130.35 Rape 130.50 (Criminal Sexual Act, which (1) and (2) fall under) is a Class B Felony, so is 130.35 (Rape). They all fall under Sec 70.80 for sentencing, which says that a Class B Felony must be a term between 5 and not exceeding 25 years. You can look up the laws in other States, but many follow the same pattern, either they lump sexual assault and rape under the same law, or they break them apart into distinct "rape" and "sexual assault", but use the same sentencing guidelines. | An assault is carried out by a threat of bodily harm coupled with an apparent, present ability to cause the harm. There is no need for physical contact in an assault, all that is needed is the threat and the apparent, present ability. The drill sergeant was behaving in a threatening manner and had an apparent, present ability to cause harm; he was guilty of assault. Consensually engaging in a legal contact sport lacks the threat of bodily harm; that is to say that the bodily harm is a risk of the sport but it is not the object of it. Of course, an illegal sport where death or maiming is an inherent part would leave the participants open to assault (and battery) charges - you cannot agree to do illegal things. What is necessary to constitute the threat and the apparent means depends on the whole of the circumstances. A person throwing water when they had threatened the victim with acid is most certainly assault. Pointing a replica pistol at someone who doesn't know it is a replica constituted the threat and apparent means in one action. | Content Warning: this post mentions rape / non-consensual sex and discusses (in some non-explicit detail) coercion of minors. As of Tuesday, March 1st, 2016, according to the Indonesian Penal Code (translated version; I cannot read Indonesian), Indonesia's age of consent is 16 years old (18 for homosexual acts). Indonesia also does not have close-in-age exemptions (for example, in Canada, the age of consent is 16 years old, but a 14-year-old can consent to a partner less than 5 years older, and a 12-year-old can consent within 2 years). I cannot verify this source but according to Wikipedia, which cites this PDF, the age of consent could be raised to 18 years under the Child Protection Act arguing that sexual acts can cause bodily or mental harm and "child" is defined as anyone under 18 years of age. As an example, according to Wikipedia, a court case in 2009 (Sydney Morning Herald) saw this used to convict an Australian man. There is nothing weird about this law. I left this as a comment, but let me elaborate in an answer. Your misconception is that persuasion is an innocent and ethical thing. The harsh reality is that children are, on average, more ignorant than adults and lack judgement, foresight, and rationality at times, and there are disgusting individuals that will exploit this fact to get children to do things they otherwise wouldn't such as sex, or drugs. Additionally, age comes with a power imbalance - think a teacher using their power over a student to convince or coerce them into having sex with them. That is not strictly violence, nor telling lies, or "forcing" in the strict sense, nor trickery, but a reasonable individual would still consider that to be not real consent. The fact is that children can only consent if it is entirely of their own accord and judgement and there is no extrinsic pressure forcing or persuading them to. In fact, I argue that adults are subject to this too and persuading or coercing an adult into having sex is also disgusting (but doing this to children is far more abhorrent). But since children are considered by law to lack the judgement to protect themselves against coercion and realize they should reject and get away from their persuader, the law instead protects them. Persuading someone is not necessarily non-consensual. It holds a high chance of being non-consensual, and consent is only considered real when it is a) not coerced, and b) the subject is legally capable; that is, not intoxicated, not a minor (by whatever the age of cosnent is), etc. If all obscene acts with a girl under 18 are illegal, why doesn't the law simply say don't do obscene acts with a girl under 18? Because sex with people between 16 and 18 is legal (in Indonesia) under the right conditions. Although I must say, since you word it as "obscene acts", then of course they're illegal. Obscene acts are, by definition, morally reprehensible and/or legally incriminating, so illegal things are illegal, is basically what you're saying. Just say "having sex" if you mean "having sex". Why does the law prohibit persuading girls to do obscene acts but does not prohibit the actual doing of the obscene act itself? Kind of weird. This makes no sense at all, and hopefully after reading my answer you understand why this makes absolutely no sense. How in the earth anyone can have sex with someone without persuading? He walks the street and accidentally plug his penis in? ... Rape? There are many ways to have sex with someone without persuading them that I don't think I have to list. Your main mistake is still conflating persuaded / coerced consent as real consent. In summary, persuasion is not some innocent matter of convincing someone in a friendly manner to have sex. It includes coercion, abusing one's power, exploiting a child's ignorance and limited judgement or foresight, and other reprehensible factors. Consent cannot be given if the individual is too young, impaired, unable to legally give consent, or coerced into it. | Yes, maybe australia In Australia, child abuse material is classified as the sexualised depiction of persons under 16 (or in some cases 18). This applies under both State and Commonwealth laws. Common charges in NSW will be possessing, disseminating or producing child abuse material under s 91(H) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Further Commonwealth offences can be found in circumstances where a communications carrier has been used for the purposes of delivering child abuse material. Within this field, there are subtle variations in circumstances. The court would need to decide if the pictures were a “sexualised depiction”. Context matters. I don’t know of any cases on point but convictions have been secured for sexualised cartoons of children and pictures of fully-clothed children in sexual poses. | This is totally, flat out wrong. Quite frankly, it is immoral, although not illegal, for the producers to even cause some viewers to believe it is true. The United States criminal code (Title 18) in Chapter 77, prohibits all forms of slavery (except as punishment for a crime which New York State does not authorize) including the one described. It is not legal. This statute implements the 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (abolishing slavery except as punishment for a crime) and was enacted under the enforcement authority provided by that statute. Those statutes have been in force for more than a century. For example, 18 USC § 1590 states: (a)Whoever knowingly recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, any person for labor or services in violation of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. (b)Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, shall be subject to the penalties under subsection (a). Similarly, 15 U.S.C. § 1584 is squarely on point: (a)Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section, or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. (b)Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, shall be subject to the penalties described in subsection (a). It also would constitute criminal child endangerment, child abandonment, use of a child to commit a controlled substances offense, conspiracy to commit criminal coercion, conspiracy to have a child engaged in illegal child labor, etc. Possession of controlled substances by the mother is also a crime, although that crime was committed before the mother tried to sell her child to pay her drug debt. (I originally also included crimes like sex trafficking and pimping a child, but from the question it does not appear that the facts implicated those offenses.) It would also constitute grounds to civilly terminate the parental rights of the mother for child abuse and/or neglect, because it violated laws in addition to criminal laws. If the child had a living father whose parental rights had not been terminated (one can't tell from the question, but perhaps the full episode made it clearer), it would violate the father's right to custody of his child. The child, though a guardian or as an adult, could sue the mother for intentional inflection of emotional distress/outrageous conduct, false imprisonment, failure to provide support, etc. | The distinction is a question of culpability, not just the harm caused. The law, at least in the criminal law context, is not fundamentally consequentialist in its philosophy. The end consequence of an act for which someone is at fault in some way isn't the only thing that matters in criminal law. Instead, there is basically a two dimensional grid. On one axis is the seriousness of the harm caused on the "eye for an eye" theory of proportionality between punishment and the harm caused. Thus, homicide is more serious than causing serious bodily injury or raping someone, which is more serious than causing bodily injury that is not serious or sexual in nature. Grand theft is more serious than shoplifting. It doesn't make economic sense to spend $70,000 a year to incarcerate someone for many years to prevent people from stealing $15 items, unless very extreme aspects of the person's criminal history suggest that this seemingly minor incident demonstrates a high risk of future offenses that are far more serious because it proves that a hardened criminal hasn't reformed himself or herself. On the other axis is basically a measure of how evil and malicious someone would have to be to do such a thing which is called culpability. At once extreme, first degree murder, for example, is calculated, premeditated harm to another. At the other extremes are completely non-culpable conduct (either due to lack of any fault-worthy conduct or because someone is mentally incapable in the eyes of society of engaging in culpable conduct like a baby or someone with dementia or someone having hallucinations relevant to the conduct that kills someone, ordinarily negligent conduct that kills someone, and criminally negligent conduct that kills someone. In between the extremes is conduct that is reckless or is impulsive or carried out in the heat of passion or by someone with diminished capacity. Only moderately culpable conduct is punishable only by a civil lawsuit for compensatory damages, and non-culpable conduct isn't even punishable in a civil lawsuit in the absence of special circumstances in which strict liability is imposed in lieu of proof of culpability. Less culpable conduct commands less serious sentences, and more culpable conduct commands more serious sentences. Why single out culpability? Basically, this is a crude way a predicting, based upon someone's past actions, the risk that the pose in the future. (Our evaluation of culpability is further refined and adjusted by factors related to the individual defendant and not the particular offense involved, like a criminal defendant's status as a juvenile or adult, and the individuals history of prior criminal convictions.) Conduct that constitutes first degree murder corresponds more or less to psychopathy, an incurable psychiatric condition in which someone lacks all empathy and takes selfish delight in harming others out of boredom or for personal gain. Psychopathy is a technical term that is modern abnormal psychology's closest synonym to saying that someone is unredeemable and evil, and conduct for which the death penalty is available, mostly in conduct that is most highly diagnostic of psychopathy, since the usual goal of incarceration, to return someone to the community once they are no longer an appreciably elevated threat to it, can never be achieved in the case of someone who is unredeemable and evil, because their condition is an incurable part of who they are as a person and their lack of empathy makes them incapable of emotionally distinguishing between right and wrong or feeling guilt. This intuition bears out. The more culpable an offense is, the more likely it is that the offender scores high on standardized measures of the extent to which someone displays signs of psychopathy that are exemplified in serial killers and the worst con men. Intermediate levels of liability correspond more or less to impulsivity that can turn violent (which is associated with a variety of incurable psychiatric conditions and also with the developmental states of adolescence and young adulthood and with instances of excessive intoxicant consumption, especially in men), in which someone knows what they are doing is wrong but lacks sufficient self-control to prevent themselves from acting until it is too late and they have calmed down, at least until they "age out" or or take steps to treat the symptoms of the conditions or addictions or intoxicated excesses. Their lack of self-control makes them a potential risk to others even though they empathize and feel guilt, but not like the risk associated with a psychopath who just doesn't care at all if they are doing something that violates intuitive moral codes of conduct. Negligence, i.e. inattentiveness and carelessness pose even less of a threat to the community and while it could be due to something like attention deficit disorder, could also be due to extenuating circumstances like sleep deprivation or being overwhelmed with too much at once to keep track of everything at once. Negligence harm generally isn't even momentarily malicious due to loss of control and the person who harms someone negligently will often immediately regret the harm that they caused and will try to refrain from doing so again and will try to make things right. Such a person is far less of a future threat to society, but still more of a threat than someone who doesn't harm others in the first place in any manner in which they are at fault. Who decides? Reasonable people (and even reasonable judges) can and do have differences of opinion on the relative importance of seriousness of harm and culpability in determining a sentence for a conviction of a particular course of illegal conduct. The difficulty in balancing the apples and oranges factors of seriousness of harm (which, in part, reflects a person's capacity to inflict serious harm in the future and also reflects society's judgment about how serious it is to do something with ill intent) and culpability. To insure that these factors are balanced in a predictable and fair way, we embody the weighing of those two factors in a collective legislative judgment codified in a state or national penal code, rather than a case by case decision making process by judges. The modern trend towards giving more weight to culpability. If anything, the tendency at the present is for legislative judgment to give more weight to culpability than it has in the past as social science methods in criminology have demonstrated that culpability demonstrated in criminal conduct actually carried out by a person is indeed highly predictive of that person's future dangerousness to society For example, cruelty to animals is an offense which reflects very high levels of culpability despite often involving relatively modest amounts of harm viewed in a human-centric way. But, cruelty to animals is increasingly being upgraded from a misdemeanor to a felony, because it is a very diagnostic litmus test for psychopathy in an individual and very frequently eventually escalates to causing serious harm to humans. Similarly, drunk driving when it is charged based upon a traffic stop, rather than an accident that occurred while someone was driving drunk, is a very low harm offense, just like any other traffic offense, and historically has only been a misdemeanor. But, in cases where someone is repeatedly convicted of drunk driving, the culpability is high and the conduct tends to reflect a very difficult to self-regulate addiction and substance abuse problem that is highly likely to recur and to eventually result in a high harm accident. Repeated convictions are what distinguish an incident where someone is basically just criminally negligent in driving when they should have known that they shouldn't, from the far more serious case where someone recklessly and with indifference to the well being of others drives drunk knowing full what the risk that they are exposing other people to. And because repeat drunk driving convictions are more culpable and reflect a personal character of the offender that shows a high likelihood of causing future harm to others, many states are starting to upgrade repeat drunk driving from a misdemeanor to a felony even though the actual harm from the specific incident of drunk driving that only gives rise to a traffic stop is still just as low the fifth or sixth time someone is convicted as it was the first time. Conclusion So, in sum, assigning different penalties to different levels of culpability is a way to allocate limited correctional and punishment resources in a manner proportionate to the future risk of dangerousness that the current conviction provides undeniable evidence of in a non-arbitrary manner. Indeed, most people simply internalize the notion that more culpable conduct deserves more serious punishment because it is wrong, without conceptualizing in the more theoretical abnormal psychology informed and utilitarian framework in which I have described it above to demonstrate the implicit logic and wisdom behind the gut instinct that more culpable conduct should be punished more seriously, especially when its cause is not a passing incident that is unlikely to recur. | When a criminal act takes place, the state in which the act took place has jurisdiction. State of residence of perpetrator or victim is not at all relevant. It also would not matter where the minor was "staying", all that matters is where the act took place. If that was California, California Penal Code 261.5(c) says Any person who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. Additionally, (261.5(e)(1) states Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an adult who engages in an act of sexual intercourse with a minor in violation of this section may be liable for civil penalties in the following amounts:... (C) An adult who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor at least three years younger than the adult is liable for a civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) | Defamatory and offensive are not the same “He is a child molester” is defamatory and illegal (unless he is, of course). “She is a two-faced f___ing b___h with the morals of an alley cat and the integrity of a politician” is offensive and legal. Neither is a crime. |
Are there any Supreme Court cases that have directly issued rulings citing the 25th amendment? Background Amendments to the U.S. constitution have been cited in rulings of Supreme Court cases, the 14th amendment is a notorious one and the 2nd amendment is another good example. I have been trying to find relevant case law directly dealing with the 25th amendment to be able to expound upon this tag in Politics.SE, but nothing seems to turn up that directly mentions, or cites the 25th amendment. Question Is there any relevant Supreme Court cases that has cited, or issued a landmark interpretation of, the 25th amendment to the United States constitution? | No. There is only one U.S. Supreme Court case mentioning the 25th Amendment at all, Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 713 (1974), and it only does so in passing, as part of a discussion of changing trends in ballot access law, citing it as evidence of "an enlarged demand for an expansion of political opportunity." Although none of them do much to actually interpret it, either, there are a few circuit-court opinions citing the 25th Amendment: Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 782 F.3d 520, 529 (9th Cir. 2015); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 208 (6th Cir. 1996); Estate of Rockefeller v. Comm'r, 762 F.2d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1985). | It appears that the "leading" source of Freedom of Movement is the Privileges and Immunities Clause (Art. IV, S.2 , Cl. 1) of the US Constitution, that "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States". See Crandall v. State of Nevada, 73 US 35: "We are all citizens of the United States, and as members of the same community must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own states" (quoted from an earlier case); US v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 In all the states, from the beginning down to the establishment of the Articles of Confederation, the citizens possessed the right, inherent in citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the limits of their respective states, to move at will from place to place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom citing the Privileges & Immunities clause as the constitutional foundation. However, this article, sect. IB notes a number of additional constiutional sources: Various Justices at various times have suggested no fewer than seven different sources: the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and [sic] Immunities Clause, a conception of national citizenship said to be implicit in the structural logic of the Constitution itself, the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and each of the Due Process Clauses. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 relates freedom of movement to the Commerce Clause, Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500 points us to the Due Process clause. The argument hasn't apparently been made based on the First Amendment, since there are better arguments. | Disclaimer: there are whole sections of criminal law courses that deal with this issue and the various laws and precedents that have shaped american jurisprudence relating to right of privacy, expectation of privacy, and search and seizure. So, this is more of a primer than a comprehensive answer. That being said, the Fourth Amendment, which protects the people from unreasonable search and seizure by the government, dictates that there must be probable cause for a search warrant to issue. However, in addition to the restrictions that are imposed by the Fourth Amendment, several states’ constitutions, as well as a variety of state and federal statutes, rules of procedure, and law court rulings interpret these edicts further, limiting the process for obtaining a search warrant (a state can add additional safeguards, or impose more stringent requirements, but not less than the 4th amendment demands). On the federal level alone, the laws on search and seizure are also limited in scope by sections appearing in Title 18, Part II, Chapter 205 – Searches and Seizures. 18 U.S.C. § 3101-18. Federal warrants are further governed by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Only Judges and magistrates may issue search warrants. To obtain a warrant, law enforcement officers must show that there is probable cause (i.e. grounds) that search is legally justified. Officers must support this showing with sworn statements (affidavits) under oath, and must describe in particularity the place they will search and the items they will seize. Judges must consider the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether or not to issue the warrant. When issuing a search warrant, the judge may restrict how and when the police conduct the search. Police officers (a broad term I'm using for ease of discussion to include all manner of state and federal investigators operating under color of law) seeking a warrant do not need to show that the people being searched (or those whose property is being searched) actually, or even probably, committed the crime(s) in question. Rather, officers merely need to show probable cause exists to show that the evidence sought-after is likely there and upon discovery may implicate some person or persons in criminal activity (that has been committed). A landmark case that resulted in some reforms is Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), in which the Supreme Court opined that a search conducted by the police at a student newspaper, where the newspaper was not implicated or connected to any criminal activity, was a legal search under the Fourth Amendment, because the police suspected it had photographic evidence of the identities of demonstrators who assaulted police officers. Afterward, however, some jurisdictions responded by passing laws restricting or forbidding these kinds of searches - so again, what stands as acceptable procedure is not static. While you may not often hear of requests for warrants being denied, it does happen if there is insufficient PC pled in the affidavit; General unawareness is not surprising as it is not something often made public, although there are instances. Most officers know when they have enough for a warrant and know how to adequately swear out an affidavit so that PC is present enough for the judge to sign the warrant in good faith. However, some Judges are more stringent and demanding than others with regard to how the PC was obtained,the scope of the warrant under those facts, etc. Certainly, not every application is granted. Cornell has a great primer of this issue and you can find article when application for a warrant was denied...especially in higher profile investigations. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/search_warrant | The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation, also called the "Constitution Annotated", is the constitution of record: the only constitutional law treatise formally authorized by federal law, the Constitution Annotated functions as the official Constitution of record What version is authoritative can be meaningful. See William W. Van Alstyne, "A Constitutional Conundrum of Second Amendment Commas". And although phoog and I have provided different answers, I think we are both correct. The text as shown in the Constitution Annotated is what is universally accepted as the version to quote from in judicial submissions and reasons. But it's because it has drawn from the version in phoog's answer. Basically, the document in the archives is authoritative, but there is no need for writers and judges to go look at that when they are quoting, because the Constitution Annotated is deemed to have replicated that content faithfully. | The relevant portion of the U.S. Constitution is the full faith and credit clause (which the Respect for Marriage act is primarily an implementation and enforcement of). This requires states to honor marriages and divorces entered into in different states (subject to limited public policy exceptions that the Respect for Marriage act further limited), and also, for example, paternity determinations and court judgments from other states. This was one argument among many used to argue that same sex marriages from other states should be recognized in other states. But the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), in which it established a right to same sex marriage in all U.S. states, relied instead mostly upon a substantive due process clause analysis similar to that of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which held that bans on interracial marriage were unconstitutional. The Article IV privileges and immunities clause protects very little (mostly the right to interstate travel and the right for an out of state resident to be licensed in a profession in a state). The Slaughterhouse cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), in the late 19th century gave a very crabbed interpretation to the 14th Amendment privileges and immunities clause, limited that only to rights arising from federal citizenship. The logic of the Slaughterhouse line of cases spilled over into the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution. The Article IV privileges and immunities clause applies to rights specific to state citizenship to prevent those rights from being denied to out of state U.S. citizens. But those rights are few and far between, and court crafted exceptions have been carved out in cases where it does exist (hunting and fishing license fees and college tuition, for example). | Yes. The Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations. ... This protection has been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech. ... Under the rationale of these precedents, political speech does not lose First Amendment protection “simply because its source is a corporation.