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Re-licensing liability of a work? Assume a person licences a work to the world as of the terms of a licence O . Basically anyone can use the work but must obey terms O . A person takes it and licences it to third person under the terms L which being violate O . Now this other person uses this work commercially without knowing it was actually infringing the actual copyright holder's copyright . Which of the two is liable for infringement and will this another be forced to follow terms of O even if it causes huge loss ? For example someone licences LGPL-licenced work to another person under MIT licence who makes a billion dollar closed source software out of it . Will he be forced to follow LGPL and release source code or refund all sales ? | The origin of a lawsuit will not be a license, but copyright law. Licenses are exemptions from copyright law enforcement. The original author holds the copyright. That person did offer a license O to the third party, but that third party did not take up that offer. Hence, there is a copyright violation, and a cause for a lawsuit. It is up to the original author what might be demanded there, but the usual demand is such suits is for damages. However, it is common practice to settle the case amicably outside the courts by agreeing to the original license O, although this may come with undisclosed extra terms. The problem with a lawsuit is that enforcement of the original license offer O is hard, because copyright law generally does not cover such licensing. The license terms L are mostly irrelevant as that person is not a copyright owner so there is nothing to be licensed. | No, it does not fall under fair use: It is commercial use in nature It is a copyrighted work It is hard to say what portion of the copyrighted work you'd be using based on your description, so test three is inconclusive It could be argued in your favor that the infringement would not have an impact on their potential market, but it could potentially impact the value If discovered the owner of the copyright could pursue action against the company you work for. | It depends on the license the code comes under and whether theres a copyright-assignment requirement for that project. In the case of the Linux kernel, the license is the GPLv2, and there is no copyright assignment requirement - so anyone who can prove ownership of code within the shipped binary (important caveat there - the Linux kernel is configurable, so parts of it can be excluded from the binary) can pursue a claim of copyright infringement if the source code is not distributed according to the license. With the case of things like GCC (until the most recent version), while the project uses the GPL (v3), it also required copyright assignment to the FSF, meaning the original authors do not hold the copyright and thus have no standing to sue (authors rights not-with-standing). They have now dropped this requirement in the latest GCC version, but it stands for older versions. As copyright holder, you have no ability to actually force the binary distributor to comply with the terms of the license - you can merely threaten them with, and pursue, a claim of copyright infringement. In court, you can sue to stop them from infringing further and to pay punitive and actual damages. You may be able to get them to agree to conform with the license terms, but its highly doubtful that a court would agree to force them to conform with the license terms (there has yet to be a copyright-infringement case orientated around open source software that has resulted in a court forcing the infringing company to GPL their own code they were trying to protect by non-compliance). So, to answer your question, theres no actual avenue here which results in you obtaining the source code you have copyright ownership of - the legal actions you can take are ones of stopping infringement and claiming damages. You might be able to come to an out-of-court settlement or a voluntary agreement to provide the code, but court actions will be about stopping the infringement and damages. | Generally not. There is a notion in copyright law called the first-sale doctrine in which after a particular copy of a copyrighted work is legitimately sold, the purchaser can sell, lend, lease, give away, or otherwise dispose of the copy as he sees fit. Copyright does not give the copyright holder exclusive rights to authorize resales. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 for the relevant US law; in other countries the same principle is sometimes called exhaustion of rights. There are limits to the doctrine. In the US, it does not allow for for-profit software rental (for most software) or musical record rentals. Moreover, software companies noticed the part where the doctrine applies to a transfer of title (i.e. an actual sale). If you read a typical software EULA, it is generally quite explicit that the software was licensed to you instead of sold; this is why. Courts in the US have often enforced these provisions (particularly if the license imposes limits like "you can't resell it"); European courts have, as far as I know, been far less willing to accept that argument. However, as a general rule resale is specifically not forbidden by copyright. | Do you have an explicit permission by the artist? Does the artist give a blanket permission to anyone which covers this kind of use of their work (a license)? If no, then you commit a copyright violation when you use their work for your blog. This applies to practically any country which signed the Berne convention which is almost everywhere in the world. Having no commercial interest is usually not an excuse to violate copyright. Regarding which jurisdiction applies when you, your website and the copyright holder are in different countries: I opened a new question about this. | Your title and your question are totally different. If someone pirates a book, makes printed copies, and sells them for profit, that's the point where it switches from plain copyright infringement to being criminal copyright infringement. Which means jail instead of paying damages is possible. If you buy one of these printed copies, not knowing that they have been created illegally, and not being willfully ignorant that the printed copies were created illegal, then you didn't commit copyright infringement yourself. Since you are asking the question, it's obvious that you now know that there was copyright infringement, and buying any more copies would be encouraging copyright infringement with no excuses for you. You can be sued for damages. It is unlikely to happen since suing takes likely more effort than getting any damages from you is worth. The correct thing to do is ask the seller for your money back and destroy the copies. If they don't refund your money you can inform the copyright holder. | We can't really know until the ruling is made. The Supreme Court might issue a ruling that encompasses all software APIs, or may predicate its ruling on this more specific situation, e.g. that because Oracle's library is so extensive its structure can be copyrighted even if that does not necessarily mean that any individual function signature can be copyrighted. They could also decide based on something unrelated to the heart of the copyright question - skimming through the petition for a writ of certiorari, they could make a decision based on the original implied license from Sun, for example. Hopefully their decision will answer the copyright question of function declarations completely, but it isn't required to. | Attribution is not a legal requirement If company A owns IP (copyright and trademarks in this case), they can licence it to company N on whatever terms are mutually acceptable. They may require company N to attribute their IP or they may not. |
Do I have any legal obligation as regards letters sent to my shared household for people who don't live in it any more? I live in a shared house with other people. Many other people used to live here before me (I know only a few of them, but not many). But a lot of mail with their name on is sent here (e.g. from HMRC, grocery stores, ...). Do I (well, we, the current tenants) have any legal obligation to keep them in a safe place, or I can just put them in the recyclable bin? | The Postal Services Act 2000 does not allow you to delay someone else's post: Section 84: 84 Interfering with the mail: general. (1) A person commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, he— (a) intentionally delays or opens a postal packet in the course of its transmission by post ... Section 125(3)(a) defines "transmission by post": a postal packet shall be taken to be in course of transmission by post from the time of its being delivered to any post office or post office letter box to the time of its being delivered to the addressee ... In the case of a postal item put through your letterbox, it has not yet been delivered to the addressee, merely to an address. You have an obligation not to delay the mail, so you can't simply put it in a safe place. You certainly can't cause its destruction (because that delays the mail permanently: it will never be delivered). The best thing to do is to follow Royal Mail's advice: If you’ve received mail which has your address, but not your name, this is because we deliver to addresses rather than names. If this does happen, you can put a cross through the address and write 'Not known at this address' or 'No longer lives here' and put it back in a letterbox. Where possible, we’ll return the item to the sender hopefully allowing them to update their records That way, you have done everything you can not to delay its delivery, and you have alerted the sender that their records need updating. | You are allowed to sublet the whole of the premises but not part of it (VIII a); if you do you must create the agreement mentioned, pay to have it stamped by the government and pay £10 + VAT to the landlord. You must only use the premises as a domicile for one family; better make sure you rent those rooms to your cousins. | You did not mention the country where you are, but this sounds like a very bad idea. Any working "glitter bomb" will be a low-grade bomb and setting one of those is extremely illegal. If you know when the next parcel will arrive, my advice would be to arrange for a credlible witness and to take pictures of the parcel before you open it any further. Then report the damage to the sender. If it was a commercial parcel, ask for a full refund. Enough of that and the postal inspectors will wonder why their machines are "damaging" so much mail. | I just put in for a transfer to another location my company has there and will transfer back to my original location when we move back. I don't believe I should have to go and change my state of residency, drivers license, car registration/plates, insurance etc) since I consider where I am now my permanent home. It's just a temporary relocation. While this arguably works for the common law concept of domicile, as a practical matter, if you live someplace for the majority of a year, and often more than 30 days, you are considered to reside there. You should change your driver's license, car registration/plates, insurance, voter's registration, etc., unless there is an extremely compelling reason to do otherwise, and not just different tax rates and more bureaucratic inconvenience. A planned three year stay doesn't cut it, especially, if you don't own a home or have a residential lease on a residence in the state you want to claim as your residence. The main exceptions would be someone who is in an institutional setting, such as attending college residentially for nine months a year while supported by their parents, in a prison, or in military service, where different conventions sometimes apply. Legally, could I leave everything as is since the apartment "technically?" isn't mine (I'd just be staying there with her? No. Residency and who owns or leases the place where you are living are two entirely different things. The many people who don't have a lease or own a home are still residents of the places where they live. For that matter, even if you are not a citizen of the U.S., you can still be a resident of a particular state or locality. I'd be filing my taxes as someone that commutes out of state to work and residing in their current home state etc. Nope. For state income tax purposes, you reside in the state where you sleep a majority of the nights in a year. There are sometimes more complicated rules that apply to apportion income between states, but that is the strong general rule. Is there anything I'm missing/not aware of that would make this a bad idea? Or is this a normal thing people do commonly and I'm overthinking it. This is a bad idea and not a normal thing that people do commonly. At a minimum, it will leave you with bureaucratic tangles and at risk of serious state tax audits (which, reading between the lines, seems like the most plausible reason you are thinking about this approach). At worst, you could be exposed to liability for having improper tax payments and car insurance in place, and potential criminal liability for misrepresenting your residence. It might not end up coming to a head and being a problem, but the probability that it will is significant. | The emails both are and are not hearsay If the landlord seeks to use them as evidence that you did the things stated in the emails, that’s hearsay. However, if he seeks to use them as evidence that he received complaints about you, that’s not hearsay. Notwithstanding, this is no doubt a hearing in a tenancy tribunal or small-claims court - strict rules of evidence generally don’t apply in those. The emails are therefore likely something that will be admissible even if they are hearsay. | Just think of the subtenant cum owner as two separate people with two separate roles. Tenant = T Subtenant = ST Old owner = OO New Owner = NO The rights of the tenant vis-avis the new owner will be informed by the lease and the local laws. Generally, if the sale happens in the middle of the existing lease, the NO is obligated by the terms, as is the T. NO cannot just kick T out, and T cannot just break the lease. The lease may say what could happen and local laws will apply. Likewise, ST has whatever contract with T that previously existed. Pretend NO and ST are different people. If T owes NO $1000 per month, and ST owes T $400 a month, that continues even though ST and NO are the same person. Depends on what kind of dispute. See above. All contracts continue, subject to whatever the lease with the original owner and the subtenancy agreement say abut modifying or breaking the lease and sublease. Local laws apply. Note, if the subtenancy was "off the books" or was done when not allowed by the original owner, and if it was not in a place that the local law says owners cannot deny subleasing, then tenant might not have any protection. ST, now that he is owner could just move out and stop paying. On the other hand, even if he is the owner, he cannot just say "I am the owner now, so I am moving back in for free" because the original lease gave the tenant use of the whole property. But ST could just drop out because T always owed OO, and now NO, the full rent. Do you mean if rather than sublease, they were both on the original lease? Interesting, but just imagine it as the obligations before the sale = the obligations after the sale. I don't know though. There are some tax implications for an owner occupied rental. | No. Refusing to tell the address alone is not a reason to detain somebody. But there are situations where the authorities can demand that a person identifies himself or herself, including such details as the address (or lack of a permanent residency). In such a situation, failure to identify yourself can get you locked up. Also, the tone of your posting seems to question the legitimacy of the UK government and legal system as a whole. That is a box you're putting yourself into, and the company you find there is not very pleasant. | I did not write "confidential" on my letter, but I assumed a business proposal is automatically considered as a confidential material. An incorrect assumption unfortunately. Unless you have a confidentiality agreement (NDA) with the first company, they and their agents are not under any legal obligation to keep information you share with them confidential. How is the legal situation here? There is none on your side. You lied about a direct question asked and were caught in the lie. Company A had no obligation to keep what you sent confidential. Even if they did, that may not (depending on how the confidentiality agreement is worded) keep the employee of company A stating that they had received the same proposal. Chalk this one up to a lesson on confidentiality and honesty in business. There are no reasonable assumptions of confidentiality in business unless you specifically state that they are confidential or are provided as part of a confidentiality agreement. |
What law makes a Movie "Nicht Feiertagsfrei"? Top Gun, Life of Brian and Heidi (2001) don't seem to have anything in common, but in Germany they are all declared "Nicht Feiertagsfrei" and may not be shown in a cinema on some days. Among them is the Friday before Easter (Karfreitag), Volkstrauertag (14th November), and Buß- und Bettag (17th November). It is the FSK that declares a movie "Nicht Feiertragsfrei", but what legal basis do they have? | Federal law protecting public holidays This explains that this has been the law since 1952 when the FRG was granted autonomy following World War 2. They are films that contradict the "serious nature" of these holidays and which are to be feared that they violate "religious and moral feelings", according to the guideline of the FSK . Which holidays fall into the category is a matter for the states, which films fall into the category is a matter for the Federal FSK. As social attitudes have changed, fewer and fewer films are categorised as Nicht Feiertragsfrei; over 60% were in the 1950s, less than 1% were in the 2010s. | One reason could be because of the scènes à faire doctrine. Many of the things you notice as similarities are not infringement. I don't know the counts of lawsuits for music infringement vs screenwriting infringement. There may just be more songs than screenplays. Screenwriters/producers do get sued, though. See Cinar Corporation v. Robinson 2012 SCC 25. | I'm pretty sure in France you have moral rights and copyrights. I am writing from New Zealand, but we have some similar intellectual property laws due to being member countries of the World Intellectual Property Organisation. We are also both member countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO has the TRIPS agreement which relates to IP). So my answer may or may not be right – check what it says in France's copyright acts: you should be able to search for terms like first owner, and moral rights, films/videos, etc. The school isn't your employer, and so the basic rule is that you as the author are automatically the first owner. Since you're not really at school to create anything or research for the school, I don't think the court would enforce a blanket term that you had to agree to that the school owns intellectual property in what you create. You probably own the copyright. You also have moral rights in what you have created, which means even if the school does own the copyright in your work, you can request they attribute it to you if they show it in public (online). Not all works have moral rights. However, in NZ if you create a film/video you do have moral rights in it. | Such an image is copyrighted, as part of the movie. You cannot legally use it without permission from the copyright holder, unless the use of the image falls under fair use (note that fair use is a strictly US legal concept. It does not apply anywhere else) or a similar exception to copyright, such as "fair dealing". There are multiple factors which must be considered in making a fair use judgement. No one factor ever totally controls the decision. It is a case-by-case decision. But several things about your proposed use suggest to me that it will not qualify as a fair use. The image is part of a creative work, not a work of non-fiction such as a news report or a textbook. That weighs against fair use. You seem to be using the whole image, although it is only part of the movie. That probably weighs against fair use to some extent. A use in "a social media post regarding a sales vacancy" sounds commercial to me. If so, that would weigh against fair use. The copyright owner might well wish to market images from the film. If so, and if many people used images from the film as you propose to use this one, that might harm the market. This weighs against fair use. You don't seem to be making any comment on the image, or using it in any significantly transformational way. That weighs against fair use. Use of the image does not seem vital or even important to the message you intend to communicate. That also weighs against fair use. In short, I think you would be wiser to use an image that you have or can get permission to use in this way. If you use this image, it is possible that the copyright holder would sue for copyright infringement, or issue a DMCA take-down notice, or both. | It is not decided whether such, in areas, filming can be prohibited. In a "public forum", First Amendment rights are maximally protected, and this includes filing (Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 in particular §A(1) for a summary of the law on this question). In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 the court refined public forum doctrine to distinguish quintessential, limited, and nonpublic fora. In a nonpublic forum, the government may "reserve the forum for its intended purposes": but, such a reservation must be viewpoint-neutral. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 states that "The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time". In a nonpublic forum, demonstrations can be forbidden, especially when demonstrations are incompatible with the purpose of the forum (example: military bases). The particular question you raise has not ended up in court. One may be tempted to reason that First Amendment rights can be arbitrarily curtailed in a non-public forum, but such a restriction would have to have appropriate justification – the restriction would be subject to strict scrutiny. Simply saying "We don't want people filming inside the holding area" is not a valid justification. But, the police are not required to announce their legal argument in advance. If you get busted and film, and they make you stop, you can sue for violation of your First Amendment rights. Your attorney would then need to make a good argument that this restriction is to be subject to strict scrutiny, and that it fails. | Germany If we actually talk about criminal law, your question is answered by §§ 1 and 2 StGB (the German penal code) – official but of course not binding translation: § 1 [No punishment without law] An act may only be punished if criminal liability had been established by law before the act was committed. § 2 [Jurisdiction ratione temporis; lex mitior] (1) The penalty and any ancillary measures shall be determined by the law which is in force at the time of the act. (2) If the penalty is amended during the commission of the act, the law in force at the time the act is completed shall be applied. (3) If the law in force at the time of the completion of the act is amended before judgment, the most lenient law shall be applied. (4) A law intended to be in force only for a determinate time shall be continued to be applied to acts committed while it was in force even after it ceases to be in force, unless otherwise provided by law. (5) Subsections (1) to (4) shall apply mutatis mutandis to confiscation, deprivation and destruction. (6) Unless otherwise provided by law, measures of rehabilitation and incapacitation shall be determined according to the law in force at the time of the decision. (Note that the last section has been voided in part by the Federal Constitutional Court but this is not relevant here.) which is a legal principle given by the German constitution, in particular by Article 103 para. 2: An act may be punished only if it was defined by a law as a criminal offence before the act was committed. To answer your specific questions with the above rules in mind: The law you are sued for is deleted while your process is going In that case you would not be punished. The law you are sued for is deleted before a case is raised against you (what you did was illegal while you did it) Same answer, you would not be punished. The law you are sued for is deleted after your process is finished (could you question the judgement?) You are out of luck. Only if there would be a new decision for an unrelated reason, your punishment would be taken back. There is a new law while your process is going The new law has no relevance at all. There is a new law after your process is finished (could you question the judgement?) Again, no relevance to your case. In another areas of the law the answers to your questions could actually be different but there would be too many cases to consider for a comprehensive answer. | According to a blog post (written by a lawyer who actually has had multiple people ask about that), it depends on several things. The gist is that they're not getting away with this "brilliant plan" unless they take so many steps to make it look legitimate that it will, in fact, become a legitimate porn production enterprise — in which case, why bother with the ruse in the first place? To find you guilty of prostitution, a jury would have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that you were guilty of prostitution and not just making porn. But putting a camera in the room doesn't necessarily make it First-Amendment-protected porn; sometimes it just means you're giving them evidence of your crime. Since juries can differ, there's not really a bright line. But some things look bad to judges and juries. If the director is also doing sexual acts in the film, that looks bad. If he's also never directed or acted in porn before, that looks bad. If a person in the film is paying for the "actresses" instead of getting paid for "acting", that looks very bad; see United States v. Roeder, 526 F.2d 736, 737 (10th Cir. 1975). Having an actual script, on the other hand, may look good. Keep in mind that if the film is not just pornographic but actually obscene, obscenity laws could still apply even if you convince them it isn't prostitution. The First Amendment does not protect obscene materials. Additionally, if you claim it's porn, you will need to properly keep records of the names (and all former names/aliases) and dates of birth of your "actors" and "actresses", unless you want to be guilty of a federal felony. This includes making a copy of their photo ID. The records must also made available for inspection by the Attorney General and his inspectors for a minimum of 20 hours per week, with no advance notice given by them. Is everyone involved really going to be OK with all of this - especially since the law specifically notes that the records may be used as evidence in a federal obscenity prosecution? | You have four questions. This made me wonder, do the laws of war say anything about misinformation or psychological warfare? Yes, a little. Mostly in the form of specific prohibitions. Is it e.g. a war crime to claim that the political or military leaders of the country you are at war with have ordered their troops to surrender, in order to mislead those troops? No, not as far as I could find. Is it a war crime to lie about the actions and declared intentions of your enemy to motivate your own troops? No, as far as I could find. Is there in fact anything that binds a country at war to factual representation of their own and their enemy's actions, declarations, capabilities and intentions? Yes, but only in a very limited context; indeed, misinformation is explicitly allowed, under the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Article 37, Section 2, which states that "ruses of war" that do not rely upon the protections of the Convention to succeed, including "he use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation" are explicitly allowed. Some prohibited ruses include feigning protected status(non-combatant, surrendering, neutral party, United Nations, sick/wounded), feigning neutral status*, or feigning being part of the enemy*. (Source, ibid, Article 39). *Except when conducted as part of naval combat operations(which have their own traditions, and generally allow pretending to be the enemy for purposes of transit, escape, etc. but require to fly one's true colors before taking offensive actions, as well as honoring surrender), and espionage (which is generally treated as a "crime" rather than an "act of war" under international law, when one is not wearing the uniform of one's own forces). |
Are the title and author of a song protected by copyright? I am developing a platform where users can search songs by BPM and Key. The only thing that came to my mind is: can I show songs' titles and authors after the user does a search, without violating the copyright of the song and its author? The platform is a commercial project, so I'm earning money through users' monthly subscriptions to the website. I am not earning money from the songs themselves, since I'm showing just the title, author, BPM, and key of the song, without letting the user reproduce it or listen to it in any way. I know songs' titles do not have copyright, but does the combination of song title + author have it? | Facts cannot be copyrighted. Such a project does not violate copyright law, and if you're in the United States, it is protected by the First Amendment. | Musical compositions can be, and if recent almost always are, protected by copyright. This is separate from the copyright on a recording of a performance of the work. If you reuse a musical passage, the new work may be a derivative work, that is a work based on an earlier work. Or an extended musical quotation could be considered to be copyright infringement. If this is in the united-states the use of a section from a previous work might be considered to be a fair use (fair-use). This is a specifically US concept in copyright law, although several other countries have a concept of fair dealing which is somewhat similar, although narrower. Whether a use is a fair use is an inherently fact-based determination. There is no clear and simple bright line for what is and is not a fair use. US law (17 USC 197) specifies four factors which are to be weighed by a court in considering the matter: The purpose and character of the use. If your use is commercial that weighs against fair use, but does not at all preclude it. This factor also includes whether the use is transformative or not. A transformative use is one that takes the part used for a very different sort of purpose than the original. Parodies are normally transformative, for example. A quote for purposes of commentary and analysis, or criticism is normally transformative. Transformative uses are more likely to be considered fair uses. The nature of the copyrighted work. Creative works such as fiction and music are more strongly protected than works such as textbooks and news stories. This probably weighs against fair use in the case described. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. If only a short section of a longer work is used, that weighs in favor of fair use. However very short quotes can still fail, to be held to be fair uses. In Harper vs Nation a quote of about 300 words from a 500 page book was held not to be fair use because it was "the heart of the book". The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. A use that significantly harms the market value of the original, or serves as a replacement for it, weigh strongly against fair use. This was a major factor in Harper vs Nation. Each case of claimed fair use is evaluated by looking at all four factors, and the specific facts of the case. From the description in the question, such a use might well be held to be fair use. Musical quotations often are. But there is no way to be sure unless a court evaluates the specific case. A lawyer specifically experienced in not only copyright law, but copyrights on music, might be able to give more specific advice. Or you could, of course, seek permission from the copyright holder, quite likely the original composer or artist. If you get permission, there is no further issue. There might be a charge, but when the use is minor, and has no commercial effect, the charge might be small or even zero provided that the source is acknowledged. | In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage. | No, it's still copyright infringement. When you modify a copyrighted work in any way, you generate a derivative work which you are not allowed to distribute without the permission of the original copyright holder. | No, copyright absolutely does not protect anything "novel" or anything related to algorithms or generally anything functional at all. Copyright only protects your "expressed representation of a creative work". Other people can duplicate your work with a different "expression" and not be infringing on copyright. And if there is nothing creative in your work then it's not even eligible for copyright in the first place. For example, if you figure out how to sort an array with fewer computational steps than what anybody else is doing then that is functional code, not creative code, and anybody can reverse engineer/duplicate your sorting algorithm. However, patents do provide the protection you're looking for. If you want to protect your fancy algorithm then apply for a patent. Patents expire an order of magnitude sooner than copyright, but they are the only means of legally protecting this type of intellectual property. Unlike copyright, patent protection is only available if you apply for it, and it has to be approved by the relevant government department in your country (although you can start using the patented technology before approval has gone through). | It is not possible to say that this is generally fair use, although sometimes it would be. A copy for personal use is still a copyright right violation on its face, and fair use does not categorically exclude non-commercial or personal use of copyrighted works. It is a highly fact specific inquiry. The likelihood of anyone discovering that you have done so and deciding to sue over it is slight, but that doesn't mean that there isn't potential copyright infringement liability. Compare this to speeding. People do it all the time, and even driving one mile per hour above the speed limit is still a traffic violation. But it is rare for less serious violations to be ticketed. | Copyright protection exists for any work (picture, paragraph, song etc), and persists for many years until it expires. Unless the work was created a long time ago, or was created by the US government (not the same as "funded by government money"), you should assume that the work is protected. That means that you must have permission to copy it. Sometimes, a work has associated with it some such permission, in the form of a "license". Without such a license, you have to request the copyright owner for permission to copy – whether or not they say that the work is protected by copyright (because by law it is protected, so they don't have to say that it is). If you request permission to copy, and do not receive the required permission, then you cannot legally copy the work. The copyright holder has no obligation to explicitly deny permission. You can certainly list the URL for an image, you just cannot copy the image in your book. | You probably can. There are a few questions here. First, is the message protected by copyright? In general, it probably is, but there are many exceptions that might allow you to use it without permission. Unfortunately, these exceptions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The exceptions tend to allow the use of small excerpts of a work for various sorts of purposes that don't undermine the copyright holder's ability to profit. That leads to the second question, which is why you are using that message. If you're including it in your source code so you can test whether a message generated at run time is in fact that message, that's one thing, and it's probably okay. On the other hand, if the owner of the copyright sells a database of all its message strings, and you're compiling a similar database that you also intend to sell, that's probably not okay. A third question concerns the Firefox license terms. It's entirely possible that they allow you explicitly to do what you're considering, in which case it doesn't matter what copyright law says about it. On the other hand, Firefox is open source software, and under some open source licenses, if you incorporate any of the source code in your own product, you are required to release your product's source code under the same license. If you're not already planning to do that, you should consider carefully whether including that error message would trigger that provision (if there is one) of Firefox's open source license. |
Gorilla glue, when does a court decide to permit a trial If a plaintiff brings a civil suit against another party (aka say the Gorilla glue hair suit), what role does the court play in whether to permit a trial, how has that role changed over the decades, and are there large inconsistencies between federal judicial districts? Federal, as I believe this type of suit would be brought there. I understand and know that a suit can be thrown out, but how far can a court judge a case before trial? And do lawyers pick certain courts where they believe their odds are better? | If a plaintiff brings a civil suit against another party (aka say the Gorilla glue hair suit), what role does the court play in whether to permit a trial, how has that role changed over the decades, and are there large inconsistencies between federal judicial districts? Federal, as I believe this type of suit would be brought there. I understand and know that a suit can be thrown out, but how far can a court judge a case before trial? And do lawyers pick certain courts where they believe their odds are better? In the Gorilla Glue case that possible plaintiff resides and the injury occurred in Louisiana. The Gorilla Glue Company is based in Ohio. There are two basic plausible claims: a product liability claim against the manufacturer, and a breach of warranty claim against whomever sold the good to the customer. If sued, the immediate retail seller could bring in the person who sold it to them (perhaps a wholesaler) who could in turn bring in the person who sold it to them (perhaps a manufacturer), in a chain of breach of warranty claims. Depending upon the facts, one or the other defendant may have deeper pockets, and the elements of the legal claim for breach of warranty and for products liability aren't precisely the same. Neither claim requires a showing of true negligence on the part of a defendant, just a showing that the product was defective or that there was a failure to warn. But that doesn't mean that establishing liability is easier in either case either. Also, while the plaintiff's claims wouldn't be negligence claims, the concept of "comparative fault" under Louisiana or Ohio law (a choice of law question for the trial court to decide as to particular issues) means that sufficient negligence of a plaintiff could overcome the suit as well. Usually though, negligence issues are reserved for a jury and not something for a judge to decide. This case there would be two possible state court forums: The state court of general jurisdiction where the injury occurred which is in Louisiana. The state court of general jurisdiction where the defendant is located, which is in Hamilton County, Ohio. Since the plaintiff and Gorilla Glue maker defendant are from different states, if they are the only defendants, the suit could also be brought in federal court in either location in the first place, or could be removed to federal court from whichever state court it is brought in (assuming that the Louisiana court has jurisdiction over the Gorilla Glue maker, which it probably would but isn't entirely certain). However, the store in Louisiana that sold the product could also be sued for breach of warranty, and if that was done in a Louisiana state court, the case could not be removed to federal court by the Ohio based defendant since there is not "complete diversity of citizenship" and the Plaintiff's case do not arise under federal law. Bringing the case in Louisiana would be more convenient for the plaintiff. But procedural and substantive law issues factor into choice of forum for the plaintiff as well. Louisiana under the the Louisiana Products Liability Act has a doctrine known as the reasonably anticipated use doctrine that is more restrictive than many other states in its product liability jurisprudence. So, the Plaintiff may prefer to sue in Ohio and to apply Ohio law where the substantive law may be more favorable, even if it means foregoing a chance to sue the retail store that sold the product. Even if an Ohio court applied Louisiana, rather than Ohio law, getting access to the internal records of the Gorilla Glue company to determine what the company actually anticipated in terms of user use of the product could be critical. As explained by @bdb484 there are two stages at which a case might be thrown out by a judge prior to trial (and more than 90% of cases settle prior to trial). One is a motion to dismiss, governed by Rule 12 in federal court, and the other is a motion for summary judgment, governed by Rule 56 in federal court. The standard for a motion for summary judgment is essentially the same in state and federal court. If a defendant can show by affidavit in a motion brought after some opportunity for pre-trial compulsory exchange of documents and depositions that the facts necessary for that defendant to win under the law are present, and the other side can't present sworn evidence or authenticated documents contradicting that argument, then the case against that defendant is dismissed. But the facts that are established must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party defending the motion for summary judgment. The earlier stage, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 in federal practice, shows more variation between state and federal practice. A motion to dismiss is a "so what?" motion. If everything said in the complaint is true, does the defendant still win (jurisdiction can also be disputed at this stage). But the standard in federal court under a fairly recently announced standard known as Twombly changing a long standing interpretation of Rule 12, is that a case can be dismissed if the complaint doesn't state a "plausible claim for relief" based upon the non-conclusory facts of the complaint asserted to be true and not merely speculated to be true based upon "information and belief". As this law review article explains: Conley v. Gibson, decided in 1957, required only that the complaint allege facts that could conceivably support a claim for relief—a lenient notice-pleading standard that allowed marginal lawsuits to survive to later stages of litigation in the hope that later-discovered facts would salvage the claim (355 U.S. 41 (1957)). A half century later, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court announced a more demanding approach—plausibility pleading—which requires the plaintiff to allege facts that give rise to a plausible entitlement to relief (550 U.S. 544 (2007); 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). Since a Rule 12 motion is decided before the parties engage in the mandatory exchange of documents and depositions of witnesses prior to trial called discovery, the plaintiff often lacks inside information that the other party has which is damaging to their case and which the plaintiff can't get without discovery or a mole in the other side's organization. This is a big deal in a product liability case where internal memos might show an awareness of a risk of a problem like the one that happened. For decades prior to the Twombly case, a motion to dismiss would be granted only if it was impossible that the someone could win the case if the allegations of the Complaint were true, even if some of those facts were based upon guesswork of things that might be true. Some states retain the older standard, or some other standard entirely, or have ways that a plaintiff can compel information from the other side prior to filing suit. Ohio's state courts use the old and more lenient motion to dismiss standard, which makes the Ohio state court potentially an attractive forum if it could be secured. But it would be harder to avoid diversity of citizenship in Ohio so it would probably be able to remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441, even though if it was an Ohio company sued in Ohio state court. This is because the Ohio court wouldn't have jurisdiction over a retail vender of the product. (Another way to avoid diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and federal court would be to limit the dollar amount of the claim to under $75,000.) Procedurally Louisiana with roots in French rather than English law as a foundation, but influenced by contract with other U.S. states for a couple of centuries, has the most divergent civil procedure rules in the U.S., so it is hard for me as a non-Louisiana lawyer, to evaluate the procedural issues in that forum. | A federal court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte (i.e. without a request to do so from a party) if it is beyond its subject matter jurisdiction (a category of defenses including lack of standing) or fails to state a claim for relief on its face. A Motion to Dismiss filed in the case provides a roadmap for the judge to dismiss the entire case. It argues in essence: A Texas federal court can't assert jurisdiction over Georgia defendants. A federal court can't entertain claims against state officials in their official capacities for the kind of relief requested. The plaintiffs lack standing to sue. Subject matter jurisdiction defenses (and lack of personal jurisdiction defenses) are also not barred from being raised later in a motion to vacate the judgment, by a default judgment. The Texas federal court can also sanction parties for filing frivolous claims by, for example, awarding all of the costs and attorney fees incurred by the defendants against the party bringing the suit in a motion requesting that relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 against the parties and/or their attorney. I would not be surprised if the Plaintiffs' attorney in this case, Paul M. Davis, was disbarred and bankrupted by it. Class action lawsuits can't proceed as such until certified by the court. Furthermore, a summons has to be personally hand delivered with a complaint to be served in a way that is sufficient to result in an entry of a default judgment, even if the complaint is otherwise valid. This is unlikely to have occurred in all 600+ cases. There are several instances in which a "clerk's default" has been entered, but that simply indicates that a return of service (even if facially defective) was filed by the Plaintiff and that the number of days set forth in the summons for a response has lapsed. In contrast, prior to entering a default judgment, which must be done by a judge, the judge must review the complaint to determine if the court has jurisdiction over the case and if a valid legal claim is stated in the complaint. | There is a saying that you can't sue city hall: that is applicable here. Governments enjoy sovereign immunity, and cannot be sued for their errors of judgment unless they specifically allow it. Safety regulations are an example of a situation where the government hold all of the power and shoulders none of the responsibility. If a government forbids sale or use of a substance on some grounds (could be safety, could be economic impact, could be something about preventing the moral decay of society), and the grounds later turns to be false, you cannot sue the government because of lost business opportunities. Generally speaking, that which is not prohibited is allowed, so there would have to be an affirmative duty for the government to prevent all forms of harm. If there were such a legal duty, there is a miniscule legal foundation for suing the government for shirking its duty. That is not a completely hypothetical possibility, in that the state of Washington imposes a constitutional duty on the legislature to provide public education, and the Supreme Court has done things to enforce this duty (the contempt of court fines are up in the realm of $80 million). Since there is no jurisdiction that imposes a duty on the government to absolutely prevent all harm, you won't be able to sue the government if they fail to outlaw a thing that is eventually proven to harm someone. | No There is some room for change of venue from, say, one county to another, or one municipality to another, within the same state. In certain circumstances this may even be constitutionally required. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (U.S. 1966) ("where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity"). But, there's no mechanism to move a state criminal trial to another state. A cousin of the scenario you're talking about is where D has committed crimes in multiple states. In such a situation the prosecutors from different states (and also the federal system) may meet and co-ordinate their strategies, and part of that will be deciding who charges what and who goes first. An example of this is the DC sniper case, which I remember pretty vividly because I grew up in the area. The Maryland and Virginia prosecutors reached an agreement to try them in Virginia first, and second in Maryland. | This would be virtually impossible to do from scratch. If you had the guidance of someone who successfully pursued a similar legal action it might be possible. In theory you should be able to pursue grievances in court by becoming well versed in the applicable laws and rules, having impeccable attention to detail, exceptional deductive and writing skills, and getting lucky enough to run your filings through patient clerks who will tell you every time you're missing something or doing something wrong. New York Courts even offer this encouraging CourtHelp website for pro se guidance on common actions. But if you really want to attempt a pro se civil action, especially against a government entity, or other entity with essentially unlimited legal funds, you not only need all of the above but also some sort of assistance from somebody who knows the system. I would spend as much time looking for sympathetic advocacy groups and lawyers offering pro bono service as I would reading relevant law and procedure. (One more thing: The word "quick" is never used in conjunction with formal legal actions, except in jest ;) | The US Supreme Court only has jurisdiction in federal matters. So if someone is suing under federal law, or there is a constitutional question, the Supreme Court is the place to go for a definitive answer. However, states have their own laws. The Supreme Court cannot tell New York that it must apply the attractive nuisance doctrine, as it is neither a matter of federal law nor a constitutional matter. New York is free to make its own laws on the subject, and the New York courts are free to interpret those laws as they see fit. In fact, federal courts are required to defer to New York's interpretation if New York's laws apply to the case, even if the case is in federal court for some reason (like diversity of parties.) See the Erie doctrine (which, coincidentally, involves yet another case about railroad injuries.) | Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent. | There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence. |
If someone does not comply with law because of lack of rescources or lack of ability? If a person in general is required to do a complete task A or a bussiness is required to provide a service to its customers under the law . There is no specific law being refered to but all this is general . If the person or business is unable to comply because of lack of funds or inability or lack of skill to perform the test given or the task A will they be punished ? Assume they caused no serious harm in the process and the punishment included imprisonment and fine .. | The general rule is that you must comply with all laws. The first thing that means is that you are required to know what the law is, thus ignorance of the law is not a defense for not complying. There are some special circumstances regarding notice, so a law must have been published. Second, whatever the law requires you to do, you have to do it, regardless of any difficulty you might encounter (e.g. you have to pay your taxes even if you don't have enough money). Suppose that a law is so onerous that it is literally impossible to obey it: you still have to obey the law. You have to file a lawsuit against the government challenging the constitutionality of the law, to get the law overturned. Frequently, more requirements are imposed on businesses than on individuals, but there is no legal difference between impositions on individuals and impositions on businesses in terms of laws being difficult to comply with. | State law may provide for criminal prosecution for vandalism, which could result in a fine or even imprisonment. The state can prosecute you, private individuals cannot. Fines imposed by a private organization are only enforceable through contracts, where damages could be recovered, but penalties cannot be assessed. ("Late fees" are in the class of "liquidated damages", where the agreement says what the late fee is – they don't just make up a number). Ga. Code § 44-3-223 does require you to "comply with all lawful provisions of the property owners' association instrument", but if it isn't in the instrument, you do not have to comply. | Preface and Caveats The question doesn't specify where this happened. I am providing an outline of the way that most U.S. states would handle this situation, if the fats are as they are much more likely to be and not as claimed in the question probably due to a misunderstanding of the underlying transaction. I identify areas where state laws most often vary and don't describe those areas of the law in detail since that is impossible without knowing where this happens. This is a matter of state law and varies from state to state, although most U.S. states are quite similar until you get to the fine details. Atypical language in the contract between the contractor and the client could also lead to a different conclusion. I don't know how this would be resolved in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. Background: The Structure Of A Typical Construction Loan Financed Construction Project In business and contractual disputes you can only understand the answer if you understand the underlying business transaction, which the question itself doesn't spell out very fully. The fact pattern identified in the question is so unusual that I strongly suspect that there is a misunderstanding of the facts, or an inadvertent misstatement in the language used in the question due to sloppy writing that flows from not appreciating the importance of some key facts. The transaction was almost surely structures more or less as follows (for background, I'm presenting a more general very of this kind of transaction rather than the simple one with no subcontractors or material suppliers involved, because this context helps someone understand why the laws are written the way that they are written.) Usually, the client owns real property, takes out a construction loan from a bank secured by the real estate, and hires a general contractor. The client will usually make some down payment to the general contractor who will take care of paying the subcontractors and material suppliers, and will pay the balance of the amount due to the general contractor through proceeds of the construction loan disbursed by the bank which are drawn as the work is done and payment is earned. Typically, each drawn cycle, which is often monthly for a smaller project and weekly, biweekly or semimonthly in a larger project, materials suppliers and subcontractors submit invoices and lien waivers to the general contractor based upon the work done. If the work is complete, a complete lien waiver is submitted, if he work in only partially finished, a partial lien waiver is submitted. The general contractor substantively reviews the invoices based upon a physical review of the construction site and a review of the subcontract. If there are problems it is rejected and must be resubmitted by the material supplier or subcontractor. If it is approved, the general contractor attaches that invoice as a supporting document to a draw request for the draw cycle summarizing all validly submitted invoices from material suppliers, subcontractors and itself, and also attaching a partial lien waiver from the general contractor. Then, the general contractor submits that draw request to a bank officer handling the construction loan as an agent of the property owner-client, and also a client representative for approval. The bank officer and client representative make a much less probing review of the draw request, looking only for obvious irregularities or suspicious amounts, and if everything is in order, they approve the request. Then, the bank write a check in the draw amount approved to the general contractor. The general contractor then disburses the invoiced amounts to the materials materials suppliers and subcontractors and pays itself the amounts that it has earned. Sometimes, however, the general contractor gets a valid invoice from a material supplier or subcontractor, and receives funds from the client in the form of a downpayment or a loan draw, but doesn't pay the subcontractor or material supplier with those funds. Also, sometimes, the general contractor does work that it is entitled to be paid for or incurs an obligation to a material supplier or subcontractor, but the client doesn't pay or the bank doesn't disburse the funds requested even though the request is valid. When a general contractor, material supplier or subcontractor doesn't get paid for work that is actually done at a particular piece of real estate, the law gives the firm that wasn't paid for its work on that particular piece of real estate what is called a mechanic's lien encumbering that piece of real estate. The details of how a firm with a mechanic's lien gives notice to the world of its rights, the priorities of lien's vis-a-vis each other, and the way that mechanic's liens are enforced varies significantly from state to state. But typically the notice must be given very promptly and not long after notice of non-payment is given, a lawsuit to foreclose on the real estate encumbered by the lien is commenced. An unpaid material supplier or subcontractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the general contractor for breach of contract, and sometimes also for misappropriation of disbursements from the client or the bank. An unpaid general contractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the owner of the property for breach of contract. The Facts In The Question and Analysis The first paragraph of the question tells us what went wrong. The client paid an employee of the general contractor (probably a project manager) instead of the firm the employee worked for (basically embezzling the money by deceiving the client into thinking that the employee was authorized to receive a payment to the employee's firm on its behalf when that wasn't the case), and the firm of the employee who was paid now wants to get paid. This happens and lawsuits usually follows when it does. But exactly what happens next depends upon the facts in the next to paragraphs. The next two paragraphs of the question, however, are probably confused and incorrect. The next two paragraphs say: Two weeks later, the client received a letter from the contractor's lender asking the client for money owed to the contractor, saying that if it was not paid, the client could be double charged. Does the client owe the contractor's lender? What probably actually happened is that the finance office of the contractor submitted a draw request to the bank officer in charge of the client's construction loan with the bank, and also gave a notice of the draw request to the client. The client tells the bank officer not to approve the draw request because the client has already paid the draw request directly to the employee of the contractor (probably the project manager) without the knowledge of the firm the employee worked for. What Happens Next If The Facts Are As I Believe Them To Be? When this happens, the finance officer at the contractor firm talks to the client figures out what happens and then talks to the employee to whom the payment was made. If the employee promptly turns over the funds the the contractor firm, the finance officers at the contractor firm scolds the employee for screwing up the system and the client for making a payment to the wrong person and there is no harm, no foul, and the matter is over. But if the employee who took the client's money doesn't turn over the money which the client can prove to the contractor firm that he paid to the employee, several things are likely to happen. Non-Lawsuit Actions: The client will direct the bank not to pay the draw request. The employee who took the money from the client is fired (no big deal, he was probably long gone). The contractor firm and/or the client will often, but not always, report to the police that the employee embezzled the funds from the client, and if the police find it credible, will issue an arrest warrant. The main reason not to do so is that the facts are uncertain enough that the police and prosecutor don't want to touch it (e.g. the client paid the employee in cash and didn't get a receipt, or the employee when asked says that the payment was made but was a "tip" or was payment for something unrelated), or the client and/or the contractor firm don't want to harm their reputations by making public the fact that there was a theft on this job. Three lawsuits could be brought, although, in practice, these might be consolidated as claims against different parties and cross-claims between defendants, in a lawsuit brought by the contractor, or in some other configuration. The contractor firm sues the employee who took the money for converting money from a client intended for it (probably both as a tort and as a breach of fiduciary duty by an agent of the construction firm). The contractor firm sues the client for breach of contract. The question is about the liability of the client in this second lawsuit. The client might also bring a counterclaim against the contractor for negligent supervision of its employee if the employee did indeed abscond with the money and the facts support that counterclaim. If the client prevailed on that counterclaim, the judgment on the counterclaim for negligent supervision (e.g. if the contractor knew that the employee had a history of doing things like this and didn't warn the client) would be setoff against the breach of contract judgment, rather than being a defense to the breach of contract claim. The client sues the employee for fraud, conversion or theft. What Are The Rights Of The Parties In These Lawsuits? In the second lawsuit, the client has breached the contract. The contract said to pay the firm, the client paid someone else, and so the obligation under the contract was not satisfied. The disputes in the lawsuit between the contracting firm and the client will be over whether the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds as an agent of he contracting firm, over whether the payment that the client says was made to the employee was made at all, and over the purpose of the payment if a payment was made to the employee but the employee claims that it was a "tip" or a payment for something else (e.g. the employee also had a catering side hustle and the employee says it was for catering services). The issue of whether the client made the payment at all may be hard to prove if the payment was made in cash and the employee didn't provide a receipt and will come down to the credibility of the client and employee's testimony at trial. if the payment was made with a check or credit card, bank records will make it an open and shut case on that issue that will probably not be disputed at trial. If the facts reveal that the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds from the client for the contractor firm and that the payment was for work on the project and not something else, then the the payment made by the client to the employee satisfies the client's duty under the contract even if the employee wasn't actually authorized to receive the funds for the contractor firm. So, the client wins and the contractor firm's sole remedy is to sue its employee for misappropriating the client's funds. On the the other hand, if the employee did not have apparent authority to accept the funds from the client, or the payment was for something other than work on the project, or the client fails to prove that the payment was ever made, then the client owes the money to the contracting firm and must pay the contracting firm for the amount due (plus interest, litigation costs and possibly attorneys' fees depending on the terms of the contract). The client may pay that obligation out of separate funds of the client's own, or may authorize a the bank officer to make a draw on the construction loan to pay the amount owed. The construction loan bank of the client wouldn't sue the client or demand payment from the client for the amount that should have been paid to the contractor firm but was instead paid to the employee. It didn't pay money to someone it shouldn't have paid it to unless the client authorized the bank to do so. And, the bank won't pay the contractor without the client/borrower's say so. If the client authorized a draw payment from the construction loan to the employee rather than the contractor firm, the client still owes the bank for what it paid to the employee at the direction of the client (in addition to all other draws on the project), although the client may have a suit against the bank officer for negligence in administering the loan by failing to flag that the payee was wrong (which might lose but isn't a sure loss). The amount owed to the contractor firm proceeds under the analysis set forth above. What If The Facts Are Right? If, improbably, the facts as stating in the question are actually what happened, the client will owe or not owe the contractor money under the same analysis as above. But the client will not have liability to any company that the contractor got a loan from (which would not encumber the client's real estate), since the client has no contractual relationship with the contractor's lender. Post-Script On Double Payment Prevention Laws The question hinges on the unfairness of the client having to possibly pay twice for the same construction work. In some situations, where the general contractor firm is at fault for causing the double payment to happen, the law protects the client from double payment, even though those laws don't apply here. I explain why these laws don't apply below. Basically, the client has to eat the double payment when the double payment occurs because the client screwed up though no fault of the general contractor and the general contractor doesn't benefit from the double payment. Some states have laws designed to prevent property owners, often only residential property owners having work performed on their own residences, from having to double pay for work done in some circumstances. But these laws usually only apply when the client pays the general contractor firm as the client is supposed to, satisfying his contractual obligation, and the general contractor doesn't pay the subcontractor, causing the subcontractor to sue the general contractor for breach of contract and the owner to enforce the subcontractor's mechanic's lien. In those situations, the double payment prevention law eliminates the subcontractor's mechanic's lien rights when the client pays the general contractor in full, and the subcontractor is left only with a lawsuit against the general contractor who didn't pass on the client's or the client's bank's payment to the general contractor for the subcontractor's share of work to the subcontractor. In this case, the double payment laws usually wouldn't apply because the legal issue here is whether the client paid the contractor, or was deceived by the employee into paying someone other than the contractor in an act of conversion/embezzlement/fraud. | Contracts don’t have to be in writing Generally, there are specific exemptions. For example, in some jurisdictions, copyright transfers have to be in writing. Written contracts do not have to take any particular form Again, in general, some specific contracts may need to be in particular forms or explicitly deal with particular matters. Writing doesn’t mean ink on paper Of course, ink on paper is “writing” but so is an email, a text message, a Facebook post, a photo, a comic book. In law, writing simply means a semi-permanent record. Signatures are not required Unless, of course, they are in the specific circumstances. Your examples The plumber’s promise is both binding and unnecessary - the plumber is responsible for his own negligent acts and omissions even without such an agreement. On the other hand, if you promised not to hold him responsible, that promise would be binding. The designer’s agreement to transfer copyright is binding even where such agreements must be in writing because it is in writing. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? | Fault, in English law, is "blameworthiness". While it covers both the act and the mental state of the defendant, it cannot equate to the subjective criminal intent of the defendant known as mens rea. In other words, you can be at fault for negligence without having the requisite intent to commit a criminal act. This is perhaps best pointed out by the next sentence after the one in bold: It would be perfectly possible for a criminal code to provide separate crimes of negligence, with lower maximum sentences, at appropriate points in the hierarchy of offences. There are also examples of such offences in English law already. For example, careless, and inconsiderate, driving ("driving without due care and attention") contrary to Section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is an offence that requires fault without mens rea. The defendant merely has to be careless and inconsiderate — they do not have to be in the state of mind where they know or believe that what they are doing is criminal in some way. In contrast, dangerous driving contrary to Section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 has the implied requirement of mens rea because of the word "dangerously". This implies the defendant must have a subjective belief that what they are doing is dangerous (or otherwise be reckless about it), and therefore criminal. | A business owner can normally refuse service for any reason unless anti-discrimination law, or some other specific law, applies. "Critic of the business" is not a protected class. Whether a business would act in such a way I cannot say if it would risk significant negative publicity. But I see no legal reason why they could not. | why do they sometimes specify the federal law as well as the state/provincial law? Isn't it redundant? Not necessarily. The contract might be entered and/or performed in a different country, whence mentioning only the Canadian provincial law does not override the other country's federal law (or that country's "supra-provincial" equivalent). Mentioning Canadian federal law removes --at least on paper-- the ambiguity of which law applies for matters beyond the scope of Canadian provincial law. In such scenarios, portions or the entirety of the provision might be null and void. For instance, an employment contract might establish waivers which are void or perhaps even unlawful under the legislation of that other country. Please note that in general a copy/paste of sample clauses is strongly discouraged unless the parties fully understand their meaning and implications. | It depends on the particular law in the particular jurisdiction in which you are charged. Most statute laws enumerate the defences that are available. In common law countries there is a general defence that (except in strict liability offences) the perpetrator must well ... perpetrate the criminal act; what you describe does not appear to meet that requirement. Other jurisdictions would not be so forgiving. |
How does copyright law apply to references of an existing work? If an author were to reference an existing work of fiction in their novel, how does that interact with copyright law? For instance, let's say a character in a novel thinks they're a fictional character, like Joker. In the universe of this novel, DC exists, and Joker is a known fictional character. No one in universe would take this character seriously as the Joker - he would more likely be considered to be delusional, and possibly dangerous. Would something like this be legal to release? Would it require special provisions and/or disclaimers? | Literary references are generally considered to be a form of Fair Use in the US, and a form of Fair Dealing in those countries that have that legal concept. Mentioning that a character has read a fictional work, or likes a character in na fictional work, or even models his actions on such a character, or thinks he is that character is not treated as an infringement of copyright. Indeed, even "cameo" appearances of a literary character are not usually treated as infringements. A character in a period mystery might briefly meet Sherlock Holmes or Hercule Poirot, say, without that being an infringement. If significant sections of the new work involve imitating the plot of the source work, while the delusional character tries to act out his or her delusion, that might make the work a derivative work of the source (here DC comics). Creating a derivative work requires permission from the copyright holder. Whether a work is derivative depends on the specific facts, and cannot be judged from the information in the question. The more of the specific details from the source work that are used, and the more extensive the use is within the new work, the more likely it is that the new work would be held to be derivative. The details will matter, and ultimately it would be a matter for the judgement of a court if a suit were brought claiming that the work was derivative. | Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark. | Expression is tied up with fixation. Copyright subsists in a work that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which they can be reproduced, perceived, or communicated. 17 USC 102 This expression is protected, not the idea. However, copyright infringement can occur even when there is not an exact copy. First, courts use a substantial similarity standard to determine if infringement has occurred. Second, when a character or plot is sufficiently developed, taking that character or that plot can be infringement, even if not expressed in the exact same manner. "We do not doubt that two plays may correspond in plot closely enough for infringement [...] the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) Some characters or plot elements are so common to a genre that they are either not considered "original" enough to get copyright protection, or can be taken by others without being considered infringement. This is the scènes à faire doctrine. "Stock scenes and hackneyed character types that "naturally flow from a common theme"—are considered "ideas," and therefore are not copyrightable. But as plots become more intricately detailed and characters become more idiosyncratic, they at some point cross the line into "expression" and are protected by copyright." Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F. 3d 1257 - Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 2001 See Amanda Schreyer's An Overview of Legal Protection for Fictional Characters: Balancing Public and Private Interests for many more cases and examples of the idea-expression dichotomy in action with respect to fictional characters. | It is absolutely illegal, unless the movie is really old and out of copyright. Copyright protects all forms of creative expression, including novels, movie scripts, actual movies, translations of movies. | Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test. | Publication after the author's death is still publication. As you can see in this excellent chart this work is copyrighted for 95 years after the publication date under US law. If it had never been published, it would be protected by copyright for 70 years after the death of Lovecraft, the author (a term which has now expired). However, statements of genealogy would be facts, and as such are not protected by copyright. limited quotes to support those facts would be appropriate in a work of non-fiction, and would normally be permitted as fair use under US law. Such quotes would probably not be appropriate in fiction in any case. The exact wording of the genealogy would probably be protected, but not the relationships (who is the parent of whom, etc). | A translation is a devivative work - the copyright owner has the exclusive right to these So, yes, translation is prima facie copyright infringement. Strictly speaking, if you translate it, it's a derivative work because you exercised creativity in making the translation; what Google translate does is not a derivative work, it's a copy because there is no creativity. Either way, only the copyright owner can do (or authorise) this. Whether it's legal or not depends on if what you are doing falls within one of the exceptions to the applicable copyright law such as fair use or fair dealing. Attributing the original author does not, of itself, allow translation. Additionally, I'm not able to find the copyright documentation for the site link I provided above. What is "copyright documentation"? Copyright exists the moment a work is created and no further documentation is required. Essentially, I could translate the whole documentation by myself to avoid this problem. No, you can't - see above. If copy-pasting the google translate is illegal, then exactly how much must I edit, move around sentences, change words, and such until the text is no longer plagiarized? All of it. If you were, based on your own knowledge of the software, to write a manual without any copying o the existing manual, that would not be copyright infringement. Is this plagiarism or copyright infringement? It's copyright infringement - plagiarism is an academic misconduct issue not a legal one. where can I check the copyright for the above link? The site you linked has "Copyright © 2020 Acquia, Inc. All Rights Reserved" in the bottom left corner which identifies the copyright holder, the date and prohibits all copying ("all rights reserved"). This isn't necessary but it is helpful. If you really want to do this, contact Acquia, Inc and ask for permission. | Under United States copyright law, according to the Copyright Office, 206.01 Edicts of government. Edicts of government, such as judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal documents are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy. This applies to such works whether they are Federal, State, or local as well as to those of foreign governments. Referencing laws is even clearer: copyright doesn't protect referring to something like "Section 830 of the Penal Code of the State of California." Note that this is assuming that they remain within the US, where copyright law is a federal issue. Other countries don't all have the edict of government rule. If a place were to legally secede and become their own country, they would cease to be bound by US copyright law. They would get to decide if it was legal for them to do it or not; this is just like how it works between the UK and US (the UK claims copyright on its laws, but US courts will not enforce that copyright because it's incompatible with US law). Treaties complicate things, but the Berne Convention allows the edict of government exception. That said, seceding from the US unilaterally is both legally and practically impossible; seceding from a state is likewise generally going to be legally and practically impossible without permission from the state. So, it all depends on the agreements made. EDIT: To specifically address the model codes issue, Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) was a case specifically about what happens when model codes are adopted wholesale into law. The Fifth Circuit (after initially finding that the model codes were protected) reversed en banc, finding that a model code produced for the purpose of being incorporated into law, and which has been incorporated into law, and which is then reproduced as the law of the place that incorporated it into law, is not subject to copyright. Veeck may not apply to cases where the law merely references the model code, or where the thing in question was not made to be incorporated into law (e.g. state laws referencing the Red Book valuation of a car didn't make the Red Book public domain). If both of those are true, it probably doesn't apply; if one holds but not the other, it's unclear. However, if the actual municipal code directly contains the text of the model code, and you reprint it as the law of that municipality (rather than as the model code), there is no copyright in the law. |
Contradictions in the Constitution regarding property rights? In the fifth Amendment : No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. In The Taxing and Spending Clause Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, it states: The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; As far as I know, money, diverse as its forms may be, is considered property in most if not all of the cultures. How do you "just"-ly compensate for the tax you have collected? A free lance programmer for example, can make as much as 5 mechanics while staying at home where as the 5 mechanics use roads, bridges and various other infrastructure on a daily basis. Even in the 18th century, it would be an extremely deviant and extraordinary claim that one will be "just"-ly compensated for his tax paid. Did the founding fathers grow weary of their undertakings and decided to forsake due diligence and instead, wager on the possibility that no dangerous amount of people will invest their time on the fault finding in the future? If that were the case, they most certainly were right. Is this a contradiction? If it is, what should we make of it? Repair it? Ignore it until it blows up like what we always do? | The historical record on the question is probably too thin to yield a well-supported answer as to the due diligence and the underlying "what were they thinking" question, that is, I doubt there is any record of any original debate where one side demands resolution of the contradiction, and how that charge was answered. The American Law of Taxation: As Determined in the Courts of Last Resort gives a summary of the ensuing case law relationship between taxation and compensation, as of 1884 (p. 31 of the book, p. 100 in the PDF): Taxation differs from the power of eminent domain in this: that it has no thought of compensation by way of return for that which it takes and applies to the public good, further than all derive benefit from the purposes to which it is applied; in other words, that the support of government and other objects of public utility promoted by taxation are supposed to return to the individual the same which has been taken from him, as his share of the public burden and The limitation in the constitution that private property shall not be taken for public use, refers solely to the right of eminent domain, and not to taxation or special assessments for local benefits. (both quotes with long lists of supporting state law citations). The New York case People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419 apparently overturned its prior ruling (I think the citation is 6 Barb. 214, which I can't track down), commenting on the earlier ruling on an assessment. The supreme court reversed and annulled the assessment, holding... That money is property; that it can not be taken from a citizen for public use by the right of eminent domain, without just compensation; and that the enhancement in value of the relators' lands, by the grading and paving of Flushing avenue, is not that just compensation within the meaning of the constitution. The later court gets out of this, noting that Taxation exacts money, or services, from individuals, as and for their respective shares of contribution to any public burden. Private property taken for public use by right of eminent domain, is taken not as the owner's share of contribution to a public burden, but as so much beyond his share. Special compensation is therefore to be made in the latter case, because the government is a debtor for the property so taken; but not in the former, because the payment of taxes is a duty and creates no obligation to repay, otherwise than in the proper application of the tax. Taxation operates upon a community or upon a class of persons in a community and by some rule of apportionment. The exercise of the right of eminent domain operates upon an individual, and without reference to the amount, or value exacted from any other individual, or class of individuals. In other words, the Takings and Just Compensation clauses are understood to be about the power of eminent domain, which specially burdens the individual, and that is distinct from the general burdening of society that is taxation. There are, as far as I know, no finely-tuned SCOTUS rulings on the relation between the Just Compensation clause and the tax and spend clause. There is case law that holds that there is no contradiction between the power to tax and the Fifth Amendment. For example McCray v. US, 195 U.S. 27: While both the Fifth and Tenth Amendments qualify, insofar as they are applicable, all the provisions of the Constitution, nothing in either of them operates to take away the grant of power to tax conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, and that power being unrestrained except as limited by the Constitution, Congress may select the objects upon which the tax shall be levied, and, in exerting the power, no want of due process of law can possibly result, and the judiciary cannot usurp the functions of the legislature in order to control that branch of the Government in exercising its lawful functions. And Brushaber v. Union Pacific, 240 U.S. 1: So far as the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is relied upon, it suffices to say that there is no basis for such reliance, since it is equally well settled that such clause is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other words, that the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring, upon the one hand, a taxing power, and taking the same power away, on the other, by the limitations of the due process clause. This however says that taxation laws do not violate the due process requirement. | The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact. | This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits. | It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common. | There is no basis for the view that requiring a driver's license is unconstitutional. First, it's critical to realize that a right to travel has nothing whatsoever to do with licensing drivers. A right to travel does not in any way mean there's a right to travel in a particular way. Likewise, using a car does not mean you're traveling. Schactman is about the right to obtain a passport, which is a requirement to travel overseas. Kent is likewise about international travel. Freedom of movement means the government cannot, without good cause (like being on parole), prevent you from traveling within the US, living where you choose, or working where you choose. Likewise, there's a right to international travel that means that without good cause, the government can't stop you from leaving the US or re-entering if you're a citizen. Requiring a drivers license to use public roads doesn't stop you from doing that -- there are other ways to travel. The Thompson v. Smith decision explicitly supports the idea that requiring drivers licenses is allowed. To quote a more representative section from the case: STREETS AND HIGHWAYS -- Right of Citizen of Travel and Transport Property -- Use of Ordinary Vehicles. -- The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day. This right is not a mere privilege which a city may permit or prohibit at will. STREETS AND HIGHWAYS -- Right of Citizen to Travel and Transport Property -- Use of Ordinary Vehicles -- Police Power. -- The right of a citizen to travel and transport property and to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day may, under the police power, be regulated by the city in the interest of public safety and welfare; but the city may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, to exercise it. AUTOMOBILES -- Drivers' Permits -- Arbitrary Revocation. -- The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking under rules of general application permits to drive an automobile on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or permitted to be held by some and refused to others of like qualifications, under like circumstances and conditions. While Chicago Motor Coach doesn't seem to be available online, searching it finds other sites stating that the real issue was a commercial operator licensed by the State of Illinois, and whether Chicago, as a municipality within Illinois, could require them to also be permitted by the city. Another line from it seems to be "Even the Legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience." To quote more recent precedent, Miller v. Reed from the 9th Circuit (a federal court of appeals, not a state court) states that The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right. (incidentally: Drivers licenses are not required by federal law. They are required by state laws.) | Yes, it's illegal new-south-wales s118 of the Crimes Act says: Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. QED | Does this theory have any basis in current or historical fact? Not really. The sovereign citizen movement uses legal terms, but not correctly, and often confounded with Biblical doctrine, and hones in on stylistic matters that are not legally material now and weren't legally material at any time historically, like capitalization rules (which, actually, were historically wildly inconsistent, see, e.g., an image of the original U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence). There was an era from roughly the mid-1800s to the early 1900s when the law was very hung up on the precise wording of deeds (e.g., a deed to "John" rather than to "John and his heirs, successors and assigns" created a life estate rather than transferring full ownership of land), or stating precisely the right things in a legal complaint to have a right to legal relief (when what was required to be stated was discernible only from legal authorities like decades of case law reports or legal treatises). But, while that was an era when technicalities and legal fictions that would seem to a layman to be similar to those of the sovereign citizen movement were important legally, none of the actual technicalities and legal fictions that were historically important in the law are actually utilized by the sovereign citizen movement. Instead, it makes up technicalities and legal fictions that never existed historically, in the service of a defiant, anti-government agenda in which it is easy to impose liability on others but hard to impose liability on adherents of the movement, while the historical technicalities and legal fictions served the opposite role - with a pro-government agenda in which it was hard for non-professionals utilizing red tape filled bureaucracies to impose liability on others but was easiest to do with regard to people who defied authority, like sovereign citizens. Likewise, there has never been any means by which individuals can evade liability for taxes, for criminal conduct, or for civil liability committed by them personally, then or now. The question restates the common misconception that: For example, a plumber may operate in the capacity of an LLC to avoid personal civil (though probably not criminal) liability for any mishaps that may happen while on the job. But, in fact, even with all of the modern limited liability entity formalities complied with, this isn't actually true. One can never have limited liability for work that one personally carries out. Limited liability only protects you from contractual liabilities and from vicarious liability for the acts of your agents and employees. And, doing so still does not insulate you from criminal liability for acts of your agents and employees for the most part due to RICO and solicitation and conspiracy offenses. One can never evade liability in the manner that the sovereign citizen movement suggests, even if one complies with actual legally recognized formalities. | You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them. |
Where are you prosecuted? I thought if you committed a crime in a certain state you were tried in that state. Maybe in a state court, maybe in a Federal court. Do I have this right? Recently, there is talk about prosecuting Donald Trump in Georgia. It is my belief that he cannot be prosecuted in Georgia because he never went to Georgia. What am I missing? | If a person A, speaking by telephone to an election official B in Georgia, attempts to influence that official to improperly alter an election result in a way that would constitute frauds or otherwise be a violation of Georgia law, then the person A has committed a crime in Georgia. There are various ways to commit a crime in a place without being physically present in that state. Since there is no question what was said on the telephone call in question (because it was recorded) the question to be determined would seem to be whether it constituted a crime under Georgia law, and whether the Georgia officials think it is worth prosecuting. It is true that a trial for a criminal accusation is normally held in the state where the crime was committed (or allegedly committed). But that need not be in a state where the person was ever physically present. If a person living in State C does business is state D, and is requires to file a tax return with the authorities in D, and it is alleged that the return was false, then the person is being accused of a crime in D, committed when the false return was received in D. | Are there any legal constraints on the number of times that a defendant can be retried following mistrials due to hung juries? No. A fairly recent case in Louisiana, for example, involved someone who had been tried perhaps half a dozen times resulting in a mix of hung juries and reversals of convictions on appeal. Or is the only practical constraint the willingness of the prosecutor to expend government resources (and perhaps political capital) pursuing a conviction? Yes. This is the only practical limitation. | Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP. | Cohen has ethical problems, but this is probably pretty far down the list. If he were lying about the law, though, that could be treated as a violation of Rule 4.1 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct: In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third person. It could also be a violation of Rule 8.4: A lawyer or law firm shall not ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; Although these would be violations of his ethical obligations, they probably do not rise to the level of seriousness that would result in any meaningful punishment. Disbarment would be extremely unlikely, though a censure is conceivable. If someone reported the offense, I would actually expect that the state would decline to investigate at all. Of course, all of this assumes that he was deliberately lying about the state of the law, which I think overestimates his competence. More likely, he's just an idiot and didn't know that he was wrong. Importantly, being wrong about the law isn't unethical; it's a presumption at the foundation of our adversarial justice system. | First of all, there is a distinction between being impeached and being convicted. Trump was impeached when the House voted to adopt an Article of Impeachment. That happened while he was still in office. He will not be convicted until the Senate votes to convict him by a 2/3rds vote, if it ever does. In the case of Nixon, the House had not yet voted to adopt Articles of Impeachment when he resigned. They had been introduced and debated, but not yet finally approved. Moreover, we don't know what would have happened if the House had proceeded to pass such articles after Nixon had resigned. The House of that time did not choose to proceed. There was no court ruling saying that they could not do so. There are some precedents saying that the Senate can proceed with a trial after an official resigns or is expelled after impeachment. None of these are at all recent, none are clear cut, none involved an official whose term had ended, none involved a President, and none that I am aware of led to a conviction. And this issue has never been tested in a Federal court. Specifically, there is the case of William Belknap. Belknap was Secretary of War under US President Grant. He was accused of improperly profiting from military contracts. The House started impeachment proceedings. Grant interviewed Belknap, who confessed to Grant and resigned on the spot. The house none the less pass five articles of impeachment after Belknap resigned. When the Senate took up the case, there was a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Senate did not have jurisdiction because of Belknap's resignation. By a vote of 37–29 the Senate held that it had jurisdiction and that a trial should proceed. The vote to convict Belknap was 35 for conviction, 25 against it. This was five votes short of the required 2/3rds to convict. Most of the Senators voting against conviction were on record as doing so because they did not agree that the Senate had jurisdiction. Thus a majority vote of the Senate held in that case that such a trial was proper, but less than 2/3rds. (Most also indicted that they thought the charges true.) There was also the case of William Blount. Blount, a Senator, was impeached by the House in 1798. (In fact this was the first impeachment ever under the US Constitution.) The Senate voted to expel him. When the articles of impeachment came up in 1799, the Senate voted to dismiss the impeachment, on the ground that the impeachment process did not extend to members of the Senate, but not on the grounds that the expulsion rendered the proceedings moot. Should Trump be convicted by the Senate (which now seems unlikely) he might bring a court case claiming that such a conviction was unconstitutional. There is no knowing how a court would handle such a case. And if Trump is not convicted, no such case will be brought this time, either. This Washington Post opinion piece by two Constitutional scholars claims that such a trial would be constitutionally proper. It also claims that it would not have been proper had the vote to adopt articles of impeachment occurred after Trump had left office. Others have taken different positions. Whether a Senate trial of an impeachment is constitutional after the person impeached has left office is a hotly debated question at the moment. There has never been a court ruling on the point, and neither of the precedents is of a situation quite matching the current impeachment of Trump. No court has ruled on the matter. The Senate did not vote for a motion to dismiss the impeachment on those grounds, although if every senator who voted for the motion voted to acquit, Trump would not be convicted. From the comments I wish that any downvoters would leave a comment indicting what thy think is wring with this answer. In the absence of a comment, I cannot improve the answer, others cannot use the reasons to write better answers, and readers have no idea why someone objects to the answer. Such a downvote seems pointless. I have updated this answer with a discussion of the Blount and Belknap precedents. In neither case did the Senate actually vote to dismiss the articles because the accused was no longer in office, although that seems to be a major reason why 25 senators voted against convicting Belknap. | Maybe, but we'll probably never know for sure. Officially, of course, he was not punished for his speech. He was punished for selling explosives without a license, which he admitted to. (He was also charged with illegally storing explosives and illegally mailing 'injurious material," but those charges were dropped in exchange for his guilty plea on the first count.) Whether those charges were a pretext to retaliate is probably unknowable. While it's a well-known fact that law enforcement frequently retaliates against people for exercising their right to free speech, this guy's story doesn't sound very credible. There is precedent for a prosecution for distributing Pest Control Report 2000, including the prosecution of white supremacist Leo Felton, a sad-sack loser who used the same material to build a bomb around to incite a "racial holy war" the same time. And just about a month after Ver's conviction, the man who owned the company that manufactured the product was convicted of violating federal explosives and transportation laws. Several months after that, he and his company entered into a consent decree with the Consumer Product Safety Commission ordering them to stop manufacturing Pest Control Report 2000. | Actually this is the only SCOTUS ruling on Impeachment because of what it legally means with respect to SCOTUS and impeachment. Namely, Impeachment is a congressional power and not a judicial one that has no punishment beyond the removal from office upon conviction and that therefor it is not a matter that is Judicial. That is a fancy way to say that SCOTUS or any lower court may not hear appeals rising from the outcome of Impeachment. Because of this, it's unlikely to hear any SCOTUS case as to the matter of impeachment and the only outstanding question they could likely hear is "Who can hear an Impeachment Trial for the Vice President?" but thus far none of the 19 impeachment trials have heard involved a vice president. Nixon v. United States basically held that in matters of impeachment it is the court's position that it is likely to respond to this hypothetical with the legal ruling of "not my monkeys, not my circus" (note: not legal jargon). With that said, this makes the U.S. senate the highest court in the land when it comes to precedents set by impeachment cases. The very first person ever impeached was a U.S. Senator, who was expelled by the Senate the same day the House voted on Articles of Impeachment. The decision not to have the trial did establish some notable precedents: first, Impeachment and conviction are all about removing an officer from office and if at anytime before conviction the officer is removed by other means, the process is stopped as it is moot. Second, and more important, is that members of Congress are not "impeachable" officers as both houses have methods that allow them to expel members by vote. This means that the only people who can be impeached are executive officers (the person who is currently president, vice president, and cabinet secretaries, any other office that is appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate, and federal judges) and that a conviction of impeachment does not bar one from holding another federal office unless the senate enacts an additional punishment after the conviction barring that person from federal office. They cannot bar one from state office. Finally, House and Senate Rules have instructions for procedures in their part in impeachment. The commonality between both is that impeachment takes precidents over all regular buisness so once articles are put to the floor, there speaker must hold the vote with in a certain window of time (three days, I think) and the Senate must hold the trial as soon as possible, though will honor reasonable delays as per the impeached officer's right to delay. As a final note, and because it wasn't clear in the question Nixon v. United States is often confused with another case (United States v. Nixon). The latter one did indirectly relate to impeachment in that it was related to President Nixon handing over evidence to the comittee investigating possible impeachment articles against Nixon, and because of that ruling, Nixon handed over the evidence and later resigned to avoid the Impeachment. The former one not only didn't involve anything related Watergate, it also wasn't related to President Nixon at all, but a (former) Federal Judge Walter Nixon, and specifically was heard because Judge Nixon happened to be the first Judge impeached by a Senate commitee as the jury rather than the full Senate, following a rule change that only held full senate as jury for the President and Vice President and a committee for anyone else. The final rule is that only the President is constitutionally mandated to have the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court act as the judge in an Impeachment trial, while the presiding officer for all other cases is either the Vice President (acting in his role as President of the Senate) or the President pro Tempore of the Senate (acting in his role of "Guy Keeping the Vice President's Seat in the Senate Rotunda Warm" (not technical Jargon)). Which is why the question of "who is the judge in impeachment of the Vice President?" a noodle baking question, and the answer differs from the Chief Justice to the Senate pr Tempore to the rarely serious argument of the Vice President himself. The best answer is that "It has never come up." | Double jeopardy does not bar him from facing federal charges, although U.S. Justice Department policy reserves such prosecutions for exceptional cases. Also, it depends to some extent upon whether there is a suitable federal crime that fits the conduct. |
What happens if I negatively answer the court oath regarding the truth? Bailiff: (to the witness) Please raise your right hand. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? Witness: No. What would happen? Unfortunately, in the limited research I did, I could not find a definitive answer. Transcript adapted from here. Question inspired by this post. | That will amount to refusal to testify. The judge will warn you that, for a summoned witness, a refusal to testify means contempt of court and you will be asked that question again. After a second "No" you go to jail for contempt of court, and the trial will most likely be adjourned until you make up your mind to answer "Yes". | Perjury is not 'not telling the truth'. It requires (in most jurisdictions) being proven to have deliberately lied under oath. As Xavier pointed out, you are not on oath when entering a plea (among other reasons, you would be required to incriminate yourself). Secondly, "I am not guilty" could mean anything from "the prosecution wrongly think that what I did is illegal" to "this law is unconstitutional" even if the facts are not in dispute; either may be mistaken without being a lie. If the facts are in dispute, the jury will have to deliver a verdict that implies (it does not state, let alone prove) that they disbelieve one party; deliberate falsehood, whether by a defendant or a police officer, would be several steps beyond that. | The parenthesized part means that if you are being compelled by law to disclose some confidential information, you must promptly notify the company of that fact. They could they respond by trying to get you excluded as a witness, or to limit your testimony, but you don't have to care what they do once they've been notified that you were subpoenaed. It may well be that every time the opposing side asks you a question, "your" side will object, and the judge will decide whether to sustain or overrule the objection. The only way in which you would defer to the company lawyer is by not answering the question before the question is finished (i.e. give the attorney 2 seconds to voice an objection). You would not have to "bring" the employer's lawyer along to a deposition, but that lawyer would probably be present and would similarly raise objections, if he felt like it. Your duty is simply to tell the company that you are being compelled to testify. In case the police or a detective agency are investigating the matter and they come to interview you, you are not compelled by law to answer (or to hand over documents), therefore you are supposed to decline to answer (and you are not obligated to inform the company that someone asked a question). As for an administrative subpoena, the perhaps tricky part will be knowing whether you are being compelled to testify, or invited to testify. The wording of the paperwork should inform you whether this is compulsory. | The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se. | A lawyer is obligated to accurately state the law as stated in the jury instructions in closing argument (and also not to make a clear and deliberate misstatement of the facts presented at trials, and also not to express personal knowledge of the facts based upon anything other than what the jury has seen). But a certain amount of poetic license is allowed so long as the closing argument is not so misleading, as a whole, that it is likely to lead the jury astray. In this case, the prosecutor is alluding, with poetic license, to the idea that an aggressor or interloper can't assert self-defense. You can't "look for trouble" and then be shielded by that doctrine. A more full quote from that prosecutor makes that more clear: you lose the right to self-defence when you’re the one who brought the gun, when you’re the one creating the danger, when you’re the one provoking other people I have no opinion concerning whether his statement does or does not cross the line. I'm not sufficiently immersed in the case, and don't have enough context from having heard the closing arguments as a whole, to have a confident opinion on that point. If there is an acquittal we'll never know. If there is a conviction and appeal and this is an issue raised on appeal, we might find out. Opposing counsel has a right to object in closing argument if it goes too far, and appealing an argument that a closing argument is objectionable is challenging unless it is preserved with a timely objection at the time. Particularly if the prosecution makes a misstatement in their initial closing, rebutting it in the defense closing may be more effective than objecting. But, if the prosecutor makes a misstatement in a rebuttal period to which the defense can't offer a corrective statement, an objection may be wise in order to preserve an issue for appeal. | An oath, which is what you make when you "swear" something, is formally speaking a promise made to God upon which you expect others to rely, and is one for of statement that can give rise to a perjury conviction. An affirmation is a statement that you state is true under penalty of perjury made only to other men and women and not to God. It is preferred by those who are non-religious and by those who feel that oaths are an improper or sacrilegious act akin to taking the Lord's name in vain or idolatry. Sometimes a written statement made with an affirmation is called a declaration, while a written statement made with an oath is called an affidavit, but the actual use of those words is not terribly precise. Functionally, they are equivalent. It is also worth noting that only certain officials (e.g. notaries, court reporters and judges) have the authority to put someone under oath, while not all affirmations require a specially authorized official to administer an oath (although many affirmations are made before such an official). If a document is called a "Declaration" it is generally affirmed rather than sworn, and is generally not notarized. | united-states I am answering this in the case of a criminal jury trial (given the context of the previous question). It is my understanding that the judge must accept (almost?) all evidence admitted into court. So, this leaves me with three questions: What happens if an official shows evidence that the judge hadn't agreed to feature in the trial? . . . What happens if the evidence happens to be inadmissible? A trial in a criminal case takes place in a courtroom at a predetermined date and time, with the prosecutor physically sitting at one table in front of a judge and the defendant and the defendant's lawyer physically sitting at another table in front of the judge, and a jury physically sitting in a seating area to the side of the judge, and a witness (usually) physically sitting in a chair on the other side of the judge (in rare circumstances, for minor witnesses, testimony is provided by telephone with the phone put on speaker in the courtroom for all to hear), and a court reporter or tape recorder keeping track of what happens verbatim. In a trial, essentially all evidence comes in through witnesses sitting on a special the chair in front of the judge designated for witnesses (called the witness stand) at the request of either the prosecuting attorney, or the defense attorney. This is the only way the evidence is introduced (other than by stipulations of both side's lawyers). Prosecutors and defense attorneys don't testify or provide evidence themselves. The judge is usually not told what evidence will be offered at trial in advance, although sometimes a pre-trial hearing is held to consider a particularly important piece of evidence's admissibility prior to trial, in a hearing on what is called a "motion in limine" or a "motion to suppress". If that happens, the judge's decision made in advance will be honored by the judge when anyone tries to introduce the evidence at trial. But those are the exception and not the rule. Usually, any witnesses can be asked any questions at trial and the judge does not consider the admissibility of the answer to the question until it is asked and objected to by the other side's lawyer at trial. A defendant can choose to be, but is not required to be, a witness in his or her own case. In a trial, when it is their turn, the prosecution and defense, respectively, ask witnesses to sit at the witness stand one by one and ask them questions, which the witness answers under oath, absent an evidence objection from the other side's attorney. While a witness is on the stand, exhibits such as documents or physical objects can also be introduced into evidence in connection with the authenticating testimony of the witness (except in cases where both sides stipulate to the admission of the documents or other non-testimonial evidence). As the lawyers try to introduce evidence by asking a question to a witness on the stand, or by asking the judge for permission to introduce non-testimonial evidence, the other side's attorney can say, "I object". If that happens, the witness on the stand is not allowed to answer the question and the non-testimonial evidence (e.g. documents, or a knife allegedly used in a crime) is not made available to the jury until the judge rules on whether it is admissible or not in accordance with the rules of evidence. Usually, the judge rules on the evidence objection immediately in the moment, although in rare cases, the judge will let the jury have a break for a few minutes while hearing arguments from the lawyers for both sides on about the relevant evidence rules and/or researching the legal issue, before ruling on the evidence issue. Once the judge rules on the evidence issue, the trial continues immediately. If the judge "sustains" the objection to the evidence, then the question doesn't get asked and/or the jury doesn't get to see the non-testimonial evidence. The lawyer whose question or offer to introduce evidence was successfully objected to moves on to their next question (if any) for the witness instead. If the judge "overrules" the objection to the evidence, then the witness answer the question and/or the jury gets to see the non-testimonial evidence which is "received" into evidence by the judge. This process continues continuously, for as many business days as it takes, until all witness testimony and all non-testimonial evidence has been presented to the court and both sides have told the court that they have presented all of their evidence. Then each side makes closing arguments to the jury, the judge reads the jury instructions of law on how to resolve the case, and the jury is sent to closed room to discuss the case and decide whether to say "guilty" or "not guilty" with respect to each charge brought by the prosecution in the trial. This decision is called a "verdict" and when the jury has made up its mind on all charges present to it, the jury lets the judge know that it has made up its mind, and the judge calls everyone back to the courtroom, and the jury tells the judge what they decided in open court. If the verdict is "not guilty" on all criminal charges in the case, then the case is over, with no post-trial motions and no appeals. If the verdict is "guilty" the defendant is convicted, subject to post-trial motions to declare a mistrial and appeals by the convicted defendant. If the convicted defendant appeals the case, and the judge abused his discretion in overruling an objection to the evidence that is made by the lawyer for the defendant (or the defendant personally if the defendant is not represented by a lawyer), because no reasonable judge could have found that the evidence was admissible under the circumstances, then the appellate court rules that the judge has made an "error". The appellate court will not find that the judge's ruling is an "error" if the judge made the correct decision for the wrong reason. If it is reasonably possible that "error" possibly in combination with other errors made by the trial court judge could have caused a convicted criminal defendant to have been acquitted by the jury if the errors weren't made by the judge, then the defendant gets a new trial. The new trial usually before the same judge with a new jury. But the new trial is before a different judge and a new jury if the judge is no longer a judge on the court for any reason, or if the judge has been so defiant of the appellate court (typically ignoring its instructions in a retrial after a first appeal) that the appellate court decides it must remove the judge from the case. A criminal defendant is only acquitted by an appellate court if the appellate court finds that it would be impossible under any circumstances for the defendant to be convicted in a new trial, possibly with different evidence presented by the prosecution. What happens if a private citizen does the above? This doesn't make sense. Private citizens don't rule on the admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial, and can't introduce evidence in a criminal trial except at the request of a prosecuting attorney or defendant's attorney by being called as a witness and asking the questions that the lawyers (and sometimes the judge as well) asks the witness. Witnesses are not allowed to volunteer testimony or provide documents to a jury unless asked to do so by a lawyer in the case. What happens if someone provides evidence in court without the knowledge of the judge? As the process described above should make clear, this is basically impossible absent some extremely irregular event on the same level of irregularity as someone bribing a jury or threatening a jury with harm if he votes the wrong way. | Only if counsel challenged the point during the trial Difficult as it might be, you can’t allow the judge to be wrong during the trial without calling them on it: very, very politely. For example, there is case law that says you can’t successfully appeal because the judge was asleep through significant parts of the trial; appeals courts are clear that you have to wake them up. If you don’t then you accepted that you didn’t want the judge to hear the parts of the case they slept through, it’s your choice how you present your case. Frankly some cases are better if the judge misses half the evidence. Of course, if the error of law makes it through to the oral or written judgement then you can appeal even if you didn’t take issue with it. |
