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Landlord/Tenant and Actus reus I'd like to add something to my previous question The first part of the scenario: A person breaks a window, enters the house through the window, takes $1000 worth of computer equipment, and leaves through a door. Now add: The house was being rented out at the time of the crime. The renter called the police. They came out and a report was filed. The renter notified the landlord of the situation the same day. Several days later, the landlord learns the identity of the perpetrator. The landlord does not notify the tenant or the police. Is the landlord guilty of any crime?	Code sections cited in this answer are to the New Mexico Criminal code, Chapter 30 as they were in my answer to the linked question, and to chapter 59A. Neither the landlord (whom I will cal LL) , nor any ordinary citizen, is legally required to report information that s/he may have about a crime to the police or other authorities. LL cannot actively conceal or destroy or tamper with evidence (section 30-22-5. of the NM code), nor assist the criminal by more than silence which would be a crime iunder section 30-22-4, Harboring or aiding a felon. If the police question LL about the crime, s/he should not lie. Apparently lying to officers during an investigation is not a crime in New Mexico, although filing a false crime report is, under section 30-39-1. If LL were to make an insurance claim while omitting or misstating a materiel fact (such as that LL knows who broke in) that would be a violation of Section 59A-16-23 paragraph (2) which prohibits: for the purpose of obtaining money or benefit, present or cause to be presented a false or fraudulent claim or proof in support of such a claim for payment of loss under a policy I am not sure if LL owes an affirmative duty to the tenant. If LL does owe such a duty, the tenant may have grounds to sue LL if LL fails to help the tenant recover the stolen property, but it is probably not a criminal matter.	Most leases have a provision allowing a landlord to make entry without notice in an emergency, but the better course of action, as noted in a comment by @BlueDogRanch, is to call the police and ask them to make a "welfare check." You would ordinarily be permitted to cooperate with police by unlocking doors in furtherance of their welfare check. The police are trained to do this properly in a way that properly balances the need to aid someone who is sick or ill, the need to preserve evidence if there was a death or crime that needs to be understood legally, and to protect the legitimate privacy interests of the tenant. You are not. You could incur liability for failing to prevent death or aggravating injury, could be wrongfully implicated if physical evidence from you contaminates the scene or you destroy evidence showing the true cause, and could be sued for invading the tenant's privacy if it was found that you entry was unreasonable and that it wasn't really an emergency, which is always easier to conclude with 20/20 hindsight. As it is, your biggest potential source of liability is delaying in calling the police seeking a welfare check. They often respond quite quickly to these by the way, although it is not the very highest priority for law enforcement.	When Bob buys a thing, it becomes his, and it ceases to be the property of the seller. By "buy", we understand that to mean "pays for and receives physical control of". At that point, Bob is responsible to control of his new property. His ownership of the property is not contingent on him leaving the store. You might assign blame to the shop if they were negligent in some way, for example if they hire a thief to do the exit-check and the door guard takes Bob's property. Obviously, the thief is ultimately liable, but the store might under special circumstances be liable if they indirectly caused his loss. A store does not have an obligation to guarantee that a customer immediately and securely exits the store after making a purchase, so they are not liable for failing to immediately eject him from the store after buying the goods.	http://www.tenantslegalcenter.com/html/eviction_notices.html 3 DAY NOTICE TO CURE BREACH (sometimes called PERFORM COVENANT) OR QUIT is used to notify a tenant that he/she has 3 days to do or stop doing something as per the rental agreement or the law. The tenant can comply with the notice or vacate within the 3 days. If the tenant vacates within the 3 days, he/she is NOT relieved from the rent obligation under the lease or rental agreement. So, the notice must be based on a law and/or the lease agreement. Presumably, the law and/or lease provision must be cited in the notice. The City of San Diego has a GOOD CAUSE law (Right to Know Ordinance) protecting certain tenants in a residential tenancy of at least TWO years and that good cause must be written in the notice. You state that you've been there seven years, so this law applies. To count the days of a notice, you begin on the next day after service as the first day. Weekends and holidays are counted but the last day of a notice to act generally may not land on a weekend or holiday. If it does, and if applicable to that notice, the "last day" can carry over to the next business day. For example, if a 3 day notice to pay rent is served on a Thursday, we count Friday as the first day Sunday is the third day. Since the last day of this type of notice cannot be a Sunday, the "third day" is then Monday (giving the tenant four days instead of three) to pay the rent. If that Monday was a legal holiday, then Tuesday would then be the "third" day (giving the tenant five days instead of three) to pay the rent. http://www.rogerfranklin.org/Instructions_for_Landlords_2017.pdf B. SERVE THE THREE-DAY NOTICE 1. After the Three-Day Notice has been filled out and signed, you must serve it on the tenant. The Three-Day Notice may be served either: (a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, or (b) If the tenant is absent from is place of residence and from his usual place of business, by leaving a copy with some person over the age of eighteen (18) years at either place, AND mailing a copy of the Three-Day Notice addressed to the tenant, postage prepaid, first-class mail, to his place of residence; or (c) If such place of residence and business cannot be ascertained and a person over the age of eighteen cannot be found at the tenant’s residence, then by affixing a copy of the Three-Day Notice in a conspicuous place on the property, AND mailing a copy of the Three Day Notice to the tenant at his residence. So if the notice was just left at your apartment, and was not delivered personally or mailed, then the service is invalid.	Don't trivialize this because it appears to be minor and inexpensive. If something goes wrong, you could be liable for damage. You should have an idea of what a reasonable cost should be based on the rent and condition of the property. Discuss it with the landlord. If the landlord chooses to fix it, you should have something in writing, signed by both you and the landlord, acknowledging that you aren't responsible for reimbursing the landlord for the cost or acknowledging receipt by the landlord of any contribution from you and a statement that the contribution fulfills your lease requirement. If you're going to fix it, you should have something in writing, signed by both you and the landlord, agreeing to the choice of replacement parts and the choice of anyone you hire to do the work. It might be nice to think you can save money by doing it yourself. But if anything happens and there's damage, you could be liable. You should have renter's insurance. You should check your renter's insurance policy to see what, if anything, it says about tenant responsibility for repairs. Your insurance might pay for it. More importantly, will your insurance protect you if something goes wrong and there's damage? I recommend you copy this and modify it as you see fit or, if you don't this is correct, make up something that you think is correct. Keep an electronic copy on your computer. But also have a notebook in which you keep how-to papers, so you don't have to figure it out all over again at some time in the future and to use the how-tos you accumulate to help you make new how-tos as necessary. Also keep documentation, especially warranties. Scan receipts (receipt ink is notorious for fading over time) and warranties, keep them the electronic copies on your computer and print the receipts and put the printed receipts and original receipts with the warranty papers in the notebook. Keep a manilla envelope with receipts, warranties, instructions, and any papers you receive from anyone you hire to do the work. When you move out, you should give the envelope to the landlord so the landlord will be able to maintain what was installed and obtain warranty service if necessary.	I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed.	This is actually a very complicated question, about (1) the scope of "knowingly", (2) what kind of "intent" is required for conviction, (3) how does the jury understand and evaluate concepts of intent and (4) how does an attorney persuade the jury that the situation does or does not satisfy the particular intent requirement. One thing we can dispose of quickly is the possibility that the law says that the accused has to actually know that the act is against the law. It is a standard legal fiction (2,400 years old) that the accused knows the law, or should have known. As for the 4th element, persuasion, on the strong side we have statements of intent by the accused – "And I pulled out my rifle and blew his head off, and I laughed the whole time". What the jury has to decide is whether the accused had in mind a conscious purpose of doing some act (that is, it wasn't just an accident like butt-dialing, or an instant stimulus-response reaction to some event). "Intent" generally falls in the realm of acting "purposely", which the Model Penal Code §2.02 defines as: A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. which more or less means what you think "with intent" means. That doesn't say what they intended to do, it just distinguishes intent from negligence and accident. The prosecutor would then present factual evidence that the accused had a bad intent, like showing that he actually made an attempt to access credit card account data (that such data had been accessed when he broke into the system), etc. We can sort of dispose of the other scope question about "knowingly", namely, what things would he have to know? The chunk accessing a protected computer without authorization can be interpreted in a number of ways, having to do with which elements of the clause are known to the accused. You might know that you were accessing but not know that you were unauthorized; you might know that you were accessing and unauthorized, but not know that the computer is protected. The only reliable way to know which is which is to study the case law on a statute and see if there is a controlling decision that say e.g. that you have to know that you are accessing and are unauthorized, but you don't have to know that the computer is protected. I haven't determined (yet) is there is decisive case law on this, but I'm betting that the outcome would be that not knowing of the protected status of a computer carries no weight. As for what kind of intent, there is a distinction between "specific intent" and "general intent". The distinction comes down to having some evil purpose like "make him suffer" (general intent) versus a specific evil purpose like "kill him". Finally, the people who actually decide, the jury, will be given instructions that say what they have to look for. Here is the tip of the tip of the iceberg, from California's criminal jury instructions. The judge will say... The People must prove not only that the defendant did the acts charged, but also that (he/she) acted with a particular (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The instruction for (the/each) crime [and allegation] explains the (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required. A[n] (intent/ [and/or] mental state) may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state), you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state). If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not, you must conclude that the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable. and then there will be some specific elaboration of whether they have to find that the accused just generally intended to do bad, versus intended to specifically defraud.	Since the incident was on private property (inside a building), a person does not have the same right to be there that you would have on the street outside the building. Yale police therefore can legally make a determination whether a person is trespassing (for example, by asking for identification), especially when there is an allegation that a person is trespassing. A law holding a person criminally or civilly liable for reporting their "suspicions" to the government without e.g. "reasonable suspicion" could easily run afoul of the First Amendment.
Am I person under New Zealand law? New Zealand has an Interpretation Act 1999 with the purpose: (a) to state principles and rules for the interpretation of legislation; and (b) to shorten legislation; and (c) to promote consistency in the language and form of legislation. Many other refer to this Act for basic definitions such as the definition of a person: person includes a corporation sole, a body corporate, and an unincorporated body It does not define what a "corporation sole", "body corporate" or an "unincorporated body" are. For an Act that is supposed to state the rules of interpretation this seems to be a very unclear definition. My first questions are why would this be omitted? Are they such well defined terms in law that there can be no question to whether something meets that definition? The Australian Law Dictionary defines "corporation sole" as: A corporate entity embodied in a single titular head whose personal identity changes as the office is vacated and a new appointment made. For example the Governor General. The The Oxford Dictionary of New Zealandisms says that "body corporate" is: an association of individual owners responsible for the maintenance and administration of property held in common... This is the definition that 99% of New Zealanders will say if you ask them. It probably intended to mean the more general definition found in Oxford A Dictionary of Accounting: A *corporation consisting of a body of persons legally authorized to act as one person, while being distinct from that person. Assuming we replace persons with individual or some other term that could work. Oxford A Dictionary of Law defines "unincorporated body" as: An association that has no legal personality distinct from those of its members (compare corporation). Both of these "bodies" rely on there being an "association". The Australian Law Dictionary defines "association" as: An entity created by the action of combining together for a common purpose; confederation, league (see incorporated association);... An entity is... (you get the idea) The problem with written definitions is that you need a basic vocabulary to start with so you could continue this exercise forever however I would expect the definition of person be a lot clearer than it is. Was I combined together for a common purpose with no legal distinction from myself? Am I a person?	You will note that the quoted definition says that person includes a corporation sole, a body corporate, and an unincorporated body What it doesn't say, but almost certainty intends, is that "person" also includes a natural person, that is an ordinary human being with a single body. What is happening here (I think) is that the law is specifying all the other things that will be treated in some way like a natural person, while it also assumes the "ordinary" or "plain English" meaning of person. Also, the law is assuming all the ordinary standard legal terminology, such as "corporation sole" and only giving definitions where the usage is in some way different from the standard meaning, or where there are multiple meanings in common use and it wants tom specify one. This makes the law shorter, but harder to understand for anyone not well-versed in that specific legal tradition (a non-lawyer, or say a lawyer from a civil-law country). So I am reasonably confident that you are, in fact, a person under this law. (Unless perhaps you are actually a robot or a space alien, after all on the net who knows. LOL)	From the GDPR's definitions: ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; This blurred image would be "information relating to an identified ... natural person (‘data subject’)." It does not matter whether the person can be identified using the information in question. Therefore, the answer to your question Under GDPR, does blurhash of a profile picture count as personal data is yes.	The UK has parliamentary sovereignty, not separation of powers Unlike, say, the United States, where the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive have co-equal power in their respective spheres, in the UK, the judiciary and the executive are subordinate to Parliament. The courts have no power to nullify an Act of Parliament for being unconstitutional like they do in jurisdictions where a written constitution gives them such a power like the USA, Canada, or Australia. The purpose of the Declaration of Incompatibility is to advise Parliament that the law they have passed contradicts the HRA and they should think about that and decide if that’s what they really wanted to do. That means that the UK Parliament could pass the Arbitrary Bollock Removal Act 2023 (ABRA) tomorrow and it would be valid law. The courts can still provide judicial review of the actions of the executive under ABRA but they cannot declare the law a nullity. That is, the Minister’s actions can be scrutinised to ensure they followed the ABRA and other established principles such as procedural fairness and, if they didn’t, declare the executive actions void. However, if they did follow the law, off come your nuts.	Natural persons are not and cannot become juridical persons. Juridical persons are entities that are not natural persons, but which it's necessary or convenient to treat in many respects as though they were natural persons. The categories are mutually exclusive. There is no "contract" involved in citizenship from a legal standpoint (there's a concept of a "social contract," but that's a philosophical justification for government and not an actual legally binding agreement with specific terms); citizenship is not subject to commercial law in any way. Incorporation has nothing whatsoever to do with citizenship; a natural person is not incorporated, and is a citizen as a natural person. That citizenship is the ordinary notion of citizenship.	Corrections to your statements or quotations Your quotation "To fall within the remit of the GDPR, the processing has to be part of an "enterprise" (...)" is not from the GDPR, and is an erroneous statement. Also, the threshold of 250 employees you refer to, is only relevant with regards to the record-keeping obligations of Article 30. GDPR provisions relevant to your question The GDPR applies to individuals or students in accordance with the material scope of the GDPR, which is treated in Article 2 (2) c) where GDPR states that "This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (...) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity;" The Recital 18 of the GDPR gives some insight as to what would be a purely personal or household activity as follows: (18) This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity and thus with no connection to a professional or commercial activity. Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. However, this Regulation applies to controllers or processors which provide the means for processing personal data for such personal or household activities. Interpretation To my knowledge, there are no specific guidelines regarding this matter to date from WP29. Those may be adopted in the future, or some requirements may already exist in local laws in one of the EU countries or from documentation available from local data protection authorities. If you are based in the EU, you could check this with your local data protection authority. There is, however, case law from the European Court of Justice as pointed out by Free Radical, interpreting the scope of the "personal use exception" in Directive 95/46/EC (which provisions are similar to the GDPR in this matter). If your hobby is not limited to your personal circle (yourself and the persons in your household), and thus if you plan to share the results of your data collection and processing with third parties (possibly teachers, other fellow students, or anybody else if you publish the results of your work) resulting from your "hobby" activity, you certainly would not fall in this exception to the scope. Case C-101/01 is an example of publication on the Internet made by an individual claiming to use its "freedom of expression to create internet pages in the course of a non-profit-making or leisure activity". The court clarified that: exception must (...) be interpreted as relating only to activities which are carried out in the course of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing of personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible to an indefinite number of people Another, less optimistic interpretation from the examples given by the GDPR recitals, could derive from the spirit in which purely personal or household activity are to be understood. These examples actually refer to limited amounts of data and which are related to the individual itself (his own address book, his social networking activity, etc.), and creating limited risks relevant to the person herself and its contacts. In this view, there is a risk that a "hobby" in which you collect data about thousands of persons unrelated to you, could be considered as not being really purely personal. Actually, an interpretation of case law C-212/13 from the European Court of Justice also mentioned by Free Radical could support this reasoning. In this case, a video recording of people was stored from cameras installed by an individual on his family home for its own security purposes, but the cameras were also monitoring a public space. The court ruled that: To the extent that video surveillance such as that at issue in the main proceedings covers, even partially, a public space and is accordingly directed outwards from the private setting of the person processing the data in that manner, it cannot be regarded as an activity which is a purely ‘personal or household’ activity (...) Extending this reasoning to your question, a "hobby" consisting of collecting "huge list of names, emails, zipcodes" unrelated to you could be regarded as "directed outwards from the private setting (...)". Conclusion As a hobbyist, or a student, if you can work on fake computer generated data and achieve the same results in your personal learning purposes you should definitely consider doing so.	It depends. Can the data controller or another person, with "means reasonably likely to be used," (see clause 26 of the preamble of the GDPR) use that data alone or in combination with other data to identify a natural person? If yes, it is personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. If no, it is not personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. Anonymous data is not subject to the GDPR. "The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes." Assigning an unique alphanumeric code to a thing does not necessarily make the code and/or the thing "personal data". But if you have a set of data that is or can be linked by the unique alphanumeric code (e.g. as a primary key in a set of tables) and you can use it to identify a person, then it is personal data. Either way, to be GDPR-compliant / to mitigate risk you should make some kind of record to reflect that process of thinking and what you decided. And if the answer is Yes, it is personal data, then you should record your "lawful basis" for processing the data and how you decided that.	First, the clearly redundant phrase is “applicable laws” - these apply to everything. Second, some acts, particularly consumer protection or sale of goods acts imply provisions into a contract, create obligations that sit beside the contract or create equitable remedies. Many of these can be limited or excluded but this needs to be done explicitly. Third, in legal writing, clarity is preferred to brevity - nice if you can get both but if not, be clear rather than brief. Fourth, the contract is not the document. The document is a record of the “meeting of the minds” that formed the contract. In the event of a dispute, it may be useful to know that particular laws were specifically considered by the parties. Fifth, in legal writing, just as all writing, some people are better than others.	Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.
What are the rights of an estate when a tenant dies in a rental unit? My uncle died in January. He was renting an apartment month-to-month in Ohio. We are in the process of cleaning out his belongings from his apartment. There will be an estate sale of the majority of his possessions at the end of February, the soonest we could get everything arranged. This will extend into the month of March by a week. My uncle had sent the February rent check in early January, post-dated for February. When the landlord learned of his death, he deposited the check; he agrees that the apartment is paid through the end of February. However, he wants a new security deposit and a month's rent for the time we will use it in March, claiming that the sale process makes us new tenants. What are the legal rights and legal obligations of an estate in a month-to-month rental situation? The estate is just starting the probate process, and I am unclear on whether the landlord is a "traditional" creditor or in a unique situation since the money he is owed for rent continues to accrue after death. All parties agree that there will be a new, unrelated tenant starting April 1st. We're just trying to figure out what everybody's legal obligations are in this situation. The situational specifics are only important insofar as I don't know what paperwork I'm entitled to from the landlord, and whether I should be directing the landlord entirely to the probate court instead of trying to work things out with him.	However, he wants a new security deposit and a month's rent for the time we will use it in March, claiming that the sale process makes us new tenants. What are the legal rights and legal obligations of an estate in a month-to-month rental situation? The estate is just starting the probate process, and I am unclear on whether the landlord is a "traditional" creditor or in a unique situation since the money he is owed for rent continues to accrue after death. The decedent's security deposit, less valid deductions, is property of the estate, so if the landlord takes a second security deposit he is double dipping. Generally speaking, after someone dies, money judgments that have not been reduced to judgment liens, and unsecured debts (i.e. debts not supported by collateral) only have a right to be paid via submission of a claim to the probate estate in the probate process with claims made paid according to a priority schedule set forth in the probate code. But, generally speaking, death does not impair the property rights of third parties, so the fact that a debtor's estate is in probate is usually not a basis upon which a foreclosure or repossession of collateral for a default on a secured debt, or an eviction due to the termination of a lease, may be postponed while the probate case runs its course. Probate does not have the equivalent of the "automatic stay" in bankruptcy that prevents any creditors, secured or unsecured, from engaging in any collection activity against an estate, and probate estates are not allowed to file for bankruptcy either. If you really wanted to play hardball and only needed the apartment for a few days in March, the estate could simply continue to occupy it for that period of time and they pay the landlord the extra month's rent but not the additional security deposit when it was done. The landlord can't begin a foreclosure proceeding until there is a default which can't happen sooner than the last day of February. Even if the landlord is really on his toes, the landlord will be hard pressed to get a notice to vacate served on the estate and then to prepare and serve an eviction lawsuit on the estate and get that case in front of a judge before the estate will be ready to move out anyway. The estate might incur some attorneys' fees in the process if it did that, but the attorneys' fees would be an unsecured claim of the landlord that would have to be collected through the claims process in the probate proceeding which is usually a fairly favorable forum for the estate, instead of the usual court where small landlord-tenant disputes are handled. The probate estate could simply deny his claim for attorneys' fees and then, if the landlord wanted them after making a claim, the landlord would have to bring a lawsuit on fairly tight deadlines in the probate court to have the disallowance of the claim overturned. If you wanted to be even more aggressive, rather than paying the last month's rent, the estate could just holdover into March without paying rent or a new security deposit (vacating before the eviction process can run its course), effectively forcing the landlord to use the security deposit for March rent, and then forcing the landlord to use the probate claims process for both damages to the property claimed and for an attorneys' fees. If the estate is insolvent, or if the claim wasn't filed by the landlord (who may not even know that it is necessary to file a claim in probate) within the short deadline for probate claims arising after death, those expenses just wouldn't get paid at all.	There are two distinct questions here. One is what happens when a lease expires and you don't vacate and the landlord doesn't try to evict you. Generally, in the absence of holdover tenant provisions expressly in the existing lease, the lease becomes a month to month lease on the same terms as previously in force. If the lease does provide for holdover tenant provisions, that lease remains in force. The second issue is what happens when the landlord transfers ownership of the property. Basically, the lease runs with the land, regardless of who owns it, and the legal analysis is no different from what it would have been if the landlord had remained the same. So, if a lease with no holdover provision expires, no new renewal of the lease is signed, and a new owner buys the property from the old one, you have a month to month lease with then new owner on the same terms as the old lease, until the tenant and landlord agree otherwise, even in the absence of an express agreement with the new owner.	The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to.	When the fixed term ends, you have two options if you want to stay. The first option is that you and the landlord can sign a new tenancy agreement, with a new fixed term. This new agreement replaces the old one at the end of the current fixed term, so the landlord is free to make changes, including proposing any number for the rent - and you are free to reject it. Alternatively, when the fixed term ends, if you don't sign a new agreement, and you don't leave, the tenancy automatically* becomes a Statutory Periodic Tenancy - often called a rolling contract. This has no fixed term, which means that if you want to leave, you have to give 1 month's notice, while if the landlord wants you to leave, they must give 2 months' notice. Apart from that, the terms of the existing contract, including the rent review clause mentioned in the question, remain in force. The rent review clause suggests that the landlord can unilaterally impose a rent increase after the fixed term ends, but only up to the amount specified. Hence, without signing a new agreement, any increase beyond that would not be allowed. Also, it doesn't appear to make any mention of future rent increases, which suggests that the default rules for rolling contracts will apply, in that the landlord can propose a rent increase, which you can accept or reject. Failing that, the landlord can impose one via a Section 13 Notice, but only once a year. If you feel the requested rent is unreasonable, you can challenge this, and a tribunal will make a ruling based on the state of the property and the rents for similar properties in the area. (* If the tenancy has any provisions relating to what happens once the fixed term ends, then the tenancy may become a Contractual Periodic Tenancy. However, unless those provisions relate to rent, then they may not be relevant here.)	You need absolute written buy in from the landlord. His agreement is with you, not this new person. If the new person stops paying for whatever reason, then landlord is coming after you.	The thing I was trying to zero in on was the work/refresh/renovation that needs to be done between tenants, and if they landlord can expect to do it while Tenant A is still paying (up to the date of the 'lease change'), but expecting that Tenant A has vacated before that date, or allows the work to be done while they are still occupying? The first tenant is not required to relinquish possession of the premises while the first lease is in force. The landlord's right of access to the apartment remains unchanged from those specified in the lease and in state landlord-tenant law. So basically the landlord has to wait until the first tenant leaves before doing most of the work. If the first tenant relinquishes possession of the premises before the end of the lease period, the landlord can keep charging rent until the premises has been re-let to a new tenant. But if the landlord has agreed to stop charging rent when the first tenant moves out, the landlord may be bound by that agreement. If the landlord has signed a second lease with a new tenant beginning immediately after the first tenant's mutually agreed early move-out date, then the landlord basically has no time available to fix up the apartment except with the consent of one tenant or the other.	In general, and in particular in New Jersey, a new owner takes possession subject to existing rental agreements, and in particular subject to existing leases, unless there is a provision in the lease to the contrary. This happens automatically, by law. Thus any lease is as enforceable against the new owner as it would have been against the old. But how enforceable is this arbitration agreement? How enforceable would it have been against the old owner O? The basic fact about a month-to-month tenancy is that either party may end it on one month's notice, for any reason or none. Moreover, when a new owner intds to occupy the premises personally, or use them for his or her family, the requirement to honor a previous lease is, in general, not applicable. T might be able to force N to go through arbitration, depending on the wording of the agreement, and on whether the written lease applies at all after the end of the first year (which it may well not). But on the facts as stated in the question, T would lose in arbitration as well as in court, and if there is any increased expense because of the arbitration, T would be obliged tom pay it. Let us look at the actual NJ law N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 provides that: any lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance, or for a part of a year, or for one or more years, of any houses, buildings, lands or tenements, ... may be removed from such premises by the Superior Court, Law Division, Special Civil Part in an action in the following cases: a. Where such person holds over and continues in possession of all or any part of the demised premises after the expiration of his term, and after demand made and written notice given by the landlord or his agent, for delivery of possession thereof. The notice shall be served either personally upon the tenant or such person in possession by giving him a copy thereof or by leaving a copy of the same at his usual place of abode with a member of his family above the age of 14 years. [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-56 provides that: No judgment for possession in cases specified in paragraph "a." of section 2A:18-53 of this Title shall be ordered unless: a. The tenancy, if a tenancy at will or from year to year, has been terminated by the giving of 3 months' notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or ? b. The tenancy, if a tenancy from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of 1 month's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-57 provides that: If no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary when the action comes on for trial, the court shall issue its warrant to any officer of the court, commanding him to remove all persons from the premises, and to put the claimant into full possession thereof, and to levy and make the costs out of the goods and chattels of the person in possession. No warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession, except as provided for in chapter 42 of this Title. Section 2A:18-61.1 provides that: No lessee or tenant or the assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives of such lessee or tenant may be removed by the Superior Court from any house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or tenement leased for residential purposes, other than (1) owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units or a hotel, motel or other guesthouse or part thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal tenant; ... except upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause ... [emphasis in original] h. The owner seeks to retire permanently the residential building or the mobile home park from residential use or use as a mobile home park But note that good cause is not required for an owner-occupied dwelling with no more than two rental units. T would be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about landlord/tenant law in NJ before attempting to contest the notice or eviction.	Since Probate had already closed (12/20), is it legal for the Probate court to, in essence, change the terms of the will? I have several witnesses willing to provide affidavits to the effect that my mother, the deceased, made it clear that I would get the real-estate and that the grandson in question would get nothing. Often, for a relatively short period of time after an estate is closed, it can be reopened and the judgment closing the estate can be set aside for good cause. This is also true in most other kinds of lawsuits. if I cannot beat this challenge, can I remove myself as beneficiary and have the Probate court declare that all 5 blood-related grandchildren will get equal shares? Removing yourself as a beneficiary is called filing a "disclaimer" in legalese. It means to refuse to accept a gift or inheritance. But you can't do that if you have already received any personal benefit from the estate and there are other statutory restrictions. For tax purposes, the deadline to do is nine months after the date of death, but the state law deadline could be different. What would happen if you do so depends upon the language of the will. Usually, gifts to a group of people are made "per stirpes" (also called "by representation") which means that if a child predeceases or makes a timely disclaimer that their children share in the share that their parent would have received only. It is possible that it says something different, but that would be by far the most common provision. Under the original Probate interpretation, when the real-estate sold, I invested the proceeds in the stock market and there have been losses. If the challenge wins, will I have to come up with the delta--since the investment losses occurred under the original interpretation? If you had the authority to sell the real estate (which you probably did if a third-party title company went through with the transaction), then their claim would almost surely be limited to the proceeds of the real estate and not "the delta" unless the person entitled to take could show that you breached your fiduciary duties in the manner in which you invested the proceeds, for example, by investing all of it in a small number of penny stocks, rather than a diversified portfolio suitable for the purposes of the estate. Also, there is a question over whether the stock investment was made by you as the executor, and was subject to fiduciary standards, or was instead made after it was distributed to you outright. Further, there is the question of whether the estate can actually be opened if you gave notice of the closing of the estate to everyone who was entitled to it, including the grandchild, and whether the grandchild was entitled to it. You really need to hire a WV lawyer who handles probate cases at this point and would be doing yourself great harm by trying to represent yourself. Probate procedures are too arcane for you to reasonably have faith that you are doing it right for yourself.
Do governments need to compensate business owners if they temporarily force a business closure? If the government (let's say in the US or EU) prohibit businesses engaging in an otherwise legally compliant enterprise, do it need to compensate the business owners for that? Assuming that's for example extreme weather, an imminent war or the 2020 pandemic, and assuming they do not single out concrete businesses, that is, they close entire sectors (all restaurants not only Bob's Diner). Would that be analogous to the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution (if the government takes private property for public use, it must provide "just compensation.")?	No Always assuming that the government has operated within the limits of its powers or, at least, that if they have exceeded those powers the excess was in good faith. First, there is the issue of sovereign immunity. Basically, a government can be held liable only when it consents to be held liable. Most governments never waive this with respect to their lawmaking powers because they have to be able to make laws in what they see as the public interest without fear of litigation. See, for example, cases on plain paper packaging of cigarettes. Second, most governments have the power to regulate commerce and to deal with public emergencies. There is an issue which comes up in Federations about which government has the power but even if a law is invalid, it does not follow that compensation is payable. It certainly isn’t if the law is valid.	The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X.	In the U.S. severance payments are not provided for statutorily, and are rarely made when an employee quits or is fired for cause. However, even when not provided for within contracts it is common to see voluntary severances paid during lay-offs. Furthermore, in the U.S. it is more likely that they would be "laid off" in order to qualify for unemployment insurance. In Pennsylvania one can make claims on the state-run unemployment insurance system only if one is able to work and does not refuse suitable work when offered. If one quits one is not eligible for these payments. Ultimately unemployment claims are born by the employer (since their legally-mandated unemployment insurance premiums are adjusted based on realized claims). So managers with the authority to layoff employees can impose real costs on their companies, both in terms of direct severance payments (which may be optional), and in terms of the inflated unemployment premiums that will hit the company down the road. However, I have never heard of a company attempting to recoup such costs from managers, since such decisions are specifically delegated to managers with hiring/firing authority. It seems much more likely that a manager deemed to have abused the company's purse would be demoted or fired rather than being sued, unless there were some gross fraud involved (e.g., kickbacks).	It is mandatory for the employer to provide sufficient restrooms (“cabinets d'aisance”), as per article R4228-10. Other provisions regulate evacuation, ventilation, heating, disabled access, etc. There is no provision regarding when employees are permitted to use the restrooms. There can't be a single rule that works for every profession: some jobs don't let you leave your post whenever you like (e.g. machine operator, driver, guard, teacher, etc.). The most common dispute regarding restroom use is whether employees should be paid during that time. Some employers want to count restroom use as unpaid pause time. Strictly speaking, that's legal: an employee who is in a restroom is not at the employer's disposal, therefore this doesn't count as work time. However enforcing this is often logistically difficult and wildly unpopular, so in practice it's only done in places where employees must clock out to reach a restroom. I could only find one case with actual jurisprudence. In 1995, an industrial butchering company (Bigard) decided to limit restroom breaks to three fixed times a day. This was, as you might expect, unpopular; the employees went on strike, and eventually the labor court struck down this measure. That's a precedent, but it doesn't seem to have made its way to the appellate court. Your case is also slightly different in that the restrooms would only be inaccessible for an hour, which is shorter than in the Bigard case. So legally speaking, it isn't clear who will win. You'll have a better chance of success by banking on the unpopularity of the measure. Talk with your colleagues and your representatives and shop stewards. Point out that employees who are trying to hold it in are unlikely to be at the top of their productivity.	As was mentioned in a comment, in the United States, businesses are generally registered at the state level. The information collected, and the extent to which or manner in which the public has access to it, varies from state to state. There may still be states where that's a paper-only process, but I'd guess in most of them it's accessible online, at least for basic information. For example, in Michigan the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs has a Business Entity Search tool. If a business deals directly with consumers, it may be a member of the Better Business Bureau. Even if it isn't, but consumers have complained about it, the BBB will make public the information it has about the purported business. If a company is publicly traded (that is, it's corporation that issues stock, and the stock is traded on a stock exchange), it is required by law to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC's EDGAR tool will display the company's filings, which should include annual and quarterly reports. If the company is or wants to be a government contractor, it generally needs to register with the General Services Administration, and certain information about successfully registered entities is publicly viewable in that system. (Conversely, the same system also lists "Excluded Parties" who are prohibited or partially restricted from doing business with the government.) Depending on what the business does, it may also be subject to registration with and regulation by additional state or federal agencies. For a full picture, however, unless you're dealing with the obvious agent of a Fortune 500 company, you'll probably want to get information from a private credit-check service as well; for example, as also mentioned in a comment, Dun & Bradstreet for the business itself, or for a really small business a personal credit report on each of the owners and officers.	If a farmer had recently built a barn (within the past year) that cost 45,000 dollars (paid for from a loan), on a piece of property that was originally 10,000 dollars(not paid for from a loan), but the market only values the property with the barn at 35,000 dollars, is the government only responsible for paying the market value if they decide to seize this land through eminent domain? Yes. The fact that you owe more on debt secured by condemned property than it is worth does not entitle you to more compensation, although the fact that the bank was recently willing to lend that much is strong evidence that its fair market value is more than the value of the loan, unless there was a corrupt or non-economic reason for it to make the loan. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp. is concerned with situations where property is difficult to value (e.g. thinly traded derivatives contracts), or where property is not of a kind that derives its value primarily from market transactions (e.g. family photographs or grave sites). But, real property with a purely economic function, like a barn used by a farmer for farming, does not fit in either of those categories. It is easily appraised. And, it is common for people to make improvements to real property that doesn't return $1 in fair market value for every $1 spend on it. But, eminent domain is not based upon book value. Now, it is important to note that the fair market value of the property that is taken itself is not the only thing that is valued in an eminent domain hearing. An eminent domain hearing also considers the impact that the property taken has on the property that is not taken. For example, suppose that while the going fair market value of a comparable barn on a comparable amount of real estate is $35,000, but it is the only barn at the farm which is useless without a replacement barn on the premises, and it costs $70,000 to build a replacement in the less than ideal conditions of the remaining land (for example, maybe the farmer has to build a bridge over a river to access the only other part of his land suitable for building a barn at a cost of $35,000 in addition to $35,000 to build the new barn itself). In that case, the eminent domain award would be more than $70,000, but probably less than $105,000 (most likely $80,000, with $10,000 being for the land and $70,000 for the replacement barn that needs to be built to preserve the value of the rest of the farm). Impact on the value of property not taken comes up a lot in eminent domain cases involving highway construction. The linked law firm's website illustrates many of the kinds of compensation for harm to the residual caused by a physical taking that are frequently awarded.	I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired.	You are not obligated to pick the thing up, but you are obligated to pay. Analogously, if you go into a restaurant and order a steak, you are obligated to pay for it, but you are not obligated to eat it. You can cancel the steak order within some reasonable short period of time (maybe a minute) – it depends on whether they have relied on your acceptance of their offer, and have done anything that puts them in a worse situation (such as "started cooking it"). You could have informed them that you decided that you didn't want the thing and they might have been able to cancel the order with no or minimum cost to you (depends on whether your job was simply "in the queue", or had they done something like ordered parts or detrimentally committed an employee to some schedule so that other customers could not be serviced). Once you accept their offer, you have an enforceable contract. The additional information about lateness of delivery doesn't clearly change the situation. If there were an explicit "time is of the essence" clause in your contract, related to any delay causing harm, then failure to meet a deadline could constitute a breach of contract. For example, if you have a contract where you will be transported to a location by a specific deadline so that you can get on the boat, failure to meet that deadline causes material harm (if you miss the boat, you suffer a loss). You apparently do not have any such clause, and there's no indication that you suffered a loss because of the delay in delivery. A reasonable delay would not be interpreted as the other party breaching the contract.
What is illegal to watch on the streets or other public spaces in California, United States? Last night I was hearing some car noises in the street next to my place in San Jose, California, and by the time I went out, things had calmed down. To my great surprise, this morning I read (mirror) that the bunch of bystanders next to my place earned a criminal record: Over 40 citations, many for municipal code spectator violations. These events are illegal and we will continue the enforcement. These municipal code spectator violations are a misdemeanor. Had I gone outside my apartment slightly earlier, I could have been struck with a misdemeanor. I am therefore very concerned as to what I am legally disallowed to look at when in a public space, especially because I have a green card and I fear deportation or issues when renewing my green or getting the US citizenship, and also need to apply for visas that sometimes require a criminal background check. Aside from looking at cars making noise, what else is illegal to watch on the streets or other public spaces in California, United States?	As a practical matter, if you learn that people are gathering around a street racing event, leave. In all likelihood, you should do the same if you learn that people are gathering around a cockfighting event, a duel, a staged fight between people outside of a licensed boxing or fighting event, or any other illegal contest. Rather than worrying about the precise contours of these laws, avoiding this situations is the safest rule for your personal safety from other participants and from authorities.	You were trespassing The community college is a public institution but they can decide what part of their land you can walk on and in what circumstances. Just like the military is a public institution but they don’t let you walk across their shooting ranges. To be clear, in the absence of clear “no dogs allowed” signage, you were not trespassing until you were told about the policy. At that point, you were legally obliged to remove yourself (or more precisely, your dog) from the campus as soon as possible. When you refused to do so, you became a trespasser. It’s trivially easy to find out who you are. One photograph, one reverse image search they’ll know everything about you right down to your shoe size. Even if you don’t use social media, I’m sure some of your family and friends do. In most US states, trespass is a misdemeanour and also in most states members of the public can arrest someone who is committing a misdemeanour in their presence. They can use reasonable force to do so and can hold the arrestee until they can transfer them to the custody of a law enforcement officer. Admittedly, this seems unlikely but it is possible. If you have caused damage, you can be sued. It seems that your discussion with the college staff was somewhat protected so the loss of productivity of those staff members is a loss that the college suffered and that they could sue you for. Again, not likely but possible. Alternatively, they could just report you to the police who may or may not bring charges. Note: this assumes the dog is a pet. If it’s a disability assistance animal, it can’t be excluded. See: Are sidewalks on a university public or private property? Can a local government charge a fee to enter a public downtown area during an event? Trespassing or Public Property? Is a mall considered a "public place" for copyright purposes?	united-states Speed limits can be enforced by any means (except photo-radar) in most U.S. jurisdictions without notice that it is being used. Those laws are close to being uniform in the U.S. due to federal coordination on federally funded roads, even though state and local laws are what governs them directly. Some U.S. jurisdictions prohibit the issuance of photo-radar speeding tickets without notice before entering the photo-radar picture taking zone. I'd have to research further to see if New York City does. The purpose of the language on the sign is to make drivers more fearful of being caught in circumstances where they don't see someone trying to enforce the law, not to have greater legal effect.	It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power.	The first thing it depends on is where you live. The US has no law requiring niceness, but perhaps niceness-enforcement exists somewhere in the world. The second thing it depends on is exactly what he does, where and how. If he comes into people's houses uninvited and starts harassing them, that is generally a crime. If he makes nasty remarks to people walking down the street, you can't even sue him. If the person commits in a crime, you can report him anonymously. However, for there to be any prosecution, someone will have to testify in court: anonymous criminal testimony is inadmissible in the US. If there is no crime, just a potential civil action, the part would hire an attorney to file a complaint, etc. and that party would be named (not anonymous), would have to testify, and would also have to have been harmed. The police will not get involved in a civil dispute. Based just on what you have said here, your attorney would very likely say that there is no case to be pursued, and your only solution is to ignore him.	There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement.	The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available.	It is not decided whether such, in areas, filming can be prohibited. In a "public forum", First Amendment rights are maximally protected, and this includes filing (Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 in particular §A(1) for a summary of the law on this question). In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 the court refined public forum doctrine to distinguish quintessential, limited, and nonpublic fora. In a nonpublic forum, the government may "reserve the forum for its intended purposes": but, such a reservation must be viewpoint-neutral. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 states that "The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time". In a nonpublic forum, demonstrations can be forbidden, especially when demonstrations are incompatible with the purpose of the forum (example: military bases). The particular question you raise has not ended up in court. One may be tempted to reason that First Amendment rights can be arbitrarily curtailed in a non-public forum, but such a restriction would have to have appropriate justification – the restriction would be subject to strict scrutiny. Simply saying "We don't want people filming inside the holding area" is not a valid justification. But, the police are not required to announce their legal argument in advance. If you get busted and film, and they make you stop, you can sue for violation of your First Amendment rights. Your attorney would then need to make a good argument that this restriction is to be subject to strict scrutiny, and that it fails.
Is an SDPX header legally equivalent to a license header? I consider to use SDPX headers in stead of the full license headers in my code. However, I wonder whether this is actually legally equivalent. So, for context, this is the SDPX license list: https://spdx.org/licenses/ The header of my code would then not look like this: # Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one # or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file # distributed with this work for additional information # regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file # to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the # "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance # with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at # # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 # # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, # software distributed under the License is distributed on an # "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY # KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the # specific language governing permissions and limitations # under the License. but like this: # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 I can't really find anything on the web page of SDPX on this. The license header is pretty obvious in stating the main terms and conditions of the license, in a human readable way, while SDPX defines a key one can use to refer to a license, but then you have to know the convention. So I could imagine they may be legally different. I know there is no such thing as international copyright law, but it would be useful to have an idea why those are or are not equivalent and what typically differences would be. Would there? Of course, this is all apart from having a LICENSE file shipped with the code, and probably other requirements that are put on my code if I want to correctly use SPDX.	First off: Legally, everything is copyrighted anyway. Licensing is not at all necessary. Hence, even if a court would disagree with # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0, that would just make it closed source. Having said that, the law generally doesn't bother with trivialities such as "file headers". Any commonly accepted way to state the copyright and license terms is OK. Your LICENSE is such a common convention. If you want to avoid all doubt what is covered under that license, put a reference to that LICENSE in each header. If you have just five files in one directory that are all licensed the same, I wouldn't even bother with that. Again, the default position is that everything is closed source.	Yes. The license itself is really just one sentence long, and states explicitly that this is allowed. Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.	You're not going to find an OSI-approved or FSF-approved license that meets your needs because these licenses comply with the OSI definition or FSF definition of open-source software, and your requirements don't. Looking at your requirements, it looks like you want a license where users can modify the software and use it for private use, but cannot use it for commercial use. I ran a search on TL;DR Legal to see what licenses match. There are some one-off licenses that appear to be written by individuals or groups or written by companies that explicitly call out a particular software package. One appears to be a modification of the Apache License. I wouldn't recommend simply using one of these without not only reading them thoroughly yourself, but also consulting a lawyer - just because they started with a license that is trusted doesn't mean that a change they made didn't cause problems if it were to be challenged. For a project hosted on GitHub, it doesn't need to be open-source. You can upload a project that is all rights reserved, but by using GitHub, you do need to allow others to view and fork your repository. However, I wouldn't expect many outside contributors. Why should I give you my hard work if you're just going to turn around and make money on it? That's essentially free labor. I'm not aware of any listing of vetted licenses that are designed for commercial use of software, like how the OSI and FSF maintain lists of licenses. There is a Binpress license generator, but again, it's not a vetted license. How much stake you put into license generator or some random license you find on the Internet is up to you and the level of risk that you find acceptable. If you want to make money on your open-source software, you may want to rethink your approach. In my experience, I've usually seen dual licensing achieve this. One license is a custom written commercial license while the other is a very strong copyleft license, like GPL or AGPL (depending on how you intend your software to be used), which forces companies to also open-source their software if they use yours. It doesn't explicitly prevent commercial usage, but many companies will either look for an alternative that has a more permissive license or purchase the commercial license to prevent their software from being required to be open-source as well. You may also be interested in questions on Open Source about how to monetize open-source projects. There are options out there - selling support and maintenance or related services or selling additional documentation or examples. Under this model, all of your software is free and open source under any of the well-known open-source software licenses, but you make money supporting users of the software.	In the United States, the case law on framing as copyright infringement is fairly scarce and somewhat conflicting. Consider first the 2007 Ninth Circuit Appeals ruling in Perfect 10 vs. Amazon.com. Google included framed images on their site. Google did not have the right to display these image works, but the ruling says ultimately that they did not display the works (emphasis mine): Instead of communicating a copy of the image, Google provides HTML instructions that direct a user’s browser to a website publisher’s computer that stores the full-size photographic image. Providing these HTML instructions is not equivalent to showing a copy. First, the HTML instructions are lines of text, not a photographic image. Second, HTML instructions do not themselves cause infringing images to appear on the user’s computer screen. The HTML merely gives the address of the image to the user’s browser. The browser then interacts with the computer that stores the infringing image. It is this interaction that causes an infringing image to appear on the user’s computer screen. Perfect 10 argues that Google displays a copy of the fullsize images by framing the full-size images, which gives the impression that Google is showing the image within a single Google webpage. While in-line linking and framing may cause some computer users to believe they are viewing a single Google webpage, the Copyright Act, unlike the Trademark Act, does not protect a copyright holder against acts that cause consumer confusion. Note that this second paragraph highlights that iframe linking may not be a copyright violation, but it may be illegal for other reasons, e.g., trademark violation, by confusing the origin of the framed content. This ruling appears to be in contradiction to the 1998 district court case Futuredontics Inc. v. Applied Anagramic Inc., which found that framing creates a derivative work. The most striking difference from the Perfect 10 case is in the following passage (emphasis mine): Defendants primarily rely on Louis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. [...]. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that a Game Genie which merely enhances audiovisual displays which originate in Nintendo game cartridges does not constitute a derivative work because... it does "not incorporate a portion of a copyrighted work in some concrete or permanent form." Id. at 968 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the Game Genie could not duplicate or recast a Nintendo game's output. Galoob did distinguish Mirage and noted that the Mirage decision would have been different had the plaintiff "distributed lenses that merely [*10] enabled users to view several art works simultaneously." Id. Nevertheless, Galoob... is distinguishable from the instant case. Galoob does not foreclose Plaintiff from establishing that AAI's web page, incorporates Futuredontic's web page in some "concrete or permanent form" or that AAI's framed link duplicates or recasts Plaintiff's web page. There appears to be a fundamental disagreement between these two cases over whether a webpage that includes a link actually "displays" the linked work. The Perfect 10 ruling viewed the page as HTML instructions that were only related to linked works insofar as those instructions could cause a user's browser to render framed content from a copyright holder different from the author of the HTML page. By contrast, the Futuredonics case considered the intended rendered output of a browser as a derivative work that includes the framed page in a "concrete or permanent form" and that "duplicates" the framed page. I'm not sure how to reconcile these two cases. Perfect 10 is more recent and from a higher court, but I'm insufficiently skilled in law to determine if and how that counts for anything. It's also possible that facts of the two cases are sufficiently different that the different rulings could be reconciled and both remain true simultaneously. Now that we've considered the case law, if you will indulge me in a moment of armchair speculation, let us consider an interesting hypothetical. Suppose I am the owner of apsillers.com. I host an HTML page on my site at http://apsillers.com/my_favorite_stories.html. My my_favorite_stories.html page frames a public domain resource at http://example.com/PD_Story.html. (I am not the owner of example.com.) Surely, we can agree that this is not copyright infringement. At a later time, the owner of example.com changes the text at http://example.com/PD_Story.htmlto include copyrighted content whose use by me would constitute infringement. My my_favorite_stories.html page remain totally unaltered. Does my_favorite_stories.html now violate copyright? The Perfect 10 ruling says no, because my_favorite_stories.html is only instructions. The Futuredontics ruling would appear to say yes, because it considers the final rendered output of the HTML, which now suddenly includes infringing content. It seems powerfully counterintuitive that the infringing status of my written work (my_favorite_stories.html) should change, dependent on the copyright status of a linked resource, when the content of my written work has remained totally unaltered. Perhaps you might argue that my case is different because I did not intend at the time I wrote my HTML page to infringe copyright. However, intent is irrelevant in making the initial yes/no determination of infringement (but may grant me a lesser punishment, as it would be innocent infringement.)	Yes, that’s allowed. Under the Stack Exchange terms of service, content you upload is licensed to Stack Exchange Inc. on a non-exclusive basis under CC-BY-SA 4.0. The terms of service do not give Stack Exchange the copyright to your contributions, and a non-exclusive license means you are not promising Stack Exchange that “only Stack Exchange will be allowed to use this content.” That means you can continue to do whatever you want with your own content and do not need to mention Stack Exchange at all. The only restriction is that you can’t stop Stack Exchange from continuing to use your Stack Exchange content under CC-BY-SA 4.0, and since it’s a Creative Commons license you also can’t stop anyone else from using your Stack Exchange content under that license.	Unknown based on what you have posted in your question. But answer lies in the terms under which the source code is made available or licensed. The most common scenario is that such "sample" source code is provided as help to the purchaser of their product and you'll often see things that permit its use in conjunction with the hardware product. You'll also often see disclaimers that say the code is for demonstration purposes only and it not warrantied to do anything at all. But again, you'll need to review the actual language under which the code is provided and then understand and follow its terms and conditions.	Disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer. This advice may be materially inaccurate. What does redistribution mean? Redistribution means you have somehow caused the software to make its way to another person. Things that probably count as distribution: Placing the file on a public website. Printing the binary in hex onto paper and giving that paper to someone else. Putting the file onto a USB drive and handing it to someone. Putting the file onto your own computer, then giving that computer to someone else. Putting the file onto a shared network drive. Things that probably don't count as distribution: Copying the files onto your own computer(s) Compiling the program Placing the program on your phone. Printing out the source code on paper, but not sharing it. As a practical matter, I recommend ensuring that BSD license accompanies any instances of the software, even if you don't intend to distribute those instances. If you don't distribute it, then nobody will see it. If you "inadvertently" distribute the software, then including the license means you are in compliance. Should you include the license in the exe or in the same folder: The specific clause is: Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. Including the license in the exe (e.g., via some sort of credits menu) is typically fine. I'll note that this is the approach used by Chrome (help->about chrome has a link to "other open source software" which includes these licenses). This approach works well for software which makes use of an installer, since users probably won't be looking in the install folder. Including the license in the folder adjacent to the exe is also typically fine. If your application does not have an install process (e.g., installed via xcopy deployment), then this approach works well, since users will easily be able to find the license. If your software is sold in a physical box, then printing out the license and including that license inside the box also works. What if I violate the license by not including the BSD terms? If you violate the license, you are subject to a lawsuit for copyright violation. What happens next depends on how the copyright owners wishes to proceed: Some copyright owners will sue. The actual results/penalties for such a violation will depend on a variety of factors. Some copyright owners will ask you to comply with the license. If you respond by apologizing and then complying, that's as far as it will go. Some copyright owners will ask you for money (with threat of lawsuit). I would expect this result if the copyright owners offers a dual-licensing scheme (i.e., where you can pay the copyright owner to exclude the acknowledgement).	If you aren't including those libraries, then yes because it's entirely your own work. If you are publishing those libraries, then no because their licenses will limit how you can do that. GPL's and MIT's main features are restricting how you can distribute software that includes the licensed code, and they don't allow the "do whatever you want" of public domain.
Afraid of Patent Troll for first app I am writing my first mobile-app that teaches a foreign language in a "chat-like" manner. Means, the user enters a chat and you learn the language by having a bot sending you individual messages. You, as a user, can select answers accordingly. This type of app is not new. I saw hundreds of patents for chats, bots etc but I cannot read all of them, neither are chats nor bots new. How do app developers proceed at the stage where I am at?	It depends upon how much money is at stake. You could have a patent search done and consult a patent lawyer help you to evaluate your risk based upon the results. This would cost several thousand dollars but probably less than $10,000 (these amounts are much less than the cost of trying to get a patent for your app). If you do this and there is anyone who has an arguable infringement claim, you would ultimately have to decide for yourself, informed by the search results and your patent lawyer's advice, what to do. Even in a low risk case, you might be sued. Even in a high risk case, the patent holder might decide not to sue you for some reason (patents of the kind you are worried about are weak and often don't hold up in court, about 50% of patent cases that go to trial end up finding that the patent is invalid and that would be higher with a patent of the type you are worried about, but of course, it costs money to go to trial so people often pay nuisance settlements to avoid litigation). You could, instead, launch your app without a patent search and see if anyone sends you a cease and desist letter and then decide what to do from there, possibly consulting a patent lawyer at that point if necessary. It only makes sense to search in advance if your investment and potentially profits from the app are significantly greater than the cost of the patent consultation. If you've invested $100,000 in making the app and expect to make $200,000 of profits from the app, you should definitely confer with a patent lawyer up front. If you've invested $1,000 in making the app and expect to make $2,000 of profits from the app, you should move forward until such time, if ever, as you receive a cease and desist letter from someone claiming to have a patent that covers your app. Somewhere in between those amounts, what to do is a business decision and a judgment call.	Apple has rules for publishing apps on the App Store, and either you follow the rules, or your app won't go on the App Store, simple as that. What you do is either not put your app on the App Store, or make the changes they ask you to make. Why are there conflicting statements? Because Apple and Google are different companies. Does Apple ask the other company? No, why would they spend their time on this, when they can ask you to make the changes? In the end, Apple has huge pockets, so they are not going to approve anything that might give a company a way to take money out of their pocket. What you want to do sounds very much like it could give some company a pretext to sue Apple; that's one thing that Apple won't let happen.	You would be in poorly-tested waters under US law. The invented name "Cthulhu" as appearing in a novel is not protected by copyright. A collection of invented names and other words assembled into a dictionary (e.g. of Klingon) might be found to constitute a copyright-protected creative work. In Paramount Pictures v. Axanar Productions (complaint), plaintiffs partially base their claim on infringement of language; defendants sought to dismiss the suit on various grounds ("questions of law" rather than questions of fact), but the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, defendants settled the case. Constructed languages are highly creative expressive works whose elements are deliberately selected for an artistic purpose, and they are not naturally-occurring facts. The copyright office has no position on copyright protection of a constructed language, and any such position would have to come from so-far non-existent (definitive) case law. The dismissal in Paramount v. Axanar doesn't clearly indicate that a constructed language is protected. The primary legal question would be whether the database that you copy into your system is protected. There is a colorable legal argument that a collection of language-like objects. The statutory language in 17 USC 102 does not specifically preclude protection of a wholely-creative database, and the copyright office does not say whether a conlang can be protected because the courts have not ruled one way or the other. The situation in Feist is very different from the case of a work which invents a language from nothing.	The first copyright law dates from 1710, so it's not true that Chekhov wrote before any copyright laws. Any work from prior to 1924 isn't necessarily safe to use (it depends on when the author died). It is in the US but will complicate things if you publish internationally. Unless you translate with something like Google translate, translation is definitely a creative process. This is especially true (although probably not significant legally) for something like a poem, where its' extra hard if you try to keep the original metre and rhyme scheme. If you publish work in the public domain, you would have some claim to the typography. If the translator has done a copyright assignment to the publisher as part of the publishing agreement, they would hold the rights to the translated version.	Copyright doesn't protect methods, only particular fixed expressions. 17 USC 102 Some methods (but not algorithms) may be protected by patent. Diamond v. Diehr 450 U.S. 175 (1981) More exactly, "an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, which cannot be the subject of a patent". However, in Diamond, the respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to preempt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process. Said another way: the algorithm cannot be protected, but if you are using the algorithm as part of a method or process that as a whole is patented, you would be infringing the patent. The paper does not have to disclose the patent - you could email the authors to see if they have any patent that protects any particular methods using the algorithm in the paper, but that doesn't rule out patents that the paper author is unaware of.	The basic principle about copyright protection is that the expression of an idea is protected, but the idea itself is not. So wholesale copying without permission is infringing. But the abstract algorithm is not protected by copyright (and let us assume that it also isn't patented). By way of analog, an insertion sort is a pretty easy concept to grasp, and once you understand it, you can re-create it, independent of how the original example (where from you learned about the sort) is expressed. So the question is whether it is necessary for you to copy that code (copyright protects against copying), or can you independently re-express the algorithmic idea (ideas are not protected)?	That is not at all what USPTO is telling you. Courts do not simply "dismiss" patents - that isn't a terminology you'd ever see used for a patent that was found to be invalid. Timeline of events: United Industries Corporation brought a suit against the owner of the patent, claiming unpatentability. That case went to trial, and the court found the claim to be invalid and that UIC failed to show unpatentability. UIC appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case because both parties agreed to its dismissal (it's possible they reached some external agreement we don't know about). As far as I can tell, at this moment, the patent is active.	Literal support means that the words of the claim are identical to words in the description. It does not have any particular nuanced meaning. The purpose of that presentation is to demonstrate that the requirements for written description in the US go far beyond literal support. That is, even if the claims are replicated in the description, that is not enough to satisfy the written description requirement (or indeed, the enablement or best mode requirements). In fact, the presentation you link to includes a nice quote from In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 217 US PQ 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1983): The test ... is whether the disclosure of the application as originally filed reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter, rather than the presence or absence of literal support in the specification for the claim language. Literal support therefore does not have much place in US law. However, historically, countries inheriting their patent system from the UK had a requirement for fair basis, where the claims had to be fairly based on the description. For example, the now superseded Patents Act 1949 (UK) s 4(4) provided: The claim or claims of a complete specification must relate to a single invention, must be clear and succinct, and must be fairly based on the matter disclosed in the specification. This was a low bar, and literal support (where the wording of the claims are identical to words in the description) would be sufficient (though not required). This gave rise to the practice of having consistory clauses, where the claims were literally copied into the summary of invention section. However, most (or possibly even all) countries have moved on to a support requirement now. Yet the practice of consistory clauses lives on. Literal support also appears in some guise in European law. Art 123(2) EPC provides: The European patent application or European patent may not be amended in such a way that it contains subject-matter which extends beyond the content of the application as filed. This is often imprecisely glossed as a requirement that the wording of an amendment must appear verbatim in the description as originally filed. That is, an amendment is generally allowable if it has literal support in the application (and does not otherwise impermissibly combine embodiments and the like). In practice though, literal support is only one factor for compliance with Art 123(2) EPC, and is neither necessary nor sufficient on its own.
Do the words "take advice" / "taken advice" imply the advisor is a lawyer? As per the title, I am (as a non-lawyer) helping someone in a dispute where fraud has occurred. If I'm helping the person write a letter to one of the involved parties based on my advice, if I help her produce a letter which says she has "taken advice" (and I am the one advising her), would this be construed as a claim she has received advice specifically from a lawyer? Put another way, if someone claims to have "taken advice", and the advice they received was from a non-lawyer, is the claim misleading?	if someone claims to have "taken advice", and the advice they received was from a non-lawyer, is the claim misleading? No. The language "taken advice" does not imply "taken legal advice", let alone one arising from an attorney-client relation or taken from someone purporting to be a lawyer. The language "taken advice" in and of itself leaves the advisor's capacity unspecified. For instance, the non-lawyer might be an accountant whose advice goes beyond a lawyer's scope or expertise. That being said, it is unclear whether adding that expression is useful at all.	There is no generalisation. The "articles" are articles of clerkship. The context permits the implication of that specific usage, in the same way that talking about "cars" at a racetrack isn't a generalisation of the word "car" - it's an implication of specifically racecars. Ancestry.co.uk explains well what the articles actually are. Briefly, they are simply fixed-term apprenticeship contracts between an established practicing lawyer and a student who wishes to become a lawyer.	It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial.	The hypothetical situation would be a material misrepresentation of the facts, as well as a fraudulent misrepresentation - both are grounds for nullifying the contract. Under your hypothetical this is almost certainly material and is certainly a fraudulent misrepresentation. A fraudulent misrepresentation of the facts pertinent to a contract occurs when one party, to a bargain for exchange, misstates a fact and either knows or believes that the fact is not true, or is not sure whether or not his statement is true but claims it to be true nonetheless. If a party to the contract relies on the fraudulent misrepresentation and enters into a contract based on that misrepresentation, the contract is voidable by the innocent party. A material misrepresentation is a misstatement of fact that will induce a reasonable person to enter into a contract. If a misrepresentation is material to the contract, the contract will be voidable by the relying party even if the misrepresentation is not fraudulent. So, in this scenario, the contact would be voidable because there is both a material misrepresentation, as well as a fraudulent one. If the other party suffers a monetary loss because of the deceit, you would almost certainly be held responsible for any damages that may flow from the inducement.	If the lawyer was negligent, you can sue Note that negligence requires considerably more than just being wrong . Professional advice (including legal advice) requires assessment of risks and strategies and advising the client of these so they can make informed choices about their options. There is plenty of scope to make mistakes, however, a lawyer who does what a reasonable lawyer (not an expert lawyer) should do has not been negligent. You cannot sue for anything done or said by the lawyer in court - this is a public policy thing to stop disappointed litigants from suing their lawyer if they lose.	This person is appointed by the court to look after the child's interests recognizing that the child's interests may be different from those of the parents. As @phoog notes in the comments: the attorney ad litem is not your lawyer. The question suggests that you might not understand this (you mention "our" attorney ad litem). The job of the attorney ad litem is to represent your daughter's interests, which might not align with yours. This is why you need your own lawyer. The attorney ad litem might be skeptical of you and your submissions to the court; that's her job. It doesn't necessarily mean that she is biased against you. If her skepticism is well founded, an attempt to have her replaced may work against you. (FYI, most jurisdictions call this person a "guardian ad litem" or GAL, but Arkansas uses atypical terminology.) Our attorney ad litem appointed for our 2 year old daughter is extremely biased against me. This is not a reason to remove the person appointed. It is their job to distrust parents and provide an independent opinion to the court. There could be grounds for removing a guardian ad litem (e.g. a personal relationship with one of the parties prior to the litigation), but nothing in this question suggests that any relevant facts are present. You would be much better served trying to figure out what causes the guardian ad litem to distrust you and to find a way to show that person that their distrust of you is ill-founded.	I'm not familiar with the lawsuit, but generally speaking, a court's finding that a lawyer falsified evidence would not directly result in the lawyer being disbarred, as the trial court does not have authority to regulate the practice of law. Instead, a court that reached that conclusion -- either by a verdict, or because a judge was persuaded by the evidence without reaching a verdict -- would likely report that outcome to whatever organization is responsible for licensing attorneys in that jurisdiction.	Here be dragons Financial services regulation is very complicated. Non-compliance can have severe consequences. Professional legal counsel could assist in navigating the complex web of law, regulation, and precedent. It may seem unfair that things are so difficult - that's a result of financial services being inherently complicated topics, ones which are fought over by wealthy people/firms, and where there has been a long history of dodgy dealings of many kinds. As an example of the difficulties involved, the law in general would like to distinguish between Investment advice given to a specific individual, taking all their personal circumstances and wishes into account, and Newspaper reports giving dispassionate information to the general public about the movement of share prices, but not telling them what to do in response; or completely generic advice like "it's good when the wiggly line goes up". The second is "meant" to be basically OK and not the concern of the regulators; the first one is where all kinds of legal duties and protections come into play, since people might be disadvantaged by advisors who are inept or unscrupulous. Intuitively, D's app is somewhere between these, because it's not as if users are sitting down with a financial advisor and making trades, but they're also not just consuming generic data like a stock ticker. There is an element of prediction, expressing a range of envisaged outcomes, and potentially with "extra filters" that add some more personalization. So what does the law say about this? Just looking at the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, Part II Chapter 12 and its form after two decades of tweaking tells us that there is a lot of complicated detail just in this regulation. We don't have to read or understand the words to see that there are a lot more of them, taking the apparently simple distinction above and trying to capture or carve out a range of activities not originally envisaged. If we do start looking at the actual words, we can see several concepts that become relevant - "advice on the merits", "leading or enabling persons to buy or sell", and so on. These, and their predecessor words in older laws, have been thrashed out in the courts in ways that are not completely obvious. A recent case in the Court of Appeal, Adams v Options Personal Pensions UK LLP [2021] EWCA Civ 474, looks at some of this territory in paragraphs 69-82. We see here some phrases about whether the context of the information presented includes elements of comparison, evaluation, or persuasion; influencing the decision of the recipient as a result of a value judgement; giving purely factual information as opposed to matters such as a characterization of risk; and others. But, as quoted here from another decision, Rubenstein v HSBC Bank plc [2011] EWHC 2304 (QB), "To attempt any greater definition of the giving of advice in an investment context would be unwise and is probably impossible", which tells us that it's not easy to decide whether developer D's app is in or out. You say "the app won't instruct users whether to buy or not" but courts have found a concept of "implied advice", where the context of the giving of information means that the customer will take it as advice. In Australia, the Federal Court recently found an implied recommendation, amounting to personal advice, had been given in a certain situation when customers were told supposedly general advice - even though there was an up-front disclaimer (ASIC v Westpac [2019] FCAFC 187). The specific law and facts are not the same as in this question, but the observation holds that disclaimers may not help if the surrounding marketing is communicating something else. Similar remarks apply to the predictive model, where there is also plenty of regulation. In the FCA's Conduct of Business Sourcebook 4.5A.14, for example, there are binding rules about information on future performance. Whether these rules apply to what D is doing, and how they can comply, are hard questions. There is an entire publication, the Perimeter Guidance Manual, about how to know whether someone is covered by the regulator, but even that is full of maybes. Aside from concerns with the regulators themselves, users may be very upset with D from time to time, and their anger might spill over into a legal claim. There is, again, a large body of law to do with such topics as negligence in giving investment advice. All of the above is evidence that the question of compliance for a particular app or business is not completely simple. Professional advice can look at the whole context, as well as relevant law, and assist D in understanding their options.
Why do governing law clauses sometimes specify the country? In Governing Law clauses, why do they sometimes specify the federal law as well as the state/provincial law? Isn't it redundant? For example This Agreement will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Province of Ontario and the federal laws of Canada applicable therein. Isn't it obvious some laws are applied from the federal level? Is this a Canadian thing (or just coincidence I haven't seen other examples)?	why do they sometimes specify the federal law as well as the state/provincial law? Isn't it redundant? Not necessarily. The contract might be entered and/or performed in a different country, whence mentioning only the Canadian provincial law does not override the other country's federal law (or that country's "supra-provincial" equivalent). Mentioning Canadian federal law removes --at least on paper-- the ambiguity of which law applies for matters beyond the scope of Canadian provincial law. In such scenarios, portions or the entirety of the provision might be null and void. For instance, an employment contract might establish waivers which are void or perhaps even unlawful under the legislation of that other country. Please note that in general a copy/paste of sample clauses is strongly discouraged unless the parties fully understand their meaning and implications.	Is it legal to redefine a term against common sense in a contract? Generally speaking, yes. What matters is that the contract be clear enough for the parties to be aware of the terms and conditions to which they are committing. Both of the scenarios you outline seem lawful. They are binding to the extent that the definitions & language therein duly inform the parties of the substance of the contract. Definitions in a contract are most pertinent where the meaning of a term is intended to supersede and replace the commonplace meaning thereof. A contract would become null and void if the substance of that contract contravenes legislation. If legislation outlaws not only the effect of a clause but also its meaning, then the [un-]lawfulness of that clause is not altered simply by crafting definitions of terms. In other words, laws or legislative intent cannot be elluded by relabeling concepts in a contract. Whenever lawful, the attempt to trick a party with tactics (such as the use of uppercase you mention) is likely to be voidable by that party. The rationale is the same: The draftsman's attempt to confuse the user contravenes the contract law tenet that the parties knowingly enter the contract at issue. Notice that in the preceding paragraph I wrote "whenever lawful" rather than "although lawful". The reason for that choice is that, in some contexts, the draftsman's tricky attempts might constitute a deceptive practice and thus be in violation of the law (for instance, consumer protection laws).	In the United States, individual members (States) of the union are allowed to make their own constitutions and state laws & regulations. This includes laws that may contradict Federal law, although this is a grey area. It usually comes down to enforcement: Federal laws are usually enforced by Federal law enforcement as they can not force states to do so. Further more, State prosecutors will usually not attempt to prosecute you for a Federal law infraction. Only Federal prosecutors OR the department of justice will do this. To see a more detailed explanation on this, look at this "How Stuff Works" article.	It does not need to be expressly defined in statute in order to be legally effective. Courts have no trouble interpreting ordinary words used in their conventional way. And there is no other definition that could work instead, considering the full body of law that (1) intends to apply to the whole of the United Kingdom, (2) often distinguishes between "Great Britain" and "Northern Ireland", (3) often distinguishes between "England", "Wales", "Scotland" and "Northern Ireland", (4) treats "Great Britain" as synonymous with England, Wales and Scotland, and (5) often uses "Great Britain" without further ceremony, as if it's a term that doesn't need to be explained. It is helpful that legislation (at least in the modern era) is consistent about the view that "Great Britain" refers precisely to England, Wales and Scotland all together. By virtue of the Interpretation Act 1978, "United Kingdom" means Great Britain and Northern Ireland. from which we may deduce immediately that Great Britain means the United Kingdom except for Northern Ireland. There is no sibling '"Great Britain" means...' clause, but construing it any other way than the normal meaning would not work. From the combined definitions of "England", "Wales", "British Islands", etc. - which by reference, also deal with such historically doubtful areas as Berwick and Monmouthshire - there is no other way to interpret the term "Great Britain" without distorting the required meaning of "United Kingdom". Including too much or too little in "Great Britain" would give the wrong result, in particular for statutory extent clauses that refer to the whole United Kingdom and ought not to accidentally leave out Cornwall or include Hanover. We do not need to go as far as the Acts of Union, which is lucky since that would entangle us in concerns about whether "England" includes "Wales", or other historical anomalies that are not relevant in current law. I would treat the Acts of Union as giving added force to the conventional meaning, rather than being the source of that meaning, since there are uses of the term which seem to be more about Great Britain considered as a place than the political entity. For example, the Food Safety Act 1990 s.18(3) talks about "any food which has not previously been used for human consumption in Great Britain", which seems to talk more about the food culture of the place, even predating the Acts of Union, than about the Kingdom of Great Britain or its successors. The term "Great Britain" is frequently used in statutes in the customary way. For example, The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 s.28 creates a "Great Britain register" and a "Northern Ireland register" of political parties, and s.38(1)(3)(b) provides for the "Great Britain register" to cover precisely England, Scotland and Wales. The Northern Ireland Act 1998 s.87 is about provisions of UK social security law that operate differently in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Electricity Act 1989 (as amended) provides for the issue of "GB certificates" as opposed to "NI certificates", and also defines "the relevant part of Great Britain" as meaning either "England and Wales" or "Scotland" (s.32M(1)). The Agriculture Act 2020 s.35 provides for a "red meat levy" to be paid between "one country in Great Britain" and "another such country", and goes on in 35(8) to list the levy bodies for England, Scotland and Wales. So all of this points to the same common meaning as in everyday life. In court, for example, Lord Hoffman in Serco v Lawson [2006] UKHL 3 had to consider the Employment Rights Act 1996 s.196, since repealed, which governed "work wholly or mainly outside Great Britain". (And by the way, in 196(1)(b) is a listing of "England and Wales" and "Scotland" as the two possible bodies of law relating to Great Britain.) In his judgement, he says: It is true that section 244(1) says that the Act "extends" to England and Wales and Scotland ("Great Britain"). But that means only that it forms part of the law of Great Britain and does not form part of the law of any other territory (like Northern Ireland or the Channel Islands) for which Parliament could have legislated. That is, he does not find it difficult to gloss the extent provision in 244(1), which doesn't include the exact words "Great Britain", as actually referring to Great Britain. Other legislation refers to "Great Britain" as a locale, like the Wild Animals in Circuses Act 2019 which talks about "an animal of a kind which is not commonly domesticated in Great Britain". This is a straightforward reference to the kind of activities typically going on in that location, treating it as the island(s) and not the political entity. The expression does not include the territorial sea, by default; some statutes include it, like the Gas Act 1986 s.5(9) which says: For the purposes of this section a place is within the jurisdiction of Great Britain if it is in Great Britain, in the territorial sea adjacent to Great Britain or in an area designated under section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964. There are several other instances of particular statutes defining "Great Britain" to include adjacent waters, but they do not define the core concept of Great Britain otherwise. They do not need to.	According to the information I was able to find, every zone, country, or even states, have their own taxation rules for sales made there. Correct. Well, in no way it's possible that small companies or individuals that sell products internationally deal with tax rules for each buyer, that would be a non-sense, and paying such taxes worldwide would be a nightmare not worth having a small business at all. You are required to comply with the law. If it is complicated, or difficult or expensive to do so then, it's complicated, difficult and expensive and you still have to do it. The answer is obvious: if it's not worth having a small business, don't have a small business. The main question, if someone buys a license from my web-site, is it considered a sale in the buyer's country/state which requires me to collect and pay some remote tax, or it's a purchase in my country/state which requires me to collect HST from that buyer? It depends on the law in both Canada and the destination country. In most cases, the sale will be an export sale from Canada (GST/HST exempt) and an import sale in the destination country - requiring you to comply with GST/HST obligations there. Another question is regarding invoices, I know that Canada requires certain information to be included into an invoice for sales in Canada. If my sales will be considered sales in a buyer's Country with some other rules, does it mean I have to manage tons of invoice templates? Yes. Let's say if my sales in UE exceed 30K EUR it looks like I need to register and pay VAT there. But what if I have less? Then you don't need to register and remit tax. Nor are you allowed to collect it from your customers. By the way, I have no idea what country in the Eurozone goes by the initials UE. In most jurisdictions, you need to register either when you reach the threshold in fact or reasonably expect to reach the threshold. Also in most, you can usually register even if you are below the threshold. For example, these are the rules for Australia. Anyone, please advice. Hire an accountant versed in international digital services. They will be able to give you the advice you need. They will also be able to recommend sales/payment platforms that can handle most of this for you (for a fee, of course).	There are two legal jurisdictions in the Channel Islands, the Bailiwick of Guernsey and the Bailiwick of Jersey. The law in Guernsey differs from the law in the UK partly because the Common Law developed differently (more Norman influence on Guernsey than on England) and partly because Guernsey and the UK have different legislatures and so pass different laws. Until recently the UK was a member of an organisation based in Belgium and Luxembourg called the European Union which has its own legal system and courts and which requires member states to enact identical legislation in certain matters including, in particular, employment law. Although the UK is no longer a member of the EU most of its employment laws remain as they were in the EU-era. By contrast Guernsey has never been a member of the EU. So this is an additional reason for differences in laws. Generally the parties to a contract can stipulate what law governs the contract and which country's courts have jurisdiction. For example a contract between a Guernsey company and an individual resident in England could be stipulated to be governed by the laws of France and subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Barbados (this particular example is highly unlikely but I am just illustrating the principle). If the contract does not stipulate the law (or the contract is unwritten) then there are default rules which determine which jurisdiction's laws apply. However, that said, most countries, including England and Wales, have some "mandatory" employment laws. These are laws which apply to everyone employed in England (or Wales) even if England/Wales does not generally cover the contract of employment. Mandatory laws typically cover such things as minimum pay rates, rest periods, minimum paid holiday entitlement, protection from unfair dismissal etc. So some employment laws in England and Wales apply to everyone working in England and Wales whilst some other aspects of the employment relationship are governed by the law of the contract - which might be England and Wales or might be some other system of law.	That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D & E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small.	should you tell the third party to sign it using the standards of the U.S.? In most cases signing a contract is not subject to country-specific standards. All that matters is that it can be ascertained from the contract who the parties are as well as and their willful, informed formation of that contract. It is more typical for a contract to specify that it is governed by the laws of country X and/or jurisdiction Y. That places on the counterparty(-ies) the burden of ensuring that they know the legal framework that underlies the contract at issue. Lastly, note that a party entering a contract is "by definition" not a third party. At most, a third party might sign a contract in a witness capacity, not than in the capacity that implicates rights and duties pursuant to that contract.
Unscheduled exterminator attempted to enter my unit without notice or invitation Yesterday there was a knock on my door and then I could hear my door being unlocked. Someone was attempting to enter my unit, he had keys so he unlocked the door and deadbolt, but I had the security latch on the door locked so he could only open the door an inch. I asked "Can I help you?" and he said he was an exterminator here about the roaches. I have none and have had no communication from my building about a roach problem and/or an exterminator visit. I told him he had the wrong apartment. He said he was spraying everyone, and I told him I didn't want it and he left. Had I not had the latch in place and he did enter the apartment, I would like to know if his entry would have been a violation of my lease. My lease says: 14. Right of Access by Landlord. Tenant shall permit reasonable access to Landlord, and any of Landlord’s invitees, agents, or contractors, in accordance with local statues and ordinances, upon receiving 2 days’ notice by mail, telephone, written notice or other means designed in good faith to provide notice. Landlord shall have immediate access to the Premises in case of emergency and where repairs or maintenance elsewhere in the building unexpectedly require such access. Landlord shall give Tenant notice of such entry within two days after such entry. For the bottom part, do imaginary roaches count as an emergency? Not sure if I should complain about this, if it's not a violation I'm at least irritated about it.	Not even real roaches are an emergency. The event was foreseeable and scheduleable. According to the terms of your lease, you are entitled to a 2 day warning. From your description, the landlord did not violate the lease, but he came close to it, perhaps to the point that the courts would consider it as good as a breach. In Chicago, §5-12-050 of the municipal code mandates 2-day notice, and the following section says that If the landlord makes an unlawful entry or a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner or makes repeated unreasonable demands for entry otherwise lawful, but which have the effect of harassing the tenant, the tenant may obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, or terminate the rental agreement pursuant to the notice provisions of Section 5-12-110(a). In each case, the tenant may recover an amount equal to not more than one month's rent or twice the damage sustained by him, whichever is greater.	As someone who acts for both landlords and tenants I would say that I have never seen exclusions for personal injury or death in a commercial lease. I would recommend that you have the whole lease reviewed by a solicitor dealing in commercial property, particularly as, as has been stated in another reply, exclusion of liability for personal injury or death is prohibited by UCTA. This would suggest there may be other provisions which, if not prohibited, are unreasonable and you should be aware of the commitments you are taking on prior to signing This pure speculation, but the fact that those clauses would not be in a standard lease precedent does make me wonder if the landlord has done a DIY job and produced a lease from the internet suitable for another jurisdiction.	Many states require an escrow of rent for habitability issues, simply not paying rent can be grounds for eviction proceedings. Illinois has a statute for deducting a repair from rent (765 ILCS 742/5). If it’s less than half the monthly rent and less than $500, a tenant can inform the landlord of the repair required. If the landlord has not provided a repair within 14 days, the tenant can have the repair completed in a workman like manner by someone having the appropriate licenses. In this case, if you’ve notified the landlord and they’ve done nothing, you can have an licensed exterminator come and treat the property. BUT... your lease may override this statute. Many leases include terms that the tenant is responsible for pest control - since often it’s the tenant’s lack of cleanliness that draws pests (not in all cases of course). So definitely review your lease and discuss with someone who is more familiar with IL law. Note that Chicago has its own interesting laws that may add to or contradict IL laws.	Presumably the lease contains an automatic renewal provision that says unless you give notice 60 days in advance, you commit to another month (otherwise, you can just leave at the end of the month). The landlord may have made a math error, or they may be misinterpreting what the agreement says. Most likely it says that the duration of the lease is a month, meaning a whole month, which can have between 28 and 31 days. Unless otherwise stated in the agreement, that means "to the last day in any given month". A 60 day notice provision states the minimum number of days to stop automatic renewal, not the maximum or exact number of days. The language of the agreement will most likely say something to the effect that the duration of the lease is a month, and that is what the courts will enforce.	Fully enclosed area means being inside something, likely a non-see-through fence. You will not convince anyone that a trash can is "fully enclosed; it is a container, which is called out. Your chance of litigating this successfully is approximately zero unless your goal is to spend money and force the HOA to do the same. You can certainly ask what the expectation is or examples that meet the requirement. Your ability to fight your issue by citing other installations is limited unless they are forcing you to do something other homes are not required to do. "I can see your can with a drone" will not let you leave your trash can out.	It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst.	Assuming you have an assured shorthold tenancy, it's not the landlord himself that can evict you. The process is that he serves you notice, and if you don't move by the time the notice period ends, then he has to go to court in order to obtain a court order to end the tenancy. The landlord must demonstrate to the court that he has properly served notice to the tenant. This is a bit of a grey area, but this article suggests that, to avoid ambiguity, the landlord should either use recorded delivery (which would provide proof as to whether or not the tenant received it), or deliver it by hand with an independent witness present. In the case of a section 21 "no fault" eviction, the only defence a tenant has is that the correct procedure has not been followed. So it is in the landlord's interest to ensure that notice has been received beyond any doubt.	The government of California has an extensive manual that says what you can and cannot do. To terminate a lease (a rental agreement for a year is a lease), there would have to be just cause for eviction (p. 65), such as failing to pay rent, violating terms of the agreement, cockfighting, and so on, and that does not include being a pain in the neck. Nor would the need to make repairs justify terminating a lease. On p. 79 they clarify that retaliatory eviction for exercising their legal rights is prohibited per California Civil Code 1942.5, and will result in fines. P. 35 ff. covers landlords entering: you may enter to make repairs, but must give 24 hour written notice (6 days if mailed), entering between 8am and 5pm business days, but you can also arrive at alternative times orally. If the local code-enforcers require you to do some modifications on the property, that is a separate matter and does not create a just cause for terminating the lease. For instance, if the electric service is not properly grounded and they require you to fix that, that does not constitute the structure "being destroyed". If the repairs make the building actually and certifiably uninhabitable, you might be on the hook for finding lodging for the tenant for the period of the repairs, so ask your attorney about that. Assuming that the tenant is not somehow responsible for the problem being repaired, then you will almost certainly have to keep the person for the duration of the lease.
How can my employer require me to work "bank" shifts The NHS in the UK requires all of its medical staff to commit any hours available you have to do additional work to the NHS as a priority before taking on another role. Essentially this means that if someone work on a full-time contract for the NHS, they would NOT be allowed to work for ANY other company in their spare time UNLESS they first offer their time to the NHS How can this be legal? I understand there may be a non-compete clause (e.g: don't work for a private medical company), but what if someone wanted to work as a gardener in their spare time, for example?. (I am not sure this clause is regularly implemented, but I am just wondering how it can be legal) Thanks	Your premise is a little off, which changes the question somewhat. The actual clause in the 2016 Junior Doctors contract Section 3 (52) states: Where a doctor intends to undertake hours of paid work as a locum, additional to the hours set out in the work schedule, the doctor must initially offer such additional hours of work to the service of the NHS via an NHS staff bank of their choosing. The requirement to offer such service is limited to work commensurate with the grade and competencies of the doctor rather than work at a lower grade than the doctor is currently employed to work at. Additional work, such as; event and expedition medicine, work for medical charities, non-profits, humanitarian and similar organisations, or sports and exercise medicine do not fall under the scope of additional work as a locum. (note that 'locum' has a standard definition of 'a person who stands in temporarily for someone else of the same profession, especially a cleric or doctor' but is not defined in the contract itself - its a well known term that does not require further definition, but it plays an important part in your question) So, a few things from that section: Where a doctor intends to undertake hours of paid work as a locum This immediately sets limits on what the clause means - the intention is to limit locum work, not general work. The requirement to offer such service is limited to work commensurate with the grade and competencies of the doctor rather than work at a lower grade than the doctor is currently employed to work at A FY2 or later junior doctor can go elsewhere to work as a house officer if they cannot find work as a senior house officer, again restricting the clause to similar working conditions and not general work. This is very very similar to any company putting a non-compete in their contract for, say, a software developer - you need the companies permission to go do contract work for another software company for example. To specifically talk to your point about being a gardener, this clause does not cover that because the employee is not acting as a locum in their professional capacity at that point. The intention of this clause is to fill the gaps in the NHS staffing plan caused by 11 years of mismanagement and underfunding - no longer can an in-contract doctor or nurse work their 38 hour rota and then go fill a lucrative shift with a private hospital, they must offer any hours under 48 to the NHS via the employee bank - this means the bank can pay minimal wages to cover shifts it had to pay locums a lot more to cover before 2016.	Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it.	I cannot recall an example where a breach of such guidance in-and-of-itself is an offence: it's when the underlying legislation is contravened that one is committed. Note that the cited article say this: this guidance is of a general nature. Employers should consider the specific conditions of each individual place of work and comply with all applicable legislation and regulations, including the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. This guidance does not supersede existing legislation or regulations across the UK More broadly, and away from the NHS, the relationship between guidance and statute was examined in The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) v Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd & Ors [2020] EWHC 2448 (Comm) where adherence to social distancing measures impacted on safe working practices on building sites, causing delays and an increase in costs. The court determined that: It follows that government advice or recommendations, whether before or after either set of Regulations came into effect, cannot have imposed or ordered a denial of access or a hindrance in access, however strongly worded the advice or recommendations were, since they did not have the force of law.	This is a tricky question on the intersection of visa and tax laws. It is tricky because every country can make its own rules that apply when you are in that country or do business in that country. Even within the EU, there is no uniform approach because freedom of movement merely covers the right to work in a country, but not the rules which have to be followed when doing so. Thus, you have to fall back to reading each individual country's rules and legislation. In general: Whether you are even allowed to work or which work activities are permitted depends on your visa or visa-free status. If you are a permanent resident or citizen of the UK, you can come to and work in every EEA country, until the end of the Brexit transition period, subject to the same rules as residents in that country. Often, visa-free visits or business visa allow some business activities such as attending meetings with clients or collecting information, but not performing actual work. If you're interested in what business activities the UK allows visitors from other countries to do, take a look at the visitor rules. Income tax may be due at the place of tax residency or where the income is generated/earned, in particular where you actually perform the work. There is a widespread belief that you only gain tax residency after staying in one country for 6 months, but this is misleading in the general case: every country makes its own rules, and income tax may be due even without (permanent) tax residency. The relevant countries (the country where you work and the country where you normally reside) might have a tax agreement that specifies where tax is due. Within the EU, it is fairly common that a person works in a different country than the one they reside in, so there is a well-developed network of tax treaties. Often, certain activities are exempt from local taxes, such as compensation for visiting researchers or regular employment. There's also a good chance that profit from independent work / business profits are only taxable at the place(s) where that enterprise has a permanent establishment – but it depends on the details. This section is based on the OECD model tax treaty (https://doi.org/10.1787/mtc_cond-2017-en) which most treaties follow closely. If no tax treaty exists that exempts your income from local taxation, you must consult the local tax laws. VAT rules are entirely different, and for B2B services are generally taxed at the location of the client (place of supply rules). But every country makes its own rules. Exception: within the EEA, cross-border B2B supply is always taxed at and by the client via the reverse-charge mechanism. So things can get quite tricky, and a business visitor should inform themselves beforehand what activities they are allowed to perform abroad and whether there are tax implications. is it any different from a UK author going travelling, taking lots and lots of notes, or even writing his/her next novel whilst in various locations, and publishing once returned to the UK? Here no tax implications arise because the travelling author is not paid during their travels, but they have to consider visa rules when performing their work. Such rules often have exemptions for artists. However, it depends on the rules of the travelled country. what basis does a government have for deciding "where" work was done? Each country is sovereign and can make its own rules. How would that apply if a team of software developers had a virtual "pair programming" session, with one in USA, one in UK, and one in the Far East ? "Where" has that software been written? It is not generally relevant where software was written, aside from copyright or export regulation issues which might have their own rules. Since each of the three programmers is working in their own country, no particular visa or income tax issues arise. However, if they have a common employer, the employer does have to consider the local employment laws regardless of where the employer is established, which may include paying some taxes in every country.	The emergency temporary standard requires either vaccination, or testing with masks for unvaccinated workers, for employees of an employer with 100 or more employees but has exceptions for employees working alone or exclusively outdoors. According to 1910.501 - Vaccination, testing, and face coverings: 1910.501(b)(3) The requirements of this section do not apply to the employees of covered employers: 1910.501(b)(3)(i) Who do not report to a workplace where other individuals such as coworkers or customers are present; 1910.501(b)(3)(ii) While working from home; or 1910.501(b)(3)(iii) Who work exclusively outdoors.	This should probably be handled under TUPE — The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 as amended by The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2014. Those regulations apply to "a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business situated immediately before the transfer in the United Kingdom to another person where there is a transfer of an economic entity which retains its identity" Broadly, there must be some consultation but you cannot be forced to change the terms of your contract to your material detriment (for example, the date of the month you are paid might change, but your work and salary would not). This consultation should establish that there is no material detriment (carry on reading here). Regulation 13 provides (2) Long enough before a relevant transfer to enable the employer of any affected employees to consult the appropriate representatives of any affected employees, the employer shall inform those representatives of— (a) the fact that the transfer is to take place, the date or proposed date of the transfer and the reasons for it; (b) the legal, economic and social implications of the transfer for any affected employees; (c) the measures which he envisages he will, in connection with the transfer, take in relation to any affected employees or, if he envisages that no measures will be so taken, that fact; and (d) if the employer is the transferor, the measures, in connection with the transfer, which he envisages the transferee will take in relation to any affected employees who will become employees of the transferee after the transfer by virtue of regulation 4 or, if he envisages that no measures will be so taken, that fact. (6) An employer of an affected employee who envisages that he will take measures in relation to an affected employee, in connection with the relevant transfer, shall consult the appropriate representatives of that employee with a view to seeking their agreement to the intended measures. If you refuse to accept the transfer you are deemed to have resigned (Regulation 4(8)), unless the "transfer involves or would involve a substantial change in working conditions to [your] material detriment", where you can be deemed to have been dismissed (Regulation 4(9)), and potentially unfairly dismissed. That would be for an Employment Tribunal to decide. But you cannot exit the successor company except in accord with your contract, including any notice period. The 2014 amended Regulations deal principally with the issue of redundancy after transfer, which is specifically allowed for "economic, technical or organisational reasons", such as the new company deciding to rationalise operations in a location 300 miles away from your normal base. In those circumstances you can be made redundant if you don't move with your job or accept redeployment. [This is what happened to me.] Note that every TUPE transfer is unique, and while yours will be subject to the Regulations, the wrinkles in your particular case (a) aren't present in your question and (b) will best be answered by a specialist employment lawyer, particularly as to whether any necessary changes to your contract are to your "material detriment".	As soon as you start working in your second job, you will be violating your first contract. If you refuse to start working in your second job, you will be violating the second contract. You were very careless. Not much of a legal question, but the question is how to get out of the mess you created at the lowest possible cost. I would suggest that you go as soon as possible to the second company (the one with the part time contract), tell them that you are very sorry but you didn't read your first contract properly, and that you cannot start working for them. If you seem suitably sorry there's a chance that they will tear up your contract and send you home, with no more damage than a big red "DO NOT HIRE" in you records. If things don't go nicely (and you don't have any legal right to expect them to be nice about it), you go and get a lawyer.	I don't think so. When it comes to wages, there may be a Tarifvertrag (union-negotiated wage schedule), which may apply even if the employee in question is no union member. It is enough if the employer is member of the employer's association negotiating the schedule, or in certain other cases. (Clever, really, by extending union benefits to non-members they weaken the unions ...) The Tarifvertrag stipulates minimum wages for certain positions, and it may define those positions implement that. An employer could not underpay a skilled machinist by calling her a 'gadget specialist' or similar non-scheduled position. But the deputy department head is likely paid above the highest bracket of the wage schedule, called außertariflich (AT, beyond the schedule). At this level, it comes down to individual negotiations between the employee and employer.
Is it allowed to ignore copyright claimed over an exact reprint of a public domain work? The question is general, but I will explain it with a specific example I am currently facing. In 1890, a book was published in Germany. Its author died in 1915. According to my understanding of copyright law, this book is now indisputably in the public domain in every country in the world and so I can do anything I want with it, though please correct me if this is not true. In 1974, a new reprint edition was published by the same publisher. At that time, the work was apparently still copyrighted, less than 70 years having passed since the author's death. The content is absolutely identical in all respects: close inspection of the two editions (which I have at hand) reveals that the 1974 edition was printed with plates that have been copied, either stereotypically or photographically, from the original 1890 plates. Apart from the title pages and the design on the endsheets, the type is indistinguishable. The 1974 edition is now out of print. I have contacted the publisher (which still exists, absorbed into a large and renowned German academic publishing conglomerate) regarding licensing and reuse. They claim that they still own the copyright on the 1974 edition, and they give me a quote of over 1000 euros to reproduce even just a few pages, and around 10000 euros for the entire work (which is less than 100 pages in total). Suppose I ignore their avaricious demands and reuse the text anyway. Is this safe? I do intend to credit the source, and I will claim that I am reproducing excerpts of the text from the 1890 edition (which is truthful, as far as anyone could know, because I could easily do the actual retyping and/or OCR using my physical 1890 copy). I will not mention the 1974 edition. However, the result will be that my publication will contain text which is an exact copy of the 1974 text, over which the publisher apparently reserves rights and expects licensing fees. Am I at any risk of legal trouble here, or is my defence watertight?	A (legal) derivative work has its own independent copyright I'll use the same example Wikipedia does, L.H.O.O.Q.: This is a derivate work of da Vinci's Mona Lisa. It's a legal work because the Mona Lisa was well and truly public domain partly because da Vinci had been dead 401 years but mostly because he died 191 years before the first copyright law was passed. However, it has it's own independent copyright which is still in effect because Marcel Duchamp, it's author only died in 1968. Anyone is free to copy the Mona Lisa. Only people with permission or who meet the exceptions to copyright such as commentary or criticism (as here) can copy L.H.O.O.Q. Of course, there are a lot of potential infringements of Duchamp's copyright out there. However, anyone can also copy any non-original components of a derivative work - like the Mona Lisa parts of L.H.O.O.Q. Your issue If the 1974 book is a derivative work of the 1890 book then it has it's own copyright and you can't copy the book. You can copy anything that is not original, like the text. However, it appears that your assertion is that 1974 book is, in fact, a copy of the 1890 book; if so, then it has no independent copyright as it is not a derivative work. The "title pages and the design on the endsheets" would appear to be independent work.	They have copyright in their additional text, and possibly in things like their visual design choices (fonts, layout etc). They may also have introduced a few deliberate typos to detect any literal copies from their version (rather as mapmakers add a few imaginary features to their maps). None of this creates any rights to the original text. You are still free to produce your own copies of the original text. Just get it from some other source so you can be sure not to include anything of theirs.	In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage.	how would this differ between say ArXiv which is open access, and a publication that is pay-only, like Elsevier or Nature? It wouldn't. But if the equation is the creation of the author of some publication, as in the author is expressing some unique mathematical expression, obviously the publication should be referenced. But is referencing enough? Are there additional rights one must obtain from the publication and/or author in order to show this content? Laws of nature, including purported laws of nature, are not protected by copyright. So, usually, key equations in an academic paper aren't protected by copyright law. Referencing the work is important as a matter of academic ethics, but is legally irrelevant. Copying of exposition by the author beyond laws of nature is permitted as fair use if it is limited to quotations necessary for academic discussion and criticism, but copying of an entire work would not be permissible fair use in most cases and would constitute copyright infringement. Of course, there is a large gray area between those extremes.	There are 196 sovereign nations in the world (more or less); each of them has its own copyright laws. 168 are signatories of the Berne Convention which requires them to extend to foreign copyright holders at least the same rights that they would have domestically. It relies from this on the concept of country of origin. Assuming that the book was originally published in the UK (as it has a London based publisher) then the applicable copyright law is that of the UK. Exceptions to copyright can be found here. The relevant exemption is the first part of the Teaching section: the copying of works in any medium as long as the use is solely to illustrate a point, it is not done for commercial purposes, it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement, and the use is fair dealing. Acknowledgement is pretty straightforward but fair dealing as a legal concept means: There is no statutory definition of fair dealing - it will always be a matter of fact, degree and impression in each case. The question to be asked is: how would a fair-minded and honest person have dealt with the work? Factors that have been identified by the courts as relevant in determining whether a particular dealing with a work is fair include: does using the work affect the market for the original work? If a use of a work acts as a substitute for it, causing the owner to lose revenue, then it is not likely to be fair is the amount of the work taken reasonable and appropriate? Was it necessary to use the amount that was taken? Usually only part of a work may be used The relative importance of any one factor will vary according to the case in hand and the type of dealing in question. If the work had been simultaneously or previously published in the USA the relevant consideration is fair use rather than fair dealing. Fair use typically gives the copier much greater latitude than fair dealing does. As to the specifics of posting on stack exchange. Extracts on SE are unlikely to affect the original market (they may even enhance it by serving as advertising) so providing that you have used the minimum amount necessary to illuminate your answer it is probably fair dealing (and fair use). This would probably be true even if, across tens of thousands of questions, the entire book were quoted. Notwithstanding, if the copyright owner issued SE with a take down notice they would take it down because they are not in the business of fighting protracted copyright cases even if they are in the right.	Yes Such a work might well still be protected by copyright after 50 years. The time that copyright protection will remain in force depends on the country where the work was created (normally where the author was living). In some countries it will also depend on when the creation occurred. In many countries such protection lasts for 70 years after the death of the author. Under US law recent works use the "life of the author+70 years" rule. Works created before 1978 may be protected for 95 or 120 years after creation, depending on the circumstances. See This well-known chart for details. If the work is protected by copyright, preparing a new derivative work, or performing or distributing the original or a derivative work are all copyright infringement, and the owner could sue. This is true whether a fee is charged or the work is performed or distributed for free. Exploiting the work for commercial profit might increase the amount of damages available, however. If the author has not published or exploited the work for 50 years or more, the author might not choose to sue, but that is entirely the author's decision. The author would have the right to sue, and given the facts as described in the question, to collect some damages. There is not enough information in the question to guess how large the damages could be. In the US 17 USC 504 provides for statutory damages, which the court has significant discretion on the amount of, with no proof of economic loss. Specifically this law says: (c) Statutory Damages.— (1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just. For the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work. (2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was: (i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives acting within the scope of his or her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives itself, which infringed by reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords; or (ii) a public broadcasting entity which or a person who, as a regular part of the nonprofit activities of a public broadcasting entity (as defined in section 118(f )) infringed by performing a published nondramatic literary work or by reproducing a transmission program embodying a performance of such a work. In short, the mere lapse of 50 years does not make the unpublished musical work free for use without permission.	Those posts are talking about making a modified copy of a copyrighted work. The key word is copy. You are not making a copy. Copyright is not about how a physical embodiment of a copyrighted work is treated. You can burn a book and shred a newspaper. Neither of those actions is making a copy. Also, cutting up a newspaper and pasting a picture on your wall has nothing to do with any “derivative works” issue.	Absolutely. Copyright exists when the work is created, publication is immaterial.
Can someone by prosecuted if they commit a crime outside of all jurisdictions? Scenario: Fred and his wife Sue are crossing the Atlantic Ocean on their yacht and are hundreds of miles from the closest nation. They jump into the water for a quick swim, and while in the water, Fred drowns Sue. Out of confidence, he even live streamed the crime on the internet as he is sure that no jurisdiction can prosecute him since the crime occurred outside of all nations and even outside of a boat that is registered in a nation. Is he right?	Yes More exactly, nations will not regard places outside of their physical limits as outside of their jurisdictions. Overview Traditionally, a nation has regarded any ship flying its flag as under its jurisdiction, and a place where it may enforce its laws. More recently, many nations will undertake to enforce laws in cases where their citizens are the victims, or in some cases the perpetrators of crimes even within other nations, and more freely on the high seas outside the physical limits or territorial waters of any country. Historically, all nations undertook to enforce laws against piracy wherever they might be committed. Several countries, including the UK and the US, now treat the UN Law of the Sea convention as part of their national law, which defines as piracy: "illegal acts of violence or detention ... against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft" This would include the situation described in the question. Therefore such actions could and quite likely would be prosecuted by any of several countries, depending on the registry of the vessel and the nationalities of those involved. Sources 18 U.S. Code § 7 provides that: The term “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”, as used in this title, includes: (1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State. ... (7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the United States. (8) To the extent permitted by international law, any foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival in the United States with respect to an offense committed by or against a national of the United States. This US DOJ page says: Among the offenses within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States are the crimes of murder, manslaughter, maiming, kidnapping, rape, assault, and robbery. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) there is also jurisdiction over such offenses when they are committed on the high seas or any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States that is out of the jurisdiction of any particular state. See JM 9-20.000 et seq. The page "Maritime Offenses" from the law offices of Trombley and Hanes says: The Federal government also exercises jurisdiction over certain maritime offenses. There is Federal jurisdiction for offenses committed on American vessels in the territorial waters, harbors and inland waterways of foreign nations. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933). ... A number of Title 18 sections specifically declare certain conduct to be a Federal crime if committed “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” See, e.g., murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111. In some instances, the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, is also applicable. See also, 15 U.S.C. § 1175; 15 U.S.C. § 1243; 16 U.S.C. § 3372. 18 U.S. Code § 1111 (b) provides that: (b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life; Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. The Britannica Article on "Piracy" says: Because piracy has been regarded as an offense against the law of nations, the public vessels of any state have been permitted to seize a pirate ship, to bring it into port, to try the crew (regardless of their nationality or domicile), and, if they are found guilty, to punish them and to confiscate the ship. The UN page on Piracy says: The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the framework for the repression of piracy under international law, in particular in its articles 100 to 107 and 110. The Security Council has repeatedly reaffirmed “that international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (‘The Convention’), sets out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities” (Security Council resolution 1897 (2009), adopted on 30 November 2009). Article 100 of UNCLOS provides that “[a]ll States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” The General Assembly has also repeatedly encouraged States to cooperate to address piracy and armed robbery at sea in its resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea. For example, in its resolution 64/71 of 4 December 2009, the General Assembly recognized “the crucial role of international cooperation at the global, regional, subregional and bilateral levels in combating, in accordance with international law, threats to maritime security, including piracy”. The UK Piracy Act of 1837 defined as a crime: Whosoever, with intent to commit or at the time of or immediately before or immediately after committing the crime of piracy in respect of any ship or vessel, shall assault, with intent to murder, any person being on board of or belonging to such ship or vessel, or shall stab, cut, or wound any such person, or unlawfully do any act by which the life of such person may be endangered, shall be guilty of felony... The more modern UK law, the Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act of 1997 embodies the UN law of the Sea convention, including its article 101, which says: Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed— (a) (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (a) (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;	Given that both parties have committed criminal offenses (the 'bad actor' is attempting fraud and the 'victim' has committed unauthorized access to a computer system), no court would hear a civil case between these parties. As a matter of public policy, criminals do not owe a duty of care to each other so no one can win this case.	He can, to the extent that there is a federal charge involved. There is no limit to the power to "grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States", but there is no power to grant reprieve or pardon against a US state or foreign country. In other words, a presidential pardon would prevent the person from being tried or punished by the US federal government. It would not prevent them from being tried or punished by a state or foreign government.	Doing nothing is legally safer than doing something, but you're not without hope if you pull the lever. Although you'll likely have committed murder or at least manslaughter, case law is littered with lenience in exigent circumstances, even where convictions have been affirmed. Because this is a philosophical problem, there are plenty of opinions from that perspective, but not so many from a legal standpoint. Let's assume that you're an innocent bystander, (not an employee of the railway company or the train company, etc) and have no duty to act. If you do nothing, then it is unlikely that you would be charged with a crime - you had no duty to fulfill, and therefore not negligent. There's little doubt that not pulling the lever is the safer option. More interesting is when you choose to pull the lever - then it's probable that you would have charges of murder, or at least manslaughter, brought against you by the state. What defenses does the law offer? Let's assume that you are aware that pulling the lever will kill a person. The primary defence is a legal principle of necessity: where your criminal actions are not protected or excluded by some other statute or principle, the fact that you were obliged to take this action in order to prevent some greater harm may safeguard you from penalties. There are certain elements of necessity: That you did not create the danger that caused you to commit the crime; That you ceased the criminal activity as soon as practicably possible; That you had no reasonable alternative; and The harm that you prevented was greater than the harm that you caused. I see such a defense only possibly falling over on (4), where the prevented and caused harm, in the case of human lives, are inherently very subjective. Unfortunately, each state has different rulings regarding the threshold for evidence of this defense. One of the most famous cases where necessity was attempted as a defense to murder, with remarkable parallels to this hypothetical, is that of R v Dudley and Stephens: A crew of four found themselves on a lifeboat at sea with no food and no water, and with no prospect of rescue. One of them was a child (Parker) and was nearing death and unconscious. Two of them (Dudley and Stephens), after some discussion over drawing lots, decided that the child would be killed before his natural death, in order that his blood be better preserved for drinking. The last crew member, Brooks, was silent on the matter. After killing Parker, Dudley, Stephens and Brooks fed on Parker's body. During the trial, the matter of necessity as a defense to murder was considered. The judges found that there was no common law defence of necessity to murder, and Dudley and Stephens were sentenced to death with a recommendation for mercy. The Home Secretary commuted their sentences to six months' imprisonment. This case concerns essentially the choice you're making in the trolley problem: either the four crew members were going to die, or one of them would definitely die and the others might live. It's easy to say that they should have just waited, but they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. It's also a great example of a situation where although the law says one thing, it doesn't align with our morals and ethics, and while it's a UK case, I would wager that almost every lawyer in common law countries would have heard about it.	Does the "US national" above matter? The nationality of the person is not relevant. Like most criminal statutes, the law applies to acts within the jurisdiction of Alabama, which basically means within the state's territory. The only foreign people who would be immune from that jurisdiction would be diplomats and the like, but such people would not be licensed to practice medicine in Alabama. This brings us to the point in the next paragraph. is it still a felony to have an abortion outside of Alabama? No. It is not even a felony to have an abortion inside Alabama. The law does not criminalize having abortions. It criminalizes performing abortions. See section 5 of the law: Section 5. No woman upon whom an abortion is performed or attempted to be performed shall be criminally or civilly liable. Furthermore, no physician confirming the serious health risk to the child's mother shall be criminally or civilly liable for those actions. To extend your question, let us consider a doctor who is licensed to practice medicine both in Alabama and in some other jurisdiction where abortion is legal. Such a doctor could not be convicted under Alabama law for performing abortions in the other jurisdiction.	Yes, a crime is committed as is a tort. The exact crime would vary from state to state. The most common description of this crime and tort would be "fraud" but the way that criminal conduct is allocated between particular offenses in states varies considerable. Theft (in jurisdictions where it is broadly defined) and shoplifting (in jurisdictions where it is a distinct offense) would be two other plausible offenses.	Greendrake's answer says that a country can declare any jurisdiction it likes. This is true, but in practice it is the convention that a country should claim jurisdiction only over its territory and its citizens. The point about "citizens" is normally not pushed, as when you go to a foreign country you are normally subject to its laws rather than those of your home, but for instance there are laws against child sex tourism where the perpetrators can be prosecuted at home for offences committed abroad. However this basic principle gets more murky with long-distance communication such as the Internet. Someone in country X can, for example, provide a service to someone in country Y which is illegal in country Y. At this point the laws of country Y have been broken by someone sitting in country X. Y is not claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction; the crime occurred inside its own territory, but the criminal is currently resident in X. From a legal point of view this is the same as if both had been inside Y when the crime was committed, but then the perpetrator fled to X before they could be arrested. So in the Kim Dotcom case, Dotcom is alleged to have committed criminal copyright violations by supplying movie files to people in the US. In the Meng Wanzhou case, Meng is alleged to have made fraudulent statements to American banks to the effect that Huawei was complying with US sanctions law (otherwise those banks would not have been able to do business with Huawei). The accounts I've read don't say whether Meng was in the US for those meetings, but the fact that they were made to American banks in order to do business in America makes the precise location of the meeting irrelevant.	You can be prosecuted for the crime in the U.S., both at the federal level and at the U.S. state level (or both), completely without regard to what happened in the criminal justice process elsewhere. This is true in all of the scenarios you pose, for any offense, and with or without an extradition treaty (of course, unless the treaty had some anomalous provision to the contrary or deprived the U.S. of jurisdiction by statute rather than constitutionally of this crime). The U.S. Supreme Court determined in Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) that the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution is applied separately with regard to each sovereign involved and that each state and the federal government count as separate sovereigns. In the pertinent part, it states: The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the common law conception of crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the government. When a defendant in a single act violates the "peace and dignity" of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct "offences." United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 260 U. S. 382 (1922). As the Court explained in Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 55 U. S. 19 (1852), "[a]n offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law." Consequently, when the same act transgresses the laws of two sovereigns, "it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence, but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable." Id. at 55 U. S. 20. In practice, the U.S. Justice Department and most state and local prosecutors are disinclined to prosecute a crime that has already been handled by another jurisdiction and often have official, but non-binding, policies to that effect. In part, this is because an acquittal in one jurisdiction makes it likely that it is a weak case, while a conviction in one jurisdiction often constitutes sufficient punishment. There could be an issue under the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (cruel and unusual punishment) over whether a punishment imposed in a U.S. conviction for a crime needs to consider the already severe punishment imposed in another jurisdiction for the same crime in order to prevent the cumulative punishment from being cruel and unusual. But, I am not aware of authoritative case law that resolves that constitutional question. Certainly, evidence of a prior punishment for the same offense could be presented at a sentencing hearing following a conviction in mitigation of the punishment that should be imposed. Indeed, in some states time served pursuant to a conviction for the same crime in another jurisdiction might statutorily count as "time served" for which the defendant is legally entitled to credit at sentencing.