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010). | Ultimately the answer (in the US) is the US Constitution. The courts pretty much have the unlimited power to interpret the law, and the limits on power mainly pertain to what the state can do. The length of the leash on the government depends on what kind of rights are at stake. The weakest and default limit is known as "rational basis", and comes down to asking whether a government action is rationally related to a legitimate government interest (such as stopping terrorist attacks) plus whether there was due process and equal protection. There are more rigorous standards (intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny) in case a law involves a "suspect classification", or in case a fundamental constitutional right is infringed. In the case of strict scrutiny, the government would have to show that it had a compelling interest in the action, the law would have to be "narrowly tailored" (i.e. does that thing and only that thing), and should be the least restrictive way to achieve that result. Roe v. Wade is probably the best-know example of that kind of review, which held that abortion laws "violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy". A court would not order a party to do an impossible act. A court could order a party to do something which the party had argued was impossible, but you can interpret a court's decision to indicate that it rejected the argument. The defendant would not shoulder the burden of proving that the action was impossible, though they would have to counter the government's argument that the act could be performed if they believe it is not possible. (In the Apple case, the argument would probably be some Apple-internal document that says "Yeah, we can do it, but do we want to?"). There is probably an expense-related limit in that the courts would not order Apple to liquidate all of their assets to comply. But: if a case were to end up at the Supreme Court, the court is stricken with mass insanity and arbitrarily orders a defendant to do the impossible, there is only the option of impeachment and Senate trial to remove the offending justices, and that is just not going to happen. There is no higher authority that overturns SCOTUS. | It probably does, up to a point. Roe v. Wade asserts a right to privacy, discussed in §VIII. Granting that there is no explicit enumeration of a right to privacy in the Constitution, its implicit presence is discerned via a long series of constitutional rulings of a diverse nature. It is not clear what is the extent of This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people... However, even in the case of explicitly recognized rights, they are not absolute: you cannot commit fraud or threaten a person with death and escape punishment by citing the 1st Amendment, you cannot own a machine gun and cite the 2nd in your defense. Fundamental rights are strongly protected, but they may be limited in a fashion that survives strict scrutiny. This means that the encroachment is necessary to a "compelling state interest", it is "narrowly tailored" towards that end, and is the "least restrictive means" to achieve that end. The question arose in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 where Jacobson was criminally arraigned for refusing to comply with a mandatory vaccination law (applicable to all persons over 21). The court noted that the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. The liberty secured by the 14th Amendment, this court has said, consists, in part, in the right of a person 'to live and work where he will'...; and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense... According to settled principles, the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety. The right to compel vaccination is reaffirmed in Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174. There is currently no mandatory vaccination law applicable to adults; were such a law to be created (analogous to the earlier Mass. law regarding smallpox vaccination), it could easily pass judicial review as long as it is "minimalist". The question of "compelling government interest" would distinguish between mandatory Ebola or zombie-fever vaccinations vs. shingles or (ordinary) flu. School-related vaccination laws are the most minimal way to achieve the desired outcome, so a law requiring everybody to submit might not pass a strict scrutiny review. |
Can the Federal Government outlaw sex? Other than good sense, what would stop (if anything) the US Congress from passing a law making all sex illegal? Obviously this is a hypothetical. But it's only somewhat tongue-in-cheek. I am curious about the boundaries on the government power in this area. | No. The constitution protects the right of consenting adults to have sex in private "without the intervention of the government." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (U.S. 2003). | You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't. | Unless there is a law or regulation against it, it is legal. However in a big government it can be practically impossible to determine whether something is legal. For example, nobody even knows how many criminal statutes have been promulgated by the U.S. federal government. And that's nothing compared to the volume of executive regulation and judicial case-law that determines whether something is illegal. I.e., in practice determining that something is legal is a bit like proving a negative. Furthermore, if you look long enough some argue that you can probably find some law under which almost any action could be considered illegal. Note also that even if it is not against the law, it could be proscribed by contract (read your Terms and Conditions!), and breach of contract is in general – but with an astonishing number of exceptions! – illegal. | Technically, there is no such thing as an unconstitutional law. There are laws which have been passed, but whose unconstitutionality has not been discovered yet. But once a law is legally deemed to be unconstitutional, it stops being a law. The constitution is a recipe for running the government. If Congress enacts legislature which it has no authority to enact, the courts have the authority to discover this and reveal it in an opinion. | So, as I understand the decision, it's a little more subtle than that. By default, states have sovereign immunity and can't be sued without their consent. Congress can remove ("abrogate") this immunity by law in some circumstances. They tried to do so for copyright infringement cases with the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990. However, in the present case of Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that this part of the CRCA is unconstitutional. The idea is that under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate state immunity when it's necessary to ensure people's right to due process, but only in a "congruent and proportional" way. Now if a state unintentionally or negligently infringes someone's copyright, that does not violate the person's right to due process, but an intentional infringement might. At the time the CRCA was passed, when Congress went looking for instances where states infringed on copyrights, they found several cases of unintentional or negligent infringement, and just a couple where they may have infringed intentionally. SCOTUS argued that to respond to this by completely abrogating state immunity in all copyright cases was disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional. But the Court suggests in the opinion that Congress could pass a different law to abrogate immunity in copyright cases, if it were narrower. For instance, a law that only stripped immunity in cases of intentional infringement would likely be constitutional, especially if there were evidence that intentional infringement was happening enough to be a significant problem. So I think the answer is that as of right now, a state could deliberately infringe someone's copyright (e.g. by pirating software) and be immune from suit. However, Congress has the power to "fix" this, and most likely will, especially if there seems to be egregious abuse. (By the way, the decision contains an impressive quantity of pirate jokes. I guess since it's not only about copyright infringement (aka "piracy"), but actually alleges infringement of a video about a sunken pirate ship, the justices just couldn't resist.) Your "eminent domain" idea is separate from this. Seizing copies of the software wouldn't give the state the right to use them, as the software itself would still be copyrighted. The state would have to seize the copyright, and I don't know whether that is possible - it's not necessarily property in that sense. But if they did so, then they wouldn't be infringing the copyright at all (since the state itself would now own the copyright) and this case would be irrelevant. On the other hand, when a state uses eminent domain to seize property, they must as you say pay fair market value for it, and that means the market value before they seized it. So the value of the copyright in such a case wouldn't be "nothing" - it would be more like the amount a competitor would have had to pay the software maker to buy all the rights to that product. Likewise, if the state seizes your lovely house and bulldozes it to build a toxic waste dump, they owe you what someone would have paid for the house, not the value of a dump that nobody wants. | No. It is an often repeated misconception that "Freedom of Speech" means that no one can restrict speech ever. This is not the case. Let us look at the US Consitution's First Admendment, which contains the "Freedom of Speech" clause: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... (Emphasis mine) As one can see, the First Amendment only restricts government actions. (It also stops other branches of government from restricting speech, because those branches are innately weak with very few powers granted to them by the constitution; the majority of executive or judicial branches powers are granted to them by a law passed by Congress, and Congress cannot give a power to another party that they do not possess). A Home Owner Association (HOA) is not a government or government agency; it is a private organization (and it is not the same as the "private management company" that manages the condominium, which is probably in the employ of the HOA; which also means that emailing the manager is not emailing the HOA board). Their power stems from a contract, one that your friend signed when they bought the property (one of the conditions agreed to is that a member who sells or gifts their HOA-member property can only do so to someone who also agrees to the contract). That said, HOAs can be horribly abusive and many states have laws that restrict what kinds of rules and penalties can be applied by an HOA. But that is not a constitutional matter (at either the Federal or State level), nor a question of "Freedom of Speech", but rather a limitation on the kinds of behaviors that can be enforced by contract. | I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question. | Article 1 Section 8 appears to answer your question - only the Federal Government has the power to regulate the value of currency. Unilaterally forbidding the use of pennies as currency would be a regulation of their value (from 1 cent to 0 cents). A state government might be allowed to refuse pennies for the purpose of paying for a service in advance like a private business can, but like a private business are required to accept them as legal tender for the purpose of repaying debts, judgements, etc. Responding to the edited post, I'm inclined to say that the proposed plan is still "regulating" currency, in the same way that only the Federal government is the only entity authorized to destroy worn out currency (which it obtains by fair exchange). As Nate Eldredge points out, this may also violate the Commerce Clause of the same section, both in terms of interstate transactions and in terms of the exchange of currency between persons of different states and the implementing state. However, if it was implemented as suggested in comments, where businesses were required to exchange whatever pennies they receive with the state government for an equal amount of other currency, it might not run afoul of either of these clauses. This is probably a question the Supreme Court would have to decide, since a lot of hypothetical factors could come into play. At first glance, there doesn't appear to be any factual difference between a state holding pennies in storage indefinitely and the state holding any other currency in storage indefinitely, which they are allowed to do so long as they don't violate any part of USC Title 18, Chapter 17 (e.g., melt the pennies for the copper). On the other hand, the Federal Government could argue that the storage of pennies for the purpose of removing them from circulation is a form of currency regulation even if the action would otherwise be legal, or that the state's actions are impactful enough to affect interstate commerce even though they only directly impact commerce in the state and therefore Congress could pass a law outlawing the practice. |
Can you charge someone with murder for hire if the target doesn't exist? This is a completely fictitious scenario from a roleplay in a video game set in America, but say a person who is an undercover cop hires you to kill their spouse, you take the money and then they arrest you- however you're told by a cop part of the sting (with bodycam evidence) that the person you were hired to kill doesn't actually exist. Does that still constitute a murder-for-hire charge? Is that a technicality a good lawyer could fight and win in court? The game law is based off of California's. | Yes to attempted murder and conspiracy to murder. No to murder Although the particular example you raise looks like entrapment and law enforcement can’t do that in the United States. Putting that aside, factual impossibility is not a defense in common law jurisdictions. Conspiracy to murder someone who can’t actually be murdered (because they are already dead or, as here, don’t actually exist) is still a crime. Legal impossibility, however, is a defense. Something is legally impossible where it is impossible to meet one of the elements that define the crime. Most crimes require that something physical be done, for example, murder requires the perpetrator to kill the victim (among other things), so you can't commit murder on a dead or non-existent victim. However, crimes in the nature of "Conspiracy to X" or "Attempted X" often only rely upon intention even if it is impossible to do the thing intended. To illustrate the difference: if it’s illegal to smuggle cocaine across the border and I, being an idiot, get caught smuggling what I think is cocaine but is actually table salt, I’m guilty of attempted drug smuggling. This is factual impossibility but a legal possibility. I'm not guilty of drug smuggling because that crime requires that I actually smuggle drugs. This is both a factual and legal impossibility. if, however, the day before I do it, the law against cocaine is repealed, then whether I smuggle table salt or actual cocaine, I’m not guilty of either crime even if I think it’s still a crime. This is legal impossibility. | They can charge you with anything they think you did. And yes, the circumstances play a large part in the decision to arrest, charge and prosecute. However, circumstances include you: Reputation is everything. If you are a 17 year old male troublemaker with a long juvie rap sheet, including 3 past instances of stealing golf carts, then expect to be charged with the theft. Honestly you would probably be charged with the theft if you had simply stayed away and called the cops to report it abandoned. If you came upon it in your vehicle and it's obviously blocking the road and your apparent motive is to figure out how to move it so you can get by, then you're probably in the clear. If you're a 44 year old owner of a golf cart business, PAL supporter, city councilwoman and know half the cops including one in the car that stopped you, then, they're going to pretty much listen to you as far as what's the deal with the cart. Probably ask you for help moving it safely, might even ask you to get your cart-hauler to take it to impound. You won't hear from the D.A. obviously; nobody will say "Sue Councilwoman stole a golf cart" because it would sound absurd and make the speaker appear to be a politically motivated liar. That's the power of reputation; no one would speak it even if you did steal it. (Of course if you got caught doing it on a Ring camera, well, the hero takes a fall!) Anything in between, they'll deal with it in proportion to both the facts about you and the fact about the situation. You do not have a right to get the same credibility as the councilwoman; that is earned. That's the power of reputation. | It is probably illegal in all of the jurisdictions in the US where a fetus is legally declared to be a person and where the murder statutes are written to not explicitly exclude abortion: that is, in no jurisdictions. No law existing or proposed for Georgia specifically addresses "travel for the purpose of getting an abortion". The underlying theory behind the claim (advocated by some Georgia attorneys) is that a person may be open to a conspiracy charge for taking a woman to another state to get an abortion, which would be a crime if committed in Georgia. If a conspiracy exists in Georgia to do something illegal (in Georgia), that is a violation of OCGA 16-4-8 ("when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy"). The substantially same law exists in Washington, and most if not all other states. The theory is apparently that "conspire to commit a crime" means something like "conspire to perform an act which would be a crime if performed in in this jurisdiction", e.g. "purchase marijuana, or take a job at certain payday loan companies". No state has successfully claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction, where a Georgia resident can be prosecuted in Georgia for a legal act carried out in another state, so this theory is a bit of a stretch. | Although the assailant (or their estate if they are killed) could lodge a claim for damages it does not necessarily follow that they would win - they would have to show that the shooting was not legitimate self-defence but rather was unlawful by, for example, negligence or use of excessive force - say by shooting them when they didn't pose an immediate and unjustified threat. The Federation rules, as far as I can see, are not actual legislation. Although they should be adhered to in normal circumstances, this shooting would be, in the given circumstances, legitimate self-defence according to Article 122-5 of the Code Pénal which says: N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, devant une atteinte injustifiée envers elle-même ou autrui, accomplit, dans le même temps, un acte commandé par la nécessité de la légitime défense d'elle-même ou d'autrui, sauf s'il y a disproportion entre les moyens de défense employés et la gravité de l'atteinte. N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, pour interrompre l'exécution d'un crime ou d'un délit contre un bien, accomplit un acte de défense, autre qu'un homicide volontaire, lorsque cet acte est strictement nécessaire au but poursuivi dès lors que les moyens employés sont proportionnés à la gravité de l'infraction. Which Google translates to English as: The person who, in the face of an unjustified attack on himself or others, performs, at the same time, an act ordered by the necessity of the self-defense of himself or of others, is not criminally liable, except 'there is a disproportion between the means of defense employed and the seriousness of the infringement. The person who, in order to interrupt the execution of a crime or an offense against property, performs an act of defense, other than intentional homicide, when this act is strictly necessary for the aim pursued, is not criminally liable. provided that the means employed are proportionate to the gravity of the offense. | In principle, police are liable for the safety of anyone they detain. If an officer creates a hazardous condition, as was described in this scenario, he or his agency (which effectively means the taxpayers who fund his agency) can be held liable for damages resulting from that action. (Whether it is the officer or instead the taxpayers who get stuck with the bill is a separate question of "qualified immunity.") This idea has been formalized under two theories: The "special relationship doctrine" would apply in this case because the officer was detaining the driver. Otherwise, the liability could be argued under the more broad "state-created danger doctrine." | Yes, in general US prosecutors are licensed attorneys if they're practicing law. You don't necessarily technically need a license if your job is purely administrative, but to appear in court you do. They are subject to professional ethics requirements, and can be disbarred for violating them. There may be a state or two where they aren't licensed, but the common rule is that they are. | First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not. | Is this work for hire? There is an arguable case to be made that you are an employee for copyright law purposes and, if so, the copyright belongs to the company. The closer an employment relationship comes to regular, salaried employment, the more likely it is that a work created within the scope of that employment will be a work made for hire. But because no precise standard exists for determining whether a work is made for hire under part 1 of the definition in section 101 of the copyright law, consultation with a lawyer may be advisable. Second, if you do own the copyright, there is clearly an implied licence with the company to allow them to use it. It is arguable that the licence is exclusive since the software is bespoke and made specifically for the company. Can you sign an agreement now Yes, but … It is clear that the purpose of signing the agreement is to screw the company over (with the compliance of 2 of the directors). That’s a contract entered into in bad faith and possibly for an illegal purpose and would likely be found invalid. You need to understand that the company is a distinct legal entity from its owners and it has its own rights. People make the mistake of thinking the owners are the company: they aren’t. The two rebel founders are on dangerous legal ground. Assuming they are the directors of the company, they have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company. That is, they must put the company’s interests ahead of their own. It is clearly not in the company’s interest to have a rival business start so they cannot plan to do that while they are directors - they need to resign first. You are not so much at risk - as an employee/contractor your duty is to follow the directions of the company (the company - not a faction within the company). However, if you aid the other two in what might be a crime, you could be in trouble. |