How to find Statutes at Large pincite for a new law? Is it possible to find the page in United States Statutes at Large that corresponds with the Public Law section for a new statute? The specific law in question is: Johnny Isakson and David P. Roe, M.D. Veterans Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-315, 134 Stat. 4932. For an article on my educational website, I resorted to using underscores for the Statute at Large pincites. For example: Key Points for C&P Exams The first three Key Points are all found in Section 2002 of the bill, the full citation of which is: Matters relating to Department of Veterans Affairs medical disability examinations, H.R. 7105, Johnny Isakson and David P. Roe, M.D. Veterans Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of 2020, tit. II, subtit. A, sec. 2002. Note: That is the citation for the enrolled bill as amended by the House of Representatives on 16 Dec 2020. The citation for section 2002 of the law is: Matters Relating to Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Disability Examinations, Johnny Isakson and David P. Roe, M.D. Veterans Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-315, § 2002, 134 Stat. 4932, __ (Jan. 5, 2021). Congress passed the bill on 16 Dec 2020, after the House agreed to a Senate amendment: Resolving differences -- House actions: On motion that the House suspend the rules and agree to the Senate amendment, Agreed to by voice vote, 166 Cᴏɴɢ. Rᴇᴄ., no. 213, H7169–7204 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2020). Using the above example, how can I find the page number(s) in United States Statutes at Large that correspond with Pub. L. No. 116-315, § 2002? I found the Statutes at Large citation for the law on the Potomac Publishing website, under "New Laws". I am guessing that at present I would need to pay for a Lexis or West publication to find this information, but I wanted to make sure. | It wouldn't be at all uncommon to cite to a new public law with a section number in the public law but not a pinpoint citation. For example: Pub. L. No. 116-315, § 2002, 134 Stat. 4932 (January 5, 2021). The citation form in the question is also acceptable: Veterans Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-315, § 2002, 134 Stat. 4932, __ (Jan. 5, 2021). This is a similar to the form commonly used in citations to newly decided court cases that haven't yet been typeset for a hard cover volume of case reports. It would be commonplace to omit a pinpoint citation from the published Statutes at Large, if the section number if provided, even in a law review journal or academic publication, in the case of a newly enacted statute. For what it is worth, the relevant Bluebook (i.e. the leading guide to citation) addresses citations to statutes at large in Rule 12.4 but doesn't specifically address what to do when pinpoint citations are unavailable, although Bluebook Rule 10.8.1 provides some options for pending and unreported court opinions. Almost all law libraries and most larger public libraries and university libraries also get hard copies of Statutes at Large on a subscription basis, although there is a considerable lag between passage and distribution of the dead tree version. | You can use academic sources when arguing in court if you like, but be aware of the following: Academic texts are not primary sources of law in Jamaica. What is in them may be persuasive but does not bind a court in the same way as statute law or case law. Sometimes, it's appropriate to cite works of legal scholarship to flesh out an argument. If the book contains a succinctly-phrased statement that matches what you want to prove, but prior case law isn't quite as neatly applicable, then you might cite both - subject to points below. Citing the book alone is weaker. At other times, when there is authority on both sides of a point, you might find academic argument tipping the balance, but again not to be used in isolation. Whether a text is persuasive may not be obvious, especially for older works. Sometimes, perhaps often, the law has changed since the book was published. Don't assume that an old book by a famous author will automatically be revered. You can check to see if newer books say something different from the older one, and in general start your search looking backwards from now in order to identify the current state of the law. It is more common these days to see references to current editions of textbooks than comparatively ancient authorities, no matter how illustrious the name of Blackstone might be. If a point of law is not actually contested, then there is no need to argue about it. It can form part of the background material that is agreed on between the parties. Basic principles of the way contracts work don't need elaboration or authority. Judges would prefer to have you limit the number and range of authorities you bring in, because they only have so much time in their day and they don't want to struggle through a lot of unnecessary background reading. In a skeleton argument, the strong preference is for only one principal authority to be mentioned in support of each point of law. You can mention a recent decisive case rather than reciting the entire history of case-law on the topic, and you don't need to include cases where a well-understood precedent was applied without difficulty. It may be that a textbook brings you to the relevant statute or judgement but then that is what you need to cite, not the textbook itself, especially if it simply quotes or restates what is found in the primary material. For filing court documents in general, pay close attention to the Civil Procedure Rules and the Practice Directions, including PD No. 8 of 2020 on the format of the judge's bundle. If the judge is annoyed enough about non-compliance with the court's rules about submissions, then various sanctions are available to them. For example, they can refuse costs on the legal research that led to the preparation of the submission. In correspondence, which I think you allude to, you can be more free than when dealing with the judge's bundle. In a letter to the opposing party you can certainly bring in additional references that you think would be helpful to you as a matter of rhetoric and argumentation. Do note that doesn't mean it is a good idea to make correspondence too aggressive or lengthy. For one thing, a judge can end up reviewing the correspondence and will notice whether or not you are making a good-faith effort to resolve the matter, or at least identify the salient issues to bring to the court. | The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court. | There are potential constitutional challenges to the bill, but as noted by the answer from user6726, a bill of attainder challenge would not be a very strong one. Better arguments that the legislation is unconstitutional would include (in approximate order of legal strength) arguments that: it violates the "dormant commerce clause" by unduly regulating interstate commerce, it is pre-empted by federal statutes which have "occupied the field" of social media regulation (e.g. with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act), it purports to make foreign policy which is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government (in connection with its "any country designated as a foreign adversary" provision), it is effectively regulating conduct outside the territorial scope of the state's authority to regulate conduct (a new SCOTUS case law doctrine from the California pork regulation case decided this month), and it unduly burdens free speech since TikTok is analogous to a modern magazine or newspaper and is regulated more heavily than non-expressive content on a non-content neutral basis. | The author of a text or essay may cite in whatever order s/he thinks best. It m,ay be that a basic text gives a better and clearer overview than any actual case, and so is worth citing first. It is true that actual case law is often more authoritative than a statute, and cases and statutes are normally more authoritative than any text or essay, but there is no rule binding on an author to cite in any particular order, although citing the actual law first may be the common practice. When writing a brief or a court decision there may be standards of citation that are enforced. | If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked. | "Could Maine pass a law making New Mexico corporations and LLCs legally nonexistent in Maine (and removing the corporate veil in cases where Maine courts have jurisdiction)?" No. The full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the dormant commerce clause doctrine of U.S. Constitutional law would both invalidate a Maine law to that effect. One might think that the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution (as opposed to the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment) might also invalidate this law (e.g., it also prohibits residents of another state from obtaining occupational licenses in a state). But, this is not the case, because the U.S. Supreme Court held in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868), that corporations are not protected by the privileges and immunities clause. See generally, here. This doesn't mean that Maine couldn't regulate foreign corporations in some manner that doesn't unduly discriminate against out of state corporations. For example, most states require out of state corporations that do business in that state to pay a small fee and make a simple filing with the Secretary of State of that state authorizing them to do business in that state as a precondition to filing lawsuits or counterclaims seeking relief in their state's courts. But, this is far from a denial of the very existence of the out of state corporation and doesn't, for example, prohibit the out of state corporation from defending itself against suits brought against it in that state's courts. Likewise, it does not prohibit an out of state corporation from owning property or from affording limited liability protections to its owners. | I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case. |
Legality of the Cat Lawyer video You may have seen the recent video of the lawyer who couldn't turn off the cat filter during a Zoom trial. What struck me about it is the legal warning in the top left frame warning that it is prohibited to record or livestream the hearing. And yet somebody recorded it. Is somebody going to face contempt charges for this? | The warning notice is intended for viewers and participants, not for the court to make its own official record of the proceedings. Presumably, it was this court record that the judge released for educational purposes under his own Order via Twitter. In which case, there has been no contempt of court. | LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision. | You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on. | Recording other people without consent is a crime (§ 201 StGB). But so is threatening other people with violence (§ 241 StGB). Secret recordings and other acts can still be legitimate if they are necessary and appropriate to deflect harm (§ 34 StGB), similar to how hurting someone can be legitimate if you're acting in self-defense. If you're prosecuted for this, it will be up to the court to determine if your act was necessary and proportionate. But regardless of what you did, your recording can be used as evidence against the ex-roommate. German criminal law does not generally exclude illegally acquired evidence. The main risk of disclosing this recording is that you are also providing evidence against yourself for possible wiretapping charges (which may or may not be punishable as discussed above). | Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country. | The difference in their treatment is because of the asymmetry in the law. There are "wiretapping" laws pertaining to interception of voice communication, which do not include photographic recording. It is generally illegal to "intercept" an oral, wire or electronic communication (direct conversation, literal wire tap, or listening in on wireless speech): there is an exception that sound can be "intercepted" by a hearing aid or similar device to correct a person's less-than-normal hearing. Using a microphone or any other electronic device is thus "wiretapping". There is no law against taking a photo in public, even using a telephoto lens (however, trespassing to take a photo is illegal). It is true that when a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy, voice recording does not require consent of either party (in Texas). But simply "being in public" does not mean that there is no expectation of privacy – it depends on whether a reasonable person would know that they can easily be heard. In that context, there is still a reasonable expectation of privacy if you're 30 feet from the nearest person. It is hard to say exactly why the law is the way it is. I presume it is partially based on differences in "reasonable expectations of privacy" for sound versus light (sound dies out quickly, light does not). Wiretapping laws are, in the first place (Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968), a reaction to Supreme Court decisions that limited wiretapping on 4th Amendment grounds in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347. Since the court did not say that the government taking a picture (without trespassing) is unconstitutional, the US government and states did not construct laws that prohibited that activity. | Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals. | Without a witness willing to break their silence, we will probably never be certain. It is possible that this was harassment (current ordinance, not 1999 – version in force at that time not available), defined in Arvada if one has the intent to annoy (etc.) and "Repeatedly insults, taunts, challenges, or makes communications in offensively coarse language to another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response" (the "record" indicates that there was a pattern of such conduct). We don't actually know that he was fined (hearsay...). |
Are Facebook Pixel GDPR compliant? GDPR states that a data subject have the right to get a copy of the data about the subject the data controller has collected, and in some cases deletion of said data. If I understand correctly, this also includes data that are collected with an ID set in a cookie, like Facebook Pixel does. Do Facebook Pixel have any way of getting the data of a single user through a userID, and also a function for deleting this data? I know Google Analytics have a function for deleting the data of a userID, and was wondering if Facebook Pixel had a similar function. If this doesn't exist, then I can't believe that Facebook Pixel is GDPR compliant. | The Facebook Pixel analytics solution does not seem to support access or erasure for data subjects. While there are some GDPR compliance features, these focus on collecting consent prior to collecting data. The relationship between the pixel user and Facebook is also murky. For certain kinds of data, Facebook acts as the data processor only, and the user has all the responsibility as the data controller. For other kinds of data, Facebook and the Pixel user are joint controllers, and therefore jointly responsible. This lack of features doesn't necessarily mean that Facebook Pixel is in violation of the GDPR, since the GDPR Right to Erasure only applies under certain circumstances. However, it is really difficult to argue that a website or app that integrates Facebook Pixel would be compliant. It is also rather dubious that Facebook could be compliant themselves, since their pixels will also collect data about persons who are not Facebook members. While these problems are most apparent with the Facebook Pixel since it's explicitly intended for tracking, this problem also applies to any other embeds provided by Facebook, such as like buttons. This was the subject of the Fashion ID case, in which the ECJ determined (in 2019) that the site operator is a joint controller with regards to data collection on the website by the Facebook embed. This effectively means that third party embeds can only be loaded after the website visitor has given consent for sharing data with Facebook. The tracking of non-users by Facebook was seen as especially problematic in Belgium, where Facebook had been banned from collecting such data already in 2015 (which was upheld in 2018). Since this was pre-GDPR, FB is currently litigating whether Belgium can continue enforcing their ban. I expect that Belgium will prevail with their ban. While this has no immediate consequences for Pixel users, this would make it more likely that Pixel users could be sued or fined successfully. From an advertiser perspective, Facebook does have valuable data that make the integration of Facebook Pixel an attractive proposition. However, other analytics solutions are much easier to bring into compliance. This is ultimately a business decision: will the better understanding of your ad spend on Facebook outweigh the risk and effort of integrating the Pixel? | … would face and voice count as personal information under GDPR? Absolutely. Does person B have the right to erasure … No. The right to erasure only applies in certain circumstances. While the initial reason for collecting personal data was consent, once it has been incorporated into a film, the processor now has a legitimate interest in the data. The right to erasure does not apply when there is a legitimate interest. | The GDPR as such puts obligations on the Data Controller (DC), that is the person or firm or other entity who determines the purposes for which data is processed. The entity that hires the developer and operates the web site is responsible for compliance with the GDPR and other laws and regulations, such as the e-privacy directive and its implementing laws. However, it is highly likely that in commissioning a web site the DC would specify that it be designed to aid compliance with the GDPR and other relevant laws, and if the developer did not do that it might be a breach of contract. Indeed, even if GDPR-friendliness was not explicitly required by the contract between the developer and the DC, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purpose would probably apply. A designer who, knowing the site is to be hosted and operated within the EU, failed to design it to facilitate GDPR compliance might well be in violation of those warranties. But that would depend on the specifics of Italian law. But note that GDPR compliance is not a matter of web site design, but of the ongoing practices of the operation of the site. There are various ways to comply with the GDPR, no specific technology or design need be used. The DC must so operate the site as to comply. If the DC fails to do that, penalties could be imposed on the DC, not on the developer. | Either approach can be GDPR-compliant. An issue to consider is that you as a data controller relying on consent “shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to processing of his or her personal data” (Art 7(1)). This might be simpler if a record of the consent is linked to a user account. On the other hand, the GDPR's data minimization principle would suggest that decentral, offline approaches are preferable. So you do have some flexibility here, as long as you feel comfortable demonstrating that your approach is compliant when investigated by a supervisory authority. In many cases, consent is not an appropriate legal basis to start with. It is one of several options in Art 6(1) GDPR. If a data processing activity is necessary for fulfilling a contract with the data subject, then Art 6(1)(b) is more appropriate. If the processing is necessary for a legitimate interest, then Art 6(1)(f) would work – after conducting a balancing test. Art 6(1)(a) consent is appropriate when the processing activity is not necessary, or when a legitimate interest balancing test doesn't go in your favor, or in some cases when required by law. For example, consent is required when processing special categories of data (such as biometrics), or when accessing or storing information on the end user's device, beyond what is necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user (the “cookie law”, but much more general than cookies). Consent also has heightened compliance requirements compared to other legal bases. The data subject must be able to make a free decision, without any coercion. You must not use dark patterns. You must leave the data subject a real choice. You must not make access to your app conditional on giving unrelated consent (like providing access to a game only when the user gives consent for personalized ads). The data subject must be able to easily withdraw consent later, without suffering detriment for this. The EDPB has issued relevant guidelines that might be helpful here: EDPB guidelines 05/2020 on consent EDPB guidelines 2/2019 on Article 6(1)(b) in the context of online services (also relevant for apps) TL;DR: what is “necessary” for performance of a contract is an objective question, and should generally be considered from the data subject's perspective. It is not possible to circumvent consent requirements by putting unrelated processing purposes like “analytics” into a services' terms of service. The main purpose of this document is to serve as a rebuttal of Facebook's GDPR compliance strategy. But it's perfectly fine to avoid asking for consent for those processing purposes that are actually necessary for the user. I've noticed that you mentioned various Google services like Analytics and Firebase. To the degree that your use of these services implies an international transfer of personal data into the US, it might be impossible to be GDPR-compliant. Be wary of claims that you're only transferring “anonymous” data, as the GDPR has a fairly broad concept of identifiability. | GDPR & EPD require user consent before storing a users personal information. Wrong. User consent is one of the ways that justify storing personal information, but there are others. You may check art.6 to see the several reasons that allow to store personal information. In this case, it seems reasonable to justify it under the paragraph f (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of course, that means that the data has to be used for this purpose. Avoiding spammers and other banned users would be such a purpose, but you should ensure that you do not send those e-mail address commercial information or even a Christmas greeting. In any case, be careful with anything you store. If along with the e-mail you stored more info, this could be interpreted as excessive and beyond the scope of paragraph f. For example, imagine storing "User wrote nazi statements" explaining why the e-mail is banned; EU laws are very restrictive about storing information about political or religious beliefs. | Cookies are information stored on the end users device and require consent¹ per the ePrivacy directive, even if the cookies or similar technologies don't contain personal data. Conditions for consent are defined by the GDPR. This was also confirmed by the "Planet49" case. 1. consent is required unless the storage of or access to information on the end users device is either strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user, or necessary for technical reasons. E.g. functional cookies like a shopping cart feature in a web shop are fine, as are cookies used solely for security purposes or technical features like TLS session resumption. It is however likely that this cookie does qualify as personal data in the sense of the GDPR. The cookie contains an ID that lets you single out/distinguish this user from all other users, even though that ID doesn't link the user to a real-world identity. It is also possible to argue that the cookie is entirely anonymous, but the safer approach is to treat it as personal data. Similarly, other features of the website necessarily involve the processing of personal data, such as processing the user's IP address, if only for the purpose of responding to their HTTP requests. The GDPR's criteria for valid consent are mainly about ensuring that the consent is a freely given unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes. For example, consent can never be the default, it needs to be an opt-in. However, Art 7(1) GDPR says that the data controller has the burden of proof of showing that valid consent was given. The GDPR itself does not provide further guidance on what this means specifically. I would argue that it can be decomposed into two aspects: Showing that valid consent was given. The manner in which you ask for consent must enable a free choice, and must respect that "no consent" is the default. For example, you could archive screenshots of the cookie management flow to show that there is a free choice. You could archive the frontend software so that it can be demonstrated that the cookie is not set until consent is given. Showing that this user gave consent. There is a wide variety of opinions on how to do that. My personal opinion is that the existence of a cookie paired with a valid consent flow to set that cookie demonstrates that the cookie can only have been set in a valid manner. However, there are consent management solutions that provide additional insight, such as the user's entire history of giving and revoking consent. For example, the user's browser might generate a pseudonymous ID enabling that user's consent history to be stored on some server. Indeed, that would be personal data, and this would have to be disclosed transparently. It would not be valid to use the consent management information for other purposes, for example by using the consent management ID for analytics purposes. Storing the user's consent history is definitely appropriate if you have a concept of identity, such as for signed-in users. I have doubts whether this is also helpful on websites that don't have user accounts, and I have not heard of a case where the existence of such records made a difference. After all, such records can only be relevant if the user gave consent but later disputes this in a complaint with a DPA or in a lawsuit. Which approach to choose will depend on more specific guidance provided by your country's data protection authority, and on the risk balance appropriate for your business. After all, the purpose of such compliance work is not to be 100% safe from lawsuits, but to reduce risks from enforcement/litigation to acceptable levels. What is acceptable is ultimately a business decision. E.g. the only 100% safe way to do web analytics is to have no analytics at all, but that is not acceptable for most businesses. | Does GDPR apply if my web app stores personal data on the user's phone only? No. If you are not processing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) then the GDPR does not apply to you. This is what a web browser does when it asks to remember your username and password for this web site. You are providing a tool, the user is using that tool to process their own data. I do offer to back up the user's personal data At this point you are processing the users PII, and the GDPR does apply to you. Even though you do not have enough information to identify an individual, as it can be used with other information to identify an individual it is PII. From the ICO: Can we identify an individual indirectly from the information we have (together with other available information)? Even if you may need additional information to be able to identify someone, they may still be identifiable. That additional information may be information you already hold, or it may be information that you need to obtain from another source. When considering whether individuals can be identified, you may have to assess the means that could be used by an interested and sufficiently determined person. | Since you are from Europe, GDPR applies to all your processing activities per Art 3(1) GDPR, regardless of where the users are located. If you would like to avoid GDPR compliance, you would have to manage your business from abroad so that you no longer have an European establishment, and would have to avoid offering your services to people who are in Europe. So let's assume that you have no European establishment. Then, GDPR can only apply per Art 3(2) to those processing activities that relate to offering goods or services to people who are in Europe. For determining this, IP-based geolocation is indeed common. Very likely, you do not need consent for this. GDPR does not require consent for everything, just a legal basis. There are six potential legal bases in Art 6(1), though the relevant ones are consent, necessity for performing a contract, legal obligations, and necessity for a legitimate interest. For things like security checks, it would be common to claim a legitimate interest. Complying with GDPR can hurt revenue. However, data subjects have a right to data protection, but you do not have a right to a particular business model. Similarly, paying taxes can "hurt revenue", but it's not really optional. If your business model can't deal with GDPR compliance (or with taxes), it might not be a sound business model. In Europe, many newspapers have since moved from advertising-only to a consent-or-pay model. That is, the user is given a choice: You can read articles without tracking if you buy a subscription. You can access articles for free if you consent to tracking. The legality of this is hotly debated. In principle, such an approach can be compliant, but the details are problematic, for example that you can only buy subscriptions rather than individual articles, and that these subscriptions are often orders of magnitude more expensive than what would be earned through ads. But this might actually be easier to solve for a mobile application than for a website, due to the availability of in-app payment and micropayment infrastructure. In any case, GDPR limits how much you can "encourage" consent – per Art 7(4), you cannot make access to your service conditional on consent. There must be a way to use your app without consenting to anything, unless that consent is actually necessary for the app to work. For example, consenting to camera access is necessary for a QR code reader app to work. It is extremely unlikely that ads would be necessary in this sense. Users also must not suffer detriment for declining or withdrawing consent. From this, the EDPB has developed the concept of "permissible incentive" in their guidelines on consent. In this post, "Europe" means EU/EEA/UK as appropriate. |
Could all participants of the recent Capitol invasion be charged over the death of Officer Brian D. Sicknick? Prosecutors in the US Attorney's office plan to open a federal murder investigation into the death of Brian D. Sicknick, a US Capitol Police officer who died Thursday night, a law enforcement official tells CNN. source I am not a lawyer, not even American, so perhaps someone (who is both) could tidy up this next bit ... I am aware that American law has a concept of each member of a group being jointly responsible for the actions of other members of the group (could someone please cite the relevant law?). So, for instance, a getaway driver parked around the corner can be charged with murder if an accomplice kills a bank teller during a robbery. Could this be applied such that every member of the crowd (or some subset thereof) around the Capitol at the time of the officer's injuries be charged? I realize that this is, in practice, highly unlikely to happen. But I seek to understand to what extend that the could theoretically apply to such a large crowd. | I am aware that American law has a concept of each member of a group being jointly responsible for the actions of other members of the group This is much too broadly stated to be accurate. There is no general law of group responsibility in the US. Under US law, when a group of people agree to do something jointly that is illegal, or using illegal means, they can all be charged with conspiracy, and the acts of one used in the trial of another. But it must be proven that an accused knowingly jointed in the conspiracy to convict that accused person. See 18 U.S. Code § 371 When one person assists another to commit a crime, in any of various ways, a charge of "accessory" or of "aiding and abetting" or of "being an accomplice" can be brought. But this will again involve proof that the accused knew that the conduct involved was criminal. Where a person commits or tries to commit a felony, alone or as part of a group, and a death results, the person can be charged with felony murder. A classic example is where an armed bank robbery occurs and one of the robbers is shot and killed by a guard. Each of the robbers may be charged with felony murder, even if none if them knew or intended that anyone be harmed or killed. But the felony must be one of a limited list provided by statute. The federal statute is 18 U.S. Code § 1111 which limits the crimes that can trigger the rule to "arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery". The DC code § 22–2101 limits the rule to arson, as defined in § 22-301 or § 22-302, first degree sexual abuse, first degree child sexual abuse, first degree cruelty to children, mayhem, robbery, or kidnaping, ... any housebreaking while armed with or using a dangerous weapon, or ... a felony involving a controlled substance Only a person who could be shown to have been committing or attempting one of the listed felonies could be charged with felony murder. Merely "being part of the crowd around the capital" would not provide grounds to charge anyone with felony murder, and to charge someone as accomplice to murder it would need to be shown that the accused intended someone to be killed. It might be that some few of the intruders could be charged with felony murder, depending on the exact facts, but probably most could not. See also What are the legal violations and criminal penalties likely to be for the protesters that entered the Capitol on January 6, 2021? | Whether or not a war between political entities can result from some action is completely political and strategic, and not legal. The specific incident is probably legal, given US and international law regarding military action. Unless the order was self-evidently unlawful there is no possibility of arrest and prosecution under US law, however there might be a framework for legal action by Iran, if e.g. a drone operator were to fall into Iranian hands. The specifics of the order are not generally known, though we know that DoD states that this was due to a presidential order. This article discusses targeted killing from a legal perspective. In the context of war, killing is legal though not entirely unregulated. There was a failed attempt to sue the US in the case Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, which involved a targeted killing of a US citizen involved in planning terrorist attacks, a suit which was dismissed. One problem is that the suit "failed to state a 4th Amendment claim", and also failed to state a 5th Amendment due process claim since Al–Aulaqi's deaths was unanticipated. The court notes that a Bivens claim allows damage action against a federal officer for violation of clearly-established constitutional rights. However, No case has discussed precisely whether a plaintiff can proceed on a Bivens action that claims deprivation of life without due process based on the overseas killing by United States officials of a U.S. citizen deemed to be an active enemy. In the discussion, the question arises whether special circumstances counsel hesitation (Doe v. Rumsfeld and citations therein), which the Doe court notes would "require a court to delve into the military's policies", and they will not do that lightly. All of this is about US citizens. Soleimani was not a US citizen. | In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest. | Yes, although whether you get any response depends on a lot of factors. Specific, credible threats are much more likely to get a response than "I'm gonna kick your ass, amphibient, you (insert opposing viewpoint/sports team/etc)." The law broken in question would be: 18 U.S. Code § 875.c: Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. As you are in different states, this would need to be reported at a national level. This would be done at https://www.ic3.gov/complaint/default.aspx. Whether or not this is the best option depends on what you hope to accomplish and whether the other person is likely to act on those threats. | The IRS Criminal Investigation division is typically going to be the arresting agency, assuming that (1) the offense is treated as a criminal matter; (2) a warrant is actually issued; and (3) anyone actually sets out specifically to serve the warrant. It is usually the case, though, that the violation is handled as a civil matter. When it is treated as a criminal violation, the defendant and the Service often reach an agreement that eliminates the need for an arrest. If there is a warrant, though, any police agency could theoretically make the arrest if they happened across the defendant. But if it's a time-sensitive investigation -- if the defendant is expected to flee or destroy evidence, for example -- it's a safer bet that you'll see an actual warrant execution. In that case, you would have CI taking the lead, perhaps with assistance from other agencies. | The definitive answer to the question "could I be charged" is always YES. I refer you to the Manassas City teen charged with child pornography. Child pornography laws were put in place to protect children and prevent them from being exploited by having sexual pictures of them taken and distributed. In this case, the picture in question is of the young man’s own genitals, which would make him both the perpetrator and the victim. Apparently the lead detective in the Manassas City teen's case was himself a pedophile and just wanted an excuse to use force to photograph the teen's erect penis. Why would you assume this "girl" is a "17 year old girl" or a "15 year old girl" and not a 39 year old pedophile Manassas police officer? | So for your first question, yelling "Stop Thief" loudly at the thief is perfectly legal (Like Yelling "Fire" in a crowded theater, it's legal if the theater is infact, on fire... the quote implied that it was a prankster who drew amusement from the reaction of the people who took him seriously). This may alert store employees, who have a specific kind of Citizens Arrest Power known as "Shopkeeper's Privilege" and is a reduced liability compared to Citizens Arrest. This is also pretty basic self defense agains people who are not engaged in any physical action against you but are starting to scare you. Suddenly shouting draws attention to you and discourages them from their behavior "I SAID DON'T TOUCH ME" being suddenly shouted in a Wal Mart is going to get notices from the immediate crowd drawn to you, and by poximate location, the person who is making you uneasy. For your second question, maybe, it depends... since the cop is clearly chasing the guy, you meet the qualification to use non-deadly force in stopping the criminal (i.e. you are witnessing a person committing a crime, in this case, resisting arrest or persuit) and it would certainly be reasonably non-deadly force if you were to trip, grab, or push the fleeing suspect. Citizens Arrest doesn't specify a minimum time to qualify, so if the officer is seconds behind, and you detain the criminal in this action until the gap is closed, it still counts. | Publishing government records is pretty classic First Amendment-protected activity. Keeping in mind that one can find a lawyer to sue for anything, I think that person would likely be operating well within the law. One thing in particular that I'd recommend staying aware of is how one might attempt to monetize this endeavor. There have been a lot of sites publishing arrest records, court records, and mugshots, and then charging people to have them removed to keep them from popping up in a Google search for those people's names. That is -- rightly -- regarded as sketchy behavior; while several states have passed laws prohibiting that business model, I don't believe any such law exists in Washington State at this point. |
What constitutes a “Rule 69 agreement” after a judge has issued a final ruling and required mediation? The context is in Arizona and I'm wondering how can a party prove an agreement existed. | It has to be in writing To prove it exists you can point to it and say “that’s it”. Further, to be valid it must be stated on the record in court or before a Judge Pro Tem, before a court reporter, or any other mediator or settlement conference officer appointed by the court to conduct a settlement conference. They’ll have a copy of it. | The judge would be required to recuse himself in that case, subject to the exception that applies when all judges with jurisdiction over the case would otherwise be disqualified. Generally a judge must recuse in cases in which the judge as a personal interest in the case (roughly speaking the same kind of interest that would give the judge standing to participate as a party in the case), or when the judge has personal ties to the parties or their counsel that would create an appearance of impropriety. The controlling provision of Colorado's Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11, which is typical, and its official commentary, states: RULE 2.11. Disqualification (A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances: (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding. (2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is: (a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or trustee of a party; (b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or (d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. (3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, child, or other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding. (4) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy. (5) The judge: (a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association; (b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy; (c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or (d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court. (B) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic interests, and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse or domestic partner and minor children residing in the judge's household. (C) A judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record the basis of the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel, whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court personnel, that the judge should not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated into the record of the proceeding. (D) In limited circumstances, the rule of necessity applies and allows judges to hear a case in which all other judges also would have a disqualifying interest or the case could not otherwise be heard. OFFICIAL COMMENT [1] Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (5) apply. The term “recusal” is sometimes used interchangeably with the term “disqualification.” [2] A judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed. [3] The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. The rule of necessity is an exception to the principle that every litigant is entitled to be heard by a judge who is not subject to disqualifications which might reasonably cause the judge's impartiality to be questioned. The rule of necessity has been invoked for trial court and court of appeals judges where disqualifications exist as to all members of the court and there is no other judge available. It has been invoked as to the supreme court when all or a majority of its members have a conflict of interest; the importance of having the court render a decision overrides the existence of the conflict, which might otherwise leave litigating parties in limbo. Under the rule of necessity, a judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. In matters that require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the record the basis for possible disqualification and make reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable. Rather than deny a party access to court, judicial disqualification yields to the demands of necessity. [4] The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is affiliated does not itself disqualify the judge. If, however, the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned under paragraph (A), or the relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be substantially affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)(c), the judge's disqualification is required. [5] A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification. [6] “Economic interest,” as set forth in the Terminology section, means ownership of more than a one percent legal or equitable interest in a party, or a legal or equitable interest in a party of a fair market value exceeding $5,000, or a relationship as a director, advisor, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that: (1) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities, or of securities held in a managed fund, is not an “economic interest” in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund; (2) securities held by an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization in which the judge or the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child serves as a director, officer, advisor, or other participant is not an “economic interest” in securities held by the organization; (3) the proprietary interest of a policy holder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositer in a financial institution or deposits or proprietary interests the judge may maintain as a member of a mutual savings association or credit union, or a similar proprietary interest is an “economic interest” in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest; and (4) ownership of government securities is an “economic interest” in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities. The general rule of 2.11(A) and also 2.11(A)(2)(c) would apply in this case. | The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary. | Law does not have an all-encompassing syntax and structure that, if not followed, makes it null and void. If a reasonable person could determine that (in the example of the sign you have) you are required to get written permission from any or all of the Paulding County Commissioners, then the sign is enforceable. I honestly don't see anything wrong with the sign you are displaying, it is reasonably clear. If, for example the notice contains an ambiguity or unclear phrase, the "spirit" of the law or sign is upheld. If the sign had said something to the effect of "No trespassing without permission". It doesn't say who you need permission from, but you can reasonably ascertain that you must have permission from somebody in control of the land. There is no line in the sand here. Often when a dispute in a contract comes up where it could be interpreted more than one way, it is often interpreted in favor of the person who did not write the contract. "Offer ends October 30 or while supplies last" Isn't really "ill-phrased" either. I assure you that those statements are vetted by highly paid lawyers from many jurisdictions. I'm not sure what "nonsense" you would be referring to in there. If the vendor runs out of promotional materials the promotion ends... If they had said "free hats to the first 100 customers on December 31st", you can't show up as the 101st customer and demand a hat, nor could you show up on January 1st (even if there were not 100 customers the previous day) and demand one either. | In general, the express terms of the lease signed supersede all prior negotiations of the parties, except to the extent that the particular language in question in the lease is ambiguous. This is called the parol evidence rule (which is the law in all U.S. jurisdictions although it has been expressly rejected in Israel). The parol evidence rule expressly makes a written agreement supersede a verbal agreement, rather than making them equally valid. Also, even if both agreements had been written, generally speaking, the last and final version of the agreement will supersede earlier versions of the agreement. The best defense would be along the lines of fraud-in-factum or fraudulent inducement, i.e. that this term was slipped into the final draft in a manner expressly intended to mislead the signing party about what was being signed. I've won one case where this happened (where there was extensive email correspondence between business lawyers regarding the changes that would be made in each draft and there the version signed did not correspond to the last version signed electronically in a very long document on paper and there were other indicia of fraud), but by far the more common outcome is to bind the party signing the document (especially in a commercial context) and to consider failing to carefully read all terms of the final draft to be negligent on the part of the party signing the contract. Arguably, there might also be a malpractice claim against the lawyer for the tenant for missing this change in a material term before the contract was signed. | Dale is right; here are the details from CA statutes: Since 1872, CA law has told CA courts to assume the parties to contracts in CA are reasonable, not crazy. If the literal reading of the contract is crazy, the California Civil Code's rules for the Interpretation of Contracts tells its courts: ignore the crazy reading. Here is what the statute says: § 1636 A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful. To win under this section, you would need to claim that both you and the landlord intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. No judge would believe this. § 1637 For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties to a contract, if otherwise doubtful, the rules given in this Chapter are to be applied. To win under this section, you would need to claim that there is no doubt that both you and the landlord intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. Again, no judge would believe this. § 1638 The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity. To win under this section, you would need to claim that it was reasonable that the landlord would pay the late fee. Again, no judge would believe this. § 1640 When, through fraud, mistake, or accident, a written contract fails to express the real intention of the parties, such intention is to be regarded, and the erroneous parts of the writing disregarded. To win under this section, you would also need to claim that both you and the landlord really intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. Since no judge would believe this, any judge would rule that the wording was a mistake, and should be disregarded. § 1643 A contract must receive such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the parties. Ditto. | This is a Federal court decision There are no state courts involved. This was a ruling by the presiding judge of the original trial There is no appeal involved because the case wasn't final. This is a ruling on a Motion for Judgement of Acquittal Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure spells this out: After the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The court may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with the trial (where the motion is made before the close of all the evidence), submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict. | There is no absolute rule in such cases. It is often a matter of negotiation between the state and federal authorities, and failing agreement, a matter of which authority has the prisoner in custody. Often the question of which crime is more serious or carries a longer sentence is an issue in such negotiations. |
Agreement to policies provided by a website link: today's version or any future version? If I am asked to sign something saying that I agree to follow the policies that are provided from a website link, does that mean I'm agreeing to whatever the state of that website is on the day I'm signing, or any and all future updates to that website? It doesn't specify either way: neither "as of the date of signing" or "any and all future updates" is written. I'm not sure if that type of "blank slate" agreement is legal. This is in USA. | does that mean I'm agreeing to whatever the state of that website is on the day I'm signing, or any and all future updates to that website? That type of "blank slate" agreements is lawful and it means "the conditions of which you are made aware", hence the terms as of the date you entered the agreement. To supersede that meaning, the agreement would need to be explicit about referring to "any and all futures updates to that website". Your willful agreement of unknown future updates is described in Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 154(b) as [the party being] aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts [...] but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient You might want to save a copy of the terms if you are concerned that the counterparty might unilaterally change the terms and allege that your acceptance was in reference to those. | This depends very much on the nature of the agreement, and whether it affects the client's rights and obligations. It may also depend on which US state this is in. If the agreement is "We will hold the negotiating meetings at your office instead of mine." the client's rights are not affected and the client probably has no veto. If the agreement is "Yes we will plead guilty to manslaughter." it isn't valid without the client's consent. If the client is giving up any rights or making any significant concessions, then the client's consent is probably required, but I can give no better answer without an indication of the subject of the agreement. | You're under 18, so you're viewed as a minor under the law, and as such, you can't agree to and sign legally binding contracts. The TOS for the applications are agreed to by your parents by default, because your parents are responsible for you and have no choice in parental guardian-type duties, such as education. Agreeing to the software TOSs may also be done for all student users by the school with their software site license(s) and under an agreement with your parents; ask for and read any written policies the school has. And, you don't have a say in data handling at your school; that will be another school policy for data and network security, and hopefully a policy exists. If a policy exists, it will set by the school board and it will respect a variety of local, state and federal laws. That said, you can approach the school board and outline your concerns and ask to take tests and assignments with pencil and paper. But they are not obligated to change policies for you or make accommodations, other than established accommodations required by law, such as under the ADA act. Once you're 18, you can fight the power. Until then, you're a minor. | An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA. | The essential parts of a trade secret are that (a) it is something that you keep secret, and (b) something that gives you an advantage in trade because you know it and others don't. A trade secret remains a trade secret if you give it to someone else under a non-disclosure agreement. If it is available where anyone can download it, either intentionally or by carelessness, then it isn't a trade secret anymore (as soon as it actually gets downloaded). If it gets made public through some illegal activity, well, that's too complicated for me. Anyway, YOU don't have to pretend anything. A claim that something is a trade secret doesn't make it one. And if something is a trade secret, no claim about it is necessary. If you download the software without doing anything illegal then it isn't a trade secret. To reply to the comment: If the sequence of events is this: I download the source code. I read the license. The license says "by using the software ..." then clearly I have the source code before using the software. At that point the trade secret status is lost. We don't need to discuss whether the license would have been enforcible, because the software is already downloaded before the license starts applying. I can tell anyone in the world about it. (I can't give the software to anyone, because that is copyright infringement, a totally different matter). | However, this uses the text "rights in an invention"; does that cover copyright? Yes. (Is this the correct law?) It certainly seems to be. Does "Relate … to the employer's business" cover the entirety of software engineering, or just the particular software engineering my employer does? Imagine that you work for a company that writes trading software. In your spare time, you develop a photo editing tool. Do you think a court would find that your project "related to the employer's business"? I do not. Or does my employer own copyright on everything down to the love letters I write? Google does not own everything their employees create; they only claim to. If someone challenged them on it, a court would decide, and probably not in their favor. | The written document is given very high priority, so parties will be held to what is in the document. Both parties sign at the bottom, as a way of signalling their agreement with the terms specified in the document. If conditions are added or subtracted (by crossing out), especially with pre-printed forms, the "customer" (person who didn't write the contract) can initial such modifications, as a way of clearly signalling that they indeed agree to the deletion of such-and-such clause. Since both parties have a copy of the signed agreement, this is not strictly necessary. The potential issue would be that an unscrupulous person could cross out a clause after the contract was signed, and claimed that they aren't bound by that clause. A comparison of the two copies would then reveal that the unscrupulous person was attempting fraud. There is nothing special about handwriting in or crossing out conditions, except that it poses a potential evidentiary problem as to what exactly was agreed to, if for example one party threw away their copy and then maintained that the crossed-out clause had not been crossed out. (So, keep your copy). In case you are proposing a scenario where one party is unaware of a change, i.e. at the very last minute Smith crosses something out and signs it, and Jones did not see that happen, then both copies would be the same and Jones would be legally bound to what's in the paper. Smith should announce to Jones that a clause was being deleted. We might suppose that there are innocent reasons why Smith made changes without making an announcement to Jones, in which case the parties do not have an agreement. There may be amicable ways to deal with that situation, but push could come to shove, in which case the written form of the document is generally taken to be the most important piece of evidence (though not always the only admissible evidence, unless you're in Colorado, Florida or Wisconsin). | Written promise pre-purchase vs signed agreement, what's stronger? The signed agreement is decisive because it "states that it supersedes any previous agreements". The language portrays that the customer no longer considers the refund option a requirement for moving forward with the transaction. Signing that contract without the right to a refund releases the supplier from having to do good on his previous promise. what about false advertising? There is no false advertising. False advertisement is the supplier's act, whereas the subsequent waiver --by signing the agreement-- is the customer's act. The fact that the customer's informed decision benefits the supplier has nothing to do with false advertising. |
What is the US constitutional basis for impeaching, trying and barring from future presidency a former US president? What is the US constitutional basis for the following actions? Impeaching and trying a former US president? Barring a former US president from elected a president in the future? | I would argue the Constitutional basis of these actions would be the Constitution itself, namely Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. and Article I, Section 3, Clause 7: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Note also, that as Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers, the Impeachment process was a check brought over from England (it predated the formation of Britain by several centuries) as a check on Executive (read Monarchal) power of royal appointments, including Judges. So, to answer your questions directly: Serving out one's term or resigning is not a shield to impeachment, otherwise one could simply play "whack-a-mole", appointing the same individual repeatedly (which is also why future barring of the individual from governmental office is an option). The purpose of impeachment is, per Hamilton, to react to "political crimes"; "mundane" crimes are to be handle by the normal judicial system. Nixon did famously resign rather than be impeached, but he was barred from running again anyway, having served two terms as President. Congress at that time chose not to continue the impeachment process after his resignation (note that disqualification is an option, but not required, punishment that can be levied by Congress in the event of impeachment). See Article I, Section 3, Clause 7, quoted above. | Impeachment is unique in that it is a question of politics, not a question of law, that is being discussed at trial. The other exception is that the Senate, not the Supreme Court, is the High Court of Impeachment (that is, legal precedence is based on what the Senate says, not what the Supreme Court or any other appellant court says). There are a few minor details, but the main part of the trial will play out like a criminal trial, with the Managers (people named by the house to argue the case) taking the role of the Prosecution and the Senate as the Jury. Because the trial is purely political in nature, a jurist decision to on the matter before evidence is presented at trial is entirely legal. It's actually perfectly legal to have your own opinion prior to trial start in a normal criminal jury and to vote on that ground... but the attorneys will dismiss you from the pool if they find even a hint of this. Unlike the judicial system, the jurists of Impeachment Trial are the same 100 people (presently) and cannot be dismissed for any reason, including comments about how they will find in the trial. Jury Fixing or tampering is when the decision a jurist makes is colored by some outside motivation to the jurists own convictions (i.e. the crime boss has your family and won't kill them if you find his hired goon innocent.). It could be an issue if a senator was given some pork to vote against his/her choice, but Impeachment is incredibly rare in the U.S. system and there hasn't been any case where this was an issue (If Articles of Impeachment are brought, this will be the 20 case to reach the trial stage since the adoption of the Constitution, and the 3rd for a President.). | Although the constitution doesn't explicitly require your vote to be equal in strength, surely the founders intended with the word 'vote' that you at least get to choose who you vote for. Quite the contrary. The founders specifically intended that smaller states should have disproportionate strength - they knew exactly what they were doing. This was one of the major design goals of the Constitution and is reflected in several other areas (e.g. the structure of the Senate); the smaller states wouldn't have agreed to join the Union if such concessions hadn't been made. There's a general principle in law that "the specific overrides the general". You're not going to get anywhere by trying to read into the word "vote" when there is explicit text saying something different. If the founders intended the word "vote" to imply "equal power for everyone", then why would they have specified, in great detail, a system which does exactly the opposite? For that matter, the founders didn't particularly intend that the people be able to vote for president at all! Article II, Section 1 says only that "each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors..." There is no requirement that the state should hold an election to determine the appointment of the electors. According to Wikipedia, five states initially had the electors chosen by the state legislature, without having the people vote at all, and South Carolina continued to use this system until 1860. The 14th Amendment, section 2, appears to require that all eligible voters (male and 21 at the time, since modified by the 19th and 26th Amendments) be allowed to vote for their electors, but even there the wording is "any election" which appears to leave open the possibility of having no election at all. (It hasn't been tested as far as I know.) I think that your proposed lawsuit would be quickly dismissed, possibly as "frivolous". | The answer is as simple as the fact that the President of the US is a civilian and citizen, and keeps his/her full rights to free speech and free press as guaranteed under the First Amendment. The military necessity exception is a somewhat surprising exception to the general proposition that you have a protected right to express any viewpoint whatsoever, but also is not relevant to POTUS who is not subject to UCMJ. Just as a plain old citizen has the unfettered right to express ridiculous and fundamentally dangerous ideas, news media have the unfettered right to express ridiculous and fundamentally dangerous ideas, as do politicians including POTUS. Plain old citizens can be "punished" for their views by shunning, news media can be "punished" by customers unsubscribing, and politicians can be "punished" for their views by being voted out of office, or not being voted in. That is the only legal limit on expression of viewpoint possible in the US. | The pardons would stand and continue to be valid. There is a minority view that the "except in cases of impeachment" language in the pardon clause of the U.S. Constitution deprives a President of the pardon power after impeachment until there is a U.S. Senate non-conviction. But the majority view is that this clause merely states that the loss of political office and prohibition on seeking future political office resulting from a U.S. Senate conviction in an impeachment trial cannot be removed via the pardon power. In the majority view, a President has all of the powers and authority of the office, including the pardon power, until the moment of a U.S. Senate conviction following a impeachment by the U.S. House (or the end of his term of office due to resignation or expiration of the President's term of office). Neither view, of course, has ever been resolved authoritatively in the courts because it has never come up before historically. Also, a group pardon would not absolve the President himself of criminal liability. The majority view (again never tested because no President has ever attempted to do so) is that a President may not pardon himself at all. But all other persons who benefit from the pardon would be relieved of criminal liability as a result. | Yes, here is an example. Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon: Now, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States, pursuant to the pardon power conferred upon me by Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution, have granted and by these presents do grant a full, free, and absolute pardon unto Richard Nixon for all offenses against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period from January 20, 1969 through August 9,1974. But he was not charged with anything. | Yes. US Constitution, at Article two, Section two, provides that the President has the power to nominate the justices and appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate. There is nothing restricting the President from doing this on any particular day from beginning to end of his term, and also no restriction on when the Senate may give their advice and consent. | TL;DNR: Madison, Hamilton, Justice Harlan & Justice Scalia agree with you. Justice Black does not. You raise an interesting question. As you point out, the Qualifications Clause, Art I, § 2.1, (those who vote for the House of Representatives “in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature”) gives states the power to establish voter qualifications. Yet 18 U.S.C. § 611, passed as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, (the IIRIRA) makes it illegal for most aliens to vote in federal elections. What gives? First, the IIRIRA is purely symbolic. It literally has no effect on who can vote in the US. For almost a century, every state has prohibited aliens from voting in state elections. Under the Qualifications Clause, this means no aliens can vote in federal elections. (Before WWI, many states allowed aliens to vote.) Second, some people argue Congress has control over voter qualifications under the "Elections Clause," Art. I, § 4.1, which gives Congress the power to regulate the "Times Places and Manners of holding elections." Like Dale M, these people read, "Manners of holding elections” to include the qualifications for voting. This reading of the Elections Clause is inconsistent with several of the sources of constitutional authority Americans typically consult, including the text, the intent of the Founder and precedent. All of these support the “Qualifications Clause” reading of the Constitution. 1) Constitutional Text: Reading the Elections Clause as giving Congress control over voter qualifications, renders the Qualifications Clause almost completely meaningless. Yet everyone agrees the Constitution should be read so that all its parts mean something – no part should be rendered superfluous. 2) Intent of the Founders: When the Founders debated voting qualifications, they were clearly worried that politicians would manipulate the electoral rules to favor them. The Founders believed the Qualifications Clause kept both national and state politicians from stacking the electoral deck. First, by giving the power of deciding who could vote to the states, the Clause prevented national politicians from choosing their own electorate. Secondly, by requiring the states to use the same qualifications for voters in state and national elections, the Clause prevented state politicians from manipulating the rules in national elections. As for the Electoral Clause, in Federalist 60, Hamilton was clear who controlled voter qualifications: “The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen…are unalterable by the [federal] legislature…” 3) Precedent and practice: For most of our history, people acted consistently with Hamilton’s statement. They tolerated a wide variation in who was allowed to vote across states. As noted above, many of those states specifically allowed aliens to vote. (And, starting in 1787 with the passage of the Northwest Ordinance, Congress passed a series of laws allowing aliens to vote in territories.) When Americans did make nationwide changes to voting qualifications, they did so by amending the Constitution. There are only a handful of Supreme Court decisions involving federal control over voting qualifications. In 1970 the Supreme Court upheld a federal law changing the voting age to 18. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Black, relied on the Elections Clause to say that Congress had the power to change voting requirements. None of the other Justices shared Black's views on the Elections Clause. Instead, they agreed with Justice Harlan, who said, “nothing” in the Constitution, “lends itself to the view that voting qualifications in federal elections are to be set by Congress.” (These Justices used the Equal Protection Clause as the basis for federal control over voter qualifications.) Since then, no Justice has followed Justice Black. Instead, they have followed Justice Harlan. For example, in 2013, Justice Scalia, (in an opinion joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy, Roberts, and Sotomayor) said, “the Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in them.” From this evidence, I’d say you were right to be puzzled about the constitutional authority for the IIRIRA. A federal law preventing aliens from voting in federal elections undermines the text of the constitution by rendering the Qualifications Clause superfluous, goes against the clear intent of the Founders, and is inconsistent with 200+ years of history and precedent. It only survives because it has no practical effect on voting in the US. |
Is begging a laid-off employee to stay an offer of employment? About a month ago, I asked a question over on Workplace. TL;DR: I was informally told I was being laid off, but when I asked HR about rights and benefits, they were totally unaware of any layoff. Looks like I was right to be suspicious, because there was no layoff. Now my immediate supervisor is begging me to "extend" my employment. I've already given them an extra two weeks. (I guess I'll find out on the 19th whether I'm actually being paid...) Now I'm being asked for another "extension." I've already made financial and personal decisions with the understanding that I'm being laid off. My supervisor does not have unilateral authority to make job offers. Does being asked to "extend" after being "laid off" constitute a job offer for purposes of claiming unemployment? In other words, if I refuse to be jerked around like this, have I "quit"? | If you have already claimed unemployment, this might be considered a job offer. If you have not yet field a claim, then it doesn't matter, only offers after a claim is field affect unemployment benefits to the best of my understanding. You could ask for a job offer in writing. If one is not provided, that is pretty good evidence that there never was an offer. If one is provided, you will have a clearer notice of the offered terms and duration, and that the offer is authorized, and can better judge what to do. | the company does have the right to "verify the eligibility of the person and terminate the service to the ineligible at any time" is pretty unambiguous. They have assessed your eligibility, determined you don't have one and have terminated the service. They are completely within their rights to do this. If you feel that they have assessed your eligibility wrongly then you can dispute their assessment - either through whatever dispute resolution is detailed in the contract or by going to court if the contract is silent. The fact that they previously assessed you as eligible (or didn't actually make an assessment) is irrelevant. | The legal reasons for dismissal in the UK are described here: it includes such things as being unable to do your job, redundancy, violence on the job, being sent to prison, the factory burning down. It does not include quitting. "Unfair dismissal" is described here, and it says Situations when your dismissal is likely to be unfair include if you...resigned and gave the correct notice period This page then describes recourse for unfair dismissal. §108(1) of the Employment Rights Act says that Section 94 does not apply to the dismissal of an employee unless he has been continuously employed for a period of not less than two years ending with the effective date of termination. §94(1) then says that "An employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer". §108(2) also lists numerous cases where the two-year tenure condition does not apply. Most of those reasons clearly don't apply to the act of giving notice (it includes e,g, pregnancy, whistle-blowing etc), which means that any firing because an employee is pregnant (etc.) is automatically unfair, regardless of duration of employment. §104 which is within the set of conditions that are "automatically unfair" is "Assertion of statutory right", (1)An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee— (a)brought proceedings against the employer to enforce a right of his which is a relevant statutory right, or (b)alleged that the employer had infringed a right of his which is a relevant statutory right. However, the reason for being fired in this case has nothing to do with bringing proceedings against the employer, or alleging infringement of a statutory right. As far as I can determine, being fired because you quit is not deemed automatically unfair in the sense of short-circuiting the two year employment requirement; and for an employee with less than two years of service, no justification is necessary. | There are really about three tiers of employees for these purposes. Also, the reasons are a mix of legal and business considerations. At the bottom, severance payments can be made in lieu of unemployment insurance claims being made by the laid off employees. Severance payments for workers at the very bottom are often modest. At the top, "golden parachutes" are often written into the individually negotiated employment contracts of senior executives. Someone like a Steve Jobs will have negotiated a contract very favorable to him in the event of his termination with the board of directors when he is hired with attorneys on both sides heavily involved in its drafting. In between, one of the reasons is to get a waiver of claims, for example, due to allegations of employment discrimination, harassment, and past work place related injuries that weren't properly processed through the worker's compensation system, and to reaffirm the existence of non-competition, non-solicitation, non-disclosure, non-disparagement, and assignment of intellectual property rights of the terminated employees. Being able to "dot i's and cross t's" and definitively foreclose litigation from laid off employees also looks good to stockholders and prospective investors. If severance agreements cutting off liability and ruling out the possibility that sloppy paperwork could compromise the firm's intellectual property to be compromised by disgruntled former employees who no longer have a stake in the firm's well being were entered into, a larger layoff would often be followed by a stock price lag reflecting unknown contingent liabilities and intellectual property risks from former employees. Closing off residual liability is particularly important in firms with stock or stock option compensation for a large group of employees and for firms with defined benefit pension plans. But, it goes beyond that. There is also just a sense of moral obligation on the part of senior managers establishing the severance terms to good, loyal employees who are losing their jobs of often many years through no fault of their own. Most of those senior managers were once in the same position, worked with the employees who were laid off personally, and can related to their plight. In a publicly held firm, even for insider members of the board of directors, the shareholders are an impersonal abstraction, while the laid off employees are genuine people whom the executives implementing the plan know a sample of personally. Of course, institutionally, this economy wide practice of big businesses also helps to fend off pressures from governments to impose bigger severance payment requirements as a matter of law. Substantial severance payments also discourage unionization by the employees who aren't laid off since it makes the employer look trustworthy despite not having its feet held to the fire by the law or a union. Finally, it is a given that many of the laid off employees will land on their feet finding mid- to senior level jobs in the same industry or a related industry, or starting their own firms that may do business with the firm that laid them off, either as consultants providing institutional knowledge that was lost in the layoff to due carelessness, or as vendors or joint venture partners. A stingy severance package could sow ill will towards the former employer that could come back to bite that firm later, while a generous package will rarely leave significant ill will from the former employees who find new positions whom the firm will end up dealing with later on. | In Great Britain Employees have two types of protections: contractual and statutory. It would be in breach of contract ("wrongful dismissal") for an employer to dismiss without notice for job hunting but contractually there is nothing to stop an employer dismissing for any reason if they give the notice required (which may be only a week or two, say). Statutory protection may, however, prevent "unfair dismissal" but this generally only applies if someone has been employed for at least two years. There are some exceptions - e.g. dismissal as an act of religious/racial/sex discrimination etc. is prohibited even if the employee has less than 2 years service but these exceptions do not include job-hunting. So someone who has been employed for less than 2 years could be dismissed with notice for job hunting. There are also contractual and statutory protections in Northern Ireland. The contractual ones are the same as in the rest of the UK but some of the details of the statutory protections are different from GB. | You can always complain to the county. It is not obvious from your description that you have a legal case. One reading of the circumstances is that you did not have a job offer, you went there on the assumption that you might get an official offer after being "oriented" and interviewed. The interview did not go well, so they did not give you the job. Time and travel expenses are often borne by the job candidate. The alternative interpretation is that you had an actual job offer, and you traveled to the site as part of your employment (involving some training). In that first session, things went bad, and you got fired. If that is the case, then (a) you would be owed wages for that day and (b) there is a slim chance that the firing was not legal (there could be restrictions on firing employees in government jobs, in whatever jurisdiction this is). Your attorney will guide you (after you giving a more detailed explanation of the circumstances) in understanding whether you were fired, or not hired. | Asking as such is hardly ever illegal. Any stranger can ask you to pick up their kids from school, like you always can tell them where to go. What I guess you are actually asking is whether the PI can require you to do it. No they probably cannot: it would have nothing to do with the matter of your contract or nature of your professional relationship with them. However, if they are in the position of power, they will have discretion in making decisions that will affect you. Whereas you legally can tell them where to get off, it might be good idea to attempt some interpersonal workplace tactics first. | must all interaction be through a lawyer after receiving the first letter? Consistent with others' answer, no, you don't need a lawyer. But your question in and of itself is indicative of the steep learning curve you would need to undergo in order to avoid "shooting yourself in the foot", as the saying goes. By this I am not encouraging you to get a lawyer (in fact, here on stackexchange and elsewhere I promote litigation in pro per). Instead, I encourage people to learn about the applicable statutes, procedural laws, how to conduct legal research, and to draft/present their arguments in court. Here are some suggestions regarding your response letter: Avoid sarcastic admissions such as "Right, for sure I am at fault for the employer's [fill_in_the_blanks]". If you ask for a clarification, clearly state that you expect reasonably sufficient detail as well as any and all records that substantiate the alleged damages. Although that won't strictly limit the allegations the employer can make in court proceedings, the attorney's reply might help evidencing the employer's vexatious approach later on. Avoid wording that may be misinterpreted as consciousness of guilt. Be assertive and truthful. Keep in mind the lawyer is gauging (1) how easily he can intimidate you, and (2) whether he can make additional claims to harass you via court proceedings. From now on, all your interactions with the attorney and the employer should be in writing (preferably email, given its reproducibility). When unethical individuals are aware that their position is devoid of merit, they are very tempted to indulge in false accusations (of threat, for example). Thus, communications in writing constitute objectively verifiable proof of who is acting unlawfully. Even if the attorney premises on your contract (or employment agreement/manual, or company's guidelines) the alleged damages, the clauses at issue might be illegal and therefore void. For instance, from 2007-2012 my former employer (an Indian IT intermediary) prohibited me --via contract-- to disclose my salary. The contract contained the typical lawyered babbling, but that doesn't mean that all of it was legal. In 2013 I realized that the prohibition violated Michigan law, and he had no option but to strike the entire clause. That being said, I didn't sue him for that, but for other more important matters which are currently pending review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Absent any further context in your inquiry, it is hard to make additional suggestions on how to proceed. |
Why might a landlord spend so much time at the house they're renting? How do I resolve this? Just moved into a new place... renting a single room with three other guys each renting their own rooms. Ive been here a month; they've been here for significantly longer. The landlord spends far too much time here. She doesnt live here. She isnt working on anything, she isnt doing paperwork regarding the property or tenants, not doing maintenance, etc. In fact, all she does is yoga, read, takes up space. She consumers utilities - which she doesnt contribute paying to. She rigidly dictates the common areas, furniture, storage, etc; we've basically been exiled to the bedrooms. We cant even cook in the kitchen because she's always using the oven and stove at the most inopportune times of day, yet is willing to criticize us for our microwave and canned food diets we've been forced into. And she comes over 3 or 4 days out of the week, for 6+ hours a day. Just loitering. In a place Im paying her rent to have access to, to make my home. I wonder if she'd do this if we four tenants were a single party and family of four renting the house. Cant bring guests over because either she'd be in their faces in the living room (which Ive never been able to make my space and wouldnt feel comfortable in anyway), or she'd be spying on me outside my bedroom door "cleaning" and hounding me about overnight guests. I know she technically owns the place.. but this is uncomfortable. And I feel like Im paying way, way too much in rent for what Im getting. No real house space. She wont let us use the empty garage for storage. She has keys to all of our bedrooms which Id be more or less fine with if she werent always here looking over my shoulder. I dont trust her to respect the sanctity of my bedroom, ie my privacy while Im away. Its like she doesnt trust her own tenants. Is there anything I can do? Id be willing to breach my rental contract even and argue these points in court if I had to. How do I approach someone about this disturbing behavior? I feel like the landlord has breached contract by treating us this way, depriving us of the basic amenities that comes with renting a home, consuming resources without contributing to the bills, etc. | renting a single room with three other guys each renting their own rooms means exactly what it says. What you are paying for is that room, plus shared access to the common areas. Without knowing exactly what your lease says, especially with respect to the common areas, it's difficult to give a proper answer. I suspect that the lease for your room says nothing about who can live in the other rooms. Unless the lease says otherwise, the landlord has full control of the common areas. (Compare with a large apartment building, with hallways, stairwells, lobbies, etc., which must be maintained by the landlord.) This isn't an unusual arrangement, but I've never understood why anyone, landlord or tenant, would want it. There's far too much potential for conflict. You, yourself, could be a totally obnoxious person that the other three guys can't stand, but they'd have to put up with you. Their only alternatives are to move out or to ask the landlord to evict you. Moving out would be a lot of trouble for everyone. But, depending upon jurisdiction, as long as you're paying the rent on time and not causing damage to the property, eviction could be a very difficult and long process. And eviction is hardly in the landlord's interest. It costs a lot of money and time, and might not be granted even if she did apply. Why might a landlord spend so much time at the house they're renting? I'd be concerned about the implications of a woman going out of her way to do yoga in an area rented to four men. That is the part that sounds most strange in this situation. How do I resolve this? I'd start looking for a room somewhere else. | If you are prevented from entering the property on the day the contract says the tenancy begins that is a breach of the contract. If you suffer a loss as a result of the breach, you are entitled to be restored to the position you'd be in had the loss not occurred. For example, if you had additional removal fees and a hotel bill resulting from this breach, you'd be entitled to claim those costs. Generally the landlord would be liable for this. It is no defence that the agent is unavailable to give you the keys - they should have accounted for the day being a Sunday or started the term on a day when someone would be available. I suggest getting in touch with the landlord in the first instance, civilly explain the situation and ask if they can arrange for you to enter the property on the given date - they might not know what is going on. Keep a log/diary of your communications with the agent and the landlord. Make sure you have a plan B for somewhere to stay. Call Shelter too, for free advice. | Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this. | The legal position You are quite clearly not running a business and if the matter went to court you could easily prove this be e.g. getting testimony from the people at the party, your testimony etc. In any event, your landlord can’t “fine” you. Fines are a punishment and only government can punish people. They can sue you for breach of contract for damages (which are restitution not punishment) or to seek specific performance. The practical position Take the listing down. Rightly or wrongly, it's souring your relationship with your landlord and their relationship with their HOA. Is having this mildly amusing joke worth damaging these relationships, particularly if you might want to renew your lease? The landlord might feel that they are better off with a tenant who doesn't cause them grief with their HOA. Even if your landlord understands, the HOA might not. If they sue your landlord, they will have very little choice but to join you. Yes, you will almost certainly win your day in court but you will not get reimbursed for the time and effort you had to go to. this includes taking the day off work, subpoenaing all your friends to give testimony etc. Who has time for that crap? Further, whenever you go in front of judge or arbitrator who has the power to force a resolution of your dispute, you are rolling the dice. Sure, you may think you have great evidence and the other sides' is completely bogus but if they present theirs with skill and confidence and you screw yours up then they can walk away with a win. Real court cases depend on who the judge believes. If they believe your landlord's reasonable story about running an illegal bar and they don't believe your crazy tale of it all being a joke - you lose. Remember: free speech can't be restricted but it does have consequences. Further, anyone who bases relationships on legal rights and responsibilities is going to have very shallow relationships. | The tenants have a right to the "quiet enjoyment" of the house, but the only way to enforce that is to sue the landlord, and the probable remedy is money damages, with an injunction possible. Neither of those really solves the problem here. The California Tenants Guide notes, onpages 63-4, the "Special rights of tenants who are victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking, or elder/dependent adult abuse." These special rights allow a tenant who is a victim to move out on 14 days notes without penalty, rather than a longer period that would otherwise be required. But here the tenants, it seems don't really want to move out, they want the landlord to move into an appropriate care facility. It is also not clear to me if this provision would apply when the aggressor is also the landlord. There is no simple way for the tenants to force this. They could, as interested parties, file a petition witj the proper court claiming that the landlord is incompetent to manager her own affairs, is a danger to herself and/or others, and is in need of a guardian. But such a petition is unlikely to go anywhere unless someone is wiling and able to act as a guardian, someone who would be acceptable to the court. One of th tenants would probably not be acceptable, even if one was willing. One option is to keep calling 911 on every violent outburst, and to document the violence on cell-phone videos, or in any other way possible. This might eventually lead to the police or other authority intervening in s helpful way, but that is far from assured. | Probably not, although it is impossible to say without reading the lease. Usually leases are monthly. That means you pay for the entire month or lease term regardless of how much or how little you use the property. It seems weird that the lease ends on the 21st, but if that is the case, then you are legally obligated to pay for that time interval. That said, if you want to drive a hard bargain, you could threaten to reoccupy the apartment and stay in it until the 21st which are legally entitled to do, unless he refunds you some money. You would have to be a pretty serious hard-ass to pull this off, or be prepared to go to court. One possible course of action is that you demand return of the key and say you changed your mind and will be staying in the apartment until the 21st. Make sure the conversation is recorded and that he knows the conversation is recorded, or have a witness. He will refuse. You can then sue him for denying you the use of your property. | The Supply of Goods and Services Act doesn't apply here. Section 1(1) says that the only contracts concerning goods covered by the Act are those 'under which one person transfers or agrees to transfer to another the property in goods'. A lease doesn't transfer the cooker to you: it gives you exclusive possession of a dwelling containing the cooker. The cooker remains the property of the landlord. Assuming that your lease is for fewer than seven years, the statutory provision for a landlord's repair obligations is set out in s11 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. Unfortunately this does not help you: although the landlord is responsible for maintaining the gas and electricity supply equipment, the Act specifically excludes 'appliances for making use of the supply of ... gas or electricity'. The text of your lease may have specific provisions for the repair and upkeep of the cooker, so you should read it carefully and seek advice if you are unsure. Most landlords will leave copies of the instruction manuals for installed appliances. You should ask for a copy of the manual if one was not provided and can't be found in the flat. In practical terms, you should report the fault in writing to the landlord (or managing agent if you have one), saying that you are unable to use the cooker and that it is a potential danger given that you don't understand how it works. At the very least, you should ensure that the condition of the cooker is reflected correctly on your inventory. | Are the reasons (mom can't stay because of covid-19 and the son is too young to live by himself) legally justifiable reasons? Unfortunately, not in this case. The landlord can prevail by arguing that the mom, insofar as a holder of a non-immigrant visa, knew or should have known of the risks of being denied entry in the US. In terms of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 154 (a) & (b), the mom is the "Party [who] Bears the Risk of a Mistake". Since the risks of which the mom was aware include even arbitrary ones such as the USCIS officer's discretion, an allegation of "supervening circumstances" as per the coronavirus crisis is very unlikely to add any merit to the mom's legal position. Is the 8 months compensate reasonable? Although this is admittedly subjective, at first glance it appears reasonable or perhaps even generous (the landlord is proposing the midpoint: half of the remaining 16 months) considering that the landlord is entitled to the completion of the lease. The "8 months as compensation" is essentially the landlord's proposal to settle his otherwise viable claim of breach of contract. You as lease holders can always attempt to negotiate and make alternative proposals, which is what you are doing already. Here, the landlord seeks to obviate court proceedings that can be a drag for both him and especially for the mom because she would be unable even to present her arguments in court and/or quasi-judicial proceedings. A settlement would benefit the landlord also from the standpoint that he would no longer be required to prove mitigation of damages (if that is a requirement in his jurisdiction). And, unless the settlement provides otherwise, the landlord would be free to immediately re-rent the unit without having to reimburse the mom (or the person(s) whose name is in the lease). That being said, it is important for the lease holder(s) to secure in writing (specifically in the settlement document) a statement from the landlord in the sense that, by virtue of the agreed compensation, the landlord waives any and all claims related to the early termination of the lease. It is always smart to be cautious and preclude the landlord from eventually bringing a claim alleging that the agreed compensation was for something else or that it did not fully settle the controversy(-ies). |
Child Sexual abuse - can you jail person just based on what child said? I heard this case and got interested. Relative of my acquintance got jailed because of child sexual abuse (child aged 8-9). But here is what confuses me. There is no proof whatsoever about this, no facts, or witnesses. Just what the child said to the psychologist. My question is can just the fact what child said to psychologist enough to jail person for years? How is the practice in world about this? For me this just doesn't make sense and I am also asking out of curiosity. It is in Caucasus Region. | Child Sexual abuse - can you jail person just based on what child said? Under U.S. law, yes. There is no proof whatsoever about this, no facts, or witnesses Testimony of a witness is evidence. There is a witness, the child, and another witness, the psychologist, who heard the child and testified. Those are facts and witnesses. Assuming that an exception to the hearsay rule and confrontation clause can be secured (which it certainly can for purposes of a probable cause determination to make an arrest and sometimes can and sometimes can't for purposes of a conviction), what the child said can be presented through the psychologist, which is admissible evidence. The fact that something was said by a child does not make it not evidence, nor does it make it inadmissible. The rules governing when hearsay is admissible as evidence are arcane at best and very circumstance dependent. A jury can choose to believe that any particular item of evidence is sufficiently credible to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility and weight are for a jury, not for the judge and not for an appellate court. | What can we do to dismiss such report? Does she just show up at a local police department telling them that she's fine and it was her own decision? In short, yes. She shows up at a local police station, tells her side of the story including the whole bit about things getting destroyed and her getting kicked out, cites the missing persons report, and make it clear that she's not missing but an independent adult who is free and making her own decisions. Since she's over 18, she can do that. (Bringing proof of age might be helpful.) The mystery of the missing person will be considered solved from the police side. She does not have to give a specific address where she's living, just convince the officer that she's OK and making an intentional decision to create distance between herself and her mother. She could also try calling (the same local station which is convenient to her current location) before showing up to see if that satisfies the officer, and only go in if needed. Would I get in trouble for being in a relationship with her daughter since I was 20 and she was 16? We had never met in person until now, to avoid any trouble. Shouldn't be a problem, as long as it's a mutually willing (non-coercive) relationship. Her mother said the police also wanted to talk to me separately. I do not want to get involved in this at all. Can I reject it? Yes, you can reject it. You do not have to answer ANY question a police officer asks; you have the right to remain silent and/or to say only "I have the right to remain silent." To reduce the probability that they'll even ask questions, you might prefer not accompanying your girlfriend when she goes to clear the missing persons report, if she goes in-person. This adds more weight to her assertion that she's going there to clear it of her own free will, not because you're forcing her. | Blaire Bayliss reviews the law in "The Kids are Alright 😂🍆🍑: Teen Sexting, Child Pornography Charges, and the Criminalization of Adolescent Sexuality" (2020) Colorado L. Rev. 251. The article uses the term "sexting" to mean the exchange of sexually explicit messages or images between individuals using electronic messaging. When images, this can constitute child pornography under federal law. Also (from cyberbullying.org), States that do not have a specific sexting law often rely on existing statutes when dealing with teen sexting. All states, for example, have child pornography or child exploitation laws that prohibit sending, receiving, or possessing images of a sexual nature of a minor. Bayliss notes though that some states have adapted their child pornography laws to account for teen sexting: For example, in Rhode Island, teens will not be charged under state criminal child pornography laws but may be "tried" in family court. And in Colorado, "teens who are approximately the same age and who exchange sexual images with the understanding of consent have committed a civil infraction." See Colo. Rev. Stat § 18-7-109(3). Bayliss's article and map are from 2020, but a 2022 dataset by the Cyberbulling Research Center shows not much has changed. That dataset also provides links to state-specific sexting laws where they exist. Note that no state law can exempt teens from the application of federal child pornography and related laws. Of course, if the image does not even constitute pornography, then all of the above is irrelevant, but I understand you to be asking about the circumstance where the content is typically or historically criminalized. | A problem with the question is that it uses the loaded term "victim". If you change the question to "Are there actions that you can perform involving another person, which are crimes even if the other person consents to participating in the action", then there are very many. Selling alcohol to a minor; selling heroin to anyone; selling sex in most US jurisdictions; selling firearms to a convicted felon. Also, for a physician to assist a person in suicide, in most states. Formerly in the US, various forms of sexual intercourse were acts that consent did not make legal. Whether or not the person is a "victim" in these cases is open to debate. In the case of physician-assisted suicide in Washington, the doctor is allowed to prescribe (oral) drugs that the person ingests: only a doctor is permitted to do this, both under the DWD Act and as a consequence that only a doctor can prescribe the drugs. There seems to be a belief that it is a crime to assist a person in committing suicide, which is probably correct if the assistance is shooting the person in the head, or in general directly causing the death (thus, "I give you permission to shoot me in the head" doesn't cut it). But from what I can tell, it is not generally against the law in Washington to help a person who commits suicide (e.g. supplying the means of self-dispatching). In some countries, suicide and helping with suicide is illegal, e.g. in Kenya Penal Code 225 says Any person who (a) procures another to kill himself; or (b) counsels another to kill himself and thereby induces him to do so; or (c) aids another in killing himself, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for life. No exception is created if the person consents to being aided to kill himself. | I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case. | If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment. | The Miranda warning only has to be given to a person being interrogated in custody, and on the premise that the wife is not in custody, the police do not need to read her the warning. Therefore, anything she says can be used against her, or somebody else, unless there is a separate reason why the statement could not be used. The wife may invoke the spousal testimony privilege, in which case she cannot be compelled to testify against the husband. The officer could theoretically testify that the wife said "I washed blood out of his clothing", but this is an assertion made by an out-of-court declarant to prove the truth of the question at hand, i.e. hearsay. There are numerous exceptions to the definition so that in some cases, the statement would not be hearsay. If the wife refuses to testify, that cuts out half of the exceptions, but maybe the wife is a co-conspirator. | In the US, only a few states allow conjugal visits by prisoners: California, Connecticut, New York and Washington. Details of implementation for Washington are here (it is called "Extended Family Visiting"). There are various limitations, for example you can't have committed homocide within the last 5 years, you can't be on death row, and so on. Although they don't explicitly say you can have sex, you can, and they have (a small sample of) contraceptive and STD-preventing technology for prisoners to avail themselves of. If you fail to take advantage of contraceptives, then yes it is possible. There is no provision pertaining specifically to mass murder. |