Breaking/entering/theft charges What would be all possible charges that could be filed in this scenario: A person breaks a window, enters the house through the window, takes $1000 worth of computer equipment, and leaves through a door.	In addition to New Mexico 30-16-3 Burglary, NM charges could include: 30-16-1 Larceny. "Larceny consists of the stealing of anything of value that belongs to another." (Possible penalties depend on the value of the thing(s) taken.) 30-14-1. Criminal trespass "Criminal trespass consists of knowingly entering or remaining upon posted private property without possessing written permission from the owner or person in control of the land. ... Criminal trespass also consists of knowingly entering or remaining upon the unposted lands of another knowing that such consent to enter or remain is denied or withdrawn by the owner or occupant thereof. ... Any person who enters upon the lands of another without prior permission and injures, damages or destroys any part of the realty or its improvements, including buildings, structures, trees, shrubs or other natural features, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and he shall be liable to the owner, lessee or person in lawful possession for civil damages in an amount equal to double the value of the damage to the property injured or destroyed." 30-15-1. Criminal damage to property. "Criminal damage to property consists of intentionally damaging any real or personal property of another without the consent of the owner of the property. " 30-45-5. Unauthorized computer use. "A person who knowingly, willfully and without authorization, or having obtained authorization, uses the opportunity the authorization provides for purposes to which the authorization does not extend, directly or indirectly accesses, uses, takes, transfers, conceals, obtains, copies or retains possession of any computer, computer network, computer property, computer service, computer system or any part thereof" If the computer is later taken across a sate line, there could also be a Federal charge of transporting stolen property.	You haven't specified a jurisdiction. In the United Kingdom† this is a clear violation of section 3 of The Computer Misuse Act 1990 (1) A person is guilty of an offence if—     (a) he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer;     (b) at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and     (c) either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies. (2) This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act—     (a) to impair the operation of any computer;     (b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer; [F2or]     (c) to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any such data; [F3or     (d) to enable any of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) above to be done.]] Deleting the data is unauthorized (3.1.a) The ethical hacker knows it is unauthorized (3.1.b) Deleting the data prevents access to the data (3.2.b and hence 3.1.c) † This is one of the few Acts that apply to the whole of the UK.	From a comment on the question: They did damage the trailer door and headlight is smashed This seems like the best thing to focus on, especially if you can show that it was not damaged before they towed it. The unusual method of towing (with video evidence) may be a factor in whether they are considered negligent. If the damage to the door looks like they caused it directly by breaking in, that would also help your case. You also asked in your comment if you should go to the police or to a lawyer first. Might as well go to the lawyer and see what they tell you to do. I'm not sure what the police would do if there is no clear crime that has been committed. (The lawyer should have better advice about whether/why to go to the police.)	There is a relevant law, Title 18 section 907 which states that "A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally". So possession of lock picks is not a crime per se. In Com. v. Gendrachi 389 A.2d 604 we are reminded that "intent need not be directly proved, but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the incident out of which the charges arise". The accused was busted in mildly suspicious circumstances at 5:20 am in the dead of winter, urinating. The court notes that "There is no evidence that appellant's hands were on the door or that he made an attempt to extract the tools from his pocket and apply them to the door. In fact, there is no act or statement by appellant that would lead one to infer that he intended to use the tools at that time", and that "appellant is a certified locksmith and it is not unreasonable to find the tools of his trade in his pocket, especially when he is wearing his work attire". Note that this is on appeal: he was convicted initially. The point is that there is a lot of slop in cashing out the legal concept of "intent". Pennsylvania does not, apparently, have any specific laws that refer to lock picks. It does have a statute that addresses having criminal tools, which are defined as (including) "Anything used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have". Mr. Gendrachi had those very tools, and the appeals court did not say anything to suggest that the tools were not "criminal tools" (and in FN 5 they actually point out that the Commonwealth cannot say that the tools were weapons, a ludicrous proposition never raised by anyone – so by failing to deny that lock picks are criminal tools, they are adoptively admitting that they are criminal tools). Thus I conclude that there is a law in PA, that lock picks are burglary tools, and that the government would have to prove intent to use criminally.	This is a rather elaborate version of receiving stolen property. It is a crime because you know that the property is not yours and you know who it belongs to. The fact that funds were returned mitigates the punishment that might be imposed, but disgorgement of profits as well as principal would be a typical criminal restitution in such a case. A prosecutor could decline to press charges (and often would decline to do so), but would have the authority to do so. An analogous case that comes up more frequently is when an attorney takes client funds out of his trust account (either accidentally or intentionally) and then uses the funds in a way that produces a profit or avoids, for example, a late payment penalty, and then returns the funds improperly withdrawn from the trust account. This is still conduct for which attorneys are routinely disbarred and prosecuted criminally. Even if the person didn't know that the money belonged to someone else when it was used, the true owner of the money could sue for unjust enrichment for both the funds and the proceeds from the funds. For example, if funds were accidentally deposited in your bank account rather than the correct one due to a transposition of numbers in the account number, and you didn't notice this error, you would have liability to return not just the accidentally deposited funds, but also the profits from those funds, because both would be unjust enrichment. But, in an accidental case where there was no knowledge that the funds were wrongfully placed in your account, you could deduct from the amount to be returned any banking charges you incurred with respect to the transactions and it would not be a crime.	The US CFAA is by no means limited to "the US government and its financial interests ". It currently applies to any computer which is "protected". 18 USC § 1030(e)(2) defines a "protected computer" as (in part): a computer ... (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States This covers any computer connected to the internet. 18 USC § 1030 (a)(2) (C) applies to anyone who obtains without authorization : information from any protected computer; Of course, nothing requires federal prosecutors to bring charges for all acts which technically violate this sub-section. If someone hacks another person's holiday card address list, I doubt if a CFAA prosecution would be brought, but it could be if the US Attorney thought fit.	You are probably entitled to the $100 (more or less) They breached the contract and you are entitled to damages (what it cost you) for dealing with their breach if they are unable or unwilling to remedy their breach. This would include the reasonable cost of your disposing of the unwanted mattress plus or minus any difference in the price from you sourcing the equivalent mattress elsewhere (subject to any legitimate terms of the contract that allow them to cancel the contract if they can’t supply). Of course, it’s not worth suing over such a trivial amount but this is the sort of thing the consumer protection regulator in your jurisdiction would be interested in.	Breaking and entering, just by entering a private premise without permission. Causing bodily harm, possibly grievous harm, depending on what consequences it has for the victim and how the jurisdiction defines grievous harm. A prosecutor might also insinuate that the defendant had a sexual motive, so they might also add some sexual assault charges In addition to criminal charges, the victim could also press civil claims as compensation for the physical injury and the psychological trauma they experienced from a stranger entering their home at night and drinking their blood. A possible defense which the vampire could use is to claim that they are no longer a human, so human laws do not apply to them. But this would be a rather dangerous strategy, because if human laws don't apply to them, then by the same argumentation human rights might not apply to them either. If they insisted on being tried as an animal, then the court could very well reason that the best way to deal with a dangerous animal that can not be controlled and can not be kept away from humans is to euthanize it.
Can the need for FDA authorization of a tool to find infectious people be bypassed by labeling? Background. OTC (over-the-counter, i.e. not requiring a prescription) rapid antigen covid-19 tests are the tests which detect pieces of viral proteins using lateral flow paper strips. Infected individuals with high viral load (i.e. individuals likely to spread the disease to others) are likely to get a positive result, while individuals without covid-19 are likely to get the negative one. The main roadblock for most companies trying to offer rapid antigen OTC at-home tests in the US is the struggle with getting FDA approval, caused by the "diagnostic" perspective of FDA. FDA has "OHT7: Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and Radiological Health, Office of Product Evaluation and Quality" called IVD office for short below but no office which looks at the tests from public health perspective, i.e. at the tests which can be used to prevent the spread to others. Given the existence of that roadblock, it is interesting to see that in this video at 1:59 a box of rapid antigen "tool" is shown labeled as "NOT-A-TEST". That motivates the following question. The question. Assume a company wants to sell or give for free rapid antigen "tools" to regular US citizens in the US. These "tools" are intended to detect individuals more likely to spread covid-19 to others. The company does not have (such as approval or EUA) from FDA IVD office to do so. Can it still legally sell or give these "tools" (possibly by the virtue of modifying the labeling of such product)? My research. I am not a lawyer, TINLA. Below I cite 21 USC section numbers, the correspondence between them and FD&C section numbers can be found here. It appears that the requirement to obtain the approval or EUA follows from the following: Such "tool" a device under 21 USC §321 (h) since it is intended for use in diagnosis, mitigation, or prevention of covid-19 in humans. Such "tool" is a class III device under 21 USC §360c (a),(f), since FDA/HHS did not issue any notices to the contrary and covid-19 tests did not exist before May 28, 1976. Such "tool" is in vitro diagnostic device, as defined in 21 CFR 809.3 (see also FDA's IVD FAQ and Congressional Research Service FAQ on covid-19 tests). Thus, my guess is that a company intending to prove they do not need an approval / EUA from FDA's IVD office may want to do one of the following. Argue that the "tool" is intended to warn individuals to be more cautious regarding the spread of the disease to others, and not to improve their own health outcomes. Hence the "tool" is not intended for use in diagnosis, mitigation, or prevention of covid-19, and thus does not fall under the definition of 'device' in 21 USC §321 (h) and FDA's authority. Convince FDA to issue the De Novo classification of the "tool" as class I or class II device excepted from the requirements previously applied to covid-19 tests. Argue that, while the "tool" is a class III device, it is not an IVD device since it is intended to reduce the spread of covid-19 to others, not for the diagnosis or treatment of the person using the "tool". Thus, it should be excepted from the requirements previously applied to covid-19 tests. I am not sure whether one of the above is a valid legal way to bypass the requirement, or whether there is some other way I am missing.	This is a duck You can label it a chicken if you like but you won’t fool anyone who knows about ducks. The FDA knows about diagnostic devices; calling it something else isn’t going to fool them.	ICE has a degree of authority to deport without court hearing, via an expedited process. The legal framework for such deportations are explained here, and rely on 8 USC 1225. The Secretary of DHS has authority to establish rules, and has recently done so here. The current regulations pertaining to expedited removal are at 8 CFR 253.3. There is no exemption for people being medically treated, for covid-19 or any other reason, but "parole" is available (at the discretion of the attorney general) to "parole" an immigrant if it is "is required to meet a medical emergency". Thus an illegal immigrant in the ICU might be exempt from immediate deportation, but that is at the discretion of the AG. State and local officials do not have the authority to interfere in the enforcement of federal law, even if the state or municipality has declared itself a "sanctuary". The criminal penalties for interference are spelled out here; no law compells cooperation, the law simply prohibits forcible interference.	You can request in advance that you get only a half-dose: there is certainly no law prohibiting making a request. They may refuse or they may agree. If they refuse, you can go elsewhere, but you cannot compel them to do what you ask for, given current law. You can also yell anything you want, or flail about however you want, at your peril. You could seriously hurt yourself by jumping around, and you would not be able to sue them for your stupid actions. Nor could you sue them for assault, since to get the ball rolling, you have to consent to getting the shot. Although consent can be withdrawn, there is the practical matter that you almost certainly cannot effectively communicate withdrawal of consent in the time needed to finish administering the job. If it took 5 minutes to administer the shot, you might be able to say "I changed my mind", and they would be required to end the treatment, against medical advice.	The use may constitute trademark infringement if it implies sponsorship or endorsement I'm going to assume US jurisdiction for this question, because you've not provided one, and you haven't provided enough car manufacturer names to suggest that this wouldn't apply to the US. I'll also only cover Federal law (the cases were tried in state courts), so be aware that there may be additional responsibilities under state law that I don't examine here. 15 U.S. Code § 1114: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 15 U.S. Code § 1125: (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. These actions - the use of the trademarked manufacturer logo within the app - is likely to constitute trademark infringement, if the trademark owner's permission is not sought prior to publication, and the use of the trademark is likely to cause confusion as to the source, sponsorship or approval of the goods. What this means, is that if the trademarks are used in such a way that a reasonable person is likely to think that: The product is an official product from the owner/brand associated with the trademark; The product is sponsored by the owner/brand associated with the trademark; or The product is approved or endorsed by the owner/brand associated with the trademark. Then an action in trademark infringement may be brought by the trademark owner. Consider the following two cases: Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) In this case, judgement was made for the defendant, as the defendant's field was not considered close enough to the plaintiff's for there to be a likely chance of confusion. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) In this case the trial judge decided that the trademarks Slickcraft and Sleekcraft were unlikely to cause confusion. This ruling was overturned on appeal and an injunction was ordered by the court. Possible defenses Nominative use of a mark When a mark is used solely to identify a product, this use is privileged. A descriptive mark used for its primary purpose Descriptive marks are a subtype of trademarks, which are descriptive in nature but have acquired a secondary meaning. Here, using a descriptive mark for its primary purpose has been found not to constitute infringement. General First Amendment protection Satire and parody are generally recognized as defenses if the primary purpose of the use is not directly commercial. If the products are not similar enough to be likely to cause confusion; and The use does not imply endorsement, sponsorship or approval of the product by the trademark owner then it should be fine. It seems that the situation in the question above would not give rise to confusion (unless the car manufacturer also develops an app, for instance), the second issue - endorsement - should be avoided. Many programs will have a legal section that includes ownership information and disclaims any association with the trademark owner(s). I have not been able to locate any cases where the effect of these sections have been tested. Further reading Overview of Trademark Law	There's nothing to cancel. Your employer has made an exception for you, because of the ADA: you are not required to be vaccinated. That doesn't mean you can't be vaccinated. Once your doctor advises you that it's safe to be vaccinated, and once you are vaccinated, you no longer need the exception, but there's no need to cancel it. As far as the weekly tests, they are required as an alternative measure because you aren't vaccinated. Once you are vaccinated, there should be no more need for weekly testing. You may of course inform your employer that your doctor's advice changed that you were vaccinated, and that you therefore no longer require the accommodation that they offered. That should allow you to stop the weekly testing regime, but otherwise it should be the end of it, since at that point everyone should be satisfied.	The COVID restrictions are new enough that there are few court decisions on how to interpret them. There are frequent requests for court injunctions seeking temporary relief. Some pass, some are denied. The website might accuse locations listed there of breaking the restrictions. Making such an accusation in public sounds like a very bad idea, especially if there is no solid documentation. But the aggrieved party would be any location falsely listed. The site may or may not be hosted in Germany. If it is not, it becomes a really interesting question which law applies. You might inform the authorities, but beyond that, forget it.	Read the TOS (Terms of Service) for each DNA service you are considering. Each service will clearly outline the privacy of submitted samples, security of the process of analysis of samples, the storage and distribution (and possible destruction) of the resulting data, and linking of personal names (or the granting of anonymity, if available) to the data. The TOS will give you enough information to determine if you are comfortable with the privacy of the service. The TOS is a legal document; both you and the service are bound by that contract once you submit a sample and pay the fee. The TOS may outline any legal recourse you have against the company for violating the TOS. Each service is bound by the laws of the country where it is located and the countries where it might outsource the analysis, as well as relevant EU law - since you're looking at EU based-services - to provide security and privacy. Those laws will be outlined in the TOS. As an example, read https://dna.ancestry.com/en/legal/us/privacyStatement at ancestry.com about their DNA testing. It's an extensive TOS, and outlines US and EU law, including the Swiss Safe Harbor Framework https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Safe_Harbor_Privacy_Principles The DNA service, of course, can't guarantee the security of the data - or your personal information - in perpetuity. Companies are sold, TOS documents change (which would have to be subsequently approved by you), data storage systems "leak" information (by insiders and hackers), and on and on. ...but I don't mind doing a lot of research on my own to classify it if I get raw results. And, any kind of site that allows you to compare your DNA profile with others - if it is a different site/service than one that does the DNA analysis - will have its own TOS regarding the privacy of your data and the resulting metadata from comparisons to other DNA profiles.	Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html
How to make a complaint as a comsumer in Germany without going to court? I'm not familiar with German law, but I'd like to complain about a certain international company as I was tricked by a company to pay to use a method that was shut down by the company online and many people have been complaining about this in comments. I really don't want to go into the details of how things went, as that's what I'd like to bring to the specific authorities but are there any places (official authorities) for consumers to complain about an encounter in online shopping. I've also complained to the company.	You can complain anywhere you want. Facebook, Twitter, review sites, write your own blog, etc. It really depends on what you are trying to achieve. The equivalent to the better business bureau are probably these guys: https://www.verbraucherzentrale.de/ I wouldn't get my hopes up that anyone would actually do something, if that's what you want.	When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints.	It seems that your friend is taking part in a multi-level marketing scheme. However, this does not necessarily exclude a pyramid or snow ball scheme. Both can be illegal in Germany and Switzerland under the respective unfair business practices codes, because the systems do not rely on the sales of goods and services, but on the continuous recruitment of further sales persons. To clarify whether your friend's system is illegal, you could report the scheme to the competent watchdogs. In Germany the "Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs" in Bad Homburg is recommendable. As the company is operating from Switzerland, German law not be applicable without more. Therefore also contacting the Swiss authorities may be advisable. This seems to be the "Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft SECO" in Bern.	Choice of jurisdiction: You’re pretty much free to choose your jurisdiction. You don’t have to contract under German law. The German state will intervene though if you’re doing criminal stuff. Legally, the best is of course to draft a written agreement. You’re completely free in the terms (unless it becomes immoral, § 138 BGB), but a loan, § 488 BGB (Darlehensvertrag), with a 0% interest rate (if it’s meant as a short-term aid) is standard. The next level is to collateralize your loan, specifically with a pledge, §§ 1204 ff. BGB, i. e. your friend gives you a valuable item which you may (and actually have to) sell for profit if he doesn’t return the loan. However, unlike contract law, in property law you are not completely free regarding the terms (numerus clausus of property law, Typenzwang des Sachenrechts). Here it becomes too difficult though for the layman, so I wouldn’t recommend that unless you know what you’re doing. Ultimately, I/we think it’s nice of you to consider helping out your friend, but as Nike Dattani already portrayed it can get really nasty if you intend to legally enforce such matters. Trish mentioned the saying: Friendship ends where business begins. I, too, suggest to refer your friend to a pawnshop, research (third-party) microloan opportunities, and help him without directly giving him cash, dine together and offer company (i. e. address the psychological dimension financial troubles entail). PS: § 9 SGB Ⅰ: Germany is (to some degree) a welfare state. Maybe your friend is eligible for some kind of assistance. However, and probably typical of Germany, if you want to get money, you have to fill in forms.	If you want to take legal action, hire a lawyer. If you want to puff your chest and see if they flinch here is what you do: First let's deal with this arbitration agreement. (There is probably also a jurisdiction agreement in there, ignore that for now.) First you need to find someone to to arbitrate and a place to hold the arbitration. I suggest a babysitter, dog-walker, friend, whatever... just make sure it is a real person. You write them a letter saying that you are exercising the dispute resolution set forth in the terms and that you propose an arbitration by [insert person's name here] to take place at [location] on [date and time]. You are going to mail this to a physical address and should include a sentence asking them to let you know within 30 days if this schedule works for them. Also tell them that you prefer to communicate via email and provide an email address. Mail this letter. Just mail it plain old snail mail. In two weeks write another letter opening with a statement indicating two weeks ago you sent a letter and asked for confirmation of receipt, that you did not get receipt and would they please acknowledge. You have now puffed your chest. Pretty soon 30 days will run and you will go to the courthouse. Hopefully this will have gotten them talking to you and you can get this resolved. What I describe next is an absolute interbreeding and then slaughter of various states' court rules. I hope that more-informed stack participants edit with gusto. If you can't resolve things go to the courthouse and tell the clerk that you want to file a claim in small claims court against [company] for [dollar amount] based on breach of contract. She will give you paperwork to fill out. You will pay her the filing fee. One of the things you will fill out is a complaint, one is a summons. It might be two in one. Here is an random example. It should be a simple form. Keep it all as simple as possible but be sure to describe the facts that support your claim. You might include the fact that they ignored your requests to arbitrate. Take this complaint and summons and serve them on your defendant. To do this you will need to get someone in the company's city to serve it. There are professionals who do this, mail or email them (if possible) the summons and complaint and pay them. They will you with provide proof of service. Now you have moved past chest-puffing and you've thrown a punch. Now you have initiated a law suit. They must file an answer. This means that they must get lawyers involved. You've gotten their attention and it only cost you filing fees. They must now file an answer to your complaint. They will also likely file a motion to dismiss and do one of a few things: 1. complain that you need to arbitrate 2. It will complain that the contract requires legal action in a certain state or county 3. It will complain that regardless of the contract this is the wrong court for any host of reasons 4. they will claim that you haven't stated a valid complaint 5. some other boilerplate stuff. You might have a hearing scheduled to deal with these things, you might deal with them all on a trial date. Now go back to the clerk at the court and ask for a subpoena form. You will have this served on the defendant also - it must name a person. This is a document that requires them to come to court at a time and place. Again, lawyers get involved to quash this. Lawyers = $ so you probably got their attention. Oh yeah, you need to pay a witness fee and travel costs. You can also serve a subpoena duces tecum which requires them to bring documents that you ask for. This needs to be served on the person in change of keeping records. You will probably pay the costs of the documents. The clerk will have forms for you and will describe the process in ambiguous terms while repeating "we cannot give legal advice." You've got your documents, you have a witness coming, you are ready for trial. If you haven't had some sort of hearing already to deal with defendant's motions to get this thing dismissed, you will need to deal with that stuff now. They will claim that arbitration is required. You tell the judge that you invited them to an arbitration that you set up and they refused to come. You show all the paperwork, including your contract with the arbiter. They will argue about jurisdiction, good luck with this one but it's a whole other problem that I can't touch here! If you survive these objections you will tell the story to the judge, you will call the witness and question her, you will present your documents as evidence. In small claims court the judge (or magistrate or referee) might ask the lawyer some questions about facts. Then the judge will bang his gavel and you wait for his decision. If you win come back here and ask how to get your money.	Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive.	The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X.	None The contractual chain is you <-> warranty company <-> (potentially others you don’t know about) <-> service provider. Should something go wrong, you would sue your warranty company who might (it is up to them) then sue the service provider. Notwithstanding, it’s likely the service company owes you a duty of care and would be directly liable to you for a negligence claim.
Is it legal to make a 3D model of a person without their consent? These would be 3D models of celebrities, famous people etc. Do I need consent for this? https://www.turbosquid.com/Search/3D-Models/trump Country - India	The question is not one of copyright law or trademark law, neither of which apply. Instead, it is a question of a common law right of publicity, which in India is recognized in some circumstances, but is not well developed and has many gaps that courts will have to resolve as cases are presented to them. The right of publicity is largely a right to sue if another person without permission profits commercially from someone's likeness without their consent and it is unclear to what extent, if any, it encompasses a right to control the use of one's own image otherwise. It is not in and of itself a crime, even though it is a tort which is the basis for a civil lawsuit for money damages and perhaps injunctive relief. As explained here: In India, the right of publicity is governed by common law and accrues to the celebrity’s individual persona. It is a right to a celebrity’s particular distinguishing and identifying characteristics, features, behavior, likeness, image or other unequivocal aspects. These rights are transferable and are generally used as an individual’s right to control and profit from the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, and persona. . . . The Indian Courts scrutinize the law governing publicity as a right in which an individual’s identity suffers the loss of commercial purpose. Some courts refer to the unauthorized appropriation of an individual’s identity as an invasion of the right of privacy. However, the two bodies of law can be distinguished as follows: while the right of publicity provides the individual with a property right in his or her identity, the right of privacy protects an individual from the publication of private facts that are embarrassing or intimate, or that portrayal of him or her in a false light is offensive. The right of publicity claims usually arise from the publication of information of which the public is already aware; the celebrities thrive on being known and talked about. In Sourav Ganguly v. Tata Tea ltd., Sourav Ganguly returned from an extremely successful tour of England and Tata Tea Ltd., where he was then employed to promote a tea packet, offered the consumers a chance to congratulate Sourav through a postcard which was inside each packet. The company intended to profit from his popularity and his latest success. Sourav could successfully challenge it in the Court before settling the dispute amicably. The right of publicity protects all persons’ rights from birth to death and beyond. When the right of publicity extends after death, it is called the post-mortem right of publicity. However, whether the right of publicity extends beyond life is jurisdiction specific. For example, the post mortem right of publicity has only been recently recognized in the US in California and will soon be recognized other American states too. Legal recognition of post mortem rights of publicity usually permits the deceased’s beneficiaries or heirs to control and financially benefit from the use of a deceased’s image and likeness. The news about the movie Dirty Picture having been challenged by the kin of the deceased actress Silk Smita, claiming that the movie does not depict her personality in the right spirits, is first of its kind in India. The linked examples, showing satirical portrays of a famous U.S. politician, hinge on the issue of what constitutes commercial use, as opposed to other uses. The right of publicity doctrine arose at common law when images of models were used to market consumer goods, when the models for the painting and photographs weren't paid. It has not generally been used to prohibit political cartoons or their 3D equivalent, the basic thrust of which is political commentary or satire that does not suggest endorsement by the subject of the image. In the U.S., such a broad reading of the right of publicity would probably be overcome by the very strong First Amendment protections of free speech. But while India also protects the right to free speech, it, like most former British colonies, tends to be less extreme in the extent to which other generally applicable laws and protections of other individual rights yield to free speech protections than the United States. I doubt that a right of publicity lawsuit by the individual depicted in the linked materials which appear to be basically satirical political depiction would be recognized in India, and it is likely the some of the same considerations that apply to fair use of copyrights or nominative use of trademarks without permission would inform its judgment on the scope of this common law right. But because India's common law in this area isn't very well developed it isn't possible to know with certainty how a case like this one would be evaluated by an Indian court. This said, there are a couple of caveats that should be added. First, it is easy to imagine that the 3D image is obtained by some illegal means which could be tortious (i.e. the basis for an invasion of privacy lawsuit) or criminal. The illegality in obtaining the information could arise not just from common law protections but also, for example, for statutory or contractual non-disclosure requirements. For example, if this was obtained obtained from records maintained for health or educational purposes it could violate laws providing privacy protections in those areas. Obtaining the 3D image surreptitiously and without the knowledge of the person whose image is obtained (e.g. through a secret camera in a changing room) would probably be both a crime and a tort. Second, if the 3D model were used to defraud someone, e.g., by impersonating them on a Zoom call, this would likely be both a crime and a tort under the general principles that apply to fraud in general, as a form of affirmative misrepresentation, even though it is visual rather than verbal.	Your photos of their copyrighted sculpture would constitute "derivative works" or "copies" of their sculpture in a different form, thus infringing the copyright, absent a statutory exemption or a license. They have granted a license for certain limited uses. You would have the burden of proving a statutory exemption, such as "fair use", or compliance with their license, were you to be charged with infringement. Commercial sales of photos of someone else's art, displayed in public, are not "fair use". Similar issues are raised in https://photo.stackexchange.com/questions/4140/what-are-the-copyright-issues-when-selling-photos-of-public-art	Unless you hire your friend cameraman, he will own the copyright. So sign a contract with him: you give him $1, he disclaims and/or grants all the copyright to you. Make sure this is actually in writing because, otherwise, presumption of no intention to create legal relations applies as you are friends.	There are various tangential ways in which this could be illegal, for example if your subjects are celebrities, you take a picture of them and commercially exploit it without permission in a product endorsement. Leaving aside such fringe cases, in the US, the legal right to privacy comes about, at the first cut, by premise trespass law. If the proprietor tells you to go away, you have to go away; if the proprietor tells you that you cannot take pictures, you cannot take pictures (your right to enter is conditional). Neither of those circumstances holds in your case. There are other tort-law bases for a right to privacy: numerous privacy laws regarding privacy and financial transactions (not relevant here), the aforementioned right of publicity (commercial exploitation of likeness), false light (like defamation, about creating a false impression – I don't see what false information is conveyed by a photo). There is also public disclosure of private fact, but that cat is out of the bag because the subject has self-disclosed the supposedly offensive fact revealed by the picture by eating in public. Intrusion of solitude and seclusion does not exist in the circumstance, since the subject is eating in public where everybody can see: there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. This page sums us Virginia law. The main take-away from that is that there is no common law action for privacy in Virginia, and only an action for unauthorized used of likeness or name.	It's questionable, because if you design your own visual interpretation of the T-Shirt then it isn't necessarily the one from the book and thus your art has it's own copyright. However, if the current Copyright Holder and Possible Trademark owner is selling the shirt it could be an issue because yours is not official but being sold as one. If you're making it for non-sale and just cosplay, than you have a better arguement.	In your example is the spare part the subject of a design patent? I assume it is not. When you combine the spare part to create a “different product” does the finished product resemble the drawings in the design patent? If, in its intended use, the final thing is close enough to the design patent to fall within its scope then you might by indirectly infringing by inducing people to infringe. The scope of a design patent is very difficult to determine reliably. This has nothing to do with how you got the components of your product, just how the completed thing looks. Copyright does not cover products (unless it is a model of a building or a statue or mold for a statue).	I've found Google's filtering based on licence to not be very reliable, at least not reliable enough to trust from a practical legal perspective. Using a photo that you don't own the copyright to is a risk. You may be infringing copyright by doing so. The owner may eventually ask you to stop, or they may sue you for damages. Further, some copyright infringement is criminal 17 USC 506. In my opinion, it would be unwise to use a work commercially that you don't affirmatively know you have permission to use.	No. You need to actively be given permission for you to have permission. If they don't reply you don't have permission and are violating their ToS.
Can an employer ask an employee about personal health matters (HIPAA) and COBRA decision in public? Hypothetical Scenario (in the US): Susan's employer, MoneySavers, offers COBRA to employees who separate from the company. Susan has given her two weeks' notice (she has quit her job) and will soon have her last day. She works in an open office without cubicles and little conversational privacy. Susan asks Emily, an HR representative (at Emily's desk) how/when Susan might receive COBRA paperwork. Susan expects to hear something like, "You'll receive it in the mail within 4 weeks." Instead, Emily responds, "Are you planning on using COBRA?" Emily continues, "You have to elect if you are going to use COBRA," with the implication that Susan needs to answer "yes" or "no" immediately. Several co-workers hear the conversation and add their own comments. One co-worker, Mike, the CFO, who arranged MoneySavers COBRA program, adds, "Susan, no former employee would ever plan to use COBRA." Susan admittedly could have tried to make her conversation more private and her co-workers could have been more prudent in their comments. However, were any laws violated here? Specifically, was it lawful for Emily to ask Susan, before she has left MoneySavers, if she will elect to use COBRA? If it were lawful for Emily to ask, would it need to be asked in a private setting? What other legal issues are at play in this situation? Financial (Not Legal) Factors: Susan is still employed and thus could be treated differently in her last two weeks depending on how she responds because MoneySavers cuts costs whenever possible. More context: In this specific scenario, MoneySavers may incur costs if an employee elects COBRA because of a health reimbursement (HRA) program it offers. Financial question: Does anyone know if an employee elects COBRA, and then incurs a large claim while on COBRA, could increase MoneySavers health insurance renewal rate for the next year? Normally, health insurance claims made by current employees can increase MoneySavers health insurance renewal rate.	It's probably not unlawful to ask, but an answer cannot be required immediately. Per the Department of Labor, Susan has 60 days to elect COBRA coverage (the qualifying event here being the termination of Susan's employment): Your plan must give you at least 60 days to choose whether or not to elect COBRA coverage, beginning from the date the election notice is provided or the date you would otherwise lose coverage under your group health plan due to the qualifying event, whichever is later. It would be unlikely for an employer to discourage an employee from electing COBRA coverage due to costs to the employer, as you suggest: Susan is still employed and thus could be treated differently in her last two weeks depending on how she responds because the company is struggling financially and is looking for every opportunity to save money. Susan electing to use COBRA coverage is unlikely to cost the company money, because the employer is permitted to charge her the entire cost of the coverage, plus 2 percent to cover the cost of administering it (additional DoL source). As far as privacy goes, I don't think anything illegal has occurred here. The most prevalent law regarding privacy of health information, HIPAA, generally does not apply to employers. Susan could, of course, request a private discussion, and any response from Emily could not rise to the level of illegal harassment or create a hostile work environment.	We're missing a lot of information that we'd need to offer a full answer. Here are some of the things that will probably drive the analysis: the type of counselor we're talking about; the types of information the counselor disclosed; the reason she disclosed it; the job functions of the people to whom she disclosed it; the reason the client is bothered by the disclosure. Generally speaking, a mental-health counselor has a fiduciary duty to maintain the confidentiality of patient information, but my understanding is that in most cases, the counselor would be allowed to discuss a case with colleagues for the purposes of advancing the patient's treatment. So discussing the facts of a tough case with a supervisor is not going to be as problematic as idly gossiping about clients with custodial staff. Beyond the permitted disclosures, there are also situations in which counselors are required to disclose confidential information, including cases where the counselor suspects child or elder abuse or where the counselor believes the client poses a danger to herself or others. If the disclosure was truly not permitted, then it may be that the client has a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In Georgia, proving that case requires evidence that: That the counselor had information relating to the client that she knew or should have known was confidential; That the counselor communicated the client’s confidential information to third parties; That the client did not give informed consent to the counselor’s conduct; That the confidential information was not a matter of general knowledge; and That the disclosure harmed the client. As you noted, the client could also file a complaint with the state licensing board. I don't know of any federal laws or regulations that would come into play in the situation you've described.	Late to the party, but I'll answer anyways. In general, providers have a lot of wiggle room when sharing information with parents, on condition that the patient hasn't explicitly objected despite having opportunity to do so. HIPAA allows the provider to make a judgment call on whether such information can be shared without explicit consent: Quoting Title 45 § 164.510 : (i) Obtains the individual's agreement; (ii) Provides the individual with the opportunity to object to the disclosure, and the individual does not express an objection; or (iii) Reasonably infers from the circumstances, based the exercise of professional judgment, that the individual does not object to the disclosure. HHS does discuss disclosure to family members in their FAQ : A covered entity is permitted to share information with a family member or other person involved in an individual’s care or payment for care as long as the individual does not object. A parent of a child who has just turned 18 is likely still somewhat involved in the child's care, so, absent either an objection or a reason to believe the child would object if asked, sharing is probably not a violation.	The primary question is whether remaining silent would constitute a breech of medical ethics. The pertinent ethical principle is AMA Opinion 2.15 One of the requirements is that the donor be assigned an advocate team whose interest is the donor, not the patient, and these should generally be distinct individuals in order to avoid conflict of interest. Assuming that the donor's team is aware of this fact, they have a duty to disclose it, since it materially affects the donor's willingness to donate the organ. The ethical opinion does not specifically address "patient breaking up with a directed donor", but there is a general obligation to share information, and it would probably be found to be a breach of medical ethics to suppress relevant non-medical information. The ethics of directed donation from live donors is not well-developed. I will mention that Potential donors must be informed that they may withdraw from donation at any time before undergoing the operation and that, should this occur, the health care team is committed to protect the potential donor from pressures to reveal the reasons for withdrawal. If the potential donor withdraws, the health care team should report simply that the individual was unsuitable for donation. From the outset, all involved parties must agree that the reasons why any potential donor does not donate will remain confidential for the potential donor’s protection. In situations of paired, domino, or chain donation withdrawal must still be permitted. Physicians should make special efforts to present a clear and comprehensive description of the commitment being made by the donor and the implications for other parties to the paired donation during the informed consent process. Neither team can tell the patient that the reason the girlfriend withdrew was because they ratted him out (anyhow, we can suppose she said something to him on her own). The hospital knows this fact, and has both a duty to the patient to solve a medical problem but also to the donor to be sure that the consent is informed. The hospital would be suppressing a fact relevant to the donor's willingness to undergo the operation, which is a breach of duty. This fact is not protected by HIPAA, or any other California statute, so does not supersede the obligation to reveal relevant facts.	A NDA can only cover confidential information, that is information that is not in the public sphere, and that was transmitted to the recipient in confidence, that is it is specifically identifiable information that the recipient knew or should have known from the circumstances of the communication was confidential. For example, "marketing techniques" are not confidential information although the specific marketing strategy (pricing, promotion etc.) to be employed for a particular group may be confidential if the circumstances of the communication are such that the recipient should have known they were. Telling them "Hey, this marketing strategy is confidential" is best, however, the nature of the communication may make it implicit, for example, if it is only communicated to a subset of employees and contains information that would obviously damage the organisation if made public such as a price or client list. An NDA that states "all information given is confidential" is probably not enforceable even if exceptions are given because a) it is manifestly untrue (how can the location of the bathrooms or which day is pay day be confidential?) and b) it places an unreasonable burden on the recipient to determine what is and what is not real confidential information.	I did not write "confidential" on my letter, but I assumed a business proposal is automatically considered as a confidential material. An incorrect assumption unfortunately. Unless you have a confidentiality agreement (NDA) with the first company, they and their agents are not under any legal obligation to keep information you share with them confidential. How is the legal situation here? There is none on your side. You lied about a direct question asked and were caught in the lie. Company A had no obligation to keep what you sent confidential. Even if they did, that may not (depending on how the confidentiality agreement is worded) keep the employee of company A stating that they had received the same proposal. Chalk this one up to a lesson on confidentiality and honesty in business. There are no reasonable assumptions of confidentiality in business unless you specifically state that they are confidential or are provided as part of a confidentiality agreement.	It would merely be a "jerk move". HIPAA only applies to "covered entities": Healthcare Providers Health Plans Healthcare Clearing Houses (i.e. Paying for your health care) Business Associates of the Above) Source: CDC page on HIPAA	Why would this be a concern? The adults have some duty in an elementary school setting to monitor the children in the restroom in any case. Separate restrooms are an employee perk, not a liability driven decision.
Can a corporation be a minor? If a law defines a minor as a legal person below (some age) does this mean all corporations not incorporated before (some age) years are minors? If yes who are their guardian?	The law doesn’t “defines a minor as a legal person below (some age)” It defines it as a natural person below (some age).	This would be a case of mutual mistake or unintentinal ambiguity. If the circumstances make it clear what year the parties intended, particularly if it is the current year, a court would probably treat the contract as if it specified that year. If the parties' intentions could not be reasonably determined, a court might rule that there had been no meeting of minds, and so no valid contract at all.	The LLC is its own legal person. Your contract with the LLC it is not affected in any way by a change in the ownership of the LLC.	In the US, "insider trading" includes both legal and illegal versions. When a corporate employee buys or sells shares of their company, they are insiders and they are trading (there is a requirement to report to the government). The illegal version involves breach of fiduciary duty or confidence. The relevant section of the federal regulations is 17 CFR 240.10b on "Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances", and you will note that the section does not rely on the term "insider" in the law part, instead it directly characterizes what acts are illegal. Thus it would not matter, from a legal perspective, if someone considers you an insider. It is illegal to trade in securities using a “manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance”. This relates to what is commonly known as insider trading via rule 240.10b5-1, by defining as manipulative and deceptive trading on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information (emphasis added to focus on the core requirements). Whether or not you have a "duty of trust or confidence" is determined by common law standards, that is, it depends on how courts have ruled on similar matters. For instance if the CEO of Apple tells you "Our computers explode and it's gonna be on the news tonight, the stock is gonna tank, but it would be illegal for you to act on that information", then it would be illegal, because you are aware that the CEO has a duty to not use that information (thus you "inherit" the duty). This also holds if he doesn't tell you that acting on the information, since it is expected that you know that the CEO of Apple could not legally act on that information (even if in fact you are unaware of the law -- ignorance of the law doesn't get you anywhere good). However, if you are unaware and could not know that the person making the factual disclosure is divulging information that he has a duty to shut up about, then you might not get prosecuted.	Yes. Typically, a will is drafted so that it applies not only to any current children but also to afterborn children. In a statement of family, in a Will, I would often say that: "children" as used in this Will including the following persons and any other person subsequently born to me or legally adopted by me. Then I would draft the guardianship and dispositive provisions using the term "children" without specifying a name. If children are born, but there might be a paternity issue, it isn't uncommon to state that "my children at the time this Will is executed are . . . . and I intentionally exclude from benefit hereunder or for any fiduciary position with respect to me, any other person claiming to be a child or other descendant of mine as of the time that this Will is executed, but do not intend to exclude subsequent children or children later adopted by me."	Does CCPA impact whether or not this is allowed? Probably not. Public schools are divisions of state government and there are limits to how much the federal government can dictate the operations of state and local governments. Limitations on whether public schools can monetize data collected from students (13+) would arise under state law. The state law could certainly expressly authorize the practice (and to some extent does already with profit generating sports teams and yearbooks). State law could likewise prohibit the practice. For the most part, state law is silent and it doesn't happen that much because it isn't very profitable. Is there different guidance for public (government-managed and nonprofit) vs private schools? The legal analysis is very different. I'm not as familiar with this area of law, however, and will leave that question to someone else. As a practical matter, private schools are in a very good position to obtain express consent to do so from parents and students, so that is usually how the issue is resolved, I suspect.	Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination.	Question #1: is this even possible? Is there some sort of central database which contains details of all recent court cases involving custody of children in New York City? Yes, it is possible. The court clerk for each respective court in the State of New York maintains a list of every case pending that court that goes back many years in electronic form, and there is some minimal classification by case type although the classifications used might not precisely match what you are looking for - it might be necessary to include more than one kind of case and some classification categories might be over broad for your purposes. There are probably at least three courts that could have jurisdiction over this kind of case in New York City. The Supreme Court (i.e. the trial court of general jurisdiction) which has jurisdiction over custody cases that are incident to a divorce or legal separation and in certain other cases, for example, criminal felony child abuse and neglect cases take place in the Supreme Court; the Family Court, a court of limited jurisdiction which lacks jurisdiction over divorces and legal separations but often handles custody matters involving unmarried couples, custody determinations incident to allegations of child abuse or neglect, and post-decree child custody matters; and the Surrogate's Court, which handles custody determinations incident to deaths and incident to some incapacity determinations (as guardianships of minors) and if I recall correctly, incident to adoptions. It also isn't inconceivable that a de facto custody decision could also be made in another court incident to issuance of a protective order or criminal case. It is also quite possible that there may be multiple related cases in the same or separate court. For example, there might be a child abuse and neglect case terminating person B's parental rights in family court, and then a guardianship of a minor case appointing the adult child as guardian of the minor child in Surrogate's Court. It is quite possible that more than one database (or portion of a centralized database) would have to be reviewed, rather than a single database. When I practiced law actively in New York there was not a single database, but that was more than 20 years ago and given the explosive improvement in information technology that has taken place since then, it would not surprise me at all if some or all of the relevant databases have since been consolidated. They do not know person B's name or other identity, but know they are somewhere in New York City, New York, USA. But they know the following about B: within last 4 years, B was a parent involved in a court case where their older adult child won custody of their younger underage child from them. Some information about the children is known but not precise identity (let's say birthday and first name for one of them is known; as well as ages). Notwithstanding my answer to question #1, it wouldn't be easy. While birthdays and ages would be present in documents filed in the various court cases, they would not be indexed centrally. The index of case names would contain the names of the parties to the case, the general case type, and the case number, and possibly the assigned judges and the attorneys who entered an appearance in the case. Difficulties Involved In Searching By First Name Unless the first name was very unique, locating it in a central index could be very difficult. Also, it isn't at all uncommon for the day to day name that someone uses to differ from the person's legal name used in the court case caption, or for the person's name to be misspelled due to lack of accurate information or clerical error, or for a nickname of someone to be used instead of their legal name. For example, suppose that the person you are searching for has the legal name: Jonathan Ralph Lee. This could easily have an indexed first name of Jonathan, Jonathon, Johnathan, Johnathon, Jon, John, Ralph or some totally unrelated nickname in the central index. I know someone, for example, whose legal name is "Claire" who uses the name "Denny" which has no source in any part of her legal name, in all circumstances except legal documents, because at one point in her life that is what other people and she started to call her (for reasons that are not entirely clear to me), and it stuck. A nickname totally unrelated to a legal name is particularly common among people who immigrate to the U.S. or have parents who do, whose legal name is not commonly used in the U.S. For example, I know someone born in Korea whose true name is Hei-Hyun who used the name June, which she used in English as a second language classes when she was first learning English abroad, in almost all circumstances except in legal documents. In those cases, either the legal name or the nickname could easily appear in court documents. Everyday use of a middle name rather than a true first name is particularly common when father and son have the same true names apart from Senior and Junior or the third, for example, and when the first name is less common or otherwise embarrassing or overlaps with a classmate. I've also known people who used a first name growing up and then later transitioned to a middle name at some point (often upon moving to a new school or new place) and people who have transitioned in the opposite direction under similar circumstances, in each case in connection with a desire of the person involved to "reinvent" themselves. Other Information Which Would Greatly Help In Searching It would be extremely helpful (cutting the number of cases involved dramatically) to know which borough within New York City this took place in, because at the level of court administration, each borough of New York City is a separate county with a separate set of court clerks and all case indexes would reveal the borough in which the case was brought. The more you can narrow the time period, the easier it is for you to conduct the search. If you knew the name of the school that the younger child who was subject to the custody order attended at any time and the younger child's first name and ethnicity, attempting to locate and review school yearbooks and newsletters in the relevant time period (often children are identified by name in newsletters listing children who won academic or attendance or sports awards, or who participated in special field trips, for example) would provide a much more solid basis for a further search of records related to person B, because this would give you a full name for the child and would also establish the most likely borough in which the records would be located. Often a list of parent names at the school can be found in PTA newsletters or lists in school newsletters of parent volunteers who are being thanked. If you knew the address of person B or the younger child or the older child at some point, this would be very helpful. If they lived in a home that they owned you could search property records to find a name of person B or someone related to person B. If they rented, you would still narrow down the likely school that the younger child attended, the likely courts in which the action could have taken place, and you could go in person to the neighborhood and ask former neighbors. Either a first name or a surname for person B, the parent, would also be extremely helpful, although a full name and borough of residence for person B would be much better and might limit the search, if you were authorized to make it, to just a handful of names. Knowing person B's gender would also help. If person B is the father, usually the child's surname will be the same as the father, while if person B was the mother and not married to the father, this would be much less common. The more you know about the precise nature of the proceeding, the better. It would be very unusual for an adult child rather than a parent to be awarded custody of a minor child outside of an abuse and neglect proceeding terminating person B's parental rights, or an adoption proceeding in which person B voluntarily relinquished his or her parental rights. So, the odds are good that you would want to search records in Family Court or Surrogate's Court, rather than in the Supreme Court which handles matrimonial actions. If person B were prosecuted criminally for child abuse or neglect, there is a very good chance that the person is incarcerated in a state prison at this time and so a search of prisoners with the right partial name who were incarcerated at about the right time and were of the right gender could be fruitful. This would be particularly helpful if person B is a woman because there are far fewer incarcerated women than there are men, and there are far few women's prisons than there are men's prisons. Knowing the name of the judge who handled the case would be extremely helpful and would greatly narrow the scope of the search. Also, if you identified the case with sufficient specificity in a request to the judge who handled the case to allow you to gain limited access to court records, it is quite likely that the judge would be able to identify the exact case involved with the help of court clerks from memory or partial memory of the case, making it much more likely that the judge would let you access the information that you needed. Media accounts of a case and appellate opinions arising from case (which are often publicly available in redacted form) are much more likely to identify the name of the judge than the name of the parties in a case involving a minor child. Knowing who represented person B as a lawyer, or in the alternative, knowing that person B was not represented by a lawyer, would help narrow the list considerably. If you knew who the lawyer was, calling the lawyer's office and asking in a manner that explained your need to know would probably be more likely to provide information that obtaining it directly from the court system. Knowing the name of the opposing counsel would be almost as helpful. If you new that person B acting pro se in the case, you could eliminate from the list all cases in which all parties were represented by a lawyer. This search could be made considerably more powerful if you knew the gender of person B as this would allow you to narrow the search to cases where someone of person B's gender was not represented by a lawyer. If the case was an abuse or neglect case, it would have been prosecuted in the name of the State or the People, so you would look for cases where the defendant was not represented by counsel without regard to the attorney for the plaintiff. Question #2: If this is theoretically possible, who would have access/privilege to do this? Any random person? A registered lawyer? Police? Court officer? Usually cases involving juveniles are closed to the general public, so to access them, you would need to be an "interested party", and neither a "random person" nor a lawyer admitted to the bar in New York State could do so without that connection. It might be possible to search case names that might contain the name of the child or the sibling without being allowed to access the contents of the file in some cases, I am not entirely sure on that point. If the case were incident to a case in which the child or the sibling was not a named party (e.g. the probate of a parent), this might not be sufficient to even identify the right case, however. A good summary regarding access to court records in New York State is available here. In some of the pertinent parts, it states: A number of statutes limit access to court records where the interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in disclosure: A. Family Court Records Access to court records in the Family Court is governed by Section 166 of the Family Court Act, which provides that the records of any proceeding in Family Court are not open to indiscriminate public inspection. In order to access a particular Family Court record, the requesting party must make an application to the Court and set forth the reasons for the request. It is solely within the discretion of the Court whether to permit the inspection of such records. Certain individuals, such as the parties and their representatives, are permitted access to Family Court records without application to the Court. 22 NYCRR205.5 Given that "B was a parent involved in a court case where their older adult child won custody of their younger underage child from them.", it is conceivable that one could articulate a reason for the need to do the search that a Family Court judge would authorize, but that would depend to a great extent on the precise nature of the reason for the search. It helps that the person you are actually searching for is an adult who would have been a named party in the case, and not the actual minor child. But, a Family Court judge would probably be pretty reluctant to authorize a search on behalf of someone who didn't even know the name of the person being searched for and instead only knew the first name and age of one of that person's children. In part, this is because it indicates that the "need" to locate person B is not very strong, and in part, this is because the search would be much more intrusive requiring review of actual court filings in many cases rather than merely reviewing the index of cases. It further states: B. Civil Actions Like criminal proceedings, civil actions are presumptively open pursuant to the guarantees under the First Amendment. Unlike criminal actions that present constitutional considerations for criminal defendants, in civil actions the First Amendment guarantees must be measured against the public interest in requiring disclosure. Family Court Proceeding The declaration in Section 4 of the Judiciary Law of a presumption of public access to court proceedings does not differentiate among the courts, and therefore applies to the Family Court, subject to any other statute that gives special treatment to Family Court proceedings. As such, there is also a presumption of openness to all Family Court proceedings, and Section 205.4 of the Uniform Rules [22 NYCRR] expressly provides that the Family Court is open to the public, including the media. However the presumption can be overcome on a case-by-case basis by an overriding interest that closure is essential to preserve higher values. See e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 US. 596, 608; Matter of Ruben R., 219 A.D.2d 117 (1st Dept.),lv. to app. denied 88 N.Y.2d 806 (1996) (holding potential trauma to mental and physical well-being of children required closure of child protective proceeding to public and press); Matter of Katherine B., 189 A.D.2d 450 (2d Dept. 1993) (holding public properly excluded from child protective proceeding where compelling testimony established that child would be adversely affected). Section 205.4 (b) of the Uniform Rules [22 NYCRR] provides specific factors that a judge may consider in determining whether to close the courtroom or to exclude specific individuals, such as preserving courtroom decorum, avoiding a disruption in the proceedings, and serving the orderly administration of justice, including privacy interests of individuals before the court and the need to protect litigants from harm. Matrimonial Proceedings Domestic Relations Law § 235(2) grants the court the discretion to exclude the public if "the public interest requires that the examinations of the witnesses should not be public." Because matrimonial proceedings include matters concerning child custody, visitation and maintenance, aside from potential embarrassment to the litigants in a public proceeding, the public interest standard may protect minors from public testimony. See CPLR 4019; Matter of Lincoln v, Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d 270 (1969) (trial court had discretion to interview the child in a custody proceeding in private). Adoption Proceedings Given the nature of adoption proceedings, the proceedings are confidential and held in closed courts, and the records pertaining to adoptions are sealed pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 114. See Matter of Walker, 64 N.Y.2d 354 (1985) (setting forth the considerations for deeming adoption records confidential). Mental Competency Proceedings The media has a qualified right of access to competency hearings, whether held pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law or the Criminal Procedure Law. See Matter of New York News v, Ventura, 67 N.Y.2d [sic] C. Matrimonial Actions Section 235 of the Domestic Relations Law provides that neither an officer of the court with whom the proceedings in a matrimonial action or a written agreement of separation is filed or an action or proceeding for custody, visitation or maintenance of a child are filed, or before whom testimony is taken, or his clerk, either before or after termination of the suit shall not permit a copy of any pleadings, affidavits, findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment of dissolution, written agreement of separation or memorandum thereof, or examination to be taken by any person other than a party, or the attorney or counsel of a party, except by order of the court. D, Confidential Records Records contained in a court file that are deemed confidential may not be disclosed absent a court order including the following: . . . • Court records in sex offense cases that might identify the victim. See Civil Rights Law § 50-b. • Mental health records, including records of commitment, retention and discharge proceedings of the mentally ill and mentally retarded (see Articles 9 and 15 of the Mental Hygiene Law; CPL 330.20) and clinical records submitted in connection with the proceedings (see Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13[c]). . . . • Records of adoption proceedings. See Judiciary Law § 90.10. • Other records or documents that have been sealed or designated confidential by the court. I am not completely clear on the extent to which the case name itself is suppressed, as opposed to merely the contents of the case file in some of these situations, but where the name of a child is suppressed due to confidentiality this often extends to the name used in the caption and indexing of a court case that is available to lawyers not involved in the case and the general public. A court official would have authority to look at the information, but probably wouldn't be allowed to disclose it to you in any situation where you or a random lawyer was not allowed to do so, for the reasons set forth above. I can imagine circumstances in which the police or the prosecutor's office would be allowed to review sealed juvenile custody case records in furtherance of a criminal prosecution or potential criminal prosecution, but I couldn't tell you how they would go about getting that authorization as I have never practiced criminal law and am not familiar with that level of procedural detail in New York State. But, it is hard to imagine law enforcement coming to your aid in the circumstances you describe, although without knowing the reason that you want to locate person B, it is hard to know for sure.
Is it illegal to drop boulders into the sea? The BBC has a video in which those opposing Greenpeace say so A Greenpeace ship has been dropping huge boulders into the sea off Brighton this week to stop fishing boats from trawling the sea bed. [...] But leaders of the fishing community describe the action as dangerous, illegal and irresponsible. What UK law prohibits this and what is the penalty for breaking it?	The sea area in question is a Marine Protected Area, which is referred to in the united-kingdom as a Marine Conservation Zone (as per No17 on the 2016 linked list) and lies within the UK's territorial waters. What UK law prohibits this? I have discounted my initial thoughts about s.58(2) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 as I strongly suspect the Greenpeace vessel is neither UK registered nor proceeding to/from a UK port. I have also considered the Criminal Damage Act 1971 which, although potentially viable* and has off-shore jurisdiction, I have discounted in favour of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 which creates the offence of depositing objects in the UK's territorial waters without a licence: s.65 Requirement for a Licence (1) No person may - (a) carry on a licensable marine activity ... except in accordance with a marine licence granted by the appropriate licensing authority. s.66(1) Licensable Marine Activity includes: 1.(a) To deposit any substance or object within the UK marine licensing area, either in the sea or on or under the sea bed, from ... any ... vessel ... s.66(4) states the "UK marine licensing area” consists of the UK Marine Area which is defined by s.42 to include: the area of sea within the seaward limits of the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom What is the penalty? s.85(4) states anyone guilty of a s.65(1) offence is liable: (a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £50,000, (b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both. *relating to the seabed as well as the bottom trawlers.	england-and-wales s161 Penalties for causing certain kinds of danger or annoyance, Highways Act 1980 ... (3) If a person plays at football or any other game on a highway to the annoyance of a user of the highway he is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding [F3 level 1 on the standard scale]. ... (See also the s137 offence of wilful obstruction.) Some places may also have their own related bylaws, e.g. No person shall on any land adjoining a street play any game in a manner likely to cause obstruction to any traffic or to cause danger to any person in such a street Made under s235 of the Local Government Act 1972, for the prevention and suppression of nuisances. Traveling further back in time, the Highway Act 1835 provided for penalties on persons who "play at Football or any other Game on any Part of the said Highways, to the Annoyance of any Passenger or Passengers" and, in London, the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 similarly made it an offence to "any Kite or play at any Game to the Annoyance of the Inhabitants or Passengers, or who shall make or use any Slide upon Ice or Snow in any Street or other Thoroughfare, to the common Danger of the Passengers." I find such a claim implausible, considering the large amount of my childhood that was spent playing in the street with no legal problems. It seems possible that the authorities turned a blind eye or your behaviour didn't come to their attention, or your street was designated as a 'play street' (introduced by the Street Playgrounds Act 1938, currently provided for by sections 29 to 31 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 as amended by the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991). Also, many alleged offenders might be younger than the criminal age of responsibility. According to TJ Miller MP (Colchester) in Hansard, speaking in 1860, in 1859 44 of London's children were sent to prison for playing games in the streets, and by April 1860 25 had been sent to prison - apparently Manchester had imprisoned none. In my youth we played in the street although we didn't put up basketball hoops, football goals or other such objects. These stories in the media seem to be rare and involve circumstances where the local authority received too many complaints, particularly when there is damage to homes, cars or flowerbeds - which may amount to criminal damage. Blackpool in 2006 Glenfield area of Leicester, 2007 Newark, Nottinghamshire, 2008 Manchester, 2010 - although this seems to be based on one complaint Hat-tip Pedestrian Liberation for the information about the older legislation and arrests of children.	Probably not In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the tort of negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. What standard of conduct do you think your employer failed to conform with? Owning a tree or a parking lot is not, of itself, negligent. Further, the branch fell "during high winds" - the wind is not within your employer's control. Now, if you can prove that your employer knew that the particular tree was ill and likely to drop branches in high winds and failed to do anything about it, that might be considered negligent. I know of a case where a council who had refused permission for a tree to be removed because it was "healthy" was found negligent when that tree latter (in calm winds) dropped a branch on Jaguar.	Maybe, Hence the Lawsuits In the absence of clear statute law these all circle around tort law. For the scooter companies, trespass to chattels, and for the affected landowners (who hire the removalists) trespass to land and nuisance seem applicable. In essence, I can’t take your stuff (trespass to chattels) but you can’t leave your stuff on my property (trespass to land) or impeding access to it (nuisance). If you do, I am entitled to the reasonable costs of dealing with it. Note that, as owner, you remain responsible for you stuff even if you rented it to someone else. Both sides are pushing hard into unexplored areas of law so we await the judgement with interest. Then we’ll know.	In England and Wales, under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by section 59 and Schedule 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) it's a criminal offence to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting someone to commit suicide. I think that applies to Scotland too, and there is similar law in Northern Ireland. Encouraging suicide is also a criminal offence in some other common law jurisdictions, e.g. in Australia. While in other common law jurisdictions, if there isn't such a law, the person might instead be prosecuted for manslaughter - or not at all. The minimum, maximum and recommended penalties may well differ between jurisdictions. I don't know what you mean by "vengeance rampage" but I'm not aware of any jurisdictions where it is lawful for a person to cause harm to someone for revenge. States tend to reserve for themselves a monopoly on the use of force.	In general, you cannot contract to do anything illegal. However, ... An argument could be made that permission has been granted to, for example, enter property and remove the item. If permission has been granted, entering property and taking an item is not a crime.	In English law there isn't a specific offence of "mooning". However: It is conceivable that under Public Order legislation someone mooning could be found guilty of causing "harassment, alarm or distress". There was a man arrested for mooning a speed camera, charged with a public order offence and subsequently acquitted. In 2010 a Kent man was issued with an anti-social behaviour order (ASBO) that banned him from mooning (among other things). ASBOs were civil orders, breach of which was a criminal offence. Had that man continued to moon, he could have been found guilty of the criminal offence of breaching the order. (ASBOs have since been replaced with a system of civil injunctions and civil behaviour orders.) It is conceivable that repeatedly mooning one or more particular people would be deemed harrassment. I am not aware of criminal cases but there was an employment tribunal case that found the person had committed sexual harrassment in the workplace because they had mooned a colleague. At common law it is an offence to outrage public decency, "an act which is lewd, obscene or of disgusting character, which outrages minimum standards of public decency as assessed by the jury." I doubt whether a brief moon would amount to that; worse behaviour might.	Scotland has a third possible verdict, which covers much of the situation you are asking about: “not proven”. While still an acquittal, it is typically used by judges and juries in situations where they are not suitably convinced the defendant is necessarily innocent, but not convinced the evidence supports a conviction. As recently as 2015, attempts to remove the third verdict from the Scottish legal system were rejected, despite it being seen as an easy way out for courts.
Trying to get sued? Are there any situations in which some party would seek to be sued? The thought came up while I was looking at some law related to copyright and public domain where it was noted that some parts were unclear due to the lack of precedent. If that lack of clarity were sufficiently problematic (worse than any reasonable resolution as it precludes acting under "both" interpretations), it would seem that a reasonable action would be to seek out a suitable plaintiff and arrange for them to sue you for nominal damages after you internally take carefully constructed action to give them standing to do so. Would/could a decision from such a situation be used to set precedent and resolve the general legal question? Has that sort of thing been done? Are there "safer" ways to get the same resolution?	The Scopes "Monkey Trial" and the Supreme Court cases about evolution In Tennessee v Scopes a school teacher deliberately incriminated themselves of breaching a law against teaching the theory of evolution, in order to be prosecuted and allow a supporting group to push the case further. In Epperson v Arkansas the same thing happened, except that the teaching of evolution was required by the local school despite being banned by the state. The teacher filed suit seeking nullification and an injunction against employment effects due to breaching the law, expecting that if successful the state would try to argue the case back (it did) and with the supporting group then hoping to get to the Supreme Court (it did).	No. A plaintiff may travel to the defendant's jurisdiction to file suit if desired. Nobody usually does this, though, due to travel and logistical considerations. The defendant is the one who decides whether to challenge jurisdiction. Good contacts will include a forum selection clause which would lay out what happens where in the event of a dispute. And this can be anywhere, it is not limited to the locations of the plaintiff and the defendant. N/A.	The doctrine of judicial estoppel could potentially be applied in the manner that you suggest. The doctrine is applied in a manner that involves considerable discretion (unlike the similar doctrine of collateral estoppel, which makes judicial determinations against a party on the merits in a litigated case binding against the party against whom it was decided in future cases, in which there is much less judicial discretion). So, it isn't a lock solid winning argument that can be convincingly relied upon. But, it is a legitimate argument that a party can make in a lawsuit that would sometimes win. Footnote Large corporations are unique, in that they (1) enter into adhesive contracts with millions of people, (2) get sued a lot, and (3) often use outside counsel. For what it is worth, most businesses and government agencies, large and small, enter into adhesive contracts, often with at least hundred or thousands of people, if not with millions of people, and many get into frequently lawsuits and sometimes use outside counsel. So, the uniqueness of large corporations is somewhat overstated in the question.	Yes there has At common law you cannot be both a plaintiff and a defendant. However, statute law can allow this - either intentionally or unintentionally. An example is Barbara Bagley v. Barbara Bagley, 2016 WL 6299507 (Utah 2016).	As for the subject matter (what can be protected), amplitude, frequency, harmonic pattern, duration etc. are all physical facts, and there is no protection for physical facts. The basic requirement is that the thing protected must be "creative". Once you have a creative composition (assuming it is a composition, where infringement is harder to establish), the question arises whether a particular other composition infringes, or is an independent creation deserving its own protection. Again, the law does not deal in technical acoustic properties, and "similarity" is dealt with in an essentially subjective manner. The find of fact, who is an ordinary observer, has to weight all of the evidence and decide whether there is substantial similarity (or striking similarity) which could be evidence of infringement (substantial similarity is not against the law, copyright infringement is). Both parties to the litigation will present testimony supporting their contention and refuting the others' contention. At some point, one side is likely to introduce expert testimony to the effect that there are only so many possible melodies, which if persuasive can overcome a feeling that two compositions are rather similar. The law only addresses the logic of that judgment, and not the scientific facts. For example, in the case of Testa v. Janssen, the legal premise is set doen that "proof of direct access is unnecessary where striking similarities between two works are present". HOw then do you know if there are striking similarities? To prove that similarities are striking, plaintiffs must demonstrate that "such similarities are of a kind that can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence, independent creation, or prior common source." Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (S.D.N.Y.1973) citing a previous ruling on that point. Ultimately, the courts cannot not dictate a scientific procedure for making that determination.	Counter notices are described in 17 USC 512(g)(3). It starts with the requirement for "A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber" (and a statement under penalty of perjury...). Supposing that you can't get anywhere with finding the contributor even via a subpoena, then you're stopped there: you can't swear on behalf of someone else. Paragraph (f) also says that if a person files a false infringement claim, they become liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it but it's not immediately obvious that you would suffer damage by taking the material down (not immediately obvious doesn't mean obviously not true). A case could be made, but it's risky. In Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Diebold was hit with substantial damages basically for having made up a theory that certain email discussion was infringing when it was clearly fair use. If a person actually lies about being the copyright owner, that would probably be viewed even more dimly by the courts. Your 4th argument gives you no traction: if an infringer posts infringing material and transfers copyright on the web page, but they don't hold copyright, then that transfer mean nothing. As for the other arguments, your attorney will have to suggest an advisable course of action. S/he might advise that your evidence is so strong that you should just ignore the takedown; or that you should take the content down and then sue for damages; or take the content down and lobby your congressman for a change in the law. [Addendum] I will reiterate my recommendation to get a lawyer. I believe that under the law, the risk to you would be the situation where the person prevails in an infringement suit against you. Outside of the "mere conduit" safe harbor, you have to participate in the notice and takedown scheme in order to "stay safe" (also you have to do so quickly). You have identified a potentially huge flaw in the system. Theoretically, criminal charges of perjury and paragraph (f) damages would be enough to deter ordinary wrong-doers, provided that you can really prove that someone else is the copyright holder. But the cost of litigation is not zero and the chances of winning are not 100%. The law does assume that all parties tell the truth, indeed the law requires a "penalty of perjury" statement. Since counter-notice is also part of the legal dance, I would conclude that you do have to write yourself a counter-notice. Then if there is a suit, you have satisfied the requirements of the law.	This probably isn't a ground for an appeal. While a party arguing to reverse a trial court's decision must show that the argument that they are making on appeal was "preserved" by that party at trial by making that argument in the trial court, the converse is not true. Indeed, one of the rules of appellate practice is that a trial court's ruling will be upheld for any reason supported by the evidence even if it wasn't made by any party at trial. Generally speaking, a trial court isn't supposed to try a pro se party's case for them, but once the evidence is in, the court is free to do original legal research and come to a conclusions contrary to the arguments made by either of the parties. A judge is supposed to correctly apply the actual law to the facts notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to lead it astray. This doesn't systemically happen in favor of one party or the other in my experience, but is more common when one or both parties is relatively inexperienced in the relevant legal field. Appellate courts also come to conclusions about the law not advanced by either party on a regular basis. If anything, this is even more common in the area of administrative law, where the judge is likely to be a subject area specialist, than in ordinary civil litigation. It is also more common in administrative law because a judge in that context is more focused on the institutional implications of a bad precedent than trial court judges in ordinary courts. (PS is there a technical term for the rules concerning the "role" of the judge in a court, what they supposed to do, and not supposed to do?) Probably, but there isn't any term that comes readily to mind. If I can think of one, I will update this answer.	I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired.
Consumer Rights 2015 (U.K.): Wear & Tear dispute over a vehicle I am planning to go to a small claims court about a Consumer Rights Act issue on a second-hand vehicle. The trader that sold the second-hand vehicle claims that it's the result of wear and tear. His mechanic had already a look allegedly. They are confident that is a timing chain issue. They say that when they had the car was fine. They request the consumer to pay for the repair. The first indication of the error was only after two weeks of purchase. No damage was done to the car from the consumer or any other third party. It was driven solely for leisure purposes. A couple of other independent mechanics (paid by the consumer) had a look at the car and each one of them has a different opinion on how to fix the car. One said to change the engine oil the other to change the solenoid. The only thing sure is that it's P0014 error code which indeed it may be caused by a series of things (all the above claims from the various mechanics are not wrong). Allegedly the root cause of it which I found online is bad vehicle maintenance (not changing with good quality engine oil at the supposed time periods, this practice is reinforced by the fact that every wheel has a different brand tyre to save cost). In the eyes of the judge does the wear and tear argument have any basis? Will more evidence be needed from either parties?	The Consumer Rights Act gives you an initial 30 days to reject it, if it is faulty, and claim a full refund from the dealer that sold it to you. After that time your rights are pretty strong for at least 6 months. It is not completely clear to me what the exceptions are, but if it is the timing chain then there can be no case that this is "wear and tear" as they last something like 80,000 miles or 10 years. Which and Citizen Advice have tools to determine your rights.	It may very well be illegal, depending on the laws of the country. Most people have the right to enter their own country (except for practical problems, like not being able to prove you have the right) because you list your passport and/or other ID). But it may be illegal to enter outside official border crossings, for example. Or illegal to enter without having the entry registered. Or soon, it might be illegal to enter the U.K. while avoiding quarantine, whether you are British or not. But it wouldn’t be the fact that you entering that’s illegal, it would be how you did it. If you are the Dutch owner of a Ferrari then entering the Netherlands on the A40 from Germany at 170mph is very, very illegal :-)	Misrepresentation At common law, if you are induced to enter a contract by a material misrepresentation then you can rescind the contract and/or sue for damages. The person concerned would have to prove on the balance of probabilities that: the misrepresentation was actually made, which, if it was only verbal and there were no independent witnesses will be problematic, the misrepresentation caused them to enter the contract. If the dealer were to deny everything, and it came down to a "he said, she said", then, on the evidence, the person should lose. The facts are equally consistent with the buyer making an unprompted mistake as to the model of the car. Unfortunately, while most cases are compelling when you only have one side's story; when both sides get to have their say the facts become less easy to determine. Outside of misrepresentation, the person can complain to whatever government consumer protection agencies there are in Florida.	Such "warranties" are generally subject to separate laws, and they are not treated as a subcase of "car insurance". Whereas homeowners insurance, vehicle liability insurance and so on are regulated in all states, extended warranties are regulated in over half of the states. There is a model law which tends to inspire state legislators in writing their own laws, and here is an instantiation in Washington state. At the outset, the law says that certain things are not covered, including warranties, maintenance agreements and service contracts (what then is covered??). There may be "required content", for example Service contracts shall state the procedure to obtain service or to file a claim, including but not limited to the procedures for obtaining prior approval for repair work, the toll-free telephone number if prior approval is necessary for service, and the procedure for obtaining emergency repairs performed outside of normal business hours or provide for twenty-four-hour telephone assistance. There are sections specific to motor vehicles, which could be relevant, for example "A service contract provider shall not deny a claim for coverage based upon the service contract holder's failure to properly maintain the vehicle, unless the failure to maintain the vehicle involved the failed part or parts". At the bottom of the Model Act document is a list of statuses in the various states: it's status in Connecticut is nonexistence, as of July 2014 (and no signs of such a law having been subsequently passed). There is a general law about express warranties, which doesn't impose any content restrictions on such contracts. So in CT, it depends on what the contract says.	As described, this may be a form of illegal bait-and-switch advertising, but not breach of contract. The contract states the specific vehicle to be sold, which does not match the test-driven car. If the dealer had listed the better car's VIN in the contract but supplied a different car, that would be breach of contract. Whether it is illegal advertisement depends on the representations and disclaimers made by the dealer. To the extent that the dealer supplied indications that there was a difference between the test model and the purchase model, or to the extent that the customer should have known that the test car had features not found in the specific model that the customer believed he was buying and paying for, the dealer was being non-deceptive. To the extent that the dealer holds that selling model X instead of model Y is an "honest mistake" on their part, the dealer was being deceptive (or, was plainly in breach of contract). It's hard to see what "honest mistake" the dealer might have made, but perhaps the mistake was "not being clearer to the customer that they had test-driven a fancier model, not the one that they were actually buying". The customer's attorney could pursue this matter and either get the better car, or get a better financial deal, but it really hinges on who said / wrote what (and has a more believable story about what was said).	Not really. The closest you get is a more general term, "limited warranty". These kinds of warranties are common in motor vehicles, but pretty much unheard of in the case of software, because the capacity diagnosis of the cause of the problem takes too much expertise which isn't widespread.	Tell whatever lawyer is drafting the "official paperwork" about the problem and ask if it is covered or if you need to change the text or add a rider. If neither company competes, a mutual release/license of existing shared code should be perfectly manageable for an experienced attorney.	Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer.
"Does not put forward a case inconsistent with the confession" of guilt In New Zealand, duties of defence lawyers require them to "not put forward a case inconsistent with the confession" if the defendant confesses his/her guilt to them (13.13.2(a)). What exactly does that involve when the previously given not guilty plea continues? Does that mean that the lawyers no longer can explicitly claim that the defendant is not guilty but just say "prove it" to the prosecution? If so, how does maintaining not guilty plea not constitute putting "forward a case inconsistent with the confession"? Related: What options does a lawyer have if a client admits he is guilty but doesn't want to admit it to the court? What does a lawyer do if they know for absolute certain that their client is guilty?	A not guilty plea is not part of the case of a defendant or a defense attorney. A "case" refers to evidence and argument made at trial (or conceivably in a pre-trial hearing). The rule in question specifically contemplates a defense attorney entering a not guilty plea for a client who has confessed to the lawyer that the client is guilty of the crime (emphasis added). If at any time before or during a defended trial a client makes a clear confession of guilt to his or her defence lawyer, the lawyer may continue to act only if the plea is changed to guilty OR the lawyer— (a) does not put forward a case inconsistent with the confession; and (b) continues to put the prosecution to proof and, if appropriate, asserts that the prosecution evidence is inadequate to justify a verdict of guilty; and (c) does not raise any matter that suggests the client has an affirmative defence such as an alibi, but may proceed with a defence based on a special case such as insanity, if such a course appears in the lawyer’s professional opinion to be available. The attorney can argue that the defendant should be released from custody prior to trial, and over what terms of pre-trial release are appropriate. The attorney can advise the client not to do anything else that would make it easier for the prosecution to prove the client committed the crime (e.g. advising the client not to brag about having committed the crime on social media). The attorney can advise the client on how to behave in the courtroom so as to avoid contempt of court sanctions, and how to dress and behave appropriately and in a manner that the court will find to be sympathetic (e.g. wearing a suit to court, acting respectfully, not speaking ill of the victim). There are a variety of defenses not inconsistent with guilt that are available: One can argue that the statute of limitations has run. One can argue that the court that the case is being tried before does not have jurisdiction over the offense. One can argue that the crime was committed prior to the effective date of the law, or after it was repealed (if relevant). One can argue that the law in invalid under human rights treaties or similar grounds for invalidity. One can argue that the defendant has immunity from prosecution (e.g. due to diplomatic immunity, or because the defendant was acting pursuant to lawful military or court orders, or because of an agreement reached with a prosecutor previously perhaps in exchange for testimony in another case, or because the defendant acted based upon assurances from an authority upon whom he was entitled to rely that his actions would not be punished) One can argue that evidence is inadmissible for some legally recognized reason (e.g. lack of authentication or doctor-patient privilege or a marital privilege). One can argue that the facts presented by the prosecution don't establish the elements of the crime charged (e.g. no evidence has been presented that permission to use the property was not granted in a trespass case). One can argue that the facts presented don't establish the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt even if some evidence is presented (but subject to limitations on what kinds of doubts may be suggested). One can make an insanity defense, or a lack of capacity to commit a crime defense. One can argue that a justification (e.g. self-defense) excuses the crime. In the U.S., an attorney could implicitly or even expressly make a jury nullification argument, but I do not know if this would be permitted in New Zealand or not. But one cannot argue, for example, that a different individual than your client committed the crime, or that the crime didn't happen at all. This ethical limitation, by the way, is much more restrictive than the limitation under U.S. law, which prohibits an attorney from introducing evidence or testimony known to be false or fraudulent, but does not generally prohibit making arguments based upon possible inferences from the true facts that the attorney knows to be false inferences (i.e. the facts are true, but the conclusions that the lawyer asks the court to draw from the facts are not consistent with what really happened). For example, a U.S. attorney could argue in a case with several co-defendants, that the victim might have been assaulted by one of the co-defendants rather than his client, based upon the evidence available, while a New Zealand attorney whose client had confessed to having assaulted the victim, couldn't ethically make that argument. A defense lawyer in either the U.S. or New Zealand could find a forensic science article showing that the technique used to link the bullet to the gun by police investigators is unreliable and use it to cross-examine a prosecution forensic expert. But, a New Zealand lawyer, unlike a U.S. lawyer, could probably not argue that there is alibi evidence putting your client on the other side of town at the time that the coroner erroneously believes the time of death to have occurred. Of course, any counsel or advocacy provided by defense counsel in connection with a sentencing phase of the proceeding would also not be inconsistent with this ethical rule and, in practice, much of the value that a defense attorney adds to the process for a defendant comes at that stage of the case.	Is there a way to accept civil liability without admitting a criminal violation? Are you allowed to tell the police, “I accept full responsibility for the accident, but I don’t wish to discuss what happened”? You can allow a default judgment as to liability to enter in a civil case (and then possibly even have a contested adversarial hearing on damages), or you can reach a settlement dismissing the case with prejudice in exchange for payment of a certain settlement without admission of liability. Indeed, this is what actually happens in about 90%+ of car accident cases that aren't resolved at trial or in a motion for summary judgment (something that is quite rare in a car accident case). Likewise, you can plea "no contest" or even being convicted following a trial of a traffic violation in connection with an accident, without the outcome of the traffic case having a binding effect on the outcome of a civil case, even though this seems contrary to the logic of how results in one case determine issues in other cases (called "collateral estoppel"). Basically, this rule has been enacted in most U.S. jurisdictions (usually by statute but in some rare cases by judicial decision), in order to prevent local traffic trial cases from turning into expensive high stakes battles that are really about liability for huge economic damages, in a traffic court process designed to efficiently deal with disputes in the tens to thousands of dollars at stake, rather than the tens of thousands to millions of dollars that are at stake in a personal injury case where there have been serious injuries. However, while the outcome and plea in a traffic case in not binding in a civil lawsuit involving a related accident, any testimony given under oath in one case can be used in the other case in almost all circumstances.	Misstating the truth is not perjury Perjury is deliberately lying under oath to gain a material advantage. For the situation you describe: You might be wrong and they actually do live where they say they do they might be wring and they genuinely think they live where they say they do, being wrong is not perjury it’s unlikely to administrate info in the form actually carries the penalty of perjury, it probably isn’t testimony unless it will positively and substantially affect the outcome of the case in their favour, it isn’t material You lack standing to interfere in the case in any event If this were brought to the attention of the court the most likely outcome would that it would just be corrected.	(As there are cases that remain sub judice, I will give only a general answer describing the disclosure process.) How does discovery disclosure work for financial crimes? Disclosure for all criminal investigations in England and Wales, including those in to financial crime, are carried out in accordance with Parts 1 and 2 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and its accompanying Code of Practice. A full explanation is given in the Code, but put briefly: the police appoint a Disclosure Officer whose role includes reviewing and assessing everything held by the police, called "material", and passing details of all "relevant material" to the CPS appointed prosecutor. There are four stages in the police disclosure process, called the 4Rs: Record Retain Review Reveal These 4Rs overlap with three questions that require answering in order: Record and Retain: Q1: Is it "relevant material" to the investigation? If No, nothing further need be done. If Yes then Record and Retain it in a "durable and retrievable format" - write it down, save it to disc etc, keep it safe and in a place where it can be found. Review: Q2: Is it "sensitive material"? e.g. does it relate to informants, covert tactics, information given in confidence etc? Either way, two seperate schedules of relevant material according to its "sensitivity" are created. Reveal: The Disclosure Officer passes both schedules (and the actual material if necessary) to the CPS prosecutor who provides the defence with a copy of the non-sensitive schedule. The prosecutor also asks: Q3: Does the material "undermine the case for the prosecution or assist the defence with theirs"? If No, nothing further need be done. If Yes, the prosecutor must disclose the material to defence, unless it sensitive and giving it to the defence is not, for example, in the public interest as it may jeopardise life, covert operations etc. The prosecutor and police then has to decide whether to drop the case or not in order to protect the reason for the sensitivity. (They may also apply to the Crown Court judge for a Public Interest Immunity certificate which - in very, very rare cases - allows a trial to go ahead in the interests of justice without the defence being made aware of material that may assist their case as long as the whole trial process is fair to the defendant.) The defence, in addition to their copy of the non-sensitive schedule, can apply for sight or copies of and any material that they consider also undermines or assists but has not been disclosed to them by the prosecutor, and is necessary for their case. In the first instance this application is to the CPS prosecutor, but if it is refused the defence may apply to the trial judge for a ruling on whether it must be disclosed or not. The overriding principle is ensuring a fair trial. ETA: It it possible for a party to such a suit to bring evidence to the court without providing the underlying data to the other party? It is possible but the principles of a fair trial, disclosure and the continuity of evidence (what some call the chain of custody) coupled with challeges by the defence are supposed to ensure that the provenance and accuracy of evidence is properly tested and accountable at a Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing (PTPH) before a trial opens. Unfortunately, especially in highly complex investigations, this does not always seem to be the case.	Short Answer The concern raised is a real one, but it is much less serious than one might naively expect. Long Answer Precedents Apply Only To Resolve The Legal Arguments Presented On The Facts Found To Exist At Trial A Bad Lawyer's Failure To Develop Facts At Trial Isn't A Serious Problem A precedent determines the law as applied to a particular set of facts found by the trial court and confirmed as properly in the trial court record by the appellate court, as to a particular legal issue. Failure to prove facts at trial due to the fault of counsel for a party in the trial court changes the scope of the precedent. Failure to establish facts in one case that sets a precedent, doesn't prevent a similarly situated party, in a case with essentially the same actual facts, from doing a better job and thus presenting a set of facts that are not governed by the same precedent. The precedent from the ill argued case would not apply because the facts as found by the trial court would be different. A Bad Lawyer's Failure To Present Legal Arguments Isn't A Serious Problem if a someone lost a case merely because they did not come up with an argument which, should they have come up with, would convince the judge to rule in their favour, and that case has become a precedent, the fate of any following cases in lower courts with comparable facts will be decided by that unluckily slow-thinking litigant/lawyer. Likewise, suppose that due to incompetence of counsel, a key legal argument isn't made. When a trial court lawyer makes that mistake, the precedent will merely resolve the legal arguments that were resolved by the trial court. This won't preclude a future litigant from making different legal arguments that are stronger in the same circumstances since the precedent won't resolve those legal arguments. For example, suppose that a trial, a lawyer for one side fails to argue that the statute of frauds (which requires certain contracts to be in writing) bars the claim, and the judgment in favor of other other side on an oral agreement is upheld on appeal. A lawyer in a new case with the same facts can move to dismiss the other side's claim based upon the statute of frauds, because the precedent upholding the oral agreement didn't resolve the question of whether the statute of frauds could be used to dismiss the claim arising under that agreement. There Aren't Better Alternatives To Sift Through Legal Arguments No lawyer can make every argument. The incentives of the system and the professional regulation of lawyers, however, increases the likelihood that the strongest arguments will be made to the court setting the precedent and in the trial court before an appellate court considers the issue, relative to pretty much any other means of clarifying ambiguous issues in the law, where the advocates for different legal rules usually don't have the same strong incentives to argue their cases as well as they possibly can. The Risk Posed By Ineffectual Rhetoric In Favor Of Good Rules Of Law Is Real But Limited This doesn't mean that bad lawyering doesn't give rise to bad precedents. But when this happens it is usually because for a given argument and set of facts, the lawyer for one side is so much more rhetorically effective in making a legal argument than the lawyer for the other side which is proposing a "better rule" of law. But the exclusion of people who can't finish law school and pass the bar exam from the process makes a truly decisive advantage for one party over another in rhetorical effectiveness fairly rare. To the extent that rhetorical failure in appellate briefing is the cause of a bad precedent, the long term systemic effect of this problem (some would call it a feature of the system rather than a flaw) is that the side with more resources that can afford to hire better lawyers will tend to produce legal results that favor similarly situated parties going forward. Thus, it produces a sort of diluted "natural selection" effect (a bias that is equally, if not more concerning, in the duel of lobbyists for all sides of an issue in the legislative process). The other safeguards discussed below, limit this risk, although not completely. Other Safeguards Subject-Matter Jurisdiction The requirement of an actual "case and controversy" for subject-matter jurisdiction, and the requirement of "standing" for subject-matter jurisdiction are designed to prevent someone from intentionally making straw man arguments on appeal that produce precedents that are bad law. Thoughtful Appellate Judges When Opinions Are Published Also, appellate court precedents are made by a panel of multiple (usually three at the first direct appeal level) experienced and esteemed judges who are acutely aware that the decisions that they are making in precedent setting cases influence the law in other cases which causes them to look beyond the arguments of the parties to resolve the dispute. It isn't at all uncommon in such cases for an appellate court to resolve a case on appeal on the basis of arguments not made by either party in their briefs, or precedents or statutes not mentioned by either party. Furthermore, most appellate court decisions are unpublished opinions that expressly determined by the panel making the decision not to make a binding precedent, which allows panels of judges in these cases to take less care to run afoul of the risk of making a bad decision due to bad lawyering by a party. So, in the minority of cases that are published and create binding precedents, judges are especially careful to consider this risk. Five More Safeguards The other main safeguards in the case law system against bad precedents due to poor lawyering by a party are: (1) the ability of uninvolved third-parties to file amicus briefs in connection with an appeal presenting perspectives on legal issues not presented by a party, (2) the ability of a state supreme court or the U.S. Supreme Court (or both) as the case may be, to overrule intermediate appellate court precedents that were wrongly decided, (3) the ability of legislatures to change non-constitutional legal rulings by statute, (4) the procedural requirement that the relevant state or federal attorney general be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in cases challenging the constitutionality of a law, and (5) the ability of the political process to amend the relevant constitution to address a bad binding precedent by a highest court on a constitutional issue that the legislature cannot fix. Collectively These Safeguards Help Somewhat None of these safeguards are fool proof. But, collectively, these safeguards reduce the risk of a bad precedent being established due to bad lawyering in an adversary system, that the inherent limitation of a precedent being limited to particular facts and particular legal arguments provides as a primary means of preventing. Other Causes Of Bad Precedents Are More Of A Problem In general, once all of the considerations above are taken together, the risk of a bad precedent being made due to bad lawyering, while it is real, is significantly smaller than the risk that a bad precedent will be made because the appellate judges rendering the precedent making opinion are bad judges. Bad judges usually end up as judges with appellate precedent making power because they were selected more based upon political considerations, as they are in many states, and in the federal system, rather than primarily based upon the soundness of their legal judgment. When one risk factor that can lead to a bad decision is much larger than another risk factor that can lead to a bad decision, further improvements in the smaller risk factor will rarely make all that much of a difference in the overall likelihood that the system will produce a bad precedent. So, the adversary system, is, on balance, good enough make the risk of bad precedents arising from bad lawyering a not very troubling problem with the system, even though it is a real risk that sometimes does produce bad precedents.	Bob will be convicted if he is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Now it is a logical fact that he cannot be guilty of both crimes, but it is entirely possible that his first conviction was incorrect and he is guilty of murder. His defense would point out that the first conviction creates reasonable doubt about his guilt in the murder case. The prosecution would have to show how it doesn't, for example by finding a police officer who forged the evidence in the first case. And then the defence would point out that the fact that evidence against Bob was forged once means reasonable doubt for the evidence in the second case. Fact is, the prosecution must show guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the murder, and the fact that Bob was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for a different crime, and that he cannot have committed both crimes, makes the prosecutions task a lot harder. Now what if the prosecution finds a second criminal who is an exact visual match for Bob? On the positive side, this would explain how there are two videos apparently showing Bob committing two crimes in different places. It would put the prosecution into the difficult position to have to prove which one is the murderer. And they can't say "Bob is in jail already, so it must have been Bill", because now Bob's first conviction looks very unsafe.	Can a jury render a verdict that contravenes with binding precedent? Yes, but (if it is a guilty verdict) it will be overturned on appeal. The appeal court will say that the jury's verdict was not one which any reasonable jury could have made on the basis of the evidence and the instructions in the case. As explained in Dave D's answer, the trial judge will have explained the law, including the binding precedent, to the jury. So if we get to this stage then the jury is disregarding instructions. The above process is the remedy. You may notice a 'gap' where the jury can unlawfully acquit a person and there's nothing anyone can do about it, because of the rule against double jeopardy (that is, you can't appeal against an acquittal). This is called jury nullification, because the jury has nullified the relevant criminal law by acquitting an offender.	I assume you mean to ask whether the guilt of the victim affects the validity of a crime-of-passion defence. canada In Canada, the only crime-of-passion type defence is provocation, today codified at s. 232 of the Criminal Code. Provocation is only relevant to a count of murder. If the person who committed what would otherwise be murder "did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation," then the conviction is reduced to manslaughter. Current codified defence: victim must have done something that would be an indictable offence punishable by five or more years of imprisonment One of the statutory requirements for a successful provocation defence is that the victim must have conducted themselves in a way that "would constitute an indictable offence under this Act that is punishable by five or more years of imprisonment." This is an objective element of the defence, not dependent on the perception of the accused. One court has found this limitation to the defence to be unconstitutional (R. v Simard, 2019 BCSC 531). However that court would still require that the "conduct of the victim [to be] of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control..." The common law and the previous codified defence also required provocative conduct by the victim Both the common law and the pre-2015 codification of the provcation defence required that the victim's provocative conduct be "of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control" (R. v. Cairney, 2013 SCC 55 at paragraphs 24-35). Burdens for establishing this defence The provocation defence is an "air of reality" defence (R. v. Cinous, 2002 SCC 29, paragraph 57). This means that there is an initial evidential burden on the accused. There must be evidence on the record that, if believed, could lead a reasonable properly instructed jury to acquit (or, in the case of provocation, to convict of manslaughter instead of murder). Once the accused meets this burden, then the defence is properly in play and will be successful unless the Crown disproves any element of the defence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Can California water districts legally use EPA water budgets? My water district is using EPA's ETo (evapotranspiration) concept to set water budgets for retail billing. ETo is higher during hot and dry months. My water district is multiplying ETo by landscape area to yield a water budget. Stay under budget, and water is $3.50/HCF. Go over and it's $5.22/HCF. Go 2X over and it's $10.22/HCF. I see two possible legal issues with this approach: It seems to violate Proposition 218's requirement that retail costs must be based on "attributable cost" because it creates an inverse relationship between retail and wholesale pricing. Since ETo is lower during conditions that tend to increase wholesale supply, and my district's billing method effectively raises retail prices at those times, retail prices are higher when wholesale prices are lower. It seems to violate Contract Law's notion of agreement between parties, since ETo data is not published in advance of billing. Can my water district's billing practices still be legal?	Can my water district's billing practices still be legal? They are likely to be legal, but it isn't entirely clear. Contract Law ETo data is not published in advance of billing, which seems to violate Contract Law's notion of agreement between parties. A contract can set forth a formula for determining a price, rather than a particular dollar amount. For example, my utility company charges me a rate for electricity and natural gas that is based upon the market price of those commodities that it has to pay (although since my utility is a regulated utility, it has to get approval from a government agency each time it does so to confirm that it is really charging the market rate). Similarly, in the construction industry, and in government contracts, "cost plus" contracts that charge based upon whatever is spent to get the job done plus a market up by the general contractor, are not uncommon. Proposition 218 The Proposition 218 analysis is trickier. This is clearly not a tax or an assessment. So the threshold question is whether this is a Property Related Fee. In December of 2018 a legislative analysis stated that: A fee is a charge imposed on an individual or business for a service or facility provided directly to an individual or business. Local governments charge fees for a wide range of purposes, from park entry fees to building plan check fees. The amount of the fee may not exceed the cost of government to provide the service. Proposition 218 restricts property-related fees, defined as fees imposed "as an incident of property ownership." At this time, there is no consensus as to which fees meet this definition. The drafters of Proposition 218 indicate that it was their intent to include most fees commonly collected on monthly bills to property owners, such as those for water delivery, garbage service, sewer service, and storm water management fees. Other analysts of Proposition 218 contend that fees that vary by level of service (for example, a fee for metered water usage) should not be considered a property-related fee, because it is based on service usage, rather than property ownership. Because Proposition 218 does not restrict nonproperty-related fees, the definition of this term will be an important and sensitive issue for the Legislature and courts. But, the California Supreme Court clarified this in July of 2006 in the case of Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil, ruling that metered rates for consumption of water are “property-related fees” subject to Proposition 218. So, assuming that your Water District is a governmental agency and not just a private company like a Ditch Company from which you receive privately owned water because you have shares in it, Proposition 218 should apply. This leads to the second question: Does the amount of the fee exceed the cost of government to provide the service? This is a non-trivial question with lots of ambiguities associated with it, that are fundamentally accounting issues, regarding the level of generality at which you analyze it. At the most general level, the water district clearly isn't allowed to collect more in fees in the aggregate than is necessary for it to break even from purchasing the water from someone and conducting its operations (assuming that it is a governmental entity). But, assuming that this threshold is met, the question is then how much discretion the water district has to allocate its costs, many of which are fixed costs that benefit all of the people in the water district, to particular users. It sounds from the question as if some of its costs involve purchasing water from a wholesaler, and some involve things like distributing that water to individual customers, metering usage, invoicing customers and collecting payments. Also, another question of generality is over what time period costs have to match services. At a fairly broad level of generality, perhaps it is permissible to match fees to cost on an annual basis. Certainly, the matching doesn't have to be any more specific than for an individual billing cycle, but it isn't obvious that this much precision in timing is required. Almost certainly, the water district is entitled to some deference in how it decides to allocate costs to services when there is more than one reasonable way to do so. Very likely, the water district evaluated its billing policy with its municipal attorney in light of Proposition 218 when it adopted this system and obtained an opinion of counsel that its plan was compliant. Indeed, it probably has covenants in its municipal bond offerings that require it to do so. Therefore, it is very unlikely that the water district's billing policy blatantly and unambiguously violates Proposition 218, even though it make be pushing the envelope with a billing scheme that isn't clearly allowed or clearly forbidden by court precedents that are factually similar. If that is the case, you might find a lawyer willing to bring a class action lawsuit to test the validity of the billing system, but it would likely be a long and difficult case with an uncertain outcome that the water district is more likely to win than you are, although it still might be a technical violation. Given the small stakes you have in the question with your own relatively small water bill, and the high stakes that the water district has in justifying its billing system for all of its customers, it is hard to see how this would be an economic battle for you to fight.	As it turns out, Talgov has a convoluted way it bills taxes which it doesn't explain on its bills or website. Its website claims to bill electricity at a rate of $7.59/month + $0.10522/kWh but, with taxes, it actually comes to $8.5631 plus $0.11598/kWh. On top of the advertised rate, it bills a gross receipts tax of 2.56406%. It also bills a public service tax of 10% on the monthly charge + $.07792/kWh + the gross receipts tax. That gets you the higher effective billing rate I mentioned above. The $.07792/kWh is reached by replacing the ECRC rate from the website with $.0077/kWh--I don't know why and I can't find an official document saying this--but that's what is happening apparently. So, Talgov doesn't bill sales tax after all and private residences are not exempt from the taxes it bills. Thus, it has not overcharged me a tax I should be exempt from and Talgov is allowed to do what it is doing, but it would be better if they represented their billing rate more honestly on their website. I'm also still not sure how they reach their 2.56406% gross receipt tax rate. The Florida statute that addresses gross receipt tax seems to specify either 2.5% or 2.6% (I can't figure out which should apply), but not something in between: (b) 1. The rate applied to utility services shall be 2.5 percent. 2. The rate applied to communications services shall be 2.37 percent. 3. An additional rate of 0.15 percent shall be applied to communication services subject to the tax levied pursuant to s. 202.12(1)(a), (c), and (d). The exemption provided in s. 202.125(1) applies to the tax levied pursuant to this subparagraph. 4. The rate applied to electrical power or energy taxed under subparagraph (a)3. shall be 2.6 percent. I found the information about the Talgov tax rates in a document from a Jacksonville utility company that compares utility rates for various utility companies, including many in Florida. Some Florida companies use a 2.5% gross receipt tax and some use a rate between 2.5% and 2.6%. This is also strange because that Florida statute seems to suggest the rate should be uniform statewide. TL;DR: Talgov is not charging sales tax, but rather some other taxes that I am not exempt from. I was able to figure out what rates they were charging for those taxes, but not why.	Not in the state of California. California law prohibits discrimination based on source of income; only discrimination based on amount of income is allowed. See the California Government Code, section 12955. It is not even legal to indicate a preferred source of income in the advertisement; landlords may ask prospective tenants about the source of income, but may not discriminate or indicate preference for a particular source (provided it's a lawful source). Also, you can't really force a city to re-zone based on "I'll make sure this bad thing doesn't happen." If the city doesn't want to re-zone, they won't re-zone. You have no right to force them to re-zone; this is especially true when the property was purchased under those zoning rules (if the buyer didn't like them, they didn't have to buy).	If the residence falls within one of the categories for which a water company can insist on a water meter, then the resident cannot refuse. See House of Commons, "Water meters: the rights of customers and water companies". That brief says that a water company can insist on installing a meter if the customer: uses an automatic watering device (such as a garden sprinkler); automatically fills a swimming pool or pond; has a large bath; uses a reverse osmosis softening unit; has a power shower; is the new occupier of a property (provided an unmetered bill has not already been sent to that occupier); or lives in an area which has been determined by the Secretary of State to be an area of serious water stress and subject to a metering programme as part of a plan to maintain secure water supplies. See also Tom Haynes and Ruth Emery, "What a water meter could do to your bills – and why you may be forced to have one", The Telegraph (1 June 2023): If your water supplier has been granted legal powers to fit compulsory water meters, you don't have any right to refuse one. As Andy White, of the Consumer Council for Water, puts it: “It's not possible for a customer to refuse where a water company has approval for compulsory metering from Defra.” If a water company has the statutory right to install a meter, and the customer has no right to refuse, this could be enforced by injunction.	No They will list the price they are charging you. This will normally be greater than what they paid because that’s how business works. The amount they are allowed to charge is what you agreed in your contract with them (which may incorporate a price list) or, if the contract is silent, a reasonable amount. What is reasonable will be related to what the market in your geographical area charges. While this is indirectly related to the input cost of a given item, business can and do charge what the market allows.	The price is not one of the terms and conditions of the CC-SA license. You may chose to attach a price to a derivative work (which you have the right to create under license section 3.b). But any person who receives the derivative work legitimately (from you or from someone who got it from you, directly or indirectly) must get it under the CC-SA license, and has the right to redistribute it, and may do so at no charge if that person so chooses. Also, you may not impose any copy protection or other technological measure that would prevent exercise of the reuser's rights. Whether selling a work that may be redistributed freely is good business is your decision.	The relevant law in California is here. In your situation, it is presumed (as you both agree) that you have a month to month agreement. §1946 states that A hiring of real property, for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of that party’s intention to terminate the same, at least as long before the expiration thereof as the term of the hiring itself, not exceeding 30 days; In other words, the landlord has to give you 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease, and you have to give 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease (and it must be written notice). The section continues: provided, however, that as to tenancies from month to month either of the parties may terminate the same by giving at least 30 days’ written notice thereof at any time and the rent shall be due and payable to and including the date of termination. which effectively says the same thing, specifically appliedd to month to month leases. There is some leeway on terminating a lease: It shall be competent for the parties to provide by an agreement at the time the tenancy is created that a notice of the intention to terminate the same may be given at any time not less than seven days before the expiration of the term thereof. The notice herein required shall be given in the manner prescribed in Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by sending a copy by certified or registered mail addressed to the other party. But you would have to establish that there was such an agreement (I assume there was not). §1946.1 asserts that a hiring of residential real property for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of his or her intention to terminate the tenancy, as provided in this section. That is, a lease is automatically renewed in your situation unless notice has been given. Moreover, A tenant giving notice pursuant to this section shall give notice for a period at least as long as the term of the periodic tenancy prior to the proposed date of termination. What you are proposing contravenes this provision of the law – from your description of the facts, you did not give notice 30 days before now. So your obligation to the landlord exists to the end of May. Bear in mind that the law imposes obligations on both landlord and tenant: just as the landlord cannot throw you out without proper notification, you cannot walk away from your obligation without proper notification. §1951.2 addresses breach of lease and abandonment by lessee (you) if a lessee of real property breaches the lease and abandons the property before the end of the term or if his right to possession is terminated by the lessor because of a breach of the lease, the lease terminates. Upon such termination, the lessor may recover from the lessee: (1) The worth at the time of award of the unpaid rent which had been earned at the time of termination; (2) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination until the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could have been reasonably avoided; (3) Subject to subdivision (c), the worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could be reasonably avoided; and (4) Any other amount necessary to compensate the lessor for all the detriment proximately caused by the lessee’s failure to perform his obligations under the lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result therefrom. There are, also, no special exceptions about landlords selling their property that allow instant termination. That is, you still owe the month's rent, even though the lease is ending at the end of the month. You could of course ask the landlord to forgive you that last month's obligation. I am assuming that the lease was terminated properly by the landlord. If it was not, the landlord has not legally terminated the lease and it will continue until someone does properly terminate the lease. That might provide incentive for the other party to just forget the last month's rent, but it also might not.	According to EU case law, everything in your scenario is legal except if Example Site is hosting the image without authorization and Pirate Site is a for-profit site, then Pirate Site is presumed to be violating Article 3 of the Copyright Directive on communication to the public (in this scenario, Example Site is also trivially violating Article 2 on the right to reproduction). In Meltwater, Case C-360/13, the court ruled that browser cache and on-screen copies fell under the temporary reproduction exception, Article 5(1) of the Copyright Directive. This means that the visitor is not infringing copyright (IPKat reference). In BestWater, Case C-348/13, the court ruled that embedding content was itself not a communication to the public when that content was hosted with rightsholder authorization, and so did not violate Article 3. This means that Pirate Site is not infringing on communication to the public rights (it is also not creating a copy itself, so is not breaking Article 2) (IPKat reference). When content is not hosted with authorization, the situation is quite a bit more nuanced. GS Media, Case C-160/15, is the controlling case. Here, the court ruled that if a link (note it doesn't even have to be embedded/hotlinked) is posted by a for-profit site, that site is expected to have done its due diligence to ensure the linked content is hosted legally. Therefore, it is presumed to be violating Article 3, i.e., the burden of proof is on the link posting site to demonstrate that it had done its due diligence in verifying the legality of the linked content. So in this scenario, Pirate Site is presumed to be infringing on communication to the public rights (IPKat reference - WARNING: slightly NSFW image here, Playboy was one of the parties to the case).