Can vehicle owners ever be held to account for accidents caused by someone else driving? Bob owns a car. Rob borrows it, drives, breaks some road rules and causes an accident with a hell lot of damage, blood and sorrow (all hypothetical). Under what circumstances can Bob be held liable for that, if any? (Barring the scenario where Bob intentionally modifies the car or sets a device to cause the accident). Let's also assume that there is no insurance whatsoever and it is perfectly legal to not have one. Say if the car does not have a current WoF (warrant of fitness, or whatever equivalent in different jurisdictions), does Bob have any duty to disallow Rob to drive it, or at least warn him about the expired WoF? Or is it totally up to Rob to check that the WoF endorsement is current? (Any jurisdiction). | Where the driver is an agent of the owner Most typically where the driver is an employee of the owner and is using the vehicle in the course of the employment. Where the owner is negligent or reckless in allowing use of the vehicle For example, where the brake warning light has been on for a while and the accident is due to brake failure. | The vehicle occupying the lane has right of way i.e. if you merge and cause a collision, you are liable. The fact that the other driver was in breach of the road rules as well as you is immaterial. If you rephrased the question to be "A vehicle behind you in that lane is exceeding the speed limit - can I exceed the speed limit too?" you would see why. "Because they were breaking the law I should be allowed to" is not a defence that has any prospect of being successful. The law says you must give way when merging, so give way when merging. | Yes Unless your business is a sole proprietorship it operates as a legal entity seperate from its owners. It owns its assets an acrues its own liabilities. It can be sued and it can sue others. It can also agree to its own contracts. Typically the only thing a legal entity that is not a natural person cannot do is sign a marriage contract. Depending on the industry there may be no need to sue. There exist many mandatory workplace insurance to cover accidents in the workplace. You may have to share details of the injury with them but they may be uninterested in whos at fault. | I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4) | Barring any specific statute the relevant law is the tort of negligence. To succeed Alice must prove Bob: had a duty to Alice, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to Alice, and Alice was, in fact, harmed or damaged. She will probably succeed on 1, 3 and 4 where she will struggle is with 2. It seems that Bob did everything a reasonable person could do to avoid the accident. The only possible hope is that not knowing that bridges freeze first might be something a qualified NZ driver should know and that he breached his duty by not knowing if that is something the judge considers reasonable. The traffic warning is irrelevant and untested (and untestable) hearsay and should be excluded from evidence. | Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? No, at least, not on the theory articulated in the question. I can imagine some circumstances where it is conceivable that there might be a duty arising from some other source, like an OSHA regulation applied to a firing range business, or an express contract with the employee (some employers provide an escort as a matter of right in the evenings or at other high risk times, as an employee benefit, especially college and university employers, in part, because they have worker's compensation liability while an employee is still on a large campus, in part because it helps attract employees who may feel vulnerable, and in part because of an attitude that the employer wants its employees to be safe at dangerous times of day and this shows that the employer cares about them), or a court injunction related to a labor-management dispute where the employee is a scab. There is no such employer duty, but an employer does have strict liability in almost every case (there are some minor exceptions for very small employers and criminal conduct by an employee who is injured when the criminal conduct is clearly outside the scope of duty of the employee) for injuries and death in the course of employment from any cause whatsoever pretty much (including criminal actions of third-parties) which is generally fully insured by worker's compensation insurance. The exact details of when someone ceases to be at work for worker's compensation/employer liability is buried in case law and regulations (for overtime and minimum wage purposes, the standard is "portal to portal" but workers compensation/employer liability need not be identical, although once you are clearly no longer on the employer's premises and commuting after a day's work is done or before a day's work starts, you are clearly not covered). But, any place where there is employer liability at all, it would be worker's compensation covered. Usually, if the employer is required to have worker's compensation but doesn't, the employer likewise has strict liability for the same harms, but the damages that may be awarded are not limited to those that worker's compensation policies would cover. This leaves the employee with at risk travel between the office and the vehicle. It seems reasonable as well that as the employer prohibits the employees self defence, they would be responsible for the employees defence between office and some safe location (i.e. vehicle). This theory pretty much always loses. An employee walking in an ordinary, non-wartime environment without a firearm is not "at risk" in a meaningful sense, any more than someone who didn't choose to carry a firearm who goes about their daily life (or is prohibited from carrying one due to past conduct such as a felony or a domestic violence protection order or a domestic violence misdemeanor or a condition of parole, probation or bond pending criminal charges). Also, the employee is not being prohibited from engaging in any kind of self-defense or protective action whatsoever (or from asserting self-defense rights if a firearm is carried contrary to an employer rule) just from carrying a firearm at that particular moment (on pain of losing a job, not forfeiting a legal affirmative defense under criminal statutes), which is one of many means by which a person can protect themselves from crimes. | I cannot see any criminal offence with Bob losing a bike. It is, as far as I can see, purely contractual. According to TfL Santander Cycles Lost, stolen or faulty page: If your cycle is lost or stolen, call the Contact Centre on 0343 222 6666 (call charges may apply). We're open every day of the year. And: Charges for missing/damaged cycles You may be charged if the bike is not returned or is damaged by you or an additional user. Not returned: up to a maximum charge of £300 Damage: up to a maximum charge of £300 Similarly, purely losing a hire car is not a criminal offence. It would be a matter for the insurance provider to deal with. If Bob was complicit in theft, then that would require a different (and off-topic) answer. | First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat. |
Harassment in Pandemic What is the legal term (so that the relevant statute can be looked up) for when someone follows you around with the intent of harassing you and does not maintain 6ft social distancing for coronavirus reasons? UPDATE: to be specific: a the suspect steps in front of the victim whenever possible, despite the victim's attempt to change directions to avoid the suspect. Suspect does not wear a mask nor maintaining 6ft social distancing. Victim indicates feeling threatened by the risk of COVID 19 infection. References (hyperlinks) to relevant Florida statute is always appreciated. | Following you around with the intent of harassing you is stalking. I don't know whether there's going to be a law actually requiring social distancing in Florida. In other states, I've seen laws set up to make it a crime to violate an order of the Director of Public Health or something like that. I don't know whether Florida actually has an order requiring social distancing by the general public. | I assume you're talking about this case: Bus lane camera mistakes woman's sweater for number plate. No he couldn't just ignore it - because that doesn't actually result in it getting put in front of a human (judge or otherwise). Instead the fine would escalate and ultimately be passed to a collections agency. Only challenging the Penalty Charge Notice (as this person did) would get a human involved. As a bonus, if the automated fine happens to come with a S172 notice to identify the driver ignoring that is an offence in of itself (irrespective of the original alleged offence), and in many cases carries a worse penalty (£1000 and 6 points IIRC). what if this item of clothing became fashionable and was therefore causing this person to receive hundreds of these fines every week? While it's unlikely to get to that stage - the item of clothing on its own wouldn't do it, there needed to be a specific partial-obscurement of the garment as well, it's not impossible, after all perhaps it's their favorite sweater, they always carry their bag like that and cut across the bus lane on their way to work etc. In those circumstances there's nothing legally that changes, I'd expect the poor vehicle owner to be on first name terms with the people at the council enforcement call centre in question sooner rather than later. Re edit: Suppose I want to annoy somebody as much as possible, what's to stop me from printing a t-shirt with their actual number plate on it, then walking around past all sorts of cameras, knowing that they will receive multiple fines every day and have no choice but to keep calling and explaining. After all, the council has no duty to make it easy for someone to get through on the phone, so, potentially, I could walk around bus lanes and car parks all day. I could get some friends to do this all over the country in different local authority areas and the victim could - literally - have not enough hours in the day to have to keep fighting false fines. Would they not have some recourse to sue for harassment or "vexatious litigation"? In all honesty I don't know for sure what would happen in this scenario - I can't think of a similar enough case. But I would expect targeting an individual in this manner would qualify as harassment pretty easily and for which there are both criminal and civil actions that can be taken. I suppose hypothetically you could argue that the "number plate shirt" is effectively being used to make false allegations that the car's registered keeper had committed crimes, which opens up avenues to prosecution for Perverting the Course of Justice or wasting police time. But I have no idea how likely that would be to be pursued. | You're looking for the Fourth Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. This prohibits the police from harassing you and stopping you without cause. It is not self-enforcing, though, so you can sue for a violation under 42 USC 1983: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. This is the normal means of enforcing your rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as the First, Second, and so on. | Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity. | Examples Detention: A person suspected of a felony can be detained at gunpoint (and, in many jurisdictions, subject to "citizen's arrest"). A more clear example is when you encounter someone committing a felonious assault. You can brandish your gun and order them to stop. If they do stop, then you cannot shoot them unless there is no alternative to preventing them from inflicting grievous bodily harm on another. Defense: If you reasonably feel that another person poses a real and grievous physical threat, you can brandish a gun in defense. A common example is the slight woman followed into a vacant alley by a large man. She can brandish a gun to keep him at bay, but she cannot shoot him if he is not making explicit threats and (supposing one accepts the "Tueller rule") makes no aggressive motion within 21 feet of the woman. Law One helpful explanation of the distinction, by a MO attorney citing the MO Supreme Court: While deadly force can only be used to meet the threat of deadly force, the threat implied by brandishing is justified by a low level threat. “When a person has reasonable cause to apprehend on the part of another a design to inflict a great personal injury, and there was reasonable cause for him to apprehend immediate danger of such design being accomplished he is justified, and has the right, ‘to avert such apprehended design,’ and in proper circumstances the right of attack may be essential to the right of self-defense.” More detailed analysis can be found of California Penal Code 417 (California's law against "Brandishing," which is similar to brandishing laws in most states): [I]f you were lawfully defending yourself or defending another person, California's self-defense laws will excuse your otherwise criminal act. You lawfully act in self-defense or in defense of others when you reasonably believe that you or another person is about to suffer imminent harm, and you fight back with no more force than is reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. I.e., sometimes it's enough to say, "Stop!" But sometimes it's necessary to present a gun for the bad guy to get the message. Additionally: Simply drawing or exhibiting a weapon isn't enough to justify a conviction for 417 PC. In order for prosecutors to convict you of brandishing a weapon or firearm, you must do so in a rude, angry, or threatening manner. The same law review provides illuminating comparisons with the related offense "Assault with a Deadly Weapon" (ADW — CA 245 PC). | Overview The cop is basically wrong. Sexual harassment is not the only kind of harassment recognized by U.S. law. The question and the cop's answer to it, assume that simply asking certain questions is illegal or not illegal, but it isn't that straight forward. Words communicated verbally are part of the analysis, but not the entire analysis. It all depends upon context and the character of the communication. None of these questions are per se (i.e. always) illegal to ask in the abstract, although a good lawyer would advise a client that it is rarely prudent to ask them because, together with other facts, they could give rise to civil or criminal liability. In this regard, he is correct that two of the three questions aren't necessarily unlawful, but he is incorrect when he assumes that the third one, which would suggest that there might be sexual harassment present, is always unlawful. But, any of these three questions could be a part of a pattern of conduct that constitutes illegal harassment, and each of these three questions suggest an intent that one would often expect to be a part of a larger pattern of harassing conduct. So, he is incorrect when he suggests that non-sexual forms of harassment are definitely legal. Also, there are really at least three kinds of illegal harassment that need to be analyzed separately, one in the context of state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of protected classes, one in the context of the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising under state law, and the third under a state's general criminal laws. In addition, certain kinds of harassment can provide a basis for the issuance of a restraining order or protection order under state law. A particular course of harassing conduct may be governed by only one of these kinds of laws, by some but not all of these kinds of laws, or by all of these kinds of laws, depending upon the nature of the conduct and the laws of the state that are at issue. In cases where the relevant law is state law, rather than federal law, the applicable laws may, and frequently do, differ in important details from state to state. I describe the most common provisions of state law that apply, using the state of Colorado, which is the primary place where I practice law, for some specific examples. But, while some important details (particularly with regard to criminal liability) differ from state to state, the broad outlines of the relevant state laws are usually fairly similar in the vast majority of U.S. states. Harassment That Is A Form Of Discrimination The Nature Of The Liability One kind, is a subset of discriminatory conduct in the context of a relationship such as employment, or operating a "public accommodation" (such as a restaurant open to the public), or carrying out governmental functions, in which there is a legal duty not to discriminate on a particular basis. This is implicated in the second and third questions. In both of these cases, harassment as a form of employment discrimination arises from the same statute. Neither that statute nor regulations interpreting it, at the time that sexual harassment claims were first recognized by the courts, specifically delineate an offense of sexual harassment or other kinds of harassment separate and distinct from employment discrimination generally. Subsequently, the case law, regulations interpreting the statute promulgated by the EEOC, and to a less extent some statutes (especially at the state and local level), have spelled out sexual harassment as a distinct type of discrimination on the basis of sex in employment with its own set of specific legal elements of the claim that must be established which differ somewhat from other employment discrimination claims. Why Isn't This A Free Speech Violation? One of the reasons that this can be prohibited, notwithstanding the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, is that in the employment and public accommodations cases, this involves commercial speech, the regulation of which is subject to less rigorous review than non-commercial speech, as a matter of United States constitutional law. In the case of governmental speech, this regulation is directly authorized (and arguably required) by the 14th Amendment requiring government to provide people with equal protection of the laws, which was enacted after the First Amendment. Also the First Amendment generally limits the power of government to regulate the speech of others, not its own speech. Discrimination On The Basis Of Sex In the context of an employer-employee relationship, a man (or woman) asking a woman "How big are your breasts?", could be interpreted as sexual harassment, which is a kind of employment discrimination on the prohibited basis of sex, and if violated, gives rise to the right of the EEOC or the woman to whom the question is directed, and possibly even to the all of the women in that workplace to bring a civil action for employment discrimination seeking money damages. While the expectation is that this sort of harassment happens from superior to subordinate that is not necessarily the case and it can occur between peers or from subordinate to superior. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC) defines sexual harassment as follows: Sexual Harassment It is unlawful to harass a person (an applicant or employee) because of that person’s sex. Harassment can include “sexual harassment” or unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical harassment of a sexual nature. Harassment does not have to be of a sexual nature, however, and can include offensive remarks about a person’s sex. For example, it is illegal to harass a woman by making offensive comments about women in general. Both victim and the harasser can be either a woman or a man, and the victim and harasser can be the same sex. Although the law doesn’t prohibit simple teasing, offhand comments, or isolated incidents that are not very serious, harassment is illegal when it is so frequent or severe that it creates a hostile or offensive work environment or when it results in an adverse employment decision (such as the victim being fired or demoted). The harasser can be the victim's supervisor, a supervisor in another area, a co-worker, or someone who is not an employee of the employer, such as a client or customer. Discrimination On The Basis Of National Origin Similarly, in the context of an employer or prospective employer asking an employee or prospective employee who is apparently a foreign-born man, "What country are you from?", this could be interpreted as evidence of employment discrimination on the prohibited basis of national origin, which, if it was occurring could give rise to the right of the EEOC or the man to whom the question is directed, and possibly even to the all of the foreign born people in that workplace to bring a civil action for employment discrimination seeking money damages. General Considerations Regarding Harassment As A Form Of Discrimination In each of these cases, the damages could be related to the direct economic harm associated with not being hired or promoted, for example, or could arise from the largely non-economic harm suffered from harassing conduct itself. Also, in each of these cases, simply asking the question is not harassment. The asking of the question must be part of a pattern of conduct that together has the effect of constituting harassment taken as a whole, and must involve some sort of improper motive on the part of the employer. An employer asking "how big are your breasts?" for purpose of ordering uniforms for a woman isn't engaged in harassment, nor is an employer asking "what country are you from?" for the purpose of determining if the employee has knowledge that would allow the employer to better serve a customer in a particular country. Harassment as a form of employment discrimination is not generally a crime, it is merely tortious conduct prohibited by law. Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress The Common Law Tort Courts in the United States have the power to established when conduct gives rise to a claim for money damages against another person which is developed through case law precedents extending back for centuries into the laws of England, so long as this is not in conflict with a statute. One such claim that is recognize by U.S. courts in most states is a tort (i.e. civil wrong) known as "intentional infliction of emotional distress." In the case of asking a (very short) guy "How tall are you?", except to the extent that the short statute was such that it amounted to a disability protected by the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) (which would be unusual but not inconceivable), this would not be a protected class and so it could not constitute harassment in the sense of a subtype of employment discrimination. But, that is not the end of the analysis in the case of the short employee. The law also recognizes a tort (i.e. a right to sue someone for a civil wrong) that is sometimes called "intentional infliction of emotional distress" and sometimes called "outrageous conduct" that is not infrequently invoked in an employer-employee context. Wikipedia at the link above summarizes this tort as follows: Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED; sometimes called the tort of outrage) is a common law tort that allows individuals to recover for severe emotional distress caused by another individual who intentionally or recklessly inflicted emotional distress by behaving in an "extreme and outrageous" way. Some courts and commentators have substituted mental for emotional, but the tort is the same. In the United States, the common law tort most often tracks the language of the Restatement of Torts (Second) Section 46 (1965), which states: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. This tort cannot, however, be used to shut down offensive statements and parodies. Per the same Wikipedia entry: The U.S. Supreme Court case Hustler v. Falwell involved an IIED claim brought by the evangelist Jerry Falwell against the publisher of Hustler Magazine for a parody ad that described Falwell as having lost his virginity to his mother in an outhouse. The Court ruled that the First Amendment protected such parodies of public figures from civil liability. Unlike harassment as a form of discrimination, this tort is not limited to any particular protected class of persons, or to a particular specified kind of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. But, the threshold of conduct which qualifies as "extreme and outrageous" needs to be both much more egregious and much more directly targeted at a particular individual. Basically, the conduct complained of must amount to either effective bullying, or to a malicious prank (there is considerable overlap between these kinds of conduct). An Example Of Conduct Held To Be Actionable Outrageous Conduct An example of conduct that was held sufficiently extreme and outrageous to give rise to tort liability if established at trial was this case: In January 1978, Zalnis contracted with defendant Thoroughbred Datsun for the purchase of a 1978 Datsun automobile. She took possession of the car on that day, and paid the balance of the purchase price two days later. Zalnis dealt directly with Linnie Cade, a salesperson employed by Thoroughbred Datsun. Defendant Trosper, President of Thoroughbred Datsun, approved the transaction based on representations by Cade which were later determined to be based upon erroneous calculations. When Trosper discovered several days later that Cade had sold the car at a loss of approximately $1,000, he instructed Cade and the sales manager to make good the loss by either demanding more money from Zalnis, retrieving the car, or repaying the difference out of Cade's salary. Cade refused to follow any of Trosper's alternative instructions, but another sales employee, defendant Anthony, telephoned Zalnis and told her to return her car to the dealership because it was being recalled. When Zalnis arrived at Thoroughbred Datsun, she refused to give up possession of her car without a work order explaining the need for the recall. Nevertheless, her car was taken from her. During the next few hours, Zalnis alleges that Anthony called her a “French whore,” followed her throughout the showroom, told her they were keeping her automobile, yelled, screamed, used abusive language, grabbed her by the arm in a threatening manner, and continually threatened and intimidated her when she attempted to secure the return of her automobile by telling her to “shut up.” During this period, Zalnis telephoned her attorney, who then telephoned Trosper and eventually obtained the return of her car. During their conversation, Trosper told the attorney that Zalnis had “been sleeping with that nigger salesman and that's the only reason she got the deal she got.” Trosper had known Zalnis for many years, and had told Cade and the sales manager that she was crazy and she had watched her husband kill himself. Zalnis v. Thoroughbred Datsun Car Co., 645 P.2d 292, 293 (Colo. App. 1982). The analysis that lead the Court to reach this conclusion was as follows (most citations omitted): The defendants argue that their actions here were no more than “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, and other trivialities.” However, the defendants did not merely threaten and insult Zalnis; they took away her car and repeatedly harassed her. Conduct, otherwise permissible, may become extreme and outrageous if it is an abuse by the actor of a position in which he has actual or apparent authority over the other, or the power to affect the other's interests. The conduct here is not a mere insistence on rights in a permissible manner. Rather, the defendants' recall of the car was to avoid a bad bargain, and accordingly, the conduct was not privileged. [S]ee Enright v. Groves, 39 Colo.App. 39, 560 P.2d 851 (1977). Defendants assert that their actions must be judged by the impact they would have on an ordinary person with ordinary sensibilities. We disagree. The outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. In Enright, supra, outrageous conduct was found where a police officer effecting an illegal arrest grabbed and twisted the plaintiff's arm even after she told him her arm was easily dislocated. In the instant case, plaintiff was peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress because she had witnessed her husband's suicide, and Trosper and Anthony knew about her susceptibility. Here, as in Enright, the defendants' knowledge exacerbated the conduct. There is outrageous conduct where the actor desires to inflict severe emotional distress or knows that such distress is certain or substantially certain. Here, Zalnis has sufficiently alleged that Trosper and Anthony acted with the intent to bully her into giving up her car. In view of their knowledge of her emotional susceptibility, they could be considered to have acted intentionally or recklessly in causing her severe emotional distress. The defendants argue that we should observe a distinction between a single outrageous occurrence and an outrageous course of conduct. While it is true that “the courts are more likely to find outrageous conduct in a series of incidents or a ‘course of conduct’ than in a single incident,” it is the totality of conduct that must be evaluated to determine whether outrageous conduct has occurred. Zalnis v. Thoroughbred Datsun Car Co., 645 P.2d 292, 294 (Colo. App. 1982) Harassment That Is Criminal Conduct General Considerations Another form of harassment is harassment that constitutes criminal conduct. In these cases, the existence or absence of protected class status is irrelevant (or only goes to the sentence that is appropriate for a violation, rather than guilt or innocence), and the formal character of the relationship between the people (e.g. as employer-employee, merchant-customer, government employee-citizen) is secondary. Instead, in these cases, the