Do I need a license to play music on free internet radio? I want to make an internet radio station where I play music I like. If there are no adds and I don't make any money whatsoever, do I need to worry about copyright? | Yes Playing recorded music in public is unlawful without permission (licence) from the copyright holder. Many jurisdictions allow automatic licensing by signing up with and paying for it through the authorised music organisation. | Whosampled.com is not just facts The information that a song was sampled in another is a fact. But the sample itself is not a fact! The sample is a sound file and an artistic work, for which Whosampled has most likely a license to offer, but which you under that license may not distribute. Further, the agglomerate of the whole website is more than just a mere fact, it is a database. Also, while a simple fact is technically free to reproduce, you still might contractually agree to not do certain things, like reproducing the facts. Yet, Terms of Service don't always hold water and some passages might be illegal - and thus void. | Wikipedia and you likely have no contract. If you don't have to click "I agree" to access the data, its likely there is no contract. Therefore this is a pure IP law question. The ONLY IP law issue that I see is copyright. The DATA is not subject to copyright. Only the expression of that data. So copying the html and selling that IS potential copyright infringement. Copying the data in some other format and using that is not. Finally, even if you do copy the full html (i.e. full expression), this MAY be licensed by their terms of use (as you suggested they have licensed some content). That is a more particularized legal question that I can't answer here. | Under United States law, copyright is normally held by the creator of a work. There is one major exception to this rule: the "work for hire." If something is considered a "work for hire" under the copyright statutes, the copyright is held by the employer. Whether something qualifies as a work for hire is a complex analysis: here is a Copyright Office circular covering some of the basics. To be clear, I'm not giving an opinion (and I don't have enough information to give an opinion) on whether any specific works you or your fiance may create or commission qualify as "works for hire." It's a narrower test than you probably think it is. If the work is not a work for hire, the copyright holder owns the copyright, and anyone else can use it only with a license from the copyright holder. A license can be implied by the parties' behavior and communications--but it shouldn't be. If you're in a situation where you need to know, for example: That you are allowed to use the artwork forever, and the artist can't ask you to stop later; That you are allowed to change the artwork if you need to, even a simple change like cropping or adding a filter or text; or That, if your product is successful, the artist won't be able to sell another license to someone else to compete with you; then you need a written contract spelling out who owns the copyright and what the rights of the other party are. A lawyer can draw up a simple, re-usable form contract for you cheaply that will prevent the problems you're worried about. Remember: even if this is a work-for-hire situation, if you need to prove that down the road, it may require a trial, or at least preliminary motion practice, to do so. That's a lot more expensive than getting your ducks in a row now will be. tl;dr: Get a lawyer. If you're in a major city, there may be a local arts law organization that will provide you with free help for a simple job like this one. (Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts operate in several East Coast cities, and I know many top commercial lawyers who do pro bono for them). | No. Copyright does not have exemptions for obsolete works, use with credit, or non-commercial use. Depending on the purpose for the distribution, this could be fair use, but it is unlikely that a court will consider this fair use when the only reason is for other people to be able to play games. Perhaps you could try contacting Adobe; it's possible that they will give you a license to distribute the Flash Player. This isn't directly relevant to the legal aspect of copying Adobe's Flash Play, but to answer the underlying issue of legally playing Flash games, perhaps you/others could try Gnash, a libre reimplementation of Flash. I have not used it, but apparently Gnash can run some Flash software without using Adobe's player. | It seems that you don’t understand what parody is. If you do understand, please explain how it’s even possible to parody computer code. What you can do with “open source” code depends on the licence the copyright holder(s) release it under. For some very permissive licences you can do what you suggest, for most, you can’t. | It would seem that your song is a derived work. You took the original work and found words that sound the same. If the original work had used different words, your work would have ended up differently. So you have a derived work. Same as making a translation; if the original was different, then the translation would be different, so the translation is a derived work. I was asked "How is this not straight up infringement". But it is. Not only copying is an exclusive right of the copyright holder, but also the creation of derivative works. | The terms transfer IP rights only for the New IP, meaning that Customer would own the new stuff. Developer will still own their old stuff, but Customer will have the right to use the old stuff, depending on the license terms. If the license is as in your link, then it is forever (but this is a stub, so I assume that the license will be more specific and possibly restrictive). You retain all your rights to old stuff, customer will not pay royalties for the old stuff, and they can transfer or extend the license, or part of the license, to others. |
Do NYS healthcare providers have a legal time limit to get your medical test results to you? United States (New York state) here. My wife got some bloodwork done at her doctor's office a few weeks ago, and she confirmed last Monday (2/2/21) with their office that the results were back, but the office secretary couldn't read her the results. Instead she has to wait for a nurse to call her back to read the results. She has called every 2 days since then and not only do the nurses not call back, but the office secretary keeps telling her that they are backlogged with work and that they will call when they can. I understand these are trying times, but 7 business days to make a call and read some results? Are there any NYS or Federal laws (HIPAA, etc.) that compel healthcare providers to give you your results within a set timeframe of the results being available? If so, what specific law/subsection/etc. is this, what are its terms and can someone provide a link to it? | According to this HHS.gov web page: Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, a covered entity must act on an individual’s request for access no later than 30 calendar days after receipt of the request. If the covered entity is not able to act within this timeframe, the entity may have up to an additional 30 calendar days, as long as it provides the individual – within that initial 30-day period – with a written statement of the reasons for the delay and the date by which the entity will complete its action on the request. See 45 CFR 164.524(b)(2). According to This Official NY state page: Q. How long will it take to see my records? A. Once your request is received, a physician or health care facility has 10 days to provide you with an opportunity to inspect your records. The law does not provide a specific time period by which copies of medical records must be provided. However, the state Health Department considers 10 to 14 days to be a reasonable time in which a practitioner should respond to such a request. So, while a timely response is desirable, a week is less than the legally enforceable period under HIPPA. | It's not illegal to ask. Whether they can give it to you, and under what circumstances, is another, much more complicated matter. For instance, if the database contains health information covered by HIPAA in the United States, or personal information covered by laws like GDPR or CCPA, the customer's ability to share the database may be restricted, either requiring additional confidentiality obligations/use restrictions, or preventing sharing entirely. | It would merely be a "jerk move". HIPAA only applies to "covered entities": Healthcare Providers Health Plans Healthcare Clearing Houses (i.e. Paying for your health care) Business Associates of the Above) Source: CDC page on HIPAA | Yes, it’s legal Homeopathic “medicines” contain no active ingredients so they are effectively placebos. Placebo work for some patients some of the time but they don’t work if the patient knows what they are. For them to be effective they have to be kept secret. Most doctors from time-to-time and for various reasons prescribe placebos. The ethics of this practice is debatable but the legality isn’t - it’s totally legal. | If that person becomes incapacitated or is deemed unfit to make their own decisions, will I be required to be physically present (for example, to sign something) to make those decisions if called upon? While it is customary for someone making decisions as weighty as removal of life support, to come to the hospital or care facility in person and discuss the issues with treating physicians, it isn't required. When you are physically there it is easier for you to personally assess the patient's condition rather than just taking someone else's word for it, and you have more informal access to everything that is going on in terms of people coming in and out of the patient's room, providers you wouldn't have known to speak to initiating conversations with you (e.g. there is typically an ER nurse for each shift, several residents doing rounds checking on a patient, and often also an outside specialist doctor involved in the treatment team). It is also usually easy when you are physically in a hospital to locate someone knowledgable and familiar with the kinds of issues you are facing at the moment to provide spiritual and religious guidance if you feel this would help you make your decision, while your neighborhood clergy person may not have a good understanding of these issues since they don't come up as often for someone is doesn't frequently spend time around people being treated in hospitals or hospices. And, this kind of pastoral counseling requires not just religious knowledge but an understanding of the options that are being presented through the lens of what is religiously and morally important about the differences between the different options. When I was an attorney for a hospital handling these issues for the hospital, we would have been willing to work with an out of state medical power of attorney agent without their physical presence. But, the fact that this was deep in the Rocky Mountains far from other urban areas (i.e. Grand Junction, Colorado) may have influenced a willingness to be flexible since it would often take a lot of time and money for someone to arrive in person. Also, while the medical power of attorney gives a specific person authority to act, an advanced medical directive is simply a document that goes into a patient's medical record that advises treating providers of the patient's intent and doesn't actually need next of kin approval or a medical power of attorney agent's say so to implement, although better practice is to seek that consent first in case there are any reasons why that advanced medical directive might have been procured improperly from someone lacking capacity or subsequently revoked. There usually will be forms for a medical power of attorney agent to sign, not authorizing a particular medical procedure, but authorizing treatment in general and providing personal and financial information about the patient in connection with admitting that person. But, these days, hospitals are relatively comfortable with handling that paperwork via fax or scanned copies sent via email, and some of the more flexible hospitals will even accept photos of signed documents sent via text message. | There aren't any specific laws or regulations about medical charges. Instead, this is a matter of general contract law, where you have to agree. You have to consent to be treated, and a signature is taken to be evidence of consent. The law does not say that they have to ask permission for absolutely everything they do, the action just as to be in accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice among members of the medical profession with similar training and experience in the same or similar medical community as that of the person treating, examining, or operating on the patient for whom the consent is obtained This law insulates doctors from getting sued. In a situation where treatment is provided against a patient's instructions, you may have a cause of action for e.g. battery. In general, a doctor can't poke you, draw blood, make "offensive contact" etc. without consent, and consenting to one procedure does not "open the floodgates" of consent for any othre procedure. Of course, if the procedure was not performed, you obviously are not liable for the cost (and they are not liable for a non-occurring battery). This may in fact constitute gross negligence. During trial, the primary issue is likely to be whether there is proof that the procedure was expressly rejected. The doctor would probably provide the consent form, and that form may or may not indicate that the test would be conducted. It would not be surprising if the patient never saw an actual form and instead just electro-signed, having been told that this is authorization to treat. Corroborating witnesses would be helpful. From a practical perspective, especially if the billing department is being recalcitrant, this is probably a matter best handled by an attorney who would start with a formal letter summarizing the consequences of unauthorized medical treatment. | I've litigated cases like these before. The IRS enforcement reaction is swift and severe. Penalties for the employer are heavy and rarely waived. It would be rare for a business like this to stay operational long enough to issue a W-2. A business like this would probably be shut down by the IRS and have the people responsible for the payroll function, at a minimum, promptly burdened with tax liens, within four to six months. These cases also constitute a significant share of all criminal tax prosecutions. The odds of someone doing this spending several years in federal prison is high. Generally speaking, if the wrongdoing is fully on the part of the employer without the collusion or knowledge of the employee, the IRS will not force the employee to double pay the taxes that should have been withheld by the employer in this situation. Instead, this IRS will try to recover the amounts that were withheld from the employees but not delivered to the IRS. It will seek to recover these amounts from the employer and also from other responsible persons in the organization (and from outsourced professionals) with the authority to pay the IRS who did not do so. There may be circumstances, if push comes to shove, where the IRS could collect from the employees in a case like this one (I've never had occasion to need to research that issue), but that would be the rare exception and not the rule, in practice. On the other hand, if the employer simply does not withhold taxes or prepare W-2s at all, and either 1099s people who should have been classified as employees (or files no information tax returns at all), the IRS will generally insist that the employee pay income taxes on the full amount owed and that they pay the employee part of payroll taxes. It will also pursue the employer for the employer's share of payroll taxes. The employer will also be jointly and severally liable for any taxes that should have been reported and subjected to withholding that are not paid by the employee (perhaps because the employee spent all the money). Sometimes cases like this are also criminally prosecuted, but it is less common to do so. | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. |
Legality of selling transcription services on copyrighted material? I provide an audio transcription service, for which I charge according to the audio length. Mostly I receive either audios or videos that have been produced by the person or organisation that sent me the material to be transcribed, so the copyright is theirs on both the source and transcript. No problem. Sometimes, however, I get asked to transcribe material that is publically available online (e.g. podcasts or YouTube videos), and not owned by the person requesting the transcript. The transcript may or may not be for the requestor's personal use. Is it illegal for me to transcribe this sort of material? I understand that a transcript of a podcast or video is a derivative work, and only the copyright owner can authorise creating a derivative work. Thanks. | "I understand that a transcript of a podcast or video is a derivative work, and only the copyright owner can authorise creating a derivative work." You've answered your own question, at least for the US and Berne Convention (Wikipedia) signatories. | It is legal Because of the first sale doctrine a person may freely sell a copy that they legitimately own. Copyright preserves the owner's right to make copies - Copy-right; once they have made (or authorised) a copy then the physical embodiment of that copy (record, CD, DVD, book etc.) is personal property and can be bought and sold like any other piece of personal property. The prohibition on copying its contents remains. | It's not fair use. Fair use is when you do something that normally only the copyright holder can do. Playing a video game is the ordinary, intended use of the work. In the United States, ordinary use is not protected by copyright. 17 USC 106 sets out the rights protected by copyright. The include copying the work, producing derivative works, distributing the work, and so on. None of these are ordinary use. Someone could perhaps argue that you are creating a derivative work. I doubt that argument would work because you are not taking any protectable elements from the work. But if anyone did argue that, it would make sense to also argue that if that's so, your use would still be covered under fair use because it's transformative, does not substitute for the original work in any way, and takes very little of the work. | The length of a literary work doesn't determine if its use is fair use. Copyright does not cover names, titles of works, catchwords/catchphrases/advertising slogans etc. or lists of ingredients (like in a recipe or chemical instructions), however, the procedure can be copyright. The work must also be original. If the tweet copies something that already exists then there is no copyright in the tweet - if the thing that is copied has copyright protection then the tweet itself may be a violation. That said, assuming that the Tweet enjoys copyright protection, the owner will be the author: presumably the owner of the Twitter account. For anyone else to legally use it, the use must be either: Licensed by the copyright owner Fair use (USA) or Fair Dealing (most everywhere else in the English speaking world) For Item 1, the Twitter terms of service say: You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). In case you don't know what that means, Twitter gives you this plain English summary: Tip: This license is you authorizing us to make your Tweets on the Twitter Services available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. So, you can get permission from the copyright holder or from Twitter. Well, Twitter has given permission: Except as permitted through the Twitter Services, these Terms, or the terms provided on dev.twitter.com, you have to use the Twitter API if you want to reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the Twitter Services or Content on the Twitter Services. Providing you use their API, you can "reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the ... Content ..." Therefore, fair use/dealing considerations are irrelevant. | You also retain the right to license the work to others. Therefore you can sell similar rights to MusicBook and anyone else, as long as you do not grant an exclusive license (you have already licensed another party to distribute). They do not gain the right to sub-license your work. If you had executed a copyright transfer, you would have no rights to the work whatsoever (leaving out moral rights for jurisdictions that have them and where they are absolute). | Generally, it's illegal. You are creating a derivative work and you are not allowed to do that without the permission of the copyright holder. Some jurisdictions may have exceptions, such as fair use under US law. However, this generally protects uses that are intended to comment on or parody the work. It doesn't sound like that is the purpose of your image modification. NOT including: faceswaps, modifications that would shame or affect negatively the reputation of the actors on the image. That doesn't make it legal. I share it in a way that I don't make any economic profit out of it, and clearly stating that it is a modified image (not sure if inside the image, or in the caption under it) and state who is the legal owner of the original image. That doesn't make it legal, either. | I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. I would interpret the Copyright Board's interpretation in relation to tariffs when musical works copied for private use only, as the document's scope does not appear to extend beyond that. However, in BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] 3 FCR 241, a consortium of record industry corporations attempted to request confidential ISP account holder information. Essentially, the plaintiffs failed to bring adequate evidence to prove the magnitude of copyright infringement; additionally, it is specifically stated at [24-5] that: Subsection 80(1) [as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 24, s.50] of the Copyright Act provides as follows: 80. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the act of reproducing all or any substantial part of (a) a musical work embodied in a sound recording, ... onto an audio recording medium for the private use of the person who makes the copy does not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the musical work, the performer's performance, or the sound recording. Although the Copyright Modernization Act, did, in fact, introduce a number of amendments, Subsection 80 still reads as it does when the BMG case was decided. Since this case, I can find no court that has found this ruling to be invalid, and no cases which have considered and not applied this subsection. There is also Subsection 29.22 (1) (which applies to all works): 29.22 (1) It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to reproduce a work or other subject-matter or any substantial part of a work or other subject-matter if (a) the copy of the work or other subject-matter from which the reproduction is made is not an infringing copy; (b) the individual legally obtained the copy of the work or other subject-matter from which the reproduction is made, other than by borrowing it or renting it, and owns or is authorized to use the medium or device on which it is reproduced; (c) the individual, in order to make the reproduction, did not circumvent, as defined in section 41, a technological protection measure, as defined in that section, or cause one to be circumvented; (d) the individual does not give the reproduction away; and (e) the reproduction is used only for the individual’s private purposes. Subsection 80(1) creates a special exemption purely for musical works, and so the less restrictive conditions there should be found to apply to them instead. On the basis of the case above, and my consideration of the Copyright Act, I would find that reproduction of a musical work does not constitute copyright infringement, pursuant and subject to s 80(1) of the Act. | Probably not. It sounds like you've copied the complete work without any meaningful transformation. You've reduced the market for the original work by hosting your own copy. The fact that your purpose "is to share the information" doesn't really do you any good, as that is also the purpose of the original work. You're almost certainly outside fair-use territory. If you're looking for a "kosher" way to do this, the generally accepted practice is to link to the article and either paraphrase or excerpt the most relevant portions. That said, the fact that this piece came from a university may help you out. If it's a public university, it may be that its "news" articles are actually public records and not protected by copyright. For more information on how to run a fair-use analysis, see the answer here. |
Licencing restriction and first sale doctrine UK re. secondhand book Does a geographical licence restriction hold after resale as secondhand item? I have a book (in UK) that is no longer of any use to me, that I now plan to sell on, and notice that there is a restriction printed both inside and on the cover "This edition is licenced for sale only in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Circulation of this edition outside of these territories is unauthorised and strictly prohibited." Does the doctrine of first sale hold such that I can sell this on, even though that would effectively be circulating the book outside the stated territories? As I bought the book secondhand, does that serve to exhaust/limit copyright and licencing restrictions, or would any contravention of copyright/licence continue to be attached to the book, regardless of how many owners it has had? | You are not bound by any contract. You bought a physical good that the seller was barred from selling outside of the listed countries by his supplier. You did not enter a contract with the seller's supplier. Let's look the stream of commerce: Supplier of the item (Printing press) offers it. Sale with a sales limiting contract to resellers. Sale by reseller to customer without limiting contract. The first sale doctrine says, that without a form of contract, the rights of the supplier are exhausted in step 2. Even with a contract limiting the reseller's rights, step 3 exhausts any right the supplier has in the item, unless he too explicitly signs a contract. Selling an item in normal commerce is not satisfying this requirement. There already were no rights in the physical copy of the book when whoever bought the book first sold it to the second-hand seller you bought it from, and there can't be any more rights in the selling of this book gained by the original supplier unless he bought the book back from you. | You can't, in general, know whether a distributor of a work has permission to distribute, or is a pirate site. I verified that they have posted an illegal copy of a work that I created, and I know that I did not grant permission to them (or anyone) to infringe my copyright. Both hosting and downloading works without permission is a violation of copyright law, so both parties are liable. Downloaders may erroneously rely on the "I didn't know!" defense, which in the US carries no legal weight. Even so, if you download my book, it will probably cost me vastly more to sue you for infringement than the damages that I might be awarded over your infringement. Usually, copyright holders go after the pirate sites, and only rarely go after particularly egregious serial downloaders. | Copyright law regulates copying of protected material. In the US, there are no laws that specifically prohibit reading anything. It may be illegal to be in possession of something (classified material), but if it is legal to be in possession, it is legal to read. (Do not confuse "read" with "read aloud to an audience" a.k.a. perform, which is a separate copyright protection). It is not illegal to be in possession of material that was copied without permission. | In the US, the right to publish is vested in the copyright holder, who is initially the author. That right can be transferred for example by a transfer agreement, and it can be inherited just as other property can be inherited. Under the terms of the will, it is most likely that the copyright was transferred to the spouse even if the will didn not say "including all copyright". There is a small chance that it wasn't disposed of if the wording of the will is restrictive enough (for example "I bequeath all real estate and tangible property to my wife", which doesn't include intellectual property). If so, that would definitively require the assistance of an attorney, and a court proceeding to dispose of the copyright. If there was no provision under the will for copyright, then the copyright could be divided accounting to the rules of succession of your state, however, the courts would want to be persuaded that it was not his intent that his wife receive the copyright as well. Possession of the physical manuscript is largely irrelevant – it does not give the manuscript-holder the right to override copyright law, although if you are in lawful possession of the only copy of the manuscript, you may be able to thwart plans to publish. Publishers generally require decent evidence that the person submitting the manuscript does legally hold copyright, when a work is submitted by someone other than the author. | They have copyright in their additional text, and possibly in things like their visual design choices (fonts, layout etc). They may also have introduced a few deliberate typos to detect any literal copies from their version (rather as mapmakers add a few imaginary features to their maps). None of this creates any rights to the original text. You are still free to produce your own copies of the original text. Just get it from some other source so you can be sure not to include anything of theirs. | The names of such units are not protected by copyright, and never were. However their insignia would have been under Crown copyright See also Ministry of Defence Crown Copyright Licensing Information. Crown Copyright expires after 50 years for all published works, but lasts for 125 years after creation for unpublished works. Works obtained through archives, such as the Imperial War Museum, are often considered unpublished, unless they were previously published in some form. Use of an insignia on a uniform may not constitute publication. Some UK military insignia, including most current insignia, is also protected by trademark. But if the insignia are not used to advertise a product, nor to identify a product, nor in such a way as to imply sponsorship, endorsement or approval, trademark protection would not apply. In any case it is not at all clear that WWII-era insignia of now-defunct units are currently protected by trademark in the UK. If an insignia is still under copyright or trademark, the above linked licensing information describes how to apply for a license. Free licenses are available in some cases for use in books, but not, apparently, for "commercial products". | Is an article licensed under an Open Access license equivalent to a public domain work? No. Intellectual property practitioners and professors often describe copyright as "a bundle of sticks." This means that intellectual property laws grant the creator of a copyrightable work a large number of rights, and the creator can grant or deny others each of those rights individually. So, for instance, an author can grant a publisher the right to publish his or her book in one country, but not in another, or to copy it verbatim but not to alter it. The purpose of a license, any license, is to specify which of those rights pass to the licensee (the end user) and which stay with the licensor (the creator). This is true of creative commons just as it is for any other license. For example, many open access publishers publish under the Creative Commons CC-BY journal. This is an attribution license; it requires as a term of the license that you give credit to the original creator. This is something you would not have to do with a public domain work. In addition, under CC-BY, you have to include a copy of the license with each copy you distribute, and you cannot add your own copy protection to any copies you distribute. Again, these sort of restrictions do not apply to a public domain work. In short: the purpose of a license--any license--is to define the ways in which you can, or can not, use the licensed materials. Any license that contains any provisions restricting the licensee's use is going to be more restrictive, by definition, than the use of something in the public domain. | Without a license, you have no right to copy or distribute someone else's work. Suppose you copy or distribute against the terms of the license. Either you didn't agree to the license, and therefore had no right to do as you did; or you did agree and still violated the terms of the license anyway. By the law of the excluded middle (accepted or not accepted), you infringed either way. |
Is slavery Illegal in the United States? I have been bothered by the phrasing of the 13th Amendment since I first read it, in particular the bold: Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. This is less clear wording than if the bold were omitted, but was it intended to allow for slavery to continue? Clint Richardson of RealityBloger claims that this allows private correctional companies to basically be slave labor sweatshops, and compares its legal status to that of marijuana: Marijuana is illegal without a (state approved) doctors prescription, making it legal for state approved persons by state approved distributors. Slavery is illegal without a judges (the STATE’S) prescription (permission), making it legal for state approved institutions to have slaves which are state approved (condemned) individuals. Richardson claims a conspiracy between courts and prison companies, and make generally unfalsifiable accusations. Jim Liske of USA Today wrote an article titled "Yep, Slavery Is Still Legal" which also asserts that slavery is technically still a legal punishment for convicts. He slightly contradicts his title at one point: Importantly, Supreme Court decisions of the 20th century ensured that no one today is sentenced to actual slavery as a form of criminal punishment, but shades of Douglass' critique still ring true. But he does not elaborate on which court decisions ban slavery or how. In trying to determine when and how slavery was completely banned in the USA, I have come up short. Sources that assert that slavery is banned generally attribute it to the 13th amendment. Has there been any legislation or legal precedent that outlaws slavery in stricter terms than the 13th amendment? Are state governments responsible for banning it individually? Is slavery still legal in the United States? | Yes, of course slavery is illegal. "Involuntary servitude" imposed upon someone through due process of law is not slavery. This is analogous to a death sentence for a capital crime, which, because it is imposed by due process of law, is not murder. Similarly, the judicial imposition of a fine, or the forfeiture of other property, is not theft. Now, rhetorically, one can speak of the conditions of modern imprisonment as "state-sanctioned slavery," just as death-penalty opponents speak of "state-sanctioned murder" and recipients of parking tickets can speak of "state-sanctioned theft." But there's a big difference between rhetoric and the law. | Generally, the legislature is not restricted to passing laws that are a good idea. This has been remarked on by the Supreme Court (in Justice Stevens's concurrence, emphasis added): But as I recall my esteemed former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on numerous occasions: “The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws.” There are some limits: for one thing, the law must pass the rational basis test, which, while extremely favorable to the legislature (Congress could probably ban coffee consumption, for instance), does impose some limits and might result in at least some of your examples being struck down—I cannot imagine a court finding that the government had a rational basis for taxing everyone 120% of their income, for example. However, the states do have a recourse in many cases, especially if Congress were to reduce the penalties for crimes: most "common" crimes (assault, battery, murder, theft, etc.) are state crimes, so Congress wouldn't have the power to change the penalties for those. Most cases where these things become federal crimes involve conduct affecting multiple states, and the person committing the crime would likely also commit at least one state crime. States also aren't required to assist the federal government in its enforcement of federal law. For instance, quite a number of states believe that the federal prohibition of marijuana is unjust, and won't enforce those laws within their boundaries. | Although the constitution doesn't explicitly require your vote to be equal in strength, surely the founders intended with the word 'vote' that you at least get to choose who you vote for. Quite the contrary. The founders specifically intended that smaller states should have disproportionate strength - they knew exactly what they were doing. This was one of the major design goals of the Constitution and is reflected in several other areas (e.g. the structure of the Senate); the smaller states wouldn't have agreed to join the Union if such concessions hadn't been made. There's a general principle in law that "the specific overrides the general". You're not going to get anywhere by trying to read into the word "vote" when there is explicit text saying something different. If the founders intended the word "vote" to imply "equal power for everyone", then why would they have specified, in great detail, a system which does exactly the opposite? For that matter, the founders didn't particularly intend that the people be able to vote for president at all! Article II, Section 1 says only that "each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors..." There is no requirement that the state should hold an election to determine the appointment of the electors. According to Wikipedia, five states initially had the electors chosen by the state legislature, without having the people vote at all, and South Carolina continued to use this system until 1860. The 14th Amendment, section 2, appears to require that all eligible voters (male and 21 at the time, since modified by the 19th and 26th Amendments) be allowed to vote for their electors, but even there the wording is "any election" which appears to leave open the possibility of having no election at all. (It hasn't been tested as far as I know.) I think that your proposed lawsuit would be quickly dismissed, possibly as "frivolous". | Can Congress essentially pardon a violation of law through legislation? Yes. Congress has the power to retroactivity reduce the sentence for a crime for which someone has been sentenced. This was done most recently in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 that reduced excessive penalties for crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine. In the same way, when the death penalty is legislatively repealed in a state, the death sentences of the handful of people on death row at the time is often commuted legislatively. While Congress cannot impose criminal penalties on someone legislatively, which is a Bill of Attainder and constitutionally prohibited, it can single out people for special treatment in a private bill, which is a constitutional exercise of legislative power at the federal level (not every state allows private bills to be enacted due to Progressive era reforms to state constitutions). For example, private bills often eliminate the collateral effects of a criminal conviction upon a person, there is even a standard procedure for doing so, which is functionally equivalent to a Presidential pardon of the crime for that purposes (the vast majority of Presidential pardons are issued after the person convicted has served the sentence for the crime). A private bill cannot impair contract or property rights, which would be a prohibited ex post facto law. But no one other than the federal government has a legally protected interest in keeping someone incarcerated or otherwise punishing them for a crime. Crimes are prosecuted in the name of the People and victims of crimes do not have legal rights in those proceedings except as created by statute. So, this would not be an ex post facto bill or a taking governed by the Fifth Amendment for takings of property interests. And, Congress may, by legislation, determine what the federal government will do in essentially all cases where it is not expressly prohibited from doing so (some argue that there is a minimum of federal authority vested exclusively in the President in the area of foreign affairs and military affairs, but that exclusivity of power does not extend to domestic criminal justice). Basically, anything that Congress could do for everyone via a public bill, it can do for someone in particular via a private bill, unless a specific constitutional prohibition applies, and there is no such prohibition when it comes to relieving someone from a sentence or the collateral effects of a criminal conviction prospectively via a private bill. This isn't exactly equivalent to a Presidential pardon or commutation, but it is very close to one in practical effect. For a fuller, but somewhat outdated treatment of the issue, you can read this 1939 article in the California Law Review which acknowledged that legislative pardons were possible under existing law. This said, government prosecutors routinely fervently oppose any retroactive criminal legislation that reduces punishment, particularly via private laws (although some countries, such as France, have constitutional requirements to retroactively reduce the sentences of anyone currently serving time for a crime whose punishment is legislatively reduced prospectively). Private bills that constitute legislative pardons are very rare. A 2011 law review article recounts how the tool of the legislative pardon (in parallel with the executive pardon which is also used much less frequency) has fallen into disuse. Part of the decline is due to the adoption of the right to appeal from a trial court criminal convictions which did not exist in the federal system until the 1890s. Until then, the only judicial relief available from a federal criminal conviction was via a writ of habeas corpus, and that was available only on very limited grounds such as a lack of jurisdiction to conduct the trial, or the non-existence of the crime of conviction. Conviction by a jury in a court with jurisdiction of a constitutionally permissible crime was an absolute defense to the extent of the sentence imposed to a habeas corpus petition at that time. (As a footnote, the term "private bill" can be confusing. In many governments with a parliamentary system, a "private bill" means one sponsored by an individual legislator rather than the prime minister and his or her cabinet. But, in U.S. terminology, a "private bill" refers to a bill with an effect limited to one person or a small number of persons who are either identified by name or by a very narrowly defined situation.) | In the United States, no. For something to be illegal in any meaningful way, you have to be able to point to a law that makes it illegal. If there's no law to break, it's not illegal. I would wonder if your colleague was thinking about question of whether cryptocurrencies are legal tender. For something to be "legal tender," there would need to be some kind of law or regulation requiring people to accept them as payment. There is no such requirement in the United States, so Bitcoin, for instance, is not legal tender. But that doesn't make it illegal tender; it just means that people can decide whether to accept it or not. | LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision. | united-states An ex post facto law criminalizes conduct after the fact that was legal at the time, something that is prohibited under U.S. constitutional law. But, as the question states: my question is about actions that were illegal and then had changes made to them. If something is a crime in 2015 and this criminal law is violated, and the conduct is then legalized in 2016, the conduct committed while it was a crime does not cease to be punishable as a crime and may be punished criminally. Often a judge would consider the fact that the conduct was later legalized when evaluating the seriousness of the crime at a post-legalization sentencing, but a judge is not required to do so. A significant number of pardons and commutations of criminal sentences by Presidents and Governors in the U.S. involve people convicted of crimes for conduct that is now legal or is now punished less severely. But pardons and commutations are purely discretionary. As an aside, France has constitutional protections that give newly lenient treatment of crimes retroactive effect, but the United States does not. | Is blocking certain people while allowing everybody else to view some content discrimination Yes. and violate anti-discrimination laws Probably not, at least in the US. There is no federal law prohibiting "discrimination" in general. There are specific laws regarding discrimination against certain groups in certain contexts. They would probably not apply to an individual determining who is allowed to view their social media posts. That said, there are some specific contexts where this might be illegal. They would generally involve non-personal use of the account. The courts recently ruled that Donald Trump may not block people on his Twitter account, because he's using it in an official presidential capacity rather than just his individual capacity. Also, racial discrimination in housing is illegal, so if you're selling your house and you block all black people from viewing your house photos, that would probably be illegal as well. Also is not being able to consume information available on a public platform a violation against right to freedom. I'm not sure what you think a "right to freedom" would entail. But I don't think you have the right to demand that a person allow you to access their social media accounts. |
Held indefinitely for contempt of court? Tommy Gregory Thompson is a former deep-sea treasure hunter and is about to mark his fifth year in jail for contempt of court for refusing to disclose the whereabouts of 500 missing coins made from gold found in an historic shipwreck. The normal maximum to hold someone is 18 months, so we are well past that. Can the courts hold someone indefinitely for contempt of court? When would this situation be considered 'cruel and unusual' punishment? | Can the courts hold someone indefinitely for contempt of court? Yes. This is civil contempt which is imposed to compel compliance with a court order that the disobedient person has the ability to comply with, rather than criminal contempt which is limited to a set time period to punish disrespect for the Court in an instance that is over and complete. Often, it is eventually vacated on the grounds of futility (i.e. it is clear that further incarceration will not secure compliance) or mootness (e.g. when a witness refuses to testify in a trial and then the trial is completed). In the case of government officials who refuse to comply to an order directed to them in an official capacity, the government official can be released forthwith by resigning from their official post. Long periods of detention for civil contempt are most common for cases like this where someone refuses to provide the location of something of great value, or in asset protection trust type cases involving millions of dollars worth of assets where the detained person refuses to disclose hidden assets or to take the steps necessary to cause them to be turned over to a creditor or ex-spouse, and the Court has determined that the person detained is capable of doing so. Less often, it is done for quite a long time in cases involving national security secrets. Persons held in civil contempt also have fewer due process protections than persons charged with indirect criminal contempt which is just a procedurally unusual form of crime (direct criminal contempt is even more procedurally unusual and involves less due process, the person held in direct criminal contempt can be jailed or fined for a set period of time summarily by a judge without a hearing for disrespectful conduct in the judge's physical presence with only a brief few seconds opportunity to speak up for himself or herself without a right to counsel in response before being punished). When would this situation be considered 'cruel and unusual' punishment? No. Cruel and unusual punishment applies to punishment for wrongdoing. Civil contempt isn't designed to punish wrongdoing. It is calculated to secure compliance going forward with a lawful court order with which the person incarcerated has the ability to comply. In a case of civil contempt, a fundamental principle is that the person detained, who has refused to comply with a court order that the person has the ability to comply with and does so without lawful justification, "holds the key to the jail" and can be released forthwith upon complying with the Court's order at any time. | The Likely Ruling Assuming points 1 and 2 in the question, all the evidence from the trunk would be inadmissible, and if there really is no other evidence against Bob, then Bob would go free. This is highly improbable; the prosecution would find some grounds to dispute the unlawful nature of stop and search, even if ones the court would not accept. A better version might be "The judge rules that the stop and search were unlawful, and is upheld by the appellate court". That is more realistic and has the same result. Inevitable Discovery The only grounds I can see for any other result is "inevitable discovery". If other police were, say, already staking out Bob's house with a warrant to search the car, and Bob was on the way to that house at the time of the stop, then the prosecution could argue that they would inevitably have conducted a legal search of Bob's car and found the same evidence. The conditions for invoking this doctrine rarely occur, but it is possible. After the Trial There is no way that Cal's body can be Bob's property, so it would be released to Cal's next of kin or legal executor. Unless Bob was Cal's next of kin, it is hard to see any way that the body would be handed over to Bob. Cal's clothes are almost surely part of Cal's estate, although it is in theory possible that they are Bob's property. No claim of ownership can be used against Bob in a later trial, because any later trial would be barred by double jeopardy. In any case, while evidence from the trunk would all be inadmissible in a trial of Bob, it might be admissible in a possible later trial of Joe, Bob's alleged accomplice. Therefore the police might well retain all the items (except the body) as possible future evidence. Terminology This is actually about the exclusionary rule itself, not about the "fruit of the poison tree" doctrine. What is the difference? If an unlawful search finds evidence, that evidence is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. If an unlawful search merely finds a lead, evidence later found via the lead is considered as "fruit of the poisoned tree" and is therefore inadmissible. For example, if the murder weapon is found in Bob's car after an unlawful search, the exclusionary rule applies. But if a note saying "stuf at 1234 Elm" is found during the unlawful search, and the police visit 1234 Elm Street, and find the murder weapon there, that is "fruit of the poisoned tree". Why does it matter? Because if the police find a different lead to 1234 Elm, so that the investigation or search at that address is not based solely on the results of the unlawful search, then the evidence found at 1234 Elm may be admissible, while corroboration will not save the evidence actually found by the unlawful search. It is a subtle but sometimes important distinction. | Theft is universally a crime in virtually every jurisdiction. Insofar as a state has a criminal code and a functioning judiciary, theft will always be a crime. It is also a basic legal principle that theft is a tort as well (in other words, a civil wrong incurring damages to an individual that can be remedied in a court of law). A key part of the problem in failing to make theft a crime, is that in the absence of a substantive penalty in terms of a fine or imprisonment, theft becomes a low-risk, high-reward activity where the maximum penalty is simply the repayment of stolen goods (with relatively minimal loss). This fails to provide an effective deterrent to this socially frowned-upon activity, and rates of crime would skyrocket. It is appropriate, therefore, to make theft a crime (and all jurisdictions do so), as all pillars of criminal justice immediately apply. Edit: As @/JBentley correctly points out, penalties do in fact exist in civil law. That said, the power of incarceration, perhaps in this case the ultimate deterrent, is largely unavailable in civil cases. The ultimate point - that theft is rendered a more sound and legitimate enterprise based largely on gambling - remains the same. Additionally, not all individuals have the time or effort to file small claims and follow cases to the end. Making theft a tort-only offense would cause extraordinary difficulties in enforcement as many would consider the loss of perhaps a small article relatively insignificant compared to filing in small claims court. | You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them. | There is one context where this does happen. Common law judges have direct contempt power. This means that while a judge is in the courtroom presiding over a case, the judge can summarily punish someone with incarceration and/or a fine without a trial for "contempt of court" because the judge has personally observed what has happened. Contempt of court encompasses types of disorderly conduct that wouldn't otherwise be criminal conduct. In other contexts, the judge is just one more witness and would not be assigned to handle the case. so you can only get "non-witness judges" from out-of-state or another region. The lawsuit hasn't begun yet, and all of the possible, local judges saw it happen. As a practical matter, this is basically impossible. But there are procedures in cases where large numbers of judges a conflicted out of a case, for example, to get a judge from the next county over or another part of the same state. | Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records. | These situations do come up (and incidentally, this is nothing new, it has been a difficult and recurring legal issue since at least the 18th century), and they really suck to be in, and often there aren't easy answers. There are a lot of legal doctrines out there that are designed to avoid a hard clash of conflicting court orders and to prevent someone from suffering contempt of court sanctions when they are in this bind. Generally, litigants caught in this bind look for these outs. For example, when particular property or records are at issue, often the person in question will "interplead" the property placing it in the jurisdiction of a court to resolve and out of their hands. There is a doctrine called in custodia legis which provides that once something is in the custody of a court that another court may not exercise jurisdiction over it. The entire sub-field of civil procedure pertaining to jurisdiction and venue is designed to avoid these conflicts. U.S. law has a whole sub-field a statutes and legal doctrines like the Rooker-Feldman doctrine designed to prevent these conflicts from coming up when they arise between federal and state courts. One of the most important legal doctrines is that a person cannot be punished for contempt of court for failing to do something that the person being held in contempt of court does not have the ability to do. One argument, which doesn't always work, is that once you are subject to a legally binding court order that has been served upon you that you may not legally defy that court order in order to follow the order of a court which cannot override the decisions of the court issuing the first order. Usually, contempt citations are directed at individual employees or agents rather than at entities. For example, in a dispute over Indian Trust Funds against the United States government, contempt citations were brought against the Secretary of Interior personally and could have sent that individual to jail for not complying. One way the an individual can get out of the order relating to an employment or professional duty is to resign from office and thus deprive oneself of the ability to perform the order. But, the short answer is that there is no one simple legal rule for resolving these situations, and the litigants stuck in these situations look for every available legal argument to resolve it until it is resolved. | RockApe's answer is correct but I think it would be better to explain what did happen: the officer is not compelling the suspect to buy the water, she is offering him the opportunity of avoiding arrest, thus if the suspect refuses to clean his mess, he will be arrested, but the charge will not be "he refused to buy water" but "they urinated where he was supposed not to" (however that translates into the English legal code). That arrest would not be a punishment for not buying the water, but for the urination. In this case, buying the water seems to have been the most immediate way of getting the water required to clean. If there was some other water source (for example a public fountain) the police officer could have allowed the suspect to get the water from there. Even if there was some public fountain and the police officer insisted in the accused buying the water, the situation would revert to 2 --> the suspect can simply refuse and he will not be punished for refusing. |
Are businesses required to try every possible combination of methods for verification under GDPR? A site maintains accounts containing: email password display name account preferences Two accounts containing the same password, display name, and account preferences may or may not exist but they will have different email addresses. Email is therefore the defining thing that separates them and makes each account unique. If a person provides a password, display name and the account preferences there may be one or two accounts with that combination. Should a business on recieving a GDPR request containing this information (ie points 2 to 4 above) search for multiple accounts, and reply if there is just one but deny the request if there is more than one? Similarly if only one person has an account preference or password no one else has and they send the password in a GDPR request then must the business check if the password is unique or not and respond if it is? The reason asking this is because right to access as given above will introduce security problems. Example : A business has an account made by an user having: email : [email protected] password : 1lL@ display name : ll preferences : yes If a person comes and says my password is this, my display name is this and my preferences are these must a business check if this combination is unique or not and then send a reply to [email protected] to that person? But this will be security risk. | GDPR recital 64 says: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. A controller should not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential requests. The GDPR does not specify exactly what methods of verification are "reasonable". GDPR Article 11 paragraph 2 provides: Where, in cases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the controller is able to demonstrate that it is not in a position to identify the data subject, the controller shall inform the data subject accordingly, if possible. In such cases, Articles 15 to 20 shall not apply except where the data subject, for the purpose of exercising his or her rights under those articles, provides additional information enabling his or her identification. This is amplified by Recital 57 which says: If the personal data processed by a controller do not permit the controller to identify a natural person, the data controller should not be obliged to acquire additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with any provision of this Regulation. However, the controller should not refuse to take additional information provided by the data subject in order to support the exercise of his or her rights. Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. GDPR Article 12 paragraph 6 provides: Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. All of the above seems to indicate that the Data Controller must follow reasonable practices, but is not required to guarantee a positive response to a Data Subject who cannot supply reasonable evidence of identity. Moreover the Controller is required to reliably ascertain the identity of the Subject before providing information or acting on a request. Incidentally, good security practice is that the site does not retain the actual password. instead it hashes the password with a good cryptographically secure hash function, and stores the hash. This means that the site cannot reliably determine if a password is unique among all passwords saved by the site, and searches among passwords are not normally done, and would not be reasonable. A site using an email address as the User Identifier would normally enforce at the time an account is created that the email is unique among all emails registered on the site. A user who cannot provide the email would typically be rejected as not able to be identified, unless the site retains additional ID info not listed in the question. I think such a practice would be considered to be reasonable in the current state of technology. | IP addresses are personal data. That means you need a legal basis to process them, but not necessarily consent from the user. That IP addresses should be treated as personal data in most contexts is clear, regardless of whether you can associate the IP address with a user ID. That you make such an association affirms that both the IP address and user ID are personal data in your context though. As the answers in the questions you linked indicate, there are alternative legal bases to consent. The GDPR offers a choice of six legal bases (Art 6(1) lit a–f). In most cases, you would instead rely on a “legitimate interest” for logging. But it's not enough to claim that you have a legitimate interest. You must have a clear purpose for which such logs would be necessary, and you would then have to weigh this legitimate interest against the interests, rights, and freedoms of the affected data subjects. If such logs are necessary for security and anti-abuse purposes, your legitimate interest test is likely to prevail. However, you must limit retention of the logged data and the included information to what is actually necessary. For example, keeping user IDs in there might not be necessary. If the association of IP addresses and user IDs is not necessary for a legitimate interest, then you would indeed need consent. Discussion on why IP addresses are personal data. You see many answers and opinions that IP addresses might not be personal data. Some of these are technically correct, but most are misinformed or outdated. I know only a single well-informed person that still disagrees. For everyone else such as the EU Commission, IP addresses are clearly personal data. Under the GDPR, personal data is any information that relates to an (indirectly) identifiable natural person. In the context of log files we can assume that the entries usually “relate” to a person, namely the person making the request. The exception would be requests triggered by automated systems. The more interesting question is whether the person to which the log entry relates is identifiable. While the GDPR does provide further guidance on the concept of identification in Recital 26, it does not provide clear unambiguous criteria. Thus, there is lots of debate about what that precisely means. One approach is to sidestep that debate and and notice that the GDPR's definition of personal data explicitly notes that a person might be identified “in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier” (Art 4(1)). Another but otherwise unrelated part of the GDPR mentions “internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags” as examples of online identifiers (Recital 30). We can also look more deeply into Recital 26 and see that “singling out” already counts as identification. We can use the IP address to single out one person's log entries from the set of log entries, so this could be interpreted as meaning that any stable user ID renders the data personal data – and an IP address is sufficiently stable in this context. Another part of Recital 26 says that we must consider “all the means reasonably likely to be used” for identification, even if this involves additional information from third parties. This phrasing is virtually identical to the GDPR's predecessor, the EU Data Protection Directive. On the basis of that DPD, the EU's top court (ECJ/CJEU) was asked to rule on the question whether dynamic IP addresses are personal data (the Breyer case, C‑582/14, judgement from 2016-10-19). It said yes. “It did not say yes”, some people will object. And they are technically correct. When someone rents an internet connection from an ISP, the ISP will have logs that connect the user's real-world identity to the IP address they were assigned at a time. You don't have access to the ISP's logs. But, if that user violated your rights (e.g. a cyberattack or copyright infringement), then you could (depending on civil vs criminal matters) report this to the appropriate authorities or to petition the court and they would have the right to order the ISP to disclose this information. The CJEU said that if this chain (you → authorities → ISP → user identity) is grounded in law, then the IP address would be identifiable. But whether there are suitable laws to compel the ISP to disclose this data would be up to national laws, and the CJEU doesn't concern itself with that. Spoiler: such laws are pretty common. To summarize typical objections: The IP address doesn't relate to a person: Can be a valid objection, but is not typically the case for user-facing web services. The Recital 30 argument is not valid because it's about profiling, not identification, and it only says that IP addresses may be used for profiling, not that they are always identifying: Technically correct, but I think that Recital 30 merely expresses the implied understanding that of course an IP address is an online identifier and permits identification by itself. “Singling out” does not apply because SOME_REASON: Indeed, this is an ill-defined term with no case law to guide us. However, regulators such as the EDPB and their predecessor WP29 routinely use “singling out” to mean being able to distinguish one person's data from other people's data. An IP address lets us do that. The Breyer judgement is not applicable because the defendant in that case was the German state, and the state has other legal means than ordinary website operators: Nothing in that case was specific to the website operator being a state or other authority. If the website operator can contact the appropriate authority and if they have the right to order the ISP to disclose the relevant data, then the IP address is identifiable. The CJEU didn't say “yes” in Breyer, it said “if”. So I'll take that as a “no”: The CJEU concerns itself with the interpretation of EU law, not with national laws. Specifically in the Breyer case, lower courts confirmed that German law has the necessary means. In other EU member states, further checks would be necessary but it would surprise me if there wouldn't be equivalent subpoena powers. If the ISP doesn't have the data, then the IP addresses are anonymous: Indeed, the CJEU scenario collapses if there is no additional data to be linked with the IP address. However: The CJEU used this scenario as an example to show that IP addresses can be identifiable. If that particular scenario fails, there could be other scenarios that still allow identification. The question of whether IP addresses are identifiable had of course been the subject of wider debate at the time. That the GDPR explicitly mentions IP addresses can be seen as a reaction to this debate. Thus, in a sense, the Breyer case is moot. It is still useful as an explanation of how broad “reasonably likely means” must be interpreted. | Earlier this year, the Internet lawyer Arnoud Engelfriet wrote a blog post about exactly this topic. As it is written in Dutch, I will summarize it here: As you also said, deleting posts breaks the flow of the archived conversation and it makes your archive incomplete. This is a problem for the freedom of expression and information. But Art. 17(3) GDPR includes an exception to the right of erasure for this situation. So posts do not need to be deleted. However, profiles are not included in this exception. So they must be removed, but they can be pseudonymized. For example replace the username with user89432, and remove all details from the profile. If other posts contain the nick of the author of an anonymized post, that is considered an journalistic, academic artistic or literary expression, so Art. 85 GDPR would apply, so the right of erasure does not apply to that. Bottom line: you only have to pseudonymize the account, if that person wants to be removed from the forum. | While German law indeed requires providing correct contact information it does not require the recipient to answer queries. It is there so that you can submit legal notifications. In your case I wouldn't be so sure that the information is not correct. However, even if the contact information is incorrect, there is not much you can do about it. This is reserved to the following groups by § 8 Abs. 3 UWG: every competitor; associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51); Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. Unless you are a competitor you are out of luck. The hoster or other providers can't do anything and don't need to, as they are not required to check legality of their user's websites. It doesn't really matter where you are by the way for these laws. | The obligation to notify the supervisory authority (CNIL in your case) no longer exists. It was part of the previous regulatory framework, but it is not part of GDPR (which takes affect tomorrow). If you use CCTV that may monitor employees (i.e. they sometimes enter the HQ to consult with the owner), your obligations under the GDPR is basically to inform the employees that the CCTV cameras are there. I.e. Data subjects are entitled to understand when their personal data is being processed, covering the transparency aspect of processing. The use of CCTV must be communicated via signage which indicates the areas covered and instructions for further information. | Given a large database of email addresses that you can't prove have given consent to receive email, the only legal thing to do with it, is to (securely) delete it. (I am going to switch your question about a larger company to a bank: in the UK, big pharma is forbidden from advertising to individuals.) In principle the rules are the same for a huge bank and everything down to a self-employed plumber. In practice the plumber will be told "don't do that again" rather than fined. This case was treated under the Data Protection Act, which has a maximum fine of £500,000 – so a big bank would probably have been fined more, but not necessarily much more. Under GDPR, fines are related to turnover, so the fine would be a lot bigger for a large bank. The incident is a year old now. Details here. | I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data? | Your data is not anonymous since from the picture of the face the individual can be identified. It would be anonymous, if the face was blurred and other possible identifiable information was removed. Of course, that would defeat your purpose. Please note that, in any case, Anonymization Techniques are, themselves, a type of personal data processing that requires a legal ground, and achieving real anonymization is not a trivial matter (see Article 29 Working Party's opinion 0829/14/EN WP216 on the subject). 1. The face of a person includes biometric information, which is defined in article 4 (14) among other types of personal information regulated by the GDPR as: "personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data". A facial recognition software's purpose is exactly to perform a specific technical processing based on the facial features of the persons, to achieve a unique identification of a person based on these biometric features. Article 9 of the GDPR includes biometric data among the types of prohibited processing, unless one of the exceptions in § 2 applies. There are 10 types of exceptions among which: consent of the person, employment context, personal data made public by the person, scientific or historical research,... (each exception having its own conditions). You should check that you comply with one of these exceptions stated in article 9 § 2, if your application is about using facial images for unique identification of a person based on these biometric features. 2. In turn, if your processing is not about unique identification of a person based on these biometric features, but only about emotions recognition (which you briefly mentioned at the beginning of your post), it could be considered as not falling under the requirements of Article 9. That would still be a processing of personal information, but it would fall under the normal article 6 requirements. |
Can I say that I am utilizing same terms & conditions and privacy policy of this (xyz) website? I am running a service A that uses some other service B. The company L also provides and uses the service B for themself as well for service K. Can I say on my service website A that my service utilizes their terms & conditions and Privacy Policy and forward the links to service K terms & conditions and privacy policy? The service K's terms and Conditions and Privacy policies have their name on them so how much that matter or what kind of change should I put on the website to reflect this correctly? | It would be terribly risky for you to simply link another company's terms of service. What if they take their server down? What if they change their terms? You would not even know when exactly the changes were made. Copying their terms means you might run into copyright issues on the text. Either pay a lawyer to write your ToS for you, or see if you can find something in the public domain. | IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics. | You ask permission, preferably with legal counsel to handle the details. It really is that simple. Unsurprisingly, most companies don't want to give their code away- especially to a competitor. If you even get a response, they will expect something in return i.e. money. Realistically though, it's unlikely they will respond, much less deal with you. | The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture. | The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless. | A website's Terms of Service can be or include either or both rules and terms of contract. Which part is what depends on the circumstances and whether there is a contract at all. Like in case of any physical venue where the owner is free to impose rules on anyone wishing to visit the venue, a website owner is free to impose rules on what the visitors can and cannot do while visiting the website. If you are the owner of a physical store, you may require the visitors to take off any helmets or sunglasses when they enter, and/or present their bags for inspection when they exit. These are rules, or conditions of entry. Similarly, you may require your website visitors to be over certain age, only use certain devices/software for accessing the website, not to engage any robots/scrappers etc. As soon as a contract between you and the visitor is formed, the relevant parts of the ToS may well be terms of the contract. For example, if visitors buy something in your store/on your website, the clauses re shipping, returns/refunds and warranty will be such terms. | Makerbot's explanation of the Terms is accurate This is comparable with most other services that host and display User-created content - even with SaaS providers, as per Interpretation of content ownership/usage in service provider agreement. They are correct that they are asking for the lots of broad rights, but it's all qualified with (my emphasis): 3.2 License. You hereby grant, and you represent and warrant that you have the right to grant, to the Company and its affiliates and partners, an irrevocable, nonexclusive, royalty-free and fully paid, worldwide license to reproduce, distribute, publicly display and perform, prepare derivative works of, incorporate into other works, and otherwise use your User Content, and to grant sublicenses of the foregoing, solely for the purposes of including your User Content in the Site and Services. That is, if they use your User Content for a purpose other than including it in the Site and Services (and you have not agreed to this use), you may be entitled to relief in the form of an injunction or damages. | According to Josh Aas, Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) Executive Director, (the umbrella 501(c)(3) for Let's Encrypt): "It is not against our terms to charge for services using our certificates, though we'd strongly prefer that HTTPS just be part of every offering as a default with no additional fees." My host sells SSL letsencrypt certificates - Help - Let's Encrypt Community Support That said, what your old company is doing is charging for their time and expertise (aided possibly by their own automated software they developed) to install SSL certificates for their own webhosting customers on their own servers. The company is not reselling the SSLs; they are selling the service of installing the certificates. It's not easy to install and automate the updating of 90-day SSLs from Let's Encrypt. So what your old company is doing is making it easy - for a fee - for their customers to use a somewhat difficult to use free service with the rest of their paid webhosting. The customers are not getting any information about what certificate they are buying. That could be. Check the TOS and information that each customer gets when they use the webhosting service with an SSL from Let's Encrypt. Many customers may only be concerned with if the SSL works, or not. And I'm sure the webhosting company does not divulge all aspects of their services to their customers, especially concerning security of their webservers and other business systems. |
Wet Ink Signatures Recently I've been pondering something. A lot of encounters with debt collector videos appear on YouTube and various other sites. These videos typically feature people arguing with debt collectors/debt enforcement officers about warrants & legality of entering the property. One of the most common lines you hear in these clips is "you need a wet ink signature for the warrant to be legal" Is that actually true? If so, what does that actually mean in the eyes of the law? | I'm assuming you are talking about "warrants in debt" and not arrest warrants. A warrant in debt is that the creditor has filed with a court for the repayment of a debt. The court will then issue a judgement (in default if you do not appear) either for the creditor or the debtor. After that, the creditor can then (if they win) seek things such as garnishment to repay the debt. Now in the UK, they have accepted the "Electronic Communications Act of 2000" which means that a Qualified Electronic Signature (QES) is as legally binding as a "wet ink" signature. Non-QES signatures may also be binding, but that requires additional evidence. Let's take an example of a small personal loan. Let's say you apply electronically for a loan of X amount. The loan is approved and the money is transferred into your bank account electronically. You spend the money but make no attempt to repay the loan. First the bank will make attempts to collect the debt via normal means, then they may sell the debt to a debt collector. The debt collector will apply for a "warrant in debt" to take you to court for the amount (possibly with fees). If you do not appear, a default judgement will be applied to you. If you signed the loan application with a QES compliant system, that signature is all the debt collector will need to show that you accepted the debt and the repayment terms. If you did not sign with a QES system, they can still submit the application but they may have to prove other things, like: Your intent to obtain money for some purpose Your action in keeping/spending the money No action on your part to return or rectify the transfer Any payments you may have made towards the loan (shows that you acknowledge the loan and terms) So no, as of at least 2000 most countries accept some type of electronic signature to be legally binding. An entirely different topic would be if the debt is legal without the paperwork. Many debt collection agencies buy debt in bulk that may not be much more than an Excel sheet with the amounts and names/addresses and other personal information. A lot of times the entire debt "paper trail" is not transferred with these debt purchases so a debt collector may have purchased $10 million worth of debt for $50,000 that is nothing more than an Excel sheet. I believe in the US this has held up, but I'm not sure about the UK/rest of the world. What the YouTube people may be saying is that they don't have anything regarding the debt as far as binding paperwork goes. That may be something completely different. | Q: Why don't US prosecutors press for imprisonment for crime in the banking industry? Q. Why aren't US prosecutors (and UK prosecutors for that matter) not pressing for imprisonment in such cases? Is this because there are no such laws under bankers can be so indicted (notably, in the case reported on above, there is the additional complication of extradition) . . . ? Prosecutors have the legal authority to prosecute bankers for crimes, and not infrequently do press charge bankers with crimes and press for imprisonment for crimes in the banking industry, and have obtained many very long prison sentences in cases like these. For example, "following the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 bankers of all stripes were jailed for their transgressions." And, in 2008, the laws involved were, if anything, easier to prosecute and had stricter penalties than they did in the 1980s. There were 35 bankers convicted and sent to prison in the financial crisis, although arguably only one of them was really a senior official. This said, the real question is not why they don't do this at all, but why prosecutors exercise their discretion to refrain from seeking imprisonment or lengthy imprisonment, in cases where they either have a conviction or could easily secure a conviction. A former justice department prosecutor (in the Enron case) argues in an Atlantic article that it is harder than it looks. But, he ignores the fact that a lot of people looking at the very Enron case he prosecuted after the fact has concluded that the criminal prosecution may have done more harm than good, leading to significant harm to innocent people (for example by destroying the careers and wealth of Arthur Anderson accountants who had no involvement with the case, due to a conviction that was ultimately overturned on appeal). This changed the pro-prosecution of corporations attitude that had prevailed before then (corporations are easier to prosecute than individuals since you don't have to figure out exactly who in the corporation committed the wrong). This time, regulators and securities law enforcers sought mostly civil fines against entities with some success: 49 financial institutions have paid various government entities and private plaintiffs nearly $190 billion in fines and settlements, according to an analysis by the investment bank Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. That may seem like a big number, but the money has come from shareholders, not individual bankers. (Settlements were levied on corporations, not specific employees, and paid out as corporate expenses—in some cases, tax-deductible ones.) The same link also points out the two very early criminal prosecutions against individuals resulted in acquittals by juries at trial, for reasons that may have been very specific to those trials, undermining the willingness of prosecutors to press even strong cases for almost three years and undermining the credibility of their threat to prosecute criminally. Also, this is not a universal rule. For example, China routinely executes people who are convicted in summary trials of banking law violations and corruption charges. Q. Is this due to the principle of limited liability? No. Banking officials in a limited liability entity (and all banks are limited liability entities) can have criminal liability for acts in violation of banking and fraud laws, notwithstanding limited liability. Is this because . . . powerful vested interests prevents the actual execution of the law as it is intended? If so - how exactly are they prevented? This does happen but not often. Sometimes this happens, but not very often. The corruption angle is a popular narrative on the political very progressive left of American politics, but as I explain below (as you note "Chomsky, the formation of Western capitalism was in large part by due to "radical judicial activism".", and Chomsky is a very left wing social and economic historian almost to the point of Marxist analysis), this visceral narrative isn't really accurate most of the time. First, for what it is worth, the prosecutors play a much larger role in this than "activist" judges do. Secondly, the decision making process is more nuanced and less blatantly corrupt and self-interested than his attempt at "legal realist" analysis would suggest. There are legitimate reasons for someone in a prosecutor's shoes to focus less on these cases, even if in the end analysis you think that they have made the wrong choices in these cases. The case for prosecuting banking fraud severely is basically a utilitarian one, but criminal prosecution is guided by norms beyond utilitarian norms. There are certainly cases where an elected prosecutor or high level elected official is persuaded not to bring criminal charges or to be lenient due to pressure from powerful vested interest. When this is done, a white collar criminal defense attorney, or a "fixer" who deals with political sensitive cases (sometimes on an elected official's staff and sometimes not), or an elected official or political party official contacts the prosecutor or the prosecutor's boss or is the prosecutor's boss, and based upon the plea from the powerful interests (direct or indirect) urges the prosecutor to back off and the prosecutor complies. At the most extreme level, a Governor or President or parole board can pardon someone facing prison for banking crimes, which has happened, but is extremely rare. But, this sort of direct intervention in an individual case is not terribly common. My guess would be that 1% to 10% of banking prosecutions are affected by this kind of influence particular to a given case. This is far too small a number of cases to reflect the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal bank fraud cases that we observe. More Often Policy Decisions Are Involved Budgets And Institutional Case Prioritization Much more common would be for the elected prosecutor or the administration that employs an appointed prosecutor to decide to deprioritize a particular kind of case and/or to reduce funding (both at the law enforcement/regulatory agency level and at the subdepartment of the prosecuting attorney's organization level) for prosecution of these kinds of cases as a matter of broad policy. Every prosecutor's office and law enforcement office on the planet has more crimes that it could prosecute and pursue than it has resources to do so, so it is always necessary to have some kind of priorities to decide which of those cases will be pursued. For example, perhaps the Justice Department funds a white collar crime enforcement office with the resources to prosecute only 750 cases a year, and there are 7,500 strong cases that the offices could prosecute. The white collar crime prosecution office has to then prioritize which of the 7,500 strong cases is chooses to pursue. It might, for example, in good faith, decide the focus on white collar crime cases that harm "widows and orphans" and other large groups of people who can't afford to hire their own lawyers to bring civil cases to sue the wrongdoers themselves to mitigate the harm that they suffer. More specifically, a policy set in place by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in the Justice Department in 1999 was followed: The so-called Holder Doctrine, a June 1999 memorandum written by the then–deputy attorney general warning of the dangers of prosecuting big banks—a variant of the “too big to fail” argument that has since become so familiar. Holder’s memo asserted that “collateral consequences” from prosecutions—including corporate instability or collapse—should be taken into account when deciding whether to prosecute a big financial institution. That sentiment was echoed as late as 2012 by Lanny Breuer, then the head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, who said in a speech at the New York City Bar Association that he felt it was his duty to consider the health of the company, the industry, and the markets in deciding whether or not to file charges. This was a top level policy choice made a decade before the Financial Crisis arose, not an individualized act of corrupt interference. Advocacy From Representatives Of Victims Another common voice for leniency are lawyers on behalf of victims of white collar crimes (I've been in this spot myself on behalf of clients). Why? Mostly for two reasons: People in prison don't make future income to compensate the victims out of. People prosecuted criminally pay fines and court costs that don't go to the victims and reduce the pool of available funds for the victims. The private lawyers representing victims recognize that not prosecuting a white collar criminal leaves that person at large to commit future economic crimes (white collar criminals are rarely a physical threat to the people in the community around them or to anyone who doesn't do business with them) and that it fails to strongly discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Institutional victims of banking crimes and other white collar crimes may also urge prosecutors not to prosecute the crimes that victimized them, because they fear that the publicity would harm them more than the criminal penalties for the offender (whom they have ample means to sue in a civil action) would benefit them. The fact that victims seek leniency more often in white collar crime cases than in almost any kind of case (other than domestic violence cases, where victims also often urge leniency out of love and as a result of their economic dependency on the perpetrator), often causes prosecutors to determine that criminal prosecutions seeking long prison sentences are not a priority for the victims of these crimes and to prioritize their case loads accordingly. To get the $190 billion of settlement money that was paid from individuals would have required convictions of 1900 people capable of paying $100,000,000 each in 1900 very hard fought individual criminal cases, instead of 49 civil cases. This may or may not have been possible, as the most culpable figures were often in upper management, while the most affluent potential defendants were in top management and would have been harder to pin with personal criminal liability. Many top managers are relatively hands off in their management style and didn't get into the culpable criminal details. There are plenty of very influential and powerful bankers who were highly culpable who would have had less than $10,000,000 of net worth, much of which wasn't tainted with improper conduct, which isn't to say that prosecutors couldn't have seized it from them for fines and restitution, but it does make the moral case for doing so less clearly compelling. Evaluating Priorities For Limited And Expensive Prison Resources Prosecutors sometimes reason in white collar crime cases that keeping a white collar criminal in prison is very expensive to the state (up to $70,000 per person per year), and doesn't change the risk of physical harm to the general public, and that a felony conviction itself and fines and publicity and probation conditions are often sufficient to mitigate the risk that the convicted person will reoffend and to discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Parole boards, in systems that have them, often release white collar criminals as early as possible, applying the same reasoning. Also, white collar criminals tend to be model prisoners. An incarcerated white collar defendant is also depriving the public of tax revenues on income that person would otherwise receive if out of prison. A long prison sentence can victimize the public economically in amounts comparable to a moderate magnitude economic crime. Crudely speaking, prosecutors reason: "Why spend huge amounts of scarce prison money to lock someone up when we have murders and rapists and people who steal things at gun point and violent criminals who seriously injure people without justification who really need to be our priority to get off the streets? The devious and dishonest banker doesn't present the same sort of risk to the general public and his conviction and probation conditions should suffice to prevent him from having the ability to do this in the future." Social Class Bias Yet another reason is that often prosecutors and the people who set policy for prosecutors don't see white collar crimes as culpable in the same way that they do blue collar crimes. Most prosecutors spend the vast majority of their careers prosecuting blue collar criminals, terrorists and the like. These are people from a different social class, who live lives very unlike their own, and the people who are victimized by these crimes tend to be middle class or more affluent people and businesses. Banks, for example, are routinely victims of armed robberies which prosecutors prosecute, and of embezzlement by low level employees, which prosecutors prosecute. Bankers socio-economically and culturally are a lot like the prosecutors themselves (who are lawyers), their peers, and the victims they usually defend, and are rarely like the people that they usually prosecute (lower class, often minority people, who have never worked in an office, failed in school, are quick to anger and hurt others, etc.). At an individual case level, a white collar criminal defense lawyer can often marshal very impressive character witnesses to say that the defendant is basically a good guy who messed up once, while this is frequently very difficult for blue collar criminal defendants to do in a way that really reaches prosecutors and judges. The bottom line is that prosecutors (and judges, many of whom are former prosecutors) sympathize with, understand and relate to white collar criminals far more than they do with ordinary blue collar criminals. And, this colors their judgments about what kinds of punishments (criminal or non-criminal) are appropriate for the kind of conduct that these people commit. Their instinct is that a crime that might be committed by someone like me is probably not as serious as a crime that a judge or prosecutor would never dream of committing like an armed robbery of a bank, even though economically, the banking fraud crime may have caused $500,000,000 of harm while the armed bank robbery may have caused only $5,000 of harm. | Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details. | as a witness. You secretly disapprove of the thing taking place Does this actually invalidate the document (as not properly witnessed)? No. In regard to the substance of a contract, witnessing does not imply, entail, or require approval thereof by the witness. The meaning or relevance of a witness's signature is nothing more than him or her certifying that the act of "2+ other parties entering a contract" took place indeed. And are you committing a crime by doing it? I highly doubt it, regardless the country or jurisdiction. The witness's [bizarre] act of acquiescence falls short of criminal conduct such as (1) forging someone else's signature, or (2) fraudulently "acknowledging" the presence of the contracting parties when in fact at least one of them was totally absent. Only if the witness subsequently acts in a way that hinders the purposes of the contract, thereby causing harm, the harmed party(-ies) might sue the witness for tortious interference with business or relation (or its equivalent in other non-U.S. jurisdictions). For instance, suppose a contract-based transaction requires involvement by a third party, who is hesitant to perform the transaction because suspects that the witness's signature was forged. That suspicion may prompt the third party to inquire of the witness whether he actually signed as witness to the contract. If the third party rejects the contract-related transaction due to the witness's [false] denial, the harmed party(-ies) in the contract may sue the witness for any losses (examples: bounced checks, costly delays, missing of deadlines, provable loss of business opportunities) that his false denial caused. | You have the right to notify the owner of the car of their vehicular trespass and the consequences of that. You do not have the right to damage the car in giving said notice. You have the right to offer to clean the gum off whatever part of the car you stuck the notice to. If you succeed in cleaning it,the other party will not have a legal cause of action, in all likelihood, since there is no damage (though with a bit of imagination they might come up with some 'missed business opportunity' loss). The court would probably find your choice of sticker to be negligent (put the notice under the wipers? use painter's tape -get some if you don't have any). The rationale 'we had no other choice' holds no water: there are alternatives. 'Criminal Damages' is a concept in UK law, but it relates to willful damage such as vandalism, not accidents. It would be an issue if you had planned to cause damage, but that seems not to be the case here. | If a candidate chooses to sign by simply typing their name as shown (as an example) in the first and second photos, they'd obviously have to stick to the same name and font when signing the contract and non-disclosure agreement. This assertion is incorrect. But what repercussions would it have in future? If the candidate has to sign any more company documents much later (signing physically with a pen on paper or even signing electronically), would it have to match with the signatures that were first made in the offer letter? No. Or would commonsense be accepted, that the signature is basically the candidate's acceptance of the terms of the agreement, and that the signature can vary? Yes. A signature is ritualized way of showing legal agreement. The content of the signature does not impact its legal validity. For example, it used to be commonplace for illiterate people to sign contracts, wills, and other documents prepared by someone else and read to them with an "X". So long as a signature is made by the person who is supposed to be signing it with an intent to legally agree to what they are signing, it is a valid signature. When a signature is obtained in a manner that does not reflect the intent of the person signing it to legally agree to what they are actually signing, that is a special category of fraud called "fraud in the factum". For example, substituting a deed to a house from a receipt for a package delivery at the last moment when the person signing it doesn't notice the switch, is "fraud in the factum". A court's conclusion that there has been "fraud in the factum" has the legal effect of causing the document signed to be treated as if it was never signed at all. In contrast, different legal consequences are present when someone signs a document, knowing what they are signing, for reasons that rely on false statements that have been made to them, which is called "fraud in the inducement." If someone tries to enforce an agreement that purports to be signed, and the person who allegedly signed it claims that the signature was forged by a third-party, inconsistency between the signature and other times that the person who allegedly signed something did so is evidence that the signature is a forgery. But it is not conclusive evidence. People's signatures change over time for a variety of reasons, sometimes dramatically in a short period of time, for example, in the case of a stroke or a hand injury. When signatures differ over time and there are allegations of forgery, then it is a question of proof for a finder of fact (i.e. a judge or jury) to decide if the alleged forgery is really a forgery. Many businesses that routinely accept small dollar value personal checks, for example, also take a thumb-print of the person signing the check in order to make it cheap and easy to litigate the question of whether a signature on a check is forged, and to discourage litigants from falsely claiming that a check was forged in the first place. This practice was established because lying and claiming that a check was forged used to be a tactic that was used on a recurring basis in civil cases and in criminal bad check passing prosecutions to escape liability. | As has already been said, as far as the vehicle registration, the officer likely already knows who the vehicle is registered to and whether it's expired or not before he walks up to your car, or at the least, he can easily find that information out. The proof of insurance is a different matter. The officer will need to see it to know if you have insurance or not. To him, it doesn't matter what the reason is that you don't provide it to him. Left it at home, misplaced it, lost it, destroyed it, or just refuse to provide it because you feel you have the right to refuse. He can't "force" you to provide it (unless he is able to search your car and happens to find it there). He can only issue you a ticket for not providing it. But your attitude could play a part in what happens next. Being upfront and letting the officer know you have left your documents at home could help your situation. In my experience... one time that this sort of thing happened to me, the officer agreed to hold my drivers license and allowed me to bring the documents to the police station and retrieve my license. Another time, in a parking related matter, I was issued a ticket, but I was allowed to bring the required documents to the police station where they then "invalidated" (cancelled) the ticket. Of course this won't always work, and is not at all likely to work if you are far from home. Keep in mind, (as far as I know, in most states) the real infraction is that you "don't have insurance"... that you failed to provide proof when asked, is secondary. In many cases (likely nearly all cases), if you show up in court and provide documents that your insurance is current, and was current at the time the ticket was issued, the judge (or the prosecutor) will likely dismiss the case with no penalties. But, what the officer has written down on the ticket about your attitude and what you told him at the time, may have an effect on how this all plays out. | The two cases are very different. The first involves a debt collector entering onto property in connection with an allegedly overdue utility bill, which is something a debt collector ordinarily would not be permitted to do without a money judgment following a court proceeding and further court orders authorizing collection of the debt from tangible personal property on the premises. This is pretty much completely without justification and realistically is a criminal offense as well as a basis for a civil lawsuit, although the modest money damages involved may have made such a lawsuit ill advised for the resident impacted by the unlawful entry. Notably, in this case Scottish Power, "admitted the error, apologised and offered compensation." I doubt that an American utility company would have had the good sense and grace to act the same way. The story doesn't make entirely clear if these were Scottish Power employees or debt collection contractors hired by Scottish Power. The question implies that abusive utility company collection agents are a systemic problem in Scotland, although the article itself does not. The second involves a utility company, Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE), drilling a lock to enter onto property in order to check a utility meter, in a building where some other tenant at a different address was not paying an electric bill on a different meter, which presents a very different issue. The customer at the address drilled had reasonably documented the utility company's mistake, but the company, for some reason, didn't believe the customer and didn't make arrangements to visit consensually when the customer was home. Instead, while the customer was work on Wednesday two male SSE workers drilled through the lock to gain entry into the flat, and when they got in and looked at the meter, they realized that they were mistaken. The fact that the story describes the two men as a "warrant team" leaves open the possibility that a warrant for entry was received from a court based upon bad information from the utility company when it should have known better, although that issue isn't clarified in the story. The customer “lodged a formal complaint against SSE for unlawful entry and reported the incident to the police.” And an ombudsman elevated the issue. According to the utility company, it "offered to replace all the locks in her property and offered her a goodwill gesture payment of £500. Both were rejected by Ms Harvey who wanted compensation for further rental, hotel and new property costs which we were unable to agree to." Utility companies will generally have an easement or some similar legal right to enter onto a customer's property to read a utility meter or the deal with something broken on the premises that affects the larger utility system such as a short circuit that is bringing down the power of everyone on the block, without notice in cases of emergencies. So, in this case, the issue is not the absence of a right to enter somewhere, but the fact that the utility company went to the wrong place (where it may very well have had no right to enter because there may have been no utility meter to check at that location), which in and of itself, would be mere negligence if it hadn't received such clear communication from the customer and ignored it, and secondly, whether the method it used to gain access to the property in the good faith belief that it had a legal right to enter to gain access to the property was reasonable. Charitably, it could be that the utility company had a key allowing it to enter and read the meter at the proper address, but that key didn't work because they were at the wrong address and the utility official may have mistakenly believes that the lock was broken rather than that the address was wrong. In that case, the question would be whether it was reasonable to force entry in a non-emergency case like a meter readings, rather than trying to contact the owner to resolve the question, which it probably was not. It isn't quite as obvious that this would be a criminal trespass, because ordinarily entry onto property under a claim of right, even if mistaken in good faith, does not constitute criminal conduct, although a claim of good faith in a context where the company as a whole knew better even if the right hand may not have known what the left hand was doing, probably doesn't hold up under agency law that imputes the knowledge of any agent of the company to the company as a whole. But, while the company may have committed a crime, the two workmen detailed to do the work may have been acting in good faith personally, and may have even had a warrant. Certainly, the utility company should have liability to repair any damage that was done to the premises in order to gain entry that arose from its negligence in going to the wrong address and its unreasonable failure to confer with the customer about the problem in a non-emergency. SSE would probably be well advised to admit with good grace that it was in the wrong and to pay the still very modest amount that the customer claimed for an alternate rental, rather than fight this issue where its fumbling became not just rude but abusive. |
Is attempted murder the same charge regardless of damage done? Scenario 1: Bob points a gun at Joe's head, says "I'll kill you", pulls the trigger, and misses Joe by 1 inch. Joe is fine physically. Scenario 2: Bob points a gun at Joe's head, says "I'll kill you", pulls the trigger, and shoots him as intended. Doctors just barely save Joe from death. Are these both attempted murder? Is this the same offense with the same penalty? | united-states He'd be looking at ~6+ more years in prison in the second scenario In the United States, this would be attempted murder in both cases, though in the case of actual physical harm, the prosecutor could charge related offenses such as battery, which is "an intentional offensive or harmful touching of another person that is done without his or her consent." Note that though most attempted murders would likely be state crimes, I'm going to answer the rest of this from the perspective of a federal prosecution for attempted murder. The result would likely be similar for states, though the exact mechanism would be different. Sentencing for people convicted of serious federal crimes is guided by the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines. An "offense level" is determined, then combined with the offender's criminal history and checked against the sentencing table to determine a suggested sentencing range for the judge. Specifically, for Assault with Intent to Commit Murder; Attempted Murder, §2A2.1. states that: (a) Base Offense Level: (1) 33, if the object of the offense would have constituted first degree murder; or (2) 27, otherwise. (b) Specific Offense Characteristics (1) If (A) the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, increase by 4 levels; (B) the victim sustained serious bodily injury, increase by 2 levels; or (C) the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisions (A) and (B), increase by 3 levels. (2) If the offense involved the offer or the receipt of anything of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder, increase by 4 levels. So in this case, it sounds like Joe suffered a life-threatening injury in the scenario where he got shot. Let's assume that this is Bob's first offense, and that it would have constituted first degree murder. If Bob missed, he'd be looking at 135-168 months (11.25-14 years) in prison. If he shot Joe successfully, he'd be instead looking at 210-262 months (17.5-21.83 years) in prison. | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. | This is going to vary based on jurisdiction. In Wisconsin, the attempt statute covers all felonies, but it doesn't cover all misdemeanors. The statute says: Whoever attempts to commit a felony or a crime specified in s. 940.19, 940.195, 943.20, or 943.74 may be fined or imprisoned or both as provided under sub. (1g), 943.20 is in that list, and it just so happens to be the theft statute, which includes theft via fraud. So Eve is out of luck - her attempted theft is a crime, even if she doesn't try to steal the $2500.01 needed to trigger a felony. The penalty listed for attempts is half the sentence you'd get for the completed crime. But even if this wasn't covered by the attempt statute, once the police start investigating Eve, they'll likely find a victim, or some other crime to charge her with. People who do this sort of thing tend to have a pattern of doing this sort of thing. And I notice she's using the Internet to commit the crime; that means she's involved in systems affecting interstate commerce, and she may be breaking all manner of federal laws in addition to state laws. | We're missing a lot of facts that would help drive the analysis. The first question I'd ask was whether this was part of an actual or attempted sex offense. If that's the case, the suspect could be facing particularly serious charges. Other information is also missing, such as the drug involved, whether it's on the list of controlled substances, her knowledge of the drug, her relationship to the suspect, and so on. Still, based on the information we've got and the inferences we can make from them, I could reasonably see the following charges being filed: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery. (g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she does any of the following: (1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another and any user experiences great bodily harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled substance. (2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another person any food containing any substance or object intended to cause physical injury if eaten. Sec. 12-4.5. Tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. (a) A person who knowingly puts any substance capable of causing death or great bodily harm to a human being into any food, drug or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption commits tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. (a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: (1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or (2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person. Sec. 21-1. Criminal damage to property. (a) A person commits criminal damage to property when he or she: (1) knowingly damages any property of another Sec. 11-1.20. Criminal sexual assault. (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent; Sec. 11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10); (3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim's consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes; Sec. 11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person: (2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent. Sec. 11-1.60. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim; (5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim's consent or by threat or deception. Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide. (a) A person commits drug-induced homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance. Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means. Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death. (b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means. | The "felony murder" doctrine, which applies in most of the U.S. (including California), holds criminals engaged in "dangerous felonies" responsible for any deaths that occur during the commission of such crimes. In the given example, the hostage taker and anyone who is an accessory to that aggravated assault would, if convicted, also be guilty of murder for deaths that occurred in connection with the incident, regardless of their intent. | Normally, making a poison is not in and of itself a crime. If a third party took the poison from the person who manufactured it without their knowledge, the manufacturer would generally not have criminal liability, at least in the absence of "gross criminal negligence" such as leaving the poison manufacturing location totally unsecured and letting people know that there was poison there for the taking. In a civil case, someone might sue the poison manufacturer for negligently securing their facility, but again, that would be a real stretch if even ordinary precautions (e.g. standard locks on doors and cabinets) were in place, or if it was an inside job theft. In the same way, a gun store owner is not usually liable criminally or civilly if someone steals a gun from his store and shoots someone with it. The police could certainly charge Person A with capital murder mistakenly believing him to have intended to kill and did kill someone with the poison, which would make the critical factual point establishing that Person B gave it to someone without Person A's knowledge. Person A might still be guilty of attempted murder if he intended to kill someone (not necessarily the person who was killed) with the poison but had not fully carried out the plot when the poison was stolen. Some places probably require a permit of some kind to make poisons, and if Person A didn't have a permit, he could probably also be charged with making poisons without a permit. | There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence. | Rudeness is not a crime Thankfully, or I’d be writing this from jail. The threat or actually of intentional and unwanted physical contact is a crime. Historically these were seperate common law crimes (and torts) of assault and battery respectively. However, in most jurisdictions these have been codified and merged and redefined so there is common assault (which merges historic assault and battery and is what you are asking about), indecent assault, sexual assault etc. In general, there must be an intentionality to the contact - accidentally colliding with someone is not assault (although it can be the tort of negligence). Similarly the contact must be unwanted - participating in a game of rugby means you want to be tackled (in a legal sense, in a sports sense you don’t want to be tackled, you want to score). And finally it must intend harm - holding your hands up to prevent a collision does not intend harm even if harm may result, punching someone does. In the cases you describe, the aggressor is the “elderly person” and they have committed a crime. I am interested in the suggestion that public opinion in first-world countries like Canada is that being old and annoyed justifies you beating someone. That is not my understanding of public opinion in Australia- old people have to follow the rule of law here just like everybody else. |