Can someone sell the property (both jointly and separately owned) property of their imprisoned spouse? I am serving a 5-year prison sentence. While incarcerated, my wife of 5 years is selling my belongings such as my cars, trucks, campers, dogs, tools, motorcycles, clothes, etc. Some property is titled in my name, some is jointly owned. Some of it is in KY, and some is in OH. Is this legal? Can I "put a block" on these items to prevent the sale? I have family willing to retrieve items and store them. She has already cleared out both checking and savings accounts leaving me with nothing. All before mentioned items are paid off. We have no children in common.	Certain things are your separate property, and only you can sell them (but you are also responsible for them). That would include things acquired before the marriage; also anything inherited by just one of you, or gifts provably given to just one of you. Other things are community (marital) property, including your pants and probably your dog. Writing your name on the object or a piece of associated paper doesn't really matter, what matters is how it was acquired. One party can sell their half-interest in joint property, but nobody (?) would buy a property interest in a dog, they would buy the dog. For another person to actually buy a dog, they would have to buy a 100% interest in the dog, meaning that you would have to agree to the sale. When it comes to property with a solid title system, such as real estate, one party cannot sell the whole property without the consent of the co-owner. However, a co-owner could petition the courts to force a partition of the property, where the courts would order that the proceeds be divided equitably. Ohio law on division of marital property is spelled out here. Getting a lawyer is really the only reasonable solution. You can't just "put a block" on selling stuff. If you want the tools, somebody has to collect the tools and take care of them, and they can't just break in to the house in the middle of the night to do this.	Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.	Civil claims have statutes of limitations too Usually shorter than 10 years. Therefore, Bob cannot sue anyone for recovery and therefore does not practically own the bike. In some jurisdictions, limitations acts make it explicit that Bob loses title to the goods meaning he doesn’t own the bike de jure as well as de facto. It’s not possible to say what a “typical” limitation period is but periods above 10 years typically only apply to actions on real property (land) not personal property (bike). However, that just begs the question. The criminal limitation is irrelevant to the civil action They are completely independent so whether a criminal action has happened, is in progress or can’t happen doesn’t affect the civil action. Bob doesn’t need the information The person who has the bike may or may not be the one who converted it: Bob doesn’t care because they are presently the one detaining it. So Bob sues for detinue: you have it, it’s mine, give it back, or, give me monetary compensation. Whether the person who has it acquired it lawfully or not is a matter of complete indifference to Bob. If they did acquire it lawfully then they have a breach of contract cause of action against the person who sold them goods without good title. But that’s their problem, not Bob’s.	The part of the statute (which is part of an article of the Uniform Commercial Code model language applicable to the sale of goods) that you are discussing reads as follows: 1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. I have put the critical language of (1)(c) for the purpose of understanding what they are talking about when they are talking about "cash sales" in bold. You are asking: Please explain it to me and tell me what a "cash sale" has to do with voidable title. Doesn't cash sale just mean you are paying cash for something? That sounds perfectly innocent to me. Items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) involve circumstances which are examples of transactions in which a buyer of goods obtains voidable title from the seller. This means that the sale can be undone if the seller acts promptly enough, but the sale can't be undone if the buyer in turn sells the goods to a good faith purchaser for value (i.e. someone who pays a meaningful price for the goods without knowledge that the seller only has voidable title). If the goods have been sold to a good faith purchaser for value, however, then the seller who could otherwise undo the sale entirely can now only sue the buyer for damages (usually the agreed purchase price, or fair market value if no purchase price had been agreed upon yet). When it says in (1)(c) that "it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale"," what the statute is describing is a transaction where the original deal was that you will deliver goods to me with the understanding that I will pay you for the goods in full with currency or other "good funds" (like a wire transfer), roughly contemporaneously. But, what actually happens is that you deliver the goods to me and instead of promptly paying you the cash you are owed for the goods, I don't actually pay you anything. This could happen because I was trying to cheat you and get something for nothing, in which case I would have also committed fraud which also falls under (1)(d). More innocently, suppose that I run a small grocery store and you run a dairy that delivers milk for resale to my grocery store every morning at 5 a.m. before banks open, in time for the morning rush of innocent customers milk to put in their coffee on their way to work, before the banks open, and then I go to the bank when it opens every day at 9 a.m. and take out some cash and hand it over to your money collector, when your money collector stops buy my grocery store around lunch time. But, today, I was stunned to discover that all of the money in my bank account had been frozen due to a garnishment on a money judgment against me that I hadn't been aware of because the process server who was supposed to give me notice of the lawsuit against me instead threw the court papers in the sewer and lied on the return of service saying that he'd delivered the court papers to me, so that unbeknownst to me, a default judgment was entered against me. The sale would be voidable in both cases, the one where I was trying to cheat you while telling you that it would be a "cash sale" and the one where I innocently found out that I didn't have the money to pay you that I had no reasons to think that I wouldn't have available to me. And, in each situation, if my grocery store sold half the milk that was delivered to me in the morning rush, those sales would be valid and irreversible, even though I completely stiffed the dairy owner and there was a total failure of consideration in what was supposed to have been a cash sale transaction. But, the dairy owner would have a right, when he found out that he wasn't getting paid at noon and the sale turned out to have been a voidable one, to take back all the milk that hadn't been sold to my customers yet in the hope that he could sell it to someone else who was actually willing and able to pay for it instead. In general, under circumstances when a sale is voidable, if I haven't resold the goods to a good faith purchaser for value, then you can legally force me to return the goods and have the sale invalidated. But, if I have sold the goods to somebody else for a more than nominal price, and the person who bought the goods from me doesn't know that I cheated you by not paying for the goods, then you can't undo my sale of the goods that I didn't pay for to the good faith purchaser for value. Situation (1)(c) is very similar to situation (1)(b), in which you give me the goods and I give you are personal check for the purchase price, but the check is then dishonored by the bank (something that could been my intentional plan to cheat you, but which could also have been my failure to keep track of the balance in my bank account as I wrote checks). Both of these situations involve broken promises which may or may not have been made with no intent to honor those promises in the first place. Situations (1)(a) and (1)(d), in contrast, involve out and out fraud and deceit, but not "fraud in the factum". In other words, what (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) all have in common is that the goods were voluntarily delivered by you to me, even though your voluntary delivery was obtained by improper means such a deceit regarding who is buying the goods. ("Fraud in the factum", which is also void, involves situations when, for example, I ask you for you to sign what I tell you is a birthday card, when what I have actually done is have you sign a letter authorizing your delivery man to deliver lots of goods to me, and then I use that letter to have goods delivered to me.) In case (1)(a) this would often be a sale on credit or open account to someone you believe to have good credit but who is in fact someone else with bad credit. For example, you make a sale to George Shrub, thinking you will be delivering goods to George Shrub, Sr. who has good credit, but instead you are tricked into delivering the goods to George Shrub, Jr. who has multiple bankruptcies and never pays his bills on time. In case (1)(d) there are myriad possible examples. For example, I may have given you counterfeit money to get you to deliver the goods to me. Or, I may have purchased your cow in a barter exchange for beans that I told you were magic beans, but that were really just ordinary beans. But, in both (1)(a) and (1)d), as well as in (1)(b) and (1)(c), you are voluntarily delivering the good to me and then not getting what you thought you had bargained for in the deal, sometimes with evil motives and sometimes for innocent reasons, so voidable title arises. In contrast, suppose that I snuck into my stockyard one night and stole the goods from you. In that situation, you would have a right to get your goods back not only from me, but even from a good faith purchaser for value to whom I sold the stolen goods, because out and out theft that does not even involve consent procured through fraud or a broken promise, doesn't give me any title to the property, not even voidable title. Similarly, suppose that I pointed a gun at you in your shop and insisted that you deliver the goods to me or else I will kill you. Again, in that situation, you aren't giving me even voidable title to the goods, and you can sue a good faith purchaser for value from me to get the goods that I never had any colorable claim to have ever owned back. The language in the first sentence of (1) goes along with the language about voidable sales of goods in the rest of (1), because the first sentence of (1) covers situations when I may not have 100% ownership of goods that I sell to some else. For example, suppose that I have a pedigreed male dog that I have purchased the pet rights in from a breeder, while the breeder has retained the stud rights in the dog. (Yes, these transactions really happen. I've litigated them.) Under the first sentence of (1), I can sell the pet rights I have in the dog to you, but I can't sell the stud rights that I don't own to you because I don't own them. And, unless I am a pet store owner to whom the dog has been "entrusted" (and I'm not a pet shop owner), I probably can't destroy the stud rights through a sale of the dog to you when I am purporting to be selling you both the pet rights and the stud rights, even if you are a good faith purchaser for value, because I am not a merchant to whom the "entrusting" doctrine applies. So, if I sold the dog, the owner of the stud rights could still enforce those rights against the person to whom I sold the dog. Parts (2) and (3) deal with an exception to the general rule in the first sentence of (1) called "entrusting" which is quite similar to voidable title. Entrusting involves you leaving your goods with a merchant who is in the business of selling those kinds of goods. So, if I leave my nice clothes with a consignment shop or a pawn shop and the consignment shop or pawn shop sells my clothes to someone and give the buyer good title, and I can't undo that sale even if you didn't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I had entrusted to the consignment store or pawn shop (e.g. perhaps they were only allowed to sell my wedding dress for a minimum price of $100, but instead sold it to someone for $30 which they didn't have permission to do, then the buyer of my wedding dress for $30 would still have good title to the wedding dress and the sale couldn't be undone). But, on the other hand, if I leave my nice clothes with an automobile parts shop or a grocery store or a stationary store, and they don't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I left in their care, and then they sold my nice clothes to one of their customers, that sale made without my permission would be void and could be undone, even if their customer paid more than a nominal price for my nice clothes and had no knowledge that the merchant didn't have my permission to sell my nice clothes. This is because we don't believe that someone who buys, for example, my wedding dress from an automobile parts shop or grocery store or stationary store, can legitimately say that they really believed in good faith that the seller really had your permission to sell my wedding dress, because that is not an ordinary merchant-customer transaction for them.	Nope, the seller can't refuse "to sell". They have sold it. They sold it right at the moment the contract was created (which, depending on where they were, would not necessarily even need to be in writing). The deposit is irrelevant. What is relevant is that now your friend must pay the full balance, and the seller must hand over the car. If the seller does not do that, that is a breach of contract which can be fixed by going to the court and obtaining an order to hand the car over.	It is almost certainly legal for the sitter to keep the money. She was ready to provide the service, and it is not her fault she couldn't (and she may have turned down other opportunities because she had this one). I think your fiance's claim would be against the firm providing the security service (they are the ones that frustrated the contract). I foresee the following problems: What are her losses? She was prepared to pay $315 (which she has paid), and the dog has been looked after. Where is the loss? (She may be able to argue that it was worth $315 to her, not to have to owe her mother a favour. I don't know if that will fly.) The contract with the security firm almost certainly waives liability for this sort of thing. She would have to convince the court that the contract terms were unreasonable/unconscionable (or whatever the term is in the local jurisdiction). There are two obvious options here: a) see if there is legal cover on her household insurance (or her pet insurance); b) forget it (it's only $175 all told).	It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages.	This is complicated. This is state dependent, and as of time of writing, you haven't disclosed what is the relevant state. This is something you should hire/retain a (divorce) lawyer, and discuss with them. The law can be messy; divorces are always messy. The answer is the most common answer in law: it depends, on specific facts. See above, get a lawyer. The first question is "is the money in this investment account a shared asset that I have any claim to". The answer is "it depends". What state are you in, and where did this money come from? Depending on various factors, the answer might very well be "no", in which case, this money (and it's loss) may not affect you at all. If you do have some claim to this money, then it gets even more complicated. "Can this asset be retrieved in a court proceeding and say that he was squandering money?" Maybe, kinda. Technically no (because of the way you phrased that). I'll explain. In a divorce, "shared" assets are divided equitably (Note "equitably" does NOT mean "equally") based on numerous factors, often on a case-by-case basis, and which factors depend on the state. (Therefore, the lawyer you retain should be licensed in the state you/your husband are filing for divorce in). Before your divorce, both sides have (in general) the right to use shared property. They do not have the right to intentionally damage or destroy said property. One complication/grey area is normal use that degrades or damages the value of said property. For example, imagine a classic sports car. Many people drive them for fun; this is normal use. On the other hand, using a classic sports car decreases the value. Is using the sports car unreasonable damage? This is a fact based determination to be made based on specifics. Can this asset be retrieved in a court proceeding [if I] say that he was squandering money? (correction to what I think think you meant). Maybe, but probably not. You can say whatever you want in court, but what matters is what you can prove, as you are the bearing the burden of proof due to making the accusation (and you must prove it to the standard required by the court in your case for your particular motion/accusation, which might be the standard of "the balance of probabilities/more likely than not" or "clear and convincing evidence", or something else; it's complicated, fact dependent and state dependent, so get a lawyer). You don't need to prove that he lost money. If he was day trading before, the fact that he was day trading after the separation is not held against him; day trading is risky, therefore you have to prove that he intentionally lost money (and, potentially, that he intentionally lost money to deny money to you in the divorce, as opposed to e.g. tax loss harvesting). I would recommend hiring a divorce lawyer and discussing it with them.
Can a company safely rely on a government agency announcement that a law will not be enforced? Intermittently, a government agency, possibly in response to an executive order, will officially announce that some law or policy won't be enforced during some time period. Some such announcements seem to actually encourage/praise such lawbreaking (e.g., see FDA hand sanitizer example below). Suppose I operate a business and violate such a law. If the agency later announced, "We are rescinding our non-enforcement policy. Further, we intend to prosecute violations which occurred while the non-enforcement policy was in effect." Would a business have any protection from such enforcement? Examples: https://www.fda.gov/media/136289/download FDA does not intend to take action against firms that prepare alcohol-based hand sanitizers for consumer use and for use as health care personnel hand rubs for the duration of the public health emergency [...] https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2021/01/19/ocr-announces-notification-enforcement-discretion-use-online-web-based-scheduling-applications-scheduling-covid-19-vaccination-appointments.html Today, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) at the U.S Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced that it will exercise its enforcement discretion and will not impose penalties for violations of the HIPAA Rules [...]	Yes. A person may not be punished for action taken in good faith reliance upon assurances from an appropriate authority that he will not be punished for those actins as a matter of U.S. Constitutional law. See, e.g., U.S. v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).	Health care providers in the US may send protected patient records to other health care providers for the purposes of treatment, either of the patient whose information it was or of a different patient (for instance, a doctor could send a chart of a different patient with a similar issue). This can be done without patient authorization, except for two cases: if the patient has requested more restrictions on use of their information and the provider agreed to those restrictions, and with psychotherapy notes. Source: HHS. WhatsApp specifically does not appear to be compliant with HIPAA, which is the US medical privacy law. However, there are many similar systems that are compliant. The body of your question asks about taking a smartphone screenshot; with many secure messaging systems, this is perfectly acceptable, and the principle of a doctor consulting with another doctor about a patient is actually encouraged. HIPAA violations do not by themselves result in any action against a medical license, nor can anyone besides the US government file suit based on a violation (everyone else is limited to complaining to the US government). Private lawsuits and (especially) license consequences are determined by state law, and are state- and situation-dependent. A doctor who calls a press conference to announce that this patient of his has HIV is more likely to face sanctions than a doctor whose violation was just not using a secure enough messaging client. HIPAA violations like this are not that uncommon, and generally result in at most a fine against the practice.	Law (regardless of its type) supersedes contract, provided it has jurisdiction over the persons bound by that contract. Contract provisions that are counter to law are generally held to be void. State law has authority over an employer's policies or hand book. However, there may be exceptions in state law (so I would double check). A frequent exception (at least in California law, which I am most familiar with) is for very small businesses. Another exception, from C.R.S. § 8-4-101(5), is if you are considered a "contractor" rather than an employee, per the government's determination. It is possibly worth your time to let you employer know of this conflict before termination if possible, so that they can adjust their policies, rather than in an adversarial position after termination, if only to avoid the headache.	Can they have a clause in the fine print that in laymans terms just says 'we might just not fulfill our side of the deal'. That paraphrase appears to trivialize the actual terms of the contract (of which fine print you mention you don't know in detail). Germany's Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) at §262 entitles the shipping company --insofar as obligor-- to a choice of service, provided that the company duly informs the customer, Id. at §263. The latter section of the BGB is not explicit as to whether the obligor's notification ought to happen at the formation of the contract, although I am almost positive that that is so and is premised on the BGB itself. Since delivery at the post office and delivery at the home address are mutually exclusive (i.e., they preclude each other), by virtue of §262 the company may outline in the contract both alternatives and thereafter decide for one of these unilaterally. If the company makes its contractual [post office] alternative contingent on "being too busy with other things" and the customer proves that the company opted for post office despite not being that busy, the customer could prevail on grounds that the company contravened Treu und Glauben. See Id. at §162(2). The "I will mow your lawn" example you outline is not a good analogy. The shipping company may argue that, even if the product is not delivered at customer's home address, the customer still benefited by having to retrieve it from a location --such as a nearby post office-- that is closer from the location where the product was commercialized or manufactured. The customer would prevail only if delivery were at a location which is more inconvenient to him than if he discarded transacting with the shipping company. See Id. at § 226.	Section 2 (a) of the order says: The heads of executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall immediately take action, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to require compliance with CDC guidelines with respect to wearing masks, maintaining physical distance, and other public health measures by: on-duty or on-site Federal employees; on-site Federal contractors; and all persons in Federal buildings or on Federal lands. (emphasis added) It would seem that if, in future, the CDC changes its guidelines to indicate that mask wearing is no longer needed (presumably in the wake of a large decline in cases) the order would mean compliance with such revised guidelines, and thus reduced or eliminated mask wearing, when and if that is advised. The order does not contain any dated sunset or reevaluation provision. But the President can at any time revise or rescind this or any other Executive Order. The Twitter comments could be taken as an intention to reevaluate and a hope to be able to remove, the order within 100 days. In any case Twitter comments are not legally binding, nor are press conference statements or other public statements by the President. Evert if the order had contained a fixed sunset date, the President could always issue a new order extending this one at any time. Note also that the order only instructs department heads to "take action, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law." This leaves significant room for judgement as to what is "appropriate."	When your company breaks a law, then that's first and foremost a matter between your company and the legal authorities. Your company might have to pay a fine to the government, you might lose some licenses, a couple people might even go to prison, etc.. But none of that benefits your customer in any material way. But when they put your obligations to comply with the law in the contract, then they have a much easier time to hold you liable for any damages they had because your company broke the law.	It is legal and quite common. Your choice as consumer is at the point of selecting insurance company. If you dislike ES enough, that would be a reason to select a different insurance company. It would be surprising if your ES contract disallows pharmacy pick-up, but even if it did, that would also be legal. This does not mean that the government doesn't have the power to break up Express Scripts, under anti-trust laws. There is no clear rule regarding how successful a company can be in attracting customers.	Does (Customer) have any claim or recourse against (Store)? No. The store's conduct altogether preempts a finding of unconscionable tactics. The store's conduct would not be found in violation of Oregon's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). See ORS 646.605(9) et seq. (I am not verifying the multitude of cross-references in the UTPA, but the language of explicit items gives a general idea of what types of conduct the statute sanctions) The store's decision to decline orders, preorders or money for the product impliedly alerts customers not to grow premature expectations on acquiring the product. Also the store's disclaimer of out of stock weakens a customer's possible allegation that customer relied on a promise of availability of the product. Accordingly, the store prevents a customer from credibly arguing that he incurred losses as a result of the store's conduct. Does it matter if (Product) was available in other stores or just never produced at all? Does it matter if other stores have (Product) but charge more than $N? No. The fact that the store [unsuccessfully] attempted to get stock indicates that the shortage --and hence the failure to supply the product-- is not willful. This implies that the matter is not actionable even if the customer "suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property". See ORS 646.605(10) and .638. That being said, it is noteworthy 646.683(8)(a) lowers the requirement of willfulness [of violation] to one of recklessness in the context of class actions.
Why does Disney omit the year in their copyright notices? I was trying to sort a stack of movies chronologically. Most boxes contain a copyright notice e.g. “(c) 1985 Acme Pictures LLC“. However, Walt Disney Pictures consistently omits the year, e.g. “(c) Disney”. Why does Disney do things differently? Alternatively, why does the rest of the industry devote precious box space to the year in addition to the full name? Since a counter example has been found, here are the titles I observed (all VHS copies): Beauty and the Beast “(c) The Walt Disney Company” Bedknobs and Broomsticks “(c) The Walt Disney Company” Homeward Bound “(c) Buena Vista Pictures Distribution, Inc.” Sleeping Beauty “(c) Disney Enterprises, Inc.” The Santa Clause “(c) The Walt Disney Company”	For works released after 1989, Copyright notices don't have any legal consequences in the United States. They are just a friendly reminder of who created the work and that they take their copyrights seriously. But those notices are not required anymore to enforce your copyrights on the works you created. If you have proof that you own the copyright on something and when it was created, and if it's still within the term limits, then you can take legal actions against people who violate your copyright. Disney has a history of repeated worldwide lobbying for extending the expiration durations in copyright laws in order to avoid any of their classic cartoons from falling out of copyright protection. So it could be that they try to intentionally muddy the waters and make it harder to find out which of their works expire when. That way people are less sure about what Disney works are and are not in the public domain, making it more risky to use them. But that's just my theory.	What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation.	All Government produced documents in the United States are public domain, as they belong to the people. The company may be asking for license to use their film, which may include several other clips that they put in any order. Their film, specifically, including any explanatory dialog, commentary, or editing choices, are not fair game. However, the clip you are asking about is not copyrighted and is fair for any use.	For a particular poem(s) the copyright term in ROK is Life + 50 years. In copyright, these are measured as calendar years so it will enter the public domain on 1 January 2019. That is, unless you plan to use it in a country that doesn't observe the rule of the shorter term (like the USA) - in those countries it may still be under copyright based on the term using their individual domestic law. Ask another question if you want this clarified. Copyright in the anthology belongs to the person who created that work i.e. the editor(s) who selected and arranged those particular poems from those particular poets. The duration is measured from the (last of) the editor's death(s). IF you are not copying or deriving from the anthology (i.e. you are only using one of the poets and are arranging them in a different way), this is irrelevant to you.	Arguably not (or, the example terms are not restricted by copyright, but not for the reasons given, which means this protection may not extend past the examples given in all cases). The protection for "stock characters" comes from the "Scènes à faire" doctrine, which protects elements that are elementary and near-required to be part of a genre. For example, a fairy tale is "obligated" to start with "Once upon a time" and end with "And they lived happily ever after". Character classes, by virtue of being character classes, do not qualify under this doctrine to me, simply by virtue of being "character classes". What matters are: a) the terms used for the classes are generic b) there is prior art to any claimed copyright, with uses of such terms in fantasy fiction stretching back at least hundreds of years and predating, for example, modern English. Note that the above is not universal to all character classes. For example, if you had classes whose names that directly related to various other copyrighted works IP (e.g. "Jedi Councilor", "Yogo Wardmaster", "Grey Warden", "Aes Sedai", "Asha'man" "Eversor Assassin"), those could still be infringing copyright.	Copyright Your code, and the display it produces, is automatically protected by copyright the moment it is "fixed in a tangible form", which includes saving it in a computer file. In the US, a copyright notice has been optional since the effective date of the 1976 Copyright act, and in most other countries even longer. This is mandated by the Berne Copyright convention, and almost every country follows Berne, either directly or via the WTO's TRIPS Agreement. If an original work was posted to a web site, and then copied and re-posted without permission, the owner could send a takedown notice to the site where it is unlawfully posted, or that site's host. Or the author could sue for copyright infringement, and possibly collect money damages or get a court order forbidding further use of the content, or both. To sue in the US, the owner must first register the work with the copyright office, which requires payment of a fee. Trademark Unless you sell your program, or offer it for sale or rent, or sell or offer for sale something connected with it, such as a service, there will be no trademark. A trademark is a word, phrase, image, or design that identifies a particular product or service in the commercial marketplace. It serves to distinguish the trademarked product or service from other possibly similar things offered by other sellers. Product names, business names, slogans, logos, distinctive packaging, or design can all serve as trademarks. Once a person or business has acquired a valid trademark, others cannot, lawfully, use that mark or a closely similar one in ways that might confuse potential customers or members of the public about which goods come from which source, without permission. One also cannot lawfully use someone else's mark or a confusingly similar mark to suggest endorsement, approval, sponsorship or affiliation, unless one has permission from the trademark owner. To do either of these is to commit trademark infringement. If a trademark is infringed the owner may sue and possibly collect money damages, or get a court order against further infringement, or both. In some countries, only registered trademarks are protected against infringement. In others, such as the US, a degree of protection can be achieved just by using a mark "in trade", that is, commercially. Valid copyrights are valid all over the world, automatically. Trademarks, however, must be protected country-by-country: what is protected in one country may well not be in another. Trademark registration is generally separate for each separate country where the trademark is used. Unlike copyrights or patents, trademarks do not automatically expire after a fixed period. But if an owner stops using a trademark "in trade" it may be canceled for lack of use in a relatively short period, as short as 5 years in some countries.	In the US at least, copyright does not normally protect titles and other short phrases, they are considered not original enough. (See the US Copyright office Circular #33). However, titles, brand names, and slogans may be protected as trademarks, as may logos. A trademark is a word, phrase or symbol used to identify goods or services to customers and others. They key issue in a trademark case is: "might reasonable people be confused into falsely attributing the infringing item with the trademarked item, or into thinking that is is associate, endorsed, or sponsored by the makers of the trademarked item, or comes from the same source". When the name is the same and the general area and genre is similar, trademark protection seems plausible. Marvel is known to be quite protective of its IP, and might well have trademarked such a title. A successful suit by a trademark owner could lead to an injunction (a court order) against future use of the infringing m,ark, and significant money damages, depending on the detailed facts. A name such as "Black Pirate" is fairly generic, and might not receive much protection. On the other hand, if that name has become associated with a detailed and specific character or content, it might have acquired a "secondary meaning" and be more strongly protected. Consulting an experienced trademark lawyer or other expert might well be a very good idea.	In general, a gameplay video would be either a partial copy or a derivative work, and in either case an infringement if created without permission. Such a video might be covered under fair use in US copyright law, particularly if made for the purpose of commentary on a game or instruction in how to play or design a game. In general, a fair use defense is more likely to succeed if only the minimum amount of the work required for the purpose is used, and sound tracks might not be required for such a purpose. Thus a maker of such a video might choose to omit the sound to improve the fair-use case. Moreover, when the sound track contains licensed popular music it would be subject to a separate copyright, and many music publishers are notoriously litigious, so prudence would advise omitting the sound. All that said, fair-use is a case-by-case determination, and if the makers of such videos have not been sued, they (and we) can only guess how a case would turn out. As to why game makers refrain from having such videos taken down (if they in fact do refrain) one can only speculate. Game publishers may consider the videos good advertising. Questions based on the absence of legal proceedings are inherently speculative, unless a copyright holder has announced a policy of not taking action and the reasons for it.
Does returning an illegal product back to the seller for the refund make one liable for said product distribution? Suppose you purchased a product on eBay, realized that it was likely illegal (like a bootleg copy of the advertised copyrighted product), and returned it. Does the act of returning the product make you liable for its distribution? If one views the return and refund as a nullification of the original transaction maybe not, but if you consider the act of purchase and the act of the return as two separate actions then maybe the return is a kind of distribution, isn't it?	Does returning an illegal product back to the seller for the refund make one liable to said product distribution? The offence, in the USA, relating to posting counterfeit goods (such as bootleg copies of copyrighted items) is at 18 U.S. Code § 2320 (a)(1) Whoever intentionally - traffics in goods or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or services ... (f)(5) the term “traffic” means to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another, for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or to make, import, export, obtain control of, or possess, with intent to so transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of My reading of (f)(5), is that the element of possession with intent refers back to the transportation for advantage or gain which would not be the case for a straight refund, so it may be lawful to return the goods - subject to any prohibitions imposed by the postal carrier. However, there is no requirement to return counterfeit goods to the seller according to EBay's Money Back Guarantee Counterfeit items If a buyer reports that an item is counterfeit, and there are strong indicators that the item is counterfeit, we may not require the buyer to return the item to the seller. The buyer agrees to cooperate with us to ensure proper disposal of the item. In such instances, we refund the buyer for the full cost of the item and original shipping, and the seller is required to reimburse us for the refund. The buyer may not sell the item on eBay or elsewhere.	No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.	Your issue is trademark, not copyright. If these other guys use their mark (product name) in commerce but did not register it, they have an unregistered trademark which you could be infringing. Between two users of the same trademark, the first to use in commerce wins. (There is a territorial component but with the Internet, meh.) If the trademark is registered that gives them a presumption of validity. Trademark infringement is concerned with consumer confusion. If someone uses someone else's trademark in a way that confuses consumers as to the origin of the goods, that's a problem. What this means is that if I make tires with the name Sportie and someone else makes soap also with that name Sportie there is not a high likelihood of confusion. Likewise a hotel in Washington called Runner's Cove probably doesn't infringe a shoe store in Florida with the same name. Fantasy games and fantasy books sold over the Internet? Sounds like a potential problem that you might want to clear up before the second book.	I'm confident that there has been no successful breach of contract lawsuit on that basis: that is not the right legal basis. Actions against a shoplifter would either be under tort law or, much more likely, criminal law. Put simply, theft is a crime, encoded in the laws of all nations, and the government will shoulder the burden of punishing a shoplifter. Since the goal of criminal law is to guarantee a well-ordered society (not to restore the victim of the crime), a victim of theft may have to pursue their own legal case against the criminal, if they want to be restored for their loss (let us say that the criminal also ate the evidence).	It may be illegal under product labelling regulations that apply to that kind of product (or under a general deceptive trade practices act), but even then, only if you are interpreting the numbers, whose meaning is not clearly spelled out, correctly. But, to be actionable as fraud it must, among other things, be a misrepresentation as to a material fact (which if the goods, such as cordless drills, are not perishable it probably isn't) and the recipient of the misrepresentation must have justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation (which is necessary not true in the case of a representation that it was made in December 2018 on a product sold no later than July of 2018). It is also not entirely clear that this is a "made on" date. It could refer, for example, to the the twelfth batch or lot or shipment of products made in 2018, and not to the month of December, or it could refer to a product made in 2018 at factory number 12. @NateEldredge in the comments also makes the plausible observation that it could be a week number which is a common system in manufacturing which would put it in a more reasonable March 2018 time frame. You probably shouldn't do anything, because you haven't been harmed by this cryptic string of numbers embossed on the product, and even if you were, your damages would not be worth the time or money involved to pursue it as anything other than part of a class action lawsuit.	Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement.	In the U.S.: To my knowledge all states and jurisdictions that with a "sales tax" technically have a "use" tax, which means the tax liability falls on the purchaser. However, they require "businesses" (whose exact definition varies by jurisdiction) to collect and remit that tax on behalf of "consumers" (which can also vary, e.g., to exclude businesses that resell). Historically consumers have avoided paying use taxes by purchasing from out-of-state businesses that are not subject to their home states' laws on withholding the use tax: while technically a violation of the tax law neither consumers nor states have had an interest in calculating or auditing use taxes owed, except in the case of very large and unusual transactions. There is a large effort underway by states and "brick-and-mortar" stores that lose business to this virtual "mail order tax exemption" to subject out-of-state businesses to the requirement of collecting use taxes on behalf of the state. A few online businesses (notably Amazon) have acquiesced to this demand. To answer your question: In the U.S., an individual who is not making a "business" of selling items or services is generally exempt from the requirement to collect sales tax. It is the purchaser who has the legal obligation to declare and pay tax on such transactions. But purchasers rarely do.	is this even legal? It is legal, but at the same time the contract is voidable by you. This means that if the buyer rejects the EULA, he is entitled to return the unused product and be reimbursed. Obviously once the buyer has used the product, the conclusion will be that he accepted the EULA and therefore no longer can void the contract. The buyer's entitlement to rescind the contract compensates for the fact that he was not duly informed about the conditions prior to making the purchase.
Springsteen was charged with "consuming alcohol in an enclosed area" Bruce Springsteen received including DWI and "consuming alcohol in an enclosed area" (the word "closed" is also used) in November 2020 in Gateway National Recreation Area in New Jersey. I searched for those phrases and for National Park Service regulations related to alcohol and was unable to find an explanation. I'd like to see a link to the relevant law and have an explanation of what constitutes a closed or enclosed area in this context and the motivation for this restriction. This seems odd to me because, in my opinion, restricting the consumption of alcohol in public, outside of enclosed places, is the familiar case.	The area is "closed" (not open), or "restricted" to alcohol consumption. Here is a memo reminding of alcohol restrictions, noting 36 CFR 2.35 which states that The superintendent may close all or a portion of a public use area or public facility within a park area to the consumption of alcoholic beverages and/or to the possession of a bottle, can or other receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage that is open, or that has been opened, or whose seal is broken or the contents of which have been partially removed. This was done in the case of the area, apparently a few years earlier (i,e, it used to be allowed and there was a policy change). The Gateway Nt'l Park website states that "Alcoholic beverages at Sandy Hook are prohibited", as are a bunch of other things. The motivation is part of the regulation, that the superintendent determined that (A) The consumption of an alcoholic beverage or the possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage would be inappropriate considering other uses of the location and the purpose for which it is maintained or established; or (B) Incidents of aberrant behavior related to the consumption of alcoholic beverages are of such magnitude that the diligent application of the authorities in this section and §§ 1.5 and 2.34 of this chapter, over a reasonable time period, does not alleviate the problem.	I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level.	I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with.	The ordinance is not very specific about how notice is to be given: therefore, it need not be in writing, and it need not be sent by mail. It would not be surprising if the "notification" came in the form of a city person inspecting the reported obstruction, walking up to the house and knocking and finding nobody home (thus triggering the "In case the owner cannot be found" condition), whereupon the city removes the rocks. That clause does not mean "In case we do not know who the owner is", it almost certainly means "in case the owner cannot be contacted immediately". Article III is in general about obstructions on streets, which are not allowed, except by permit in section 78 under "Permit to Obstruct Traffic Lane". Assuming that no obstruction permit was obtained, what usually happens is that an officer is sent to tell the owner to remove the obstruction (more or less immediately), and if nobody is at the site whom they can tell, they probably won't go any further (e.g. asking neighbors where the owner is). There is no legal definition of "reasonable time", instead the law simply takes that to mean "the amount of time a reasonable person would require". It would thus depend particularly on the size of the obstruction and the volume of traffic. One measure would be how quickly the rocks were moved -- if it was a matter of days and there was no notice, written or otherwise, then there would not be the kind of urgency that might justify the "We knocked and nobody was home" version of notification.	I would say no, it's not the same. There's a reasonable expectation of privacy that you have in an office that isn't present when you're standing on a roadside or in a city park. In Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit said "The filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers performing their responsibilities" was in the spirit of the First Amendment. And this is not limited to police; an arrest "in the course of filming officials in the hallway outside a public meeting of a historic district commission" was found to be a First Amendment violation in Iacobucci v. Boulter (1st Cir. 1999). But a private meeting in an office is not a "public place" as it is meant in Glik (even if the building is owned by the government.) And the Glik decision says "To be sure, the right to film is not without limitations. It may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions."	This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough.	The felon-possession law is Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503, which distinguishes Category I restricted person and Category II restricted person, a complex definitions that distinguish felons in general and violent felons, as defined at Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5. In the case stricter case, the law says: (2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under the person's custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or control: (a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or (b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree felony. and in the less strict case: (3) A Category II restricted person who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or control: (a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or (b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. The law does not impose any restrictions unrestricted people. A "dangerous weapon" is defined in 76-10-501(6)(a) as "a firearm; or an object that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury". They add a bit of subjectivity to their definition of "dangerous weapon" (i.e. "we'll decide after the fact if the thing is a dangerous weapon"), because: (b) The following factors are used in determining whether any object, other than a firearm, is a dangerous weapon: (i) the location and circumstances in which the object was used or possessed; (ii) the primary purpose for which the object was made; (iii) the character of the wound, if any, produced by the object's unlawful use; (iv) the manner in which the object was unlawfully used; (v) whether the manner in which the object is used or possessed constitutes a potential imminent threat to public safety; and (vi) the lawful purposes for which the object may be used. The felon could not have a stun gun with the intent to use it as a dangerous weapon, but it is not prohibited for a felon to have one to use on for legal purposes. There are contexts where stun guns are held to be dangerous weapons (United States v. Wallace, 800 F.2d 1509. Some states define stun guns as dangerous weapons, but that is not the case in Utah. It is also illegal for an unrestricted person to "sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any firearm or dangerous weapon to any person, knowing that the recipient is" a restricted person, and in cases of flagrant negligence the court might find that allowing such a person access to a dangerous weapon constituted "transferring" the weapon.	Taking the stated facts at face value (i.e. you can prove them in court). Md. TRANSPORTATION Code Ann. § 20-102 § 20-102. Driver to remain at scene -- Accidents resulting in bodily injury or death (a) Bodily injury. -- (1) The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to another person immediately shall stop the vehicle as close as possible to the scene of the accident, without obstructing traffic more than necessary. (2) The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to another person immediately shall return to and remain at the scene of the accident until the driver has complied with § 20-104 of this title. So, you must stay there until you have complied with § 20-104. Md. TRANSPORTATION Code Ann. § 20-104 § 20-104. Duty to give information and render aid (a) Rendering assistance. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall render reasonable assistance to any person injured in the accident and, if the person requests medical treatment or it is apparent that medical treatment is necessary, arrange for the transportation of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical treatment. (b) Duty to give certain information. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall give his name, his address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and, on request, exhibit his license to drive, if it is available, to: (1) Any person injured in the accident; and (2) The driver, occupant of, or person attending any vehicle or other property damaged in the accident. (c) Exhibiting license. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall give the same information described in subsection (b) of this section and, on request, exhibit his license to drive, if it is available, to any police officer who is at the scene of or otherwise is investigating the accident. (d) If no one able to receive information. -- If a police officer is not present and none of the specified persons is in condition to receive the information to which the person otherwise would be entitled under this section, the driver, after fulfilling to the extent possible every other requirement of § 20-102 of this title and subsection (a) of this section, immediately shall report the accident to the nearest office of an authorized police authority and give the information specified in subsection (b) of this section. So, not only is it legal to leave to seek aid, its required.
Can a company officially decide to break the law since the penalty for breaking it is cheaper than following it? For example imagine a company in Washington that needs a temporary building for its workers to live in during the summer. Instead of bothering with permits, they rapidly construct a dormitory for their employees which is a violation punishable for up to $500/day. They keep the building up for 3 months and then pay a $45k penalty to the state government. For their purposes this is cheaper than getting those employees hotel rooms or waiting for the permits to arrive. Is there any issue with the company’s management officially deciding to ignore the permit system and just pay the fine? Or in other words, can they be charged with anything besides the known $45k penalty for openly deciding to break the law? In more general terms, I’m trying to understand if the concept of “treat fines as a convenience fee” applies to businesses as well. I.e. it is commonly said that smoking in hotels is allowed, you just have to pay a $250 fee to do it.	Yes, but there is a risk If a company persistently violates the law, the regulator can go to court to get an injunction for them and their agents to stop. If they don’t they are now in contempt of court and the fines for that are much steeper. Also, the people in contempt can be jailed until the contempt stops.	That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.	What do you mean by "a public building"? Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. Assuming that the Senior Center is owned by the town, it is probable that the Administrator is empowered to act as the town's agent in this matter. Now, since this "No Trespass order" is specifically directed at you, there is a reason behind it. It may be something you've done. It may be that complaints have been received about your behavior. It may be an actual abuse by someone who doesn't like you. We have no way of knowing. It the order itself doesn't give you a hint as to why, you can ask the town administrator for the reason. As for being against your rights, there is nothing inherently illegal about this situation(that is, an agent of a property owner exercising the latter's right to prohibit an individual from said property), but some of the details, especially why it was specifically applied to you as an individual might be a civil rights violation.	You would report unpermitted lock replacement to the home owner. The building code regulates new construction and renovations, and is not a requirement of any and all residences. This seems to correspond to a "secondary suite", which is supposed to be registered with the city (if it is allowed in your city). Here is a link for Vancouver, for instance. Such suites are supposed to be registered and inspected, the inspection being carried out by Development, Building and Licencing: By-Law Compliance & Administration (a division of the city government). This article discusses some of the legal problems that can arise from an illegal secondary suite, however the penalties would land on the property owner, and he may not have approved of this subletting or the basement suite. A less-nuclear first step would therefore be reporting it to the property owner.	Landlord-tenant law is an area that is heavily statute-based, jurisdiction-dependent, and far from uniform across the country. A complex, specific, multi-part question like this one is not going to get a simple answer. In general, though, I can clear up some of the confusion with a quick example. Let's say you abandon your lease, but as you do so, you write a letter to the landlord saying: "While I won't be living there any more, my friend's band needs a place to practice. They have agreed to pay half my rent if you let them play there 4 nights a week. They'll be starting on Tuesday at 11 PM: please have a set of keys waiting for them at the front desk." The landlord does not give your friends the keys. They re-key and clean the apartment and rent it two months later. Are you going to stand up in court and argue, with a straight face, that you should only be liable for half the rent for those two months because of the landlord's "failure to mitigate"? Again, jurisdictions differ, but the duty to mitigate is not absolute. If the landlord could rent out a $1,000/month apartment for $5 a month, it doesn't have to do that, and you can't make the Court take $5 a month off their damages if they refuse to do so. Also, you seem to be confused about what subleasing is. A sublessor owes duties to you; you still owe the duty to your landlord to get the rent paid. A sublease is an agreement between you and a third party to pay you rent. It does not affect your relationship with the landlord at all, unless it's a breach of your agreement with the landlord or of local law protecting the landlord from unauthorized subleasing.	Lying in itself ("of course you will get a wifi signal here") is not a crime. However, if you have proof that the lies were intended to benefit your landlord at your expense ("You won't sign the lease unless there's wifi? No problem") and that they actually did so ("You've signed the lease, it's too late to back out"), he may be guilty of fraud, which is a civil wrong and may be a crime. You would be well advised to consult a lawyer before going amy further, since there are probably ten people believing themselves to be victims of fraud for every one who actually is so in legal terms. The lawyer will also probably tell you that the best you can hope for is restoration to the state before the lies (in my example, the lease is cancelled and you get your deposit back), though the authorities will look at prosecuting the landlord.	Technically the signage implied an agreement, and allowed you to infer one. But yes, I think that management could not legally insist on more than the posted price, whether for a lost ticket, or for a particular duration. (Unless the sign included "prices subject to change without notice" or something of the sort.) As a practical matter, challenge this is going to be a pain. The employees on the spot probably have no authority to vary the price merely because the amount programmed into the register differs from the posted sign. At least they will claim not to have such authority. And they won't release the car without being paid the $80 that they will insist is the proper price. To challenge this, a person would probably have to pay under protest, and then sue for a refund, I would hope in a small claims court. Most people will not go to that trouble for $10, which perhaps the management counts on. Publicity might be more effective.	I cannot recall an example where a breach of such guidance in-and-of-itself is an offence: it's when the underlying legislation is contravened that one is committed. Note that the cited article say this: this guidance is of a general nature. Employers should consider the specific conditions of each individual place of work and comply with all applicable legislation and regulations, including the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. This guidance does not supersede existing legislation or regulations across the UK More broadly, and away from the NHS, the relationship between guidance and statute was examined in The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) v Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd & Ors [2020] EWHC 2448 (Comm) where adherence to social distancing measures impacted on safe working practices on building sites, causing delays and an increase in costs. The court determined that: It follows that government advice or recommendations, whether before or after either set of Regulations came into effect, cannot have imposed or ordered a denial of access or a hindrance in access, however strongly worded the advice or recommendations were, since they did not have the force of law.
What happens if I used an invention for some commercial use after its public disclosure and before it got patented? In the US, inventors have up to 1 year to file for a patent to the USPTO after an invention has been publicly disclosed, and by default the USPTO takes 1.5 years to publish the patent application after it was filed. This means that during 2.5 years, an invention might be displayed somewhere publicly before the public is aware that a patent has been filed for it. What happens if I used an invention for some commercial use after its public disclosure and before it got patented? Do I have the same obligations toward the inventors as if I had used the invention after it got patented?	Until and unless a patent is issued, the inventor has no exclusive rights. Assuming a patent is granted, the issued claims will be what defines infringement. What you do before the patent is issued is not infringement since there is nothing to infringe. However, if there is a finding of infringement in the U.S. for activity after a patent is issued, the patent owner can possibly also get royalties for activities you engaged in (in the U.S.) before the patent was issued under 35 U.S.C. § 154(d). This ABA article explains its effect in practice. The rights the patentee has in this regard are called "provisional rights". Nothing at all to do with provisional applications. In the U.S., once a patent application is published, someone who does something that would infringe a hypothetical future patent with claims very similar to the published claims and who is on notice of the publication, can be subject to future royalties. If the issued claims are quite different from the published claims, this law does not apply. As mentioned in the ABA article this was put in place by Congress when the 18 month publication requirement went in. That was part of an international treaty that has the U.S. conform to the publication regimen the rest of the world had been doing. Prior to that treaty U.S. patent applications were confidential up to the day of grant. If an applicant decided the allowed claims were not worth the disclosure, they could abandon the patent application and opt to keep it a trade secret instead. This is still possible by asserting, in a non-publication request, to the USPTO that no filing outside the U.S. will be made.	In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.	Trivial is hard to judge after the fact due to hindsight bias. Once you know the answer to a riddle it seems obvious but you couldn’t figure it out without already knowing it. The criteria for get a patent in the US does not include the word or concept “trivial”. It does include non-obviousness. To reduce hindsight bias an examiner needs to follow a process of identifying all sub- components of an invention in the prior art and then making a good argument as to how someone of ordinary skill in the field would be motivated to put them together. Also there is no measure of improvement over past technology required for a patent. A trivial improvement in cost or performance is fine. Actually no objective improvement is required at all. An existing solution might work as well or better than your invention. That means probably no one will buy it but if it is novel and not obvious one can get a patent.	Your client is confused about how copyright law works (at least in the United States and virtually every other country I've ever heard about copyright in). If I were guessing, they read something like this from the United States Copyright Office: The copyright in a derivative work covers only the additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work. Protection does not extend to any preexisting material, that is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a third party. and figured that because it's a derivative work, the copyright only covers the additions and changes they make, and there's no copyright protection for the original work. This misunderstands the law: the original work still has its own copyright (assuming it hasn't expired), and permission from the holder of the copyright on the original work is required to create that derivative work in the first place. The copyright on the derivative work is separate—that is, both copyrights exist in parallel. Some exceptions, such as fair use, exist, but would be unlikely to apply to the situation you describe.	Publication after the author's death is still publication. As you can see in this excellent chart this work is copyrighted for 95 years after the publication date under US law. If it had never been published, it would be protected by copyright for 70 years after the death of Lovecraft, the author (a term which has now expired). However, statements of genealogy would be facts, and as such are not protected by copyright. limited quotes to support those facts would be appropriate in a work of non-fiction, and would normally be permitted as fair use under US law. Such quotes would probably not be appropriate in fiction in any case. The exact wording of the genealogy would probably be protected, but not the relationships (who is the parent of whom, etc).	Once you withdrew the complaint without prejudice, any statute of limitations benefit you obtained from filing the lawsuit evaporated. From a legal perspective, it is as if you never filed at all, except that the lawsuit that was filed proves that you had notice of the claim at the time you filed, so you cannot take advantage of any "discovery rule" that allows a statute of limitations to start running from the date that you knew or should have known of your right to file a lawsuit. In all likelihood, the statute of limitations has now run, although that would depend upon the jurisdiction in which it was filed. Some jurisdictions toll the statute of limitations during a period of minority, but that tolling might very well be insufficient to allow the claim to be filed 20 years later.	Many attorneys would have an "intake form" that they would like you to complete in advance, and every lawyer will want your name and contact information at a first meeting. But, other attorneys would prefer to meet with you first, without getting details about the work to be done, as many patent applicants are very reluctant to put information in writing that is shared with others and many patent applicants don't know what is relevant. There is no special terminology for the things that you should prepare for prior to meeting with an attorney. And, anyone who completed a provisional patent application is not so half-baked in their idea that it is premature to meet with a patent lawyer. Having done a provisional patent application is more than enough due diligence and preparation for such a meeting. The marginal cases where preparation by clients is often lacking are those cases where the concept of the invention isn't fully fleshed out yet and the inventor is trying to work with a patent lawyer to figure out what part of "idea space" isn't already protected by patents. There are basically three kinds of information that are relevant: When was the invention invented, made public, or shared with anyone? Is there anyone else who could be considered a co-inventor? For example, if you have an employment agreement discussing intellectual property, you should bring it. You would need your full provisional patent application, which will explain most of the necessary information but may need to be clarified for a final application. If visual aids are helpful to explaining your invention or you have prototypes small enough to bring with you, you should bring them, even if they are beyond the scope of the provisional patent application's contents. You ideally should do some due diligence regarding "prior art" to provide some assurance that the idea you propose hasn't already been patented or discovered, but not every patent applicant has the ability to do such a prior art search. At a minimum, you should be able to say in good faith that you've never seen a similar invention and explain why you think personally that your invention is novel. Generally, you should not order a professional patent search before you have discussed it with your patent attorney. But, if you are able to do so and have reviewed existing patents, reviewed literature you are able to access, and have done some Google searches for similar ideas, that would be more than reasonable preparation. But, don't delay meeting with a patent lawyer because you haven't done those things. A patent lawyer needs lead time to prepare the application by the deadline for doing so (ideally, several months, and at a minimum, several weeks to a couple of months). In addition, you should be prepared to discuss why your invention is not obvious to someone skilled in the relevant field and what utility your patent has to a user of the invention. Similarly, you should be ready to discuss the larger context of the field in which you have an invention, such as how others usually deal with the issue that your invention addresses in the status quo and what other notable new inventions there are in that field. "Buzz words" related to your kind of invention are also very helpful for doing searches of prior art. Finally, you should be prepared to demonstrate that you have the capacity to pay for the patent lawyer's work. Patent lawyers almost never do pro bono (i.e. charitable) patent work for individual inventors (sometimes they might, for example, for a university clinic aimed at inventing things for use in the Third World), and are loathe to do work on a contingent or on credit basis, although sometimes they would be willing to work on credit if you could provide security for the debt beyond the patent itself (e.g. putting the equity in your home up as collateral). A patent lawyer would almost always charge more than $10,000 to do the work beyond an initial consultation (which wouldn't be free but might cost $100-$1000), and often a patent could cost $100,000 for each patent for legal work, if it was at all complex. Patent lawyer have among the highest hourly rates of all kinds of attorneys. So, the more clearly thought out you are, the better organized your paperwork is, and the more efficiently you can communicate your invention, the less you will pay for meeting with the patent lawyer while "the meter is running." Even in the unlikely case that the patent lawyer will do the work on credit, the patent lawyer will at a minimum insist that you provide the filing fees up front. If you are truly broke, you need a business partner to finance the patenting process for you. You can look at the relevant fee schedules at the patent and trademark office website. The patent lawyer would also expect any out of pocket costs for things like a professional prior art search, having quality drawings prepared, courier fees, and mailing costs to be paid in advance, even if doing some of the legal work on credit. The prior art search is the most expensive item and it would usually cost in the low single digit thousands of dollars.	Does the registrant still have common law rights over the mark? Maybe. According to Yospin Law, Just because a mark is listed as “dead” at the USPTO, does not mean it is available to use without registration, or to register. It’s possible that the registrant of the trademark abandoned the federal trademark registration, but is still using the mark – and so still has common law trademark rights. Does this mean the registrant can never register this mark again? No. It does not mean the trademark can never be registered again. However, a new application for registration of the mark must be made. This registration is completely separate from the previous one - it's effectively registering a new mark that happens to be identical to an old one, without the problems that would normally cause. Can another entity register this mark for the same purpose? Possibly. If it remains in use under common law rights, you would face an uphill battle to successfully register it for yourself. If it is truly abandoned, you can apply for registration, but as Beth Hutchens discussed, this is not a simple matter of filling out the form and celebrating your new acquisition. Here is a handy brief summary, but for any actual case, your first step should be to consult a patent and trademark attorney, particularly one experienced in the jurisdiction you intend to use the mark in.
Is it legal to sell un-trippable circuit breakers? About a week ago, the popular YouTuber bigclivedotcom uploaded this video, in which he showed a "circuit breaker", which on the outside seems marked appropriately, but is entirely non-functional; meaning that in the event of an overload or short-circuit, electricity would still flow, leading to potentially damaged electrical equipment, electrical fires, injury or death. Would it be legal to sell such a thing? What would the concequences be? Note: I am primarily interested in answers regarding the EU and the UK.	TLDR: it's illegal to BUY it. It's illegal to USE it. Know your suppliers. That's certainly an interesting question, in light of how the market has changed in recent years, particularly due to Amazon/eBay, but even moreso due to Amazon Fulfillment and competitors. Over on diy.se, this is a constant vexation, because we see people buy crud like this all the time, and they need help installing it. And we find it's illegal to install, not even safe, and needs to be sent back in lieu of listed product. The advanced nations do have a highly effective apparatus for screening and blocking dangerous goods. However, these protections are geared toward bricks-and-mortar retail. Can you count on something bought at Wickes, Redoute or Home Depot? By and large, yes. Is it legal to export it to you? Yes, for all practical purposes. The people selling it are in an unreachable bastion in a foreign country that would not cooperate with their extradition, and would interfere with investigation. The government knows perfectly well that the stuff is complete crud, and doing so aligns with its national policies of raising hard currency and building industrial capacity, while harming the capacity of other nations. Is it legal for the item to be listed on Amazon or eBay? Amazon and eBay say "Yes". Their position is that they are merely a platform which connects buyers and sellers. They surely have excellent lawyers. Amazon is more like eBay than you might realize. Amazon opened their retail site to third party sellers. Third parties can sign up as additional sellers of a particular SKU, or write their own product listings. Since Amazon's behavior has been unchallenged, the answer seems to be "yes". Is it legal for Amazon to bring it into their warehousing systems? Amazon also opened their warehousing system to third party use. That can be for companies that don't sell on Amazon... or it can be for companies that do both Amazon and off-Amazon sales; in the latter case you order elsewhere but Amazon fulfills (ships) the item. When a company both sells the item on Amazon and it ships from an Amazon warehouse, it qualifies for "Prime" shipping where Amazon offers that. Amazon also offers "Commingling" for established SKUs. The idea is that if you have widgets in the Madrid warehouse, and I have widgets in a Warsaw warehouse... and a Madrid customer buys mine - why not ship them yours since they are all the same? I get credit for the sale and Amazon "owes you one". When you get a sale in Madrid, Amazon has one in Barcelona so they ship that one to your customer. Commingling is great, but what happens when I inject a pallet full of those SKUs - and they're counterfeits? Amazon doesn't know the difference, and your Warsaw customer gets my counterfeit. So do Amazon's Berlin and Wroclaw customers. Amazon ships them around the network to balance the warehouses, and now my counterfeit has contaminated the supply. I'm sitting in China. Whatcha gonna do about it? Again, Amazon has top lawyers, who have surely done their diligence. Still, the program is ambitious, and e-commerce giants break the law all the time with their ambitions. In the US, there's the "Express Shipment" rule, which allows small orders ($800 or less) with no duty and an informal entry process. So they ship to Mexican warehouses, and then bring the items over by the truckload. Wait, how can a truckload be less than $800? Because they don't bring it over until there's an end-user customer order, and they argue "these are for individual customers". This qualifies them to breeze through customs, bypassing the quality and safety controls that prevent Home Depot from doing the exact same thing with a truckload that hasn't found customers yet. Is it legal for you (as the end consumer) to import it? No. The rules for Conformité Européenne are that the importer is responsible. When you as an end customer buy mail-order from China, you are the importer. Under EU law, if you bring a CE-marked item into the EU, you are responsible for meeting the CE design standards, and doing in-house lab testing to affirm the performance of the product. By having the CE mark on the thing you imported, you are attesting to having done that. Further, the various nations may require that a certified independent testing lab verify your testing and claims. This was historically done by national testing labs like BSI, TUV, CSA or UL. However by treaty they are largely cross-recognized: US OSHA keeps a canonical list of "Nationally (by USA) Recognized Testing Labs" (NRTLs) that every other agency and many other countries defer to. Big Clive is probably fine, since Clive's purpose is public ridicule, not usage. Is it legal for you to install it in your house? Oh, heck no. Every nation has rules as to what certifications equipment must meet to legally be installed in a building's electrical system. For instance North America's El NEC, widely adopted or copied, has 110.2: 110.2 Approval. The conductors [wires] and equipment required or permitted by this Code shall be acceptable only if approved. "Approved" means by competent testing labs; i.e. OSHA's list of NRTLs. So no, you can't install non-approved equipment in any jurisdiction with a similar rule (and you pretty much need such a rule for inspections to have any teeth).	I emailed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in the USA asking this and received the reply: "There is nothing to prevent you from marketing antiques in the UK while present in the US." I also contacted a relevant US attorney and received: "There’s nothing in your question which would implicate Colorado or US law. If you're a UK citizen, and the sale is happening in the UK while you're in the US, then the US has anything to do with it. So as long as the UK doesn’t have any problem with it, the US will not." So I would conclude this question fairly answered.	No, it does not. There is indeed a 2-year guarantee for all goods, but "goods" is defined to be a "tangible movable item" according to Directive 1999/44/EC Article 1, subsection 2(b). In less legalese, a physical item; software doesn't count. While there has been discussion about extending this protection to software, I'm not aware of this having been done yet. Even if it were, determining whether goods are "faulty" ultimately comes down to whether it conforms to the contract of sale (Article 2). I think it's likely that vendors in this area would put a disclaimer for unforeseen security vulnerabilities, or something to that effect.	To answer the question in the headline, yes, it is legal to install a non-original battery in an iPhone. In a 2016 Supreme Court case regarding another consumer electronics product (in that case, printers), the Court found that once a company has sold a product they cannot dictate how it is used. Since the phone is your property you are free to repair as you see fit. Re your edit: The tech making the repair would not get in trouble either, unless they separately had a contract with Apple that forbade them from doing the repair; that's not something you as a customer can account for. You do not say if your phone is under warranty. If it is not, Apple is generally free to decline to service it for any reason. For information about your rights under warranty, see bta's excellent answer on this same question. There is also good information in the comments on this answer.	I know the OP is asking about America, but its also worth knowing about other countries. This is legal if both subscriber and subscription are within the EU. There was also a court case about this. In another case in 2014 the pub lost, but that seems to have been because the decoder was only licensed for domestic use. These cases were for satellite decoders rather than Internet streaming, but the legal issues would be the same. Both these cases involved British pubs, so obviously this law doesn't apply to them since Brexit.	No Via the FTC (emphasis added): The Cooling-Off Rule does not cover sales that are: ... made entirely online, or by mail or telephone;	The acts in question don't distinguish between online and in person sales. Both are retail sales. A retail sale is a sale for use rather than a wholesale sale for resale. Wholesale sales are exempt from sales tax and so are easy to distinguish. Online sales are still retail sales. It is a distinction without a difference. Sales and Use Tax Law § 6007(a)(1) and common law case law would suffice. There is also case law under the UCC, and the relevant federal statutes. But, I doubt that the argument of the vendor would be that it didn't make a retail sale (at least once their lawyers got involved). More importantly, there is nothing that says that online sales aren't retail sales. Bob should contact the online sales department to seek a remedy since he was advised by the company to contact that department. But the part of the company handling his complaint doesn't change his rights. Warranty rights don't depend upon the intent of the parties. If a warranty arises and it good isn't as warranted, there is a legal right to a remedy. If a store doesn't honor one's legal warranty rights, then you sue the store for damages, typically, in a court of limited jurisdiction, or if there is an arbitration clause, in a consumer arbitration forum (some of which are not actively doing business due to controversies in recent years, leaving a judicial forum open).	Barring manufacturer negligence (and even this is a dubious theory, given that recovery would be for pure economic loss), there is probably no legal theory that would allow recovery of any loss of resale value. I am assuming that the promise to replace/repair the engine if it fails is part of the contract of sale. This is typical for a warranty that the manufacturer will repair certain failures. Assuming the manufacturer fulfils what it agreed to in the warranty, then the buyer is getting exactly what they contracted for and there is no contractual theory that would support any further recovery: there is no breach. The buyer bought a car that included a warranty to repair. I cannot imagine that they bought a car that included a promise that it would not fail.
What is meant by the provision about electors in the Seventeenth Amendment? I was reading about the Seventeenth Amendment and had a question about one of the sentences in its opening paragraph: The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. What does this phrase mean? Is this referring to Electoral College electors? To the voters in the state casting votes? To the officials up for election? I've done some searching online about this and haven't really found anything on the subject.	It refers to the voters in the state who cast votes. "Elector" isn't a special term invented for the Electoral College, it just means "person who votes in the election." For President, the real election is technically when the Electoral College votes, so those are the "electors." For Senate, the real election is when the people of the state vote, and so every qualified voter in the state is an elector. The provision means that a state has to set the same standards to vote for Senate as to vote for its own legislature; this has always been true for the House, and limits the extent to which a state can undermine the concept of popular election of Congress.	In the United States, the answer depends on who is unlawfully in power. In the hypothetical you presented, the answer is probably that the law would remain valid, as Congress generally has the sole authority to pass judgment on whether to admit the elected person. A third party would not have the ability to challenge the law based on the qualifications of a lawmaker. But if we were dealing with an administrative official promulgating regulations, those rules would generally be void if that official were unlawfully appointed. That was the case in Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014), where a cola distributor challenged a labor regulation, saying that the members of the NLRB who enacted it were improperly appointed. The Court agreed that the appointments were improper, so the regulations were nullified. A judicial decision coming out under these circumstances would also be nullified if one of the judges weren't really a judge. That happened just last year, in Yovino v. Rizo. In that case, ten judges from the Ninth Circuit heard a case, and the vote split 6-4. But the author of the majority opinion died before the decision was published, which is when it become effective. The Supreme Court held that because there were therefore only five votes for that decision, it was not a majority opinion, and therefore not binding on future Ninth Circuit panels.	Yes the Senate could adopt a secret ballot rule, but other constitutional provisions combined with high partisanship make it practically impossible that the final results will be done through secret ballot. As other answers have mentioned, Article 1, Section 3, provides for the Senate to have sole power of trying impeachments. Similarly by Article 1, Section 5, each House may adopt its own rules. That means that yes the Senate can create its own rules that say the conviction vote will be done by secret ballot. However, adopting these rules only achieves a pyrrhic secret ballot. The very same section that provides for each house to make its own rules (Article 1, Section 5) also states: ...and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the desire of one fifth of those present, be entered on the Journal. This means that if any vote is taken including this secret ballot vote, after doing so any member can ask for the Yeas and Nays of all members to be put into the Journal. The journal is the official record of each House. Thus while the vote was first taken in secret at least any member of the Senate will have access to the subsequent recorded vote, provided at least 1/5 of the Senate wishes to have a recorded vote. While not all is lost, the Senate could declare that this record itself is to remain secret, all 100 Senators and most likely many of their staff members will know how each Senator voted. Additionally, the Speech and Debate Clause states that: for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. Thus if a Senator were to publicly read the vote results into the record of a public committee hearing or during a filibuster or for really any other procedure (as rules of germane debate are very very lax in the Senate, but that is an issue for another question) that information could easily become public record. So while yes the rules can be changed to use secret ballot, a fifth (20 Senators currently) could ask for the Yeas and Nays to be entered on the Journal and this defeats the purpose of the secret ballot. So the only reasonable way to keep a secret ballot as the final dispositive record of a vote is to convince more than 4/5ths of the Senators to not ask for a recorded vote. In this sense it is certainly allowed and possible for the Senate to vote by secret ballot.	There seems to be no current applicable prohibition state law in Iowa in Iowa Code 39A, the Election Misconduct and Penalties Act. It is also not at all clear that precinct caucuses count as "elections" as applicable to the sections with criminal prohibitions (the precinct caucus does not appear to constitute a "primary election" under Iowa law).	The operative clause is constrained to interpretations that are consistent with the prefatory clause. "But apart from that clarifying function, a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause." DC v Heller 554 U.S. 570 (2008) The majority in Heller, after interpreting the operative clause "return[ed] to the prefatory clause to ensure that [their] reading of the operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose." In their case, since their interpretation of the operative clause was consistent with the announced purpose in the prefatory clause, the prefatory clause may seem to have no effect. However, they make the point that other interpretations of the operative clause can be ruled out by cross-checking against the announced purpose from the prefatory clause: "petitioners’ interpretation does not even achieve the narrower purpose that prompted codification of the right." The court writes that if the petitioners had their way, only state-organized militias would be the beneficiary of the 2nd Amendment protections. However, the majority does not read the prefatory clause this narrowly. "[If] the organized militia is the sole institutional beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee — it does not assure the existence of a “citizens’ militia” as a safeguard against tyranny." The majority reads the prefatory clause to refer to a "citizens' militia": "the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense".	This document from the Michigan Sec'y of State says that "A US citizen who has never resided in the US and has a parent, legal guardian or spouse that was last domiciled in Michigan is eligible to vote in Michigan as long as he or she has not registered or voted in another State". You then use the Federal Post Card Application or the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot, which you can get here.	One can argue both ways. On one side, yes, zero representation in the Senate for all states is equal suffrage in the Senate. On the other side, no, depriving all states of all representation in the Senate deprives them of their suffrage in the Senate (without needing to consider the question of whether the suffrage is equal). Since this question has never been considered by a court, we can't do much more than speculate how one might rule. There has never been an amendment proposed to modify the composition of the Senate -- at least not one that was seriously considered. The spirit of the law works in favor of the second interpretation. Furthermore, a strict application of abstract logical reasoning was probably not the intention of the framers. A strategy that might seem more likely to succeed would be to introduce amendments reducing the Senate's power in the legislative process, similar to the evolution of the House of Lords in the UK. If the goal were to sideline one state, this might work, but if the goal is to address the complaint that the Senate is undemocratic because people in smaller states have proportionally more influence there, there's no way the amendment would pass 3/4 of the states' legislatures. The number of states with one or two representatives is 13, by itself a sufficient number to block the adoption of an amendment.	Separate law? Is a separate law needed to prohibit people to whom Section 3 applies from taking office, or to remove such people from office? Griffin’s Case There is some reason to think so. In 1869 there was Griffin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 2 Am. Law T. Rep. U. S. Cts. 93; 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 358. This was tried by Chief Justice Chase, in his role as a Circuit Justice, not as a Supreme Court case. One Caesar Griffin was accused of shooting with intent to kill, tried before a Virginia state court, convicted, and sentenced to two years in prison. He then filed a writ of Habes Corpus claiming that his imprisonment was unlawful, because the jusge before whom he was tried, Hugh W. Sheffey, (in the words of Justice Chase): in December, 1849, [Sheffey] as a member of the Virginia house of delegates, took an oath to support the constitution of the United States, and also that he was a member of the legislature of Virginia in 1862. during the late Rebellion, and as such voted for measures to sustain the so-called Confederate States in their war against the United States; and it was claimed in behalf of the petitioner, that he thereby became, and was at the time of the trial of the petitioner, disqualified to hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state ... Several other people tried and convicted before Judge Sheffey in the circuit court of Rockbridge county, including some convicted of murder, filed similar Habes Corpus petitions, claiming that Sheffey was prohibited by Section 3 from holding office, and that therefore their convictions were invalid. Judge Sheffey had been appointed to the office of Judge after the end of the US Civil War by the reorganized government of Virginia, the one recognized as valid by the Federal Government. He was appointed before the ratification of the 14th Amendment. There was no dispute that he fit the letter of the group of prohibited persons in Section 3. Justice Chase wrote: The general question to be determined on the appeal from this order is whether or not the sentence of the circuit court of Rock-bridge county must be regarded as a nullity because of the disability to hold any office under the state of Virginia, imposed by the fourteenth amendment, on the person, who, in fact, presided as judge in that court. Justice Chase rejected the suggestion that all official actions by Sheffey and anyone in a similar position were automatically void and of no authority because of sectio0n 3. He wrote that: The proposition maintained in behalf of the petitioner, is, that this prohibition, instantly, on the day of its promulgation, vacated all offices held by persons within the category of prohibition, and made all official acts, performed by them, since that day, null and void. After pointing out that many of the offials of the reconstructed governments of the sothern states were withign the terms of the prohibition of section 3, Chae went on to write: If the construction now contended for be given to the prohibitive section, the effect must be to annul all official acts performed by these officers. No sentence, no judgment, no decree, no acknowledgment of a deed, no record of a deed, no sheriff’s or commissioner’s sale — in short no official act — is of the least validity. It is impossible to méasure the evils which such a construction would add to the calamities which have already fallen upon the people of these states. As a further reason not to construe section 3 as instantly and automatically removing all such officials, Chase wrote: Now it is undoubted that those provisions of the constitution which deny to the legislature power to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or to pass a bill of attainder or an ex post facto, are inconsistent in their spirit and general purpose with a provision which, at once without trial, deprives a whole class of persons of offices held by them, for cause, however grave. It is true that no limit can be imposed on the people when exercising their sovereign power in amending their own constitution of government. But it is a necessary presumption that the people in the exercise of that power, seek to confirm and improve, rather than to weaken and impair the general spirit of the constitution. ... Is there, then, any other reasonable construction? ... The object of the amendment is to exclude from certain offices a certain class of persons. Now, it is obviously impossible to do this by a simple declaration, whether in the constitution or in an act of congress, that all persons included within a particular description shall not hold office. For, in the very nature of things, it must be ascertained what particular individuals are embraced by the definition, before any sentence of exclusion can be made to operate. To accomplish this ascertainment and ensure effective results, proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcements of decisions, more or less formal, are indispensable; and these can only be provided for by congress. ... [I]t seems to put beyond reasonable question the conclusion that the intention of the people of the United States, in adopting the fourteenth amendment, was to create a disability, to be removed in proper cases by a two-thirds vote, and to be made operative in other cases by the legislation of congress in its ordinary course. Chase also note that, 2 months after the conviction of Griffin: in February, 1869, congress adopted a joint resolution entitled “a resolution respecting the provisional governments of Virginia and Texas.” In this resolution it was provided that persons, “holding office in the provisional governments of Virginia and Texas,” but unable to take and subscribe the test oath prescribed by the act of July 2, 1862 [12 Stat. 502], except those relieved from disability, “be removed therefrom;” and that this indicates that such people were regarded by Congress as having remained in office and not beign automatically removed. Griffin's Case seems to establish that some proceeding is needed to establish when a person falls under the exclusion rule of Section 3 of the 14th. In 1869 this was done by military order. In 1870 Congress passed a statute providing for criminal proceedings in such cases. This was repealed at the end of Reconstruction. Currently 18 U.S. Code § 2383 makes "rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof," a crime, and provides that anyone convicted of it "shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States." This is not quite the same as the section 3 disqualification. One the one hand, it does not depend on a prior oath to support the constitution, and on the other it does not appear to ban holding a state or local office. But it shows how a similar law could be drafted by Congress. Legislative declaration Can a Congressional resolution, or a Federal statute declare that specific people have so engaged? This is probably prohibited as a Bill of Attainder, that is, a legislative declaration, without trial, that particular persons are guilty of particular crimes. Other Proceedings What proceedings would be needed to establish that a person had "engaged in insurrection or rebellion"? If a person subject to the section 3 disqualification was elected to either house of Congress, that house could refuse to seat such person, or expel him or her, as the Constitution permits. Most state legislatures have similar powers over the seating and expulsion of their own members. If a person is convicted under 18 USC § 2383 or any similar law, that person would clearly be excluded. Congress could pass a law establishing a special tribunal for determining when a person was subject to Section 3 of the 14th. But it has not done so. See also See also: this leglal blog post This article in Constitution Daily 14th Amendment's Section 3 Gets New Look as Democrats Weigh Measures Against Trump from the National Law Journal
Who is to examine the witness who is the self-represented plaintiff or prosecutor? Bob is a self-represented plaintiff in a civil case (or, say, private prosecutor in a criminal case). He is also a witness. If the trial is judge-alone aka bench (not jury), he is able to conduct it himself. At the hearing/trial, Bob (in his capacity as the plaintiff/prosecutor) says: Your Honour, I call myself. — and goes to the witness box to be examined by... himself. Now what? Does he ask himself questions and give answers? Or does he just make statements of fact? (Any common law jurisdiction)	It depends on the judge. Both narrative and question-answer formats can be required. Under the narrative format, the defendant gives their statement. The prosecution can then cross-examine. Under the question-answer format, the defendant plays both the role of themself and the role of their representative. They ask questions to themselves then answer. This was used in United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1989).	If someone testifying before congress refuses to respond to appropriate questions (questions within the scope of the congressional inquiry), that person can be cited for contempt of Congress. One way to avoid this is if the witness can invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. That says that a person may not be compelled to be a witness against himself (or herself) in a criminal case, and has been interpreted to mean that if testimony might in future be used against the witness in a criminal case, it cannot be required, even if the current occasion is not a criminal case. However, if a person has been granted immunity in a particular matter, no testimony can be used against the person in a criminal case on that matter, and so there is no Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify on that matter. This applies to testimony before a court as well as before Congress. The grant of immunity must be at least as comprehensive as the refusal to testify would have been, or the privilege remains. Therefore, if a person has been granted immunity on a subject, that person cannot refuse to testify before Congress by invoking the Fifth Amendment. If the person does refuse, s/he can be cited for contempt of Congress. However, the person can raise a claim that the inquiry was not a proper one, for example because the subject was not a proper one fo Congressional inquiry, or that the Committee was not properly authorized. If the court upholds such a claim, the person will not be convicted of contempt. Also, while Congress can issue a citation, the Justice Department is not required to prosecute the person, and may choose to let the issue drop. Or the court might not convict on some other ground. And of course Congress (or one house of it) has to vote to issue the citation, which it might decide not to do, for political reasons, or indeed for any reason at all. So a grant of immunity alone is not enough to say that testimony will be compelled, but it is a significant step towards such compulsion. Note that under Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964), a state grant of immunity also bars Federal use of the compelled testimony or its fruits, and under Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) a Federal grant of immunity bars state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits. See also This Justia essay on "the Power to Compel Testimony" which covers the whole subject with multiple case citations.	united-states Absent an agreement to the contrary, the employer can make expert testimony a requirement for further employment, and the employee can quit if this is not acceptable. As a practical matter, employees almost always agree to do so without any serious objections to testifying as experts on behalf of their employers. Also, U.S. courts distinguish between retained and non-retained expert testimony. A retained expert is someone testifying solely because they were hired to do so in particular case. A non-retained expert is someone who has personal knowledge of the events in the case who has expertise in an area and is being asked to testify about that personal knowledge in a manner informed by that person's expertise. A non-retained expert can be compelled to testify by subpoena, even if an agreement for that person to testify as an expert voluntarily is not reached. Many employees asked by an employer to provide expert testimony would fall in the category of a non-retained expert who could be compelled to testify about the matter from their personal knowledge in a manner informed by their expertise, even if they quit. But, a non-retained expert can only be compelled to testify at trial, not to cooperate in preparing for that testimony with an attorney for the employer or preparing a written report in advance of that testimony. Incidentally, it would be the rare exception to the rule for the written report of a retained expert witness in advance of their testimony at trial or in a deposition to make that report stating that opinion under oath. Typically, it would be signed but not sworn to by the expert. the court requires (version 1) the company (version 2) someone with expertise from the company to provide a sworn opinion (something like "the process to do X is Y"), and answer questions in court. In U.S. cases, it isn't "the court" that is proactively telling litigants what evidence they have to provide. The law tells litigants what has to be proved. Sometimes, in U.S. non-criminal litigation, expert testimony from someone is required to proven or disprove an element of a case. For example, in professional malpractice cases, someone with expertise in that profession must testify that the professional did or did not perform the work which is the basis of the lawsuit in a manner that falls below the standard of care for a professional of that type. Other times, expert testimony is one means of many possible means to prove a fact in the case. For example, one could prove lost profits by showing that a specific contract was lost by someone's action, or one could instead hire an expert to show what profits could have been earned if something was done.	In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment "standing"1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term "standing" in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis.	Before you act, it’s Prudence soberly to consider; for after Action you cannot recede without dishonour: Take the Advice of some Prudent Friend; for he who will be his own Counsellour, shall be sure to have a Fool for his Client. Conventional wisdom has strongly disfavored this since at least 1682 when William De Britaine made the statement above in his book “Humane Prudence, or, The Art by which a Man May Raise Himself and Fortune to Grandeur”. Other notable figures have reiterated that advice since then. The modern language of the saying that "A man who represents himself, has a fool for a client," is often attributed to Abraham Lincoln, although the attribution is probably false. Practically speaking, one reason is that it doesn't work very well to elicit testimony from yourself as opposed to a third-party at trial. Another is that a lawyer is stronger when the lawyer's personal credibility isn't subject to being questioned in the case. A third is that it is hard to exercise independent judgment in an accurate fashion when you own case is involved. A fourth is that negotiations are often easier when made through third-parties. This said, lawyers do routinely represent themselves in areas where they have expertise anyway. It is arguably unwise, but it is rarely, if ever, legally prohibited or improper. Indeed, generally speaking, everyone has a legal right to represent themselves without a separate lawyer. Sometimes the cost or the concern about trusting someone else with their own case will prevail over conventional wisdom.	What remedies are therein the United States? I would imagine that the witness could be prosecuted for perjury. My guess is that the plaintiff could prosecute the witness for the lost damages. Are there any other remedies like reopening the original trial or declaring a mistrial so that the plaintiff could sue the (deep-pocketed) defendant, or would this be double jeopardy? Perjury prosecutions are like unicorns. They are rumored to exist but are almost never seen. A prosecutor would be exceedingly unlikely to bring charges in such a case, but it might not hurt to ask. Even if the criminal prosecution prevailed, however, the defeated plaintiff would be no better off, or might get out of pocket court costs as restitution at most. You could request that the witness be sanctioned for contempt. But, this leaves the loser in the original case no better off unless the judge made the highly unusual decision to award compensatory damages as a contempt sanction. Similarly, if you have reason to believe that the attorney knew that the testimony offered was false, that would be grounds to grieve the lawyer which could result in the lawyer's suspension or disbarment, but that is very difficult to prove and again would not advance the unjustly defeated plaintiff's cause. Assuming that the time to move for a retrial (usually two weeks) expired when the new evidence was discovered, you could move to set aside the verdict (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 or the equivalent state rule). The deadline for such motions based upon fraud by an adverse party is usually six months. Sometimes an independent action to set aside the verdict for fraud on the court could also be brought (sometimes within two or three years), which is an uphill battle, but probably the best option if all other deadlines have expired. The witness probably has absolute immunity from civil liability outside that court case for the testimony offered, so a civil action suing the witness for lost damages would be dismissed. The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply, but a similar doctrine called "res judicata" (a.k.a. "claim preclusion") prohibits retrying a case that was tried on the merits between the same parties, if it has become a final order. So, filing a new case is ruled out assuming that no appeals were filed within the deadline for doing so. And, even if the deadline for filing an appeal has not lapsed, it probably wouldn't prevail because the key new evidence wouldn't be in the record. It would be better to file to set aside the judgment in a motion and to appeal if that motion was denied.	This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.	Are defendants legally obliged to provide all culpatory evidence to prosecution? The question here is whether or not all evidence requested by prosecution must be provided by the defense? If the defense plans on only using the evidence of the prosecution, does the prosecution get to demand evidence the defense would rather not release? No. Usually only specific kinds of evidence related to specific kinds of claims such as alibi evidence, an insanity claim, or expert testimony must be disclosed prior to trial by a defendant in a criminal case. A defendant in a criminal case does not have to disclose evidence harmful to the defendant's case prior to trial as a general rule. Sometimes there is a requirement to disclose witnesses anticipated to be called, or exhibits to be possibly used very shortly prior to trial, but that is more the exception than the rule. Does the answer depend on the whether or not the case is criminal or civil? Yes. A plaintiff in a civil case can compel disclosure prior to trial of all evidence in the custody, control, or possession of the defendant that is relevant or is reasonably calculated to be relevant to a disputed issue identified in the complaint, answer, and other pleadings (e.g. counterclaims, replies to counterclaims, third-party complaints, cross-claims, etc.). The scope of discovery is slightly different in jurisdictions that don't follow the federal model. This can include pre-trial depositions of the parties, although a defendant can claim the 5th Amendment at the risk of being exposed to an adverse inference communicated to the jury at trial if the defendant does so. Furthermore, most jurisdictions require the pre-trial disclosure of expert testimony that will be used at trial, of exhibits that will or may be used at trial, of witnesses who will or may be called a trial, of all documents that are relevant to a disputed issue identified in the complaint, answer, and other pleadings, of all insurance coverage that could cover the claim, of all persons with knowledge of the disputed facts, and of an expected damages calculation. In the federal system, however, one need pro-actively disclose only witnesses and documents that support your case without being asked. Is there consistency on this or is it at the discretion of the judge? The rules of procedure applicable to a case govern the scope of discovery, but judges have considerable discretion to determine that requests are excessive relative to what is at stake in the case, are irrelevant, or unduly burden some other legitimate interest of the person subject to discovery. Is there punishment for non-compliance? Yes. First of all, a failure to disclose when there is a duty to do so is a ground to exclude presentation of that evidence at trial. Secondly, in civil cases, attorney fees incurred to obtain the discovery can be awarded, facts that might have been disclosed can be declared to be true as a matter of judicial sanction where there is not disclosure, claims can be dismissed, etc. The main relevant federal rule in civil cases is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. It is an unlawful request that must nonetheless be followed with only a hypothetical remedy left to the defendant as is the case in most of these united states to comply with an obviously unlawful arrest that doesn't present an immediate threat to life? I don't understand this long and convoluted sentence. The part about an unlawful arrest seems divorced from the issues in the rest of the the question. It isn't clear what kind of unlawful request is involved either.
Can the accused change their mind about testifying mid-trial? USA criminal law As I understand it, under US criminal law, a defendant may decline to testify in their own trial. Suppose a defendant elects to testify in their own trial but decides that it is no longer in their best interest to continue. Can they leave the witness box at a whim. For example mid-question by either defence or prosecution. Could they perhaps say to the judge, "I no longer wish to testify, may I step down?" and the judge allow this? Conversely, if the trial is going badly and, at the last moment, they decide that they do want to testify in order to bolster their position, can they request this and it be granted, even at the last minute? Are there any precedents for these actions by a defendant?	Normally, the prosecution case will not rely upon the testimony of the defendant. Instead, the prosecution will call all of its witnesses until its evidentiary case is complete. Then, the defense case opens and it may call witnesses. The defense is not obligated to call all of the witnesses that it stated that it anticipated that it would call prior to trial and the jury doesn't know which witnesses the parties said that they anticipated that they were going to call and didn't call. Until the defense case is closed, the defendant can call himself or herself as a witness if he or she wishes to do so, but is not obligated to do so. Once a defendant starts testifying (generally in his or her own case) he or she has generally waived the Fifth Amendment right not to testify. So, the prosecution may cross-examine the defendant in this situation. But since the prosecution's case is usually already closed at this point, the prosecution's cross-examination is limited to the scope of the defendant's testimony under questions from his or her own lawyer (there are some nuances of how this is done when the defendant is self-represented and has no lawyer). The prosecution cannot expand the scope of questioning of the defendant to new topic areas. I can imagine deviations from this pattern in odd circumstances, but they would be very rare.	In the event that a lawyer stops representing the client, and the client openly has told the lawyer that they have committed a crime, would it be legal for the lawyer to testify against them? Generally, no. The attorney-client privilege survives the termination of the attorney-client relationship. So, the lawyer cannot testify against the client. There are exceptions to the general rule. The two most important ones are as follows: There is a crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege that applies when someone uses an attorney's services for the purposes of carrying out a crime and the attorney is a knowing or unwitting co-conspirator. For example, if the crime the client confesses to is to defrauding investors in a securities prospectus that the client has the lawyer draft for the client containing false information about the company and then tells the lawyer after it has been sent to investors who put lots of money into the company that the statements the client told the lawyer to put in the prospectus were intentional lies made for the purpose of defrauding the investors. An attorney is entitled to testify if the client effectively waives the privilege in the context of disputed issues between an attorney and a client such as a malpractice lawsuit or an ethics complaint lodged against a lawyer where the lawyer's testimony concerning the privileged communications is necessary to defend the lawyer. For example, if the client sues the attorney for malpractice for refusing to present a key witness at trial causing the client to lose the case, the attorney can defend himself or herself by stating that the attorney knew that the witnesses testimony would have been false because the client told him "X".	Regardless of whether a defendant is a wife or husband in relation to a potential witness, the latter can always refuse to say jack or just go with the "I can't recall" thing. What, will they torture them? What's the point of these "privileges" then? There are actually two separate spousal privileges, the confidential communications privilege and the testimonial privilege. Confidential communications with a spouse are not admissible in evidence, even if the spouse wants to testify. This privilege is like an attorney-client privilege, or a psychologist-patient privilege, or the privilege that attaches to confessions made to a priest, reflects the long standing assumption that communications made in reliance on a confidential relationship should not be betrayed in court. There are often exceptions to the spousal privilege for domestic violence and child abuse. It applies even if the couple that was married at the time that the communication was made is no longer married. Part of the theory of the confidential communications privilege with a spouse is that these communications wouldn't have happened in the first place but for the privilege, and that communications between spouses serve a socially desirable end overall that should be encouraged, by strengthening marriages. The testimonial privilege is the privilege against testifying against a current spouse. In some jurisdictions this belongs to the testifying spouse, and in some jurisdictions it belongs to the spouse testified against. In Florida, it belongs to the testifying spouse in federal court and is not available in state court at all. This applies only to a current spouse and is designed to avoid forcing someone to have to choose between obeying the law and loyalty to their spouse. This usually has more exceptions than the confidential communications privilege and some jurisdictions don't have it at all. The law presumes that people who testify under oath will tell the truth and retains the right to punish them for contempt of court or perjury if they do not. The fact that someone can lie on the stand in ways that sometimes can't be caught is besides the point of whether it is fair to force a spouse to do that. Historically one goal has been to prevent domestic violence against a testifying spouse that might occur if the testifying spouse testifies truthfully but negatively against their non-testifying spouse. Also, there is a sense that the testimony offered may have more to do with the health of the marriage (being more or less favorable based upon that without regard to whether the testimony is truthful) and hence isn't reliable. It also prevent discovery in the course of a lawsuit from one's spouse, which could otherwise be used as a dirty litigation tactic to impact a litigant's family in a civil case primarily for purposes of harassment. Contempt of court sanctions against non-cooperative witnesses are not uncommon. Lots of witnesses aren't very sophisticated and aren't good at paying attention. When you start answering "I don't know" regarding your address, when the last time you saw your spouse in person, what kind of car you have, and whether you know what a copying machine is, it is often pretty easy to spot an intentionally uncooperative witness. Often there are prior unsworn statements or the witness is crystal clear on some points and yet claims no recollection on others. Procedurally, if the judge is convinced that someone is trying to obstruct the court a judge makes a finding of fact to that effect based upon observations that could support that conclusion in the testimony and evidence, higher courts on appeal have to defer to those findings. Appellate courts can't second guess trial court credibility determinations. So, it is a lot easier to establish grounds for contempt of court than one might theoretically expect. Perjury prosecutions are exceedingly rare (on the order of 1 per 200,000 people per year), and a majority of those prosecutions do not involve court testimony. But the legal prospect of being convicted of a felony for lying under oath in nonetheless a powerful one because a lot of tactical and practical decisions in court are based upon worst case scenarios, and it does happen now and then, a few times a year at least, in most states.	If no one objects to a leading question, then the judge does nothing. A judge does not generally pro-actively police the rules of evidence at trial. Also, there are circumstances when a judge has discretion to allow a leading question even when it wouldn't ordinarily be allowed to move the trial along on largely undisputed points or to allow in inarticulate witness to testify. The exception to judicial passivity in the absence of an objection at trial is "plain error" that is not "harmless error", which a judge has a duty to prevent or address even if no objection is raised by a party. But, offering a leading question when one is not allowed by the rules of evidence almost never constitutes plain error, and would almost always be considered "harmless error" even if it was objected to and the judge ruled incorrectly, unless the use of improper leading questions was pervasive and there was a contemporaneous objection by counsel. For example, allowing a prospective juror to serve as a juror, despite that juror saying in the jury selection process that he can't be impartial because the defendant committed adultery with his spouse, because neither the prosecution or the defense attorney moves to strike the juror for cause, rather than striking that juror for cause of the court's own accord, is the kind of conduct that would often be considered "plain error" that is not "harmless error."	I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case.	If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position.	This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off.	You could bring a motion to compel for failing to respond substantively to a motion to admit which is objected to, just as you could for an interrogatory. The process is the same. Normally, a request to admit would not be deemed admitted if a substantive objection was filed by the deadline, even if there was no express admission or denial. Only if the objection were completely and utterly meritless would a judge be likely to order that the request to admit would be deemed admitted in that case since the response was a de facto non-answer and the objection was a mere sham. @Iñaki Viggers states in his answer: the purpose of a request for admissions is [to attempt] to stipulate --rather than to discover-- the facts on which plaintiff and defendant agree. This is not really true. A request to admit is a discovery tool to prevent you from having to prove up what should be non-controversial facts that might nonetheless take time or documentation to prove at trial and to gather evidence for in advance of trial. The questions in a request to admit are typically ones that the other side would not willingly stipulate to (for example, because they'd like to be able to offer testimony to explain a seemingly unfavorable fact) but may not be able to deny. If a party denies a request to admit and then offers nothing to support the denial in discovery practice or at trial, that party risks court sanctions for the groundless denial. Good litigation practice is also always to include some requests to admit that are effectively outcome determinative to give the opposing party a chance to screw up and essentially default the case by not responding on time.
Is there a licensing recourse to recycling a riff? I don't mean covering a song and making a few changes to the arrangement; there are mechanical licenses for that. I don't mean sampling, because this involves recording, and I'm thinking of playing the notes on one's own instrument. I mean taking just a riff and doing something completely different than what the original artist did; if it were a cover, it would almost be unrecognizable. I mean the equivalent of doing what Chopin did when he took this Beethoven piece and made it into this beauty (and these will take fewer than four minutes if you listen to them one after another, so please do). What legal recourse do I have if I want to do that?	Musical compositions can be, and if recent almost always are, protected by copyright. This is separate from the copyright on a recording of a performance of the work. If you reuse a musical passage, the new work may be a derivative work, that is a work based on an earlier work. Or an extended musical quotation could be considered to be copyright infringement. If this is in the united-states the use of a section from a previous work might be considered to be a fair use (fair-use). This is a specifically US concept in copyright law, although several other countries have a concept of fair dealing which is somewhat similar, although narrower. Whether a use is a fair use is an inherently fact-based determination. There is no clear and simple bright line for what is and is not a fair use. US law (17 USC 197) specifies four factors which are to be weighed by a court in considering the matter: The purpose and character of the use. If your use is commercial that weighs against fair use, but does not at all preclude it. This factor also includes whether the use is transformative or not. A transformative use is one that takes the part used for a very different sort of purpose than the original. Parodies are normally transformative, for example. A quote for purposes of commentary and analysis, or criticism is normally transformative. Transformative uses are more likely to be considered fair uses. The nature of the copyrighted work. Creative works such as fiction and music are more strongly protected than works such as textbooks and news stories. This probably weighs against fair use in the case described. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. If only a short section of a longer work is used, that weighs in favor of fair use. However very short quotes can still fail, to be held to be fair uses. In Harper vs Nation a quote of about 300 words from a 500 page book was held not to be fair use because it was "the heart of the book". The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. A use that significantly harms the market value of the original, or serves as a replacement for it, weigh strongly against fair use. This was a major factor in Harper vs Nation. Each case of claimed fair use is evaluated by looking at all four factors, and the specific facts of the case. From the description in the question, such a use might well be held to be fair use. Musical quotations often are. But there is no way to be sure unless a court evaluates the specific case. A lawyer specifically experienced in not only copyright law, but copyrights on music, might be able to give more specific advice. Or you could, of course, seek permission from the copyright holder, quite likely the original composer or artist. If you get permission, there is no further issue. There might be a charge, but when the use is minor, and has no commercial effect, the charge might be small or even zero provided that the source is acknowledged.	The DMCA prohibits circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to a copyrighted work. So you can't legally "crack" the software, period -- even if you own a disc containing the software and have a valid license to use it, a license to use the work is not authorization to circumvent access controls. So if the disc is copy-protected, by my understanding of the DMCA, you're kinda screwed. (The company might be willing to provide you a replacement copy, even if only to maintain the illusion that the software is "licensed, not sold". But you can't make one yourself.) Likewise, if you have a copy of the disc but have lost the license key, you're screwed. Even if you could prove beyond any doubt that you are the licensee, there's not any law i'm aware of that would compel the copyright owner to provide you another license key. And courts have held that distribution of license keys without authorization is a violation of the DMCA. So whoever might provide you another key, if they're not the copyright holder, has broken the law. If you managed to copy the disc from a friend (without circumventing any kind of copy protection), and had your own license key, you might be in a better position. Many EULAs allow you to make a backup copy. Even if they didn't, copyright law does, so there's a possible case for fair use.	You can licence your copyright under as many licences as you like to as many people as you like It's your copyright - you can do what you want with it. What you can't do is give someone an exclusive licence and then give licences to others - that would be a breach of contract with the exclusive licensee. How you let people know about the available licences is also up to you - your bio on Stack Exchange is fine.	There is no case law as yet However, the most likely situation is that there is no copyright in the original works because they are computer-generated. There is certainly copyright in the code that created the art but the output of that code, the art itself, would probably not be subject to copyright. Copyright only exists in art created by humans. The US Ninth Circuit has held that animals cannot create copyrighted works. Subsequently, the US Copyright office has rejected applications for registration (a prerequisite to a suit in the US) of computer-generated art because it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.” While this position has not been tested in the courts, I don't think they are any more likely to grant copyright to a program than they were to a monkey. What's going on? The OP states that there is litigation: there isn't. What there is, is a DCMA takedown request from Larva Labs. If this is complied with that will be the end of the matter; if it isn't then there may be litigation. However, before Larva Labs could sue CryptoPunks in the US they would first need to get a writ of mandamus to force the USCO to register it. If they try and fail then there will be a legally binding court decision that Larva Labs don't own the copyright in any of their computer-generated art. Which kills their business model and, presumably, them. This would be a very high-risk move. They may choose to sue in a jurisdiction where registration is not a prerequisite, however, that court would still need to be satisfied that there was a copyright that could be breached. So that's just a different take on the same problem. I have ignored the issue of NFTs as these are legally problematic in their own right and irrelevant to the main question. However, the NFT and the artwork are not the same thing.	By "buying the song" on Gumroad you don't actually buy the song, you buy the right to do specific things with that song. I couldn't find the exact license terms, but for 800 Yen (about $6) for a whole album I highly doubt that this will include much more than the right to listen to the song on a private device. The rights to publicly perform, reproduce, redistribute, use commercially etc. usually cost a lot more. So if you want the rights to use the song in your own video, you will have to negotiate the purchase of a license which allows you to do that with the creator. Or if they reassigned their copyrights to a music label or copyright collective (which some music artists do), with that organization. There are some exceptions in the copyright laws of some countries where you can use parts of a song without a license. For example, the "fair use" exception in US copyright law if you review, discuss or analyze a song. But such exceptions usually don't apply if you use the song as background music, adapt the song into an own work or even just reupload the song on your own channel.	A performance of copyrighted written music is copyright infringement. One of the bundle of rights that comes with a copyright is the performance right. You can obtain a license to cover copyrighted written music, however, on a mandatory basis for a royalty amount set by law, rather than only with the permission of the copyright owner as is the case with other copyrighted works. There are exceptions to the broad general scope of the the rights associated with a copyright, such as fair use, but a performance of instrumental music is not itself, in general, fair use.	It’s tricky. I’ll talk about the general then the specific. In general, your notion of "didn't get permission" doesn't really reflect how the music industry works. Generally, a venue pays for a universal license to use recorded music. There are three major licensors: ASCAP, BMI and SESAC. If you get an ASCAP license, you can play any ASCAP music in your licensed venue without limit. I don't know if you have any records or CDs, but look carefully at the disc or the liner notes, and you'll see ASCAP or BMI next to each song. That tells you whether you can play it on your license. Licenses go to the venue or application, not to the person. So for instance if you have a bar and grill, of course you get an ASCAP and/or BMI license, and that covers the bar's normal activities as agreed in the contract. If you then create a Youtube channel, you would need to negotiate a separate ASCAP license to use music there. Each one is negotiated and priced separately, and you are negotiating with ASCAP, BMI and SESAC. Keep in mind a blanket license for the venue, say a baseball park, is not enough, as they exclude political events specifically. Political campaigns have to get the same blanket license as everyone else. But for political campaigns, particularly, ASCAP etc. provide an “opt-out”, by which an artist can exclude themselves from the license. Of course the artist usually has failed to do this when they hear their music on coverage of the event. The artist still has some recourses in the area of false endorsement and a few other legal theories, but they’re complicated. However a campaign will usually honor the artist's wishes. In theory, the artist’s legal options would take years winding through the courts, and the campaign would be long over by then. But in practice, the artist would likely team up with the opposition, and now the campaign is squared off against two different experts at using media - the other campaign, and the artist, who got where they are by playing the media well. The campaign doesn’t want to fight that fight, because a knock-down drag-out media palaver with a universally beloved musician is not a good look. Now there is something called a "compulsory license", but that is about a performer's right to use a song someone else has written. (But they must still pay for the use; and ASCAP/BMI/SESAC handle that too). That would come up if the campaign's house band was playing Fleetwood Mac songs.	This appears to be very clear to me: "NPR does not allow other websites to post our content..." I cannot think of a more clear way to say "Do not reproduce our content on your site." Since you asked about licensing the right to reproduce their content, and they flatly ignored your request, I think it is safe to assume that they are not interested in licensing that right to you, even for a fee. This is also consistent with their "NPR does not allow [any] other websites to post..." language. It is always the copyright holder's right to refuse to offer any particular person (or all persons generally) a license, no matter what payment they might offer. (With the exception of statutory licenses, which in the U.S. exist only for recording covers of musical works.) They have also ignored your request to recompense them for infringement already performed. If in the future they decide to take legal action against you for your past infringement (hugely unlikely that such a hassle would be worthwhile for NPR) or seek any out of court settlement (again, quite unlikely they will care enough), I'm sure they will let you know. As they've said in their email, you are welcome to link to NPR's content. You are, of course, not welcome to spread misinformation or lies about NPR by claiming something like, "Look at this wonderful article that NPR wrote purely for us, at our personal request," or "NPR thinks that In Home Teaching Agency XXX is a great company, so we built a curriculum around their content," when NPR has never said any such thing. Any legal issue around linking would probably be a trademark offense, by wrongfully suggesting that NPR endorses you, or by misrepresenting yourself as an agent of NPR. If you don't do either of things, and just say, "Here's an article on [subject X] published by NPR," you're probably fine. If you want to be very thorough, you could include a disclaimer on your site like, "In Home Teaching Agency XXX is not a licencee or partner of NPR. Links to NPR articles are included for educational purposes only," or similar. This seems pretty excessive to me, since a reasonable person won't assume that linking to an article from a major news source suggests a partnership, but I suppose it couldn't hurt to include such a disclaimer.
Deed of undertaking between neighbours Neighbours have an issue about their adjoining land parcels and have verbally agreed to sort it out in a certain way. One of them wants to make sure that the other is aware of the consequences and does not later ask to revert the agreed state of things. What sort of paper do they need to sign, if any, to have the agreement binding? Deed of undertaking? Do the signatures need to be witnessed? Example: Bob's land is uphill Rob's. Bob has done some earth moving which has changed the path of rain water drainage which makes Rob's land too wet where he doesn't want it to. Bob and Rob agree that Bob directs the water away from Rob's land completely. Rob is aware that it may cause his land dry out and promises not to complain about that. Bob wants it to be binding before putting effort into redirecting the drains. Can that be recognised as a contract i.e. Rob's consideration is to refrain from making a certain type of complaints? I doubt this because Rob may never actually want to make those complaints, so there would be nothing moving from him. Jurisdiction: any common law, though specifically interested in New Zealand.	In the U.S., the common way to address this would be called a servitude among academics and legal scholars, although it would typically be titled either an "easement", or more likely a "covenant" (which is the customary name at common law for a promise that runs with the land). It would typically be reduced to writing and executed by both parties and recorded with the same formalities as a deed (i.e. it would typically be signed and acknowledged before a notary public, would contain a legal description, and would be coded with both parties in the grantee-grantor index). In New Zealand, I suspect that the process would be similar. One complication in New Zealand that might make the formalities different is that, New Zealand has a title certificate based system of real property recording called a Torrens Title system which it adopted in 1870, rather than the less formally structured race-notice recording system that, in principle, allows almost anything to be recorded without requiring that it fit in a particular box of types of documents that are permitted. Since 2017, in New Zealand, valid legal interests in law do not arise unless they are recorded. Since 2017, the New Zealand system's official copies are also now entirely electronic. Covenants are governed by Sections 240-250 of the Land Transfer Title Act of 2017 and seem to correspond to the kind of contract described in the question.	Compliance with acoustic standards does not necessarily mean that you will not hear noise from your neighbors. You have an expert opinion stating that the building complies. It is possible that the expert is wrong - the only way to find out is to have a different expert do their own analysis. This will cost you money and they will either agree with the first expert that it does comply or they won't. If they agree you will at least have the satisfaction of knowing that the developer did what they promised in their contract. You will have to come up with your own solutions as to how to deal with the fact that you find it too noisy. In these circumstances, this is an issue with you, not the apartment. If they don't agree then you have a basis for commencing legal action (in accordance with the dispute resolution clauses of your contract). How that will turn out will depend on which evidence the court/arbitrator/whatever prefers. If you succeed you may get compensation or remedial works (if these are possible) done. If you lose you will likely be paying some hefty legal fees. In the meantime, I would be very careful about what you say about the developer or the complex publicly. If you say things that are not true then you could be sued for defamation. The developer has already indicated that they are not happy with what you are saying - this doesn't mean it is defamatory but the developer may be willing to go to court to find out if it is, are you? If you sell the apartment you are not generally obliged to reveal anything to the buyer but you must answer questions they put truthfully. If they ask about sound insulation you can truthfully answer that it complies with NBN S 01-400-1. You are not required to disclose your personal opinion that its too noisy.	IMHO, your questions reflect several misunderstandings of how the process works. So, with your permission, I will avoid directly answering your questions and instead focus on suggestions how to best help you plot a path forward. Your counterparty has the burden of proof. If your counterparty forged your signature on a contract, then they must prove you signed it or they can not enforce it. In order to enforce the contract, they will need to sue you civilly. Then you can introduce evidence of their forgery at that time. Inform your counterparty you did not sign the contract. Then act accordingly. If your counterparty forged your signature on an extension contract then you should inform them immediately after it has come to your attention. Advise them you have no intention of complying with a contract you never signed. And that if they try to enforce the forged agreement, you will defend yourself "vigorously." Never threaten criminal charges to advance your position in a civil case. This behavior is a crime in itself. It's called extortion. If you want to pursue criminal charges at some point then do it without relating it to the civil case. The police are not your only means of pursuing criminal charges. You can also schedule a meeting with your District Attorney, State's Attorney (whatever that position is called in your state) or your state's Attorney General. In other words, you might want to approach the government's attorney responsible for prosecuting crimes in your jurisdiction. Forget about involving the police. They have given you their position on the matter. Approach the DA or AG office instead. If the DA/AG decides to use the police, she we will make that decision then inform the police how she needs to use their services. Police are wary of being used as leverage in civil disputes. That's probably the reason for their policy decision regardless of whether it's technically justified by the law or not. Your counterparty can't "fix" anything. If they claim you signed a document you did not, they will have to produce that document with your signature on it. This will presumably be your Exhibit A evidence they forged it. Disclaimer: I am a lay person and not an attorney. This writing is no substitute for proper legal advice. If you need help with a specific legal situation please hire an attorney and do not rely on anything I have written here.	There wasn't a merger of estates because Sam had a fee interest in Blackacre, but only a life estate in Whiteacre, therefore the right-of-way which would otherwise have been extinguished was not extinguished because the estates were not identical. In other words, there is not unity of ownership. The easement hasn't been overburdened because the express terms of the easement set the scope and don't limit the amount of traffic in this regard, and because further development is assumed. There is no easement by necessity because Blackacre has access to a public road even though it is a crappy one.	The key language to be taken notice of in that code is 'by fraud or deception'. If the property manager has provided reasonable notice of a clear-out, then the code doesn't apply due to lack of fraud or deception. But at the end of the day, just go and check the mail room on a Thursday afternoon and you shouldn't have any problems.	It sounds to me like the parties made proposals with an intent to draw them up and formalize them but didn't intend to form binding agreements. The first agreement sounds vague. The second was committed to writing, suggesting that the written deal was to be the real agreement, and not executed. In the last case, it doesn't appear that there was an agreement because there was no meeting of the minds on the essential term, which was the price. Going to court is expensive. It is expensive whether this is litigating underlying disputes or trying to enforce an alleged oral settlement that is disputed. Also, settlement discussions that don't result in a resolution are not admissible as evidence in court. Making a deal would be nice, but Dave's concept of what constitutes a deal seems to be out of touch with reality.	You are never obligated to sign a contract. You already have a lease agreement in place, which will be enforceable for the agreed-upon duration. The lease can be changed if both parties agree to it, but one party cannot unilaterally demand that other agree to any changes to the contract - a landlord can't, for example, change your lease agreement to increase your rent payment in the middle of your lease term and demand that you sign it. The landlord is certainly allowed to ask, in the hopes that both parties can come to an agreement, but again, both parties need to agree in order for an existing contract to be changed.	Generally speaking, you signature and delivery of the lease to the landlord makes it possible for the landlord to enforce. Particularly when, as in the question, the landlord presented the lease to you as an "offer" which you accepted without modification, it is probably binding upon the landlord even if the landlord does not sign it or return a copy with the landlord's signature. In jurisdictions that have a statute of frauds, your part performance by sending checks in the lease period consistent with the lease, and the landlord's part performance by continuing to allow you to occupy the premises without objection, would probably make the statute of frauds (which generally requires a signed writing by the party against whom a lease is enforced) to be inapplicable. On the other hand, if you materially changed a version provided by the landlord, there is a real question over whether there has been an offer and acceptance, or a meeting of the minds, agreeing to the new lease. Materially here meaning changes that are more than updating your contact details and go to the heart of the lease contract.
Would a prisoner be allowed to practice law and represent other inmates in court? Would a prisoner be allowed to practice law and represent other inmates in court, and shown in For Life (2020)? According to the story, when he got to prison, he went to work for the paralegal association, representing inmates in the internal cases, inside prison. That got him unlimited access to the library. From there, college and law degrees online. Then he took the vermont bar, which is the only state where you can sit for the bar exam with a degree from a non-accredited law school. Then, he applied to have his license accepted reciprocally in new-york. Some bigwig sponsored him for the bar.	Maybe. There are two questions presented. The first is whether someone who is in prison for a felony may be admitted to the practice of law. There is not a categorical prohibition on doing so. Instead, a character and fitness committee in each state to which an applicant seeks admission (even if it is a reciprocal admission) considers an applicant on a case by case basis. Usually, people with a felony conviction that is being served or is recent are not admitted to the practice of law, but it is not a blanket prohibition, so that could happen, although it would be highly unusual. The second question is whether someone admitted to the practice of law in good standing who is incarcerated in prison would be allowed to do so by prison officials. The work the inmates are allowed to do is largely in the discretion of the prison warden at a particular institution. It isn't inconceivable that a prison warden could allow an inmate to do this subject to significant limitations on scope of practice, but again, it would be highly unusual. Some factors that might encourage a prison warden to allow it would be that: (1) the state has to pay another lawyer to represent inmates in some kinds of cases if the fellow inmate does not at greater expense per hour to the state, (2) it might promote rehabilitation and garner good press, and (3) the prison warden might reasonably guess that an inmate represented by a fellow inmate is less likely to prevail on the merits than an inmate represented by another lawyer and might prefer that outcome. The leading treatise on the subject of lawyering by inmates, with and without full or limited admission to the practice of law, is the Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual.	No A lawyer is considered an "officer of the court" in the sense that certain duties to the court are imposed on the lawyer. That does not give the lawyer authority as if the lawyer was part of the court staff, nor a law enforcement officer. A statement can be prosecuted as perjury only if it is made under oath (or affirmation) in court, or if it is made "under penalty of perjury". This is generally done by a statement in a document signed, something like "I declare under penalty of perjury that all statements in the above document are true to the best of my knowledge and belief." It can also be done verbally, with the person making the statement agreeing that it is true and that this is subject to perjury prosecution if it is false. The exact wording will vary, but it must be clear and explicit. Aside from that, false statements to a lawyer are not generally subject to prosecution for perjury, nor otherwise illegal. In some cases a lie in a business transaction may be fraud, which is actionable, and possibly criminal. But that will not have anything to do with whether the person lied to is or is not a lawyer. This Wikipedia article says: Perjury is the intentional act of swearing a false oath or falsifying an affirmation to tell the truth, whether spoken or in writing, concerning matters material to an official proceeding. ... The rules for perjury also apply when a person has made a statement under penalty of perjury even if the person has not been sworn or affirmed as a witness before an appropriate official. An example is the US income tax return, which, by law, must be signed as true and correct under penalty of perjury The US Federal law on perjury, 18 U.S. Code § 1621 says: (1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States. Title 9 of the Maryland code, section 9-101 says: (a) Prohibited.- A person may not willfully and falsely make an oath or affirmation as to a material fact: (1) if the false swearing is perjury at common law; (2) in an affidavit required by any state, federal, or local law; (3) in an affidavit made to induce a court or officer to pass an account or claim; (4) in an affidavit required by any state, federal, or local government or governmental official with legal authority to require the issuance of an affidavit; or (5) in an affidavit or affirmation made under the Maryland Rules. (b) Penalty.- A person who violates this section is guilty of the misdemeanor of perjury and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years. Nothing about statements made to a lawyer not under oath or affirmation, or under penalty of perjury. Other US state laws are similar.	In the US, only a few states allow conjugal visits by prisoners: California, Connecticut, New York and Washington. Details of implementation for Washington are here (it is called "Extended Family Visiting"). There are various limitations, for example you can't have committed homocide within the last 5 years, you can't be on death row, and so on. Although they don't explicitly say you can have sex, you can, and they have (a small sample of) contraceptive and STD-preventing technology for prisoners to avail themselves of. If you fail to take advantage of contraceptives, then yes it is possible. There is no provision pertaining specifically to mass murder.	when is it a good idea to get a lawyer? Only when you are not confident that you can put enough dedication to the matter & learning curve, or when you are not confident of your ability to cope with the emotional/frustrating toll of judicial proceedings. I do not mean this in an ironic way or to challenge you. It is just important to avoid a false sense of confidence. However, if you decide to represent yourself in court, you will have much more control of your case than if you delegate it to some lawyer whose attention is split with many other unrelated cases. Also, never get intimidated by pedantic or wasted phrases such as "he who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client". In the XXI century, most urban people can read and write, Canadian laws are written in your own language, and the Internet provides many informative resources for free. Furthermore, even knowledgeable attorneys happen to be clearly wrong about the law, as I pointed out here. I feel like the bulk of the work is carefully detailing what happened which feels more like the job of a news paper editor. It involves more than that. A newspaper editor does not get entangled with subtleties of a story or of the law, and subtleties are often decisive in judicial proceedings. Litigation also involves intensive legal research so as to find case law (that is, binding court decisions) and statutes that support your position. The application of these laws to a particular case are often premised on subtleties. Hence my remark in the previous paragraph. A newspaper editor hardly ever knows what questions or evidence are required or would suffice for proving a case. This knowledge only comes through (self-)education and experience. What options exist if I don't want to pay a lawyer a bunch of money and am willing to do most of the work myself, for example would pro bono be a good option? Start by searching for "pro se" and "Canada" on the Internet. Some of the results might actually provide guidance on what procedural law(s) apply in your jurisdiction, the legislation, and so forth. As for searching case law, there should be a Canadian equivalent of http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch (sorry I am not knowledgeable of the specifics of Canadian litigation/resources). Based on your other post, I presume you are or will be getting acquainted with the Tenancy Act. I recently addressed here a question about the Act, showcasing the combination of that legislation and contract law (interestingly, many tenants presume their issue with the landlord is strictly about landlord-tenant legislation when in fact it has to do with contract law). I am sure in a library will find plenty of useful books covering the basics of the legal system as well as the rules of civil procedure. Find out whether the public has access to case files in Canadian courts. If so, go to a courthouse and study those files. Get acquainted with the drafting and format of pleadings, motions, responses, briefs, and so forth (although in Small Claims court much of this would be unnecessary, for small claims proceedings are much more simple). This will show you the practice aspect of what you learn from books. When using a term that you consider essential to your case, be sure to consult its meaning in a legal dictionary (I do not know whether Black's Law Dictionary is applicable in Canadian litigation). The meaning of many words are much more specific in litigation compared to their common usage. Or would getting a real lawyer and spending only one hour of his time be better? I highly doubt it, especially if you have not gained any background in law. A lawyer will not explain things from scratch, let alone the intricacies you need to know. The most you could get from speaking with a lawyer for an hour would be notions which are too generic to be of any use at all. Moreover, I doubt that a lawyer in a phone interview will give you any legal references for you to verify on your own. In the very beginning of my litigation, I spoke with a law firm as assigned by a lawyer referral company. By then I already had some background in law and therefore I had specific questions. The guy from that law firm just kept babbling ambiguities very quickly. At the end of the phone call, I thought "nah, I will do this by myself". You might end up making that decision in your current or future matters.	It is binding precedent for lower federal courts in the Ninth Circuit. They are required to follow it. It is persuasive precedent for the other circuits and for state courts. They may be persuaded by the reasoning and will consider the fact that the Ninth Circuit held as it did to be one factor in their decision-making, but they can make a different decision if they want to. Some courts are also more persuasive than others, although this is usually not explicitly acknowledged in written opinions. For example, state courts in the Ninth Circuit are likely to give more weight to a Ninth Circuit opinion than they are to give weight to a decision from another circuit. Cases from the Second Circuit are more likely to be persuasive than cases from other circuits, because of its reputation. Cases from the Southern District of New York are more likely to be persuasive than cases from most other non-local District Courts. There is also a personal reputation function that comes into play when looking at persuasive decisions. Some judges have a better reputation or a better reputation with a particular other judge, and their decisions may be considered more carefully. This is not explicit, but it means a good lawyer will mention the judge's name when a case in support of his position was decided by a well-regarded judge. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's holding would be persuasive precedent for the Supreme Court. You could write law review articles about this, but to dip one toe in: they may be persuaded by the reasoning and it matters to their function of providing unifying law, so especially during the process of applying for a writ of certiorari, they will care what different circuits have held on an issue and which circuits are going which way. But they are not bound by the circuit courts, and will overturn all of the circuits if they think that's the right decision. They did that a while ago with a statute about what it meant to use a firearm while committing a crime, for example.	Short Answer They will probably not hire you unless they have legal work that they need done in Bangladesh or the U.K. from a U.S. office. Long Answer Admission To The Practice Of Law In The U.S. A Bachelor of Law, Masters in Law and the Bar (BPTC) from the UK is not a satisfactory credential for employment as a lawyer in the United States. To be employed as a lawyer in the United States, you must be admitted to the practice of law in the U.S. state where you are employed (or in the District of Columbia, if you are employed there). Ordinarily, admission to the practice of law requires completion of a law degree at an American Bar Association accredited law school followed by a character and fitness background check and passage of the bar exam. It is plausible that one or more states would waive the law school requirement (in California, law school is not a pre-requisite to taking the bar exam, for example). Some states have exceptions to this requirement specifically aimed at non-U.S. lawyers. But, you will still need to take a bar exam preparation course which is typically six to eight weeks of full time study (since there are sufficiently significant differences between U.S. and U.K. law that you would probably not be able to pass the bar exam in the U.S. without it), and then pass the bar exam in a state that waived the completion of an ABA accredited law school degree, and then you will still need to complete the character and fitness review (which is very thorough). You do not need to be a U.S. citizen to practice law in the United States, but character and fitness review would almost certainly take longer. For example, a typical character and fitness review requires you to identify every place you have lived in your adult life and to provide a reference from each, and to list every traffic ticket you have ever been issued with proof that it was paid. These steps would be harder to implement for someone who has lived their entire life outside the U.S. These steps would typically take several months and would be inconvenient to conduct from outside the U.S. Immigration Requirements Of course, if the firm that hired you needed someone to engage in the practice of law in Bangladesh on its behalf, from its U.S. offices, that could be done immediately, if the employer were wiling to secure the proper work visa for you. However, even if you were qualified, usually employers aren't interested in obtaining a work visa for a foreign lawyer to do U.S. based work, as they have plenty of U.S. based lawyers admitted to the practice of U.S. law from whom they can choose. Also, many U.S. legal employers disfavor hiring someone with more than three to five years of experience, rather than someone fresh out of law school, because they want to impart to you their corporate culture and to hire someone who is junior to the existing legal employees to do the grunt work. You could be hired as a paralegal without the relevant credentials, but getting an employer to sponsor a work related visa for you (and obtaining such a visa as an employer) to be a paralegal would be very difficult.	This paper studies the question, in a restricted context of federal cases (the main problem is getting data, but turns out that some federal court clerks have been obliging). From that database, between 1998-2011 1,156,460 felony cases were resolved. 0.2% of those cases were pro se representations with virtually all cases having professional representation ("data missing" is 10 times more frequent than pro se, and the only thing rarer was pro bono attorney at 0.03%). As for outcomes, it is possible that pro se defendants had the charges dismissed at a higher rate (16.9% pro se vs. 6.1% represented -- "possible" is a way of simplifying the statistical problems in interpreting these numbers); with acquittals it's a wash, and with convictions pro se defendants may have done worse (14.8% pro se, 4.9% represented). There also seems to be a trend that juries convict pro se defendants more often than they do represented defendants (90% vs. 77.9%). Ah, and this paper follows up and contradicts the findings of the Hashimoto study, linked in the comments.	It depends upon how the service works. A "scrivner" is permitted, but "legal services" are not. If, for example, it asks you the questions on a state approved form and asks you to fill in answers and the compiles the answers into a complaint with the proper typesetting, this would be permissible. It could also have "educational materials" which you could read that could discuss small claims court. But, if it provides individualized assistance on a case by case basis on how to answer the questions, for example, prodding you to say something about each element of a cause of action if you fail to do so, this might very well constitute the practice of law and be illegal.