existence or absence of harassment hinges on the character and subtextual message of the question in the context of the larger interaction. Exactly what is defined to be criminal harassment varies from state to state, but the key point is that the subtext of the message must either be (1) something that is outright prohibited, for example, when the superficially non-threatening question, in light of the tone used, body language, and the physical context where it takes place is an implied threat to harm someone, or (2) must be part of an overall context of conduct including the question, and a manner of communication which is calculated to distress, annoy, or disturb a person, to an extent that exceeds communication of an idea they may be inherently distressing in a civil, calm and non-combative manner, and would in fact disturb a reasonable person. In the latter case signs that it may be criminal harassment include yelling at a person, bombarding them over and over again with the statement in a way that it can't be avoided verging upon stalking, and being part of a large context of discussion showing specific animus against the individual target of the communication. The Example Of Colorado's Criminal Harassment Statute For example, Colorado's criminal harassment statute reads as follows: (1) A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he or she: (a) Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches a person or subjects him to physical contact; or (b) In a public place directs obscene language or makes an obscene gesture to or at another person; or (c) Follows a person in or about a public place; or (e) Directly or indirectly initiates communication with a person or directs language toward another person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, telephone network, data network, text message, instant message, computer, computer network, computer system, or other interactive electronic medium in a manner intended to harass or threaten bodily injury or property damage, or makes any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal by telephone, computer, computer network, computer system, or other interactive electronic medium that is obscene; or (f) Makes a telephone call or causes a telephone to ring repeatedly, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate conversation; or (g) Makes repeated communications at inconvenient hours that invade the privacy of another and interfere in the use and enjoyment of another's home or private residence or other private property; or (h) Repeatedly insults, taunts, challenges, or makes communications in offensively coarse language to, another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response. (1.5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “obscene” means a patently offensive description of ultimate sexual acts or solicitation to commit ultimate sexual acts, whether or not said ultimate sexual acts are normal or perverted, actual or simulated, including masturbation, cunnilingus, fellatio, anilingus, or excretory functions. (2) Harassment pursuant to subsection (1) of this section is a class 3 misdemeanor; except that harassment is a class 1 misdemeanor if the offender commits harassment pursuant to subsection (1) of this section with the intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's actual or perceived race; color; religion; ancestry; national origin; physical or mental disability, as defined in section 18-9-121(5)(a); or sexual orientation, as defined in section 18-9-121(5)(b). (3) Any act prohibited by paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section may be deemed to have occurred or to have been committed at the place at which the telephone call, electronic mail, or other electronic communication was either made or received.... (7) Paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section shall be known and may be cited as “Kiana Arellano's Law”. (8) This section is not intended to infringe upon any right guaranteed to any person by the first amendment to the United States constitution or to prevent the expression of any religious, political, or philosophical views. Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-9-111 (emphasis added). The case of the harassment of Kiana Arellano, after whom the statute was named, is discussed in an article in the Denver Post, and sheds some light on the kind of conduct that legislators where attempting to punish when they passed the law. It was a case of severe cyber bullying that caused this person to attempt to commit suicide. Restraining Orders And Protection Orders Both tort remedies and criminal sanctions for harassment punish a perpetrator and/or compensate a victim of harassment after it has happened. In many case, the law also allows a court to enter orders known as restraining orders or protection orders directing someone who has engaged in harassing conduct to cease doing so. States differ considerably in defining exactly what kinds of harassing conduct can provide a basis for entry of a restraining order or protection order against an individual directing that person to cease having contact with or harassing the individual protected by the order. The most common fact patterns in which restraining orders or protection orders are entered for harassment (which is not the only kind of conduct that can provide basis for an order like that) involve (1) a former romantic partner harassing his or her ex, (2) a person who had engaged in elder abuse harassing the elderly person who had been abused, (3) a criminal defendant harassing potential witnesses in a case, and (4) a "fan" (often, in part, because they don't really understand the difference between entertainment performances and reality), or a "hater" (often, as part of a larger political agenda intended to bully opponents into compliance) harassing a celebrity, politician, or adult entertainer. Harassment that justifies issuance of a restraining order or protection order, like the harassment that can justify a common law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, must typically be very extreme and pose an imminent threat to the protected person's safety, emotional well being, the judicial process, or the ability of the protected person to live an ordinary daily life. There must also generally be some reasons to think that the harassing conduct will continue if the court does not act. As in the case of other legal remedies for harassment, harassment in a restraining order or protective order context usually involves consideration of the context of a pattern of conduct over time, even though it can be based on a single very extreme incident. Every state provides that someone who violates a court order like this one may be held in contempt of court, which can result in incarceration or a fine, after a hearing is held in which someone (usually the victim's attorney) acts as prosecutor against the person who violated the order in a quasi-criminal proceeding within the main civil or criminal lawsuit in which the order was obtained. Some states make violation of a court order like this one a criminal offense as well, that can be enforced by law enforcement prior to a hearing if there is probable cause to believe that it was violated. | too long, didn't read: You would be liable for a claim for breach of contract. The self-isolation guidance is voluntary in this scenario and in any event the relevant legislation allows you to leave to "fulfil a legal obligation" such as completing a contract. Therefore, the court would probably give judgment for the claimant on the facts you've given us. Your requirement to self-isolate The Government guidance for self-isolating on suspicion of, or a positive test for, coronavirus is entirely voluntary. You are only subject to legal obligations to self-isolate, and the associated risk of a £1,000 fine, if you enter England from a non-exempt country under Clause 4 of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) Regulations 2020. Therefore, in the given situation, you would not be legally obliged to remain within the property for the entirely of the quarantine period. You would be able to seek alternative accommodation. Indeed, even if you were subject to Clause 4, subclause 9(c) explicitly states: (9) During the period of their self-isolation, P may not leave, or be outside of, the place where P is self-isolating except— (c) to fulfil a legal obligation, including attending court or satisfying bail conditions, or to participate in legal proceedings, Fulfilling the terms of the contract of sale would count as needing to "fulfil a legal obligation" so you would not be fined under the legislation and it would not be a defence to any lawsuit. The court's view Given that the self-isolation guidance is voluntary and, in any event, the relevant legislation has the "legal obligation" escape hatch, the court would likely treat this as a standard breach of contract and find that you had no exceptional circumstances that caused you to breach the contract by failing to vacate the property on the day of completion. Conclusion You would be open to a claim for breach of contract. Your defence would be unlikely to succeed on the merits and the court would likely side with the claimant. | In that case, Cruise-Gulyas was subject to a second stop, and the court found that the second stop was an illegal seizure. There is no qualified immunity since this was an exercise of a clearly established First Amendment right. The authority to seize her ended when the first stop ended. The finger is not a basis for a stop, since it does not violate any law ("This ancient gesture of insult is not the basis for a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or impending criminal activity", Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105. |
Do changing social norms change the definition of "defamation?" One hundred years ago, if you said that "Miss X is not a virgin," when in fact she was, that would be grounds for a defamation suit. The reason is that because 80%+ of unmarried American adult women were, in fact, such (before the advent of the "Pill" in the 1960s). Someone made the observation, "today, you would more likely be sued for defamation if you alleged (wrongly) that Ms. X IS a virgin," implying that she is sexually inexperienced. The issue is that 90%+ of unmarried adult women are not virgins today. One way of interpreting the above is that a statement that "Ms. X is a virgin" would not be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." That is, you are praising Ms. X for her "chastity." But another way of looking at it is that you are alleging, in 2021, that Ms. X is deviating from the prevailing norm by being a virgin, whereas in 1921, NOT being a virgin would represent a deviation from the norm. Would alleging that someone was "out of line" with prevailing norms in the above fashion be grounds for defamation even though these norms have changed over time? | The definition of defamation, itself, doesn't change. What may change is whether certain kinds of false statements are "so bad" that it is not necessary to prove that the person was actually damaged by the statement, i.e. is defamation per se. In California this is Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime; Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease; Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits; Imputes to him impotence or a want of chastity; Hence, being falsely claimed to be a virgin is not defamation per se, but if you can show that you were actually damaged by the claim then you can be compensated for those damages. This is long-standing law (Tonini v. Cevasco (1896) 114 Cal. 266), which makes it difficult to erode in lieu of a change in statutory language (as in the case of the California Civil Code, amended in 1948). Barnes-Hind v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 377 provides a loophole, that the reader of a libel will recognize it as such. If no reasonable reader would perceive in a false and unprivileged publication a meaning which tended to injure the subject's reputation in any of the enumerated respects, then there is no libel at all. If such a reader would perceive a defamatory meaning without extrinsic aid beyond his or her own intelligence and common sense, then (under section 45a and the cases, such as MacLeod, which have construed it) there is a libel per se. But if the reader would be able to recognize a defamatory meaning only by virtue of his or her knowledge of specific facts and circumstances, extrinsic to the publication, which are not matters of common knowledge rationally attributable to all reasonable persons, then (under the same authorities) the libel cannot be libel per se but will be libel per quod. A "reasonable" reader would not recognize a claim of non-virginity as having a defamatory meaning, but would likely recognize being a professional incompetent as having a defamatory meaning. In other words, even false statements statutorily listed as being potential defamation per se will be subject to a "reasonable man" test: but proving actual damage is still an option. | The term "defamation" describes an untrue statement that’s been presented as fact and causes harm to the character of the person it describes. In some jurisdictions an admittedly true statement can still be defamatory. See Can true statements or statements of opnion be libel or defamation in any country? If A claimed that B defamed A, but a court rules that there was no defamation, this might make A's statement legally false. But it will not be defamatory unless it also harms B's reputation. Statements made in court, and in legal filings, have absolute privilege and may not the be basis of a defamation action. Public statements by A accusing B of defamation might be the basis of such an action. | I know of no laws at the federal or state level that explicitly extend their protection to poly relationships. However, any law that purports to outlaw a polyamorous relationship among consenting adults should be looked at very skeptically, as it would likely be found unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. While that case dealt with homosexual relationships, it seems unlikely that the courts would conclude that heterosexual couples, throuples, etc., are entitled to less protection. Adultery laws exist in many jurisdictions, and many of them have survived constitutional challenges. But as far as I know, all those challenges relied on legal principles and precedents -- in particular, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) -- that Lawrence explicitly overruled. In this regard, I would not expect anyone in a polyamorous relationship to encourter meaningful legal jeopardy as a result of that relationship, assuming that the relationship(s) were otherwise legal and out in the open. If A is unaware of her spouse's relationship with C, for instance, that could cause problems in a divorce proceeding. I don't know of any legal options specifically designed for this sort of arrangement, but the more interconnected and interdependent these groups are, the more likely it becomes that some sort of written agreement would become worthwhile -- not as a response to legal danger arising from the polyamorous nature of the relationship, just to address the fact that someone is eventually going to fall short, potentially causing problems for the whole group. There are many lawyers who specialize in LGBT issues, and I'd imagine that some of them would be able to provide more detailed advice about how to deal with this type of situation. | Not in this case First, we are having an appeals court case that is filed against the dismissal of the real case - there had been no trial. It's a research into if there was a clear error of the court, not who would have won. The Appeals court decided to send it back to the district court with pretty much a direct order to have a trial and solve the issiue, as the very last paragraph of the file shows: We conclude that Schwake stated a Title IX claim against the University because he plausibly alleged gender bias. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the district court’s order and judgment dismissing the claim with prejudice, and remand for further proceedings. Now, back to your quote. As this is an appeal case, the standard is different than in the district court. In this case, it tries to see if there might have been a case, which was dismissed erroneously. Page 15 and 16, where you cite, states (emphasis mine): Schwake’s allegations of a pattern of gender-based decisionmaking against male respondents in sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings make that inference plausible. He alleged that “[m]ale respondents in student disciplinary proceedings involving alleged sexual harassment and misconduct cases at [the University]” “are invariably found guilty, regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” Schwake further alleged that he was “aware of recent [University] disciplinary cases against male respondents in alleged sexual misconduct cases who were all found guilty regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” The district court was not free to ignore this non-conclusory and relevant factual allegation. [your quote] The absence of this level of detail from Schwake’s complaint does not render Schwake’s allegation conclusory or insufficient. There is no heightened pleading standard for Title IX claims. See Austin, 925 F.3d at 1137 n.4. That point is particularly apt here. It may be difficult for a plaintiff to know the full extent of alleged discrimination in decisionmaking before discovery allows a plaintiff to unearth information controlled by the defendant. This sheds much more light upon the situation of the case: Schwacke sued and alleged something. The University alleges the contrary in their reply brief and asks the court to dismiss the claim. The court dismissed in March 2018. This was before any discovery has taken place: nobody was subpoenaed, nobody had to testify in court, nobody had to turn over any documents. We have only statements from either side. As the next step, Schwacke appealed the dismissal, and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, as it found clear error in the handling in dismissal, as one can see in the last paragraphs from each claim's section: Here, we are satisfied that Schwake’s allegations of contemporaneous pressure and gender-based decisionmaking establish background indicia of sex discrimination relevant to his Title IX claim. Considering the combination of Schwake’s allegations of background indicia of sex discrimination along with the allegations concerning his particular disciplinary case, we conclude that sex discrimination is a plausible explanation for the University’s handling of the sexual misconduct disciplinary case against Schwake. This is sufficient for Schwake’s Title IX claim to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage. Now it is up to Schwacke to get into discovery, subpoena the information from the university and go into the courtroom trial... Unless the parties settles. Sidenote By the way, the quote of the university refers to a different case from the 6th Circuit (where Ohio is), which they try to pull up as a model standard. This case is not binding for the 9th Circuit (where Arizona is) but could have been used as a model. Doe v. Miami University, 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) is somewhat similar to Schwacke, as it had been previously dismissed. However, the Title IX was restored by the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit and it was sent back to the lower court to have a trial. Here too, the standard was reasonable expectation or plausibility: Plaintiff “allege[d] facts showing a potential pattern of gender-based decision-making that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal’ circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination.” | It depends, in part, what is meant (and what can be proven) by D's intent: no apparent motivation to harm V Revenge porn, or more accurately, "Disclosing, or threatening to disclose, private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress" contrary to section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 which states: (1)A person commits an offence if— (a)the person discloses, or threatens to disclose, a private sexual photograph or film in which another individual (“the relevant individual”) appears, (b)by so doing, the person intends to cause distress to that individual, and (c)the disclosure is, or would be, made without the consent of that individual. If there is no intent, then the offence is not committed. If there is intent to cause distressto V, then setion 35 needs to be considered, especially subsection (2): Meaning of “private” and “sexual” (1)The following apply for the purposes of section 33. (2)A photograph or film is “private” if it shows something that is not of a kind ordinarily seen in public. (3)A photograph or film is “sexual” if— (a)it shows all or part of an individual's exposed genitals or pubic area, (b)it shows something that a reasonable person would consider to be sexual because of its nature, or (c)its content, taken as a whole, is such that a reasonable person would consider it to be sexual. I cannot find and caselaw or guidance on the particular issue - i.e. whether or not V's commercial sales of her own images would fall within this definition - and as D's intent is not clear, it would probably be a matter for a jury to decide. | Socially the woman has become a "kept woman". It would not be rape, at least in most jurisdictions, because the officer is using neither force nor threats of force. The duress is from her economic and general circumstance, and most jurisdictions would not consider that to be rape. At least technically, this is a form of prostitution, but a form very rarely prosecuted. Maryland maryland is a not untypical jurisdiction as US law goes in such matters. § 3-303 of the Naryland Criminal Code (Rape in the first degree) provides that: (a) Prohibited. -- A person may not: (a) (1) (a) (1) (i) engage in vaginal intercourse with another by force, or the threat of force, without the consent of the other; or (a) (1) (ii) engage in a sexual act with another by force, or the threat of force, without the consent of the other; and (a) (2) (a) (2) (i) employ or display a dangerous weapon, or a physical object that the victim reasonably believes is a dangerous weapon; (a) (2) (ii) suffocate, strangle, disfigure, or inflict serious physical injury on the victim or another in the course of committing the crime; (a) (2) (iii) threaten, or place the victim in fear, that the victim, or an individual known to the victim, imminently will be subject to death, suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, serious physical injury, or kidnapping; (a) (2) (iv) commit the crime while aided and abetted by another; or (a) (2) (v) commit the crime in connection with a burglary in the first, second, or third degree. Section 3-304 (Rape in the first degree) provides that: (a) A person may not engage in vaginal intercourse with another: (a) (1) by force, or the threat of force, without the consent of the other; (a) (2) if the victim is a mentally defective individual, a mentally incapacitated individual, or a physically helpless individual, and the person performing the act knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a mentally defective individual, a mentally incapacitated individual, or a physically helpless individual; or (a) (3) if the victim is under the age of 14 years, and the person performing the act is at least 4 years older than the victim. Sections 3-306 thru 3-307 have similar provisions but they mention "sexual act" rather than "intercourse" and they do not define the crime as "rape" but as "sexual offense". But the emphasis on force or threat of force, and lack of consent is much the same. So it seems that under Maryland law, at least, the situation described in the question would not be legally "rape" nor a "sexual offense". Maryland Criminal code § 11-301 (2018) defines prostitution in subsection (c) which reads: (c) Prostitution. -- "Prostitution" means the performance of a sexual act, sexual contact, or vaginal intercourse for hire. Whether the provision of food, shelter, and protection by one person to another in return for sex would be considered "for hire" is arguable. In practice such arrangements, even if they also involve cash payment, are rarely if ever prosecuted. | If you sue a person for a tort X, one of the things you have to prove is that the defendant did do X. A baseless belief that it must have been so-and-so will do you no good. You do not have to have iron-clad evidence of your allegations, for a civil suit, but you have to show with a preponderance of evidence that the claim is true. A combination of "hates me" and "provably did this a number of times in the past" could well suffice. As for damages, it depends on what harm you actually suffered. If you get fired and you show that it was because of a false allegation, you would probably have to take this to the big court, since small claims court handles amounts in the $5,000 range (jurisdiction-specific). | (Standard disclaimer: I am not your lawyer; I am not here to help you.) Under American common law, the distinction here would relate to the harm to B: either a damages issue or a "special harm" issue. The Restatement elements of defamation are falsity, publication, fault, and inherent actionability or special harm. See Rest. 2d Torts § 558. The last element captures the traditional doctrine that slander (not libel) is only actionable if it falls into one of four or five specific categories ("slander per se"), or if it actually causes economic injury. Your example doesn't seem to fit into any of the special categories. But see Rest. 2d Torts § 573 (imputations affecting business or office). If the statement to C is oral rather than written, and C doesn't believe it or otherwise nothing comes of the statement, B may not be able to prove special harm and therefore fail to recover anything. If D, on the contrary, avoided doing business with B, B may be able to show special harm supporting a claim. Similarly, C's disbelief or D's belief may be relevant to determining the actual damages B suffered and is therefore entitled to recover from A. |