Are apps "delivered by a door-to-door salesman" in any way, according to FTC rules? If a person buys an app on the Google Play store, is the person "buying from a door-to-door salesman" or not? That is, the FTC has a mandatory 3-day "Cooling-off Period for Sales Made at Home or Other Locations." I'm asking because the buyer does not visit any physical location, but no salesman comes to the buyer's house. Does the 3-day cooling-off period apply? | No Via the FTC (emphasis added): The Cooling-Off Rule does not cover sales that are: ... made entirely online, or by mail or telephone; | Do I need to inform the user about storing the score locally? No, there is no need as long as you don't transmit, store or process any personal info. It's doubtful that the score could be considered personal info, but you're not sending it to your servers in any way, so you don't seem to be processing it anyway. Do I need consent for using non-personal AdMob? You have to check this with AdMob, but usually, if it is non-personal, they shouldn't be processing any PI, so you're clear without informing. Do I need to ask for the age? How should I handle kids? Again, you're not processing any PI, so regarding GDPR there isn't any problem. Can I disallow a user from using the app if consent is not given? If you needed consent, no, it would be unlawful to block a user for not giving consent, unless it is impossible to provide the service without it. See recital 43: Consent is presumed not to be freely given if [...] the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. | Is there a legal reason why many advertisements say “Limited Time Offer”? Sometimes, especially where the advertisement specifies the deadline. This would help defeating a claim of unfair and misleading practices that customers might pursue apropos of an open-ended offer. An offer triggers the offeree's power of acceptance. Lapse of time --whether reasonable or specified by the offeror-- and revocation by the offeror are two permissible methods for termination of that power. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 36, 41. By specifying a deadline, the offeror preempts both the question of fact as to what constitutes reasonable time under the circumstances, Id. at 41(2), and an argument that revocation of the offer was so arbitrary that it took customers by surprise. Is there a law that says they have to include that? No. The decision mostly depends on the offeror's marketing preferences and the litigation risks associated to making an open-ended offer. | Typically it works like this: Sales Tax: Owed in the state that the sale is made (in your case, New York). This is difficult in the internet age with businesses operated with no physical presence in a state. Technically sales (and local taxes) are due depending on where the item that was sold is delivered, so if you shipped an item made in Texas to New York, New York sales taxes would be due on that item. These taxes would be paid to the state of New York. Same for all 50 states. This is a huge burden on small businesses and is not usually enforced. Most small businesses only collect sales tax on items sold to the state that the business is operating from (in your example, you would only collect Texas state sales tax). Income Tax: This is the corporate tax levied by the state that the business is operating in, in this case it would be Texas. Since Texas does not have a state income tax, there would be no income tax. However Texas does have a Franchise Tax that would be due (this is due from all business organized or operating in Texas) The state that the business is registered in may have its own taxes which would be on the income of the business and would be specific to the state that the business is registered in. These can also be in the form of registration fees, annual fees, franchise fees, etc. | Is the question just whether a company can contact its customers to ensure that they're happy with the company's services? If so, the answer is generally yes. I can think of no reason why this would change based on the fact that someone saw her using the services of a competitor. Your mother seems to be treating the phone call as an accusation, but it appears to be standard customer-relationship maintenance. If she chooses to approach it differently, she can use it to improve her bargaining power with Gym 1. | I spent 26 years in Law Enforcement (two years in Fraud, Identity Theft, and Embezzlement) and here is the answer I would often give other people in this situation: By law, recipients are not required to do anything. It can be deleted without a second thought. There is no specific law requiring someone to report this as it doesn't rise to the level of a crime. Contacting the sender or intended recipient can be risky because the other person is unknown. Return addresses online may be masked by redirects or other traps. What is displayed may not be the full picture of the site where they want someone to go. Having information about someone, although private, is not a crime unless there is a specific intent to use that information for a crime: fraud, identity theft, theft, etc. Doctors, banks, and numerous other businesses have access to personal identifying information about people. Unless they were to use it illegally, just having the information is not a crime. Phishing attempts: As far as sending the information on to the intended recipient, that would be very noble; but there is no requirement to do so. This type of transaction is likened to having a stranger call looking for someone else. There are people around the world just hoping to get people to click on their site so they can download everything on the victim's computer. I once taught a class in Internet Safety to senior citizens. The message was simple: Don't put any information on-line that you wouldn't post on your front door. Advances on computer security have made it possible to securely handle more information but still be on-guard; Phishing still happens. Most reputable companies won't send you e-mails asking for personal information, passwords, or account numbers. Hackers, thieves, and criminals have access to personal information regularly. In today's society, it's just a part of life in a digital world. How does one protect themselves? Be diligent about all transactions. For instance: Check bank accounts, credit card purchases, and credit reports regularly. A TV show, Adam Ruins Everything - Adam Ruins Security, clearly outlines a lot of these facts. (Season 1, Episode 2 - First aired October 6, 2015) To recap: 1) Do nothing. 2) Stay vigilant. 3) Be wary. Common idiom - If it looks too good to be true, it probably is. | No Overview There is no general rule requiring a seller to determine the mental condition of a buyer. However, if a seller knows or has good reason to know that a buyer does in fact had dementia or some other mental problem, and is not or may well not be able to understand the nature of the deal or the reasons why it is or is not a good bargain, if the seller took advantage of the buyer's mental condition, then the seller may be liable. Also, if the buyer's condition is such that the buyer is deemed not to be capable of properly entering into a contract, that is the buyer lacks the capacity to contract, then the contract may well be void from teh4 start. The Video The video linked in the question shows a man confronting a salesman who, he alleges, sold two houshold doors to his mother for a total of just under 6,000 pounds UK. The son claims that it was obvious that his mother was impaired. He claims that the only problem was that one door had a broken handle and latch, which could easily be repaired for 50 pounds. He claims that the salesman falsely states that the doors were "not safe" without mentioning that the one with a problem could easily be repaired, and need not be replaced. He also claims that the salesman took checks in payment, in spite of the printed terms on the invoice saying that no payment was due until after installation. He says repeatedly that the salesman "pressured" his mother into making this purchase, and describes it as "robbery". No proof is shown in the video, and no court decision is refereed to. I express no vieo as to whether the claims of the son in the video are accurate. But I do discuss situations where similar claims are accurate. Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (UTR) It sees that a sales agent acting similarly to the one accused in the video might have committed unfair practices and thus offenses under the UTR, specifically "aggressive selling", "misleading statements", and "misleading omissions". Under the UK Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (UTR) regulation 3, specifically 3(3) and 3(4): (3) A commercial practice is unfair if— (a) it contravenes the requirements of professional diligence; and (b) it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to the product. (4) A commercial practice is unfair if— (a) it is a misleading action under the provisions of regulation 5; (b) it is a misleading omission under the provisions of regulation 6; (c) it is aggressive under the provisions of regulation 7; or (d) it is listed in Schedule 1. UTR regulation 5 provides in relevant part: 5.—(1) A commercial practice is a misleading action if it satisfies the conditions in either paragraph (2) or paragraph (3). (2) A commercial practice satisfies the conditions of this paragraph— (a)if it contains false information and is therefore untruthful in relation to any of the matters in paragraph (4) or if it or its overall presentation in any way deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer in relation to any of the matters in that paragraph, even if the information is factually correct; and (b) it causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise UTR Regulation 7 on Aggressive commercial practices provides in relevant part: 7.—(1) A commercial practice is aggressive if, in its factual context, taking account of all of its features and circumstances— (a) it significantly impairs or is likely significantly to impair the average consumer's freedom of choice or conduct in relation to the product concerned through the use of harassment, coercion or undue influence; and (b) it thereby causes or is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise. (2) In determining whether a commercial practice uses harassment, coercion or undue influence account shall be taken of— ... (c) the exploitation by the trader of any specific misfortune or circumstance of such gravity as to impair the consumer's judgment, of which the trader is aware, to influence the consumer's decision with regard to the product; UTR regulation 8 provides in relevant part: 8.—(1) A trader is guilty of an offence if— (a) he knowingly or recklessly engages in a commercial practice which contravenes the requirements of professional diligence under regulation 3(3)(a); and (b) the practice materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to the product under regulation 3(3)(b). UTR schedule 1(12) describes as unfair: Making a materially inaccurate claim concerning the nature and extent of the risk to the personal security of the consumer or his family if the consumer does not purchase the product. UTR regulations 9 through 12 make unfair practices, as described in regulations 3 through 7 and schedule 1, offenses punishable by fine or imprisonment. These might well apply to the practices alleged in the video linked in the question Financial Conduct Authority A Guidance from the UK Financial Conduct Authority is available online. This seems to apply more to sales of financial products (e.g. investments) than physical goods such as doors. It is also a draft, not a final regulation. But it more specifically deals with people vulnerable due to metal issues, and might show the trend of regulation on such issues in the UK. 2.1 In our Approach to Consumers we define a vulnerable consumer as ‘someone who, due to their personal circumstances, is especially susceptible to detriment, particularly when a firm is not acting with appropriate levels of care’ (as presented in our Occasional Paper 8 on Consumer Vulnerability) ... 2.14 (g) Exposure to mis-selling – vulnerable consumers may be more likely to fall victim to pressure selling, or be provided with the wrong information about potential products or services by staff who do not understand their circumstances. People with mental health problems, for example, are more likely to have mistakenly bought a product on credit and 3 in 4 of those felt pressured into doing so. 2.15 We expect the firms we regulate to treat customers, including vulnerable customers, fairly. Our previous work has shown that not all firms treat vulnerable consumers fairly, and those consumers face a significant risk of harm. Vulnerability is, therefore, a key priority for the FCA Conclusion I have not found any UK law or regulation that requires firms or people doing general business to determine if a potential customer suffers from Alzheimer's, dementia, or any similar mental issue. However, taking advantage of people who exhibit symptoms of such problems might be found to be an unfair practice, and so lead to civil or criminal liability | There may be violations of consumer protection and/or advertising statutes here by the online store, but the common law position is that: The website's owner is making an invitation to treat Based on that, you are making an offer The contract comes into place when the website's owner accepts your offer. The time of contract formation is "when the parties give objective manifestation of an intent to form the contract." You would need to read the site very carefully, in particular their terms and conditions, acknowledgement page and/or email to see if they are actually accepting your offer or if there are conditions attached. If there is no clear, unconditional acceptance then there is no contract at that time; this applies even if you have paid for the goods. If this is the case (and I strongly suspect that it would be for most online stores), then their acceptance of your offer and the formation of the contract probably does not come into effect until they "give objective manifestation of an intent to form the contract" by shipping the goods. Up until that time there is no contract and their only obligation to you is to promptly refund your money. |
Any law that requires you to allow police to photograph you in public? Lets say you are in public, and the Police approach you. You do not wish to speak to them and want to walk away. They detain you for the purpose of taking a photo of you but you have not committed a crime and they won't state whether you are the suspect of a crime. In the U.S. in any state, is there a law that states you must allow them to photograph you? Can you be charged with obstruction if you actively prevent them from taking the photo by covering your own face? | In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest. | There are several misunderstandings here. First of all, the US exclusionary rule applies only to evidence gained by the police, or by people acting as agents of the government, and not always to them. Secondly it applies only in criminal cases. The question does not say which state this would be in, and these are largely matters of state law, so it makes a difference. But I don't know of any state where taking a video without explicit consent, in a place where the person has a right to be, is a crime. In some states it would not even be a tort. If a video is taken without the subject's consent, that may be an invasion of privacy, and the subject might be able to sue (not "file charges). In such a case the video itself would absolutely be put in evidence, and if it recorded verbal permission to take the video, the case would be promptly dismissed, quite possibly with sanctions for a frivolous lawsuit. Even if the video were taken by a police officer, and was presented as evidence in a criminal case, the office could testify to the verbal permission. That would be enough for the judge to view the video as part of a suppression hearing (which is not before a jury). If the judge saw and heard verbal permission to take the video, that would be an end to the motion to suppress, unless it was claimed that the permission was somehow coerced or faked, and evidence supported such a claim. | Staff at polling stations have been told to stop people taking selfies - even though it is not against the law. The Electoral Commission fears the craze for taking self-portraits on phones and posting them on social media threatens the secrecy of the ballot. Anyone who inadvertently reveals how someone else votes in Thursday's local and European elections could face a £5,000 fine or six months in prison. Staff have been urged to put up "no photography" signs in polling stations. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-27486392 Its not illegal to take a photo of your own ballot paper, it is illegal to reveal how someone else voted without their knowledge. Thats where Section 66 of the Representation of the People's Act comes into play. This law hasn't been updated since the 2014 BBC article, so the articles claims about lawfulness are still valid. | A "police car" doesn't necessarily have a special legal status, so a police officer can theoretically drive a beat-up pickup truck and "be legal" (but not in Washington, see below). What matters is whether others have to give special attention to the vehicle. The pertinent question is, what are the requirements for being an authorized emergency vehicle. I'll give you Washington state law, and you can apply this to other states fairly easily. RCW 46.37.190(1) mandates that Every authorized emergency vehicle shall, in addition to any other equipment and distinctive marking required by this chapter, be equipped with at least one lamp capable of displaying a red light visible from at least five hundred feet in normal sunlight and a siren capable of giving an audible signal. (3) Vehicles operated by public agencies whose law enforcement duties include the authority to stop and detain motor vehicles on the public highways of the state may be equipped with a siren and lights of a color and type designated by the state patrol for that purpose. The state patrol may prohibit the use of these sirens and lights on vehicles other than the vehicles described in this subsection. Given these restrictions, a driver knows whether they must get out of the way, and whether they have to "pull over" (stop driving and get ready for a brief traffic detention). The manner of attachment of "stuff" on the outside of the vehicle falls under general state patrol safety rules, whereby for example you can't balance a rocking chair on the roof and speed down the highway. The state patrol has reasonable discretion to deem that a particular mode of attachment is "unsafe" – this won't be like building-code minutia. Duck tape would probably be deemed to be an insecure means of attachment. There can be some statutory provisions regarding use of private vehicles, for example RCW 46.37.185 allows green lights on firefighter's private care: Firefighters, when approved by the chief of their respective service, shall be authorized to use a green light on the front of their private cars when on emergency duty only. Such green light shall be visible for a distance of two hundred feet under normal atmospheric conditions and shall be of a type and mounting approved by the Washington state patrol. The use of the green light shall only be for the purpose of identification and the operator of a vehicle so equipped shall not be entitled to any of the privileges provided in RCW 46.61.035 for the operators of authorized emergency vehicles. Flashing blue lights are prohibited by WAC 204-21-230(c)(4) "other than a law enforcement vehicle as defined in WAC 204-21-020", which is "a publicly owned or leased vehicle operated by a law enforcement agency and which is used for the law enforcement functions of the agency". That means that in Washington, the town sheriff cannot use his personal car as a law enforcement vehicle. I expect there to be some variation on that point across the US. The lights-and-sirens law is what keeps ordinary people from putting lights and sirens on their vehicles. | The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law." | Yes P was standing in a hallway to which he had apparently been lawfully admitted Indeed. And what were the conditions imposed on P for that lawful admittance? If one of those was "no photography" then P would not have been lawfully on the premises once they started taking pictures; at that point, they would have been a trespasser. Similarly, if they were admitted under conditions of confidence. As a trespasser, the information they obtained would not have been obtained legitimately and would fall foul of protection on trade secrets. Of course, P's actions can be "wrong" without being unlawful. | You are not obliged to say anything to a police officer during a traffic stop, in fact you are generally better off staying silent. This is your Fifth Amendment right to silence. The only exception to this is that the officer could ask for your name and you are obliged to give it under Arizona Laws 13-2412, but the answer to that is language-independent and is usually already answered with your driver's license in a traffic stop. If you did choose to communicate only in German, this may have the effect of frustrating the officer's investigation but if you only make truthful statements in German it is unlikely to be obstruction of their investigation. Arizona Laws 13-2409 is I believe the relevant section (emphasis mine): A person who knowingly attempts by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation or force or threats of force to obstruct, delay or prevent the communication of information or testimony relating to a violation of any criminal statute to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury or who knowingly injures another in his person or property on account of the giving by the latter or by any other person of any such information or testimony to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury is guilty of a class 5 felony, except that it is a class 3 felony if the person commits the offense with the intent to promote, further or assist a criminal street gang. In general, a law that required you to give answers to a police officer during an investigation in English if you understand English and have waived your right to silence would violate your First Amendment right to free speech (as it is in effect "forced speech"). However, you would need to be careful not to tell the police officer that you do not understand English if that is not true, as it could be misrepresentation. Police officer training likely includes instructions for detaining someone that cannot understand them and the police can detain you and wait for an interpreter to continue their investigation if they determine that is necessary. You may actually be shooting yourself in the foot by doing this, because the time it takes for them to get an interpreter likely extends the amount of time the detainment can last while remaining "reasonable," so you may be waiting by the side of the road longer than you would have if you had simply told the officer that you were invoking your right to silence and followed the officer's instructions without speaking. As an aside, as more people are educated on their rights via the Internet and understand why they should always invoke their right to silence when detained, police officers will get more used to people they pull over immediately and politely telling them that they are going to invoke their right to silence. I doubt most police officers will hold it against you as long as you are otherwise cooperative and don't yell at them or berate them. | (Assuming the jurisdiction is the US.) Your question I was wondering whether there are any limitations on using photos of private individuals on websites. is the least of your potential problems. Photos of the public taken in public are mostly legal to use and publish, and you own the copyright on the photo, and generally don't need a model release. But your plan of posting the photo with accompanying information about (alleged) fraud: There's a fraud conducting business in my state and I want to create a website that warns others of his fraudulent practices. is potentially legally problematic. As phoog indicates in his comment, you need to be aware of defamation, both at the federal level and among states, as some have criminalized defamation (Wikipedia). Libel is the publication of provably false facts by one person about another person. For a full outline of defamation (libel and slander, and including private and public figures), see Libel and Slander | Nolo.com. What you want to do is publish "facts" about this alleged fraud on the website with a photo of the individual, linking the fraud allegations to them. That is potentially libelous. The facts of the fraud may be provably true, or they may be provably false; that remains to be seen. But the facts don't matter when considering what actions the person can take against you if you publish such information on your website. If this business and the individual(s) feel they are not committing fraud, they can sue you for libel in civil court, alleging that you have damaged their reputation and impacted their business by publishing those facts on your website with the photo identifying the person and their business. If they take legal action, and you can prove the business and the individual(s) are committing fraud with provable facts - hard evidence of fraud, such as legal documents and court judgments - than you should (no guarantees) be able to successfully defend yourself in a libel suit brought against you by that person. Even if the business and the individual(s) are aware of facts that prove their fraud, and know they will probably not prevail in court, they can still take you to court, and it will cost you whatever time and money it takes to defend yourself. My responses above concern what legal actions the alleged could take against you if you published the website with the photo and information about the alleged fraud. No one here is advising you to put up the website with the photo and the "facts" as you see them, even if you have hard proof of the facts of the fraud; you should find legal representation before taking any action with the website. And, no one here is advising you to open any legal action against the person; that's your choice in terms of determining your case and if you can show actual harm that was caused by the alleged fraud by the individual, and you should find legal representation before taking any action. |
Does the United States' Fourth Amendment cover privacy violations by private corporations? For the sake of contrast, consider the wording of the First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. The First Amendment makes clear that only a legal institution which enacts a law, say, "abridging the freedom of speech," would be in violation of the US Constitution; if a private corporation does so, it would not be in violation of this law. Contrast the wording of the Fourth Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. This passage does not say "shall not be violated by Congress," but rather "shall not be violated," full stop. Is it a correct inference that the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" extends to even a private corporation? For example, if a corporation, without disclosing such practices in its Terms of Service or Privacy Policy or whatever, infringes on a client's "security in his person," would such corporation be in violation of the Fourth Amendment (irrespective of any other potential legal issues)? | Is it a correct inference that the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" extends to even a private corporation? No. It's not even a correct inference that it extends by its own terms to state and local governments. In Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights was enacted as part of the federal constitution and only restricts the exercise of the federal government's authority. State and local governments are instead bound by the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Over the years, the courts have held that state action that deprives someone of fundamental rights deprives them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Wolf v. Colorado (1949), the Supreme Court held that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a fundamental right, so state action violating it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most of the Bill of Rights has been held to be "fundamental," and people routinely say "the state violated the Fourth Amendment" instead of "the state violated the Fourteenth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable search of the sort that would violate the Fourth Amendment if conducted by the federal government." Courts will say "the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth." But the point is that the Fourth Amendment itself is not applicable to anyone except the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, only restricts the states. The Fourth Amendment only restricts the federal government. With rare exceptions, neither applies to private entities. | Yes. The First Amendment protects all speech, outside a few historically recognized exceptions, which include libel, perjury, incitement, and true threats. There is no exception for speech that injures the speaker himself. | The constitutionality of each of the charges is well supported and there is no really viable First Amendment defense to any of them. There is literally a U.S. Justice Department handbook on how to prosecute attempts to undermine the integrity of elections accumulating the wisdom its has gleaned from doing precisely what it is doing in this indictment, successfully, for generations. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Defraud the United States) This statute states that: If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor. Fraudulent statements which are protected by the First Amendment are the exception more than they are the rule. When fraudulent statements of presenting existing facts, or fraudulent concealment of presently existing facts, seek to impair someone's legal rights, it is generally constitutional to punish that conduct criminally. At noted here: Fraud and Perjury While, again, the First Amendment makes no categorical exception for false or misleading speech, certain types of fraudulent statements fall outside its protection. The government generally can impose liability for false advertising or on speakers who knowingly make factual misrepresentations to obtain money or some other material benefit (such as employment). Prohibitions on perjury — knowingly giving false testimony under oath — also are constitutional. This statute requires proof of intentional fraud, and not just a good faith difference of opinion sincerely held by the defendant. Probably the most on point precedent upholding the constitutionality of this statute in an analogous context is United States v. Rafoi, 60 F.4th 982 (5th Cir. 2023). This case held that the statute was constitutional where the charged conduct caused harm inside United States or to United States citizens or interests, that provided sufficient nexus, as required by due process, between United States and defendant's conduct in allegedly meeting with co-conspirators in Miami, Florida, where a noncitizen defendant, a citizen of Portugal and Switzerland who was employee of Swiss wealth-management firm, conspired to violate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as agent of a person while in United States, relating to alleged international bribery scheme between businesses based in United States and Venezuelan officials and the defendant has the intent or knowledge that the monies involved were proceeds of specified unlawful activity would be unlawfully transmitted from or through a place in United States to a place outside United States. The relevant holding in this case is that prosecuting violations of U.S. laws that exist for the purposes of insisting upon orderly and non-corrupt conduct of actions related to U.S. officials or U.S. persons through fraud under this statute, is constitutional. When it affects the conduct of U.S. government business, or of a U.S. business or person, the statute is actionable and constitutional. Also pertinent is a much older U.S. Supreme Court decision, Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182 (1924): [F]ormer President and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court William Howard Taft explained in a landmark 1924 opinion, the full meaning of the statute almost anticipates our current surreal scenario: “It also means to interfere with or obstruct one of its [the country’s] lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest." In contrast, fraud in the course of a political campaign to persuade voters is protected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that a law criminalizing false factual statements about military honors received in a political campaign called the "Stolen Valor Act" in the version then in force was unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds). But that isn't what this charged is seeking to prosecute. A law review article from 2015 attempts to clarify the scope of Alvarez, distinguishing between completely unprotected lies, lies that are protected so as not to chill the expression of truthful statements, and "lies that must be protected for their own sake". The citation to the article is Alan K. Chen and Justin Marceau, "High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment," 68 Vanderbilt Law Review 1435 (2015). It is notable that in Alvarez every conservative justice on the Court at the time other than Chief Justice Roberts, voted to affirm the constitutionality of the "Stolen Valor Act", over a mostly liberal majority that held that it was an unconstitutional violation of free speech rights. Now that there is a six justice conservative majority in the U.S. Supreme Court, if the positions of conservative justices on the issue was consistent, the U.S. Supreme Court would be even more likely to uphold the constitutionality of a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371 than the U.S. Supreme Court would have been inclined to in 2012. It is unclear, however, how much this conservative ruling was dependent upon the fact that the statute prohibited lying about military honors rather than about other matters. Conservatives tend to hold honor, and in particular, military honors, in greater esteem than liberals. Also, conservative justice may have been more clear than the liberal justices in that case about just how open and shut these cases were, since the truth or falsity of the statement can be determined definitively, from a single official document, the veteran's Form DD214, which there is a strong presumption that almost any veteran capable of running for political office would understand perfectly well. Another issue which influenced swing votes in the Alvarez case is that the statute that the U.S. Supreme Court considered at the time criminalized fraud regarding military honors even when it was arguably immaterial (e.g. in dinner table conservations with friends or family, as opposed to only in the context of an election campaign, or only in a request for economic benefits or legal privileges). This concern is not present in this particular prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371, since Donald Trump would receive the legal benefit of being re-elected as President of the United States if his alleged election results related fraud conspiracy was successful. One critical distinction, previously noted by the Washington State Supreme Court its 2007 decision in the case of Rickert v Washington, is whether, in the context of the speech giving rise to the legal consequences, "the government is capable of correctly and consistently negotiating the thin line between fact and opinion in political speech." This will generally be true in the case of factual statements related to election results and administration, but will generally not be true in wide ranging statements about policy issues in the course of a political campaign. An August 1, 2022 report of the Congressional Research Service, the non-partisan research arm of Congress, generally confirms the analysis above. This is the only D.C. grand jury indictment for which there is even a colorable free speech argument, but given the case law, it is a weak argument. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 (Obstruction of and Attempt to Obstruct an Official Proceeding and Conspiracy To Do The Same) Obstruction of an official proceeding in action action with an intended effect and doesn't prevent people from expressing opinions in a way that does not obstruct official government functions, so again this isn't unconstitutional. The charge in this case charges the crime that: Whoever corruptly-- obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so is guilty of a felony punishable by up to twenty years in prison. There is already case law testing the constitutionality of this portion of this statute in the context of the same course of conduct related to the January 6, 2021 riot by a lower level minor from the D.C. Circuit whose rulings are binding precedents in this indictment. United States v. Fischer, 64 F.4th 329 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The foundation for this ruling is longstanding: Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. (1949), the Supreme Court held the First Amendment affords no protection to “speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.” A robber’s demand at gunpoint that you hand over your money is not protected speech. Nor is extortion, criminal conspiracy, or solicitation to commit a specific crime. Abstract advocacy of lawbreaking remains protected speech. There is no constitutional basis to distinguish a direct charge of obstruction with official business from a conspiracy charge to do the same. In the case of the conspiracy to obstruct charge, the co-conspirators take actions that collectively seek to deprive people of their constitutional rights or obstruct an official proceeding, the statements made in furtherance of the group effort to achieve those ends are not legally protected speech. It is the action (either a verbal act or another kind of act) and not the expressive content of the speech that is implicated. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights) A conspiracy to cause false election results to be certified to Congress to change the results of a Presidential election by two or more persons impairs the constitutional right to vote, and rights under Congressional adopted federal election laws. Notably, a conspiracy to violate rights, which is a felony punishable by up to death if the conspiracy causes someone's death (as can be plausibly alleged in this case due to a death arising from the January 6, 2021 riot) provides that the felony has been committed: If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same. The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held that prosecuting conspirators for tampering with the process of determining the correct result of the election is constitutional. U.S. v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944). This also comes within the "Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct" exception to the protections of the First Amendment that is discussed above. FOOTNOTE: If the Justice Department sought the death penalty on this criminal charge the jury would have to be "death qualified" in the court of jury selection which tends to make the jury more conservative. But, there is no indication that the Justice Department intends to seek this relief in this particular prosecution of Donald Trump. As a practical matter, given Donald Trump's age, health, and the length of time necessary to fully appeal a death penalty conviction (which exceeds ten years in most cases), any criminal conviction with a sentences of ten or fifteen years or more would as a practical matter result in him dying in prison, and it is unlikely that appeals of a death sentence would be completed before he died of natural causes. | Foreign citizens are just as entitled to Fourth Amendment protections against search and seizure as American citizens are. The case you cited was, in fact, a South Korean citizen who successfully had evidence suppressed from an unjustified border search. | Yes The US constitution is in the public domain. Anyone may publish a version of it, including an altered version. No US law forbidding publication of an altered version would itself be constitutional -- the First Amendment would prevent such a law. However, if an altered version were sold under such conditions that a customer might reasonably believe it to be an unaltered version, that might be false advertising, or perhaps fraud, because the seller would be deceiving the customer as to what the product is. | The question is rendered moot because Cal. Civ. §1798.100 declares that Any provision of a contract or agreement of any kind, including a representative action waiver, that purports to waive or limit in any way rights under this title, including, but not limited to, any right to a remedy or means of enforcement, shall be deemed contrary to public policy and shall be void and unenforceable. This section shall not prevent a consumer from declining to request information from a business, declining to opt out of a business’s sale of the consumer’s personal information, or authorizing a business to sell or share the consumer’s personal information after previously opting out. You can fail to request such information, and you can tell a business that you don't plan to ever exercise that right, but you cannot be bound by such promises, which is to say, this is an un-waivable right. For another right, you might be able to waive that right. Your 5th amendment rights can be waived, but we would have to know more of the circumstances to know if that was a knowing and intelligent waiver. | Almost no constitutional right, for the most part, applies or gives rise to an all-encompassing right at all times. Schools can determine that certain times are off limits as activity during those times may interrupt the environment most conducive to learning, or for other articulable reasons; this is fine so long as it is applied evenly. Schools may say you may not hand out literature at certain times, only before or after classes, weekends, or put limits on the place or manner of distribution. There are examples of this premise that exist, pertaining to nearly every right, otherwise considered absolute. This is no different than the principle that while Americans enjoy the right to free speech, not all speech is protected at all times, or that the right to bear arms does not apply to all people, places, or environs. | Huge difference between a car and a house. For example, at least in Pennsylvania no warrant is required to search a vehicle on public roads. In other states there are so many easy pretexts that you practically have little protection from a full vehicle search (although the pretext will have to withstand strict scrutiny if evidence found in a search is used to charge you with a crime). Your house, on the other hand, still enjoys very strong fourth-amendment protections: One of my favorite U.S. Supreme Court cases on the subject is Florida v. Jardines, in which SCOTUS ruled that even approaching the front door with a drug-sniffing dog without a warrant constituted an illegal search. (The majority opinion is worth reading for its illumination of current law on this question.) |
Why are businesses not concerned about every law in the world, mostly? Several businesses have publicly accessible websites . Thus don't they operate in every country? Then why are they only concerned about their own country's laws and sometimes GDPR and CCPA? Is it legal? Are they safe? Are their owners being and their assets in their home country safe? | That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D & E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small. | The GDPR does not outlaw such processing of personal data. It merely regulates how and for what purposes you can process personal data. In general, you can conduct any processing activity as long as it has a clear purpose and a legal basis. Here, the purpose would likely be something like “conducting business with my clients” and the legal basis would be a “legitimate interest”. A legitimate interest always requires a balancing test that weighs your interests against the interests and rights of the affected persons. For example, can the affected persons reasonably expect such processing activities? In a professional setting, it can probably expected that business partners keep notes about contact persons so your intended processing could be fine. The GDPR does impose some general constraints. There are general principles like data minimization and storage limitation – you should only collect data that is necessary for your purpose, and shouldn't store it for longer than necessary. You should think about appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs) to protect the processing activity, for example about how your CRM is hosted, how backups are made and how security updates are installed, who has access to the personal data, and how the people with access to the personal data can be trained. For example, such training might inform your employees that they can only use the data in the CRM for business purposes, but absolutely not for personal purposes like asking Gina from reception out for a date. | Yes When personal data is processed in the context of an EU/EEA/UK establishment (for example, by a company with offices in the UK), then all these processing activities must fully comply with the GDPR, regardless of where the data subjects are located. For the UK GDPR: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the United Kingdom, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the United Kingdom or not. For the EU GDPR: The GDPR applies to: a company or entity which processes personal data as part of the activities of one of its branches established in the EU, regardless of where the data is processed; or … | In the United States, the main statute governing the use of health care information is HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. HIPAA and its related statutes and regulations detail what you can and can't do with medical information. You can't always collect it; if you do, you can't always share it, and you can't always delete it. This is a complex field of law and it's easy to screw up in a way that would cause big, serious, company-destroying, job-ending problems for everyone involved. To put this another way: this is absolutely, positively, not something you want to get advice on from strangers on the internet. You don't just need a lawyer; you need a HIPAA specialist--or the equivalent in whatever other countries you plan to operate in--before you push anything out to real-life patients, especially children. | I think that one cannot answer a question such as "Will the personal use exception in the GDPR apply to personal blogs?", because it is unclear if you refer to: personal information published on the blog pages personal information collected from the Website, by way of forms, cookies, server logs, strictly collected and processed for the purpose of operating the Website for your own personal purposes as a blogger (by yourself of through a subcontractor in the sense of GDPR) and not personal information collected from the Website's operation, transferred or provided to third parties for their own purposes (this would include cookies used to identify and track users across multiple domains) Regarding 1., a personal blog wanting to benefit from the exemption should not publish third party's personal information without their consent or another legal basis, and C-101/01 certainly applies here. About 2., if the information is strictly collected and used for the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog, I would tend to agree that it should benefit from the exemption. I feel that C-212/13 would not necessarily be an indication that because the blog is publicly accessible it is then "directed outwards from the private setting" in the sense of this ruling, and should not be considered as "purely ‘personal or household’ activity". C-212/13 case was relating to a camera installed by an individual on his family home for its own security purposes which was also monitoring a public space. The persons filmed on this public space had absolutely no direct connexion with the person collecting their images. In case of a blog, the visitors of the blog interact with the blog for fulfilling the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog of the publisher of the blog. Another argument is given by the Recital 18 which you quote: a personal blog can be viewed as a type of social networking or related online activity. Finally, about 3., there is no doubt for me that, in this case, the publisher of the blog is engaged in an activity which is not personal, since it willingly provides personal information to third parties which they use for their own purposes (and not as subcontractors in the sense of GDPR). There may be other approaches apart from these 3, but that's a start for your considerations. | ...due to the international registration of multiple domains to generate ad revenue by recycling stories across sock puppet networks, giving the impression of multiple, independent companies. None of that is illegal on its face. Internet domains are freely registerable by anyone, anywhere (with the exception of some laws in some nations that restrict such Internet-related activity), and registered privately or publicly, and websites can be hosted anywhere. Writing articles and "spinning" and copying articles (even if that writing is sales gibberish in broken English) among the same copyright owner is legal, and using the same design and layout for a network of sites is legal. The formation of multiple, related companies and shell companies to give the impression that companies are separate and independent is legal (again, with the exception of some business and corporate laws in some nations that restrict such activity). These are all common business practices. Some business practices may appear to be unethical - trying to fool customers in order to make money and get clicks and sell ads. And what you may be feeling is that such activity is unethical. And that's OK. But feeling that they are unethical doesn't make the practices illegal. Many common activities that are considered to be unethical are illegal; but not all. Buyer beware. One way some of that activity may be illegal is if those articles are factually incorrect and promote quack medical treatments, are financial scams requiring payments, are gambling sites or promote other clearly illegal things. But then you get into the complexity of exactly how they are illegal, which jurisdictions are involved, and on and on. | It may be legal or it may not For example, if any of the users are in the European Union, then the GDPR applies and the person storing the information is a data controller and has legal obligations. These include, having a legitimate reason for storing them, storing them only for as long as necessary for that reason, notifying the individuals that the data is being stored and why, deleting it upon a users request etc. | If an employee takes home information that his or her employer considers confidential, that would be a matter of company policy. The employer could discipline or fire the employee if it learned of the incident, and chose to act. If the information is considered to be a trade secret, or part of one, disclosing it or mishandling it so as to risk disclosure could be a crime under US law. However, only in unusual cases is criminal action taken on such matters, normally it is left to civil lawsuits or internal company action. I do not know if Canada has a similar law. |
Rudy Giuliani sued, why ask for $1.3b? Rudy Giuliani has been sued. The plaintiffs are asking for S1.3 billion in compensation. He doesn't have anything like that much money. His net worth is estimated to be $45 million. Why are they asking for such a large amount, which they could not possibly ever receive? What is the legal thinking behind it? What is the strategy? $45 million is the maximum they could ever recover, so why not ask for that? | You claim for the damage you suffered If you owe me $130 for unpaid wages, I sue for $130. If you wrote off my $130,000 car I sue for $130,000. If you burnt down my $130 million building, I sue for $130 million. If you did (in my estimate) $1.3 billion damage to my reputation I sue for $1.3 billion. Of course, I will have to prove that the damage was suffered - some damages are easier to prove than others. Whether the defendant can pay it is irrelevant to the suit. Of course, if there is a judgement that is more than the defendant’s net worth then any excess is “wasted”. At least commercially. However, commercial return is only one factor involved in deciding to launch a suit. Others include: seeking a precedent making a statement of principle vengeance | If you want to protect yourself or any property interests you may have in this circumstance you have to talk to a lawyer. You cannot get (or trust) legal advice from the internet. I will, however, make the following personal observations: I only provide a W-9 to people who are paying me money, and who request it as a condition of paying me. I don't know of a legal requirement to supply it after the fact. However, not providing it to someone who did pay you more than $600 in a tax year could certainly make it difficult for them to comply with their tax filing obligations. I do not sign any agreements, assignments, or contracts, without what I consider to be fair consideration. E.g., if on leaving a job (as has happened) I am asked by a former employer to sign something that I am not already obligated to sign due to some prior contract, then I negotiate what is commonly called a "severance package." They pay me and/or extend benefits, and I sign something that limits their liability. | Two reasons that spring to mind: The Respondent wanted the appeal to proceed so that they would have definitive case law from a higher court. That is they thought they would win and, quite possibly, the appellant thought they would win too. Rolling the dice on a losing proposition is not so bad if you have no skin in the game so the Respondent is encouraging the appeal. Its a commercial PR decision - it looks bad in the press if you use your money and power to prevent someone from pursuing their legal rights. This way, they can put their hand on their hearts and say "we gave them every opportunity to prove us wrong". | It means exactly what it says: one of the parties (call them A) to the case purchased a life insurance policy that would pay £300,000 (presumably to A) if the judge were to die. Why they did this, we can only guess. But if the case was extremely long, there may have been a greater chance that the judge would die before it ended, and this would presumably delay the proceedings even further, causing more trouble and expense to the parties. It may be that A wanted to be protected financially if this happened. Another possibility is that A felt that Scarman was favoring A's side of the case; if Scarman were to die and be replaced by another judge, it might reduce A's chances of winning, and so A wanted insurance against that. | Is it worth it to contact a lawyer? No. The amount at issue indicates that the matter would have to be litigated in Small Claims court, where typically parties are not allowed to be represented by a lawyer. Furthermore, litigating in Small Claims court will give you some exposure to judicial proceedings. Being able to advance your legal arguments in court is useful, and this seems to be a great occasion to gain experience of that sort. The rental company's uncooperative behavior is unreasonable and can forfeit its entitlement to at least a sizeable portion of its actual expense. In many jurisdictions, the legislation provides treble damages in claims of fraud. Although claims of fraud and breach of contract oftentimes overlap, your entitlement to treble damages is not something to rule out. At the outset, the company's initial promise to give you the final statement most likely supports a finding of reasonable reliance, one of the prima facie elements of fraud. It is unclear whether the rental company made the aforementioned promise in writing. For evidentiary purposes, make sure that all your subsequent interactions with the rental company are in writing. That will make it harder for the company to disavow its verbal representations. | What should I do? Don't get intimidated, don't sign/accept/submit to his "agreement" now that you are securing employment elsewhere, and make sure that henceforth all your communications with the CEO & his startup be --or continue to be-- in writing. The CEO's attempt to be reimbursed is pure non-sense because hitherto there is no mutually agreed clause between you two to that effect. Generally speaking, compensation is for the professional's work, not for his employment spanning "n" pay periods. Having there been no employment/founders agreement of any type, he will be unable to prove that this was agreed any differently in your case. Furthermore, the CEO's threat to seek reimbursement of your earned compensation unless you submit to his "mutual" agreement not only amounts to extortion, but it also reflects his cluelessness about contract law. For instance, that contracts which are signed under hardship or duress are voidable. By contrast, submitting to his conditions will needlessly impose on you the burden of proving duress once you decide the situation is unsustainable. This is in addition to the legal weight with which your acceptance and subsequent conduct would support the CEO's allegation(s) that you two have "at all times" been in a cognizable contractual relation. Being realistic, it is highly doubtful that a startup which pays you weeks late is able --or even willing-- to spend money on a lawyer for nonsense like this. | The expected value formula involves multiplying the estimated dollar amount of each possible outcome by the estimated probability of that outcome adding up the result for every possibility. The results for each outcome have to include the ability to pay if you win and the cost of collecting if you win and the time value of money if not settling delays getting you paid. This formula is routinely used in litigation to evaluate settlements, but it is only a starting point, it isn't the only factor that should be considered. You need to consider the margin of error in the estimates. A big margin of error in the best or worst case scenario, or in a small probability, can make a huge difference. You also need to recognize that it is well known that the best lawyers who ultimately get the best results, routinely overestimate the strength of their own cases, and that clients usually overestimate the strength of their own cases as well. This is a well known cognitive bias and you need to correct for it. You need to include reaching a settlement later on, but before trial, in your list of possibilities. Often, even if it make sense to settle, making an offer at just the right moment instead of a less opportune time can make a big difference. Similarly, you have to consider the case from the other side's point of view to get a realistic sense of what the other side might be willing to pay. If it seems very likely that they would be willing to pay more, you might not want to accept an offer even if the amount offered would be good enough to be an acceptable result for you. You need to consider the future litigation costs that are avoided by settling, both in terms of dollars paid to lawyers and litigation costs, and in terms of lost time, expense and opportunity costs to you or your firm. You need to consider the economic harm that you may suffer from not having the matter resolved now rather than later. For example, suppose that your firm is about to have a public offering of stock, and if the litigation is not settled, the litigation will have to be disclosed and will have a disproportionate negative effect on the price investors will be willing to pay in the public offering. It may pay to settle a case for "more than its worth" to avoid the economic harm caused by having the litigation still outstanding. You need to consider the economic harm potentially caused by information disclosed in the context of a public trial which would reveal information that there is economic value in keeping secret, or that might encourage others to bring additional lawsuits. You need to consider the long term strategic impact of each possible outcome when considering each possibility and in considering settlement, and not just the impact in the immediate transaction. Once something has been proven in court, that loss in one case can frequently be held to have been judicially established in future cases in many circumstances. For example, if a contract term is determined to have a particular meaning in a lawsuit, and the court interprets it in an unfavorable way, that could influence the economic value of another 200,000 outstanding contracts with the same language where the meaning of this term has not been resolved in litigation, and it could open the door to a class action lawsuit against you on behalf of a class consisting of all 200,000 counter-parties with you on this contract. If it the contract interpretation makes only a $5 difference in each case, the incentive to prevent that from being resolved against you in court could be huge. On the other hand, if a corporation that engaged in many transactions gets a reputation for easily settling weak cases for generous amounts, they will be bombarded with frivolous lawsuits. Expected value really only makes sense with these adjustment and also only for repeat players in cases where the outcome of any particular case will not materially affect the person considering a settlement and there are no long term strategic effects, such as large employers and large companies in consumer cases that try to force other parties to resolve disputes with them on a case by case basis in confidential arbitration hearings that don't create precedents. It is less useful for one time participants in the legal system in a case with life changing consequences, as the benefits and costs of an outcome may be non-economic or may be non-linear (although this can be solved by more accurately valuing the dollar amounts in an expected value formula to consider the total impact of a particular result rather than the naive immediate payment). This non-linear factor is critical in these cases, however, because the personal utility value of an outcome is not strictly a matter of average dollar return. To give a simple and fairly common example, suppose that you have a case where you have a 70% chance of winning and a 30% chance of losing. If you lose you get nothing and pay nothing. If you win, you get $10,000,000. The expected value is $7,000,000. But, if you have someone who has never had real money in their life and will never have an opportunity to get real money in their life ever again, settling for a 100% chance of getting $3,000,000 could very well be better than getting a 70% chance of getting $10,000,000, because to that person the difference between getting $3,000,000 and $10,000,000 may not be very important, but the difference between getting at least $3,000,000 and getting $0 would be huge. One of the reasons that plaintiffs like to use class action lawsuits is that handling one big all or nothing cases causes businesses to stop thinking like expected value repeat player robots, and to start thinking like individuals who participate in litigation one time with high stakes, causing them to accept less optimal settlements for them relative to expected value to avoid the risk of a big disaster. Paying settlements or losing a modest percentage of small cases now and then won't harm anyone's career. Losing a big life or death of the company case after going to trial when a settlement that was a better deal was an option will cost the entire management team their careers and get many of the lawyers at the firm handling the defense of the case fired as well. | Can I legally put pressure on the company to get a compensation? (e.g. write an article explaining what they did) Writing an article about being fired doesn't have anything to do with the fact that writing that article is legal or not. Sure, you can write an article - or likely an opinion piece - about being fired for what you say are unjust reasons and hope it results in pressure on your old company. This happens all the time in the press; that's what Op-ed and opinion pieces - and also "objective" journalism - do every day. A big corporation isn't going to care about some bad PR from a disgruntled freelancer. Bad PR is not legal pressure. So consider the answer to your last question Can I be sued for warning of a potential crowdfunding scam? which is an outline of defamation law. If you're not very careful (and the publication's editor, if there is one and if they are not well-versed in defamation law), you will defame someone at the company (publish provably false facts) in your article and they (and/or the compnay) can take action against you. And self-publishing a piece has even greater risks of defamation, because it's likely you don't know the boundaries of defamation. Defamation is complex (especially in an international context) and turns on many details of the facts, how they were published, and more. But: how much money do you have to defend yourself against a libel suit? Another point to consider is this: even if you don't clearly libel someone at the company, the company can still take action against you. They can retaliate against bad PR with a lawsuit. You say they have lawyers and can afford it, and you're alone. Can you afford to defend yourself? Is it worth suing them (they're US-based), considering the cost or the legal action would not come cheap (I guess)? As a side note I am based in Europe (I avoid putting the country here, as a means to protect my privacy) That's entirely up to you. No one here will advise you about that. Only you can make that decision, or your lawyer can advise you on that. Talk to an attorney who might take on such an action, and one involving international jurisdictions (a US state and the unnamed European - possibly EU - country). Aside from potential libel, the other important aspect is to determine what legally can be done internationally in terms of defamation, both with any potential action you take and what actions the company can take against you. That will be determined by different laws and international agreements between the US (and possibly the state) and the unnamed (possibly EU) European country. The minor aspect of your dispute is your termination and the employment contract: The company engaging with the contractor has the right to terminate the agreement after several warnings have been issues.... However, no FORMAL warning has ever been issued. That's legally vague enough to allow the company to fire you at any time. (Update from comments: Virginia is a "Right to Work" state which means that the employer may fire the employee for any reason without cause unless the employee is being fired for being a member of a protected class, i.e.race, religion, sex, etc.) Again, international jurisdictions come into play concerning labor laws. Can you find a lawyer who will take on an international labor dispute? |
What if a spacecraft lands on my property? In December 2020 Hayabusa2, a Japanese space mission, returned samples from an asteroid to Earth, landing them in the Australian outback. Now, imagine a scenario where the samples accidentally land on someone's private property. Is that person legally obligated to give back the samples? | You have to give them back You don’t own other peoples stuff just because it’s on your property. However, you may be entitled to salvage rights - that is, payment for recovery of the vessel. | Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test. | What is the name of the crime and/or tort I have committed? You are guilty of the crime of fraud, the crime of theft of the money and the item (I can't point you to the precise statute). You have breached your contract of sale. You are probably liable for fraud civilly (i.e. you could be sued for fraud). But, if one was really creative, I imagine that one could find more grounds for civil and/or criminal liability, although they would probably be unnecessary since the victims have plenty of remedies to secure all possible relief already. Who gets to keep the object? Under the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2, in the United States, the general rule is delivery of possession by the seller (which didn't really happen here to one distinct person), but for unique goods, title passes when the unique good is identified to a contract with a buyer, so first in time to contract, first in right to the car, would probably prevail. But, I don't know what the rule would be in England and Wales. Is it handled differently if the "valuable physical object" is real estate? Land is harder to defraud someone with, because a reasonable person knows that in England and Wales real estate title is (usually, but not always) represented by a certificate of ownership maintained by a public official in the Land Registry, and is easily checked (about 15% of land in England and Wales show in the link is not registered so the possibility for deception is somewhat greater in that context). Also, generally, you don't pay for real property until you simultaneously receive payment in good funds, while brief extensions of credit for a non-perfectly contemporaneous sale transaction are more common in cases involving tangible personal property. | 1.a) Is there any states in the U.S. where stolen property is statutorily (and/or by case law) mandated to be returned to the legal owner from an equitable owner in the above scenario or in cases where the victims’ footings are more balanced? Yes 1.b) Which are they? All of them. The relevant cause of action is the common law tort of detinue: The gist of an action in detinue is that the defendant is wrongfully in possession of personal property which belongs to the plaintiff ... In modern practice, detinue has been superseded almost entirely by statutory actions for the recovery of personal property. 2.a) Is there anything else whatsoever than the law (statutory or decisional) that Alice may plead to bind the court to issue a mandatory injunction ordering Charlie to return the violin to Alice if Alice is willing to forgo any and all damages in return of such injunctions? Alice is not seeking an injunction for the return of the violin; she is seeking a judgement ordering the return. An injunction is an interim order to preserve the status quo. She might seek an injunction that Charlie be restrained from using, damaging or disposing of the violin while the case is ongoing and that might be granted but one ordering the return where ownership is yet to be established would not. However, given that monetary damages are a suitable recompense for Alice's loss in this instance, the court might not issue an injunction. 2.b) If there is, how does it overcome Ebay? Ebay is not applicable to the final judgement. If the violin is found to be Alice's, the court will order its return (not an injunction). If Alice does seek an interim injunction, then Ebay will apply. Hence why I suggest that some types of injunctions might be granted and others will not. 3.) Which states, if any, in the U.S. punish the knowing possession of stolen property as opposed to punishing the knowing receipt thereof? None as far as I know. What is happening between Alice and Charlie is not a state punishment - it is the resolution of a civil dispute about ownership. Most states do have forfeiture laws that might allow them to confiscate the violin irrespective of if Alice succeeds in proving ownership but, again, that is not punishment of Charlie - his loss was at the hands of Bob, not the state or Alice. | It is legal for a property owner to have a vehicle towed off of their property, if the vehicle is there without permission. If you have a vehicle with expired tags, your permission to park there may have been rescinded as of that notice. It is possible that a parking spot is part of the lease, in which case it would be a breach of contract for them to have your car towed. However, even if it's in the lease, if it is required by law, or specifically mentioned in the lease (i.e. "must be registered"), it is legal to tow the car. The city claims the right to regulate vehicles even parked on private property: Abandoned vehicles are defined as: vehicles that do not bear a license plate, or on which the displayed license plate is invalid, unless said vehicle is stored within a completely enclosed building or unless it is stored on a bona fide sales lot or an automobile storage yard or automobile wrecking yard, which threaten or endanger public safety or welfare; create a blighting influence upon the neighborhood where the vehicle rests, or; is, or may reasonably become, infested, or inhabited by rodents, vermin or other animals, or may furnish a breeding place for rodents, vermin or other animals. Inoperable, when referring to a vehicle, means the vehicle is incapable of being immediately driven, moved, or pulled in the manner for which it is intended or designed. The specific underlying ordinance Sec. 518.203(1) says No person in charge or control of any property within the city whether as owner, tenant, occupant, lessee or otherwise, shall allow any junk or abandoned vehicle to remain on any private or public property within the city longer than 15 days; and no person shall leave any such vehicle on any property within the city for a longer time than 15 days; except that this article shall not apply to a vehicle on the premises of a business enterprise licensed and operated in a lawful place and manner, to repair vehicles with current license or those places where active restoration is taking place and both activities are taking place within a closed building. An abandoned vehicle is defined as a vehicle that does not bear a license plate, or if the displayed license plate is invalid, unless said vehicle is stored within a completely enclosed building or unless it is stored on a bona fide automobile sales lot or an automobile storage yard or automobile wrecking yard The ordinance does not apparently define "valid license plate", but from state law, we can determine that you affix a "validation sticker" to your "registration license plate", so without a current tag, the license is not valid. Apparently the practice of towing cars with expired tags is not isolated in Florida: an untagged vehicle may not be visible to the public. | Important story, but BoingBoing also doubts the BBC's wording. It could be an attempted summary of a previous story on BBC Newsnight on 18 July: Lord Porter of Spalding, a former bricklayer, alleged corporations were running tests on the safety of their high-rise building materials but refusing to share the results. Releasing the results could allow residents and local authorities to know if their buildings are at risk of a fire following the Grenfell catastrophe which claimed the lives of at least 80 people. There Lord Porter was talking about results commissioned by private companies including manufacturers, where the labs wouldn't provide information because of 'intellectual property rights' of the client, or presumably commercial confidentiality. Under these situations, it is said the private concerns have no obligation to disclose. If this is what the BBC story was referring to, then at least investigations by government or third parties wanting to reveal characteristics of the products wouldn't have a copyright (or patent etc) problem. | No These are derivative works and making them is copyright breach. Doing this as a hobby or even for the entertainment of friends in private is likely fair use. Distribution or performance in public (monitored or not) is likely not fair use and you would need a licence. Here is a summary of the relevant law in australia. | It is their property, so keeping it without permission could well be seen as theft. I think you are obliged to make reasonable attempts to notify them you have their property before using it or selling it. Just like if someone left the item at your house after a party. If they want it back, however, it is at their cost, you should not be out of pocket for their failure to deliver within a reasonable time-frame; you may find they've already claimed the cost of the product from the courier and don't want it back. You are well within your rights to offer to buy it from them, and them to accept or reject that offer, this is a separate contract to the original sale. |
In the UK, can a landlord/agent add new tenants to a joint tenancy agreement without the consent of the current tenants? I am currently subject to a fixed-term joint tenancy (assured shorthold) agreement with two other tenants. One of the joint tenants wishes to exit the tenancy early. The tenancy agreement describes the procedure for leaving the tenancy before the end of the fixed term: 9 DEALINGS 9.1 The tenant must not assign the Property or any part of it although the Tenant may assign the whole of the Property after the first 3 months of the Term has expired subject to first obtaining the Landlord's written consent (such consent not to be unreasonably withheld). 9.2 Where one or more of the individuals comprising the Tenant (the Outgoing Tenant) wishes to leave before the end of the Term and has found another person or persons (the New Tenant) acceptable to both the Landlord and the remaining individual or individuals comprising the Tenant (the Remaining Tenant), the Outgoing Tenant and the Remaining Tenant may assign the Property to the Remaining Tenant and the New Tenant subject to first obtaining the Landlord’s written consent (such consent not to be unreasonably withheld). 9.3 The Landlord may reasonably withhold consent in these particular circumstances if, amongst other matters: (a) The New Tenant (or where appropriate any individual comprising the New Tenant) is not a student pursuing a course of study at an education establishment or will not become such a student within 3 months of the date of assignment; or (b) The New Tenant (or where appropriate any individual comprising the New Tenant) has not produced satisfactory financial and personal references; or (c) The Remaining Tenant (or where appropriate any individual comprising the Remaining Tenant) informs the Landlord that the New Tenant (or where appropriate any individual comprising the New Tenant) is not acceptable; or (d) The Landlord is reasonably of the opinion that the New Tenant (or where appropriate any individual comprising the New Tenant) would be incompatible with the Remaining Tenant (or where appropriate any individual comprising the Remaining Tenant). 9.4 The Tenant must not sublet or part with or share possession of the Property or any part of it. However the candidate replacement tenants have not been acceptable to either me or the other remaining tenant. The letting agent has informed us that once three candidates have been nominated by the tenant wishing to leave the agreement, we must accept one of the candidates. This "three candidate" rule is not in the tenancy agreement. Can a letting agent change a tenancy agreement without the consent of the tenants in this way? Thank you. | No All parties must agree to change a contract. On the face of it, the New Tenant has to be “acceptable to both the Landlord and the remaining individual or individuals comprising the Tenant (the Remaining Tenant)”. It goes on to describe what the landlord may consider in making this assessment; there is no such imposition on the Remaining Tenant. However, there is implicit in a contract a requirement that the parties must act reasonably when using discretion. If Remaining Tenant repeatedly rejects every proposed New Tenant then this raises the question of if they are acting reasonably. Have you clearly articulated why the proposed replacements are unacceptable and are those reasonable reasons? | This would be pointless and wouldn't work. Eviction due to defaulting on rent requires the landlord to give 3 business days notice, in writing. This must include a method by which the tenant can settle their debt. Either the landlord would be forced to accept a payment or this would not be valid. Source Additionally, in this case, there is nothing stopping you physically handing an envelope of cash to the landlord as they live upstairs. However, there is no reason for your landlord to do this. If your landlord hates you that much it would be far easier for them to simply give you 60 days notice and terminate your tenancy that way. | A person's contractual rights and obligations remain valid past their death, so if the landlord dies, their heirs cannot then kick out the tenant, and likewise if the tenant dies, their estate still is liable for unpaid past and future rent. That means for example that the person cannot be evicted, the landlord cannot take their property or enter without permission save for the standard emergency conditions. The tenant (or their estate) remains liable for rent until the lease terminates. If the lease has a clause to the effect that the lease terminate at the end of the month when notice of death is given, that defines when the tenancy ends and therefore when rent isn't due – relevant to a yearly lease, and the question of whether the estate would be on the hook for a full year of rent (it also depends on whether subletting is allowed). | You can be held liable for rent after you are off a lease. Rewriting a lease only affects future obligations, and doesn't extinguish past obligations. However, you appear to have released X from all obligations via paragraph 2. If you plan to sue for past rent, the court will have to interpret the statement that "The landlord, Y, and Z agree to relinquish X from any obligation regarding the lease as mentioned above", which is non-standard English. It is extremely likely that the court will interpret this to mean "release". You might argue, using earlier emails, that all parties had a clear understanding that this means "from all future obligations, but not past obligations", but that is not what the written agreement says, and the parol evidence rule, which is codified as explicit law in California, says execution of a contract in writing... supersedes all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument That clause lets X off the hook, in exchange for his claim on the security deposit and for relinquishing his tenant rights to the unit. You cannot sue X for any rent. | Can the renter declare the contract to be void because of the death of the only other party to the contract? No. The estate of the decedent steps into the shoes of the decedent and the executor of the decedent's estate can enforce the lease. What if one of the heirs comes to the renter and tries to add additional conditions? The heirs do not have the authority to modify the lease without the tenant's consent, although the tenant knows that the lease may be less likely to be renewed if the tenant does not consent. Also, the heirs, strictly speaking, don't have the authority to do anything. Only an executor duly appointed by a court does. | If your friend thinks he can live there for free due to his unique interpretation of contract law, he is mistaken. He'll get evicted if he doesn't pay rent, and likely end up with a judgement against him for unpaid rent. At its core, a rental agreement ensures that in exchange for paying rent, he may occupy the property. You can argue up and down about payment methods, but the fact remains he must pay rent in order to live there. Your friend MAY have an argument that he could move out and not be subject to penalty for breaking the lease because the payment terms changed. He'd have to give notice and would still owe for the time he occupied the property. There's just no way he can live there for free. He may find this out the hard way. | Charlie is not a party to the contract between Alice and Bob Alice and Charlie have no contractural relationship and Alice cannot require him to do anything nor is he liable to Alice in any way. Alice’s issue is with Bob who has clearly breached his contract. Alice can sue Bob for damages and may be able to end the lease. There is no trespass because Charlie is there with the permission of the leaseholder. From Charlie’s position there is no reason to believe that Bob does not have the authority to give this permission so Charlie is not in breach of the law. The police will see this as a civil matter and won’t intervene. | The wording of the original lease and the renewal form are vital here. The Texas Property code, Title 8, chapter 92 is the relevant state law for residential tenancies. It neither forbids nor guarantees a right of renewal. That is left up to the lease agreement. However, it does require a landlord to provide a tenant with a copy of any signed lease promptly. Specifically Sec. 92.024. LANDLORD'S DUTY TO PROVIDE COPY OF LEASE provides that: (a) Not later than the third business day after the date the lease is signed by each party to the lease, a landlord shall provide at least one complete copy of the lease to at least one tenant who is a party to the lease. ... c) A landlord's failure to provide a complete copy of the lease as described by Subsection (a) or (b) does not invalidate the lease or, subject to Subsection (d), prevent the landlord from prosecuting or defending a legal action or proceeding to enforce the lease. (d) A landlord may not continue to prosecute and a court shall abate an action to enforce the lease, other than an action for nonpayment of rent, only until the landlord provides to a tenant a complete copy of the lease if the tenant submits to the court evidence in a plea in abatement or otherwise that the landlord failed to comply with Subsection (a) or (b). (e) A landlord may comply with this section by providing to a tenant a complete copy of the lease: (1) in a paper format; (2) in an electronic format if requested by the tenant; or (3) by e-mail if the parties have communicated by e-mail regarding the lease. Sec. 92.003 provides that: (a) In a lawsuit by a tenant under either a written or oral lease for a dwelling or in a suit to enforce a legal obligation of the owner as landlord of the dwelling, the owner's agent for service of process is determined according to this section. (b) If written notice of the name and business street address of the company that manages the dwelling has been given to the tenant, the management company is the owner's sole agent for service of process. (c) If Subsection (b) does not apply, the owner's management company, on-premise manager, or rent collector serving the dwelling is the owner's authorized agent for service of process unless the owner's name and business street address have been furnished in writing to the tenant. Dallas municipal law prohibits retaliating against a tenant who complains about improper conditions or requests maintenance, but says nothing about lease renewals. Under ordinary contract law, an offer and acceptance makes a contract, unless the parties have previously agreed otherwise. Moreover, demonstrable practice can make or confirm a contract. If the tenant has paid rent for either March or April in reliance on the renewal agreement, and at the specified renewal rate, and that rent has been accepted, that may well constitute ratification (and thus execution) of the renewed lease. This is if the new lease would hav started before the April rent was due. So the tenant may well have the right to enforce the terms specified in the February renewal form. However, this will depend on what those terms are, and also what renewal provisions, if any, were in the original lease. It might be a good idea to send a letter to the landlord and manager, saying that the renewal form that you signed constitutes an acceptance of their offer, and thus a binding contract, and asking for a signed copy as per section 92.024, mentioning the section number. If it were me, I would send such a letter by both email and USPS certified mail, to both the manager and the landlord, if I had both addresses. I would keep a copy of any communications, and make them all in writing from now on (email is writing, legally). In any case the tenant would be wise to continue to pay rent on time in the amount specified on the renewal form, by some traceable means such as a check, money order, or credit card. I would be sure to use a method the original lease listed as acceptable, or that had been used in the past, except for cash. If I used a check, I would write "payment in full for rent of {address} for {month}" on the back The tenant would be wise to consult a local lawyer who specializes in tenant's cases, there seem to be quite a few. There is a local housing crisis center. It offers regular (twice a month) legal clinics with volunteer lawyers, and can be reached at 214-828-4244 or [email protected]. Such a center might be able to recommend local lawyers. Often an initial consultation with a lawyer on such a matter is free or at a low charge. It would probably be a good idea for the tenant to take some action fairly promptly. 15 U.S. Code Chapter 96 (the federal e-sign act) (section 7001) provides that: (a) In general -- Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law (other than this subchapter and subchapter II), with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce— (1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and (2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation. Also the UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999), which has been adopted by Texas, allows but does not require the use of electronic signatures. Thus the tenant;s email response ought to be a vald means of forming a contract. |
Can I sue Uber for property damage to my mobility device? I use a mobility device, an electric mobility scooter, to get around as I am temporarily disabled. While using Uber to attend a medical appointment in the Australian Capital Territory, my mobility scooter was damaged by the driver due to careless handling. As I am renting the scooter, I am obliged to pay for any damage to it. I would like to recover this cost from Uber as I believe that (1) the damage occurred as a result of the negligence of their driver, and (2) they are responsible for providing the service as my agreement is with them, not the driver. So my question is simply - if Uber refuses to pay, can I sue Uber at court for damages? I intend to take them to the ACAT. | No, you cannot sue When you signed up to Uber you agreed to their Terms and Conditions. In Section 6, you agreed that disputes should be settled first by Mediation and, if that fails, by binding Arbitration - both under the respective International Chamber of Commerce Rules. These will be have their seat in Amsterdam and be conducted under Dutch law. This does not mean that you will need to travel to Amsterdam - you will be able to participate remotely. Notwithstanding, the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) cannot be excluded by contract or choice of law clauses and will still apply. Of direct relevance here is the consumer guarantee (Part 3-2) that services will be provided with "reasonable skill and care" and that this is a 'consumer contract' and subject to the unfair contract provisions of Part 2-3. The dispute resolution clause 6 is not unfair - Australian law supports alternative dispute resolution and a term is not unfair if it is allowed by law. The Disclaimers; Limitation of Liability; Indemnity Clause 5 is problematical for Uber as, while limitation of liability clauses are not ipso facto 'unfair', when the seek to limit liability for a breach of a consumer guarantee, they must be limited to what can be excluded by s64A. As written, these are far broader and, notwithstanding the savings clause about 'applicable law' they would probably be held to be misleading. A misleading term is ipso facto unfair. You may be able to approach the court to have Clause 5 declared an unfair term under s250 before proceeding to arbitration - the court may defer that decision to the arbitrator of course. You can, of course, sue the driver. Uber maintains that their drivers are contractors and not employees (which may or may not be true). If Uber is right, you have no contract with the driver and are free to bring a negligence suit. | If you are prevented from entering the property on the day the contract says the tenancy begins that is a breach of the contract. If you suffer a loss as a result of the breach, you are entitled to be restored to the position you'd be in had the loss not occurred. For example, if you had additional removal fees and a hotel bill resulting from this breach, you'd be entitled to claim those costs. Generally the landlord would be liable for this. It is no defence that the agent is unavailable to give you the keys - they should have accounted for the day being a Sunday or started the term on a day when someone would be available. I suggest getting in touch with the landlord in the first instance, civilly explain the situation and ask if they can arrange for you to enter the property on the given date - they might not know what is going on. Keep a log/diary of your communications with the agent and the landlord. Make sure you have a plan B for somewhere to stay. Call Shelter too, for free advice. | Traffic tickets are not equity law. This said, equity has not been done away with. It has merged with law in almost all states, and in some states, equitable defenses are available to legal claims (although in others equitable defenses are only available to equitable claims). | One analysis is in Bow Cycle & Motor Co. Ltd. v. Murray, 2006 ABPC 366, by Judge O'Ferrall (now Justice of the Court of Appeal of Alberta). The defendant sat on a motorcycle, positioned it fully upright, and when he returned the motorcycle to rest on the kickstand, the bike crashed to the floor. There were three potential paths to liabilty argued, none successfully: negligence (for example, if the defendant had repositioned the kickstand at any point—there was no evidence of this) trespass to goods (but this would have required intentional or negligent treatment of the good) contract (which would have required a clear "you break it, you buy it" policy with express statement that the customer would be liable even for non-negligent damage—there wasn't) Context mattered. Liability might be made more strict more easily in a china shop. The judge wrote: in the end, this case must turn on the presence or absence of negligence because, at least in the circumstances of a motorcycle shop, a “break it, you buy it” arrangement would have required an element of fault on the part of the breaker, absent a very clearly communicated term that the customer pays irrespective of negligence. There being no such term and negligence having not been proven, I find the Defendant not liable. In so doing, I considered the china shop analogy. It may be that in a china shop one could infer that the customer pays for broken items irrespective of fault because there is no need to touch the item in order to make the purchase decision. But in order to make an informed purchase of a motorcycle, the purchaser must try it on for size and the fact that he must do so makes it much more difficult to infer a no-fault promise to pay for damage howsoever caused. | If we go by Indian case law (as we should), you have to find a way. The relevant case is K.P. Adbul Gafoor v. New India Assurance Ltd, where appellant drove on a motor cycle on a learner's permit without a licensed driver positioned correctly, in violation of Rule 3 of the Rules, and smacked someone. The bulk of the case is about the insurance and liability consequences of violating the rule: the main point here is that the court deemed this to violate the rules. | Unless you have caused loss to the customer by making the typo, the answer is no. Obviously, anyone can attempt to sue anyone. However, for the court to accept their claim/charge for processing it needs to fall in one of these buckets: They had a contract with you personally and you were in breach of it — obviously this does not apply in your situation; You committed a crime — looks like this is not the case either; You had a duty of care towards them and committed the tort of negligence. This is what the customer must be referring to — making the typo could be regarded as negligence, especially if it caused actual harm/losses to them. | There isn't any indication in that news story that the disabled son was anywhere nearby. I agree the situation you describe sounds like a legitimate use of the placard, but it seems in this situation, the placard was being used in a manner totally unrelated to the transport of a disabled person. My guess is that the cops cited her because the son wasn't in the car, and was not inside the establishment at which she parked. California code has this to say: A person to whom a disabled person placard has been issued may permit another person to use the placard only while in the presence or reasonable proximity of the disabled person for the purpose of transporting the disabled person. So as long as the disabled person is within a "reasonable proximity", and the placard is being used to transport them, they do not have to be inside the car to make using the placard legitimate. In this case, the woman was just transporting herself and using the placard anyway, which is illegal. | It depends. The police and only the police decide what are and are not police matters. However, although it might not be a police matter, you still have lots of options at your disposal. For example, does your jurisdiction (city, town, municipality, etc.) have an animal control division? i.e., City dog catcher. Most do. If so, I would call the animal control division and file a report. They might possibly do a field visit and take the animal into custody if the animal is still roaming loose. If you sustained bodily injuries, you should get checked by a doctor and have those injuries documented in a medical report. If possible, you could drive by the property and take photos of the unchained dog roaming loose. Then, armed with your evidence consisting of: police report medical injury report animal control report and photographs of the scene You could (with the help of a licensed attorney) file a civil suit against the pet owner. You might be able to win an award for damages, pain and suffering and possibly punitive damages as well (check with your attorney). Also, your attorney could advise you if you might have a cause to move for an enforcement action against the dog and/or its owners that might or might not include having the animal removed from the owners custody or in extreme cases of negligence and bad behavior possibly "put to sleep." Your suit might focus on collecting from the homeowner's insurance policy of the pet owner and you could potentially collect a lot of money with the right set of facts and evidence on your side. You might want to look for an attorney who specializes in personal injury. Most PI attorneys work on a contingency. Meaning they don't charge an up front fee and will only get paid if you win your case or settle. In which case their fee is typically about 1/3 of what you get awarded in settlement or judgment. |
"This provision survives the termination of this Agreement." In a business contract, does the following statement : "This provision survives the termination of this Agreement." Means that the provision survives for a unlimited amount of time? Is there a legal limit to this? Isn't it abusive? If yes, can this be legally enforced? | Jurisdiction has not been provided, so I've written a general answer: Not necessarily; often, such provisions clauses will have their own expiration dates, for example "for five years after signing, X", with X still being valid after cancellation up to 5 years(so if you cancel after 3 years, X is still valid for 2 more years), or "for two years after cancellations, Y"(especially common with non-compete clauses) where the time-limit of Y starts when the contract is cancelled. Other clauses are meant to indeed be enforced forever, such as some non-disclosure, non-disparagement, or indemnity clauses. For example, an indemnity clause in a contract that prevents a party from suing the counter-party for work done under the contract would be pointless if it could be bypassed by a party terminating the agreement. There are lots of legal limits, based on the terms of the provision, and its nature, all governed by the contract law of the jurisdiction under which the contract was drafted under and/or is governed by (this is generally obvious, except for some cross-border contracts, which generally will have a declaration as to whose laws apply). It is not inherently abusive, but can certainly be abused. What is considered abusive often varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (not only on this issue, but on legal issues in general). It depends on the jurisdiction, and generally on the terms of the provision itself. If the court asked to enforce the terms of the agreement feels that the provision is illegal or abusive, they won't be enforced (and possibly the entire document declared null and void, depending on the central-ness of the illegal or abusive provision; some provisions specifically state that invaliding the provision doesn't invalidate the whole contract to try to prevent this). If they don't feel the provision is illegal or abusive, they will generally enforce it. | No All parties must agree to change a contract. On the face of it, the New Tenant has to be “acceptable to both the Landlord and the remaining individual or individuals comprising the Tenant (the Remaining Tenant)”. It goes on to describe what the landlord may consider in making this assessment; there is no such imposition on the Remaining Tenant. However, there is implicit in a contract a requirement that the parties must act reasonably when using discretion. If Remaining Tenant repeatedly rejects every proposed New Tenant then this raises the question of if they are acting reasonably. Have you clearly articulated why the proposed replacements are unacceptable and are those reasonable reasons? | I can answer for the U.S., if that's helpful. The general rule, in the United States, is that covenants not to compete are enforceable as long as they are reasonable. What constitutes "reasonable" varies from state to state. Factors considered generally include: What kind of actual harm will come to the business if you go to a competitor? In other words, is this rote language they include in every contract, or did they put it in yours because you know all the secret formulas and have the customer list memorized? Is it reasonable in time, location, and scope? Something preventing you from taking any job anywhere in the United States for ten years won't be enforceable; something preventing you from taking a job with the exact same title in the same industry in the same town for the next six months might be. The general rule at common law was that covenants not to compete were unenforceable restraints of trade; the fact that they're enforceable at all is later law created by each jurisdiction, and that means it's going to vary based on your specific jurisdiction. If you want to know whether it's okay to take a specific job based on a specific non-compete you signed, you will need to talk to a legal professional licensed in your jurisdiction--and even she may not be able to tell you for sure. | In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source. | could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)". | The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds. | Termination is a matter of fact That is, it has either happened, or it hasn’t. Whether it has or hasn’t depends on a multitude of factors including the terms of the contract, the actions of the parties, and communication between them. These factors are so case specific that it is impossible to generalise. Further, within a given case, reasonable parties may differ on if a contract has been terminated, which party initiated the termination, and if that termination was lawful. Usually, these cases involve mutual allegations of repudiation by the other party and rightful termination in response by our side. These issues are likely to be the major ones that the court or tribunal will have to determine. A claim for damages would need to be pursued as part of the overall case but the deadline for raising them is a procedural matter for the court or tribunal. Failing to raise them as an issue in pre-litigation correspondence would not be a bar to raising them in a claim or counter-claim. However, failing to raise them at the earliest opportunity denies the offending party the opportunity to mitigate the damage and, if they can show that there were actions they could have reasonably taken to mitigate but couldn’t because they weren’t informed, then that may reduce or eliminate the damages payable. | the company does have the right to "verify the eligibility of the person and terminate the service to the ineligible at any time" is pretty unambiguous. They have assessed your eligibility, determined you don't have one and have terminated the service. They are completely within their rights to do this. If you feel that they have assessed your eligibility wrongly then you can dispute their assessment - either through whatever dispute resolution is detailed in the contract or by going to court if the contract is silent. The fact that they previously assessed you as eligible (or didn't actually make an assessment) is irrelevant. |