Actions to take against parcel delivery service that lost my parcels I sent five parcels using a UK parcel delivery service called parcelhero. The parcels were collected by parcelforce UK. Only 1 of the parcels was delivered, another was returned to sender, and three are still missing. The phone number of the parcel delivery service does not work, and chasing parcelforce UK is futile. The missing parcels contained valuable items such as a passport, notebooks etc. Considering one of the missing parcels contained a passport, what kind of action can I take against the parcel delivery service?	None You broke your contract with ParcelHero - they could take action against you. You say you sent a passport, which is clearly on the list of prohibited items and this makes it an Undeliverable Consignments. And “Customer shall be liable at all times for any and all Charges incurred by PH in returning, storing or disposing of an Undeliverable Consignment.”	At this point, since it's been more than four weeks since the order was issued, you are able to enforce the order. The delay is just to allow appeals or corrections. It is up to you to arrange enforcement, so at a high level your choices are to do nothing, or to proceed. If you do nothing then you will not get any money. If you proceed then you will spend more money, which you may or may not get back, as with the original sum. The Scottish procedure is conceptually similar to the English one that is more normally described in online resources, but the words are different. To decode things a bit, You are now trying to proceed with "diligence", which means enforcing the court order. The court itself is not involved, having moved on to other things. There are several ways the money could come to you, such as "arrestment", "attachment" and "inhibition". Or, X might give you the money voluntarily. The next steps must be taken by a "sheriff officer" on your instruction. Despite the name being similar to "sheriff" as in "Sheriff Court", these officers are private practitioners who are licensed by the courts to pursue debtors. You can use https://smaso.org.uk to find a sheriff officer you like. Most likely you will be able to give them all the information online. Then, they will go ahead with the first step, formally serving a "charge for payment" on X. Then, X has 14 days to come up with the money; if they don't, then the sheriff officer can proceed with more drastic steps. They will be able to advise based on the particular circumstances, but some broad possibilities are "arrestment" of X's money directly from their bank, or "attachment", which is seizure of X's property to be auctioned off. If X is an employed person (rather than a business, say) then you might also arrange "arrestment of earnings" whereby the employer diverts a sum from X's pay to you, for whatever necessary period of time. All these come with their own rules and timescales, including processes if X's bank or employer does not comply. The sheriff officer will have to be paid for all this. The usual way is that you pay them up-front, and then that fee can be added to the diligence. All officers charge the same rates, but the fee schedule is a bit complicated depending on exactly which services are involved, how long it takes the officer to do the work, and their travel time. It is up to you to make the decisions about how much you want to spend in pursuit of the money, also taking into account the likelihood that you will actually get it. For the sheriff officer, since this is a completely routine part of the job, they will be able to give you their impression of the range of outcomes based on the specifics of X's situation.	You have been scammed - report this to the police. There is little to no chance this person will ever be found or that if they are that you will get your bitcoins back from them. On the plus side, for the bargain price of $9,500 you have learned never to trust a cheque until it is cleared. You do, however, have avenues with your bank. You can ask Westpac what redress they will make. You can make a formal complaint to their complaints department. You can then go to the Financial Ombudsman Service. Legally, I don't think you have a leg to stand on as your releasing goods on the basis of a pending cheque is your own idiocy, however, the bank may make some redress as a commercial decision to a loyal customer.	"Revenge" is not a legal concept. If you injure someone other than in self defence or for another legal reason than you are committing assault. Hence dangerous booby traps for trespassers are illegal, so anything that might cause injury, however minor, is definitely out. That includes itching powder. However I would make an analogy with anti-climb paint. This allows you to use a paint that damages clothing provided you put up warning signs. So if you were to leave a parcel coated with anti-climb paint or containing a bag of paint or glitter rigged to spill it over the person opening it then that would be legal as long as there was a warning that tampering may cause property damage. (Note "spill", not "squirt" or "splash": anything ejecting paint or glitter under pressure might get it in someone's eyes, causing injury). So your friend could put a notice up saying that unauthorised tampering with parcels could cause damage to property and then put out parcels that might do exactly that. Your friend could also put a GPS tracker in a parcel to try to find out where they are going. Update Here is someone who did this. The BBC story does not mention any legal issues for him. A former Nasa [sic] engineer spent six months building a glitter bomb trap to trick thieves after some parcels were stolen from his doorstep. The device, hidden in an Apple Homepod box, used four smartphones, a circuit board and 1lb (453g) of glitter. Mark Rober, who is now a Youtuber, caught the original thieves on his home security camera. [...] The former Nasa engineer said: "If anyone was going to make a revenge bait package and over-engineer the crap out of it, it was going to be me."	I know it's not a huge amount of money, but I'm not currently in a position to pay it. Is it still legal to send invoices this long from the past? Yes, it is legal. And the surveyor is still within the statute of limitations to sue you for breach of contract. Beyond the purely legislative aspect, personally I would encourage you to pay the surveyor once you are in a position to do so, even if the statute of limitations had expired. From your description, it seems that the surveyor acted with nobility in that Even though he didn't mention any payment, he sent me the survey. and there is no indication that the survey was faulty. Thus, it would be opportunistic not to honor your part in the contract under pretext of the statute of limitations. Consider this: You would not wish to be deprived of compensation today (or once the debtor becomes able to pay you) simply because years earlier you were too overwhelmed to send an invoice for work you actually performed.	The contract between you and the company is for the supply of the goods. How they get them to you is irrelevant; they may have them in stock, or they may order them and ship them on, or they may send an order to the factory to ship them directly to you. There is nothing saying that they have to be in stock anywhere. The law you refer to says that they must ship within 30 days unless they provide a specific date. In effect "shipped within 30 days" is an implicit term in the contract. If after 30 days they have not shipped the goods then you are entitled to rescind the contract (i.e. get your money back). Where things get interesting is if they took your money knowing that they would not be able to ship within 30 days, or at least being reckless (i.e. not caring) about it. It does rather sound like this may be the case. If so then it may rise to the level of fraud, and the FTC or state authorities may take action. Try writing to the FTC. A single event won't get any action, but if they get lots of complaints then they might.	Yes, but ... It doesn’t protect you. Let’s imagine you put such a clause in and a person in Europe used your service notwithstanding: they’ve broken the contract but you’ve broken the law. You get the fine and they get ... nothing. Because you can’t contract outside the law you never had a valid contract with them so you have no basis to sue. Further, because you are purporting to something you can’t legally do, you are probably on the wrong side of misleading and deceptive consumer protection law: which is another fine. If you can ensure that you don’t breach local law - like by not operating over the internet - then you can choose not to deal with e.g. Europeans. If you can’t guarantee that, then you’re stuffed.	In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it.
What degree of copyright does a tabletop RPG's DM hold to an instance of a campaign? So, I have been watching the Youtube channel CritCrab, that deals with various flavors of misbehavior in tabletop roleplaying game groups. One video dealt with a group that had kicked out their DM and gotten another DM, and DM1 had then gone after DM2 for "stealing his campaign". No actual legal threats were made, but this got me wondering if DM1 might have had some sort of standing. As a quick overview, in a tabletop RPG, the Dungeon Master (exact nomenclature varies between rpg systems) creates an outline for a narrative he wants the players' characters to participate in. This outline is generally called a campaign. The players, for their part, design their characters with more or less input from the DM. They players and DM then get together to flesh out the outline of the narrative through basically improv theater and combat simulation using polyhedral dice. So, clearly this is a group effort and the players have a great deal of input in the creative process of fleshing out the storyline. Ergo, they'd have some degree of copyright to the ongoing story outlined by the DM. My question is, do the players have enough copyright to ask someone else to pick up from where the previous DM left off and essentially create a derivative work? Or, can an ousted DM pretty much vindicate the group's decision by taking the new DM to court to prevent them from continuing the story?	That is going to depend on the details of exactly who does what, and how much is written down. It will also depend on the agreements between the people involved, which may well be verbal or implied. I don't know of any actual cases where such a dispute came to a copyright lawsuit. As copyright suits largely deal with financial harms and damages, and in most individual game there is little or no financial impact, a suit might be unlikely in most cases. But lets look at some possibilities. In the typical case, the game organizer or DM creates a setting and outline for a series of sessions. This is likely to include maps, descriptions of rooms or locations, descriptions of artifacts, descriptions of non-player characters, locations and types of monsters and other hazards, and other such background. This is probably mostly or fully written down (which includes being recorded on some sort of computer file.) It is therefore protected by copyright, and the initial owner of that copyright is its creator, probably the DM. (In some cases the DM uses a published "module" and makes only limited changes, in which case the DM would only hold copyright on those changes, if anything.) Then the players create characters, in a process that may be supervised by the DM, and possibly participated in by other players. Each player would probably hold copyright to the description of his or her own character, but the DM or other players might be considered to be co-authors of that, depending on their degree of participation. Then the players start having playing sessions, each player controlling the actions of a character (or perhaps more than one), and the DM more-or-less controlling the rest of the world, guided by the pre-created maps and descriptions. Some of those will be shared with the players, or modified (partial) versions of them will be. Events of the sessions may or may not be written down (or otherwise preserved in a tangible form). If they are not, there is no copyright on them. If they are, there is a copyright, and all the players and the DM are probably co-authors. Now lets look and agreements and ownership. The DM probably owns his or her notes, S/he has at least permitted players to use any that have been revealed to the players. The group has probably agreed (implicitly) to co-create the adventure as it happens. There probably are no written agreements about any of this. If a dispute arises, the DM is legally free to withhold the campaign notes, maps, etc that have not been shared with the players. Whether s/he can legally demand that the players not further use the parts of the setting that had been previously revealed is not so clear. It would depend on what the agreement between the DM and the players said; on, in effect, what license the DM had granted to the players. And since there was probably no written agreement, and quite likely not even an explicit verbal agreement, it would depend on what a court found they had agreed on by implication, based on their actions, and the usual customs of such groups. Sorting that out would be loads of fun. It might involve significant legal fees. The DM is unlikely to hold any exclusive copyright on the previous events of the campaign. Most likely everyone who participates would be a co-author of those. Unless there is a specific agreement to the contrary, any co-author of any shared work has the right to use, and license the use of, the shared work, although s/he must account to the others for any profits. The DM certainly has no legal right to forbid the same group from playing together with a different DM (absent a very improbable contract giving such a right). The DM can only control the maps and notes s/he created independently. If a professional DM is involved, as a comment mentions is possible, it might be more likely that an explicit wri9tten contract between the players and the DM will have been agreed to, If so, its terms will control, whatever they are, unless they are somehow contrary to law. Such a pro DM might be more defensive of copyrights, but would not have any more rights than any DM, except as a specific contract might have provided them. I doubt that the courts will see many actual lawsuits over such issues.	You can do whatever you like with posts made after you change the rules - you have to leave the previous stuff alone. The contributors' have accepted the terms of the licence: They own the copyright or have permission from the copyright holder to post it (the promise) They agree that it can be edited altered or removed CC-BY-SA allows people to copy the stuff off the website and republish it - this is way outside what the contributors agreed to. These people have given permission for their work to be altered but not copied.	The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use.	The resulting figure could surely be covered by copyright, if it is original. A new set of folds to make a known figure might not be separately protectable under US law. In this news story A court in Japan is said to have held that: the folding instructions are indeed a copyrightable subject matter, because (i) the author’s selection of 10 out of 32 folding steps were subject to alternative modes of expression; (ii) the author’s folding instructions, including the organization of the diagrams, the texts, and the drawings, had elements of “style”; (iii) taken in its entirety, one admittedly found room for creative expression (Tokyo District Court Opinion: Case No. Heisei 23 (2011) (Wa) 18968 (Tokyo D.Ct., May 20, 2011). But it further held that the particular diagram displayed was not an infringement of the claimed source. In this tech dirt podcast a suit over an artwork derived from a folding pattern is reported. Tech dirt thinks it is an obvious case of fair use. The British Origami society says: The issue of how the laws of copyright affect origami diagrams and models is an important one. Groups such as the Origami Artists and Creators are working towards an internationally agreed set of guidelines. Dr. Robert Lang has presented his interpretation on his website. Until a common statement is agreed, we refer people to the terms in our constitution. (1) The Society and its Members shall respect all copyrights, registered trademarks and registered designs in all models, designs, diagrams, photographs, books and writings and shall observe the laws of copyright, registered trademarks, registered designs and patents and all other provisions relating to intellectual property which are applicable in all the separate countries throughout the World. (2) This article shall apply to all models, designs, diagrams, photographs, books and writings whether existing in writing or print on paper or any other hard copy or existing in electronic form, photocopy or microfiche in libraries, public or private archives or on the internet or on recorded discs or tapes of any kind or in any other kind of electronic record and whether made commercially or otherwise publicly or made privately. (3) Before reproducing any model, drawing, photograph or text contained in any publication, a member of the Society shall obtain the consent of the copyright owner before publication. (4) As a matter of courtesy, whether or not required to do so by law, the Society and its Members shall give proper acknowledgement to the original author of any model, design or diagram demonstrated or reproduced in any manner. Origami USA says that: OrigamiUSA is very concerned about protecting and respecting the rights of origami artists, authors, and diagrammers. While "traditional" origami models are in the public domain, the vast majority of published origami designs are of recent authorship and therefore cannot be published or used commercially without obtaining permission from their creators and/or diagrammers. It seems that few suits on origami copyright have been filed, and then appealed to where opinions are published and thus accessible to a non-professional's search.	When a company stops existing for whatever reason, then its assets (physical, financial, intellectual or otherwise) don't stop existing. When the company dissolves voluntarily, those assets usually go to the owner(s) of the company. When the company got bought up and integrated into another company, the buying company will usually own them. When the company went bankrupt and got liquidated, then they will often get sold off to the highest bidder. And then there is the question of who actually owns the IP rights to a specific game asset. Often there is not just one legal person which worked on a game. In addition to the developer, there might also have been a separate publisher who might or might not own IP rights. There might have been investors in the background who financed the project and now own some copyrights. Sometimes there was more than one publisher. And sub-contractors might have been involved in the development who only licensed their assets but retained copyright. So unfortunately it is often not really clear what happened to IP assets of a defunct company. People who might have the rights will often not care much about them until something happens which gives new commercial value to those assets. So even if you are unable to determine who owns the assets to a game, as soon as you start using them, someone might show up with a plausible claim to the IP rights and demand money from you. Such lawsuits can get really messy and really expensive. For a good example for just how much of a goose chase you might be in for when you want to legally obtain the rights to a game from a defunct company, check out the story of the re-release of No One Lives Forever. tl;dr: multiple game companies said "Maybe we have the rights to the game according to some contract buried in some file cabinet, but we don't care enough to find out. But if you try to release it, we will find out and if we do we will sue you!"	The text and content (including all diagrams and illustrations) of the 1847 work (and of any other work published in 1847) are in the public domain in the US and everywhere in the world. You may freely use them verbatim or in any modified form that you wish. You are not even legally required to credit your source, although not to do so would be unethical, in my view. The version by Nicholas Rougeux that is linked to in the question has the licensing statement: Posters and website design are copyright Nicholas Rougeux. All other content and diagrams are under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license (CC BY-SA 4.0). This will not apply to any content copied from the 1847 version, of course. You may use any of the new content and diagrams so released, or make and use derivative works based on those elements, provided that you comply with the CC BY-SA 4.0 license. This has a number of provisions, but the major ones are that you must release your work under the same license, must acknowledge your source work, and must not impose any additional conditions or restrictions on users of your derived work. These are spelled out in sections 3.a and 3.b of the license (linked above). Please read the full terms if you intend to use this license. If this procedure will satisfy your purpose, you do not need any further permission from Nicholas Rougeux, nor to pay any fees or royalties to him. If you do not choose to place your work under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license, then you must not use the diagrams from Rougeux's version, nor modified versions directly based on them, nor an overall design clearly and directly based on the original design of that version, unless you secure permission from Rougeux (or the current copyright holder of Rougeux's version, whoever that may be). Given that Rougeux chose to release under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license, he may well be unwilling to grant permission under a different license, but that is his choice to make. Exception: in the US, you may use content from the Rougeux version to the limited extent permitted by fair use. This is not likely to cover the use of all or a large number of diagrams, particularly for a competing version of the same base work. Without specific information on how much content you would be using from that version, and how similar it would be to the original, no one can reliably determine if fair use would apply or not, but fair use is most likely to apply when a strictly limited amount of content is reused, and particularly when it is used for a different purpose than the original. Also, fair use is a strictly US legal content, and a work that might be held to be fair use by a US court might be considered an infringement by the courts of some other counties. Other countries have their own exceptions to copyright which are different in scope and terms from fair use. Many of them are significantly narrower. Note that a work posted to the internet is in effect published in all countries, and a copyright holder might choose to sue in any country s/he pleases. US courts might well enforce such a judgement even if it would not have been the judgement of a US court. Rogeux (or any other creator of a new edition) can have no copyright in elements already present in Byrne's 1847 work. Any similarity to Rogeux's work that is because of a similarity to Byrne's 1847 work is not copyright infringement. But any new elements introduced by Rogeux (or anyone else), including the manner of adding interactivity to a diagram, may well be protected by copyright (although the idea of having an interactive version of the diagram will not be). Any new or significantly modified text or diagrams introduced in a later version will be protected. As to any other versions of the 1847 "Byrne's Euclid" that may have been published, the publishers gain no copyright over the original 1847 work or any of its elements, including text, diagrams, or color scheme. Provided you do not use any original content newly introduced in such editions, you do not need to secure any permission from, or pay any fee to, the copyright holders of such editions. However, you may not use any such original content, or modified versions clearly based on such original content, without permission, unless an exception to copyright, such as fair use, applies. All that I said above about fair use would then apply. A copyright holder may grant or refuse permission to use a protected work or create a derivative work on any terms that s/he chooses, and charge any fee or royalty rate s/he thinks proper. Lack of response to a request for permission must be treated as if the response was "No".	No, this is not true. Copyright can be enforced selectively. You are confusing copyright with trademark. Company can lose its trademark if they aren't protecting it. All the meanwhile they can choose to ignore some copyright infringement while enforcing their rights on others with no legal problems what-so-ever. In order to illustrate the difference: for example, if someone would make a clone of Super Mario and would call their clone as well "Super Mario" and maybe even would call themselves "Nintendo", even if they have programmed the whole game by themselves from scratch and the art and music would be all different, they wouldn't be infringing the copyright but challenging protected trademarks. In your case, the naming was identical, the art and everything was too similar to the original and therefore the clone was challenging the trademark that needs constant protecting.	The copyright owner is whoever first put the material in fixed form. It is most likely that that is the note-taker (you). It is possible (and highly unlikely) that the lecturer read (had memorized) a prepared script and you copied that script mechanically, and if that were the case, he would hold copyright and you infringed by making a copy. Typically, a note-taker follows the logic of a lecture and expresses those ideas in his own words (the notes do not match a plausible verbatim class lecture). Since expression is protected and ideas are not, that makes it most likely that you would prevail in a suit. The equations are almost certainly not protected.
What would happen if a US state government refused to abide by a decision of its own supreme court? Assume some legal question is brought up for a ruling by a US state supreme court. Further assume the question is on an issue which both the US constitution and US federal law takes no stance on; it is strictly a state matter. The state supreme court makes a ruling and then the state executive and/or legislative branches simply refuse to abide by that ruling. What now? Do any/all of the the state judicial branches have any actual enforcement capability? Not just the legal authority to demand compliance, but the physical capability to act when someone defies that authority? Would the federal government have any power to intervene? Would they have to be requested to intervene? If so, whose request would suffice? Would public opinion play any role? Would it matter if the residents of the state are in opposition to or support of the court? Has anything like this ever happened?	This happened recently in Washington state, when the state Supreme Court ordered the state government to comply with a constitutional funding mandate (McCleary v. Washington, 2012). The state did not comply for 6 years and was fined ($100,000 per day) for 3 years. I don't recall that the state paid a penny, and the courts did not demand payment of fines for that period. Public opinion did not have any obvious effect, but you could take this to Politics SE to get a lot of opinions as to whether public opinion mattered. The federal government can't get involved, unless they (the federal government) first make a federal issue out of it, perhaps because of some law suit. Power of enforcement is essential non-existent, given a sufficiently non-cooperative state government. I should point out that the court's order was a bit vague, that is, it was not "release Smith from custody instantly", it required the government to act to the satisfaction of the court.	An individual does not have authority to "issue" a restraining order. In the U.S. only judges can issue such orders. The guidelines and policies for obtaining a restraining order vary by jurisdiction, although in the end a judge can issue any order he wants. So in theory you might be able to find a judge who will issue an order for any or no reason. In practice I'd be surprised if many judges would abuse their office to gratuitously harass people in this fashion, though there are probably a few amusing/disturbing examples out there to the contrary.	No The case was dismissed on procedural reasons. Like this. Well, perhaps not so pedantic but there are things that have to happen before the Supreme Court can get involved and they haven’t. For example, the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction in a limited classes of case; if this isn’t one of those (and it isn’t) it has to be heard in a court that does and then get appealed up the chain. When they have, the court will make a decision on the merits.	The Supremacy Clause. U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. [emphasis mine] This is also known as the "Supremacy Clause" of the U.S. Constitution. It prevents any law of any state from acting contrary to the federal constitution. A comment correctly cites multiple cases that use this clause, in part, as the basis for SCOTUS' authority to review State Supreme Court decisions. So in your hypothetical, the federal issue in play is the clarity of the federal constitution which supersedes state law.	1-3: This would be prohibited under Article VI, paragraph 2 of the US Constitution, which provides that federal law, and the ability to enforce that law, has supremacy over state law. As summarized by Cornell Law, the Supremacy Clause: establishes that the federal constitution, and federal law generally, take precedence over state laws, and even state constitutions. It prohibits states from interfering with the federal government's exercise of its constitutional powers... 4: Not legally; see above. 5: Yes, probably a lot of laws. Those charges could range anywhere from interfering with a federal investigation, wrongful imprisonment, assault, or kidnapping. I think it's important to point out that it is highly unlikely the situation would ever escalate to 4, let alone 5. The federal government is incredibly well resourced with regards to being able to move its law enforcement officers throughout the country. And that's not withstanding that the FBI and other agencies (CBP, TSA) are already stationed in any particular state. A non-zero number of those agents are also residents of the state they're stationed in, which would complicate things further.	The future prospects are negligible, and the present status of such influence is non-existent. In a few cases, you may find an appellate decision citing some statement from a reputable law review. Here is an article that addresses such influences on SCOTUS (which, the authors note, have decreased over time). However, you are describing a wingnut legal theory, and courts do not rely on wingnut legal theories, they rely on what the actual law is.	In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another.	Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.
Is a gun in the waistband with a tucked-in shirt concealed or open carry in Michigan? I generally carry my gun concealed, inside the waistband with a shirt or jacket over it. If I were to tuck said shirt in, the grip will show. Is this now considered open carry, or does the whole gun have to be showing?	It will hinge on the specific facts, but if the pistol is not discernible by casual observation it will most likely be regarded as concealed. Michigan Open Carry Inc's FAQ #11 asks: Can I open carry with an inside the waistband/inside the pants (IWB) holster? The Michigan Court of Appeals appears to answer this in People v Curtis Phillips (1996) (unpublished): In the case, officers observed Mr. Phillips standing on a nearby porch with the butt of a gun protruding out of his waistband. The Court held that the pistol was not visible under "ordinary observation” and therefore "A casual observer may not have discerned the object in defendant’s waistband." Essentially, it's up to the "trier of fact", meaning open to interpretation for a judge in a bench trial, or a jury in a jury trial. The FAQ goes on to quote The Michigan Court of Appeals per curiam in People v Curtis Phillips (1996) Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “concealed” a handgun because the arresting officers could see the butt of a gun protruding from his waistband. We disagree. To determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). A conviction for carrying a concealed weapon without a license requires proof that the accused concealed a dangerous weapon. People v Pickett, 21 Mich App 246, 248; 175 NW2d 347 (1970). Concealment is a question of fact and exists when the weapon is “not discernible by the ordinary observation of [those] coming in contact with [the accused], casually observing him, as people do in the ordinary and usual associations of life.” People v Johnnie W Jones, 12 Mich App 293, 296; 162 NW2d 847 (1968). While searching the area for gunmen after a reported shooting, the arresting officers observed defendant standing on a nearby porch with the butt of a handgun protruding from his waistband. They were able to identify this object as the butt of a handgun based on their training and experience. The officers were not “casually observing” defendant “in the ordinary and usual associations of life,” and this was not “ordinary observation” because the officers were searching for armed suspects. A casual observer may not have discerned the object in defendant’s waistband. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude there was sufficient evidence that defendant concealed a gun in his waistband.	CO Rev Stat § 18-12-105.5(1) says that A person commits a class 6 felony if such person knowingly and unlawfully and without legal authority carries, brings, or has in such person's possession a deadly weapon as defined in section 18-1-901 (3) (e) in or on the real estate and all improvements erected thereon of any public or private elementary, middle, junior high, high, or vocational school or any public or private college, university, or seminary... but there are exceptions such as presenting an authorized demonstration, or for some authorized extracurricular reason. The meme about under 3.5 inches derives from the general statute pertaining to concealed weapons, where CO Rev Stat § 18-12-101 defines "knife" as being over 3.5 inches long (and it is a misdemeanor to carry a concealed knife). We'll come back to this. The applicable part of the definition of "deadly weapon" in the school-specific law is (II) A knife, bludgeon, or any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate, that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. This raising a question that I encourage you not to test, whether the school deadly weapon definition excludes knives that are longer that 3.5 inches. The definition section for Article 12 starts by saying (1) As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires so that means that "knife" is redefined in a special way (in terms of length), and that is for the entire article which includes the school weapon section. The actual definition of "knife" in the definitions section of Article 12 is (f) "Knife" means any dagger, dirk, knife, or stiletto with a blade over three and one-half inches in length, or any other dangerous instrument capable of inflicting cutting, stabbing, or tearing wounds, but does not include a hunting or fishing knife carried for sports use. The issue that a knife is a hunting or fishing knife must be raised as an affirmative defense. The modifier "with a blade over three and one-half inches in length" might be thought to refer to all of the preceding terms, or just the last one – stiletto. These is a rule of legal interpretation that a modifier should be interpreted as referring to the last antecedent, meaning that the length limit pertains to stilettos. The punctuation (lack of comma) supports the interpretation "stiletto with a blade over three and one-half inches in length", meaning that a knife is a knife. Whether or not a literal knife with a blade under 3.5 inches long constitutes a redefined knife, it certainly constitutes a "dangerous instrument capable of inflicting cutting, stabbing, or tearing wounds". In the context of a specific law restricting the possession of weapons (concealed or not) in schools, the context requires that the definition explicitly mentioned in 18-1-901(3)(e), which is outside Article 12, is being referred to. The reason the law was explicitly written to refer to that definition was so that the general definition in article 12 would be overridden. My point is that this is a not atypical example of the problem of legal definitions, which can get rather convoluted. If someone has told you that a knife under 3.5" is legally not a knife, you probably now know why they would say that, but also you should know what that's simply not true when it comes to weapons in school. I omitted one complication, which in this instance is not applicable, namely the kirpan exception. In Singh v. Thompson, 36 F.3d 1102, it was ruled that a prohibition against knives (in school), in that instance, violates the Free Exercise clause (the kirpan must be worn at all times). On the other hand, TSA does forbid taking a kirpan into the secure zone, a matter which has so far not been litigated.	The first passage quoted appears to be from the North Carolina General Statutes section 14-269.2 (Weapons on campus or other educational property) The roughly corresponding section of South Carolina law is SECTION 23-31-215 (Issuance of permits.) subsection (M) (5). It is quite different in both wording and content. I do not find the second quoted passage in an online search, and I presume it is of the school's own writing. If you were in elementary school "about 10 years ago" it would seem that you are probably in high school or college now. Rules for those institutions are often quite different from elementary school and from each other. I have no way to evaluate what the school regulations on such subjects might be, but it is probably safer to leave your empty casing at home, although no rule you have quoted or that I can find online would prohibit it. An expended cartridge or casing is not a "gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind" and so this provision of NC 14-269.2 would not apply, even in North Carolina. An expended cartridge is not likely to be defined as a "weapon" either, and so the second quotes passage should not apply, although it is possible that the school regulations define "weapon" differently so that an expended cartridge is included. I have no way to know what other provisions the school regulations might include that would be relevant.	The Supreme Court considered and rejected some related interpretations in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). The entire opinion, and the dissents, are well worth reading, if you wish to get a clearer understanding of how the Court has most recently interpreted the Second Amendment. A few specific comments: "The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia" (p. 1). The Court does not agree that "militia" should be understood as synonymous with "National Guard": The “militia” comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens’ militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens’ militia would be preserved. (p. 2) The Court, citing U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, holds that the weapons protected are "those in common use for lawful purposes". There is some discussion on pages 55-56, in which the majority seems to explicitly deny that the Second Amendment grants a specific right to possess military weapons. Instead, they reason that historically "the militia" would have reported for duty with the sort of firearms they normally had at home, whether or not those were the preferred weapons for fighting a war, and so therefore the Second Amendment protects the right to bear "household" weapons, not military weapons. They seem to agree that laws banning "dangerous and unusual weapons" are constitutional, even if those weapons are in military use. They specifically mention M-16 rifles as a type of weapon that can be banned.	This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.	An affirmative defense is a way of avoiding conviction by acknowledging you did the act claimed, but that such act was among the exceptions provided by the law which makes such acts otherwise an offence. That is, you affirm (acknowledge, admit) your action of using the device, but you are claiming that your use of the device (handsfree as a GPS guide) is okay, and therefore you should not be convicted. For all intents and purposes in this situation, your "2" and "3" are the same thing. The device is supported by something other than you holding it, and you are able to keep both hands on the wheel while using it in this way. Finally, a plain language reading of the definition for "hands-free accessory" suggests that using an object in the car to support the device where it can be seen, or using a feature of the device that speaks directions which you can hear, neither of which requires moving your hands off the wheel, will be considered such an accessory. It is also worth pointing out that such usage of a device (placed in a cradle or on the dashboard or turned up so it is heard) will be well-known to the legislators, and there is a reasonable interpretation of the law that would allow such usage. If this ever went to court, and somebody used this defence for this situation, they would probably be okay.	Since no jurisdiction is specified, I decided to search in maryland in the united-states As far as I can tell, there is no state or federal law which prohibits a private individual from owning a decommissioned military tank. Most public highways and roads have weight limits, and many tanks would exceed them. Most tanks, or at least most older tanks, are not in any case "street legal" not having required headlights, brake lights, air bags, and other safety devices. Treads must be modified to avoid road damage. None of this would be relevant if the tank was kept on private land and not used on public roads or streets. If somehow the main gun or a mounted machine gun were still in place, and not disabled, permits would be required that are almost impossible to obtain. Specifically: "State Laws and Published Ordinances – Maryland Statutes current through chapter 18 of the 2020 session lists Code section 4-401 which provides that: (c) Machine gun. "Machine gun" means a loaded or unloaded weapon that is capable of automatically discharging more than one shot or bullet from a magazine by a single function of the firing device. Section 4-402: (a) Evidence of possession. The presence of a machine gun in a room, boat, or vehicle is evidence of the possession or use of the machine gun by each person occupying the room, boat, or vehicle. ... (c) Registration of possession. (1) A person who acquires a machine gun shall register the machine gun with the Secretary of State Police: (i) within 24 hours after acquiring the machine gun; and (ii) in each succeeding year during the month of May. Section 4-501 (b) Destructive device. (1) "Destructive device" means explosive material, incendiary material, or toxic material that is: (i) combined with a delivery or detonating apparatus so as to be capable of inflicting injury to persons or damage to property; or (ii) deliberately modified, containerized, or otherwise equipped with a special delivery, activation, or detonation component that gives the material destructive characteristics of a military ordnance. (2) "Destructive device" includes a bomb, grenade, mine, shell, missile, flamethrower, poison gas, Molotov cocktail, pipe bomb, and petroleum-soaked ammonium nitrate Section 4-503 (a) Prohibited. A person may not knowingly: (1) manufacture, transport, possess, control, store, sell, distribute, or use a destructive device; or (2) possess explosive material, incendiary material, or toxic material with intent to create a destructive device.	The police performed an "open air sniff". Federal and Pennsylvania law differ on this. Under Federal law, this is not considered a search and can be done on any vehicle- usually to get cause for a more invasive search. (Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005).) Under Pennsylvania law, an open air sniff requires reasonable suspicion. This is lower than probable cause- all it requires is that a reasonable person could suspect from the facts that a crime may have or could be committed. Being overly nervous during a routine traffic stop driving someone else's car could potentially be considered reasonable suspicion- as I only have your second-hand account, I won't speculate further. If there was no reasonable suspicion, any evidence found by that search, or evidence found by a search justified by it would be suppressed. Fourth Ammendment rights also apply here. The police cannot detain someone solely for the purpose of waiting for a sniffer dog. They have ways and techniques to waste time for this purpose, but if the stop was concluded before the dog arrived, your husband would be free to leave. Again, I have only your second-hand account so I won't speculate on whether this happened. He should speak to his lawyer about specifics of the case.
Why are assault and battery often both charged for the same crime? Assault seems similar to "attempted battery", so it feels akin to charging "attempted murder" whenever "murder" charges are brought.	Edit: because this question has tagged the United States, the answer below discusses US law, not the law of any other country. Because they're separate crimes that, as a general rule, don't merge, and prosecutors like to charge multiple crimes when they can because it gives them leverage in plea negotiations. You could also charge attempted murder if there's been an actual murder, it's just that it would kind of be a waste of time since they would merge upon conviction. You're close on the view that assault is attempted battery. But, note that generally assault is placing someone in imminent fear of receiving a battery, whereas as an attempt usually requires a 'substantial step' towards commission of the actual offense, so the ambit of assault is slightly larger than the ambit of attempted battery (again, generally speaking).	Assuming these are common law crimes (Kenya is a common law country - sort of) or statutory crimes that have codified common law crimes without substantially changing them. It is not attempted murder - this requires an intent to kill. Pulling the trigger would have that intent, pointing it doesn't. It is assault if it puts the victim in fear of immediate harm (pretty sure it would). There are probably some statutory firearms offences too.	new-south-wales No it's not harassment State and territory laws criminalise stalking. These offences often target behaviour amounting to harassment There are also state and territory offences that capture harassment at work, in family or domestic contexts, and in schools and other educational institutions. "Harassment" requires a pattern of behaviour which is missing from your example. It's probably the tort of battery A battery is a voluntary and positive act, done with the intention of causing contact with another, that directly causes that contact: Barker et al at p 36. See Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1 at [215] for a summary of the definition of “battery”. The requisite intention for battery is simply this: the defendant must have intended the consequence of the contact with the plaintiff. The defendant need not know the contact is unlawful. He or she need not intend to cause harm or damage as a result of the contact. The modern position, however, is that hostile intent or angry state of mind are not necessary to establish battery: Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd, above, at [52]. It is for that reason that a medical procedure carried out without the patient’s consent may be a battery. On the other hand, it is not every contact that will be taken to be a battery. People come into physical contact on a daily basis. For example it is impossible to avoid contact with other persons in a crowded train or at a popular sporting or concert event. The inevitable “jostling” that occurs in these incidents in every day life is simply not actionable as a battery: Rixon at [53]–[54]; Colins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 per Robert Goff LJ.	united-states He'd be looking at ~6+ more years in prison in the second scenario In the United States, this would be attempted murder in both cases, though in the case of actual physical harm, the prosecutor could charge related offenses such as battery, which is "an intentional offensive or harmful touching of another person that is done without his or her consent." Note that though most attempted murders would likely be state crimes, I'm going to answer the rest of this from the perspective of a federal prosecution for attempted murder. The result would likely be similar for states, though the exact mechanism would be different. Sentencing for people convicted of serious federal crimes is guided by the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines. An "offense level" is determined, then combined with the offender's criminal history and checked against the sentencing table to determine a suggested sentencing range for the judge. Specifically, for Assault with Intent to Commit Murder; Attempted Murder, §2A2.1. states that: (a) Base Offense Level: (1) 33, if the object of the offense would have constituted first degree murder; or (2) 27, otherwise. (b) Specific Offense Characteristics (1) If (A) the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, increase by 4 levels; (B) the victim sustained serious bodily injury, increase by 2 levels; or (C) the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisions (A) and (B), increase by 3 levels. (2) If the offense involved the offer or the receipt of anything of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder, increase by 4 levels. So in this case, it sounds like Joe suffered a life-threatening injury in the scenario where he got shot. Let's assume that this is Bob's first offense, and that it would have constituted first degree murder. If Bob missed, he'd be looking at 135-168 months (11.25-14 years) in prison. If he shot Joe successfully, he'd be instead looking at 210-262 months (17.5-21.83 years) in prison.	It would depends on the laws of the particular state, since each state has its own laws pertaining to voting. The law in North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. §163-275(7), says that it is unlawful For any person with intent to commit a fraud to register or vote at more than one precinct or more than one time, or to induce another to do so, in the same primary or election, or to vote illegally at any primary or election The corresponding jury instruction says what it means to have an intent to commit a fraud: Intent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence. It must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred. You arrive at the intent of a person by such just and reasonable deductions from the circumstances proven as a reasonably prudent person would ordinarily draw therefrom. Specific intent is a mental purpose, aim or design to accomplish a specific harm or result. If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the defendant voted more than one time in the same election event, the (name election event or contest),and that defendant did so with the intent to commit a fraud, then it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. If you do not so find, or if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, then it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty The prosecution would presumably construct an argument that the defendant intended that is vote be counted twice, and if they can prove that intent, then the jury should convict. Defense could argue that the intent was based on a reasonable belief that their absentee ballot was not counted thus disenfranchising defendant, and defendant acted with the lawful intent that their vote be counted, once. Because NC law contains procedural provisions to filter out double-voting, defendant can reasonably have a non-criminal intent, even if they are mistaken about the efficacy of those safeguards. However, the Ohio law does not carry an intent element: (A) No person shall do any of the following: ... (2) Vote or attempt to vote more than once at the same election by any means, including voting or attempting to vote both by absent voter's ballots under division (G) of section 3503.16 of the Revised Code and by regular ballot at the polls at the same election, or voting or attempting to vote both by absent voter's ballots under division (G) of section 3503.16 of the Revised Code and by absent voter's ballots under Chapter 3509. or armed service absent voter's ballots under Chapter 3511. of the Revised Code at the same election; This doesn't even require that you know that you are voting twice. So it depends on the particular law of the state.	Some of this will vary by Jurisdiction, that is by country, and by state in the US, or by province in some other countries. This answer will be focused on the US. Other answers may address other countries. Why did they only arrest the attacker and not the victim? There is not enough information here to say, but stories from participants or witnesses could have made it clear who the attacker was. If the police believed that one party was only defending himself, they might well arrest only the attacker. Can the victim be subpoenaed to court? Yes, the victim can be subpoenaed just as any witness can be. In some areas a victim is routinely subpoenaed even if s/he si expected to attend voluntarily. Could they have actually done anything without the victim present? Yes, if there is enough evidence. The victim rarely takes the stand in murder cases, after all. However, in some cases there is simply not enough evidence aside from the testimony of the victim, so that becomes vital to the case. But if there were many other credible witnesses, the prosecutor might choose not to call the victim. The prosecutor has wide latitude on what witnesses to call and what evidence to presnent, and what charges to bring. Would the attacker have been put in a holding cell? S/he might have, that would depend on the policy of the local police, and the facilities the police had available. Could he have requested to see the victim? This seems like the "one phone call" thing to me, but is that possible here? S/he could ask, but the police would not be required to grant any such request. Indeed permitting this would be a bit unusual, but not unheard of. Usually a visitor would not see a person in a cell, but in some sort of room for the purpose. Details vary. (Edit Comment suggest this is even less plausible than I had thought, unless this is set several decades or more ago. It probably dosen't change the plot much if the attacker was brought to some sort of conference room or visitor's room instead.) Is the victim's testimony enough to actually reduce the sentence down to aggravated assault? Is six months too short of a time? If the judge or jury believed the testimony that there was no intent to kill, then a conviction of aggravated assault would be possible, as a lesser included offense. But this would depend on the totality of the evidence, and the way in which the finder of fact (judge or jury) interpreted it, and whether all the elements of aggravated assault had been proved, and whether any elements of attempted murder had not been proved. In those jurisdictions that I know about, intent to kill is an element of attempted murder. As for the sentence, 6 months is not, I think, outside the range of plausibility for aggravated assault, depending on the facts and the view taken by the judge. The Judge has wide discretion to choose a sentence up to the maximum allowed by law, or much lower. The "usual sentence" varies by jurisdiction, and does not bind the judge anyway. Would the attacker just go back to normal after his release? Would there be any further punishments or restrictions? The court could impose an additional term of probation, with various restrictions, depending on the local law, and the choice of the Judge. These might include staying employed, not getting into other fights, not owning a firearm, taking anger management courses, or other possibilities. Failure to comply with such conditions might lead to a person being sent back to jail/prison. The Judge does not have to impose any such restrictions however. Could the victim change his testimony afterward and reopen the case? Or would that be unreliable? It can happen, but reopening the case is far from automatic. Generally a court has to order the case reopened, and courts generally are reluctant to do so. How many years would the attacker have been facing for the original attempted murder? Probably quite a few, but this varies a good deal by jurisdiction. And the Judge would have considerable discretion up to the maximum sentence permitted by the law in that jurisdiction. Why did it take so long for the case to start? The question does not say how long it took, but it is not uncommon for major cases to take several years before the start of the trial, partly because of the time taken to investigate, and partly because of backlogs in the court system. There are cases on record where the trial took place decades after the crime. That is unusual.	It obviously varies by jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions I am familiar with have something like a "Statute of Limitations" where crimes cannot be prosecuted after a certain length of time because it was "too long ago". The logic is firstly that if you prosecute a pensioner for stealing a bottle of beer from a shop when they were 18, the person you are prosecuting is very different from the person that committed the crime. Secondly, it is very hard to obtain a fair trial after the passing of a long period of time. As far as I know, all jurisdictions vary the length of time depending on the severity of the crime, and the most serious crimes are never time-limited. Rape usually falls into the category of "never time-limited". Of course, although murder and rape can be prosecuted after 15+ years, the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial, and of producing evidence from that long ago, means that they may not be. Finally note that "prosecution" of the accused is often not the primary aim of accusers. They just want to say "this was wrong". Abused individuals often find it very hard to speak out about the abuse; the current scandals have made it that bit easier, by reassuring them that it isn't just them (see the #metoo campaign for example).	Murder is Murder Adding all the elements of murder are proven beyond reasonable doubt then the person gets convicted. The fact that they were a sibling would be considered in sentencing as it always is.
Can I be sued for acting as the US sales agent for a EU manufactured product that subsequently is accused of breaching a US patent? If I sell a product in the US as a US resident sales agent on behalf of an EU seller of a product they manufacture in the EU that subsequently breaches a US patent can I be sued?	35 USC 271(a) says whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent Also, (c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. Both an offer to sell and an actual sale are infringing activities.	That is not really a "global license deal". You can try to attach strings to your US deal that makes you money when the US licensee sells out of the US. It is not typical and you may or may not have the leverage to get that agreement. Since you have no IP outside the US you can’t keep third parties from competing with them so it might not be good business for them. Also the SCOTUS has ruled that a contract licensing a U.S. patent can’t include royalties after the patent expires. In the past people negotiated deals where the royalties dropped in half (for example) after a patent expired. Although freely contracted and making business sense to the parties these royalties are not enforceable as a matter of public policy. It is possible that there may be a prohibition on contracted royalties where no IP exists. However you can license know-how, trademarks etc. independent of the term or existence of a patent.	Why do you think Oracle have not been protecting their trade mark? Using a trade mark to describe the product (“Written in JavaScript”, “Seeking JavaScript developer”) is not an infringement and the trade mark owner is under no obligation to, indeed, cannot stop this. Where they are required to defend their trade mark is when it is being used in such a way that there is the risk of confusion that the goods or services could be confused with the trade mark owner’s goods or services. Further, they are not required to defend all breaches, only enough to show that they are actively doing so. Also it is not important that the trade mark be associated with the trade mark’s owner. Do you know who owns the trade mark “Ben & Jerry’s”?	"I contacted LG directly over the phone eight days ago, bypassing the retailer because I assumed they were off the hook after two years and ten months, and it should be the manufacturer assuming responsibility." Nope. In the EU (and Britain still is), the retailer is the only party with a legal warranty duty (at least 2 years, national law may deviate to the benefit of the customer). The manufacturer may offer any additional warranty, but even if they do that does not absolve the retailer. The UK does have a longer warranty period than the EU minimum if you can prove the product was faulty, but this is a reversed proof, and it still binds the retailer instead of the manufacturer.	You would not be required to do either of the things you state (unless you explicitly agreed to do so). What, strictly speaking, you need to do is to advise the seller that the original goods arrived and ask them if they want to collect them, have you return them at their expense or abandon the goods to you. (In all likelyhood they will give the goods to you because the cost of them recovering them is to high). Although I'm not in the UK, I believe the Sale of Goods Act 1979 applies. Strictly speaking, as you have not paid for the goods, they still belong to the seller - but you do not have to pay to return them.	Is there any consumer protection against the manufacturer repeatedly replacing items under warranty until the customer simply gives up? There are two implied warranties that people should knno about - fitness for a particular purpose and merchantabilty. You are concerned with merchantability. The implied warranty of merchantability basically says that goods are reasonably fit for the general purpose for which they are sold. If something keeps breaking it is not merchantable (generally). The warranty of merchantability is found in the Uniform Commerical Code and in Texas' Business and Commerce Code. Both at Section 2.314. You can read it, it is not very long, but one important part is, "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." This is an implied warranty, which means it is automatic unless disclaimed. Some states prohibit sellers from disclaiming implied warranties; Texas is not one of them (no surprise there). 2.316 is where we find out how to disclaim the warranty. This is how to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous 2.316 also says Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof." So a buyer needs to see if the seller and the manufacturer both disclaimed the implied warranties. If so the buyer is going to be limited to the expressed warranties. If they did not disclaim then the remedy is to return the item and get the money back. So yeah, this is like a lemon law for stuff. There is a requirement that the seller be a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind." That just means that the buyer didn't buy shoes at a car dealer. That it was the seller's business to sell the thing. A last note on this. Implied warranties differ from state to state as to who they can be applied against. 2-318 offers three options. Texas chose option 3 - which means that the courts decide if the buck stops at the retailer or if it extends to the manufacturer. This chapter does not provide whether anyone other than a buyer may take advantage of an express or implied warranty of quality made to the buyer or whether the buyer or anyone entitled to take advantage of a warranty made to the buyer may sue a third party other than the immediate seller for deficiencies in the quality of the goods. These matters are left to the courts for their determination. In other words, unless the implied warranties were disclaimed by both the retailer and the manufacturer, the buyer can go after either for the refund. And what is cool1 is that a 2013 Texas Supreme Court case found that a buyer of a used engine has a claim against the manufacturer. MAN Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows. This is different because some states require privity of contract - meaning that only the original buyer can exercise the warranty and they can only exercise against the seller. EDIT 2.316(c)(2) says when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him This basically says that if you know about the defect you waive the implied warranty. There are two ways to look at this. The first way is that the first defective item is the "the goods or the sample or model" that you have now inspected, so you now know about the defect, and if you buy another you are buying it with defects revealed which waives the warranty. The other way to look at it is that you do not know that the first one is representative of all the products so it is not until you get the second, or third, that the defect with the goods or the sample or model is representative of all the products, and that it is not until you have this knowledge that the defect is "revealed." In other words, it depends. 1Cool for consumers, not manufacturers.	No, it does not. There is indeed a 2-year guarantee for all goods, but "goods" is defined to be a "tangible movable item" according to Directive 1999/44/EC Article 1, subsection 2(b). In less legalese, a physical item; software doesn't count. While there has been discussion about extending this protection to software, I'm not aware of this having been done yet. Even if it were, determining whether goods are "faulty" ultimately comes down to whether it conforms to the contract of sale (Article 2). I think it's likely that vendors in this area would put a disclaimer for unforeseen security vulnerabilities, or something to that effect.	It depends on the state. In some states the Secretary of State holds the records for business entities and in others, such as Arizona, it's an organization known as the Arizona Corporation Commission. Regardless of the state's organization that keeps the information, one of the pieces of information you will find when you look at a company's records is the "registered agent", "resident agent" or "statutory agent." The agent, whether a person or a representative corporation, must be located within the state where business is conducted. That agent is who or what gets served with papers for a lawsuit. Here's a good explanation at legalzoom. A personal example that may help: I am an owner in a business that does business in Louisiana and Arizona. Our LLC is registered in Louisiana and is registered as a "foreign corporation" in Arizona. However, we are required to have a registered agent in each state. We pay a company to act as our registered agent in each state and the registered agent has a physical address in each state in which we are registered. If someone wants to sue my company then they can look up the name of my company in either state and will find my registered agent along with the registered agent's physical address. Service to the registered agent counts as service to my company. The agent will forward to me any service which is made to them. EDIT: if you don't known the name of the entity, i.e., the name on the door of the business does not represent the name of the company, then you need to find the "doing business as," or DBA record of the company. I don't know what state you're in but all the states in which I've done business maintain a "Doing Business As" system that can be searched. I guess it's possible that you're in a state that doesn't maintain DBA filings or require them. Typically, you can search either way - search by owner or search by the DBA name. Some states, such as Arizona, record DBA names at the county level. I've seen some states allow searching by address also.
I'm Irish but have an English birth cert. What are my rights regarding dual citizenship and getting an English passport? I'm an Irish citizen and passport holder, and both my parents are Irish, and I've lived in Ireland pretty much my whole life. But, I was born in London. My parents were living and working there in the late 80's/early 90's, and then I was born. They returned to Ireland within a couple months. Because of this, my birth cert is English. Around 2015 I smelled Brexit coming and wanted to future-proof my option to live and work in England in the event of the Ireland/UK common travel area ending. I remember ringing some English dept. (Maybe the passport office? I don't remember) and being told that I was not entitled to a passport or dual citizenship on the sole basis of being born in London. When I answered her question about my parents, and told her neither of them are English, she was instantly dismissive. In hindsight, I'm skeptical that the woman was telling me the truth, because from what I've observed in the media, birth certs are meaningful and powerful legal docs when it comes to being entitled to live and work in a country, getting a passport, dual citizenship etc. But I was only 20 at the time, so I took her word for it and forgot about it. Now that Brexit has happened, it looks like the Ireland/UK common travel area is to be maintained, so I'll ultimately have nothing to worry about. But I just want to know for sure what my rights are regarding the following: Getting an English passport Getting dual citizenship Was the lady being truthful? If I were from a 3rd country, would my birth cert be enough to allow me to live and work in the UK? (ex. common travel area)	You are a British citizen: Born in the UK between 1 January 1983 and 1 October 2000 Whether you’re a British citizen depends on where your parents were from and their circumstances. There are different rules if, when you were born: at least one of your parents was a British or Irish citizen at least one of your parents was a citizen of an EU or EEA country neither of your parents was a British, Irish, EU or EEA citizen You’re automatically a British citizen if you were adopted by a British citizen in a UK court. If at least one of your parents was a British or Irish citizen when you were born You’ll be a British citizen if when you were born at least one of your parents was either: a British citizen an Irish citizen living in the UK If the parent that meets these conditions is your father, he must have been married to your mother when you were born. Source: https://www.gov.uk/check-british-citizenship/born-in-the-uk-between-1-january-1983-and-1-october-2000 Anyway, to live and work in the UK, you don't need British citizenship, because Irish citizens automatically have that right independent of European Union law (which is why children of Irish citizens born in the UK gain British citizenship). When I answered her question about my parents, and told her neither of them are English, she was instantly dismissive. Did you tell her that they were Irish? If so, she shouldn't have been so dismissive. If she was, then she was wrong. But I just want to know for sure what my rights are regarding the following: getting an English passport As a British citizen, you are generally entitled to a British passport. getting dual citizenship Legally speaking, you already have it. was the lady being truthful She was probably not lying. She probably said what she said because she misunderstood the facts or the law. if I were from a 3rd country, would my birth cert be enough to allow me to live and work in the UK? (Ex. common travel area) Ireland has different rules, but the UK does not have, as others have noted, absolute _jus soli _ If you had been from a third country, you would have been a British citizen only if your parents had had indefinite leave to remain.	Being automaticly citizens of the US and Uruguay, causes no problem with your German citizenship. For Uruguay, you are appling for recognition of your citizenship at birth as a grandchild of a Uruguayan citizen. Only when you, as an adult, apply for nationisation (i.e. that country considers you to be a foreigner at the time of the application) would you lose your German citizenship automaticly when this application has been granted, unless you apply for an exception beforhand. Such an exception would only be granted when you can prove that you still have strong ties to Germany.	Basically: what Flup said in his last paragraph (and so upvoted accordingly). Every one of the practitioners you named has an undergraduate degree from the UK, and an undergraduate degree from Canada. This, presumably, is because you're not permitted to practise law in most jurisdictions unless you have some kind of qualification in the law of that particular jurisdiction. The laws of each country, and moreover, the way in which cases are decided and in which each country's legal system works, varies so tremendously that you need to study the particulars for each jurisdiction before you can practice there. Regarding Canada: from this site: You must complete a Bachelor of Laws (L.L.B.) program or Juris Doctor (J.D.) program in order to qualify for bar membership in any Canadian province or territory. This generally takes three years to complete. In England and Wales, you can now take a law conversion course in place of an undergraduate law degree as a first stage towards being qualified. I suspect, however, looking at the dates of the judges you list, that the law conversion course wasn't an option at the time they got their qualifications, so their only option was a full undergraduate course. So the answer is: they each have two undergraduate qualifications, one from each jurisdiction, so that they could qualify to practise law in both jurisdictions.	Assuming, for purposes of argument, that such a change could be made by executive order, or indeed by legislation, rather than by amendment, yes, the change could and would have to have an effective date, and apply only to persons born after that date. Indeed that would still be true if such a change were made by constitutional amendment. Consider, people whose parents (or one of whose parents) are US citizens, but who are born outside of the US, are or may become citizens (by statute), but only if the citizen parent complies with certain rules specifying a minimum period of residence in the US, and other conditions. Those periods and conditions have changed over the years, and each such change had an effective date. If such a change could be made but could not be made with an effective date, then it would apply retroactively, and deprive people who are already citizens of their citizenship. There is no valid equal protection claim, because the same rules apply to both individuals, they merely give different results for the different birth dates. (See my answer to this question for why I do not think such a change would be valid except by Constitutional Amendment.) EDIT: I suppose such a changed interpretation, if made at all, might take the position that such births never did validly convey citizen ship, and all people whose parents were not validly in the country had never been citizens. That strikes me as even less likely to pass judicial review, but one cannot know what the Supreme Court will do when faced with a truly novel situation.	If you simply moved to the US, nothing more, then nothing would have disturbed your Romanian citizenship. Even if you became a US citizen and officially renounced your Romanian citizenship, under the Romanian constitution Art 5(2) "Romanian citizenship cannot be withdrawn if acquired by birth". It's yours for life.	You do not have to prove that you are an EU citizen, because EU citizenship is entirely irrelevant to the GDPR. Have a look at Article 3, which basically says that GDPR applies if you are in the EU or if the company is in the EU. If the company is in the EU, therefore, you do not need to send them anything or prove anything about yourself to invoke GDPR. If the company is outside the EU, you can send proof of address or other evidence that you are in the EU, which might be something that they already have, like your IP address.	For the US, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act provides that just about any US citizen living abroad who has previously resided within the US is entitled to vote in federal elections as though they still lived at their last US address, provided they'd be eligible to vote if they still lived at that address. If you're overseas on duty in a uniformed service of the United States or as a spouse or dependent of such a person, it's based on your legal residence instead. This is a right of US citizenship; dual citizenship doesn't affect it. This State Department website has details; there's a special process you can generally use instead of the state absentee process. UOCAVA applies to all federal elections (including primaries); state and local election eligibility is up to the state. For Canada, citizens of Canada living there seem to have the right to vote regardless of any possible loyalty issues with another country. Canadians living outside Canada for over five years can't vote, but if you live there it seems as though it is allowed. So, the answer is seemingly "yes." For a definitive answer, contact the US consulate and Canadian election officials.	england-and-wales Yes, double jeopardy applies The common law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict apply equally to foreign offences; this is black letter law in Halsbury's Laws of England. Scotland is "foreign" for these purposes. There is no analogue to the odd US dual sovereignty doctrine. The general exception to double jeopardy regarding the re-trial of serious offences under Part 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not apply here, because of an odd anomaly created by the statute due to criminal justice being devolved to the Scottish Parliament. As a result, according to the Crown Prosecution Service: There are no provisions dealing with qualifying offences [for retrial after acquittal] in Scotland as criminal justice is a matter for the Scottish Parliament. At present, the law in Scotland has not been changed so that these provisions do not apply to acquittals that take place in Scotland.
What is the advantage of having a legal domicile in the Caymans? I was researching corporate structures and stumbled upon a large Chinese company called SMIC. They are legally domiciled in the Caymans. I was wondering what the advantage for them to have a legal domicile there is. Is it just a Chinese thing to do?	The Cayman Islands are well known as a tax haven. They have a corporate tax of 0%, and that includes income from abroad. So by moving your company officially to the Cayman Islands, you can avoid to pay a lot of taxes. Now of course most other countries will still send you a tax bill for any income you make with business activities within their borders. But there are accounting tricks to get around that. For example, many countries only tax profits, not revenue. So you can reduce your annual profits of your national subsidiaries to zero by having them pay money to your company on the caymans. For example, you can transfer your trademark to your subsidiary on the Cayman Islands and then have your subisdiaries in all other countries pay the Cayman company an annual license fee for using that brand name. And the license fee happens to be just so expensive that your national taxable profits become zero. And no, that's not just a Chinese thing. Corporations all around the world use that method to avoid taxes.	Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony.	The law applicable to immovables is the law of the situs (lex rei sitae), i.e. the law of the country where the immovable property is located. This is important because this law changed after the annexation. Therefore, the mortgage may not exist anymore as a security. The lex rei sitae in regard to immovables is usually not subject to a choice of law agreement. Consequently, the law of the country of the creditor, which applied to the mortgage agreement is not applicable. As far as the loan is concerned, the courts in the new country have jurisdiction over a claim for payment under the loan agreement and may apply the law of the country of the creditor and order payment. If you are unable to make payments, your house maybe subject to insolvency rules and sold, the proceeds then paid to your creditors. The country of the creditor may also have jurisdiction, if you are still a national of this country and nationality is a ground for jurisdiction in that country. Assuming the property is your only valuable asset, a judgment in favour of the creditor needs to enforced in the "new" country. Whether this actually happen, depends on the law of the "new" country, and most importantly probably on the relationship between the two countries after the annexation.	Companies have a registry of their shareholders. Anyone with at least one share registered in their name is a shareholder of record. However, the vast majority of people who consider themselves "shareholders" aren't actually registered owners of a stock. Instead, almost all public stock in the US is held "in street name." That means that the stock is formally held in the name of a brokerage. What an individual has is "beneficial ownership:" the brokerage passes dividends on to the beneficial owner, will vote how the beneficial owner tells it to vote, and requires agreement from the beneficial owner before it can sell the stock. To make stuff even more complicated, the broker itself generally holds the stock in street name. Almost all public stock in the US is really owned by the Depository Trust Corporation in the name of Cede and Company (a general partnership of a few DTC officers). The reason public stock is mostly held in street name is efficiency. Transferring the legal owner of a piece of stock is a nontrivial process; until recently, it involved physically shipping stock certificates to the new owner. Even now that stock ownership can typically be transferred electronically, it's much easier to tell Cede & Co. "the new beneficial owner is this person." Because beneficial ownership is just a contract, you can skip all the formalities of updating the company's official register of shareholders.	The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it.	The only reason you couldn't take all the profits is if your business were a C-Corp. I don't know of any reason a single-owner LLC would elect to be taxed as a C-Corp. Multi-owner LLCs and LLPs are, for federal tax purposes, either an S-Corp or a C-Corp. When possible they can and should generally elect to be taxed as an S-Corp. IRS Pub 2553 lists the criteria for S-Corp election. (Employees have nothing to do with the question.) For tax purposes partnerships, sole proprietorships, and S-Corps are "pass-through" entities that are not expected to pay a corporate tax. In effect, whether you like it or not, you do pay yourself all of the profits each fiscal year, and they are taxed accordingly.	I'm based in England, but I'm sure the principle is similar in Canada. The night club or concert venue is private property. When someone owns or rents private property one of the main things they are buying is the right to control who is present on that property, and generally they can use reasonable force to remove people who are not authorised. Security guards generally act as agents for a property owner, tenant or similar.	The company probably owes U.S. and state corporate income taxes because income from services performed in the United States are usually considered "effectively connected" with the United States. The fact that the servers are located in the U.S. is pretty much irrelevant, relative to the fact that the services are performed while located in the United States. I can't think of a single tax case that has ever turned on the location of the servers in a company. Unlike a U.S. company, a foreign company is not taxed by the U.S. on its worldwide income, nor is the individual, a non-resident alien (having an F-1 visa rather than a green card) taxes on the individual's worldwide income. But, a non-U.S. person is still taxed on income that is effectively connected with the United States. Generally speaking income from property is not effectively connected with the United States merely because it is managed by someone located in the U.S., so if the company had owned an apartment in Brazil that it received rental income from, for example, that would not be subject to U.S. taxation. Also income from intangible property (like interest payments on loans or dividends on publicly held stock) is generally not subject to U.S. taxation if paid to a non-resident, non-citizen of the U.S. But, generally speaking, income from the performance of services is taxable in the place where the services are performed. For example, Colorado can impose state income taxes on income earned by a Texas baseball player while playing at a stadium in Denver. The lack of a salary or employee status shouldn't change the fact that the income received by the company from performance of services in the U.S. is effectively connected with the United States. When the owner performs services in the U.S., the company is performing services in the U.S. and so it is subject to taxation in the U.S. Dividend payments from the offshore company probably wouldn't be subject to U.S. taxation in this scenario, but the company itself would be subject to corporate income taxes in the U.S. from the profits it earned from the services performed in the U.S.
Is it legal in the USA to pay someone for their work if you don't know who they are? Let's say you go on a freelancing platform and hire a designer to make a website for you. They never reveal their real name, photo or location and payment is requested via Bitcoin. The job completes successfully and far as you've concerned you've just transferred $1,000 to a completely anonymous person who may be located at any corner of the planet. You also have no way of ever contacting them again, as their email address was single-use just for this job and they'll never access it again. Would this violate any laws? Does it matter if you pay them as an individual or as a business entity? For the sake of this question assume that the person/entity paying is located in the US.	You cannot do this legally General rules Under US law you are required to file a Form 1099 with the IRS for this payment if it was for a trade or business purpose. ( $1,000.00 is above the current reporting limit of $600.) This you cannot do without the recipient's name (personal or business) and address. You will also need their SSN or TIN. Failure to file the 1099 may be a violation of law. Private people, as well as businesses, get 1099s which are also filed with the IRS. I myself have received 1099s as a private individual for freelance work. (Corporations mostly do not get 1099s.) Private individuals as well as businesses report payments on 1099s. Such a person might be involved in unlawful tax evasion, and the demand for payment in bitcoin might support a reasonable suspicion of this. If so, you might be accused of being an accessory. If the person is foreign (non-US) and the work was not done in the US it may not need to be reported, but if you do not know the person's location you cannot safely assert that it is outside the US. If you intend to deduct the payment on your own taxes as a business expense, you may also need to have a receipt showing the recipient of the money. It would seem that if the payor/client is in the US and the work was done for a trade or business (which includes a non-profit, but not a hobby or personal site) and the amount is $600 or more, there is no safe and legal way to hire a person or firm without knowing the name, address, and (in most cases) TIN (taxpayer identification number) of the contractor, or at least using ones "best efforts" to obtain the TIN. See the various IRS instructions below for details. IRS Instructions According to the Form 1099-Misc/1099-NEC insatructions Report on Form 1099-MISC [or 1099-NEC] only when payments are made in the course of your trade or business. Personal payments are not reportable. You are engaged in a trade or business if you operate for gain or profit. However, nonprofit organizations are considered to be engaged in a trade or business and are subject to these reporting requirements. Generally, payments to a corporation (including a limited liability company (LLC) that is treated as a C or S corporation) [are not reportable]. If you are required to file Form 1099-MISC, you must furnish a statement to the recipient. Enter [in Box 3] other income of $600 or more required to be reported on Form 1099-MISC that is not reportable in one of the other boxes on the form. File Form 1099-NEC, Nonemployee Compensation (NEC), for each person in the course of your business to whom you have paid the following during the year: At least $600 in ... Services performed by someone who is not your employee (including parts and materials) (box 1); Generally, you must report payments to independent contractors on Form 1099-NEC in box 1. If the following four conditions are met, you must generally report a payment as NEC. You made the payment to someone who is not your employee. You made the payment for services in the course of your trade or business (including government agencies and nonprofit organizations). You made the payment to an individual, partnership, estate, or, in some cases, a corporation; You made payments to the payee of at least $600 during the year. Instructions for Form 1042-S specify that one must report for foreign payees: Compensation for independent personal services performed in the United States. General Instructions for Certain Information Returns says: Recipient names. Show the full name and address in the section provided on the information return. If payments have been made to more than one recipient or the account is in more than one name, show on the first name line the name of the recipient whose TIN is first shown on the return. ... TINs. TINs are used to associate and verify amounts you report to the IRS with corresponding amounts on tax returns. Therefore, it is important that you report correct names, social security numbers (SSNs), individual taxpayer identification numbers (ITINs), employer identification numbers (EINs), or adoption taxpayer identification numbers (ATINs) for recipients on the forms sent to the IRS.	Yes, this violates the GDPR if the user is in Europe. Data which is tied to a personal device can be tied to the person who owns it. From "What Is Personal Data" by the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (emphasis added): Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. What identifies an individual could be as simple as a name or a number or could include other identifiers such as an IP address or a cookie identifier, or other factors. If it is possible to identify an individual directly from the information you are processing, then that information may be personal data. If you cannot directly identify an individual from that information, then you need to consider whether the individual is still identifiable. You should take into account the information you are processing together with all the means reasonably likely to be used by either you or any other person to identify that individual. The bit about "all means reasonably likely" in the last bullet includes the kind of de-anonymisation tactics described in the NYT article. There are 6 lawful bases for data processing in the GDPR, and all processing must fall under at least one of them. (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) Selling data isn't covered by any of the others, so consent must be obtained. Permission must be clear and positive, and you cannot predicate delivery of a service on the processing of data that isn't necessary for that service. So for instance you cannot say "You can use this service as long as we are allowed to collect and sell your data" because selling the data isn't necessary to the provision of the service. From "Consent" by the ICO: Consent requires a positive opt-in. Don’t use pre-ticked boxes or any other method of default consent. Explicit consent requires a very clear and specific statement of consent. Keep your consent requests separate from other terms and conditions. Be specific and ‘granular’ so that you get separate consent for separate things. Vague or blanket consent is not enough. [...] Avoid making consent to processing a precondition of a service. This applies to any processing of data about individuals within the EU, so just being an American company doesn't get you a free pass to ignore the GDPR if your app gets used by Europeans. The "Legitimate interests" basis is more problematic, in that the company collecting the data has to conduct a vague "balancing test" to determine if this basis applies. For direct marketing the ICO has written this, which says that direct marketing may be a legitimate interest, especially if you can show that the user has expressed interest in such adverts. For instance a location service which promises to tell you about nearby special offers would fall into this category. Against this, the impact on the user's privacy has to be considered, and location data is "special category data" because it can reveal medical information (e.g. hospital attendance) or religious affiliation (e.g. which church you go to). So unless the relationship between the recorded location data and the service is very direct its not going to pass the balancing test. The company would also need to distinguish between knowing the current location and keeping a record of historical locations; the two need separate justification. And of course nothing about this covers the sale of the data; this is considering a company which sells advertising space in it's app, not one that sells the data itself.	The Apache 2.0 license purports to be irrevocable, but it also presupposes that the supposed licensor has the right to grant permission to copy. In this case, that is untrue, so there never was a proper license and nothing to revoke (the copyright owner grants permission in the form of "a license" which is a legal abstraction, that normally is specified in the license document). An end-user snared by this illegal license might attempt to sue the author because of the legal screw-up but paragraph 9 says that the supposed licensor cannot be held liable. In this case, though, "licensor" is defined not as the person who hands you the license document, but as the copyright owner. So it's the employer who would be not liable under the terms of the document (but since the employer had nothing to do with the license, it's as though the license never existed). The end-user is a secondary infringer (the employee is the primary infringer, in illegally distributing the material). Under US law, that doesn't matter, the user is still liable. Under UK law, secondary infringement includes the element that you have to have reason to know that the copy is infringing, which in the scenario that you describe is not the case.	Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams.	There are a number of existing legal sites that do this, for free or for pay. The main concern for a website operator pertains to the DMCA "safe harbor" provisions, which protect against vicarious liability for infringement. A "report piracy" option is not sufficient; see this answer to a related question.	It is legal for a company to ask for any information they want as a condition of doing business with you, so long as their request isn't proscribed by law. I don't know of any jurisdiction where a request for banking or credit information is illegal. (In this case, however, it does seem like you are being phished. You could report the matter to your country's consumer protection agency.)	Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful.	You are free to sell or not to sell to whoever you like (unless it is illegal discrimination, like not selling to white Christians), but it doesn't make a difference, because anyone who buys the software from you can legally sell it on to anyone they want. So you cannot control who ends up owning the software. If I want the software and you don't sell it to me, and I still want it, I'll just ask a friend to buy it and give them the money. Other people would just get a pirated copy if you refuse to sell to them (and would have very little bad conscience since they offered you cash and you refused to take it). You can put terms into a license, and in the USA this is binding. The customer may not agree with the license, and in that case they have the right to get a refund for the software. In the EU, I don't think a license is binding, so you'd have to sign a legally binding contract with the buyer. Apart from all that, you have very little chance to find out if the software is used against your wishes and to do anything about it.
Why are service or maintenance contracts called 'warranties', when they legally aren't warranties? The expression 'warranty' legally signifies? Please select all that apply. a term of a contract as opposed to a representation. The term 'warranty' is used to distinguish between a term (warranty) and a mere representation, and also to distinguish between terms that give no right to termination upon breach (warranties) and terms that do (conditions). Service contracts for electrical and similar items are not really good examples of the use of 'warranty' in the legal sense, although they are, of course, separate contractual agreements (for which one pays, often heavily), containing a number of terms providing for what will happen if a fault develops. Reference: Sections 5.1.2, 5.4.1 If warranties legally don't signify service or maintenance contracts, which are misstated as Warranties, then how do the legal definition of "warranty" relate to service or maintenance contracts? Why did corporations start misnaming service or maintenance contracts Warranties?	Because English loves homophones A lot of words in English have more than one meaning. The current front runner is run with 645 definitions in the OED. Understanding English requires more than knowing the definitions, it requires understanding the context. Warranty in a contract law context means a term the breach of which does not justify terminating the contract. Or a term of a contract rather than a representation about the contract, depending on context. Warranty also has a common meaning that makes it a synonym of guarantee. It can also mean a court order calling for the arrest of someone (an arrest warrant) or to search a premises (a search warrant). It can also mean the authorization from the government to act as a high ranking NCO in a military service - NCOs hold warrants, officers have commissions. Among others ...	A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws.	I had a contract with a company, but that company changed its name. Is my contract still enforceable? Yes, because what matters is the entity itself. A contract is not stricken merely because one or more parties changed names or labels.	Yes There is no general legal prohibition on perpetual contracts. What you describe is not a perpetual contract A perpetual contract is one where at least one parties obligations are indefinitely ongoing and there is no mechanism in the contract (outside breach or repudiation) for terminating it. The contract you describe has a mechanism for termination albeit only available to one party. Perpetual contracts can be entered into knowingly and willingly - most perpetuities, where a person leaves the income on an investment to a university or charity forever subject to conditions, are of this type. Or they can be entered into accidentally, for example, a fixed term contract with an automatic renewal where the renewal term is not specified is a perpetual contract. The important point is there must be no explicit mechanism in the contract for bringing the contract to an end for it to be a perpetual contract. In commercial arrangements, courts may imply a term that the parties can terminate on reasonable notice but this is subject to all the normal limitations. Your example As described, because there is an explicit term allowing termination, this is not a perpetual contract. Such a contract would be subject to the normal common law doctrine of unconscionably (which it almost certainly is) and, in some jurisdictions, consumer protection laws against unfair contract terms.	A contract need not be written to be valid and enforceable. However, if there is no written contract, then in a dispute the burden of proving (via a preponderance of evidence) a contractual obligation falls on the party asserting it. In the scenario you describe it sounds like that would be impossible for the processing company.	Such a right would only exist if the legislature has created it by some act. Insurance is excluded under the class of covered contracts under The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 (see schedule 2), and The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. The only restriction on automatical renewal clauses under Consumer Rights Act 2015 is that the deadline for objecting to renewal cannot be unreasonably early (schedule 2, unfair terms); and in general, the terms may not be vague. Since there is no law restricting a contract from requiring written notice, or telephone notice, or whatever they demand, then it comes down to what the contract says. If it says "you must call", then you must call.	If I may paraphrase the scenario: The customer has a contract with the insurer The customer is contemplating undergoing a certain procedure and is unsure if it is covered under the contract The customer calls the insurer to ask this specific question The insurer says "yes" The customer undergoes the procedure The insurer refuses to pay on the ground that it is not covered under the contract. Let's put aside issues of evidence and what can be proved and assume these facts are not in dispute. There is no question that the contract has been renegotiated; it hasn't. This avoids the necessity of considering if the insurer's employee has the authority to do this or it the customer can rely that they do even if they don't. There are two possibilities: The procedure is covered and the insurer must pay under contract The procedure isn't covered and the insurer must pay under the tort of negligent misstatement. The insurer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee. The insurer owes a duty of care to a customer who asks such a question to answer it correctly. It is foreseeable that the customer would act on the insurer's advice and incur costs that they may have avoided if the correct advice had been given. Nothing is ever certain in the law but this is as close as you can get.	What is a representation and why are they put in contracts? From a practical perspective, a contractual representation is a statement of fact in a signed writing made at an easily provable time that, if false, will support a claim for fraud upon showing the other elements of a claim for fraud that are not also included elsewhere in the contract (e.g. knowledge of falsity, the other party's lack of knowledge of falsity and damages). Some other elements of a common law fraud claim (e.g. publication of the statement to the other party, justifiable reliance, and materiality) are often also established on the face of contract that contains representations identified as such. In a close case, the classification of a statement as a "representation" may also tip the scales if the status of a statement as a statement of a presently existing fact (which a representation must be to be actionable in a fraud action) is disputed. If a representation concerning a key fact foundational to the contract is not true, that might provide a basis to rescind the contract based upon mutual mistake (even if it doesn't amount to fraud). Proof that a false representation was intentionally false may give rise to claims for punitive damages and a right to rescind the contract in addition to a claim for compensatory damages. Representations in a contract also simplify the proof of preliminary facts like the place of incorporation of the signing party, the addresses of the parties, the authority of the person signing it to do so, the fact that someone is not in military service, etc., in a lawsuit arising from the contract on any theory. Sometimes a representation will "estop" a party from asserting something contrary to that representation in litigation. For example, if the seller represents that the transaction is a consumer transaction, and then tries to say that a consumer protection act claim does not apply because it is not a consumer transaction later on in court, when a dispute arises from the transaction, this argument contrary to the representation in the contract is likely to be summarily dismissed based upon that representation. As another example, a party might represent that they agree that $500 an hour is a reasonable fee to pay an attorney in the event that a dispute arises under the contract and a prevailing party in litigation becomes entitled to attorneys' fees, which might reduce litigation over whether a party's attorneys are charging reasonable rates in that context. Similarly, a contractual representation concerning authority to sign is binding on the party for which the signature is made, even if that person doesn't actually have the authority to do so under what is known as the "apparent authority" doctrine in agency law. And, representations often provide context for the transaction that make it easier to interpret other provisions of the contract that would otherwise be ambiguous. For example, a representation that a transaction is being entered into solely for economic business purposes may help a court decide what other representations and disputes are and are not material to the parties, and might cause a court to decide that non-economic damages (i.e. emotional distress) should not be allowed even with respect to fraud claims arising from a misrepresentation (since non-economic damages are as a default rule allowed in connection with fraud claims in many jurisdictions). What are warranties and covenants and why are they put in the contracts? A warranty or covenant is a promise that something will be the case for which there is a remedy if it is not true, without regard to fault on a strict liability basis. Relief for a breach of warranty is generally limited to compensatory damages if breached, and would not generally provide a ground to rescind a contract, but a breach of warranty claim much easier to prove in court because it often doesn't require nearly as much evidence to prove in court as a fraud claim. The evidence beyond the contract itself in a breach of warranty claims is usually in the possession of the aggrieved party prior to bringing a lawsuit. In a fraud claim based upon a representation, in contrast, some of the facts that must be proved to prevail in court (e.g. the knowledge of the person making the statement at the time that the statement was false) can usually only be obtained from testimony or out of court statements from an opposing party, or made to an opposing party. Why call something both a representation and a warranty? One both represents and warrants something in a contract so that both sets of remedies are available if the statement proves to be incorrect. There is an easy to litigate remedy of money damages if the statement is not true, and harder to litigate fraud remedies if the statement meets the additional conditions. Other Fine Points N.B. There are other kinds of contract terms in addition to representations and warranties, such as conditions precedent. But, they are beyond the scope of the question and usually don't appear in a representations and warranties (a.k.a. "reps and warranties") section. A slightly less common phrase is "represents, warrants and covenants", with the notion being that a warranty usually concerns something that you are promising is true at the time that the contract is signed, while a covenant is something that you promise will be true in the future or on an ongoing basis (sometimes running with the land when real estate is concerned). So, you might "warrant" in a sale of real estate contract that the house you sold someone is free from defects and "covenant" that you will forever refrain from building any other building in a subdivision that impairs its view of the mountains. Or, you might warrant in a corporate bond contract that no more than 5% of a borrower's accounts receivable are currently overdue, and covenant that you will never let more than 10% of the borrow's accounts receivable enter overdue status. But, in modern American English legal writing, the distinction between a warranty and a covenant has largely collapsed and even many sophisticated big business contract lawyers no longer use "represents, warrants and covenants" language in their contracts.
Why isn't it copyright infringement to condense an NBA game into a 10-minute YouTube video? There are now many channels whose only purpose is to take a whole NBA game and basically condense it into a 10-minute video. What they do is to show only the plays that lead to a made basket in chronological order from start to finish. There is no commentary or criticism. They show the video as it was broadcast. Why isn't this copyright infringement?	It probably is infringement, assuming that this is being done by copying parts of a broadcast of the game. It is up to the holder of the copyright on the original broadcast that is being condensed to decide whether to sue or take other action, such as a takedown notice. Perhaps the holder thinks this is good advertising for its business. They have the right to make that decision. Now if a person went to the game, and used a personal camera to film it, and posted excepts of that recording, the legal issues would be very different. The ticket probably includes a provision prohibiting filming and photography, so this would be a breech of contract. But it would not be copyright infringement. (In practice if this were spotted, the person would be required to stop recording or leave, at least.)	Such an image is copyrighted, as part of the movie. You cannot legally use it without permission from the copyright holder, unless the use of the image falls under fair use (note that fair use is a strictly US legal concept. It does not apply anywhere else) or a similar exception to copyright, such as "fair dealing". There are multiple factors which must be considered in making a fair use judgement. No one factor ever totally controls the decision. It is a case-by-case decision. But several things about your proposed use suggest to me that it will not qualify as a fair use. The image is part of a creative work, not a work of non-fiction such as a news report or a textbook. That weighs against fair use. You seem to be using the whole image, although it is only part of the movie. That probably weighs against fair use to some extent. A use in "a social media post regarding a sales vacancy" sounds commercial to me. If so, that would weigh against fair use. The copyright owner might well wish to market images from the film. If so, and if many people used images from the film as you propose to use this one, that might harm the market. This weighs against fair use. You don't seem to be making any comment on the image, or using it in any significantly transformational way. That weighs against fair use. Use of the image does not seem vital or even important to the message you intend to communicate. That also weighs against fair use. In short, I think you would be wiser to use an image that you have or can get permission to use in this way. If you use this image, it is possible that the copyright holder would sue for copyright infringement, or issue a DMCA take-down notice, or both.	Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties.	Yes The relevant legal concepts are copyright, contract law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. You are liable to be sued by the people affected for damages and/or be prosecuted by the government for the felony under either or both laws. Let's start here: "I bought a game". No, you didn't; you bought a licence to use the software in accordance with the terms of service (licence) that you freely agreed to. All modern ToS will not allow you to reverse engineer the software. If you breach those terms of service then you have broken a contract - that is what allows them to sue you. They will no doubt argue that the prevalence of cheat routines developed by people like you reduce the number of people willing to play the game - say 100,000 users x $10/month * 12 months = $12,000,000. They will also ask the court to impose punitive damages to discourage this sort of thing. Which brings us to the copyright violation. You are allowed to copy their software provided you comply with the ToS. But you didn't. Therefore you are in breach of the Copyright Act and subject to additional civil and criminal sanctions. Finally, your "cheats" access their servers in a way that the ToS doesn't authorize. This puts you in breach of the CFFA - breaking this carries serious jail time penalties. Not to mention that in the US, a criminal conviction will preclude you from many jobs, including, naturally, any with access to company computer systems. Putting aside the illegalities, cheats are unethical and ruin the game experience for hundreds of thousands of people who don't use cheats. You are a criminal - stop being one!	At least in the United States (and I'm pretty sure this is true around the world), facts and information cannot be copyrighted. Just because a work is copyrighted, doesn't mean every part of that work is copyrighted, and factual information conveyed by the work is a part which is not subject to copyright. Copyright on a collection of facts is limited to the selection and arrangement of those facts, and only if that selection and arrangement has some bare minimum amount of originality. See Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340. In this case, it looks at first glance like the person who made that site made their own selection of which materials and which sources would be included; the one place where they really seem to have copied their selection is from glass catalogs with datasheets from specific manufacturers, who would have a hard time arguing that "everything we manufacture in this widely-recognized class of substances" is an original selection. What the author of the website has done is relinquish his rights in his selection and arrangement of the data. In some places, there are other rights besides copyright that do apply to databases; for instance, the EU recognizes database rights to protect significant investment in compiling a database of stuff. But the US does not have that concept. For citing stuff, that's not really a legal question, and has more to do with academic standards. Ask your adviser or teacher if you have one.	A translation is a devivative work - the copyright owner has the exclusive right to these So, yes, translation is prima facie copyright infringement. Strictly speaking, if you translate it, it's a derivative work because you exercised creativity in making the translation; what Google translate does is not a derivative work, it's a copy because there is no creativity. Either way, only the copyright owner can do (or authorise) this. Whether it's legal or not depends on if what you are doing falls within one of the exceptions to the applicable copyright law such as fair use or fair dealing. Attributing the original author does not, of itself, allow translation. Additionally, I'm not able to find the copyright documentation for the site link I provided above. What is "copyright documentation"? Copyright exists the moment a work is created and no further documentation is required. Essentially, I could translate the whole documentation by myself to avoid this problem. No, you can't - see above. If copy-pasting the google translate is illegal, then exactly how much must I edit, move around sentences, change words, and such until the text is no longer plagiarized? All of it. If you were, based on your own knowledge of the software, to write a manual without any copying o the existing manual, that would not be copyright infringement. Is this plagiarism or copyright infringement? It's copyright infringement - plagiarism is an academic misconduct issue not a legal one. where can I check the copyright for the above link? The site you linked has "Copyright © 2020 Acquia, Inc. All Rights Reserved" in the bottom left corner which identifies the copyright holder, the date and prohibits all copying ("all rights reserved"). This isn't necessary but it is helpful. If you really want to do this, contact Acquia, Inc and ask for permission.	First, the press release is copyrighted from its inception and may have been work for hire (a close call since you wrote them for an LLC and the LLC had a deal with them). There is a copyright in someone, although the absence of a copyright notice limits the remedies available for infringement. Second, a link is not a copyright violation. Third, copyright protects an exact manifestation of an idea or description of a fact, not the idea or fact itself. Fourth, there are two different doctrines that could protect an exact copy of a press release. One of two doctrines, which applies if the press release has been released to the public, is an implied license. Press releases are meant for the general public and reprinting them when that is their intended purpose is an implied grant of permission. In the same way, if you have an unfenced front yard to a concrete path leading to your front door, anyone who wishes to meet with you has an implied license to walk up to your door and knock. Whether this implied license can be revoked or not is a harder question. The other of the two doctrines, which is not limited to press releases that have been released, is "fair use". In this situation, when the work was short, has been released to others, has limited literary value, transmits unprotected facts relevant to you, relates facts that may also be a matter of public record (the sale anyway), and you aren't trying to profit from the text of the press releases themselves just from the facts that they convey, the case for fair use is pretty decent even though this is a business use. Ultimately, however, to be squeaky clean and avoid litigation, you can link rather than regurgitate the press releases, and can write your own statements about the facts in them from scratch. This information is not privileged or trademarked. If you didn't sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or if they were released to the public, they aren't subject to trade secret protection either. If they were only released to the customer whose sale was involved and there is an NDA they could conceivably be trade secrets but even then the case would be very weak since the information doesn't create value by virtue of being kept secret.	A "similar brand", even a "knock off", does not infringe trademark protection (which is the issue here, not copyright) as long as reasonable consumers or purchasers will not be confused or mislead into thinking that the product is the same as the original product, or is made by, affiliated with, sponsored by, or authorized by the makers of the original product, or that the knockoff in some way shares the reputation of the original product. Obviously that is a fact-based judgement, but a name that alludes to another product but is obviously different is generally not considered an infringement. (I recall reading of a case in which the well-known "North Face" clothing brand tried to sue a new brad called "South butt". I believe that North Face lost. Apparently I was wrong and the case was settled.)
Am I allowed to cut a 1 second scene from a movie and use it in my 10 minute YouTube video My YouTube video is 10 minutes long. There is a one-second scene in a movie that I want to insert into my video to create a funny effect. Is this copyright infringement?	Maybe. It might fall under "fair use", which overrides the general requirement to get permission. The way to find out is to do it, get sued, then try to defend your action by using the fair use defense. If they win in the lawsuit, you can't, if you win, you can. There are four "factors" that have to be "balanced", plus a fifth. The factors are "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes", "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole", "the nature of the copyrighted work" and "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work". The fifth consideration is "transformativeness". W.r.t. purpose of the use, your use would likely be found to be "fair", except for the Youtube monetization problem. The "nature of the copyright work" question is primarily about "artistic works" versus "factual works", so it would depend on what you are taking from. One second might not be substantial, unless that one second is the only reason people pay to watch the copyrighted work. That interacts with the substantiality desideratum: could people get the crucial amusement content of the paid work for free by watching your video? You can read some case law in the links here, and you basically have to get an attorney to analyze your plans to tell you what your risks are.	It probably is infringement, assuming that this is being done by copying parts of a broadcast of the game. It is up to the holder of the copyright on the original broadcast that is being condensed to decide whether to sue or take other action, such as a takedown notice. Perhaps the holder thinks this is good advertising for its business. They have the right to make that decision. Now if a person went to the game, and used a personal camera to film it, and posted excepts of that recording, the legal issues would be very different. The ticket probably includes a provision prohibiting filming and photography, so this would be a breech of contract. But it would not be copyright infringement. (In practice if this were spotted, the person would be required to stop recording or leave, at least.)	Expression is tied up with fixation. Copyright subsists in a work that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which they can be reproduced, perceived, or communicated. 17 USC 102 This expression is protected, not the idea. However, copyright infringement can occur even when there is not an exact copy. First, courts use a substantial similarity standard to determine if infringement has occurred. Second, when a character or plot is sufficiently developed, taking that character or that plot can be infringement, even if not expressed in the exact same manner. "We do not doubt that two plays may correspond in plot closely enough for infringement [...] the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) Some characters or plot elements are so common to a genre that they are either not considered "original" enough to get copyright protection, or can be taken by others without being considered infringement. This is the scènes à faire doctrine. "Stock scenes and hackneyed character types that "naturally flow from a common theme"—are considered "ideas," and therefore are not copyrightable. But as plots become more intricately detailed and characters become more idiosyncratic, they at some point cross the line into "expression" and are protected by copyright." Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F. 3d 1257 - Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 2001 See Amanda Schreyer's An Overview of Legal Protection for Fictional Characters: Balancing Public and Private Interests for many more cases and examples of the idea-expression dichotomy in action with respect to fictional characters.	Not only can’t you trademark it, you can’t use it The original logo is covered by copyright which belongs, prima facie, to the original artist. It doesn’t matter that they are based in Russia; Russia and the US are both signatories to the Berne Convention which means they protect each other’s copyright. That means you can only use it if it is fair use (it isn’t) or if you have the copyright owner’s permission (you don’t). Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Not if the seller didn’t have permission to make those changes. Creation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights copyright gives. The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. See above. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. They already have copyright. They would need to register it in the US before they could sue but there is no impediment to them doing so. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bounded by any terms of the stock photo website Makes no difference. Just because you didn’t steal the car, that doesn’t make it ok for you to drive it. The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. Not relevant at all. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image. You can’t sell something you don’t own. If the seller had no right to upload the photo (as it seems they didn’t), the terms of the website don’t matter. The true owner never agreed to those terms and isn’t bound by them.	License to use does not mean license to create derivative works These are different rights under copyright. If you want to make a derivative work, which your animations are, you must have a license to do so.	It does mean that you cannot reuse any parts of the source code, even small simple ones. You would have to rebuild the code from scratch. There is a significant chance that the code would be "substantially similar" to the code that you were hired to build, also that if anybody else were to write a bubble sort or 24-to-am/pm conversion routine, it would look the same, where even variable names (which should describe function) are the same or very similar. In case of an infringement lawsuit, you would have to defend yourself by showing that there are only a few ways to code a given function. Copyright protects only the "expression", not the abstract idea. A linked list is an idea, which can't be protected by copyright; same with recursion, pointers, stacks, object-oriented programming... Anything that involves copy and paste is infringement. If you re-read the copyrighted code and then try to reconstruct it, you probably crossed the infringement line. If you remember the problems and solutions and accidentally write somewhat similar code, that is probably on the safe side. From the perspective of the programmer not wanting to always reinvent the wheel, it would be most useful to make a distinction in the contract between "the essentials of the customer's program" versus "incidental utility work". The difficulty will arise in saying specifically what is essential vs. incidental. For instance, I know that if I were to hire you to develop a speech-recognition system, low-level audio-acquisition and encoding would not be essential to my purpose, whereas DSP parsing routines would be the center of my interest. The programmer would then want to retain recycling rights to all non-essential code.	It is still making a copy, and thus an infringement of copyright unless an exception, such as fair use or fair dealing, applies. But if in fact it is never distributed, the copyright owner will never hear of it, and thus will never sue. Remember that copyright infringement is, in all but a few extreme cases, a tort and not a crime. The basic law for the united-states is 17 USC 106. This grants to the copyright owner ... the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; subject to various limitations, particularly those in 17 USC 107 where [tag:fair_use] is defined, as much as it is in statute. However, in 37 CFR § 201.40 an exemption to the anti-circumvention provision has been declared by the Librarian of Congress has determined, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(C) and (D), that noninfringing uses by persons who are users of [certain] works are, or are likely to be, adversely affected. This includes Motion pictures (including television shows and videos), as defined in 17 U.S.C. 101, where the motion picture is lawfully made and acquired on a DVD protected by the Content Scramble System, on a Blu-ray disc protected by the Advanced Access Content System, or via a digital transmission protected by a technological measure, and the person engaging in circumvention under paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii)(A) and (B) of this section reasonably believes that non-circumventing alternatives are unable to produce the required level of high-quality content, or the circumvention is undertaken using screen-capture technology that appears to be offered to the public as enabling the reproduction of motion pictures after content has been lawfully acquired and decrypted, where circumvention is undertaken solely in order to make use of short portions of the motion pictures It is not so clear that it includews entire films for personal use.	If I did punch him , would that be okay? No, that would be Assault and Battery. If you did him serious injury you could face a charge of Grievous Bodily Harm. If you killed him, that would be murder. If you are in the UK, Canada or Australia and you were charged with murder you could claim provocation in an attempt to have the charge reduced to Voluntary Manslaughter. If you were in the US you could attempt to argue "extreme emotional or mental distress" if you are in a state that has adopted the Model Penal Code for any of the charges; if successful your sentence would be reduced. I saw people punch one another over this in movies. And I saw aliens invading the Earth in the movies - what happens in the movies if not necessarily true. Kissing my wife is adultery right? No, extramarital sex is adultery. Notwithstanding, adultery is not illegal in common-law countries. I'm pissed and don't know what to do? I sympathise with you but this is not a legal question. Whatever is going on between you, your wife and your neighbour is a social situation; not a legal one.
Web archives and sites with DMCA Assume the following: A website is indexed by a web archive like the wayback machine. The website receives a DMCA takedown and the content is removed. Does the web archive need to remove the saved content as well or only if the web archive receives a DMCA takedown, too? Are there mechanisms in place to automatically remove content if the archiver detects a 451 unavailable for legal reasons HTTP status code?	Nothing in 17 USC 512, which includes the DMCA Safe Harbor and Takedown procedures requires an online service provider to notify others who may have made copies of content (including archive sites) claimed to be infringing that a takedown notice has been received or that access to the content has been blocked or removed. A separate DMCA takedown could be sent to the archive site. The internet archive honors robots.txt files set to deny access to a particular site, page, or section of a site by removing from public view all archived versions of that content. This is often done when a new owner acquires a domain and it is repurposed or put up for sale. To the best of my understanding there is no legal requirement that an archive act in this way, but the IA at least does so.	Written down computer code is subject to copyright. If you do not have the permission of the owner to copy it you are breaching their copyright unless your use constitutes fair use/dealing.	A cease and desist letter is not binding or mandatory (for copyright infringement, and in most other circumstances). You are not required to send such a letter, and even if you do, any vague suggestion that compliance guarantees that the future plaintiff will not sue is non-binding. Such a letter simply warns the recipient of possible consequences of continuing the action. The closest connection to an enforceable cease and desist letter in the case of copyright infringement is that under DMCA, a plaintiff may send a certain kind of cease and desist letter to an internet service provider, and if they comply (etc.) the provider cannot be sued for contributory infringement.	First, I don't know what "Sir is" means - I assume it is a typo of "sue us" and answer on that basis. Also, you don't tell us where you are and local law differs - I will assume US law. They can't sue you successfully - that's not how the "Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act" works. The way it works is: You give the "online service provider" (YouTube) a notice of the claimed infringement that complies with section 512. YouTube must expeditiously remove or disable access to the allegedly infringing material and take reasonable steps to promptly notify the alleged infringer of the action. The alleged infringer then has the right to object to the takedown. If they do, you have 14 days to bring a lawsuit in the district court alleging breach of copyright: If you don't then YouTube will restore the material - essentially you have given up your claim that the material infringes your copyright, If you do then the court will decide if the material does or does not breach copyright. The alleged infringer can raise a fair use defense if they like and they may or may not be right. If you win, you get damages, if you lose, you pay damages. In practice, you and the alleged infringer may opt for an out of court settlement instead.	Given that filing a DMCA counter notice is essentially an invitation to a lawsuit, consulting a licensed lawyer in your jurisdiction before filing a counter notice is highly recommended. To understand what is happening, one must understand the relevant intent of the "safe-harbor" provisions of the DMCA (Digital Millenium Copyright Act). Essentially, there are/were two "complications" of standard copyright doctrine to the internet: The standard of Anonymity online, which makes filing a traditional lawsuit more difficult. Because of the nature of the internet, a) few people host their own content, either using a hosting company directly (like most websites do), or post their content on someone else's website (like Youtube and StackExchange), which makes them distributors, traditionally liable for infringement, (and much nicer targets for litigation, because they have deep pockets). However, without the ability to post on someone else's website, the internet as we know it wouldn't exist (we'd basically blogs, and maybe email). Both of these issues were "solved"/dealt with via the takedown notice/counter notice system. A displayer of other's content (e.g. Youtube or StackExchange, ISPs, etc.) has "safe harbor" protection from liability for hosting copyright infringing content, provided that they respond to a properly formatted takedown notice within the specified time frame. Someone one the other side of this, who believes that they do have the legal right to utilize such content, either due to owning it, licensing it, or fair use, can file a counter notice, and upon receipt of a properly made counter notice, must return the content in a specified time period 10-14 days. This "solves" both of the above issues: The intermediary service is no longer legally liable, instead acting as a message carrier, and if the person uploading the disputed material believes that the DMCA should not apply, they can reverse the takedown, by filing a counter notice that allows the original claim filer to file a standard lawsuit. Essentially, the hoster gets to say "I want no part of this, this is between you guys, I'm just a messenger". But what does a counter notice need to contain? 17 U.S. Code § 512g(3) states that a counter notice must contain 4 things (legal code below, my comments are in italics): Contents of counter notification.—To be effective under this subsection, a counter notification must be a written communication provided to the service provider’s designated agent that includes substantially the following: (A)A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber. This is a legal document, you must sign it, either physically or electronically. (B)Identification of the material that has been removed or to which access has been disabled and the location at which the material appeared before it was removed or access to it was disabled. Clarification of what material is specifically being requested to be made accessible again; this information should also be in the original takedown notice (C)A statement under penalty of perjury that the subscriber has a good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification of the material to be removed or disabled. This is essentially the bit that gives legal cover for the hoster to restore access to the disputed content, and places the liability on the counter notice filer's shoulders. Note that this is under the penalty of perjury, so jail time can concievably result if this is made falsely. (D)The subscriber’s name, address, and telephone number, and a statement that the subscriber consents to the jurisdiction of Federal District Court for the judicial district in which the address is located, or if the subscriber’s address is outside of the United States, for any judicial district in which the service provider may be found, and that the subscriber will accept service of process from the person who provided notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) or an agent of such person. Essentially stuff that makes it easy for the filer of the original takedown notice to sue you. Sources: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/512 https://www.crucialp.com/resources/tutorials/web-hosting/how-to-file-dmca-counter-claim/	You probably can. There are a few questions here. First, is the message protected by copyright? In general, it probably is, but there are many exceptions that might allow you to use it without permission. Unfortunately, these exceptions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The exceptions tend to allow the use of small excerpts of a work for various sorts of purposes that don't undermine the copyright holder's ability to profit. That leads to the second question, which is why you are using that message. If you're including it in your source code so you can test whether a message generated at run time is in fact that message, that's one thing, and it's probably okay. On the other hand, if the owner of the copyright sells a database of all its message strings, and you're compiling a similar database that you also intend to sell, that's probably not okay. A third question concerns the Firefox license terms. It's entirely possible that they allow you explicitly to do what you're considering, in which case it doesn't matter what copyright law says about it. On the other hand, Firefox is open source software, and under some open source licenses, if you incorporate any of the source code in your own product, you are required to release your product's source code under the same license. If you're not already planning to do that, you should consider carefully whether including that error message would trigger that provision (if there is one) of Firefox's open source license.	Here's where you went wrong legally: Suppose I legally obtain some digital image created by somebody else (e.g., by downloading from a public website). That, right there, is copyright infringement- unless the copyright owner has granted permission or the image is public domain you cannot copy it - this breaches "the right to make reproductions". By posting it on the web (assuming that it isn't itself an infringing copy) they have given implied permission for you to look at it in a web browser but not to copy it into a presentation even if that presentation is never presented. If it is presented then that makes the infringement worse - it adds breaches of "the right to communicate to the public" and "the right to use the work as a basis for an audiovisual work". How is this different from the computer wallpaper? It isn't. If you are using the one of the defaults that shipped with the OS then the license gives you permission. If you are using someone else's copyright without permission then it's a breach. There are defenses to copyright infringement but these are quite nationally variable - search this or other sites for "fair dealing" and "fair use".	If a legal action is filed, the take down order generally remains in force until a court orders otherwise. If a legal action is not filed with the required time frame, the Internet Service Provider (ISP) such as Google is no longer required to honor the take down order. See generally here and here. Also, an ISP is not required to honor even a valid takedown order. Doing so sacrifices the ISP's statutory immunity from copyright law liability, but that is all.