Is dubbing a YouTube video in another language illegal? If I download a YouTube video, dub it in another language, and reupload it on YouTube, can I be prosecuted by law (or can YouTube remove my video) for infringement? | Yes, assuming the material was given the standard license. You would be creating a derivative work, and only the copyright owner has the right to authorize creation of a derivative work. See the copyright FAQ for general information. The owner can file a DMCA takedown notice with YouTube and they will by policy notify you of the infringement claim and unless you file a counter-notice (you legally couldn't given the facts you're asserting), they will take it down. The owner can also sue you. | The "Standard Youtube License" or TOS reads You shall not copy, reproduce, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, or otherwise exploit any Content for any other purposes without the prior written consent of YouTube or the respective licensors of the Content. That stipulates no "free usage" and as such, you cannot use a screenshot ("Content") without permission or license from the copyright owner anywhere in your own work or on a platform such as Wikipedia that requires permissions from the copyright owner. You are legally OK with (preferably written) approval and license from the creator for use of a screenshot on Wikipedia, because such an written agreement will satisfy Wikipedia's requirement of owner approval for the use of another creator's work on Wikipedia and gives you written permission and license to use the work on Wikipedia. Simply contact the copyright owner and ask for permission. If you do not have the owner's permission and still use a screenshot, and are confronted with copyright infringement by the owner or Wikipedia, your use of a screenshot may fall under Fair use. The important qualifier is may. You being able to prevail with a Fair use defense - worst case, if taken to court, or at very least, Wikipedia taking down the screenshot under a DMCA request - is not guaranteed, because a judge would make that decision, based on the evidence of the usage and their determination if, in fact, a screenshot is Fair use. Fair use (Chapter 1 - Circular 92 | U.S. Copyright Office) stipulates that usage is legally permissible when (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole is not considered to be substantial enough is an infringement of copyright of the whole work. Who determines what is what is "substantial enough"? A court. The court could take into account (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. in determining your usage is Fair use, or damages if the court rules against you. You do risk copyright infringement without clear permission from the copyright owner, and you risk Wikipedia being send a DMCA takedown notice. Whether or not you are the subject of a copyright infringement lawsuit is up to the copyright owner, and if that happens, whether you prevail is up to the court. | Is it illegal to ask a company for money in exchange for information on a bug in their software/website? That in itself is legal. Indeed, the company would incur unjust enrichment if it coerced you to disclose your discovery for free. Only if you threatened the company to divulge to others your discovery unless the company pays you, it would be illegal and trigger charges such as extortion (likewise, legislations outlaw the unjustified delivery of programs or instructions for hacking a software/network/etc., although this goes beyond your actual question). Can the company take legal action against me? That seems doubtful, futile, and it could backfire (please note I have not done any research on legal precedents about this). Although the terms and conditions of the website or the End User License Agreement (EULA) of software might prohibit you to reverse engineer (RE)/decompile/etc. the application, anti-RE clauses are unenforceable and the remedies therefor are indeterminate because the sole act of conducting reverse engineering does not subject the company (or third parties) to any losses. The company's decision to take legal action for your discovery could backfire from two standpoints. First, it calls attention to the fact that the software at issue is defective and unsafe. And second, the bug is likely to be detected by someone else anyway, thereby potentially compromising customers' systems. | Interesting that they don't give a source and also don't link to anywhere (such as Wikimedia commons). So I assume that content is google's own. So generally speaking: No, when no license is provided, that means you can't use whatever it is in a project of yours (whether commercially or not), because the "default", when nothing is specified, is that no license is given. So unless you find a license that grants you a permission on google's own content, these sounds can't be used freely. | Yes it's illegal. Just like singing/whistling happy birthday in public (used to be) illegal. You could be sued for untold amount of damages that could ruin your life forever (in theory). If you whistle a mashup remix then it's legal as long as it's different enough from the original that you can't tell that they are the same song anymore. Yes anyone can sue you if you piss them off. Disney doesn't sue all the people who sing covers of their songs because it's bad for business to piss off your fans, but they can sue if they feel like it. This is more common sense than anything else but I suggest you look into fair use copyright law since there is a lot of misconception about it. https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/what-is-fair-use/ | Copyright law requires permission of the rights holder to e.g. post material. The terms of that permission could be very complicated, as seen in royalties contracts with publishers, but they can also be simple. If someone asks "can I post your video on my website" and you say "Sure, as long as you give me credit", then they can post the video on their site as long as that say something like "This video was made by Jake" or something like that. There is no exception to permission where permission is retroactively withdrawn just in case it turns out that one can make money off of the video. However: you gave That Guy permission, and that does not mean that the hundreds of Other Guys have permission. So you can pursue all of the Other Guys and demand that they take the video down, or require some payment to get your permission. | I presume the input is text: "my original text" is assumed to mean you wrote (created) the text. That means that you hold the copyright to the text, and only you can authorize a derivative work (such as a synthesized recording). Therefore, you hold the copyright to the recordings as well. The crucial consideration governing that right is that you "created" the work, meaning that there is a modicum of creativity. However, if you did not create the text and your only function is to host an automatic process where users can create a synthesized recording, then whoever created the text has the right to the text and derivative works (i.e. the synthesized output). Automated processes like (unassisted) OCR or wav-to-mp3 conversion would not count as being "original", nor would automatic text-to-speech, so you don't gain copyright just from making an automatic work-creating tool available. On the assumption that the conversion involves a component of Chrome, you can use the service per the terms of service, though you cannot "reproduce, duplicate, copy, sell, trade or resell the Services". This might limit the extent to which you could make this conversion available to others, depending on how, exactly, you could do such a thing (does it duplicate the service?). As they say, Google owns all legal right to the Services, but Google obtains no right from you for any content created through their service. There is no restriction in the TOS against using the service for commercial purposes. Even if there were, that would not assign copyright in the recording to anyone else, it would just mean they could sue you for violating the TOS. | There are a number of existing legal sites that do this, for free or for pay. The main concern for a website operator pertains to the DMCA "safe harbor" provisions, which protect against vicarious liability for infringement. A "report piracy" option is not sufficient; see this answer to a related question. |
What are the penalties for attempting to fill a forged prescription in the U.S.? My cousin who lives in Anaheim, California was just caught trying to fill in a forged prescription for a benzodiazepine (Valium/diazepam). He scanned and forged the original script given to him by a doctor who refused to refill it a second time. He went to a CVS last December and they successfully filled it. He tried again this month only to be caught by the pharmacist who asked him to wait a bit but called the police who arrived and arrested him He was bailed out and now they say he's looking at being on the hook for a felony if the DA decides to press charges. How serious is this? I know a workmate who did something similar here the UK and only got a caution. I think this is highly unlikely to happen to him though as the American justice system is known for being particularly brutal in comparison to other Western nations. | If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment. | We can look at Missouri law as an example. Missouri Statutes §577.029 says A licensed physician, registered nurse, phlebotomist, or trained medical technician, acting at the request and direction of the law enforcement officer under section 577.020, shall, with the consent of the patient or a warrant issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol content of the blood, unless such medical personnel, in his or her good faith medical judgment, believes such procedure would endanger the life or health of the person in custody. Blood may be withdrawn only by such medical personnel, but such restriction shall not apply to the taking of a breath test, a saliva specimen, or a urine specimen. In withdrawing blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol content thereof, only a previously unused and sterile needle and sterile vessel shall be utilized and the withdrawal shall otherwise be in strict accord with accepted medical practices. Upon the request of the person who is tested, full information concerning the test taken at the direction of the law enforcement officer shall be made available to him or her. "Shall" means "must" – if there is a warrant (we assume there is no consent). Then the question is, what happens if the phlebotomist (etc) refuses? First, §577.031 immunizes the medical-person from legal liability when they act in compliance with a request from a LEO (a simple request, not necessarily accompanied by a warrant). §577.033 says that being dead, unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing does not constitute withdrawal of consent (which is implied, by law). No specific penalty is prescribed for refusal to administer a court-ordered blood draw. There is no penalty for complying, there is no prescribed criminal penalty for refusing to comply with a court order (there is the possibility of a finding of contempt of court). Not every state is Missouri: I understand that Utah is different. | Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me. | It should be pointed out that smuggling doesn't just involve illegal goods but also includes legal goods that are brought in without following proper procedures such as paying required duties. https://www.findlaw.com/criminal/criminal-charges/smuggling-and-customs-violations.html False Declarations; Exporting violations; and Importing violations. False declarations can happen when a person returns to the U.S. or enters for the first time. They must declare the value of any goods they are bringing in from overseas. You can violate the law by misrepresenting the value of the goods, omitting them from the declaration form completely, or making false representations. Also, if you fail to disclose leaving or entering the country with $10,000 worth of currency, you can be criminally charged. While I am not a lawyer I could see that the authorities might have an issue with someone pulling a stunt like that in order to "test" them. Even if there is no legal issue the person could be put through a lot while they run tests to confirm that nothing illegal is being brought in and there is nothing preventing them from making the process as long and painful as they can. Something else to consider they also have rules in place for brining other legal objects on board planes if they resemble objects that are not allowed. https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/whatcanibring/items/toy-guns-and-weapons Squirt guns, Nerf guns, toy swords, or other items that resemble realistic firearms or weapons are prohibited. We recommend emptying water guns, which must follow the 3-1-1 Liquids Rule. Replicas of explosives, such as hand grenades, are prohibited in checked and carry-on baggage. TSA officers have the discretion to prohibit any item through the screening checkpoint if they believe it poses a security threat. It is also possible to be charged with selling fake drugs and the local authorities can bring those charges and it can become their word versus your word about what your intentions are. In this case you might not be intending to sell them but it would be impossible to argue that you are not trying to pass it off as fake drugs. https://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/legal-advice/criminal-defense/drug-charges/jail-selling-fake-drugs.htm Question: I sold a baggie of aspirins that I said was OxyContin to a guy at a concert. After the show, I heard that there were undercover officers in the crowd. Could I be busted for selling fake drugs? Answer: Yes. States and federal laws make the sale of fake drugs illegal, and you can even be charged with an attempted drug sale under some laws. | There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context. | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. | Under federal law, it is illegal the minute you have any marijuana or marijuana seeds. Likewise under NJ law, except if authorized by state law, for medical marijuana production. Under NJ's medical marijuana law, "alternative treatment centers" grow and dispense medical marijuana, and there is no provision for mass-production growers (who don't distribute). Such a center is "an organization approved by the department [of Health and Senior Services] to perform activities necessary to provide registered qualifying patients with usable marijuana and related paraphernalia in accordance with the provisions of this act". The department accepts applications to operate such a center, and "shall seek to ensure the availability of a sufficient number of alternative treatment centers throughout the State, pursuant to need, including at least two each in the northern, central, and southern regions of the State" (they have to find a need for another center in a location, in order for one to get authorized; this is evaluated every 2 years). There are criminal background checks for those involved with a treatment center. According to this article, there are a maximum of 6 centers to be opened, in Montclair, Egg Harbor Township, Woodbridge, Bellmawr, and Cranbury (existing), and Secaucus (under review). The article implies that 6 is the statutory maximum, but that is the statutory minimum, though probably the regulatory maximum (i.e. the state will not authorize any further centers). It also says that the centers must be non-profit, though the law only requires the first two to be non-profit (though it could be a de facto requirement via the regulatory power of the Dept. of Health). Since they don't seem to be eager to expand availability, there isn't any information on what other requirements there are for operating such a center, though the application form is here. The 2016 annual report gives information on production at the 5 existing centers, which is in the range of 400-800 lbs annually. | Giving someone drugs without their knowledge or consent, say in food or drink, is a criminal act. At the least it is a form of assault, and possibly a more serious crime could be supported by the facts. Note that people's reactions to drugs vary, and serious harm or even death can result from drugs that do not have serious effects on most people. Very serious criminal charges might then result. The facts should be reported to the police. If this is a case where the people receiving the drugs know about them, and want them, that is a very different matter, although it may still be illegal depending on the nature of the drugs. Note that under US law, an uninvolved witness is not normally required to report a crime, although reporting is strongly encouraged. This rule is different in different countries. That is, in some countries an ordinary citizen may be legally required to report a crime. In at least one state any person is required to report a crime if a victim is in danger of bodily harm (Wisconsin statute 940.34) There may be similar provisions in the laws of other states. People with some sort of duty of care, or who are made "mandated reporters" by statute, such as teachers and health professionals, may be legally required to file reports when they know or have reason to believe that a crime is underway or has taken place. Such statutes vary from state to state, and will be different in non-US countries. |
Is the following a form of "jury nullification" and if so can it be overturned legally? Regarding the O.J. Simpson trial, an (African American) commentator said something like, "O.J. was guilty of murder, but it also appeared that he was being framed (by e.g. Mark Fuhrman), and therefore the jury voted to acquit, rather than support a wrongfully obtained conviction." Suppose this had been an opinion expressed (after the fact) by one or more jurors, rather than a "third" party. Would this be a form of "jury nullification"? Would this be grounds for a mistrial on the theory that no "reasonable" jury would make such a finding? | So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification. | "Since state level crimes are prosecuted in the state they happen and potential jurors are eligible voters, would this make it impossible for anyone who voted in the election to serve on such a jury as they would obviously prefer their side to win?" No. A conflict of interest is a particularized and personal interest in the case that is different from an interest of a member of the general public or of a voter or of a taxpayer in general. Someone who wouldn't have standing to bring a case will generally not have a conflict of interest for purposes of being a juror. | On an issue of pure law, an appellate court decides if the trial judge got it right or wrong from scratch, and if there is a case that is a better match than the one that the judge used that leads to a different outcome in the case, then an appellate court is likely to find that the trial court's ruling is a reversible error. On an issue of mixed fact and law, or on a legal issue where a judge has more discretion in how the law is applied (like many evidentiary issues), a judge is given more deference, and the judge will generally only be reversed if no reasonable judge could have applied the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them, and then, only if an application of the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them would have changed the outcome of the case. There are a couple of ways that this standard of review is described, one of which is called "abuse of discretion" review. | The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas. | It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question. | If this judge is truly biased, won't the litigants be all the more glad to have a jury of their peers? You are proposing to abandon your duty to others. At trial you serve the community, not the judge. Back on scope for Law SE: If you refuse to serve on a jury, that could be a separate offense or general criminal contempt, for which you (this all depends on your jurisdiction) could get 30-90 days in jail. Edit: like several others have pointed out, I would not expect much trouble if you politely told the court that you felt you would be biased b/c of past connections. Even if the judge doesn't dismiss you, one of the litigants is likely to strike you. P.S. In most states, no one except a prosecutor (sometimes another state employee) can "take someone" to a criminal court. Individuals can only take someone to civil trial, where one cannot be sentenced, only ordered to pay a judgement. | A party can ask a judge to recuse at the outset of a case for bias or other reasons (e.g. a family connection to a party). Generally, a judge rules on that motion personally and it is an interlocutory motion not subject to appeal except by extraordinary writ (or the equivalent) to the state supreme court. It is not generally proper to do so during a trial. Moreover, one jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial (which happens when the jury is sworn) if the trial ends prior to a jury verdict for reasons other than those attributable to the defendant, the defendant cannot be tried again on those charges and is functionally acquitted. There are probably some arguable exceptions to this rule in extraordinary circumstances that are not the fault of either party (e.g. if a meteor hits courthouse and kills the judge and some jurors mid-trial, or if it is revealed that the judge committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried). But the threshold for exceptions to the general rule is very high. | Is this normal? Pretty much. Witnesses lie in court all the time (in my experience, defendants, law enforcement officers and medical doctors are the most likely to lie). Dealing with a witness who lies in court under oath effectively is one of the most challenging tasks lawyers face. It is an inherently challenging hurdle to proving or defending a case. The facts as presented in court often differ in some material way from reality. It is a pretty tough thing to accurately measure, but my gut estimate would be that this happens in a least 30%-40% of cases that produce contested trials, although not infrequently, a judge or jury will not find the false testimony to be credible. On the other hand, it isn't at all uncommon (probably at least 10% of the time) for a judge or jury to believe the liars to be telling the truth, and to find the people who are telling the truth to be less credible. There is absolute immunity from civil liability for lying in court testimony, although it could, in theory, give rise to contempt of court sanctions from the judge in some circumstances, or to a prosecution for perjury. But, perjury prosecutions are, in practice, very rare, and a good share of them arise from false statements made in documents under oath, rather than from courtroom testimony. There is probably less than 1 perjury prosecution per 1000 provable lies made under oath in courtroom testimony on material issues that end up influencing the outcome in a case. I totally sympathize with how frustrating this situation is having been there in cases that I am litigating many, many times. But, in short, life isn't fair. |
Should I blur personally identifiable information on Facebook screen recording for YouTube? (Global question: EU, US, etc) I'm recording a video for YouTube where I show how browser extension works while surfing through different Facebook Groups, Business Pages, Personal Profiles, etc. Should I blur surnames and photos of people who meet on the screen? According to this article: https://gdpr.eu/eu-gdpr-personal-data/ photos are also considered personally identifiable information: Video, audio, numerical, graphical, and photographic data can all contain personal data. ... Methods of identification that are not present today could be developed in the future, which means that data stored for long durations must be continuously reviewed to make sure it cannot be combined with new technology that would allow for indirect identification. So it's possible to find people if I show their avatars (using Neural Networks, Google Images, or other services). So It seems that even avatars should be blurred. But should I blur personally identifiable information? Especially considering that people on Facebook made it public and do not hide it. Thanks! | There are multiple issues with what you are trying to do, including issues with copyright, personality rights, and data protection. You are trying to use other people's content and likeness for your advertisement. Unless you are certain that you can do this in your relevant jurisdictions, without their consent, this sounds like a very bad idea. At least under GDPR, “but they made it public” is not an excuse. Personal data is personal data regardless of how you acquire it. The GDPR also has a very broad concept of identifiability that goes beyond direct identifiers or PII. If you want to use other people's personal data, you need a legal basis, and must provide them notice about your processing. Consent (informed opt-in) is one legal basis, legitimate interest (opt-out) another. You are suggesting to avoid this by blurring PII, but you may also have to blur other content that is indirectly identifiable. Real anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is a really hard problem. In some cases, a legitimate interest is able to avoid such problems. E.g. if I make a video with commentary about a Tweet, it would likely be OK to show surrounding personal data like the responses including the identities of the various accounts, to the degree that this is relevant to the commentary and/or necessary for proper attribution. However, that commentary likely has strong protections under freedom of expression. At least from an European viewpoint, a tutorial, demo, or advertisement would not have a freedom of expression argument that would shift a GDPR legitimate interest balancing test in your favour. Instead of blurring almost everything in your video or working on GDPR compliance, content licenses, and release forms, you should consider a different solution: create dummy content just for your videos. You can use your own content, and maybe add a dummy profile. | It doesn’t make you exempt from the GDPR if that’s what you’re asking The hash you produce is linked to one (or a small number) of computers and it therefore serves as an ID number. Because that ID number is linked to the owner of the computer it is personal information and if you are collecting it, you must comply with the requirements of the GDPR - valid legal reason, deletion when no longer required, deletion on request, data security etc. | You are right that a visitor of a website does not expect to be tracked upon opening the website. But when using Google Analytics configured in the way explained in my other post, the visitor is not tracked. At least not in a way which violates the GDPR. You worry about the cookies. I also found this article which also does and suggests to either: change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, so it will be removed when the browser is closed. To do this, set the Cookie Expiration variable in your Google Analytics Settings to 0. completely disable cookies. (GA does not require cookies). To do this, set the storage field to none: ga('create', 'UA-XXXXX-Y', { 'storage': 'none' }); If you do not disable cookies, cookies can be used for tracking, which is more general defined in the GDPR as profiling. Profiling is defined in Art. 4 GDPR as: ‘profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements; Art. 22(1) GDPR disallows profiling. Therefore in the settings menu from Google Analytics you have to disable data sharing and data collection. So data will only be used for the analytics function. But because you have configured to Anonymize your visitors IP Address, the part of the IP address used for this, is no longer considered personal data. This is because approx. 