Californian resident travelling in EU - which privacy law applies? If a Californian resident is travelling within the EU, it seems both European GDPR and Californian CCPA privacy laws will apply. Sometimes businesses have single privacy emails, so if a deleting request is sent how is it responded to? As a CCPA request or GDPR request? CCPA has some differences with GDPR; probably records kept for CCPA requests will be different from those of GDPR. So which law will be applied? (Though not a part of the question, what if this person has dual citizenship of a third country that has different privacy laws? It would be helpful if someone could answer this last question too; it is not required but will be helpful.) This is in response to a comment seeking differences: Firstly a difference would be records for accountability . Obviously records to be maintained for ccpa should be separate given the format and laws . Secondly for gdpr there is an obligation tell about E.U. authorities that in my non lawyer knowledge is not required for ccpa . | It is not an either–or. You may have certain rights under both CCPA and GDPR, but they have rather different mechanisms for determining their scope. When does the CCPA apply? CCPA applies to certain businesses and consumers. It covers any business (regardless of legal structure) that that does business in the State of California and has a certain scale. A consumer means a natural person who is a California resident. These aspects are not influenced by your current location. When you as a California resident travel to the EU, you still have all your CCPA rights against businesses that do business in California. You do not have any CCPA rights against businesses that don't do business in California, for example a national rail company in the EU you've bought a train ticket for. When does the GDPR apply? Whereas the location of the user/data subject can be a factor in the GDPR context, their residency or nationality does not. The GDPR applies to all processing activities by data controllers who are established in the EU, including any businesses, non-profits, and individuals. This includes processing activities in the context of an EU establishment of a non-EU company. For example, GDPR would apply with respect to processing of personal data by a hotel you're staying at in the EU. The GDPR also applies to non-EU data controllers in the context of (a) offering goods or services to people who are in the EU, or (b) monitoring behaviour of people who are in the EU. Here, “offering” does not mean “doing business”, but “targeting or marketing”. For example, you might have installed a smartphone app that assists with sightseeing while in Paris. If this app monitors your behaviour while you are in the EU (such as by tracking your GPS position to alert you to nearby points of interest), that would fall under the GDPR while you are in the EU. The app may also fall under the GDPR per case (a) if it is marketed to / targeted at people who are currently in Paris. That the GDPR applies in such cases comes from the offering/monitoring while you are in the EU, not from your continued presence in the EU. You would be able to exercise your GDPR rights relating to this processing even after leaving the EU. Note that some service or processing activity can fall under CCPA and GDPR simultaneously. For example, this app would also fall under CCPA if the company also does business in California, e.g. if it also provides sightseeing information for Los Angeles or San Francisco. And both CCPA and GDPR could apply when an EU company does business in California. Under which privacy law would a deletion request be dealt with? In practice, most companies don't have this sorted out properly and results are unpredictable. Ideally, a company would just comply with both laws simultaneously, thus making it unnecessary to determine which law applies. Information that is only required under on law can be provided with conditional statements, e.g. “If this processing activity is covered by GDPR, you have the right to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority in your country”. As mentioned above, both laws can apply simultaneously. Whether GDPR applies and whether CCPA applies are independent questions. However, the answer to neither of these depends on your current location at the time of making the request. In this answer, any statement about the EU applies equivalently to the UK. | Yes, phone numbers would generally qualify as Personal Data under GDPR. It would be so irrespective of whether you have also stored other information along with the phone numbers or not, since also information that indirectly could identify a natural person is Personal Data (provided that there are, somewhere else, public or not public, a register of who holds the specific phone number). See Article 4(1) GDPR. (One could possibly argue that the phone numbers would not be considered personal data if there is no actual register of who owns a specific phone number with any other party. Or if such register is in practice not available for anyone. It might be so in some cases, although I would not rely on it.) Whether you have the right to process the phone numbers must be assessed based on its lawfulness (see Article 6 GDPR). It could be based on consent, performance of contract, legitimate interest or any other ground set out therein. | I understand that storing any hash or IP that can identify "user uniquely" is against GDPR. That is not correct. However any data which is identifiably associated with a an individual human, including any data which could be used to identify that human, is generally "Personal data", and may not be processed (which includes storing it) without a lawful basis, if the GDPR applies. Any of the six lawful bases allowed by the GDPR may be used, including consent, and the legitimate interest of the data controller. The GDPR does not generally specify that particular technological solutions are permitted or forbidden. If this usage pattern could reasonably be used to identify a particular person, or to single out a person from among a group of people, it is probably personal data, and a lawful basis would be required. Otherwise, not. As for whether such a person is "identifiable" if use of this technique permits the Data Controller to identify two visits at separate times as having been made by the same person, when the later visit is still in progress or is recent, the IP for that visit will still be available, and thus could be associated with the first visit as well. And even if that is not done, such a technique could permit building a profile of such a person, including the actions taken on different visits. I think that would be enough to make this "personal data". | GDPR compliance is a matter between every customer and the business, not between different customers. How did you get the other customer's contact details? If they were provided or leaked by the business, that might be a failure of the business's obligation as a data controller to protect the personal data they are processing, possibly even a data breach in the sense of the GDPR. When you contacted the other person this was presumably a purely private or household activity, just like contacting any other personal acquaintance. In that case, the GDPR simply does not apply to any “processing” you may have done (compare Art 2(2)(c)). Things would be very different if you were promoting your own business, but that doesn't seem to have been the case. If the matter really is as plain as you described, then you can effectively ignore their references to the GDPR until you are contacted by your data protection authority, by their lawyer, or are served with court papers. None of these should happen: even if you were a “data controller” and your processing were subject to the GDPR – only the other customer and not the business would be the data subject, and only a data subject has a right for remedies like making complaints to the data protection agency and only the data subject would have standing to sue you in court for GDPR violations. | GDPR is not a blanket ban on the handling of personal data. It is a set of guidelines when and how data may be processed and stored. Documenting the compliance with a deletion request is one of many purposes for which some data may be retained after a deletion request. Others would be past contractual obligations, legal documentation requirements, and even a balance of 'legitimate interests' of the processors and the data subjects. The processor might be able to argue that fraud/abuse prevention is such a legitimate interest. What if I want to create a service that does let users enter their friends' email addresses, and send those friends an email invitation to the service? Get a specialist lawyer on staff who can check your exact business processes. A web site like this cannot possibly give you a full explanation of the pitfalls. | You do not have to prove that you are an EU citizen, because EU citizenship is entirely irrelevant to the GDPR. Have a look at Article 3, which basically says that GDPR applies if you are in the EU or if the company is in the EU. If the company is in the EU, therefore, you do not need to send them anything or prove anything about yourself to invoke GDPR. If the company is outside the EU, you can send proof of address or other evidence that you are in the EU, which might be something that they already have, like your IP address. | Congrats, you've done well to minimize your processing of personal data. But I think you're still processing personal data, and are subject to the GDPR. Serving a website necessarily involves processing an IP address. This IP address will typically be personal data. While you are not storing the IP address, the GDPR's definition of “processing” extends beyond storage and pretty much covers doing anything with that IP address. As far as I know this is not an entirely settled matter, but it's better to err on the side of caution and to assume that you are in fact performing a processing activity. Even a static web page can easily lead to additional relevant processing of personal data, for example if the HTML embeds resources from third party domains. Since your website is clearly targeted at the public, it does not fall under the GDPR's exception for “purely personal or household” purposes. So I think you do need a (minimal) privacy notice that contains at least the items mentioned in Art 13 GDPR. The main reason why some people try to avoid posting a privacy notice is because it must disclose your identity and contact details. But in Germany, that information has to be provided anyway due to the Impressumspflicht. As part of your GDPR compliance obligations, you must protect how data is processed by others on your behalf. A hosting provider will typically act as your data processor. For this to be legal, you need a contract / data processing agreement that fulfills the conditions in Art 28 GDPR. This contract binds the data processor to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. European hosting providers sometimes include the necessary terms in their terms of service / AGB, but you should check to make sure. Netcup expects you to accept their data processing amendment in your account settings. In the hypothetical case that you were not processing any personal data at all, the GDPR would not apply and it wouldn't require you to post a privacy notice. Other laws might still have information obligations, notably the German TMG and TTDSG. | There are two relevant bodies of EU law to consider here. The GDPR covers processing of personal data. Personal data is any data where the data subject can be identified directly or indirectly. The ePrivacy directive is also relevant, and covers how you may access and store information on the user's device. Directives are not directly applicable law. Instead every member state translates the directive into national law. In the UK, ePrivacy is implemented by PECR. Is the data you collect personal data in the sense of the GDPR? Yes: that hashed unique device ID or a system-provided advertising ID likely is personal data, and any linked data would then be personal data as well. This is going to be the case in particular if you store user accounts on your server and can connect these bug reports to a user. Consider also whether the game save could include personal data, and whether the video clip could be analyzed to identify the data subject. Does this mean collecting this information in bug reports is forbidden? No, the GDPR doesn't forbid or allow anything outright. Instead, you should go through the compliance process. In a nutshell: determine the purpose of this processing, e.g. “fixing bugs” find an Art 6 legal basis for this purpose, e.g. “Art 6(1)(f) legitimate interest” or “Art 6(1)(a) consent” if the legal basis is legitimate interest, you must balance that interest against the data subject's interests determine whether your compliance requirements include creating/updating your Records of Processing, or whether you have to write a Data Protection Impact Assessment implement the processing in a manner that respects GDPR principles such as Transparency and Data Minimization if the legal basis is legitimate interest you must implement an opt-out solution if the legal basis is consent, you must request consent first in a manner that satisfies the Art 7 conditions for consent – and allow consent to be revoked easily prepare to satisfy data subject rights: information requirements per Art 13, usually done in the privacy policy right to access, rectification, erasure, and data portability right to object (opt-out) and to restrict processing be aware of your general requirements a data controller to process this data securely, e.g. use HTTPS connections to transmit bug reports, take steps to protect your own accounts (e.g. 2FA), and ensure you have a suitable contract with any data processors that act on your behalf, e.g. cloud providers or contractors I would question whether your bug reports really need to include a device ID. That isn't forbidden, it just complicates compliance a bit. And what about ePrivacy? The ePrivacy directive is known for its cookie consent requirements. But these consent requirements apply when accessing any information on the user's device, or when applying equivalent fingerprinting techniques. Your game save is not an issue because it is necessary for the game. But that device ID and other system information is more difficult. So what to do? Compliance isn't trivial, but certainly possible. You will likely process the bug reports under your legitimate interest, but might still have to collect consent for accessing a system ID due to ePrivacy. Such a screen might look like this: Oh no, the game crashed! Do you want to send a bug report to the developers? Your bug report will be protected as per our privacy policy (link). Your bug report will contain the following information: … Yes, collect system information and send bug report No, do not send bug report You could make an argument that a bug report can be sent in any case, and that you just need ePrivacy consent to collect useful system information. For example: Oh no, the game crashed! When sending a bug report to developers, do you want to include extra system information (link to details) that helps fixing the problem? In any case, your bug report will be protected as per our privacy policy (link). Your bug report will contain the following information: … Yes, send bug report with extra system information No, send anonymous report |
Are companies at sexual discrimination risk for using whiteboard interviews during the job interview? Background Currently, many companies hiring software development engineers use a whiteboard algorithms interview technique. This involves asking the job candidate to code a solution to an algorithm question on a whiteboard while the hiring manager and other team members watch and critique. This interview technique has long been criticized as making the candidate uncomfortable, as ineffective, and perhaps at least a little demeaning. Many in the industry believe it is little more than a hazing ritual. See the following links for more information: Why is hiring broken? It starts at the whiteboard. Tech Hiring Has Always Been Broken. Here’s How I Survived it for Decades. !Whiteboard: A better way to hire the best developers So, even though I and many others don't believe in the effectiveness of whiteboard interviews, I have supported the right of companies and individuals to legally use them, at least until a few weeks ago when I happened across a university study of whiteboard interviews. Does Stress Impact Technical Interview Performance Study This is a study out of North Carolina University conducted last year. An article titled You're testing them wrong: Whiteboard coding interviews are 'anti-women psychological stress examinations', published in July of last year by the Register says about the study: As a consequence, whiteboard interviews may fail to assess coder competency. Rather, the researchers argue, they measure how well job candidates handle anxiety. The researchers found that stress hinders interview performance, with participants in the traditional technical interview exhibiting higher cognitive load, lower scores, and higher stress levels. In essence, social anxiety took otherwise qualified job candidates out of the running because of the circumstances of the interview. What's more, whiteboard technical interviews appear to favor men over women. 'We also observed that no women successfully solved the problem in the public setting, whereas all women solved it correctly in the private setting,' the paper says. This is a link to the study. There is also another article published by the university that summarizes the results of the study. Currently, just 14% of software developers in the US are women. This study suggests that one of the primary reasons for this poor representation is because of sex discrimination. So, is this new study enough to encourage legal experts representing large corporations to at least worry about sex discrimination lawsuits from women that have failed whiteboard interviews? If you are a corporate attorney and it was your job to minimize legal risks to that company, would you recommend to human resources that whiteboard interviews are now too legally risky and the company should avoid them, or do you believe instead that it is nothing to worry about and it is okay to do business as usual? | Barrister to instructing solicitor: “Am I working for the plaintiff or defendant?” Plaintiff Your honour, this excellent study and the expert testimony you have heard from the authors, clearly demonstrates that whiteboard testing is sexual discrimination by another name. The clear correlation between the gender of the interviewee and their ability to perform this task, which is unrelated to the job and is actually a test of how good the person is at handling performance anxiety, is being used to prejudicially and unlawfully screen out female applicants. Defendant Your honour, this discredited paper and the inconsistent testimony of the author clearly demonstrated that the methodology was flawed and the conclusions are unsupportable. When pressed, it turned out that the number of females encompassed by the catch-all word “all” was 6 - hardly a sample big enough to draw any meaningful conclusions from. Further, it turned out that the number of men who also improved was unknown because they didn’t test them! So we have the authors of a study with gender discrimination in its very methodology drawing asinine conclusions from it about gender discrimination! It may be that whiteboard testing is better at finding competent actors than programmers and this may make it a terrible recruitment tool. However, my client can run their businesses in whatever inefficient way they choose so long as it isn’t unlawful discrimination - and this isn’t that. | how does hiring only women comply with our Civil Rights Act (which outlaws discrimination based on sex)? It is compliant. The Civil Rights Act includes an exception where the discrimination or limitation based on sex (or any other protected category) "is a bona fide occupational qualification for employment". That exception is located at the end of 42 USC 2000e-3(b). Although literally referring to employer's publishing of that preference, the very existence of that statutory exception implies a permission to discriminate [for certain occupations] on the basis of sex. At the outset, it would be unreasonable to allow the employer to explicitly state his criteria for hiring and yet be prohibited to implement them. But a more important reason for that exception is the premise of bona fide occupational qualification. That premise indicates that the legitimate purpose of the employment at issue takes priority over the general intent of the Civil Rights Act. The actual & occupational purpose of cheerleading in the NFL context is not to shake pom poms and do choreography on field grass, but to amuse men, who comprise the vast majority of the customer base in the football business. Accordingly, the issue is not whether males are fit or unable to cheerlead, but that male cheerleaders simply would not amuse the average football fan. The occupational purpose would be frustrated if females were replaced with males. The legislative intent of the Civil Rights Act is to preclude discrimination for employment where the protected category (be it sex, religion, etc.) is irrelevant to the actual fulfillment of the occupational purpose. | This is largely a matter of state law. In California, for example, this would be plainly unlawful (my emphasis): All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. (Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code section 51) Other states may define "business" more narrowly, or exclude professional services. Also, there is the question of professional ethics. Discriminating against a racial group will likely run afoul of the rules of the licensing board, the AMA, the APA, and other organizations. Finally, remind your friend that every racist has what they regard as good reasons for their racism, and your friend is not special in that regard. | So-called AI software does not enjoy a special legal status (at present: one never knows what new law might be added). The question of whether any software can be distributed "safely" or "responsibly" is also not a legal issue. Nor is "true sentience" a relevant consideration, and nothing is guaranteed. When you distribute software of any kind, there is an implied warranty that the product is "fit", and if software kills you, you may be able to sue the creator for negligence. A software creator may then want to disclaim liability, by saying "WARNING: THIS PROGRAM MAY KILL YOU. OCP IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY INJURIES ARISING FROM USE OF THIS PRODUCT". This may or may not actually remove liability. In the UK "liability for negligence occasioning death or personal injury cannot be excluded", so such a disclaimer will not prevent a suit against the manufacturer. In the US, the issue is determined at the level of the state – here is a summary of the law in the states. Probably the primary question would be whether such a disclaimer is an unconscionable term, and the second question is whether the act constituted gross negligence (not simply "negligence"). Mississippi exceptionally does not allow disclaimers, but even then, it does allow disclaiming liability when it comes to computer hardware and software. A software disclaimer is not inherently unconscionable, though perhaps some specific disclaimer would be found to be. Courts typically disfavor disclaimers in the case of gross negligence, and again determining what constitutes "gross negligence" is determined on a state by state basis. If the act shows "reckless indifference to the rights of others" and "failure to use even slight care or conduct that is so careless as to show complete disregard for the rights and safety of others", then the act might be grossly negligent. | This policy would appear to have a disparate impact on workers age 40 and older, given that most workers obtain degrees in their 20s and few obtain a second degree later. Workers age 40 and older are protected from employment discrimination under the ADEA. Policies with a disparate impact may be considered discriminatory, but not necessarily. The EEOC rule as of 2012 is that such a policy is not illegal if it is based on a "reasonable factor other than age". It is not clear to me whether the 10-year degree policy would pass this test, and it might depend on how the employer justified the rule. Here is the discussion from the EEOC's FAQ: 8.What determines whether an employment practice is based on Reasonable Factors Other than Age? An employment practice is based on an RFOA when it was reasonably designed and administered to achieve a legitimate business purpose in light of the circumstances, including its potential harm to older workers. Example 1: If a police department decided to require applicants for patrol positions to pass a physical fitness test to be sure that the officers were physically able to pursue and apprehend suspects, it should know that such a test might exclude older workers more than younger ones. Nevertheless, the department's actions would likely be based on an RFOA if it reasonably believed that the test measured the speed and strength appropriate to the job, and if it did not know, or should not have known, of steps that it could have taken to reduce harm to older workers without unduly burdening the department. The rule emphasizes the need for an individualized consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular situation. It includes the following list of considerations relevant to assessing reasonableness: The extent to which the factor is related to the employer's stated business purpose; The extent to which the employer defined the factor accurately and applied the factor fairly and accurately, including the extent to which managers and supervisors were given guidance or training about how to apply the factor and avoid discrimination; The extent to which the employer limited supervisors' discretion to assess employees subjectively, particularly where the criteria that the supervisors were asked to evaluate are known to be subject to negative age-based stereotypes; The extent to which the employer assessed the adverse impact of its employment practice on older workers; and The degree of the harm to individuals within the protected age group, in terms of both the extent of injury and the numbers of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the employer took steps to reduce the harm, in light of the burden of undertaking such steps. Here is the full text of the rule, 77 FR 19080. | That’s legal The New York Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination on the basis of “age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, marital status or disability”. Federal law prevents employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, or gender identity), national origin, age (40 or older), disability and genetic information (including family medical history). What law school you went to is on neither list. If Harvard’s policies break the rules, that’s not the firm’s issue. However, AFAIK, Harvard is scrupulously fair in their admissions program - so long as you have the grades and the money, they’ll let you in. It’s not Harvard’s fault that most of the people who get the best secondary education and have the most money are predominantly white, Christian, and US born - that’s do to politico-social-historical-economic factors beyond Harvard’s control. | This page sums up the state of federal law regarding sex segregation and schools. There are various "separate but equal" provisions under the law, for example Boys State or Girls State are not outlawed, there is no requirement for co-ed PE class. But as far as I can see, a school field trip to hear the Petaluma Symphony Orchestra could not be limited to only females (or only males). It's not clear what you mean by "host", or whether the event is educational (the law doesn't say that everything a school does has to be sex-neutral, it prohibits "discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"). | The validity of the NDA is not an easy question, but a related one is more clear. A lawyer in the U.S. in most states is not permitted to threaten criminal or administrative action (e.g. reporting someone to immigration or tax officials), to gain advantage in a civil case. You can unilaterally bring criminal charges or take administrative action, but it is deemed to be unethical and against public policy to refrain from bringing criminal charges or taking administration action to gain civil advantages. An NDA of the type described arguably violated the same public policy and might be invalidated as a result. Put another way, there is a privilege to make certain reports to public officials without legal consequences and such an NDA might violate that privilege. Some of these privileges found in what are called "whistle blower" statutes specifically prohibit this kind of agreement as to some specific kinds of illegal conduct, but not others. There isn't a general rule. This said, it is not black and white. For example, a private NDA can't prevent someone from testifying under subpoena, but can prevent someone from voluntarily testifying in the absence of a legal compulsion to do so such as a subpoena. Suppose a woman is sexually assaulted at work, and is given an NDA to sign. Can the company legally require her not to disclose the conduct of an illegal activity? I can imagine this example coming out different ways in different jurisdictions. For example, some states have a legal duty (rarely enforced) that requires people to report felonies, and an NDA in this case would contradict that affirmative legal duty, while others do not. Another source of gray in the analysis is that there is a difference between not reporting a sexual assault that actually happened, and, as part of a larger settlement, executing an affidavit stating under penalty of perjury and under oath that a sexual assault didn't happen. The first is potentially an NDA that is void as a matter of public policy. The other, in principle, is a settlement that the person signing the affidavit can only enter into if it is true. There is nothing, in general, wrong, about requiring someone to confirm that certain representations are true as part of a business transaction or contract and allowing the contract to go forwards only if certain facts are true. The gray gets deeper, because whether a sexual assault happened or not is not always a subjectively black and white clear issue of pure fact. (It is subjective because an affidavit or affirmation is made to the best of the declarant or affiants' knowledge and belief, not as a matter of objective fact.) For example, someone may not have perfect memory of what happened, or there could be doubt over the question of whether the perpetrators acted recklessly (the Model Penal Code intent requirement for sexual assault) or merely with criminal negligence (which would not be sexual assault under the Model Penal Code). A statement made under oath about whether a sexual assault happened to the best of your knowledge, thus, might be a mixture of factual issues (A penetrated B at a certain date and time) and legal or not perfectly factually known ones (A acted with X intent regarding consent during that act). So, in a case where there was some room to argue either way about how to characterize what happened and about what actually did happen, there might be some room for a settling party to make a non-perjured statement consistent with the settlement and then to agree not to a true NDA, but instead to not make statements which, if the affidavit is true, would be false. In a plea bargain in a criminal case, one can plead "no contest" without agreeing that the crime factually happened, but that isn't really possibly in the context of an affidavit about what really happened, with an NDA limited to not disclosing the incident since it was already agreed as a matter of sworn fact that there is nothing to disclose that rises the level of a crime. |
Can damages be claimed from someone who backs out of a contract (before signing) Can a landlord (UK, English law) make a claim from a potential tenant who wants to back out of signing a Tenancy Agreement? If a tenant makes a repeated commitment (via emails, face-to-face conversations and text messages) that they want to sign a Tenancy Agreement and rent a house, and at the same time repeatedly (5 times) adjust the start of the contract by one more week forward. If the tenant then finally admits he can't/won't be able to move in, does the landlord have any legal rights to claim compensation? On the landlord's side: The tenant has verbally and unambiguously committed that they want to move in. The landlord has paid for referencing. The landlord has paid for a contract to be drawn up The landlord has paid for the dates on the contract to be changed (repeatedly) The landlord has paid for a detailed inventory to be taken. The landlord has turned down other potential tenants On the tenant's side: The tenant has not signed any legal document The tenant has paid a holding deposit (equal to one week's rent) The tenant feels that the reasons for not moving in as soon as planned are outside his control. The tenant didn't ask for an inventory to be taken. The tenant didn't ask to have his references checked. On a related issue, what's the situation if the tenant still claims they want to move in, but the landlord wants to withdraw because they no longer trusts the tenant's promises? Can the tenant then make a finical claim against the landlord? Update regarding costs The landlords rent-guarantee insurance requires that the AST (the contract) is written and edited by legal professionals only. (this is a requirement of the insurance company only, not sure it's legally correct) According to the Association of Inventory Clerks the inventory should be taken 'immediately prior to moving in' so if a new Tenant is has to be found, a new inventory will be required (unless they can be persuaded to move in at very short notice). The AIIC also advise that tenants don't sign inventories that weren't taken immediately prior to moving in. The 'Tenant Fees Act' restricts the holding deposit to a maximum of one weeks rent, this is less than the costs incurred. (the act makes no mention of how long the holding deposit can be held, nor the circumstances under which it can be retained) The total delays in moving in add up to five weeks beyond the initially agreed date - more than one months rent. Update - just for completeness, rent guarantee insurance is no longer available (not in the UK anyhow) due to covid. | Can a landlord (UK, English law) make a claim from a potential tenant who wants to back out of signing a Tenancy Agreement? No. Your description reflects that in this particular scenario there is no tenancy contract. The only actual contract relates to the holding deposit, and your description suggests that both parties fully complied with their obligations pursuant to that contract. Accordingly, neither party has a viable claim against the other. Regardless of whether verbal agreements are cognizable under UK tenancy law, the meeting of the minds you portray is that this tenancy ought to be formalized only by signing a contract. That supersedes customer's prior verbal expressions of intent about moving in. The landlord incurred expenses that either were covered by the customer's holding deposit or were unreasonable. An example of the latter is the fees "landlord has paid for the dates on the contract to be changed (repeatedly)", a task that any person can perform with a text editor at a negligible cost. Likewise, "turn[ing] down other potential tenants" is covered by the holding deposit the customer paid. As for taking "a detailed inventory", that is a task the landlord would perform with any potential tenant and which would render the same outcome regardless of who the tenant would be. The holding deposit must be associated to a deadline or holding period. Beyond that deadline, it is up to the landlord to grant customer's requests for postponement. But the landlord is not entitled to compensation for a risk he deliberately took without even requiring a [renewed] holding deposit. what's the situation if the tenant still claims they want to move in, but the landlord wants to withdraw because they no longer trusts the tenant's promises? That depends on the deadline associated to the holding deposit. Once the holding period has elapsed, the landlord is entitled to do with his property whatever he wants. The customer would have a claim only if (1) landlord withdraws prior to the deadline and (2) customer provably intended to move in. | Unfortunately, your relative is more in the wrong here First, the COVID situation does not change anyone's rights and obligations under a contract (see What effect does an event like the current Covid-19 pandemic have on contractural obligations?). So the landlord (through their agent) is obliged to provide the property and your relative is obliged to pay the rent and to occupy the premises (most residential leases contain a requirement for the tenant to live in the premises and not leave it empty). Your relative (through you) has indicated that she will be in breach of her contract. The agent has considered her position and has offered two (IMO generous) alternatives: Allow her to continue with the lease without taking possession providing the rent is paid. To release her from her obligations under the contract and return the rent. To put it in perspective, if your relative simply "walked away", she would be liable for the rent until a new tenant was found and, if that new tenant was paying less rent than she was, the difference for the duration of the lease plus the costs of finding a new tenant - advertising, agent's fees (usually 1 month's rent) etc. Now, the landlord has an obligation to minimise your costs so advertising the property could just be prudent. However, if they lease it when your relative's contract has not been properly terminated then it is they who are in breach. Surely they can't take the rent and offer to re-let the property at the same time? Surely they can. What they can't do is relet the property without properly terminating your relative's lease. Would they even be entitled to retain the deposit under these circumstances? Absolutely. The deposit is to cover their losses if your relative breaks the lease - as she has indicated she is going to do (this is called anticipatory breach). Finally, I'd rather not go down this route but is there any protection for my relative for not being forcefully 'evicted' - since she's paid the deposit, rent - and those haven't been returned? Having never taken possession, she is not being evicted. | In most jurisdictions, yes, you must give 30 days notice; this is a statutory requirement incumbent on both parties. This (your rental type) is a tenancy-at-will. If you pay rent monthly (on 1st) then this is the period of time required for notice to vacate. In some jurisdictions 30 days is required no matter what intervals you may rent (say weekly), other jurisdictions if you pay rent weekly then a week's notice is all that's necessary. This is In the absence of a rental agreement setting forth another agreed to term. See this question: If no prior contracts have been signed, can a landlord make tenants sign after a week of tenancy? It is not the same but there is some information on this type of tenancy. | As you say, the roommate who was there "did not equate the sound of a running toilet with wasting water". That, I am afraid to say, is negligent: normally, when you hear constantly flowing water, you do something about it. Somebody has to pay for the water, and assuming the water is in your name, that is you. You could yell at the roommate, but legal negligence is irrelevant to the water bill. However, if there were any resulting damage (for example to wiring or walls), that is where the question of negligence would come up: you probably would be found liable for damage to the building that resulting from letting the condition persist. But unless the fill valve broke at the tank and leaked water onto the floor (which would be clearly obvious) there won't be any damage that you are liable for. I assume that the leak developed from an old part giving out. This would be normal wear and tear, for which you would not be responsible (assuming you didn't cause the problem, for example by putting concentrated bleach in the tank). You you are saying that the landlord is trying to charge you for the repairs, and on this point, the landlord is on thin ice. A landlord cannot just make up rules about assigning liability for damage: that is a matter to be determined by the courts. A tenant can do things to a fill valve that can cause a leak; and the seal has to be replaced every few years. The tenant is not liable especially for routine replacement of the fill value seal, and does not become liable because they failed to inform the landlord in a prescribed manner. Not reporting a leak within 24 hours does not contribute to the underlying failed part. You could probably contest the legality of that bit of maintenance clause 24, in that the landlord cannot unilaterally declare who is responsible for damage. At the trial, both sides will present relevant evidence, and the judge / jury will decide whether the tenant's negligence caused the seal to fail. | There are several questions in the OP. The answers to all of them depend on the lease terms. If Person A wants out of the lease, is the only option to just try to negotiate a way out of their portion of the lease with the landlord, presumably by payment or other means? Yes, usually. Regardless of who is on the lease, Person A is on the lease. In order to terminate or break the lease, Person A will have to negotiate termination. Most residential leases provide for joint and several liability for lease obligations. That means the co-signed lease is like three non-exclusive leases, one each between landlord and Persons A, B, and C. So Person A has to find a way to break the Person A lease. Other than a breach by either party, that likely can only be done by negotiation with landlord. What rights do Person B and C have if Person A does stop paying? Absent some other relationship or understanding between them (that is, other than the lease,) likely none. Persons B and C are each fully responsible to pay all of the rent. In other words, as far as the landlord is concerned it does not matter who pays the rent as long as it gets paid. If it doesn't get paid, the landlord can evict and sue all 3 for non-payment of rent. But the lease likely does not discuss the relationships between A, B, and C - whether they pay pro rata by time in the unit, by space used, per capita, or whatever. Landlord doesn't care, and is not the counterparty to those decisions. That said, if there is a relationship between A, B, & C (for instance, if A & B had a contract describing who would pay what, and B entered into another contract with C,) that will determine their relative obligations. The landlord agrees to allow the lease to be amended for another person, person C to be on the lease. Person B negotiated this with the landlord without consent of person A. This may create liability between B to A, C to A, or B & C to A. It is even conceivable that it creates a liability from landlord to A, if A had a reasonable expectation that the lease would not be amended absent A's consent. And the amendment may not be enforceable against A. So, for instance, A may be able to kick C out of the unit and bar C from reentry. It will not effect A's liability to pay rent. | When the fixed term ends, you have two options if you want to stay. The first option is that you and the landlord can sign a new tenancy agreement, with a new fixed term. This new agreement replaces the old one at the end of the current fixed term, so the landlord is free to make changes, including proposing any number for the rent - and you are free to reject it. Alternatively, when the fixed term ends, if you don't sign a new agreement, and you don't leave, the tenancy automatically* becomes a Statutory Periodic Tenancy - often called a rolling contract. This has no fixed term, which means that if you want to leave, you have to give 1 month's notice, while if the landlord wants you to leave, they must give 2 months' notice. Apart from that, the terms of the existing contract, including the rent review clause mentioned in the question, remain in force. The rent review clause suggests that the landlord can unilaterally impose a rent increase after the fixed term ends, but only up to the amount specified. Hence, without signing a new agreement, any increase beyond that would not be allowed. Also, it doesn't appear to make any mention of future rent increases, which suggests that the default rules for rolling contracts will apply, in that the landlord can propose a rent increase, which you can accept or reject. Failing that, the landlord can impose one via a Section 13 Notice, but only once a year. If you feel the requested rent is unreasonable, you can challenge this, and a tribunal will make a ruling based on the state of the property and the rents for similar properties in the area. (* If the tenancy has any provisions relating to what happens once the fixed term ends, then the tenancy may become a Contractual Periodic Tenancy. However, unless those provisions relate to rent, then they may not be relevant here.) | she immediately stated that I need to provide 60 days notice She is wrong. See Minnesota statute 504B.135(a). Absent any agreement that supersedes the statute, the landlord cannot unilaterally stretch the notice period to 60 days. Is it legal for a landlord to say my rent is due 5 days earlier than we had verbally agreed? Is it legal for a landlord to do this right after I tell them that I am planning on moving out? No. The lanlord cannot unilaterally alter the implied contract that exists between you two, including the pattern of you paying rent on the 6th of the month. To prove in court that this was indeed the pattern, it suffices to show the receipts your landlord has the statutory obligation to provide to you immediately upon making each one of your payments. See 504B.118. The landlord is just "making sure" you will not recommend her to other prospective tenants. | What does "PROVIDED FURTHER" here mean? The term keeps two provisions separate, and hence independent of each other (unconditional). The former provision addresses landlord's initiative [to terminate the lease] whereas the latter addresses tenant's initiative. The latter pertains to early termination of lease and is not to be confused with tenant's default/non-payment. If rent is to be paid on the 1st of each month and the landlord wants the tenant to move out by August 13, the landlord needs to give a written notice at least thirty days prior to August 1 because the 1st of August is "the next rent payment date". This is regardless of tenant's timely payment of rent. Tenant's initiative to prematurely terminate the lease forfeits his security deposit regardless of having hitherto/always paid rent on time. |
Can a U.S. election be overturned for foreign interference? Can a U.S. election be overturned due to foreign interference? In the last U.S. election, people were concerned that Russia played a significant role in getting Donald Trump elected, so I was wondering if the current state of the law in the U.S. could allow the result of an election be overturned. If it is the case, I am wondering that are the conditions necessary for the decision to pass, and how long after the election the decision can be taken and by whom. | With the president, no. In the case where the election results cannot be certified, a safe harbor provision (3 U.S. Sec. 5) allows, if not requires, the state to appoint the electors by alternate means. Under most conceivable circumstances, the process ends here. However, if the House of Representatives refuses to accept the validity of those electors, and the president-elect still has a majority of the Electoral College, the state will simply have no say in the president's election. If rejecting those electors leaves no candidate with a majority of the Electoral College, the House of Representatives itself will elect the president per the process in Art. II of the constitution, as amended by Amend. 12. If the president-elect makes it past all these considerations to the oath of office, the only removal mechanism is impeachment. With other state and federal offices, each state, as well as the federal government, has its own laws regarding disputed elections. But one remedy would have to be a new election. | The Supremacy Clause makes Federal laws superior to state laws and even state constitutions, but that is only true for Constitutional federal laws. If Congress passed a law seeking to restore the effect of the now overruled Roe decision, there would be a question as to what provisions of the constitution empowered Congress to do so. Such a law might be challenged, and if no convincing source of congressional authority to pass such a law was cited, it could plausibly be overturned. One supposes that the members of the majority in Dobbs would be reluctant to see that decision superseded by a new Federal law. One hopes that they would take a principled stance, and only overturn such a law if there was good legal reason to do so. Without seeing the text of such a law, and the constitutional arguments for and against it, there is no legitimate way to judge if it would be within the power of Congress. As a political matter, I doubt that the current Congress will pass such a law. | Separation of powers means that the judiciary can't pass laws or executive orders. It doesn't mean that the judiciary can't interfere with their passage and enforcement. Quite the opposite -- the checks and balances inherent in the system ensure that the judiciary can interfere in some cases. One of the checks is the concept of judicial review: the courts' power to review each branch's actions for compliance with the constitution -- and more importantly, to strike down actions that are unconstitutional. When a court strikes down part of a law, though, they aren't writing a new law, or even repealing a law. They are overturning parts of the existing law -- basically declaring the unconstitutional parts of it void, to be treated as if they didn't exist. In India's constitution, Article 13 provides the main basis for this power. Article 13.(2) (in Part III) states: (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. This article, aside from making it clear that laws passed by the State can be void, also gives the Supreme Court the inroads it needs to do the overturning. The catch is, the Court can not overturn most laws passed by Parliament, just the ones that Part III can be construed to prohibit. (While the judiciary is not explicitly named, it's the only branch that can officially say whether or not a law is constitutional. It'd be a conflict of interest anyway for Parliament to do it. Parliament, in passing the law, presumably wanted it to be enforced, and thus has an interest in avoiding too much scrutiny.) So the Court can already declare an unconstitutional law void, because it already is...and that's before we even get to Article 142. Let's take a look at the article anyway: (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. Note that (2) explicitly grants the power to issue subpoenas, contempt citations, etc. So we can't claim that's what (1) was intended for, and have to ask what it means. The Court decided that the article gives it the power to order the government not to violate your rights, as such an order is "necessary for doing complete justice". And as the final arbiter of the meaning of the very text that defines it into existence, it has that prerogative. And due process is one of the rights protected. Article 21 (also in Part III): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. "Procedure established by law" is a much weaker phrase than "due process", and technically meant that anything that the government scribbled into law was good enough. But case law has all but removed the distinction. (See Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India.) Basically, any procedure for depriving someone of life or liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. (Otherwise a law declaring you a criminal, to be arrested on sight, would be constitutional.) "Someone filed a complaint" simply wasn't gonna fly. | "Conflict of interest" has a specific meaning w.r.t. various federal laws, which have financial gain as their underpinning. The so-called conflict which your referring to is an abstract moral duty, eforced at the polls every few years: there is no conflict of interest. "Obstruction of justice" is defined in 18 USC 73. The law does not require a person to passively submit to an investigation, thus you can file motions with a competent court to resist a subpoena. If there is a criminal investigation of a US criminal statute, it is illegal to willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute Saying "you don't have authority to tell me to do that" is not obstruction of justice. I have not seen any (credible) claim that it is unconstitutional for the president to order an investigation of election fraud, for example Executive Order 13799. That commission was disbanded, but a new commission could be ordered via the same mechanism. Congress has the power to defund any such commission, and there was an unsuccessful attempt to use that power in the previous instance. | In the USA, could a clause (article, proposition) of a State Constitution be held unconstitutional, with respect to the USA Constitution, by the Supreme Court? Yes. The supremacy clause in the US Constitution means that State law is supervened by Federal law. This includes State constitutions. If it could, has it ever happened? Yes. Here is a list of all SCOTUS cases that have overturned state law. For state constitutional provisions see nos 37, 49, 50, 51, 54, 74, 75, 139, 140, 151, 182, 188, 202, 207, 224, etc. (there’s nearly 1,000 in the list, you can go through them yourself). Also, could a decision by a State Supreme Court be reversed by the USA Supreme Court? Most of those cases will have gone through the State Supreme Court first. Except where SCOTUS has original jurisdiction (those involving disputes between the states or disputes arising among ambassadors and other high-ranking ministers) the state courts must have ruled to enliven its appellate jurisdiction. | For the US, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act provides that just about any US citizen living abroad who has previously resided within the US is entitled to vote in federal elections as though they still lived at their last US address, provided they'd be eligible to vote if they still lived at that address. If you're overseas on duty in a uniformed service of the United States or as a spouse or dependent of such a person, it's based on your legal residence instead. This is a right of US citizenship; dual citizenship doesn't affect it. This State Department website has details; there's a special process you can generally use instead of the state absentee process. UOCAVA applies to all federal elections (including primaries); state and local election eligibility is up to the state. For Canada, citizens of Canada living there seem to have the right to vote regardless of any possible loyalty issues with another country. Canadians living outside Canada for over five years can't vote, but if you live there it seems as though it is allowed. So, the answer is seemingly "yes." For a definitive answer, contact the US consulate and Canadian election officials. | No Even if there were any evidence that any member of the US government were involved (there isn’t), that is a matter for the US justice system. The US is not a member of the International Criminal Court so no Supra-National body has jurisdiction. | Authorizing someone else to vote on your behalf (either at your direction or at their own discretion is called Proxy Voting. It is extremely common in elections within corporations and other organisations; it is extremely rare in governmental elections. Each state of the US determines the rules governing voting so there is no blanket answer. For California the answer is no - from Where and How to Vote the voter must cast their own ballot, either in person or by mail. |
Is it illegal to post a software without permission? I am making a software which would do gridcomputing (i.e combine many computers processes to speed up a Function/App/Computer) I would post it online like a virus and spread to computers. This software will not take any of data. Delete it. Use it. It will only use a little bit of internet and 10MB of RAM. | Unauthorized use of a computer is illegal in most of the United States, and in many circumstances it is a federal crime. Here's a round-up of applicable laws from the National Conference of State Legislatures. | This would be unauthorized access to a computer. The offence is found in Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Note that this is a criminal offence, approaching the police about it might be the best way of handling the situation (if you want to go that route, and also, I'm not a lawyer). | If you don't want someone copying your stuff you don't need a licence at all - that is the default way copyright works. Simply put a copyright notice in the deployment and any splash screen or about screen. | From the perspective of US law: Scenario 1: Removing the watermark is perfectly legal, obviously. You own the copyright. Scenario 2: Abandonware is not really a thing in the US when it comes to copyright (and the Wikipedia article you linked says this.) Even if the company went out of business, the copyright almost certainly went to somebody - the former owners, the creditors, etc. As far as the Internet Archive goes, they are taking advantage of an exemption in the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions, along with the copyright exemption found in 17 USC § 108. But both of these exemptions require you to be a "library or archive" to take advantage of them, and you are not a library or archive, so you cannot take advantage of either. As a practical matter, if the software is really abandoned it's unlikely that anyone will actually come after you for infringement, but that's not quite the same as it being legal - you could be on the hook for up to $150,000 in statutory damages per work infringed, if the owner does sue you. You could attempt to claim fair use, of course. If the image is abandoned you might get a favorable result on factor 4 of the fair use test (the effect on the market for the original) since there's no market if nobody can find the owner. But it would depend on the other factors; that alone wouldn't get you fair use. Scenario 3: I'm not sure where you get the idea that downloading a copyrighted image to your desktop is somehow protected. It isn't automatically legal to save a copy of something just because it's on the Internet. And the existence of a watermark may indicate that someone wanted to prevent the file from being copied. The website containing the image will likely have terms of use, which may indicate whether or not you're allowed to make a copy. For example, Stack Exchange's TOS says in part: Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content. | If it was illegal to make the entire copy, it is illegal to copy half the file. See also, e.g., Basic Books v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) In response to the question of whether moving it to someone else's servers makes a difference: it is the act of copying, not the possession of the copy, that is the violation of copyright law. As for the copy a service assists someone to make, contributory liability would be the issue. You don't need to be the person making the copies to be contributing to the infringement--material contribution to the copying process and knowledge of infringement run a serious risk of creating contributory liability. If seriously considering such a service as a business model someone would need to consult a copyright expert with technical knowledge or pay counsel with technical knowledge for a good bit of time to do some research. There are major civil and criminal consequences if the industry or the government decides to go after a service doing this, so legal expenses would be a significant and important cost of doing business that would significantly increase barriers to entry. In addition, the service would likely be in violation of its agreement with storage vendors, who would want to minimize their legal exposure and might well discontinue the service when they learned what it was doing. | Generally, such sanctions prevent certain sorts of transactions in goods and services with nationals or entities of the nation under sanction. The exact list of transactions prohibited or restricted varies. If Open source software were being provided as a service, so that the recipient paid directly for a license, or for customization or configuration work, or for some sort of consulting or assistance, such transactions could be banned or restricted by a sanctions regime, but might not be. (If the sanctions included that particular class of transactions.) However, if it is merely a matter of an open source product being published, for anyone to download, install, and use, I don't see how that would be barred or restricted by any sanctions of the sort recently in use. | Use of SE is subject to the terms and conditions specified here. Section 3 says "You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license." That means that your contributions can be used forever. That means the stuff is there, end of story. Section 11 on Termination says "Stack Exchange may also terminate, block, or suspend any and all Services and access to the Network immediately, without prior notice or liability, in its sole discretion, for any reason or no reason at all, including but not limited to any Subscriber breaches of any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement". That means you can be banned. So, yes, what they did is legal. | It's a contract violation if you're under the EULA. It may be a contract of adhesion, but such "clickwrap" contracts been found to be acceptable and enforceable in software EULAs out of necessity. However, there may be some limits. If you're not under the EULA, as you argue, then you lack a license to use the software at all and it's an outright copyright violation and/or a theft or misappropriation of the software. Whether or not you can be sued depends in part on what you do with it — if you don't release the material or otherwise cause damages then there's not much to sue for... Added for clarification: to answer the framing question, supposing neither contract or copyright applied, one could be sued in tort or in equity (i.e. for unjust enrichment). |
When does "forced flex time" become "unpaid overtime"? Jurisdiction: Ontario, Canada. Facts: Salaried employee. Employer has made it very clear that working hours are strictly 9:00 - 12:00, 1:00 - 5:00. No flex. Clients often request services outside of these hours. Management encourages staff to accommodate clients and provide after-hours service. Any time these hours are put through the HR system as overtime, employees get pushback from management, and are told to "flex these hours within the same day or week" rather than filing them through HR. Questions: Is this legal? Specifically, is an employee in this situation within their rights to tell their employer "I'm only seeing clients after-hours if I can submit it as overtime"? Which regulations or laws would be relevant here? | Overtime pay in Ontario is required by the Employment Standards Act (ESA). Most employees are entitled to "time and a half" if they work more than 44 hours in a single week. According to this Ontario Government web page For most employees, whether they work full-time, part-time, are students, temporary help agency assignment employees, or casual workers, overtime begins after they have worked 44 hours in a work week. Their hours after 44 must be paid at the overtime pay rate. Managers and supervisors do not qualify for overtime if the work they do is managerial or supervisory. Even if they perform other kinds of tasks that are not managerial or supervisory, they are not entitled to get overtime pay if these tasks are performed only on an irregular or exceptional basis. ... A fixed salary compensates an employee for all non-overtime hours up to and including 44 hours a week. After 44 hours, the employee is entitled to overtime pay. ... An employer and an employee cannot agree that the employee will give up their right to overtime pay under the ESA. Agreements such as these are not allowed and would be deemed void. However, an employee can make an agreement to take paid time off in lieu of overtime pay or to average hours of work for overtime pay purposes. An employer cannot lower an employee’s regular wage to avoid paying time and a half after 44 hours (or another overtime threshold that applies) in a work week. For example, if Josée’s regular pay is $17.00 an hour, her employer cannot drop her regular rate in a week when overtime was worked to $15.00 an hour and then pay her $22.50 (1½ × $15.00) for overtime hours worked instead of $25.50 (1 ½ × $17.00). There are various industries that are subject to special rules that modify the usual rules for overtime. There are particular kinds of jobs that are exempt from the ESA. These are listed on this page. Conclusion The situation described in the question sounds like a violation of the ESA. But it might come under an Averaging Agreement, which is permitted. Under such an agreement weeks with longer hours are averaged with weeks that have shorter hours. There are rules governing such agreements. Note that the hours listed in the question amount to 35 hours per week. An additional nine hours could be worked in any given week before getting to the 44 hours of work which usually triggers overtime pay. The linked pages include official contact information for ESA information and enforcement. | I’m asking if I can sue for lost wages because it’s taking time out of my day No, that would be a frivolous claim. You did not specify how much time and effort the walk takes you on a daily basis, but it is extremely doubtful that you could viably claim lost wages. Suing the landlord for this would put you at high risk of being ordered to pay his attorney fees, which surely will exceed that fictitious loss. The allegation "I'm losing work because I’m an independent contractor" is untenable and makes no sense. By that token, a full-time employee typically is more constrained (for instance, in terms of schedule) than an independent contractor. It is also questionable that the time you spend walking back and forth when leaving your apartment is comparable to the time it takes you to do your job or get more clients. Depending on your location, the landlord would defeat your claim also on grounds that you could --and unjustifiably decline to-- take the bus or seek other arrangements if the issue truly were causing you provable losses. It is also very unlikely that the continued failure to recognize your motorcycle would support a claim of breach of contract, since the terms of a lease hardly ever address that kind of minor details. The only circumstance whereby you would have a viable claim is if you were handicapped, but your description nowhere reflects that that is the case. Even in that scenario, the nature of your claim would be other than "lost wages" and mostly would warrant injunctive relief. | In Canada can employer force employees not to discuss wage? Not in Ontario. That would violate Section 74(1) of the Employment Standards Act, 2000: No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall intimidate, dismiss or otherwise penalize an employee or threaten to do so, (a) because the employee, (v.2) discloses the employee’s rate of pay to another employee for the purpose of determining or assisting another person in determining whether an employer is complying with Part XII (Equal Pay for Equal Work) See also Section 74.12(1)(a)(v.2). What if the employee signed a confidentiality agreement where they agreed not to discuss wages? The agreement would be void in that regard. See Section 5 of the same Standards: [...] [N]o employer or agent of an employer and no employee or agent of an employee shall contract out of or waive an employment standard and any such contracting out or waiver is void. The allowed exceptions are any clauses that provide a greater benefit to an employee than the employment standard (see 5(2)). | No First, there does not appear to be unlawful discrimination: there is nothing to suggest that you are a member of a protected class and were terminated because of that. Second, you were given no reason for your dismissal so your employer is not claiming you were terminated for just cause. So, in BC, an employer "can end an employee's job by giving written working notice or pay" and this is perfectly legal. For someone who worked for "about 6 months", the notice/pay period is 1 week. So either they must give you 1 weeks work or pay you 1 weeks wages. | An employer has a duty of care to employees and must take steps to ensure their safety. Notably: 125 (1) Without restricting the generality of section 124, every employer shall, in respect of every work place controlled by the employer and, in respect of every work activity carried out by an employee in a work place that is not controlled by the employer, to the extent that the employer controls the activity, ... (y) ensure that the activities of every person granted access to the work place do not endanger the health and safety of employees; (Canada Labour Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. L-2)) If there is a reasonable belief that the other employee is a danger to you, they should take reasonable steps to prevent this. If they choose to ignore this, they may be liable. Whether or not there is a reasonable belief they are a danger to you or others here is unclear. Being annoying or rude does not endanger you and they haven't made threats towards you (I assume, since you'd have mentioned otherwise). | Since this is a board about law, the legal answer is that New Jersey does not regulate vacation pay: In New Jersey, employers are not required to provide employees with vacation benefits, either paid or unpaid. If an employer chooses to provide these benefits, it is only required to comply with its established policy or employment contract. The specific law cited by that web page is this one, which says that "Nothing in this chapter requires an employer to pay an employee for hours the employee is not required to be at his or her place of work because of holidays, vacation, lunch hours, illness and similar reasons." So whether your boss can count weekend days as part of your vacation will depend on your employment contract and the established policies of your employer. Unfortunately, that's not something this forum can provide advice on. | (For a definitive answer, consult an employment attorney). According to the federal Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, in general, An employee cannot be forced to participate (or not participate) in a religious activity as a condition of employment. This requirement comes from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Answer 14 on this page elaborates: Some private employers choose to express their own religious beliefs or practices in the workplace, and they are entitled to do so. However, if an employer holds religious services or programs or includes prayer in business meetings, Title VII requires that the employer accommodate an employee who asks to be excused for religious reasons, absent a showing of undue hardship. Similarly, an employer is required to excuse an employee from compulsory personal or professional development training that conflicts with the employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would pose an undue hardship. It would be an undue hardship to excuse an employee from training, for example, where the training provides information on how to perform the job, or how to comply with equal employment opportunity obligations, or on other workplace policies, procedures, or legal requirements. So the questions would be: Is the activity in question a "religious service or program"? This might be ambiguous, and you might have to consult an employment attorney for a more informed opinion. Does it "conflict with your sincerely held religious beliefs or practices"? Would it be an "undue hardship" for the employer to excuse you? Note that this law might not apply to employers with fewer than 15 employees. It also doesn't apply if you work for an employer such as a church, or a religiously affiliated hospital or educational institution, or the like. | Quitting before the start date: is the non compete enforceable? The non-compete is unenforceable unless the employer has provided you with material information that you can use to the detriment of the employer. Even in that case, the non-compete as outlined in your description seemingly exceeds the legitimate interests of the employer (see art. 2089 of the Civil Code of Québec). This means that the non-compete clause would be curtailed in court because the employer cannot prove that his business (or market share) encompasses the area depicted in the clause. The reason of being of non-compete clauses is to protect the employer from a potential misuse of information the employee obtained pursuant to his employment, such as trade secrets and information about clients. The fact that you are a fresh graduate suggests that you are dealing with just some typical intermediary who really has no "trade secrets" and who is not providing you with key information, let alone for a job that is scheduled to start five months later. Non-compete clauses that are overly broad contravene public policy in that they would singlehandedly exclude civilians from the labor market and disproportionately impair free trade. |
Why is secrecy of correspondence treated differently than telephone or electronic surveillance According to wikipedia "secrecy of correspondence" "Paper letters have, in most jurisdictions, remained outside the legal scope of law enforcement surveillance, even in cases of "reasonable searches and seizures". " Why is communication with letters treated differently than communication by other means? | They aren’t treated differently In most jurisdictions, law enforcement requires a warrant to intercept/open/read the contents of physical or electronic correspondence. Similarly, in most jurisdictions, a warrant is not required to read the metadata: who is communicating with whom, how and when but not what. That is they can read what’s written on the outside of the envelope or the routing information of the email/SMS. Telephony is not correspondence because it is not the intent of the parties to create a permanent record. It is usually treated as any other conversation - if it carried out in a place and manner that the participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy it’s usually illegal to record it (electronically or by writing it down). If it’s said publicly, it isn’t illegal. | Assuming that the police have a warrant to seize your cell phone, the scope of what can be seized is specified in the warrant. It is not automatic that seizing a phone entails seizure of some or all online accounts (e.g. automatic backups, collections of passwords in a Google account) and it does not automatically "freeze" or block a person's access to their accounts including phone accounts. It's not that it is impossible to seize an account, it's that it is not automatic: it has to be in the scope of the warrant. Here is a collection of petition templates, asking the court to allow the seizure of various things for various reasons (mostly electronic), including access to bank accounts. If the police suspect that information might be available online after it has been deleted from a phone, they would need to include online accounts in the scope of the petition(s). There is even a template for "give me everything", called "Frankenstein". | Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character. | Yes and No See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967): What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. The glass has clearly been "knowingly exposed" and if that glass was, on the normal methods of examination by the officer (sight, smell etc.), evidence of a crime then it would be able to be used as evidence. However, any DNA on that glass is not "knowingly exposed" - finding the DNA requires a laboratory, specialised equipment and trained technicians. | Police are not required to “look into” any report What the police choose to investigate is solely at their discretion irrespective of the number or quality of reports on the matter. You do not have to give your name You can report anonymously if you like. It does make investigation more difficult because the police cannot follow up for further information and may influence their decision on whether to investigate. | Such a search would have been emotionally satisfying for many people, but it would almost certainly not have been legal. Evidence that someone committed a crime is not always sufficient to permit a search of their home. An arrest warrant requires probable cause to believe the target individual committed an offense, and a search warrant requires probable cause to believe that the target location will have evidence of a crime. So whatever evidence they had that Epstein committed a crime, they would generally need a separate warrant to search his properties for evidence of that crime. There is no "emergency clause" for search warrants. I imagine you're thinking of the "exigency" exception to the requirement that the police obtain a warrant before searching property, which allows a search in cases where there is an actual emergency, where evidence is being destroyed, or when someone ducks into private property while officers are pursuing them. "Reasonable suspicicion of possible threats to ... potential victims" would not be enough to justify a search based on an exigency. If Epstein is already in jail, he doesn't really pose a threat to anyone, he isn't able to destroy any evidence, and no one is pursuing him anywhere. | Attorney-client privilege is normally waived if a privileged communication is voluntarily disclosed. Submission of an attorney-client privileged document to a judge to review in camera does not waive the attorney-client privilege. Most of the case law involves inadvertent "oops" style disclosures of attorney-client privileged documents (keep in mind that big lawsuits often involve exchanges of terabytes of data that have to be reviewed page by page for attorney-client privileged materials by armies of junior lawyers and paralegals, so mistakes are inevitably made now and then), which is a somewhat convoluted area of law. Basically, if it is caught soon enough, the person accidentally receiving it can be ordered to not look at it any more and to destroy it without keeping copies if it remains within an accidental recipient law firm or government agency's possession and has not been further disseminated into public records yet. In particular, such documents can't be presented as evidence at trial if the mistake is caught before it is too late to correct the mistake. In those cases, the legal system does its best to pretend that the mistaken disclosure of attorney-client privileged materials never happened. | It's just been answered by the Court of Appeal: BBC News, Encrochat: Secret network messages can be used in court, judges rule (5 February 2021) A, B, D & C v Regina [2021] EWCA Crim 128 (5 February 2021) The rationale for the decision is: Interception of messages renders them unable to be used as evidence. But the Encrochat system used end to end encryption, and the captured messages were in plain text and not decrypted by authorities. Therefore the captured evidence data could not have arisen from "interception" of messages. They were not intercepted messages, but on-device captures of the phones memory/RAM prior to encryption and sending. Corroborating this, the court observed that the captures also apparently included device data that was not part of any transmitted message,showing again, they were not "intercepted" data. It appears it was captured by some kind of software introduced onto the phones by French authorities, perhaps with UK involvement its not clear to me. |
Non FDA approved Covid vaccine required by employer Can an employer legally require employees to get the NON FDA approved covid vaccine or be terminated? Where is the legal information on this? The concern is it being non FDA approved and requiring it. State-Mississippi | There are, as far as I know, no "FDA-approved" vaccines against covid in the US. The FDA has given Emergency Use Authorization to some vaccines. This does not currently include the Johnson & Johnson vaccine. It is impossible for a person to get the J&J vaccine in the US, because it is not authorized, and J&J does not distribute it. One could imagine an unauthorized foreign vaccine being smuggled into the US, but it would be illegal to distribute it. I assume that you specifically mean, can a person refuse to get a vaccination on the grounds that it only has an emergency authorization and is not actually approved: and can one sue an employer for firing you because you refused to get vaccinated? In general, the employer can fire for anything they want, unless you have an employment contract that limits the grounds for termination. There are discrimination-based grounds that they cannot use, such as race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, age (age 40 or older), or genetic information at the federal level. Mississippi has no specific employment discrimination laws. Other that that, an employer can fire an employee for any reason, or no reason (Mississippi is what's known as an "employment at will" state). There are some state restrictions where it is prohibited for an employer to fire an employee for engaging in a specific required activity such as being called for jury duty or being called to military duty. An employer could not require an employee to break the law, but that is not applicable here. | It was decided back in 1905 in the case of Jacobson v Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, that mandatory vaccination laws are constitutional in the US (the specific example being mandatory smallpox vaccination - through vaccination, this illness was eradicated globally). The court observed that in every well ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. An American citizen, arriving at an American port on a vessel in which, during the voyage, there had been cases of yellow fever or Asiatic cholera, although apparently free from disease himself, may yet, in some circumstances, be held in quarantine against his will on board of such vessel or in a quarantine station until it be ascertained by inspection, conducted with due diligence, that the danger of the spread of the disease among the community at large has disappeared. The power of the government to protect is not totally unfettered: its actions must be necessary. Smallpox being prevalent and increasing at Cambridge, the court would usurp the functions of another branch of government if it adjudged, as matter of law, that the mode adopted under the sanction of the State, to protect the people at large was arbitrary and not justified by the necessities of the case. We say necessities of the case because it might be that an acknowledged power of a local community to protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all, might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons. An attack on a mandatory vaccination law would probably focus on the question of necessity. | Why would the FDA limit actionable material that may enhance treatment? Because the FDA has a bunch of regulations that say if you are going to sell a medical test you first have to prove that it is safe, accurate, and effective. The genome scan companies first had to prove that their genome scans were accurate and had sufficient quality controls built in. In addition, the typical results from a genome scan involve a lot of ambiguity, and probabilistic measurements of relative risk, so there was a huge question of whether the automated reports produced by these companies would actually be accurate, intelligible, and not promise too much or too little to the consumer. The company, Sure Genomics, in the article you linked too, apparently avoids this issue by having a physician review the report, and consult with the consumer. Other companies tried to completely automate the process and didn't include the physician consultation. As least one company, 23andMe, has, at least partially, worked out it's issues with the FDA and can provide medical reports on some conditions. | We can look at Missouri law as an example. Missouri Statutes §577.029 says A licensed physician, registered nurse, phlebotomist, or trained medical technician, acting at the request and direction of the law enforcement officer under section 577.020, shall, with the consent of the patient or a warrant issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol content of the blood, unless such medical personnel, in his or her good faith medical judgment, believes such procedure would endanger the life or health of the person in custody. Blood may be withdrawn only by such medical personnel, but such restriction shall not apply to the taking of a breath test, a saliva specimen, or a urine specimen. In withdrawing blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol content thereof, only a previously unused and sterile needle and sterile vessel shall be utilized and the withdrawal shall otherwise be in strict accord with accepted medical practices. Upon the request of the person who is tested, full information concerning the test taken at the direction of the law enforcement officer shall be made available to him or her. "Shall" means "must" – if there is a warrant (we assume there is no consent). Then the question is, what happens if the phlebotomist (etc) refuses? First, §577.031 immunizes the medical-person from legal liability when they act in compliance with a request from a LEO (a simple request, not necessarily accompanied by a warrant). §577.033 says that being dead, unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing does not constitute withdrawal of consent (which is implied, by law). No specific penalty is prescribed for refusal to administer a court-ordered blood draw. There is no penalty for complying, there is no prescribed criminal penalty for refusing to comply with a court order (there is the possibility of a finding of contempt of court). Not every state is Missouri: I understand that Utah is different. | Obtaining consent for cookies is not required by the GDPR at all. Instead it is covered by the e-privacy directive, which as a directive rather than a regulation, must be implements by specific legislation in each individual country. The exact requirements vary with the law of each country. An e-privacy regulation has been proposed, which would have scope similar to the GDPR, would replace the Directive, and would not require national implementing legislation. However it has not yet been adopted. Proposed versions have significantly different requirements than the current Directive. Nor does the GDPR require consent for advertising that does not involve the processing of personal information, unlike some other privacy laws such as the California CCPA. However, if the Google package sets cookies without consent that are not strictly necessary for operation of the web site, it might well fail compliance with some of those national laws implementing e-privacy. Also, even necessary cookies must be disclosed to the user, as I understand it, possibly only in general terms. Several national Data Protection agencies have said that cookie compliance is not a major priority, at least not until an e-privacy regulation is in place. But that does not mean that lack of compliance is legal. Unfortunately I see no way for a developer using the Google package to correct this issue within the package. One would either have to implement a different solution, or trust that Google will fix this before enforcement becomes a serious issue. However, the app developer could add a separate general cookie consent banner, and turn off all adds if consent is not given, I believe. | CNBC's explanation is simply wrong. The law says that a vaccine manufacturer is immune from suit and liability under Federal and State law with respect to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure if a declaration under subsection (b) has been issued and there was a declaration under subsection (b). This immunity is not conditioned either way by being approved, indeed the declaration states To be a Covered Countermeasure, qualified pandemic or epidemic products or security countermeasures also must be approved or cleared under the FD&C Act; licensed under the PHS Act; or authorized for emergency use under Sections 564, 564A, or 564B of the FD&C Act The liability immunity is not perpetual, the declaration says: Liability immunity for Covered Countermeasures administered and used in accordance with the public health and medical response of the Authority Having Jurisdiction begins with a Declaration and lasts through (1) the final day the emergency Declaration is in effect, or (2) October 1, 2024, whichever occurs first. That doesn't mean that there can't be another declaration in the future. Immunity of a manufacturer to liability is not related to a patient being "covered". There are other ways in which a patient could be "covered". One of them is the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program and the other is the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which presently redirects you to CICP. | I'm not a lawyer, but I am an NHS employee, and can more concretely answer your questions. Has any crime been committed, and if so, is there any point in pursuing this with the police? If so, how do I go about it? Yes, in-fact, several crimes have been committed. Firstly, NHS employees are prohibited from viewing patient's personal information that they are not specifically treating. In opening your letter from the NHS, the nurse in question violated this practice. It's a breach of both privacy and trust. This is taught at the NHS and the nurse would be aware of this. Secondly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse has committed workplace fraud. They have impersonated a patient, and in doing so, cost the NHS money and time it won't get back by cancelling your appointment. Again, this is also taught within the NHS, and the nurse would be aware of this too. Thirdly, by cancelling your appointment, the nurse may have put a life in danger in doing so, which is effectively gross negligence at a minimum. Although this can be reported to the police, it'll be more effective to report it to the appropriate NHS bodies. Even if a crime has not been committed, I would think that at the very least, opening someone's mail and then impersonating them and cancelling the surgery would at least be viewed as unprofessional, especially for someone employed in the NHS. Is there a procedure for making a complaint against an NHS worker? There are several different approaches, given the various breaches of trust. As BlueDogRanch mentioned, you can file a compliant to NHS England, which includes via email. Be sure to get appropriate information like the nurse's name, address, and if possible any details (like appointment reference numbers) to aid the investigation. Secondly, because of the cost incurred via the malicious cancellation of an appointment, costing time and money (and running the risk of opening the NHS to litigation), you can also report the fraudulent aspects to the NHS Counter Fraud Authority. | It is difficult to keep track of the rapidly changing legal variables, but it would be illegal and unconstitutional for state police to set up an unauthorized stop-and-search checkpoint on the road ("due process" means "following the law"). As a prelude, there would have to be some higher authority that empowers them to do this. You would have to scrutinize the emergency powers legislation of every state to be certain, but no governor has the power to mandate blanket body searches in case of a medical emergency. (Martial law shifts enforcement of the law to the military, but doesn't generally create arbitrary decree-writing powers). The legal foundation of such searching would have to be a new law: then the question is what the law requires that could make on-the-road body searches constitutional. Since the right to be free of unreasonable searches is a fundamental constitutional right, this law would be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Searches "just for fun" will not pass such scrutiny, nor will "because it's an emergency" or "keep the public safe". Having the disease is not and cannot be a crime, so this law would have to be founded on a strict no-travel requirement. That brings the matter within the sphere of the "officer safety" exception in the case of an arrest. I'm not suggesting that an absolute travel ban would be upheld as constitutional in the US, but that is the kind of legal foundation that would be required for state police to force people to be Covid-searched. |
If Trump can be impeached after leaving office, why couldn't Nixon? I know that this was essentially already asked here, but the responses to that question only seem to say "You can't be impeached after leaving office," and we now know that that is apparently not true. So if Trump's impeachment continues after leaving office, why couldn't Nixon's? I understand that Nixon was pardoned, but my understanding is that the pardon shuts down criminal prosecutions (but not impeachment). I am not expressing any political opinion about the current impeachment - I'm just asking why it can continue if Nixon's couldn't. | First of all, there is a distinction between being impeached and being convicted. Trump was impeached when the House voted to adopt an Article of Impeachment. That happened while he was still in office. He will not be convicted until the Senate votes to convict him by a 2/3rds vote, if it ever does. In the case of Nixon, the House had not yet voted to adopt Articles of Impeachment when he resigned. They had been introduced and debated, but not yet finally approved. Moreover, we don't know what would have happened if the House had proceeded to pass such articles after Nixon had resigned. The House of that time did not choose to proceed. There was no court ruling saying that they could not do so. There are some precedents saying that the Senate can proceed with a trial after an official resigns or is expelled after impeachment. None of these are at all recent, none are clear cut, none involved an official whose term had ended, none involved a President, and none that I am aware of led to a conviction. And this issue has never been tested in a Federal court. Specifically, there is the case of William Belknap. Belknap was Secretary of War under US President Grant. He was accused of improperly profiting from military contracts. The House started impeachment proceedings. Grant interviewed Belknap, who confessed to Grant and resigned on the spot. The house none the less pass five articles of impeachment after Belknap resigned. When the Senate took up the case, there was a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Senate did not have jurisdiction because of Belknap's resignation. By a vote of 37–29 the Senate held that it had jurisdiction and that a trial should proceed. The vote to convict Belknap was 35 for conviction, 25 against it. This was five votes short of the required 2/3rds to convict. Most of the Senators voting against conviction were on record as doing so because they did not agree that the Senate had jurisdiction. Thus a majority vote of the Senate held in that case that such a trial was proper, but less than 2/3rds. (Most also indicted that they thought the charges true.) There was also the case of William Blount. Blount, a Senator, was impeached by the House in 1798. (In fact this was the first impeachment ever under the US Constitution.) The Senate voted to expel him. When the articles of impeachment came up in 1799, the Senate voted to dismiss the impeachment, on the ground that the impeachment process did not extend to members of the Senate, but not on the grounds that the expulsion rendered the proceedings moot. Should Trump be convicted by the Senate (which now seems unlikely) he might bring a court case claiming that such a conviction was unconstitutional. There is no knowing how a court would handle such a case. And if Trump is not convicted, no such case will be brought this time, either. This Washington Post opinion piece by two Constitutional scholars claims that such a trial would be constitutionally proper. It also claims that it would not have been proper had the vote to adopt articles of impeachment occurred after Trump had left office. Others have taken different positions. Whether a Senate trial of an impeachment is constitutional after the person impeached has left office is a hotly debated question at the moment. There has never been a court ruling on the point, and neither of the precedents is of a situation quite matching the current impeachment of Trump. No court has ruled on the matter. The Senate did not vote for a motion to dismiss the impeachment on those grounds, although if every senator who voted for the motion voted to acquit, Trump would not be convicted. From the comments I wish that any downvoters would leave a comment indicting what thy think is wring with this answer. In the absence of a comment, I cannot improve the answer, others cannot use the reasons to write better answers, and readers have no idea why someone objects to the answer. Such a downvote seems pointless. I have updated this answer with a discussion of the Blount and Belknap precedents. In neither case did the Senate actually vote to dismiss the articles because the accused was no longer in office, although that seems to be a major reason why 25 senators voted against convicting Belknap. | Well, moral obligations are not laws, nor sometimes even moral obligations. Some laws are based on what some courts and legislatures think are moral obligations. We think cannibals have a moral obligation not to eat people; cannibals think non-cannibals are fools for passing up a good BBQ. As for a leader's moral responsibility for millions of lives, we can take as extreme examples Mao, Hilter, Stalin, Pol Pot, etc., that there are no obligations. The law that could apply in the case of a POTUS who does not "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States..." (oath of office for POTUS) is that of "High Crimes and Misdemeanors", the grounds for most impeachments. But "faithfully executing the Office of President" has no moral obligation; it has legal implications, that's all. High crimes or misdemeanor are legal definitions, not moral, and depend on previous cases of what a crime or misdemeanor is. Insobriety can be illegal; there are laws on the books concerning public drunkenness. But in the contest of POTUS (one who is hopefully not passed out on the sidewalk in front of the WH), it remains to be seen if insobriety is a high crime or misdemeanor. That would be up to the House Judiciary Committee and US House of Representatives, which by Constitutional powers handles impeachment proceedings. The Twenty-fifth Amendment outlines who succeeds the president due to "Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office," but it does not state who has the power to declare a President incapacitated. It's possible that a POTUS who incapacitates himself with alcohol is guilty of a "high crime or misdemeanor." But how drunk do you have to be to be incapacitated? Drunk enough to think a Game Boy is the nuclear football? Again, that's up to the House. Some past presidents have arguably been functional alcoholics (or functional recovered alcoholics.) But incapacitated? That can be subjective when it comes to the application of the law. And morals have little to do with it, unless those morals have a basis in that same law. Update 12/04/16: Some federal judges have been impeached due to drunkenness: http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html and http://www.crf-usa.org/impeachment/high-crimes-and-misdemeanors.html | There are 2 separate issues here: what happens to such a President and what happens to the person who has been pardoned. What happens to the person who has been pardoned? While at least one attempt at reversing a pardon has been discussed in recent history (Clinton's pardon of Mark Rich), there is no case of a pardon that has been reversed without the wishes of the person who was to be pardoned. There were 2 SCOTUS cases which decided that a pardon is a form of clemency rather than an act of overturning a judgement. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833) established that if a person does not accept a conditional pardon, then it is not in effect. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915) decided that if a person does not accept an unconditional pardon, then the pardon is not in effect. Burdick specifically did not want to accept the pardon because his contention was that accepting it would be tantamount to admitting guilt and would strip him of his 5th amendment right to not incriminate himself. There is very little case law surrounding the understanding of the power to pardon, so it may help to simply list the relevant instances of considerations and available opinions. Both (fmr President) Nixon and (fmr Sec of Defense) Weinberger were pardoned without ever being tried for the crimes for which they were pardoned. Even after Burdick v US, the issue of whether a pardon does amount to a formal admission of guilt remains controversial (i.e., not fully settled legally). In Nixon v US (not to be confused with the more famous US v Nixon), the court referred to Black's Law dictionary, rather than to the previous 2 opinions, to state that a pardon does not overturn a "guilty" judgement but rather provides a clemency. It is established that all punishments (jail time or fines), that one would receive for the crime, would not be applied if the person is pardoned. However, it is not established, for example, if the the presumption of guilt that goes with the accepting of a pardon counts as a "strike" for the purposes of "3 strike" laws (because of no precedent); would result in a requirement to continue registering as a sex offender in case the crime was a sex crime (because of no precedent). The current DOJ FAQ states that a pardon removes "civil disabilities" such as restrictions on the right to vote hold state or local office sit on a jury It is widely claimed that a President cannot pardon anyone for state crimes. However, as far as I know, it's never been attempted. The current interpretation of the US Constitution's Supremacy Clause is that states cannot interfere with the proceedings of the Federal government. So should a President attempt to pardon anyone for a state crime, it would (almost certainly) result in a court challenge. Any claims, that the outcome of such a challenge would result one way or another, are (by definition) nothing but a speculation. Further, if a pardon does remove the civil disability of not being able to hold a state office, then it does remove punitive consequences of some states' laws. Which may potentially bolster the claim that a President may pardon a state crime. But again, this is a pure speculation and there are plenty of good arguments to be made against such a possibility. What happens to the President who has taken a bribe? That having been said, no official act performed by a President is automatically reversed if the act is found to have been done corruptly (in exchange for a bribe or any other personal consideration contravening his oath of office). However, the Congress has the enumerated power to impeach a President and remove him from the office if he is found to have taken a bribe. Removing him from the office does not, in itself, reverse any of his official actions (including the ones performed corruptly). The Congress, however, does not have the power to reverse pardons. Nor can it create such a power with a legislature. For Congress to gain such a power would require a constitutional amendment. | Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence. | My understanding is that the syndicate would be committing an act of extortion. Under the RICO Act, IF the politician conspired with the syndicate OR IF the politician had something like an 'understanding' with the syndicate, then they (any, and all involved) could be charged with the crime (extortion), racketeering and conspiracy. Additional crimes/laws to consider: Campaign finance violations Money laundering Compelled speech (1st Amendment) | The only relevant case heard by SCOTUS is Nixon v. US, 506 U.S. 224, where a federal judge was tried and convicted for actual crimes, but would not resign his position so continued to draw his salary. The key legal question was whether the matter is "justiciable" (meaning, not a political matter but a legal matter). Nixon's argument was that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, and the court held that the question (more specifically what it means to "try") is nonjusticiable. White & Blackmun, and Souter, wrote concurring opinions (which might be called on in a subsequent impeachment case) that reminds the reader (and future court) what was not part of the holding of the court, and what might therefore allow future impeachment review. White writes The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us even to consider his contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore reach the merits of the claim. I concur in the judgment because the Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" petitioner. He observes that the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed a trial by reasonable judges. But, I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to "try" impeachment cases. When asked at oral argument whether that direction would be satisfied if, after a House vote to impeach, the Senate, without any procedure whatsoever, unanimously found the accused guilty of being "a bad guy," counsel for the United States answered that the Government's theory "leads me to answer that question yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. Especially in light of this advice from the Solicitor General, I would not issue an invitation to the Senate to find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business, to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment process. Souter in his opinion states that One can, nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply" 'a bad guy,'", judicial interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. In other words, review of an impeachment is largely but not entirely off the table, at least until SCOTUS declares that impeachments are completely unreviewable, no matter what, period (unlikely to ever happen). | There is a legal doctrine of executive privilege, where the executive branch can resist subpoenas, but that privilege is limited (US v. Nixon). Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. SCOTUS pointed to the kinds of cases where such privilege would be valid Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the confidentiality of Presidential communications is not significantly diminished by producing material for a criminal trial under the protected conditions of in camera inspection, and any absolute executive privilege under Art. II of the Constitution would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under the Constitution. But otherwise, when a claim of Presidential privilege as to materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here, not on the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality, the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice Decades later, Harriet Miers claimed executive immunity (as White House counsel) to a subpoena to testify before the Committee on the Judiciary, and the district court ruled rebuffed that claim There are powerful reasons supporting the rejection of absolute immunity as asserted by the Executive here. If the Court held otherwise, the presumptive presidential privilege could be transformed into an absolute privilege and Congress's legitimate interest in inquiry could be easily thwarted. if the Executive's absolute immunity argument were to prevail, Congress could be left with no recourse to obtain information that is plainly not subject to any colorable claim of executive privilege. However, executive privilege has been invoked dozens of times since Nixon – there are no other SCOTUS decisions. We should set aside current political posturing. POTUS might claim executive privilege, and then the question is whether the courts would order Banon to testify. We don't know the basis for such privilege, but we can assume that it would involve national security issues (thus might be within the penumbra of the Nixon ruling). Traditionally, executive privilege has involved the person who is president, not the person who ended up becoming president, so it would be extremely surprising if the courts upheld immunity in a pre-election matter. | He was jailed for breaching an injunction imposed on the Shard in 2018 which was intended to prevent anyone from climbing it, according to a news report from the Guardian at the time. The actual offence he committed was contempt of court which is a criminal offence. Double jeopardy does not apply here because the crime he was cautioned for was not the same crime he was prosecuted for. It appears there was no precedent set, prior to this private prosecution, about whether or not someone could be jailed for breaching an injunction in this manner, as opposed to merely being fined, etc. Obviously, since he has been jailed, people in the future will be reluctant to copy his behaviour and a deterrent has been set. |
Youtube made for kids Youtube allows youtubers to mark videos as made for kids. There the United States COPPA is cited The age of a kid here is thirteen . In U.K. it is 16 and some country it may be else if they wish to maker such a law. So what is the standard to be followed for a kid ? Are videos for collected and uploaded for college students or of general appeal of all ages " for kids " ? Lastly if a video for kids is labeled as "Not for kids " are they punishable in India or U.S. ? A basic summary of what doubt led to this question: Different countries have different ages for kids so it is unclear who is a kid or not. If a video which does not feature any violence or impolite content but education content that kids ( in some jurisdictions kids but not in COPPA ) may like ( age 16 + ) or of appeal of all ages is marked as not for kids is it illeagal ? ( I cannot as of writing find a wrong in it morally .). | In the united-states the heart of COPPA is 15 U.S. Code § 6502. This section requires (in sub-section (b) (1)) that: (A) ... the operator of any website or online service directed to children that collects personal information from children or the operator of a website or online service that has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child (defined as a person under age 13)— (i) to provide notice on the website of what information is collected from children by the operator, how the operator uses such information, and the operator’s disclosure practices for such information; and (ii) to obtain verifiable parental consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information from children; It also requires (in subsection (b) (1) (B)) any such website operator to provide a description of personal information (PI) collected and to permit a child or parent to refuse permission for further use or collection of such PI. subsection (b) (1) (C) prohibits requiring more PI to be submitted than is "reasonably necessary" for a child to participate in a game or other activity, or be eligible for a prize. subsection (b) (1) (D) requires an operator: to establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal information collected from children. Nothing in COPPA requires any content to be labeled as "for children" or as "not for children". Marking some content, or even an entire site, as "not for children" is evidence that the site is not "targeted at children" and so may avoid the operator being required to comply with 15 USC § 6502. In addition, other US laws, not part of COPPA, prohibit knowingly furnishing to a minor sexually explicit or otherwise "inappropriate" content, even when this is not legally obscene and would be protected when furnished to an adult. Marking content as "not for children" and attempting to verify age might help avoid application of such laws. The Wikipedia article about COPPA says: In 2019, the Government of the State of New York sued YouTube for violating COPPA by illegally retaining information related to children under 13 years of age. YouTube responded by dividing its content strictly into "for kids" and "not for kids". This has met with extremely harsh criticism from the YouTube community, especially from gamers, with many alleging that the FTC of the United States intends to fine content creators $42,530 for "each mislabeled video", possibly putting all users at risk. However, some have expressed skepticism over this, feeling that the fines may actually be in reference to civil penalties, possibly intended for the site's operators and/or warranted by more serious of COPPA violations or specific cases of "mislabeling videos." (citations omitted) This WGN news story "All You Need To Know About COPPA On Youtube" includes a link to an interview with Peder Magee, a Senior Attorney of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. Magee says in the interview that recent actions under the law were for failing to properly handle PI collected from children. At time 5:02 Magee says "...and if you are collecting personal information [from children] you may have to comply with the law". COPPA does not make any content "illegal". What it prohibits is collecting excessive PI from children, not obtaining consent for collecting PI in some cases, or refusing to delete such PI on request. If a site does not collect any PI from users, 15 USC § 6502 simply does not apply to that site. Website operators may choose to restrict the access of children to avoid possible applicability of 15 USC § 6502 and its administrative requirements. They have the option of providing access but complying in regard to any PI collected. Note that COPPA is, in theory, applicable to non-US sites that are targeted at US users or collect PI from US users. However, according to the Wikipedia article: in practice, the FTC has never (as of 2015) actually issued any enforcement action against foreign companies, and attempts to do so may be frustrated by the lack of jurisdiction. Obviously, laws in countries other than the US are likely to be different. | This is unlikely to give rise to criminal charges in the U.S., if the bare bone facts of the question are all that is involved. It does not count as child pornography. But possible offenses might include contributing to the delinquency of a minor (a minor misdemeanor), or perhaps enticing a minor to travel in interstate commerce for sex, neither of which are likely to come up in a case where no travel occurs until both parties are adults. The potential offenses, unlike child pornography offenses themselves, would generally include defense for good faith mistakes regarding age. The situation in Turkey could be more serious. While I can't identify a particular offense, if the participants were of the same sex, even though homosexuality is not outright banned in Turkey, as it is in many predominantly Islamic countries, this could be characterized as an "offense against public morality" in Turkey. In either a same sex or opposite sex circumstance, it might be characterized in Turkey as some form of illegal seduction, or perhaps as some implicit form of blasphemy. Even if it didn't give rise to criminal charges, it might also be used as a basis for severe parental discipline, or as a basis for finding that someone lacked "good character" in a civil context, in either country. Of course, unless the interaction is known, identified with real people, and brought to the attention of law enforcement, nothing would happen. | Discrimination is legal, so long as there is not based on a protected category or class(e.g. race, sex, religion). Age is generally not a protected category. Some states do treat age as a protected category, but: 1) It is generally only in employment, so, for example charging someone differing amounts based on their age is legal (e.g. senior discounts, kids under X are free, etc.). 2) It is generally only protecting higher ages (i.e. discriminating against someone in employment because their age is higher than what you'd like would be illegal, but discriminating against someone because their age is lower than you'd like is not; and in some cases the later is mandatory). | There is nothing illegal about the child asking for nude images, but, depending on jurisdiction and circumstances, there is quite likely to be a serious legal problem with the adult providing such nudes. The exact laws that might be violated would depend a lot on the jurisdiction. The detailed facts would also be significant. But such a situation is fraught with danger, for the adult. Even if there is no ill-intent, such actions could easily be misinterpreted, and might be technically unlawful regardless of intent. Of course, not all nudes are obscene, or even "inappropriate for children". Which are so classified depends on the laws of the particular jurisdiction. | Blaire Bayliss reviews the law in "The Kids are Alright 😂🍆🍑: Teen Sexting, Child Pornography Charges, and the Criminalization of Adolescent Sexuality" (2020) Colorado L. Rev. 251. The article uses the term "sexting" to mean the exchange of sexually explicit messages or images between individuals using electronic messaging. When images, this can constitute child pornography under federal law. Also (from cyberbullying.org), States that do not have a specific sexting law often rely on existing statutes when dealing with teen sexting. All states, for example, have child pornography or child exploitation laws that prohibit sending, receiving, or possessing images of a sexual nature of a minor. Bayliss notes though that some states have adapted their child pornography laws to account for teen sexting: For example, in Rhode Island, teens will not be charged under state criminal child pornography laws but may be "tried" in family court. And in Colorado, "teens who are approximately the same age and who exchange sexual images with the understanding of consent have committed a civil infraction." See Colo. Rev. Stat § 18-7-109(3). Bayliss's article and map are from 2020, but a 2022 dataset by the Cyberbulling Research Center shows not much has changed. That dataset also provides links to state-specific sexting laws where they exist. Note that no state law can exempt teens from the application of federal child pornography and related laws. Of course, if the image does not even constitute pornography, then all of the above is irrelevant, but I understand you to be asking about the circumstance where the content is typically or historically criminalized. | Facebook can continue to gather and exploit data, modulo the requirements of COPPA, because it does not depend on obligating a minor to do something, such as pay money or dig a ditch. In general and because of copyright law, nobody has the right to use anything that Facebook provides unless Facebook grants the user permission. The user has no obligation to provide anything to Facebook – if it did, the minor would arguably be exempt from that obligation. | There is and never has been a single “age of majority” The law treats people of different ages differently for a wide variety of reasons. Just a small sample of typical limits (jurisdictions vary): you must be 4 to go to school you must be 10 to be criminally responsible you must be 11 or 13 to get a job in the australian-capital-territory but there is no specific age limit in new-south-wales you must be 15 to attend an M-rated movie alone (your rating system may differ) you must be 16 to get a learner driver permit and 17 to get a provisional licence you must be 18 to attend an R-rated movie at all you must be 14-17 years old to have sex depending on the age and relationship with your partner. you must be 16 to 21 to buy and consume alcohol (jurisdictions vary a lot on this) you must be 18 to marry without the consent of the court but can be as young as 16 with that consent you must be 18 to legally take and post sexually explicit pictures of yourself you must be 18 to get a tattoo you must be 18 to join the defence force you must be 18 to vote you must be 35 to stand for President of the united-states So tell me, when is the age of majority. There isn’t one - there is simply a long period where an individual is granted progressively more control and responsibility over their life. Now, as to why some things happen at particular ages, that’s a political question, not a legal one. | The YouTube Standard License is described in the terms of service. It means that you retain your copyright: you retain all of your ownership rights in your Content. But you also grant YouTube very broad permissions to your content: by submitting Content to YouTube, you hereby grant YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, sublicenseable and transferable license to use, reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform the Content in connection with the Service and YouTube's (and its successors' and affiliates') business Yes, that means YouTube could allow others to use your content by "sublicensing" or "transferring" their license. I never heard of YouTube doing that, but the license terms would allow it if they would decide that they want to. But without an explicit permission from you or from YouTube, people are not allowed to reproduce your content. Agreeing to those terms (or alternatively to the Creative Commons CC-BY terms which do allow others to use your content as long as they give attribution) is a condition for using the platform. You can also put different license terms into the video description. This is called "dual licensing". But that means that people get to choose under which license terms they want to use the content. They can either use YouTube's terms, or your own. |