Status of U.S. attorneys in US DOJ (2021) With the new President Biden and his administration in the U.S., I see news stories that the Biden administration is asking 56 Trump-appointed and Senate confirmed U.S. attorneys to resign from their positions at the DOJ. How does this work? Do they have to resign if asked? If one does refuse to resign, will their life as a prosecutor be difficult?	The DoJ under the executive branch has attorneys, judges are under the independent judicial branch. US attorneys serve at the pleasure of the president, so in the worst case they can be fired and some were by the previous administration. It is common for US attorneys to resign at a change of administration, but an administration can press for resignations as in the 2017 dismissal of Obama appointees (where some "solicited" resignations were not accepted). Ultimately the attorney can be fired, as Geoffrey Berman was (fired for different reasons).	As an example, POTUS does not undertake the entire pardon process on his own, instead they are preliminarily processed by the Department of Justice, which makes a recommendation. Only POTUS can "grant" the pardon, and we lack substantive information on how deeply he gets involved (does he just sign documents based on staff recommendations? does he do his own research?). I don't know what physical form Clinton's 450 pardons on January 20, 2001 took, but a president might use an autopen (Obama did use such a device). Questions have been raised and definitive answers from SCOTUS are lacking as to whether hand-to-paper signatures are demanded by the Constitution. DoJ at one point thought it was okay. This article lists the Constitutional functions which cannot be delegated: reporting to the Congress on the state of the Union; convening either or both Houses of Congress and adjourning Congress; signing and vetoing bills; receiving ambassadors and public ministers (recognition); appointing and removing ambassadors, ministers, and certain other public officers; nominating federal judges; and making recess appointments However, the Constitutional function of negotiating treaties or numerous functions as commander in chief of the armed forces is generally delegated, within the executive branch. Numerous statutory functions can be delegated (and Congress may say explicitly that some function can be delegated, in passing the law). The matter of implied power to delegate statutory function is the topic of a couple of centuries of litigation, but as an example in Williams v. United States, 42 U.S. 290 SCOTUS held that a law prohibiting the advance of public money in any case whatsoever to the disbursing officers of government except under the special direction of the President does not require the personal and ministerial performance of this duty, to be exercised in every instance by the President under his own hand. SCOTUS has not established bright lines regarding the extent of permissible delegation.	There is currently no law requiring a candidate for US President to release tax records to appear on the ballot. Nor is there any law requiring the President to release such records after taking office. There are laws requiring members of congress, and other Federal officials, to make public some limited information about their finances. This is much less than the information that would be included in an income tax return. Congress could pass a law requiring candidates to release their returns, but it seems unlikely that the current Congress will do so. States have broad authority over Federal elections. A state could pass a law requiring a candidate to release his or her returns as a condition of appearing on the ballot. Such a law might be challenged on Due process grounds. This would be an untested legal area, so there is no telling how a court would rule on such a challenge to such a law. Congress, or an individual house of Congress, may subpoena almost any information in pursuit of its investigation function. Investigations must be related to possible legislation, meaning it must be related to a subject about which Congress has power to pass a law. But the relation can be rather remote, as long as the information might inform the judgement of members of congress in considering a possible law. There does not have to be an actual law under consideration. Investigations have been challenged, and in a few cases there have been court rulings that an investigation was not related to possible legislation, and so Congress was not allowed to enforce subpoenas on that subject, nor to compel testimony. But such rulings have been rare. Previous Presidents have asserted, under the name of "Executive privilege", a right not to disclose information, such as internal discussions within the executive branch. This is not explicitly specified by the US Constitution, nor by any law, but has been generally accepted, and in some cases supported by court rulings. No court has ever clearly defined the extent or limits of Executive privilege. A House committee issued a subpoena this year for President Trump's tax records, or some of them. I forget whether this was addressed to the IRS or to the Treasury Dept. This has been challenged in court, and the matter is still in court. I be3live that one of the grounds asserted against the subpoena was that it was not to look into tax issues, as specified in the law authorizing the subpoena. No one yet knows how that case will proceed. The NY State Attorney General is investigating allegations that the Trump Organization, and various individuals, violated NY law, including by falsely reporting campaign expenses and contributions. In pursuit of that investigation, he issued a subpoena for various records which he claims will reveal possible evidence of those illegal actions. He pretty learly has the authority to subpoena records which might be evidence in a criminal case. This subpoena has also been challenged, but seems pretty likely to be upheld. However the subpoena was as part of a Grand Jury investigation, and Grand Jury proceedings, including evidence obtained by subpoena, are by law secret unless an indictment and trial results. So even if the subpoena is upheld, this should not lead to the public release of the records, unless someone is put on trial for some crime, and the records are evidence in that case. Even then the judge can order the records not to be released to the public.	A district attorney has discretion to decide whether to prosecute. A district attorney may be appointed by e.g. a county board of commissioners, or they may be elected. The electorate has the exclusive power to chastise DA, but voting him out of office, so there is little to be done other than write letters to the editor. An appointed DA has some superior, so you can complain to that superior. There is no way to legally force a DA to prosecute if they do not believe that there is enough evidence to get a conviction.	To start, for this hypothetical to happen, a whole bunch of decisions contrary to sanity have to happen: The Vice President and President Pro Tempore do not invoke the 25th Amendment to temporarily remove the President from office Congress does not issue Articles of Impeachment The President does not pardon himself The District Attorney decides to prosecute the sitting President rather than waiting for his term to be over There are probably more I'm missing. With that out of the way, in theory there's no law that says a President cannot serve while in prison, and simply being a felon does not disqualify him from the Presidency. The judge might order that while he was still serving as President, he serve his time under house arrest - he'd constantly be surrounded by police officers, so it would be pretty difficult for him to run, and it would keep him as as able as possible to keep performing the official functions of the office. The judge could also just defer his sentence. Putting him in regular prison would have serious national security implications, both in terms of protecting his person and in allowing him to effectively serve as Commander-in-Chief, so the government could probably make a compelling case against putting a sitting President in prison. According to this Senate Report, the President will also continue to receive Secret Service protection once he leaves office, so long as he is not removed by Impeachment. There doesn't seem to be a provision against that protection if the President is in prison, so the Secret Service would be obliged to find a way to protect him while he is in prison. Most likely this would mean he would be put in an isolated prison wing, possibly with Secret Service protecting his section.	There's no settled legal answer to this, but there seems to be a general consensus that this would not be legal under the Impeachment Clause, which says: The President ... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. There would be two main issues here: 1. Can a president pardon himself? It's never been tried, so it's never been challenged, so the courts have never had a chance to say whether it's legal. The main argument in favor of self-pardons is that the constitution grants broad pardon authority for any offense against the United States, making an exception for impeachment, but not for self-pardons. The response to that is that the constitution uses all kinds of broad language that everyone agrees is not as broad as it sounds; Congress is not allowed to abridge the freedom of speech, but perjury laws are nonetheless constitutional. There are several theories as to why the self-pardon would be illegal, but they mostly come down to two main ideas -- that our legal system does not permit anyone to be the arbiter of their own case, and that a person subject to impeachment may not be pardoned. 2. Can a president issue secret pardons? Again, it's never been tried, so it's never been challenged, so the courts have never had a chance to say whether it's legal. And again, the primary argument in favor of secret pardons is that the Pardon Clause grants broad pardon authority without requiring that pardons be publicized. The main arguments against are (1) that presidential pardons are inherently public acts, as they have no effect if the justice system doesn't know about them, and (2) that the Presidential Records Act requires official White House records to be transferred to the National Archives.	I was told that DAs and other prosecutors are typically prohibited from engaging in volunteer, pro bono work You have not really understood the linked answer and are oversimplifying its analysis. I'll restate the analysis in a different way in this answer in the hope of providing greater clarity. The key to understanding that question is that the question presented there was: "Are DAs and other prosecutors prohibited from being defense attorneys, such as in a pro bono fashion?" Having a prosecutor do criminal defense work presents conflicts that other types of pro bono work frequently would not. Does this mean that public attorneys can engage in pro bono work in Texas? If so, are there strings attached? For example, would a public attorney be able to represent their friends and family so long as they don't charge for the work? These questions don't have a single global answer and must be analyzed on a case by case basis. It depends upon whether the pro bono work constitutes a conflict of interest with the public attorneys' regular work (i.e. what kind of legal work is done pro bono and for whom) and it depends upon the policies of the lawyer's particular employer. There are two distinct questions presented, neither of which are materially different in Texas than they were in the previous question. One is when doing so would violate the professional ethical obligations of a lawyer, which is what the Texas Bar Association statement is talking about. The other is whether it is permissible in a manner consistent with the contractual employer-employee relationship of any particular Texas attorney working on a full time salaried basis for a particular employer. This is a subject upon which the Texas Bar Association statement is silent. Professional Ethics Considerations As noted above, one question is whether pro bono work by a prosecutor in the specific subject matter of criminal defense would constitute a conflict of interest. The answer to that question is "usually yes" for the reasons explained in the linked question. One can also easily imagine other circumstances where pro bono work could pit a salaried government lawyer against his employer, such as a state attorney general's office lawyer doing pro bono civil rights litigation against the state government. But, not all pro bono legal work constitutes a conflict of interest. For example, a prosecutor doing pro bono work helping low income people prepare documents naming legal guardians for their children in the event that they predecease their children (the very first pro bono case I took on as a Colorado attorney) would be very unlikely to be conflict of interest for the prosecutor, even though a pro bono criminal defense case in the county where the prosecutor practices would be an obvious and direct unethical conflict of interest. Similarly, judges frequently do pro bono work, where authorized to do so by the court systems in which they work, in the areas of legal education for non-lawyers (like High School Mock Trial competitions or lectures to school students) and by providing mediation services to indigent parties outside the judicial district where they practice, that are specifically calculated to avoid conflicts of interests, or appearance of bias or impropriety. Employment Relationship Considerations The second issue is whether "public attorneys can engage in pro bono work in Texas?" in a case with a subject matter that does not otherwise present a conflict of interest. Public sector attorneys are not prohibited from doing so as a matter of professional ethics. But, that isn't the only consideration. The other consideration is whether doing that pro bono work violates the employment policies of a public sector employer of a lawyer in the usual case when a public sector lawyer is employed on a salaried basis for the full efforts or something similar, of the lawyer. This is basically an issue of contract law, not of professional ethics. The way this is usually dealt with in private law practice when a salaried attorney works for a law firm is that the private salaried lawyer needs to obtain law firm permission to do pro bono work and that pro bono work is often structured so that the pro bono client's lawyer is the law firm itself and the lawyer in that firm doing the actual pro bono work is often just one agent of the firm as a whole that actual represents the pro bono client. Frequently, salaried lawyers in private law firms have quotas of billable hours which they have to meet as a condition of employment each year at the law firm, and frequently a private law firm's pro bono program allows the salaried lawyer to count hours working for the law firm's pro bono clients towards that annual billable hour quota. Incidentally, there is nothing magic in the absence of a conflict of interest, about limiting "moonlighting work" to unpaid pro bono work. For example, many U.S. law schools expressly authorize salaried full time law professors who are admitted to the practice of law to have a paid private practice up to a certain number of hours per year as a fringe benefit in addition to the salary, akin to the common practice of allowing professors to retain for themselves textbook royalties for textbooks written while the professors were being paid a salary to do scholarly work including writing textbooks. The pro bono program structure used in private law firms for their salaried employers isn't as workable for a salaried attorney working full time for a governmental employer. This is because allowing a government salaried employee to work for free for a private citizen on something that doesn't involve public business of the government would functionally be an indirect appropriation of legal salary funds from the governmental entity to the pro bono client without receiving authorization from the elected representatives of the government in question. So, in the public sector, a more common arrangement would be to provide that every salaried public sector lawyer working for that government is permitted to do up to X billable hours of pro bono work per year for their own, personal moonlighting private practice clients as a fringe benefit of employment, much like paid time off, if it is permitted at all. And, other public sector employers, which are not so generous, simply prohibit their salaried attorney employees from doing pro bono work at all in order to avoid having to deal with and think about the issue. This doesn't arise very often in the case of lawyers hired by small local governments or on a contract basis by a larger government for a particular specialized task, as they have their own practices and have not agreed to provide substantially all of their professional legal work to their employer the way that a salaried lawyer would. So they are more akin to private sector law firm lawyers who simply have an additional set of conflict of interest considerations as a result of having a particular local government as an employer.	Impeachment is unique in that it is a question of politics, not a question of law, that is being discussed at trial. The other exception is that the Senate, not the Supreme Court, is the High Court of Impeachment (that is, legal precedence is based on what the Senate says, not what the Supreme Court or any other appellant court says). There are a few minor details, but the main part of the trial will play out like a criminal trial, with the Managers (people named by the house to argue the case) taking the role of the Prosecution and the Senate as the Jury. Because the trial is purely political in nature, a jurist decision to on the matter before evidence is presented at trial is entirely legal. It's actually perfectly legal to have your own opinion prior to trial start in a normal criminal jury and to vote on that ground... but the attorneys will dismiss you from the pool if they find even a hint of this. Unlike the judicial system, the jurists of Impeachment Trial are the same 100 people (presently) and cannot be dismissed for any reason, including comments about how they will find in the trial. Jury Fixing or tampering is when the decision a jurist makes is colored by some outside motivation to the jurists own convictions (i.e. the crime boss has your family and won't kill them if you find his hired goon innocent.). It could be an issue if a senator was given some pork to vote against his/her choice, but Impeachment is incredibly rare in the U.S. system and there hasn't been any case where this was an issue (If Articles of Impeachment are brought, this will be the 20 case to reach the trial stage since the adoption of the Constitution, and the 3rd for a President.).
Motorcycle chariot subject to FL motor vehicle laws How might the motorcycle chariot's of 1930's Australia fit into today's Florida motor vehicle statutes? Specifically, could I legally drive one on the streets while operating it from the chariot? My thinking is it would be classified as a motor vehicle and not a motorcycle, all controls would need to be operable from the chariot, the chariot would need applicable brake/turn signals, and I could probably skirt the safety belt laws since the operator would not be in the front seat. Photo courtesy of National File and Sound Archive of Australia and they are in the video at the 0:54 mark.	It wouldn’t Motor vehicle designs and modifications have to meet certain safety standards - so called “street legal”. These don’t. Play with them all you like on a private track but they won’t get on the road	In New South Wales it is entirely legal to film police (or anyone else). However, as discussed (What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?) audio recording is more restricted: you must either have the permission of all the participants in a conversation or be a party to the conversation. I do not imagine the law is any different in Victoria.	Apparently, people are citing these cases for the proposition that there is a right to drive a car without a license (several facebook accounts making this claim have been shut down and a document making this argument is signed with the Biblical name of God). This is frivolous poppycock reserved for conspiracy theory crackpots that also never works. A lawyer who tried to make an argument like this in court would probably be sanctioned by the trial court judge for making a frivolous argument, and might even risk suspension of his license to practice law, unless he made clear that he was arguing for a change in the law that is not supported by any current law. Like all rights, the right to travel, including the right to travel by motor vehicle, is subject to reasonable restrictions which include the requirement that one have a driver's license that is currently valid. No court has ever held that having a traffic code regulating the use of motor vehicles on public roads is unconstitutional, nor has any court every held that the government may not obstruct public roads in a reasonable manner for purposes such as maintenance, parades, and the like. The question in People v. Horton (the correct citation to which is 14 Cal.App.3d 930, 92 Cal.Rptr. 666 and not the one cited that conflates two separate citations in different reporters to the same case), entered by an intermediate appellate court in California on January 29, 1971, is whether a search of an occupant of a motor vehicle requires probable cause under the 4th Amendment as incorporated by the 14th Amendment to apply to the states, and under parallel California constitutional provisions, and it hold that even occupants of motor vehicles have a 4th Amendment expectation of privacy despite the exigent circumstances associated with a motor vehicle. A more complete quotation from the case states: Applying these principles to the instant case, we are impelled to conclude that Officer Winfrey did not have legal cause to stop appellant's automobile. Appellant was driving within the legal speed limits, not erratically, and there were no visible operational defects on the vehicle. Furthermore, although the officer observed two young passengers in the vehicle, he saw no furtive or suspicious movements and he had no information that the youths were being kidnaped, detained or molested in any manner. In fact, the only reason given by Winfrey for stopping appellant was that appellant was driving a vehicle along the streets of Modesto at 1:15 in the morning with two young passengers and that he did not look old enough to be their parent or guardian. Clearly, even if we should assume that what the officer observed constituted unusual activity, and it is difficult to make such an assumption in this modern age, the activity alone did not suggest that it was related to criminality. The Attorney General argues that Officer Winfrey had reasonable cause to stop appellant's vehicle on suspicion that appellant was aiding and abetting his two young passengers to loiter in violation of the municipal ordinance of the City of Modesto. However, driving along city streets, even at 1:15 in the morning, is not “loitering.” (In re Cregler, 56 Cal.2d 308, 312 [14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305]; In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.2d 845, 853 [64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353].) For all that Officer Winfrey knew, appellant could have been driving his two young passengers home from a theater or other authorized place of amusement. We are not insensitive to the numerous problems which face police officers on patrol in a mechanized nation. As we stated in Bramlette v. Superior Court, 273 Cal.App.2d 799, 804 [78 Cal.Rptr. 532], “[t]he use 934 of the automobile in criminal activity has vastly increased the possibility of unlawful conduct, and the likelihood of escape by criminals from the scene of their crimes.” Moreover, we are cognizant of the fact that the great majority of police officers assume the grave responsibility which our society has foisted upon them in a courageous and conscientious manner. Nonetheless, the right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right which must be protected by the courts. Consequently, while we do not censure Officer Winfrey or question his motives, the fact remains that he stopped appellant's vehicle solely because it was occupied by young people. Were we to condone the stopping of vehicles for this reason alone, no matter how altruistic the officer's motive might be, we would lend our approval to the creation of a second class citizenry; we would also contribute to an already deteriorating relationship between the youth of America and law enforcement officials; in a free nation this relationship must be based on mutual confidence and respect. Having decided that Officer Winfrey did not have probable cause to stop appellant's vehicle in the first instance, it follows that the subsequent search was unlawful, even though consented to by appellant, and that all evidence adduced therefrom was the product of an unlawful search. As our Supreme Court said in People v. Haven, 59 Cal.2d 713, 718, 719 [31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381, P.2d 927]: “A search or seizure made pursuant to a valid consent before any illegal police conduct occurs is obviously not a product of illegal conduct. A search and seizure made pursuant to consent secured immediately following an illegal entry or arrest, however, is inextricably bound up with the illegal conduct and cannot be segregated therefrom.” The case of People v. Franklin, 261 Cal.App.2d 703 [68 Cal.Rptr. 231], is squarely in point. There, as here, the officer stopped the defendant's vehicle without probable cause, and afterward defendant consented to the search which ultimately uncovered marijuana. The court in reversing the conviction, at page 707 of the opinion, had this to say: “The stop having been illegal, the search, though by consent of the vehicle owner, does not breathe legality into the resultant find by the officers.” A later California case before the same intermediate appellate court a few years later, also distinguished People v. Horton, holding that while driving in a car as a juvenile as 1:15 a.m. was not "loitering" that similar conduct did violate a municipal curfew ordinance for minors which was validly enacted and not unconstitutional. In re Francis W., 117 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1974). The claim that People v. Horton recognizes a constitutional right to drive without a license was analyzed and rejected in the case of Newman v. Garcia, 2016 WL 8939133, Case No. 3:16-cv-137-J-PDB (M.D. Fl. September 26, 2016) in which a federal trial court ruled on a motion to dismiss a civil rights claim brought by a man alleging that his constitutional rights were violated because he was arrested for driving with a suspended driver's license in which he sought $28 million of damages. The judge in that case held in pages 3-5 of the Slip Opinion that dismissed this claim that: Right to Travel Newman primarily argues Officer Garcia violated his constitutional right to travel by issuing him a citation for driving with a suspended license and stopping him from driving his car. See generally Doc. 2, Doc. 12. He contends he has a protected liberty interest in driving on public highways, he does not need a license to drive, and a driver's license is a contract between the state and a person that is cancelled when the state suspends a license. Doc. 12 at 3–4, 7. In Kent v. Dulles, the United States Supreme Court explained the right to travel—the freedom to move “across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well”—is “part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law.” Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958). It has long been recognized as a basic constitutional right. Att'y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 901 (1986). “A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.” Id. at 903 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A restriction on one method of travel does not violate a person's constitutional rights. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999). There is no constitutional right to the “most convenient form of travel.” City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982). 4 The constitutional right to travel does not include a fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle. Duncan v. Cone, 2000 WL 1828089, at 2 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished); Miller, 176 F.3d at 1206 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has recognized a state's power to “prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles.” Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915). That includes passing legislation requiring drivers to have licenses. Id. Such a regulation is “but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens.” Id. Newman cites many state-court cases he contends support his argument he has a right to drive without a license. See Doc. 12 at 3–4. They do not. See People v. Horton, 92 Cal. Rptr. 666, 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (addressing legality of traffic stop and search; observing, “The right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right which must be protected by the courts” (emphasis added)); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 137–38 (Ariz. 1963) (addressing state law suspending license of uninsured motorist involved in an accident who does not post sufficient security); Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869, 871, 872 (R.I. 1958) (addressing state law suspending license for failure to deposit security with the registrar; observing, “[T]he right to use the public highways for travel by motor vehicles is one which properly can be regulated by the legislature in the valid exercise of the police power of the state”); Payne v. Massey, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495–96 (Tex. 1946) (addressing ordinance regulating operation of taxicabs); Teche Lines, Inc., v. Danforth, 12 So. 2d 784, 785, 787 (Miss. 1943) (addressing state law regulating stopping on certain portion of highway; observing right to travel “may be reasonably regulated by legislative act in pursuance of the police power of the State”); Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583 (Va. 1930) (addressing contention city could not change ordinance to permit revocation of license; observing, “regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part ... by granting, refusing, and revoking ... permits to drive an automobile on its streets”); Swift v. City of Topeka, 23 P. 1075 (Kan. 1890) (addressing ordinance restricting use of bicycles on sidewalks and a bridge).4 Newman does not cite authority to support his contention a driver's license is a contract with the state that is cancelled when the license is suspended, and he does not explain how the existence of a cancelled contract would support his argument that Officer Garcia violated his constitutional rights. See generally Doc. 12. Other courts have rejected similar arguments as meritless or frivolous. See Oliver v. Long, No. CV-06-2429-PCT-LOA, 2007 WL 1098527, at 5 (D. Ariz. Apr. 12, 2007) (unpublished) (argument that by cancelling all contracts with California Department of Motor Vehicles plaintiff could violate traffic laws with impunity “frivolous,” “specious,” and “nonsensical”); North Carolina v. Ellison, 471 S.E. 2d 130, 131 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (argument that by cutting up license and returning it to Division of Motor Vehicles plaintiff had rescinded contract with state and could drive without complying with statutory requirements “without merit”). Absent authority to support the argument that a suspended driver's license is a cancelled contract with the state, and in light of states' authority to regulate the operation of motor vehicles on their roads, the argument is meritless. *5 Though Newman enjoys a constitutional right to travel, he has no fundamental right to drive. A state may regulate the operation of vehicles on its roads, including requiring a license. Officer Garcia informed him of the suspension and informed him of the consequences of driving with a suspended license but did not restrict his right to travel by other means of transportation. The complaint does not plausibly allege Officer Garcia violated Newman's right to travel The other two cases cited, in addition to the flaws noted below, also predate the U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion that a state has the power to “prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles.” Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915), including passing legislation requiring drivers to have licenses. Id. Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779 is an opinion from a Delaware state trial court entered on February 27, 1907 (111 years ago as I write this). It held that at the time, in Delaware, on the public highway in question, both cars and pedestrians had an equal right to use the road and both had a duty of care in the contexts of a lawsuit against the car owner for causing an accident through negligence. It did not reference any fundamental or constitutional right and has no precedential value and has in any case been superseded by statute. Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236 is an opinion from a Delaware state trial court entered on December 13, 1905 also involving liability for an automobile accident. It says in the pertinent part: A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public streets of a city as a vehicle of any kind. In using any parts of the streets all persons are bound to the exercise of, reasonable care to prevent collisions and accidents. Such care must be in proportion to the danger or the peculiar risks in each case. It is the duty of a person operating an automobile, or any other vehicle, upon the public streets of a city, to use ordinary care in its operation, to move it at a reasonable rate of speed, and cause it to slow up or stop if need be, where danger is imminent, and could, by the exercise of reasonable care, be seen or known in time to avoid accident. Greater caution is required at street crossings and in the more thronged streets of a city than in the less obstructed streets in the open or suburban parts. Like Simeone, it predates the adoption of a statutory traffic code in the state of Delaware, has no precedential effect, is no longer good law, and does not purport to establish any fundamental or constitutional right. It merely enunciates the default rules governing the use of public highways by cars and pedestrians in the absence of other laws or regulations.	The booklet from the condominium management could legally be seen as a part of the lease, and you should have been aware cars can be towed without notice, and have in fact agreed to that by living there. The fact that the tow company entered your car really isn't relevant; they are tasked with removing the car, and by law, they must do everything they can in order to tow the car while not causing damage. They will be insured and bonded for damage during the tow and liability for storage at their lot; but in order to safely tow the car, they must have access to the parking brake, the gear shifter (if manual), the steering wheel (to straighten the tires, if needed, which could be a problem if the steering wheel is locked), etc. They can legally enter the car to ensure a safe tow if the car is unlocked, or use a "slim jim" or other tool to unlock the door, disable the alarm if needed, etc. If the tow company damaged the car while towing, or you find property is missing from inside the car when the care is returned, your issue is with the two company and not the condominium management. See Virginia Code § 46.2-118. Prohibited acts by tow truck drivers and towing and recovery operators	It's likely that you'll find similar statutes for your state. Florida's specifically considers the circumstances you've described: 316.081 Driving on right side of roadway; exceptions.— (1) Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows: (a) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing such movement; (b) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center of the highway; provided any person so doing shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within such distance as to constitute an immediate hazard; This last entry represents your stalled car. An obstruction exists and you've yielded the right of way to oncoming traffic. You're good to go.	So I found information from a law firm in Florida about Hit and Run Cases. You definitely want a lawyer as it is a $500 fine and/or 60 days in jail for your case (property damage, no injury or loss of life). The good news is that if you can argue the case correctly, it's very easy to get a Not Guilty verdict. Under Florida Law, a Hit and Run must meet the following criteria to legally find someone guilty: Disputes as to the identity of the driver; Lack of knowledge that a crash occurred; Lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property; The failure to stop was not willful, but was dictated by circumstances; The defendant stopped as close as possible to the site of the accident; The other driver refused to receive identifying information The other driver became belligerent, necessitating that the defendant leave the scene to call police; The assistance rendered was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the statute. Given that you had no lack of knowledge that a crash occurred (2) AND lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property (3.) AND you would have stopped but for the circumstances of the event prevented you from recieiving knowledge of that the crash had occured (4) you already fail to meet 3 of the 8 criteria. This should be easy to argue in and of itself, but where you need a lawyer to assist is in criteria 7. While you were never fearing the other driver to such a degree that you needed to call the police, his behavior was interpreted by you as "road rage" and you had a reasonable fear to not wish to engage him. It's not rules as written, but it could be that the rules allow for leaving the scene because of the plaintiff's behavior and could be valid in other forms. I'll admit, this will vary wildly on the judge's own interpretation of that rule, BUT it's worth a try. Keep in mind with all of these, the Prosecution will be required to prove all 8 facts against you, while you only have to disprove one, to some level of doubt. As an armchair jury, I have no facts to support your story, but I have no facts to doubt it either. And when doubt happens, you must assume innocence. It would help if you had any hint of the officers attitude at the time. Was he friendly? Dismissive? Distracted? What was the guy who hit you's attitude towards the situation? Was he constantly yelling at you and the officer? Was he quiet and separated? Either way, get a lawyer because 60 days of jail time and a $500 fine is not something you want to fight by yourself. Make calls (the ticketing officer should have a work number or other contact information on the ticket.). Notify the insurance company of the fact that it was cited as hit and run but not proven... it could make the difference of who's company is to pay (It will be his if there was no Hit and Run).	This an instance of the general rule ignorantia legis neminem excusat: ignorance of the law is no excuse. If the municipal ordinances state that a particular place does not allow parking at certain times, then if you park there you have violated the law and will get ticketed. There is no requirement that there be signs prominently posted saying that you must obey the law in this particular location. A law might itself require there to be postings, for example speed limit law pertaining to school zones typically are stated in terms of "posted" boundaries. Assuming that the ordinance doesn't have such a "as posted" requirement, you have no legal leg to stand on, and the burden must be shifted to your political leg. If, for example, you were in Pennsylvania, 75 PaCSA 3353(d) permits local parking ordinances: The department on State-designated highways and local authorities on any highway within their boundaries may by erection of official traffic-control devices prohibit, limit or restrict stopping, standing or parking of vehicles on any highway where engineering and traffic studies indicate that stopping, standing or parking would constitute a safety hazard or where the stopping, standing or parking of vehicles would unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic. Signs are kinds of traffic control devices. Since PA does not statutorily prohibit overnight parking, any local restrictions on overnight parking would require signage. Thus restriction such as this one that "The following vehicles shall not be parked between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on the streets...", applying to commercial vehicles among others, would require a sign. That borough has an interesting ordinance stating that In the event of a conflict between the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale and the provisions set forth in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3351 through 3354, as amended from time to time, the provisions of the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale shall control. Generally speaking, local ordinances are subordinate to state law, so this provision is legally questionable (although: the borough does not actually deny the signage requirement, so technically this is not a conflict, it is just ignoring state law – if there is no signage). The borough could of course argue that they were unaware of the state requirement to post no-parking signs, but ignorantia legis neminem excusat.	You may contact a towing company; they will ask who you are, and will politely inform you that since you aren't the property owner, they aren't authorized to take someone else's car that is trespassing on the property. [Addendum] The first step in unraveling the legalities of the situation is seeing that only the property owner can give permission to enter (park) on the property. That permission can be rescinded, but only by the owner. The owner seems to have given permission and has stated in advance some conditions under which permission might be rescinded. The towing company could be called (by the owner) to act as the agent for the owner and remove the offending vehicle; but the towing company cannot just up an do this on their own. If they were to spontaneously tow a vehicle without officially acting on behalf of the owner, they would be liable for damages, owing to their having torted some guy's chattels. So the company will want to know that they are protected, in acting as the agent of the property owner. One way to do that is to verify that the person calling the towing company is the owner. Another would be to get the caller to swear that they are the owner and indemnify them against damages, in case they get sued. That pound of cure is more costly and annoying than the ounce of prevention of making sure that you're towing a car with proper authorization, so it's unlikely that they would just tow the car on your say-so. You might try suing the complex owner for some kind of breach of contract, if you think you have a contractual right to a parking space and they are negligent in doing what's necessary to meet your contractual right. The lease says "we may...", not "we will", so they haven't promised to absolutely enforce this rule. Or, of course, you could call the manager and mention that there's still a problem.
What are the rights of the software owners if their software is used to make money? Let's assume that I have an iPhone and I tell how to use it (e.g. how an app is downloaded, how a photo is taken), I mention about its functions, features (e.g. how a contact is created, how Wi-Fi is disconnected), I tell use, functions, features of another downloaded software from App Store, I show built-in and downloaded software's screens, screen images, screen video records, symbols, logos, functions, features etc. in my blog webpage which made money via Google AdSense and/or affiliate marketing or on YouTube which made money via Google AdSense and/or affiliate marketing or on Udemy which made money by selling courses. Or, let's assume, I have a Windows 10 on my desktop and I do same thing (e.g. selling C language course on Udemy by using Code::Blocks or selling complete Windows 10 course on Udemy). Or, let's assume, I have a Linux disto on my laptop and I do same thing (e.g. publishing how a virtual machine is created by using VirtualBox on the blog which made money or selling complete VirtualBox course on Udemy). As you predict, much more combinations can be produced. Can you please explain what the rights are of the software owners in this case? EDIT: You can think that I buy the software if it requires something like a key and if I want to handle them on the platforms as in the way I mentioned. E.g. Windows 10 EDIT 2: I mean people or companies who provide a software, such as PuTTY, VirtualBox or WhatsApp, by software owners.	You are absolutely allowed to discuss or describe or criticizes software (or books or other copyrighted or trademarked things) without any permission from the copyright holder or trademark holder. This includes teaching people how to use those things. You may not, however, copy protected software without permission. For example you could not include a CD with a copy of Windows 10 as part of a course you taught on using Windows 10, without permission from Microsoft. Also, you may not use a trademark in such a way as to imply that your course is approved or endorsed by the trade mark holder, or by the maker of the trademarked item. If reasonable people could think that your Windows course was approved by Microsoft, you are probably infringing their trademark. Use of screenshots is more of a grey area. Such use, for purposes of teaching or of commentary, is probably covered by fair use (in the US) or fair dealing (in any of several other countries). But that is always a case-by-case determination, and depends on the exact facts, such as how extensive the use is, and whether it in any way harms the market for the original. If in doubt consulting a lawyer experienced in IP issues is wise. But aside from the issues of screenshots, the makers or copyright or trademark holders of software have no right to grant or withhold permission to one who teaches about the softrware, nor to demand any fee from any such person.	Not the free version Your use is commercial so you have to buy the software which (presumably) allows commercial use.	In general, the output of a program is not copyrighted by the author of the program. When you write a novel in Word, Microsoft doesn't own any copyright in your novel. When you prepare financial statements with Excel, Microsoft doesn't own any copyright in those either. There can be exceptions. Some programs (like GNU Bison, a parser generator) actually do output parts of their own source code, and their source code is copyright to the author. To clarify things, GNU made a statement in the license for Bison that officially says they don't have copyright to what it outputs. You should expect programs of this type to have such an exception, and if they don't, maybe ask the author or don't use them.	No, you can't The last paragraph of the MIT License explicitly says the author is not responsible for damages (emphasis mine): THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. A software license is not a contract. You didn't enter a contract with the developer or team. You found software online and decided to use the software. When you install paid software you are almost always presented with the EULA and check-box saying you agree to it. You took an action and agreed to the EULA. You didn’t have to agree to anything before getting access to the code under the MIT license. The software is offered "as-is" which is further protects the author. You'd have to show the author convinced you to use the software fraudulently. You're unlikely to talk to the author at all, and since the entire source code is available for review, it would be very difficult if not impossible to claim fraud. Finally, in the U.S. people have been sued using the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. None of the notable cases involve embedding a virus in an open-source project. Of interest is how the CFAA defines a virus (emphasis mine) (A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; Simply writing bad code wouldn't be enough. You'd have to prove the developer acted maliciously. Hobbyists working for free don't usually have much money. The other major contributors to open source are large companies like IBM and Google, which have lawyers on retainer and deal with frivolous lawsuits frequently.	Yes A software license is just a contract and parties to a contract are free to agree whatever terms they wish under the doctrine of freedom to contract. Government can restrict what terms can be used in a contract either in general (e.g. for being against public policy) or specifically (e.g. by requiring wages be paid in money). None of the terms you mention fall foul of any restrictions I know of.	At least in theory an end user could be sued for infringing on a patent, especially a method claim. Given the cost of a patent lawsuit, this strikes me as extremely unlikely to happen though, unless the user in question were an extremely large company, or something on that order. Theoretically, the only difference between open-source software and proprietary software would be that availability of the source code makes it easier to prove use of a patent in open-source software. Releasing the software as open-source doesn't confer any immunity from patent law or anything like that though. Realistically, however, the chances of being sued for infringement if you're basically giving away the software in question are fairly remote. It rarely makes sense for a patent holder to spend millions of dollars on a lawsuit where they stand no chance of even recovering their cost (but no, that certainly should not be taken as legal advice that you're free to infringe on patents, or anything similar--in fact, none of this should be taken as legal advice at all). If you can actually prove that a technique was published or publicly known and used (e.g., in a product that was offered for sale) well before the patent was applied for, the patent is probably invalid (and if proven so in court, the case would normally be dismissed with prejudice, which basically means the patent holder wouldn't be able to sue anybody else for infringement of that patent). I'd note, however, that in my experience this is much less common than most people imagine--many look at (for example) the title of a patent, and assume it lacks originality because it refers to some well-known technique, and ignore the claims where it details the precise differences between the previously known technique and what the patent really covers. Just for example, the EFF used to have a web page talking about a (now long-since expired) patent on how to draw a cursor on screen. In an apparent attempt at scaring the unwary, they showed code they claimed infringed in the patent--despite the fact that the patent's "background of the invention" specifically cited the technique they showed as being previously known, and not covered by the patent.	As long as you own the copyright to the works, you can even publish the source code itself under two different licenses, which can be radically different. For example, MySQL is licensed under both a commercial and an open-source license. Given that you can publish a single piece of work as multiple licenses, it is your choice which one you wish to grant to the book or the code, as long as you own the copyright.	If I make a working prototype and upload it on youtube will it prevent others from getting a patent on the idea? Generally yes. If the core information is accessible to the public, it becomes "prior art" and cannot be patented anymore by someone else. That includes you. Depending on local legislation, you have a small time window to apply for a patent (after disclosure) but if you don't, it's public domain and everybody is free to use it. If it's mainly code, you may be able to upload to Github and attach a license to it but that offers only limited protection. Globally? That depends on local legislation which there are too many of, to answer this here.
How does the "Plain Meaning Rule" intersect with persons and corporations The Plain Meaning Rule dictates that statutes are to be interpreted using the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute. If a law is written and uses only the word "person" (or "persons"), and the law lacks a definition for the word "person", and the law does not use the words "natural persons", then does the law include a corporation as a person under the Plain Meaning Rule? Thanks in advance. If needed, here is some example text. In the example text, it is not clear to me whether corporations are included or excluded because (1) "person" is not defined; and (2) the words "natural persons" was not used. The best I can tell, the conduct would include corporations because the courts have interpreted persons to include corporations via hundreds of bastardizations of the 14th amendment (like the Citizens United v. FEC case). (a) A person may not follow another in or about a public place or maliciously engage in a course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys the other: (1) with the intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other; (2) after receiving a reasonable warning or request to stop by or on behalf of the other; and (3) without a legal purpose.	So, the plain meaning rule is a general rule, and, as with most general legal rules, there are exceptions. One such exception is that if a statute uses a word that has a commonly understood legal meaning, even if that differs from the ordinary meaning, then that legal meaning applies. "Persons" is commonly understood in legalese to include corporations (just take my word for it), so when used in a statute it's going to include corporations and other entities. A similar example is that the word "he," when used in a statute, is not construed to only include males within its ambit. Note that there can be exceptions to this rule too. Since your example is a criminal statute, note that, under certain circumstances, criminal liability can be imputed to a corporation or other entity.	As @James K indicated in a comment: Private law involves relationships between individuals, such as the law of contracts and torts, (as it is called in the common law), and the law of obligations (as it is called in civil legal systems). It is to be distinguished from public law, which deals with relationships between both natural and artificial persons (i.e., organizations) and the state, including regulatory statutes, penal law and other law that affects the public order. In general terms, private law involves interactions between private individuals, whereas public law involves interrelations between the state and the general population. Source: Wikipedia The effect of section 156 is that anyone adversely affected by a public authority's failings under Part 11, Chapter 1 cannot sue: any redress is by way of judicial review. The Explanatory Note to section 156 offers this example: A local council fails to give due regard to the requirements of the public sector equality duty when deciding to stop funding a local women’s refuge. An individual would not be able to sue the local council as a result and claim compensation. She would need to consider whether to pursue judicial review proceedings.	The words "an Act" and "a law" are often used loosely to be synonymous in an every day conversation, but "a law" is a broader term. For example, the criminal code is "a law". But, while the original version of the criminal code may have been a single "act", the criminal code has almost certainly been amended by many other acts over the years after its original enactment as a single act. An "act" is a single enacted bill proposed in a single legislative session approved in a single Presidential assent. A law, in contrast, can be the result of multiple acts approved in multiple Presidential assents at different times and then codified into a single statute. Also, the term "a law" can be used correctly to refer to a particular holding of case law that is judicially created and not enacted by the legislature. For example, someone might correctly say, "there is a law that makes it illegal to breach a contract without legal justification", even though that is a case law principle, rather than a legislatively enacted rule. Confusingly, it isn't uncommon for the short title of a statute (i.e. a law) that is the product of multiple acts amending the original one, to be the short title of the original act that has been amended over the years. For example, in the United States, the "1933 Securities Act" which was the short title of the original act giving rise to that statute, is still described by that short title, despite the fact that it has been amended scores of times since then well into the 21st century. (A careful writer would say "the 1933 Securities Act, as amended"). I suspect that this practice is also followed in India, because the American practice of naming statutes in this fashion dates back to English practice that was in place before the American revolution and has continued to be followed since then. This isn't a hard and fast rule, however. Hence, another statute has the short title, "Statute of Frauds", even though it could have been described by the short title of the original act from the reign of Queen Anne. But, in the abstract, "an act" has its more narrow technical meaning. Incidentally, to prevent confusion, "the law" is a term much broader than either "an act" or "a law". The phrase "the law" encompasses not just a particular statute, but all statutes, all regulations that have the force of law, all treaties, the constitution, and all judicially created case law, not just statutes which come into being through the passage of bills as acts by the legislature.	"Could Maine pass a law making New Mexico corporations and LLCs legally nonexistent in Maine (and removing the corporate veil in cases where Maine courts have jurisdiction)?" No. The full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the dormant commerce clause doctrine of U.S. Constitutional law would both invalidate a Maine law to that effect. One might think that the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution (as opposed to the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment) might also invalidate this law (e.g., it also prohibits residents of another state from obtaining occupational licenses in a state). But, this is not the case, because the U.S. Supreme Court held in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868), that corporations are not protected by the privileges and immunities clause. See generally, here. This doesn't mean that Maine couldn't regulate foreign corporations in some manner that doesn't unduly discriminate against out of state corporations. For example, most states require out of state corporations that do business in that state to pay a small fee and make a simple filing with the Secretary of State of that state authorizing them to do business in that state as a precondition to filing lawsuits or counterclaims seeking relief in their state's courts. But, this is far from a denial of the very existence of the out of state corporation and doesn't, for example, prohibit the out of state corporation from defending itself against suits brought against it in that state's courts. Likewise, it does not prohibit an out of state corporation from owning property or from affording limited liability protections to its owners.	The law works in the opposite direction of what you seem to be imagining. State courts generally have jurisdiction to hear lawsuits based on federal law, even without "authorization" from Congress. It is therefore perfectly normal to see lawsuits under Section 1983 , the Privacy Protection Act, or the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Protection Act being litigated in state court. Instead, when Congress authorizes a private right of action, it includes explicit language when it does not want cases heard in state court. This is the case with copyright, patent, and bankruptcy litigation, for example.	Generally, a managing member of an LLC cannot speak for the LLC in court. The LLC needs to hire a licensed lawyer to do that. The general rule is that entities may not represent themselves "pro se" through non-lawyer officers and must have a licensed attorney represent them in any court matter (in practice, a court will usually allow an officer or manager to write a letter to the court asking for a brief extension of time to a deadline to obtain a proper lawyer, even though that is logically inconsistent). If an entity does not hire a lawyer, a default judgment will enter against it. In other words, a CEO or manager or managing member of a company isn't allowed to speak for it in court. This rule is almost universal in the world of legal systems descended from English common law, although sometimes there are narrow statutory exceptions. The manager of an LLC is a person to whom legal process may be directed to begin a lawsuit, but that isn't the same as representing the LLC in court. Wyoming does have an exception to the general rule for small claims court cases at Wyoming Statutes § 1-21-202(b), which states: Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter 5 of Title 33 of the Wyoming Statutes, in small claims court, the state, governmental entities, natural persons, corporations, partnerships, associations or other organizations may litigate actions on behalf of themselves in person or through authorized employees, with or without an attorney, provided that if an attorney appears, the opposing party is entitled to a continuance for the purpose of obtaining an attorney of its own. Keep in mind, however, that small claims court only governs claims of $6,000 or less, and only in cases where the Plaintiff has elected to file a suit using small claims court procedures. I note that this question is tagged "small claims court" but it isn't clear from the circumstances set forth in the question whether this is merely a claim for a small amount of money or is truly a claim that was filed using the special small claims court procedures in which an attorney is not required. Wyoming Statutes § 33-5-101 et seq. is the law regulating attorneys which prohibits the unauthorized practice of law that is the basis for the general rule at Wyoming Statutes § 33-5-117 which states: It shall be unlawful, and punishable as contempt of court, for any person not a member of the Wyoming state bar to hold himself out or advertise by whatsoever means as an attorney or counselor-at-law. This statute isn't perfectly clear on its face, but is understood to codify the universal common law rule so it isn't ambiguous in any way.	This article goes into Miranda variants in some detail. The basic answer is that there are no SCOTUS-mandated formal requirements on the warning, and there exist up to 900 variants of the warning. The court only requires clear communication of those rights and appropriate waiver of them. The specific requirements, if any, are set by the jurisdiction. Since this is a constitutional issue, every jurisdiction must satisfy SCOTUS (and not the state's legislature). Some jurisdictions include a statement about providing a lawyer "if and when you go to court", which was found in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 to not render the warning inadequate (although it suggests that you only get a lawyer when you go to court). This gives rise to variants in New Jersey, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Alaska (but apparently not in Indiana where the warning originally arose). The city of Seattle policy is stated here. When advising a person of Miranda, officers will include the following statements: “You have the right to remain silent.” “Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law.” “You have the right at this time to talk to a lawyer and have your lawyer present with you while you are being questioned.” “If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before questioning, if you wish.” Officers will establish that the suspect understands in one of two ways: By asking “Do you understand” after each of the four Miranda warnings, or By asking, “Do you understand each of these rights?” after reading all the warnings. Officers may then begin asking questions. If the arrestee makes a comment that causes the officer to believe that the arrestee might be requesting an attorney, officers will ask the arrestee to confirm, with a “yes” or “no” answer, whether the arrestee is requesting an attorney. There is no verbatim text that must be strictly adhered to, and the officer just has to "include the statements". The following section speaks of including an additional clause when "reading" Miranda to juveniles, but the previous section does not say that you have to literally read the warning from a card. Analogously, pattern jury instructions are theoretically read verbatim from a script, and yet they are not (always?, ever?) transcribed into the record exactly as dictated by the jury instruction committee. In general, verbatim language is not legally required, especially in speech.	First, the clearly redundant phrase is “applicable laws” - these apply to everything. Second, some acts, particularly consumer protection or sale of goods acts imply provisions into a contract, create obligations that sit beside the contract or create equitable remedies. Many of these can be limited or excluded but this needs to be done explicitly. Third, in legal writing, clarity is preferred to brevity - nice if you can get both but if not, be clear rather than brief. Fourth, the contract is not the document. The document is a record of the “meeting of the minds” that formed the contract. In the event of a dispute, it may be useful to know that particular laws were specifically considered by the parties. Fifth, in legal writing, just as all writing, some people are better than others.
Does the U.S. Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the constitutionality of an impeachment? A question arose on Politics SE asking why the constitutionality to continue an impeachment trial (whose prime purpose is, presumably, to remove an official from office) after the official has left office has not been decided. There was a disagreement in the comments: While it is almost universally agreed that there is no judicial review of how the trial was conducted, including its result (because it's the Senate's supreme privilege), the case was not so clear with a review of whether the impeachment was constitutional to begin with. Could the Supreme Court declare an entire impeachment process unconstitutional?	Part of the problem you'll find is that there are so few impeachments in U.S. History (Only 21 articles of Impeachment have ever been drafted, of which only 8 resulted in convictions) and SCOTUS is so selective on cases it chooses to hear, that only one case has ever been heard and that was upheld (Nixon v. United States). In that case, SCOTUS ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the legal question before it (was the new trial format a proper trial by the senate), but did not have an opinion one way or another to suggest that SCOTUS could not review other cases that come before it. One of the reasons they also haven't is in order to have a legal case in the U.S., the plaintiff must suffer actual harm. More impeachments ended without a conviction than with either acquittal (8), resignation before trial conclusion (4), and expulsion from senate (1, and will never occur again as Congressional office holders are not impeachable following this particular case). Since no harm was caused and courts do not rule on hypotheticals, a case with actual harm (conviction) must occur in order for SCOTUS to even consider hearing the case. Nixon does not bar SCOTUS from hearing more appeals resulting from Impeachment, it only bars those relating to the manner in which the senate chooses to hold the trial.	India does not have a constitutional court, which is a term usually reserved for a court which has exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional questions and is usually limited to deciding constitutional questions. India has a (mostly) unitary court system capped by the Supreme Court of India, but its jurisdiction is not limited to constitutional questions, and it is not the only court in India that can interpret and apply the Constitution of India. When a component of a decision decided by the Supreme Court of India is not necessary for resolution of the case before it, that portion of the decision is called dicta and is not binding precedent although it is still persuasive authority before lower courts as it is a good indication of how the Supreme Court of India would resolve a case in future litigation. The same distinction between portions of a ruling that are binding precedents and those that are mere dicta also applies in all other appellate courts in a common law legal system such as India's. Also, a portion of a court decision is not dicta merely because it is far reaching. A binding precedent can be broad or narrow in the deciding court's discretion. What makes "dicta" distinct is that it is literally "off topic" and not literally controlled by the potentially broad principles used to decide the case before the Court. What determines whether a part of the ruling is "off topic" is the exact scope of the issue that the court states that it is resolving. For example, if the Court states that it is resolving the question of "due process in an admiralty case" and remarks on due process in an ordinary non-admiralty case, the later remarks are dicta. But if the court states that it is resolving the question of "due process in a legal proceeding" then the same statement is not dicta.	Constitutional matters can be, and often are, decided by a single judge in a garden-variety trial court. It's just that the judge's decisions may be reviewed and possibly overturned by a higher court, one of which is the supreme court. Furthermore, district courts are bound by precedent. If a case turns on a new statute, however, the trial judge can indeed find that new statute unconstitutional without a higher court first having done so. If a panel of judges is evenly divided on whether to overturn a lower court's ruling, the lower court's ruling stands, but no precedent is set. The supreme court often has an even number of justices hearing a case, whether because of a vacancy or because a justice has recused him or herself.	The relevant statute, 28 USC 455 simply states what shall be, and does not suggest that the law could be enforced by any particular means. There have been cases where there was a suggestion of a hint of impropriety at SCOTUS and yet things proceeded. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 Rehnquist did not recuse himself despite being a White House lawyer and having expressed an opinion on the legality of certain arrests, and that was the end of that matter.	Marbury V. Madison did not establish judicial review. It was simply the first case where that power was used. It was clearly spelled out in The Federalist #78 that this power would exist in the new constitution, and those who voted to ratify it understood, or should have understood, that it would exist. All that Marbury V. Madison decided was that the Supreme court did not have original jurisdiction to issue Writs of Mandamus That could be overturned, or the constitution could be amended to grant such jurisdiction to SCOTUS. That would not have any major effects on the US judicial system as far as I can tell. I suppose that the constitution could be amended so as to deny the power of judicial review to the courts. But I think the resulting system would be potentially unstable, and this would require a far more fundamental change than simply "overruling Marbury V. Madison" As #78 of The Federalist said: By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. (emphasis added) The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents. . . . [W]here the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental. . . . [W]henever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former.	Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so.	Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.	What would happen? Nothing. The Courts would deem it to be a political question that was decisively and conclusively resolved when Congress ratified the electoral vote and the President was sworn in. To the extent that there was a possibility of challenging it, this would be considered untimely not later than the end of the President's term.
Meaning of "issue" in a law Below is a quote from the laws of the United States. It in Chapter 26, section 672(c): (c) Related or subordinate party For purposes of this subpart, the term “related or subordinate party” means any nonadverse party who is— (1) the grantor’s spouse if living with the grantor; (2) any one of the following: The grantor’s father, mother, issue, brother or sister; an employee of the grantor; a corporation or any employee of a corporation in which the stock holdings of the grantor and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of voting control; a subordinate employee of a corporation in which the grantor is an executive. For purposes of subsection (f) and sections 674 and 675, a related or subordinate party shall be presumed to be subservient to the grantor in respect of the exercise or nonexercise of the powers conferred on him unless such party is shown not to be subservient by a preponderance of the evidence. I do not understand the word issue. It does not make sense to me, and I suspect that it has some legal meaning that I do not understand.	Issue in this sense means a person's children or other lineal descendants such as grandchildren and great-grandchildren. It does not mean all heirs, but only the direct bloodline.	Generally, in non-emergency situations, the state with jurisdiction over parenting issues related to children including relinquishment and adoption is vested in the courts of the "home state" of the child. A child's "home state" is defined by statute by a coordinated definitions set forth in parallel laws at the state (the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction And Enforcement Act in 49 states) and federal (the Parental Kidnapping Prevent Act) level. This definition of "home state" provides a fairly precise definition of something that approximately matches your intuition regarding the state where the child resides in most cases. There is also an international treaty with a similar home state definition. The state where the child was born ceases to be relevant at the point at which that state ceases to be the child's "home state". But, once a state's courts take jurisdiction over parenting issues for a child, the barrier to divest that state of jurisdiction is higher than it would be if there was no prior litigation. So, the state establishing the child support decree would often be the "home state" in the fact pattern set forth in this question. I will refrain from discussing the substantive law of voluntary relinquishment following an acknowledgment of paternity and payment of child support at length in this post as it is beyond the scope of what was asked. Suffice it to say that this is generally disfavored and is sometimes impossible. Also, the actions that could lead to involuntary termination of parental rights (even for mere non-support) also often have parallel felony criminal sanctions associated with them.	One place to look is the incest statute, 18-6602, which says: Persons being within the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are declared by law to be incestuous and void, who intermarry with each other, or who commit fornication or adultery with each other, are punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not to exceed life. The relevant statute pertaining to consanguinity and marriage (32.205) states: Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and descendants of every degree, and between brothers and sisters of the half (1/2) as well as the whole blood, and between uncles and nieces, or aunts and nephews, are incestuous, and void from the beginning, whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate. A literal reading of the law with attention to the bold part tells you that the prohibition of marriage between brothers and sisters of full or half blood does not preclude marriage between blood-unrelated sibling. It does, however, not grant the same right to aunts and nephews etc. (including those by adoption), which could engender competing claims about legislative intent. It would then be relevant to look at the Washington analog of this statute, RCW 26.04.020, which prohibits marriage: (1)(b) When the spouses are nearer of kin to each other than second cousins, whether of the whole or half blood computing by the rules of the civil law. (2) It is unlawful for any person to marry his or her sibling, child, grandchild, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew. Here, the blood-relation rule applies to (second) cousins and is absolute for aunts and sibling. It would seem that various legislatures had different intents, in forming these statutes. In Oregon, ORS 106.020 prohibits marriage When the parties thereto are first cousins or any nearer of kin to each other, whether of the whole or half blood, whether by blood or adoption, computing by the rules of the civil law, except that when the parties are first cousins by adoption only, the marriage is not prohibited or void In this case, the Oregon law explicitly equates blood and adoption, and then could cast doubt on the concept of "whole or half blood" as actually referring to blood relationship (although, Oregon is not Idaho, or Washington). Given the literal reading of the Idaho statutes (and without there being any clarifying case pertaining to relationship by adoption), it may take a court order to compel the county clerk to obey the law, especially if the clerk is dispensing life choice recommendations. That is especially so if the law is not clearly established. Montana likewise restricts (40-1-401) a marriage between an ancestor and a descendant or between a brother and a sister, whether the relationship is by the half or the whole blood, or between first cousins That statute also says Parties to a marriage prohibited under this section who cohabit after removal of the impediment are lawfully married as of the date of the removal of the impediment. However, there is no obvious way to get legally unadopted, especially when the parties are adults. An additional wrinkle is that in Idaho under 32-209, valid marriages entered into elsewhere are valid in that state unless they violate the public policy of this state. Marriages that violate the public policy of this state include, but are not limited to, same-sex marriages, and marriages entered into under the laws of another state or country with the intent to evade the prohibitions of the marriage laws of this state. But it is established law that same-sex marriages are legal. The bold section is clearly unconstitutional; the question then is whether if you took this to SCOTUS, they would strike down the entire statute (a number of states still have such language on their statute books, e.g. Montana still declares that marriage is between a man and a woman). At any rate, a lawyer is probably mandatory.	I think your confusion stems from assuming there is a universal definition of "minor" across laws, jurisdictions, and rights. 18 is the age of majority for the purpose of voting (26th Amendment), the death penalty, labor law (although age 14 is the minimum age for employment), and many other laws. But, 21 is the age required to buy alcohol in all states (by their own choice in order to receive highway funding). Nothing requires the age of majority to be consistent across different sections of code or statute or between jurisdictions (except when constitutionally prescribed, like voting age, or minimum age for certain elected offices). There are many counties that prohibit purchase of alcohol at any age. The age of consent varies between 14 and 18 across US states. Age 65 is a threshold for certain tax credits. You need to be 25 in order to be a member of the US House of Representatives, 30 to be a Senator, 35 to be President. You are only protected from age discrimination if you are 40 or older. Here is a rough list of various age-based thresholds for various rights, privileges, or responsibilities in the US. (I havn't vetted this whole list, and some are clearly satire, but the ones I know about are consistent with my understanding.)	Has it ever been formally established that giving any group, X, a priority of credulity in court over any other group, Y, would amount to granting the group X a title of nobility? No. This has never been formally established. In the 100 years between the ratification of the US Constitution and "Coffins v US", were there any laws or court decisions which would give any groups de facto nobility over other groups by demanding that their accusations against some other groups must be assumed (if formally stated) true until proven false? Effectively so. For example, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor works that way and that have been classes of people who have been historically not eligible to serve as witnesses. There are also many procedural circumstances historically (e.g. confessions of judgment) that operate in this manner. Did the argument that this amounted to granting of titles of nobility (which was prohibited) ever come up in any court cases? No.* The core litmus test under the title of nobility prohibition has been that a privilege granted by the government is hereditary and is not simply ordinary property. Without a hereditary component, the title of nobility prohibition does not apply. A lengthy analysis of this jurisprudence can be found in the answer to the Law.SE question "What exactly is a title of nobility?" While this question isn't a true duplicate of that one, the pertinent legal authorities are all discussed in the answers to that question. Obviously, it isn't possible to know every legal argument that was made orally in a trial court or legal brief for all of the United States for all time by everyone and anyone, often leaving no historical record whatsoever. There are no recorded appellate court opinions of which I am aware, however, that engage with this legal argument and rule upon it (which is usually what someone really means when they say "did this argument ever come up in a court case"). Post-Script This post also confounds a "presumption of guilt" with a per se rule regarding credibility determinations, but while both go to the issue of how evidence is evaluated by a tribunal, the two concepts otherwise have nothing in common, and sometimes it isn't clear which is which. For example, in many U.S. jurisdictions, a marriage certificate in existence at the time someone is born, accompanied by the passage of time under a short (often five year) statute of limitations, conclusively prevails on issues of paternity, over a DNA test that is 99.999% certain to be correct as a matter of genetics. You could interpret that as meaning that marriage clerks are always more credible than genetic scientists. But, of course, that isn't really the intent. Instead, this is effectively a substantive rule of law couched as an evidence rule. Similarly, the requirement that real property can only be conveyed in writing could be interpreted as an evidence rule, but it is more realistically viewed as a rule concerning the definition of what a transfer of real property really is that is useful to make a bright line rule. Thus, an oral statement can be a promise to transfer real property, but it doesn't really happen until there is a signed deed or other conveyance. A traffic ticket basically has a presumption of guilt in some jurisdictions, because if you fail to appear you are found guilty in absentia even without evidence, something that is not permitted as a matter of criminal procedure in the U.S. for more serious offenses for which you can be incarcerated. But, on the other hand, if you do appear, the prosecution has the burden of proving that you committed the offense alleged in the ticket. Perhaps the closest example there is to a presumption of guilt (either rebuttable or conclusive, depending upon the statute and facts) is a statutory rape law, which in theory, presumes that someone under a certain age does not have the capacity to consent to intercourse, rendering the offense rape. But, a more straightforward way of understanding those laws is that sex with a minor in the circumstances described is itself illegal without regard to any conclusive presumption of lack of consent. There are also many laws prohibiting certain people from testifying about certain matters in certain circumstances. For example, spouses may not testify against each other in court over a spouse's objection in many kinds of cases. These rights are called "privileges" and are not considered to be titles of nobility. The U.S. Code of Military Justice, intentionally allocates legal rights in these quasi-criminal proceedings in a manner that treats people with different military ranks unequally. Officers have different legal rights than enlisted soldiers, for example. But, since military offices are not hereditary, these rights are not titles of nobility.	Amendments to the US Constitution are part of the US Constitution, and this includes the so-called Bill of Rights. The doctrine of applying parts of the US Constitution to states, known as incorporation, comes from the 14th amendment: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The scope of the doctrine of incorporation is logically limited to amendments because the original articles of the constitution state how the federal government is run, and does not guarantee any rights or privileges to individuals. Amendments 1,2,4,8 are fully incorporated against states, 5 and 6 are partially incorporated, third and 7th are not incorporated, and for 9th and 10th there is no ruling. This arrangement derives from decisions by the Supreme Court, interpreting the 14th Amendment and the concept of "due process". If a state were to passe a law forbidding criticism of the governor (violating the First Amendment), an individual could sue to have the law found unconstitutional. Because, under the 14th Amendment, "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article", Congress can and has passed a law prohibiting violation of civil rights: 42 USC 1983. Since the state in this hypothetical scenario has violated federal law, the federal government (Dept. of Justice) has standing to sue the state for violating federal law.	not in germany Germany has laws about founding, operating and financing political parties, the Parteiengesetz which demands certain organisatorial structures, and the Parteifinanzierungsgesetz, which is very explicit about how they can finance themselves and what a party needs to report. The only allowed gains are property proceeds (like from owning property or selling goods), membership fees, gifts to the party, and state sponsorship. Also, non-citizens are not allowed to give to a party unlimitedly. The parties also are also obligated under the basic law to report all financing they get, down to the cent. Their organisation form is strictly limited: Parteien sind frei gebildete Personenvereinigungen im Sinne des Artikels 9 Absatz 1 GG, die sich auf der Basis des privaten Rechts nach den vereinsrechtlichen Regelungen des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (§§ 21 bis 79 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB) gründen. Sie sind in der Regel nicht rechtsfähige Vereine This precludes them from being Aktiengesellschaften: they have to be organizations of people (Personenvereinigungen) that follow the BGB, and thus are not allowed to organize as an AG under the Aktiengesetz, which demands that an AG to not be an organization of people. So, a party can't be a stock company, and selling stock in a political party in Germany is not allowed under the framework and is thus neither possible nor legal.	It's saying if part of the contract is found to be void or unenforceable, that the rest of it is still a contract. It's called severability.
At what point does "peaceably" in the First Amendment not apply with regard to unlawful assembly? Background In some U.S. States such as New York, there are laws against unlawful assembly like the law described below: 240.10 Unlawful assembly. A person is guilty of unlawful assembly when he assembles with four or more other persons for the purpose of engaging or preparing to engage with them in tumultuous and violent conduct likely to cause public alarm, or when, being present at an assembly which either has or develops such purpose, he remains there with intent to advance that purpose. Unlawful assembly is a class B misdemeanor. I can see how committing the crimes themselves are, from the view of a common person like me, illegal. But simply assembly seems to push a grey area of the first amendment of the United States Constitution: Amendment I Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. At what point does "peaceably" not apply to an assembly? Maybe in the "clearly comitting a crime" situation I stated above may cross that line. But specifying which kind of speech is threatening would then require dealing with another grey area of the first amendment: abridging freedom of speech. It is this unclear area of assembly that has primed me to ask the question: Question At what point is "peaceably" no longer applicable to an assembly with regard to the "unlawful assembly" laws in the United states?	Overview, reasonable judgement As with the frequently used standard, the "reasonable person", whether an assembly is "peaceable" or not is a question of judgement. In some cases it is clear. A group throwing stones and Molotov Cocktails at a group of opponents, or at the police, is not acting "peaceably". What about a group holding signs and chanting "No Justice, no Peace"? Calmly singing 'We Shall Overcome"? In short, there is no bright-line separating "peaceable" from not. It is not like a trespassing case where one either did or did not cross a boundary, or a speeding case where one did or did not go faster than the limit. There are, however, an number of fact patterns in which assembled protesters have been held not to have justified arrest, and various other circumstances in which dispersal and arrests have been held justified. See the cases below. Each person must use judgement as to whether a group's actions are "peaceable" when deciding whether to join or remain a part of such a group. A police official must make a similar judgement when ordering a group to disperse. Later, a court may have to make a similar judgement when deciding whether someone accused of "riot" or "disorderly conduct" was within his or her constitutional rights, or if a police officer acted unconstitutionally. The circumstances and the details of the actions will matter. The right of assembly, like the right of speech is subject to "time, place, and manner" restrictions, so long as such restrictions are content-neutral. See this page from teh Library of Congress To be clear, a police officer's judgement does not make a group's actions constitutional or criminal, that decision is for a court. But an officer must make an on-the-spot judgment as to whether, and if so how, to react to the group's actions. If the court later finds the officer's actions reasonable in light of the specific events and circumstances, it may treat the officer differently than if it finds the LEO actions unreasonable. But my point above was that everyone involved had to make judgements, and that the law expects everyone to act in a "reasonable" manner, and there may be consequences later for those held not to have done so. Selected Cases Shuttlesworth In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) The US Supreme Court dealt with a case involvign a civil rights protest march. Justice Stewart described the events as follows in the majority opinion: On the afternoon of April 12, Good Friday, 1963, 52 people, all Negroes, were led out of a Birmingham church by three Negro ministers, one of whom was the petitioner, Fred L. Shuttlesworth. They walked in orderly fashion, two abreast for the most part, for four blocks. The purpose of their march was to protest the alleged denial of civil rights to Negroes in the city of Birmingham. The marchers stayed on the sidewalks except at street intersections, and they did not interfere with other pedestrians. No automobiles were obstructed, nor were traffic signals disobeyed. The petitioner was with the group for at least part of this time, walking alongside the others, and once moving from the front to the rear. As the marchers moved along, a crowd of spectators fell in behind them at a distance. The spectators at some points spilled out into the street, but the street was not blocked and vehicles were not obstructed. At the end of four blocks, the marchers were stopped by the Birmingham police, and were arrested for violating § 1159 of the General Code of Birmingham. The opinion went on to say: There can be no doubt that the Birmingham ordinance, as it was written, conferred upon the City Commission virtually unbridled and absolute power to prohibit any "parade," "procession," [Footnote 1] or "demonstration" on the city's streets or public ways. ... This ordinance as it was written, therefore, fell squarely within the ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional. ... It is argued, however, that what was involved here was not "pure speech," but the use of public streets and sidewalks, over which a municipality must rightfully exercise a great deal of control in the interest of traffic regulation and public safety. That, of course, is true. We have emphasized before this that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments [do not] afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 ... But our decisions have also made clear that picketing and parading may nonetheless constitute methods of expression, entitled to First Amendment protection. Cox v. Louisiana, supra; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88. The Court overturned the conviction of Shuttlesworth. It did not deal with the peacefulness of the march, except in the above quoted description of events, no allegation of violence was made, only of lack of a permit (which had been applied for and refused, with an indication that no permit would ever be granted to that group.) Ward In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) The Copurt held that: even in a public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. (Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U. S. 288) Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests, but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. Ward was a Speech (music) case, not an assembly case, but the standard from Ward has also been applied in assembly cases. Jones Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2006) was a right-of-assembly case. In it, people were accused of violating the very law (NYS 240.10) mentioned in the question, as well as other NY State laws, including disorderly conduct. The events described produced a whole series of court decisions. The linked opinion is from the US 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, not the Supreme Court, but it reviews and quotes many relevant SC rulings. The linked opinion is actually on a claim by various law-enforcement officers (LEOs) for qualified immunity in a suit by people arrested. When it was brought, the various charges against those arrested had already been dismissed or found to be without merit. The Court of Appeals opinion says, in relevant part: The Supreme Court has declared that the First Amendment protects political demonstrations and protests — activities at the heart of what the Bill of Rights was designed to safeguard. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 ... Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that police may not interfere with orderly, nonviolent protests merely because they disagree with the content of the speech or because they simply fear possible disorder. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 ... First Amendment protections, while broad, are not absolute. Regan v. Boogertman, 984 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1993) It is axiomatic, for instance, that government officials may stop or disperse public demonstrations or protests where "clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, (1940). Indeed, where a public gathering threatened to escalate into racial violence and members of a hostile crowd began voicing physical threats, the Supreme Court expressly sanctioned police action that ended the demonstration and arrested the speaker, who defied police orders to cease and desist. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 ... the Supreme Court has long applied the "clear and present danger" test to protest cases to determine when police interference is constitutional. Moreover, although defendants make much of the fact that some demonstrators had allegedly violated the law, transforming the peaceful demonstration into a potentially disruptive one, the Supreme Court has expressly held that " [t]he right to associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of the group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected." NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 ... The Supreme Court has already ... made clear that the police may not interfere with demonstrations unless there is a "clear and present danger" of riot, imminent violence, interference with traffic or other immediate threat to public safety. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308-309 (finding no imminent violence where anti-Catholic diatribe angered listener and provoked suggestion of violence). Neither energetic, even raucous, protesters who annoy or anger audiences, nor demonstrations that slow traffic or inconvenience pedestrians, justify police stopping or interrupting a public protest. Cox I, 379 U.S. at 546-47, 549 n. 12 (group of protesters who provoked a visceral, angered response and slowed traffic did not jeopardize their speech rights); Edwards, 372 U.S. at 232, 237 ("clear and present danger" means more than annoyance, inviting dispute or slowing traffic). ... Plaintiffs also allege that they made no threats of physical harm to police or members of the public, did not incite violence or disorder and displayed no dangerous weapons. ... We are mindful that the First Amendment does not insulate individuals from criminal sanction merely because they are simultaneously engaged in expressive activity. Section 240.10 of the [NY] Penal Law states that four or more persons assembled for purposes of engaging in violent and tumultuous conduct likely to cause public alarm constitutes an unlawful assemblage. N.Y. Penal Law § 240.10. Conviction under this law requires "an incitement which is both directed towards and likely to produce imminent violent and tumultuous conduct." Jones, 2005 WL 928667 ... New York courts have interpreted [N.Y. Penal Law § 240.20(5) (disorderly conduct)] to permit punishment only where the conduct at issue does more than merely inconvenience pedestrian or vehicular traffic. People v. Pearl, 66 Misc.2d 502, 321 N.Y.S.2d 986, 987 (1st Dep't 1971) ("Something more than the temporary inconvenience caused to pedestrians by the demonstrators' blocking of the west crosswalk, requiring them to enter the roadway to get to the other side, was required to sustain a conviction for obstructing pedestrian traffic."); [P]laintiffs had an undeniable right to continue their peaceable protest activities, even when some in the demonstration might have transgressed the law. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 908. Plaintiffs still enjoyed First Amendment protection, and absent imminent harm, the troopers could not simply disperse them without giving fair warning. *City of Chicago v. Morales-, 527 U.S. 41, 58 ("[T]he purpose of the fair notice requirement [in disorderly conduct statutes] is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law."); Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321, 71 S. Ct. 303 (finding no First Amendment violation where imminence of disorder was "coupled with petitioner's deliberate defiance of the police" and their orders to disperse) Specific actions Actions that have been held to be permitted as part of a protest or assembly, not justifying police intervention, include: walking in orderly fashion, remaining on the sidewalks except at street intersections, not interfering with other pedestrians or traffic; picketing and parading, even without; a permit when a permit has been improperly denied; orderly, nonviolent protests; A diatribe that angered listeners and provoked suggestion of violence; Energetic, even raucous, protesters who annoy or anger audiences' Demonstrations that slow traffic or inconvenience pedestrians; Peaceable protest activities, even when some in the demonstration might have transgressed the law; Actions that have been held not to be protected thus justifying police intervention, include: Violating a regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech that is narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests; Demonstrations or protests where "clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears." Where a public gathering threatened to escalate into racial violence and members of a hostile crowd began voicing physical threats; Defying appropriate police orders to cease and desist; Makin threats of physical harm to police or members of the public; Inciting violence or disorder with a direct appeal to imminent lawless action; Imminent disorder when coupled with petitioner's deliberate defiance of the police and their orders to disperse; Summary While there is no single bright line rule on what constitutes "peaceable assembly", the test for the "clear and present danger" of violence or lawless action seems to come closest. In mot cases police must unless there is an immediate prospect of harm, order an assembly to disperse and give them a reasonable chance to do so before making arrests, particularly forceful arrests. Failure to do so may subject LEOs to personal civil liability.	Trivially, yes The First Amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791. Every time there has been a dispute about what it means that has gone to court since then, the judgement of that court has established, overturned or clarified precedent - that's what common law courts do. The government can limit your speech The Supreme Court has recognized categories of speech which receive lesser or no protection from the First Amendment. For example, inciting lawless actions, fighting words, true threats, obscenity, child pornography etc. They have also determined that it doesn't limit the government's power to impose reasonable time, place or manner restrictions on speech. As Justice Holmes put it in Schenck v. United States (1918), "Even the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing panic." It applies to parts of government which derive their power from Congress Which is, in most cases, all government. The executive actually has surprisingly little power granted by the Constitution (Article II, Section 2). All the other powers of the executive are technically delegated powers of Congress and are therefore subject to the First Amendment. Similarly, only the Supreme Court draws its mandate without going through Congress Article III, Section 1) - all other courts are subject to First Amendment restrictions. It only restricts government The limitation is a negative one on the US Congress (and through incorporation, the states). It does not, of itself, restrict private actors who are free to restrict speech however they want within their own property, including both physical and online spaces. It is open to the government to enact laws that would extend an affirmative right to free speech onto non-state actors (see Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins (1980)), however, the Federal government has not done so and neither have most states.	Law The origin of the phrase is from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). It specifically rules on the limitation of freedom of speech (first amendment): The original ruling is this: The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. As pointed out by @phoog, this does not saying anything about the lawfullness of shouting "fire", it says that if your speech creates a clear and present danger, the first amendment will not protect you, even if the danger does not result in actual harm. Commentary If these instances are correct then it would seem clear that Freedom of Speech is being honored as it's the result of speech, not the speech itself, that could be an offense. You seem to think that it should be illegal, but only if it results in a panic that endangers people. If people ignore you, you think it should be protected by your first amendment rights. That's not how the law works. The law tries, among other things. To establish norms for human behaviour. For example, you will be punished for driving an automobile while intoxicated, even of this does not result in you running over somebody. In the words of the supreme court: If your actions "are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger", the congress has the right to prevent you from doing so, despite the first amendment.	Impeachment In addition to the Constitutional qualifications, one may become ineligible to federal office by being impeached by the House, convicted and removed from office by the Senate, and having the Senate add the "disqualification" term to the sentence. This is surely something done by the legislature but it is not done by passing a law. Criminal Conviction One may also become ineligible by being convicted of treason or insurrection, and possibly other relevant federal offenses. Specific Laws Specifically 18 U.S. Code § 2381 provides that: Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. (emphasis added) 18 USC §2383 provides that: Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. (emphasis added) 18 USC §2385 (originally passed as the Smith Act)provides in relevant part that: Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; or Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof— Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction. If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction. (emphasis added) 18 USC §2387 provides in relevant part that: (a) Whoever, with intent to interfere with, impair, or influence the loyalty, morale, or discipline of the military or naval forces of the United States: (a) (1) advises, counsels, urges, or in any manner causes or attempts to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the military or naval forces of the United States; or (a) (2) distributes or attempts to distribute any written or printed matter which advises, counsels, or urges insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the military or naval forces of the United States— Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction. (emphasis added) (See also Chapter 115 which collects these and related sections of title 18.) (See also the Wikipedia article) (See further "A Civilian's Guide to Insurrection Legalese" from The Marshall Project.) Case law In United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 470 (1807) Chief Justice Marshall wrote an opinion overturning the conviction of Aaron Burr, because Burr was not actually present at the overt act proved, as charged in the indictment. In Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945) a conviction for treason was overturend because the court held the "overt acts ... as proved were insufficient to support a finding that the accused had given aid and comfort to the enemy" Possible Future laws While treason is defined (or more exactly limited) by the constitution (Article III section 3), nothing in the constitutional provision requires or specifically authorizes that the penalty include ineligibility to office. (It merely says "The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason".) There is no specific Constitutional authorization for 18 USC 2383, 2385, or 2387, or their penalty sections beyond the general authority of Congress to pass laws and define crimes and their penalties. I am not certain that "employment" in 2385 and 2387 includes elective office, but I suspect it does. 2383 clearly includes elective office. Thus Congress has passed laws, with no specific constitution authorization, that deny people, as punishment for relevant crimes, eligibility to office or employment under the United States. What Congress has done in one case, it could do in another, if it saw fit. Congress could pass a law creating a new offense, or modifying an existing offense, to add the penalty of disqualification. But the Constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws would mean that such a law would not apply to conduct that occurred before the law was passed or amended. Conviction required Congress may not declare a person guilty of a particular crime; that would be a bill of attainder, which is also specifically prohibited in the Constitution. A criminal conviction by a court is required to trigger the ineligibility provisions of sections 2381, 2383, 2385, 2387, or any similar law. Fourteenth Amendment Section 3 of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution reads: No Person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. This forms another ground whereby an individual can be barred from some federal and state offices, but it is not one that can be invoked by Congress for specific people by name. Indeed it is not clear how it can currently be invoked. This provision requires a judicial determination that it applies to a specific person. From 1868 to 1872 there was a law in force for this purpose, but in 1872 Congress granted a broad amnesty which exempted most of those who would otherwise have been subject to this provision because of the US Civil War, and the law was soon repealed. In the wake of the events of 6 Jan 2021 several bills have been introduced to create ma new enforcement mechanism for this provision. To the best of my knowledge, none have yet been passed into law. See "The 14th Amendment’s Disqualification Provision and the Events of Jan. 6" for so9em relevant details and background. That article also says: Section 3 is different from a disqualification from federal office imposed as a sentence for an impeachment conviction. A disqualification sentence from the Senate is final and not, for all intents and purposes, subject to judicial review. By contrast, Congress cannot simply declare an official outside of that body ineligible under Section 3 without the concurrence of the courts. To hold otherwise would allow simple majorities in Congress to oust federal and state officials without judicial scrutiny ...	It's less that the first amendment does not apply to minors and more that the first amendment does not apply to the parents' conduct. The first amendment to the U.S. constitution reads (emphasis added): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Thus the first amendment applies to the conduct of the federal government (and has its reach extended to state governments through Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)). The parents' conduct, while perhaps objectionable morally, does not violate the children's rights under the first amendment, as they are neither the state nor the federal government.	Sometimes rights conflict with each other, and the courts decide which right takes priority. The Sixth Amendment provides that a defendant is entitled to "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor". The Fifth Amendment says "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". And the First Amendment gives the right to free speech, which includes the right to not be compelled to speak. If you're on trial and try to get someone else to confess on the stand, his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination trumps your Sixth Amendment right to have him testify. But if he couldn't take the fifth (for example, if he had already been acquitted), your Sixth Amendment right would override his First Amendment right to free speech.	An anti-BDS law may be invalid in some circumstances, but this has nothing to do with the establishment clause of the First Amendment. Boycotting or not boycotting Israel is not an inherently religious question and isn't justified as such. More often the issues will be pre-emption by a higher level of government's laws, lack of legal authority to enact such a law under an authorizing statute, or possible the "dormant commerce clause." The linked material in the OP refers to the First Amendment freedom of association and possible the First Amendment freedom to petition, not to the establishment clause.	The NYT article implies that she has used social media in the past to get her victims to believe her fake back story. She is being released from detention, and the restriction on her using social media is not tied to her expressing a particular viewpoint. Courts have repeatedly held that the Government can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest ( U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 US 367 - Supreme Court 1968). One such compelling interest is the effective administration of criminal justice (U.S. v. Spilotro, 786 F. 2d 808 - Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit 1986). For instance, speech restrictions can be tied to the purpose of preventing a defendant from committing further crimes while released.
What does "reasonable grounds" mean in this Victorian Law? In Victoria Australia, this piece of legislation exists: PARLIAMENTARY PRECINCTS ACT 2001 - SECT 16 An authorised officer may direct a person to leave or not to enter the Parliamentary precincts if the authorised officer believes on reasonable grounds that the direction is necessary for the good order and security of the Parliamentary precincts. My question is, under Victorian or relevant Australian law, what constitutes "reasonable grounds" and what does "good order" mean? My other question is, can this law be used in a preemptive manner in that an "authorised officer" may give directions based on the past behaviour of the directee in unrelated circumstances outside of parliamentary grounds?	It has a common meaning across Australia “Reasonable grounds” requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind (e.g. belief, suspicion) in a reasonable person (George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; Walsh v Loughnan [1991] 2 VR 351). So, the officer must have the state of mind "that the direction is necessary for the good order and security of the Parliamentary precincts" and that a reasonable person in their position would also have arrived at that state of mind. “Good order” means able to function normally. The directive can clearly be preemptive because the instruction can be to "not enter".	Is it illegal to open carry Hinged Handcuffs? england-and-wales No, but there use may constitute an assault or false imprisonment if one cannot justify their application was reasonable, proportionate and necessary in the circumstances. A civilian can lawfully use reasonable force if the conditions of s.3 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 are met: (1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.	It refers to whoever the judge reasonably says it refers to. The referent of that specific clause N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(b)(6) is not analyzed in any court ruling that I have been able to locate, but case law such as State v. Krueger, 241 N.J. Super. 244 has addressed other discretionary provisions of the statute, and has upheld the propriety of such discretionary acts as ordering restitution "as long as (1) there is a reasonable relationship between the restitution and the defendant’s rehabilitation, and (2) there is a factual underpinning supportive of the restitution". The court concludes that we are entirely satisfied that the debarment was reasonably designed to “assist” defendant in “leading] a law-abiding life” and was thus permitted under N.J.S.A. 2C:45-la....The condition of probation was substantially related to an appropriate penological and rehabilitative objective followed by numerous citations.	The segment of the video I watched is wrong or misleading in several ways. The speaker apparently claimed to be performing a "citizen's arrest" on a police officer on the basis of s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986. The question above also talks about s.26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2013, which deals with an offence of improperly exercising the powers of a constable. Somebody who is not a police officer is allowed to arrest somebody else without a warrant only under tightly defined circumstances. These are given in s.24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (inserted by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005). The elements include that the offence be indictable, which does not mean as claimed in the video that "you can get sent to prison for it", but refers to the mode of trial. Some summary offences are imprisonable. Since the offence under s.5 of the 1986 Act is a summary one, rather than indictable, we fall at the first hurdle. A further qualifiction is that this power of arrest can only be exercised if the person believes it would be impractical for a constable to do it instead, and that the arrest is necessary to stop the arrestee from escaping, hurting themselves or someone else, or damaging property. In the video, the police officer does not look like he is doing any of those things, and there is another officer right next to him. Thus it would be hard to argue that there are reasonable grounds for arresting the officer in this way. Also, while members of the public may object to the conduct of police officers, that does not always amount to an offence under s.26 of the 2013 Act. The offence there is about corruption, exercising the powers of a constable for personal benefit. That personal element does not seem to be shown in the video. There are some other mistakes in the part I watched. A lawful arrest cannot be effected just by using the words "I am arresting you". The arrestor has to take or imply some directive action as well, or else there is no arrest at all: just two people continuing to stand awkwardly. This also goes to the point about needing to stop the arrestee from causing injury (etc.) - if you aren't actually taking steps to restrain them then you can't say you're preventing the harm. The point of the provision is to take the fact of an arrest (I am stopping you from getting away) and make it a legal arrest; it can't conjure up an arrest where none exists. In a citizen's arrest there is no need to give a warning about "anything you say may be used against you" or whatever. This is applicable to the police when they are questioning suspects, which is not what is happening here. Indeed, while the police can arrest somebody without warrant because they want to investigate whether they've committed a crime, a regular person can't. Although there is a statutory requirement to tell somebody why they've been arrested, coming from ECHR as well as domestic common-law principles, the police are not expected to cite the law with precision. It's OK to say "I'm arresting you for selling heroin" rather than "I am arresting you because I have reasonable grounds to suspect you of supplying a controlled substance to another without lawful authorisation, contrary to section 7 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971". While there are more rules that kick in during pre-charge detention or questioning, the law recognizes that the operational circumstances of an arrest make a briefer explanation more appropriate. Indeed, more formal language would defeat the point of the rule, which is that the arrestee should know what's going on. "You can only arrest a cop for an indictable offence" is not quite right. You (a non-constable) can only lawfully arrest anyone for such an offence, and if the other conditions are met. A constable can be arrested for any kind of offence: there's no special immunity for summary offences. As to the general question of "How can one arrest a police officer?", the usual way is to become a police officer yourself. Almost all arrests, especially those involving police misconduct, are done by the police. For corruption it is likely that an arrest would be made after a long investigation and after the issue of a warrant, rather than on the spur of the moment. As a normal person, wilfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty is an offence (Police Act 1996, s.89), and affecting an arrest may amount to assault on the officer. That does not make it impossible to arrest an officer in this way, just fraught with future difficulty.	You are responsible It is unlikely that the arrangement you had with the sitter amounts to a contract. Even though there was consideration on both sides, at first blush it seems unlikely that both of you intended to create legal relations. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? Notwithstanding, if there is a contract it is silent on who is responsible to for injury to the pet so it would fall back on the law of negligence anyway. For the sitter to be responsible, she must have been negligent. She wasn't. See Is there liability for pure accidents? Looking at the elements: a duty to the plaintiff, such a aduty probably exists. breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), she didn't (see below). the plaintiff must have suffered actual harm, no question that you have. the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of that harm, and that harm was foreseeable, probably it wasn't (see below). Here are the facts: She took the dog on public transport - not unreasonable, many people do. The fact that you wouldn't is irrelevant since you did not communicate this prohibition to the sitter. She took it to an off-leash park - not unreasonable, that's what they are for. She rode an escalator - it is unclear if she carried the dog or expected the dog to ride the escalator itself. The first is clearly reasonable, the second may or may not be depending on the size of the dog etc. She noted the injury and had it treated - eminentely reasonable. So, in general, she has acted as a reasonable person would. It is also far from clear to me how any of the decisions made would result in foreseeable harm to the dog. Remembering that the standard is would a reasonable person foresee that there was a risk of harm barring extraordinary circumstances. By the way, the legal reasoning is exactly the same if you had entrusted her with your child or your car.	(I am not your lawyer. I am not here to help you. If you are reading this because someone has died, please stop and instead read the Scottish Courts and Tribunals guide to dealing with a deceased's estate in Scotland, or contact a solicitor.) Yes, in general. Section 1 of the Wills Act 1963, which is in force in Scotland, specifies that "[a] will shall be treated as properly executed if its execution conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed." Furthermore, Section 4 states that "[t]he construction of a will shall not be altered by reason of any change in the testator’s domicile after the execution of the will." "Construction" here refers to interpreting the language and effect of the will. So if the will was validly executed in England, it should also be in force in Scotland, and a Scottish court will give it the same meaning it would have had under English law. Furthermore, the same rule of validity seems to apply in both England and Scotland: Wills Act 1837 section 9. There may be other Scottish laws affecting the disposition of the estate that differ from English law. Relevant statutes include Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, section 21A, which seems consistent with Wills Act 1963. (I am trained in U.S. rather than English or Scottish law; I'm trusting the accuracy of the UK's excellent online legislation archive for the proposition that the statutes cited are in force in Scotland. I haven't checked the case law for contrary interpretations.)	Because HRA1998 says so, but it's not an absolute limit and is subject to discretion by the court: (1)A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may— (a)bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or (b)rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings,but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act. (5)Proceedings under subsection (1)(a) must be brought before the end of— (a)the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of took place; or (b)such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances,but that is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the procedure in question.	In case there is no way of knowing, thus no way to sue, would this seem like a loophole that practically abolishes the 4th amendment ? The 4th amendment only means that the officer needs a probable cause/reasonable suspicion to detain you. It absolutely does not mean that he has to tell you what that is. In fact, not telling you what the probable cause is is often a part of the officer's job because, if you are indeed a perpetrator, letting you know what the suspicions are could make you do things that would allow you to escape justice. There is certainly always a way to sue i.e. file a lawsuit, for which you do not need to know what the probable cause was. Instead, you contend that there was not any. And from this point the officer has to tell the court what it was, if any. If he fails to provide one, you win and get redressed for harassment — this is how your 4th amendment rights work. If he does provide a good probable cause, you lose because in this case you either: actually did something suspicious and knew there was a probable cause; OR jumped to the conclusion that the officer harassed you when he was simply doing his job.
In court can you ask someone for all names they go by? How would question be phrased? In a hearing the plaintiff has reason to believe that the defendant may have some type of pseudonym or sometimes use a variations of his name (like going by his middle name and leaving out the first). What questions can the plaintiff put to the defendant to find the full enumeration of all of his names? I don't even know what some types of names are called, like "Catholic Confirmation Name". Must the defendant answer, or could a judge decide if this is relevant? It could make a difference to evidence, for example if a letter was directed to "Joe Blow" but the defendants legal name is "Jim Joe" but they are one in the same person.	This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer.	You're only required to show up for a settlement conference. You're not required to do or say anything at the conference. Nothing you say or do or fail to say or do can be used at trial, and every that happens there is kept strictly confidential. The judge is there just to give advice to both parties and for procedural reasons. The judge will not order you to respond to any questions the defence may have. From "Important Information About Your Settlement Conference" by the Superior Court of Justice, Office of the Chief Justice: A settlement conference is an informal, confidential meeting between the parties in the presence of a judicial officer (a judge or deputy judge). The judicial officer at your settlement conference will not be the judge at your trial. You may feel free to discuss your case openly at your settlement conference. What you say cannot be repeated at trial. Your discussions at a settlement conference are strictly confidential, and will remain so. Unless you consent, the matters discussed at the settlement conference, and during any negotiations, shall not be disclosed to anyone. You must never mention the settlement conference during the actual trial. Note that normally there is no discovery process in Ontario Small Claims Court, but there is one exception. The judge at a settlement conference can make an order requiring you to produce documents, but this will only be for documents that you yourself would want to provide as evidence at trial and have failed to provide to the defence as required before the settlement conference. Unless you have some document listing your employment that you would need to rely on to win your case, you won't be required to provide anything to the defence that would reveal where you work.	How are such no-show-no-tell boundaries established They largely stem from the rules of evidence which are complicated, vary from state to state and knowing which is a big part of what litigation attorneys are paid for. Parties to litigation become aware of all the evidence/topics that their counterparts wish to broach in the courtroom well in advance — during discovery. They will usually disagree whether some bits and pieces can be presented to the jury. In this case the court will hold admissibility hearings — again, well in advance before the trial. Despite all the preparations, some of these disagreements arise during the trial, and then they are resolved in place by way of voiced objections. The attorneys and the judge talk about them using professional jargon of the rules of evidence — having themselves seen all the evidence in advance. does the jury get to know them No, the jury doesn't need to follow the professional talk. In fact, they should hear as little as possible of it — which is the reason why admissibility disagreements are resolved in advance as much as possible. If serious issues arise during the trial, the judge will ask the attorneys to speak to them in chambers — away from the jury. Or they will ask the jury to take a break while the professionals talk. The jury just needs to listen to the evidence that is allowed in, and disregard any evidence the judge say they have to. is this also in the public record somehow? It is in the court record. It may be accessible to the public if the court allows. If someone wishes to see the record they need to apply to the court, provide reasons and a judge will decide if anything can be released.	Is this normal? Pretty much. Witnesses lie in court all the time (in my experience, defendants, law enforcement officers and medical doctors are the most likely to lie). Dealing with a witness who lies in court under oath effectively is one of the most challenging tasks lawyers face. It is an inherently challenging hurdle to proving or defending a case. The facts as presented in court often differ in some material way from reality. It is a pretty tough thing to accurately measure, but my gut estimate would be that this happens in a least 30%-40% of cases that produce contested trials, although not infrequently, a judge or jury will not find the false testimony to be credible. On the other hand, it isn't at all uncommon (probably at least 10% of the time) for a judge or jury to believe the liars to be telling the truth, and to find the people who are telling the truth to be less credible. There is absolute immunity from civil liability for lying in court testimony, although it could, in theory, give rise to contempt of court sanctions from the judge in some circumstances, or to a prosecution for perjury. But, perjury prosecutions are, in practice, very rare, and a good share of them arise from false statements made in documents under oath, rather than from courtroom testimony. There is probably less than 1 perjury prosecution per 1000 provable lies made under oath in courtroom testimony on material issues that end up influencing the outcome in a case. I totally sympathize with how frustrating this situation is having been there in cases that I am litigating many, many times. But, in short, life isn't fair.	If no one objects to a leading question, then the judge does nothing. A judge does not generally pro-actively police the rules of evidence at trial. Also, there are circumstances when a judge has discretion to allow a leading question even when it wouldn't ordinarily be allowed to move the trial along on largely undisputed points or to allow in inarticulate witness to testify. The exception to judicial passivity in the absence of an objection at trial is "plain error" that is not "harmless error", which a judge has a duty to prevent or address even if no objection is raised by a party. But, offering a leading question when one is not allowed by the rules of evidence almost never constitutes plain error, and would almost always be considered "harmless error" even if it was objected to and the judge ruled incorrectly, unless the use of improper leading questions was pervasive and there was a contemporaneous objection by counsel. For example, allowing a prospective juror to serve as a juror, despite that juror saying in the jury selection process that he can't be impartial because the defendant committed adultery with his spouse, because neither the prosecution or the defense attorney moves to strike the juror for cause, rather than striking that juror for cause of the court's own accord, is the kind of conduct that would often be considered "plain error" that is not "harmless error."	Names clearly are personal data and so a good question to ask for GDPR compliance is: Do you need to do what you want to do in order to offer your product or service? For your scenario a common answer seems to be that websites ask for the users first and last name during account creation. The reason is that they need this information to confirm the identity of the account creator. But the public profile only displays a user name that the user can pick freely. In general there is no good reason to publically show the legal names of users so websites don't do it. So for your website ask yourself, why do you want to publically show the names of your users? If you have a good reason to do that specify it in the user terms and go ahead. If you don't have a good reason don't do it.	Your ability to assert your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not limited to cases where you are on trial or have been accused of a crime. Your ability to assert that right is also not an absolute bar against being ordered to testify: if you are given immunity, you can be forced to testify. Alice cannot hold Bob in contempt – only the judge can. Bob can explain to the judge why a simple truthful "yes" or "no" answer is not possible, if he knows how to do that (does he understand the notion of a false presupposition, or unclarity?). He could for example assert truthfully that he does not understand the question (pointing to the distinction between "Charlie's body falling on the vase, causing it to fall and break", and "Charlie acting with apparent intent to break the vase", since it's not patently obvious that the former scenario constitutes "breaking the vase"). However (changing the scenario a bit), he has to understand that if the question is "Did Charlie shoot Delilah?" and the fact is that Ethan forced Charlie to shoot Delilah, saying "No" based on a theory of blame is not reasonably interpreted as truthful testimony. Taking the 5th, without setting forth your basis (not understanding the question) runs the risk that the prosecution will grant immunity from prosecution, and therefore you don't get to avoid answering the question. Immunity covers various things except that it does not cover prosecution for perjurious testimony. See US v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115: the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial for false swearing because, at the time he was granted immunity, the privilege would not have protected him against false testimony that he later might decide to give. Immunity is conferred under the control of some applicable statutory law, such as 18 USC 6002 which says that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.	In the case you link, this was given as an opening statement by the defense. Opening statements do not contain evidence. The defendant may or may not testify on their own behalf during the trial - this testimony, if given, counts as evidence, even if it is somewhat self-serving. And anything which tends to casts doubt as to the defendant's guilt is evidence that they didn't do it, even if it isn't proof. If there is reasonable doubt, then "he didn't do it" is not illogical. And it would seem unfair to allow the prosecution to say "he did it" but not allow the defense to say "no he didn't".
If you ask a police officer if something is illegal, can they lie? It's been established that police in the US have pretty broad discretion in terms of being permitted to lie. If you ask an on-duty police officer if something is legal, can they lie about that? I know there is a previous question that asked "Can the police lie about whether I am compelled to do something?" but I am asking "Can the police lie about whether I am permitted to do something?" For example, say you're visiting a state where you're unfamiliar with local laws, and by some strange coincidence there is someone giving marijuana samples, but there is also a police officer nearby. If you ask the officer, "Is it legal to have small amounts of marijuana here?" could the officer say "It's fine. Go for it!" but then arrest you anyway? Note, I do not use marijuana. That just seemed like the clearest example of something where laws vary greatly from state to state.	There is no clear rule on this matter, but there is a reasonable prospect for using an entrapment defense in this case, when deliberate deception is employed. There are two tests for entrapment: the subjective test and the objective test. The former focuses on the defendant's state of mind: whether the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime without law enforcement pressure. The latter is where the officer uses tactics that would induce a reasonable, law-abiding person to commit the crime. It depends in part whether the jurisdiction recognizes one of these defenses. An example of objective entrapment: "A reasonable, law-abiding person could be tempted into committing prostitution for a substantial sum of money like $10,000." Similarly, applicable to this question: A reasonable, law-abiding person could be tempted to undertake a pleasurable action having been assured that the action is actually legal. Where the subjective test applies: The fact of asking about the legality of an action is evidence that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime.	There are various ways in which a minor cannot assist a police investigation, and it might be useful to say in what ways any civilian could do so (TV shows notwithstanding). A civilian cannot conduct a custodial interrogation, nor can most of them gather physical evidence (so that a proper evidence log is maintained including relevant information on method of collection, the evidence isn't contaminated etc. – stuff that requires a modicum of training). They cannot execute a search warrant. On the other hand, anyone can provide information that is useful to the police, and it can be done without giving your name or indicating that you are a minor. A minor can serve as a witness at a trial, and it can be helpful to police to know that they have a witness to a crime. A minor can also be used the same way an adult is used, as a confidential informant. There is not a lot of data on that practice given the confidentiality of juvenile records, but there is an article to read ("Juvenile Police Informants: Friendship, Persuasion, and Pretense". The article does suggest that parental consent may be necessary in some cases (such as wearing a wire to a drug transaction). There is a law in Washington requiring every county's prosecutor to have a local protocol for using informants, and there should be guidelines developed by a work group, however the results (if any) of that group's meetings are not available on the internet. It is possible that there are specific restrictions on the use of minors as informants in some jurisdiction. The article explores the subtle distinction between "informant" and "friend", applied to minors. California has a law that limits the use of minors – none under 15, those above with approval of a judicial officer and parent, though those 13 and older can be used as bait in a cigarette or alcohol sales case. New York does not have a blanket prohibition against using a minor as an informant, but there may be relevant guidelines for a particular department.	There are certain situations where the law may require you to provide some information -- particularly when you've been pulled over for a traffic violation -- but it is typically limited to basic identifying information. Beyond that, it is legally advantageous to refuse to answer questions. If you are doing so, though, you should explicitly invoke your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and your Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Invoking the Fifth prevents the police from using your refusal to answer as evidence, and invoking the Sixth requires the police to stop asking you questions. It may, however, be practically disadvantageous to refuse to answer questions, as there are cops who are just looking for a reason to act like a psychopath.	"I have done nothing wrong" You got up in court and, when the judge asked if you had done anything wrong, you said: "yes" (guilty). So, in the eyes of the law, you are in the wrong. Police are entitled to make mistakes and, when they do, the accused can either accept the consequences of that mistake by pleading guilty and paying the penalty or they can defend themselves and show that the police made a mistake. Unfortunately, while you have a right to a defence, you don't have a right to a defence at no cost.	There is a lot of confusion over the difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause. They are not the same thing. Reasonable suspicion is any justifiable belief that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Probable cause requires an officer to have actual, tangible evidence that you have committed a crime. Only after probable cause has been established can an officer arrest you (with limited ability to search your immediate person and effects). Reasonable suspicion only requires some articulatable justification that you did something wrong. The police can detain you on reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you why. This is called a Terry stop (after Terry v. Ohio where the Supreme Court ruled this was legal). However, they can only detain you long enough to ascertain whether or not they have probable cause to arrest you. If after conducting a preliminary investigation they can't find probable cause to make an arrest, they have to let you go. In that video, we have a guy walking around in Texas with a shotgun and some shells. We never see what this guy looks like or how he's carrying himself, but he appears to be a troll. The cops received a call, so they investigated. They had all the reasonable suspicion they needed to detain him. Texas is an open carry state (a person can walk around openly with a gun), and it is not a stop-and-identify state (the police cannot demand that you ID yourself). Therefore the man did not break any laws. But neither did the police officers. They were doing their job by asking questions, and after failing to find any evidence, they let him go. If he had run before the officers had cleared him to leave, they could have chased him down and arrested him. That is, after all, what a detention is. You don't get to run away because you don't recognize a cop's authority to stop you. And fleeing a law enforcement officer is a crime. But you do have the right not to answer any questions, including (in some states) what your name is.	Being misunderstood is not a crime. You could concoct scenarios where any number of statements could be a crime if interpreted unfairly. "I went to Georgia last weekend." "I choose to believe you mean the country instead of the state, and you don't have a passport, therefore you admitted that you went to a foreign country illegally!" The police would be free to investigate, but they wouldn't be able to get a warrant or arrest him based just on an ambiguous statement, let alone obtain a conviction. Of course, if the younger sister decided to accuse him, and the older sister decided to lie about having a relationship with him, that puts the statement in a whole other context - but if someone is falsely accusing you and someone else corroborates their story, you're probably in trouble no matter how exactly that came about.	united-states Since "lying" is not a clearly-defined legal concept, we need to look at a specific kind of (non)statement. Some lies are plainly illegal, for instance saying in the context of a sale that "this column is made of pressure-treated lumber" when in fact it is make of sand and Elmer's glue is fraud. A receptionist being told to say "Mr. Smith is at a conference in New York" when he is actually drunk in Chicago is a legal lie. Now the question is, who can refuse to tell this lie (without suffering employment consequences), and on what grounds? Generally, in the US you can be ordered to tell such a legal lie as part of your employment duties. If I refuse, I can be fired. If you refuse, you can request a reasonable accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, since you proffer that your religion requires you to tell the truth / forbids you from telling a falsehood. If you make a claim for a religious accommodation, then the issue becomes whether there is a reasonable alternative. Such an accommodation might be that you instead say "Mr. Smith is not available"; or perhaps someone else who does not have a religious objection will be forced to act as receptionist for the day. This is specifically about religion. "I don't want to" or any similar idea does not provide protection against being fired. However, bear in mind that there is no official list of approved religions and their beliefs which the courts will refer to in determining whether your refusal was protected. If you claim "As a Pastafarian, I can't lie", the courts will not accept the premise that declaring yourself to be Pastafarian (a parody "religion") is valid. The available governmental resources on the fine line between general moral code and religious beliefs are quite sparse.	This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate."
Why would a Solicitor Advocate QC still instruct QC and junior barristers? In Serafin v Malkiewicz & Ors [2020] UKSC 23 (3 June 2020), David Price QC, Solicitor Advocate instructed two QC and a junior barrister for the appellants. But then what's the point of the Solicitor Advocate? Why didn't the Solicitor Advocate appear instead of the junior barrister? If the Solicitor Advocate felt unqualified to appear at the UKSC, then why hire the Solicitor Advocate at all in the first place? Solicitor-advocate or barrister? \| Opinion \| Law Gazette The role of a solicitor-advocate can depend on the area of law. In family cases, the solicitor who wishes to use their rights of audience will see a case right through to final hearing, preparing the case and cross-examining witnesses. Criminal solicitor- advocates can sometimes do the same, although being a full-time solicitor-advocate in crime can mean you are instructed by a firm in the same way as a barrister. If you work ‘in-house’ you will be kept busy with advocacy if you choose to use your rights of audience. You would therefore not see the case through from beginning to end, but it is more likely you will be involved in every hearing – hence keeping a healthy continuity for the client. What is a Solicitor Advocate? How Do I Become One? - The Lawyer Portal A solicitor advocate is, in basic terms, someone who is fully qualified as a solicitor but has gained the same rights of audience as a barrister by obtaining an extra qualification.	Just because you can doesn’t mean you should I’m a professional electrical engineer and a licensed electrician. That means I can do electrical wiring but most electricians who do nothing else can do it quicker, better and neater than I can. Just because a solicitor-advocate can do the job of a barrister doesn’t mean that’s in their client’s best interest.	Issues in the question In Australia, any civil claim below $10,000 is considered a small claim This depends on the State or Territory involved. In three the limit is $25,000, not $10,000. In only one is it exactly 19,000. In several the plaintiff has an option not to have such a case treated as a small claim. one cannot use a solicitor to represent himself in the small claims court. This also varies by state/Territory. In some a lawyer may represent a person or company, in some legal representation is allowed only if both parties agree or if the court permits, in some no lawyers are allowed except in very special circumstances. One may also not claim the amount incurred in legal fees for small claim proceedings. This seems to be true in most states Sources "Small claims tribunals" from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) "Debt Recovery – Small Claims" from the The Arts Law Centre of Australia Details Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Small Claims Limit: $25,000 Name of court: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT) Option to use a higher court: No Lawyers (solicitors) allowed: Yes Can a solicitor's costs be recovered by the winner: no New South Wales (NSW) Small Claims Limit: $20,000 (higher for some kinds of cases) Name of court: Local Court, Small Claims Division or NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal Option to use a higher court: Unclear from my sources Lawyers (solicitors) allowed: Yes Can a solicitor's costs be recovered by the winner: No Northern Territory (NT) Small Claims Limit: $25,000 (higher for some kinds of cases) Name of court: Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NTCAT). Option to use a higher court: No Lawyers (solicitors) allowed: Only with the leave of NTCAT Can a solicitor's costs be recovered by the winner: Only in exceptional circumstances Queensland Small Claims Limit: $25,000 (higher for some kinds of cases) Name of court: Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal ('QCAT'). Option to use a higher court: No Lawyers (solicitors) allowed: No, unless one party is a child or both parties and the tribunal member agree, or in certain other limited circumstances see https://www.qcat.qld.gov.au/resources/legal-advice-and-representation Can a solicitor's costs be recovered by the winner: No South Australia Small Claims Limit: $12,000 Name of court: Magistrates Court, Civil (Minor Claims) Division Option to use a higher court: No Lawyers (solicitors) allowed: No, unless both parties agree or one party is a lawyer. Can a solicitor's costs be recovered by the winner: No Tasmania Small Claims Limit: $5,000 Name of court: Minor Civil Claims Division of the Magistrates Court Option to use a higher court: No Lawyers (solicitors) allowed: Only if both parties agree and permission is granted by the Magistrate, or in other special circumstances. See https://www.magistratescourt.tas.gov.au/about_us/civil/minor_civil_claims Can a solicitor's costs be recovered by the winner: Yes, when one has been used. Victoria Small Claims Limit: $15,000 Name of court: Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) Option to use a higher court: Yes, Magistrates' Court. Lawyers (solicitors) allowed: Only if the Tribunal is satisfied that the other party will not be unfairly disadvantaged or in certain specific circumstances, see https://www.vcat.vic.gov.au/what-vcat-does/legal-and-professional-representation#when-you-don%E2%80%99t-need-to-ask-for-permission Can a solicitor's costs be recovered by the winner: Not normally, but possibly if the losing party has acted improperly or made a claim with no legal basis. Western Australia Small Claims Limit: $10,000 Name of court: Magistrates Court (Minor Claim) Option to use a higher court: No Lawyers (solicitors) allowed: Only if all parties agree, or the court grants special permission Can a solicitor's costs be recovered by the winner: No, unless exceptional circumstances exist.	The appellate court gets the trial transcript which includes all the testimony (and exhibits or descriptions/photos of them) and the trial court's rulings. Also, each side presents an appeal brief, which will generally include a statement of facts, pointing out ones it thinks favorable to its views. In civil cases a jury may be asked/instructed to give yes/no answers to a series of questions, but this is not normal in criminal cases. An appellate court can (and sometimes does) rule that there was not sufficient evidence to permit any reasonable jury to convict; to that extent it can rule on questions of fact. But, as the comment by ohwilleke mentions, an appellate court does not hear new evidence. It can overturn the conviction and send the case back for a new trial, and in such a new trial additional evidence may be introduce at the trial court level.	This is not possible, simply as a matter of definitions and legal terminology. Someone who is "represented by one or more attorneys" is by definition not pro se which means representing yourself without an attorney. There are very rare instances in criminal trials involving serious consequences in which a pro se defendant is allowed to have an attorney advisor who does not represent them in court in an agency capacity, but, first, people who do that almost always lose and are almost always mentally ill (although not necessarily eligible for an insanity defense), and second, because courts generally don't allow this in any other circumstance (at least in court). The concept of getting advice from an attorney without having full fledged representation is called a "limited representation" and the law regarding limited representations more generally varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even between different courts in the same place. For example, Colorado's state courts and Colorado's federal courts have different rules for limited representations.	Your assumptions are incorrect. Courts allow oral arguments (when they do allow them) so that attorneys have a chance to better address a judge's concerns. The idea is that it lets an attorney not only present the core of his case, but it also lets him address any problems with his reasoning that the judge may have or help the judge explore a complicated question. Without that all you have is the back-and-forth in writing with opposing counsel, which is useful, but may not actually address the issues that are important to the judge. There is some difference in how you present arguments on paper as opposed to in oral argument, but the distinction is largely one of style rather than substance. An argument that is great on paper is still great when presented out loud, you just present it differently because you are presenting it in a different medium. For example, you have to present oral argument with the assumption that the judge may interrupt you at any time to ask a question they are interested in, derailing your entire pre-planned argument into a tangential point the judge considers important. This is great because it lets you address what the judge is concerned about, but it requires a different preparation and some changes to the format of your argument. For example, while you will front-load both oral and written arguments with a roadmap, both your roadmap and your first sentence are much more important in oral argument.	Usually, a person becomes a client of a lawyer by virtue of the lawyer giving advice to them. It is quite easy for a lawyer to accidentally create a lawyer-client relationship. But, a lawyer can give legal advice to someone who is not his/her client subject primarily to the limitation of Rule of Professional Conduct 4.3 which states: In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client. So, basically, if a lawyer gives legal advice to someone who isn't his client, the lawyer needs to be clear that both the person is not someone with a conflict of interest with his/her client, and that the lawyer provides the disclaimer that the lawyer does not have the third-party's interests at heart when giving the advice. If the non-client is adverse to the lawyer's client, or otherwise is in a conflict of interest with the lawyer's client, the lawyer may not give that person legal advice other than to retain a lawyer of their own. A lawyer giving legal advice to a non-client is also subject to Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1 which requires the lawyer to be truthful in communications with third-parties. This rule states: In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6. Note also that "legal advice" means applications of the law to a particular person's actual factual situation, for use by that person, and not merely provision of general educational information about the law.	An appeal to ignorance asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false. That is not in any way the situation here. The defendant knows if he/she has or has not so the only available answers under oath are "yes" or "no" - the jury knows this too so any other answer will be seen as disingenuous. However, this information (affirmative or negative) is off limits to the jury as it could prejudice their decision, hence the mistrial. A quick judge could instruct the defendant not to answer and instruct the jury to disregard the question but if a conviction results the defence team could use the fact that it was asked as grounds for appeal. A judge must decide if the interests of justice are better served by a retrial or a tainted conviction.	The cited case (Ross [2012] UKPC 3) is not a Canadian case. It is from St Kitts and Nevis, an appeal from the Court of Appeal of that small Caribbean country to the Privy Council. The two barristers are from the same firm based in Canada (WeirFoulds LLP), a firm which also has a cross-jurisdictional practice encompassing several countries in the eastern Caribbean who share their appellate court system. Those nations also have a common pathway for onward appeals to the Privy Council, for essentially historical reasons dating from the era of the British Empire. Thus, counsels' appearance in this case is not because they are Canadian, but because of their separate entitlement to appear in Caribbean appeals. Frank Walwyn's biography (linked in the question) says he is "He is licensed to practise law in Canada, and is also a member of the bars of Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, the British Virgin Islands (BVI), Dominica, Grenada and St. Kitts and Nevis." (my emphasis). Membership in the St Kitts bar was enough for him to be able to also appear before the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, and therefore the JCPC as well. Bryan Finlay's biography does not specify, but as senior partner in the same firm he may well have the same status. In any case, since "duly qualified members of the Bar in countries from which appeals to the Queen in Council lie have a right of audience before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council" (Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 66, para 795, 2020 ed.) he could appear before the JCPC whether or not he was allowed to do so in lower courts. Regarding your Q2 (Why Canadians?): In this case, the appeal was from St Kitts, which is a very small country of about 50k people. This would give a small talent pool from which to draw, if only barristers from St Kitts were eligible to practise in appeals. That is why the shared Eastern Caribbean court system exists and why there is some added generosity about qualifications between the participating countries. While the appellant Ross might have had many choices, he himself is "a Canadian lawyer who was at the time [= 1983] practising in Halifax, Nova Scotia", and could therefore have been drawn to a Canadian firm with a Caribbean practice. The appeal, moreover, does not appear to have turned on any local peculiarity of St Kitts' law. It was mainly about how certain commercial documents should be interpreted. The issues arising would be accessible to practitioners from many common-law countries. Canada is not especially at an advantage or disadvantage, and neither is England. There are several barristers in London who have Caribbean experience and qualifications and who are more commonly instructed to appear on Caribbean-related cases (London is a nexus for commercial litigation, and several Caribbean jurisdictions are commercially important in this way, such as the Cayman Islands). I have no data on your Q1 (How many Canadians?). I expect that there are not many, because the natural choice of counsel might be either a London-based barrister, or one from the jurisdiction of origin who has been handling the case so far, rather than from a third country with no recent history of JCPC appeals. You could gather your own data from case reports if you are so inclined; as far as I know there isn't a systematic pre-existing study available.