250 other users share the same part of the ip address which is stored, so data is not distinguishable between those 250 users. The anonymisation used by google is currently considered good enough. At least by the Dutch DPA. This might change if someone proves it is not good enough anonymized. Note that I am not a lawyer either, but I have read from multiple experts that analytics can be a "legitimate interest", the same way marketing can be a legitimate interest. This way configured the privacy impact is considered very low. It is also very important to note that a DPA consideres GA Google Analytics compliant. Even if a court would not agree in the future, you are acting in good faith if you follow those instructions, so you will probably not be fined. The DPA does currently not suggest to change the _ga cookie to a session cookie, or disable cookies completely. Note that the GDPR does not require doing anything to make it technical impossible to track someone. If a website has access to the data to track someone, but "promises" not to do that, that is fine. And rules regarding the usage of cookies in general, is not part of the GDPR, but (currently) part of the ePrivacy Directive. Only the way to ask for consent for storing cookies is defined in the GDPR. | Copyright The photographer, not the subject(s) own the copyright in the picture. So, unless this was a selfie, you have no rights in the picture. Privacy If the photo was taken in circumstances where a reasonable person would expect privacy, then revealing it to others might be a tort of privacy breach. In most common law jurisdictions this area of the law is undeveloped. However, if the photo was taken from a public place (even if you were in a private place), or with your permission, this doesn’t apply. Intimate images In some jurisdictions, the distribution of intimate images without the permission of the subject is a crime. Intimate does not include a photo that is merely embarrassing. Bullying This is probably bullying behaviour but bullying per se is generally not illegal. It might be illegal if the bullying is motivated by a protected characteristic (race, age, gender, sexuality etc.) but that usually requires a context - employment, public accommodation etc. it might also be illegal hate speech even outside such an institutional framework. Similarly, within an institutional context like a workplace or school there might be policies around bullying; these might have the force of law but are probably quasi-contractural matters. However, a private person doing it because they don’t like you and want to humiliate or embarrass you is probably not doing anything illegal. | BAD idea It is one thing to upload the phonebook and associated pictures for use of the owner of the phonebook. It isn't a fair use of the phonebook pictures - and you might not have a license anyway, as some people associate photos with numbers that they don't have a license to associate with anyway. But what if instead of a photo of the person, the first photo someone associated with the person is a photo of something like... crack cocaine, a photo of someone in a very compromising situation, just genitals, or some other thing that is just as tasteless or possibly criminal to share? In that case, your company is possibly committing defamation, and in case sharing or possessing of the image itself is illegal, your company is now the actor and liable. Depending on the content of the picture, distribution of pornographic material (possibly even underage material of that sort) could be up that alley just as much as hate speech through symbols, usage of banned symbols (such as swastikas in Gernamy) and many many others. | The GDPR does not prescribe how information should be pseudonymized and does not even define the term properly. Yet, pseudonymization is suggested as an safety measure in various places, so that pseudonymization should be implemented wherever appropriate. The most useful guidance the GDPR gives is by contrasting pseudonymization with anonymization, where it says that pseudonymized data is still personal data because the data subjects can be identified using additional information (see Recital 26 GDPR). In contrast, re-identification is not reasonably likely for truly anonymized data. A common technique for pseudonymization is to replace identifying information with a pseudonym, for example replacing a name with a random numeric ID. However, this can only be considered pseudonymous if the mapping between the ID and the real value is not available to whoever uses this data. Replacing individual fields in a data set might not be sufficient for pseudonymization because apparently non-sensitive fields could still enable indirect identification. This requires careful analysis taking into account the entire context of the data, so it isn't possible to say whether merely removing names + email addresses achieves pseudonymization or anonymization. What you are doing is redacting parts of sensitive data. I think this is a pretty weak pseudonymization method since it still leaks partial information about the true value, and leaks information about the length of the redacted value. It is possible to argue that this is OK (e.g. if you can show that you have multiple similar redactions so that you achieve a level of k-anonymity). But by default, such partial redactions are likely to be unsafe. Completely removing the sensitive data is much safer. The “Article 29 Working Party”, a pre-GDPR EU body, has published an opinion on anonymization techniques in 2014 (PDF). It does not account for the GDPR's specific phrasing, but provides an overview of pseudonymization and anonymization techniques and puts them into context of European data protection law. It considers how such guarantees guard against attacks such as singling out data subjects, linking multiple records of the same individual, and making inferences about the data subject. In this guidance, pseudonymization techniques that are suggested include encrypting or hashing the sensitive data. However, the guidance warns that such techniques do not provide strong protection against singling out or linking records of the data subject. A bit earlier, the UK ICO had published guidance on personal data, including on the matter of anonymization and pseudonymization (PDF) with some good examples. For determining whether a data set has been successfully anonymized (or pseudonymized), they suggest a motivated intruder test: could someone without specialist knowledge or skills re-identify the data subject? In your example, such a person should not be able to infer that a record about Stxxx Axxdxrxn is about a Steve Anderson. In my opinion, your pseudonymization approach would fail the motivated intruder test unless you have multiple records that could all be about Steve Anderson (compare k-anonymity). | You must get opt-in affirmative consent to process personal data, including tracking people's use of your site or providing targeted advertising. The banner on StackExchange is likely in violation of the GDPR. Do not copy it. It does not have an explicit opt-in, only an opt out which is onerous (leave the site, then manually go in and delete any cookies they set, which may be hard to identify if they are from 3rd parties). The sites you mention that have a gateway are a more correct implementation. Consent must be acquired before processing of data begins, and it must be explicit. | It follows from case law from the ECJ, e.g. C‑70/10 (28 January 2010) and C-582/14 (19 October 2016), that IP-addresses are personal data. Since my interpretation of the case law differs from the interpretation offered by @Greendrake, I'll go into the relevant case law in a bit more detail than I did in my initial answer. TL;DR: Yes, IP-addresses in server logs are personal data and you need to declare IP-address logging in your privacy policy. As I said, we need to examine the case law I mentioned in the introduction to find out whether IP-addresses are personal data. The first of those are ECJ C-70/10. In this, the court concludes that all IP-addresses are "protected personal data": It is common ground, first, that the injunction requiring installation of the contested filtering system would involve a systematic analysis of all content and the collection and identification of users’ IP addresses from which unlawful content on the network is sent. Those addresses are protected personal data because they allow those users to be precisely identified. (my emphasis) Then, in 2016, the ECJ ruled in a more narrow case ECJ C‑582/14 specifically ruling on dynamic IP-addresses: The court goes through a number of deliberations, then concludes: Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person. It is very clear from this text that the court does not challenge or invalidate ECJ C-70/10 on static IP-addresses. The court is very careful, in its ruling to point out its ruling is specifically about dynamic IP-addresses. So the ruling of ECJ C-70/10 still stands for static IP-addresses, these are always protected personal data. I believe this case law is summarized in Recital 30 of the GDPR. This recital lists the identifiers that may make natural persons identifiable: Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. (my emphasis). Since it follows from case law that static IP-addresses always makes the data subject identifiable, and dynamic IP-addresses may make the data subject identifiable, I will conclude, based on jurisprudence alone, that: Unless you are able to filter your logs to exclude static IP-addresses. I think you must consider IP-addresses protected personal data under the GDPR. However, in ECJ C‑582/14, the ruling about dynamic IP-addresses hinges on the controller having legal means to identify the data subject by connecting the IP address to some other data. The court seems to think that getting access to ISP logs is the only means of doing that. This is wrong. In 2015, the Norwegian computer scientist Einar Otto Stangvik identified 78 Norwegians who seem to have downloaded abuse material starting only with their IP-addresses. Stangvik did this while working as a consultant for Norway's larges newspaper VG. I know Stangvik and I am familiar with the methods he used. I've tried them myself, and they work. Stangvik did not have access to ISP logs, he did not do anything illagal, and the 78 natural persons identified only by means of their IP-address, combined with other data the Stangvik had legal access to. I will not go into details, I will just say this: If you know how to do this, getting to the natural person when you know the IP-address is not difficult or labour-consuming. To return to the question: It also follows from the GDPR that logging of IP-addresses falls under its definition of "processing". Your privacy policy should list all personal data personal data that is collected by yourself and third parties ("processors" in the terminology of the GDPR) that you rely on. Your hosting company is such a third party, and you need to declare the logging of IP-addresses in your privacy policy. |
Is the right to keep and bear crypto protected by the Second Amendment? Stumbled across an interesting comment in regards to the recent events about TorProject and a public library in Lebanon, New Hampshire, U. S. of A.: http://www.dslreports.com/forum/r30291606-So-let-me-get-this-right The Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti/ ) has no issues with encouraging freedom fighters from using a service that is illegal in their countries, but sends an "advisory letter" to anyone in the United States that uses it where it is legal. Shady. The government has already classified encryption technology as a weapons system. Wouldn't this mean that use of encryption technology by US citizens is protected under the 2nd Amendment? (This isn't a serious argument, but it does make you wonder) I still remember when the Department of Homeland Security got its name. I laughed my ass off. My buddy who was a Russian linguist for the military laughed even harder because it DIRECTLY translates to KGB. The soviets had Committees for everything instead of departments, and they used "the state" instead of "the homeland" in colloquial conversation. Goldir (emphasis mine) Indeed, it's been well known in the technical communities that crypto has long been classified as munition by the US government. Bernstein v. United States. http://export.cr.yp.to/ Doesn't it indeed make it protected under the 2nd Amendment? | Not all weapons are protected by the Second Amendment. There is a "dangerous and unusual weapons" exclusionary clause established by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, which excludes pretty much anything that's incredibly dangerous (obviously we wouldn't want our people to have the right to keep bombs in their house) or not considered a normal weapon (encryption/cryptography would probably fall under this). One case currently being considered under this exclusion is the stun gun, which is going to the Supreme Court to determine whether it qualifies as an unusual weapon and whether it is protected by the Second Amendment. | You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey. | "Civic obligations" are based on one's personal moral philosophy, best discussed on Philosophy SE. On the legal front, in the US, there is no (existing) legal basis for simply declaring some random thing to be "top secret", even if it has great potential to be used for evil purposes. If this is research conducted under the umbrella of the Dept. of Defense, it might be classified, but a garage inventor is not subject to the laws regarding classified documents. Congress could pass a law prohibiting promulgating research on time travel, but even if such a law were found to be constitutional (unlikely, on First Amendment grounds, see this), one cannot be penalized for breaking the law before it becomes a law. | It's illegal under US law. 18 U.S. Code § 478 says: Whoever, within the United States, with intent to defraud, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any bond, certificate, obligation, or other security of any foreign government, purporting to be or in imitation of any such security issued under the authority of such foreign government, or any treasury note, bill, or promise to pay, lawfully issued by such foreign government and intended to circulate as money, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. There are several similar laws for similar crimes: § 479 - Uttering counterfeit foreign obligations or securities § 480 - Possessing counterfeit foreign obligations or securities § 481 - Plates, stones, or analog, digital, or electronic images for counterfeiting foreign obligations or securities § 482 - Foreign bank notes § 483 - Uttering counterfeit foreign bank notes § 488 - Making or possessing counterfeit dies for foreign coins § 502 - Postage and revenue stamps of foreign governments According to version of the South Sudan penal code I was able to find, counterfeiting is illegal. But if I understand section 7 correctly (which I might not), most counterfeiting is not prosecutable under South Sudan law if it is not done in South Sudan. Having a counterfeit revenue stamp, however, would be, as would fraudulently altering a coin. Given that there's not an extradition treaty and that it's already illegal under US law, this probably doesn't matter much, though | Yes, this violates the GDPR if the user is in Europe. Data which is tied to a personal device can be tied to the person who owns it. From "What Is Personal Data" by the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (emphasis added): Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. What identifies an individual could be as simple as a name or a number or could include other identifiers such as an IP address or a cookie identifier, or other factors. If it is possible to identify an individual directly from the information you are processing, then that information may be personal data. If you cannot directly identify an individual from that information, then you need to consider whether the individual is still identifiable. You should take into account the information you are processing together with all the means reasonably likely to be used by either you or any other person to identify that individual. The bit about "all means reasonably likely" in the last bullet includes the kind of de-anonymisation tactics described in the NYT article. There are 6 lawful bases for data processing in the GDPR, and all processing must fall under at least one of them. (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) Selling data isn't covered by any of the others, so consent must be obtained. Permission must be clear and positive, and you cannot predicate delivery of a service on the processing of data that isn't necessary for that service. So for instance you cannot say "You can use this service as long as we are allowed to collect and sell your data" because selling the data isn't necessary to the provision of the service. From "Consent" by the ICO: Consent requires a positive opt-in. Don’t use pre-ticked boxes or any other method of default consent. Explicit consent requires a very clear and specific statement of consent. Keep your consent requests separate from other terms and conditions. Be specific and ‘granular’ so that you get separate consent for separate things. Vague or blanket consent is not enough. [...] Avoid making consent to processing a precondition of a service. This applies to any processing of data about individuals within the EU, so just being an American company doesn't get you a free pass to ignore the GDPR if your app gets used by Europeans. The "Legitimate interests" basis is more problematic, in that the company collecting the data has to conduct a vague "balancing test" to determine if this basis applies. For direct marketing the ICO has written this, which says that direct marketing may be a legitimate interest, especially if you can show that the user has expressed interest in such adverts. For instance a location service which promises to tell you about nearby special offers would fall into this category. Against this, the impact on the user's privacy has to be considered, and location data is "special category data" because it can reveal medical information (e.g. hospital attendance) or religious affiliation (e.g. which church you go to). So unless the relationship between the recorded location data and the service is very direct its not going to pass the balancing test. The company would also need to distinguish between knowing the current location and keeping a record of historical locations; the two need separate justification. And of course nothing about this covers the sale of the data; this is considering a company which sells advertising space in it's app, not one that sells the data itself. | What a country claims to be the case certainly doesn't guarantee what is the case. The constitution (at least as of 2012) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (aka North Korea) says: Article 67. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and social organizations. Needless to say, North Korea is not generally considered a bastion of free speech. The People's Republic of China has a similar provision in its constitution. When we get to countries where those outside the country consider there to be some level of freedom of speech, there are still restrictions. In the UK, the Official Secrets Act makes it a crime for any person to republish leaked classified information. Germany makes it illegal to deny that the Holocaust happened. Until 2013, Canada made it illegal for a person to use telecommunications to say something that would expose people to hatred for some reason covered by antidiscrimination law. Many, many countries criminalize child pornography. Many, many countries have copyright laws. "Free speech" does not mean "you can say whatever you want and the government can't stop you." It means "as a general rule, the government can't restrict what you're saying because they don't like it." I am unaware of any country with a functional government with unfettered freedom of speech. | The essential parts of a trade secret are that (a) it is something that you keep secret, and (b) something that gives you an advantage in trade because you know it and others don't. A trade secret remains a trade secret if you give it to someone else under a non-disclosure agreement. If it is available where anyone can download it, either intentionally or by carelessness, then it isn't a trade secret anymore (as soon as it actually gets downloaded). If it gets made public through some illegal activity, well, that's too complicated for me. Anyway, YOU don't have to pretend anything. A claim that something is a trade secret doesn't make it one. And if something is a trade secret, no claim about it is necessary. If you download the software without doing anything illegal then it isn't a trade secret. To reply to the comment: If the sequence of events is this: I download the source code. I read the license. The license says "by using the software ..." then clearly I have the source code before using the software. At that point the trade secret status is lost. We don't need to discuss whether the license would have been enforcible, because the software is already downloaded before the license starts applying. I can tell anyone in the world about it. (I can't give the software to anyone, because that is copyright infringement, a totally different matter). | united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority. |
The Californian Mask Laws of 1918 I am trying to find the text or at least the proper citation for the mask laws in San Francisco and other cities in 1918. However my research only tells me that they existed, when they were enacted and paraphrasing of the contents, and that they resulted in an open-air court on the street, where fines were contested and upheld. Yet I could not find either the proper reference to them or the original text. I am not in the US, so digging through the papers in the archives of LA and SF is impossible for me. How should one cite these repealed/annulled laws and where can one find the verbatim text of at least one of them, most favorably the San Francisco one? | This was a resolution of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, passed on 1918-10-24 as the Chronicle reported the following day. "Everyone Is Compelled to Wear Masks by City Resolution". San Francisco Chronicle, 1918-10-25. page 1. The texts of resolutions may be obtained from the Clerk of the Board, but one needs to know the specific resolution number, or at least "reasonably describe" an identifiable resolution. It is possible that "mask wearing resolution passed on 1918-10-24" is a reasonable description. How many mask ordinances could the Board have passed that day? ☺ https://crmproxy.sfgov.org/Ef3/General.jsp?form=SSP_COB_Information&page=SSP_COB_Information Information from the Board on the WWW only goes back to 2000, and in the Legislative Research Centre to 1998. https://sfbos.org/resolutions | Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out. | Constitution of the USA, Article IV, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. and the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 3): [The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; SCOTUS has found the former to mean that states that do not allow same-sex marriages in their laws must recognize same-sex marriages registered by other states - Obergefell v. Hodges. Maybe one could argue that driver licenses are not equivalent among states, but I would expect judges (SCOTUS) to require a very well reasoned explanation. For example, maybe Alaska could refuse to recognize licenses from Florida because Florida drivers do not know how to cope with snowed roads. But even in that case Alaska probably would need to produce data showing that these measures aim to serve the public interest (avoid accidents) and that there are no other ways of getting the same result. OTOH the Commerce Clause has been successfully used to avoid states mandating racial segregation of travellers, so it is quite reasonable to see it being used to prevent a state from trying to limit the mobility of citizens from other states (again, in the supposition that the state restricting it cannot show a compelling reason to do so). AFAIK, only the Federal Government could invoke the Commerce Clause; I would expect a lot more people (in your example, the PA government or maybe even any PA driver) would have standing. | I'm not sure if you are asking for each of the countries listed, but I am assuming that they are there merely for example. In the US, the are a variety of different rules for its different court systems. As a rule, each State can make its own rules for its court system, and the overarching Federal system has its own rules as well, although they run off of the same principles. As such, the answer varies on which state the court is located in and possibly the type of document. In California, for example, different documents have different retention times for different documents. For example, documents for civil cases default to 10 years of retention, while adoption paperwork is retained permanently. For a criminal matter, the judgement (the final product that says if the accused is found guilty or innocent, and for what crimes) is retained permanently, while all other documents are retained for the greater of 50 years or the maximum length of sentence imposed. When the retention period for a document is over, the document is not automatically destroyed(at least in California). Instead, the appropriate official sends an official notice to all the parties in the case that the document is to be destroyed, and if no response is received to transfer the documents, the documents can be destroyed. (Source:http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNum=68152) Note: I have said "document" throughout, which originally meant a piece of paper. However, recently, documents have been submitted electronically, and sometimes older documents are electronically scanned. | The article is public domain. The pictures aren’t If this was first published in the British Empire (as it then was), then The UK is the place of first publication. What follows is its status under UK law, other jurisdictions may have different results. The original article is public domain because H. C. P. Bell died in 1937 meaning copyright on everything he wrote expired 31 December 2007. If he’d lived until 1951 or later it would still be under copyright (in 2021). However, this isn’t the original article because: Text on this page extracted from an original copy of Annual Report. The photographs were taken when I visited the site in 1991, and again in November 1995. The bits that this unknown author added, including the photographs, are their copyright. Since they were clearly alive in 1995 (due to the well known pirate aphorism “dead men take no photos”) the copyright in those is still current. | Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have "or else" provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say "anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just". Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section. | In California (as in all states) there is a justifiable homicide defense which might be used in such a situation. For the force to be justified, you have to reasonably believe you are in danger of being harmed, that you need to use force to avoid the harm, and you may only use the minimum force necessary to eliminate the threat. It then is a matter for the jury to decide whether those principles were followed in your particular instance. The reason why it's hard to predict the outcome is that it depends on a subjective evaluation by the jury, as to whether the shooter had a reasonable fear and whether lesser force was a viable option. The jury's decision is guided by instructions to the jury (#506, #506) which focus on relevant distinctions. The jury will be told that "Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be", and that you have to reasonably believe there is "imminent danger of great bodily injury". My evaluation is that that does not describe the scenario in the question. There is some possibility of future harm... but not imminent harm. People v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470" states that "the rule developed at common law that killing or use of deadly force to prevent a felony was justified only if the offense was a forcible and atrocious crime" and "Examples of forcible and atrocious crimes are murder, mayhem, rape and robbery", and that could support application of a justifiable homicide defense in a bank robbery. But in the present instance, the bank is being robbed and the shooter is a by-stander. Despite all of the bank robberies in California, there is no relevant case from which one could draw an analogy. | I did not perform a complete survey but The Jurisdictional Limits of Campus Police reports that, "subject to jurisdictional constraints, campus police officers had virtually the same powers as their municipal counterparts." (Internal quotes omitted.) Generally speaking, police are police not administration. Here are some statutes: ILLINOIS HIGHER EDUCATION (110 ILCS 1020/) Private College Campus Police Act. The Board of Trustees of a private college or private university, may appoint persons to be members of a campus police department.... Members of the campus police department shall have the powers of municipal peace officers and county sheriffs. MASSACHUSETTS General Laws PART I TITLE II CHAPTER 22C Section 63. The colonel may... at the request of an officer of a college, university, other educational institution... appoint employees of such college, university, other educational institution or hospital as special state police officers. Such special state police officers shall... have the same power to make arrests as regular police officers for any criminal offense committed in or upon lands or structures owned, used or occupied by such college, university, or other institution or hospital. Oklahoma 74-360.17 ...certified campus police officer shall have the authority to enforce... State criminal statutes. Campus police departments formed by private institutions of higher education pursuant to this act shall be deemed to be public agencies in the State of Oklahoma Here is a case: People v. Boettner, 362 N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y.Sup., 1974) is a case where school officials at a private school tried to get the cops to come execute a search. While the cops were dragging their feet obtaining a warrant, the school officials did their own search, found marijuana which they turned over to the police. Suspect was arrested and convicted. When the cops can't go into the room, send in the administration. Sort of. present search and seizure was conducted by college officials in a private capacity without government knowledge or participation and concludes that as such it is not subject to fourth amendment constraints. While it is true that a student does not lose his constitutional rights at the school house door or at the entrance to the college campus neither does he become cloaked with greater protection than any non-student who is the subject of a seizure of evidence by a private citizen. BUT the judge makes sure we understand that "State Police had no knowledge of and did not participate, directly or indirectly, in the search conducted by RIT officials on the 15th." So "it cannot be said that the RIT officials who decided on their own to search defendants' rooms were acting as agents, either actual or implied, of law enforcement.... Nor can it be said that the present search was only one incident in a close and continuing relationship between RIT and local law enforcement officers.... In the final analysis, RIT acted on its own, for its own reasons, and to further its own purposes." Regarding a written policy: The fact that the rules of the college regarding room searches were not complied with is of no consequence in determining the admissibility of the evidence for purposes of a criminal proceeding. Public schools are an entirely different animal. In those cases the university staff are public employees and their searches can be fourth amendment violations but they ARE allowed to conduct searches subject to the "reasonable exercise of University supervisory duties." "Even though the special relationship that existed between these petitioners and Troy University officials conferred upon the University officials the right to enter and search petitioners' dormitory rooms, that right cannot be expanded and used for purposes other than those pertaining to the special relationship." Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F.Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala., 1970) Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ., 284 F.Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala., 1968) |
What happens when a president is part of a mafia that violates the law in other countries? In his confession, one of the individuals arrested in FIFAgate (corruption, bribes that were paid through United States financial institutions) mentioned former President of Argentina Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, now Senator, and other former ministers. What can the United States do now? Can the United States arrest ministers, senators or presidents from other countries? | Defendants in the US would be charged with racketeering, not bribery, since government officials were not bribed. The DoJ indictment against Webb et al. is here: most of the defendants are not citizens of the US, though none are listed as being government officials. DoJ could certainly seek an indictment of ministers, senators or presidents of foreign countries. If said official were in the US on an ordinary passport, they could be arrested. They also might be arrested by e.g. Argentinian policy and extradited to the US, but whether that would be legal depends on the country (some countries don't extradite their own citizens; there would have to be an extradition treaty between that country and the US). It is inconceivable that any nation would hand over a sitting president because of an indictment by the US, and generally unlikely for any government official, but the official could be locally deposed first. But whether a government would do this is basically a political question, not a legal one. | When you are in another country, you are subject to their laws - you may be arrested and go through the due process as defined by that countries laws. This potentially means anything from a fine, to incarceration or deportation or even execution, depending on the local countries laws. A good example is the caning of American citizen Michael Fay in 1994 by the Singapore authorities, as a judicial punishment for vandalism, or the case of Swiss citizen Oliver Fricker, who was also caned in 2010 for vandalism. | Impeachment of a president does not on conviction automatically disqualify the convicted party from becoming president again. However, after conviction, the Senate can vote to add to the punishment of removal from office "disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States." This requires only a simple majority vote. Does impeachment by the House of Representatives, with or without subsequent removal from office by the Senate, actually disqualify one from being re-elected to the same Presidential office? See above. It requires impeachment by the House, conviction by the Senate, and a separate vote by the Senate to impose the punishment of disqualification. It's conceivable that the Senate could disqualify the convicted party only from becoming president, though it looks like in the two prior instances where this punishment was imposed it was the broader disqualification. But if a person disqualified only from being president is in an office that would normally be in the line of succession, that person is simply omitted from the line of succession. This happens routinely with naturalized citizens, and there's no reason to think it would be any different for a former president who had been disqualified only from the office of the president after being convicted on articles of impeachment. | They are not given independence from statute. This clause just says that conviction is not the end goal of the prosecutor. If in light of the evidence, the prosecutor comes to believe a person is not guilty, they are not to proceed with the prosecution. They must not hide exculpatory or mitigating evidence in order to get a conviction. | One does not lose legal rights by becoming a government official, so POTUS retains the right to sue for defamation, hold copyright, sue for trespass or breach of contract, and so on. The standards for defamation change when one becomes a "public figure" (you have to show "actual malice"), but this is much broader than being a government official. Anything that is a "work of the US government" is not protected by copyright, so presidential decrees, as government works, are not protected by copyright. I do not know of any state where one legally loses publicity rights as a function of being famous, or being an elected official. California Civil Code §3344 spells out the right of publicity in that state, which says that anyone who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent can get sued. However, there is a "fair use" escape clause: For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a). The law doesn't say exactly what constitutes a "political campaign" or "public affairs broadcast or account", but since politicians get caricatured in the papers all the time, with no requirement for consent, it is highly likely that the use you point to would be found to be part of a "political campaign" or "public affairs account". Additionally, under the First Amendment, you can criticize a government official, and that right is not limited to just critical words. It is obvious that the things on sale are basically criticism of POTUS, and you can't use the law to suppress such criticism. Accordingly, one could also criticize Tom Cruise (not a government official) using his likeness on such an object. However, one cannot exploit his image to sell perfume. | Well, moral obligations are not laws, nor sometimes even moral obligations. Some laws are based on what some courts and legislatures think are moral obligations. We think cannibals have a moral obligation not to eat people; cannibals think non-cannibals are fools for passing up a good BBQ. As for a leader's moral responsibility for millions of lives, we can take as extreme examples Mao, Hilter, Stalin, Pol Pot, etc., that there are no obligations. The law that could apply in the case of a POTUS who does not "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States..." (oath of office for POTUS) is that of "High Crimes and Misdemeanors", the grounds for most impeachments. But "faithfully executing the Office of President" has no moral obligation; it has legal implications, that's all. High crimes or misdemeanor are legal definitions, not moral, and depend on previous cases of what a crime or misdemeanor is. Insobriety can be illegal; there are laws on the books concerning public drunkenness. But in the contest of POTUS (one who is hopefully not passed out on the sidewalk in front of the WH), it remains to be seen if insobriety is a high crime or misdemeanor. That would be up to the House Judiciary Committee and US House of Representatives, which by Constitutional powers handles impeachment proceedings. The Twenty-fifth Amendment outlines who succeeds the president due to "Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office," but it does not state who has the power to declare a President incapacitated. It's possible that a POTUS who incapacitates himself with alcohol is guilty of a "high crime or misdemeanor." But how drunk do you have to be to be incapacitated? Drunk enough to think a Game Boy is the nuclear football? Again, that's up to the House. Some past presidents have arguably been functional alcoholics (or functional recovered alcoholics.) But incapacitated? That can be subjective when it comes to the application of the law. And morals have little to do with it, unless those morals have a basis in that same law. Update 12/04/16: Some federal judges have been impeached due to drunkenness: http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html and http://www.crf-usa.org/impeachment/high-crimes-and-misdemeanors.html | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. | This is an interesting hypothetical. In this scenario, Country Z does not have jurisdiction to enforce such a law on foreign nationals, unless Country Z has an extradition treaty with Country A. Generally, however, these types of laws would never be enforced as they are egregious abuses of government, and could possibly be elevated to the International Court of Justice if Country Z actually charges any individuals with such a crime. In these instances, however, war is a very unlikely scenario, since this would often be expensive and any escalation would most likely be small skirmishes that would lead to an eventual ceasefire, with the encouragement of the international community, without the involvement of UN Peacekeeping troops. |
Can I use Facebook Chat Plugin without asking GDPR consent? My webpage has no analytics because I don't want to show the GDPR consent popup to users. Would I violate GDPR if I integrate the Facebook Chat Plugin without adding the GDPR consent popup? | When integrating third party plugins, it is important to determine whether that third party is your data processor or another controller. When they are your processor, you need a legal basis for the processing purpose and need to have a suitable contract with your processor. When they are a data controller, you need a legal basis for the processing purposes AND a legal basis for sharing this data with the third party. When using Facebook tools, you have to read the fine print in their Business Terms. I will assume that when integrating the Chat Plugin, you and Facebook would act as joint controllers. Facebook would not be your data processor. So you need a legal basis for sending data to Facebook. Some information will already be sent merely by loading the plugin in the visitor's browser – and this will happen whether or not the visitor is a Facebook member. Two legal bases seem especially interesting: you might have a legitimate interest for loading this plugin, or you might ask for consent. A legitimate interest requires a balancing test between your interests, and the rights and freedoms of the data subjects. The reasonable expectations of the data subject will likely be a factor as well. Here, I would suggest thinking about the reasonable expectations of a visitor who is not a Facebook member. In most cases, when you rely on a legitimate interest you must also give the opportunity to object to further processing, i.e. to opt-out. You can base almost any processing activity on consent. This gives you a lot of flexibility at least initially, but you can't use the data for any other purpose, and must make it easy to withdraw consent. Here, I think that your legitimate interest balancing test would lead you to the conclusion that consent would be the more appropriate legal basis. But this doesn't mean that you need to show a consent banner to every user. Instead, I would suggest the following procedure before loading any third party plugin or embed (whether a Facebook chat, a Tweet, or a Youtube video). The point is that users are given an informed choice: do not load the content by default as a placeholder for the content, or in a popup when the user interacts with the placeholder, show the following information: what the purpose of this content/plugin/embed is that a third party provides the content who the third party is what personal data will be disclosed to the third party, e.g. IP addresses if personal data will be transferred into a non-EU country: information about possible risks, e.g. the US does not provide an adequate level of data protection where visitors can find further information about the resulting processing by the third party (e.g. the FB privacy policy) a link to more information in your privacy notice how visitors can revoke consent later if the visitor clicks a button such as “start chat” or “load content”, treat this as consent store the consent for later visits, e.g. in a cookie make it easy to withdraw consent, e.g. with an easy to reach button that opens a consent management tool So instead of asking for consent when your page loads, ask for consent just in time before they're accessing something for which you need consent. Background: In the Fashion ID case, the ECJ has found that the provider of a website that loads Facebook social plugins such as the Like Button is a joint controller with Facebook. So the website provider is responsible for collecting and sending personal data to Facebook through this button, but they are not responsible for what Facebook later does with this data. At least in Germany, it has long been standard that social plugins are only loaded upon consent, e.g. with a toggle next to the network's logo (news report from 2011). The list of information to be shown in a popup was modelled after section 3.3.1 “Minimum content requirements for consent to be ‘informed’” in the EDPB guidelines on consent 05/2020. Providing information just-in-time (just before the user takes a relevant action) and in a layered manner (key information directly, details in a privacy notice) are best practices suggested in the WP29 guidelines on transparency which were later endorsed by the EDPB. | The basic requirements for the effectiveness of valid legal consent are defined in Article 7 of the GDPR and specified further in Recital 32. There is no form requirement for the consent, so using a button is not a problem. However, I do not think the MailChimp-button you reproduce as an example is good enough. It asks for a blanket consent to stuff that is buried in MailChimp's “Anti-spam Policy & Terms of Use”. But according to the GDPR, what the data subject consent to can’t be buried in the ToU – it must spelled out in clear, plain language. Requests must be granular, asking for separate consent for separate types of processing. “When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them” (Recital 32). Blanket consent, as used by MailChimp, is not allowed. The other clear requirement from the GDPR is that opt-in is mandatory. Pre-ticked and opt-out buttons are explicitly banned: “Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent” (Recital 32). ‘No’ must become your data default, but if the user chooses to opt-in by clicking a button, this is valid consent. The MailChimp-button complies witrh this. The GDPR also requires you to keep a records of the consents given (so make that part of the user profile), and to withdraw consent at any time – so you make make provisions for that as well in your implementation of consent. | I think that one cannot answer a question such as "Will the personal use exception in the GDPR apply to personal blogs?", because it is unclear if you refer to: personal information published on the blog pages personal information collected from the Website, by way of forms, cookies, server logs, strictly collected and processed for the purpose of operating the Website for your own personal purposes as a blogger (by yourself of through a subcontractor in the sense of GDPR) and not personal information collected from the Website's operation, transferred or provided to third parties for their own purposes (this would include cookies used to identify and track users across multiple domains) Regarding 1., a personal blog wanting to benefit from the exemption should not publish third party's personal information without their consent or another legal basis, and C-101/01 certainly applies here. About 2., if the information is strictly collected and used for the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog, I would tend to agree that it should benefit from the exemption. I feel that C-212/13 would not necessarily be an indication that because the blog is publicly accessible it is then "directed outwards from the private setting" in the sense of this ruling, and should not be considered as "purely ‘personal or household’ activity". C-212/13 case was relating to a camera installed by an individual on his family home for its own security purposes which was also monitoring a public space. The persons filmed on this public space had absolutely no direct connexion with the person collecting their images. In case of a blog, the visitors of the blog interact with the blog for fulfilling the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog of the publisher of the blog. Another argument is given by the Recital 18 which you quote: a personal blog can be viewed as a type of social networking or related online activity. Finally, about 3., there is no doubt for me that, in this case, the publisher of the blog is engaged in an activity which is not personal, since it willingly provides personal information to third parties which they use for their own purposes (and not as subcontractors in the sense of GDPR). There may be other approaches apart from these 3, but that's a start for your considerations. | What Big Tech is doing is spending a lot of money on lawyers and appeals – doesn't matter if it costs millions if you can make money in the meanwhile. Facebook stores a lot of user data in the US. Initially, this was allowed because the US was recognized as offering an adequate level of data protection under the Safe Harbor and later the Privacy Shield Framework. Then Schrems I and Schrems II happened and the adequacy recognition was ruled to be invalid. Does Facebook pull back their user data? No. The GDPR offers alternative reasons why you might process data in foreign countries, such as “standard contractual clauses” (SCCs) or “binding corporate rules” (BCRs). Now, Facebook claims that they are using SCCs. Is this valid? Almost certainly not due to the issues of US law analyzed in the Schrems II case, but it can take years for the next round of court cases to work its way through the system. And when Facebook's use of SCCs is ruled invalid they will probably try BCRs next, and once that is over a decade will have passed and the US might actually have achieved an adequate privacy level by then. You do not have Facebook-style money to spend on lawyers and endless rounds of appeals, so you should avoid legally risky things such as outsourcing data processing activities to companies in the US (this doesn't mean you can't be compliant if you are a US entity). I mentioned adequacy decision previously. There is a list of countries that the EU considers to be sufficiently safe. Currently, the more notable countries involve Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, in addition to EU/EEA countries of course. If you want to process data in a location that is OK for both the UK and the US, then looking at companies in one of these countries is a good idea. For example, if most of your users are in the US but you would like your servers to be in a country with an EU adequacy decision, then looking at Canada could make sense. Even outside of this list, you can process data if you implement additional safeguards via SCCs. However, this requires a case by case analysis of the legal environment in that country. One problem with the US is that it has national security laws that impose requirements on companies in a manner that is incompatible with SCCs. A company bound by these US laws cannot enter into such a contract where it guarantees the privacy of your user's data. Countries other than the EU have much more tedious data residency laws. The GDPR does not impose any data residency requirements in the sense that data must not leave a particular country – you just have to ensure that the data is properly protected. In contrast, Russia and China have real data residency requirements that are fundamentally incompatible with the GDPR. | GDPR compliance is a matter between every customer and the business, not between different customers. How did you get the other customer's contact details? If they were provided or leaked by the business, that might be a failure of the business's obligation as a data controller to protect the personal data they are processing, possibly even a data breach in the sense of the GDPR. When you contacted the other person this was presumably a purely private or household activity, just like contacting any other personal acquaintance. In that case, the GDPR simply does not apply to any “processing” you may have done (compare Art 2(2)(c)). Things would be very different if you were promoting your own business, but that doesn't seem to have been the case. If the matter really is as plain as you described, then you can effectively ignore their references to the GDPR until you are contacted by your data protection authority, by their lawyer, or are served with court papers. None of these should happen: even if you were a “data controller” and your processing were subject to the GDPR – only the other customer and not the business would be the data subject, and only a data subject has a right for remedies like making complaints to the data protection agency and only the data subject would have standing to sue you in court for GDPR violations. | The point of privacy laws is to set basic standards that apply to everyone, whether or not they have a privacy policy. A privacy policy that is inconsistent with privacy laws cannot be enforced. Breaches of privacy law can be punished even if the conduct is permitted by a privacy policy. Article 7 of the GDPR illustrates this by making special provision for the nature of "consent" to the processing of personal data. Consent must be freely given, and a "written declaration" as to consent, like the acceptance of a privacy policy, "shall not be binding" to the extent that it infringes the GDPR. The $5 billion penalty obtained by the FTC in United States v. Facebook, Inc (19-cv-2184) demonstrates that privacy laws can have a practical impact when a service provider "subvert[s] users’ privacy choices to serve its own business interests." Facebook was penalised even though its users agreed to Facebook sharing "information about the App User and the App User’s Facebook Friends" with third-party developers. Whether a service provider has breached privacy law is a complex, fact-specific question, but if the service is "pretty much part of people's lives," that will generally affect both the application of privacy law and the likelihood of an investigation by the regulators. | The GDPR's right to erasure just applies in some specific situations. While messages you wrote on Slack are personal data, they are generally also part of a larger discussion with others. If your messages are removed, the discussion becomes incomplete, so that will violate the freedom of expression of those others. Art. 17(3) GDPR provides an exception for the right of erasure in such cases. So basically, whoever is the controller, you probably don't have the right to have your messages to be deleted. However, you would have the right to have your account pseudonymized like Slack replied in the Reddit post you linked to. See also my answer in "Does a user have the right to request their forum posts deleted?". Basically, it is correct that Slack can be just the processor. Even if the controller cannot get access to more than 10000 messages unless they pay. However, Slack is not allowed to do anything with those messages, except when the controller says so. In its Privacy Policy, Slack distinguishes between customer data and other data. It states to be the processor for the customer data, but controller for the other data. Because those are tied together, I am not sure this distinction can be made. If not, Slack and the customer will be joint controllers, but it requires probably a court case to decide on that. For example, the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled (in the Fashion ID case) that putting a Facebook "like" button on your website, makes you a joint controller together with Facebook. And (in the Wirtschaftsakademie case) that also creating a Facebook "fan" page makes you a joint controller. But neither of those are very similar to the situation with Slack. | No, it is not legal. Regardless of their location, the only legal options for companies serving to EU residents are to either deny access altogether or to make consent truly optional1 Recital 42 states (emphasis mine): Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement[...] Recital 43 states: Consent is presumed not to be freely given [...] or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. 1 Of course, remember that consent is only one of several means that allow them to process data. For example, if you were getting a trial account for a limited time, it would be considered a legitimate business need to ensure that you are not just opening new trial accounts when the old ones expire. So, if they wanted some data from you to ensure that you are not a previous user and you refused to provide it, then they could deny giving you that trial account without breaking the GDPR. |