Is it illegal to resell software licenses? This commentsays Most of the “windows 10 license keys” on eBay are illegitimate. Downvoted I quibble with "most", and believe to be an all or none issue. More importantly, it is a jurisdictional issue. For some reason, people tend to believe that the majority of us come from the USA, which is not the case, so maybe that is the source of the comment(?). Obviously, we cannot have another worldwide answer, but, can we have some generalizations (even specifics) on the theme of "Most of the “windows 10 license keys” on eBay are illegitimate"? USA, Europe, other jurisdictions ... | All Licenses are granted in the shape of contracts. Contracts contain clauses that allow or disallow their transferability. The typical way a License for a software is obtained is to buy a key that acts as proof of purchase, and then agreeing to an EULA. For example the Win10 one. very typical clauses from the Win10 EULA explicitly forbid to transfer of the license without the device it was installed on: Installation and Use Rights. a. License. The software is licensed, not sold. Under this agreement, we grant you the right to install and run one instance of the software on your device (the licensed device), for use by one person at a time, so long as you comply with all the terms of this agreement. Updating or upgrading from non-genuine software with software from Microsoft or authorized sources does not make your original version or the updated/upgraded version genuine, and in that situation, you do not have a license to use the software. c. Restrictions. The device manufacturer or installer and Microsoft reserve all rights (such as rights under intellectual property laws) not expressly granted in this agreement. For example, this license does not give you any right to, and you may not: (iii) transfer the software (except as permitted by this agreement); Transfer. The provisions of this section do not apply if you acquired the software in Germany or in any of the countries listed on this site (aka.ms/transfer), in which case any transfer of the software to a third party, and the right to use it, must comply with applicable law. a. Software preinstalled on device. If you acquired the software preinstalled on a device (and also if you upgraded from software preinstalled on a device), you may transfer the license to use the software directly to another user, only with the licensed device. The transfer must include the software and, if provided with the device, an authentic Windows label including the product key. Before any permitted transfer, the other party must agree that this agreement applies to the transfer and use of the software. b. Stand-alone software. If you acquired the software as stand-alone software (and also if you upgraded from software you acquired as stand-alone software), you may transfer the software to another device that belongs to you. You may also transfer the software to a device owned by someone else if (i) you are the first licensed user of the software and (ii) the new user agrees to the terms of this agreement. You may use the backup copy we allow you to make or the media that the software came on to transfer the software. Every time you transfer the software to a new device, you must remove the software from the prior device. You may not transfer the software to share licenses between devices Cincom Systems, Inc v Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. Sept 2009) held that you can not transfer software that was merely licensed, even as the part of your company that uses the software becomes part of another company through a merger. The licensor had put express language that forbids the transfer of the license by licensee into the contract: When Alcan Ohio merged with Alcan Texas, the license granted by Cincom solely to Alcan Ohio transferred to the surviving corporation, now known as Novelis. Because Novelis did not abide by the express terms of Cincom's license and gain Cincom's prior written approval, Novelis infringed Cincom's copyright. Likewise, the court in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) held that you can not re-sell an (installed) digital item as you create a new copy without the license for this. In a similar fashion, Disney recently changed the Terms of Service and contract on the digital codes that come with DVDs. The new terms explicitly forbid unbundling the code from the disk and forbid transferring the disk after using the code. This was what allowed Disney to gain an injunction in the case of Disney v RedBox. The end result is not out yet. In the EU, the ruling in one case fell different: UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp. held in 2012 that there is possibly a right to resell your used license... as long as it is a license forever (emphasis mine): in the event of the resale of a user licence entailing the resale of a copy of a computer program downloaded from the copyright holder’s website, that licence having originally been granted by that rightholder to the first acquirer for an unlimited period in return for payment of a fee intended to enable the rightholder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic value of that copy of his work, the second acquirer of the licence, as well as any subsequent acquirer of it, will be able to rely on the exhaustion of the distribution right under Article 4(2) of that directive As a result software licenses adapted and started to expressly sell the license as a license to obtain the service of a maintained software. To software as a service - which Windows and the Office suite are - this ruling does expressly not apply and you can not re-sell such a software license after it has been used. Signed License v. License Key That does not apply to the key, the representation of the payment. You can buy them in a store. They are a pretty tangible good. The principle is - in general - that you validate the license you sign by handing over the key to the supplier of the software. This usually voids the key. But... all those sites claim you can transfer?! not.... quite: once you agreed to the EULA and obtained the software service it can no longer be resold. Also, you just agreed you may not do that with transferable software. However, as long as you have the key unused the unused key for a license can be resold. That is a physical good that the first sale doctrine applies to. However, you may not retain a copy of the key to sell it, again and again, you would interfere with your customer's ability to contract as a used key often is rejected - you'd have defrauded the customer. Even in the EU, if you bought a perpetual license, you need to render your copy unusable under the ruling above: The CJEU held that the first purchaser needs to "make his own copy unusable at the time of its resale…in order to avoid infringing the exclusive right of reproduction of a computer program which belongs to its author“ The CJEU therefore briefly commented “to solve that problem, it is permissible for the distributor – whether ‘classic’ or ‘digital’ – to make use of technical protective measures such as product keys“. The key is a means to show you are entitled to a contract. It is the consideration Microsoft gets for signing the other side of the contract. Most software resellers deal with keys, the resale of keys is expressly possible. Some software companies mark a used-and re-sold key and require to contact the company to make sure that the software has been disabled on the other end. Since many companies can't render the software disabled on the seller's end, they refuse to acknowledge the sale on the same basis: the software was not disabled or rendered useless, and as a result, the sale did not happen in accordance with the judgment. | Copyright Prominent at the bottom of the page is: © RealClearPolitics 2015 This is nice because it tells you who you have to approach for a licence. If it wasn't there the material would still be copyright you just wouldn't know who owned the copyright. Questions So: If I'm looking to build an app or write a book and I wish to use statistics, am I allowed to basically use their numbers as long as I cite where it is coming from? No, unless what you do constitutes fair use and I don't think it does. If I do make a profit from it, do I owe any royalties to the original scientists/surveyers? No, but you would owe whatever licence fee you negotiated with the copyright holder, ostensibly RealClearPolitics. Must I ask them for permission? Yes, unless you are OK with running the risk of being sued. Commentary I see books reference hundreds of studies all the time This is because they are generally protected by Academic Fair Use public polls should be open information to everyone The only public poll that I know of is an election and that information is available. What you are looking at is a private poll commissioned by and paid for by RealClearPolitics and it is their intellectual property; why should that "be open information to everyone"? commercial interests may be legally entangling Always | As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum). | Legally, yes, if you get a license from Blizzard (unlikely, and if so, they'll probably want either money or a portion of your profits). Otherwise, not legally. This is exactly the situation that IP law (e.g. copyright and trademark) was created to address. Blizzard created the game and so they have rights to control and benefit from derivatives there of. There are some exceptions, but prints, buttons, and keychains are not likely to meet the requirements for those. | It's a contract violation if you're under the EULA. It may be a contract of adhesion, but such "clickwrap" contracts been found to be acceptable and enforceable in software EULAs out of necessity. However, there may be some limits. If you're not under the EULA, as you argue, then you lack a license to use the software at all and it's an outright copyright violation and/or a theft or misappropriation of the software. Whether or not you can be sued depends in part on what you do with it — if you don't release the material or otherwise cause damages then there's not much to sue for... Added for clarification: to answer the framing question, supposing neither contract or copyright applied, one could be sued in tort or in equity (i.e. for unjust enrichment). | There is something called the exhaustion doctrine that says that once the holder of a patent sells a patented device, they have relinquished control over that particular instance of the patent implementation. Anyone who legally purchases this hardware has the right to run whatever software they want on it, as long the software is otherwise legal (software designed to defeat DRM would be an example of software that is is not legal). | Why do you think Oracle have not been protecting their trade mark? Using a trade mark to describe the product (“Written in JavaScript”, “Seeking JavaScript developer”) is not an infringement and the trade mark owner is under no obligation to, indeed, cannot stop this. Where they are required to defend their trade mark is when it is being used in such a way that there is the risk of confusion that the goods or services could be confused with the trade mark owner’s goods or services. Further, they are not required to defend all breaches, only enough to show that they are actively doing so. Also it is not important that the trade mark be associated with the trade mark’s owner. Do you know who owns the trade mark “Ben & Jerry’s”? | This question has been addressed directly, with very similar facts, by the federal courts, and the answer, based on those decisions, is: Maybe. The most famous case in this area is Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). In that case, the defendant had bought a copy of plaintiff's art book, cut out the pages, and affixed them to ceramic tiles, which it sold. The defendant relied on the first sale doctrine, codified in 17 U.S.C. 109. The first sale doctrine says that if you own a copy of a copyrighted work, you can resell it without the copyright holder's permission. The plaintiff argued that, by altering the original artwork, the defendant had created a new derivative work. The first sale doctrine gives you the right to sell the book to someone else, but not the right to create derivative works, whether by writing and publishing an unauthorized sequel or, they argued, cutting and pasting and tiling and kilning the physical pages. The Mirage Editions court agreed with the plaintiff that the tiles were a derivative work outside the scope of the first sale doctrine, and therefore the defendants had infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights. However, other courts faced with similar facts have disagreed, and to date I'm not aware of any Supreme Court decision resolving the issue. The bottom line is: you are allowed to sell what you bought; you aren't allowed to transform it into something new and sell that. Where the line gets drawn is muddy and likely to remain so at least until the Supreme Court addresses the issue. |
How do US appellate courts know the facts of the case? My understanding is this: In the United States, in a jury trial the jury is the finder of fact, but they are not invited (or permitted) to share any of their findings beyond guilty/not guilty. I also know that a verdict of guilty can be appealed. Also, appellate courts aren't supposed to rule on questions of fact. This, to me, looks like the court has no way of having any facts. So, what exactly do the appeals courts base their decisions on? | The appellate court gets the trial transcript which includes all the testimony (and exhibits or descriptions/photos of them) and the trial court's rulings. Also, each side presents an appeal brief, which will generally include a statement of facts, pointing out ones it thinks favorable to its views. In civil cases a jury may be asked/instructed to give yes/no answers to a series of questions, but this is not normal in criminal cases. An appellate court can (and sometimes does) rule that there was not sufficient evidence to permit any reasonable jury to convict; to that extent it can rule on questions of fact. But, as the comment by ohwilleke mentions, an appellate court does not hear new evidence. It can overturn the conviction and send the case back for a new trial, and in such a new trial additional evidence may be introduce at the trial court level. | Discovery Basically, you ask. If your opponent thinks your request is out of bounds they object, give their reasons to the judge, you give yours and the judge orders them to produce the evidence or not. A lot of people think court cases have big “ah-ha” movements when a witness reveals something unknown on the stand. This rarely happens because there are no secrets in litigation - both sides have to clearly explain their case before, usually well before, they go to trial. | Short Answer Statements of jurors about their deliberations are not allowed to be considered for any purpose, subject to very narrow limitations which do not apply in the fact pattern you are asking about in this question. The General Rule And Its Exceptions Consideration of juror statements, subject to narrow exceptions, is barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which has a state or territorial equivalent that is substantially similar in every U.S. jurisdiction that has true jury trials (as opposed, for example, to courts-martial which look like jury trials but are not jury trials from a legal doctrine perspective). Federal Rule of Evidence 606, which is the model for the lion's share of these rules reads as follows: Rule 606. Juror (a) At the Trial. A juror may not testify as a witness before the other jurors at the trial. If a juror is called to testify, the court must give a party an opportunity to object outside the jury’s presence. (b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment. (1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters. (2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether: (A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form. This is subject to exceptions only in a few extremely limited circumstances: To document interference or influence on the jury from outside the jury during the trial or deliberations (e.g. bribery of a juror, a juror's consultation of outside facts, blackmail of a juror, counsel for a party providing information not authorized by the judge to the juror). This is covered by Rule 606(b)(2)(A) and 606(b)(2)(B). To establish that a mistake was made filling out the verdict form (e.g. testimony immediately following a jury trial that the jurors confused the names of two co-defendants and incorrectly filled out the jury form convicting each one of the crimes where the jury found the other co-defendant guilty). This is covered by Rule 606(b)(2)(C). Under an exception created just this year for the first time (the source opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court by a 5-3 vote in this case, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado (March 6, 2017), is here), to document that one or more jurors essential to the verdict reached the result as a result of a racially/ethnically discriminatory reasons (e.g., one or more of the jurors who voted to convict in a case resulting in a conviction said "let's convict him because he's Hispanic" and then did so). This is not expressly covered by Rule 606(b), but the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is constitutionally necessary to allow it. The situation you pose does not involve any of these exceptions. Instead, it concerns the internal deliberations of a jury not subject to outside influence, and it does not involve racial or ethnic bias in deliberations. So, this information is legally irrelevant and may not be considered by any court at the trial or appellate level. Procedural Aspects Of This Question Of course, in all of these scenarios including the exceptions, the mere fact that a juror says something publicly is meaningless legally. But, there is no means by which a lawyer in a case (or anyone else) can obtain information about juror deliberations through a subpoena or other compulsory court process. The only way anyone could find out about improper jury deliberations is if a juror voluntarily discloses these facts. Any effort to introduce consideration to this statement would have to be submitted to the trial court (generally, the trial court that handled the original case, but sometimes a habeas corpus action trial court) in either the form of a sworn affidavit of the juror, or live witness testimony of the juror under oath in the trial court in a post-trial hearing of some sort. This would have to be submitted by a lawyer for the defendant (or less often by the prosecutor in the case, seeking to right a wrong discovered by the prosecutor, for example, in the context of a separate bribery investigation conducted by the prosecutor's office). The juror or a third-party would not have standing to challenge the verdict or to bring juror statements to the court's attention in a legally effective manner. A statement of a juror about the verdict or how it came to be at a trial can only be considered at the trial court level and only: (i) in a post-trial motion for a new trial, which can be considered on direct appeal, (ii) in a collateral attack on the original verdict in a different kind of post-trial motion (state practice differs regarding what these motions are called), or (iii) in a collateral attack through a separate civil action (called a habeas corpus action) to set aside a jury verdict. Generally speaking, appellate courts never consider new evidence in any kind of case and can only consider evidence that is part of the official trial court record. The only true exception to this rule is that it may consider a post-trial fact that would terminate the case for procedural reasons (e.g. the existence of a settlement by the parties, or the death of a defendant during the pendency of the appeal or earlier which would render the appeal moot). Appellate courts can take "judicial notice" of certain matters that constitute general knowledge not specific to the case before them (e.g. the existence and duration of the U.S. Civil War, or the distance between New York City and Chicago, or the name of elected officials at the time the facts of the case took place). But, evidence concerning juror statements is not something about which judicial notice may be taken. Policy Considerations Why do we have such a rule when allowing this testimony could prevent serious miscarriages of justice? In rough order of importance, the reasons include the following: To protect the ability of a jury to engage in "jury nullification", which is an issue also informed by the double jeopardy protections of the 5th Amendment to United States Constitution (applied to state and local proceedings by virtue of incorporation through the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and parallel state constitutional protections) against revisiting a jury acquittal in a criminal case for any reason. To minimize the burden jury service places on jurors who would otherwise routinely be interrogated by lawyers unhappy with their verdict after the trial even if they didn't want to speak with those lawyers. To protect the finality of verdicts on appeal and in post-trial proceedings as this would add another set of grounds to disturb a court decision in addition to those which can be observed in the court record. Non-Obvious Consequences Of This Rule One important consequence of this rule is that "harmless error" analysis by an appellate court, which is conducted when there is a legal error made in a jury trial to determine if the error, if it had been corrected, was material enough to change the outcome of the case, is always conducted on a hypothetical and theoretical basis rather than based upon actual factual knowledge of what would have or would not have influenced the jury's decision. Another important consequence of this rule for appellate practice is that jury verdicts will be upheld in any case where it would be possible for the trial court record to allow a jury to come to the conclusion that it did, whether or not the jury actually considered the arguments and facts it would have had to have considered to correctly reach its verdict. Thus, it is frequently the case that a jury misunderstands the jury instructions or the facts of the case and makes an incorrect decision as a result, but that verdict is upheld on appeal because it would have been possible for a jury which, for example, found witnesses that the actual did not actually believe were telling the truth to have been truthful to rule in the manner that it did. Another practical effect of this rule is that it is easier to overturn a judge's decision on appeal because the judge must articulate his or her factual and legal basis for each ruling, than it is to overturn a jury verdict, since a jury need not articulate the reasoning behind its verdict except to the extent that it is given and completes special verdict forms when it deliberates. | In the United States, prohibition against double jeopardy is a constitutional protection. As long as one was actually at jeopardy for an offence by a particular sovereign, that sovereign may not subsequently prosecute the accused for the same wrong. In other jurisdictions, such as the U.K., it has a less strict form, even though generally, special pleas of autrefois acquit would be available. It is also not the case that after an apparent "confession" in public that there is "no doubt" about a person's guilt. No evidence is "certain" in law without being tested in court. Also, you propose: you were tried for murder and acquitted - then you go out and publicly admit that they were wrong, you did actually murder that person This does not put the acquittal into question. The prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. This means at law that one is deemed to be not guilty. Your scenario does not show that the trier of fact was "wrong" about the prosecution failing to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not an avenue by which the prosecution can challenge an acquittal. If a properly instructed trier of fact finds that that the prosecution did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, this conclusion is unassailable. You ask "where is the justice?" The justice of a system is assessed by its application across the totality of cases. Given that a system of prosecuting and judging that is run through humans will inevitably produce errors, the law has developed to promote a measure of "justice" across the entirety of the cases that are disposed of by the court rather than to futilely attempt to ensure the "correct" result in every particular case. The rule against double jeopardy has arisen out of this systemic concern for justice. It does not purport to secure the "correct" result in every case. | "Allowed" is not an applicable concept, since the few laws regulating juror conduct pertain to corrupt behavior (such as bribery). Instead, there are standards for juror conduct that the legal profession wishes to be adhered to, and the only way that impression is conveyed to jurors is through the judge's instructions (or lack therein). It is held in Sparf and Hansen v. United States 156 U.S. 51 that In the courts of the United States, it is the duty of the jury, in criminal cases, to receive the law from the court, and to apply it as given by the court, subject to the condition that, by a general verdict, a jury of necessity determines both law and fact as compounded in the issue submitted to them in the particular case. In criminal cases, it is competent for the court to instruct the jury as to the legal presumptions arising from a given state of facts, but it may not, by a peremptory instruction, require the jury to find the accused guilty of the offense charged, nor of any offense less than that charged. One of the "technical" rights of a jury is the right to judge the law itself (jury nullification). This arises in part from the Zenger trial and similar colonial events, and (in terms of legal precedent) from a famous instruction by Jay in Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1: It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law, it is the province of the court to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On this, and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the court: For, as on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable, that the court are the best judges of the law. But still both objects are lawfully, within your power of decision. Sparf v. US however finds that a judge is under no obligation to inform jurors of that right, and jury instructions say things like "you must apply the law as I give it to you, even if you disagree with the law". For examples, instruction 101 in the California criminal instructions manual says that trials are conducted in open court with the parties presenting evidence and the judge deciding the law that applies to the case. It is unfair to the parties if you receive additional information from any other source because that information may be unreliable or irrelevant and the parties will not have had the opportunity to examine and respond to it. Your verdict must be based only on the evidence presented during trial in this court and the law as I provide it to you. This is not an enforceable law, for instance if a juror (esp. an attorney) argues one way based on his version of the law, that is not a punishable offense, nor is it a punishable offense if a juror (who is an engineer) argues that some expert testimony on an engineering matter is factually wrong. Jurors are not supposed to do either thing, but there are no legal consequences if they do. Since the legal ideal is that a jury will evaluate the (allowed) testimony in court and applies the law as given by the judge, and attorneys have an ethical obligation to uphold the law, they thus have an ethical obligation to not restate the law and especially to not do so under the guise of being an attorney (who has expert knowledge of the law). This is basically an unenforceable principle. There was an instruction in California saying that: should . . . any juror refuse[] to deliberate or express[] an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on penalty or punishment, or any other improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the Court of the situation but People v. Engelman 28 cal 4th 436 nixed that instruction. That case says that jurors have no right to refuse to deliberate or to disregard the law in reaching their decision but Directing the jury immediately before deliberations begin that jurors are expected to police the reasoning and arguments of their fellow jurors during deliberations, and immediately advise the court if it appears that a fellow juror is deciding the case upon an "improper basis," may curtail or distort deliberations. This does not mean that in the rare instance that a lawyer is on a jury, he must suppress his conclusions, even when they are professionally informed. This article recounts a lawyer's experience on a jury and identifies a point of law (and how the issue was handled). In that case, the question is what to make of a statement that something is "not at issue". The non-;awyers interpreted that to mean "we aren’t supposed to award her anything for back and neck injuries". The lawyer said: I was pretty sure this was wrong. While it was true that the lawyers had said the back and neck injuries were “not at issue,” that was a phrase that I could recall uttering in court, too. When I said it, I meant that both sides agreed on a certain fact or point of law. I did not mean that the fact or point of law was not material to the case. No other juror interpreted the lawyers’ statements my way, and when we checked, we found that the jury instructions were silent on the issue. So, we wrote the judge a question. Turns out, “the lawyer” was right. The judge instructed us to consider any injury from the collision, whether it was an injury to the plaintiff’s back, to her neck, to her shoulder, or elsewhere. The lesson for attorneys: explain to the jury exactly what you mean. Don’t assume they understand your shorthand terms, like “not at issue.” In other words, the judge still determines what the law is, though in this case it looks like it took the expert knowledge of an attorney to figure out that the jury needed to ask the judge what "not at issue" means. | The term "jury nullification" gets thrown around a lot, especially by non-lawyers. But your question doesn't really seem to be about jury nullification. There is a well-established procedure in the federal courts of the United States, and similar structures in all state systems I'm familiar with, that allows the judge to overrule a civil jury if it finds that no reasonable jury could have reached the verdict they did. In the federal system, this is formally known as a "renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law," and is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. It's universally called, by lawyers, a JNOV, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This is common and well-established in civil cases, such as most patent cases. It isn't commonly granted, but jury nullification--or, more frequently, jury screwups or misunderstandings severe enough to justify it--are not very common either. Jury nullification usually refers to criminal verdicts, and almost always to criminal verdicts of "not guilty." These the Court cannot correct by imposing a guilty verdict without the jury, and these are the only cases, in my opinion, properly considered as "jury nullification" cases. | england-and-wales Admission of the confession is at the discretion of the court PACE s78 gives the court the discretion to decide on the admissibility of confessions obtained if it appears to the court that "having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it." There is deliberately no case law guidance on this. Superior courts in the UK have been scrupulous in saying that each case turns on its merits. The “circumstances in which the evidence was obtained” are certainly suss and would not be permitted by a police officer who is required to warn the suspect and advise them of their right to silence. However, that is not sufficient to exclude the evidence. The court also needs to consider whether it would have “such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.” If the confession is the only evidence then admitting it would clearly be unfair. However, if the Crown has mountains of other evidence, then the confession may only have a small probative value. There is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine in the UK Far more likely is that the Crown would not even seek to introduce the confession. It would just slow the trial and give the defence grounds for an appeal. Instead, they would use the confession to inform their investigation and get other evidence to convict. Legal privilege In England and Wales, legal advice privilege only applies where there is a lawyer present. If Badal is a lawyer, then the privilege attaches; if he isn’t then it doesn’t, irrespective of what he led Naina to believe. The same would be true even if Badal believed he was a lawyer but, for some reason, was not licenced in E&W. Litigation privilege is a broader concept and covers all advice, including from non-lawyers, where litigation (including criminal prosecution) has commenced or is reasonably likely. Based on the description, Naina has been committed to stand trial so everything she said is covered by privilege and is inadmissible. Why bother doing this? Most criminals are not sophisticated and will often implicate themselves if you give them enough space without the police or others violating any rules. Anecdotally, I have a relative who was a psychologist for a remand prison - prisoners charged but not yet tried. At the start of every meeting with a prisoner they would say “I work for the state, nothing you say is confidential and it can be used against you” - they still had prisoners confess to crimes they weren’t charged with, name accomplices, and tell where the loot was hidden. | There is no "different legal procedure" for challenging the constitutionality of a law. The only way to do so is through the process that this question contemplates: to argue that the law is unconstitutional in a civil or criminal trial. Whether the law bears directly on the matter at trial or only on ancillary matters such as discovery, the court has the power to find the law unconstitutional and to issue orders accordingly. The extent to which such a ruling binds other courts depends on which court issues the ruling. |
Is it a violation of due process for a public committee to have no regular rules of order? Many committees operate by Robert's Rules of Order, but there are others that have no fixed rules and I have observed public committees in some cases acting arbitrarily. Is it a violation of due process if a public committee that governs administration of municipality to act with no written rules or procedures? | In most cases, the failure to use Robert's Rules of Order will not be a violation of due process. To be a violation, (1) due process must be required; and (2) the procedure must either (a) fail to satisfy the elements of due process (notice and a hearing); or (b) be inadequate. Was due process required? As a threshold matter, the Fifth Amendment provides due-process protection only when you are going to be "deprived of life, liberty, or property." The vast majority of government action comes and goes without anyone being deprived of any legally cognizable life, liberty or property interest. This would probably include votes to approve a budget, name a street, designate a holiday, and so on. In those cases, no one is entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment. Was due process provided? But the government often does implicate those interests, in matters across the spectrum of seriousness, from imposing the death penalty to imposing jail time to seizing property to handing out parking tickets. Determining whether the Fifth Amendment is satisfied involves two tests. First, you'll look to see whether the basic elements of due process are satisfied. That means looking for (1) notice of the decision to be made; and (2) an opportunity for the affected person to make their case; (3) before a neutral decision-maker. In the absence of those elements, there is no due process. Was the procedure adequate? But even when those elements are present, the process may still be "inadequate," as you're suggesting the committee procedures are here. When the government provides procedural protections, they must be "tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). You've suggested that Robert's Rules would be the appropriate way to provide due process. Under Eldridge, a court would determine whether that additional safeguard (or any other) was required by balancing three considerations: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action." Is the government trying to take your home and sell it to developers or is it holding your car until you pay off your parking tickets? It's not clear what kind of committee you're imagining, but the greater deprivation it can work, the greater greater protections it must provide. "Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards." Is there any objective evidence that the current system is getting the wrong results? Is there any reason to think that the proposed change would result in more accurate decisions? If there's some reason to think that Robert's Rules is going to result in better decisions, it's more likely to be required. If it's not, don't expect a court to require it. I'd argue that this is the most important part of the test. "Finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." How important is the objective the government is trying to achieve? Ensuring public health and safety are toward the top of the list, so the government will get a little more leeway in determining how to handle them. Fining people for letting their grass get too tall is less important, so the government isn't going to be given as much license to screw around. Then, given the importance of those functions, this basically becomes a test for practicality. Would the proposed change impose serious administrative burdens? Would it be cost-prohibitve? You can impose Robert's Rules probably for nothing more than the cost of a copy of the book, but properly applied, it's an incredibly complex process that imposes serious administrative burdens. Without knowing what kind of committee action you're talking about, it's hard to say how these rules would apply, but I'm comfortable guessing that Robert's Rules would not be required. But assuming that the committee has the power to work some kind of deprivation of life, liberty or property, it probably would be a due-process problem if they had no rules of order whatsoever. This was sort of the same problem that arose in CNN v. Trump just last month. | There is a state law that requires you to obey the police: ORC 2917.13, which says you may not Fail to obey the lawful order of any law enforcement officer engaged in the law enforcement officer's duties at the scene of or in connection with a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any kind. If you do, misconduct at an emergency is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. If a violation of this section creates a risk of physical harm to persons or property, misconduct at an emergency is a misdemeanor of the first degree. You also cannot Hamper the lawful operations of any law enforcement officer, firefighter, rescuer, medical person, emergency medical services person, or other authorized person, engaged in the person's duties at the scene of a fire, accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any kind "Hamper" is not defined statutorily, but the plain meaning of "hamper" is not the same as "fail to assist". We have not established that the order is lawful, however, which is crucial. The police cannot just freely search a residence without permission. If they have permission from the occupant, they can search and seize. If they have probable cause to believe that a crime exists and the circumstances make a warrant impractical, they can search and seize. I don't know what you mean by "wellness check", but that seems plainly to be unlawful entry. However, if the resident calls 911 and reports that he is having an issue, that is sufficient consent for entry. In the case of a fire alarm, the fire code authorizes a fire department official in charge of an actual emergency response incident to order the evacuation of a building, and occupants are required to comply. If we suppose that the smoke detector in a room has gone off, the fire department is authorized to inspect for fire, and there is a provision under the law about failure to obey a lawful command (to open the door so that they can look for fire). Problem: you cannot know whether the order is lawful. The officer doesn't decide what is lawful, the courts do (after the fact), and typically a command is found to be lawful unless it is clearly unlawful. The order from your supervisor is not "enforceable" in the sense that you cannot be arrested, imprisoned, or fined for disobeying your boss. However, there is a potential club they can use against you, namely firing you for disobeying the order. Normally, you can be fired for wearing the wrong shirt. But there are laws about employers doing illegal things, such as ORC 4113.52, which provides recourse when the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety etc. In which case you report this to the supervisor, they have 24 hours after getting the report to correct the situation, and after that you would report the situation to the county prosecutor. (Read all of the details in the linked law, don't just skip steps: this is an executive summary). Having done this, you are protected from being fired, demoted. reassigned etc. The employer will be strongly motivated to not incur the penalties for violating the whistle blower statute. Additionally, you can sue the employer if they fire you for refusing to violate the law (termination in violation of public policy). | The community charges $300 annually for access to the community pool, to which I only actually used the first three years living here. It likely does not matter whether you used the pool or not. I was handed a case by a police officer today saying I have exactly 30 days upon receiving the letter to pay dues for the community pool for the past 8 years that I have not used it. I imagine the result of failure to pay the HOA fee is a lien on the property. I don't know whether foreclosure is an option but it might be. The communities HOA has made it incredibly difficult to contact to ask for a copy of the rules and regulations, since their automated phone system demands a pin of some sort to which it swiftly disconnects you if you do not have it. This is not likely to be a valid excuse for not paying the HOA dues. You almost certainly owe them regardless and you probably also owe any late charges or penalties associated with not paying on time. My question is, can they legally force me to pay this fee? Nobody can force you to pay. But if they present their case in court and win, the judge can force you to pay, have your assets seized, garnish your wages, or put you in jail if you refuse. That comes pretty close. Is there another way to obtain a copy of the community rules and regulations? Of course. Send certified letters requesting the CCRs to: The HOA office The government office where the deed is recorded If the CCRs are valid and binding something to that effect will be recorded on the deed. If so, the current valid and binding CCRs may be filed with the government or may only be available from the HOA. I am not a lawyer. If you have $2,400 to pay I suggest you pay it and stay current on all future payments. HOAs that actually notice missing fees are not to be trifled with. If you think they are making your life miserable now, you ain't seen nothing yet. | There is a special type of law enforcement officer, called a "bailiff" who is charged with maintaining order in a courtroom, and often, a bailiff is a direct subordinate of a judge who must follow the judge's orders. Judges can also issue special kinds of court orders, called "writs" which are a direction to a law enforcement agency generally to take certain action. But, in these cases, the law enforcement agency is effectively an "independent contractor" in relationship to the judge with considerable discretion regarding precisely how and when a writ is carried out. Somebody in the law enforcement agency to which a writ is directed is required to take action, but no individual law enforcement officer is personally compelled to comply with this order. The quote in question is not a statement about the legal authority of a judge, however. It is a statement of "realpolitik". The judge can't physically force or threaten law enforcement to do what they are told to do by a judge. The cops have the guns, not the judges. Instead, the judge relies upon law enforcement obeying the judge's orders because that is what law enforcement officers do. It's right in the job title. But, if law enforcement chose to ignore judges, in general, there is very little that judges could do about that (and in some countries, law enforcement does routinely ignore judicial directions). Some forms of executive branch authority to defy judicial orders is even legally codified, most starkly in the case of the pardon power. | The Florida Supreme Court has held in State v. Williams, 623 So. 2d 462 Fla. that if a law enforcement agency manufactures drugs for use in a reverse-sting operation, then this constitutes governmental misconduct and is a violation of the Florida Constitution due process clause and that a conviction in these circumstances should be reversed. That is, the manufacturing of a controlled substance may be grounds for reversing a conviction which relies on that substance. However, based on this judgement, the circumstance you describe would not be a violation of due process. From the judgement, at 466: Section 893.02(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), defines "manufacture" as: the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, cultivating, growing, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance either directly or indirectly, by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container.... Further, the judgement distinguishes State v Bass 451 So.2d 986 (1984) wherein law enforcement officials delivered marijuana obtained from federal agents to defendants as part of a reverse-sting operation. At Appeal, it was held that law enforcement officials do not need statutory authority to "engage in reverse-sting deliveries of controlled substances". That is, simply using drugs from a pharmacy without modification, repackaging or otherwise relabelling, does not constitute conduct so outrageous as to violate Florida's due process clause, and on the facts that you have presented, there is no evidence that a due process defence would be held. | There are literally hundreds of such laws. Most of them (perhaps all, if we exclude firearms-related crimes in Title 26) are contained in Title 18 of the US Code, part I. The problem is that your definition of "public insurrection" is too broad, since it would include lying to federal agents (a crime), insofar as the reason for 18 USC 1001 is to prevent impeding federal investigations by giving them false information. Assaulting a federal agent impedes government and is a crime. There is pretty much a federal version of any state-level crime of violence. There is the riot act, and a specific law against insurrection and rebellion. Chapter 115 is probably the most relevant: this is where the various "overthrowing the government" laws are. | At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case. | Prior to that act, civil procedure in federal courts was non-uniform (historical overview). The main problem seems to be that courts were supposed to conform to the procedure of the state in which the court is located (as mandated by the Conformity Act of 1872). The "has to" reason is that SCOTUS at the time did not feel that it was authorized by the Constitution to write its own rules when Congress could have done so, see Wright & Miller Federal Practice and Procedure. The root problems seems to be the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, which in the latter case did not allow courts to set rules for actions at law, and in the former case required courts to apply rules in effect when the state joined the Union (regardless of how the rules changed subsequently). |
Would it be legal to forbid Superman from participating in college sports? Suppose Kal-El, son of Jor-El, living under the assume identity Clark Kent, decides to spend some time as a professional athlete. Suppose he reveals his true identity. Obviously most professional athletes protest that this is unfair and actually mostly pointless because he can outperform entire teams of athletes to amazing fits and set new unbeatable records. Clark Kent, however, does not relent. He insists that he should have the same right to participate in sports and (for example) earn a college scholarship if he wants to play on a sport team for his college team. Is there anything in the current law which would allow a college to deny him the right to make a certain sport essentially irrelevant by playing it? While I am asking the question in jest, I also ask that you, please, support your answers with links (or at least quotes) of the relevant rules, laws and regulations. For the purposes of this question, let's assume that the question of Kal-El's citizenship has been legally settled based on the fact that his adopted parents adopted him legally. Let's assume the courts have settled this issue, at least for this one individual. | Let's assume the college receives some amount of federal funding, because quite a lot of them do. Let's also assume that Superman is considered to be a natural person for legal purposes—that is, he has all the rights a human would—so that his case isn't going to get dismissed on that ground. Superman's best bet would be to allege race discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S. Code § 2000d) That law states: No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. For obvious reasons, there's no precedent on whether a non-homo sapiens species of intelligent humanoid aliens is a "race" for civil rights purposes. However it seems like a reasonable argument could be made that it would be. For one thing, in terms of plain meaning, the term is extremely common to describe such beings (1.7 million+ hits on a web search for "alien races"—as one relevant example, Wikipedia has a List of alien races in Marvel Comics), and it would be a straightforward way to incorporate them into existing anti-discrimination law. Since all Kryptonians gain superpowers on earth, discriminating against him on the basis of his superior abilities would be, in effect, discrimination due to his Kryptonian race. A less compelling, but still plausible, argument might be that this is national origin discrimination under the same law (based on the fact that they're discriminating based on his being from Krypton). | I know of no legal restrictions on using the title of Doctor in the United states. I know next to nothing about Canadian law and can't speak on that. Falsely claiming to have a license to practice medicine is probably illegal, depending on circumstances, and practicing medicine without a license is most certainly illegal, and there a numerous federal and state laws that would apply. But simply styling one's self as Dr. is unlikely to be held by a court as a claim to hold a medical license, or a particular degree. It's, of course, misleading and generally frowned to use the Dr. prefix unless one has earned an MD or PhD. Some holders of honorary doctorates use it as well, though some debate whether that's acceptable or not. | You may want to ask Reich what he personally was talking about. There is a distinction within the US between states which prohibit mandatory union membership versus allow mandatory union membership. In about half of the states, a union cannot force an employer to accept a contract which obligates that a person join the union. These are known as right-to-work laws. No state requires all workers to join a union, and no state forbids the formation of unions. | You would need a court order to force them to take it down. There is virtually no chance a court will order them to take it down, because it would be almost impossible to do so without violating the First Amendment. You would have to prove that forcing a publisher to stop saying that you teach at the university would advance some compelling governmental interest, and that there isn't a better way to advance that interest. It's not clear what you mean by "cyberstalking," but if you're talking about someone sending you harassing messages, then the court would probably conclude that the better option would be to punish the harasser, rather than limit the publisher's speech. You could try paying them off or sending a threatening legal demand, but I doubt either would go far. I suspect that the best course would be a persistent campaign to escalate up their chain of command to find a sympathetic person willing to help. Even that, though, I would expect to be tough, because I'm sure you wouldn't be the first person trying this. | "If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining. | It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot. | As someone who is not a lawyer, but is familiar with FERPA and university policies as a former instructor, I would be more than willing to bet that you signed or otherwise agreed to some type of Terms of Service before being given access to that type of service. There are almost certainly numerous things you signed to become a student, as well as various policies you agreed to in first gaining access to the computer services, which would apply here. I can tell you with certainty that the school where I was a student had a policy that I agreed to that they would make certain information available to other students unless I chose for it to be restricted. However, my university did not have any photos of students that were viewable by other students in a directory. That said, there were also times I participated in extra-curricular activities where I was required to sign release forms giving the school the rights to video tape, record, and photograph me, and to do what they wished with those things. So, with that in mind, I suspect that's partly due to FERPA restrictions, but also largely due to their own privacy policies that go beyond what FERPA requires. All in all, I doubt they would be okay with you using their photos for your own private use - student privacy is something that is taken very seriously. | Where the President explicitly tells a newspaper that they should reveal their sources. Is this not illegal in the US? It is not illegal. Well, it would be a U.S. Attorney, rather than the President himself. You're thinking of shield laws, but no such law exists at the federal level. Moreover, although some people might think that the First Amendment ("freedom of the press") would protect a journalist in such a case, the Supreme Court has held that it doesn't, though the government is required to "convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest". So if a reporter were subpoenaed in federal court to reveal a source, and they couldn't convince a court to quash the subpoena under the Branzburg test, they'd have to either reveal their source or be held in contempt. In practice, many reporters have chosen the latter, and served time in jail rather than reveal the source. For instance, Judith Miller. There've been a number of proposals to create such a federal law, but so far Congress hasn't seen fit to do it. According to the Wikipedia article, every state except Wyoming has some sort of shield protection for journalists, either in statute or case law, though the protections are not necessarily absolute. So a state court or prosecutor would find it much more difficult to enforce such an order. |
Is it legal under international law to distribute passports among citizens of another country? In the last few days Russian president Vladimir Putin has been publicly considering offering fast-track passports to Ukrainian citizens. Some sources quote concerns that the Russian government could eventually use these newly acquired citizens as a reason for military intervention. Since this problem may have occured before in history, my question is as follows: Is it legal unter international law to distribute passports among citizens of another country? If it is not, are there restrictions as to who is eligible for passports? | Any country can certainly decide who it should grant citizenship status to. There is no international rule that I know of requiring that the recipient be currently a resident of the country granting citizenship. Any country may issue passports to its citizens. | Unfortunately, there are no EU visa’s for non-family members on the basis of a romantic partnership or relationship. The EU recognizes family members to be facilitated entry and residence as follows: Article 2 Definitions For the purposes of this Directive: 1. ‘Union citizen’ means any person having the nationality of a Member State; 2. ‘family member’ means: (a) the spouse; (b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member State; (c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b); (d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b); 3. ‘host Member State’ means the Member State to which a Union citizen moves in order to exercise his/her right of free movement and residence. Some Member States, potentially Italy included, recognize domestic partnerships as equivalent to marriages. Maybe you and her are able to come to peace with this idea that for a longer stay, you two would have to make deeper commitments. Maybe that is a non-question, and can work well if that is the case in Italy. Other than that merely on this basis, there is not much room to consider. If there are other facts that may be relevant, for e.g., she may apply to a university and get a student visa; maybe the familial tie you mentioned or other familial ties or ancestry may entitle her to naturalization and citizenship, but these questions vary from state to state; if she’s from a widely recognized less democratic country where she was subjected to or has a well-funded fear of persecution as a member of a social, ethnic or “racial” group or for political opinion or faith, asylum may be another option. | The new decree of November 14, 2022 contains an amendment (bottom of p2) to the Federal Law 53-FZ originally enacted on March 28, 1998, concerning military service. The former version of the text contained separate provisions in Article 2 about different kinds of military service that could be performed depending on nationality. This allowed Russian citizens who also held another nationality, or foreign citizens, to serve in the Russian armed forces under contract, and only in non-officer ranks. Russian citizens without other allegiances were able to serve voluntarily, or be conscripted, and were additionally eligible to serve in the state intelligence apparatus and other bodies, as well as in the main armed forces. The amendment is slightly differently organised, but the key part is the text which extends service "по призыву" (on demand) to "гражданами в том чсиле имеющими гражданства (подданства) иностранного государства" (citizens, including those who have citizenship (nationality) of a foreign state). Draftees under this section are again only for the non-officer ranks of the regular armed forces. The option is retained for Russian citizens without other allegiances to volunteer, in which case they might become officers or serve in the broader military/intelligence establishment, or for non-Russians to volunteer for the regular forces. Russia's original law was fairly generous in exempting holders of other nationalities, as most countries with mandatory military service or registration do not make the distinction. For example, Israel and the USA are two countries where holding additional nationality is not a barrier. (Though in both of those cases, there are other exemptions which might be in play. The USA is also not currently operating actual conscription, just a registration system.) And there are plenty of countries without a draft at all. In the context of the overall pipeline from "you are a regular person minding your own business" to "you are in uniform pointing your weapon at your country's designated enemy", militaries also have several opportunities to discard draftees or volunteers who they genuinely don't want, for whatever reason. It may be that even a country which obliges dual citizens to register and attend an assessment, would then choose not to make them train and fight. Or they may be channeled into different roles. It might depend on the conflict in question (e.g. you are a citizen of A and B, and A is at war with C, so you have to fight; if A were at war with B then your fate would be different). Regarding Why should they care whether someone also has citizenship of some other country? they may be anxious about you having divided loyalties, or about angering the other country. These concerns would be more acute if the country is engaged in an actual conflict. There are several treaties that allow multiple citizens to avoid having to serve multiple terms of military service in each country. The details depend on the countries involved, but the general idea is that if you are (for example) both Austrian and Danish, and live in Denmark, then you do your military service there and Austria does not mind. In that case, it's helpful that neither of those countries is at war, and certainly not with one another. What you cannot generally do is use both of your nationalities to cancel each other out, and avoid military service altogether. Equally, if you are Austrian and British (the UK has no conscription) then the government of Austria still wants you to do military service on their terms. | It is well known and often repeated that China does not tolerate dual citizenship, except in the case of its citizens who have right of abode in Hong Kong or Macau. The Chinese Nationality Law is clear about this: Article 3. This is not true and you misunderstand what Article 3 says. Article 3 says (depending on your translation): The People's Republic of China does not recognize dual nationality for any Chinese national. The only way I think this can be interpreted is that, if a person were to statutorily have both Chinese nationality and foreign nationality under each country's respective laws, then the PRC would only recognize their Chinese nationality, and not recognize their foreign nationality. This article does NOT mean that nobody can have dual nationality under the law. In order to "recognize" or "not recognize" something, it presupposes that the thing exists. If nobody had dual nationality under the law, then this article would be meaningless, as there would be no point to "not recognize" something that nobody has anyway. This article only matters to someone who truthfully has dual nationality under PRC and foreign law. Given someone who truthfully has dual nationality under PRC and foreign law, since dual nationality is not recognized, which nationality is recognized and which is not? Since Article 3 says "Chinese national", it implicitly recognizes the person's Chinese nationality, which means it's the foreign nationality that is not recognized. (This, by the way, is essentially identical to the US position -- the US only recognizes the US nationality of a dual national.) It is true that true dual nationality of the PRC and a foreign country is uncommon, but that is mainly due to Articles 9 (which says a Chinese national naturalizing abroad automatically loses Chinese nationality) and 8 (which says that a foreign national who naturalizes to get Chinese nationality shall not retain foreign nationality). It is not because of Article 3. By the way, when I say someone who has dual nationality of the PRC and a foreign country, it does not include a Chinese national who has naturalized abroad, who is subject to Article 9 but continues to use/obtain PRC passports and/or continue to exercise the rights of a Chinese citizen. De jure, this person no longer has Chinese nationality, even if the PRC government is not aware of it yet. When discovered, they will be treated as only a foreign national, and that is consistent with my explanation, since this person does not de jure have Chinese nationality. Any documents issued to them reflecting Chinese nationality after their foreign naturalization, were issued in error. Article 3 is irrelevant for such a person since there is no question of "recognizing" dual nationality for a person who does not legally have dual nationality. So who are the people who truthfully have both PRC and foreign nationality? There are several cases. First, as you noted, this is possible for many people in Hong Kong and Macau, due to explanations of the PRC nationality law for those territories. For example, in the one for Hong Kong, items 2-4 say that Chinese of Hong Kong are Chinese nationals despite holding foreign passports. They do not have foreign consular protection while in Hong Kong and the rest of China, (unless they choose to apply for change of nationality to foreign nationality, effectively renouncing Chinese nationality). It says their foreign passports can be used for traveling to "other countries and territories" (implying that they cannot be used to enter Hong Kong or the rest of China). This supports my explanation of Article 3 above, that the PRC only recognizes the Chinese nationality of a dual national, and does not recognize their foreign nationality. Another case is a child born in China to one Chinese citizen parent and one foreign national parent who meets the conditions to automatically pass on foreign nationality to the child at birth according to that foreign country's law. According to Article 4, a child born in China to at least one Chinese citizen parent is automatically a Chinese citizen, without regards to whether the child also has foreign nationality at birth, or anything else. Any person born in China whose parents are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality. And finally, we get to the case you mentioned, for children born abroad. Article 5 deals with children born abroad, and it says that a child born abroad to at least one Chinese citizen parent automatically has Chinese nationality, except when at least one parent is a Chinese citizen who has settled abroad, AND the child has foreign nationality at birth, in which case the child will not have Chinese nationality. Any person born abroad whose parents are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality. But a person whose parents are both Chinese nationals and have both settled abroad, or one of whose parents is a Chinese national and has settled abroad, and who has acquired foreign nationality at birth shall not have Chinese nationality. Because they wrote it with an "and", it means that children who had foreign nationality at birth but where neither parent was a Chinese citizen who has settled abroad, will have Chinese nationality at birth. If they had wanted to make it so that children born abroad could not have both Chinese nationality and foreign nationality at birth, they could have written it with an "or", but they didn't. Unlike some other countries, the PRC nationality law does not require that children born abroad be registered at a PRC consulate with a declaration that the child does not have a foreign passport in order to get Chinese citizenship. Nor does the PRC nationality law provide that dual national children lose their Chinese nationality if they don't renounce foreign nationality at a certain age. Since you specifically ask about children born in the US, they will all have foreign nationality (US citizenship) at birth (ignoring cases of children born to diplomats). So it only depends on the other condition (whether at least one parent was a Chinese citizen who has settled abroad). The PRC government interprets "settled abroad" as having foreign permanent residency (e.g. US green card). So assuming the only relevant foreign permanent residency is the US green card, here is a table summarizing whether a child born in the US has Chinese nationality at birth, based on the status of the parents: Chinese citizen without green card Chinese citizen with green card non-Chinese citizen Chinese citizen without green card Yes No Yes Chinese citizen with green card No No No non-Chinese citizen Yes No No The current procedure at PRC consulates (both in US and in other countries) is that they issue PRC Travel Documents (旅行证) instead of PRC passports to children born abroad, who have both Chinese nationality (as determined by Article 5) and foreign nationality at birth, who wish to travel to China. These Travel Documents are passport-like booklets, are valid for 2 years (can be re-applied for again after expiration), and contain a Chinese and an English info page, both of which say, among other things, The bearer of this Travel Document is a citizen of the People's Republic of China. [...] Having a US passport does not preclude the issuance of the Travel Document. In fact, the consulate expects the child in this case to have a US passport and requests the US passport information as well as the physical US passport during the application process, if the child already has one. The consulate clearly has no problem recognizing the child as a Chinese citizen even if they know that the child has US citizenship and a US passport. This Travel Document can be used to enter and exit China. When exiting China, the child would present both the PRC Travel Document and the US passport at PRC exit controls. The border control officer will recognize, upon seeing the Travel Document, that this is the routine procedure for a dual national child, and it will not lead to problems like when both PRC and US passports are presented (even though both the PRC passport and PRC Travel Document say inside them that the bearer is a citizen of the PRC). As you can see, having a US passport is not incompatible with the PRC's recognition of the child's Chinese nationality. If the PRC Travel Document is lost or expires while in China, the child can get a PRC Entry/Exit Permit (通行证), which again can be used with the US passport when exiting China with no problems. When back abroad, the child can again apply for a PRC Travel Document at a PRC consulate the next time they need to travel to China. Although it is possible for the child to be added to hukou while in China, the child should not apply for a PRC passport, as it seems this will cause problems when exiting China, as you mentioned. The child should stick to Chinese Travel Documents and Entry/Exit Permits. I have heard rumors that the consulate might no longer issue PRC Travel Documents to such a dual national child after turning 18 (perhaps forcing the child to renounce either PRC or foreign nationality), but I haven't seen any official source on this, and the PRC nationality itself does not mention any need to do anything at any particular age. As for renouncing US citizenship, US law requires that loss of US citizenship can only occur when the person intends to relinquish US citizenship, and young children are considered to lack sufficient maturity and understanding of the meaning of renunciation of citizenship, and be too much under the influence of parents, to have the necessary voluntary intent. The Foreign Affairs Manual presumes that an age of at least 16 is generally necessary to renounce US citizenship. See 7 FAM 1292(i)(2): Voluntariness and intent: Minors who seek to renounce citizenship often do so at the behest of or under pressure from one or more parent. If such pressure is so overwhelming as to negate the free will of the minor, it cannot be said that the statutory act of expatriation was committed voluntarily. The younger the minor is at the time of renunciation, the more influence the parent is assumed to have. Even in the absence of any evidence of parental inducements or pressure, you and CA must make a judgment whether the individual minor manifested the requisite maturity to appreciate the irrevocable nature of expatriation. Absent that maturity, it cannot be said that the individual acted voluntarily. Moreover, it must be determined if the minor lacked intent, because he or she did fully understand what he or she was doing. Children under 16 are presumed not to have the requisite maturity and knowing intent; | The Justice Department prosecutes all crimes prosecuted by the U.S. federal government regardless of which agency has jurisdiction over that kind of regulatory activity. The Canadian government could prosecute for passport fraud or forgery. The offshore account country could prosecute for bank fraud or forgery. The U.S. federal government, the Canadian government, and the offshore jurisdiction could probably all prosecute for attempted money laundering or attempted tax evasion (or worse, such as attempted material support of terrorism). Realistically, none of this is terribly likely to happen if there is no harm, and even if there was an arrest and a conviction, the sentence would probably be mild for such a victimless white collar crime (probably probation and a fine or a few months in jail at most unless there were larger aggravating factors). But, harm is not required for a criminal prosecution. Or, more precisely, the violation of the criminal law per se is the harm. 18 U.S.C. § 1543 states: Whoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or alters any passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, with intent that the same may be used; or Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any such false, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, or any passport validly issued which has become void by the occurrence of any condition therein prescribed invalidating the same— Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both. This statute clearly applies to both U.S. and non-U.S. passports. But, it isn't obvious that the crime would apply in this case, because the crime may have taken place outside the U.S. and with a target outside the U.S., one or the other must be true for the U.S. to enforce its criminal laws - U.S. citizenship isn't sufficient. The offense in this particular statute is making with the intent that some use it, using or attempting to use a passport. The crime was directed at the offshore location. But, it wouldn't be such a stretch to assume that if the fake passport was made or used by the defendant in a U.S. living room that it was used there even if only to send it over the Internet to a foreign country. On the other hand, if the fake passport were made or used in a hotel room in Montreal by a U.S. citizen and was directed at the Cayman Islands, the U.S. might lack criminal jurisdiction over the case. The maximum offense would be 10 years and a fine for a first or second offense, but the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines would very likely call for a much milder recommended sentence, and any excess punishment over this recommendation would have to be justified by the judge. | Legally speaking, very many nations grant asylum, and religious persecution is one of the most basic grounds for granting asylum, following the 1951 Refugee Convention. This newspaper article compares asylum statistics in Ireland versus other parts of Europe. The Irish immigration authorities spell out the details for an asylum application. Note that you must already be in Ireland, to apply for asylum in Ireland (you should apply when you enter the country). One could also apply to Norway (almost an English-speaking country), but again you have to be in Norway to do so. There is a generic solution to the "what if I'm not in country" problem via the UNHCR, which can propose resettlement into various countries. I need to add that getting a visitor's visa from certain countries can be extremely difficult. To take an example, Norway (which is fairly open to refugees) is pretty up-front on the chances of getting a visa, based on country. To take a random example, they are not very optimistic about visitor's visas from Iran, and they say "we consider how probable it is that you will return to your home country or the country you live in when the visit is over. We consider the situation in your country and your own situation", "If we believe that it is unlikely that you will return, your application will normally be rejected" and "If you plan to visit Norway as a tourist, you will normally not be granted a visa". This is the fundamental problem that refugees face, the problem of getting there. One country that allows visa-free admission from Iran is Turkey. This guide (which is in Farsi so I can't comment on) provides practical information on the UNHCR asylum process "the political asylum process for Iranians in Turkey": that may indicate that apostasy is a different matter. Other evidence suggests that this option is worse than staying put. Only for the sake of discussion, Svalbard is a theoretical possibility. Svalbard (next to the North Pole) is part of Norway, but Norway treats it as being somewhat outside of Norway. It is outside the Schengen visa area, and it is a visa-free zone, meaning that nobody requires a visa to visit or live there. This is due to the Svalbard Treaty whereby Norwegians and treaty nationals have equal rights to the islands, and while most nations are not treaty signatories, it has been policy to extend those rights to everybody. The Governor does have the power to expel anyone who is a burden on local society (e.g. unemployable). Normally one would have to get a Schengen area visa to get there, which would be an obstacle, but it is apparently possible to get a same-day visa-free transit at Oslo Airport, if travelling non-stop to Svalbard (I cannot find a definitive policy statement on this matter, but I also am not sure where exactly to look). There are some air routes from outside Schengen where the first Schengen stop is Oslo. The Governor's office gives appropriate warnings about local problems (ridiculous prices, housing shortage, work shortage, more polar bears than people, really cold). | Insofar as those treaties don't bind the US, the notion of "violating" such laws is moot. Hoda Muthana is, under Yemeni law, a Yemeni citizen (it is immaterial whether she has ever "accepted" or exploited it), and as such stripping her of US citizenship would not leave her stateless. In the case of Hoda Muthana, the action is based on the legal argument that she was not ever a citizen, based on the premise that her father was a foreign diplomat. Under US law, children born to foreign diplomats in the US are not birthright citizens, following US v. Wong Kim Ark. Birthright citizenship cannot be revoked. However, a person can renounce their citizenship, via certain acts, including taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having attained the age of eighteen years;or (3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons serve as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer The defense argument would presumably be that ISIS is not a foreign state (despite their own claims to the contrary) so her affiliation with ISIS does not qualify. There are grounds for denaturalization, including falsifying or concealing relevant facts pertaining to naturalization, refusing to testify before Congress, or joining a subversive organization including Al Qaeda within 5 years of naturalization. | You have the right to withhold this information; they have the right to withhold a passport. You do not have a right to a passport; it is a privilege and that privilege may be withdrawn at the discretion of the State Department for all sorts of reasons. As a US citizen you have a right to travel within the US; you don't need any papers for this. However, if you wish to cross an international border then both the country you are departing and the country you are arriving in will decide the circumstances under which you can. |
How can jurisdiction be limited if platform does not provide geoblocking? If we are allowed to upload content on to a site but the site does not provide any way to georestrict it, are we still capable of stopping countries we do not target from enforcing or claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction on the fully original educational content. Assume India is the home jurisdiction. | You cannot stop the claim. But the good news is that claims of jurisdiction by many countries are routinely ignored by many other countries. So enforcement attempts might fall short. I've written things here that might get me into real trouble with the authorities of North Korea if I ever traveled there and if they were able to match my real-world identity with this account. But I don't plan to travel there. Likewise, before I went to Turkey I should probably review what I've written about their government, and then wonder if it is worth the risk. Probably yes, it wasn't very incendiary. But my home country and those I tend to visit (if there is no pandemic ongoing) would not extradite me for what I wrote. | Only a court can decide if use is fair. As Dale stated, we will know whether it was or was not legally fair when a court decides, and it ceased to be appealed. Unfortunately, there is no formula. Remember that fair use is an exception to rules that make copyright infringement illegal, so it occupies a narrow space practically by definition. Fortunately this was already decided (yes, I recognize that this is an old question) Judge Katherine B. Forrest decided in favor of your favorite YouTuber: The Court has held that the Klein video constitutes fair use, and further that the Klein video does not infringe plaintiff’s copyrights. and further that: But even if this Court held the Klein video is not fair use, the Court would still dismiss Claim II because defendants clearly had a subjective “good faith belief” that their video did not infringe plaintiff’s copyrights. Cf. Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1153. It is undisputed that defendants understand the concept of fair use and have an established practice for ensuring their videos make fair use of copyrighted material. But that answer isn't entirely satisfying, is it? Let's get specific. Fair use seems to be something that should be clear to both parties: the copyright holders and the user of copyrighted content. While it is true that the percentage of original content may be of concern, there is no specific percentage nominated in Title 17 Chapter 1 Section 107 of the US Code. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. It takes vigilance on the part of both parties to cohabit this narrow law. Fortunately, YouTube has recently taken measures to ensure that use that should (presumably in their view) be judged as fair will remain live on their site while a dispute process is pursued. This procedure resolves cases outside of formal legal battles, which can be costly for both parties. However, YouTube has pledged to pay legal fees of content providers that are sued for copyright infringement, in special circumstances (esp. when the use was fair, and when a claimant is abusing, again presumably as determined by some legal counsel at YouTube). They discuss similar matters in their FAQ page. Why did YouTube let an abusive claimant remove my video? YouTube takes action to address cases of abuse and misuse in our copyright takedown processes. While we cannot comment on specific cases or our processes, we do look into abuse of our copyright tools and processes, and have a zero-tolerance policy for claimants we've deemed abusive. Misuse of the copyright process (for both takedowns and counter notifications) can result in termination of an account. And remember that courts love precedent Future cases will likely leverage the decisions made in the case you mention. And while the following does not have any real legal value, you may find comfort in knowing: there are many YouTubers out there that heavily leverage others' content, and their videos are still up. Again this is not strictly speaking a precedent, but you can safely assume that in cases where a high-profile YouTuber (say CinemaSins, for instance) uses content from many content owners, and uses a great deal of it, they will likely have come up against claims of unfair use, and have emerged with an intact channel. The aforementioned avenues that YouTube provides should be utilized wherever possible to stay out of court. | Is it possible to forbid linking to a site? No. It would be quite childish and out of touch to aspire to that level of control. Publishing a website/page for permanent, wide open access is inconsistent with prohibiting accessing it from certain venues, such as hypertext links. The prohibition of linking to a site is an attempt to enforce a certain degree of selective privacy. As such, it would not be enforced by U.S. courts, and it would be laughable if other jurisdictions proceeded differently. In United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008), the court wrote that e-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information. That rationale is equally --or perhaps even more-- applicable to a publisher, since in this case browsers and/or the publisher himself post(s) his URL (the equivalent of a "from" address of emails) "for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information". A hyperlink is an address, so it would be similar, I believe, to disallowing someone to list an address (on a map for instance). That analogy is inadequate because it overlooks essential differences between a web address and a physical (be it home, office, etc.) address. A web address is used for obtaining information which the initial publisher deliberately makes available to the public. By contrast, the act of having one's physical address registered somewhere else serves no such purpose whatsoever. Another important difference between a hyperlink and a physical address is that "consuming" a hyperlink simply cannot annoy or harm the initial publisher (except in the extreme scenario of Denial-of-Service attacks), whereas a common knowledge of a person's address may make that person vulnerable to harassment, trespassing, larceny, and other unlawful acts. A better analogy with hypertext links would be bibliographical references, since both are types of text strings for directing the consumer to a (or "the") source of information. Neither text string causes detriment to the author/source of that information. Can you imagine if bibliographical references were forbidden by statute or by the author of that information? The mere difference that a bibliographical reference needs to be copied/pasted, whereas it suffices to click on a hypertext link, cannot permit treating the permissibility of hypertext links any differently than the permissibility of bibliographical references. | Usually this answer would be provided by a local government land use ordinance, and not by the constitution, national law, state law or common law caselaw rules. It would vary considerably from place to place within India. You would need to review your local land use ordinances to find the answer. | The territorial scope of the GDPR is defined in Article 3. It covers "personal data of data subjects who are in the Union", whether they are EU citizens or not. So to answer your questions: 1) are EU users, but moved to USA a few years ago, and signed-up on my website? They are not in the EU, so are not covered. You don't need to know if someone is an EU citizen, just if they are currently in the EU. 2) went for holidays in USA, signed-up on my website, and then came back to EU? (note - potentially skipped any Consent questions at sign-up, because IP was from USA) If someone moves into the EU while using your service then they fall under the GDPR for the time they are in the EU. If their home address is in the EU then that is covered, and monitoring of their behaviour while in the EU is also covered. Your other two questions are about VPNs. If a VPN is used to evade IP address geolocation and you have no other clue about where someone is then you can't be blamed for not knowing where they are (although I'm not aware of any actual case law on this topic). But if someone with a USA IP address gives a home address in the EU then you should probably treat them as being in the EU to be on the safe side. Basically, if you don’t know if they are in the EU or not, you should treat them as if they were. | What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes | The Antarctic Treaty does not nullify claims or prevent land ownership, and most of Antarctica is claimed by one of a handful of countries. However, these claims are not recognized by most countries. There are many entities that are not universally recognized, including the Republic of Somaliland which is recognized by no-one (January 2022). One should include declaration-only micronations such as Liberland. In other words, you can say whatever you want, declaration does not make it so. A new nation could, in principle, can be created as it was done in the case of East Timor and South Sudan, which underwent processes of self-determination. These were lands that had permanent populations, unlike Antarctica. Such a process of peaceful nation-creation would, without doubt, involve the intervention of the UN to determine if this new nation represented "the will of the (resident) people". | Like many other jurisdictions, in the UK sites like the Daily Mail are liable for the content they host. In other words, the legal issue here is they either do not have the staff available to (or simply do not want to) spend the time moderating the comment sections in order to remove potentially defamatory or otherwise illegal content. As Lag added in a comment below: another legal reason may be liability for publishing something that creates a substantial risk of seriously impeding or prejudicing the course of justice in some ongoing legal proceeding. Far easier to prevent it beforehand than moderate it (and risk missing it) later. Content on Twitter (for example, replies to their own tweets), on the other hand, is not the Daily Mail's problem to moderate. |
How to report an attempted web designer scam? I am a freelance web designer; I have a website and a Facebook page to find new clients. A few days ago I received an email inquiring about web design that immediately sounded fishy: Good Day, Am Tom Williams i wanna know if you can handle (Website Design) for a new marketing and also if credit card is fine to make payment with you kindly get back to me ASAP so i can send you the job details. The bad grammar and immediate mention of credit cards was strange, but I need all the work I can get so I decided to prod for more details. He told me he was located in Texas (I am in Arizona), told me about his business (agriculture products), gave me a link to a competitor's site as reference and a list of job requirements as well as a budget of $4000 to $6000. Now, that price range is not out of the ordinary for a professional business website but I myself am I young, self-taught freelancer and I don't usually make anywhere near that per project. And if he's in Texas, why choose an Arizonan web designer? There's got to be hundreds or more that are closer to him. So I really wanted this to be real but I'm now 99% sure that it's a scam. After a couple more emails back and forth I decided it couldn't hurt to give him a price and ask for a deposit; and if I received the money with no funny business I'd make the website. I told him I wanted $1000 up front and then he replied with this: I have my credit card available for the payment . But first I want you to pay attention to this .I have been advised to take a long rest for an easy and fast recovery,hence the reason why I need your favor. I haven't payed the project consultant that has the text content and the logo for my website he does not have credit card facility. Regarding this fact,I will be giving you credit card for the total of $5,080. Once the funds clears to your account $2,000 will be deducted as an upfront payment for the design of the website,$80 for yourself as tip and the remaining $3,000 will be sent to the project consultant that has the text content and the logo for my website. Be rest assured you will be charging everything on my credit card including the 3% CC charges. Below is the final break down of the total charges i will be authorizing you to charge on my credit card. Website-Deposit: $2,000 - Consultant-fee: $3,000 - Tips & Gratitude: $80 - 3% CC charges? Basically, it sounds like he wants to transfer a bunch of money to me, and then have me keep my cut and transfer the rest to someone else. I don't know how, exactly, but I imagine that somehow I'll get screwed out of everything and possibly the funds already in my account (jokes on them, I'm broke). Anyway, I found this article confirming my suspicions that stuff like this does happen: https://www.alvalyn.com/email-scams-target-web-designers/ And I wonder if I should report this somehow? Or if there's any other legal action I could take? Thanks. | Short Answer This is a variation of the classic Nigerian Prince Confidence Scam a/k/a 419 Scam and you are their mark. The goal of this con is theft and abscondence. Not necessarily money laundering as others have suggested. Because, ultimately, there is no money on their end except what they seek to steal from their mark. As others have pointed out, variations on this also include the Overpayment Scam and hat tip to the Spanish Prisoner Scam of the 16th century for historical context. Banking asymmetry is the key The basic idea is that funds clear U.S. banks faster than foreign banks. More specifically, money transfers to points inside the U.S. from points outside the U.S. take longer to clear than transfers from points inside the U.S. to outside the U.S. The ongoing success of this confidence scam rests upon that single feature of the global banking system. This asymmetry will eventually land you in a situation where your funds clear (leave your account) but theirs don't (i.e., never enter your account) — yet at first appear to do so — until you find out later their funds "bounced." By that time, they will be long gone but the bank will come after you for the bounced funds. And, of course, your money will be gone. Thereby leaving you holding the bag. Best response: stop communicating The best thing to do is to just stop communicating with them. You can try reporting it to your state's Attorney General but, quite frankly, I wouldn't bother. These are so common you just have to treat it like "background noise." Cautionary tale: sad and common This is really sad. But I used to work in a retail location of a large national bank. Our clients were mostly members of a small suburban neighborhood. At least once per week, and sometimes two or three times per week, like clockwork, we would always see a different person coming into the bank asking to withdraw all their funds to send out of the country. After asking a couple questions it was always clear that this was another variation of the 419 Confidence Scam. The marks were usually older people (who are more gullible and trusting of strangers than the average population. Something to do with simpler times in the past, I guess.) Often times the marks were so convinced by the con that we could not explain to them what was happening in a way they would believe us and got conned anyway. Losing all their money. It's all very sad, but a cautionary tale and an example of how convincing these cons can be. Also, to illustrate how common it all is, imagine that this probably happened in every retail location serving every neighborhood in the U.S. Very sad. And very common. | In case a company is flooded by such "asymmetric" requests, how should a company react? Although article 12.5 refers to singular "a data subject", it can be inferred that exposing the controller to significant expenses is not part of the legislative intent. Accordingly, the company may have requesters choose between paying a reasonable fee for the ensuing administrative costs or withdrawing the requirement that delivery be by postal mail. The bad faith scenario you outline seems to be a non-sequitur, since generally a pattern (or a high number) of requests for postal mail delivery should prompt the controller to suspect that some or many might not be legitimate. A requester with bad intentions would be unable to prove the identity of the various data subjects he impersonates or alleges to represent. | From what I can see on the USPTO registry, "tweet" is still not trademarked for the purposes you're talking about. Twitter has been working to secure that trademark, but I can't find any record of them having actually secured it. Just the same, I'd predict that using it will get you at least a cease-and-desist letter, and possibly a lawsuit. Whether you'd win that case seems to be a very open question, but that presumes you have the resources to litigate. | This smells strongly of "bait and switch" fraud: offer a product at an attractive price, then "discover" that the product is not really available at that price. By that time the customer has sunk costs and is therefore willing to accept an alternative product with a lower quality or higher price than was originally promised. Looking at the homepage for ".club" it seems that they do indeed offer different prices for different names. I see "examples.club" listed at $101 while "model.club" is listed at $19,000. From your post it sounds like your hosting company have cancelled your purchase and will not actually charge you the higher fee. This is, as you say, a very dodgy practice. You might want to move to another company which is more up-front about unknown costs for such domains. If you have already paid the £7.99 then you are entitled to that money back. You do not have to accept a different name: that would be a classic bait-and-switch scam. They are NOT entitled to charge you a higher price unless you agree to it. If they won't return your money or try to charge you more then you should drop them like a hot brick and report them for fraud. Edit in response to question edit The situation is not clear-cut, and will probably depend on the exact wording in the company's terms and conditions to determine exactly when the contract was formed. An article about a similar case in The Telegraph had this to say: The legally binding contract is complete when a retailer accepts an order. However, acceptance does not necessarily happen at the point of order. Even the confirmation email may not be an acceptance. Some retailers reserve the right to cancel an order up to the point of delivery. It is therefore important to carefully check the retailer’s terms and conditions (which must be available on their website) and emails – if a retailer simply acknowledges an order, there may be no contract at that point. Lots of companies have T&Cs saying that there isn't a contract until they actually deliver the item, so if they don't deliver then they are not in breach of contract. The company may also be able to argue that its offered price was so grossly disproportionate that it was an obvious mistake and therefore they should not be held to it. UK contract law is based on the concept of a "meeting of minds" where two people have the same view of the contract and agree to it, but this is rather problematic when one of the minds was represented by a buggy computer. You might be able to counter this by showing that they are still doing it, and hence this is an ongoing business practice rather than an honest mistake. Ultimately your only options, assuming they decline to honour the purchase, are to either accept the refund or take them to court requesting an order of specific performance. | Yes a company can be sued (since anyone can sue anyone). But in order to win a lawsuit, you have to have damages as a result of some action, AND you must prove that the action was done with intent to harm or was otherwise negligent. So following your website example, a lot of things would have to happen: The website would have to be hacked. If the passwords are encrypted instead of hashed (which still qualifies as "plain-text" once they email it to you), the hacker would have to figure out how to decrypt the passwords. (Which a good hacker could probably do.) The hacker would have to take those passwords and do something with them that causes damage to their owners. Even if all of those things happened, you would still also have to prove negligence on their part which would be pretty difficult to do because the flaw that was hacked would be the focus of negligence discussions moreso than what was stolen. That being said, if your goal is simply to get them to fix the problem, rather than receive monetary damages, then you could still sue for an action to be taken. You'd have to pay by the hour for the attorney since they wouldn't have a chance of winning monetary damages. But in all likelihood the website owner, upon seeing the lawsuit, would fix the problem before it gets to court, so I could see that having the desired effect. That is if you think it's worth the cost of filing the lawsuit in the first place. Perhaps you could save yourself the cost of an attorney and just threaten to sue if they don't fix the problem. | They must give you a refund By saying they don't give refunds that are required by law they are engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct which will expose them to some serious fines. Report them to the relevant Italian authority. Presumably, you paid for this service with a credit/debit card. Contact your card provider and dispute the transaction - they will put the money back in your account and that will probably the last you hear of this company. | To paraphrase the Princess Bride: "I don't think those words mean what you think they do". The "truther-activist", "sovereign citizen", and "Citizen vs. Human Being" concepts will only hurt you. It has never succeeded, to my knowledge; It has failed multiple times. Let me tell you a little about myself to illustrate what I mean: I am a software developer (and it seems from your profile, you are at least somewhat computer inclined, so this will hopeful make sense to you). The business side of the company I work for think that myself and my team write "magic code", and having the system do whatever they ask for is just a matter of pressing enough buttons in the correct order. It totally insane, and it completely analogous to what you are propose. The court is a carefully designed system, and you don't have the power to make arbitrary changes to it. Certainly not through the "arbitrary button presses" of "legal fiction". Some things to note Legal fictions are never summoned. People are. Organizations are. See initial paraphrase with regards to "legal fiction". Your legal fiction has not been summoned, you have. You will be appearing as yourself, not a straw man. I'm sorry to break it to you, but whomever you have heard this from is wrong, and in the most best case scenario, they are confusing what they want to be true for reality. If they have received any money from you in relation to this opinion, then they are almost certainly a scammer and a liar. If you insist on going further with this nonsense, then you WILL lose, regardless of what actual facts you have. My condolences. Now, to answer the question you asked: Yes, you can file a monition for discovery before first appearance (but not before pleading). You can file by mail, and in some jurisdictions, online. Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/goingtocourt/caseBasics.shtml. | Is it illegal to ask a company for money in exchange for information on a bug in their software/website? That in itself is legal. Indeed, the company would incur unjust enrichment if it coerced you to disclose your discovery for free. Only if you threatened the company to divulge to others your discovery unless the company pays you, it would be illegal and trigger charges such as extortion (likewise, legislations outlaw the unjustified delivery of programs or instructions for hacking a software/network/etc., although this goes beyond your actual question). Can the company take legal action against me? That seems doubtful, futile, and it could backfire (please note I have not done any research on legal precedents about this). Although the terms and conditions of the website or the End User License Agreement (EULA) of software might prohibit you to reverse engineer (RE)/decompile/etc. the application, anti-RE clauses are unenforceable and the remedies therefor are indeterminate because the sole act of conducting reverse engineering does not subject the company (or third parties) to any losses. The company's decision to take legal action for your discovery could backfire from two standpoints. First, it calls attention to the fact that the software at issue is defective and unsafe. And second, the bug is likely to be detected by someone else anyway, thereby potentially compromising customers' systems. |