Were the Nuremberg trials legal with respect to the US constitution? I'm very much a layman, and an Englishman rather than American, with an interest in political philosophy. I was reading through the US constitution the other day, and one sentence in Article I, Section 9 stood out to me: No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. With respect to ex post facto laws in particular, this made me wonder about the legality of the Nuremberg Trials. One of the key points made by the defendants at Nuremberg was that their transgressions - the mass killings, the conspiracies to wage wars of conquest, etc - were not crimes under German law at the time they were committed. The Nuremberg trials represented an uncomfortable fusion of American, British and Soviet law. To the best of my knowledge, there is no straightforward ban on ex post facto legislation within British law, although there is a vague consensus that such laws are unjust and are to be avoided. Whatever the articles contained within it, the Soviets in this period only seemed to treat their constitution as a set of guidelines and aspirations. But it strikes me as odd that the Americans would be willing to overlook such a clear ban, since they, more than any other nation, have tended to view their constitution as a kind of sacred text. I anticipate that one response to my question will be that the US constitution applies to domestic matters, and not to international law. This seems correct at first glance, until we read in Article I, Section 8 that one of the powers of Congress granted by the constitution is 'To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations'. But I'm sure that there are many layers of subtlety that I'm failing to grasp here, and I'd be grateful to anyone who could put me straight. I think I should close with the disclaimer that, in calling into question the legality of the Nuremberg trials, I don't intend to exonerate any of those who were convicted. They were certainly criminals in the moral sense of the word, and, putting questions of legality to one side, the world was better off without them in it. Regarding the matter of whether this question is a duplicate, I'll quote one of the comments below: The linked question is relevant, but not a duplicate. It briefly mentions the question of whether the trials operated under ex post facto laws, but devotes more space to other purported issues. None of the current answers address this issue. This should not be closed as a duplicate.	The US Constitution has no bearing on the Nuremberg Tribunals The tribunals were not conducted under US law, they were conducted under an international treaty going by the snappy title of No. 251 Agreement by the Government of the United Kindom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Union of Societ Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis. This was signed for the United States on 8 August 1945 by Robert H. Jackson who later served as chief prosecutor on the tribunal. The laws of the United States allow three mechanisms for the US to join international treaties: treaties, congressional-executive agreements and executive agreements. I do not know what mechanism was used but AFAIK, no contemporary challenge was made that the US lacked the power to or hadn't properly acceded to the treaty. This is the extent to which US domestic law would be applicable. The US recognises that there are other laws and other courts than merely US ones and that their citizens may be subject to those laws and serve on those courts. Indeed, there are circumstances where US courts will apply foreign law to a case; when that happens US law applies to the procedure but the substantive law of the other jurisdiction is applied to the facts. There is no doubt that the legal basis of the Nuremberg Tribunal was suspect and controversial and this was recognised at the time as this April 1946 The Atlantic article demonstrates. However, there was never any doubt that US law (or UK, or USSR, or French law) was totally irrelevant. I suggest you ask a new question focusing on the role of "Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law" under international law.	Compliance with the Dutch Constitution is evaluated pre-enactment, rather than post-enactment as indicated below. The Dutch Constitution prohibits the courts from reviewing the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament. They are however obliged to assess whether statutory regulations are compatible with international treaties. The ban on constitutional review is laid down in the Constitution. This does not mean that this type of legislation is at no point reviewed in the light of the Constitution. This is in fact done during the preparatory stage by the bodies involved in enacting legislation (the Council of State in its advisory role, and the legislature, in other words, the government and both Houses of Parliament). It is first and foremost the responsibility of these bodies to ensure that no legislation is passed that is in conflict with the Constitution. From here. Also, keep in mind that most of the entrenched human rights protections in the Netherlands are via treaties associated with the Council of Europe, and the Dutch courts can determine if domestic laws violate international treaties (which Dutch law does not allow the Netherlands to abrogate unilaterally unless the treaty so provides). This makes the lack of judicial review far less interesting in the Netherlands than in the United States or many other countries (e.g. Canada or India), and it makes international law much more interesting. American constitutional law would not be much of a big thing if it were (1) stripped of its individual rights protections (2) was in a unitary state like the Netherlands, where the are no federalism concerns to protect, and (3) there is also not a constitutionally enshrined separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, as there is in the U.S. You could teach a course on American constitutional law stripped of those issues in a week and the questions that are left would be much easier to evaluate in advance, rather than after the fact, since they would concern the legislative process for the most part. Institutional And Political Culture Matter This question is premised, to some extent, on the belief that judges act in one way that respects legal enactments, while other political bodies do not. But, this behavioral claim is not a universal one, it is a function of particular sets of institutional and political cultures. The legislative check also has more bite in the Netherlands because it is more of a "deliberative democracy" in terms of its political culture (i.e. decision-making relies more heavily on the substantive merits of legislation rather than ethic or partisan identity and seeks wide input) (the Netherlands ranks #9, the U.S. ranks #94). See internal pagination 91-93 of this report. The constitution's pronouncements are also more meaningful in the legislature because people act differently when they know there is no "safety net" from the courts to which they can pass the buck for ensuring compliance with the constitution. You see the same thing in the U.K. parliament which historically was not subject to any form of judicial review. The Council of State and its institutional norms, in particular, are a known quantity, because the Dutch Council of State has operated continuously since 1531 CE making it one of the oldest continuously functioning state institutions in the world. Likewise, Dutch judges, when applying the laws and treaties currently in force, are independent, and are arguably less partisan than U.S. courts. So, enforcing a binding treaty may have considerable power in the courts.	You may be mistaken about the purpose of the Miller test. If some content is obscene according to the Miller test, then it does not receive First Amendment protection, and could be prohibited from distribution by the government. However, it says nothing about the contractual obligations that two parties can agree to. To the extent that the obligations themselves are objectionable this analysis would fall under the doctrines of unconscionability and public policy.	The question largely does not come up in the US, but it does in some officially bilingual jurisdictions such as Canada. If someone ventures to paraphrase law of the US into Farsi or Spanish, that could be a kind act on their part, but it has no official status: only the law as enacted has legal weight. Though India is officially multilingual in many ways, acts of parliament must be in English – the English version is authoritative, even though translations may be made. In Canada, both English and French versions are official; so in the case of R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265, a conflict is detected: The French version of the text, which translates could bring the administration of justice into disrepute, is less onerous than the more stringent English version, "would bring the administration of justice into disrepute", and consequently is preferable in that it better protects the right to a fair trial (invoking a separate principle of interpretation, lenity, in case of ambiguity). There is some indication that EU directives can be translated after the fact, so that the 1979 Wild Birds Directive was translated from English into Slovak some years later. In the case of the EU, the Directorate-General for Translation shoulders that responsibility.	No Any such law would violate the US First Amendment as an improper restriction of speech and of the press. If done by the court rather thiygh a law, it would also conflict with 17 USC 105 which says that: Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government Courts have restricted video and still photography of court proceedings, on the ground that the presence of cameras would disturb court sessions and distract witnesses and jurors. But that would not apply to the proceedings of an appellate court.	The United States would be one such country. I'm sure it is not the only one. In the case of countries with constitutional courts there is basically no one to second guess their interpretations which is also true when the apex court in a country provides an opinion. Since no one can overrule many of these courts, they are allowed to do what they want.	I presume that Dad will check with the college attorneys, so this is for information purposes only. Smith v. Daily Mail 443 U.S. 97 concerns a newspaper which published the name of a minor arrested for allegedly murdering someone (having legally obtained that information). SCOTUS held that The State cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The asserted state interest in protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender to further his rehabilitation cannot justify the statute's imposition of criminal sanctions for publication of a juvenile's name lawfully obtained There was a state law prohibiting a newspaper from publishing a minor's name involved in a criminal proceeding – it specifically singled out newspapers, hence the holding includes the mention of newspapers, but the footnotes in the case indicate that they "don't need to go there" (the equal protection question was unanswered), because "First Amendment rights prevail over the State's interest in protecting juveniles". The First Amendment right would be the same, applied to video, and classroom use.	I don't think there would be such a case. The Supreme Court itself does not allow cameras in its courtroom. Also, when Florida wanted to bring cameras into Florida courtrooms, the Supreme Court said in the 1981 case Chandler v. Florida: Absent a showing of prejudice of constitutional dimensions to these defendants, there is no reason for this Court either to endorse or to invalidate Florida's experiment. It's also worth noting that "the jury may not be filmed" and "The Florida Supreme Court has the right to revise these rules as experience dictates, or indeed to bar all broadcast coverage or photography in courtrooms" were two of the specific rules that the Supreme Court noted Florida had implemented. Although those particular rules were not at issue in this case, the Court made no further mention of them, and thus perhaps tacitly approved of their constitutionality. Given that there does not seem to be a general right to film in a courtroom, it seems unlikely that there would be a right to film jurors in particular. Furthermore, this page lists the courtroom camera rules for several states. In many of them, filming jurors is prohibited. Presumably, if there was a ruling that this was unconstitutional, they wouldn't have those rules.
Is PI legally allowed to require their PhD student/Post-docs to pick up their kids from school? Assuming that I'm a PhD student/Post-doc, what kind of tasks are the principal investigator(PI) - i.e the group leader - legally allowed to ask me to perform? For example, is s/he legally allowed to ask me to pick up her/his kids from school? If so, what can s/he do if I refuse? The exact answer might depend on the details of my contract but you can assume a typical PhD/post-doc in a university/research institute. I also welcome examples from other European countries other than Germany. I would appreciate if you could support your answers with the relevant law.	Asking as such is hardly ever illegal. Any stranger can ask you to pick up their kids from school, like you always can tell them where to go. What I guess you are actually asking is whether the PI can require you to do it. No they probably cannot: it would have nothing to do with the matter of your contract or nature of your professional relationship with them. However, if they are in the position of power, they will have discretion in making decisions that will affect you. Whereas you legally can tell them where to get off, it might be good idea to attempt some interpersonal workplace tactics first.	I think you are misinterpreting what the article is saying. It's not Germany as a whole that is banning managers contacting employees (and since you are not a manager, this wouldn't affect you anyway), it is the German ministry of Employment banning it for its employees. When it comes to your own workplace, you will need to look at your own contract and see whether you are allowed to work on the weekend without, for example, getting extra money for that work. This is probably not the case for you as a PhD student, but if it is, you would usually need to talk to your employer before doing work on the weekends.	Yes The child owns what they own - it would be illegal for the parent to take the item and dispose of it or otherwise permanently keep if from the child (once they became an adult). However, parents are their children’s legal guardians and are responsible for the raising of their children including matters of discipline. It is both legal and appropriate for a parent to limit access of a child to their possessions.	Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task.	You're under 18, so you're viewed as a minor under the law, and as such, you can't agree to and sign legally binding contracts. The TOS for the applications are agreed to by your parents by default, because your parents are responsible for you and have no choice in parental guardian-type duties, such as education. Agreeing to the software TOSs may also be done for all student users by the school with their software site license(s) and under an agreement with your parents; ask for and read any written policies the school has. And, you don't have a say in data handling at your school; that will be another school policy for data and network security, and hopefully a policy exists. If a policy exists, it will set by the school board and it will respect a variety of local, state and federal laws. That said, you can approach the school board and outline your concerns and ask to take tests and assignments with pencil and paper. But they are not obligated to change policies for you or make accommodations, other than established accommodations required by law, such as under the ADA act. Once you're 18, you can fight the power. Until then, you're a minor.	It depends. If the tip is that there are pictures proving that a minor consumed alcohol 10 years ago, probably not. If the tip is that there's a kidnapped child being tortured inside, more likely. In either event, they would probably seek to build up some independently obtained evidence to enable them to obtain a warrant based on probable cause. An anonymous tip might be enough, depending on how detailed it was and whether there were any objective indicators of reliability, but it's not a sure thing.	Public schools are on a shorter legal leash than private schools are, because they must behave like proper governments do and respect the constitutional rights of their charges. (First Amendment rights are much broader in public schools than they are in private schools). Assuming that we're in a public school, a search of your phone is governed by a watered-down version of the 4th Amendment. They may search your phone if they have a reasonable suspicion that there is evidence of a violation of the law or a school rule, but this is passive with respect to you providing information -- if the phone is on, they can snoop around if they have a reasonable suspicion. The 5th Amendment would be relevant to passcodes: they cannot compel you to give up your passcode. If there was plainly-visible evidence of wrongful activity on the phone which they saw, and then you shut the phone down, then analogous to in re Boucher the courts could order you to reveal your password, under the "foregone conclusion" doctrine. However, it's the courts and not the schools who get to make that determination. One way the school could literally force you, bypassing the legal system, would be to physically threaten you, by beating you or threatening you with a gun or whip. Such physical coersion would be a felony, and it is almost inconceivable that they would do that. What they might maybe do is give you a non-physical ultimatum, of the type "decrypt the phone / reveal the password or we will... expel you / fine you / fail you in your English class / not let you go to any more football games / turn the phone over to the police". The question is, what would be legal versus illegal by way of consequences? I know of no constitutional right to attend football games anywhere, so they might well be able to get away with that deprivation. You might have a contractual right to attend games at a private school. With a private school, there is some contractual agreement between the school and you (least likely, assuming you're a minor) or your parents~guardians (most likely). That contract could imply certain rights, such as attending games, and might spell out a procedure for them to terminate that right. If they don't follow the process, they could be in breach of contract. Apart from contractual rights (which probably involve your parents, not you, but also would be considerable, for example the right to attend and be graded fairly in the English class), you have no protected rights. As you can see, the answer has a lot of "it depends" in it. Suppose your public school had a reasonable suspcion that you had engaged in a criminal activity, and might prove that by looking at the phone – which you shut down. They cannot use physical force against you, but they can try to persuade you, by offering you something that you want which they can legally take away – like attending a football game. If they try to deprive you of something that you have a right to, you can sue them to prevent that. However, they can also seek a court order to compel you to reveal the password, and it is certainly not illegal to inform you that if you don't unlock the phone, they will seek a court order. Whether or not the courts will grant the request is not obvious (incidentally, if the device is fingerprint-protected, you are hosed, since forcing a person to prove fingerprints is not against the 5th). If the school can be very specific about having seen criminal evidence, they have a leg to stand on, otherwise you cannot be compelled to testify against yourself (coughing up a password is a form of testifying against yourself).	Nothing is typical Investigators have wide discretion on how (and if) they pursue an investigation of an alleged crime. When they make an arrest is part of that discretion. Making an arrest starts all sorts of clocks running on the legal process and investigators may not want to do that for all sorts of legitimate reasons.
Asking for a payment to release funds A while back, a friend of mine did a dumb: she gave her savings to some guy in return for a vague contract to invest it for high returns. This wasn't an Internet/email thing; she knew this guy in real life (before COVID-19). The guy led her to believe that he was registered financial advisor (though I didn't find anything to that effect in her contract or their message history). Then she had some bad luck: lost her job, wrecked her car, etc. So she wanted to dip into her savings. She contacted the guy, who agreed to start disbursements from her investments (which he claimed to have a value of several times the principal at that point; he gave an approximate dollar figure). He paid out a couple thousand, then started delaying, temporizing, and making excuses. After a while of this, she started asking for all of her funds to be returned. She continued regularly asking him for her money over the next number of months and this behaviour continued. No doubt about it: my friend's trust in this guy was unwise. But that's not the point here. The point here is that buried in their message history, after several months of requests from her for money and excuses from him, he asked for another $2,000 to cover "fees" and expedite the process of returning her money. (She didn't pay.) From my viewpoint, this appears to jump from some sort of confidence fraud straight into 419 scam territory. Is this a felony? Both parties here live in the US state of Washington.	Fraud may be a crime, or a tort (civil wrong): only criminal fraud can be a "felony". The Washington criminal laws about fraud are here, and they are all fairly specific, such as selling or destroying encumbered property (which is a misdemeanor anyhow), or conducting a mock auction. Most frauds are misdemeanors, though forgeries are in the felony category. It also includes identity thefts, again the emphasis being on false documents. Based on your description, this is not a crime, it is a civil wrong, meaning that she will have to sue the guy to get her money back. The Attorney General's office will not get involved unless there is a widespread state interest (for example, very many Washington residents being victimized), and then the involvement would be suing on behalf of the victims. That said, if the swindle was carried out by phone, then that is potentially a violation of a federal felony law, 18 USC 1343. It would not matter if the parties are in the same state, because phone service counts as "interstate commerce". So the details of phone involvement matter. Saying that you "have to" charge for processing a refund is not per se fraudulent and texting someone that "I'll have to charge an extra $2,000" doesn't make this wire fraud. But there is some potential for a federal wire fraud angle.	If you buy a house and your wife signs a quitclaim deed to you, that transfers to you whatever rights she has in the house. Similarly, if you and your wife sign an agreement that anything deposited in a particular bank account in your name would be your separate property, that would override the pre-nup as far as that account was concerned. Such an agreement could include a dollar limit per month or per year, or an explicit purpose, such as savings for a down payment. (It could be thought of as a gift to you of her share of any funds deposited.) Giving property to your parents or others with the understanding that it will be returned on your request might be seen as an attempt to evade the pre-nup, and a court might hold that the property was actually shared, if you ever do divorce. There might also be gift tax issues if the value is high enough. Whether asking your wife to agree to a quitclaim or any sort of agreement to modify the pre-nup would help or harm your marriage I cannot know, nor did you ask that. But I would think that for most people being open would work better than going behind a spouse's back. None of this should be taken as legal advice. I am not a lawyer.	Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice.	If you are in the habit of paying people just because they ask you to, then I say you owe me $500 - if you want to pay I'll send you my wire transfer details. This is a facetious way of making a very simple point: You don't owe people money just because they say you do. If someone claims to be owed money by you, the legal onus is for them to prove both their legal entitlement and the amount. Normally, people agree that they owe money and that's enough, however, if the debtor disputes the debt then the creditor has to prove that it is owed: the debtor does not have to prove that it isn't. Their legal basis must come from either a contract or the tort of trespass. For the former they must prove that a contract exists and that you breached a term of it. For the latter they must prove that you committed the tort. In both cases, they are only entitled to recover their costs (including loss of profit) that your actions caused. As they are not a government they have no right to punish you with a fine: if they are asking for more than damages then this is a penalty and void. I am unaware of the consumer protection laws in Canada but presuming they are similar to Australia - a disputed debt is not a debt. It only becomes a debt when the dispute is resolved, usually by agreement or a court. Only actual debts can have enforcement action taken including such things as being pursued by a collection agency or being recorded by a credit reporting agency. In short: this is a scam. In 2012 I went through a similar process. This is the letter I sent: We are the registered operator of motor vehicle XXXXX and have received your letter dated 6/6/2012 for payment of car parking penalty number XXXXX that you allege we incurred on 6/4/2011. To the extent that we entered into a contract with you, which is denied, please take this letter to constitute a written appeal in accordance with the appeal process described on your website and/or in your documentation. We dispute incurring the alleged debt and we dispute entering into any contract with you. We will defend any action brought against us. You must cease all efforts to collect this alleged debt whilst it remains in dispute, in compliance with National, ACCC and NSW laws and guidelines. Except as specifically outlined herein, we are requesting that you cease all contact with us about the alleged debt. Any further contact should be strictly in conformity with the ACCC Debt Collection Guidelines (refer http://tinyurl.com/parking-01). Your contact with us should be limited to: acknowledging our letter and providing us with any documentation that we have requested informing us that you have ceased collection efforts on the alleged debt stating that you are taking a specific action in relation to the debt such as commencing court proceedings (note that you can only threaten court proceedings if you intend to start them otherwise you are in breach of the guidelines - refer page 33 "you must not threaten legal action if the start of proceedings is not possible, or not under consideration, or you do not have instructions to start proceedings"). You must also advise any debt collectors or lawyers you have collecting this debt to stop. If you or your agents continue to attempt to collect this alleged debt, we will complain in writing to the ACCC, to NSW Fair Trading, and to the car park owner (and if we receive a further letter from your lawyers, we will complain to the Legal Services Commissioner in the lawyer's home state). Please send us within 7 days: Confirmation of whether or not you still hold us responsible for this alleged debt. If you still hold us responsible, we require you to properly articulate the facts and matters on which your claim is based. Please forward us the following particulars: A copy of the contract we are alleged to have entered into. Photographs of any signs that need to be read in conjunction with the alleged contract. Details of the actual offence you are claiming. e.g. failure to buy ticket, expired ticket, parking in no-standing etc. As well as the usual particulars of date, time, precise location with the car park and other facts and matters giving rise to the alleged breach of agreement. An itemised breakdown of the debt you are claiming and details on how it was calculated. Show separately legal costs, court costs, administration costs, costs associated with identifying us as the car owner, patrolling costs and a breakdown of any other costs not already mentioned. Pursuant to the Privacy Act, a copy of all photos you have of our car and/or us. Indicate the date each photo was taken and the name of the person who took the photo. And forward us any other data that you hold on us that the Privacy Act requires you to disclose. The basis on which you allege that we ware a party to the agreement alleged to exist; Proof that the alleged debt was incurred by us. The name(s) of any lawyers or solicitors who received payments pursuant to any clause in your terms and conditions. Please show the amounts and dates on which these costs were incurred, and the dates when these payments were made. Please itemise the work that such lawyers or solicitors performed for you, and indicate which clause in your terms and conditions allows you to hold us liable for such payments. A copy of any agreement that the car parking company has with the owner of the car park which covers the handling of disputes and appeals. Indicate the amount of money the car park company would have been paid had we entered into the alleged agreement with it, and if the alleged terms and conditions had been followed to the company's satisfaction. (In other words, how much money do you normally receive for a car to park in your car park for the period of time we are alleged to have parked there for). The contact name, postal address, and phone number of each of the following: the car park owner, the car park manager, and the car park operator. A copy of your Appeal handing procedure. As well as setting out what factors are taken into account, state who is the judge or arbitrator and whether they are independent and any other relevant factors to the Appeal. In addition, please give us disclosure of any arguments being put by yourselves on this matter in the Appeal so that we might reply to any new issues which are raised. If you decide to dismiss our appeal, please send us the full reasoning in relation to each of the specific points raised in our letter. The name and address of the person you allege was driving our car at the time you allege our car was parked in your car park. If you are alleging an agent authorised by us was driving our car, please confirm this in your response and forward us a copy of the agency agreement, along with the name and address of the agent. We put you on notice that should you continue this claim, we will issue an application, seeking orders that: Any request for a statutory declaration or request from you to prove in anyway that we do not owe this debt is misleading or deceptive conduct, because you are not a government agency and that the burden of proof rests with you as the person who claims the alleged debt. The amount claimed pursuant to the alleged contract amounts to a penalty and therefore void at common law. Alternatively, the amount claimed is claimed pursuant to a consumer contract within the meaning of the Australian Consumer Law and that the amount claimed is an unfair term within the meaning of section 23 of the ACL and, accordingly, is void. Finally, this debt remains in dispute until we advise you in writing that we owe this debt. I received one further piece of correspondence which didn't address any of the things I asked for and which I ignored and that was the end of the matter.	There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.	Yes, you're allowed to pay someone to keep quiet, as long as whatever they're keeping quiet about isn't evidence of a crime. Companies can do this too, and quite often do. Offering to keep quiet in exchange for money may well constitute blackmail. But that doesn't appear to be an issue here.	Generally speaking, fraud in connection with an affirmative statement, in both criminal and civil cases, is limited to false statements of a presently existing material fact. Future income is not a presently existing fact. So, simply incorrectly stating your future income is not fraud. But, you are affirming when you make such a statement that you presently sincerely believe that you will have a future income of approximately the amount stated. And, if you make a statement about your future income when you do not actually believe that you will have that future income, then you have still committed fraud. In practice, there are lots of gray areas where a judge or jury considering the case would have to weigh the facts and your credibility. If you represented that you predicted that you would have an income of $1,000,000 in the next year, when you had never done so before and didn't even have any plausible plan other than playing the lottery for doing so, this would almost surely be credit card application fraud. On the other hand, if you represented that you predicted that you would have an income of $50,000 in the next year, when your income in past years had ranged from $30,000 to $45,000 from self-employment, and you believed sincerely that improvements in your marketing efforts and current economic trends were going to make the coming year your best year ever for income from self-employment that would give you a $50,000 income in the coming year, that would not be fraud. Where exactly the line between not fraud and fraud is drawn would be for the tier of fact to decide when and if the case went to trial.	A SAFE is basically what used to be called a "subscription agreement", i.e. an agreement to invest money in the future that will ultimately give rise to an equity investment if made. From a practical perspective, while the contract is legally enforceable, pursuing a lawsuit to enforce it is almost always a death knell level bad move. Firms who sue investors early in the game don't get future investors. The amount of time it takes to enforce such an agreement in a lawsuit is also too long (perhaps a year or two before you have money in hand if it runs its course and still many months if it settles), and the cost of doing so is too great (probably more than $40,000 that you won't get back to bring in $400,000), for it to make sense to do so at the delicate early stage of a start up. Instead, what you need to do is get on the phone with the investor, or quite possibly meet in person, at their offices or in a more casual deal making environment over drinks, for example, to figure out what is troubling them or slowing things up and how to make them happy. This is more of a function of continuing to sell the fact that you are good investment and an opportunity that they are missing out on, than it is about telling them about your legal rights. If this fails, it is probably wiser to seek financing from someone else than to force them to perform.
Are "To the maximum extent as permissible under law" exemption clauses too uncertain and litigation-prone? This clause is from a commercial landlord's offer in England. Isn't it too disputable and vague?? Firstly, it wrongly assumes that the "law" on exclusion clauses is settled and certain. Perhaps the case law is uncertain. Or there may not even be law. Secondly, it wrongly assumes that "the maximum extent" can be handily identified. Perhaps Landlord and I disagree on what "the maximum extent" is. Thirdly, the "law" can change. Then what's "the maximum extent" or "law"? I communicated these arguments to the Leasing Manager, but she refused to amend this clause. She replied that this clause is part of Landlord's standard form contract, and Landlord almost never amends it for small business owners like me. Is this reasonable? Or must I just push harder? I'm bewildered because I don't want to antagonize Landlord by pushing harder, and I got little bargaining power. I plan to pay a solicitor to review the contract, but the solicitor advised me informally to ask the landlord myself to define the extent of the exclusion clause upfront. Why? If he does it, he'll charge me and he'll be saying the same thing. He advised me to accomplish as much as I can myself before officially retaining him. To the maximum extent as permissible under law, the Landlord shall not be liable to the Tenant, its employees, licensees or invitees in respect of any claim, loss (including but not limited to loss of profits), damage or injury to person or property sustained by the Tenant or any such other person caused by or through or in any way owing to: (i) the adequacy or inadequacy of or any defect in or breakdown, failure, malfunction or suspension of the lifts, escalators, fire services equipment, security, airconditioning system or other facilities of the Building or the electricity, gas or water supply or other building services provided to the Premises, the Building or the Development; or (ii) typhoon or other adverse weather condition or fire or the overflow or leakage or influx of water including rain, storm or sea water or water of any other nature or other substances from or into anywhere within the Building or the Premises or the escape of fumes, smoke, fire or to activity of termites, cockroaches, pests, rats, mice or other vermin in the Building or any part(s) thereof; or (iii) the adequacy or inadequacy or otherwise of or any defect in any of the management services (including security) rendered by the Landlord and/or the Building Manager or the failure to render the same or the suspension or interruption thereof for whatever reason; or (iv) the closure of shopping mall of the Building or any part thereof by reason of any war, hostilities (whether war be declared or not), invasion, act of foreign enemies, revolution, insurrection, or military or usurped power, order or direction of any Authority, riot, commotion, social unrest, strikes, industrial action, lock outs or disorder, or threats of terrorism, or pandemic, or any other contingencies which, in the opinion of the Landlord, may cause or threaten to cause damage or injury to the Premises or the Building or any part thereof or injury or death of person; (v) the letting or leasing of any part of the Building and the Development (except the Premises) to any other party for any purpose whatsoever or any acts, omissions, neglect or default of any other tenants, licensees or occupiers of or of any accident in the Building and the Development.	No, such clauses are precise and common. The landlord wants to say: “we're not liable for anything”. Unfortunately for them, they can't say that because the law might still recognize some liability. So this construction achieves the next best thing: to the maximum extent possible, they will not be liable. What does this mean for you? If you want to sue them because you think they were liable for something, you won't be able to do that successfully – unless you can point to a liability they cannot disclaim. Yes, this might not always be entirely clear but that's why there are courts. On to your concrete objections: Firstly, it wrongly assumes that the "law" on exclusion clauses is settled and certain. Perhaps the case law is uncertain. Or there may not even be law. Which is why this construction says: we don't know where precisely the maximum is, but whatever the maximum is: we want it. Secondly, it wrongly assumes that "the maximum extent" can be handily identified. Perhaps Landlord and I disagree on what "the maximum extent" is. Either you can convince the landlord that they are liable and can settle this out of court. Or you go to court. Then, your opinion doesn't matter, only the court's judgement. Thirdly, the "law" can change. Then what's "the maximum extent" or "law"? This construction avoids this problem because it does not fix a certain list of liabilities that are included or excluded. Instead, it will disclaim maximum liability at any relevant point in time, which will likely be the time of the event giving rise to liability. If new laws are passed, they won't generally apply retroactively. However, new case law could update the interpretation of existing laws. What can you do? This is a business negotiation. You want that the landlord fulfils their duties, and they don't want to be on the hook if something bad happens. In particular, they don't want to be forced to pay for any missed profits or such. Maybe the clauses could be modified to ask for reasonable effort on the part of the landlord to mitigate certain events, in particular with regards to security. But in reality: you will have to get insurance to cover the cases you are concerned about. And some risks are just business risks.	In general, and in particular in New Jersey, a new owner takes possession subject to existing rental agreements, and in particular subject to existing leases, unless there is a provision in the lease to the contrary. This happens automatically, by law. Thus any lease is as enforceable against the new owner as it would have been against the old. But how enforceable is this arbitration agreement? How enforceable would it have been against the old owner O? The basic fact about a month-to-month tenancy is that either party may end it on one month's notice, for any reason or none. Moreover, when a new owner intds to occupy the premises personally, or use them for his or her family, the requirement to honor a previous lease is, in general, not applicable. T might be able to force N to go through arbitration, depending on the wording of the agreement, and on whether the written lease applies at all after the end of the first year (which it may well not). But on the facts as stated in the question, T would lose in arbitration as well as in court, and if there is any increased expense because of the arbitration, T would be obliged tom pay it. Let us look at the actual NJ law N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 provides that: any lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance, or for a part of a year, or for one or more years, of any houses, buildings, lands or tenements, ... may be removed from such premises by the Superior Court, Law Division, Special Civil Part in an action in the following cases: a. Where such person holds over and continues in possession of all or any part of the demised premises after the expiration of his term, and after demand made and written notice given by the landlord or his agent, for delivery of possession thereof. The notice shall be served either personally upon the tenant or such person in possession by giving him a copy thereof or by leaving a copy of the same at his usual place of abode with a member of his family above the age of 14 years. [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-56 provides that: No judgment for possession in cases specified in paragraph "a." of section 2A:18-53 of this Title shall be ordered unless: a. The tenancy, if a tenancy at will or from year to year, has been terminated by the giving of 3 months' notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or ? b. The tenancy, if a tenancy from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of 1 month's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; [emphasis added] Section 2A:18-57 provides that: If no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary when the action comes on for trial, the court shall issue its warrant to any officer of the court, commanding him to remove all persons from the premises, and to put the claimant into full possession thereof, and to levy and make the costs out of the goods and chattels of the person in possession. No warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession, except as provided for in chapter 42 of this Title. Section 2A:18-61.1 provides that: No lessee or tenant or the assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives of such lessee or tenant may be removed by the Superior Court from any house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or tenement leased for residential purposes, other than (1) owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units or a hotel, motel or other guesthouse or part thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal tenant; ... except upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause ... [emphasis in original] h. The owner seeks to retire permanently the residential building or the mobile home park from residential use or use as a mobile home park But note that good cause is not required for an owner-occupied dwelling with no more than two rental units. T would be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable about landlord/tenant law in NJ before attempting to contest the notice or eviction.	First, the clearly redundant phrase is “applicable laws” - these apply to everything. Second, some acts, particularly consumer protection or sale of goods acts imply provisions into a contract, create obligations that sit beside the contract or create equitable remedies. Many of these can be limited or excluded but this needs to be done explicitly. Third, in legal writing, clarity is preferred to brevity - nice if you can get both but if not, be clear rather than brief. Fourth, the contract is not the document. The document is a record of the “meeting of the minds” that formed the contract. In the event of a dispute, it may be useful to know that particular laws were specifically considered by the parties. Fifth, in legal writing, just as all writing, some people are better than others.	It is done to prevent or at least provide a defence against a latter argument based on Estoppel; which at the risk of trivialising something that is very complex means that if you indicate to someone that you will or won't do something and they act on that indication then they may have a claim if you don't do what you indicated. When lawyers say this they are usually outlining a client's possible future actions so estoppel is in play. If they include this they are specifically saying "... But we might not do that."	As user6726 said, a contract to sign away statutory tenant rights is virtually never going to be enforceable. Tenancy is a situation that basically always involves contracts; the whole point of statutory rights is to limit the scope of these contracts. Waiving tenancy rights would be sort of like waiving minimum wage. "Consideration" doesn't change anything, because it's assumed when you're talking about contracts. A contract without consideration is void. However, while your example of consideration isn't really what "consideration" means, it is a possible exception to tenancy rights. Certain situations are generally excluded from statutory tenancy rights; for instance, being in the hospital for two months doesn't make you a tenant. RCW 59.18.050 (to go with user6726's Washington theme) also excludes Occupancy by an employee of a landlord whose right to occupy is conditioned upon employment in or about the premises. In other words: You can provide your employee with housing that they only keep as long as they work for you, and in that case they're not a tenant. A live-in housekeeper is a perfect example of this.	The closest you will get is the first-in-time ordinance passed by the city, but that was overturned in court. That law required accepting the first qualified applicant for a rental: it did not say anything about sales. If there is a specific provision to that effect in your lease agreement, that would be applicable, but there is no general legal mechanism that forces a seller to accept a particular offer.	what responsibilities/liabilities does/will his company have given that it's in possession of my property? None. There is no contract (implicit or otherwise) between the owner and you. The owner receives no consideration from you in exchange for storing your goods, and an essential element of contracts is an exchange of considerations. Thus, he has no obligation to continue storing your goods. Another essential element in contract law is that the agreement --meaning the conditions thereof-- be entered knowingly and willfully. Since the time of making the arrangement and up to now, you were reasonably unaware of the likelihood of an obligation to pay the owner. This preempts the owner's right to start billing you. If anything, you would need to prove special circumstances to avail yourself of a viable claim of promissory estoppel. See Havens v. C & D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158, 171-172 (1994): To obtain recovery in promissory estoppel, plaintiff must establish (1) [a] promise which (2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause the promisee to change his position and (3) which does cause the promisee to change his position (4) justifiably relying upon the promise, in such a manner that (5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. However, the viability and duration of any relief pursuant to promissory estoppel seems very unlikely in the situation you describe. The hardship you are undergoing --and which prompted you to store your goods there-- is unfortunate. But generally speaking, a third party (such as the owner) who is unrelated to the causation or prolongation of that hardship cannot be lawfully forced to aid you for free.	In the real world, the contract could not be enforced, as being unconscionable. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445. This, from the ruling, seems particularly applicable to TOS conditions: Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices
How can I legally protect my website from users who upload copyrighted material? I have a small website that hosts content in the form of text from registered users. The content can be described more specifically as short novels, essays and other personal work. How do I protect myself and the website from people who might upload copyrighted content (i.e., e-books that are not their intellectual property, copy-pasted works of other authors, ...)? Does a simple EULA take care of the legal aspects, or is there a real risk of running into trouble?	A simple EULA does not absolve you from legal responsibility. The law that you need to be acquainted with, if you are dealing with the US (i.e. might be sued in the US), is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in particular Title II, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act which states the "safe harbor" provisions. Aspects of DMCA safe harbor are covered in many Law SE questions. In essence, you have to provide a way for rights holders to complain that someone has infringed their copyright on there site, and you have to take down allegedly infringing material: and there are a number of legal formalities to attend to in doing this. The main point is that you can't just ignore the problem and hope it goes away, and you can't just say it is not your responsibility, which is what a simple EULA does. To be protected, you need a "designated agent" where complainers can contact you. You provide the information online (as well as stating the DMCA policy, which can be in the EULA), and also register that information with the Copyright office (online). The complaint has to be in writing, and most of the burden is on the author of the complaint, but you still have to be sure that the complaint is legally conforming. The complaint has to say what was infringed (e.g. the URL), the identity of the protected content (title of the book, for instance), and provide the complainer's signature and contact information. It also requires the complainer to say that they have a good faith belief that the material is illegally copied (no permission, and not otherwise allowed by law), and a perjury statement that the foregoing is accurate and authorized by the copyright holder. When you have a conforming notice, you must "expeditiously" remove / disable the infringing material (there is no definition of "expeditious"), notify the user, then wait for a proper counter-claim (same general form as the take-down claim but where the user denies the posting the material was illegal. If you get a counter-claim, you notify the alleged copyright owner and wait for them to file suit in 10 days. If they don't do that, you restore the material. Here is a sample complaint, and a sample counter notice. Also, this document (look for the download tab) reorganizes the legal language so that requirements are put in logical order and not randomly scattered throughout the US Code.	No, copyright absolutely does not protect anything "novel" or anything related to algorithms or generally anything functional at all. Copyright only protects your "expressed representation of a creative work". Other people can duplicate your work with a different "expression" and not be infringing on copyright. And if there is nothing creative in your work then it's not even eligible for copyright in the first place. For example, if you figure out how to sort an array with fewer computational steps than what anybody else is doing then that is functional code, not creative code, and anybody can reverse engineer/duplicate your sorting algorithm. However, patents do provide the protection you're looking for. If you want to protect your fancy algorithm then apply for a patent. Patents expire an order of magnitude sooner than copyright, but they are the only means of legally protecting this type of intellectual property. Unlike copyright, patent protection is only available if you apply for it, and it has to be approved by the relevant government department in your country (although you can start using the patented technology before approval has gone through).	The text may be public domain in the United States It depends on when it was created/published. The eBook is subject to its own copyright The eBook itself is a derivative work and subject to its own copyright protection. The translation of an ink and paper book into an eBook contains enough artistic choice to trigger copyright protection. If the original is really public domain, you can copy the text but not the eBook.	Forget about copyright or EULAs. In the UK this would be illegal under the Computer Misuse Act (1998) and you could be jailed for up to a year - specifically Unauthorised access to computer material. (1)A person is guilty of an offence if— (a)he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer, or to enable any such access to be secured; (b)the access he intends to secure, or to enable to be secured, is unauthorised; and (c)he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function that that is the case. This law has been applied even to simply altering parameters in a GET request to a website, so it is incredibly broad. Other jurisdictions have similar wording, so be aware!	Physical content The main consideration with physical content is that reading it does not require making a copy, so uncomplicated copyright law is what’s relevant. Copyright law is about making copies (also distributing). Purchase a novel (a physical book which was legally obtained). There is no copying involved (you do not in fact make a copy in your mind, if you're a human). Under the First Sale doctrine, once a copy is sold by the rights-holder (e.g. the publisher, initially to the bookstore or distributor), that owner can do whatever it wants with that specific copy, including reading or re-selling (and anying thereafter can likewise). Books are sold, not licensed. Copyright relates to copying, not reading. It’s true that all (legal) rights are reserved, but the power to prevent resale is not a right. Book (or anything else) on the ground. As above, with the complication that you aren’t at least immediately the rightful owner. But, you don’t have to be the owner of a protected work to read it (otherwise libraries would not exist). The rightful owner might unsuccessfully try to sue you for reading their property, but reading does not cause damage, and your act is innocent (not even negligent), and not wrongful. Eventually (depending on jurisdiction) you may become the owner if the original owner does not reclaim the book. Reading a copy made by someone else. See above about the relationship between reading and copyright. The teacher might maybe be liable for infringement, but you are not culpable (assuming you didn’t encourage the teacher to make an illegal copy). Digital content However, every item of digital content has to be copied many times, in order to actually be read. E.g. a copy is made to video display memory from RAM, which is copied some number of times from RAM to RAM as the program formats and sizes, ultimately reading a copy stored on disk storage (which is installed from.... using N temp files) Typically what happens is that you acquire a copy of a license to use the content. Some number of copies may be statutorily permitted, e.g. the myriad transitory copies created across the internet as you download the work, or on your computer as you install it. The law addresses this matter in part at 17 USC 117, saying that it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful. Since Congress chose the word “program” rather than “file”, the plain reading of this is that permission is always required to read digital content. One may assume, when you purchase an electronic book at the store (you thus own the recording medium), that the work also comes with specific permission to make those automatic copies required to actually read the book on a computer. In order to read the book you must make some number of copies. Seeing stuff on a web page. Let’s also assume that the material is on the page without permission, but you don’t know that, and it just jumps out at you. This raises an interesting question regarding statutory language and web pages. The statutory language is not at all clear about link-clicking (the statutes don't say anything about "links"), and I don't know of any relevant case law (probably because it would be ludicrous to go after an innocent link-clicker) Infringement is defined in 17 USC 501(a): Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright and if you infringe, you may be liable. 17 USC 106 spells out those rights: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; … (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; … When you go to a web page and click a link, are you reproducing the protected material? Or is the website owner reproducing the material, and pushing it onto you? I don’t know of any decisions that address this kind of technical question. There is no question that the person hosting the infringing material is liable, the question is whether you would be as well? It would be highly unjust to hold the innocent link-clicker responsible. There is a bit of protection for innocent infringement in 17 USC 405(b) Any person who innocently infringes a copyright, in reliance upon an authorized copy or phonorecord from which the copyright notice has been omitted and which was publicly distributed by authority of the copyright owner before the effective date of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, incurs no liability for actual or statutory damages under section 504 for any infringing acts committed before receiving actual notice that registration for the work has been made under section 408, if such person proves that he or she was misled by the omission of notice. In a suit for infringement in such a case the court may allow or disallow recovery of any of the infringer’s profits attributable to the infringement, and may enjoin the continuation of the infringing undertaking or may require, as a condition for permitting the continuation of the infringing undertaking, that the infringer pay the copyright owner a reasonable license fee in an amount and on terms fixed by the court. (c) Protection under this title is not affected by the removal, destruction, or obliteration of the notice, without the authorization of the copyright owner, from any publicly distributed copies or phonorecords. (You could be prevented from further use of the infringing material, and liable for specific lost profit). Infringement is not defined in terms of what you know or believe about the copyright status of work. Nevertheless, I would expect that in addressing the question of whether a person had in fact made a copy that they would look at the mental state of the individual, looking for mens rea. This could distinguish clicking a link that unexpectedly pushes protected material onto you, versus attempting to obtain protected material by clicking on a link.	It would be terribly risky for you to simply link another company's terms of service. What if they take their server down? What if they change their terms? You would not even know when exactly the changes were made. Copying their terms means you might run into copyright issues on the text. Either pay a lawyer to write your ToS for you, or see if you can find something in the public domain.	You can't You agreed: by submitting Materials in any form to the Company, in addition to other provisions of the Terms, you automatically grant Company a royalty-free, world-wide, irrevocable, non-exclusive, and assignable right and license to use, copy, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, edit, translate, create derivative works from, transmit, distribute, publicly display and publicly perform such Materials for the purpose of displaying and promoting the Materials on any website operated by, and in any related marketing materials produced by, the Company and its affiliates. They can keep and use your data forever and give it to whoever they want. The clause you quote doesn't alter that. All it says is that once a year, if you ask, they will tell you what information they shared and with whom. If they feel like it they will tell you how to get the information deleted.	In a hypothetical case like you are describing, you could make a contract with them regarding the duplication of the content, irrespective of copyright law. Their violation of that contract would not necessarily be a copyright violation (which would allow statutory damages), but you might win a breach of contract lawsuit. But if someone took it from them and made copies, you would likely not have a case against that person because copyright would not protect you and you have no contract with them. In addition, you could obtain a very "thin copyright" in a particular new presentation of the material. This would mean that copyright law would apply, but only to the particular presentation (e.g. new footnotes, a particular layout, etc...) If considering doing this IRL, you should consult a copyright attorney.
How is it with taking photos of people? Few years ago there was an interesting affair. There was an IT guy whose laptop was stolen. The owner used his IT skills to get pictures of the new owners of his laptop (not neccesarily thieves) remotely. The owner shared some of the pictures on his blog. The new owners noticed it and sued him for invasion of privacy or something like that. They won and the original owner was forced to pay them for the damage done. My question is, how could these ordinary people sue somebody for taking their pictures without permission, when there are tabloid journalists who do this every day to celebrities ? (And obviously they get away with it.)	how could these ordinary people sue somebody for taking their pictures without permission, when there are tabloid journalists who do this every day to celebrities ? (And obviously they get away with it.) Tabloid journalists only get away with it when the pictures are taken in public, where there is no expectation of privacy. No permission is required in this case. Conversely, the IT guy apparently took photos of the laptop users when they were at home etc. where privacy is pretty much expected and therefore permission is required.	If you have sufficient grounds to fear that someone is about to infringe on one of your rights, you can go to court to obtain an injunction against that person. This is a court order to refrain from some particular action. In many cases, the point of this is just to have the legal debate on whether the anticipated action is actually legal or not before it happens rather than after. However, the punishment for violating the injunction is set by the relevant judge based on how important it is to dissuade the target from actually doing the thing, and how extensive the punishment needs to be in order to achieve this. After a few rounds of your guy doing the copyright infringement, getting an injunction against him doing it again should be quite straight-forward. And if he violates that, it would be reasonable to ask for a significantly higher fine next time, and then more, and more. Injunctions could also involve preparatory actions, eg prohibit the guy to even approach a computer, if this is deemed necessary to prevent reoffending.	Yes. I am tempted to leave the above as the entirety of my answer, but to expand: Yes, you can do that. You won't (as a business matter) be able to charge all that much because many people will realize they can just download a similar picture from the net and print it off themselves. You can charge a bit because you've framed them (perhaps), and chosen the nicest, and perhaps you have a better printer, or have used the expensive glossy paper. Also, if you are successful charging a lot, other people will start selling the same pictures for slightly less (and you won't be able to stop them).	They wouldn't need to keep samples, just the fingerprint. So they could send a guy with a laptop to Japan, download all the songs, fingerprint them, and take the fingerprints back home. It's not a problem, but it would be expensive. I suspect that US and European record companies will make the music available to them for free, otherwise they'd have to pay 20-30 million dollars for 20-30 million songs. The Japanese record companies wouldn't, so while it is technically and legally possible to collect the fingerprints, it would be expensive. And what is the benefit? We are talking here about music that you cannot legally own, that you cannot legally buy after the software recognised it, so there is very little incentive to spend that money.	It depends. Wikipedia is quite strict on its policies, and it only allows uploading images (and other media) that either are in the public domain or with a licence that allows to be reproduced (often, Creative Commons, CC). If you go to the details of the image it claims that the picture is licenced under CC, with attribution to Saffron Blaze. So most probably Saffron Blaze got permision to take the picture, and he distributed it with the CC-Attribution licence. When scrapping a web site for data, Google and other engines usually search for metadata (the robots.txt file) that tells them what to index and what to not. If a user gives them permission to index a picture by not stating restrictions in the robots.txt, they can do index it. Of course, in both cases it might be that someone uploads a picture that he does not have permission to share. In this case the situation will, of course, depend on jurisdiction, but many laws have provisions that ensure that, if the content provider is dilligent in addressing copyright issues caused by the users, they are protected. For example in the USA the Digital Millenium Copyright Act establishes "safe harbor" provisions that protects content providers if they give a way to denounce copyright infringiments and address those in a given timeframe.	According to this article, the Malmö Administrative District Court found that the intent of the user is immaterial to whether a camera is being used for surveillance, so even if that is not why you are doing this, it counts legally as "surveillance". The law requires a permit from the länsstyrelse (county? government), according to the Kameraövervakningslag (2013:460) (article 8 states the requirement for permit, art. 16 tells you who to apply to). I believe that a tennis court would be considered a "public place", even if privately owned. Art. 17 tells you what goes into an application (there is probably a form), and art. 18 says that the kommun gets to weigh in. Presumably it would be critical to have a consent form signed before any recording happens, and you would include that in the application.	It probably is infringement, assuming that this is being done by copying parts of a broadcast of the game. It is up to the holder of the copyright on the original broadcast that is being condensed to decide whether to sue or take other action, such as a takedown notice. Perhaps the holder thinks this is good advertising for its business. They have the right to make that decision. Now if a person went to the game, and used a personal camera to film it, and posted excepts of that recording, the legal issues would be very different. The ticket probably includes a provision prohibiting filming and photography, so this would be a breech of contract. But it would not be copyright infringement. (In practice if this were spotted, the person would be required to stop recording or leave, at least.)	This question needs more detail. As a cybersecurity professional I can provide some technical context around what I believe to be the situation. While I do not know the legal precedence, technically, IP addresses cannot typically be attributed to an individual person. There are a number of reasons for this. In a local network, IP addresses are not unique. Rather, they are distributed by the DHCP server, and are reassigned at intervals. Forensic attribution to an individual in most environments would require a DHCP log linking the IP to the machine’s MAC address, with time stamps that correlate to the individual’s logon to that machine at the same time. If the IP correlation involves a VPN, it gets more difficult. I would need to know where the log/evidence was obtained to determine what the IPs in question actually correlate to. If the evidence was obtained in local area network of the suspect, the IP addresses are likely assigned by the DHCP server (see previous). If they are obtained after encryption in transit to decryption, then very little can be determined. If they were obtained at the VPN server log, these IPs likely belong to an ISP which in turn may or may not be able to show what machine initiated the conversation. Digital photos often contain EXIF data, which is metadata about the photo. This data can contain details like, device make and model, sometimes location, time and date... If the defendant owns a Nikon such and such and the photo was taken with a Nikon such and such, and was uploaded using a VPN the defendant has an account with, and the defendant was in that location at the time and place of the photo... there may be enough there... but I’m not a lawyer. I believe the discovery should include any EXIF metadata and logs to be used as evidence. You may need a special technical whiteness to educate the court on what can and cannot be determined (technically) given the evidence. Things to consider for such a witness could include: EXIF, forensic certification, network administration experience, VPN, TCPIP, OSI Model, Network Address Translation (NAT). Again, nothing here should be considered legal advise. Seek professional legal counsel.
Does Australia's News Media Bargaining Code prevent Australian news being displayed outside of Australia? The Australian News Bargaining Code, if passed, will prevent companies like Google and Facebook from displaying images and snippets (and possibly even headlines) on their platforms unless they pay content creators for the right to do so. In response, Facebook today removed all posts from all Australian media sites' facebook pages - a fairly drastic action - so as to prepare for and not fall foul of the new code, leaving media pages with millions of followers appearing to have no posts at all: Under the code, presuming Google also do not agree to the code, Google will not be able to show Australian media articles to Australians in Google News, but will Google News be legally able to display Australian media articles to users outside of Australia? (e.g those whose IPs show them to be from other countries)	Yes, once law is passed and Facebook is designated under it as a "designated digital platform corporation" then it will be obligated either pay remuneration to all "registered news business corporations" in Australia for content they voluntarily post on Facebook, or not allow any Australian news on their site at all. The same applies to Google and in theory any other digital platform corporation designated by the Australian government. The law makes no distinction according to where the content is shown, but only Australian news businesses can benefit from it. The purpose of the law is to "address a bargaining power imbalance that exists between digital platforms and Australian news businesses" and amends the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 to create a "News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code". Currently Australian news companies, like any other Facebook user voluntarily posting content on the site, are paid nothing by Facebook. Similarly, Google doesn't pay anyone for the content the indexed on their site, essentially also voluntarily, since it's trivial to opt out of this. The Australian government sees this as the result of unfair competition. According to them, Facebook and Google have abused their power to force Rupert Murdoch's News Corp and other Australian news companies to agree to put their content on their sites for free. This new bargaining code seeks to solve this problem by forcing designated digital platform corporations and registered news business corporations into final offer arbitration over remuneration if they can't come to a negotiated agreement. Any arbitration determination would require that Facebook or Google to pay some amount of remuneration, and the determination would be based in part on "the benefit (whether monetary or otherwise) of the registered news business’ covered news content to the designated digital platform service". This would include the benefit they receive by showing the content outside of Australia. A key part of the law is it's "non-differentiation" requirements. This would prohibit Facebook and Google from showing or indexing Australian news corporations' content differently depending on whether they're forced to pay them money or not, or even whether they're an officially registered news business or not. This means Facebook and Google aren't allowed to choose to show some Australian news businesses' content and not others. If they show any of their content then they must show content from them all. If they show content from a registered Australian news business anywhere in the world then they must pay for it. This leaves Facebook and Google with three options if the law passes: Pay for news content from all registered Australian news business. Don't show or index any Australian news business content. Remove their presence completely from Australia to prevent Australia from enforcing their law on them.	The warning notice is intended for viewers and participants, not for the court to make its own official record of the proceedings. Presumably, it was this court record that the judge released for educational purposes under his own Order via Twitter. In which case, there has been no contempt of court.	At least as of 2011, when regulations under the Information Technology Act related to privacy and data security were issued (some of the relevant statute sections and regulations are linked in this answer at Law.SE), there was no non-contractual right to have your data destroyed, although a terms of service for a site could give you that right contractually. Instead, usually, a term of service agreement will do exactly the opposite and give a site owner an irrevocable right to keep your data forever. I am not aware of any subsequent statutory, regulatory or case law developments in India which have changed this situation, but that kind of tweak of IT Act regulations in India wouldn't necessary make headlines outside of the local IT industry press coverage in obscure trade journals. The EU is the only place of which I am aware that has any individual right to have data destroyed or suppressed even if it doesn't violated copyright, wasn't obtained illegally and isn't fraudulent or defamatory. Even then, as I understand it, in the EU this is not a unilateral right that applies in all circumstances and is instead a specific remedy for certain situations that have a particularly intense privacy aspect to them.	It could be. Accessing any web page is subject to whatever the terms of use are for the page, and if those terms state that the page may only be accessed from within the US, then accessing the page from outside the US is a violation of the TOS (hence use is infringing): see 2.4(h) of the Netflix EULA. There are EU rules that override such terms, within the EU. The usual way to circumvent technological location-restrictions (where the web page says "I'm sorry, I can't let you do that") is to use a VPN and pretend to be somewhere else. Use of a VPN is not per se illegal in most countries (there are exceptions), but using it to circumvent geo-blocking may be. Again returning to the point that the TOS may itself say "No you may not", the interesting question is what to conclude if there is no such statement, for example I did not see anything in the PBS TOS that restricts access to the US (I didn't look very deeply). Terms of service can't be secret: you can't be held to following rules that you cannot reasonably know of. If you attempt to access a page that uses un-announced geo-blocking technology and it informs you that you can't use the page because of your location, then you have effectively been put on notice that there is a rule. If you happen to be using a VPN and access an un-announced, (reasonably) undetectable geo-blocked site, that would not be a breach of the terms (because you have not been put on notice that location is a term of use).	There is no exhaustive list of material banned specifically in WhatsApp profile pictures, but there is an exhaustive list of crimes that § 140 StGB applies to: Whoever rewards or approves of publicly, in a meeting or by disseminating material (section 11 (3)) in a manner which is suitable for causing a disturbance of the public peace one of the unlawful acts referred to in section 138 (1) nos. 2 to 4 and no. 5 last alternative and in section 126 (1) or an unlawful act under section 176 (3), sections 176a and 176b, under section 177 (4) to (8) or section 178 after it has been committed or culpably attempted incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. In turn, sections 138 and 126 enumerate various crimes, whereas the other mentioned sections relate to (child) sexual abuse. Section 138 (1) no. 5 lists: murder under specific aggravating circumstances (section 211) or murder (section 212) or genocide (section 6 of the Code of Crimes against International Law) or a crime against humanity (section 7 of the Code of Crimes against International Law) or a war crime (section 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 of the Code of Crimes against International Law) or a crime of aggression (section 13 of the Code of Crimes against International Law) The last alternative is indeed a “crime of aggression” which is defined in particular as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”. In Germany, there is a clear consensus that Russia is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine. The “Z” symbol is used in a Russian context in support of this invasion. It is therefore understandable that a prosecutor has the reasonable suspicion that publicly posting a Russian flag with the Z symbol is public approval of this crime of aggression. Spiegel Online reported of 140 similar cases across Germany. Thus, the photo could be real. Of course, the accused should not accept this invitation to talk to the police and instead get themselves a criminal defense attorney. A defense strategy would likely argue that the profile picture was not “suitable for causing a disturbance of the public peace” so that the conditions of § 140 StGB were not fulfilled. More realistically, the defendant would not contest a fine.	For the same reason you can’t ask the parties to a contract what they meant Legislation, once enacted, stands on its own independent of the people who drafted it, introduced it to Parliament and voted for or against it. These are not the same people in any event and since the legislation might have been passed anywhere between the 13th and 21st centuries, a lot of them will be dead. There’s a fundamental issue of fairness here. The people who are obliged to comply with the law (you and I) can’t ask the politicians so neither can the judges who have to decide if we did. Further, the judiciary cannot interact with the executive or the legislature in this way without violating the principle of separation of powers. Imagine you are charged with a crime and your guilt or innocence turns on the interpretation of the statute. Do you really want politicians who are looking at how the case plays out on Twitter telling the judge which interpretation to use i.e. effectively telling them whether you are guilty or not?	It is not obvious that it violates the TOS (which is a complex wall of text and links to chase). §3 states that "we need you to make the following commitments", followed by some subsections – you can re-interpret this as an agreement on your part to do this stuff. Those subsections relate to "legitimate accounts and users" (not relevant), "what you can do" (potentially relevant), "permissions you give" (granting them license to use your stuff), not infringing on their copyright. The second subsection about what you can "do" says that you can't "violate these or other terms", or do anything unlawful, or infringing, nor may you upload viruses, or scrape Facebook data. So it turns out that there is nothing specific in that subsection, but it does say that you won;t violate "other terms". §5 presents a bunch of other possible terms and policies: Community Standards, Commercial Terms, Advertising Policies, Self-Serve Ad Terms, Facebook Pages, Groups and Events Policy, Meta Platform Terms, Developer Payment Terms, Community Payment Terms, Commerce Policies, Meta Brand Resources, Music Guidelines and Live Policies. Those primarily apply to advertisers, group-pages, developers, commercial use and content broadcast via Meta. Community Standard applies to everybody, and as you should predict there is a long list of specific sub-categories such as "Violence and Criminal Behavior", "Safety", "Objectionable Content", "Inauthenticity" etc. You would have to hire a lawyer to do an exhaustive search and interpretation. However, it appears that using an ad blocking app is not forbidden on FB, and that seems to be what that extension is. But you should read it for yourself. All. Of. It. It may have violated the older TOS, but that clause seems to me missing from the present TOS.	You're thinking of "unconscionability." In the United States, the general rule is that a contract provision will not be deemed unenforceable for unconscionability unless it is both procedurally and substantively unfair. A provision is considered procedurally unfair if it results from some sort of unfair asymmetry in bargaining positions. This could include situations where a party was acting under duress, had a diminished mental capacity, or unequal experience in the . A provision may be considered substantively unfair if it imposes disproportinately unfavorable terms on one party, perhaps by imposing costs far out of line with market prices, or by allocating all risk to that party. If the agreement is not both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, it won't be voided. So the Google TOS may be procedurally unfair because Google's market position gives it disproportionate bargaining power, but because they don't really impose any serious costs on you, they aren't unconscionable. Similarly, a contract provision requiring you to give me your house if you ever forget to turn off the porch lights at night wouldn't be unconscionable if it was agreed to after lengthy negotiations between our lawyers.
Can an LLC be a non-profit 501c3? And can a for-profit LLC accept donations via patreon or kickstarter? Can an LLC be a non-profits? Or are LLC's by definition for-profit organizations? If the former, how would that designation be reached?	An LLC can obtain a 501(c)(3) designation, but all its members/owners must also be 501(c)(3) non-profits. So if Red Cross and Habitat for Humanity and Goodwill got together to start an LLC, that LLC could obtain a 501(c)(3) designation. If a human person is a member of an LLC, that LLC cannot obtain a 501(c)(3) designation. I don't think there's any reason a for-profit LLC could not accept donations from Patreon or Kickstarter, but those donations would generally be treated as income, the same as money received in exchange for goods.	What would be an appropriate legal classification? A trust. How could this entity be structured so it could manage multiple estates? As a trust. Could this entity choose to keep, say, 30% for internal use e.g. resuscitation research? If that’s what it says in the trust deed, yes. How could this entity be made "recession-bulletproof," such that it could survive collapse of civilization? It can’t. Could it be given autonomy under the direction of a single person, or even sovereignty along the lines of a Mars colony? A trust is managed by its trustee(s) for the benefit of the beneficiaries. A trustee can be an individual or a corporation and there can be one or more of them. It couldn’t be given sovereignty - only nation states are sovereign. Could it be immune from legal jeopardy if it chose to accept clients who volunteer to be frozen before they die? No. What might happen to the estates if the economy is radically altered, e.g. a scarcity-free system where money is obsolete? Beats me - you’re the science fiction writer, you make it up.	Based on a reply from the Charitable Law Office of Ohio Attorney General: Hello, I am in receipt of your inquiry below. Please be advised that there is nothing to prohibit using electronic storage for your organization’s business documents. Many organizations find this method to be a very effective measure as opposed to retaining hard copies. ... it seems electronic storage is wholly permitted.	You can do it using a US non-profit, but you need a lawyer We know it can be done in the US using a non-profit because it has been done. For example, the Clay Institute’s Millennium Prize does exactly what you propose: it pays people who solve unsolved math problems. Similarly, the the Everglades Foundation used a prize to get people to come up with new ways to get phosphates out of the water sources. To do what they did, you need to follow their lead, and set up and run a non-profit (aka, 501(c)(3), named after the relevant provision of the tax code). Because non-profits are tax exempt under US tax law, you have to apply to the IRS to become a non-profit. Speaking broadly, the IRS imposes two requirements on non-profits: 1) It must serve a charitable purpose; 2) It must spend a certain percentage of its money every year doing charitable work. To set up a foundation you have to specify the charitable purpose you will serve (“encourage research in mathematics”), and have a plan to do so (“we will award a cash prize to people who solve important unsolved problems”). If the IRS decides your plan is genuine, then they give you a pass on paying taxes. To make sure you are carrying out your charitable plan, the IRS requires you to spend a certain percentage of your money each year on charitable work. (This is called the "distribution requirement.") Meeting the distribution requirement may be a problem, since you may not award prizes every year. You may be able to get a general idea about how the IRS deals with such situations by searching on line. At some point, however, you will probably need to talk to a lawyer with experience setting up non-profits. (FWIW, it looks to me as if the Clay Institute meets its yearly spending requirement by supporting lots of other activities that count towards the spending requirement.) One other problem that it seems you won’t have involves giving prizes directly to individuals. For obvious reasons, the IRS is generally suspicious of prizes given to individuals, so they impose restrictions. For example, for the winner to avoid taxes, the prizes have to be for previous work. Where to go for more information: USA.gov has a nice overview of the application process here. The IRS has several publications and websites that you might find helpful: here, here, here, and here. These cover everything from the general rules to nuts-and-bolts details about which forms to use. You can read more about the IRS treatment of prizes here and here. Depending on how comfortable you are with financial statements, you may learn about how these non-profits work by reading their 990 forms. The Clay Institute's forms are here.	In business dealings, you would have a contract with a company, not with its owner. The new owner inherits both the assets and liabilities of the company. It's up to the buyer of the business to do due diligence before buying the company. The old owner may escape obligations to clients and suppliers once the sale of the business is complete, but the new owner could sue the old owner for fraud. (It may be possible to escape some liabilities by declaring bankruptcy, but that's not the situation you described. One unethical accounting trick that a company can use is to split the company into two corporations such that one branch inherits the liabilities, and it go defunct.)	The company pays you a salary A. They need to withhold some amount B of that to give to the IRS. Now, if they pay you only C and withhold amount D that is based on that amount, and then make a separate tax-deductible donation E, that means the IRS does get not only an amount D that is smaller than B, but also the company can deduct E (in part) from their own taxes. As a result, that sounds like tax evasion on the face. However, if they still pay you A, withhold B (the tax on the whole amount), and payout C to you as well as the donation as part of your salary, that could possibly be a legal way - though you might want to consult your tax consultant.	No An LLC that didn’t exist at the time of the act or omission that caused the loss being sued over is not a valid defendant. They would sue you personally and all of your assets, including the LLC, would be available to the creditor.	united-states The license won't let you sell the .stl file. Probably you have created a derivative work, which means you can't sell it without a copyright license (and the CC-A-NC won't do). If it were licensed under CC-A you could sell it without problems (you'd have to give attribution, of course). You could also sell it under the CC-A-SA, but once you do you have no control over the result -- anyone you sold it to could give it to someone else under the terms of the license. This could work, though, if it were (say) a commission and you only expected to sell one copy. I don't know what the situation would be with the physical objects printed under any of these licenses.
Can a former United States president be criminally prosecuted for acts committed when he was president? Just after voting to acquit Trump, GOP senate leader Mitch McConnel said: We have a criminal justice system in this country. We have civil litigation. And former presidents are not immune from being accountable by either one. (source) However, given the past 4 years of discussion regarding the immunity of a sitting president, can Trump be prosecuted for alleged crimes he commited while being president, or is his immunity invalid only for crimes commited as a private citizen?	Yes The rule against prosecuting a sitting President is not a law, it is a Justice Department opinion and policy. The justification for it is that dealing with a criminal case would be severely distracting to the President, and thus harmful to the nation. Besides, the opinion goes on, any serious issue can be dealt with by impeachment. That reasoning obviously does not apply to a former President. Article I, section 3, paragraph 7 of the US constitution says: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. (emphasis added) This clearly contemplates the criminal prosecution of a former office holder, after such a person was removed by an impeachment. There is no exception for a President. Therefor a President can be criminally charged and prosecuted for actions during the presidency, provided that the evidence to establish probable cause is there, and that a Grand Jury indicts said former President. So far as I know there has never been a case where such a thing was done. President Ford's pardon of President Nixon stopped any Federal prosecution of him. I think there have been cases were former US Judges, after impeachment, were criminally prosecuted. But that is not quite the same thing -- no one claims that sitting judges are immune to criminal charges. To be clear this would not apply just to issues that a President had been impeached for. A former President is no different from anyone else in this respect. Any such person can be prosecuted if there is probable cause, and convicted if there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal violation of some law, even if the violation occurred while the president was in office.	From Clinton v. Jones 520 U.S. 681 (1997): Deferral of this litigation until petitioner's Presidency ends is not constitutionally required. [...] The separation-of-powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. [...] Nixon v Fitzgerald provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. Nixon v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 731 (1982): Petitioner, as a former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. [...] The President's absolute immunity extends to all acts within the "outer perimeter" of his duties of office.	Perhaps. The relevant law is assembled into notes on 3 USC 102. The original act of 1963 defines President-elect in this manner: (c) The terms 'President-elect' and 'Vice-President-elect' as used in this Act shall mean such persons as are the apparent successful candidates for the office of President and Vice President, respectively, as ascertained by the Administrator following the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President in accordance with title 3, United States Code, sections 1 and 2. There is no specific statutory provision directing the Administrator of the GSA to ascertain who is that President-Elect. The administration is apparently taking a position similar to that taken by the Clinton administration, that states determine who has been elected, and the states have not officially determined who has been elected: nor has a candidate conceded. If a court orders the Administrator to make the ascertainment, I expect that the administration would appeal the ruling up to the Supreme Court. This letter, addressed to the Administrator, gives the legal rationale.	The best course of action for Barr would be to file an objection to the subpoena in the proper court (probably the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) under or by analogy to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d) (which governs disputes over subpoenas in civil cases in the federal courts), if he thinks that there are matters he cannot lawfully divulge or thinks it is improper to divulge even if they are not privileged, and to let a judge decide. Generally speaking, in a civil action, you can only object to a subpoena by following this process and Congress has increasingly used the civil lawsuit discovery process as a benchmark. Failure to file an objection with the proper court, or at least in a response to Congress by the date required in the subpoena to produce the materials, will generally constitute a waiver of the objections that might otherwise have been asserted to the subpoena. Simply not responding without explanation by the due date would be a pretty clear case of Contempt of Congress which is the basis for both a civil action and criminal contempt charges. For example, in the Lynch case, cited below, the Court stated with respect to information that was withheld without any claim of privilege: Failure to provide any grounds for withholding particular records does not comply with the order or enable the Court to resolve defendant’s privilege claims as to those documents. Accordingly, defendant must produce the material withheld without any proffered justification. This said, in any dispute between Congress and the Executive Branch there is always some uncertainty, and the courts strongly favor negotiation and conferral between the parties before bringing these matters to a head. A general discussion of Congressional subpoenas can be found here, recognizing, however, that while there are a variety of grounds for redaction asserted in the Mueller report case, "Executive Privilege" is not among them and so the special considerations that apply to an assertion of executive privilege do not apply. The authority of the judicial branch to resolve these issues has been upheld, for example, in the cases of United States v. Nixon (U.S. 1974) and Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Lynch (D. D.C 2016) (both of which involved the more difficult scenario of an assertion of executive privilege in addition to the more ordinary assertions of privileges like the grand jury privilege). Not infrequently, the judge will review the unredacted material in camera (i.e. privately in chambers without showing it to the requesting party) to determine if the claim of privilege or other basis for redaction is really valid (e.g. maybe something that was redacted under the label grand jury testimony is not, in fact, grand jury testimony). But, there is case law to support the notion that Congress would have to demonstrate some specific reason why it doubts the accuracy of the assertions of the executive branch regarding redactions in this particular case to make it necessary for there to be an in camera review. In the Lynch case (which is a non-precedential opinion itself) the Court said: As for whether the redactions are what they purport to be, the Court notes that counsel for even the most disputatious parties are often called upon to trust each other, and that the judiciary relies regularly on declarations by the executive branch that matters redacted from FOIA productions are what they are described to be in the Vaughn index. See Loving v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that district court had not abused its discretion by relying on agency’s Vaughn index and declaration in determining whether a disputed document contained segregable portions); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The reviewing court may rely on the description of the withheld records set forth in the Vaughn index and the agency’s declaration that it released all segregable information.”). The Court has been provided with no reason to believe that its assistance is needed to verify for counsel for one branch of government assertions made in pleadings by an officer of the court representing another, equal branch of government. If in the end, a neutral is required to read each individual redaction and confirm that what the Department claims is simply a name or a telephone number is in fact a name or a telephone number, the parties can arrange for that on their own. These discretionary issues are likely to be influenced by the partisan leanings of the particular judges involved. Another question is to whom a subpoena could be directed. While attorney-general Barr is one possible person to whom it could be directed, Mueller himself is another possible person to whom a subpoena could be directed and that might lead to a more tractable counter-party in the lawsuit and might simplify some of the conflicts of interest present in a subpoena of the attorney-general himself that in criminal contempt cases is enforceable by his subordinates, i.e. U.S. attorneys, who are required by law to bring such charges.	It is not a crime in the US. It may be a firing offense depending on the nature of the appointment (that is, what exactly do you mean by "diplomat"?) or at least cause for demotion / reassignment. A diplomat from another country could be declared persona non grata, but again it is not a crime to act contrary to a governmental boycott call, in the US. This follows from the First Amendment.	Article II of the Constitution does say that "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors". So it is true that a president or a federal judge could be impeached and removed from office, and it has happened to some extent 19 times – in 8 cases it went all the way to removal (as opposed to acquittal or resignation). However, this would not be a very effective way to avert a "crisis". Any judicial ruling is subject to appeal by a higher court, until you get to the Supreme Court. Moreover, impeaching a lower judge does not erase his or her rulings. So ultimately, a matter will be decided by SCOTUS. In anticipation of such a ruling, Congress might decide to get rid of some Supreme Court justice who they think might stand in the way. That was attempted with Samuel Chase, who was acquitted. Such a decision is not subject to judicial review (Nixon v. United States 506 U.S. 224). However, SCOTUS can also overturn that decision though that would be very unusual. It would also be very unusual for Congress to impeach a Supreme Court justice for having a position that they disagree with. At any rate, there is no such thing as a "deadlock" between branches of government. When the court rules, that is the end of the matter from a legal perspective. It is, in fact, entirely possible that a general will rule that the court or the president (or both) are wrong and will declare what the law now is, but that takes us out of the realm of legal discussions.	Let's start with the most important point first: A campaign finance violation is not a ground to remove an elected official from office, no matter how egregious, on its own, even if one could prove that the campaign finance violation probably caused the outcome of an election to change. Congress could decide, however, that a campaign finance violation constitutes a "high crime or misdemeanor" for which a sitting President could be impeached, if a majority of the House of Representatives votes to impeach the President and a two-thirds majority of the U.S. Senate trying the impeachment under the supervision of the Chief Justice of the United States (that and not "Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court" is the official title) finds that the offense set forth in the impeachment has been committed and constitutes sufficient grounds to remove the President from office. At the outset, there is some ambiguity over whether the violation of campaign finance laws would have been by individual person, or the political campaign of the individual person (which is a Section 529 non-profit organization). The individual or the campaign, as the case might be, would definitely owe either civil or criminal fines, as the case might be, for a violation of the particular campaign finance laws that the individual or campaign is alleged to have violated. The violation could also affect the ability of the violator to obtain all or any amount of federal matching funds in a future election. Depending upon the particular campaign finance law involved, which isn't clearly specified, there might be a criminal penalty (either a misdemeanor or a minor felony) as well, which could give rise to a probation sentence, a sentence to some period of incarceration, a period of post-release parole, criminal fines, court costs, and, at least in the case of a felony, some collateral consequences of that conviction such as a prohibition on owning a gun and ineligibility for many occupations and jobs. Neither a civil campaign finance violation, nor a criminal conviction for a campaign finance violation, disqualifies someone from holding the office of President. The President does not have immunity from civil or criminal consequences of campaign finance violations committed prior to taking office, and the President's campaign, at a minimum, is not immune to campaign finance violations at any time. Presidential immunity from liability is limited to the conduct of the President while holding the office in furtherance of the governance duties of the President. Generally speaking, campaigning would not be a governance duty of the President, but there are factual circumstances under which it is hard to distinguish between what constitutes governing and what constitutes campaigning in the case of a sitting President who is currently in office. Also, campaign finance violations can't be prosecuted by just anyone. A violation of federal campaign finance laws must be prosecuted by a federal government lawyer authorized to do so by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which has an even partisan balance of members by design and almost always deadlocks on motions to prosecute anything but the least controversial and most blatant campaign finance violations against members of either of the two major political parties in the United States. A "private attorney general" can't bring a lawsuit to enforce campaign finance laws unilaterally. The President can definitely pardon a criminal violation of a campaign finance law by anyone other than himself. The President definitely cannot pardon a civil violation of a campaign finance law by anyone. The majority and more analytically sound position is that the President cannot pardon himself for his own criminal violation of a campaign finance law (there are prior questions and answer at Law.SE regarding that question). A judge considering a campaign finance violation charge against a sitting President could, however, take steps short of dismissing the charges that could accommodate a sitting President. For example, the judge could be very deferential to the President in setting hearing dates, allowing the President to participate in proceedings by telephone or (in some but not all cases) through a representative, or in setting the amount of a bond or the terms of pre-trial release in the event of a criminal charge, or in cooperating with the President's security detail when the President is required to appear. In a civil violation case, the President would probably be allowed to be a deposition witness, with the deposition testimony used at trial, rather than appearing in person at trial, if his lawyers requested that treatment.	To the best of my knowledge, there is no crime under US law known as "despotism". However, many of the actions that might be called "despotism" are crimes, civil violations, or possibly violations of police regulations. "use of excessive force", "false arrest", "illegal detention",. and "deprivation of civil rights" might apply, as might various other charges or causes of suit. In particular there is 42 U.S. Code § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights often known simply as "section 1983". This provides that: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. ... This means that if a police officer or other government official takes action based on his or her authority as a police officer or government official that deprives someone of rights, the person deprived can sue the police officer or official in court, and collect damages directly and personally from the officer. This is limited by qualified immunity. That says that is a point of law has not been "clearly established" police can not be sued for violating it. The exact limits of when qualified immunity applies is a complex topic that has been the subject of many legal cases, quite a few decided by the US Supreme Court. The rules have changed over time. But what has not changed is that clear violations of constitutional and statutory rights by the police and others can give grounds for a federal lawsuit against the people who committed such violations. qualified-immunity, section-1983
If I'm the CEO and largest shareholder of a public company, would taking anything from my office be considered as a theft? To summarize it, I'll give an example: I'm Bill Gates. I own Microsoft. On a desk, there's a Microsoft Surface that is branded by my company. I decide to take it home and never bring it back, although I didn't buy it personally, and the company's budget was spent on it. Would that be a theft?	Yes. Let's assume this anecdote takes place while Gates was CEO. Bill Gates doesn't own all of Microsoft, and as an officer of the company, he owes a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company and its shareholders as a whole. Taking the company's property for personal use breaches that fiduciary duty. Now, in this particular hypothetical, Gates might have a decent argument that, as a public figure who can afford any piece of technology he desires, him being seen using a Microsoft Surface actually is acting in the company's best interests. But that wouldn't apply in the hypothetical scenario where he took, say, a printer.	You own it In general, if you own an object, you can do what you like with it if you otherwise comply with the law. It is possible that a particular object may be protected under heritage or similar law, but if it isn’t, and you comply with environmental and safety law, you grind that thing into dust if you want to. Of course, if it did, you would never be able to delete a voicemail, email, or throw out used notepaper - they’re all copyright.	This is a good example of the life of the law being experience and not reason. While there is a logical argument that this isn't theft, in reality, this conduct would universally be considered an open and shut case of shoplifting and anyone who tried this would surely be convicted of a crime with consequences far more severe than creating a tort debt for conversion of the property. Also, you do intend to permanently deprive the store of its property. The fact that you intend to remedy that by paying for it doesn't change that. You aren't borrowing the property with an intent of returning it.	What you describe is forbidden by corporate law in every jurisdiction with which I'm familiar. I don't know the law in Quebec, but in principle: An entity in control of a corporation can't use that control to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of other shareholders. (If he does so through deceit then he is committing the common law tort of fraud, and quite likely a criminal offense.) A trustee or fiduciary that uses his control of assets to enrich himself at the expense of those to whom he owes a duty (e.g., minority shareholders) is guilty of various statutory offenses, among which may be "Breach of Fiduciary Duty" and "Fraudulent transfer." Sales of corporate assets in general must be done through an "arms-length" mechanism. If they are being auctioned off, and the auction isn't open, so that an insider is able to purchase them below "fair market value," then, once again, a fraud has been committed. The grading and remedies vary by jurisdiction. Of course, whether it's worth pursuing a remedy through legal action depends (as always) on: the amount at stake, the cost of pursuing the remedy, statutory allowances for punitive damages, the likelihood and cost of collecting on any judgement won. Only a lawyer familiar with the jurisdiction, the complaint, and the corporation's governing documents could help you answer that question.	The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture.	You certainly can claim whatever you want. Will you be granted it though? Time is money indeed, and replacing the damaged items requires some time not just items themselves. The question is how much time and at what rate? Your duty will be to mitigate the damages and so to minimise the time and its cost. Will your normal hourly rate be applicable? Only if you have to use your actual work time and miss out on earning for those hours. It will probably be unreasonable to use work time in the first place, let alone that you may not necessarily miss out any earnings in case it's a salaried job and your boss is fine to just let you go for a few hours to sort out personal issues. If the time you use for replacement is evenings/weekends then you would need to quantify how much you miss out on not doing what you would do otherwise.	No. Theft is, in most jurisdiction, an action by which the offender takes another person's property with the intent to permanently deprive them of it. The clerk isn't taking any property from the store, and she doesn't have any intent to deprive the store of anything. She is therefore not guilty of theft. If she were doing this intentionally -- either in league with the customer or even without the customer knowing -- she could likely be held liable for the theft, either on a conspiracy theory or perhaps an innocent-agency theory. The lack of criminal liability of course does not mean that there can be no accountability. The employer is free to terminate the employee, and it will have different options -- depending on jurisdiction -- to recover the value of the uncharged printers, perhaps by docking her paycheck or through a negligence action.	This is not theft, this is a contract dispute. You gave them money, they promised to do certain things, the contract says what that is. I surmise that they wanted a deposit to cover their costs in further dealing with you (moving is more complicated and costly than buying a loaf of bread), so in walking away from the deal, you've economically damaged them to some amount. The deposit is "liquidated damages". Your recourse is to sue them for that amount, because... Perhaps you didn't understand why you were giving them this deposit (an act that constitute some level of agreement), but any time you hand over a deposit, there is a circumstance under which you will not get that money back, and you have to understand what that circumstance is.
What does "surety and scholar initial" mean I have received an award letter of a scholarship which has terms and conditions to be printed on a non-legal stamp paper. There are 4 pages and at the end of each page there are the terms "Scholar Initial" and "Guarantor/Surety Initial" side by side with a short blank line above each, indicating that something needs to be written on it. What do they mean and what should be their purpose?	It means that the scholar (presumably you) and the guarantor/surety should each write their initials in that space, i.e. the first letters of their first and last names. John Smith would write "JS". This is a common way of acknowledging that you have read and understood the text on the page.	The matter is not clear-cut (and the university lawyers are presumably relying on that fact). The bold part and following overstates the situation, especially the unconstrained "publishing anything" edict. You can publish whatever you want that the university doesn't have a legal interest in. The clause that says "If you have co-authors or co-researchers you must ask their permission before publishing, and include their names" is true, and defines a limit on their control. If you don't have co-authors, it's none of their legal business. (There can be issues regarding publishing an affiliation, so let's put that on hold). They can, however, prohibit you from claiming an affiliation with Pod U, unless you submit your works to some internal vetting organization. This requirement should, however, be stated somewhere perhaps in the rules of the graduate school (not just the student handbook); or the other legally-enforceable rules. You should also pay attention to the exact words that they use. You must ask permission to publish work done with a co-author (that's a fact: it's a standard requirement in universities). It is important to be sure that the information you publish is correct (clearly that is not in dispute). They are allowed to ask you to get X's approval. The First Amendment does not prohibit them from urging you to follow a course of action.	A "writ" is a formal written order issued by a court to another entity. A "writ of mandamus" is an order to a lower court or government official to do something they are obliged to do by law. It is one of the "prerogative writs". Another well-known example is a "writ of habeas corpus": an order to produce a detained person in court, in particular to determine whether the detention is lawful. A person might ask a court to issue a writ.	First of all, the notice is legally optional, and so a notice not conforming to any standard does no harm. But if one wishes to conform, under US law,17 USC 401 (b) provides that: (b) Form of Notice.—If a notice appears on the copies, it shall consist of the following three elements: (b) (1) the symbol © (the letter C in a circle), or the word “Copyright”, or the abbreviation “Copr.”; and (b) (2) the year of first publication of the work; in the case of compilations or derivative works incorporating previously published material, the year date of first publication of the compilation or derivative work is sufficient. ...; and (b) (3) the name of the owner of copyright in the work, or an abbreviation by which the name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the owner. Note that it is the name of the owner of the work, not of the author or first owner. It is the year of first publication, not the yer the owner acquired the copyright. So in your example the technically proper notice would be: Copyright 2015 New Company Ltd. I believe this would suffice as a proper notice in any country that complies with the Berne Copyright Convention or the TRIPS agreement (which is the vast majority of all countries in the would). The symbol © can be substituted for the word "copyright" and might be more comfortable internationally. The phrase "All Rights Reserved" was never required under US law, but was once standard, because it was required for full protection under the Buenos Aires Convention. As the Wikipedia article says of this statement: As the Buenos Aires Convention was not modified, the presence of a simple copyright notice was sufficient to ensure mutual recognition of copyright between countries which became parties to the UCC (which only Honduras never did). As of 23 August 2000, all parties to the Buenos Aires Convention are also parties to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which provides for mutual recognition of copyright without any formalities (Art. 5.2 Berne) So "All Rights Reserved" is even less required than the optional copyright notice, although it does serve to remind people that a work is not under an open-source or permissive license. And of course it does no legal harm. But it can safely be omitted, its retention is essentially a matter of habit and tradition, its legal value ceased in 1952 when the UCC effectively superseded the Buenos Aires Convention. The same notice would be suitable for a notice displayed when the program runs, and indeed for any copyright notice on any kind of work (although in some cases the year can be omitted). Effect of Notice in US 17 USC 401 (d) provides that: (d) Evidentiary Weight of Notice.—If a notice of copyright in the form and position specified by this section appears on the published copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had access, then no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages, except as provided in the last sentence of section 504(c)(2). The cited sentence of 504(c)(2) deals with an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library, archive, or public broadcasting entity who reasonably believes that copying fell under fair use.	I presume that the document refers to "barn" and "barnebarn". Norway has forced heirship laws, which refers to offspring as "barn", not limited to those under the age of majority. Interpreted in the context of Norwegian law, there is no assertion in using the word that it grants a right to minors. When you add the additional condition that the recipient must have reached the age of majority, there is no conflict. In this kolonihage bylaws document, which is probably similar to the one you are looking at, §11.2.1 requires that a tranferee fulfill the criteria required for the allocation of parcels, and §11.2.2 addresses the non-necessity of paying the transfer fee in the case of death of the member, and does not create a special inheritance right. It also says that the new contract must be established. But a minor cannot establish a contract, and in general cannot be forced to fulfill the obligations of a member as spelled out in §9. You should check with a lawyer to be certain, of course.	Unless there is something special in Pakistani case law on this topic, it would pass the originality requirement. In my opinion, it is actually very well laid out, and it is clearly not just slapping a few tags on plain text. This article does not indicate any particularly high standards for originality in Pakistan.	I do not believe that there is any requirement to number clauses, paragraphs, or pages, and I have certainly seen contracts where none of these are numbered. It is a common practice to number provisions in some way, in particular to make reference from one to another easier. But not all contracts include such internal references. Contracts presented in electronic form, such as on a web page, may not have any clear concept of separate pages, and so page numbers would be pointless on such contracts. Page numbers on contracts printed out are common, but I do not know of any legal requirement for such numbers. For contracts presented in electronic form, one can ensure against unauthorized modification by including a checksum or hash of the contract text. If a one-way hash function is used, it will be quite hard to produce a text with a different content but an identical hash value. This technique could also be used on printed contracts. However, I do not recall seeing this technique used in practice.	It is actually because "this is important". Under US law, disclaimers must be "conspicuous" (UCC 2-316). So you can talk regularly when you're just stating the terms, but if you're disclaiming liability, YOU MUST BE CONSPICUOUS ("to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous"). There are many ways to make text conspicuous, so bold or larger type would do, but all-caps is pretty bullet-proof from a technological perspective. Thanks to ohwilleke for salient citations: invalidation of a plain-type buried indemnification clause, all-caps clause held to be sufficient, law review article on the conspicuousness requirement.
UK: What information are the police legally required to collect when going door-to-door, and why? A few days ago, a police officer knocked on my door in the evening and asked whether I had noticed any disturbances in my street earlier in the day - he said it was in relation to reports that they'd had, and were investigating. I informed him that I hadn't noticed anything, and he then asked whether I had been at home at the time of the disturbance, and what I was doing at that time, as well as taking my name and date of birth. What are the reasons/ legal requirements that the police might need my personal information, given that I had not been able to provide any further information/ witness testimony to the incident that they were investigating? I would understand the need to collect it had I been able to provide any further information regarding the incident, or been asked to provide a witness statement, but given I hadn't been able to, what would the legal reasons be for them to collect/ hold this information?	What are the reasons/ legal requirements that the police might need my personal information, given that I had not been able to provide any further information/ witness testimony to the incident that they were investigating? The police in england-and-wales have a duty to undertake reasonable lines of enquiry and to carry out a proportionate investigation in to allegations of crime. No-one is legally obliged to answer house to house questions but, notwithstanding the honesty and integrity of the majority of members of the public, any information held by the police may need to be corroborated to identify or eliminate suspects, witnesses, evidential opportunities or other lines of enquiry. Also, if it is established that someone has no information that may assist the investigation this is recorded to prevent duplication of effort thus enabling the police to focus their resources accordingly. All the while complying with the relevant privacy and data retention legislation.	Yes, "The offender will receive a criminal record." But, you ask, "How is this squared with s14(1) of the 2000 Act?" Well, you will note that it states that it "shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any purpose other than the purposes of the proceedings." The key here is "other than the purposes of the proceedings" which means that, although there is no further punishment for your crime, you have still been convicted officially and it will be noted (on your record) as per the proceedings, and may be brought up in any subsequent proceedings ( "and of any subsequent proceedings which may be taken against the offender under section 13 above." ). You will also note section 12(7): "Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a court, on discharging an offender absolutely or conditionally in respect of any offence, from making an order for costs against the offender or imposing any disqualification on him or from making in respect of the offence an order under section 130, 143 or 148 below (compensation orders, deprivation orders and restitution orders)." Which further shows that an absolute discharge is not an absolute pardon, and should not be thought of as such. Rather, "You are very much guilty, but of such a minor crime that the experience of a trial has probably been enough, so we'll let you go without additional punishment."	I overdosed on an illegal drug and called an ambulance. I was honest and told them what I took. [emphasis added] You stated that you had possession, and had recently used a notable amount, of an illegal substance. That is reasonable cause (or "probable cause" in some jurisdictions) for a search, regardless of a warrant, and they do not need permission. For example, as FindLaw.com explains, in the USA. [p]olice may use firsthand information, or tips from an informant to justify the need to search your property. If an informant's information is used, police must prove that the information is reliable under the circumstances.	You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.	The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing	Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.	No. The police cannot determine if you have a lawful reason to know the details. Not their job. You can file your civil case using fictitious defendant name and then just apply for a court order to disclose who the guy actually is as part of the disclosure process. Provided that the court is satisfied you have a case, it will grant such order and the police will have to obey it.	It seems clear that this is personal information under the GDPR. If you are subject to the GDPR, you need to have a "lawful basis" to store or process such information. (You are subject to the GDPR if you are locates in the EU, or if your users are. My understanding is that it is location at the time the app is accessed that matters, not a user's citizenship. I am not totally sure about that, however. Unless your app is limited to non-EU access, it it probably safest to comply with the GDPR) The degree of precision of your location data will not matter -- a specific city is quite enough to make it personal data if it can be tied to a specific person. There are various lawful bases that may be relied on for processing and storage, but explicit consent is probably the one with the widest applicability. To use consent as the lawful basis, you must present an OPT-IN decision to the user, and record the results. If the user does nothing, the result must record lack of consent. You may not use a pre-checked consent box or another mechanism that has the effect of an opt-out choice. You should be clear about what information will be stored, and how it will or might be used. You will also need to consider how your app will function for those who do not consent, and how to handle requests to withdraw consent. So if an app obtains user consent to store location data in a manner that complies with the GDPR, it may store user location data. The consent should make the possible uses of the data clear. If the data is to be shared, the consent should make the possible extent of sharing clear. Some previous questions and answers here on law.se dealing with GDPR consent that seem possibly relevant: User consent required under GDPR What provisions should I make regarding GDPR consent when users do not sign themselves up? GDPR - Withdrawn user consent Opt Out Consent under GDPR
Would a contract to pay a trillion dollars in damages be valid? Let's say you write a contract with someone, and you want to make sure they don't breach it. You could just have them covenant certain things, but then they'd only be liable for whatever damages you could actually prove in court. Let's say you instead wrote that they'd pay you one trillion dollars if they breached the contract. This would mean that they would instantly be insolvent, allowing you to seize all their assets. What's the advisable way to do this? Is there a legally valid way of stating "all the money you have, and then some", other than just writing a ludicrously large sum of money? What if the value of the dollar goes down? Would this be enforceable, or would the contract risk being set aside for undue hardship? I am asking for the context of a software license.	What you're talking about is a liquidated-damages clause, where the contract explicitly spells out the damages to be awarded in the event of a breach. The law will vary some from state to state, but these clauses are generally enforceable. Some courts limit their use to cases where calculating the damages resulting from the breach would be impossible or impractical. But in the United States, along with all other common law jurisdictions, courts generally agree that if the liquidated-damages clause appears to penalize the breach instead of simply compensating for it, it is not enforceable. See, e.g., Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Ass'n, 17 Cal.4th 970, 977 (Cal. 1998) (“A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671(b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.”) The trillion-dollar damages clause "bears no reasonable relationship" to the damages that would actually result from a breach of a software license, so you can safely expect a court to refuse to enforce it, and limit you to whatever damages you could actually prove in court. Even if you were to drastically reduce it to "all the money you have, and then some," "all the money you have," "half the money you have," or even " "1 percent of all the money you have," the language still makes clear that the contract is not aimed at compensating for the breach, but rather penalizing the breaching party. In the end, what you're talking about isn't going to work, because contract law is generally less concerned with penalizing people than with making them whole.	No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.	You can read about (federal) damages from the Surface Transportation, but they are at least liable for 60 cent per lb. for damages. The company has to inform you that you have the option for full-value, which you can waive. In addition, they are allowed to limit their liability for damages for items of high value such as furs and jewelry, things worth more that $100/lb (sounds like the coffee table might be such a thing). You are also required to give notice of high-value items. If you waived full coverage in exchange for a lower rate, then it would be non-productive to take them to small claims court. Also, under state law, there may be an arbitration clause which would prevent you from suing them (so, check the contract).	No. Reason: Taxes are not a contract for specific services, so even if the government did nothing for you in return for your taxes, you do not have recourse to a rebate for "breech of contract." The only recourse is political. Theoretically if the government failed to provide a service that was required by law or Constitution, there could be legal action to force the government to do that action but you still don't get your tax money back. It might be an interesting act of civil disobedience, but no not legal. That is the answer. But to address some of the other premises of your question (Note: these are irrelevant because see above answer): The U.S. government runs at a deficit anyway, meaning the amount spent each year is more than the amount of revenue collected. For example, in May, 2018 the CBO estimated that for FY2018: BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR FY 2018 (As of May 24, 2018 ) OUTLAYS $4.1 Trillion REVENUES $3.3 Trillion DEFICIT $793 Billion DEBT HELD BY THE PUBLIC (End of Fiscal Year) $15.7 Trillion So even if in the partial shutdown, gov saved 20%, every cent of your taxes would still go to the expenditures; the deficit would just be a little less. The U.S. government is saving quite a bit of money by not paying some subset of its employees, etc. .... believe that many of those employees will not receive back-pay. Probably not true. In the past modern shutdowns, employees received the back pay, whether they worked as emergency employees or were home. A bill as already been proposed in Congress to ensure that all will be paid when this ends. Some contractors might not get paid because they get paid by their employers, not directly by the gov. So in some cases no work, no pay. There are bills proposed to get them paid also. Note- I do not at all mean to downplay the effect on people's finances and morale. Missing a paycheck today even if the money will/might come eventually is a real hardship.	Let's say you have an actual contract where you give A something of value in consideration of which B gives you something of value. That way, the exchange is legally enforceable and is not just a cancellable promise. This is all written up clearly, and you become a creditor. One thing to bear in mind is that you may have to wait in line so that others are paid first. For example, taxes have to be paid, also secured creditors have to be paid. Nearly at the end of the list, unsecured creditors such as you are paid, and finally heirs can receive shares of what is left. I don't know what you mean by "recognizing" a debt, but what a financial institution could do is treat a debt as an asset, for the purposes of a loan. For instance, a bank might lend you $10,000 where you pledge your home as a thing of value that they can take in case you default on repayment. You cannot force a bank to accept a particular asset as collateral, so the answer to the "how" question is "by persuasion". Since your asset has an indefinite value between $0 and let's say $10,000, you would have to persuade the bank that there is negligible risk to them. In the case of property used as collateral, when you default the creditor can use the courts to seize your property and sell it, but they can't seize the property of a third party who owes you something, they would have to wait possibly for years for the third party to die and see what's left. Investment instruments might be used as collateral, but only if they can be liquidated reasonably promptly. The risk to the bank is extremely high, but if you are very persuasive, they might accept such a debt as collateral.	It seems that you have a valid contract and he has breached it. You could sue for the value of a year's hosting in a small claims court. Whether this is worth the effort ...	Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy.	There is no fixed rule for this. Every situation is different, and of course there is nothing specific to software in there. It is very much a matter of intent. For example, negative profits are no clear sign. Company X thinks they could make $6 million profit by developing a product and selling it, minus $4 million development cost. It turns out development cost is $10 million. Raising prices is not possible because of competition. Company X will suffer losses of $4 million, without being predatory in any way. The reality is that a judge will look at the situation, take everything into account, and make a decision based on what they see. Since this is all about competition law, the main point is the intent or effect that your pricing makes competition impossible. That's what the judge will decide. For example, if you offer your service for $500,000 while others offer a similar service for $1,000,000 you could be using some super efficient processes that allow you to make money at that price, or you might have an idiotic sales person who will drive your company into bankruptcy, or you are trying to drive your competitors out of business. That's what the judge will decide.
Make my Day... in the office? Assume Adam, Esquire, is working in Colorado. He has an office different from his home. Let's say Downtown in a sleepy town that has no extra gun control laws. It's 3 AM and he is working on the filings for the next day, the light visible from the front street, but not the back. His trusty Taurus Public Defender is sitting on a pile of files next to him. Butch decides that he wants to break into the office of Mr. Adam to try and steal something. Butch picks the lock and sneaks into the front room of the office. He entered from the back of the building and didn't see the light, so is not suspecting someone would be there. As a result, he isn't very silent. Adam hears the commotion and guns Butch down with a snarky remark of "Make my Day". He knew that Butch committed trespassing besides the breaking and entering - nobody is allowed to be there but him after closure. And Adam reasonably believes that Butch either is attempting to commit theft, destruction of property, or might target Adam to do him harm. That qualifies for the Make My day.... if it's in a dwelling. But is a closed office after service hours, but separate from the permanent residence, a dwelling that allows to invoke Colorado's “Make My Day law” CRS 18-1-704.5?	No Section 18-1-704.5. (1) says that : The general assembly hereby recognizes that the citizens of Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within their own homes. (*emphasis added) Subsections (2), (3), and (4) all refer to "any occupant of a dwelling" as the class authorized to use force by this section. An offie is not a dwelling. Section 18-1-901. Definitions says: (g) "Dwelling" means a building which is used, intended to be used, or usually used by a person for habitation. Section Section 18-1-704 provides that: (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203.of person's authored by this law to use force Under that provision, the use of deadly force does not seem clearly justified. It is highly questionable that "a lesser degree of force is inadequate". Any conclusion that the intruder represents an "imminent use of unlawful physical force" seems dubious, but I can't say what a court might find. This law is fairly recent, there may be no published case law for it.	So my answer depends heavily on a clarification. Are the Police Suspicious or do they have a warrant? This is a big difference in the two behaviors as the former is not a thing, from a strictly legal perspective, and the police should not be harrassing Bob, who doesn't want to talk to them, when they should be making calls to get a warrant (If the police think Bob is being disorderly, they will arrest him and Bob should zip it, get an attorney down to the station, and let the Lawyer yell at the cops... and the judge... and the prosecutor and whoever else... If it's the latter case, they don't need to ask Bob to have Bob come outside... they can kick in the door and arrest Bob or remove him as part of executing the warrant. That's why you have them. In the situation as described, it reads like there was some crime in the area and the police think Bob may have some knowledge about it (he need not have done it, they could be looking for a witness). Bob does not have to say anything to the cops as per his rights against self-incrimination, so Bob tells them he does not wish to speak to them, possibly in an irksome manner and the Police won't take no for an answer. Perhaps they really think Bob might be the criminal... this doesn't necessary mean they have evidence to arrest Bob on. Perhaps Bob was identified by a guy off of security camera footage... maybe it was Bob, or maybe it was Bob's evil twin he never knew about and Bob's been home all night Keeping Up With The Kardassians (anyone knows Bob knows he can't stand going a week without knowing what Kim and Kanye are doing). Either way, it could be enough for a search warrant but just wanting to talk without a warrant, Bob can refuse and they need to respect that. Again, it's probably a bad faith arrest, but the street is not the place to have that fight... save it for the courts.	None of the factors you list about Charlie committing a crime, about to commit a crime* or being responsible for the officer's injury apply to whether or not Bob can shoot Charlie on behalf of the officer. On the other hand, if Charlie's actions lead Bob to the reasonable belief that Charlie represents an imminent threat of death or grave bodily injury to anyone then Bob will be justified in using force, including deadly force, to stop Charlie. I'm aware of many states that also allow the use of deadly force to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A normal citizen can go to great lengths to assist the police and stories of citizens coming to the aid of police officers are easily found. There may be some reason the police officer felt the need to use deadly force against Charlie. Bob will need to make his own determination based on all the factors available to him, which may include communication from the officer. If Bob decides to shoot Charlie then an investigation will center on whether it was reasonable for Bob to deduce that the use of deadly force was justified given the information available to Bob at the time. Some states have laws that penalize refusal to aid a police officer. A list of them can be found on this wikipedia page. Notably, California just repealed their statute requiring assistance. *The statutes of some states allow the use of deadly force to prevent the commission of felonies, typically forcible felonies. However, just because a crime is listed as a forcible felony doesn't always mean that deadly force can be used to stop the crime. An example comes from Florida where the statutes state that deadly force can be used to stop forcible felonies, the statutes also define burglary as a forcible felony. However, the courts have ruled that the use of such force is not reasonable where the structure being burglarized is unoccupied.	Defendant's girlfriend should produce the copies of the recording to police, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney. Possession of the recording should induce the police and prosecution to at least re-evaluate the charges against Defendant, as Defendant would be able to subpoena the gun's owner to testify about the purchase and then use the recording to impeach him if he then denies owning the gun. It is unclear, though, whether the audio actually has any value because we don't know what charges Defendant is facing. If he's charged with unlawfully owning a gun, the recording would likely be quite helpful; if he's charged with unlawfully transporting a weapon, the recording's value would probably depend on whether the law in question outlaws "knowingly" transporting a weapon or "negligently" transporting a weapon, or transporting a weapon regardless of whether he knew about it.	I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at 11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at 2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on.	It has been investigated, it simply has not been prosecuted. The investigation started when someone reported suspicious activity in Hastert's accounts. The investigation proceeded from a belief that he was being blackmailed. After listening to a wire of a conversation between Hastert and the alleged blackmailer, the officers investigating decided it was not a simple case of him being blackmailed--they or the prosecutors' office used their discretion to go after Hastert for illegally structuring his payments to avoid anti-money-laundering reporting laws, and to my knowledge have not yet pursued any blackmail charge. Police and Prosecutors have very wide discretion regarding what charges they bring. In addition, it is very common to have a civil lawsuit brought that implicates criminal laws, but not have the criminal violations be charged. For example, if you steal a purse you go to jail, but if you steal a building you are rarely charged with a criminal offense. It is rarely to a civil litigant's advantage to bring up criminal matters and there are ethical rules limiting the interaction between the two.	In Texas, as in most of the US, the law is "Employment at Will". This means that an employer is free to fire people at any time, for any reason, or none, as long as it is not for one of the few reason forbidden by law, such as racial or age discrimination. Hourly employees are entitled to overtime pay in such cases, but "exempt" employees are not. Nor are they entitled to comp-time as a matter of law, that is at the option of the employer. (The question seems to imply that the employee in question was "exempt" but does not actually say so.) The only really effective recourse against that sort of "death march" is to quit and find a better job, or to threaten to do so while they still need you, unless the conditions return to acceptable ones. I have heard of people in such a situation who "get sick" every day at 5:30pm, because local law forbid requiring ill employees to work. But that is pretty much inviting an arduous and possibly expensive administrative and/or legal battle, and will depend on the specifics of the state/local law. In any case, it is too late for the person in question to try that. On the facts as stated, there might be a valid claim of age discrimination. But additional facts would be needed to establish this, and it would be in my view unwise to try it without consulting a good employment lawyer. Such a lawyer could advise exactly what must be proved and how, and what the probable chances of any recovery would be.	Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.
Do I own derivatives of my music if I released it under CC without the SA provision? If I release music under the Creative Commons 4.0 license, without the ShareAlike provision (CC-BY-NC), do I still have the right to use derivatives of my own music however I want, as the creator of the original piece of music? For example if someone remixes my music and then releases the remix as "all rights reserved", do I still get the right to use their remix since I created the underlying music that is being remixed?	No you don't. There are two copyright holders regarding the derivative work: yourself, for creating the original. the other artist, for creating the modified version. The other artist has received the right to use your original through the CC-BY license, under the condition that they attribute you appropriately. However, you have not received any rights to the other artist's work.	It's complicated You still own your own posts First off, you own everything that you originally created. Posting it on Stack Exchange doesn't affect your rights to your own content. Incorporating suggestions If you copy any of the text from posts that were created by others, you must comply with the CC BY-SA license. The exact version will depend on when the content was posted, and can be viewed by clicking the "Share" link or viewing the post's timeline via the clock icon on the left. Currently, new posts are licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0, which requires you to (basically) provide attribution with the creator's name, a link back to the content, and an indication of whether changes were made. A more detailed description of the exact requirements is here. You would also be required to license the work that you incorporated it into under the same license. However, game mechanics aren't copyrightable. If you merely used mechanics suggested in the posts without actually using the actual creative expression (for instance, names or description text) from the posts, you would not be required to provide any attribution or use any particular license, because you didn't use any copyrightable material from the post. A thank-you would still be nice All that said, it's still a nice thing to do to provide some sort of informal thanks to those who provided valuable assistance, even when you're not legally required to do so.	Copyright is for original pieces of work. What you have made, is essentially a derivative work. Copyright is automatic for all things, unless the author has explicitly waived their rights, normally through a license. What this means, is that you have created a piece of art, that has been derived from that of the original author. You made modifications to the original artwork to produce a new one. Your creation could not, and would not have effectively existed without the original. Your image has the same shape, and the same colour tones as the original, and would likely be considered a derivative work. Since the right to derivative works is an exclusive right to the copyright holder, you would be infringing their copyright.	Under your proposal, the author cannot effectively use the software at all, much less sell his creative efforts. The EULA clearly states that copyright is automatically transferred to the vendor when a document is created. The author gets started, writes "It was a dark and stormy night" then has a moment of writer's block, saves and closes, takes a walk, then tries again. The author has transferred copyright in the work to vendor, and needs vendor's permission to make revisions. So you have to tweak the EULA to grant automatic permission to author to create derivative works (revisions), and to distribute. A more effective strategy would be to impose a revenue-sharing formula on any commercially-exploited work created using the software, rather than attempt to directly seize the intellectual property. The CC "NC" license attribute is a distant version of what you are looking for - it prohibit any money-making use of the software. What you would add to that is a condition that the software can be used commercially, provided a certain compensation be rendered. You would of course have to be very clear in advance about what was actually agreed to.	A few years ago, there was a trial in the USA about some short sound on some music CD: One party claimed that one piece of music on the CD contained a sound of less than one second length which is copied from another CD without the permission of the copyright owner of the other CD. It could never be found out if this claim was really true. The court's decision was: If it is not possible to distinguish between a copy and a work that does not depend on the other work at all, it is not a copyright infringement - even if the sound has been copied from the other CD. For this reason, I'd guess that a 4x3 image would not be a copyright infringement, yet, while 60x45 would definitely be one. Just for reference: The same image as 3x4 and as 45x60:	I know that classical music is public domain, so no-one can claim that they own classical music. That's not quite right, at least not under US law. First off, "classical music" is a style, and music in that style is not automatically in the public domain. The rule for if music is in the public domain depends on when it was written, not what style it's in. For instance, music written in the US after 1926 is likely to still be copyrighted. Second, that's about copyright in the composition. A recorded performance has its own copyright, separate from the copyright the composer has in the composition. Even if Beethoven's Ninth Symphony is public domain, a performance of it by the New York Philharmonic involves creative interpretation and belongs to the orchestra (assuming it was recorded). So unless the recording you used was public domain, it still is subject to copyright. In the US, copyright for recordings after 1972 mirrors normal copyright law; copyright for recordings before 1972 is complicated. Third, Youtube's system involves some amount of automation. It is possible that the Content ID claim involves an automated system incorrectly thinking your recording was a copyrighted one. That's why you can dispute a Content ID flag and ask the copyright holder to review it manually.	The first thing that people need to do is to quit over thinking it. That being said, I'm going to see if I can tackle your problems one by one, before summarizing and providing my own opinion: Many users don't care if their code is copied. I'm like that. I left a couple comments on Shog9's post that read this: Good point: Licensing does not prevent careless or malicious use. I'm surprised about how many people are thinking that this license will let them steal their code, because it's already happening right now. I don't want to sound pessimistic, but when thousands of people break a license/law/contract, it's a bit of a lost cause. You're not significantly damaged in a direct way, so honestly, let it go. All I want is to make sure that no one can come up to me if something of mine screwed something on there side. Aside from that, I don't care about people who don't attribute me: chances are, they have no moral sanity, and I will appreciate the people who do, and help me out. As it is, I'm 16, I share what I know with a good heart, and in a well-spirited manner, and at the end of the day, knowing that I was able to help someone out makes my day. I don't mind if my code is copied. I know that people will copy my code whether I like it or not, but I also know that there will be people in the world who will say "thanks", and will try to attribute me where possible. I feel good about that. That being said, I don't care. But the person who uses my code does. The license that affects all Stack Exchange posts are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike license, or CC BY-SA. Code contributions don't fit well with this. This excellent post on Open Source explains why it's discouraged for code. What these people want is a code-friendly license, so that they can stay in the clear when it comes to copyright issues. The next thing they want, is for someone to come after them over some licensing issue. You may think that people are good, but you never know the world around you. They can be evil. For other users, they don't mind their code being copied to another post, as long as there is a link to the post and a mention of the original author. Most people post with good intention. There's not that much of an issue from a legal perspective either: The license allows people to copy and paste into answers of their own, and since the license remains the same, there's no issue to get into. The license allows it, and contributors kind of have to acknowledge it. I don't think anyone cares what happens to code that is less than 3-4 lines at least. I can probably agree. Such code probably wouldn't be eligible for copyright anyway, since it's so trivial. Many jurisdictions have a "Threshold of Originality," which means that simple things can't be under copyright. Stack Exchange does not probably want people to own the code they submit. For example, Stack Exchange has (and probably wishes to retain) the right to keep even deleted posts in the visibility of the high rep users (even if the author is against it). Wait what? You may be right that it is in Stack Exchange's interest to host content. After all, they get hits, which helps them as a business. It is illegal for companies to host illegal content. If somebody sees objectionable, copyrighted content hosted on Stack Exchange that they would like removed, then they need to file a DMCA Takedown Request. This is also why moderators, like myself, cannot process legal requests. The reason why Stack Exchange doesn't act themselves, even if they see something that is copyrighted and objectionable, is because it's a form of liability. When YouTube began removing copyrighted content themselves, they received a wave of lawsuits (If you remove some, you need to remove all. Why didn't you remove mine? being the argument). The plaintiff's won those, and when YouTube did nothing, they weren't liable at all. If a user wants to have their content taken down, it's tricky. You need to look at the Terms of Service for Stack Exchange: (quoting Section 3) You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange When Stack Exchanges gets your content, you grant them an irrevocable license to your contribution. This is pretty standard across a lot of sites: it's just a way to secure data and stay in the clear of licensing issues. At the same time, it doesn't seem fair for SE to acquire complete ownership of the content. The user must still have the final say, if the content is to be used for purposes not already agreed upon in the licence. They don't. What users have done is that they have provided a license of their content to Stack Exchange. This is done, again, through their Terms of Service: You grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works and store such Subscriber Content and to allow others to do so in any medium now known or hereinafter developed (“Content License”) in order to provide the Services, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by You. The user grants a license to their content to Stack Exchange, but they do not assign or relinquish copyright. The code still belongs to them. It's important not to conflate the user contribution policy, with copyright assignment. You are still free to add an additional license to your content (known as dual or multi-licensing), and have a copy for your own use. Stack Exchange will always host a copy licensed under the CC BY-SA license. Stack Exchange can expect a high level of decorum and respect for laws from its users. At the same time, it cannot expect redundant attributions anywhere and everywhere, because one of its main aims is to not waste the users' time. Not only Stack Exchange expects it, but many copyright laws in various jurisdictions require it too. There's a concept known in many jurisdictions known as moral rights. These are rights that are irrevocable, whether you like it or not. Generally, these include attributions, disclaimer of liability, and other rights as well. Even if your work is in the public domain, you still retain these moral rights. If memory serves me right, the right to be attributed is revokable under United States copyright law. Therefore, attribution becomes more a courtesy, when the right is revoked. Licenses such as CC BY, and CC BY-SA still require attribution as a part of their licensing terms. What defines attribution is generally up to the person who uses the content. If memory serves right again, one can not demand how to attribute. There should be a clear-cut way to determine what is code and what isn't. The code formatting indicators on SE may not be adequate because some users simply use backticks, or 4-space indented text for other not-so-codey text. Personally, I feel like making the entirety of a post under both the Creative Commons license and whatever proposed code license they use is the best option, and allow people to use moral judgement to determine the most appropriate license. The concern comes about people who lack such judgment. I bet these same people don't follow the existing license anyway - and are a lost cause. We made it through! There will always be debate on the license of choice. Some people want the GPL, a license that's apparently closer to the status quo of Creative Commons license (I disagree that it's a good match), while other's want permissive licenses, such as the MIT or the Apache licenses. I'd prefer the permissive type, since it allows use in closed-source applications, and grant more rights (i.e. less restrictions) to the people that use them. I'm not going to right much because my hands are tired, but I'm sure if you've got more questions about the open source licenses themselves, you can probably ask on Open Source Stack Exchange.	Here's where you went wrong legally: Suppose I legally obtain some digital image created by somebody else (e.g., by downloading from a public website). That, right there, is copyright infringement- unless the copyright owner has granted permission or the image is public domain you cannot copy it - this breaches "the right to make reproductions". By posting it on the web (assuming that it isn't itself an infringing copy) they have given implied permission for you to look at it in a web browser but not to copy it into a presentation even if that presentation is never presented. If it is presented then that makes the infringement worse - it adds breaches of "the right to communicate to the public" and "the right to use the work as a basis for an audiovisual work". How is this different from the computer wallpaper? It isn't. If you are using the one of the defaults that shipped with the OS then the license gives you permission. If you are using someone else's copyright without permission then it's a breach. There are defenses to copyright infringement but these are quite nationally variable - search this or other sites for "fair dealing" and "fair use".