Is VirusTotal's business model violating copyright laws? For those not familiar, VirusTotal is a Google-owned site that allows anyone to upload any binary so it can be scanned by numerous anti-virus engines. Many third-party products also integrate the VirusTotal API so that binaries are automatically uploaded based on system scans. The way VirusTotal makes money is that they charge subscription fees so that other users can download the binaries that were uploaded. So my question is, doesn't this violate the copyright of the binary authors? Now, obviously malware authors are not going to claim ownership of their binaries but a lot of other non-malicious binaries get uploaded to VirusTotal. And because anti-virus engines are not perfect they will mark legitimate software as malware. When a binary is marked as malware, according to VirusTotal, it will send that sample to other third parties as part of a sharing program. In summary: VirusTotal allows anyone to upload any binary regardless of the EULA of the software. VirusTotal facilitates sharing of the binary again regardless of the EULA. VirusTotal profits off the uploaded binaries by charging a subscription fee. VirusTotal provides no recourse available when legitimate software is marked as malware, only to contact each individual anti-virus company to report the false positive. Putting aside the benefits of helping to identify malware, it seems to me that VirusTotal is in violation of copyright laws. | VirusTotal is no different than many internet companies which operate with user-supplied content (i.e. Facebook, Youtube, etc.), and they are no different in the way they protect themselves with a TOS that outlines all aspects of their use of any material contributed or licensed or sold. Their Terms of Service states that users must own the copyright for what they upload and give VirusTotal a license to use it and relicense it and profit from it. VirusTotal uses the "safe harbor" clause of the DMCA to limit their liability for illegal uploads and provide a recourse for users who claim a copyright violation of uploads. And VirusTotal clearly seek to limit their liability for their own service in the case of false positives by standard clauses that claim they "do not warrant or guarantee that the services are accurate, reliable or correct." They're really no different than many internet companies; read the Terms of Service. It's a legally binding contract for all users, though some jurisdictions may limit some aspects of it. | Yes, it's illegal. 18 USC 1030 (a) (5) (A) [Whoever] knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer [shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section]. "Damage" is defined at (e)(8) to mean "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information". Your proposed attack would certainly cause impairment to the availability of the Stack Exchange system and the data and information which it hosts. Whatever else you may think about the Stack Exchange terms of service, they certainly do not authorize any user or moderator to "destroy the site" in any sense such as you describe. It's not necessary for the TOS to explicitly say "you may not do X"; it's enough that they don't say that you may do it. To use a firewall analogy, it's "default deny". "Protected computer" is defined in (e)(2) to mean, essentially, any computer that is used in or affects interstate commerce. Which means practically every computer that has ever accessed the Internet, and certainly includes Stack Exchange servers. So your proposed attack would include all the elements of a violation of this section. Such a violation is punishable by up to five years' imprisonment if it causes a loss of more than $5000 (see (4)(A)(i)(I)), which if such an attack were successful, it certainly would. Greater penalties are possible in certain circumstances. Even if the loss does not exceed $5000, or if the attack is merely attempted but without success, it is still punishable by one year imprisonment or a fine ((4)(G)(i)). There is nothing in the terms of service saying you will go to federal jail for destroying stack exchange. Irrelevant. It is not up to Stack Exchange Inc. or its TOS to determine who does or doesn't go to federal prison. Rather, it is up to Congress to determine what conduct deserves such punishment (as they did in 1984 by enacting this law), up to federal law enforcement and prosecutors to investigate and make a case against an alleged violator, and up to the federal courts to determine if the accused is guilty and how they should be punished. | Disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer. This advice may be materially inaccurate. What does redistribution mean? Redistribution means you have somehow caused the software to make its way to another person. Things that probably count as distribution: Placing the file on a public website. Printing the binary in hex onto paper and giving that paper to someone else. Putting the file onto a USB drive and handing it to someone. Putting the file onto your own computer, then giving that computer to someone else. Putting the file onto a shared network drive. Things that probably don't count as distribution: Copying the files onto your own computer(s) Compiling the program Placing the program on your phone. Printing out the source code on paper, but not sharing it. As a practical matter, I recommend ensuring that BSD license accompanies any instances of the software, even if you don't intend to distribute those instances. If you don't distribute it, then nobody will see it. If you "inadvertently" distribute the software, then including the license means you are in compliance. Should you include the license in the exe or in the same folder: The specific clause is: Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. Including the license in the exe (e.g., via some sort of credits menu) is typically fine. I'll note that this is the approach used by Chrome (help->about chrome has a link to "other open source software" which includes these licenses). This approach works well for software which makes use of an installer, since users probably won't be looking in the install folder. Including the license in the folder adjacent to the exe is also typically fine. If your application does not have an install process (e.g., installed via xcopy deployment), then this approach works well, since users will easily be able to find the license. If your software is sold in a physical box, then printing out the license and including that license inside the box also works. What if I violate the license by not including the BSD terms? If you violate the license, you are subject to a lawsuit for copyright violation. What happens next depends on how the copyright owners wishes to proceed: Some copyright owners will sue. The actual results/penalties for such a violation will depend on a variety of factors. Some copyright owners will ask you to comply with the license. If you respond by apologizing and then complying, that's as far as it will go. Some copyright owners will ask you for money (with threat of lawsuit). I would expect this result if the copyright owners offers a dual-licensing scheme (i.e., where you can pay the copyright owner to exclude the acknowledgement). | Yes. The license itself is really just one sentence long, and states explicitly that this is allowed. Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. | It doesn't make a difference if the product is free or commercial use, if it's initiated by a company or an individual. What you are considering would be a "derivative work" and without explicit permission from the copyright holder, it is considered a violation. | Not having immediate access to the source doesn't preclude a finding of copyright infringement. If you have seen the source material, subconscious infringement can happen. However, in this example, both the short phrases doctrine and the merger doctrine would likely prevent the is_prime function from having copyright. Words and short phrases are not individually copyrightable, so the name would be free to take. Regarding the implementing code, if it isn't an exact copy (i.e. copy and paste), courts will apply the abstraction-filtration-comparision test. They may find that you took the selection and arrangement of instructions from the original source, albiet using different names. That selection and arrangement would probably be considered a substantial similarity and, if not for the merger doctrine, infringement. However, given the limited number of ways to express the prime-detection algorithm means that the expression of that idea has merged with the idea, and thus is not protected by copyright. (Or in some jurisdictions, merger is a defence to infringement rather than a bar to copyrightability). | Sure, you can. But if you, from the US, contract with and pay someone outside the US and then use the results of that effort - the reverse-engineered code, either directly in violation of copyright or to find workarounds - within the US, you may not be culpable in a criminal sense (depending on different jurisdictions and trade/IP agreements), but you certainly would be liable in a civil sense. If the US based software developer (I assume a US-based software company, as you said "outside the US") tracks you down, they can open a civil action against you for any damages they want to claim, including theft of IP, loss of profits, EULA violations, and on and on, because you posses and are using reverse engineered code. How much money do you have to lose? | Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy. |
Is it legal to make two competing brands of the same product without making the public aware of the common source? Suppose I create rocket boots and brand them as "Super Jumpers". After a couple months of selling them, I stealthily create a new brand of rocket boots called "Mega Fliers". I do not publicly reveal them as created by the same person or corporation, and perhaps I even market them with improvements I intentionally left out of the original boots. Would this alone be illegal, or only under certain conditions? For example, if I had a monopoly on rocket boots, if I was inflating prices, or if using other consumer manipulation to make them purchase more of both. | You mean like Unilever, and countless others do? Yes. Many, many companies control a stable of brands, often of competing products. This is particularly prevalent in grocery lines (cleaning, food, beauty products) and motor vehicles (there are dozens of brands of motor vehicle but only a handful of automotive companies). Clearly, these products have different features (improvements) – you are entitled to segment your market anyway you like. If they are actually produced by the same company, keeping that secret would be virtually impossible. If they were separate companies (even with licencing agreements etc.), well, they are not the same company even if they have common ownership. As for having a monopoly: if you hold a patent you are allowed to have a monopoly, if you don't, expect to see knock-off rocket boots on the shelf in a week. | Does a situation like this constitute breach of contract and/or a violation of advertising laws? No. There is not enough information that would lead to a finding of either. It is unclear how customers would be allegedly affected (if at all) by the release of a product at a different store, let alone where the goods or services at issue are digital and require no physical presence at a venue or premise. Except for very specific factual circumstances, a change of sales venue would hardly be cognizable as deceptive or unfair practice. Also, prior to purchasing or reserving a game, there is no contract between the public and the developer/supplier. Potential customers typically are not entitled to a specific performance by the developer. Even if [Phoenix Point] supporters' decision were provably based on the prospect of release at Steam, your description nowhere reflects that there was a mutually conscious exchange (or promise of an exchange) of considerations involving the parties' support of a game and the counterparty's release of the game at a specific venue. Absent that meeting of the minds, either party's reliance or expectation on the other is irrelevant. Generally speaking, the sole cruciality of either party's motives does not create legal obligations. | Under US law: It depends, but it is likely legal. Trademark is designed to prevent confusion in consumers, to avoid someone's good work and reputation from being taken advantage of by another, and/or damaged by another's poor work/service. The game's name and character names are (generally) not trademarked, nor are they copyrightable. Even if they were, there is nominative fair use to consider as a defense. There are still some legal issues that might occur (e.g. this does not apply to the novel's name; using the game's logo on cover art might constitute trademark violation if it was so positioned as to be associating a relationship with the game publisher, descriptions of the game's content, especially story content, is a bit hazy), but not with using the game name or character names. | Copyrights protect the mark as is, and derivatives of it, but does not protect the brand from look a likes or from new trademarks that would be confusing. Consider the Pepsi logo: I could easily draw a circle half red and half blue with a white line straight across, vertically, or diagonally. In fact: © 2018 A. K. all rights reserved. There it is my new logo for my cola company called Hep-C (I'm raising awareness). Under copyright law Pepsi could not come after me because the logo is my own creation. I could even call it Pepsi and it would not be a copyright violation as you cannot copyright words. However, Pepsi has better lawyers than that and with my trademark so similar to theirs and the name sounding so similar (and my new name being potentially disparaging to Pepsi) it would likely confuse consumers between what was Pepsi and what was Hep-C thus under trademark law it would be disallowed for commerce. Now you would have common law trademark protection by virtue of using your mark in commerce, but it would only be for the states in which you used it. Additionally a lack of a registered trademark would disallow you from seeking statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117. | In your example is the spare part the subject of a design patent? I assume it is not. When you combine the spare part to create a “different product” does the finished product resemble the drawings in the design patent? If, in its intended use, the final thing is close enough to the design patent to fall within its scope then you might by indirectly infringing by inducing people to infringe. The scope of a design patent is very difficult to determine reliably. This has nothing to do with how you got the components of your product, just how the completed thing looks. Copyright does not cover products (unless it is a model of a building or a statue or mold for a statue). | 20th Century Fox have a trademark on "Simpsons." They have trademarks on "Bart Simpson", on "D'oh", on "Duff Beer". I would assume that they take their trademarks seriously. What you can't do is to use someone else's trademark to make people believe your commercial product is related to theirs. It's quite reasonable to assume that someone seeing your book in a store would think it is written by the makers of The Simpsons show and therefore buy it. Even if you say that isn't your intention, it is what would happen. I'd try coming up with some different titles, maybe "How to write animated TV shows" with "Example: The Simpsons" (well, you are the writer so you should come up with something better), and take them to a lawyer. And then contact the makers of the show (again asking the lawyer for advice how to do this) because even if your lawyer says the title is fine, that doesn't mean you can't be sued. | This is unlikely to be a problem. There are many companies that have already registered software-related trademarks prominently involving an X or the name Xcom. That Twitter has changed to X branding does not substantially change this general situation. With trademarks, the general question is whether similar branding causes confusion. It is unlikely that someone would confuse the X display server / X.Org project / X.Org Foundation with the social media service now being branded as X or x.com. Of course, anyone can sue anyone, the real question is whether that's possible successfully. Here, I have my doubts that x.com could successfully demonstrate confusion in its favour. It is worth noting that the X.Org Foundation does not seem to hold any relevant trademark registrations at all. This is not unusual for Open Source software projects and doesn't mean that X.Org has no rights, but does make a defense a bit more difficult. However, there also doesn't seem to be a relevant registration by the ex-Twitter company or by the X Corp. The x.org domain name is unlikely to be threatened. If the x.org domain name was being used in bad faith it could maybe be seized, but the X.Org Foundation has a pretty strong claim on this name. For historical context, both x.com and x.org were among the six single-letter .org/.net/.com domain names when such registrations were stopped in 1993. But while x.com has been pretty much dormant since that company was renamed to PayPal, x.org has (I think) always been associated with the display server software, and has been used continuously by the X.Org Foundation since its establishment in 2004. | Neither law has precedence - manufacturers have to obey both. The FD&C says that they don't need to list ingredients which are trade secrets; the CFR says they must. If they list the trade secrets they do not break either law. If they don't, they break the CFR. Conclusion: they must list the trade secret ingredients. If the FD&C said it was forbidden to list trade secret ingredients, but the CFR required it, manufacturers would still have to obey both laws - which would mean they couldn't sell anything where one of the ingredients was a trade secret. |
Must an employer provide a break room/lunch room to its employees? I started working in a retail store. It has no lunch room, break room, or a place where employees can sit comfortably to relax. In practice there's a storage area where people use bins to eat their meal off of, but its intended use is not for this. Is there a law regarding this? What legal actions are possible? | Is there a law regarding this? The relevant law is the Employment Standards Act of British Columbia which only requires an employer to provide meal breaks for employees but not somewhere for them to eat their meal. (1) An employer must ensure (a) that no employee works more than 5 consecutive hours without a meal break, and (b) that each meal break lasts at least 1/2 hour. What legal actions are possible? None - unless there's a breach of, say, health and safety legislation by allowing meals to be eaten in a refuse area, but that's off-topic. | Unless it is prohibited by law in some state (such as California), a server's employment contract can have a clause holding the server responsible for an unpaid tab. Even in lieu of such a clause, since in most states employment is at-will, the employee can be fired if they do not do as told. There is a limit to the effect that their wage cannot be reduced below minimum wage. The question of the political rationale of this practice is outside the scope of law, but there are some legal factors that can lead to getting compensation from a server, even if pay-docking is prohibited. If a server intentionally colludes with a dine-and-hash customer, the server is liable. The server might also be negligent, for example they may have failed to notify management of evidence of an impending dine-and-dash such as overhearing a conversation, or watching the customers trickle out; or, disappearing for an unreasonable time for a smoke break (leaving the table unattended). Liability requires a lawsuit where the court decides if the server should pay. | There are regulations governing occupational safety, whereby e.g. an employer can be fined for forcing employees to work in a literally toxic environment, for instance breathing chlorine gas. You could file a complaint with a state or federal agency (OSHA). You would need to hire a labor lawyer to get advice about your specific circumstance, to see if there is indeed a provision that covers what you describe, though I doubt it would. OSHA's blurb on disease don't obviously cover your situation (they describe situations that govern healthcare workers in intimate contact with infectious materials). However, certain diseases such as TB or Ebola cause a general health quarantine to be imposed, so if a worker comes in with such a disease, action would be taken by the health department. This does not cover sniffles, and probably not pertussis (but that's a local decision). There are also regulations pertaining to disabled employees, whereby an employee who is disabled by having a severely compromised immune system can be entitled to reasonable accommodation, for example allowed to work in a closed room away from others (if the job is not a receptionist job). That entitlement only applies to the employee, and is controlled by objective health danger (requires a doctor's note), and not the comfort level of the employee. | Employees of an employer aren't governed by a fault based liability regime in the United States (subject to some usually quite narrow exceptions that vary from state to state, which sometimes also limit tort liability). Instead, employers are required to have worker's compensation insurance policies in place, in exchange for not having any tort liability whatsoever to employees. (An employer who doesn't have worker's compensation in place is strictly liable to the worker for all injuries suffered by an employee whatsoever at work, without the prohibition of a worker's compensation insurance policy plan on paying things like pain and suffering damages as well.) Worker's compensation insurance provides coverage (in principle) for all medical costs incurred, all lost wages, and in the event of a death support for dependents if any and a modest death benefit sufficient to provide a funeral if there are no dependents. Often, in practice, worker's compensation insurance payments tend to be rather stingy. One of the most common big worker's compensation claims these days, especially in office and retail workplaces, is for employees who are seriously injured or killed in crimes at work. Often, a worker's compensation insurer will give an employer a discount if they have a "gun free" zone, because, statistically, doing so greatly reduces the average amount of harm experienced by employees at work. The presence of employees with guns in the workplace, as an actuarial matter, greatly increases the insurance company's risk of having to pay claims. | Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job. | Yes, the employee can choose not to accept the contract offered at the end of the probationary period and thereby allow the probationary period to end without accepting a long-term position. This is usually called "quitting". | It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin Tobacco use or non-use doesn't make the list. That's the legal position; if you want advice on how to handle the workplace stuff post your question on the Workplace Stack Exchange. | According to the LA County Public Health Department: "Food facility" means an operation that stores, prepares, packages, serves, vends, or otherwise provides food for human consumption at the retail level, including, but not limited to, the following: An operation where food is consumed on or off the premises, regardless of whether there is a charge for the food. Any place used in conjunction with the operations described in this subdivision, including, but not limited to, storage facilities for food-related utensils, equipment, and materials. So your food stand is a "food facility" for the purposes of the law. As such, as far as I can tell, you would be subject to the same permit and inspection requirements as any other similar food facility, like a commercial food stand. |
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