What dcouments must be available as hard copies (printouts) for a 501c3 (non-profit organization) in Ohio? Our 501c3 organization in Ohio is spending $3000 per year for storage rental to store printouts of official documents backdating 10 years. This was being done to comply with (assumed) legal requirements for being a 501c3. In a recent meeting, I was tasked to check to what extent hard copies of organizational documents are required to be available in OH. Knowing this we can digitize documents and reduce the cost of storage rental. I could not find any leads/info via Google to get an answer to this question. I looked at multiple sites including the official state government pages on non-profit orgs. Is there any such requirement that a 501c3 have hard copies of specified documents, and if so, where can a list of the requirements be obtained? | Based on a reply from the Charitable Law Office of Ohio Attorney General: Hello, I am in receipt of your inquiry below. Please be advised that there is nothing to prohibit using electronic storage for your organization’s business documents. Many organizations find this method to be a very effective measure as opposed to retaining hard copies. ... it seems electronic storage is wholly permitted. | According to Wikipedia, the organization that holds Vatican copyrights has the following policy: [N]ews organizations can quote from the pope's speeches, encyclicals and other writings without charge. They can also publish full texts free provided they cite Vatican copyright ... but if a text is published separately ... payment is due. You say that no Vatican copyright was cited, which is too bad - they'd have a good argument that they already had permission. it must have a copyright Correct. Published or unpublished, it has a copyright from the moment it was fixed. it's a translation, which require official permission. Translations are considered derivative works, which is a right protected under copyright. So you need permission, fair use, or some other law that allows you to use it. it's the whole document, and so not under fair use Well, not so fast. There are four factors included in fair use, and that's only one of them. The factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; Is the website offering this work for religious purposes, or for profit? (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; I'm not really sure where religious works fall under this factor, honestly. (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; The whole work is used, so this factor would be against fair use. (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Is there a market for this work? Does the Vatican sell it, or use it to drive traffic, or anything? If so, this factor would be against fair use. If not, the translation probably does not affect the market for the work, and this factor would be in favor of fair use. | Anywhere in the world, do parties to court hearings have no absolute right to access those transcripts (or recordings)? I have not checked every common law jurisdiction but I suspect that as all (?) such courts have their own inherent powers to make directions the answer is probably: NO. That said, a close-but-no-cigar example may be found at Rule 79.30 of the Civil Procedure Rules concerning terrorist financing proceedings in england-and-wales: Unless the court directs otherwise, rule 5.4 (Register of Claims), rule 5.4B (Supply of documents from court records – a party) and rule 5.4C (Supply of documents from court records –a non-party) do not apply to any proceedings to which Section 2 or 3 of this Part applies or to any document relating to such proceedings. "Sections 2 and 3 of this Part" refers to applications to set aside financial restrictions and appeals against being designated as being linked to terrorism. The relevant cited Rules are: 5.4 (1) A court or court office may keep a publicly accessible register of claims which have been issued out of that court or court office. (2) Any person who pays the prescribed fee may, during office hours, search any available register of claims. And 5.4B (1) A party to proceedings may, unless the court orders otherwise, obtain from the records of the court a copy of any document listed in paragraph 4.2A of Practice Direction 5A. (2) A party to proceedings may, if the court gives permission, obtain from the records of the court a copy of any other document filed by a party or communication between the court and a party or another person. | I am an Ontario-licensed lawyer. The following is a general information about the law and not specific legal advice. You are not my client and I have not given you advice related to your circumstances. First, even when you ask a generic question, define the jurisdiction of interest. For the purpose of your question, Canada is a collection of different jurisdictions with different rules. My answer relates to Ontario, Canada. Other Canadian jurisdictions have different rules. The Law The applicable Section 109 of Ontario's Residential Tenancies Act http://canlii.ca/t/33p is reproduced below for your convenience. EMPHASES MINE. Receipt for payment 109 (1) A landlord shall provide FREE OF CHARGE to a tenant or former tenant, on request, a receipt for the payment of any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent or any other amount paid to the landlord. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (1). Former tenant (2) Subsection (1) applies to a request by a FORMER TENANT only if the request is made within 12 months after the tenancy terminated. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (2). Regulation Ontario Regulation 516/06 http://canlii.ca/t/sjx dictates minimal form: Receipt A document constitutes a receipt for the purposes of section 109 of the Act if it includes, at a minimum, (a) the address of the rental unit to which the receipt applies; (b) the name of the tenants to whom the receipt applies; (c) the amount and date for each payment received for any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent, or any other amount paid to the landlord and shall specify what the payment was for; (d) the name of the landlord of the rental unit; and (e) the signature of the landlord or the landlord’s authorized agent. O. Reg. 516/06, s. 9. Landlord Compliance A good landlord will provide receipts immediately upon payment, and keep a copy. An very good landlord will provide additionally a summary of payments for the year, in tabulated form, and keep a copy of the yearly receipt instead of the multiple receipts for each payment. An excellent landlord will keep the tabulated information in a computer system and will issue a receipt for the whole tenancy period on termination. Keep a copy. Tenant's Application If your Ontario landlord refuse to comply with the above, file a T2 http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Tenant%20Applications%20&%20Instructions/T2.pdf *A T2 can also be filed online. Remember to ask for cost http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Interpretation%20Guidelines/03%20-%20Costs.html | Although the exact answer should depend on the country you are, in general private copies of copyrighted works are allowed. General rules are: You need to have got the work in a legitimate way. That is, that you have purchased a copy of the work with permission from copyright owners or you have got the work from an act of public distribution authorised by copyright owners - if you got it from a website that is not making a copyright infringement itself, you are in the second case. That you don't make a collective or commercial use of the work. (I took these rules from Spanish Intellectual Property law (article 31), but most countries have similar rules, specially in the European Union. Anyway, the exact limits of private copying exception may differ). Since private copying might have an economic effect, some countries collect private copying levies to compensate copyright owners - probably you have already paid for those when purchasing the printer. Therefore, you can print a book downloaded from a website (unless the site is hosting the work without authorization of the copyright owners, as pirate sites do) for your own use. You can't sell the copies or made a collective use of them. Although reach of collective use might be hard to assess, I would suggest that if you want all the people in your class have the book, send them the link so that any one could print their own copy. Update about the USA As the OP has now specified now their country I update the answer with a comment, although an additional answer by anybody more knowledgeable on US law would be great. I'm quite sure that for practical purposes the result is that you can print such a book anywhere in the world. However, I don't know which laws regulates that in the US. Google doesn't return meaningful results for "private copy usa", so I suppose it is know there by another name. Furthermore, statutes in common law countries tend to be less explicit and there might be no case law applicable. For example, I nobody printing a copy of a pdf for himself to read at home has ever been challenged in court in the USA, there might be no explicit rule about the subject. | If you're in the U.S., then section 117 of the Copyright Act is likely what you're looking for. The U.S. Copyright Office says: Under section 117, you or someone you authorize may make a copy of an original computer program if: the new copy is being made for archival (i.e., backup) purposes only; you are the legal owner of the copy; and any copy made for archival purposes is either destroyed, or transferred with the original copy, once the original copy is sold, given away, or otherwise transferred. Based on the information you provided, it sounds like you meet all three of these criteria. They also note that your particular software's license agreement might include special conditions that affect your right to make a backup copy. Such a warning would only make sense if it was legally possible for the software distributor to make such a limitation, so I'm afraid the direct answer to your main question is "yes". It's definitely not the norm - at least in my experiences - but it is a possibility so you'll need to consult your program's license agreement. There's also a possibility that the company misunderstood you and was thinking that you were running a backup server (in the sense of a redundant infrastructure) and not making an offline backup of your entire server. It's quite normal to require an additional license for the former case. | The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture. | You can put anything you like in a ToS document, but not everything you might put there will be enforceable. By posting something on the web, you are inviting anyone to read it. In some jurisdictions that may include the right to make and store a personal copy, although not multiple copies or a copy for commercial use. You can taker technical measures to prevent automated access and automated downloads (scraping). There was a case (hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp, 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019)) in which access restrictions were held binding in a US court, but in that case the site owner had notified the would-be reuser (a competitor) directly. The laws on this sort of thing may differ from country to country, and are not as well-settled as older parts of the law tend to be. The question asks: can I list in my terms of service that all users acknowledge I own their posts ... The only way in which the host could "own" the posts would be if the users transferred copyright to the host, or granted the host an exclusive license. Under US law this would take a written and signed document. Clicking an "I agree" box or button might constitute a valid signature. A statement that "by using this site you agree ..." would pretty clearly not. You might prohibit bots copying from your site and posting duplicates, but to prohibit users re-posting their own messages elsewhere is harder, legally, and leas reasonable in my view. Under US law you could not actually file suit for copyright infringement until you had registered the copyright, but that is not true in many other countries. |
Splitting a claim into several small claims UK, small claims court question. Is it permissible to split a large claim into several small claims, against multiple defendants, arguing a different cause of action in each? Consider this hypothetical and entirely fictional case: Adam inherits a valuable piece of art (e.g. a painting). Adam has no interest in art, and decides to sell. Bill contracts to handle the sale. He promises to sell the painting for a minimum of £120,000, and to charge a commission of £10,000. Charlie is a professional art restorer. Bill hands the painting to Charlie for cleaning. But Charlie makes a mistake, and damages the painting, reducing the value. It subsequently sells for £90,000. Bill deducts £20,000 from the sale price, double the agreed commission, and sends Adam the balance of £70,000. Adam is outraged. He had been expecting a payment of £110,000 but has ended up £40,000 down. Adam consults Dave the lawyer. Dave advises that he might have to spend £50-60,000 to recover the loss, might not win, might not recover costs, etc. So Adam considers a claim in the small claims court. The UK small claims limit is £10,000, but Adam has a plan. He will make three separate claims, asking for maximum damages in each. First, he will sue Charlie for damaging the painting. Second, he will sue Bill for damaging the painting. (vicarious liability) Third, he will sue Bill for overcharging on the fees. Is Adam's plan legally permissible? Basically, is it allowed to sue two different people for the same negligence, and sue one person twice for two different things. Can a big claim be split up into smaller claims like this? Note - for clarity, I'm not interested in Adam's dispute. I don't need to know about overcharging and the law of contracts, or liability for damage in tort law. Just the point about splitting up the case. And the case I described is just an example. Make the answer as general as possible, not restricted to this particular case. And, as a final reminder, the jurisdiction is England and Wales. Not asking for legal advice, you are not my lawyer, etc. | You can only sue once on the same facts on the same defendant The issue here is res judicata - once a case between 2 parties has been resolved, that matter can never be litigated again. So Adam cannot split his litigation against Bill. Adam has suffered no damage from Charlie If Adam now had an artwork of reduced value as a result of Charlie’s negligence he would. But he doesn’t have a damaged art work so Charlie has caused Adam no harm. | In the U.K., bankruptcy law applies to individuals and partnerships, while the U.K. insolvency law applies to companies. In an insolvency proceeding, there is administration (the rough equivalent of a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in the U.S.)or a liquidation (the rough equivalent fo a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the U.S.). In administration, the administrator of the company renegotiates debt payments so that carrying costs of office buildings can be brought to less than rental income, if possible, and if not, or if it is a liquidation in the first place, sells the building at auction to the highest bidder and stiffs unpaid creditors if this is not enough to pay them all according to priority and pro rata within each priority ranking. Simple. Negative value property is trickier. Sometimes someone can be paid to take it over (this happens often with depleted oil and gas wells that have to be plugged), if there are sufficient funds to do so. The administrator may instead disclaim the property. A disclaimer under this section— (a)operates so as to determine, as from the date of the disclaimer, the rights, interests and liabilities of the bankrupt and his estate in or in respect of the property disclaimed, and (b)discharges the trustee from all personal liability in respect of that property as from the commencement of his trusteeship, but does not, except so far as is necessary for the purpose of releasing the bankrupt, the bankrupt’s estate and the trustee from any liability, affect the rights or liabilities of any other person.. . . (5)Any person sustaining loss or damage in consequence of the operation of a disclaimer under this section is deemed to be a creditor of the bankrupt to the extent of the loss or damage and accordingly may prove for the loss or damage as a bankruptcy debt. Basically, a court decides what to do with it. If no one claims it and it has been disclaimed by the administrator, it escheats to the Crown (i.e. the U.K. state) as it would if a decedent's estate with no creditors or heirs. This disclaimer process is similar to the process in Australia described in the answer by @DaleM and has the same name in U.K. law as it does in Australia. Escheat can still occur in England and Wales, if a person is made bankrupt or a corporation is liquidated. Usually this means that all the property held by that person is 'vested in' (transferred to) the Official Receiver or Trustee in Bankruptcy. However, it is open to the Receiver or Trustee to refuse to accept that property by disclaiming it. It is relatively common for a trustee in bankruptcy to disclaim freehold property which may give rise to a liability, for example the common parts of a block of flats owned by the bankrupt would ordinarily pass to the trustee to be realised in order to pay his debts, but the property may give the landlord an obligation to spend money for the benefit of lessees of the flats. The bankruptcy of the original owner means that the freehold is no longer the bankrupt's legal property, and the disclaimer destroys the freehold estate, so that the land ceases to be owned by anyone and effectively escheats to become land held by the Crown in demesne. This situation affects a few hundred properties each year. Although such escheated property is owned by the Crown, it is not part of the Crown Estate, unless the Crown (through the Crown Estate Commissioners) 'completes' the escheat, by taking steps to exert rights as owner. However, usually, in the example given above, the tenants of the flats, or their mortgagees would exercise their rights given by the Insolvency Act 1986 to have the freehold property transferred to them. This is the main difference between escheat and bona vacantia, as in the latter, a grant takes place automatically, with no need to 'complete' the transaction. Thus, the toxic property would escheat to the Crown, but not the Crown Estate (defined below, which would not claim it since it has no value) and no one else would claim it. So, it would be technically owned by the government but not administered by anyone, unless the government affirmatively decided to do so. The Crown Estate is a collection of lands and holdings in the United Kingdom belonging to the British monarch as a corporation sole, making it the "Sovereign's public estate", which is neither government property nor part of the monarch's private estate. As a result of this arrangement, the sovereign is not involved with the management or administration of the estate, and exercises only very limited control of its affairs. Instead, the estate's extensive portfolio is overseen by a semi-independent, incorporated public body headed by the Crown Estate Commissioners, who exercise "the powers of ownership" of the estate, although they are not "owners in their own right". The revenues from these hereditary possessions have been placed by the monarch at the disposition of Her Majesty's Government in exchange for relief from the responsibility to fund the Civil Government. These revenues thus proceed directly to Her Majesty's Treasury, for the benefit of the British nation. The Crown Estate is formally accountable to the Parliament of the United Kingdom, where it is legally mandated to make an annual report to the sovereign, a copy of which is forwarded to the House of Commons. The Crown Estate is one of the largest property managers in the United Kingdom, overseeing property worth £12 billion, with urban properties valued at £9.1 billion representing the majority of the estate by value. These include a large number of properties in central London, but the estate also controls 792,000 ha (1,960,000 acres) of agricultural land and forest and more than half of the UK's foreshore, and retains various other traditional holdings and rights, including Ascot Racecourse and Windsor Great Park. Naturally occurring gold and silver in the UK, collectively known as "Mines Royal", are managed by the Crown Estate and leased to mining operators. Also, while not strictly on point, the Environment Agency in the U.K. may criminally prosecute people who were involved in breaking the environmental laws in question, if they are still living. (In Colorado, where I live, most toxic mines date to the 19th century, were abandoned, everyone who was personally involved with them is dead, and the state and federal EPA try to clean them up as funds become available, sometimes making the problem worse due to unexpected mishaps that occur in the cleanup process.) | Yes, there is a reasonableness limit, and this is especially true in consumer transactions. If you were given an estimate and the final bill is a lot more than what you were expecting, you can dispute it. The final price should be ‘reasonable’. The law doesn’t say what counts as reasonable, so you’ll have to agree it between you. You should consider: the estimate you agreed to [if there was one] any changes, and why they happened anything that happened that was beyond the control of the trader, like bad weather or the cost of materials going up https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/consumer/getting-home-improvements-done/problem-with-home-improvements/ When it comes to work itself, the act states that a tradesman or professional has a 'duty of care' towards you and your property. Any standard or price you agree must be honoured. But if it isn't agreed in advance the work must be done to a reasonable standard, at a reasonable cost, and within a reasonable time. So if you haven't fixed a price, you don't have to pay a ridiculously high bill. All you have to pay is what you consider 'reasonable' and invite them to sue you for the rest. Be careful though, in some circumstances when you are withholding payment you may have a claim made against you by a supplier if you are in breach of contract. What's a reasonable amount would be what similar tradesmen would have charged for the job. So get a few quotations. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/1fdlwC9xzyxjCpWMlsCGG3j/supply-of-services NB that article refers to The Supply of Goods & Services Act 1982, which was partially superseded by the Consumer Rights Act 2015. | We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. The debt collector is probably either the owner of the claim against you, if it is an assignee of the claim, or an agent of the landlord for purposes of collection. Thus, payment to the debt collector is equivalent to payment of the landlord. The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction regarding whether payment constitutes of waiver of a right to sue over the debt. Sometimes it is necessary to designate the payment "under protests" or "reserving all rights", but that is not a uniform rule of law that applies in all jurisdictions, and I do not have the time and familiarity with that state's law to research Massachusetts case law on that point accurately. | It would depend on the law of that state, and the insurance policy. Here is a sample policy from the California Earthquake Authority. §8 on Other Insurance says a. If there is other insurance that covers earthquake loss to the dwelling or other property covered under this policy,we will pay our share of the covered loss or damage. Our share is the proportion that the applicable limit of insurance under this policy bears to the combined limits of insurance of all policies that cover the same property. As you can see, they anticipate the possibility of having multiple insurance policies, so it's reasonable to conclude that it's not illegal to have two earthquake insurance policies, at least in this case. | You have to pay the premium You are not buying insurance by the month - you are buying coverage for a year for which you making monthly payments. At law, your insurer has to pay out for a single claim that happens during that period - most insurance policies contain a reset clause that reinstates the cover after a claim but this only applies if the asset still exists. Insurance law started with insurance of wooden ships on intercontinental voyages where losses were usually total and this ‘accident of history’ informs modern insurance where losses are usually not total. Similarly, being able to cancel the insurance if you dispose of the asset is a creature of the contract and usual practice rather than a legal requirement. As for “mak[ing] it clear to me” - they did. It’s in the policy which you legally read and understood even if you didn’t actually read it. | As a matter of contract law it would not be possible to enforce a requirement to pay legal fees without agreement. You could easily see how this would be problematic: one could just draft letters to hundreds or thousands of people and require them to pay the costs of composing the letter. My understanding is that this is common practice in the United States (see speculative invoicing). However, people are generally free to pay whatever they want to anyone they want. The other side is free to pay the legal costs, they just probably won't. In some common law jurisdictions, the concept of a Calderbank offer may be another reason to write a letter such as this; the settlement offer can be relied upon in later proceedings as an indication as to the costs that would be appropriate to award to the winning party, should the offeree unnecessarily prolong legal proceedings | One reason is that in a German civil suit, the cost for lawyers and for the court (court isn't free) is set according to the value that the parties are arguing about, which would be the value that one party demands, minus the value that the other party is offering to pay. Then the cost is divided between winner and loser according to the percentage of the value the claimant was awarded. So if I ask for €1,000,000 and I am rewarded €10,000 then the cost is calculated based on my €1,000,000 claim, and since I was rewarded only 1% of the claim, I'll pay 99% of the cost. The defendant will pay my €10,000 and 1% of the cost, that is my lawyers, their lawyers, and the court. With these rules, asking for the sky and then not getting much is a very, very bad strategy. On the other hand, if a huge company sues me for €10,000 then they can't snow me under with an army of lawyers: The court will get only a small amount of money for the case, so at some rather early point the judge would tell the huge company: Stop right now; I'm not paid enough money to listen to your army of lawyers. |
Can someone plead the fifth regarding impeachment? Recently, former president Trump turned down the opportunity to testify at his own impeachment hearing. However, given the magnitude of the charges, could he be compelled to testify by subpoena? Or could Trump plead the fifth, thereby avoiding having to testify against himself? The basis for this question is that there's a bit of debate upon whether impeachment itself is a legal process or a political one. The criteria by which a president is impeached is deliberately vague, but the penalties for a successful impeachment are partially legal and partially political (i.e. removed from office, barred from serving again; but this does not otherwise deprive the defendant of their liberty (though other legal charges may)). Regardless, because impeachment does not have any stated criteria other than, "Treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," those penalties could theoretically come about simply by virtue of Congress holding a 2/3 majority of an opposing party. Given that the 5th amendment protects a defendant from being a witness against themselves in a criminal proceeding, could Trump exercise that protection to avoid being compelled to testify before Congress? | Yes Impeachment proceedings (as are all activities of Congress) are legal proceedings in that they are enabled by the Constitution. While it is true that they are not judicial proceedings, the activities of the legislature as with the executive (like a police interview) and judiciary (like a trial) are legal processes and the Fifth Amendment rights apply. During the McCarthy “red scare” era, pleading the fifth was commonplace by witnesses to Congressional hearings. However, pleading the fifth does not mean you can avoid testifying. If subpoenaed you would need to turn up and answer the questions, pleading the fifth when the answer could incriminate you in a criminal matter. | House Rule XI(m), p. 19, states the power of committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas. (1)…a committee or sub-committee is authorized (subject to subparagraph (3)(A)) …to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses… (3)(A)(i) Except as provided in sub-division (A)(ii), a subpoena may be authorized and issued by a committee or subcommittee under subparagraph (1)(B) in the conduct of an investigation or series of investigations or activities only when authorized by the committee or subcommittee, a majority being present. A subcommittee could therefore authorize the chair of the subcommittee to issue subpoenas with no vote at all. Otherwise, the (sub)committee must "authorize" a subpoena, which conventionally means "vote on the motion". There is no requirement that the entire house must vote on subpoenas. There is no question that POTUS did not obey the demand of the House subcommittee. The argument that will most likely be proffered is not that the House violated its rules, but that the House rules exceed constitutional authority in issuing the subpoena. As pointed out in this analysis, this is not a well-established and settled question of constitutional law. There is no rule that requires a full House vote on all subcommittee rules established by a subcommittee that forwards articles of impeachment to the full House. That is, a subcommittee does not have to get prior approval of the full House in order for a subcommittee to conduct business and recommend an action to the full house. Instead, the House simply votes yes or no on the particular articles, following the rules for House votes. | That remains to be determined. This article (100 Tex. L. Rev. 56 (2021)) discusses the possibility. To start, the Constitution does not directly say that a sitting president cannot be prosecuted. The lack of an express presidential immunity and the fact that an attempt by Madison to create such an immunity is an indication of "original intent". The view that an incumbent president cannot be indicted, prosecuted, convicted or punished is a policy stance set forth by the Dept. of justice, but is not constitutional law. Alito in Trump v. Vance points to some apparently negative consequences of allowing indictment of a sitting president, but this was in a dissenting opinion. Practical considerations of policy might argue for not prosecuting a sitting president, but the Constitution itself does not expressly forbid it. As we know from numerous SCOTUS rulings, the court is also capable of finding implicit support for a rule in the Constitution. For example theimpeachment provisions do not demand or even hint that impeachment must precede trial and punishment. An argument that prosecution would "incapacitate" the president is met with the fact that there is a provision for replacing an incapacitated POTUS with VPOTUS as acting president. The idea that a trial interferes with a person's ability to do their job (or that they can't adequately participate in their defense if they are doing their job) has not actually prevented ordinary people with jobs from being prosecuted for their crimes. | The only relevant case heard by SCOTUS is Nixon v. US, 506 U.S. 224, where a federal judge was tried and convicted for actual crimes, but would not resign his position so continued to draw his salary. The key legal question was whether the matter is "justiciable" (meaning, not a political matter but a legal matter). Nixon's argument was that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, and the court held that the question (more specifically what it means to "try") is nonjusticiable. White & Blackmun, and Souter, wrote concurring opinions (which might be called on in a subsequent impeachment case) that reminds the reader (and future court) what was not part of the holding of the court, and what might therefore allow future impeachment review. White writes The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us even to consider his contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore reach the merits of the claim. I concur in the judgment because the Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" petitioner. He observes that the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed a trial by reasonable judges. But, I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to "try" impeachment cases. When asked at oral argument whether that direction would be satisfied if, after a House vote to impeach, the Senate, without any procedure whatsoever, unanimously found the accused guilty of being "a bad guy," counsel for the United States answered that the Government's theory "leads me to answer that question yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. Especially in light of this advice from the Solicitor General, I would not issue an invitation to the Senate to find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business, to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment process. Souter in his opinion states that One can, nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply" 'a bad guy,'", judicial interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. In other words, review of an impeachment is largely but not entirely off the table, at least until SCOTUS declares that impeachments are completely unreviewable, no matter what, period (unlikely to ever happen). | Mr. Comey answered this in his testimony. LANKFORD: Okay. Fair enough. If the president wanted to stop an investigation, how would he do that? Knowing it is an ongoing criminal investigation or counterintelligence investigation, would that be a matter of going to you, you perceive, and say, you make it stop because he doesn't have the authority to stop it? How would the president make an ongoing investigation stop? COMEY: I'm not a legal scholar, but as a legal matter, the president is the head of the executive branch and could direct, in theory, we have important norms against this, but could anyone be investigative or not. I think he has the legal authority. All of us ultimately report in the executive branch to the president. LANKFORD: Would that be to you, or the attorney general or who? COMEY: I suppose he could if he wanted to issue a direct order could do it anyway. Through the attorney general or issue it directly to me. This issue also came up in United States v Texas. The obligation to refrain from interference with the FBI is a norm, not a legal requirement. And, like many executive powers, an act that is sometimes legally permitted can become illegal given an improper motive. It is also possible for Congress to find legal acts to be untenably corrupt. | The Fifth Amendment always protects someone from being forced to testify against themselves if it would implicate them in a crime (see, among others, Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17). Any person can assert the privilege, regardless of their role in the trial, with the possible exception of the plaintiff (who is the one person who wanted to go to court). Like always with the Fifth Amendment, they can answer some questions but not others (but if they do answer a question, they need to fully answer it). In civil cases, the Fifth Amendment itself does not keep the jury from making adverse inferences against whoever invoked the privilege; if you refuse to testify, they can assume that it's because testifying would be extremely damaging in that particular case. However, most states have rules against that, and so invoking the privilege in state courts generally works like it does in a criminal case (where the jury basically ignores that the question was even asked). In federal courts, if a case is being heard under diversity jurisdiction (plaintiff and defendant are from different states but the claim is not a federal claim) the state rule is supposed to apply; if the claim is a federal claim, the federal rule applies and adverse inferences are allowed. While the Fifth Amendment can be invoked by anyone, there may be consequences. In many states (where adverse inference isn't allowed), a witness who will just invoke the Fifth and answer no questions can't be called, because it's a complete waste of time. If the plaintiff invokes the Fifth to not answer key questions, then the court can potentially dismiss the case; they have the right to assert the privilege, but their lawsuit might suffer for it. In federal court, another possibility that's been done several times before is that the civil case is just put on hold until the criminal matter is resolved. Sources: “The Fifth Amendment Can & Will Be Used Against You In a (Federal) Court of Law” Taking the 5th: How to pierce the testimonial shield Plaintiff as Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amendment | No. They could be, but the "nullification" wouldn't be automatic. That is because, as the Congressional Research Service says in its excellent "Executive Orders: An Introduction": "Once issued, a valid executive order has the force and effect of law. Executive orders do not, by default, expire when the issuing President leaves office. Instead, an issued executive order remains in effect until it is either struck down in court, modified, or revoked." Because executive orders persist but can be easily changed, one of the first orders of business of a new administration is to revoke, modify or re-issue inherited executive orders. As far as your hypothetical, most commenters agree that when the President is expected to return to office quickly, the Acting President's job is simply to "keep shop." However, in extreme cases, such as the one you outline, they also agree the Acting President can exercise the full-range of Presidential powers. Thus, the Acting President could revoke the problematic orders. (This is discussed in Yale Law School's in the Yale Law School's "Reader's Guide" to the 25th Amendment.) If you want to know more, the Wikipedia page on Executive Orders gives a short (and harmless) summary. For more detail, see either the CRS pamphlet cited above, or their earlier pamphlet,"Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation." | The Twenty Second Amendment is quite clear on this: No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice In your question, the President has been elected twice - unless of course the President was actually the Vice President (or elsewhere in the line of succession) at the start of the first term, in which case theres other limits: and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. So, someone who has held the office of President after being elevated to it rather than elected to it, but served no more than 1 year 364 days of that first term, could possibly, by the wording of the Twenty Second Amendment, be eligible to resign within their second term and stand again but only once more. |
Do I need to register for Foreign Qualification in my situation? I am wondering if or where I need to register for Foreign Qualification: I incorporated a company as a C-corp in Delaware. I work day-to-day and have set the official HQ of the corporation in Maryland. Currently, we don't sell any products for a price (our products are free IT). Do I need to register for Foreign Qualification in Delaware (or am I already?), or do I need to in Maryland? Thanks! | A corporation that is incorporated in Delaware is a foreign corporation in Maryland and not Delaware. Since it sounds from the question that this corporation regularly conducts business in Maryland ("work day-to-day" and "official HQ" in Maryland), it almost certainly is required to register for foreign qualification in Maryland. In Maryland, "a foreign corporation is doing business within a state when it transacts some substantial part of its ordinary business therein", Chesapeake, Etc. v. Manitowoc Engineering Corp., 194 A. 2d 624 (Md. 1963), and is therefore required to qualify as a foreign corporation under Maryland Code, Corporations and Associations § 7-203. "Factors which may be taken into account include the payment of state taxes; the maintenance in the state of property, an office, telephone listings, employees, agents, inventory, research and development facilities, advertising, and bank accounts; the making of contracts; and the extent or pervasiveness of management functions including supervision and control of distributors and services for customers within the state." SAS Personnel Consult. v. Pat-Pan, 407 A. 2d 1139 (Md. 1979). If the corporation's HQ is in Maryland, it is likely these factors all indicate that the corporation does business in Maryland and is thus required to register. | Please note that I can't provide legal advice and consider the following as suggestions you can and should discuss with a lawyer of your choice: You are probably member of a tax-advisory association (Lohnsteuerhilfeverein). These associations can only advise its members on their tax declarations. Therefore you are indeed a member, not a "member". As a member you are presumably obliged to pay a yearly membership fee, and from your initial question I infer that the membership cannot be terminated before three years have passed. That and when you have to pay your fee is most likely provided for in the association's constitution. Payment of the fee does not depend on an invoice, because the requirements of § 14 UStG are most likely not met: the association is not a trader (Unternehmer), nor is a membership a performance (Leistung). Whether you have to pay a penalty depends on the wording of the section regarding the fee in the constitution. If your membership rights have been infringed by not giving you notice of the annual general meeting, this would not give you a defence or objection against the payment of the fee. You could report this matter to the competent watchdog (Aufsichtsbehörde) under § 27(1) StBerG, though: Aufsichtsbehörde ist die Oberfinanzdirektion oder die durch die Landesregierung bestimmte Landesfinanzbehörde. 2 Sie führt die Aufsicht über die Lohnsteuerhilfevereine, die ihren Sitz im Bezirk der Aufsichtsbehörde haben. That is either the Oberfinanzdirektion or the Landesfinanzbehörde in the German state where the association has its statutory seat. | Here is the technical manual: you want 11.015. It says: New Registered Owner Section—The name, address, and driver license or identification card (DL/ID) number for each new registered owner must be entered on the appropriate lines. If an owner has not been issued a California DL/ID card, their out-of-state DL/ID number, if any, is acceptable. Print the out-of-state DL/ID number and state of issuance in the upper-right corner of the face document or application. The out-of-state DL/ID number cannot be keyed, but will be microfilmed with the title. The word “None” should be entered for persons who have not been issued a DL/ID card from California or any other state. | Bonded labor is illegal in India, but enforcement is lax. Read Right against exploitation in Fundamental rights in India. The right against exploitation, given in Articles 23 and 24, provides for two provisions, namely the abolition of trafficking in human beings and Begar (forced labour)... As per law, they cannot make the contract binding if it relates to bonding of the laborer. But a general contract may stand in court if they have made you sign the contract and paid the duty to government for the contract. This contract will be mild form of Bonds/begar-contracts. As per the requirements of the contract, usually they will ask you to give them your original documents and degree certificate. Do not do that. That will give them control, and it's illegal. From personal experience, such companies are phonies and they want to exploit you. Visa thing is a scare. As per they wont give me Experience letter and Releasing letter; they might do that, and so you will not be able to show experience. You can file a lawsuit against them. (But you know it's a waste of time in Indian courts) As per first three things you mentioned: It is written on my company's letter head. It doesn't contain any stamp paper. It doesn't contain any company seal. It's not a contract. Do not provide them your actual signatures. Make a strange signature so that you can later argue that it's not your signature. But think about the consequences: You are going to that (probably shady) company, do you think they will hold any of their promises later, at all. Think: Will the company stay in business until your bond is over? Then how will you get an Experience certificate? That ends the answer. A few suggestions I'd suggest finding a different job. I'd suggest talking to a lawyer. It's cheaper than your life being screwed up. I'd suggest talking to your family about it. Nothing written here constitutes legal advice. Talk to a lawyer to get a legal opinion on the matter. | Yes, in most jurisdictions citizenship or residency is not a pre-requisite for standing. However, be aware that there are plenty of jurisdictions where the practical effect of being non-native gives you effectively no chance of winning. "Fair" in some countries means their citizens always beat foreigners. | It is not legal in the case of a company. They must also accept communications by post. In the UK, "a company must at all times have a registered office to which all communications and notices may be addressed." (s 86, Companies Act 2006). It must display the address of its registered office on its website, business letters, and order forms (r 25, Company, Limited Liability Partnership and Business (Names and Trading Disclosures) Regulations 2015). It must also disclose the address to you if you ask for it in writing (r 27). A failure to do either of these is a criminal offence (r 28). As a practical matter you can also look up the address yourself on the Companies House register if you know the name or registered number of the company. The company must provide you with its registered name on all forms of business correspondence (r 24) (this is a wider definition than that for disclosure of its registered office address). A company cannot rely on the fact that the registered office address it has given to Companies House is out of date. It must continue to accept communications at any address on the register for 14 days after it notifies Companies House of any change. (s 87, Companies Act 2006). | The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date. | This is a live political issue. Currently, the various datasets are incomplete and have known accuracy issues. Considering a particular parcel of land: It might not be in the Land Registry at all. About 85% of land in England and Wales is registered, and less in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Scottish registered land might only appear on the paper "Register of Sasines", as opposed to the more recent electronic database, or potentially in even older county-specific sasine registers. The owner might be a company, partnership, trust, etc., rather than a natural person. The ownership and control of that company (etc.) can be hard to trace. Companies House data is not verified; companies can be incorporated overseas; the trusts register is not publicly searchable; things can be muddled. Raw data might not show that a dozen properties, each owned by a single company that owns nothing else, are in fact ultimately controlled by a particular person of interest. Different people may own the freehold, or a leasehold, or have various other forms of ownership or control. Even a long-term tenancy may be of interest for database purposes. Because of continuing interest in anti-money laundering, tax evasion, and general accumulation of wealth, there have been plans to have a new "register of beneficial ownership". Such a register would record, for each plot of land, the name of the human beings who actually own and control it in the end. In the anticipated structure, each of those people would have an identifying number, and so we would get your proposed reverse index where you could look up a person and see what they owned. The register introduced by the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 is the "Register of Overseas Entities" (ROE). However, as the name suggests, it only covers companies/partnerships/etc. from outside the UK. It's operated by Companies House. Overseas entities who have dealt in UK land since 1999/2014/2022 (depending on which part of the UK the land was in) have to list their beneficial owners. Because this is new, it is also not very complete yet: it only went live on 1 August 2022 and no penalties apply until the deadline of 31 January 2023. In Scotland, the "Register of Persons Holding a Controlled Interest in Land" (RCI) is meant to do the same but not just for overseas entities. It is live since 1 April 2022 and the initial registration period ends on 1 April 2023, so again it may not be very complete just yet. There will likely be more political tussle over potential creation of a more extensive UK-wide register. Until that exists, this is a known problem with the extent of current data. You can get a partial view but even that will be frustrating when it comes to the most interesting chunks of property. |
Is a tenant legally required to report the rent payments in cash to the IRS? I've been renting a room in a house in California, USA for a few years. Each month, I pay an advance payment to the homeowner. The rent is currently $650/month, and he wants cash. Legally speaking, am I required to report those cash payments to the IRS? And, does the IRS have a webpage that has instructions or regulations regarding these cash transactions? | In general, a person who pays for goods and services with cash is not obligated to report the payments to the IRS (thus simplifying your trip to the hardware store, purchases from a vending machine, etc.). There are laws requiring reporting of receipt of cash 31 USC 5313 which applies to banks, which are regulated, but Ordinary Joe is not subject to this law. Receipt of over $10,000 in one or more related transactions, in the course of business, must be reported under 26 USC 6050I. The IRS also says "File Form MISC-1099 for each person to whom you have paid during the year" if you pay at least $600 in rents, prizes awards, "other income payments", medical and health care payments and so on. Later, they list exceptions including payments for merchandise, telegrams, telephone, freight, storage, and similar items; payments of rent to real estate agents or property managers. The instruction book then says, even more specifically, Report on Form 1099-MISC only when payments are made in the course of your trade or business. Personal payments are not reportable. And then they repeat the exception for merchandise: but you're not paying to a real estate agent or a property manager, so that exception is not relevant (but the fact that the payer reports only in case it is a business covers your situation). | The thing I was trying to zero in on was the work/refresh/renovation that needs to be done between tenants, and if they landlord can expect to do it while Tenant A is still paying (up to the date of the 'lease change'), but expecting that Tenant A has vacated before that date, or allows the work to be done while they are still occupying? The first tenant is not required to relinquish possession of the premises while the first lease is in force. The landlord's right of access to the apartment remains unchanged from those specified in the lease and in state landlord-tenant law. So basically the landlord has to wait until the first tenant leaves before doing most of the work. If the first tenant relinquishes possession of the premises before the end of the lease period, the landlord can keep charging rent until the premises has been re-let to a new tenant. But if the landlord has agreed to stop charging rent when the first tenant moves out, the landlord may be bound by that agreement. If the landlord has signed a second lease with a new tenant beginning immediately after the first tenant's mutually agreed early move-out date, then the landlord basically has no time available to fix up the apartment except with the consent of one tenant or the other. | No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement"). | Michigan law say nothing about landlord entry, so whatever it says in the lease is what is allowed. Various sources like this comment on the lack of such statutory regulations. There does not appear to be any relevant case law for Michigan which impose restrictions on a landlord's right to access a rental. Since there is no statutory or case law restriction on landlord's right to access his property, landlord's agent would have the same right to access. That would mean that if the listing agent were authorized by the landlord to enter, then the agent could enter, and it would not be necessary for the landlord to accompany this agent whenever entry was needed. That does not mean that a "listing agent" that happens to work with a landlord has an independent right to enter the landlord's property. The same would go for repairmen. It is actually not clear to me whether there could be blanket permission for any and all with access to the lock box to enter, since pretty much any realtor can enter a house for sale, subject to whatever the stated limitations are, and they don't call the owner for each entry. I suspect that one would not have legal grounds for imposing a particular additional restriction on a landlord's right to access and permit access to the property, since there's no overriding statute, and restrictions on landlord access mainly derive from statutes. | If you want to get out, and are willing to lose $270, you can not sign the lease and demand a return of your security deposit. You could ask for a return of the other fees as well, but you are less likely to be successful. They would probably have trouble enforcing a security deposit against you if you didn't have a lease with them, and would probably have trouble demanding you sign a lease when they changed the unit. You should probably get it all back, because you applied for it, but it probably isn't worth litigating over. I would also encourage you to turn to social media sites if they have one, or to sites like Yelp, if they do not. Many businesses are sensitive to this and if you are truthful if could provide you with some leverage. | You should have seen this coming. This might vary a bit from place to place, however it would generally be accepted that if you are in a rented place, you have to pay rent. Most jurisdictions would have some law which requires pro-rata'd payment for the time you actually stay, there would not be any requiring the landlord let you stay free. An uninvested third party might ask "Why would a landlord provide you with 5 days free rent". Another way to look at it is that one of the elements of a contract is consideration (think payment) - Thus in contracting to stay in his place longer you should expect to provide consideration - and pro-rata'd rent would be typical. | What "reasonable accommodation" were you requesting? That they lower the bar of determining your ability to pay your bills on time? I don't think that will qualify. A business setting a minimum bar for financial viability isn't a burden tied to a handicap. It's one thing to request a ramp, contracts in braille, etc., but it's another thing to request that they accept a highly-probable financial risk. What would you expect of them the next time "life" got in the way and you couldn't pay your rent? Another accommodation? I think what they were saying is that since you didn't pass the financial background check, and as such were not accepted as a resident, you aren't in a position to make an accommodation request. | This may be true of the Nooksack tribe, in a sense. There is a category of Indian land known as trust land, which is held in trust by the US Government for the benefit of a tribe (there is also land that is just plain owned by the tribe). A tribe can thus set rules regarding use of the land that they control, which could mean that nobody can live in a particular place (not uncommon). The tribe could rent out land, and the rental agreement could contain a tribal membership clause. This complaint by the Nooksack Indian Housing Authority alleges that defendant is not a member of the tribe, and that the rental agreement requires defendant to be an enrolled member of the tribe. Defendant was disenrolled, and the eviction action followed. Non-member evictions are not the most popular actions that a tribe undertakes, so finding those rules online is not going to be easy. |
Can a free website have a terms of service? I co-own a free website that recently underwent a spam attack. I have considered a terms of service to keep people from abusing the website. However, upon reading sites that inform me how to create one, I noticed a lot of them have to do with money. Since the website is free, and has no current plans to make money, I do not want the site or any legal things to deal with money. The website also has no relation to any company. Is there a way to tell people that they are not allowed to use the site if they do not follow the rules, and what can I do if they do not follow these? | Yes, you can. An excellent example is this very website - at the bottom of this page you will find a series of links in the footer, one of which is "Terms of Service". I think you will agree that most people using the Law SE are making no money from it or paying no money to use it and yet the terms of service sets out in black and white what a user of this site can do, and what the repercussions can be if they breach the ToS, so it serves a purpose as an excellent example for your question. | Just at the offset this does not constitute legal advice, just some opinions I have on this point. Technically, you would not be prohibited to generate speech and use it however you like. Under normal circumstances any output generated by the system that does not contravene the service agreement would be your intellectual property. This would include the text and speech generated. Once you go about the request limit you would naturally be required to pay, but until that time you can use the service as a paying customer. Just to clarify this point I would like to make reference to the service license agreement, clause 3, which make reference to the following prohibitions: (a) copy, modify, create a derivative work of, reverse engineer, decompile, translate, disassemble, or otherwise attempt to extract any or all of the source code of the Services (subject to Section 3.4 below and except to the extent such restriction is expressly prohibited by applicable law); (b) use the Services for High Risk Activities; (c) sublicense, resell, or distribute any or all of the Services separate from any integrated Application; (d) create multiple Applications, Accounts, or Projects to simulate or act as a single Application, Account, or Project (respectively) or otherwise access the Services in a manner intended to avoid incurring Fees or exceed usage limits or quotas; (e) unless otherwise set forth in the Service Specific Terms, use the Services to operate or enable any telecommunications service or in connection with any Application that allows Customer End Users to place calls or to receive calls from any public switched telephone network; or (f) process or store any Customer Data that is subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations maintained by the Department of State. Unless otherwise specified in writing by Google, Google does not intend uses of the Services to create obligations under HIPAA, and makes no representations that the Services satisfy HIPAA requirements. If Customer is (or becomes) a Covered Entity or Business Associate, as defined in HIPAA, Customer will not use the Services for any purpose or in any manner involving Protected Health Information (as defined in HIPAA) unless Customer has received prior written consent to such use from Google. Similarly, as specified here: Customer will not, and will not allow third parties to: (i) use these Services to create, train, or improve (directly or indirectly) a similar or competing product or service or (ii) integrate these Services with any applications for any embedded devices such as cars, TVs, appliances, or speakers without Google's prior written permission. These Services can only be integrated with applications for the following personal computing devices: smartphones, tablets, laptops, and desktops. In addition to any other available remedies, Google may immediately suspend or terminate Customer's use of these Services based on any suspected violation of these terms, and violation of these terms is deemed violation of Google's Intellectual Property Rights. Customer will provide Google with any assistance Google requests to reasonably confirm compliance with these terms (including interviews with Customer employees and inspection of Customer source code, model training data, and engineering documentation). These terms will survive termination or expiration of the Agreement. You should also take a look at this and this. However, as per the terms of the agreement the speech generated would be your intellectual property, unless otherwise specified. Good luck! | Owing to the First Amendment, in the United States your recourse would be limited to civil action based on violations of terms of service (meaning that "the authorities" are not going to knock on their doors to tell them to behave). This is not "spam" (which could be regulated) as the term is generally understood. It is annoying, but probably does not constitute threatening or child porn. It might involve violation of an anti-impersonation law such as this one from Texas, if the offender uses the persona of a real person as opposed to a fictitious person). That law, moreover, does not criminalize simple annoying. Prosecution may be possible in the UK. | What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation. | At least as of 2011, when regulations under the Information Technology Act related to privacy and data security were issued (some of the relevant statute sections and regulations are linked in this answer at Law.SE), there was no non-contractual right to have your data destroyed, although a terms of service for a site could give you that right contractually. Instead, usually, a term of service agreement will do exactly the opposite and give a site owner an irrevocable right to keep your data forever. I am not aware of any subsequent statutory, regulatory or case law developments in India which have changed this situation, but that kind of tweak of IT Act regulations in India wouldn't necessary make headlines outside of the local IT industry press coverage in obscure trade journals. The EU is the only place of which I am aware that has any individual right to have data destroyed or suppressed even if it doesn't violated copyright, wasn't obtained illegally and isn't fraudulent or defamatory. Even then, as I understand it, in the EU this is not a unilateral right that applies in all circumstances and is instead a specific remedy for certain situations that have a particularly intense privacy aspect to them. | The only real recourse you have is to contact the webhost and try to convince them your content is really yours and file a DMCA Takedown request. How you convince them might be an issue; do you have any old screenshots? Original photos? Any proof that the content and photos are yours? The webhost appears to be https://datacamp.co.uk/ , unless the DNS is being proxied, since DNS points to CloudDNS https://mxtoolbox.com/SuperTool.aspx?action=dns:marksmayo.com NZ and UK are members of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, so there don't appear to be any arguments about not applying copyright law. You willingly gave up the domain, so you have no recourse or valid reason to try and regain ownership of the domain. You could try and contact the new owner of the domain by filing a complaint via the abuse email listed by the domain registar at https://www.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx?&domain=marksmayo.com But they may not do anything, even if you can prove a copyright violation, since they only handle the domain registration and not the webhosting. How they got the content is another question: who was your webhost when you owned the site? Datacamp? Did they not delete it when you closed your account? How did the new owner come to get it? | Check the website's terms of service. Check to see if you're violating these terms, and check to see if the script you are making enables other people to violate them. Courts don't often look kindly on actions whose sole purpose is enabling someone else to do something that is prohibited. If you're making a script that helps people do something they're allowed to do, in a way that's better for at least somebody and makes nobody worse off, that's often a different story. Major websites will generally indicate whether or not you're allowed to do this. Some sites are fairly strict about prohibiting scraping (e.g. Craigslist, which at one point shut down Padmapper's alternative more-useful presentation of their content). Others, like Wikipedia, much more actively encourage reusing content from their sites as long as you meet certain conditions such as a link back to the original source. | Can a moderation team in a game extend a ban that you have just because they want to TL;DR Yes and no. It's their platform and you broke the rules that you agreed to. Therefore, you forfeited your right to use the service for as long as they deem appropriate up to and including forever. In exercising this power they must act reasonably which, in the absence of anything in the contract (and I can't see anything) means that their response must be proportionate and offer you procedural fairness. It's possible that they haven't done this - it may even be likely. However, in order to have this overturned, clause 24 of the EULA requires you to take the dispute to arbitration. Clause 24.4 sets out how to initiate this. |
Can police charge someone with a misdemeanor in the total absence of evidence? In California, given that the police have probable cause to arrest someone, can they charge that person with a misdemeanor in the total absence of evidence that any crime has been committed? To be clear, it is NOT the case that the police gathered evidence that ultimately did not prove their case; rather, the police saw and gathered NO evidence at all (nor did they collect specimens of any kind from the arrested person). I'm wondering if there is a cause of action against the police in such a situation. UPDATE: The following are the details of the arrest. Bob, a 70 year old single man, lived in a rented house with his girlfriend, Susan. Susan has a history of causing problems and was evicted from the house about 2 years ago. Bob remained in the house. Bob also has a history of causing problems and over the last 6 months has had 3 or 4 women in the house (one at a time, not all at the same time). None of the women established residency in house. Two of these women used drugs in the house. One used heroin and the other used meth amphetamines. The police were frequently at the house responding to multiple domestic disturbance calls. Bob used meth amphetamines just before calling the police for yet another domestic disturbance. When the police arrived, Bob was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Bob plead guilty and will be taking a drug diversion class. This was approximately 3 months ago. Two months ago Bob moved in with Susan in her apartment. Recall that Susan was the woman evicted two years ago from the house Bob rents. Bob continued renting the house even though he was living with Susan in her apartment. One week ago, Bob moved back into the house he is renting. Susan remained in her apartment. Susan, who has not been to Bob’s house since being evicted 2 years ago, called the police and falsely reported drug activity at Bob’s house. The police showed up at Bob’s house and informed Bob that someone called to report drug activity in the house. They asked if they could enter the house and conduct a search. Bob agreed. The police found nothing and then asked Bob if he was under the influence of any medication. Bob said yes, he had taken a Ritalin and produced the bottle of Ritalin, showing that it came from a pharmacy and was prescribed for Bob. The police asked Bob to produce a urine sample. Bob unsuccessfully attempted to produce the sample (the police had arrived only a minute or two after Bob finished using the restroom). The police gave Bob 3 bottles of water to drink, which Bob drank. The police then waited for about 90 minutes at Bob’s house to give Bob time to produce the sample. Still unable to produce a sample, they arrested Bob. Bob challenged the arrest, asking why he was being arrested. The police responded by saying that the house was a known drug house, that Bob had a drug conviction and was on probation and that they felt Bob was under the influence of something other than the Ritalin. Bob believes he is not on probation, having never been ordered to meet with a probation officer. We are now investigating whether or not Bob is on probation. While in police custody, the police never asked Bob to attempt to produce a urine sample. The police released him the next day, charging him with misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. Bob never admitted using anything illegal and the police left the house with no evidence and no evidence was gathered while Bob was in custody. | A person cannot be arrested for a misdemeanor by a police officer without a warrant unless the officer has probable cause that a person committed a misdemeanor in their presence. "Probable cause" is when the facts objectively support a belief that the person has committed a crime. If there is a total lack of evidence, then there is no probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, so an arrest (for anything) when there is absolutely no evidence that the person committed a crime would be illegal. If, for example, an officer decides he hates your face and arrests you for littering without any reason whatsoever, that would be illegal and a cause for a lawsuit. An officer might arrest a person for smoking marijuana in public based on a person exuding the smell of marijuana and seeing the person smoking a hand-rolled cigarette, but they could also be factually mistaken as to whether the person had actually been smoking marijuana at the time: perhaps they were wearing marijuana-smelling perfume and were smoking a regular tobacco cigarette. The evidence for the crime would not be completely non-existent, but would be insufficient for a conviction. If the officer failed to take the cigarette as evidence, that would be a problem, because the remaining evidence (visual and olfactory) would not support a conviction. | If the victim is unable to prove who the culprit was, then it will be impossible to prosecute that person criminally or sue them for civil damages. Incidents like these are rarely enough to cause a police department to throw sufficient investigative resources at it to crack the case without some reason to believe that it is part of something bigger. An unfortunate fact of life is that most perpetrators of crimes and torts get away with it and are not caught. And, if the only available witness is willing to lie to cover up the name of the guilty party (probably out of a desire to not have the dog put down), it is that much harder. A private investigator might be able to solve the case, but the cost of hiring a PI would probably exceed the benefit that could be obtained if the PI was successful. | Keep in mind that a warrant doesn't require proof that you stole the property or have the property. Instead, the warrant is just authorization to look for that proof. The standard for securing a warrant is probable cause, which is a much lower bar to clear than people seem to think. It just requires that given everything the officer knows, there's a "substantial probability" that a piece of evidence will be in a given place at a given time. If the officer swore to a judge that a reliable source had told him that the letter was stolen, then seen in your front yard, and not seen since, I wouldn't be at all surprised if the judge gave him a search warrant. | Could DA Bragg have only charged Trump with 34 misdemeanor counts, without elevating the charges to felonies? Yes. if Trump's defense team argues that the law that elevates the misdemeanor charges to felony charges does not apply in this case, because the elevation option does not include federal laws, then since this is a matter of law and not a matter of fact, Judge Mercan (rather than the jury) will decide whether or not to dismiss the felony charges? Yes. Does Judge Mercan have the option of dismissing the felony enhancement but allowing the misdemeanor charges to proceed, or would Mercan have to dismiss all charges against Trump? Judge Mercan could probably choose either option if he found that the original charges were not supported by the law. There is law regarding how this decision is made but I personally don't know that area of law well. One of the reason that I am unfamiliar with it is that it is exceedingly rare for a judge to conclude that the prosecutor's charges are not supported by the law. I would be very surprised if that judge reached that conclusion in this case, in particular, because both federal election law violations and state and federal tax law violations are implicated by the indictment. The DA no doubt legally researched this issue exhaustively before presenting the charges to the grand jury and has made out a prima facie case for a felony under the applicable New York State law. If Trump is brought to trial, then would it be possible for a jury to return a verdict that Trump was guilty of the misdemeanor offenses of falsifying business records but innocent of doing so with an intent to commit another crime? If so, then could Trump still be found guilty of the misdemeanors, or would he be fully acquitted, since the jury ruled that he was not guilty of the exact charges that DA Bragg filed? Whether a jury is presented with a lesser included offense charge at the request of the defense, is partially a matter of the prosecution's election to make that option available or not, and partially a matter of the judge's decision on how to handle it. The body of law involved in how this decision is handled on a case by case basis is quite involved. Most of the case law involves homicide cases, assault cases, and property crime cases where there are charges with are identical except for aggravating factors for the most serious charges. But, lesser charges generally aren't presented if based upon the evidence presented at trial, either the more serious charge is established or no charge is proven. For example, if the defendant presents an alibi defense, and a witness whose credibility is disputed places the defendant at the scene intentionally committing a crime, a lesser included offense charge would not be appropriate. But, if the defendant admits hitting a pedestrian and causing the pedestrian's death, but claims that the pedestrian was at fault in the accident for jay walking, while the prosecution alleges that the pedestrian was intentionally struck as part of a mafia hit, multiple lesser included offenses would probably be charged involving different levels of intent of premeditated intent/aggravated circumstances killing (first degree murder), to a knowing killing (second degree murder), to a reckless killing (manslaughter), to a criminally negligent homicide or vehicular homicide charge. Typically, the decision on this point would not be made until all evidence was received and the judge in a hearing away from the jury but in the presence of the prosecutors and defense counsel crafted jury instructions based upon the evidence presented at trial and the arguments raised by counsel at trial. | Conducting an illegal search does not amount to a permanent get out of jail free card ("does that invalidate all evidence against you". What is excluded is evidence derived from that illegal search, regardless of what crime they were searching for. It would include later evidence for an unrelated crime where the probable cause was uncovered by the illegal search. The doctrine is not absolute, so a grand jury can inquire about a matter brought to their attention via an illegal search ("the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons", US v. Calandra). Also, the doctrine excludes the product of a bad faith search without probable cause e.g. where the officer lies about the probable cause. There is also a "social cost" consideration, see Pennsylvania v. Scott. Utah v. Strief establishes three related doctrines. Unlawfully-obtained evidence independently acquired by officers from a source may be admittede. Evidence may be admitted if it would have been discovered without the unconstitutional source. Finally, since the poison fruit doctrine is intended to limit illegal police action, it may be admitted when there is a remote connection between illegal police conduct and gathering of evidence (e.g. the existence of an arrest warrant, discovered after the search). Nothing in your hypothetical points to an exception. The "social costs" consideration was specifically related to "social costs of allowing convicted criminals who violate their parole to remain at large", but the potential for wider application is established (however, it is well-established that evidence of ordinary drug possession is excluded, from the myriad cases of such exclusions over the past century). | One answer is that you should say "yes", because it is a federal felony (5 years prison term) to say "no", because it is untrue, and you know it is untrue. This assumes that the question simply asks "Have you ever been convicted or arrested; please explain", with no qualifiers like "as an adult". If you are absolutely positive that the record was sealed, an alternative answer is "no", based on a law like RCW 13.50.260(6)(a), which say you can legally "act as if it didn't happen": If the court enters a written order sealing the juvenile court record pursuant to this section, it shall, subject to RCW 13.50.050(13), order sealed the official juvenile court record, the social file, and other records relating to the case as are named in the order. Thereafter, the proceedings in the case shall be treated as if they never occurred, and the subject of the records may reply accordingly to any inquiry about the events, records of which are sealed. California has a similar law. The problem here is that this is state law, so a valid defense for a state charge of lying, but you need to comply with federal law, and states cannot tell the FBI what to do. It is variously rumoured that the FBI does not report sealed records, but it is unwise to count on rumours, and even if it is general discretionary policy for them to delete information about sealed records when reported from the state, it is not guaranteed that the policy is absolutely always followed. You can request an Identity History Summary Check from the FBI. So the safest path is to get an informed opinion, tailored to your facts, from your attorney. | The Secret Service is primarily concerned with protecting the people and information they oversee, not enforcing laws. They have the power to arrest someone for any unlawful conduct, but unless a drug user is presenting as a threat to a protectee, they are unlikely to be arrested by the Secret Service. More likely the Service would simply escort the person off the premises and refer the matter to the DC Metro Police to handle. Edit: Such a case would not be turned over to the US Capitol Police (as originally written) It would most likely be referred to the DC Metropolitan Police Department.Corrected my answer above. | They can’t But they aren’t This is the law (as amended). Section 9 contains the penalties. In any event the police don’t fine people they issue an infringement notice which is an allegation of an offense - police can issue these even if they reasonably believe they took place - they are entitled to be wrong. The person given the notice can admit the offense by paying the fine or contest the allegation by going to court. |
Can killing be "self-defense" if you are committing a crime yourself? Kyle Rittenhouse has been charged with murder. I believe that the facts of the incident are not in dispute, because of ample video evidence: Rittenhouse was attacked, tried to escape, and when he couldn't escape, he used his rifle on the attackers. However, he is a minor and was therefore in possession of a firearm potentially illegally. If so, does this fact make it impossible for him to claim self-defense? | Engaging in unlawful conduct does not completely preclude a claim of self-defense under Wisconsin law ...but it does raise the bar in some circumstances: Criminal conduct by the defendant removes the presumption that "force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm" when defending against unlawful forced entry to one's own property. A much higher burden on use of force is imposed if engaging in unlawful conduct that is "of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack." Anyone intentionally provoking an attack by any means, lawful or unlawful, "with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant," is not entitled to self-defense at all. Section 939.48 of Wisconsin law governs the standards for self-defense. 939.48(1) sets out the general standard: A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. 939.48(1m)(ar) provides presumptions in favor of the defendant and no duty to retreat when defending against unlawful entry to one's own property (an implementation of the castle doctrine), but those presumptions are removed by 939.48(1m)(b)1. if (among other things), "[t]he actor was engaged in a criminal activity." More relevant to a case that occurred outside is 939.48(2), which lays out how provocation affects a claim of self-defense: (a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self-defense, but the person is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely to cause death to the person's assailant unless the person reasonably believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm at the hands of his or her assailant. (b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. (c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense. | Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception. | Is it true that a teacher can't engage/attack a shooter from behind during a school shooting that is in progress? No. Any use of force of any kind that only harms or kills the shooter who is actively engaged in a school shooting (and indeed, even if it caused bodily injury that isn't grave or deadly to someone else who is innocent) is always justified. You can't shoot someone who is not an ongoing threat to others if they flee, in order to arrest or punish them (e.g. an unarmed shoplifter), but under the leading constitutional case, Tennessee v. Garner, this limitation doesn't apply to murderers and mass shooters anyway, at least if they continue to pose a future threat. | Under U.S. law the prosecution must prove that the defendant committed a particular crime beyond a reasonable doubt. So, it is not sufficient to prove that someone committed one of three crimes without proving which one it was. an alternative that I thought of later: someone is found somewhere where they can legally be, but in a situation where the only way they could have gotten there would involve trespassing through one of several properties owned by different people. Since the crime of trespassing requires the prosecution merely to show that someone was on the property of another without legal authorization to do so, it might be possible to prove this crime beyond a reasonable doubt without showing precisely which property was crossed, although I wouldn't be surprised if there was a split of authority among U.S. states on this question. | The definitive answer to the question "could I be charged" is always YES. I refer you to the Manassas City teen charged with child pornography. Child pornography laws were put in place to protect children and prevent them from being exploited by having sexual pictures of them taken and distributed. In this case, the picture in question is of the young man’s own genitals, which would make him both the perpetrator and the victim. Apparently the lead detective in the Manassas City teen's case was himself a pedophile and just wanted an excuse to use force to photograph the teen's erect penis. Why would you assume this "girl" is a "17 year old girl" or a "15 year old girl" and not a 39 year old pedophile Manassas police officer? | In short, no, that cant be a pardon for those police officers who would be now influenced to take more violent actions towards those they detain. Pardons are only applicable to past actions. You may be pardoned before charges are filed, but the actions must have already occured. Though I less certain about this, simply because Ive never heard such a thing proposed, I would also note that it is highly improbable that the actual statement he made - generic and during a speech - could everbe interpreted as an affirmative act intending to grant pardons to anyone who may act in that manner in the future. | Unless there is enough evidence to convict one or more of the suspects, none will be convicted. In general the argument: We know it must be one of you, but we don't know whch, so we find you all guilty. is not allowed in any non-dictatorial jurisdiction. Just how much evidence is needed for a conviction varies by jurisdiction in theory, and by judge or jury in practice. Also, it would be possible to charge several of the residents with having acted jointly in the crime, but there would still need to be sufficient evidence against each defendant to obtain a conviction. | It is reported that this is the result of new legal reasoning in German law. In the cases of Demjanjuk in 2011 and 2015 it was found that being a camp guard is enough to be found guilty of accessory to murder, even without specific evidence of a crime. In a more recent trial (Rehbogen) the prosecution used the same reasoning to charge and try a concentration camp guard. |
To whom do import laws apply? Let's assume in Country A the import of certain digital goods is restricted as with the Wassenaar arrangement. A person hosts such software on his server and has an export license. Another person downloads these digital goods in Country A. Who has broken the law; the server host or the other person who did the download? Is it ok for the host to specify that it cannot be imported to that Country A? | Import laws apply to the one who imports. In your scenario that is the person in country A only. The server owner does not cause the digital content to be transmitted to A. The one who downloads does. | The answer to this question would also heavily depend on which country the transaction is occurring. Supreme court of South Korea ruled in July 2009 that exchanging virtual currency for real world currency is legal, even though doing so was against the game's terms of service. Consequently, players cannot be held legally liable for trading their virtual currency into real money if the game is being serviced in South Korea. This however, does not mean the company cannot suspend your account for doing so. Likely, other countries have different laws about this type of transaction, which you should look into. Source: Official ruling of the case (in Korean) | In the US, there are provisions of criminal law especially 18 USC 2320 which make selling counterfeit goods a crime. Counterfeit goods are subject to forfeiture to the US government. However, this requires a formal legal determination that the goods are counterfeit, and no provision of the law excuses a seller for illegally seizing property that they hold in trust for a party. There might be a contractual provision that allows this, e.g. "at our sole determination we may deem property to be counterfeit and will destroy it, without compensation". In that case especially with online services, it matters what the "contract" says. It is not sufficient to say "It's somewhere on the web page". Generally there is an "I agree" button that links to a document: and that document may refer to other documents such as "Community standards". So if the restriction is in the agreement or in a document referred to by the agreement, then it would be legal. The assumption is that the party agreeing to the terms reads "the agreement", and also reads or understands any terms mentioned in "the agreement" (they become part of the agreement). | It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations. | You can't, in general, know whether a distributor of a work has permission to distribute, or is a pirate site. I verified that they have posted an illegal copy of a work that I created, and I know that I did not grant permission to them (or anyone) to infringe my copyright. Both hosting and downloading works without permission is a violation of copyright law, so both parties are liable. Downloaders may erroneously rely on the "I didn't know!" defense, which in the US carries no legal weight. Even so, if you download my book, it will probably cost me vastly more to sue you for infringement than the damages that I might be awarded over your infringement. Usually, copyright holders go after the pirate sites, and only rarely go after particularly egregious serial downloaders. | A simple EULA does not absolve you from legal responsibility. The law that you need to be acquainted with, if you are dealing with the US (i.e. might be sued in the US), is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in particular Title II, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act which states the "safe harbor" provisions. Aspects of DMCA safe harbor are covered in many Law SE questions. In essence, you have to provide a way for rights holders to complain that someone has infringed their copyright on there site, and you have to take down allegedly infringing material: and there are a number of legal formalities to attend to in doing this. The main point is that you can't just ignore the problem and hope it goes away, and you can't just say it is not your responsibility, which is what a simple EULA does. To be protected, you need a "designated agent" where complainers can contact you. You provide the information online (as well as stating the DMCA policy, which can be in the EULA), and also register that information with the Copyright office (online). The complaint has to be in writing, and most of the burden is on the author of the complaint, but you still have to be sure that the complaint is legally conforming. The complaint has to say what was infringed (e.g. the URL), the identity of the protected content (title of the book, for instance), and provide the complainer's signature and contact information. It also requires the complainer to say that they have a good faith belief that the material is illegally copied (no permission, and not otherwise allowed by law), and a perjury statement that the foregoing is accurate and authorized by the copyright holder. When you have a conforming notice, you must "expeditiously" remove / disable the infringing material (there is no definition of "expeditious"), notify the user, then wait for a proper counter-claim (same general form as the take-down claim but where the user denies the posting the material was illegal. If you get a counter-claim, you notify the alleged copyright owner and wait for them to file suit in 10 days. If they don't do that, you restore the material. Here is a sample complaint, and a sample counter notice. Also, this document (look for the download tab) reorganizes the legal language so that requirements are put in logical order and not randomly scattered throughout the US Code. | Yes. In the United Kingdom it is illegal under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. In other jurisdictions there may not be a law directly aimed at computer crime but if you sell it knowing that a crime is going to be committed with it that makes you an accomplice. Most computer crime is prosecuted under laws not directly aimed at computer misuse. | According to the information I was able to find, every zone, country, or even states, have their own taxation rules for sales made there. Correct. Well, in no way it's possible that small companies or individuals that sell products internationally deal with tax rules for each buyer, that would be a non-sense, and paying such taxes worldwide would be a nightmare not worth having a small business at all. You are required to comply with the law. If it is complicated, or difficult or expensive to do so then, it's complicated, difficult and expensive and you still have to do it. The answer is obvious: if it's not worth having a small business, don't have a small business. The main question, if someone buys a license from my web-site, is it considered a sale in the buyer's country/state which requires me to collect and pay some remote tax, or it's a purchase in my country/state which requires me to collect HST from that buyer? It depends on the law in both Canada and the destination country. In most cases, the sale will be an export sale from Canada (GST/HST exempt) and an import sale in the destination country - requiring you to comply with GST/HST obligations there. Another question is regarding invoices, I know that Canada requires certain information to be included into an invoice for sales in Canada. If my sales will be considered sales in a buyer's Country with some other rules, does it mean I have to manage tons of invoice templates? Yes. Let's say if my sales in UE exceed 30K EUR it looks like I need to register and pay VAT there. But what if I have less? Then you don't need to register and remit tax. Nor are you allowed to collect it from your customers. By the way, I have no idea what country in the Eurozone goes by the initials UE. In most jurisdictions, you need to register either when you reach the threshold in fact or reasonably expect to reach the threshold. Also in most, you can usually register even if you are below the threshold. For example, these are the rules for Australia. Anyone, please advice. Hire an accountant versed in international digital services. They will be able to give you the advice you need. They will also be able to recommend sales/payment platforms that can handle most of this for you (for a fee, of course). |
Applying for a patent in one country using a patented invention beloning to some else from another country Let's assume certain invention is patented in country A, but not in B (in the latter it should be considered novel and non-obvious). Can a random person (not the original inventor) apply for and be granted a patent in country B on that same invention (thus prohibiting the inventor to produce/sell it in B)? | No Because it’s patented in country A, it is not novel anywhere in the world. That is, the patent in country A is “prior art” that would disqualify it from being patented anywhere else. The original patent holder can patent it elsewhere because patent law has an exception for that. | Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark. | No, copyright absolutely does not protect anything "novel" or anything related to algorithms or generally anything functional at all. Copyright only protects your "expressed representation of a creative work". Other people can duplicate your work with a different "expression" and not be infringing on copyright. And if there is nothing creative in your work then it's not even eligible for copyright in the first place. For example, if you figure out how to sort an array with fewer computational steps than what anybody else is doing then that is functional code, not creative code, and anybody can reverse engineer/duplicate your sorting algorithm. However, patents do provide the protection you're looking for. If you want to protect your fancy algorithm then apply for a patent. Patents expire an order of magnitude sooner than copyright, but they are the only means of legally protecting this type of intellectual property. Unlike copyright, patent protection is only available if you apply for it, and it has to be approved by the relevant government department in your country (although you can start using the patented technology before approval has gone through). | Ideas are not protected by copyright, only arrangements of words are protected. If you "rephrase" by only a minor change of wording, leaving much of the wording intact, that is still a copyright infringement unless an exception such as fair use or fair dealing applies (and that seems a bit doubtful in this case). If you "rephrase" so that the wording is quite different, even though the idea is the same, there is probably no infringement. Copying elements of computer code or other IT commands that are essential to making an example work is not infringement. Where there is only one or a very small number of ways to naturally express a fact, copying such expression is not infringement, as facts are not protected by copyright. Adding examples but keeping significant wording unchanged is still likely to be infringement. | Patenting does not require a working product in fields where the performance is predictable before hand. Chemistry and biology do have criteria regarding real results. The description in the patent application needs to be detailed enough that someone of ordinary skill in the field could make and use the invention. After company A gets a patent (might be 3 years or never), it can try to stop company B from making, selling, offering to sell, using, or importing whatever is claimed in the issued patent. You say "does essentially the same thing". If you accomplish the identical goal (speaker identification from noisy audio, for example) but accomplish it by following very different steps, then there may be no infringement at all. | The law of each country where you offer the app for download applies, and you have to consider: Privacy Policy (GDPR in EU, CCPA in California, APPI in Japan, LGPD in Brasil, and more - check each country to be on the safe side) Disclaimer versus AGB/Terms and Conditions (e.g. Germany), not required but recommended Impressum (Germany, Switzerland, Austria) Value Added Tax (VAT) which is taken care of e.g. by Google Play for most countries but not all (e.g. not for Japan) in case the app is not free Consumer Protection Law - applicable (and different) everywhere There might be more, but these are the important ones I am aware of. | Prompted by this recent similar question, I've revisited this question and deleted my original answer as it was completely off the mark. This is its replacement. It is illegal, and it turns out to be an international standard in the Berne Convention. Article 16 in full: (1) Infringing copies of a work shall be liable to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to reproductions coming from a country where the work is not protected, or has ceased to be protected. (3) The seizure shall take place in accordance with the legislation of each country. Your scenario falls squarely within point (2) and the imported George Orwell book is to be treated as an infringing copy within the UK. The implementing UK legislation for (2) can be found in Section 27(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. | Why do you think Oracle have not been protecting their trade mark? Using a trade mark to describe the product (“Written in JavaScript”, “Seeking JavaScript developer”) is not an infringement and the trade mark owner is under no obligation to, indeed, cannot stop this. Where they are required to defend their trade mark is when it is being used in such a way that there is the risk of confusion that the goods or services could be confused with the trade mark owner’s goods or services. Further, they are not required to defend all breaches, only enough to show that they are actively doing so. Also it is not important that the trade mark be associated with the trade mark’s owner. Do you know who owns the trade mark “Ben & Jerry’s”? |
My landlord won't provide me appropriate documentation after charging me a lawyer fee I recently ended my lease on 01/31. My landlord had charged us a lawyer fee for adding someone to the lease. He was giving us random amounts and when I asked for receipts, paperwork, and proof of transaction, he failed to give me any of those. On the day of 01/31, he proceed to charge us ( a different amount that was originally stated) and handed me a receipt that was dated 01/31. He deducted it from my security deposit without giving me a chance to review it. I feel like I am being taken advantage of. | Review the terms of the lease, and determine (a) what deductions can be made from the security deposit, and (b) what charges can be made for lease changes or tenant changes. If the amount and type of deduction for "lawyer fee" is included in either of those areas, then it sounds like the landlord did what the lease allowed. But if not, then the deduction could be improper. If you're in the U.S., you could see a lawyer specializing in landlord-tenant law; or there might be a "tenants' union" in your area, which is usually a nonprofit organization that provides information for tenants to exercise their rights. | The security deposit goes with the lease, so he will transfer the deposit to the new owner, who will return it to you when the time comes. Unless, in your state, security deposits are put in escrow accounts, and again you will get it back at the end of the lease.. | The closest you will get is the first-in-time ordinance passed by the city, but that was overturned in court. That law required accepting the first qualified applicant for a rental: it did not say anything about sales. If there is a specific provision to that effect in your lease agreement, that would be applicable, but there is no general legal mechanism that forces a seller to accept a particular offer. | You say that you have a joint lease. This means that you and your roommate are jointly (together) and severally (individually) responsible for fulfilling the terms of the lease. From the landlord's position there is only one tenant - both of you together constitute the tenant. If you want to change this so that the tenant from date X is your roommate and someone else you have 2 options: Jointly give notice, ending the current lease and triggering the return of the deposit. Your roommate and your replacement are then free to negotiate a new lease with its own deposit. The landlord would conduct a final inspection on your lease and an initial inspection on the new lease. With the landlord's permission, substitute the new person for you on the existing lease. This does not end the lease and does not trigger the return of the deposit. The landlord is not obliged to do anything. You can negotiate whatever deal you like about the security deposit with whoever you like. | This would be pointless and wouldn't work. Eviction due to defaulting on rent requires the landlord to give 3 business days notice, in writing. This must include a method by which the tenant can settle their debt. Either the landlord would be forced to accept a payment or this would not be valid. Source Additionally, in this case, there is nothing stopping you physically handing an envelope of cash to the landlord as they live upstairs. However, there is no reason for your landlord to do this. If your landlord hates you that much it would be far easier for them to simply give you 60 days notice and terminate your tenancy that way. | Based solely on what you've described, what the lawyer did is inappropriate if, in fact, it occurred without any prior permissions. However, since you are not the actual client, it may be that you lack pertinent info, because this would be exceedingly rare behavior. Lawyers are allowed to make procedural and "expert"/professional decisions about your case without your consent, and do so all the time. As a general rule: we decide who to depose, what expert(s) are necessary to prove your claim, what questions to ask in discovery, what to say and when to say it when attempting to settle, and what witnesses to call vs. not to call at panel or trial. All of that is in the purview of the attorney's general discretion and work product. However, attorneys cannot diminish, amend, or settle your claim without your permission, unless you've signed a limited representation agreement and/or a prior authorization to do these things with a waiver of consultation on issues relating to settlement. (It is not uncommon for a client to say, "My bottom line is X; hence, you have my permission to settle the case for anything over that amount.") A client may also, subsequently, give verbal consent, saying things like "just do your best and get what you can". Contingency and Total Award Strategies Since you aren't the one having entered into the contract, you may not be privy to the existence of these types of contingencies. Agreements like this are very common when an attorney takes a weaker med mal claim. It may be that the lawyer will only take the case to the extent that they will try to settle, and may even file the case, with the understanding that they will never try the case. It is a way to try to get you as much as possible when all facts come to light, without agreeing to the expense of a trial. This happens a lot. In these situations, when you are trying to settle a claim that ends up being much less valuable than the attorney thought when he took the case, the insurance carrier will often say, "We will pay X on the claim if Doctor Doe is dismissed out," or something like that. Often lawyers intentionally over-file, in hopes there are two carriers (the more insurance the more money to make you go away) that they can try to settle with. When it turns out both docs are covered under one insurance carrier, then the weaker claim will often get dismissed out. It is a strategic decision to add them, and to dismiss them – and this is very common. Proving malpractice against one doctor is hard enough; trying to prove that you are the victim of double malpractice, back to back, is nearly impossible. All of that said, even if a client has entered into these types of limited or decisional authority-granting agreements, the lawyer still has a duty to keep the client apprised of what's going on. The client may decide later they don't like how little the attorney is stating the claim is worth (despite being forewarned this may happen, it happens all the time that when it actually occurs the client is not happy). In that case, they have the right to find a new lawyer, but that will be very difficult to do for a few reasons: (1) the original attorney is entitled to get paid for the work done under a theory known as “quantum meruit,” so other attorneys will be hesitant to get involved; (2) they will put a lien on any recovery for the amount of time and expenses, to be paid from any settlements or awards (and they get paid first, before the client or the new lawyer); (3) if a client gets angry and says they want to just drop the case rather than have the lawyer make more than the client, even after a year or more of work, all of the costs will still be owed by the client; (4) the potential new attorney will call the one who has the case and ask about whether the client has unreasonable expectations, if their case has any value, etc. Keep mind, if an attorney is doing the things you've described, they probably would suffer no love loss if the case went away. Malpractice in Context It very often happens, especially in medical malpractice cases, that a client will come in and describe the case one way, and then when the medical records arrive and the attorney and/or the paralegal/nurse-para review them, and all the facts get flushed out, it turns out things occurred a bit (or a lot) differently than the client described or recalled in the first place. This is typically not a matter, 99% of the time, of the client lying to the attorney, but rather it is merely the phenomenon of memories being based on their perception of the events/their care, rather than verifiable fact and established medical standards. (This is why eye-witness testimony is so notably unreliable: 10 people can witness the same event and there will inevitably be 10 different descriptions.) One thing all clients should be told by their lawyer (and you should only hire an experienced medical malpractice lawyer for these cases) is that bad outcomes do not equal negligence. Lay people often think that if something bad occurred while under the care of a doctor, this is the case, but it is not the measure of malpractice. Sometimes, even when the doctor does everything according to their specialty/industry standard, bad outcomes happen. Malpractice/negligence only occurs when they have deviated from this standard of care - outcome notwithstanding. The inverse is also true, when it comes to a bad outcome. The doctor may have breached the standard of care, but this cannot be determined by the patient - the law requires expert testimony to establish this. Sometimes bad outcomes are just the risk of the procedure. This is why patients sign (but rarely read) the informed consent forms, that describe in detail, and state the patient is aware, of all the potential bad outcomes that may occur during the procedure. Negligence, or a "breach of the standard of care" occurs when the typical physician (not the best expert in the world, just the normal, typical doctor in that field) would have found the actions to be unreasonable and never acceptable given the totality of the circumstances. Once you prove that, you then still need to prove that is what caused your damages (not the disease, or the ailment itself). Unfortunately, even with the best physicians, bad outcomes happen all the time. It is very common, to the point of being almost predictable, that a medical malpractice claim's value will depart from the original ballpark estimate of value that an attorney tries to "best guess" at the outset. When your attorney tries to value a case, they roughly estimate your "special damages", which consists of medical bills, lost income, lost earning capacity, and other quantifiable sums. Then, they must try to assess the market rate award for pain and suffering for the type injury you've sustained. This is only guesswork, based on jury verdict reports, reported settlements, and the jurisdictional leanings toward large or small verdicts (comparatively). As the case evolves, as facts come to lights, as experts are consulted - this is when these estimates can largely deviate from the original guesstimate based on very limited information. Risks of Contingency Representation At any rate, when a lawyer takes a case on contingency (when they agreed to get paid only if they recover, and not until they recover, aside from out of pocket expenses), they do this because they've relied on the client's account of what happened, as well as their initial assessment of the records, usually prior to hiring an expert (if they even intended to hire one because they agreed to take the case all the way through trial). You must understand that attorneys don't like when a case loses value any more than the client; in fact, probably less as they are the ones who've invested often hundreds of hours in the case at that point. This is how they make their money. Thirty-three percent of a small amount is not the same as that of a large amount. And many, many hours go into these cases. An attorney can make far more than their hourly rate on a great case, but this is balanced by making far, far less on cases whose values plummet as facts come to light. When a case appears to lost much of it's initially estimated value, the attorney will still try to maximize recovery; however, it may not seem that way to the client because after they take their third, and then recoup their expenses (which is on top of the third and is the responsibility of the client win-or-lose), clients can end up with almost nothing. This is because the expense of these cases is enormous and it is the problem with that area of law and the system in general. It is not uncommon for a medical malpractice case to cost, out of pocket, $200,000 or more! This is why so few people are able to get a lawyer to take these cases, and often when they do, it's on the very limited basis I described. Med Malpractice Primer Med Mal cases are some of the hardest cases to win and they are by far some of the most expensive cases to try. This in not accidental. Depending on the state you live in, tort reform (a legislative effort to limit the amount of medical malpractice claims filed and tried overall, as well as limiting their total recovery) can range from limits on damages, to very short windows for statute of limitations, to the requirements (like where I practice) where you must literally try the case twice – once before a med mal screening panel, who hears all your witnesses just as a jury does, and then decides whether the case should (and in some cases can) go forward. In some states (I happen to practice in one) the findings are admissible in court (not the evidence but the finding). So, if the MMPT screening panel finds the doctor was not negligent, or was, but the damages were within the standard disclosed potential outcomes, so there was no causation, or myriad other things, if you decide (or in some states, if you even still get to go to court) the defense gets to say to the jury that the legislatively enacted Med Mal Pre-trial screening panel found X (no negligence, causation, or damages – or all three). These panels are usually comprised of a lawyer (75% defense lawyers) or a judge, and two doctors who are biased against these types of cases in the first place). Also, if your expert gets torn apart on an issue during panel phase, anything they admit can be used against them in the trial. I say all this to help you understand that these cases are made, by the legislature, to be very hard to even find a lawyer to take, very hard to win, and exceedingly expensive to litigate. This is based on the (fallacious) theory that medical malpractice claims should be limited to the most serious claims because this litigation is so costly, and so impactful on the rates all citizens pay for insurance, that the legislature has seen fit to make them very difficult to prosecute, thereby weeding out weak claims. Bottom Line If the client truly feels their lawyer did something they did not have permission (either explicitly in writing, or verbally) to do, they need to talk to the attorney, explain their discomfort with the situation, and figure out why it occurred and if it was truly in the best interest of the case and the client. If the lawyer cannot adequately answer those questions, they should get a second opinion. The client can demand that anything the attorney did be undone, if it was the type of thing that is in the client's control. One would need to see the engagement letter and retention agreement, and also be privy to the conversations. It is, unfortunately, not uncommon for a client to say they understand what the lawyer is proposing when they don't. If you find that's the case, you may have them ask that all determinations be put in writing, with an explanation as to why. | From your account, you seem to have entered into a verbal contract for this extra work to be done without agreeing a price. According to this article, Canadian courts will assume that a contract contains "implied" terms "on the basis of the presumed intentions of the parties where necessary to give business efficacy to the contract". To put that in English, these are terms that must be there because otherwise the story wouldn't make sense. In this case the implied term is that the lawyer will be paid a reasonable amount for his work, as it would be unreasonable to expect him to do this for free. Lawyers generally bill by the hour, so a reasonable amount would be the time he spent multiplied by his usual hourly fee. If that is what he has billed you, then I'm afraid you owe him the money. | You should do one of two things. Either (1) fire your lawyer and obtain competent counsel, or (2) demand that he pay for the "second opinion" (in actuality, co-counsel or a consultant) if he is unfit to offer a proper opinion on the case. I am unfamiliar with the bar rules in Canada, however I am willing to bet they require one be competent to the prosecute the case they take. In the U.S. in all jurisdictions, the bar rules demand that an attorney not take a case unless he is competent to prosecute it. If he is not, he has a duty to either decline the case, or to find competent assistance to bring the case to closure. Unless your lawyer told you at the outset that he can only represent your defense and not your counterclaim, then he needs to be able to advise you about both issues. You should not be responsible for obtaining a second opinion. Most lawyers would not want their client seeking a second opinion as it reflects poorly on their ability competently practice. The fact that this guy has the gall to ask you to get one is unacceptable. As an example: I recently had a case that was within my practice area. During discovery I realized there was a substantial ERISA issue. This is a very specialized area of law that I am not very adept at dealing with as it is a complex regulatory scheme I don't deal with regularly. So...once I spotted this, I contacted an colleague who specializes in ERISA, who told me what I needed to argue, and gave me a primer on the area of ERISA law that I needed to be adept at. If I didn't have a friend who worked in this area, I would've had to get a co-counsel (at my own expense) by either splitting my fee, or by hiring him as a consultant but being personally responsible for the cost. If I didn't think that would be cost effective (i.e., the value of the case was not big enough to justify me hiring a consultant) then I would've had to tell the client that an issue arose that I was not competent to deal with and that he needed someone who specialized in that area (the problem is that people who do ERISA law aren't litigators traditionally) and had the ability to litigate. Or, give him the opportunity to say, "No, I want you to be trial counsel and we will hire him as the ERISA guy." In that case, the client would be responsible for the cost of the second attorney (otherwise I would just withdraw), but I couldn't demand this. What your lawyer is doing is trying to get you to ensure he does't get it wrong, and that is not OK. |