Why does the female in a marriage usually get most of the belongings when they divorce? I can imagine that this is true, but is it actually legally spelled out and motivated? Or is it just what tends to typically happen, for "other reasons"? I've never been married and thus not divorced, so I'm just going by what I've perceived as well as a text I just read which was talking about the economics of moving between houses, where it's casually mentioned that the ex-husband "just gets to keep a mattress and the TV". Is this actually a legal thing? Something which is in a legally binding "marriage contract" (I don't know if that even exists)? If so, what's the reason for this?	united-states In the United States, divorce is a matter of state law, and each of the 50 states has slightly different laws. But in general, it is not true as a matter of law that divorced women are awarded everything but "a mattress and a TV". A small number of states, of which the largest are California and Texas, are community property states. In such states, all property acquired during the marriage is generally divided equally according to the value of the assets. The majority of states, however, follow what is called "equitable distribution". In such states, assuming the divorce goes before a judge (most divorces don't), the judge must determine a fair distribution of the assets acquired during the marriage. As an example, in the state of Illinois, this division should be based on factors such as: the effects of any prenuptial agreements the length of the marriage each spouse's age, health, and station in life whether a spouse is receiving spousal maintenance (alimony) each spouse's occupation, vocational skills, and employability the value of property assigned to each spouse each spouse's debts and financial needs each spouse's opportunity for future acquisition of assets and income either spouse’s obligations from a prior marriage (such as child support for other children), contributions to the acquisition, preservation, or increased value of marital property, including contributions as a homemaker contributions to any decrease in value or waste of marital or separate property the economic circumstances of each spouse custodial arrangements for any children of the marriage the desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to live in it for a reasonable period of time, to the party who has physical custody of children the majority of the time, and any tax consequences of the property division. (The exact legal phrasing of the statutes can be found in 750 ILCS 5 if you're curious.) In practice, this may result in a partner who has stayed home with the kids for 10 years getting a larger share of the shared property; such a person may have difficulty re-entering the workforce because of their lack of recent work experience. Similarly, if it is desirable to have the couple's children remain in the family home, and one partner will be receiving primary custody (perhaps because they have spent many years at home bonding with the children), then the family home may be awarded to that partner. In such circumstances, the judge may also award the other partner a larger portion of the assets than they would otherwise receive, to compensate for the loss of equity. In practice, given gender norms within Western societies, it is more likely that a woman will stay home with the children, have worse economic prospects after divorce, and be awarded primary custody of any children. An equitable distribution would therefore favor the woman under the above criteria. But the law itself does not discriminate by gender. If a heterosexual couple divorced where the woman had been the primary wage-earner and a man was the homemaker, the distribution of assets might well favor the man.	As Tom says and these guys reiterate (I'm quoting those guys), "Employment relationships are presumed to be “at-will” in all U.S. states except Montana. The U.S. is one of a handful of countries where employment is predominantly at-will". Montana (Dept. of Labor and Industry) also states that they are the only ones in the US like that. Montana Code 39-2-904(1)(b) states that a discharge is unlawful if "the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of employment". (2)(a) then states that "During a probationary period of employment, the employment may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the employee on notice to the other for any reason or for no reason". There is a presumptive 6 month probationary period in case an employer say nothing, but it could be longer or shorter (it can be 7 years for university professors, and I don't find anything in the code preventing an employer from setting the probationary period at 50 years).	The legal system is set up to alleviate the problem or conundrum of intimidation by perpetrators. In the US criminal system, the State is the plaintiff, not the individual. In the extant described situation, very likely all you would have to do is sign an affidavit that the recovered phone is your phone, and that it was removed from your possession by unknown means on or about a certain date. From your description given here you don't know if it was stolen...you appear to have perhaps dropped it or left it somewhere, and someone picked it up/found it. Clearly it didn't belong to them, but this is more like "recovered lost property" rather than "received stolen property." The craigslist poster might be entirely un-chargeable with a crime, though they might have to give up the phone to you.	It primarily depends on the title that you have to the house: are you "joint tenants with right of survivorship". This could have happened when you bought the house; it also could have been done after the fact in various ways. In that case, the house is outside of your wife's estate (which, under the circumstances, is divided between children and you). The lender might be confused about the status of the property, but they might be right, so the question is, what is your legal "interest" in the house, that is, does the title document say "tenants in common"? Assuming that the property is not recorded as JTWROS, then there are two matters to attend to. First, the lender may need to be satisfied, somehow, that they aren't taking a risk by refinancing when you aren't really the full owner. The second is clarifying actual ownership. Estates Code 201.0002-.003 govern intestate succession with a surviving spouse, where the dividing question is whether it is a community estate or not, which then implies shares for children. In that case, the children are part-owners, so you need their consent to e.g. sell the house (that is, this is a complication that needs to be fixed). Basically, you have to get a lawyer, and straighten this out.	Between your mother and you the bank does not care where the payments come from. If they do not get them, they can sue you, or your mother or (most likely) both of you and they will chase whichever of you has the most money and ultimately repossess the house to satisfy the debt. What matters between you is the contract or deed that you signed with your mother where you documented that you would each pay half of the mortgage. Unfortunately, agreements between family members are presumed not to be contracts. That is, the courts will not get involved to decide how much each of you owe - you have to sort that out for yourselves. A signed agreement will usually overcome that presumption. Other evidence may overcome the presumption - for example, evidence that you split the payments 50/50 for some period of time. Talk to your mother. And a lawyer.	Even in a community property state like Washington, a person is not liable for the premarital debts of a spouse (but is responsible for postmarital debts). During the marriage, jointly-owned property is accessible to creditors, but after divorce, there is no risk to the non-debtor. Though, you would be responsible if you were a co-signer on the loan.	This may be true of the Nooksack tribe, in a sense. There is a category of Indian land known as trust land, which is held in trust by the US Government for the benefit of a tribe (there is also land that is just plain owned by the tribe). A tribe can thus set rules regarding use of the land that they control, which could mean that nobody can live in a particular place (not uncommon). The tribe could rent out land, and the rental agreement could contain a tribal membership clause. This complaint by the Nooksack Indian Housing Authority alleges that defendant is not a member of the tribe, and that the rental agreement requires defendant to be an enrolled member of the tribe. Defendant was disenrolled, and the eviction action followed. Non-member evictions are not the most popular actions that a tribe undertakes, so finding those rules online is not going to be easy.	You are not legally responsible for your spouse’s acts or omissions. However, in most jurisdictions most assets of a married couple are legally jointly held which means any judgement against your spouse exposes the jointly held assets.
In the US, what stops public libraries from being overcrowded with remote workers? The main con that comes with the double-edged sword of remote work is isolation from in-person human contact. You can socialize just fine, to an extent, through applications like Slack, but there's also something to be said for having some in-person socialization throughout the day. Therefore shared workspaces and things like that have a solid purpose. However whereas shared workspaces can be expensive, public libraries are free. So assuming someone just needs their laptop to work, and not two huge monitors or anything else like that - assuming they can just throw everything in a normal-sized laptop bag - what's stopping them from using the public library 8 hours a day, 5 days a week indefinitely? (Just to be clear, I'm not talking about chatting with people throughout the day. It's just the idea of having other people in close proximity, as an ambient aspect, and that sort of thing in general. Occasionally having someone to nod to while walking by and that kind of thing. The thing that's being avoided is being completely alone inside one's apartment all day or something.) Libraries will often have free wi-fi, a free place to charge the laptop, free everything except coffee. And if it's just the occasional person doing this, they probably won't mind. However, especially considering the work-from-home situation with COVID-19, what's stopping these places from being swarmed and overcrowded indefinitely with people of this nature? In particular, in a typical US municipality, what legal setup blocks public libraries from being swarmed by people using them indefinitely as free work offices? What are the normal legal limits that allow libraries to get used like this in moderation, while preventing them from getting overrun? FWIW, the main reason this has come to my mind is that, for certain reasons, I've been spending a few weeks on the other side of the US from where I live. During this time, I've found working inside the local library to be usually fairly preferable to working inside the hotel/hostel. So much so, that it's tempting to keep doing this once I'm back home next week, and I'm wondering how much is too much, and how that's reflected in a typical legal setup. This question was suggested as a duplicate: Legal Doubts Regarding Park Rules The important thing here is that I am not talking about breaking any rules. The second the library tells me to pack up the computer, I will. However no such limit has been imposed for several days, and they've actually acted fairly friendly and accommodating up to this point. Therefore, is there anything in the law (in a typical setup) that places a major limit on this type of usage? If it is nothing more than just simply waiting until the library staff say something, then that answers the question. I just want to make sure there's nothing in a typical legal setup that places a meaningful limit on this.	First point: During the pandemic, most libraries have ceased in person services and only do downloads, pre-arranged loans, pick up and drop off. Second point: In non-pandemic times, typical U.S. municipal library is a somewhat odd mix of young children with parents or nannies, homeless people, remote workers who don't need to talk on the phone much, retirees, and middle school and high school students studying and reading for pleasure (with the studying more common among students whose home situations aren't well suited to studying due to poverty, many siblings or housemates, or noisy family members or neighbors who play instruments). Libraries are usually incentivized to be well occupied as it helps when they seek municipal budget contributions or tax levies. FWIW, I've used municipal libraries for lengthy research projects as a lawyer now and then, both in times when I've been between offices (e.g. at one point tenant finish wasn't done at my new office but my old lease has expired and I was mostly working from home), and when I need to concentrate and the phone and colleagues interrupting me with innocent reasonable questions that aren't urgent keep interrupting me. Third point: It is rare in practice for libraries to be overwhelmed with remote workers, in part, because you can't really talk on the phone or attend Zoom meetings, or meet with people. It is also poor for spreading out with a lot of dead tree paper, especially if filing is necessary. Coffee shops which allow for talking and allow food and drink are more popular and commonly used by low volume realtors and lawyers without offices (I used them for meetings when I was a newly admitted solo practitioner), day traders, freelance and novel writers, graduate students, etc. The prohibition on talking and on consuming food and drinks in the library mostly solves the problem. Also, lots of remote workers don't want to work someplace that has little children squealing during story time and lots of homeless people. In my experience, the most common kind of remote workers in municipal libraries are day traders. It is much more common for municipal libraries in the U.S. (which are one of the only places you can just be without spending money) to come up with ways to limit homeless people (or to better accommodate them) than to boot them out. Many municipal libraries in urban areas have hired social workers in lieu of security staff to regulate things, place limits on sleeping in the place, and sometimes place a maximum number of hours in place. CLOSING THOUGHT: Libraries are publicly owned property, and as such, library managers have not only the regulatory authority of a representative of the government, but also all of the rights of a property owner at their disposal legally. This gives them wide discretion to adopt and enforce rules that couldn't be imposed otherwise.	For a large organization, software licensing compliance is a very broad and intractable problem. The licensing environment is very different for the big company than it is for little tiny you. Many large companies are subject to audits by software vendors (i.e. Adobe, Oracle, etc.) in which they have to show licenses purchased for each active seat. There's a whole new INDUSTRY around maintaining license compliance. An employee bringing in their own software and installing it on a company computer complicates this vastly. That is the environment that the question should be considered within. The large company makes the decision somewhere along the way that your individual efficiency in performing your individual tasks is less important than maintaining auditable software licensing compliance. Since they own the computer/laptop/server, it's their decision. Many times it seems that corporate policies as they apply to the individual worker are obstructive and limiting, but there's a bigger picture to the situation.	A document can be distributed under more than one license. Just because it has been made available under a CC license for free, doesn't mean that IEEE can't negotiate a different license with different terms that allow them to sell the content. (This is similar to the way that a software library can be available for free under a license that permits non-commercial use, but also be made available for a fee for commercial use.) If you want to know whether IEEE is legally selling Aaron Swartz's manuscript, you can contact Morgan & Claypool, the publisher that owns the copyright, and ask them whether this use by IEEE has been authorized by them. For the other documents you mention, contact MIT Press. Etc.	Content posted to the web is usually openly accessible to all (unless protected by a password, paywall, or similar restriction). But that does not mean it is freely copyable by all. Such content is protected by copyright in just the same way as if it had been published in a book of essays by various contributors. Unless the copyright holders (who are likely to be the original authors, but might not be) give permission, or an exception to copyright applies, copying such content would be clear and obvious copyright infringement, and any copyright holder could sue for damages. Permission could be given by publishing the content under a permissive license, such as a CC-BY-SA license, or any of many other available permissive licenses. Or a would-be reuser could find the copyright holders and ask for permission. If the holder cannot be found or identified, or does not respond, then no permission has been granted. In the US the main exception to copyright is fair use. See this answer and other threads with the fair-use tag here for more on fair use. Since the question seems to contemplate using the whole of the posted content, since it might well damage any potential market for that content, and since the use does not seem to be "transformative", nor used for criticism or comment, a finding of fair use for this situation seems unlikely. But Fair use findings are very much fact-driven, and the exact facts do matter. Thus I cannot be at all sure whether a court would find this toi be fair use or not. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions to copyright, and I have not come close to reviewing them all. But none of the ones I know of seem to apply to the situation described in the question. Many are narrower than the US concept of fair use. I fear that without permission, copying this content would be infringement. However, it would not be infringement to create a site that includes a link to the existing content, and a summary or description of that content, along with new content, including comments on the old, with brief quotes to indicate what is being commented on.	You are right that this is probably a private space; you are wrong in thinking it is your private space; it isn't. The space belongs to your employer and they can do whatever they want with their space unless there is a law that says they can't. As to what type of "hidden surveillance" is allowed that depends on your particular circumstances including what state and federal laws apply and the employment contract you are covered by. As a starting point, if this was happening in Australia then: If you gave permission, all would be legal If you did not give permission: it would be illegal to record anything taking place across a public telecommunications system (i.e. phone tapping) it would be legal for anyone to make an audio recording (not phone tapping) of any conversation to which they were a party it would be legal to make a video recording without sound.	Assumptions Let us assume that the code involved was created during the period of employment, was within the scope of that employment, and was validly work-made-for-hire (WFH). In that case, the code copyright is owned by the former employer.dn the person who wrote it has no more rights than a random stranger would. I am also going to assume US law. Ownership of Ideas Who owns the ideas, the knowledge of how these libraries work? No one does. In the absence of a patent, no one ever "owns" an idea. ]17 USC 102(b)](https://copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#102) provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Derivative Works Copyright law does prohibit anyone making a derivative work from a work protected by copyright without the permission of the owner. A derivative work is one "based on" the source work. The classic case is a translation. Exactly when a piece of software is a derivative work of another is fact-dependent. Bu several things are clear. If the source work is trivial and obvious, ther may not be sufficient "originality" for the source work to be protected by copyright at all. If the source work is not protected by a valid copyright, nothing is a derivative work of it. A "hello world" program, for example, is probably not original enough for any copyright. A straight-forward implementation of a basic algorithm like quicksort is probably not original enough, either. If there is only one way, or only a small number of ways, to express the ideas of the source work, the merger doctrine applies. This means that the expression of the work is merged into the idea, leaving the expression unprotected. When the merger doctrine applies, there is, in effect, no copyright. If a work copies ideas from a source, but none of its particular expression of those ideas, the result is not a derivative work, and is not an infringement of copyright. If a work is definitive, but is also a fair use of the source work, it is not an infringement. The usual four-factor fir use analysis must be made to determine this. In particular, if a work is highly transformative, it is likey to be found to be a fair use. Issues from the Question What if the new code (presumably, in the case of something simple) comes out exactly the same (even if I rewrite it without looking)? That Rather suggests that the work was too trivial to be original enough to have copyright protection at all, or else that there are only a few ways to express the idea, and the merger doctrine applies. But if neither o those were true, this might be an infringement. [* To be coninued*]	To use an API over a network connection (as opposed to, e.g., the Windows API), a user communicates a request to the API host, or server, and awaits a response. The host of the remote API can refuse to serve requests from users for probably any reason. Such services often require users to accept a license as a condition of using the service, and they may charge a fee as a condition of the license. A license to use a service is obviously not necessarily bound to a license for the use of its source code, just as the ability to reach the service is not dependent on the ability to see (let alone use) the code in any format, whether it be the source code or some compiled form of the code. In essence, source licenses and service licenses have different primary goals, at least inasmuch as the source license seeks to restrict someone who has actual physical access to compiled code, and possibly source code. Service licenses do not have that concern, though I have seen service licenses that also prohibit decompiling. This is probably the result of a CYA attitude among lawyers: the language is already in the standard software license text, and it doesn't hurt anything to leave it in, and it could help if a service user somehow managed to download the program code.	If you buy a house, you can generally rent out a room in the house, unless in that jurisdiction there is some law against renting rooms in houses (that's actually a condition in my neighborhood, one widely ignored). If it's legal to rent (lease) a room, it is generally legal to sub-lease that room – as long as that's allowed under the original lease contract. I have never heard of a jurisdiction that has a blanket prohibition against subleases. So as far as the actual question goes, the answer is, "yes". The links are about something a different, namely rent control law in San Francisco, and the question of whether a tenant can be evicted from a rent-controlled unit because the owner wants to move in to the unit. Owner move-in eviction requires a specific procedure for giving notice, and the links are about these requirements. Conceivably, though, the question could be whether a person can buy a house that is being rented out, do a proper owner move-in eviction, and then lease a spare room. The SF rent laws require a good faith intent to move in and use as the primary residence for 3 years, and nothing prohibit subsequently leasing a room. Those laws pertain to evictions, not re-rentals. (It should be noted that once eviction under section 37.9(a)(8) has been carried out on a unit in a building, no other unit in the building can ever be so recovered. That could mean that the room in the house could never again be recovered, if it is considered to be a separate "unit" from the "unit" that is the whole house).
Consumer Rights 2015 (U.K.): Faulty vehicle & Trader avoids responsibility and cannot reach him I have been sold a faulty vehicle by a second-hand car dealer. The place is in the United Kingdom. According to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 I can claim a full refund if I request it under 30 days. But then I didn't do that cause of my ignorance, I did though notify him about the issue in less than thirty days. Long story short, I am chasing him to fix the car now, but he is always difficult to catch, I have been chasing him for a couple of months now. I once sent a letter with a deadline, then I reached to him online and he said that he did not receive it. I used the address on the gov.uk page where his business is registered. It was recorded and someone signed for him. I have two questions. Firstly, according to Consumer Rights 2015, is there a deadline from when the issue is raised to the trader to then taking action to fix it, or is it based on what deadline I set on my letter? Secondly, if I do send a letter, for instance, notifies him for court, to which address should I send it to? His official one in gov.uk, where he claims he didn't notice or his yard? What is the legal sound thing to do, for then the judge to tell me that he wasn't notified (Is that a thing)?	According to Consumer Rights 2015, is there a deadline from when the issue is raised to the trader to then taking action to fix it, or is it based on what deadline I set on my letter? The "deadline" is one that is reasonable in the circumstances. See s.23 of the Act: [...] (2) If the consumer requires the trader to repair or replace the goods, the trader must— (a) do so within a reasonable time and without significant inconvenience to the consumer, and (b) bear any necessary costs incurred in doing so (including in particular the cost of any labour, materials or postage). [...] (5) Any question as to what is a reasonable time or significant inconvenience is to be determined taking account of— (a) the nature of the goods, and (b) the purpose for which the goods were acquired. [...] If I do send a letter, for instance, notifies him for court, to which address should I send it to? His official one in gov.uk, where he claims he didn't notice or his yard? The Civil Procedure Rules Pre-Action Protocols do not dictate where such a letter (referred to a letter before claim and described here and here) must be served but the usual requirement is to an address at which the potential defendant resides or carries on business within the UK. See Rule 6.8(a) for example.	When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints.	Main Question: Most likely not under Magnuson-Moss or U.C.C.. Question 1: If a charge payable before hand was not set forth in any written warranty, it is most likely not legal to deny remedy to the consumer. However, even if it was, it is possible that it would not meet the federal minimum standards for warranties as, per paragraph (d) a warranty has to provide for remedy without a charge. If there is absolutely no way for you to obtain the information to prove that a remedy is due — for e.g. no third party has legal or technical capacity to diagnose the vehicle — that is likely also a term to be found unconscionable and void, and may be found fraudulent, malicious and/or oppressive which may entitle one to collect punitive damages. (It is worth obtaining written confirmation of whether this decision is made in accord with their policies or on a line that they announce to be recorded) Question 2: Most likely same as Question 1. Question 3: Most likely same as Question 2. According to 15 U.S.C., subsection (a) of Section 2302 entitled "Full and conspicuous disclosure of terms and conditions; additional requirements for contents: "In order to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products, any warrantor warranting a consumer product to a consumer by means of a written warranty shall, to the extent required by rules of the Commission, fully and conspicuously disclose in simple and readily understood language the terms and conditions of such warranty. (4) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such written warranty—at whose expense—and for what period of time." (5) A statement of what the consumer must do and expenses he must bear. (6) Exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the warranty. (7) The step-by-step procedure which the consumer should take in order to obtain performance of any obligation under the warranty, including the identification of any person or class of persons authorized to perform the obligations set forth in the warranty. (12) The characteristics or properties of the products, or parts thereof, that are not covered by the warranty. (13) The elements of the warranty in words or phrases which would not mislead a reasonable, average consumer as to the nature or scope of the warranty. It may, in addition to any or all of the above, be a violation of paragraph (8), (9), (10) and/or (11) based on specific fact patterns. To the 2nd point added: If the manufacturer stated that the vehicle would run at least a certain number of miles on a full charge for a certain number of miles driven or number of years, and did not stipulate it otherwise, they would have to remedy this. It is highly likely that they tried to evade making such written statement (if not written, it's not a warranty under Magnuson-Moss). If they did, and they did not define the scope of what they would have to do in the case of a defect or malfunction, they would have to remedy it by repairs within a reasonable time; if they fail, they would have to refund or replace. This does not mean that it is likely worth pursuing the matter in court other than maybe in small claims (See: ohwilleke's reply to this question for a general explanation). Moreover, most auto manufacturers put arbitration provisions in their sale contracts and/or their warranties and generally it may be required of one to opt out of it within 30 days of entering into the agreement. If that took place, first the dispute would likely need to be disputed through a qualified dispute resolution mechanism of the manufacturer, dealer, distributor and/or sellers choice depending on who gave the warranty. The specific State's lemon laws may provide for civil penalties for willful violations which may or may not be a very high bar to meet depending on the State's case law, and which is more likely to make it worth for "lemon" lawyers to take the case, but generally they are not a great deal more like hyenas of this segment of the law. It may still be worth considering for one depending on the specific facts, including State jurisdiction and the impeding nature of the nonconformity. (Please specify a State for the State's lemon laws applicable in this hypo)	Is it a crime for a repo man to accidentally repo the wrong car? Not unless the car was retained after the accidental repossession was discovered, and then, only by the person retaining it (as the repo man may have turned over the car to the creditor whose loan on a similar car is in default). Generally speaking, taking property of another with an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property of it is a crime only if one knows that the property is the property of another. For example, if two people leave black umbrellas in an entry room and someone accidentally leaves with the wrong one, the taking of the wrong umbrella is not a crime. Whether the repo man's assertion that he accidentally took the wrong car is credible is a question of fact to be determined at trial, if the prosecution doubts him. If he was supposed to repossess a 1936 Ford and he repossessed a 2021 Tesla, the repo man is probably going to lose and be convicted of theft. If he was supposed to repossess a white 2021 Tesla and he repossessed a different white 2021 Tesla in the same neighborhood with a license plate from the same state as the one he was supposed to repossess, he has a very good chance of prevailing. However, once someone learns that they have taken the wrong property, they have a duty to return the property promptly to the owner upon request, and probably, to notify the owner (if the owner can be determined) and the authorities who were informed that a different vehicle was taken, promptly. Otherwise, the originally good faith mistake becomes theft. If the repo man's explanation is convincing, he is not likely to be charged with theft, even though no special law applies. What makes the repo man special is that he did have permission from the secured car loan creditor to repossess it due to the secured car loan debtor's default by the Uniform Commercial Code. If he had taken the right car without a breach of the peace, the Uniform Commercial Code would have absolved him of liability and given him legal permission to do so. If the repo had been of the right car, the creditor would have had a duty to promptly return the personal possession in the car in which it did not have a lien to the rightful owner. This conclusion doesn't change when the repo man accidentally takes the wrong car. While the repo man's mistake was not knowing or intentional, it was probably negligent to repossess the car without carefully confirming the VIN number and license plate to make sure that he was repossessing the correct car. As a result, the car own probably has a claim against both the repo man (whose negligence caused the wrongful repossession) and the creditor (for whom he was acting as an agent to repossess the car) for any damages caused to the owner of the wrongfully repossessed car, including damages to the vehicle and damages from loss of use of the car and possibly damages for emotional distress caused by thinking that his car had been stolen or by missing a non-economic opportunity that he could have had if the car had not been wrongfully taken (e.g. if this caused the car owner to miss the funeral of the car owner's father). The creditor and the repo man probably have insurance policies in place that cover legal defense of such claims and also economic settlements or money judgments entered on that kind of claim.	Being as general as possible - refund policies are governed by bank and scheme policies, and so aren't necessarily the domain of law. There may be jurisdiction-specific regulations that limit your liability as a consumer, but there's not usually a legal requirement. This is almost certainly wholly governed by your credit card terms of use.¹ You can report this to your local authorities, but without proof of a crime, it's unlikely to be actionable. The website isn't necessarily to blame, either - if your computer or your connection to the website was somehow compromised, then your details may have been obtained in that way, and the website could have had nothing to do with it. Again, this is almost certainly wholly governed by their scheme agreement.¹ 1. Some off-topic information here, which may or may not be accurate, and which you should not seek clarification for here (check Money SE instead, and first check whether it is on-topic there) - generally, bank policies will refund you for fraudulent transactions below a certain quantity or value. In this case, the bank tends to take a loss and chargeback rights are not exercised. In other cases, the bank will require the merchant to prove that the authorised cardholder did in fact authorise the transaction. The level of proof is governed by the way in which the transaction was conducted and verified at the time of purchase - whether the CVV2 code was verified, whether address verification was completed, whether 3D verification was completed. If the merchant is unable to prove, according to the scheme guidelines, the transaction will be charged back to their account.	Would I sue seller or manufacturer for a new appliance that does not function correctly? You have viable claims against both seller and manufacturer, and you may sue both of them in the same complaint. Hopefully the tech's assessment that you "should get a new machine" is in writing, since that evidence seems dispositive (i.e., decisive) and immune to manufacturer's potential denial. Regardless of what approach you choose, the award you might be granted is subject to the prohibition of double recovery. It seems that the seller's directions were purposefully dilatory. Coupled with its subsequent pretext about expiration of the 30 day period, seller's conduct is in violation of legislation regarding unfair and misleading practices. Your post does not specify which jurisdiction in the US you have in mind, but consumer protection laws are rather uniform all over the country. If the provision of 30-day return period is reflected in a document such as the invoice, or in seller's signs/advertisements, you also have a claim of breach of contract for seller's failure to abide by the corresponding clause or policy. A similar rationale applies with respect to the manufacturer. The manufacturer is not entitled to arbitrarily postpone compliance as to the warranty. Seller's 30-day deadline serves as comparison in your argument that the manufacturer's open-ended schedule is excessive, a schedule which is on top of the delay from the interactions with both techs. if I win, what do I do with the dishwasher? Wait for the party who reimburses you or replaces the dishwasher to determine whether it opts to take the defective dishwasher. That party is responsible for transportation costs and related expenses if it decides to pick up the appliance. If the party is not interested in retrieving the defective appliance, make sure it signs a waiver. Otherwise you would be at risk that that party maliciously tries to turn the tables by alleging that you unlawfully got a second dishwasher for free.	Such a right would only exist if the legislature has created it by some act. Insurance is excluded under the class of covered contracts under The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 (see schedule 2), and The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. The only restriction on automatical renewal clauses under Consumer Rights Act 2015 is that the deadline for objecting to renewal cannot be unreasonably early (schedule 2, unfair terms); and in general, the terms may not be vague. Since there is no law restricting a contract from requiring written notice, or telephone notice, or whatever they demand, then it comes down to what the contract says. If it says "you must call", then you must call.	They are separate warranties. The store doesn’t have to do anything about the manufacturer’s warranty and vice versa. It is of course good service if the store takes care of things for you, but that isn’t legally required. I expect that you don’t need a receipt but proof of purchase. A bank statement or credit card statement should do. My bank (in the U.K.) can provide statements 10 years back online.
Is this copyright or am I allowed to have this in my math textbook? I was recommended from MSE(math) to ask here. I'm creating a fun math book to sell and I don't know whether if I'm allowed to have these in my book due to copyright or not: video game / movie references and names common integration bee problems names of a university / math competition organizers integration techniques and formulas using someone's Overleaf Latex package to format the book Do all of these violate copyright or are they not considered copyright? It's quite hard to explain, so here's a preview of how my textbook starts off.	Names of people, institutions, and events are not protected by copyright. Things that have occurred at events like math tournaments are facts, and may be recounted, in your own words, with no fear of infringing any copyright. Facts are never protected by copyright, although a particular description of facts could be, and so could a particular selection and arrangement of facts. Specific math techniques and their names are not protected either, and may be described without infringing copyright. The items you mention in the question are: video game / movie references and names No copyright issue here. common integration bee problems No copyright issue here. names of a university / math competition organizers No copyright issue here. integration techniques and formulas No copyright issue here, unless you copy an extensive description of a technique without rewriting it in your mown words.. using someone's Overleaf Latex package to format the book This depends on the license for the package, but there is not likely to be an issue. In short I think you are worrying over issues that are in fact non-issues.	What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea.	Is it ok to copy the game concept and even with mostly similar content like "fighting", "building houses" etc ? Yes, but ... I should also mention that pretty much my whole User Interface is based on the User Interface from "Parallel Kingdoms" Is copyright violation. Ideas are not protected by IP law. The tangible representation of those ideas (art, words, layout, format etc.) is protected.	You can’t use pictures You can’t use any of these, nor can you make your own art that is derived from these. That’s copyright infringement and there is no fair use defence because you are specifically trying to do something Nintendo already does. You can reproduce that stats of the Pokémon because stats are facts (even if they are facts about fictional things) and facts are not protected by copyright.	You need to check if the original game developers patented the mechanics/rules of the game. For your example, Monopoly was patented, but expired in the 50s and while it would not be a copyright violation to mimic the rules/mechanics, it would be a different intellectual property violation (patent infringement). Spry Fox vs LOLAPPS is also relevant as it extends copyright protection to the implementation of an idea, but ideas (like rules/mechanics) cannot, by themselves, be copyrighted. This means that there is an avenue for the original developer/company to sue even if the visual/audible aspects are different, but the overall gameplay is the same. Also see Tetris Holding LLC vs Xio Interactive Inc. as it relates to the visual aspect of the game.	Yup, copyright statutes and case law cover these situations. In Canada, look at at Copyright Act Section 30.7: It is not an infringement of copyright to incidentally and not deliberately (a) include a work or other subject-matter in another work or other subject-matter; or (b) do any act in relation to a work or other subject-matter that is incidentally and not deliberately included in another work or other subject-matter. The US doesn't have this in statute, but some defendants used a fair use defence, some successful, some not. (http://www.iposgoode.ca/2010/04/cindy-incidentally-the-incidental-inclusion-exception-in-canadian-copyright-law/) If you're using a piece of art as part of a tutorial, or being illustrative of a point, or subject of commentary, review, or criticism, that may be fair use or fair dealing.	It would be copyright infringement. The script that you are planning to copy from is protected by law, so requires the copyright-owner's permission to create a derivative version (your own interpretation). If instead you write a completely different story inspired by the original book, you might not get sued. The problem is that there is a reasonable chance that you would accidentally duplicate part of one of the myriad adaptations, then the jury would have to decide whether it was just a coincidence, or copying.	Getting permission from the game owner would be a sensible approach. If you get it, great. Then you could do it with the owner's blessing. It's possible to do your write up without the owner's permission, but then you have to be much more careful. For instance, the names of games cannot be copyrighted. No one can prevent you from writing "A Guide to Bridge," or "A Guide to Chess," etc. On the other hand, some games are trademarked, in which case you will need to attach a TM (trademark) symbol when referring to them. In this case, see a lawyer. You are also allowed to discuss the game itself "in your own words," but you must be careful not to "plagiarize" anything from the rules, or the official game description. That is, while you can refer to specific aspects of a game, such as building houses and hotels, the leash on copying is fairly short, as little as five words. This does not refer to five words in a common sequence referring to a single thought like "The United States of America," but it could refer to five words in an original or unusual sequence such as "I think therefore I am," by Rene Descartes, or "X houses and Y hotels," where the numbers X and Y define the number of houses and hotels in a certain board game trademarked (I believe) by Parker Brothers.
Indepdendent/Contractor vs Regular Employee I was about to ask another question but think I should start at the basics. What exactly does it mean to be working as a contractor? Many jobs require you to sign some contract (e.g. non disclosure agreement, non-compete) but this isn't considered contract work. Also, is a freelancer considered a contractor? I ask because many (labor) laws are different for regular employees vs contractors. For example in free lance contracts, what's the point of this: (example from https://www.pandadoc.com/freelance-contract-template) Independent Contractor. Nothing contained in this Contract shall create an employer and employee relationship, a master and servant relationship, or a principal and agent relationship between Freelancer and Customer. Customer and Freelancer agree that Freelancer is, and at all times during this Contract shall remain, an independent contractor. What does mean independent with regards to contractor?	This is a confusing issue in most common law jurisdictions and AFAIK, Canada and Australia still rely on common law definitions of this. First, any arrangement where someone provides services in return for compensation is a contract. If worker is an employee then the contract is an employment contract and is subject to whatever laws apply to employees (things like, workers' compensation, withholding of tax, superannuation etc.). If the worker is instead operating their own business that is independent of the principal's business they are independent contractors and employee law doesn't apply. In most cases it is easy to determine if someone is an employee or is a contractor. For example, if your business hires a bookkeeper to work set hours for which they are paid a salary from which you detect and remit tax, etc. then they are clearly an employee. Your external accountant who does your year end taxes, has their own premises and contracts to many other businesses is clearly an independent contractor. However, the dividing line is not clear cut in edge cases. Using British Columbia as an example: Calling a person an independent contractor, even if the worker agrees, does not decide the issue. In order to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor under the Act, it is important to consider the definitions of “employee”, “employer” and “work”. The Act defines these terms very broadly. The courts have developed some common law tests that may be useful, but they must be considered in a manner consistent with the definitions and purposes of the Act. Some of these tests include how much direction and control the worker is subject to, whether the worker operates their own business and has their own clients, whether the worker has a chance of profit or a risk of loss, whether the work they are doing is integral to the business and whether there is an ongoing relationship. The longer a person works for another, the more closely the worker’s duties are connected to the purpose of the business, the more the person who pays the worker controls the material and tools and directs the activities, the more likely it is that the relationship is one of employer/employee. So, deciding if a person is an employee or contractor is not up to the worker or the principal and what they may or may not have written on a piece of paper! The entire relationship must be considered. As an additional complication, legislation is not uniform between state/provincial and federal levels of government and even within the same jurisdiction. For example, in Australia, it is possible that a person is an independent contractor for Federal income tax law but an employee for state workers' compensation law.	This is a duck I might want this duck to work for me laying duck eggs (only not this duck because it's a boy duck). If I call this duck a chicken; it's still a duck. Similarly, the duck may call itself a chicken. It may even believe it's a chicken. It's still a duck. Now, I might want to call the duck a chicken because ducks have fewer workplace rights than chickens. Similarly, the duck might want to be a chicken because chickens can be more ... creative ... with their taxes; they might even be able to funnel their income through special C-corporations (C is for chicken). It's still a duck. The law doesn't care what you call your relationship or even what you think your relationship is - it cares about what it actually is. Is a freelance software developer a duck or a chicken? The actual law can be found here. Starting from the beginning: 2750.3. (a) (1) For purposes of the provisions of this code and the Unemployment Insurance Code, and for the wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission, a person providing labor or services for remuneration shall be considered an employee rather than an independent contractor unless the hiring entity demonstrates that all of the following conditions are satisfied: (A) The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact. (B) The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business. (C) The person is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed. So a freelance software developer who is working without their client's "control and direction" about when, where and how they do their work (obviously, direction on the final product is OK), for a client who doesn't normally develop that type of software (e.g. writing a website for a hairdresser or even writing accounting software for a computer game developer but not writing computer games for a computer game developer) and that there exists such a 'thing' as independent software developers (which there are) can be correctly classified as a contractor. A person who goes into a software house to work on their in-house code is an employee. So after the initial classification, there is a bundle of exemptions and exceptions. None of them are particularly relevant until we get to: (e) Subdivision (a) and the holding in Dynamex do not apply to a bona fide business-to-business contracting relationship, as defined below, under the following conditions: (1) If a business entity formed as a sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, limited liability partnership, or corporation (“business service provider”) contracts to provide services to another such business (“contracting business”), the determination of employee or independent contractor status of the business services provider shall be governed by Borello, if the contracting business demonstrates that all of the following criteria are satisfied: (A) The business service provider is free from the control and direction of the contracting business entity in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact. (B) The business service provider is providing services directly to the contracting business rather than to customers of the contracting business. (C) The contract with the business service provider is in writing. (D) If the work is performed in a jurisdiction that requires the business service provider to have a business license or business tax registration, the business service provider has the required business license or business tax registration. (E) The business service provider maintains a business location that is separate from the business or work location of the contracting business. (F) The business service provider is customarily engaged in an independently established business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed. (G) The business service provider actually contracts with other businesses to provide the same or similar services and maintains a clientele without restrictions from the hiring entity. (H) The business service provider advertises and holds itself out to the public as available to provide the same or similar services. (I) The business service provider provides its own tools, vehicles, and equipment to perform the services. (J) The business service provider can negotiate its own rates. (K) Consistent with the nature of the work, the business service provider can set its own hours and location of work. (L) The business service provider is not performing the type of work for which a license from the Contractor’s State License Board is required, pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the Business and Professions Code. Summarising this: if the freelance software developer is part of a bonafide business providing services to the 'public' and not just to this employer then they can be correctly classified as a contractor.	If this is a client - contractor relationship, it depends on the contract. Attorneys may bill on a quarter-hour basis, or a 10th-hour basis. A 1 minute phone call under a quarter hour billing basis is more expensive than under a 10th-hour basis, all other things being equal (i.e. the hourly rare). So if I hire an attorney to do something and he bills me for 1 hr 6 minutes because he spent 1 hr 4 minutes to do it, he can do that, and I can't object that he didn't spend a full second hour on the task. It just comes down to what the client and contractor agreed to, and if a contractor wants to bill by the second, he can. For employers and their employees, the Fair Labor Standards Act applies in the US (there are state analogs which mostly say the same thing). The employer is responsible for paying employees based on work done, so they have to keep records. Department of Labor rules allow an employer to simplify record keeping, for example they can round employee hours (1 hr 2 minutes is the same as 55 minutes) – you have to be consistent. They explicitly allow 5 minute granularity, and don't disallow granularity to the second.	If an offer is accepted, you have a contract Oral contracts are binding for most transactions. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? However, from the circumstances, it’s not clear that there was an offer subject to acceptance. Had the wages been agreed? The hours of work? The annual leave? The sick leave? If these were undetermined then there is no contract.	The fact that you have been laid off is both your company’s information, and your personal information. You are allowed to tell your own personal information. The move to a new partner however is not your information. As long as you are still employed your employment contract will probably say that you mustn’t do anything to damage the company. You’d need to read what the consequences would be. Maybe the contract says you can be fired... which doesn’t matter unless you would lose a redundancy payment. After leaving it would depend on whether you had a non-disclosure agreement. And last, does your company care? This merger can’t be kept a secret anyway.	Under United States law, copyright is normally held by the creator of a work. There is one major exception to this rule: the "work for hire." If something is considered a "work for hire" under the copyright statutes, the copyright is held by the employer. Whether something qualifies as a work for hire is a complex analysis: here is a Copyright Office circular covering some of the basics. To be clear, I'm not giving an opinion (and I don't have enough information to give an opinion) on whether any specific works you or your fiance may create or commission qualify as "works for hire." It's a narrower test than you probably think it is. If the work is not a work for hire, the copyright holder owns the copyright, and anyone else can use it only with a license from the copyright holder. A license can be implied by the parties' behavior and communications--but it shouldn't be. If you're in a situation where you need to know, for example: That you are allowed to use the artwork forever, and the artist can't ask you to stop later; That you are allowed to change the artwork if you need to, even a simple change like cropping or adding a filter or text; or That, if your product is successful, the artist won't be able to sell another license to someone else to compete with you; then you need a written contract spelling out who owns the copyright and what the rights of the other party are. A lawyer can draw up a simple, re-usable form contract for you cheaply that will prevent the problems you're worried about. Remember: even if this is a work-for-hire situation, if you need to prove that down the road, it may require a trial, or at least preliminary motion practice, to do so. That's a lot more expensive than getting your ducks in a row now will be. tl;dr: Get a lawyer. If you're in a major city, there may be a local arts law organization that will provide you with free help for a simple job like this one. (Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts operate in several East Coast cities, and I know many top commercial lawyers who do pro bono for them).	If two parties agree to the terms of an exchange, then there exists an enforceable contract. A signature is not needed to create a contract. However, an intent to negotiate a contract is not, per se, a contract. Absent some specific and explicit measures (which for major deals may be codified in an MOU or LOI that itself contains contractual terms), if you can't reach an agreement on terms then there is no contract. It's up to the particulars of "the verbal agreement to start the hiring process" whether an agreement on exchange has been reached, or merely proposed. E.g., "You and I agree that I will pay you $X in exchange for Y due Z" is a contract. "You and I agree that we'd like to work together, and we'll hammer out the terms X, Y, and Z by the end of the week" is merely a proposal to contract, not an actual contract. Of course, this doesn't mean you're immune to liability for failing to reach a contract in this hypothetical: you can always be sued!	In the United States, specifically in Norwalk, Connecticut, where I live, may I volunteer for an individual, and may an individual use volunteers? For example, may I volunteer as a personal chef for a celebrity, ie, cook them meals for free, and may they accept my services without compensating me? I think the answer depends on whether I'm an independent contractor or an employee. The answer is not nearly as simple and straighforward as the employee v. independent contractor distinction suggested in the question. People who work for free fit in a number of categories, some lawful and some not, even though the definition of employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (regulations here) and parallel state legislation is facially very broad (people who suffer to let others work for them, more or less) and many of the exceptions are quite narrow. The nature of the categories is a nice illustration of how much social context and nuance is buried in a seemingly straightforward black and white legal rule like the minimum wage. Any time there are common practices that a statute doesn't expressly contemplated that aren't routinely the subject to litigation, you should doubt whether the statute really applies to them (although often enough it does), and courts are more likely in these circumstances than most to devise a definitional oriented, or implied, or common law exception to encompass the common practices as being lawful. The facts in the original question aren't rich enough in character to really determine which category applies, and those facts "smell fishy" as far as whether it would really fit in any legal category of unpaid work, in part, because the motives of the "volunteer" are very unclear. The legal categories include: People work for free in furtherance of their own charitable intent (e.g., working for free at a United Way fundraiser). People working for free who have bona fide donative intent (painting a mural on your boyfriend's wall as a birthday present). This is one possible category that the original question seems to be considering as possibility. Note that donative intent doesn't preclude an expectation that there will be unspecified, not legally enforceable, reciprocity in the future, in the form of reciprocal generosity, or in the form of owing someone an ill defined "favor" that doesn't amount to a true quid pro quo barter transaction. You might have donative intent towards a celebrity because you are a fan, because you appreciate their work or contributions, and because you desire to be part of the inner circle of a celebrity or wish to become a friend of a celebrity and want to do so out of friendship, since the celebrity is an awesome person that it would be nice to have in your life. This category could also include cases of moral but not legal obligation, or cases of seeking to do penance to the person for whom you volunteer out of non-legally binding guilty or shame (as distinct from a threat that you will be embarrassed). Family members doing chores for each other out of a duty of care and support on the part of a parent or spouse, or a duty to obey a parent arising at common law, on the part of a child, and similar family obligations. Closely related is unpaid work as a fiduciary (e.g. an executor, power of attorney agent, or trustee) with a donative or family relationship motivation. Parties to contracts remedying damage that they have done for which they would otherwise have contractual responsibility (e.g. cleaning your own apartment, or an apartment upon which you guaranteed someone else's lease, before the tenant moves out, so you won't have deductions from your security deposit, or so you won't be sued for damages). Similarly, work incurred to protect or add value to your own property. People who work expecting to be paid and have a legal right to be paid who don't get paid after the fact due to the insolvency of the employer, or discharge of the debt in bankruptcy, or the expiration of a statute of limitations or claims deadline in a probate proceeding. People performing court ordered community service and inmates in prison pursuant to a conviction. Self-employed business people who don't make a profit, either personally, or in a capacity as an officer or director of an entity owned by the self-employed person. But, if this involved providing services for no compensation, without a more involved business with expenses as well as receipts, as an alleged independent contractor, for a single other person, this is probably a case where the law would find that someone is actually an employee and not an independent contractor, and where the contract is void for want of consideration. The form over substance analysis that holds that is employment subject to the minimum wage for purposes of the FLSA and state law seems like the most likely scenario in the original question, but the facts aren't detailed enough to tell definitively. Unpaid interns and students learning while doing something of value (generally permitted, but the analysis of the FLSA and state law is rather involved). This is another category that plausible could apply to the original question. People within other express FLSA exceptions that are also present in state law. The illegal categories include: Slaves. These rare cases are usually prosecuted criminally intended to punish keeping slaves (often accompanied by human trafficking charges). Indentured servants (basically slaves for a term of years who aren't allowed to quit, often to someone who paid a major expense such as travel costs to a new country for you, in order to repay the debt). These rare cases are usually prosecuted criminally intended to punish this practice (often accompanied by human trafficking charges). Inmates in jails who have not yet been convicted of a crime, and who are awaiting trial, who are required to work without pay. People working for free due to duress or blackmail, not expressly authorized by law, and not merely the generalized economic duress of needing money to live (e.g. doing household chores for a bully because he threatened to beat you up if you don't). These cases, if they are litigated at all, are usually prosecuted criminally under extortion statutes. More generally, you are not a true "volunteer" if you work is in any meaningful sense involuntary, even if it does not support a provable case beyond a reasonable doubt of true criminal extortion. People in normal employment relationships who are paid for some work but required to do additional unpaid work as condition of employment. Most civil FLSA litigation involving completely unpaid work, involves this category of unpaid work. I'm sure that there are other possibilities that I have not considered and listed, but generally, the legality of working for free is evaluated on a category by category basis. Situations where payment is predominantly in kind (e.g. room and board and clothing) can be complex to analyze and these arrangements are frequently subject to special rules. The primary statutory minimum wage exemptions are as set forth in the exemptions provision of the FLSA: §213. Exemptions (a) Minimum wage and maximum hour requirements The provisions of sections 206 (except subsection (d) in the case of paragraph (1) of this subsection) and 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to— (1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity (including any employee employed in the capacity of academic administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools), or in the capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited from time to time by regulations of the Secretary, subject to the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, except that an employee of a retail or service establishment shall not be excluded from the definition of employee employed in a bona fide executive or administrative capacity because of the number of hours in his workweek which he devotes to activities not directly or closely related to the performance of executive or administrative activities, if less than 40 per centum of his hours worked in the workweek are devoted to such activities); or (2) Repealed. Pub. L. 101–157, §3(c)(1), Nov. 17, 1989, 103 Stat. 939. (3) any employee employed by an establishment which is an amusement or recreational establishment, organized camp, or religious or non-profit educational conference center, if (A) it does not operate for more than seven months in any calendar year, or (B) during the preceding calendar year, its average receipts for any six months of such year were not more than 331/3 per centum of its average receipts for the other six months of such year, except that the exemption from sections 206 and 207 of this title provided by this paragraph does not apply with respect to any employee of a private entity engaged in providing services or facilities (other than, in the case of the exemption from section 206 of this title, a private entity engaged in providing services and facilities directly related to skiing) in a national park or a national forest, or on land in the National Wildlife Refuge System, under a contract with the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture; or (4) Repealed. Pub. L. 101–157, §3(c)(1), Nov. 17, 1989, 103 Stat. 939. (5) any employee employed in the catching, taking, propagating, harvesting, cultivating, or farming of any kind of fish, shellfish, crustacea, sponges, seaweeds, or other aquatic forms of animal and vegetable life, or in the first processing, canning or packing such marine products at sea as an incident to, or in conjunction with, such fishing operations, including the going to and returning from work and loading and unloading when performed by any such employee; or (6) any employee employed in agriculture (A) if such employee is employed by an employer who did not, during any calendar quarter during the preceding calendar year, use more than five hundred man-days of agricultural labor, (B) if such employee is the parent, spouse, child, or other member of his employer's immediate family, (C) if such employee (i) is employed as a hand harvest laborer and is paid on a piece rate basis in an operation which has been, and is customarily and generally recognized as having been, paid on a piece rate basis in the region of employment, (ii) commutes daily from his permanent residence to the farm on which he is so employed, and (iii) has been employed in agriculture less than thirteen weeks during the preceding calendar year, (D) if such employee (other than an employee described in clause (C) of this subsection) (i) is sixteen years of age or under and is employed as a hand harvest laborer, is paid on a piece rate basis in an operation which has been, and is customarily and generally recognized as having been, paid on a piece rate basis in the region of employment, (ii) is employed on the same farm as his parent or person standing in the place of his parent, and (iii) is paid at the same piece rate as employees over age sixteen are paid on the same farm, or (E) if such employee is principally engaged in the range production of livestock; or (7) any employee to the extent that such employee is exempted by regulations, order, or certificate of the Secretary issued under section 214 of this title; or (8) any employee employed in connection with the publication of any weekly, semiweekly, or daily newspaper with a circulation of less than four thousand the major part of which circulation is within the county where published or counties contiguous thereto; or (9) Repealed. Pub. L. 93–259, §23(a)(1), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 69. (10) any switchboard operator employed by an independently owned public telephone company which has not more than seven hundred and fifty stations; or (11) Repealed. Pub. L. 93–259, §10(a), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 63. (12) any employee employed as a seaman on a vessel other than an American vessel; or (13), (14) Repealed. Pub. L. 93–259, §§9(b)(1), 23(b)(1), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 63, 69. (15) any employee employed on a casual basis in domestic service employment to provide babysitting services or any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the Secretary); or (16) a criminal investigator who is paid availability pay under section 5545a of title 5; (17) any employee who is a computer systems analyst, computer programmer, software engineer, or other similarly skilled worker, whose primary duty is— (A) the application of systems analysis techniques and procedures, including consulting with users, to determine hardware, software, or system functional specifications; (B) the design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, or modification of computer systems or programs, including prototypes, based on and related to user or system design specifications; (C) the design, documentation, testing, creation, or modification of computer programs related to machine operating systems; or (D) a combination of duties described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) the performance of which requires the same level of skills, and who, in the case of an employee who is compensated on an hourly basis, is compensated at a rate of not less than $27.63 an hour; or (18) any employee who is a border patrol agent, as defined in section 5550(a) of title 5; or (19) any employee employed to play baseball who is compensated pursuant to a contract that provides for a weekly salary for services performed during the league's championship season (but not spring training or the off season) at a rate that is not less than a weekly salary equal to the minimum wage under section 206(a) of this title for a workweek of 40 hours, irrespective of the number of hours the employee devotes to baseball related activities.
Constitutional Law in the absence of service-process Can a Federal Judge make findings that substantially affects the property interests of third persons who are not and never were before the court {no action commenced against them, and no process) during the course of criminal sentencing proceedings directed at defendant parties in that case? And if there is no authority for making such a finding, what would be the remedy where the Court ordered the property of the other persons to be sold, again without issuing service to said persons?	A court can have jurisdiction over property in rem without personal service upon all persons who may claim an interest in the property. Typically, this is done by providing some form of service (such as notice by mail) upon people who are known to have an interest in the property, and an alternative to service directed at an individual (such as notice by posting at the property, by publication of a notice in a public place, or by publication of a notice in a newspaper where the property is located). Civil forfeiture often involves this kind of indirect notice to unknown parties by publication. what would be the remedy where the Court ordered the property of the other persons to be sold, again without issuing service to said persons The ruling of the criminal court is not binding on people who were not served with process in the original action (either personally, if known, or by publication or some other similar means, if not known to the court) in another legal proceeding. But if a claim becomes moot, there may be not remedy available of a violation of one's rights. They could conceivably bring an action to quiet title, or the equivalent, or an action in replevin, which would not be bound by the Court's findings since the third-parties weren't a party to it, and an injunction on the sale could be sought in that case, if it wasn't too late. But, if the third-parties had actual notice of the pending criminal action, the better option would probably be to file a motion in the criminal action to intervene with respect to disposition of the property. Takings of property in the context of the criminal justice system are not "takings" in the 5th Amendment constitutional sense, for which an inverse condemnation action are available, although there is still a due process requirement, which isn't met without some effort to give potential known or unknown third-party claimants notice of the sale. If there was a court ordered sale, any claim would probably be against the proceeds of the sale, and not against a bona fide purchaser for value at a court ordered sale regularly conducted. Of course, this presumes that the property is not contraband (you can't make a legal claim to cocaine even if you own it). If the defendants did not give you notice of your ownership interest, and this resulted in you not being able to intervene in the criminal action, you could also sue the defendant for breaching duties owed to you as a fellow property owner of the property disposed of in the criminal action. Ultimately, this is not an enviable position to be in, and the likelihood of a court effectively destroying your property interest in the property subject to the criminal proceeding in a manner that there is no economically efficient remedy to address is significant. Some of the relevant case law is discussed at another answer I wrote on a related topic. See also this answer on civil forfeiture. One of the leading U.S. Constitutional law cases on the topic is Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (“For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state's action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable post-deprivation remedy.”).	The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law	So, as I understand the decision, it's a little more subtle than that. By default, states have sovereign immunity and can't be sued without their consent. Congress can remove ("abrogate") this immunity by law in some circumstances. They tried to do so for copyright infringement cases with the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990. However, in the present case of Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that this part of the CRCA is unconstitutional. The idea is that under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate state immunity when it's necessary to ensure people's right to due process, but only in a "congruent and proportional" way. Now if a state unintentionally or negligently infringes someone's copyright, that does not violate the person's right to due process, but an intentional infringement might. At the time the CRCA was passed, when Congress went looking for instances where states infringed on copyrights, they found several cases of unintentional or negligent infringement, and just a couple where they may have infringed intentionally. SCOTUS argued that to respond to this by completely abrogating state immunity in all copyright cases was disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional. But the Court suggests in the opinion that Congress could pass a different law to abrogate immunity in copyright cases, if it were narrower. For instance, a law that only stripped immunity in cases of intentional infringement would likely be constitutional, especially if there were evidence that intentional infringement was happening enough to be a significant problem. So I think the answer is that as of right now, a state could deliberately infringe someone's copyright (e.g. by pirating software) and be immune from suit. However, Congress has the power to "fix" this, and most likely will, especially if there seems to be egregious abuse. (By the way, the decision contains an impressive quantity of pirate jokes. I guess since it's not only about copyright infringement (aka "piracy"), but actually alleges infringement of a video about a sunken pirate ship, the justices just couldn't resist.) Your "eminent domain" idea is separate from this. Seizing copies of the software wouldn't give the state the right to use them, as the software itself would still be copyrighted. The state would have to seize the copyright, and I don't know whether that is possible - it's not necessarily property in that sense. But if they did so, then they wouldn't be infringing the copyright at all (since the state itself would now own the copyright) and this case would be irrelevant. On the other hand, when a state uses eminent domain to seize property, they must as you say pay fair market value for it, and that means the market value before they seized it. So the value of the copyright in such a case wouldn't be "nothing" - it would be more like the amount a competitor would have had to pay the software maker to buy all the rights to that product. Likewise, if the state seizes your lovely house and bulldozes it to build a toxic waste dump, they owe you what someone would have paid for the house, not the value of a dump that nobody wants.	Disclaimer: there are whole sections of criminal law courses that deal with this issue and the various laws and precedents that have shaped american jurisprudence relating to right of privacy, expectation of privacy, and search and seizure. So, this is more of a primer than a comprehensive answer. That being said, the Fourth Amendment, which protects the people from unreasonable search and seizure by the government, dictates that there must be probable cause for a search warrant to issue. However, in addition to the restrictions that are imposed by the Fourth Amendment, several states’ constitutions, as well as a variety of state and federal statutes, rules of procedure, and law court rulings interpret these edicts further, limiting the process for obtaining a search warrant (a state can add additional safeguards, or impose more stringent requirements, but not less than the 4th amendment demands). On the federal level alone, the laws on search and seizure are also limited in scope by sections appearing in Title 18, Part II, Chapter 205 – Searches and Seizures. 18 U.S.C. § 3101-18. Federal warrants are further governed by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Only Judges and magistrates may issue search warrants. To obtain a warrant, law enforcement officers must show that there is probable cause (i.e. grounds) that search is legally justified. Officers must support this showing with sworn statements (affidavits) under oath, and must describe in particularity the place they will search and the items they will seize. Judges must consider the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether or not to issue the warrant. When issuing a search warrant, the judge may restrict how and when the police conduct the search. Police officers (a broad term I'm using for ease of discussion to include all manner of state and federal investigators operating under color of law) seeking a warrant do not need to show that the people being searched (or those whose property is being searched) actually, or even probably, committed the crime(s) in question. Rather, officers merely need to show probable cause exists to show that the evidence sought-after is likely there and upon discovery may implicate some person or persons in criminal activity (that has been committed). A landmark case that resulted in some reforms is Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), in which the Supreme Court opined that a search conducted by the police at a student newspaper, where the newspaper was not implicated or connected to any criminal activity, was a legal search under the Fourth Amendment, because the police suspected it had photographic evidence of the identities of demonstrators who assaulted police officers. Afterward, however, some jurisdictions responded by passing laws restricting or forbidding these kinds of searches - so again, what stands as acceptable procedure is not static. While you may not often hear of requests for warrants being denied, it does happen if there is insufficient PC pled in the affidavit; General unawareness is not surprising as it is not something often made public, although there are instances. Most officers know when they have enough for a warrant and know how to adequately swear out an affidavit so that PC is present enough for the judge to sign the warrant in good faith. However, some Judges are more stringent and demanding than others with regard to how the PC was obtained,the scope of the warrant under those facts, etc. Certainly, not every application is granted. Cornell has a great primer of this issue and you can find article when application for a warrant was denied...especially in higher profile investigations. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/search_warrant	At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case.	So what relevance if any does standing have in criminal trials? E.g., are there any examples of criminal cases/charges dismissed for lack of standing, by which I mean that the court decided the government lacked standing? Let's restrict the discussion to federal proceedings, for the sake of not making this too broad. Almost none. Conceptually, this is because a violation of a sovereign's criminal laws is an injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest of a sovereign in not having its own criminal laws violated. The violation of the law itself is the injury. Where standing type considerations apply they are usually described as jurisdiction. A sovereign, be it a state or the federal government can enforce its own criminal laws, but not another sovereign's criminal laws except by extradition. For example, a state prosecutor can't enforce a federal immigration crime in state court, nor can a state prosecutor file federal or state charges in a federal court. Likewise, a federal prosecutor can't bring federal or state charges in a state court, and a federal prosecutor can't bring state criminal charges (unless adopted by reference as part of federal law) in federal court. Criminal justice in Indian territory which is handled by the federal courts by federal prosecutors in felony cases, are a special case conceptualized either as a "contract service" relationship or as evidence that Indian tribes are not fully sovereign. The extraterritorial application of criminal laws is likewise usually considered a question of jurisdiction rather than standing. Sometimes the federal government passes a law incorporating some state criminal laws by reference as federal criminal laws in federally controlled territory, but that is an issue of substantive law, not standing. A handful of states allow private criminal prosecutions for select minor offenses, rather than being exclusively brought by the government (mostly on the East Coast). In those cases, standing is an issue, just as it is in civil cases. Only victims can bring private criminal prosecutions, where they are allowed, and only in cases where they are the victim.	When judges are finder of fact, the standard is one of deference to the trial court, but may be overcome if the trial court made a "clearly erroneous finding". See Concrete v. Const. Laborers, 508 U.S. 602 (1993).	I will assume that your question pertains to the United States. In other jurisdictions, different rules could apply. Context matters. The usual penalty for spoliation of evidence (the technical term for what you describe) in a civil case is a judicial determination or jury instruction that the evidence destroyed would have established the relevant part of the other side's case had it not been destroyed. In all of these cases, your failure to take affirmative action to preserve the evidence once you knew that there was a bona fide likelihood that you would be sued could be held against you by making an adverse determination that the evidence would have been unfavorable to you and possibly also money sanctions. You could not be held in contempt of court for this if these events happened before a case was commenced. In a criminal case, where you are a defendant, you have an absolute right to not incriminate yourself and do not have to take affirmative action to preserve evidence, although this right is limited to criminal cases and your failure to preserve evidence can still be held against you in a civil case. Certainly, in situation 4 you are a potential criminal defendant, so the 5th Amendment protection would apply. In situations 1 and 2, where the precautions were not put in place to facilitate a crime, the 5th Amendment would protect you if you were a potential criminal defendant, but suppose that you are a bystander like a third party ISP representative. If you were a third party, at a minimum you would have to be put on notice of the police need for the evidence, would probably have had to have had the police ask you for the evidence, and of course, would have to be aware that the destruction was imminent and have the power to prevent that destruction. If all those conditions were present, you might be guilty of obstruction of justice (there are precedents for inaction knowing of the consequences in the fact of a police question amounting to obstruction of justice). In situation 3, this kind of action pretty much amounts to being an accessory to some crime before the fact (unless someone was successfully deceived by a very elaborate story) and would likely make anyone involved part of a conspiracy to commit the crime that the destruction of the papers would facilitate. While the papers themselves might have been evidence of a crime or civil wrong, the destruction of the papers might itself be considered part of the crime, regardless of what could be established regarding the actual content of the papers.
Where does the "liquidated" in "liquidated damages" come from? An answer to a recent question mentions that "all the money you have" is not a valid liquidated-damages clause in a contract. The main use of "liquidation" that I'm familiar with is in the context of bankruptcy, where it does indeed mean (roughly) "all the money you have". (Well, strictly speaking it means converting all your assets to cash, with the implication that you then give all the money you have your creditors.) Are these usages of "liquidated"/"liquidation" related? Or more generally, where does the term "liquidated" in "liquidated damages" come from?	Black's Law Dictionary (5th edition 1979) states that "Liquidated" means Ascertained; determined; fixed; settled; made clear or manifest. This is the sense of the term in which damages are "liquidated" by a liquidated damages term in a contract or statute. The damages are settled by a contractual determine rather than being "unliquidated" (i.e. uncertain or unresolved or undetermined.) The sense of the word meaning sold or reduced to money, is derivative of this prior and more fundamental sense of the word. When assets or an estate are reduced to money their fair market value is fixed or settled. How a word meaning "liquid" came to mean "make clear" when modified is speculative (given what my brief research uncovered), but I think that are some very plausible paths by which that could have happened. According to Oxford Languages: liq·ui·date /ˈlikwəˌdāt/ Origin mid 16th century (in the sense ‘set out (accounts) clearly’): from medieval Latin liquidat- ‘made clear’, from the verb liquidare, from Latin liquidus (see liquid). liquidate (sense 1) was influenced by Italian liquidare and French liquider, liquidate (sense 2) by Russian likvidirovatʹ A second online dictionary source states: liquidate (v.) 1570s, of accounts, "to reduce to order, to set out clearly" (a sense now obsolete), from Late Latin or Medieval Latin liquidatus, past participle of liquidare "to melt, make liquid, make clear, clarify," from Latin liquidus "fluid, liquid, moist" (see liquid (adj.)). Sense of "clear away" (a debt) first recorded 1755. The meaning "wipe out, kill" is from 1924, possibly from Russian likvidirovat, ultimately from the Latin word. Related: Liquidated; liquidating. English.StackExchange has some answers of essentially the same question that doesn't shed much more light on the matter but one excerpt is notable: The meaning is already present in the Latin liquidus which means both "liquid" and "clear, evident". This obviously comes from liquids being limpid (transparent). Limpid by the way (another Latin cognate, originally from Oscan origin) gives Spanish limpido and limpiar. Also liquare means "to filter". So that the idea of transparency and purity is already strongly associated with liquids in Latin.	In the U.S. severance payments are not provided for statutorily, and are rarely made when an employee quits or is fired for cause. However, even when not provided for within contracts it is common to see voluntary severances paid during lay-offs. Furthermore, in the U.S. it is more likely that they would be "laid off" in order to qualify for unemployment insurance. In Pennsylvania one can make claims on the state-run unemployment insurance system only if one is able to work and does not refuse suitable work when offered. If one quits one is not eligible for these payments. Ultimately unemployment claims are born by the employer (since their legally-mandated unemployment insurance premiums are adjusted based on realized claims). So managers with the authority to layoff employees can impose real costs on their companies, both in terms of direct severance payments (which may be optional), and in terms of the inflated unemployment premiums that will hit the company down the road. However, I have never heard of a company attempting to recoup such costs from managers, since such decisions are specifically delegated to managers with hiring/firing authority. It seems much more likely that a manager deemed to have abused the company's purse would be demoted or fired rather than being sued, unless there were some gross fraud involved (e.g., kickbacks).	If the common law applies (i.e. there is no statute that changes it) then it depends on if the item was lost, mislaid or abandoned. The US has statute law dealing with lost money but that is not the question here. Property is generally deemed to have been lost if it is found in a place where the true owner likely did not intend to set it down, and where it is not likely to be found by the true owner. At common law, the finder of a lost item could claim the right to possess the item against any person except the true owner or any previous possessors. Property is generally deemed to have been mislaid or misplaced if it is found in a place where the true owner likely did intend to set it, but then simply forgot to pick it up again. For example, a wallet found in a shop lying on a counter near a cash register will likely be deemed misplaced rather than lost. Under common law principles, the finder of a misplaced object has a duty to turn it over to the owner of the premises, on the theory that the true owner is likely to return to that location to search for his misplaced item. If the true owner does not return within a reasonable time (which varies considerably depending on the circumstances), the property becomes that of the owner of the premises. Property is generally deemed to have been abandoned if it is found in a place where the true owner likely intended to leave it, but is in such a condition that it is apparent that he or she has no intention of returning to claim it. Abandoned property generally becomes the property of whoever should find it and take possession of it first, although some states have enacted statutes under which certain kinds of abandoned property – usually cars, wrecked ships and wrecked aircraft – escheat, meaning that they become the property of the state. For your specifics: If I purchase merchandise in a physical store, and then (accidentally or not) leave the merchandise at the store after I've paid for it, is the store allowed to resell that merchandise to another customer? This would be mislaid property and if they cannot find you and you do not return to claim it after a reasonable time (which would be different for a Mars bar and a Boeing 747) then it is theirs and they can do what they want with it: including sell it to someone else. How does this scenario differ from leaving personal items at the store that I purchased elsewhere? It doesn't.	This is complicated. This is state dependent, and as of time of writing, you haven't disclosed what is the relevant state. This is something you should hire/retain a (divorce) lawyer, and discuss with them. The law can be messy; divorces are always messy. The answer is the most common answer in law: it depends, on specific facts. See above, get a lawyer. The first question is "is the money in this investment account a shared asset that I have any claim to". The answer is "it depends". What state are you in, and where did this money come from? Depending on various factors, the answer might very well be "no", in which case, this money (and it's loss) may not affect you at all. If you do have some claim to this money, then it gets even more complicated. "Can this asset be retrieved in a court proceeding and say that he was squandering money?" Maybe, kinda. Technically no (because of the way you phrased that). I'll explain. In a divorce, "shared" assets are divided equitably (Note "equitably" does NOT mean "equally") based on numerous factors, often on a case-by-case basis, and which factors depend on the state. (Therefore, the lawyer you retain should be licensed in the state you/your husband are filing for divorce in). Before your divorce, both sides have (in general) the right to use shared property. They do not have the right to intentionally damage or destroy said property. One complication/grey area is normal use that degrades or damages the value of said property. For example, imagine a classic sports car. Many people drive them for fun; this is normal use. On the other hand, using a classic sports car decreases the value. Is using the sports car unreasonable damage? This is a fact based determination to be made based on specifics. Can this asset be retrieved in a court proceeding [if I] say that he was squandering money? (correction to what I think think you meant). Maybe, but probably not. You can say whatever you want in court, but what matters is what you can prove, as you are the bearing the burden of proof due to making the accusation (and you must prove it to the standard required by the court in your case for your particular motion/accusation, which might be the standard of "the balance of probabilities/more likely than not" or "clear and convincing evidence", or something else; it's complicated, fact dependent and state dependent, so get a lawyer). You don't need to prove that he lost money. If he was day trading before, the fact that he was day trading after the separation is not held against him; day trading is risky, therefore you have to prove that he intentionally lost money (and, potentially, that he intentionally lost money to deny money to you in the divorce, as opposed to e.g. tax loss harvesting). I would recommend hiring a divorce lawyer and discussing it with them.	It first depends on what state you are dealing with. This expression shows up in standard forms in Georgia, where it is not defined. You can read the associated statutes (Georgia Code, Title 53) especially the definitions, and it won't tell you. The probate court rules also don't tell you. So in Georgia, it would be "what a reasonable person would conclude" (good luck there). Searching for legal blogs that might give a hint, this article refers to "Significant assets that are solely titled to the decedent- property, automobiles, boats, homes", which seems obvious – they don't suggest a lower value, because that is not legally determined and they don't want to get in trouble for advising that $1,000 (or $500) is "an insignificant value". The purpose of the form is to put beneficiaries on notice as to what is at stake, and for purposes of that form, it is an estimate, not a binding promise. You have pretty much identified the indeterminacy of the law (in Georgia).	You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right.	Yes The airline is entitled to recover what the passenger cost it - that’s how damages work. If it’s successful in its legal pursuit of the passenger it’s also entitled to legal costs (generally, legal costs are complicated). This can either be the actual amount or a genuine pre-estimate of that amount in the contract, called a liquidated damages amount. Liquidated damages do not have to be accurate in the particular circumstances but they must be a reasonable expectation of what an average breach would cost the airline. Too large and they risk being a penalty and unenforceable - only governments can punish.	You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment.
In the State of NY, if I have no income, but I have a house — do I need to pay property tax? If I need to pay property tax on the house, are there any exemptions, based on the fact that I have no income? Is it relevant what the tax assessment of the house is? When I look at houses in house search websites, I often see in the tax history something like: Property tax for 2017: $2,000 While for all the other years from 2000 to 2019, there is no info. What does it mean?	If I need to pay property tax on the house, are there any exemptions, based on the fact that I have no income? No. There may be property tax exemptions for other reasons, but there is not a property tax exemption for lack of income. The most common property tax exemptions in New York are listed here. They are: STAR (School Tax Relief) Senior citizens exemption Veterans exemption Exemption for persons with disabilities Exemptions for agricultural properties The stunningly long full list of property tax exemptions can be found here. The long list mostly reflects, however, a variety of property exemptions for non-profits and governmental entities, enacted in a piecemeal fashion. Given that you are relying upon a home search website, rather than official records, I suspect that the gaps are simply due to incomplete data for the website.	"Understanding the law" and the availability of information on law and in particular the real estate laws of NYC are different things. There are many online resources for the law; Google "NYC Real Estate law" and look at Wikipedia, Findlaw, Justia, the Cornell and Stanford law sites, state and federal government sites that make codes available, etc. But understanding the law takes your own effort and your skills at reading and critical thinking. It's your choice to read and think and take classes in the law if you choose, i.e. Law \| edX. No one or any government is obligated to you in that respect.	As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine.	You would report illegal income via Schedule 1, line 8. At the bottom, after naming many specific legal sources of income there is a line 8z "Other income. List type and amount" with very little space. The instructions refer you to Miscellaneous Income in Pub 525. They do list "Stolen Property" as a category, saying If you steal property, you must report its FMV in your income in the year you steal it unless in the same year, you return it to its rightful owner. However, there is no requirement to report the illegal nature of your income, and it is not difficult to describe such income in non-incriminating terms, such as "miscellaneous income". If they are not satisfied, you may inform them of your 5th amendment right to not incriminate yourself. Invoking your right to silence does not constitute probable cause for a search warrant.	You ask them explicitly, maybe adding that you need that info specifically to calculate tax. IP address is not reliable because your customers could be using VPN, Tor, or be on vacation overseas. (By the way, "IP" on a website about law would more likely be understood as "Intellectual Property", not "Internet Protocol address".)	In the US, the laws that govern habitable residences and the related issues - such as land zoning, health regulations, sewer and water services, private and commercial building codes, etc. - are very localized at the city and county levels. So you need to check with the city and county where you want to place such a structure and determine the relevant laws. Commercial buildings are much more heavily regulated than private residences. (And some federal laws and codes could supersede local laws.) Many cities and counties have their zoning and building codes and requirements online, as well as permitting systems to apply for building and utility hookup permits. It's true that some counties in the US have minimal zoning or building codes, so yes, you could move a shed to land you own in that county and build your own road, haul your water, put up solar panels, dig an outhouse, and not deal with any - or very few - regulations. But cities and towns will be much more regulated, since zoning and building codes are used to insure public safety, and services such as water and sewer are supported by taxes and protect public health. In other words, you may not legally be able to live in a shed that does not have city sewer, water and electric service. There may also be building codes for minimum size of bedrooms, egress windows for fire, ventilation, heating systems, so even if a small house is sold as a complete residence in a package, it may not pass local building codes. Breaking zoning, building and health codes can result in the local inspectors visiting and determining if the residence is up to code; they will not typically need a warrant or your permission to enter. They can order you to bring the residence up to code, if possible; or condemn the structure and require you to move out.	A "land contract" is not a way of renting property, it is a way of purchasing property on an installment basis without bank financing. It is Ohio's version of what in some other places is known as "contract for deed". See "What is a Land Contract in Ohio" and "How Land Contracts Work" The actual law is Section 5313. In a land contract, the buyer has equitable but not legal title. The buyer normally pays all taxes and fees, and is responsible for maintaining the property, just as if s/he has bought the property. But if the buyer defaults, all payments and equity would be forfeit to the seller. Until the buyer has paid 20% of the purchase price, or made 5 years of payments (whichever comes first) a single missed payment constitutes default and can lead to the buyer being evicted with all payments to date going to the seller, the buyer coming out of the deal with nothing. Also, if the seller still has a mortgage and defaults, the buyer may lose everything paid to date. The buyer does not have the protections that a lease gives a tenant, nor the protections that legal title gives a purchaser via a traditional mortgage. Land contracts are often used when the buyer cannot qualify for a mortgage. The buyer pays interest, and it is often at a higher rate than the current rate on a mortgage. Land contracts are often a form of predatory lending, but for some buyers they make sense. A buyer needs to carefully review the contract with a lawyer knowledgeable about land contracts, and consider the risks and benefits of this form of financing. As I understand it, there cannot be a valid land contract for one apartment in an apartment building. A land contract must be for title to the land and all fixtures, including all buildings, on it. (There was at one point some unclarity if the question referred to an apartment. It is now clear that it refers to a house, so this statement is not relevant to the OP, but may be to others.) It is not clear just what the OP's landlord (LL) has in mind. It may be that LL plans to offer a "land contract" in which the purchase would be completed only after a very long time, with the idea that the OP would simply default when s/he wanted to move. Such a default could harm the OP's credit. There seems no benefit to the OP in such a scheme compared to a lease, unless LL will lower the price significantly, taking into account maintenance costs and taxes, which OP may well be expected to pay under a land contract. Note that a landlord can't legally force a tenant to sign a document cancelling a lease, or to sign whatever s/he will call a "land contract". Nor can s/he cancel the lease without the tenant's consent except for good cause as specified in the law (such as not paying rent). S/He could become uncooperative on other matters if a tenant doesn't do as s/he wants. If a tenant does cancel his or her lease, s/he will lose some rights. Others are guaranteed by law as long as the tenant is paying rent. If one signs a "land contract", what happens depends on its provisions. OP needs to very carefully consider just what is being offered, and its risks and any possible benefits. Details of the contract will matter. No matter exactly what LL has in mind, this is not at all a usual procedure for a landlord. OP or anyone in a similar circumstance should be very careful.	There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf
Trade restrictions on open source software Apparently the US has put Huawei on a trade blacklist that prevents US companies to trade with Huawei. With hardware and proprietary software it is straightforward how this can be executed (don't make any contracts, don't sell stuff/licenses). With OSS this is a lot more complicated since there is no real deal or negotiation between the licensee and the provider of a license. Also, there is not a single copyright holder and copyright matters are often very complicated concerning OSS. So the question is twofold: does the trade blacklist have any effect on OSS and if not, is it at all possible for the US government to limit the trade of OSS?	Publishing source code is protected under the First Amendment. Therefore the US government cannot stop anyone from publishing open source software, and once it is available from a web site it is impossible to stop anyone else getting it. However any kind of support contract (such as this) or other commercial arrangement would fall under the definition of "trade" and be banned. Update in response to comments about ITAR. The USA International Traffic in Arms Regulations still cover cryptographic software. However any attempt to prosecute an open source project for publishing cryptographic software would run up against the First Amendment. In 2008 the 9th Circuit found that open source cryptographic software is covered under the First Amendment, and hence the use of ITAR to restrict its publication is unconstitutional. The US government declined to push this case to the Supreme Court, and no other similar cases have arisen since. In the meantime strong open source cryptographic software has been made widely available from within the USA without US government permission (Linus Torvalds is resident in the US). In theory the US government might launch a case against an open source project, win the appeal in another circuit, and hence create a circuit split which the Supreme Court would have to resolve. However they have now had over 10 years to try this, and the longer they wait the less likely such a case is to succeed.	It depends on what you are selling to the enterprises. You could be selling just a licence to use the program, and retain all the rights on the source code. You could be selling the rights to the source code. For #1, the source code is yours and you can do what it pleases with it1. In fact many programs offer both an open-source licence (which usually forces the user to make its changes to the code publicly available) and a commercial one (which allows the user to keep the modifications of the source code for themselves). For #2, the source code is no longer yours so it is not up to you to decide what to do with it. 1I am assuming no other agreements imposing limits on those; for example that none of your contracts to your customers have a clause forbidding you from making the code available to the public.	As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum).	The law in every country where your service is available prevails. That means that if your servers are in Estonia, your file storage is in Lithuania, your company is in Switzerland, you are in France, you hold Thai citizenship, your users are in the USA and the signal transits through the U.K., Belgium, Germany, Canada and Poland then you are subject to the laws of each and every one of them. In addition, if China has reason to believe that the stored files contain matters relating to their citizens then they can take an interest. And so on and so forth ... A country has jurisdiction wherever it wants to have jurisdiction subject to the limits of and its ability to actually enforce its laws. What you are proposing is certainly illegal in many countries and you need to seek professional legal advice - not rely on strangers on the internet.	It seems that you don’t understand what parody is. If you do understand, please explain how it’s even possible to parody computer code. What you can do with “open source” code depends on the licence the copyright holder(s) release it under. For some very permissive licences you can do what you suggest, for most, you can’t.	You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction.	You cannot do this through any established public license that I know of, but you could write your own. The model would be any educational use or non-commercial use license, such as CC NC licenses. The main challenge is defining the excluded classes of usage. That is why you should engage an attorney to draft this for you. I don't think there is any point in adding a $5M penalty clause. You offer a separate paid license for individuals who do not want to comply with the particular terms of your license, and set the fee to whatever you want. Saying that you're gonna fine violators is a bad idea because penalty clauses are illegal. Instead, the standard approach is a liquidated damages clause, where you state what a reasonable estimate of your damages would be. In the case of software that is available for purchase, illegal copying of the software obviously results at least in the cost of the software qua lost revenue as damages. Plus shipping and handling.	Some MP3 technologies are still under patent in the US: you can read the wiki page on that matter to see if it is applicable to what you intend to do. This assumes you write your own code – if you use someone else's conversion software, that would depend on the licensing terms for the software.
Who is responsible for comments on YouTube? Who is responsible for comments which are posted on YouTube? The channel, YouTube or the poster? I am refering to defamation and copyright suits in India. As both YouTube and the video uploader have powers to delete comments, does this mean they have to search for infringing or defamatory comments and delete them? Also, if a notice is sent under s.79 of the Information Technology Act 2000 is it to be sent to YouTube or the video uploader?	Under U.S. law, Section 230 (47 U.S.C. § 230) limits liability for comments solely to the comment maker and not to the video uploader or YouTube. It basically says that there is no duty to moderate except for copyright upon a takedown notice. Normally takedown notices would be directed to YouTube which has a process that handles that, and not to the uploader, even though the uploader would have a limited able to comply if a comment if problematic. Since YouTube is U.S. based, Section 230 carries a lot of weight in both being law that is relevant to the platform and in setting norms about what is expected of participants in that platform, but it is not binding on other countries. Another country could impose liability on someone who has the ability to delete comments, even though U.S. law would not impose it. The section of the India IT Act referred to in the question states: Central Government Act Section 79 in The Information Technology Act, 2000 95 [ 79 Exemption from liability of intermediary in certain cases. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), an intermediary shall not be liable for any third party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted by him. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply if- (a) the function of the intermediary is limited to providing access to a communication system over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored or hosted; or (b) the intermediary does not- (i) initiate the transmission, (ii) select the receiver of the transmission, and (iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission; (c) the intermediary observes due diligence while discharging his duties under this Act and also observes such other guidelines as the Central Government may prescribe in this behalf. (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply if- (a) the intermediary has conspired or abetted or aided or induced, whether by threats or promise or othorise in the commission of the unlawful act; (b) upon receiving actual knowledge, or on being notified by the appropriate Government or its agency that any information, data or communication link residing in or connected to a computer resource, controlled by the intermediary is being used to commit the unlawful act, the intermediary fails to expeditiously remove or disable access to that material on that resource without vitiating the evidence in any manner. Explanation. -For the purpose of this section, the expression "third party information" means any information dealt with by an intermediary in his capacity as an intermediary. Section 79 of the India IT Act appears to be modeled on Section 230 under U.S. law. And, it would appear to be a fair reading that YouTube and not the uploader is the "intermediary" for purposes of Section 79, so the uploader might not have express immunity from liability under Section 79. But it also seems unlikely that the common law in India would impose liability on an uploader for failing to moderate comments that is not imposed upon YouTube which is statutorily absolved of the same liability. Since the uploader is probably not an intermediary, this also means that liability for failing to respond to a takedown notice under the India IT Act absent of court order, is probably also non-existent. Any common law action to impose liability (or a statutory action under copyright law) requires a showing of a prima facie case, which involves a showing of a legally recognized duty to act or to refrain from acting. I doubt that the law of India would find a legally recognized duty of a YouTube uploader to delete offending content from a YouTube run comment forum in which the uploader is given limited rights, even though Section 79 does not appear by its own terms to prohibit that liability from being imposed. For example, I think it is unlikely that a court in India would find that a comment made by a third-party to an uploaded post would constitute "publication" of a defamatory statement by the uploader (or of copyrighted material by an uploader), which is an element of defamation and copyright liability. But I wouldn't be surprised if the case law on point is thin or non-existent as this is a relatively new phenomena and it isn't an intuitively very natural way to apply pre-Internet law to these new circumstances.	The platform will get in trouble for copyright infringement. The disclaimer that you are not liable does not work, legally, since the person suing you hasn't agreed to the TOS on your webpage. You can be sued for "secondary infringement", meaning that not only the uploader but also you the service provider are liable. The solution to this quandry is the "DMCA safe harbor", a set of rules which, if you follow them, you won't be held liable. The specific piece of law is here. The essence of the rules is that you have to have a "designated agent" who receives takedown notices: if a copyright owner finds their stuff on your page, they officially notify you, then you take the material down – expeditiously (no dawdling). You notify the uploader, they either accept the takedown or file a counterclaim, you notify the rights-holder, there's a waiting period, then the rights holder can file a lawsuit, or not. If the rights-holder doesn't file suit, you can put the material back up. You cannot rely solely on the intricate DMCA notice / counter-notice dance, because under para (c)(1)(A)(ii) of §512, you also must not be "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent".	Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual.	I do not have the phone number, email, or anything else associated with the account. Well, neither do I - so it must be my account. Unfortunately, the fact that you appear in most or all of the pictures on that account does not prove that you own it. It could be the photographer's account. Do I have ANY options here Can you reactivate the email account associated with the Twitter account? Or the phone number? Either would allow you to reset the password and access the account. You can go to court (in California) and seek an injunction ordering Twitter to delete the photos or give you access. Of course, you have the same issues proving ownership here as you did with Twitter but the court may have different priorities (justice) than Twitter does (corporate protection). I had an idea. If you (or your husband) own the copyright in the photos (i.e. one of you was the photographer) you could issue a DCMA take-down notice because the poster (who, according to Twitter, isn’t you) does not have permission (even if they did at the time: permission can be revoked). Twitter would be unable to contact the account holder and would be required to remove the images when they got no response.of course, if the photographer was someone else, they could do it. Or you could break the law and say it was you, although I would never recommend this even with a near zero chance of being caught.	Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly.	Copyright law requires permission of the rights holder to e.g. post material. The terms of that permission could be very complicated, as seen in royalties contracts with publishers, but they can also be simple. If someone asks "can I post your video on my website" and you say "Sure, as long as you give me credit", then they can post the video on their site as long as that say something like "This video was made by Jake" or something like that. There is no exception to permission where permission is retroactively withdrawn just in case it turns out that one can make money off of the video. However: you gave That Guy permission, and that does not mean that the hundreds of Other Guys have permission. So you can pursue all of the Other Guys and demand that they take the video down, or require some payment to get your permission.	There is no law against a person creating and distributing such a poster, to the best of my knowledge. However such a poster pretty clearly implies that the person shown is guilty of a crime, or at least strongly suspected. If the store somehow made an error, pulling the image of a person who did not use the stolen card or there is some other error, the person pictured might well suffer a significant loss of reputation, and might sue for defamation. Damages could possibly be significant. Such suits have, I believe, happened when surveillance photos were posted but there later proved to have been an error. Mary might wish to double check how sure the store is that the photos are of the person who actually used the stolen card.	There are now 2 works. An original, abandoned work, and a new, derivative work. The original creator owns the copyright over the original, and the new person owns copyright over the derivative he created. In your scenario, it will be the new creator, who will have the right to sue, if the gpl of the new work has been infringed
Is there a penalty for late registration of self employed status in Germany? I believe it is the case (please correct me if this is wrong) that if someone earns money in Germany on a self-employed basis, then they are supposed to register as self-employed with the local finance office, even if the actual income from this work is very low. What would happen in the case where someone had been working for about a year as self-employed but earning an extremely low income from this (far below the threshold to pay tax) and hence did not realise they needed to register? Upon realising that they should register, would they be subject to a fine or other penalty for not having registered in a timely manner? Edit: the work in question is conducted online, and does not involve any element of physical risk.	When starting self-employed work, there are a number of consequences. If the activity is gewerblich but not freiberuflich, it is necessary to register with the Gewerbeamt (~ trade office). This obligation is specificed in §14 GewO. Per §146 GewO, failure to perform a registration is a misdemeanour that can be fined with up to €1000. This assumes that the business has to be registered but not authorized. For any self-employed work, it is necessary to fill out the Fragebogen zur steuerlichen Erfassung with your tax office. This is specified in §138 AO. I can't find information about a concrete fine, but misdemeanours are generally fined with between €5 to €1000, in proportion with the severity. As a self-employed person, you are required to file taxes. Delayed tax filings are penalized (see §152 AO) with 0.25% interest per month on the due tax (at least €10 or €25 per month), but is capped at €25000. However, the surcharge can be dropped if no tax is owed. Note that without any tax filings, the tax office is required to estimate your earnings – and is allowed to assume the “worst case” of maximal reasonable earnings (§162 AO). You are required to inform your health insurance about any changes to your employment, including taking up self-employment. If you are insured through statutory health insurance, they will recalculate your past insurance premium. The good news that premiums depend on your income, so low additional income will lead to moderate additional payments. If you draw any kind of public benefits or social security payments (including Bafög or Arbeitslosengeld I/II), you must notify the respective office. You may be required to repay part of these benefits (with penalties). However, this will depend a lot on how much you earned. Given that we're talking about low sums, there might be some exceptions from having to register as self-employed. If your activity were revenue-neutral or -negative, there might be an argument that it's not a business but Liebhaberei, i.e. a hobby (but it depends on the details). Services as part-time tutor, artist, or caregiver might be tax-free for up to €3000/year (but it depends on the details). That the self-employed work was carried out through a computer makes absolutely no difference.	It is likely that you don't owe any taxes even though you have worked for many years in Brazil. Earned income that is earned outside the U.S. by natural persons who are U.S. citizens (as oppose to entities like corporations) up to a certain amount that is indexed for inflation is excluded from taxation under Section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code. The cut off is $104,100 U.S. per year in 2018 (about 347,000 Brazilian Reals per year). Also, unearned income and any excess earned income can benefit from the standard deduction and personal exemption from U.S. income taxation unburdened by your foreign earned income up to the threshold. This can be quite substantial. Similarly, if you have children, they would benefit from the child tax credit which would reduce your income tax obligation. And, any U.S. federal income tax due on your unearned income to the extent that it exceeds the standard deduction and personal exemption from U.S. income taxation is reduced by any Brazilian taxes you paid on your Brazilian income as a result of the foreign tax credit. The bottom line is that unless you are very affluent and have significant unearned income, it is unlikely that you owe any U.S. income taxes. Even if you do owe U.S. taxes after these considerations, they wouldn't arrest you. You have to be "willfully" violating U.S. tax laws for it to be a criminal offense and this is one small corner of the law where ignorance of the law is an excuse. And, the Internal Revenue Service would first have to send you several notices by mail setting forth the amount that they think that you owe, allowing you to dispute that amount, and the declaring that you owe it, before you have a potentially criminal tax violation that is well defined enough and communicated to you well enough that you can willfully fail to file a tax return or can willfully fail to pay. So no, they will not arrest you and make you pay, at least not until they send you lots of notices which you ignore. On the other hand, if you do owe any U.S. income taxes there is no statute of limitations on collecting those taxes for years in which you were required by U.S. tax law to file a tax return but did not (basically, years in which you owed U.S. taxes). So, if you, for example, won a big lump sum payment playing the lottery when you were 20 years old and owed U.S. income taxes as a result (even though you didn't know it), those taxes could still be collected by the IRS when you are 40 years old since you did not file any U.S. tax return for the year in which you had taxable U.S. income. Finally, under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 enacted in December last year, U.S. taxation of the foreign income of U.S. persons was reformed in the most significant way in the last seventy years or so, and the taxation of U.S. persons on foreign source income is greatly curtailed for 2018 going forward. This is not retroactive, but could mean that as you come into your higher income earning years in middle age, that the taxation of U.S. citizens on their worldwide income is no longer a serious concern for you, even if it would have been under U.S. tax law before then. Enforcing laws that have since been repealed is also rarely an administrative priority for the IRS. It is also hard (to the point of being economically not worth it) to enforce U.S. tax laws against someone who has no U.S. assets. It is also possible that even though you were a dual citizen at birth, that you could have taken an act (e.g. voluntarily serving as an officer in the Brazilian military) that could cause you to lose your U.S. citizenship. So, even if you were a U.S. citizen at birth, it is not 100% certain that you are a U.S. citizen now.	Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive.	Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task.	Where your office is, is your designated workspace. You get the public holidays wherever your official office address is. If you live and work in Hessia, then you get the 11 public holidays there. If you live in Hessia but work right over the border in Bavaria, you get 14 public holidays, even if you live in Hessia. Now, where do you work in case of remote work? That depends on what your official work address is. Do you connect remotely to an office in Bavaria where you are located on paper or do you have no such office? If you have an office you work at officially, then that is your agreed-upon, designated workplace, and in our example, if that's in Bavaria you get the 14 public holidays. If you don't are designated to work in an office in Bavaria and may log in remotely there, then your agreed-upon, designated workplace is your home address, and if that is in Hessia, you get the 11 public holidays there. Where your company's central is... Now, let's assume the company is seated in Brandenburg, which has 12 public holidays. That doesn't matter at all: the Feieratagsrecht of the place you work (officially) dictates your public holidays. So either the laws of your designated location apply: either Hessia's 11 public holidays if your home is the designated workplace, or Bavaria's 14 if the office you connect to is the designated workplace but you remote-connect to it. It would by the way matter if you are designated to be in a location for that exact day: you could be designated to work in a location that has no public holiday on that day, then you don't get that day. However, the Brandenburg company can decide to say "You get our extra holidays in addition. Have fun with the extra free day" - that'd be extra in the contract, not the legal requirement.	The status of any PII (Personally Identifiable Information) is the same in GDPR regardless of location, or who enters it. Its goals are (among others) to stop any actor (company / government or other) from hiding responsibility about their use and practices around people's data. GDPR does even apply to anything offline and on paper. Basically it means you have to validate any entry field is free of PII before processing it. Or make it clear in your privacy statement how you handle this use-case.	Your legal obligation to pay income taxes is generally dependent upon where you perform the work, not where the funds you earn from doing the work are delivered. If you do work in Turkey that causes you to receive earned income, you owe Turkish income taxes on those earning, and your employer has a legal obligation to the Turkish government to make sure that those taxes get collected, or your employer will have to pay your taxes (with penalties) for you. If your employer has to do that, your employer will dock your pay to cover your obligations regardless of which bank account you use or whether you set up a corporation that does work in Turkey as a subcontracting company rather than in an employee-employer relationship. Any of the actions you propose to evade Turkish income taxes would constitute criminal tax fraud and could lead to you and the payroll officials at your employer's company who were complicit in allowing you to attempt to evade Turkish taxes spending time in a Turkish prison. Then you'd be deported. And, of course, you'd be fired probably as soon as you were criminally charged. The U.S. would cooperate with Turkey in pursuing you, your employer and your employer's payroll officials, although I don't know how the Kuwaiti government would respond.	If you process any personal data, you do need to provide notice to the data subjects per Art 13 or Art 14 GDPR. Personal data is any information relating to a (directly or indirectly) identifiable natural person. It seems you are processing personal data including as addresses, PayPal accounts, and IBANs. Thus you're in scope of the GDPR. The GDPR does have an exception when data is processed for “purely personal or household purposes”, but that very likely does not apply to you. The German Datenschutzkonferenz (DSK), a cooperation of the German supervisory authorities, has published a handout on information obligations, listing which information has to be provided in a privacy notice: https://datenschutzkonferenz-online.de/media/kp/dsk_kpnr_10.pdf Such a privacy notice can be fairly short if you're don't doing anything special, in particular if you only use the data as necessary to fulfil the sale contract and then as legally required (e.g. for keeping financial records). There are privacy notice generators that can help with the boilerplate, but be aware that some are significantly outdated, and that in any case you have to fill in the information about your concrete processing activities. You have guessed correctly that you will need to inform your customers about your data retention periods. Your privacy notice will get more complicated if you also want to use this data in other ways, for example for marketing purposes. That would also require you to think about appropriate legal bases (e.g. legitimate interests, or consent).
After the Brexit, can we store UK data in EU region? Can you please tell me, whether we can store PII data belong to UK in EU region? I know the other way round is illegal. But I could not find a place where this problem address properly. Can you please help me with this?	When personal data is transferred between the EU and UK, this is an “international transfer” (also called “restricted transfer” in ICO guidance). Transfers of personal data from the UK to the EU/EEA are easy since the UK has granted an adequacy decision to the EU (see Art 45 GDPR). Nevertheless, this must be disclosed to data subjects per Art 13(1)(f) GDPR. Transfers of personal data from the EU to the UK are different. An adequacy decision is still under negotiation, but is not guaranteed. As an interim measure, the Brexit trade deal says that transfers of personal data into the UK are temporarily not considered international transfers, so that no legal basis such as an adequacy decision is needed. This interim measure will expire after April, but will likely be extended to expire after June. If this temporary measures expires before an adequacy decision is in place, alternative transfer mechanisms such as standard contractual clauses (SCCs) have to be used. In a way, the temporary measure allows an extended transition period for putting SCCs into place.	I decided to rewrite this after the clarification in the comments. You can find the old version in the history. The question is not, actually, about a browser extension. It is about a web service that can be accessed by the browser extension. The way to access the service should make little difference, it could be clay tablets, homing pigeons, or this browser extension, what matters is the service. The service has two functions: Receive PII of the victim, sent by the customer, to calculate the probable email of the victim, and return this PII to the customer. The service operator could argue that the customer is really the data controller under GDPR rules, and that the service operator is only the data processor, but that is not a plausible use case. The customer would need to get and document the consent of the victim before the probable mail is calculated, so why would the customer pay the service operator for a service like this? There is already contact with the victim. Generate a database of specific company email patterns to enable 1. This would also use PII, from random employees of the company in question, and there is no customer to shield the service provider by pretending that consent was collected. The way around the first issue might be to sell the database and have all calculations on the customer's system, but that doesn't resolve the second issue, that of creating the database. This involves looking for patterns in PII of individuals, unless the target company is obliging enough to make the pattern public.	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".	In order to process data (which includes storing data), a data controller must establish one or more of the lawful bases contained at Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR. Briefly, those are: a) Consent of the data subject b) Necessary for performance of a contract with the data subject c) Necessary for compliance with a legal obligation d) Necessary to protect vital interests of data subject or another person e) Necessary for public interest or exercise of official authority vested in the controller f) Necessary for controller's legitimate interests Clearly a) and d) don't apply. As you've settled the debt, it seems unlikely to me that b) or f) apply. That leaves c) and e). A common example under c) would be a requirement by Companies House or HMRC to keep accounting records for a certain period of time. Some public bodies may also find it necessary, under e), to retain records which they need to be able to carry out their other functions. It seems highly unlikely to me that either of these would justify retention for your "lifetime" however. I would start by sending them a written demand to have your data erased under Article 17(1). Make sure you also specifically request that they provide you with all the information (and in particular the purposes of the processing) under Article 15(1), and that, in the event that they refuse to erase your data, they explain the reasons why pursuant to Article 12(4). Their response on these points will be helpful in establishing whether there is a lawful basis. Your next step after that is either to complain to the ICO or to apply to court for a compliance order under Section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The former is free while the latter is not and carries risks of cost if you are unsuccessful. If you opt for one of these steps, make sure you cite the relevant provisions of the GDPR and explain why you think there is no lawful basis for the data retention (including by referencing any response you received from them). "I have read GDPR guides on how to request erasure, but I don't really feel this applies- I want to have my account deleted, not the track record of the loan and repayment" It doesn't matter whether we are talking about your account or your track record. What matters is whether the account constitutes personal data, which it almost certainly does, per the definition at Article 4(1): "‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;"	Per Art 3(2), GDPR only applies to non-European companies when their processing activities relate to the offering of goods or services to people in Europe, or when the processing activities relate to monitoring people in Europe. However, the word “offer” of this targeting criterion requires some level of intent. It is not enough for GDPR to apply that they're marketing to someone who happens to be in Europe, but GDPR would apply if they are intentionally marketing to people who are in Europe. I don't know what they are marketing, so I don't know if that would be the case here. Even if GDPR were to apply, it would not be the most appropriate law. Yes, there's the GDPR right to erasure, which applies under some conditions (though there's a pretty absolute right to opt-out from marketing). The EU's ePrivacy Directive provides more specific rules though, in particular that every such marketing email must offer a way to unsubscribe. Other countries have comparable anti-spam laws, potentially also the home country for this online service.	Yes If you are in the EU, or your players are in the EU and your service is targeted at some part of (or all of) the EU, then this pretty clearly falls within the scope of the GDPR. Such a service would be collecting data associated with natural persons. At least some of it would be made public along with an online identifier, and other parts would be processed and stored, even if disclosed only in anonymized form. (By the way it is a non-trivial task to anonymize data well enough that it is no longer persona data under the GDPR. But let's suppose yoru methods are good enough.) Under GDPR Article 6 the DC must have a lawful basis for such processing. If the basis is "consent" then the consent must be freely given, whch means giving consent may not be a condition of using the service. Under GDPR Article 13 a notice must be sent to the Data Subject (DS) when the data is collected from the subject, including some 11 items or categories of information about the collection process, the Data Controller (DC), the purposes of processing, the legal basis of processing (which the DC must define), who will receive the data, the data retention period, and various rights of the DS. Such a service must be prepared to respond to data access and data erasure requests, under articles 15-17, and data restriction requests under article 18. It must provide a method for a DS to easily make such requests. Other GDPR provisions may well apply in addition to these, but that is enough to show that such service is very likely to be within the scope of the GDPR, unless none of the DSs are present in the EU or the related market area.	Maybe, but probably not The geographic location of the organisation is immaterial: under Article 3.2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: ... (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. Posts anyone (not just EU citizens) make to Reddit (or anywhere else) while they are physically located in the EU or UK engage the GDPR. Pushift.io is therefore captured by the GDPR and any denial of that is just plain wrong. Given the denial, it is likely right out of the gate that they are non-complient. For example, they are unlikely to provided the required information under Article 14. More importantly, it seems that they have not determined the lawful basis for processing the data under Article 6 - they can possibly rely on the public interest basis (preserving deleted publication is arguably a public interest) or a legitimate interest but that requires a balancing of their interest against the data subject's. That said, the right to be forgotten is not absolute, the reasons that might be applicable here are: The data is being used to exercise the right of freedom of expression and information. The data is being used to perform a task that is being carried out in the public interest or when exercising an organization’s official authority. The data represents important information that serves the public interest, scientific research, historical research, or statistical purposes and where erasure of the data would likely to impair or halt progress towards the achievement that was the goal of the processing.	Yes When personal data is processed in the context of an EU/EEA/UK establishment (for example, by a company with offices in the UK), then all these processing activities must fully comply with the GDPR, regardless of where the data subjects are located. For the UK GDPR: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the United Kingdom, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the United Kingdom or not. For the EU GDPR: The GDPR applies to: a company or entity which processes personal data as part of the activities of one of its branches established in the EU, regardless of where the data is processed; or …
Camera to monitor mailbox A community has a row of mailboxes, as opposed to a mailbox at each address. This is common in the rural USA. Since the covid-19 pandemic, people occasionally drive by and steal the mail. Several homeowners have since gotten locking mailboxes, and one considered putting up a webcam at the site as a deterrent. What's the law here?	There is no mailbox-specific law. You can take pictures in public, and you can put a camera to take pictures on your property. Whether you can install a camera in a particular place depends on who owns that place. Of course, you also can't aim it to peer into a nearby residence; and it has to be a video-only camera (unattended recording of audio is illegal without the consent of the thief). In some cases, mega-boxes are owned by the USPS so you would need USPS permission. There is a widespread false narrative that the USPS owns all mailboxes, but the USPS does not say that nor does the US Code. USPS describes two kinds of cluster-boxes, private and USPS-owned. The USPS offers no statements on permission or its denial to install a cameras inside a USPS-owned box, so you would have to ask the local post office in case your box is USPS-owned.	It is difficult to keep track of the rapidly changing legal variables, but it would be illegal and unconstitutional for state police to set up an unauthorized stop-and-search checkpoint on the road ("due process" means "following the law"). As a prelude, there would have to be some higher authority that empowers them to do this. You would have to scrutinize the emergency powers legislation of every state to be certain, but no governor has the power to mandate blanket body searches in case of a medical emergency. (Martial law shifts enforcement of the law to the military, but doesn't generally create arbitrary decree-writing powers). The legal foundation of such searching would have to be a new law: then the question is what the law requires that could make on-the-road body searches constitutional. Since the right to be free of unreasonable searches is a fundamental constitutional right, this law would be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Searches "just for fun" will not pass such scrutiny, nor will "because it's an emergency" or "keep the public safe". Having the disease is not and cannot be a crime, so this law would have to be founded on a strict no-travel requirement. That brings the matter within the sphere of the "officer safety" exception in the case of an arrest. I'm not suggesting that an absolute travel ban would be upheld as constitutional in the US, but that is the kind of legal foundation that would be required for state police to force people to be Covid-searched.	Laws against such actions are not stated in terms of popular and fluid concepts like "computer virus", they are stated in terms of clear concepts like "unauthorized access". There are federal and state laws against this. This web site lists and links to all of the state laws on the matter. There is also a federal law: a detailed legal analysis by DOJ is given here. There are some limits to federal jurisdiction, for example "protected computers" include "computers used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication". The term "affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication" is widely used in federal law, and can be used to prohibit growing feed for your own animals. Anything that you "send" clearly affects interstate commerce (the internet is internationally connected). 18 USC 1030(a) says Whoever ... (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains...(C) information from any protected computer Essentially, a computer connected to the outside world is protected. The key here is "without authorization". If you authorize MS to report back stuff about your computer, that is not unauthorized. It may not be possible to use their product without giving such authorization, in which case you can use a different product that doesn't require that you grant authorization. There is also the possibility that some software producer has technically violates the law because they think that it's okay for them to access the computer as long as they do no harm. Typically, people are not aware that they have granted software publishers access to their computer. The concept of "harm" is pretty much irrelevant to computer-crime criminal law. It would be relevant, though, if a plaintiff were to sue someone for sniffing around their computer: then you'd have to show that you were damaged.	Governments have a significant interest in controlling pathogens and preventing outbreaks: they are dangerous to dense & unimmunized populations. Can a government legally prevent me from intentionally infecting myself with a virus? Yes, governments have the broad authority to enact laws. The US prohibits and regulates pathogen experimentation (self-infection). There are also rules regarding shipping and export (ITAR). Furthermore, in the US, there are (FL, NY state) laws that prevent patients from being tested unless the order is given by an authorized health care professional. Hopefully, you do live in a state that does not have this regulation (AZ). While I do believe in one's right to do as one sees fit with one's own body, there is the counter-argument: there must be limits when it comes to unnecessarily exposing the community to pathogen risk. I hope that this question is theoretical and that nobody actually believes the immunity supposition without a credible peer-reviewed scientific publication. Unfortunately we live in an age where misinformation is propagated at novel speed and scale. I wish the OP well. That being said, I have concerns regarding the underlying assumptions of the question. While I am comfortable with the OP question, the underlying assumptions give me great pause. UPDATE IMHO: I hope that no reader will seriously consider amateur experimentation in self-infection in the hope of conferring immunity. Giving a pathogen uncontrolled safe-haven to propagate and possibly infect others seems irresponsible. I doubt that the government cares if any individual manages to puts themselves in an early grave, however, it does care if amateurs create an unnecessary pandemic risk. I would think that any government would view pathogen experimentation much like nuclear device experimentation, because of the mass casualty risk. I hope that readers understand the implications of an amateur uncontrolled experiment.	This letter from the governor says what happened, at the level of "the state". First, this all relates to a series of proclamations, saying that the surge of individuals unlawfully crossing the Texas-Mexico border poses an ongoing and imminent threat of disaster for certain counties and agencies in the State of Texas This is the standard kind of gubernatorial proclamation that we are now familiar with from covid. The disaster proclamation from May is here. The recent letter asserts a need for additional manpower to arrest those violating state law. The standard recitation of authority is As “Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the State” under Article IV, Section 7 of the Texas Constitution, the governor can “call forth the militia to execute the laws of the State.” Section 431.111 of the Texas Government Code likewise recognizes that the governor can call on state military forces “to enforce state law” and “to assist civil authorities in guarding [or] conveying prisoners.” And Section 437.002 of the Texas Government Code recognizes that “[t]he governor has full control and authority over all matters relating to the Texas military forces.” The bottom line (and last sentence) is I hereby order that the Texas National Guard assist DPS in enforcing Texas law by arresting lawbreakers at the border. So actually, Texas increases the available manpower to enforce the law. Whether or not individuals engaged in such law enforcement are guilty of knowingly violating anyone's civil rights is a separate question. If and when there are actual prosecutions, we will be able to see whether the alleged violation of state law. The Texas criminal trespass statute, §30.05, does require that the trespasser "had notice that the entry was forbidden; or received notice to depart but failed to do so", so unposted land with no order to leave communicated is trespassable without criminal consequences.	This varies depending on the specific law of the state or locality involved. In New York, the word "POSTED", along with the name and address of the owner is sufficient to notify people not to intrude, and anyone ignoring such a sign is technically trespassing (although, in practice, if such a person leaves the property when asked, did no damage, and appeared honestly ignorant, it is likely that no legal action would be taken). In California, as specified by penal code section 553 (quoted in the linked answer) a sign for this purpose must include: the words “trespassing-loitering forbidden by law,” or words describing the use of the property followed by the words “no trespassing.” in letters at least two inches tall, and follow other specifications in the law. The word "Posted" is neither required nor sufficient, although the law calls land with such signs "posted property".	The judgment linked to by the article says: During the period from 5 October 2007 to 11 April 2008, Mr Ryneš installed and used a [continuously recording] camera system located under the eaves of his family home. The camera was installed in a fixed position and could not turn; it recorded the entrance to his home, the public footpath and the entrance to the house opposite. [my emphasis] That is the context of the case. He hadn't obtained consent from his neighbour to film the entrance to their home and therefore their family. He hadn't obtained consent from passers-by or warned them by means of a sign that there was a surveillance system monitoring that part of the public space. The court ruled that: The second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that the operation of a camera system, as a result of which a video recording of people is stored on a continuous recording device such as a hard disk drive, installed by an individual on his family home for the purposes of protecting the property, health and life of the home owners, but which also monitors a public space, does not amount to the processing of data in the course of a purely personal or household activity, for the purposes of that provision. [my emphasis] If you recorded or took photos of your family members enjoying walking through Trafalgar Square, a very busy public space, it's likely you could successfully claim it was a purely personal or household activity - if the authorities were at all bothered by it (which they are not).	Your numbers are off The states don't seize a mile next to every road, as farms don't suffer from traffic noise. They also don't seize land when they just rebuild a road, but that is still part of the 400k acres of road. In fact, most "new roads" are rebuilding old ones, and a huge part of the rest is through undeveloped land that is owned by the state or farmers - and thus cheap and doesn't need a mile-wide strip of noise protection. Eminent domain cases are RARE 2018 saw 87 cases of eminent domain in colorado - most of them for buildings no longer deemed habitable and condemned to be torn down, then re-developed. The federal government lists 1001 real property cases filed by the US in the same year's report, not indicating what kind of development or redevelopment would happen there, or if it is Eminent Domain or some other type of real property case. Under Eminent Domain, the seized land can be used for any public use. And in strange cases, it happens even to what used to be a private road and shopping complex in front of Walt Disney World - to build an interchange.
Length of a contract limited or not? Is there any limit to the length of a contract ? Can someone sign a 10000 page long contract that would basically take years to interpret with some repeating but relevant clauses . Example : a contract has clause 1 refer to clause 89 which refers to clause 10000	There are many contracts that are well over 10,000 pages For example: mining contracts - the environmental impact statement alone is likely to be of the order of 10,000 pages. privatised prisons - it takes a lot of pages to set out the expectations of the government on things like prisoner welfare defence contracts - aircraft carriers are complex pieces of machinery; 10,000 pages would barely scratch the surface These do take years to interpret, but they are interpreted by teams of hundreds, sometimes thousands of lawyers and engineers, so while they take several person-years they may take less than one actual year. Of course, these sorts of contracts may spend years in the negotiation phase as well.	If a contract sometimes uses the wrong name, is it still valid? Yes. It is valid as long as the contract as a whole permits identifying the parties (unequivocally) and ascertaining their role with respect to the contract. Using "Contractor" and "Consultant" interchangeably despite only the former being explicitly defined seems a bit sloppy, but it does not by itself alter or invalidate the meaning of the contract. The excerpt you reproduce is self-explanatory. Its first sentence identifies the parties, and there are only two. Thus, there is no reasonable way to dispute that the second sentence means "Contractor shall indemnify Company", since a clause of the sort "he will indemnify himself" makes no sense. Moreover, the legal definitions of Indemnitor and Indemnitee (Black's Law Dictionary) clearly make reference to "the person" (who protects or is protected, accordingly) and "the other" (that is, not to self).	Written Contract If there was a written contract, the fact that it wasn't signed is not relevant. While a signature is evidence of agreement with the terms there are other ways that acceptance can be indicated: like you paying them $600. Wrong Information Where the error is fundamental to the performance - e.g. you needed shipment to Alaska and they were offering shipment to Alabama, the contract would be void ab initio. That is, it never happened and everyone needs to be returned to their original positions as far as possible. However, in general, an error by one or the other party in their understanding of what was agreed does not invalidate the contract. For example, if you told them it was a "small" dog because it was small for a Great Dane but under an objective classification, it is, in fact, a "large" dog the contract must be completed and either you or they wear the additional cost of doing so. Whether they are entitled to ask for additional payment "due to some wrong information" depends on who took the risk under the contract for its correctness? Barring a specific term, the risk usually lies with the party that provided the "wrong information" but some contract will assign the risk for one party's errors to the other party - subject to a requirement to act in good faith. If they are not entitled to additional payment, they have to perform the contract for the original fee. If they are entitled, then you have to pay a reasonable price increase - you are not generally entitled to cancel. All of this turns on the specific terms of the contract and the exact nature of the "wrong information". Consumer Protection Law CPL in your state or their state or both will almost certainly have something to say about this beyond common law rules of contract.	Depending on the circumstances, it may be irrelevant whether or not the the terms of service contain an express clause dealing with inaccurate information. For example, in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, under section 2(1) of the Fraud Act 2006, if you dishonestly make a representation which is untrue or misleading with the intention to make a gain or cause someone a loss you will commit the offence of fraud. This could arise for example if you give a false name intending to obstruct the other party from being able to pursue you for any breach of your contractual obligations (e.g. non-payment for services). As for whether or not you would breach any clause in the contract requiring you to provide accurate information, it's very hard to say without seeing the exact wording and context of the clause.	You are not bound by any contract. You bought a physical good that the seller was barred from selling outside of the listed countries by his supplier. You did not enter a contract with the seller's supplier. Let's look the stream of commerce: Supplier of the item (Printing press) offers it. Sale with a sales limiting contract to resellers. Sale by reseller to customer without limiting contract. The first sale doctrine says, that without a form of contract, the rights of the supplier are exhausted in step 2. Even with a contract limiting the reseller's rights, step 3 exhausts any right the supplier has in the item, unless he too explicitly signs a contract. Selling an item in normal commerce is not satisfying this requirement. There already were no rights in the physical copy of the book when whoever bought the book first sold it to the second-hand seller you bought it from, and there can't be any more rights in the selling of this book gained by the original supplier unless he bought the book back from you.	Contracts are a relationship between two or more people Just as it is meaningless to speak of marrying yourself, it is equally meaningless to speak of a contract with yourself. Even if you were to draft such a thing, you would not have standing to sue because you can’t sue yourself. Your example probably isn’t a “one person contract” It’s a contract between the car owner (person 1) and the car yard (person 2) - probably a corporation. The fact that person 1 is representing both parties to the contract doesn’t make it a “one person contract”. There are potential conflicts of interest with this but they are not necessarily ones that can’t be overcome. However, if the car owner runs a business as a car dealer as a sole trader, then, no, they cannot make this kind of contract.	"Acknowledged" is fine. There is no "preferable" substitute with which to prefix your signature. As a precaution, never leave too much space between the end of clauses and your signature, lest another clause later on gets slid in without your consent (a public institution is unlikely to incur such misconduct, though). Also, always be sure to ask for a copy of the contract/agreement you sign.	The problem with "as soon as possible" is that one could then say "Well, I've got a lot of bills, so it's not possible to pay you until Uncle Bill dies and I get my inheritance". A good contract leaves no doubt about who does what, when. A specific date is best, though if there is a certain amount of backing and forthing, "July 30" could be "tomorrow", and therefore "within 14 days of acceptance" would still identify a specific date -- provided that the date of acceptance is there in the contract. (It usually is, but doesn't absolutely have to be).
What if you and a restaurant can't agree on who is at fault for a credit card issue? This question established that, if a restaurant is suddenly unable to take all credit cards, and you don't have cash, then it is not a criminal matter and the debt would just be resolved through civil methods. On the other hand, if you went to a restaurant with only a credit card that you knew full well was a bad card (or any other version of going to a restaurant knowing in advance that you can't pay), this is indeed a crime (theft of services). But there's a middle case I'm not sure about. I once went to a restaurant, and I gave them two different cards from two different banks. I telephoned both banks directly in front of restaurant staff, and both banks confirmed the cards were good, but the restaurant continued to insist they weren't. After the incident, I continued using both cards, and they both continued to work with no problems. In my case, I had a third card that inexplicably worked - but supposing I didn't. I understand that the key issue is whether I had an intent beforehand to take food without paying, and I obviously know that I had no such intention. But now there is a dispute over whether I can prove what my intent was, and even though I was telling the truth, I can (sort of) understand that the restaurant (and the police) wouldn't necessarily take my word for it. Could this have been a criminal matter? Footnote: The actual incident was regarding a prepaid to-go order, so I probably would have just not received the food. But let's assume the hypothetical version wasn't prepaid.	As the answer by Paul Johnson says, if you had no criminal intent, there was no crime. As the answer by Dale M says, the prosecution would need to prove that criminal intent along with the other elements of the crime. Offering to make the call to the banks should be evidence that you had no criminal intent. Making the call and getting assurance from the bank should be evidence that you had good reason to think the cards were good, and thus has no criminal intent. That the cards were good subsequently (which could be shown by receipts or statements) would be further evidence to that effect. While such evidence might not strictly be required, it might help if a criminal case were brought, and mention of it might help persuade the authorities not to bring one. Of course, the bill must still be paid, but that is a civil matter where there was no intent to avoid payment.	It is legal for a company to ask for any information they want as a condition of doing business with you, so long as their request isn't proscribed by law. I don't know of any jurisdiction where a request for banking or credit information is illegal. (In this case, however, it does seem like you are being phished. You could report the matter to your country's consumer protection agency.)	Theft is universally a crime in virtually every jurisdiction. Insofar as a state has a criminal code and a functioning judiciary, theft will always be a crime. It is also a basic legal principle that theft is a tort as well (in other words, a civil wrong incurring damages to an individual that can be remedied in a court of law). A key part of the problem in failing to make theft a crime, is that in the absence of a substantive penalty in terms of a fine or imprisonment, theft becomes a low-risk, high-reward activity where the maximum penalty is simply the repayment of stolen goods (with relatively minimal loss). This fails to provide an effective deterrent to this socially frowned-upon activity, and rates of crime would skyrocket. It is appropriate, therefore, to make theft a crime (and all jurisdictions do so), as all pillars of criminal justice immediately apply. Edit: As @/JBentley correctly points out, penalties do in fact exist in civil law. That said, the power of incarceration, perhaps in this case the ultimate deterrent, is largely unavailable in civil cases. The ultimate point - that theft is rendered a more sound and legitimate enterprise based largely on gambling - remains the same. Additionally, not all individuals have the time or effort to file small claims and follow cases to the end. Making theft a tort-only offense would cause extraordinary difficulties in enforcement as many would consider the loss of perhaps a small article relatively insignificant compared to filing in small claims court.	Because one is theft and the other is breach of contract Theft is taking someone’s property with the intent of permanently depriving them of it. It has always been a crime, in fact, it’s a toss up whether theft or murder was the first crime ever. Not giving someone something you lawfully owe them but that they never possessed is not theft because it lacks the dispossession aspect required of theft. That’s simply failing to pay a debt and that is just breach of contract. Now, there was a time, back in the nineteenth century when not paying your debts would land you in debtors prison but society moved on. Now, there are jurisdictions (australia) which are considering making wage theft, the deliberate and systemic underpayment of workers a crime. Perhaps society is moving on again?	Sounds a lot like a bad-luck, move-on situation. I can't imagine any reason why the complex would have any duty to watch your bike for you or otherwise ensure that no one steals it. The fact that you bought it knowing that the bike shed had not yet been built and that the security gates were broken would probably count against you. If you know who stole your bike, you'd have a much better case against them, but it doesn't sound like that's the case. If you're looking for a typical contingency-fee arrangement, in which the attorney takes a fee from your winnings, I'd imagine you're going to be especially out of luck, based on two hard facts: The total damages you can collect is probably going to be equal to the price of your bicycle: £400. The average hourly rate at national firms for the most junior lawyer is already more than £200. If you sat down with such a lawyer, explained your situation, discussed your options, and then tasked the lawyer to write a threatening letter to the apartment complex, you'd already have incurred more fees than the value of the bicycle. Probably no attorney is interested in that arrangement -- especially since it's highly unlikely the complex would pay. So unless you're actually willing to pay hourly rates, I can't imagine any lawyer taking this case. Even if you were, no one may take it just because lawyers don't like taking cases that they're going to lose.	In the US, in general anyone can claim anything. Others are free to believe or disbelieve the claim. In theory, a person might base their decision to do business with Hilton partly on this particular claim (this is why some software companies start presentations about their new features with a Safe Harbor statement letting the audience know not to base purchasing decisions on unreleased features), and in that case they could argue that Hilton's claim damaged them by causing them to enter into a contract under false pretenses. I doubt such a case would be meritorious, but there could be some contrived situation where the point of whether Hilton owned the hotel when it invented the brownie was actually important.	Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.)	I'm not sure there would be any need - or any ability to bring - any civil action. Forgery would appear to count as a Category D felony under Section 205.090 and, "In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution.", so person "a"'s damages should have been met under the process of the criminal prosecution of person "b" for forgery, with nothing further to claim. Person "c" will have stolen a car. Whether that car was legitimately owned by person "a" may only be relevant if person "c" is using their belief that it belonged to person "b" as mitigation (for example recovery of a debt - though it won't help much as this should have been done through proper channels), which again would be a criminal proceeding.
Where is the line at which the producer of a product cannot be blamed for the stupidity of the user of that product? It seems to me that no matter how thorough your warnings are, there will always be someone foolish enough to get themselves hurt in a way you couldn't have expected. Is there a line somewhere at which any injuries are the user's fault, not the company's even without an explicit warning?	There is no bright, highlighted line, but the test is generally what a reasonable person would do or expect. Not a total moron. Let's take an example of using spray-on adhesive instead of hairspray. Would a reasonable person pour wood glue into their hair? Well, Hair gel is technically a very weak glue. But would you pour a glue that is (let'S take Gorilla Glue as a typical example) labeled as skin irritant, don't get in contact with eyes and skin onto your hair, or is it a misuse of a product the producer could not have expected? 2.1. Classification of the hazardous chemical Classification according to the model Work Health and Safety Regulations (WHS Regulations) Flammable aerosols, Category 1 H222 Gases under pressure : Liquefied gas H280 Skin corrosion/irritation, Category 2 H315 Serious eye damage/eye irritation, Category 2A H319 Specific target organ toxicity — Single exposure, Category 3, Narcosis H336 And that is not even the crux: reading the chemical composition and MSDS, that stuff is laden with solvents while its glue-power is what one would expect from superglue. Is it foreseeable that a reasonable person puts superglue in their hair, in any shape or form? Is it even advertised as a possible hair-product? No While you can sue for anything in the US, being stupid and (in our example) dousing your hair in a product advertised as extra-strong spray-on superglue is far from what any reasonable person would do. And in this case, Devin J. Stone and Steve Lehto agree that there are no grounds to sue, product liability does generally not cover gluing your hair to your head.	Could a phrase "Don't buy from X" with indirectly implied material be considered defamatory? No. The phrase is only an order, wish, or instruction, which is different from making a direct or veiled statement of fact. Even in jurisdictions where a statement of opinion could be actionable, a stated wish of that sort cannot be construed as defamatory. anyone that reads the marketing material would indirectly have a false picture about company X. It depends on the contents of the marketing material, on which you did not elaborate. Persuading the customers on the basis of truthful representations as to why X's product is better than A's does not mean that people have a false image about X. The context and exact wording of someone's statements could amount to omitting and/or juxtaposing facts in a way that conveys some falsity, but your description gives no indications of that being the case here.	This is all outlined at Terms of Service - Stack Exchange When you ask a question, and/or comment on or answer a question, or otherwise participate on an SE site, you license your content to SE. You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. In turn, (emphasis mine) Subscriber acknowledges that Stack Exchange has no control over, and no duty to take any action regarding: which users gains access to the Network; which Content Subscriber accesses via the Network; what effects the Content may have on Subscriber; how Subscriber may interpret or use the Content; or what actions Subscriber may take as a result of having been exposed to the Content. Much of the Content of the Network is provided by and is the responsibility of the user or subscriber who posted the Content. Stack Exchange does not monitor the Content of the Network and takes no responsibility for such Content. Subscriber releases Stack Exchange from all liability for Subscriber having acquired or not acquired Content through the Network. ... This doesn't mean someone can't sue you anyway, notwithstanding that disclaimer. Anyone can sue anyone in civil court. That's the way the system works. Someone could track you down and sue you for the (bad) advice you gave that cooked their Macbook, even though they got that advice on SE and SE states that SE is not responsible for any damages resulting from the use of the information. The TOS of all SE site(s) shows that anyone who uses SE sites is bound by this click-through agreement, even if they didn't read it. And that should suffice in a court if it gets that far. It should suffice for any attorney thinking of taking the case of someone who wants to sue you. Again, someone could sue you; but chances are really great that it will never go very far due to the legal nature of SE and your contributions. This SE site - Law SE - has more of a specialized TOS, as practicing law without a license is illegal, and giving legal information as a layperson (or even as an attorney, of which there are some who particpiate here) needs special terms; see the sidebar for this disclaimer and link: Law Stack Exchange is for educational purposes only and is not a substitute for individualized advice from a qualified legal practitioner. Communications on Law Stack Exchange are not privileged communications and do not create an attorney-client relationship. General Disclaimer - Law Stack Exchange So, if you do get sued by someone who cooked their Macbook by following your bad advice, you can ask about the lawsuit here on Law SE. But, unless your question is about general legal procedures, terms, case law, etc. (as outlined at What topics can I ask about here? - Law SE), your question will be closed because this site is not for giving specific legal advice in specific legal situations, especially active lawsuits. You will be advised to talk to an attorney.	If we go by Indian case law (as we should), you have to find a way. The relevant case is K.P. Adbul Gafoor v. New India Assurance Ltd, where appellant drove on a motor cycle on a learner's permit without a licensed driver positioned correctly, in violation of Rule 3 of the Rules, and smacked someone. The bulk of the case is about the insurance and liability consequences of violating the rule: the main point here is that the court deemed this to violate the rules.	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.	If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible.	Warranty is company policy. It could be considered part of the contract of sale, but it would still be what the company stated it - at time of purchase - to be. Unless the warranty lists accidental damage as being covered, it looks like the company are following their policy and fulfilling the contract. If you were looking for legal redress since accidental damage resulted from using the product as intended, you'd have more chance of success looking at unsatisfactory quality or the product being unsuitable for the intended purpose under Part 1 chapter 2 sections 9 and 10 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. It's worth sticking to objective details (for example that the port broke, and that you had used the device as intended). The company are not assuming you broke it (anyone or anything could have caused the accidental damage), and they are not refusing a warranty repair as it appears that accidental damage is not covered by their warranty policy, so this is not one.	The creator of the software doesn't provide any warranty. If you feel confident in the quality of the software, nothing stops you from providing a warranty. If the software doesn't meet your guarantees, you will have to pay out because you provided the warranty, depending on the terms. Not the creator of the software because they explicitly didn't provide any warranty. If that's what you want to do, go ahead. I wouldn't. You don't have to republish under the BSD license, which you wouldn't. You must attach the license terms, which clarifies the role of the original creators, and that they don't give a warranty. Doing this allows you to copy the software. It doesn't mean you can't provide a warranty.
Technical basis for the binding nature of precedent or stare decisis I understand that US district courts are generally required to follow precedent set by the appeals court directly superior to the district court, while opinions of other appeals courts may be influential, but are not binding. Similarly, appeals courts (indeed all inferior courts) are of course bound to follow precedent set in rulings of the supreme court. Is the mandate to respect the precedent set by superior courts explicit in statute somewhere? I looked in the US code, but could not find it. Is it specified in the judiciary's rules of procedure?	No The importance of following precedent, and the principle of stare decisis were inherited by the early US legal system from the British Common Law system, and have been taken as part of the natural order of the legal system by US courts ever since. This extends even to a court overruling itself. US Courts are notoriously reluctant to overrule their past decisions, even when current court members agree, However they will do so from time to time. The US Supreme Court in particular will flatly overturn previous decisions, especially on Constitutional issues, when it thinks there is no other way to achieve a proper outcome, although it often prefers to distinguish the prior decision without actually overruling it. I think the fastest and most extreme case where the US Supreme Court overruled itself was that of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the second flag-salute case. (This was also a particularly significant case.) This reversed Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) a case on the exact same issue, only three years previously, and a vote of 8-1 on the first case became a vote of 6-3 the other way, with only one new Justice on the Court. Only Justice Frankfurter, the author of the fist decision, issued a dissenting opinion in the Barnette case, and no other Justice formally joined that opinion.	Writs of Mandamus Are A Recognized Procedural Tool In the Federal Courts Is there precedent for this type of use of the writ of mandamus? Yes. It needs to be understood against the background rule of civil procedure that a party can only appeal a final judgment of a trial court, and cannot appeal an order entered by a trial court prior to entry of a final judgment. For example, the denial of a party's request that a motion to dismiss a case, or a motion for summary judgment be entered, which forces the claim at issue in the motion to be resolved following an evidentiary hearing or trial, rather than summarily earlier on in the case, is not an appealable order (subject like almost everything in the law to a few narrow exceptions, e.g., for a denial of a law enforcement officer's claim of qualified immunity in a civil rights case, and for preliminary injunctions). At the federal level, writs of mandamus have not been abolished as a means of securing an interlocutory appeal of a lower court ruling, but some alternative means of obtaining interlocutory appeals have been authorized by statute, and a writ of mandamus is only available where alternative remedies are not available. The route of last resort is a writ of mandamus. But, there are also other exceptions, a couple of more common of which including the following ones. Sometimes it isn't clear if a judgment is final or not, or a judgment is final against one party or on one issue, and not against other parties in the case or on other issues, and there is no good reason to delay an appeal against the one party against whom a final judgment has been entered. In those cases, a trial court, may, but is not required to certify the partial judgment as final, allowing an immediate appeal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). There is also another kind of discretionary appeal by statute in federal court and this is what the government is claiming that the lower courts abused their discretion in not providing. This statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1291(b), which provides that: When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order. Writs of mandamus in the federal courts are another means by which interlocutory relief can be granted (in addition to compelling public officials to take non-discretionary actions) which are authorized by the All Writs Act which is "28 U.S.C. § 1651, which authorizes the United States federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Many states have replaced the writ of mandamus with statutory rights to interlocutory appeals or with specific civil rules that replace the previous common law writs. For example, in Colorado, writs of mandamus directed at public officials other than judges and at judges in trial courts of limited jurisdiction have been superseded by Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 106 and writs of mandamus directed at general jurisdiction trial courts have be superseded by Colorado Appellate Rule 21. Writs of mandamus in the U.S. Supreme Court are also governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, but the federal rule retains the historic "writ of mandamus" terminology (in part to make it easier to search old precedents that used the old common law writ terminology and in part to keep the rule clearly within the authority granted by the All Writs Act). The use in question has been around pretty much as long as the federal court system, although it isn't terribly common, and writs of mandamus, when filed, are frequently denied. Historically, a writ of mandamus was treated as a lawsuit in the higher court by the aggrieved party seeking to appeal the lower court judge's decision prior to a final order against the judge in the judge's official capacity. Most jurisdictions no longer structure interlocutory appeals in this way because it is an irritation for a judge who is applying for a loan to have lots of lawsuits against him or her in the public record that aren't really lawsuits against the judge personally, even though they superficially look like it when one does a simple party search of court records. Writs Of Mandamus Are Used When Other Options Provide Inadequate Relief Under what circumstances is this normally used? At common law, before there was statutory authorization for interlocutory appeals (i.e. appeals before a final judgment on the merits is entered in a case, usually following a trial or ruling on a summary judgment motion that resolved all pending claims), a writ of mandamus was the only means by which appellate relief could be obtained before trial. Typically, a writ of mandamus was sought in circumstances where a failure to address the order appealed would make it an uncorrectable fait accompli once a trial was conducted (e.g. an appeal of an order requiring someone to disclose allegedly attorney-client privileged information), the negative consequences of the order are material, and there is no statutory alternative means by which to obtain interlocutory relief. More precisely: interlocutory appeals are permissible in a small category of cases where the decision being sought for appellate review: – (1) Conclusively determined the disputed question; – (2) Resolved an important questions separate from the merits of the action; and – (3) The decision is effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action. See, e.g., Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2004). The decision to grant this relief is discretionary and the court receiving a writ of mandamus is not required to resolve the issue presented to it on the merits. Application To The Case Identified In The Question In the case of "a petition for writ of mandamus against this Court’s orders declining to dismiss the case and to certify an interlocutory appeal," the main procedural issue is whether the statutory remedy provided in cases where an interlocutory appeal can be certified to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals was intended to abolish the common law writ of mandamus (which is not something that is constitutional in nature even though it is so ancient), in this situation by providing an alternative remedy. The government is probably arguing in this writ application that emoluments clause litigation is prohibited by Presidential immunity, and that even though they don't fall within the letter of the law authorizing an interlocutory appeal as a matter of right, that the litigation itself over the emoluments clause litigation against the President poses such a distraction to the conduct of the Presidency, that the purpose of Presidential immunity would be undermined by allowing the trial court lawsuit to go forward, even though a ruling against the President in this case could be appealed when and if a judgment is entered against the President on the claims presented in the case (logical quite similar to the reason that interlocutory appeals of denials of claims of qualified immunity in civil rights lawsuits are allowed). The government is probably also arguing that enforcement of the emoluments clause should be considered a "political question" that can only be enforced by Congress, for example, via impeachment, in which case the trial court would not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the case. And, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a matter which is often a grounds for granting a writ of mandamus. The argument against granting a writ of mandamus is that the appellate courts shouldn't micromanage the pre-trial process in trial courts, that most of the distraction can be handled by lawyers for the President without interfering much with the President's day to day conduct of his office, and that the distractions caused by a civil lawsuit arising out of the business interests of someone who is the President are a risk that the President assumed when he took office without selling his business assets or putting them in a blind trust. Previous cases in the Nixon and Clinton administrations established that Presidential immunity does not provide a blanket prohibition upon lawsuits against a President while the President is in office. The case involving Clinton, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), established that a subpoena for a deposition in a private lawsuit unrelated to the President's duties or conduct in office in any way could go forward while the President was is in office, and his testimony in that deposition would later become the lynch pin of an unsuccessful effort to remove him from office via impeachment. The case involving Nixon, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), which upheld the enforceability of a Watergate related subpoena is more clearly on point as it held that a President could be compelled to comply with a subpoena in a case that arguably had some relationship to his Presidential role and duties, although it was not cut and dried and Nixon's resignation made this largely a moot point. Both of these cases are controversial in conservative legal circles, and Brett Kavanaugh, recently confirmed as a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, has gone on record stating that Presidential immunity has been too narrowly construed by the courts and that these U.S. Supreme Court precedents should be overturned or modified by the U.S. Supreme Court. The lawyers bringing the writ of mandamus in this action know that President Trump is unlikely to prevail in his arguments to dismiss or stay emoluments clause litigation (which is why he lost on that argument in the trial court and why the 4th Circuit refused to consider his interlocutory appeal) under the existing U.S. Supreme Court precedents described above, but might prevail and secure a narrowing of these precedents in the U.S. Supreme Court with its new solidly conservative majority. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court did deny the writ of mandamus, this wouldn't preclude the U.S. Supreme Court from later holding on a better developed trial court record, if and when the trial court ruled on the merits in the case, that Presidential immunity barred the lawsuit, contrary to the ruling of the trial court on this legal issue, if the 4th Circuit upheld a trial court's judgment against President Trump. Doing so would allow the U.S. Supreme Court to postpone having to resolve a politically sensitive issue of constitutional law that might never end up reaching them at all depending upon how the case plays out. And, this is what the U.S. Supreme Court usually does when it can. So, the U.S. Supreme Court needs to really feel strongly that interlocutory relief is the only adequate remedy in order to rule in the President's favor on this writ of mandamus petition.	Appellate judges make holdings on matters of law, and generally defer to the fact-finder in a given case (the jury, or sometimes the judge) on factual matters relevant to a case. So in a case that involved certain mathematical arguments, they would generally leave it to the jury to decide whether those arguments were reliable. Put simply, Appeals courts don't make binding decisions on issues of fact, only issues of law.	Ultimately the answer (in the US) is the US Constitution. The courts pretty much have the unlimited power to interpret the law, and the limits on power mainly pertain to what the state can do. The length of the leash on the government depends on what kind of rights are at stake. The weakest and default limit is known as "rational basis", and comes down to asking whether a government action is rationally related to a legitimate government interest (such as stopping terrorist attacks) plus whether there was due process and equal protection. There are more rigorous standards (intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny) in case a law involves a "suspect classification", or in case a fundamental constitutional right is infringed. In the case of strict scrutiny, the government would have to show that it had a compelling interest in the action, the law would have to be "narrowly tailored" (i.e. does that thing and only that thing), and should be the least restrictive way to achieve that result. Roe v. Wade is probably the best-know example of that kind of review, which held that abortion laws "violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy". A court would not order a party to do an impossible act. A court could order a party to do something which the party had argued was impossible, but you can interpret a court's decision to indicate that it rejected the argument. The defendant would not shoulder the burden of proving that the action was impossible, though they would have to counter the government's argument that the act could be performed if they believe it is not possible. (In the Apple case, the argument would probably be some Apple-internal document that says "Yeah, we can do it, but do we want to?"). There is probably an expense-related limit in that the courts would not order Apple to liquidate all of their assets to comply. But: if a case were to end up at the Supreme Court, the court is stricken with mass insanity and arbitrarily orders a defendant to do the impossible, there is only the option of impeachment and Senate trial to remove the offending justices, and that is just not going to happen. There is no higher authority that overturns SCOTUS.	Why do you want to know? I think that the reason this question seems so obscure is because it does not involve sufficient context and specificity. It can't be answered until one knows the reason that it matters to know if a rule is new or not. In a particular context, these questions usually have obvious and clear answers. The murkiness arises only when one tries to overgeneralize. The life of law is not reason, it is experience. In general, it is almost never fruitful to try to apply legal principles of any kind to their logical conclusion without grounding that logic in fact specific and context specific precedents and applications. That approach to legal reasoning is a classic rookie mistake that gets a lot of young associate attorneys doing legal research into trouble by overstating the confidence that they should have in their conclusions when there is no case right on point addressing a situation. For example, if a federal government agency publishes something in the federal register that does not exactly restate an existing regulation, then it is a rule change, in the narrow sense that is changes an existing published narrowly defined Code of Federal Regulations rule. The process by which one does so derives from the Administrative Procedures Act and other authorizing legislation passed by Congress and also custom and case law interpreting these, so it isn't self-referential. A completely different context in which the question of whether there is a "new rule" of law is when a court according to the principles of stare decisis makes a ruling interpreting the constitution in a manner different from or expanding upon previously rulings interpreting the constitution in a similar circumstance. In this context, this matters because a "new rule" of constitutional law is generally given only prospective effect, while an interpretation of an existing rule of law that merely expands upon existing precedents in a foreseeable way has retroactive effect. In this situation, as in any case in which one tries to determine the best definition to apply under the law, the best approach is to look for a definition that produces just results given the consequences of a particular definition v. another particular definition. In that context, the determination of whether a rule is a "new rule" should depend upon foreseeability and the amount of reliance that people put on the old rule as opposed to the new rule being in force. There is no good reason to have transsubstantive legal meta-rules that apply to both of these situations. The former mechanistic rule makes sense in its context and makes the status quo clear and the events that constitute a change in the rule clear, while the latter consequence oriented definition makes sense in the completely different context where it is used. Surely, there are other contexts in which the question of what constitutes a "new rule" could have different consequences still. For example, to determine what constitutes a new v. old rule of U.S. Senate procedure, or to determine which statute is newer or older for purposes of determining which statute of two that conflict should be given effect when there was a cosmetic recodification of the section numbers of one of the titles but not the other without changing the substantive meaning of the recodified statute. The determination should generally be made on a case by case basis as there is no important purpose served by having a uniform metarule to answer these questions. If you are getting paradoxes trying to apply your legal theory, you are probably doing it wrong. For what it is worth, I have a dim opinion of Hart as someone who uses lots of words to say nothing of consequence or use, and I am not familiar with Biagoli or Suber. In general, legal theorists are not terribly influential in how the law is applied and interpreted in practice, although, of course, there are always exceptions.	Is there precedent for Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases when they have strong ties to groups with strong opinions on the case? Not really. Supreme Court justices decide unreviewably whether or not to recuse themselves from cases, informed by general canons of judicial ethics which guide their decisions even though they are non-binding on Supreme Court justices. There is a strong record of Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from particular cases in which the justice was involved as lawyer prior to becoming a Supreme Court justice. There is also a fairly strong record of Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases where they have a strong, personal, and particularized to them (as opposed to general to people of their class and situation) financial interest (e.g. from cases involving companies in which they have large investments or family members who are top managers). In the example given of the 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis case, her strong ties to anti-gay Christian groups would normally not be a ground for recusal. General strong policy dispositions are normally not a basis for recusal. But, if instead, she were an investor in (or even a long time regular customer of) 303 Creative LLC, she would probably recuse.	The appellate court reviews based upon the trial court record. To the extent that it turns on questions of law, including interpretations of written documents whose authenticity is not in question, this review is de novo. Likewise, decisions on this issue made on a paper record and argument of counsel, without an evidentiary hearing that resolved material disputes of fact between the parties, are reviewed de novo. So are procedural question, like whether an evidentiary hearing should have been held. But, in cases where there is a mixed issue of fact and law, the appellate court defers to all findings of fact made in the trial court from an evidentiary hearing held in the trial court that are supported by admissible evidence in the trial court record. Since the material facts relating to the enforceability of arbitration are frequently not in dispute in a case like this and arbitration rulings are often made without evidentiary hearings, as for example, in this case and in this case, an appellate court often does engage in de novo review. But, the appellate court is not permitted to re-weigh the credibility of witnesses, for example, in a manner contrary to the trial court's findings of fact supported by admissible evidence in the record, if an evidentiary hearing was held and this was necessary to resolve disputed issues of fact that were material to the question of whether arbitration could be compelled. While what I have said above is somewhat different than the standards, for example, in New Jersey as stated in this document quoted below, this is to some extent a function of the facts of the referenced cases. None of which involve a refusal to compel arbitration following an evidentiary hearing involving disputed findings of fact. Appellate courts "review de novo the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration." Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020). See Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020). "Under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7, either party may move to confirm an award within three months of the date of its delivery. Once confirmed, the award is as conclusive as a court judgment. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-10." Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 292 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 158 N.J. 392, 398 (1999). N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 provides a court may vacate an arbitration award for: 1) corruption, fraud or undue means; 2) evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; 3) misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; or 4) the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. "Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276 (2010)). "To foster finality and 'secure arbitration's speedy and inexpensive nature,' reviewing courts must give arbitration awards 'considerable deference.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201-02 (2013)). "[A]n arbitrator's award resolving a public sector dispute will be accepted so long as the award is 'reasonably debatable.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013)). "An arbitrator's award is not to be cast aside lightly. It is subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Kearny PBA Loc. # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979)). Certain statutes, including the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -30, set "strict limits on the appeal of an arbitration award." Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 2008). In support of a contrary view that even the findings of fact of the trial court are subject to de novo review are statements like this one (from this case): The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). But, the cited cases don't mean precisely what they are purported to say in the rare case where the decision rests, for example, on resolved a disputed credibility decision between two witnesses over whether the purported arbitration document is authentic in an evidentiary hearing. Those cases are merely dicta as applied to that fact pattern. The case containing this quote was decided at the trial court level on the pleadings alone without receiving any testimony or documents in an evidentiary hearing (see footnote 1 at page 2). Hirsch was decided in motion practice without an evidentiary hearing (see page 184) and the case itself says (at page 186): Orders compelling arbitration are deemed final for purposes of appeal. R. 2:2–3(a); GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572, 587, 17 A.3d 177 (2011). We review those legal determinations de novo. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995) (“A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.”). The decision in Frummer was similarly qualified and also relied upon interpretation of written instruments whose execution was undisputed that was resolved in motion practice without any mention of an evidentiary hearing. The Court in Frummer said at page 13: We review the denial of a request for arbitration de novo. See Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 393 N.J.Super. 560, 572-73, 925 A.2d 22 (App.Div. 2007). "A `trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Id. at 573, 925 A.2d 22 (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995)). See also this case stating that: The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). Again, however, I would question whether this holding is dicta because it involves the interpretation of written instruments whose authenticity is in doubt, and not, for example, a dispute over whether the person who signed the documents is the same person who is a party to this litigation and not someone else with a very similar name that was resolved in an evidentiary hearing.	1. Are this and similar ordinances constitutionally valid? Yes. Some future court might decide the law is invalid at some future time. But that possibility is hypothetical and speculative. Therefore, as of now, the law is valid unless and until it is challenged and overturned. 2. What defenses could a government make if challenged? It depends on what grounds the law is challenged. Your question about possible defenses is highly dependent on the nature of any challenge — which you have not specified in your question. The U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits laws respecting a number of things such as freedom of the press, speech, religion, peaceful assembly, bearing arms, etc. to list just a few of the most notable ones. But your question does not assert the law in question violates any specific or particular prohibition against it. Although the question mentions "restricting free movement as well as targeting only a specific demographic," it does not specify any part of any constitution that prohibits these things. Therefore, your question is unclear as to what might present a constitutional problem for the law. It is also unclear which constitution you think might contain prohibitive language. Is it a federal constitutional issue that concerns you? Or is it a state constitutional matter? In either case, which issue specifically concerns you? Your question needs to address these specifics in order to analyze it and respond in a meaningful way. Look at it like this... just as it is impossible to prove a negative, so is it impossible for anyone to conclude with absolute certainty that any law is not unconstitutional because no one can predict with certainty every possible future challenge a law might face. There are just too many possibilities to (pre-emptively) exhaust them all with certainty. Also, no one can predict with certainty how any future court might rule on the future challenges (which themselves are unpredictable as previously argued). Therefore, one can only say I think the law is unconstitutional and here are my reasons. Then others can analyze the law and the reasons; then offer an opinion. Further, based on precedent, would they likely be successful? See above answer to question numbered 2. Laws aren't required to be "justified" by the constitution. Constitutional justification for a law is a meaningless phrase. There is no requirement for a law to be "justified" by any constitution other than that the legislature is empowered by the constitution to make laws. That's all the justification any law needs. Beyond that, however, no law can violate the constitution as determined by a Supreme Court (or the last court to rule) if challenged.
The legally blind vs medical intake forms A fiercely independent, elderly, and legally blind woman walks into a doctor's office. Since she can’t read the intake forms, she requests the staff help her fill them out. Rather then help her, the staff instead let her see the doctor without them and send the blank forms home with her. The next visit the forms are still not filled out. The office staff express annoyance but still let her see the doctor and again send the blank forms home. They still refuse to help her fill them out. After this happens a third time, the staff has had enough and refuse to allow her to make any more appointments. Is the office required to accommodate this legally blind woman without forcing her to use her friends and/or family as interpreters (thus exposing her private medical information to them)?	Under SubChapter III, section 12181. paragraph (7) (F) of the Americans With Disabilities act (ADA), a "professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;" is a public accommodation. Section 12182 (a) provides that: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. Section 12182 (b) (1) (A) provides that: (i) Denial of participation It shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or class of individuals on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. (ii) Participation in unequal benefit It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals. Section 12182 (b) (1) (D) provides that: (D) Administrative methods An individual or entity shall not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize standards or criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability Section 12182 (b) (2) (A) provides that: For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, discrimination includes: ... (ii) a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations; (iii) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden; It would seem that failure of the people in the office to give assistance would constitute a violation of Section 12182 (b) (2) (A) (iii) and that giving such assitance would be required as a reasonable modification under Section 12182 (b) (2) (A) (ii). Section Section 12182 (a) and Section 12182 (b) (1) (A) would also seem to apply. Filing an actual suit under the ADA would be a possibly costly and time consuming solution, however. It would probably require a lawyer knowledgeable in DA practice. Possibly merely pointing out to the office staff that such assistance is needed, or if that does not work that the ADA requires such assistance would suffice. As a different possible solution, many (but not all) legally blind people are able to read printed materiel and fill out forms with the help of an assistive device, such as a light-and-magnifier system. Some years ago I helped a legally blind friend obtain such a system, and she found it very useful.	It is not legal to give false responses on such a declaration. The point of anti-discrimination laws is that they say when it is legal vs. not legal to discriminate against an employee, and Alex is expected to have faith in the legal system to protect his legal rights. Dissatisfaction with the outcome of the law may be understandable, but still does not legally justify falsifying information given to an employer. In certain cases (look for the fine print and mentions of "penalty of perjury") you can be fined and imprisoned for lying. More commonly, your employment can be terminated when you are discovered. You may also be held liable for consequences of such lies. Your employer's health insurance contract might require truthful and accurate reporting of medical facts and a lie about your condition could result in termination of coverage.	Note: All links in Spanish (sorry). Regardless or your father being or not the legal owner of the home, the issue at play is that of alimentos1. This is an obligation between some family relationships to help each other so if family member (the alimentista) is in dire need of help (i.e., needs the help to survive) the others have the obligation to provide the help. The relatives of the alimentista affected are, in order: The couple, always when married and only when expressly agreed upon for non-married couples. Descendants: sons/daughters and grandsons/granddaughters. Ascendants: parents and grandparents. Brothers: Only when indispensable and the minimum amount. The order determines who of all the family members is under obligation to provide the help; in case of multiple people in the same category the amount is to be divided between them in function of their income. The amount of the help is not fixed and will depend of the circunstances of the situation2; and it is possible to provide by providing the needs(shelter, food) directly. Now, until when does a father/grandfather need to provide alimentos to a son or daughter? Certainly until s/he is 183, as this is the date of full age in Spain, but it is usual to consider that the obligation exists while the alimentista is studying and lacks of his/her own means of subsistence. That is not a "free rider" situation, as alimentos may be denied by several reasons: Obviously, because the person that should provide the help does not have the means to do so without endangering his own subsistence. The alimentista gets his/her own means of subsistence. Any of the causes that would make the alimentista unable to inherit from the person providing the help4: attempted murder, coercion to change their will, and other grave crimes. The alimentista does not do enough to get his/her own means of subsistence. If a judge decides that the alimentista son/daughter is neither studying nor seriously trying to get a job, the help can be revoked. Judges seem to be progressively taking a harsher stance against descendants who refuse to do their part. The article quotes the case of a 19 years old guy whose claim to the pension was denied. As a side note, rejecting to pay alimentos is another of the causes that would cause the person doing it to lose any right to inheritance from the alimentista. If for whatever the reason you do not qualify for alimentos, the details of the agreement between your father and your grandfather for the home become relevant5: If your father has formally rented the house then your grandfather position is not relevant, as your father has all of the rights6. If your grandfather allows your father to live in the house without paying rent, then it is your grandfather rights as owner against your father rights as an occupant. No idea about the outcome of that situation. UPDATE: You still do not tell about your grandfather stance about the issue, which is important. If your grandfather agrees with your father7 then the only way to stay at home is that of alimentos. What you describe is a situation of either precario or comodato, where your grandfather allows the use of the home without compensation. The differences are: precario is for an undefined time. comodato is for a defined time/use (e.g. for X years). Now, I have to suppose that you are not part of the agreement so it is just between your father and grandfather. That makes it your father's dwelling, and beyond alimentos he cannot be forced to share his dwelling with you. But if this is a situation of precario (which is what most often happens) your grandfather has the "nuclear option"8 of threatening to evict your father, as it is a relatively easy (in the legal sense, not the personal one) procedure. In a situation of comodato your grandfather could not evict your father until the conditions of the cession expire, making threats somewhat weaker. As a final note, and given how specific this answer has become: I am not a lawyer, you have not provided enough specific info, and this is not legal advice. Talk to a lawyer. Maybe a lawyer will check the agreement and it will turn out that your father is paying rent by performing some service, voiding the precario aspect. Maybe with the details provided the lawyer can find a way to an agreement that is more amenable to all. Talk to a lawyer. Shut up. The issue at hand may be stressful, and sometimes it might be tempting to boast to your father about the issues of alimentos or precario. Don't. If there is something to be said about that, let your lawyer do the talking. Try to stay calm. Consider the effect of your actions before taking them. While there is nothing wrong with talking to a lawyer, going beyond that and beginning a legal battle with members of your own family is most of the times an ugly affair. It could easily have an effect for a very long time in your relationship with most of your family, even with those who are not directly implied. Try to stay calm. 1 Literally, "foodstuffs", but when used as a legal term it includes other basic needs. 2 There are some official guidelines but judges seem to have freedom to follow them or not. 3 I believe that there are some exceptional reasons to lose such right before becoming 18 (e.g., sons condemned of attacking their fathers and the like) but I have no specific data about those. 4 As a side note, in Spain last wills do not allow the "donor" to distribute the goods freely, as some porcentajes of the inheritance must obligatory be provided to descendants and widowers. 5 Of course, in the case that your grandfather wanted to oppose your father's decision. 6 Since one of the legal reasons to end a rent agreement is to provide a home for a first degree relative, your grandfather could expel you from your rented home to give it to your father, but not the other way around. 7 And "agree" does not mean "Is happy with the decision" but "Will not go to the court to challenge your father decision". 8 Which is a very relevant analogy, because it could be almost as damaging to your family as a literal nuclear bomb.	Will UKVI allow a concession for this specific situation? Only your wife's UKVI caseworker can definitely answer this with any certainty, but as you say CR2.3 (b) does seem quite compelling but (c) less so - unless the medical records support her condition was "life-threatening" ...any period spent outside the UK will not count towards the 180-day limit if the absence was for any of the following reasons: [...] (b) travel disruption due to natural disaster, military conflict or pandemic; or (c) compelling and compassionate personal circumstances, such as the life-threatening illness of the applicant, or life-threatening illness or death of a close family member; [...]	In the UK, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 includes provisions which are thought to apply to websites, although as far as I know there is no case law on the matter. If a website's use of JavaScript makes it inaccessible to users with some disability, it may fall foul of the DDA. However, there is no law specifically requiring JavaScript-free versions of web pages.	Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked & answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false & misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness.	TL;DR: Most likely, for certain drugs. Self-prescribing was never illegal under Federal Law; it is regulated to varying degrees by the states, and discouraged by professional organizations like the American Medical Association. Pharmacists can refuse to fill prescriptions they are uncomfortable filling, and many will not fill self-prescriptions. It's not clear if, as originally written, this question is referring to the FDA's Expanded Access Program, which was created under FDA's regulatory authority (ergo it is not a law) and is colloquially called compassionate use; or the Right to Try Act, which was signed into law by President Trump in 2018. I am going to take a few moments to give an overview of both and then get to the question of self-prescribing. Expanded Access has been around for about 30 years, when it began as a way to make experimental HIV drugs available to patients during the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It has been used since them to make drugs available for a variety of diseases (like cancer), and most recently for COVID-19. The Right to Try Act is similar in that it makes experimental drugs available to patients before they have received full regulatory approval. The mechanism for that availability is a different, and it has since it is a law it has the explicit approval of Congress. Here are a journal article and a very good table breaking down the differences between Right to Try and Expanded Access. Neither of these modify the patient/doctor relationship, so they do not effect whether a prescriber can write their own prescriptions either way. A doctor could probably prescribe COVID-19-related treatments for themselves approved for widespread use under Expanded Access; they would likely be unable to self-prescribe other more medically-complex, higher-risk treatments like chemotherapy. See below. Self-prescribing is legal under federal law. As noted by the Emergency Care Research Institute: Under federal law, physicians in the United States are not prohibited from self-prescribing medications. State laws governing physicians, however, vary greatly, and some may prohibit physicians from prescribing, dispensing, or administering certain medications to themselves or family members. Restrictions vary by state. Most (perhaps all) states prohibit a prescriber from self-prescribing Schedule II controlled substances, with some providing an exception for an emergency. Many prohibit prescribing of Schedule II drugs to family members. I have found several sources that claim some states outright prohibit self-prescribing, but whenever I follow those back to the actual statute they only apply to Schedule II drugs. Professional organizations like the American Medical Association strongly discourage their members self-prescribing, stating in their Code of Ethics that "treating oneself or a member of one's own family poses several challenges for physicians, including concerns about professional objectivity, patient autonomy, and informed consent." The greatest barrier to self-prescribing lies at the pharmacy, where pharmacists are able to refuse prescriptions when they question the medical necessity or standard of care that lead to the prescription.	It is mandatory for the employer to provide sufficient restrooms (“cabinets d'aisance”), as per article R4228-10. Other provisions regulate evacuation, ventilation, heating, disabled access, etc. There is no provision regarding when employees are permitted to use the restrooms. There can't be a single rule that works for every profession: some jobs don't let you leave your post whenever you like (e.g. machine operator, driver, guard, teacher, etc.). The most common dispute regarding restroom use is whether employees should be paid during that time. Some employers want to count restroom use as unpaid pause time. Strictly speaking, that's legal: an employee who is in a restroom is not at the employer's disposal, therefore this doesn't count as work time. However enforcing this is often logistically difficult and wildly unpopular, so in practice it's only done in places where employees must clock out to reach a restroom. I could only find one case with actual jurisprudence. In 1995, an industrial butchering company (Bigard) decided to limit restroom breaks to three fixed times a day. This was, as you might expect, unpopular; the employees went on strike, and eventually the labor court struck down this measure. That's a precedent, but it doesn't seem to have made its way to the appellate court. Your case is also slightly different in that the restrooms would only be inaccessible for an hour, which is shorter than in the Bigard case. So legally speaking, it isn't clear who will win. You'll have a better chance of success by banking on the unpopularity of the measure. Talk with your colleagues and your representatives and shop stewards. Point out that employees who are trying to hold it in are unlikely to be at the top of their productivity.
Can I booby-trap my property against police? Inspired by this question: Suppose I'm paranoid (perhaps justifiably) that law enforcement personnel might conduct a warranted raid of my property. So I setup booby-traps that are designed to either: A. Destroy any evidence I think they might look for, or, more extremely, B. Destroy the property and anyone on it in the event that it is raided. We know from here and here that I owe trespassers some duty of care. Being an (otherwise) law-abiding citizen, I post explicit warnings within the perimeter of my property, which I have secured against trespass by anybody but a very determined attacker. I.e., the only way the police could see the warnings is if they have entered for a raid, at which point the warnings state, "If you go any further into this property you will trigger devices that will destroy the property and kill all persons therein." Sure enough, the police get a no-knock search warrant, breach the outer perimeter, and stop at the warnings. At this point can I be compelled by a court to grant safe access for law enforcement to carry out the search warrant? And if, despite the clear warning, the police decide to press on with their search and an officer is injured or killed, can I be held criminally or civilly liable for that casualty? Notes & clarifications from comments: I'm revealing my mens rea in this question, but objectively I have merely secured the property and warned determined trespassers. The police can lawfully search, but do I have a duty to make my premises safe to search? Am I ex ante liable for their injuries, given the suitable warning? Or can they say, "If you don't make it safe to search, you're liable for our injuries?" At which point haven't they compelled me to incriminate myself, meaning that I can disarm the traps but all the premises' contents are then "poisoned" evidence? Practically speaking it's not hard to rig thermite to destroy evidence without endangering anyone not in close proximity. But then, destruction of evidence is a crime, and I'd rather not destroy my valuable stash of whatever. Or, again, maybe I don't have anything to hide but on principle I really don't want police in my house. So part of the motivation here is to determine: can one construct a scenario that would flat-out deter the search? One analogy that might illuminate this is to consider a hazmat factory: It is secured, it has warnings, and if police barge in and start tossing things without adequate protection they could be injured or killed. So in real life – even just approaching suspected meth labs – the police bring in hazmat specialists. They don't say, "Please render your lab safe for us to search," and I don't think they say, "We got hurt raiding your lab, so that's on you." In this hypothetical there is no specialist they can call because the exact threat is unknown, and designed to be unknowable in advance. In fact, I could just be bluffing and not have any boobytraps. Another reference point that occurs to me: when police are confronted with non-trivial explosive devices, whenever possible it seems they prefer to just clear a safety perimeter and destroy the device than to try to approach and disarm it. One last point of reference I came across: There is one such example in existence in the U.S.: Fugitive John Joe Gray has kept police from entering his property to arrest him for 16 years, simply because no sheriff has considered it worth the risk.	First off, you cannot booby trap your property, period. It is both illegal and tortious. But, as you noted, there are already questions/answers that deal with this issue. Sure enough, if the police get a no-knock search warrant, that in and of itself is the Court order allowing entry by any means necessary. When the officers, there by right of law, breach the outer perimeter and stop at the warnings, they will not be seeking any other court orders to have you allow them "safe entry". Their warrant gives them all the right they need, as probable cause of crime and violent intent or intent to destroy evidence was already presented to a judge. If, in real life, you actually put up signage or state explicitly that they're being forewarned that you intend to harm, trap, maim, or otherwise make it unsafe to enter; or that doing so will result in an attempt to destroy evidence, that is something they have already assumed (hence the seeking and granting of the no-knock vs. a regular search warrant). However, the signs in and of themselves are not protected speech, but rather overt threats, and that would put you in a very precarious position indeed. If the police get a "no knock" warrant (the most invasive, difficult to get warrants, whereby there is a grave risk of destruction of evidence or injury to persons), the police will ensure they have safe passage – they've come prepared for dangerous entry long before your signs, but once they see them, you could rest assured they will take them as they are intended: as a direct threat to their safety, and they will deploy a SWAT or other heavily armed entry team (who is usually there anyway for these dangerous entries). You could expect things like smoke/out canister and teargas, flash bangs, and heavily armed and well armored officers attempting to force you from your dwelling. Presumably, if you need to disarm traps to escape the situation, they can enter. Assuming you're home when they invade with chemical weapons, whether you come out or not, they will force you to disarm whatever booby trapping you may have in place that may destroy evidence, likely walking you in as their human shield in the event you're lying about any dangerous ones. That is probably your best case scenario. They may just decide to throw you through the perimeter once they get their hands on you, just to see what happens! If you don't exit and are home or if you are lucky enough to be out, the bomb squad, ATF, and SWAT will converge on your property in less than typical means. Because from your warning they can assume some incendiary or explosive device exists, bringing it into the jurisdiction of other agencies. If they cannot disarm the trap, they would send a robot in first to set it off, or cut through your roof, or knock down a wall – whatever it takes to get in without using a typical means of ingress/egress, so as not to chance your trap. Regardless, you can rest assured that they will get in, and you will pay for the trap you set for law enforcement. Further, to whatever charges you'd have been faced with from evidence flowing from the original warrant will now be added additional charges like attempted murder of a peace officer; if you have any roommates or known associates: conspiracy to do those things; attempted destruction of evidence, criminal interference with a police investigation ... all at a minimum. If anyone is actually harmed, your signage offers you no shield from criminal or tort liability, and you will be lucky to live through the experience once they get their hands on you. Police tend to not like being the targets of intentional maiming, dismemberment or death. You have to understand that, according to this hypothetical, you are intentionally trying to harm law enforcement, or destroy evidence of your dangerous criminal activity. These are not invaders, or intruders according to the law; they are the people whose job it is to enforce the laws, collect the evidence (if you weren't getting arrested pursuant to the fruits of the warrant, you certainly would be at that point). The signs themselves would make excellent exhibits in the coming case of State v. you. BTW: The only reason they have left John Joe Gray alone is that he knows the Henderson County Sheriff Ronny Brownlow, who has been told that the ATF, FBI, and State SWAT, would all be happy to enter and get or kill Mr. Gray if need be. Since the Sheriff never filed any federal charges, and has determined that he doesn't want to breach (and it's in his jurisdiction to determine this), the Sheriff, aware that Gray's entire family is holed up in the "compound", decided it's not worth going in. It's as well known as it is anomalous. When the police want in, and have the right to get in, they will get in. That Sheriff just decided it's not worthwhile.	We need a jurisdiction, because burglary is a statutory crime. Since this is a residence, in Washington, under RCW 9A.52.025(1), the trespasser might have committed residential burglary: A person is guilty of residential burglary if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, the person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle. While other states may have a provision requiring intent to commit a felony, or intent to commit a crime other than trespassing, the Washington statute does not say "felony" or "other than trespassing". A person can enter unlawfully by accident, or with no intention to be there unlawfully, in which case the person committed the act without the requisite criminal intent. If a person intends to enter but not remain, and they enter, they have committed the misdemeanor of trespassing. The question of whether unlawful entering with the intent to unlawfully remain satisfies the "intent to commit a crime" called for in the Washington statute has not been directly addressed in case law, as far as I know. While the state generally shoulders the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crime, in Washington, under RCW 9A.52.040, the accused may bear the burden of disproving intent (this is a permissive inference on the fact-finder's part): In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such criminal intent. This does not mean that the state shoulders no burden of proof regarding intent, according to State v. Newton: A jury may, however, infer the defendant's specific criminal intent from his or her conduct if it is not "'patently equivocal'" and instead 'plainly indicates such intent as a matter of logical probability' In this instance, the burglary conviction was overturned because no evidence shows his intent was anything other than to show her she could walk The relevant fact is that the accused was under the influence of PCP, and believed that God had told him that his disabled mother could walk, and he broke into the residence to tell her this. Pursuant to State v. Bergeron where the conviction for attempted burglary was upheld, the court held that The intent to commit a specific named crime inside the burglarized premises is not an "element" of the crime of burglary in the State of Washington... The intent required by our burglary statutes is simply the intent to commit any crime against a person or property inside the burglarized premises The court observed in this case that "there is absolutely no evidence in the record to prove what specific crime it was the defendant intended to commit inside". What distinguishes Bergeron from Newton (the latter, not precedential, citing the former) is that there was a good case that Bergeron had an intent to commit some crime, though not a specific identifiable crime; but for Newton, there was no evidence that defendant intended to commit any crime whatsoever, even remaining unlawfully. In the hypothetical instance, the fact that the criminal smashed a vase is evidence of an intent to commit a crime (destruction of property). It's unlikely that a mere assertion "I just did that on the spur of the moment" would carry any weight. If the circumstances make it more likely that he entered intending to do something wrong, such as vandalism, the elements of burglary are present/ If the defendant claims some innocent reason for trespassing, such as escaping a riot, he may avail himself of a defense (RCW 9a.52.090) that The actor reasonably believed that the owner of the premises, or other person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him or her to enter or remain If there is no evidence of a riot, such a defense is not credible. Alternatively, if the house is for sale, the "I thought it would be okay" defense is more credible.	Of course not. If the owner/tenant needed to be home I could rent a house in my name, and then never occupy it (my associates live there) the cops could never enter. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) - Cops executing a warrant need to knock. If no one answers they must wait a reasonable time for an occupant to let them in. It's the knock and announce rule. By implication it might lend authority to what is an obvious answer.	united-states This question does not indicate in what jurisdiction the hypothetical events take place. Since they are hypothetical, I am going to assume the United States. Perhaps other answers will be given for other jurisdictions. I would be interested to read such answers. The Officer's Authority In the hypothetical situation described, it would appear that the police officer had no warrant or other court order, and that he did not have any probable cause to believe that any criminal activity was in progress, or that any crime had been committed. Indeed it would appear that the officer did not even have the "reasonable suspicion" required for a so-called Terry stop (named for the case, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) in which such stops were declared legal). In any case the encounter described is not a Terry stop, because such a stop takes place "on the street" or in a public place, not on private property. So far it seems that the police office is acting without lawful authority. When the man orders the officer to leave his property, the demand is lawful, and by not leaving, the officer becomes a trespasser, unless the officer has some justification not mentioned in the question. The Duty to Comply However, once the officer starts to give orders, the other person must generally treat them as lawful. There are exceptions: Officers cannot compel people to commit crimes, nor to submit to rape or murder. But orders given for the ostensible protection of the officer have particular deference. As the US Supreme court said in Terry v. Ohio (cited above): ... we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is, in fact, carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. (emphasis added) Resisting the Officer Following the logic of Terry Courts tend to give deference to police assertions of the need to protect themselves. The modern tread is to require citizens to submit to police orders in such cases, even if the citizen believes the order to be unlawful, and even if the court eventually agrees. In many states, violent resistance to such orders would be a crime even if the order was later ruled unlawful. In every US state, he use of deadly force, by drawing and firing a gun at a police officer who has issued possibly unlawful orders, but has not threatened the life or well being of anyone, and has not used any force at all, would be clearly criminal. Nolo Press's article on "Resisting Unlawful arrest" says: Historically, American citizens were legally entitled to use reasonable force to resist unlawful arrest. Some states continue to follow this rule, while others don’t. A statute rejecting the traditional rule might say something like this: “You can’t use force to resist if you know or should know that you’re being arrested by a police officer, regardless of whether the arrest is legal.” ... It’s critical to note that one can be convicted of resisting arrest even without having committed the crime that was the basis for the arrest. It should be understood that even in those US states which follow the "traditional rule" and permit resistance to an unlawful arrest, only "reasonable force" is permitted. Shooting a gun at an officer is deadly force, and will not be reasonable unless the person has a justified belief that the officer is about to kill or seriously injure the arrestee or another person without justification. Also, if the arrest is somehow lawful, even though the arrestee reasonably believed it to be unlawful, the use of even "reasonable" force is no longer permitted, and the arrestee may be convicted of resisting arrestee and other crimes. This makes resistance a dangerous gamble, even in states that follow the traditional rule. In addition, resistance is all too likely to lead to escalation of the conflict, and end with the arrestee shot dead or seriously injured. Even if the officer's actions are later held unlawful, that will not bring the arrestee back to life. Under Color of Law The question asks if the office's actions are taken "under color of law". They are, in US law. This does not mean that the acts are lawful or proper. Rather it means that they are take by means of legal authority. Such acts therefore constitute "state action" subject to the limitations of the 14th Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. The Wikipedia article on this topic (linked above) says: ... just because something is done with the "color of law" does not mean that the action was lawful. When police act outside their lawful authority and violate the civil rights of a citizen, the FBI is tasked with investigating. The well known "section 1983" (42 USC. § 1983) provides a private right of action in such cases, saying: Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... Here the hypothetical officer's entry onto private property, his refusal to leave when ordered by the owner, his order to put down the pistol and step away from the other guns (implying an arrest or detention), his order to stop recording and turn over the record, and his drawing of his firearm are all acts taken "under color of law", and had the citizen submitted, he could have subsequently filed a Sec 1983 suit against the officer, although he would have had to establish harm done to collect more than nominal damages. The officer is relying on his authority as a police officer to enforce his orders, and indeed to support his presence on private property. This makes his actions clearly done "under color of law".	That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism.	The general rule is that a warrant is required to enter private property (absent constitutional case law exceptions to the warrant requirement such as exigent circumstances and consent), and that a warrant is available only when there is probable cause that a crime has been committed. Whether the neglect or abuse of an animal constitutes a crime within the meaning of this 4th Amendment requirement could potentially be seen as a gray area, since historically, in the absence of statutory authority in early common law, an owner of an animal had absolute authority to deal with his or her property (the animal) as the owner of the animal saw fit. The purpose of the statute is to clarify that this conduct by an animal owner constitutes a crime for 4th Amendment search and seizure purposes by making a state law determination that it is a crime, which states can do, even though they can't change the constitutional requirement under the 4th Amendment. Also, just because a state can authorize law enforcement to get a warrant for any search authorized by the U.S. Constitution, that doesn't mean it has to allow law enforcement to do so in every case where it is constitutional for the state to do so. The duty to get a warrant for law enforcement to enter onto private property at all arises not only from other state statutes, but also from the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (as incorporated to apply against state and local governments though the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). But, the constitutional requirement has case law exceptions, so it isn't required in all circumstances. In particular, exigent circumstances, and the consent to entry exceptions, which are allowed by constitutional criminal procedure case law, could apply to the requirement to get a warrant in the first place. But, law enforcement needs to have the authority to search at all with a warrant under state law, for an exception to the warrant requirement to be relevant. This statute appears to carry out that purpose by authorizing searches for this particular purpose. For what it is worth, it is not the best drafted possible statute to achieve this objective, and it could have been written to be more clear, but it still gets the job done. So, in answer to the top-line question, no, I wouldn't read this statute as requiring a warrant in every possible circumstance in order to go onto private property to check on an animal, although a warrant would be required in every case where an exception to the warrant requirement under 4th Amendment case law does not apply. Section 578. Is an animal related statute rather than people. The people involved are the property owners. The property owner's rights in their real property are potentially infringed if there is a warrantless entry. The human beings owning the animals are potentially violating a law which the State of Missouri wants law enforcement officers to be able to enforce (the relevant laws are the state animal cruelty and agricultural laws expressly referenced in the statute, so, it is irrelevant that "Barry County Missouri has no animal control laws or leash laws"). Among other things these statutes make it a crime if a person "Has custody or ownership of an animal and fails to provide adequate care[.]" As the question claims that: "The definition "Adequate care" is vague as well." But the question also notes that: "The 578 statute has been challenged for being unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary which was overruled but that was serious abuse case." The state has a right to decide what is and is not illegal. It is not prohibited from banning treatment of animals that is not serious abuse. The state has every right to make it a crime to fail to provide adequate care for an animal, even if that failure to provide adequate car does not constitute severe abuse. Also, keep in mind that a lawful search requires only probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and a good faith belief that an exception to the warrant requirement is present. If the law enforcement officer has a good faith belief that the animal will die or seriously suffer or be hidden by the owner in the time that the law enforcement officer reasonably thinks that it will take to get a warrant, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies. The fact that the lawful search later reveals that a crime was no committed does not mean that the search was improper. A mere belief that an animal was abused or neglected and that exigent circumstance were present with a reasonable factual basis (e.g. a tip from a neighbor who seems credible and claims to have personal knowledge of the facts) will usually suffice to establish probable cause. So warrant needed or not? and if so, what legal action can be taken for trespass, rights violations under color of law etc. if any? If there is a search without a warrant or probable cause was not present, and an exception to the warrant requirement does not apply, and the property owner believes that their 4th Amendment rights were intentionally violated by law enforcement in the warrantless search in violation of clearly established law to the contrary, a civil lawsuit against the law enforcement officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be brought in state or federal court. The employer of the law enforcement officer can be sued as well, under the same statute, if the warrantless search in violation of the clearly established constitutional right was made pursuant to an express policy of the law enforcement officer's employer. But the fact that the law enforcement officer violated someone's rights does not automatically make the law enforcement officer's employer civilly liable for the wrong. In most U.S. states, law enforcement officers are protected by state law governmental immunity from common law trespass lawsuits for their conduct while carrying out their official duties, but I haven't checked specifically to see if that is the case in Missouri. A claim of a 4th Amendment violation can also be a ground for suppressing evidence obtained with an unlawful search when defending a prosecution under some ordinance or statute that relies upon that evidence.	Laws on self-defense vary greatly from nation to nation. Generally, one cannot hunt down a hypothetical threat but one can defend against an actual threat or even a mistakenly assumed actual threat where no actual threat exists. Alice set it up so that Bob would feel threatened. In many jurisdictions, the self-defense defense for homicide rests on the state of the mind of the suspect, insofar as it can be determined, and failing that on a "reasonable person" standard. Presumably Bob genuinely felt threatened by Charlie and says so afterwards. "I thought he/it/whatever was trying to harm me. I didn't know it was a harmless actor." Just how much harm Bob needs to make self-defense stick varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It could be fear of imminent, serious bodily harm, or fear of being victimized in any sort of crime (stand your ground laws). As the comment by user6726 points out, just protraying a zombie or whatever isn't enough, there has to be threat to Bob. Bob cannot hunt Charlie down because Charlie "is" an evil lich or whatever. Bob can defend himself against attacks by Charlie and (in some jurisdictions) against intrusions by Charlie in his property. So it makes a difference if Bob hunts in his own backyard or further afield. The well-documented and extensive efforts by Alice and Darren to fool Bob should support Bob's statement. Say the court/jury believes that it was reasonable (or at least "not entirely unreasonable") for Bob to be afraid. Since the perceived self-defense would apply even if Bob thought the attacker was human, thinking that it was non-human should make little difference. Except that it would further showcase the degree to which Bob was fooled to see a threat. If the whole endeavor by Alice and Darren broke laws, the death might fall into felony homicide in some jurisdictions. This one could come to technicalities because Bob wasn't their accomplice. Otherwise, Darren's track record might prevent the two from being charged for negligent homicide. Consider the well-publicized cases where either the police or civilians shot unarmed people, and say that they thought the victim was armed and a threat to them. If doesn't matter if the victim drew a gun or a wallet, it matters if the shooter can make his or her fears plausible enough.	In the United States . . . Scope of Search Warrant: To what extent can they search you and your belongings? The scope of a search is limited by what is stated in the warrant. Not only must a warrant be supported by probably cause, it must also describe with particularity, "the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." See U.S. Const. Amend. 4. For example, they cannot search a house if the warrant specifies the backyard, nor can they search for weapons if the warrant specifies marijuana plants. However, that doesn't mean that officers can seize only those items listed in the warrant. If, in the course of their search, police officers come across contraband or evidence of a crime that is not listed in the warrant, they can often seize it. When it comes to containers, the police are allowed to search anything that items could be inside. So, if they're looking for stolen TV's, they can't search a jewelry box or under the floor boards. However if they looking for something small, like bomb parts, just about everything is fair game. To search you, the warrant would need to authorize the search of your person, or the police would need an independent justification to search you. For example, if they found explosives that were illegal to posses, they could conduct a search incident to arrest. Can they search your entire computer? Yes, assuming computers are within the scope of the warrant. Compelling people to produce passwords of encryption keys: If they find encrypted files can they detain you until you decrypt them? This depends on your jurisdiction as it is a developing area of law and deal with 5th amendment. This is something that would not be done through a search warrant and would involve a separate proceeding. In this situation, constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. V, may be implicated. Case where Court held producing passwords violated the 5th Amendment: The government's postindictment grand jury subpoena ordering the defendant to provide all passwords associated with his computer in order to secure evidence of child pornography allegedly contained in the computer, which spawned the three counts contained in the indictment, required the defendant to make a "testimonial communication," and thus the subpoena violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, where the government was not seeking documents or objects but instead was requiring the defendant to divulge through his mental processes his password that would be used to incriminate him, the district court in U.S. v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2010), held. The court explained, an act is "testimonial," and thus protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when the accused is forced to reveal his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the government. It is the extortion of information from the accused, the attempt to force him to disclose the contents of his own mind, that implicates the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, the court said. Case where Court held producing passwords did not violate the 5th Amendment: The district court in U.S. v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012), recognizing that production of a document may fall within the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination since it acknowledges that the document exists, that it is in the possession or control of the producer, and that it is authentic, held that the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not implicated by requiring her to produce the unencrypted contents of a computer where the government knew of the existence and location of the computer's files; a preponderance of the evidence established either that the computer belonged to the defendant or that she was its sole or primary user, such that she had the ability to access its encrypted contents; and the government had offered her immunity, precluding it from using her act of producing those unencrypted contents against her. The court determined, also, that a preponderance of the evidence, in a motion to compel production of the unencrypted contents of the computer, found during a search of the defendant's residence, showed that either the computer belonged to her or that she was its sole or primary user, such that she could access its encrypted contents, supporting the decision to compel her to produce those unencrypted contents, where the defendant acknowledged, during a telephone conversation with her ex-husband, that she owned or had such a computer, the contents of which were accessible only by entry of a password, and the computer, which was found in her bedroom, was identified with her name. This issues probably will not be decided one way or the other until the supreme court rules on it. If they find a password safe can they force you to give them a password and >then can they log into all accounts you have stored in it? When you say password safe, I am assuming you mean password management software. If so, see above. If you don't give them the password but they find it written down somewhere, can they still use it? Yes, assuming their warrant allows them to search papers or it is in plain view. Out of curiosity, do police ever actually do this? Find a password protected file on a computer and go through all the papers in the desk and try all possible passwords until they find one? I'm not sure, but it wouldn't surprise me. Even if they don't have a warrant that covers papers, police have been known to bend the rules. I think someone with police experience could have a better answer for this.
In the software license BSD, what is " Redistribution in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice..." I'm trying to understand all the responsibilities of this license. Does redistribution mean: publicly placing a windows .exe using the BSD licensed library for users to download on a website(free and commercial) sharing the exe with friends (free and commercial) Can redistribution even mean just packaging your project into a exe because you are like rearranging the files into one executable?? Are we required to include the license in readable form in an exe in the project application itself or just in the project folder like a readme? What if people forget to include the notices for some libraries? Do they have to pay fines or something?	Disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer. This advice may be materially inaccurate. What does redistribution mean? Redistribution means you have somehow caused the software to make its way to another person. Things that probably count as distribution: Placing the file on a public website. Printing the binary in hex onto paper and giving that paper to someone else. Putting the file onto a USB drive and handing it to someone. Putting the file onto your own computer, then giving that computer to someone else. Putting the file onto a shared network drive. Things that probably don't count as distribution: Copying the files onto your own computer(s) Compiling the program Placing the program on your phone. Printing out the source code on paper, but not sharing it. As a practical matter, I recommend ensuring that BSD license accompanies any instances of the software, even if you don't intend to distribute those instances. If you don't distribute it, then nobody will see it. If you "inadvertently" distribute the software, then including the license means you are in compliance. Should you include the license in the exe or in the same folder: The specific clause is: Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. Including the license in the exe (e.g., via some sort of credits menu) is typically fine. I'll note that this is the approach used by Chrome (help->about chrome has a link to "other open source software" which includes these licenses). This approach works well for software which makes use of an installer, since users probably won't be looking in the install folder. Including the license in the folder adjacent to the exe is also typically fine. If your application does not have an install process (e.g., installed via xcopy deployment), then this approach works well, since users will easily be able to find the license. If your software is sold in a physical box, then printing out the license and including that license inside the box also works. What if I violate the license by not including the BSD terms? If you violate the license, you are subject to a lawsuit for copyright violation. What happens next depends on how the copyright owners wishes to proceed: Some copyright owners will sue. The actual results/penalties for such a violation will depend on a variety of factors. Some copyright owners will ask you to comply with the license. If you respond by apologizing and then complying, that's as far as it will go. Some copyright owners will ask you for money (with threat of lawsuit). I would expect this result if the copyright owners offers a dual-licensing scheme (i.e., where you can pay the copyright owner to exclude the acknowledgement).	If your own software includes software covered by the GPLv2 (for example by copying source code, or by linking dynamically) then your own software is also covered by the GPLv2, and you will have to provide the source code. This is called a "work based on the Program" on the GPLv2. In this case, however, it seems that your own software does not include software covered by the GPLv2, but you want to put it onto an SD card together with software covered by the GPLv2. That would most likely fall under "mere aggregation of another work", as long as your software and the other software do not interact very closely (such as dynamic linking). To quote the GPLv2: In addition, mere aggregation of another work not based on the Program with the Program (or with a work based on the Program) on a volume of a storage or distribution medium does not bring the other work under the scope of this License. So in that case the GPLv2 does not cover your program. You will still have to supply the source code for the GPLv2 software on the SD card. This is covered by section 3 of the GPLv2. Basically, you have two options: send along the complete source code for all the software (would be quite bothersome for a complete distro) or provide a written offer to provide the source code on demand to anyone who asks (you may charge for this, but only to cover your cost) GPLv2 contains a third option, but that only applies to non-commercial distribution. Practically speaking, it should be enough to include a README.txt or similar explaining that the SD card contains software covered by GPLv2, and that you will provide the source code on demand for a certain, reasonable fee (say $5 or $10 per CD). In practice, it is unlikely that anyone would ask for this, as the source code can usually be downloaded for free elsewhere, but if someone does ask, you just charge them $5 and send a CD. Of course, to reduce legal risks it may be prudent to contact a lawyer for your jurisdiction, as this is only general advice.	You're allowed to make backups of copyrighted software, as long as you are authorized to use the software, the backups are not distributed, and they are destroyed when/if you are no longer authorized to use the software. 17 USC §117(a): (a) Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy. -- Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) ...(not very helpful)...or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful. The law is usually used to justify copies of the installation media, but it would be unconscionable to cut your rights off there and make backups illegal for machines containing copyrighted software. After all, with such an interpretation, no Windows machine could be backed up since Windows is copyrighted.	There is no loophole because a work released in object code form only — without the Corresponding Source — is not released under GPLv3, even if you say it is. GPLv3 only requires them to also provide whatever source came with it False. Providing the Corresponding Source is compulsory (§6 as pointed by @cHao). If they do not have access to it, it means the work has not been released under GPLv3.	To use an API over a network connection (as opposed to, e.g., the Windows API), a user communicates a request to the API host, or server, and awaits a response. The host of the remote API can refuse to serve requests from users for probably any reason. Such services often require users to accept a license as a condition of using the service, and they may charge a fee as a condition of the license. A license to use a service is obviously not necessarily bound to a license for the use of its source code, just as the ability to reach the service is not dependent on the ability to see (let alone use) the code in any format, whether it be the source code or some compiled form of the code. In essence, source licenses and service licenses have different primary goals, at least inasmuch as the source license seeks to restrict someone who has actual physical access to compiled code, and possibly source code. Service licenses do not have that concern, though I have seen service licenses that also prohibit decompiling. This is probably the result of a CYA attitude among lawyers: the language is already in the standard software license text, and it doesn't hurt anything to leave it in, and it could help if a service user somehow managed to download the program code.	The starting point is whether you infringe copyright by downloading or using the cracked software. The licence you purchase relates to a specific copy of the software. The licence almost certainly does not say 'You can use any copy of this software.' It will usually say something like 'You may install this software', surrounded by other language that makes it clear that 'software' refers to a specific copy. E.g. the Windows 7 EULA says 'you may install one copy of the software on one computer' and, in another place, says 'By using the software, you accept these terms. If you do not accept them, do not use the software. Instead, return it to the retailer for a refund or credit.' Nothing in that licence allows you to download an infringing copy of Windows from elsewhere and apply your licence to that copy. In the case of Windows, you don't have a licence to run 'Windows', you have a licence to run a specific copy of Windows. Therefore, even though you have purchased a licence, you would not have a licence for the cracked copy. Running a computer program inherently requires you to make copies of it in memory. In the absence of a copyright licence, this is copyright infringement: MAI Systems Corp v. Peak Computer Inc (1993) 991 F.2d 511 (defendant, who was not a licensee in relation to software, ran software and in doing so created copies of the software in memory; the person was purportedly authorised by a licensee to do so, but the licensee did not have the right to so authorise the defendant). In some jurisdictions, there is legislation to permit non-licensees to run software without infringing copyright, but these provisions (at least the ones in the US and Australia) don't apply to copies of the program which are themselves infringing copies. See 17 USC 117(a) and section 47B of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). Now, supposing you do infringe copyright, the question of whether that is a criminal act will depend on the jurisdiction and the other facts of the case. In Australia, downloading or using software is almost never a criminal act (offences under the Copyright Act require trade in infringing copies or commercial scale, etc). In the US, infringing copyright for commercial gain (e.g. if the software is for use in a business) or of particularly expensive software might be criminal under the No Electronic Theft Act. Furthermore, downloading the 'cracked' software may make one complicit in the distributor's offending, specifically by way of 'counselling and procuring' or 'conspiracy'. The distributor's offending may include the kind of commercial copyright infringement that is criminalised.	The Apache 2.0 license purports to be irrevocable, but it also presupposes that the supposed licensor has the right to grant permission to copy. In this case, that is untrue, so there never was a proper license and nothing to revoke (the copyright owner grants permission in the form of "a license" which is a legal abstraction, that normally is specified in the license document). An end-user snared by this illegal license might attempt to sue the author because of the legal screw-up but paragraph 9 says that the supposed licensor cannot be held liable. In this case, though, "licensor" is defined not as the person who hands you the license document, but as the copyright owner. So it's the employer who would be not liable under the terms of the document (but since the employer had nothing to do with the license, it's as though the license never existed). The end-user is a secondary infringer (the employee is the primary infringer, in illegally distributing the material). Under US law, that doesn't matter, the user is still liable. Under UK law, secondary infringement includes the element that you have to have reason to know that the copy is infringing, which in the scenario that you describe is not the case.	Apparently Such Files May be Distributes or Sold Section 5.e of the Google APIs Terms of Service reads: e. Prohibitions on Content Unless expressly permitted by the content owner or by applicable law, you will not, and will not permit your end users or others acting on your behalf to, do the following with content returned from the APIs: Scrape, build databases, or otherwise create permanent copies of such content, or keep cached copies longer than permitted by the cache header; Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of, sell, lease, lend, convey, distribute, publicly display, or sublicense to any third party; Misrepresent the source or ownership; or Remove, obscure, or alter any copyright, trademark, or other proprietary rights notices; or falsify or delete any author attributions, legal notices, or other labels of the origin or source of material It might seem that 5.e.2 prohibits the suggested use. But if the text is in fact in the public domain,"applicable law" (that is, copyright law) permits you, or anyone, to "Copy, translate, modify, create a derivative work of" or otherwise use the content. Thus 5.e.2 does not apply. Points 3 and 4 would seem to indicate that the source, including title and author information, must be included or preserved in the output files, but seems to be the only relevant restriction that applies. Response to Comment A comment by user Brian Drake questions the theory of this answer, stating: The most you can say is that copyright law does not prohibit certain conduct (and even that is not clear: just because the text is in the public domain does not necessarily mean that the audio is in the public domain); this does not mean that copyright law expressly permits that conduct. US Copyright law does not define what constitutes the public domain. Rather it defines what is protected by copyright, and specifies some cases in whch a work is not protected. (For nexample, 17 USC 105 provides tht works of the US Federal Government are not protected.) Anything not included in the protection of copyright is in the public domain. This has been confirmed by many cour cases and legal writings. Law generally follows the rule "Anything not forbidden is allowed." Audio as Derivitive Work An audio recording of a person reading a text aloud would be a derivative work of that text, and would normally have its own copyright, if created lawfully. (If the recording was of a text protected by copyright, made without permission and outside of fair use, it was not made lawfully and the infringer has no copyright in the recording at all.) But US courts have held that a work created by a mechanical or automatic process, including many computer programs, is not an "original work of authorship" and thus is not protected by copyright at all, and is thus in the Public Domain. The case of the "Monkey Selfie" is on point. ("Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, § 313.2" (PDF). United States Copyright Office. 22 December 2014. p. 22. "To qualify as a work of 'authorship' a work must be created by a human being.... Works that do not satisfy this requirement are not copyrightable. The Office will not register works produced by nature, animals, or plants." Moreover, if the audio were protected by copyright, it would presumably be owned by the person who ran the program, and 17 USC 106 specifically grants the copyright owner permission to distribute copies. Sources The Wikipedia article "Public Domain" reads in relevant part (citations omitted): The public domain consists of all the creative work to which no exclusive intellectual property rights apply. Those rights may have expired,[1] been forfeited, expressly waived, or may be inapplicable. ... As rights vary by country and jurisdiction, a work may be subject to rights in one country and be in the public domain in another. Some rights depend on registrations on a country-by-country basis, and the absence of registration in a particular country, if required, gives rise to public-domain status for a work in that country. ... Definitions of the boundaries of the public domain in relation to copyright, or intellectual property more generally, regard the public domain as a negative space; that is, it consists of works that are no longer in copyright term or were never protected by copyright law. According to James Boyle this definition underlines common usage of the term public domain and equates the public domain to public property and works in copyright to private property. However, the usage of the term public domain can be more granular, including for example uses of works in copyright permitted by copyright exceptions. Such a definition regards work in copyright as private property subject to fair-use rights and limitation on ownership "How Can I Use Copyright-Free Works (in the Public Domain)?" by Nolo Press reads: Copyright law gives creators certain exclusive rights. These rights include the exclusive ability to copy, distribute, and perform the copyrighted work. But copyright is not infinite. Rather, it provides copyright holders with protections for a limited duration. When a work becomes available for use without permission from a copyright owner, it is said to be "in the public domain." Most works enter the public domain because their copyrights have expired. The Legal Information Institute (LII) article "public domain" reads: The public domain includes every creative work that is no longer protected by a copyright, trademark, or patent. Creative works that are no longer protected are owned by the general public rather than the original creator. As such, the work is free to be copied, performed, or otherwise used by anyone. "Copyright and Scholarship: Public Domain" from Boston College Libraries reads in relevant part: "Public domain" works are not protected by copyright. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. An important caveat regarding public domain material is that collections, new editions, and derivative works of public domain material may all be protected by copyright. With collections, an author could collect public domain works in a book or display them on a website, and the collection as a whole could be protected by copyright, even though individual works within it are not. "Welcome to the Public Domain" (Stanford libraries) reads in relevant part: The term “public domain” refers to creative materials that are not protected by intellectual property laws such as copyright, trademark, or patent laws. The public owns these works, not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining permission, but no one can ever own it. Wikipedia article "Monkey selfie copyright dispute" "A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos" (AP) reads in relevant part: A macaque monkey who took now-famous selfie photographs cannot be declared the copyright owner of the photos, a federal judge said Wednesday. U.S. District Judge William Orrick said in federal court in San Francisco that "while Congress and the president can extend the protection of law to animals as well as humans, there is no indication that they did so in the Copyright Act." NARUTO, a Crested Macaque, by and through his Next Friends, People forthe Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., v. DAVID JOHN SLATER; BLURB, INC., ; WILDLIFE PERSONALITIES, LTD." (Ninth Circuit full opinion April 23, 2018 No. 16-15469, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-04324-WHO) reads in part: We must determine whether a monkey may sue humans, corporations, and companies for damages and injunctive relief arising from claims of copyright infringement. Our court’s precedent requires us to conclude that the monkey’s claim has standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Nonetheless, we conclude that this monkey—and all animals, since they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court
Keeping children away from an ex-convict legally required? Are there laws that prevent a minor under your protection from staying with a person who you suspect is a pedophile, if you believe they are not likely to be abusive? Assume that said minor is adamant that nothing illegal has gone on and that no personal boundaries have been violated. Example: John, a childhood friend of Emily, was released from prison. Emily suspects the arrest was related to child pornography charges due to rumors, but does not know for sure. Emily's children have said that nothing bad had gone on the last time they were with John before his arrest. John is not a registered sex offender. Is Emily required by law to keep her children away from John, regardless?	You are responsible or assessing risks to your children A parent (or a person in loco parentis) is obliged to care for and protect their children this includes assessing the risk to those children and whether that risk is acceptable or should be avoided or mitigated. This applies to all risks, when they should cross the road, when they are responsible enough to be left home alone and, yes, who is a suitable person to care for them. This does not require any sort of formal or documented risk assessment process but if things go wrong, the state may require the parent to justify their actions. If the state believes that their actions were reckless then this may be a crime. If the state believes their actions were not reasonable then this may have ongoing consequences with child protection agencies.	You don't say who is telling you that you need to do these things, and it does matter. Educational institutions are required to maintain a discrimination-free environment, so if a student makes inappropriate remarks to another student, they have to address the matter (if they ignore it, saying "Boys will be boys", they can get sued). They will have previously spelled out procedures for addressing such accusations, which probably include giving a good talking-to to the guilty party, and maybe some harsher sanction like suspension. The school district might then have in mind a parent-teacher conference, with the underlying threat being to turn the matter over to the police: did the letter come from the school district? A minor can commit a crime, such as assault or threatening: in Oklahoma, this includes Ok. Stat §21-1172, which makes it a crime to send a message that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, and a first violation of the law is a misdemeanor. For an adult, the penalty can be a year in prison and $500 fine, but that is unlikely for a minor. There may be a hearing in Juvenile Court with some disposition, and if the charges are proven then the court has wide latitude in meting out punishment. Did the letter come from the juvenile court system? The Oklahome law regarding children and juveniles is here. When the Office of Juvenile Affairs engages in "the intake process", they are investigating the case to make a recommendation to the DA. "Intake" is defined as a mandatory, preadjudicatory interview of the juvenile and, if available, the parents, legal guardian, or other custodian of the juvenile, which is performed by a duly authorized individual to determine whether a juvenile comes within the purview of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code, whether nonadjudicatory alternatives are available and appropriate, and if the filing of a petition is necessary Since "intake" is juvenile justice jargon, I assume this is a legal proceeding, not a parent-teacher conference. An actual criminal charge might result from the hearing, which is brought about by a referral. Because detention is a real possibility, consulting an attorney is wise. Whether or not it is a good idea to have the attorney present for the proceeding is something only your attorney can say (in his professional judgment). There is really no way to know in advance what they already know.	The police (and any other involved public agencies) do not work for Steve. They make their own decisions. You didn't specify a location, and requirements to consent to a search vary by location. It wouldn't be surprising, though, if Steve can't legally consent to a search of someone else's room (but possibly could consent to search of common areas). One possibility you don't seem to have considered is that the police or prosecutor would, if Steve is willing to testify, use Steve's testimony as probable cause to get a warrant. Then they could obtain text messages from Mike's service provider (even if he's deleted them from his phone), search his room without his consent, etc. Details again vary by location. Finally, any jail/prison term is typically up to a judge or jury, not the police. Pre-trial detention is typically up to a judge or magistrate. (Also, outside the scope of your question, but if there is any chance Steve has allowed himself to become involved in the misdeeds, even slightly, Steve would be wise to talk to a lawyer. Or if he suspects the police could believe that.)	So I can block children under 13, but I can't tell them that? You can tell them after they fail, you cannot tell them on the asking screen. Then what is the correct way to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? I agree with you that it is odd that they recommend using a cookie but they do!* So you have a entry page with a simple question, "Please indicate your age" and then block based on the response. That's it. Note that the rule is neutral. This means that you do not need to disguise your purpose or try to trick people into entering their correct age. *I think that what is happening here is that any parent who wants to complain to their legislator can be met with the response, "If your kid is so sneaky that they are using different computers to lie about their age what do you want us to do about it?" The fact is, this scheme keeps innocent kids from seeing stuff they shouldn't; the sneaky ones are going to find a way.	There are cases out there like Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, State v. Unnamed Defendant, Williams v. Unnamed Defendant; there have been indictments of John Doe who was only identified via a DNA profile. Not knowing the actual name of a person wouldn't pose a problem per se, and it seems that when the name is not known, John or Jane Doe is generally filled in. There was in instance a year ago in the UK where rioters who refused to identify themselves, and prosecution decided to drop the case.	Parents have very wide latitude to make their children do what they are told, especially when the action is mandated by law. Vaccinations for school children are mandatory, and that could include covid vaccinations. A child is not eligible for an exemption on their own (only the parent can request a non-medical exemption). Force can be used on the child to get them to comply with a mandatory vaccination, per RCW 9A.16.100. It is the policy of this state to protect children from assault and abuse and to encourage parents, teachers, and their authorized agents to use methods of correction and restraint of children that are not dangerous to the children. However, the physical discipline of a child is not unlawful when it is reasonable and moderate and is inflicted by a parent, teacher, or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child. Any use of force on a child by any other person is unlawful unless it is reasonable and moderate and is authorized in advance by the child's parent or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child. However, that does not mean that the shot-provider is willing to tie the child down on parental say-so, so it is reasonably likely that a court order would be necessary. If the child has been legally emancipated, they are the ones who would have to consent to a vaccination, so their parents can't make them get shots.	In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.	If someone attacks your dog, or the dog of a third person, you may use force to defend property rights, see ORS 161.205 and ORS 161.229. This does not apply to a person attacking their own animal. Force may also be used to effect an arrest by a private person (ORS 133.225) – you "may arrest another person for any crime committed in the presence of the private person if the private person has probable cause to believe the arrested person committed the crime". You would need to study up on ORS 167.320. Assuming that the abuse is less than causing death, for first degree animal abuse, it is when one "causes serious physical injury to an animal". The child actually becomes relevant because the misdemeanor becomes a felony when The person knowingly commits the animal abuse in the immediate presence of a minor child. For purposes of this paragraph, a minor child is in the immediate presence of animal abuse if the abuse is seen or directly perceived in any other manner by the minor child. So in fact, no amount of force can legally be used to prevent a person from hitting their dog. Force can be used to arrest a person (which prevents any further beating), if the person causes serious physical injury to the dog.
Can utilities refuse to do business with you? Can my electric or water company refuse to serve me? I have been doing research and have only found situations in which the bills aren't paid on time or at all and I don't care about that. Assuming the bills are all paid on time, can a utility company refuse me service for arbitrary reasons e.g. my political views?	This is a matter of state law, and so could in theory vary from state to state. But I think that in most, if not all, US states, a public utility like a water or electric company must take any customer unless they have a history of unpaid bills or the like. They don't have to lay new pipes or run new wires to bring service to you if it is at a location not previously served, however. In the Maryland code, § 7-307 ( Termination of service to low income customers) provides: (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, the Commission shall adopt regulations concerning the prohibition against or limitation of authority of a public service company to terminate service for gas or electricity to a low income residential customer during the heating season for nonpayment. (2) In adopting the regulations required under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Commission shall consider and may include provisions relating to: (i) the circumstances under which service may and may not be limited or terminated; (ii) the minimum heating levels required to maintain life, health, and safety; (iii) the medical, age, disabling, or other individual characteristics that are relevant to a prohibition against or limitation on the termination of service; (and other provisions) That the Public Service Commission is empowered, and indeed obliged, to issue binding regulations on when service may be terminated might imply a duty to provide service in the first place, but that is not as clear as I would like. I know that in practice a utility runs a credit check and may demand a deposit if the results are not satisfactory, but I do not see a law compelling that behavior. It may be in regulations adopted by the commission.	No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.	How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.	Contracts can say all sorts of unenforceable things, you provided an example of one of them. A person cannot be compelled to stay and work somewhere they no longer wish to work. At the risk of getting my wrist slapped for straying too far into the land of opinion, a clause like this is likely intended to take advantage of naive teenagers who will provide free employment referrals because they think they have to.	user662852 has a good point -- whoever own the property has the right to make the rules. Is the property, land+construction in fact your's or does it belong to the HOA who just grant you access as a lease holder? Different states has different rules, but in my state it is illegal to maroon a property and there must be a access to public streets even when this necessitate passing over somebody else land. However that is irrelevant if the HOA owns the land your house is build on. I think you will have to look at your HOA agreement and see what it says.	It looks like the gym was allowed to take the money out of your bank account and didn't. They didn't notice that they didn't take your money, so they can't really expect you to notice it. So you haven't done anything that would be criminal. The bigger question is how much you owe them. If you used the gym all the time, like someone paying monthly would do, they will most likely have the right to payment. That's not unlimited, there will be some "statute of limitations" so they can't ask you for 30 years back payments, but with less than two years they probably have a right. If they raised prices, it's unlikely the would have a right to that because they never told you. The situation while your subscription was frozen is interesting. Basically you just walked in, used the gym without paying, but they didn't stop you in any way. I could walk into your gym, ask if it is Ok to use it, and if they say "yes" and don't mention payment, I'm in. So for this time you can argue whether or not you owe them money. Summary: You haven't done anything criminal. You most likely owe them money. About the money, they can take you to court if you don't pay which will cost both sides money. Since you did use their service and other users did pay, the morally right thing would be to pay what seems fair to you, possibly with some negotiation. And legally, you might consider paying them enough to make both sides happy enough so you can stay a gym member and don't get sued for the money.	Is this legal for the county to enforce? Yes. And can I sue if they try to enforce it? You could, but you would very likely lose your lawsuit. A more fruitful approach would be to go to the county planning board and seek a variance to permit you to do what you want to do.	I do not have a written agreement of her saying she will pay 1/5 of utilities cost. Can I still take her to small claims court to get my money back? Yes. This type of agreements does not need to be in writing. Proving the other roommates' timely payments is strong evidence that also she is under a similar agreement. You did not elaborate on the form of her refusals. If these are stated in writing, they might evidence elements that further weaken her legal position. For instance, these might reflect her inconsistencies and/or bad faith. Even if you were unable (which seems very unlikely) to prove that there is an agreement to the effect of splitting costs, you might still prevail on grounds of equity.
Knives out - inheritance In the movie Knives Out (2019) there is a specific type of inheritance. The old milionare bequeathed all of his property to his nurse, instead of giving it to his family. Could he really do it like this ? Could he omit all of his descendants and bequest his property to a non-family member ? (According to US Law). Do the descendants have any right to get some money or property from the inheritance even when they were purposely omited from the passed one's will ? Edit: The movie took place in America, not in Great Britain as I found out.	Since Harlan Thrombey is not married at the time of his death, his children (Walt and Linda, but not Toni, who is his daughter-in-law) are entitled to some of the personal effects from the estate. Section 2-403 of the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code: The decedent's surviving spouse is entitled from the estate to a value at date of death, not exceeding $10,000 in excess of any security interests therein, in household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects. If there is no surviving spouse, the decedent's children are entitled jointly to the same value. ... These rights are in addition to any benefit or share passing to the surviving spouse or children by the decedent's will, unless otherwise provided, by intestate succession, or by way of elective share. This means that even if the will held up in probate court, Marta would probably still not be entitled to "the house ... and all belongings therein"; Walt and Linda would get to pick out up to $10,000 (between them) of their favorite pieces. To be honest, though, you could probably remove $10,000 worth of furniture from that house and it would look largely the same. And, of course, the house itself, the money, and the business are not affected by this clause. Note that unlike surviving children, a surviving spouse cannot be completely disinherited under Massachusetts law. A surviving spouse can choose the "elective share" of the estate instead: The surviving husband or wife of a deceased person, except as provided in section thirty-six of chapter two hundred and nine, within six months after the probate of the will of such deceased, may file in the registry of probate a writing signed by him or by her, waiving any provisions that may have been made in it for him or for her, or claiming such portion of the estate of the deceased as he or she is given the right to claim under this section, and if the deceased left issue, he or she shall thereupon take one third of the personal and one third of the real property; ... if he or she would thus take real and personal property to an amount exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars in value, he or she shall receive, in addition to that amount, only the income during his or her life of the excess of his or her share of such estate above that amount, the personal property to be held in trust and the real property vested in him or her for life, from the death of the deceased. ... If I'm reading this correctly, this means that if Harlan's wife (or husband?) had still been alive during the movie, and had been disinherited in the will as the children were, she could have claimed $25,000 outright and a life interest in one-third of the estate (less the $25,000.) Given the ongoing income from the publishing business, this would probably have been quite lucrative. However, there do not appear to be similar provisions for Walt and Linda under Massachusetts law.	I am sorry for your loss, and that you have to deal with bills on top of everything else. The quick answer is yes, you might have to sell the house to pay your mother's bills. As you probably know, the estate includes both your mother's assets (cash, house, car, and so on) and her debts. In general, to "settle the estate," the executor must pay all debts before she gives away any of the assets. Legal Aid of West Virginia has a helpful website about West Virginia probate law. Here is what it says about this issue: If you can’t pay all of your family member’s creditors from the person’s available money, you must sell off the family member’s property and pay the creditors in the order listed in W. Va. Code § 44-2-21; W. Va. Code §§ 44-1-18 to -20. You may have to sell the family member’s land or home in order to pay creditors. W. Va. Code § 44-8-7. Added after comments Under WV law, it does not matter that you were bequeathed your mother’s house. The law gives debtors priority over heirs. This means debtors are paid before any heir. Heirs are “paid” from whatever is left in the estate after the debts are paid. So if the estate is underwater, if it owes more than it is worth, there will be nothing left in the estate to give to the heirs. As executor, your job is to carry out West Virginia law. The nuts and bolts of what happens if you refuse to the sell the house depends on WV law. You might be able to find the details by searching on line, but your best bet is to probably to talk to an attorney who specializes in WV probate law. An attorney will know both the law on the books, and how that law is implemented. They will be able to advise you on what options you really have, and the costs and benefits of those options. If the estate is underwater, you could buy the house from the estate. If you do that, you will not be liable for any of your mother’s debts; those are owed by the estate. Depending on how the sale is handled, this may be your (financially) best option. (Depending on whether the price covers the debt, and on what other heirs are bequeathed, the court might worry about you selling yourself the house at a discount price, and thus look at the sale very carefully.)	You are describing a charity. In the simplest case, a charitable foundation could be established to receive donations and dispense payments for medical services. There are various irrelevant non-legal reasons why it might not work (e.g. insufficient contributions relative to demand). The main legal concerns of such a foundation are its tax liability (do they have to pay income taxes on contributions?), and local regulations (how do you distinguish between a scam and a real charity?). The tax question is primarily about 501(c)(3) status, and for the most part there should be no problems with charitably dispensing contributions, though there is a requirement that no part of the net earnings of a section 501(c)(3) organization may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual – perhaps the CEO would be an exception to the universality of the program (but providing equivalent service could be a pre-tax employment benefit). A recipient does not have to pay tax on a gift, owing to the "medical exclusion" Registration is a state-level matter, here is the Washington law. Nothing in that law says "you can't provide coverage of medical expenses", and no maximum income level is imposed on the recipient of a charitable gift. The concern of these regulations is mainly record-keeping and access to records, not on specific ways of benefiting the community. Since unlike taxes contributions cannot be coerced, this means that some people might not pay what other people deem to be "their fair share", which is, again, a political issue.	We can't give personal legal advice, but we can explain in general terms what the law is. Apparently, the mother, brother and estate are outside the US, in country X. The disposition of the estate follows the laws of X, so you would need an attorney who can practice law in country X. The primary issue is, (1) how are estates probated in X and (2) what provisions, if any, did the deceased(s) make for the disposition of the estate (was there a will; a trust; did one or more parents die intestate?). To simplify matters, we will assume that the laws of X are very similar to US law (which is not uniform – it is state-specific, but broadly similar). In the US, assets can be in a trust and can be directly transferred to a beneficiary. The disposition of the assets may be irrevocable, meaning that the person setting it up can decide who gets what, and then that cannot be changed. It is thus possible that a child could be excluded as a beneficiary of a trust. E.g. the father could set up a trust with just the mother and brother as beneficiaries. The mother may simply have been misinformed as to what the trust document said. Or, there could have been illegal misappropriation of funds, even something as heinous as providing fraudulent documents purporting that an actually living beneficiary is dead. In other words, even though you can't afford a (foreign) attorney, that is realistically the only way to get a clear answer, if the brother is being uncooperative or untruthful.	Who Owns The Bunker? Your relative obviously owns the cellar up to their land property boundary. The people who own the other land would have originally been the owners of that portion of the bunker, assuming that it was not permissive (if it was permissive, an easement by estoppel probably would have arisen). So, then the question is, whether the people in the chain of title to the relative acquired ownership of that portion of the bunker by adverse possession. Normally, adverse possession is acquired when someone occupies land under a claim of right that is open, notorious and hostile. While the use of the bunker would be "hostile" in this case (because the other property owners didn't have access to the bunker), it is not at all clear that it was "open and notorious". Indeed, apparently, the other land owners weren't aware that it existed. So, there would probably not be "squatter's rights" in this situation. Also, adverse possession can't run against the sovereign, so to the extent that the bunker goes under public land (e.g. a public street), that also can't be adversely possessed and that portion of the bunker remains the property of the sovereign land owner. @PaulJohnson in a comment to another post notes that: It sounds like your relative has one of the secret bunkers built for the "Auxiliary Units" who were to wage guerilla war from behind the lines after a successful German invasion. bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-37947840/… If this were the case, and the government authorized its construction, there would probably be an implied easement that would allow the bunker to be the property of the person owning the entry to it, rather than the other property owners. But, as you note, proving that case would be difficult. It might be possible to scour declassified civil defense records from the WWII era to determine if this was the case, but you might need to employ an archivists or historian to get to the bottom of this question. What if they sell it? Suppose that they do sell it. What happens? Since title is certificated in Britain, there would be no title insurance company to compensate the buyer if someone later claimed to own the property. Your relative would have a warranty of title inherent in the deed to the portion of the property that is legally described in the deed (unless the property were sold by a quitclaim deed specifically disavowing any promise that what was sold was owned by the seller), but that warranty would probably not include the portions of the bunker outside the boundaries of their lot because that is not included in the legal description of the property on the property certificate or the deed. So, if it was sold, the buyer might not have any claim against the seller if the buyer did not get good title to the entire bunker, and would have no one to sue at all, if your relatives died before litigation over ownership of the bunker arose. The buyer might sue your relatives for common law fraud if the bunker were described in the marketing materials for the sale, but if they were told that some of the bunker went outside the lot and that its legal status was unknown, or if the property was sold by a quitclaim deed, that suit would probably not be successful. Other Options Depending upon whether the owner is on good terms with his neighbors, the owner could probably buy the subsurface rights or some sort of easement to that property from the neighbors under whose land it runs, and might even be able to purchase such rights from the local council where it runs under a street. Negotiating the price would be tricky. On one hand, it doesn't hurt the other owners at all. On the other hand, they have the power to deprive your relatives of all use of the property. Often deals like this are done for nominal consideration between people on good terms with each other, but for extortionate prices when people are not on good terms with each other.	The co-tenants in any real property are entitled to possess and enjoy the entire property, "unless otherwise". The conveyance might say otherwise (it's on the deed), and it is most likely that you are equal co-owners. You and your brother could take exclusive possession of the property for some period of time, meaning that you can legally exclude your sister from the property during that time – if you all agree to that (I assume you didn't, maybe you did). In that case, your right to possess the property could be contingent on the prior agreement to pay rent (again, I assume there is no such agreement). Your sister also has the same right live in the house without paying rent. She cannot throw you out of your own house if you don't pay rent. The primary question is whether from a legal perspective, you and your brother have exclusive possession of the property, under the laws of your jurisdiction, so in a few jurisdictions you might have to pay rent. That's not the same as "living there".	Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.	Generally speaking, the police will not return property known to be stolen to someone other than the owner of the property, even if it is illegally seized in a search that violates the 4th Amendment. While stolen property is not strictly speaking, contraband, it also isn't something that the person who would seek its return would be entitled to reclaim. This is particularly true when, in a circumstance like this where the motorcycle's ownership can be confirmed with a VIN number on file with a government agency linking the VIN number to the true owner of the vehicle, so the fact that it is stolen can be confirmed with great certainty. If the police do not return the property voluntarily, which they would not do, the person in possession of it would have to bring a suit for possession against the police who are in possession of it. In the face of a civil lawsuit to regain custody of the property from the police after they failed to return it, the police could insist that the true owner be joined to the action and could also raise the issue of unclean hands or similar defenses. A court filing claiming property known to be stolen by someone who is not the true owner would also provide evidence of the stolen property charge that would probably not be tainted "fruit of the poisonous tree" and instead, would be treated as an independent confession to the crime that was dismissed for lack of evidence after the original seizure under the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule.

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