How negligent does a prison have to be before becoming liable for harm to a prisoner? This question is prompted by this news story: A hastily executed transfer of nearly 200 people in California’s prison system set off a public health disaster that endangered the lives of thousands of prisoners and staff and led to dozens of deaths, according to a new report from the state’s office of the inspector general (OIG). So is there any point where a prisoner (or their estate) can claim compensation for harm they suffered? Presumably a prisoner who was left without food or water, or was clearly injured but denied access to medical care, would be able to claim. What about a case like this? Given that prisoners have no say in what happens to them, to what extent does the state owe an enforceable duty of care to avoid exposing prisoners to foreseeable harms? Is there any criminal liability for gross negligence? I'm asking specifically about this case in California, but other jurisdictions would be of interest too. | I guess it depends on what courts decide is the "standard of care" in prisons against transmissible diseases. This has been litigated in various way recently, not just following deaths: From a legal standpoint, many the cases center upon: due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly related to pre-trial detainees; Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment; Americans with Disabilities Act violations; and discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs are often asking judges to intervene to force immediate changes at prisons and jails, while litigation is pending. The approach has yielded mixed results thus far. Some judges have moved aggressively, ordering institutions to improve conditions and to do more to adhere to CDC guides. Yet those decisions have met with continued appeals and resistance from corrections officials, and the U.S. Supreme Court has twice overturned efforts by federal judges to intervene forcefully in coronavirus-related matters. In May, the high court rejected on procedural grounds a request by inmates to increase cleaning and COVID-19-related education efforts at their Texas-based geriatric correctional facility. The court upheld the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, which had overturned a Houston-based federal judge’s ruling supporting the prisoners. A few days later, however, the court appeared to switched course, letting stand a federal judge’s order requiring that prison officials move hundreds of inmates from an Ohio institution where nine people had died from COVID-19. Then, on Aug. 3, justices, in a 5-4 decision, overturned a lower-court injunction requiring stricter health and safety measures at the jail in Orange County in Southern California. The Orange County case, Barnes v. Ahlman, is instructive in terms of the arguments being made on both sides and the response by the courts. The jail’s leadership was accused by prisoners of ignoring Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommendations by failing to enforce social distancing measures and declining to isolate inmates with COVID-19 symptoms. A federal judge in California had issued a preliminary injunction that required the jail to take stronger measures, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined a request by the jail to halt the injunction. Jail officials argued that, prior to the injunction, CDC guidelines had been “largely implemented” and said the injunction’s requirements far exceeded the scope of the CDC’s recommendations. They also cited their efforts to voluntarily release half of the jail’s inmates to help with social distancing and said they had all but eliminated “COVID within the jail population.” The Supreme Court majority voted to stay the injunction while litigation continues. As is custom, the justices did not explain their reasoning in the order. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, saying the stay was premature and that jail had placed inmates at significant risk. Earlier in the Texas case, Sotomayor encouraged lower courts to ensure “that prisons are not deliberately indifferent in the face of danger and death.” I guess some Supreme Justices might not say it but probably think it that it's not cruel and unusual to (catch and) die of transmissible diseases in prison since it happens all the time. E.g. according to one study 97% of infected inmates don't get Hep C treatment. At the other end of the spectrum: a former jail administrator in Oklahoma was sentenced to more than 4 years in prison following his decision not to take an inmate with diabetes to hospital, resulting in his death in 2013. The administrator "pleaded guilty to one count of deprivation of rights under color of law." The inmate in question died of ketoacidosis. So the standard of care in prisons is somewhere in between these extremes. Most litigation regarding Covid-19 seems to center on whether CDC guidelines have been followed or not. I see that the CDC does have some specific guidelines for correctional facilities in this regard. I'm not sure of negligence case law in prison, but regarding the 8th Amendment violations, Helling v. McKinney is probably relevant to preventative measures: In Helling v. McKinney, the Court considered the case of a Nevada prisoner, "the cellmate of a five-pack-a-day smoker," who sought to be housed in an environment free of second-hand smoke. McKinney suffered from no ailment and sought no medical treatment. Justice Byron White wrote for a 7-2 majority of the Court that McKinney's claim that prison officials "have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of ETS [second hand smoke] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health" raised a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment. He wrote that McKinney would have to prove both the scientific facts of the dangers of exposure to second-hand smoke and prove that community standards supported him, that "it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today's society chooses to tolerate." He would also have to prove that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference. Also following Ashcroft v. Iqbal government officials could not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates so each official would have to be proved liable individually for involvement in such a (faulty) decision. | Your question is about "Would it be kidnapping if I was injured and someone took me to a hospital without my consent", so I don't understand these other answers which say "it depends on the situation". The key point is what you mean by "without my consent". Good Samaritan laws are also relevant, which offer defenses to people who do things that would otherwise be unlawful when they are doing it with good intentions to help someone who they believe is injured or would become injured without their intervention. The main things to consider are the degree of injury, which is a spectrum ranging from no injury at all to being dead, and whether the injured person is conscious. Are you so injured that you are unconscious? In most jurisdictions, being unconscious is considered as you consenting to any actions which are done with the intent of giving you medical assistance, which is on a spectrum of saying "hey are you ok?" or shaking you in order to wake you up, all the way up to treatment including major surgery. So by being unconscious it is usually automatically consent, but if you are awake and are refusing help or treatment, even if you could die if you didn't receive treatment, it would be easy to argue that you were not consenting and that any treatment/assistance etc was unlawful. This situation sometimes happens, and EMTs are often trained to wait until the person goes unconscious to then give them medical assistance/transport etc, but assisting someone before they go unconscious could still be argued as permissible, if the injured person was so distressed that they were unable to give/refuse consent, or at least if the assistor believed that to be the case. This is why if someone has a major medical problem and is unconscious, hospitals can resuscitate them and even perform surgery without them signing a consent form. By being unconscious, it is considered that they are consenting to any necessary surgery to help them, even including amputation or other negative consequences. Conversely, if someone has a valid Advance healthcare directive on file which forbids measures such as resuscitation, they will be considered not to consent, and will usually be left alone without life-saving assistance. Resuscitating/performing surgery on someone in this case can be cause for damages to the injured person, because it would have been clear that they did not consent to such assistance. | I don't think that simply failing to make a sufficient explanation of the risks would make a death manslaughter. Three would have to have been serious negligence in addition, rather beyond the level needed to find malpractice, as I understand the matter. Law.com says that: Voluntary manslaughter includes killing in heat of passion or while committing a felony. Involuntary manslaughter occurs when a death is caused by a violation of a non-felony [sic], such as reckless driving. The Wikipedia article on Manslaughter says that Involuntary manslaughter is the homicide of a human being without intent of doing so, either expressed or implied. It is distinguished from voluntary manslaughter by the absence of intention. It is normally divided into two categories, constructive manslaughter and criminally negligent manslaughter, both of which involve criminal liability. Constructive manslaughter is also referred to as "unlawful act" manslaughter. It is based on the doctrine of constructive malice, whereby the malicious intent inherent in the commission of a crime is considered to apply to the consequences of that crime. It occurs when someone kills, without intent, in the course of committing an unlawful act. ... Criminally negligent manslaughter is variously referred to as criminally negligent homicide in the United States, and gross negligence manslaughter in England and Wales. In Scotland and some Commonwealth of Nations jurisdictions the offence of culpable homicide might apply. It occurs where death results from serious negligence, or, in some jurisdictions, serious recklessness. A high degree of negligence is required to warrant criminal liability. ... An example is where a doctor fails to notice a patient's oxygen supply has disconnected and the patient dies (R v Adomako). Another example could be leaving a child locked in a car on a hot day | They can still be sued - they just can’t be found liable For example, as an adjudicator, I have immunity for acts and omissions done in good faith as an adjudicator. A suit could be brought alleging lack of good faith and/or acting as other than an adjudicator. If these were proved (and barring corruption it’s a very high bar) the adjudicator would be liable. However, adjudicators are often joined with the claimant (usually the Respondent is the plaintiff) and the ANA (Authorised Nominating Authority - the organisation that appointed the adjudicator, who also have immunity) not so they can be held liable but so that they can be subpoenaed and forced to give evidence - if they aren’t parties to the suit they can refuse to do this. My standard response when this happens is to write to the court saying “I submit to the decision of the court save as to costs” meaning I am not going to contest anything unless you try to make me pay costs - which I don’t have immunity from. | I am not a lawyer and I have never even been to the UK. You will not go to prison if your neighbor's dog attacks you and it dies as a result of you defending yourself. You might go to prison and/or owe the owner damages if: You are somewhere you do not technically have a right to be. It can be shown you could have retreated from harm but chose instead to stand your ground. The force you used was deemed excessive - it showed intent to harm the dog more than necessary to protect yourself You contributed to the confrontation in a way that a reasonable person would think might cause trouble You might be able to protect yourself from problems by: taking pictures or videos of the dog behaving badly or aggressively note dates and times when you observe the dog behaving badly or aggressively formally contact the dog's owner with your concerns and/or evidence in which you assert your rights to access the areas you walk through and your right to defend yourself in the event that you are attacked by the dog if possible, change your route or schedule to avoid the problem entirely Good luck | In theory, yes; in practice no. At common law, an employer is vicariously liable for the negligent actions of an employee performed in the course of employment, and the employee is also liable to third-parties but can claim indemnity from the employer. The employer can sue the employee for breach of contract and win (see Lister v Romford Ice Cold Storage), however, such suits are rarely brought and even more rarely successful. This is partly because of the bad publicity such cases generate but mostly because many jurisdictions have introduced laws to stop them like the NSW Employee's Liability Act. | This effectively comes under duty of care. Firstly, in England and Wales there is no obligation to be a Good Samaritan - in other words, there is no obligation to be a rescuer. Until you intervene to try and rescue someone, you do not owe that person a duty. As soon as you do intervene, however, you do owe them a duty. Specifically, you owe them a duty not to make the situation worse (Horsey and Rackley, Tort Law, 3rd ed., OUP 2013, p. 75). The specific situation Horsey and Rackley give is that of resuscitating a drowning child and breaking a rib as you do so: this may be 'making the situation worse' (Horsey and Rackley, pp. 75-76). Does this mean that you'll be liable if you give someone first aid and in doing so, you make the situation worse? Not necessarily, because, as Horsey and Rackley point out, duty is different to liability. Using the drowning child example again, they state: So, for example, while someone who intervenes may owe a duty not to make the situation worse, their actions would still be judged against those of a 'reasonable person' in the circumstances (and so if a reasonable person would have tried to resuscitate the child in the same way, there will be no breach of their duty and therefore no liability to pay compensation.) (p.76) The 'reasonable person' standard corresponds to what you mentioned in the question about lack of expertise. If a doctor intervenes in such a situation, the standard of care they'd be expected to give would be higher than, say, for someone who's simply done a basic first aid course. The question is whether or not you've acted as the reasonable person in your situation would have done. On that basis, then, your tutor is pretty much correct: so long as you take such care as is reasonable based on your expertise, or lack thereof, then under English and Welsh law, you're unlikely to be liable. | When the accused has not received a fair trial or due process The right to a fair trial is guaranteed by the sixth amendment. The right to due process is guaranteed by the fourteenth. Justice Clark said in Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966): This federal habeas corpus application involves the question whether Sheppard was deprived of a fair trial in his state conviction for the second-degree murder of his wife because of the trial judge's failure to protect Sheppard sufficiently from the massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution The appellant would need to demonstrate that Waters' comments (among other things) were such that they led the jury to consider matters other than the evidence in the trial. For what it's worth, I agree with the trial judge. |
Would judges need to recuse themselves if they own shares of index funds? I understand that there is some requirement or expectation for judges to recuse themselves from cases where they would have a financial interest in the outcome. Index funds were said to represent ~20% of mutual fund assets in 2014, and I imagine this proportion has only increased since then. But the holdings of those funds is predictable. If a judge's retirement were in ITOT shares, for instance, 5.48% of her wealth would be in Apple stock. Is this taken into account with conflicts of interest? “The judge has $1 million invested in index funds” sounds very different from “The judge owns $50,000 of Apple stock,” but it actually works out to the same thing financially. (This question doesn't need to be about index funds specifically; I just use that as an example because it's an increasingly popular sort of mutual fund, and the composition of the fund will always be predictable.) | No, it is not A mutual fund holding, whether in an index fund, or a managed fund, is not considered to be a "financial interest" in the underlying stocks or companies, and does not require that a judge be disqualified. See details below. However, if the holding is sizable, and the case so impacts the company that the probable impact on the judge's financial position would be substantial, then the rule against an "appearance of impropriety" might apply. Cannon 2 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges says: (B) Outside Influence. A judge should not allow family, social, political, financial, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. A judge should neither lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. Cannon 3 (C) (1) says: (1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances in which: ... (c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge’s spouse or minor child residing in the judge’s household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding; Cannon 3 (C) (2) says: (2) A judge should keep informed about the judge’s personal and fiduciary financial interests and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal financial interests of the judge’s spouse and minor children residing in the judge’s household. Cannon 3 (C) (3) (i) says: (i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund; The cannons above are closely mirrored by 28 U.S. Code § 455 which provides: (a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: ... (b) (4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; ... (d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have the meaning indicated: (d) (4) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that: (i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund; (ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a “financial interest” in securities held by the organization; Cannon 3 (C) (3) (i) and 28 U.S. Code § 455 (d) (4) seem to directly settle the question asked here. | Often one chooses your accountant, your financial advisor, or your lawyer. Another option is to appoint the trust department of a bank. I personally, as a lawyer, have a policy of not consenting to do that except in rare cases like the one in this question, of a client who just doesn't have anyone and has an estate sufficiently small that a bank trust department would not be cost effective or well suited to handling some aspect of the executorship. But, I have done it a few times in those cases. Most lawyers I know of take a similar position. If no executor is designated, your estate will usually be administered either by a large unpaid creditor, or by the public administrator (whose job is primarily to administer estates in cases where there are no next of kin, no executor has been designated, and there are no unpaid creditors who have stepped up to do the job). | Would a U.S court honor his request, based on his prior commitment? You are not specifying the purpose of the court hearing, or whether Adam is pro se litigant (which sounds unlikely if this plaintiff is a movie star). If plaintiff Adam is represented by an attorney, Adam's presence is unnecessary in most or all court hearings. In fact, typically neither parties nor their lawyers have to show up in court, whence their absence does not constitute contempt of court. Absence merely implies that they miss the opportunity to [orally] argue their position before the court, and thus would depend on whether the judge bothers to actually read their brief. If you mean a hearing in which Adam needs to be present, his request to reschedule the hearing is most likely to be granted. His contract is strong evidence that his request is not a vexatious attempt to delay proceedings. Since the hearing would be in month 4, the particularity that his contract goes up to month 4 implies that rescheduling would not significantly delay proceedings. Regarding your comment, rescheduling can (and does) happen multiple times even in criminal cases. This post includes an excerpt of the Register of Actions of criminal case 16-870-FH in Michigan state court (Washtenaw county), highlighting several instances of rescheduling as requested by the defense counsel and despite prosecutor's objection. I believe the case got rescheduled a few more times beyond what the snapshots reflect. | The core principle of stare decisis is that the law should not depend on what judge you got; two cases with the same facts should have the same outcome. In the common-law tradition, there weren't really written statutes; there was only "what's been done in the past," and so the only reference you'd have to what the law should be in some situation is past court decisions. If judges didn't have some constraints to rule similarly to before, there really wouldn't be any legal standards (because there was no written law to go back to; in civil-law countries, there always has been a written law, so precedent isn't so important). Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent. However, judges are expected to obey precedent, and for the most part do what they're supposed to do. If they don't, the case will likely be reversed on appeal. Binding precedent only applies within the area a court serves; a court doesn't have to listen to precedent from a different court that has nothing to do with the case. The rule is that precedent from any court up the appeals chain is binding; federal district courts are bound by their circuit court and SCOTUS, state courts are bound by higher state courts and SCOTUS (but not other federal courts, as the case can't be appealed to them). A court can sometimes overrule its own precedent, but the cases where it can do that are rare (and so applying a higher court's precedent can also be viewed as "if you appeal to them they'll say X, so we're saying X.") | Because they are only apparent with hindsight The judge writing the judgement does not decide what is dicta and what is obiter - that is for some future judge considering a different case and deciding if they are looking at a binding (dicta) or persuasive (obiter) precedent. First of all, the vast majority of cases follow precedent; they do not set it. If you are trying to disentangle dicta and obiter then you are usually looking at the case of an appeal, not a trial judgement. Most trials turn on the facts, not precedent-setting points of law - usually, there is no dispute about the law at all. Even then, most appeal decisions don't set a precedent either and sink into obscurity until at some point in the far future when a lawyer doing research on a particularly tricky case has an "ah-ha" moment and says "Look at what Justice Bozo said in paragraph 365 of this 56 page judgement about a tangentially related issue between different people at a different time in a different place - I need to spin this as dicta." Meanwhile, the lawyer on the opposite side has a different precedent from a different case that contradicts this one - one of them must be wrong. So a trial judge faced with this paradox has to resolve it; they don't get to say "this is too hard". Basically they have 2 methods of doing so: The decide that one (or both) are obiter and make the decision based on the precedent that remains. They decide that both are ratio and write a judgement that they know has to be appealed because they have to follow both precedents and they can't. At least in Australia, this is becoming more and more common. The judge basically says "I have two conflicting binding precedents, I pick this one for [reasons]. Now go off to the Court of Appeals to see if I got it right. I look forward to finding out." Of course, the winner isn't going to appeal and it may not be in the loser's commercial interest to do so. So maybe the question just gets kicked down the road for some other poor bloody judge to have to deal with. | There is certainly precedent. This list of the 10 biggest class action lawsuits in the world indicates that 8 of the 10 were by investors against their own company. In any event your analysis is flawed. The people who initiate the class action may (probably are) no longer be investors because they sold their shares and realised their losses. Further a legacy investor who didn't buy on the basis of the company's wrongdoing would not be entitled to damages. Finally, an investor who bought at say $100 on the basis of false information (like the cars were legal when the company knew they weren't) and now hold shares worth $40 will wait many years (if ever) to make good their losses: a lawsuit will be quicker and more certain. | TL;DR: It is a $100.000 lawsuit. Talk to a lawyer. If getting out of lawsuits was as easy as acting through a company and selling it afterwards, nobody would ever get paid damages. In addition to that, any answer will depend heavily on a lot of data that you do not disclose (location, kind of company, what is the basis for the lawsuit, etc.). Talk to a lawyer. But, a couple of points to help you understand the situation: the only reason she was 51% shareholder was because my father wanted a certain tax exemption for minority women owning businesses. It does not matter the reason, she was the shareholder. And in fact, I would not publicly use that reason as an excuse before checking with a lawyer, because perhaps it could be considered fraud1. she gave up her rights to the business. Exact wording of the agreement will be important for your lawyer. Did she return ownership of the stock? Or did she just agreed not to manage the business? In C corporations, stockholders are only liable for the money invested (i.e., the value of their stock may drop to zero, but no one can sue them for more). In other kind of companies (unlimited companies), owners can be forced to pay (fully or partially) for the debts of the company. does it matter if she sells her shares at this point or will she still be sued? Who exactly is going to buy the stock? It does not sound like the company is publicly traded, but just a small operation. Unless her 51% is worth more than she is being sued for -or the buyer thinks that the lawsuit will fail-, people won't be interested. Of course, it might be tempting to "forget" telling about the lawsuit to prospective buyers, but that probably will end with the buyer suing your mother when they discover that she has not fully disclosed the status of the company. Talk to a lawyer. 1But explain all of the details to your lawyer, s/he may make use of them and convince your father to take full responsability. And your lawyer will not inform the authorities. Talk to a lawyer. | The future prospects are negligible, and the present status of such influence is non-existent. In a few cases, you may find an appellate decision citing some statement from a reputable law review. Here is an article that addresses such influences on SCOTUS (which, the authors note, have decreased over time). However, you are describing a wingnut legal theory, and courts do not rely on wingnut legal theories, they rely on what the actual law is. |
Is it illegal for a police officer to buy lottery tickets? I work retail and one of my jobs includes upselling lottery tickets. I was told by a police officer (clearly on duty & uniformed) that it was illegal for them to buy one while on duty as it is considered gambling. Is this true? This is in the UK, specifically England. | No. There's nothing in neither the Gambling Act 2005 nor the Police Regulations 2003 specifically preventing police officers from buying lottery tickets (or gambling in general for that matter). The principal requirement from the Police Regulations is at Schedule 1, para 1 which is to do it (like everything else in life) sensibly: A member of a police force shall at all times abstain from any activity which is likely to interfere with the impartial discharge of his duties or which is likely to give rise to the impression amongst members of the public that it may so interfere. However, there may be local force policies in place (regarding lottery tickets) but I doubt it. | No. Money Laundering is the act of taking money that was made as a result of criminal activity and turning it into "clean" money. There are a number of ways this occurs, and there may be ways to do it with casino chips, but you haven't demonstrated that your money is "Dirty" to begin with. If you have a $100 dollar chip from a Vegas Casino, it means that the original casino where it was purchased will redeem it for $100 dollars in currency. Nevada is unique in the United States as Casinos operating in the state must honor chips between different casinos so it's possible to buy a Chip at Casino A, go to Casino B, and redeem the chip there. This allows Las Vegas to use them as a sort of alternative currency and so long as the person you are doing business with accepts it as a form of payment, you are allowed to use it same as cash. Collecting Casino chips is a hobby of some people and you can find them on places like Ebay, often times for more value than the face value of the chip. Like Currency, nothing says that you have to buy the chip at face value, so rare, old, or chips with defects may be worth many times over their current face value to the right collector. It would only be money laundering if that $100 dollars was obtained through illegal activity and you were using the chip as a way to gamble to make your legitimate earnings on tax reports. While you can launder any value of money, the people who do so are normally doing so with 10,000s of dollars (the value most banks will notify the government if deposited in a single transaction... and they will take notice if you're doing more frequent smaller transactions to avoid that detection). If you have ever seen "Breaking Bad" there are a few scenes where Money Laundering is explained, but the idea is to take a business that has a large use of hard currency exchange (Arcades, Nail Salons, and Car Washes are all discussed in show as perfect business examples) in which dirty money is mixed with legitimate earnings and deposited into the bank. As cash does not have a paper trail, you can't determine which bills were earned at the arcade verses through other means. As long as your bookie is legitimate, Sports Gambling is legal in Vegas (You can even bet the Superbowl Coin toss) and as long as you report it as taxable income, you're not committing any crimes. | Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out. | It is not entrapment because entrapment must be done by officers of the State (police usually). A member of the public inducing another to commit a crime is not entrapment and not a defense to having committed it. Entrapment is a "thing" in Ireland as it is in all common law jurisdictions, however, the specific limits on what police can and cannot do vary by jurisdiction. Police posing as underage children to catch pedophiles is legal throughout Australia (i.e., not entrapment). Police are more restricted in Canada and the USA but I believe that online "trawling" by police is legal in those jurisdictions too, however, they must remain more "passive" than Australian police. Yes, there is a crime being committed, the crime of attempting to engage in underage sex. It doesn't matter that the actual crime attempted is impossible to commit because the "victim" is not actually underage. Evidence is evidence – it doesn't matter who collects it. However, amateurs in the handling of evidence are more likely to botch it up in a way that would allow the defense to have it ruled inadmissible than professionals (although even they can botch it up). | In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible. | Police may not arrest you without probable cause, and the existence of probable cause is evaluated “at the moment of the arrest.” Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). Therefore, police may not “look for after-the-fact justifications for [seizures] that would otherwise be impermissible.” United States v. Hughes, 606 F.3d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 2010). In Beck, for instance, the defendant was arrested because he had a prior record of illegal gambling and because an officer had heard "reports" about him doing something that was never specified. When the officer saw the defendant driving, he stopped him and searched his car, but found nothing. He arrested him anyway, and when they got to the jail, they found betting slips in his pocket. He was convicted under the local gambling ordinance based on that evidence, but the Supreme Court reversed the conviction: The constitutional validity of the search in this case, then, must depend upon the constitutional validity of the petitioner's arrest. Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it — whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense. However, if they want to arrest you for Crime A but only have probable cause to arrest you for Crime B, they may arrest you on that offense, and doing so may quite easily give them the time or access they need to gather additional evidence on Crime A. This is why so many large drug busts start as turn-signal violations. | Not all illegal things are crimes. Lack of evidence. They are asked to testify, and they say "what I said in my book was a lie". There is no general law against lying, except when under oath. Statute of limitations. Saying "10 years ago I did smoke drugs" means that any offence is no longer prosecutable. Lack of details. Which jurisdiction were they in? When did they commit the act, how many acts? You cannot be arrested for being a "bank robber" or a "murderer". You are charged with "robbing Bank X on 123 Fake Street the Thursday 25 April 2018" or "murdering Jim Thio in January 2017". Otherwise the defendant would have a hard time defending himself (how to prove that you have not killed anyone at any time?) All of the above combined with prosecutorial discretion in the form that any possible prosecutor will most likely determine that bringing charges would be just a waste of time and resources. UPDATE February 2018: Just for the sake of completeness, a reference to the situation of Jacques Cassandri, who did boast about a serious crime(a robbery in a Societe Generale vault in 1976) in a book. Unfortunately for him, he made some kind of mistake/miscalculation and the crime had not yet expired, so he has become an example of someone being prosecuted by confessing a crime in a book. | Was or is possession of screwdriver illegal in the UK? Yes, if the screwdriver's intended purpose is for a criminal act. There's not enough detail in the article, but the most likely scenarios are: Offensive Weapon, contrary to section 1 Prevention of Crime Act 1953: (1)Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence ... [...] (4)In this section “ public place ” includes any highway, or in Scotland any road within the meaning of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 and any other premises or place to which at the material time the public have or are permitted to have access, whether on payment or otherwise; and "offensive weapon” means any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him or by some other person. Going Equipped to steal, contrary to section 25 Theft Act 1968: (1)A person shall be guilty of an offence if, when not at his place of abode, he has with him any article for use in the course of or in connection with any burglary or theft. (2)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. (3)Where a person is charged with an offence under this section, proof that he had with him any article made or adapted for use in committing a burglary or theft shall be evidence that he had it with him for such use. [...] (5)For purposes of this section an offence under section 12(1) of this Act of taking a conveyance shall be treated as theft. Possession with intent to destroy or damage property, contrary to section 3 Criminal Damage Act 1971: A person who has anything in his custody or under his control intending without lawful excuse to use it or cause or permit another to use it— (a)to destroy or damage any property belonging to some other person; or (b)to destroy or damage his own or the user’s property in a way which he knows is likely to endanger the life of some other person; shall be guilty of an offence. [with a maximum sentence of 10 years] NB in this jurisdiction, possession of a weapon for self-protection is not, except in some very narrow circumstances, a reasonable excuse to carrying one. |
Could double jeopardy protect a murderer who bribed the judge and jury to be declared not guilty? Assume the following hypothetical case: a well-known multi-billionaire is holding an event with lots of invitees, (so there is no doubt about his identity), then in front of many witnesses and live cameras takes out a gun and murders several people, while saying that he is of sane mind, and intended to do this because they annoyed him. It seems like a clear-cut case, his guilt is beyond all reasonable doubt. But at the trial, he is declared not guilty. Everyone is horrified, but he goes free. Much later it comes to evidence that the judge and jury received ludicrous sums of money, and disappeared in a country with no extradition treaty. Can someone be protected by double jeopardy in such a case? | There is precedent for the idea that double jeopardy need not apply when the initial trial was a sham because the judge and/or jury had been bribed. See Aleman v. Judges of Cook County Circuit Court, 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998). This case was very similar to your hypothetical: Aleman was initially acquitted of a murder, but years later it came to light that he had bribed the judge (in a bench trial). He was retried and convicted in state court. He appealed his conviction on the grounds of double jeopardy, but the Seventh Circuit denied his appeal, accepting Illinois' argument that because of the bribe, Aleman was never "in jeopardy of life or limb" in the first place. | Any country is free to decide what actions are considered to be crimes, and what crimes are prosecuted depending on whether you perform the action in the country, outside the country, and depending on whether you are a citizen, a resident, both, or neither. They can also decide what are accepted defences in court and which are not. Any other country is free to decide under which circumstances they will ever extradite someone to that first country. Now you have to check the laws of the individual countries. | Yes. This is legal, even though it is highly unlikely. There were very few, if any, instances of the federal pardon power being used this way historically, but it could happen, and President Trump, while he was in office, intimated that he might use the pardon power in this fashion. Realistically, it would be easier for the President to prevent someone from being prosecuted in the first place if the crime took place during his term, but he might pardon someone who committed the crime under a previous administration. The fact pattern in the question: “don’t be surprised if I pardon anyone that puts to death repeat heroin and fentanyl dealers dealing in amounts larger than 50 pounds” doesn't sound very morally palatable. But consider a slight variant of it which is much more plausible. Suppose that while running for office a Presidential candidate says: don't be surprised if I pardon someone who was convicted of homicide in a previous administration for killing someone who had been using them as a sex slave in a human trafficking network, or killing someone who was in the process of raping them shortly before their divorce became final but was not allowed to assert a self-defense argument at trial because marital rape was legal at the time. Now arguably that's different, because it doesn't induce someone to commit a future crime. But the President has broad discretion to make policy to de-emphasize certain kinds of criminal prosecutions in any case while in office even without the pardon power, and generally, this is not a basis for having a special prosecutor appointed at the federal level since there is no individualized conflict of interest. Of course, the U.S. President can only pardon someone from a federal crime and can't pardon state crimes or criminal convictions from other countries. So, even if the President pardoned someone of a federal crime in this situation, the state in which the murders took place could prosecute the individual for murder unimpeded (constitutional double jeopardy considerations would also not bar a state prosecution following the federal prosecution). Indeed, the vast majority of murder prosecutions are made under state law, and there are very few murders that take place which are beyond the jurisdiction of any U.S. state and any foreign country, that are in the jurisdiction of the U.S. government and covered by a federal homicide statute, in any year. As noted by @hszmv in a comment to another answer: Federal Murder charges are a thing and can be prosecuted, but are normally reserved for murders that either involve federal government employees (especially if they are murdered because of the duties the performed in the course of their duty or the status as a federal employee) OR murders that occur on Federally Owned Property OR the Murder involved crossing state lines OR is in U.S. Jurisdiction but not in a territory or state jurisdiction (usually applies to some uninhabited territorial islands or U.S./International Waters). Further, a pardon would not prohibit the victim's family for suing the murderer for wrongful death, and indeed, probably wouldn't prohibit them from using the murder conviction that was pardoned to conclusively establish liability in a civil case under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (I haven't researched that highly specific and technical civil procedure issue, however, but even if that wasn't possible, the murder trial transcript would be admissible in the civil case). A civil judgement for wrongful death was famously obtained against O.J. Simpson by the victim's family after O.J. Simpson was acquitted in a criminal murder trial. This tactic would really only be helpful to a prospective defendant with respect to cases where there is not a parallel criminal offense under state law. | Could the acceptance of the pardon then have any bearing on the case in the other jurisdiction? Possibly, but not much. There is very, very little case law on this point since: (1) pardons are rare (especially federal ones), (2) people who are pardoned generally do so because everyone in the criminal justice process in the prior case agrees that the person is reformed and they are usually correct, (3) the statute of limitations has often run on a new prosecution, and (4) many cases where these issues arise, are probably not appealed (either because the neither parties attempts to, or because a defendant is acquitted and there is no appeal), but an appeal is necessary to give rise to binding precedents. Can the admission of guilt be used in the new case? The criminal collateral estoppel effects of a pardon flow from the adjudication on the merits which is vacated. Also, comity between sovereigns and public policy mitigate such a rule. The pardon power would not be very interesting if it routinely resulted in a new prosecution that was conducted on a summary basis via a preclusion doctrine such as collateral estoppel. In many cases, the statute of limitations will have run on the original crime or there will be no parallel state law crime, but this is not always the case. Also, I would disagree with the statement that a pardon always implies an admission of guilt to the crime for which a pardon was granted, even though that statement is often used rhetorically. For example, one important use of the pardon power is to commute the sentence of someone who asserts that they are factually innocent but have been convicted of a crime, potentially in a manner that is not subject to further judicial review, and treating that as an admission of guilt doesn't make sense. As the Wikipedia entry on Burdick notes in the pertinent part: Legal scholars have questioned whether that portion of Burdick [ed. about admission of guilt] is meaningful or merely dicta. President Ford made reference to the Burdick decision in his post-pardon written statement furnished to the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives on October 17, 1974. However, said reference related only to the portion of Burdick that supported the proposition that the Constitution does not limit the pardon power to cases of convicted offenders or even indicted offenders. I would read this as dicta, as this portion of the holding was not necessary for the court to reach its conclusion and the fact pattern in Burdick was a typical fact pattern where guilt was not disputed. It didn't raise the concerns present when a pardon is requested based upon a claim of innocence, and granted following a conviction. Instead, the holding of Burdick was that there was no pardon because the pardon was rejected (in a manner very similar to a common law disclaimer of a gift), so its holding didn't need to reach the effect of a pardon that is accepted to resolve the case. Can it be used as "reasonable cause" for various actions? This is a bit too vague to know what you are getting at. I suppose that a pardon could constitute reasonable cause for some things favorable to a defendant who is pardoned (e.g., potentially in a motion seeking to reopen a termination of parental rights entered on the basis of the conviction). I suppose it could also be used in a manner potentially unfavorable to a defendant (e.g. showing a pattern of past conduct that demonstrates modus operandi in connection with a prosecution for a new crime). I don't think it could be used as grounds to deny an occupational or business license for bad character. Still, without more clear context it is harder to know what you are really looking for in this regard and I'm not confident that my examples address that. Does the defendant lose their right to refuse to testify in the new case? I haven't reviewed the case law, but my intuition is that if it has never been waived before, it wouldn't be waived by the pardon, but that if it was waived in a previous proceeding resulting in a conviction that was then pardoned, that the prior sworn testimony might be admissible evidence in the new action since it is not hearsay and isn't itself evidence of a prior conviction. The context of the prior testimony might have to be concealed from the jury. As noted by @Putvi, the defendant could not claim risk of conviction for the federal crime as a ground for invoking the 5th Amendment if a pardon is accepted (something that is implied in Burdick), but if there was an overlapping state law crime, risk of conviction for the state crime could constitute a grounds upon which to invoke the 5th Amendment. Burdick does stand for the proposition that a pardon not solicited by the defendant, that is rejected, cannot provide a basis for removing the 5th Amendment protection with respect to a risk of conviction for federal crime. I would also be inclined to think that matters disclosed in an application for a pardon might be admissible evidence as a non-hearsay statement of a party-opponent, if the statement was stripped of the pardon application context (which would be unduly prejudicial since it would imply a prior conviction which otherwise wouldn't be admissible). | So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification. | No They look like pretty standard jury instructions to me. The only odd bit is “sure he is guilty” - that’s not what “beyond reasonable doubt means” and, at least in Australia, judges don’t tell jurors what it means, that’s one of the things they have to decide for themselves. However, in context, where the term “reasonable doubt” is clearly used latter, it’s probably ok. | Intent is an element of the offense of murder. If the prosecution can't prove the required level of intent for murder, the defendant may still be convicted of a "lesser included offense" like Manslaughter or perhaps Criminally Negligent Homicide, or even an offense that doesn't require an actual death like Aggravated Assault or an offense that doesn't require proof of an injury like Deadly Conduct. If the defendant is claiming that the intent was not voluntary because of some hypnotic effect then that is basically an insanity plea. Defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity face an indefinite commitment to a mental hospital, which can amount to decades of involuntary hospitalization. To learn more about this situation, read about the case of John Hinckley Jr. I personally doubt any jury would actually believe a hypnosis defense, especially without a woo-woo jury foreman, some outstanding work by the defense attorney, and a team of expert witnesses that includes an unrelated hypnotist and a psychologist who didn't believe in hypnosis until examining the defendant in this case... so a Mulder and a Scully. | It is not as simple as the witness just making the assertion that they are the killer. They will be subject to grueling cross examination to break their story. If the victim was killed at a specific time, perhaps the prosecution can prove the witness was somewhere else at that time, and therefore lying. (No Opportunity) If the victim was killed with a specific weapon, perhaps the prosecution can prove that only the accused had the weapon, and the witness had no access to it, and therefore lying. (No Means) If the victim was killed in a specific way, perhaps the witness doesn't know any of the details of how the crime happened, and therefore is not credible. (No Knowledge) If the accused's DNA is found at the scene, and their shirt is covered in blood, and the witness has no corroborating evidence against them, then the witness is likely lying. (No Evidence) If the witness claims he is the murderer, the prosecution can inquire as to why he killed the victim. The real murderer had a reason: Perhaps money, power, hatred, passion, etc, that the witness may not be able to provide. (No Motive) Planting doubt in the mind of a jury is an effective defense. But lying about who did what, when, how, and why it is not as easy as you suggest. |
What is the legal and administrative status of honk-on-lock in California? The California Vehicle Code Section 27001 states (a) The driver of a motor vehicle when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation shall give audible warning with his horn. (b) The horn shall not otherwise be used, except as a theft alarm system which operates as specified in Article 13 (commencing with Section 28085) of this chapter. However, 95% of the times when I am startled by a car horn, the car is empty, and the horn has nothing to do with safe operation or a theft alarm system. Rather, the car is honking to let the owner know that he or she has just successfully locked the doors using a remote control - the so-called "honk-on-lock" feature. Is this legal? Is it legal to sell a car which is configured to have this behavior? If not, why is the law not enforced? Would enforcement require additional legislative action? Proof of property damage? | let's look at the referenced Section 28085 ARTICLE 13. Theft Alarm System [28085- 28085.] ( Article 13 added by Stats. 1977, Ch. 993. ) 28085. Any motor vehicle may be equipped with a theft alarm system which flashes the lights of the vehicle, or sounds an audible signal, or both, and which operates as follows: (a) The system may flash any of the lights required or permitted on the vehicle. (b) The system may sound an audible signal. (c) No vehicle shall be equipped with a theft alarm system which emits the sound of a siren. (Amended by Stats. 1994, Ch. 516, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 1995.) This tells us what is allowable as a theft alert system. It may use sound(b) and turn the car into a goddamned Christmas tree(a), provided it is not: a siren sound(c) not audible(b) or a non-permitted light like Emergency Vehicle Lights(a). It does not regulate when it may fire, only that the sound alert has to be audible (preventing infrasonic make-your-ears-bleed or dog whistle sounds) and that the lights have to be an allowable part of the vehicle. So you could set the alert to honk or play imperial march or berate the wannabe thief or use painful loud music, all provided that it is audible and does not violate other laws. So, what is the correct operation of a car theft alert? Nothing in the article says, that you may just use the signals and honking for alerting in the case of theft, but that the system may use all the things in A and B under condition C to operate. Operation is "effect brought about in accordance with a definite plan". The definite plan for the alarm system is as follows: initialize alert the owner that it has correctly initialized wait for theft attempt or shutdown in case of theft: alarm everybody in case of shutdown: shutdown How the alertion and alarm are set up is up to the manufacturer's discretion, as long as the Article 13 is not breached. Example: My Ford Fiesta does a double-flash of the turn lights and a low key beep overpowered by the lock operation on locking and a single flash on unlocking. That is the factory setup (for my area) afaik. The manufacturer (or if I wanted to go to a car shop) could under Article 13 set the activation to trigger a short honk or any other audible to signal proper initialization as part of the normal operation. The failure of the sound coming after locking the car would alert me that something is amiss and it is not operating. The top 3 causes are most likely that the car key battery might be dead, a malfunction of the car alert or someone jamming the frequency of the key. As it is clearly part of the operation of the alert system, which is marked as a legal use of the horn of a car in Article 12 under Section 27001 b, yes, the alert may honk. INAL, so only my layman reading. | You have the right to notify the owner of the car of their vehicular trespass and the consequences of that. You do not have the right to damage the car in giving said notice. You have the right to offer to clean the gum off whatever part of the car you stuck the notice to. If you succeed in cleaning it,the other party will not have a legal cause of action, in all likelihood, since there is no damage (though with a bit of imagination they might come up with some 'missed business opportunity' loss). The court would probably find your choice of sticker to be negligent (put the notice under the wipers? use painter's tape -get some if you don't have any). The rationale 'we had no other choice' holds no water: there are alternatives. 'Criminal Damages' is a concept in UK law, but it relates to willful damage such as vandalism, not accidents. It would be an issue if you had planned to cause damage, but that seems not to be the case here. | Section 11302 of the California Elections Code makes it crystal clear - as soon as an office becomes vacant, the recall election proceeds anyway, unless as of that moment there are not enough signatures to proceed to the vote. So the resignation tactic can only be used to stop a recall election while they are still in the signature-gathering phase - it will not work if they have already gotten enough signatures. California's recall law as it applies to statewide elected officials is, frankly, idiotic (it should be like an impeachment, next officer in line gets the post), but it is designed specifically to stop a shenanigan like you describe. The Lieutenant Governor would become Governor if Newsom resigned, but only subject to the results of the Recall - if Newsom is recalled (despite already having resigned), the person with the plurality on part two of the ballot would become the next Governor. | I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4) | Illegal weapons Weapons are defined and are made illegal by statute. In many states, it is illegal to possess brass knuckles. For example, California penal code 12020(a)(1) makes it illegal to possess "any metal knuckles", "writing pen knife", "any leaded cane", among other things. I don't know of any state where it is illegal to pick up a stick, or keys, etc. So, yes, there is a legal distinction between your four scenarios. The mechanic is committing a crime by merely possessing the brass knuckles. The others are not committing a crime by the mere possession of the things you mention (unless there are states where they've been made illegal). Effect on a self-defense analysis Courts would have the jury go through the same self-defense analysis in each of these cases, regardless of the legality of the weapon used. We've described that analysis here. A pure self-defense analysis does not factor in the legality of the weapon that is used. But, if the weapon has been made illegal because of its disproportionate ability to injure, etc. that might weigh against the reasonableness of the force that was used when choosing to use that weapon in self-defense. Possession of an illegal weapon might also weigh against the credibility of the owner of that illegal weapon. | Can someone be compelled to prove they are complying with a contract? In this context, yes, since its apparent breach is evident. The other answer rightly explains the notion of preponderance of evidence, which pertains to the procedural aspect. Here, I will mainly address the substantive standpoint as per the situation you describe. The HOA rule most likely is intended to serve one or more purposes, such as preserving the prestige of the neighborhood, and to avoid safety hazards. The prolonged presence of an abandoned vehicle --just like any piece of junk--- tends to contravene those purposes. Regardless of the vehicle's true state, the effect of its apparent abandonment is visibly detrimental to the neighborhood, and it frustrates the ultimate purposes of the HOA rule: to preserve safety conditions in the neighborhood as well as the value of the properties. Also, the presumption that an abandoned vehicle is inoperable seems reasonable. The most straight-forward way to disprove the board's allegations of inoperability is to actually move the vehicle at least once in a while. Accordingly, the owner's inexplicable reluctance to take that simple step reinforces the supported suspicion that the vehicle is indeed inoperable, and thus in breach of the HOA rule. | No. Your evidence of registration of the car would suffice to show that you are not receiving stolen property, although you are correct that not informing the police that it has been recovered could get you pulled over if the car has been reported as stolen. Given the circumstances of the question, I don't address the means by which the car is repossessed. Not every use of force would be justified to secure the return of the stolen car. Reporting the theft and recover to the police would also make it easier for you to make an insurance claim. Repossession of a car stolen by fraud (tricking you into signing over the car title to them in exchange for Monopoly money in an envelope that you don't check until after they are gone, or for a forged check), which is then sold to a bona fide third party individual for value, however, might constitute car theft. | In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it. |
What prevents the DOJ from charging Democrats in Congress under U.S. Code § 2383? 18 U.S. Code § 2383 states Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. Members of Congress can be charged for crimes and even removed from office and jailed during their term. Washington Post has an article stating that more than two dozen members of Congress have been indicted since 1980. So it would seem that Congressmen are not immune from prosecution under the Federal law. A number of legal scholars, including Alan Dershowitz, have made the claim that, given the current fact pattern, "impeaching Trump would be an abuse of power by Congress." While abuse of power is a separate crime criterion, the act of violating the Constitution in order to attempt to unseat a duly elected President seems to fit the definition of rebellion (because it's an act of insurrection against the law). Of course, whether or not it is such an act is not my decision to make. In our legal system such decision are made by juries at trials (because it's a decision on the facts of the case). Is there a legal (rather than political) impediment preventing DOJ from charging Congressmen who voted for the impeachment of President Trump? I understand that, because of the political considerations, this question is hypothetical in nature. But I am asking about the law and not about the politics of it. Politics will change. The legal jeopardy (if it really exists) may remain in place for many years to come. | The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate. | The Commander-in-chief powers are quite broad. The War Powers Resolution limits his ability to engage unilaterally in military action, by requiring him to report to Congress within 48 hours, and if Congress disapproves, troops must be removed after 60 days. However, this law pertains to armed forces, and would not apply to remotely-launched missiles. Additionally, it is unknown if the resolution is unconstitutional (presidents say it is). No law at all requires POTUS to obtain permission from someone else, in order to engage in a military action. Article 90 of the UCMJ states that it is a punishable offense to "willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer". The manual also states that An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime. Murder of a civilian is an example. It also says The lawfulness of an order is a question of law to be determined by the military judge. "Shocking the conscience" is not a grounds allowing disobedience. One can only conjecture how a military judge would evaluate the lawfulness of a presidential order, when there is not a shred of legal evidence that such an order is in fact illegal: I conjecture that the order would be found to be lawful. | To consider obstruction of justice, it's not necessary to consider the impact of a delayed nomination on the work of the Supreme Court. 18 USC 1505 provides that a felony has been committed by Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress Since there's no suggestion of threat or force, the issue would be whether the lawyers' actions were corrupt, and whether the delay constituted an impediment. I am doubtful that either could be established. Furthermore, section 1515(c) says that This chapter does not prohibit or punish the providing of lawful, bona fide, legal representation services in connection with or anticipation of an official proceeding. Returning to your theory about preventing or delaying the confirmation of a nominated justice, there does not appear to be anything in the law that criminalizes this. The court having 8 members does not prevent it from hearing any case unless 3 of the 8 have recused themselves from the case, as the Supreme Court's quorum is six justices. | If the Senate took the extreme measure of attempting to abolish the Supreme Court, there's nothing in the Constitution that requires them to confirm any of the President's nominees. However, attempting to dismantle one of the three branches would be nothing short of a coup d'etat. The president has some options here: He [the President] may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses [of Congress], or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper. -- Article 2, Sec. 3 Basically, this means that, in an extraordinary circumstance (total defiance of the entire Senate would easily qualify), the President can lock the Senate in their chamber until they straighten their heads out. And when I say "lock them in", I don't mean that figuratively. The Constitution requires that a majority of each house be present to constitute a quorum to do business. The President could order up to 51 Senators to convene, and if they refused, could order the FBI or whoever to physically arrest them and drag them to the capitol building. This was actually done in Wisconsin by Gov. Scott Walker in 2011 when 14 Democrat Senators fled the state to avoid the quorum needed to vote on a controversial bill that they couldn't block. It would be messy for sure, and as far as I know, has never been done with the U.S. Senate. But there is precedent for it. Additionally, the President could use his vacancy power and just appoint a justice. Legally, he would have to wait for the Senate to be in recess, and the Senate would likely arrange things so that never happens. However, if there were no justices left, he could just appoint a Chief Justice (the Constitution provides that there be at least one justice). Even if he did this in the most "in-your-face" illegal way, with both middle fingers extended, the only judge that can tell him he did wrong is the guy he just seated. Of course, the Senate would move to impeach that judge, and probably the President too for having appointed him illegally, but you need a supermajority of both houses to remove them from office. If you had such a supermajority, then the game is over at this point; there's no way the President would step down in such a situation (who would force him?) and we're in a civil war because we don't have a functional government anymore. In reality, this isn't an "interesting twist in constitutional law that the Founding Fathers may not have considered." It's that if Congress ever went totally off the rails like that, the President, or the people would have to step up and hope they could end the standoff peacefully without resorting to violence, because this is the kind of thing that revolutions are fought over. | The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas. | Generally, the legislature is not restricted to passing laws that are a good idea. This has been remarked on by the Supreme Court (in Justice Stevens's concurrence, emphasis added): But as I recall my esteemed former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on numerous occasions: “The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws.” There are some limits: for one thing, the law must pass the rational basis test, which, while extremely favorable to the legislature (Congress could probably ban coffee consumption, for instance), does impose some limits and might result in at least some of your examples being struck down—I cannot imagine a court finding that the government had a rational basis for taxing everyone 120% of their income, for example. However, the states do have a recourse in many cases, especially if Congress were to reduce the penalties for crimes: most "common" crimes (assault, battery, murder, theft, etc.) are state crimes, so Congress wouldn't have the power to change the penalties for those. Most cases where these things become federal crimes involve conduct affecting multiple states, and the person committing the crime would likely also commit at least one state crime. States also aren't required to assist the federal government in its enforcement of federal law. For instance, quite a number of states believe that the federal prohibition of marijuana is unjust, and won't enforce those laws within their boundaries. | Mr. Comey answered this in his testimony. LANKFORD: Okay. Fair enough. If the president wanted to stop an investigation, how would he do that? Knowing it is an ongoing criminal investigation or counterintelligence investigation, would that be a matter of going to you, you perceive, and say, you make it stop because he doesn't have the authority to stop it? How would the president make an ongoing investigation stop? COMEY: I'm not a legal scholar, but as a legal matter, the president is the head of the executive branch and could direct, in theory, we have important norms against this, but could anyone be investigative or not. I think he has the legal authority. All of us ultimately report in the executive branch to the president. LANKFORD: Would that be to you, or the attorney general or who? COMEY: I suppose he could if he wanted to issue a direct order could do it anyway. Through the attorney general or issue it directly to me. This issue also came up in United States v Texas. The obligation to refrain from interference with the FBI is a norm, not a legal requirement. And, like many executive powers, an act that is sometimes legally permitted can become illegal given an improper motive. It is also possible for Congress to find legal acts to be untenably corrupt. | Defendants in the US would be charged with racketeering, not bribery, since government officials were not bribed. The DoJ indictment against Webb et al. is here: most of the defendants are not citizens of the US, though none are listed as being government officials. DoJ could certainly seek an indictment of ministers, senators or presidents of foreign countries. If said official were in the US on an ordinary passport, they could be arrested. They also might be arrested by e.g. Argentinian policy and extradited to the US, but whether that would be legal depends on the country (some countries don't extradite their own citizens; there would have to be an extradition treaty between that country and the US). It is inconceivable that any nation would hand over a sitting president because of an indictment by the US, and generally unlikely for any government official, but the official could be locally deposed first. But whether a government would do this is basically a political question, not a legal one. |
Do proponents of jury trials see it as a means to an end, or an end in itself? Let me explain the question. In the U.S., it is common place to hear people express enthusiasm for the fact that many cases are determined by juries. Such enthusiasm may be motivated by the efficiency/accuracy of jury trials: that they are more likely to find the true facts and can more accurately determine whether the defendant is guilty (liable) or not. Such enthusiasm can also be motivated by seeing jury trials as an end in itself: it allows people to participate directly in the judicial system and is more democratic, and thus is more desirable (irrespective of the efficiency/accuracy of jury trials). What is the main motivation behind the enthusiasm? The true answer is likely a mix, and the exact weights may differ by layman vs legal experts. I’m curious what you think. Thank you for your thoughts. | The reality, and to some extent the conventional wisdom, is that jury trial as less accurate (and jury trials are without a doubt, in modern times, less efficient). But there is also a widespread belief that jury trials are less biased than bench trials. Judges are probably more accurate but are perceived as being biased against most kind of criminal defendants, so that the average result is worse of innocent defendants, even though jury trials probably cause more guilty defendants to go free than they would otherwise. The empirical evidence is mixed and is system and context specific (judges might be biased in favor of law enforcement defendants, for example). But the revealed preferences of criminal defendants show an overwhelming belief that the average results of jury trials for them are better than the average results of bench trials for them. The fear of judicial bias also illuminates the circumstances under which the British retain civil jury trials (e.g. in eminent domain valuation proceedings, where judges are seen as having something of a conflict of interest since their department's budget competes for scarce funds with those funds used to pay eminent domain claims). Sometimes being fair is more important than being right, and that is what the jury system strives to do. The belief that judges have some inherent biases overlaps with the notion that the jury may bring a broad range of insight into interpreting the factual presentation and the credibility of witnesses based upon their wider range of personal experiences. The removal of the class and occupational biases of judges generally from the system also does have a democratic aspect to it. It gives granular active control of a key form of state use of power involuntarily over someone to the democratic populace making the system more democratic. Juries also turn a decision made by a lone judge (because unlike civil law systems, common law judges with only rare exceptions conduct bench trials individually, rather than in panels of judges), guarding against the idiosyncrasies of any one individual decision maker. Also, as a practical matter, in the U.S. and pre-modern England, there was a scarcity of legally trained judges so adopting a system calling for far more judges per capita, as civil law legal systems of Continental Europe did, would have been expensive, and juries made collective decision making possible, leveraging scarce judicial resources. Another important facet of this is jury nullification which gives a jury the practical, although often not formally acknowledged, power to disregard the law when its application seems unfair. The revolutionary Americans figures that their fellow citizens would be less likely to convict them of wrongs against an unjust state than British appointed judges had been to do so, and in practice, even in modern times, juries have often been lenient with politically motivated criminal defendants charged by the state with crimes. It also reflects a political calculus on the part of the judiciary collectively. In a bench trial, the public will seek to hold the judge responsible for decisions with which it disagrees and to blame the judiciary collectively for bad decisions. A jury trial deflects blame from the judge to an effectively anonymous and ephemeral group of ordinary citizens so that decisions perceived as bad don't taint the long term reputation of the judge with the public. More generally, bad decisions in high profile court cases can undermined the legitimacy of the government as a whole if made by a judge, but not nearly so much, if made by a jury. Finally, there are decisions that mosts often come up in tort cases (such as personal injury cases, defamation cases, and money claims for violations of civil rights) where a big component of any damage award involves compensatory non-economic damages (e.g. for pain and suffering and damage to dignity) and non-compensatory punitive damages claims, where a jury serves what amounts to an opinion survey-like role by translating intangible harms into fixed sums of money in a way that reflects community opinion, where there is no easy way to define that sum of money in a flexible way to cover myriad situations that a judge can follow in a principled way. | The "why" is pretty simple: the duty of the court is the ensure compliance with the law and uphold the rule of law. A statement to the contrary would undermine that obligation and would undermine a juror's oath to rule consistent with the law. But, out of institutional considerations, any rule that would make jury nullification impossible would also undermine other aspects of the jury trial that are designed to make a jury's determination of the facts of a case in a manner consistent with the law independently. And the oath of jury members to uphold the law is seen as adequate to secure the goal that juries uphold the law. One of the main points of a jury as an institution is to make random members of the general public who will never assemble together again and whose reasons aren't disclosed, rather than an identifiable individual who will continue to serve for decades and is identified with the government responsible for unpopular resolutions of particular criminal cases. If a judge could inquire about the reasons for a jury decision and punish them for making a decision for the wrong reasons, this appearance of independence and transfer of responsibility would be defeated. Another purpose of a jury trial system is to democratize the courts and to make a collective decision of the people at large look like one. But, even rare instances of jurors being disciplined for rendering a verdict in a manner that a judge grilled the jurors upon and found wanting would be problematic with respect to the cause of getting jurors (who already readily evade service) to serve. Therefore, continuing to keep in place the practices with respect to appellate review and the privacy of jury deliberations that makes jury nullification possible in fact, while not acknowledging this "loophole" in the system, is viewed as a suitable compromise. This isn't a breach of a human right to a fair trial because jury nullification is an extra-legal benefit to a criminal defendant to which they have not entitlement for the trial to be fair, and because governments don't have human rights. A jury nullification is in the same moral and human rights territory as an executive branch pardon. It can provide a safety valve that, because of the persons who are exercising it, we believe to be fairly safe from undue abuse, even though it does not implicate legal rights strictly construed. | united-states Procedures differ on such things. The closest I know of to an outcome of "not enough evidence" is the classic "scotch verdict" of "Not Proven. In the US, the prosecutor can wait to proceed with a criminal case while s/he does (or has done) as much investigation as s/he thinks is advisable. But once the trial starts, it normally proceeds to a conclusion. If there is not enough evidence to convict, the result should be "not guilty" and that will bar any future trial of the same person for the same offense under the doctrine of Double Jeopardy. Circumstantial evidence, as described in the question, can be enough to convict, if the jury (or judge in a bench trial) is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. Exactly how much evidence it takes to convince a Jury varies, and there is not a clear standard other than the phrase " beyond a reasonable doubt". The judge, or a later appeals court, can set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, but only by finding that no reasonable jury could have convicted on the evidence pre3sented, taking it in the light most favorable to conviction. Judges are reluctant to set aside jury verdicts unless they appear badly wrong. If further evidence is found during the trial, which tends to show the accused is not guilty, the prosecutor can request that the trial be halted. This may or may not bar a future re-trial of the same defendant, depending on whether the dismissal is 'without prejudice", a decision the Judge makes. But once evidence has been started to be presented, dismissals are usually "with prejudice" meaning that double jeopardy applies. The defense can also request a dismissal, most often at the end of the prosecution case. In rare circumstances the Judge may dismiss without a request from either prosecution or defense. These will most often be "with prejudice" It is possible for the trial to be recessed while new evidence is evaluated or sought, but this is rare and usually only for a short time -- a day or two, perhaps. In general a prosecutor is not supposed to schedule a trial if there is any reasonable chance of additional evidence coming to light. It can and does happen, but the system tries to avoid it, and does not easily accept that it has happened. This answer is US-Specific, and different answers may apply in other places. | It is possible that someone is convicted. Destruction of evidence an constitute circumstantial evidence that a crime was committed, and other evidence, such as testimony, could pin the crime to one of the four possible suspects. A jury has broad discretion to assess the weight of the evidence. | What are the factors in weighting whether to disclose substantive evidence vs. using it for impeachment at trial? In an adversarial system (such as that in the jurisdictions in the U.S.) the surprise factor is disallowed on trial. I am not knowledgeable on the procedural exceptions, but generally speaking the documentary evidence (including deposition transcripts) has to be filed during the discovery stage of proceedings. A discovery deadline is set up during case scheduling, and extensions of that deadline have to be requested via motion. There is the slightly related concept of sequestration of witnesses whereby inconsistencies may serve to impeach a witness's testimony, but that is different than withholding from the jury any pre-existing evidence that a plaintiff would like to be considered on trial (whether for impeachment or otherwise). Also, it is in the injured party's best interest that the jury get to see the evidence rather than have it merely rely on a witness's reaction of surprise. The wrongdoer's lawyer will try to confuse the jury and thus outweigh the jury's perception of a "surprised witness", but that attempt is likelier to fail if the jury has the evidence with which to compare the witness's testimony at trial. | I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well. | If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear. | We have all see on TV the judge instruct jurors that during trial they are not to speak about the case with anyone, even other jurors, unless all jurors are present and they are deliberating. However, contrary to the example given about England, in the U.S., those restrictions evaporate at the end of the trial. After a trial concludes, the court has no continuing control over the jurors and could not impose lasting restrictions without it. The Constitution provides the guarantee of trial by a jury of ones peers. In the U.S. for all general civil cases and all criminal cases, we have public trials. (special courts and tribunals are created to deal with cases involving classified information and issues of national security, and the courts have mechanisms for handling trade secrets, etc. to insure that information is not presented to jurors) So in that sense, there is nothing a juror could be exposed to in during their service as jurors that would require any type of continuing restriction. |
I want to use Moonlight Sonata in my movie - Copyright Issues? I am shooting a movie in which there is a shot of a phone ringing. The ringtone is moonlight sonata by Beethoven. Can I download the music from youtube and use it in my movie? Will I be breaking any copyright issue because of that? Or should I compose my own music and put it? | The Moonlight Sonata itself is well out of copyright. Most countries have copyright terms equal to or less than 70 years after the author's death, 1827 in the case of Beethoven. However, particular performances of the Moonlight Sonata may be under the copyright of the performer or even the arranger. Also, downloading from Youtube is against their terms of service. Overall, using the Moonlight Sonata is fine, just make sure you find a good legal source for it. | What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes | In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost. | A matter of terminology, what you want is not the copyright, but a license to use the copyright, presumably a non-exclusive license. You would probably need to approach a licensing department at Disney. They will ask lots of questions, and if they are open to the possibility, will quote a fee, which will, i would think, be sizable. Anyone should be able to ask, but I suspect that most requests are refused. It would probably be well to have a business plan laid out, and exactly how the images would be used in your plan. Disney can refuse any license, or offer one on whatever terms it pleases. | If you are utilizing the name of the characters just so users can rate them (by rate - I mean rank, review, critique) you should be fine. Copyrights are subject to "fair use" by the public. For purposes such as review, criticism, and comment - this is generally considered to be fair use. Is the site commercial or for-profit? That could impact the analysis, but only if you are making money flowing from the use of the actual copyrighted material(s), rather than advertising (like Adsense) or something similar (this should not suggest that those type sites cannot violate copyright, but it's part of the analysis). If it is something you are investing money into creating, you may want to get a formal legal opinion. But if the site if for fun, or hobby, you are likely fine if what's described is the only use. http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/copyright-fair-use-and-how-it-works-for-online-images/ This link is to a great, easy to read and understand article on fair use, what it is and what it allows. Keep in mind each case is fact intensive, however, from what you are describing this seems fine. | Yes, assuming the material was given the standard license. You would be creating a derivative work, and only the copyright owner has the right to authorize creation of a derivative work. See the copyright FAQ for general information. The owner can file a DMCA takedown notice with YouTube and they will by policy notify you of the infringement claim and unless you file a counter-notice (you legally couldn't given the facts you're asserting), they will take it down. The owner can also sue you. | "Personal use only" does not excuse copyright infringement under US law. The uploader does not hold copyright, and neither gives nor denies permission to copy his creation. The law does not require a copyright holder to deny permission, it requires the user to actually obtain permission. So no matter how you slice it (even as fair use) it is infringement for you to copy that video. | Under US law, the use of the converter is irrelevant. The legal situation would be the same if they were posted in MP3 format, or downloaded and played in whatever format they are posted in. The point is making and distributing copies without permission. The first question is: Is the music protected by copyright at all? If the work is old enough, there is no copyright on the composition. For example, most works of classical music will be long out of copyright. However, the recording itself can be copyrighted, even if the composition is not. In general, if recording was published before 1972, it will not be protected by US copyright. There are some other edge cases where the the recording will not be protected. See This chart for details. Assuming the recording is protected, the second question is: is the posting legal? That is, was the music posted by or with the permission of the copyright holder? If not, any download or further use would be copyright infringement, although holders are unlikely to sue individuals who download for personal use only. If the posting of a protected work was legal, the key question is, did the user have permission or some other legal basis. It is generally considered that when music (or other content) is posted to the net, there is an implied permission to download it for personal use. Alternatively and to the same effect, this might be considered in US law to be a case of fair use. But this will stop at personal use. Any making of additional copies, redistribution of such copies, or public performance of the music will require permission from the copyright holder. In the absence of such permission, it will be infringement, and the holder could sue. Permission may be granted directly, by contract, or by a permissive license. But permission in some form is required for such use to be lawful. I should add that the creation and distribution of a new (cover) version of a copyrighted song or other music may be permitted under US law by a compulsory license, known as a "mechanical license". This is provided for under 17 USC 115. There is a specific procedure to follow, which involves notifying the copyright holder and paying royalties at a specified rate. Failure to follow this procedure, unless permission is obtained in some other way, means that making and distributing recordings (phonorecords) is copyright infringement. |
Would a bitcoin "cleaning" service be legal in New Zealand? I'd like to create a piece of software or service which takes someone's Bitcoin, goes through a process of "cleaning" it (making it untraceable) and then returning it. Provided the purpose of the application is not for any kind of criminal usage, could this be legally published as a service? | The applicable law is the New Zealand Anti-Money Laundering law. The regulations describing exactly what is covered don't mention Bitcoin cleaning, but the "wire transfer" and "currency exchange" bits probably cover such a thing. I certainly wouldn't like to be the test case. There was also this case in Europe. | Hypothetically speaking, if a program doesn't come with a EULA, does that mean someone in possession of it (who isn't the owner) would be breaking the law if they used it? If the copy on the stick was lawfully made with permission of the copyright holder, then you can lawfully use the software. Someone who lawfully comes into possession of a lawfully made copy of the software (that was not a backup) has the right to use that software in the ordinary way. For example if someone found a USB stick lying on the ground and it had software on it but no EULA, could they use the software? Maybe, but it would be hard for them to know whether they could or not. It might be a backup. It might be an unlawful copy. There was a case where a person found a CD in the trash that was clearly an original. The package had a shrink wrap agreement, but he found the CD without the package. The court held that he had every right to use the software on the CD (since it was a lawfully-made copy and not a backup) and was not bound by the EULA (since he hadn't opened the package). But he was very fortunate in being able to demonstrate these facts. | It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages. | A more general version of the question, as far as I can see, is "Is Google Drive legal?". I can create an account and upload files to Google Drive, and I can open them from the cloud using various interfaces. I can directly open only certain files types, others I have to download to the device that I'm using in order to open the file. There are various file storage systems that allow this, most or all of which seem to use some sort of system of password access, file-access permissions and encryption to block access by unauthorized individuals. All systems seems to allow "sharing" of a specified file. Google and colleague escape liability by complying with 17 USC 512 aka the DMCA safe harbor provisions. Basically, they don't know, they don't select uploads, they have a removal procedure, they don't know that the material is infringing, and they "are not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent". There is a chance that you would be sued for inducing copyright infringement, see MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, specifically We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties You describe a situation that is unlikely to be found to constitute inducement to infringing, instead it is "enabling possible infringing", and mere possibilty of doing something bad with a tool does not make you liable for selling a tool, under current US law. An eyebrow would be raised, though, as to why this service only allows ebooks to be deposited. | This would be entirely dependant on the jurisdiction. The things that would need to be legal to make this transaction legal are: Is the sexual act legal? Is gambling legal? Ongoing consent by both parties To make this an enforceable contract, in addition you would need: Sexual acts to be valuable consideration, basically, is prostitution legal? The fundamentals of a binding contract: intention, legality of objects etc. | Of course you'd be in legal trouble, the contract is still valid. I also don't know why you don't consider virtual goods to be goods. Take this example: You buy a 1 year subscription for (example) netflix. The next day they cancel your subscription but don't give you the money back because its not a "real good". This should make it clear that virtual goods are goods too in the eyes of the law. Question is if police/lawyers care about it as much as for "real" goods. | If you are charged under the laws of Estonia (or Australia or Thailand or the UK) then the laws of the USA have no relevance whatsoever. It makes no difference if you are a US citizen, if the alleged crime happened in the USA or was perpetrated against the USA. If nation X has jurisdiction then you are tried under the laws of nation X. That is what sovereignty means. As to your specific example, Facebook does business in Estonia, therefore they are subject to Estonian law, as a US corporation they are also subject to US law and the law of every other jurisdiction they operate in (see why they need big legal departments?). If a legitimate Estonian warrant was served on them to disclose metadata or anything else then they are legally obliged to do so or be in contempt of court. Oh, and by the way, the first amendment right to free speech does not give you a right to anonymous free speech. | Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability. |
What if I don't pay the deposit of a rental contract? Here is the situation: I've just moved to a new flat in Germany, and my contract states that I need to pay a certain amount of deposit to my landlord. However, I really didn't like the flat from the first date and would like to move out, if possible, tomorrow. What happens if I don't pay my deposit? Can the landlord sue me? I want the contract to be terminated as soon as possible; I don't want to live here. What can I do to make her terminate the contract given that I haven't paid the deposit. Note: I've sub-rented the apartment. | You have a contract - if you break it, you can be sued. A contract is a legally binding promise that the state (through its courts) will enforce. You promised to pay the deposit - you must pay the deposit. You promised to pay rent on a regular basis for the period of the lease - you must pay that rent. You don't want to live there? Fine, the lease probably doesn't require you to. So long as you keep paying the rent, you don't have to. If you break the lease, then the landlord can sue you for the damage that they suffer - this is typically the value of the rent until they can find a new tenant and if that tenant is paying less than you, the difference between that amount and your rent for the balance of the lease. If you want to renegotiate the contract (for example, to end it early), you will need to ask your landlord but they are under no legal obligation to release you from it. They may be willing to do so out of the goodness of their heart and/or if you pay them. | Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony. | No If you breach the contract that may allow the rental company to terminate it (among other things), however, termination would need to be communicated to the customer. Only if they kept it after that, with the intention of permanently depriving the company of it, are they stealing it. | Am I at fault? Can I get my security deposit back from Landlord? The landlord is wrong, and he should reimburse you the totality of the security deposit. Clauses #1 and #16 would entitle the landlord to deduct from your security deposit only the portion of the 7-day period that is not already covered in the payment you made for 1st week's rent, which according to clause #1 starts on Sunday July 29. If I understand correctly, you signed the contract (and paid) on July 27, and then gave your 7-day notice on July 28. Since you paid an additional amount for Saturday July 28, then your 1st week's rent payment actually covers the entire 7-day period of your notice. Therefore, the landlord should reimburse you the entire security deposit. The contract nowhere indicates that the count of [post-notice] 7 days starts after the current rent-week elapses. But even if it did contain language in that sense, the dates you mention render that hypothetical clause void. Lastly, clause #16 refers to giving a written notice, which is what you did by sending him the text he obviously read and understood. Therefore, his statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out" clearly is false. What should I do? If the landlord insists to retain the security deposit, your option is to file a complaint in Small Claims court (I don't know whether this has a different name in PA). Depending on PA procedural law, you and the landlord might be cited for mediation prior to being assigned a court date. A process in small claims court is pretty straight-forward, but only you can determine whether the hassle of attending mediation and court hearing is worth. If anything, it (1) certainly gives you some [minimal] exposure to litigation, and (2) teaches the landlord to abide by the very rules he drafted in the contract. 8/30/2018: Edited to address OP's follow-up question of whether section 250.512 of the Landlord and Tenant Act precludes recovery of security deposit (see comments) After analyzing the statute you found, Pennsylvania courts have still held that a tenant's failure to provide a new address does not preclude recovery of the security deposit. See Adamsky v. Picknick, 412 Pa.Super.Ct. 544, 549 (1992): we find the lack of notice argument is tenuous at best since appellant's reason for withholding the deposit was not because he did not have appellees' new address, rather, he withheld it because he maintained there were damages for which he should be compensated. That conclusion is squarely applicable to your situation. The landlord's only pretext for withholding your deposit is his inaccurate statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out", and for that matter he refers to nothing else than the rental agreement. The rental agreement nowhere requires you to provide your new address. One decision that does not constitute legal precedent but still might help persuading Small Claims court in your situation is Back v. Taylor, 19 D. & C. 3d 606, 609 (1980). After citing section 250.512(e) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, the court states: That section sets forth certain guidelines as to when tenants can obtain double recovery. Defendants have only sought recovery of the deposit and therefore, the above cited section does not apply. (emphasis in original) Unless you were pursuing double recovery (see item (c) of the statute), it would be very questionable --to say the least-- why a [Small Claims] court should decide your dispute any differently than in Back. Another non-precedential decision analyzing the same statute is Shoemaker v. Henry, 35 D. & C. 206, 209 (1984). Also in the context of double damages, the court stated: We cannot believe the only purpose [to require a tenant to provide his new address] was a negative one, that is, to cancel a right to double damages for failure to comply. A more rational explanation is that its purpose was to provide a landlord with an address to which the damage list could be sent. (brackets added) The statute apparently was enacted well before the prevalence of electronic communications. If your landlord has any way to send you a "damage list" (as it seems to be the case insofar as he replied to your text), then the rationale in Shoemaker should apply in your situation. If you are not even pursuing double recovery, then it would be unavailing for the landlord to cling to the language in item (e) of that statute. Therefore, you are definitely entitled to your deposit even if you did not provide to the landlord a new address. It is up to you whether you want to go for double damages, in which case the decision in Shoemaker might or might not be persuasive in Small Claims court. Beyond that, the Adamsky opinion constitutes legal precedent which favors your position. | If you want to get out, and are willing to lose $270, you can not sign the lease and demand a return of your security deposit. You could ask for a return of the other fees as well, but you are less likely to be successful. They would probably have trouble enforcing a security deposit against you if you didn't have a lease with them, and would probably have trouble demanding you sign a lease when they changed the unit. You should probably get it all back, because you applied for it, but it probably isn't worth litigating over. I would also encourage you to turn to social media sites if they have one, or to sites like Yelp, if they do not. Many businesses are sensitive to this and if you are truthful if could provide you with some leverage. | What the landlord is doing is forcing you to abide by the terms of your lease agreement. You most likely agreed to a 1 year lease on a signed document, which means you're pretty much screwed because if he wanted to, he could force you to fulfill the lease and pay him anyway. However, his remarks about when you can notify to terminate are wrong. See end of answer. About Terminating Your Lease Early However, there are a few loopholes you can exploit. The easiest one is to get him to increase your rent. Ask about it, tell him that you're considering staying but tell him you want to know if he's going to increase the rent by much. If he declares that he is going to increase the rent, perfect. Get him to send it to you in writing (which he is legally required to do). Just in case though, have him on speaker phone and record every conversation you have from now on without telling him. This is legal (see this answer) and is a powerful form of evidence, so exploit the hell out of it. If you can get him to tell you that he's going to increase your rent, then you can legally submit a notice to terminate tenancy on the grounds that you do not wish to pay the increase. In this case, the amount of notice that you have to give is capped to the day that the rent increase is to take place. If you try this, do everything you can to get it in writing. Don't feel proud of snaring him and immediately announce that you're leaving because of this as soon as he says it on the phone, because you're screwing yourself out of going through the proper channels to make sure you not only win, but you've made your case air tight. Also, feel free to let you landlord know that he owes you money. Landlords in Ontario have to repay you a capped interest rate on your last months' deposit every 12 months. This rate is decided annually and for 2015 is capped at 1.6%. If your landlord wants to be anal about the rules and stick the letter of the law to you, do it back. Becoming a pain your landlords ass is a great way to get them to either become more flexible, or make a mistake that will give you an out. Notice that if he does increase the rent, he can demand that you increase your last months deposit and force you to pay it. You could "accidently" make him aware of this right in a conversation where you are concerned about a rent increase immediately after letting him know that he owes you money for the interest. "I'm concerned about the rent increase because I have to increase my deposit by law too." This way, he'll hopefully have the thought "I can avoid having to give him any money by increasing his rent by the same interest rate, so he'll owe me what I owe him, therefore I owe nothing. I'm so smart!" Then he cheerfully gives you a notice to increase rent, at which time you invoke your right to terminate tenancy on short notice due to an increase in rent. Your Landlord Is Wrong All that aside, your landlord committed an illegal act when they refused your notice to terminate, because he's denying you your rights under the RTA. From the Residential Tenancies Act: A tenant may terminate a tenancy at the end of a period of the tenancy or at the end of the term of a tenancy for a fixed term by giving notice of termination to the landlord in accordance with section 44. 2006, c. 17, s. 47 The details adjust a little bit depending on your circumstances, but the conditions in section 44 are basically to ensure the following: You are giving 60 days notice. You are not giving 60 days notice where the termination date you provide is less than the previously agreed term, except in special cases like the one I mention about increased rent. There is nothing in section 44 that can be confused to mean that you must wait until you have passed the end of your term before you can decide to leave. I suspect your landlord is deliberately interpreting the use of wording like "may terminate at the end of" to imply you have to wait to give your notice. A notice of termination is not a termination. It is a notice that in the future, you are going to terminate. Let's remove the confusion by replacing the word "terminate" with "vacating the premises and not paying another cent". That should remove any ambiguity that could be abused. So frankly you can simply go straight to the board, file the appropriate form with them and just pack up and leave when you've reached the date specified in the notice to terminate. Your final month is covered by your deposit. File the form immediately, let them know about the conversation you had with your landlord, then go to your bank and cancel the cheques you've already written (except for your deposit cheque) and simply ignore the landlord, carrying on with your moving plans. You should ask the Board if this illegal act has any ramifications. Perhaps because he has done this, this gives you an immediate out or something else. Call the Board and tell them what happened and ask them. They have an obligation to inform you correctly. Sources: Landlord Tenant Board of Ontario FAQ Final Note The Board is there to serve you, free of charge. They have a duty, as it is their explicit directive, to assist you in all matters regarding being a tenant. Phone them, talk to them at length, demand assistance. They are to inform you of your rights and guide you on the appropriate action, forms and procedure to assist you in resolving any issues you have. Note that I wrote the whole bit about getting out of your lease early legally before I refreshed my memory on the fact that you can/should give your 60 days notice before the end of your lease period. That makes the case much simpler as a I note in my answer. I left the information I already wrote however because it could be applicable or at least be of some help to others. Also note that if you're saying that the landlord came to get more cheques on the basis of his lie that he used to refuse your attempt to legally leave, then you'll need to cancel those cheques. That costs money. That alone is enough of a case to take him before the Tribunal and force him to repay the cost of those cancelled cheques. You may even successfully claim further damages or the Tribunal may voluntarily award you money for the actions your landlord is deliberately taking to deprive you of your rights. Talk to the Board. | You agreed to pay these fees when you applied for the apartment, so unless they explicitly say that one or both of these fees is waived in case you don't take the apartment (virtually no chance that they said such a thing), you owe that money. Your obligation is not contingent on them convincing you that the fee is just, so it doesn't matter that they won't explain the difference. However, if they said you can pay electronically, then you can pay electronically, since that too is part of the agreement. | The terms of the lease are subject to Ohio's law. The only option for a tenant terminating a rental agreement is ORC 5321.07(B)(3), in response to failure to fulfill obligations under 5321.04. Those obligations relate to safety and health, keeping things in good working order, not abusing access and privacy rights. There is no obligation to make the tenant happy. As a general rule, when you sell real estate, rental agreements transfer from seller to buyer. If they did not, tenants could be evicted as trespassers or rents could be raised massively within the period of the lease. The tenant's obligation remains the same, and it has simply been transferred to another person. |
Is it legal for an investment firm to announce some positions/trades that aren't true? Taking as example the 2021 GameStop short squeeze, is it legal for an investment firm to announce some positions/trades that aren't true? The question was triggered by this Tweet (mirror): | No Lying about a trade would be market manipulation. | You’ve presented a number of different scenarios, without a lot of specifics, so I’ll start from the top, and from a US perspective. A very generic term that would come up in this situation is material misstatement. one might say that an account or line item is overstated or understated, or a misstatement could arise from the omission of a necessary note, because notes are an integral part of the financial statements. Financial statements are said to be materially misstated if the misstatement would affect the choice of a typical decisionmaker. There’s no explicit standard for what is or isn’t material, but in practice, auditors often choose some small fraction of net income as the threshold. Materiality can also be caused by positive vs. negative earnings, or other thresholds, like financing agreements which might oblige the company to keep its current ratio above a certain level, for example. In the US, the rules to which the statements have to be materially correct are known as GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and they are codified in the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Accounting Standards Codification (FASB ASC). Depending on how the scheme is arranged, issues in the realm of “buying stuff as a “customer” to make the business look good” include: Substance over form: it may not be appropriate to recognize as a sale at all. If the net effect is a transfer of cash from the owner or manager to the business, while the goods find their way back into the company warehouse, that could be considered as paid-in-capital, or even a liability, rather than a sale. Owner bought some product to inject cash, and put the goods back in the inventory? That’s cash from the stockholder, not a customer sale. Somebody in management moved a truckload of product to his storage unit, only to return it after year end? That might be more accurately characterized as a loan, not a sale. I don’t know of any specific terms for this exclusively, but there have certainly been cases where companies moved inventory to undisclosed warehouses in an effort to hide fictitious sales from their independent auditors. Edit: Another term for certain sales without commercial substance is a “roundtrip transaction” or “roundtripping.” Disclosure notes: even if there is commercial substance to the transaction, it may require disclosure notes, such as those for related party transactions, as required by ASC 850. Transactions with related parties must be disclosed even if they are not given accounting recognition (ASC 850-05-5). Examples of related parties are given in ASC 850-05-3, including “an entity and its principal owners, management, or members of their immediate families,” among others. Under the relevant definition, a person does not need a formal title to be considered a member of management (ASC 850-10-20). The related party disclosure is not required in consolidated financial statements, for transactions that are eliminated in the consolidation process (ASC 850-10-50-1). For sales from a public company to a bona-fide external customer, there’s also the major customers disclosure, but the threshold for that is 10% of revenue, which is much more than enough to materially impact the bottom line. Generally, transactions between a parent company and a subsidiary will be eliminated in the preparation of the parent’s (consolidated) financial statements (ASC 810). This means if the parent company A sells goods with a carrying value of $30 to its subsidiary, B, at a price of $50, A doesn’t recognize that $20 gross profit until B sells the goods to an outside party. Internally, B might carry the goods at $50 on B’s books, but A would have to cancel it out so that only $30 of that appears on A’s consolidated balance sheet. The consolidation method is applied when one business has a controlling interest in another, and in summary it means that the parent company reports A+B’s financials as if it was all a single entity. That means B’s assets and liabilities, revenues and expenses, are all reported as part of A. It also means any transactions between B and A are transactions within the entity; you wouldn’t recognize a gain or loss (nor revenue and GP) if your marketing department sold office equipment to your engineering department, and you don’t get to with subsidiaries either. Consolidation requires not only eliminating revenues, cost of goods sold, and excess carrying value of inventories on intra-entity transactions; it's also gains and losses on things like equipment, meaning the same transaction could require a consolidation adjustment twenty years later to eliminate excess depreciation expense. Long story short, ASC 810 deals with consolidation, and those rules apply when you create or purchase a subsidiary to buy your stuff, or use a subsidiary to pass the same $200,000 back and forth. When the parent entity does not have a controlling interest in the investee (the basic threshold is 50% of voting shares, or by some other agreement) but does have significant influence (representation on the board or other factors in ASC 323-10-15-6), then it will be treated as an equity method investment. Instead of adding the line items together, it's a single asset and A's portion of B's earnings are a single line item on the income statement, but the adjustments are similar to those in a consolidation. Another kind of revenue recognition game which companies used to play involved bill-and-hold arrangements, wherein the customer (or the “customer,” or a salesperson without any real input from the supposed customer) would place an order, and the company would send (or at least, prepare and book) an invoice (revenue), but not ship the goods until the customer actually asked for them. These days, the rules on revenue recognition are fairly guarded against these kinds of things, but some other examples of “sales” that aren’t really sales include consignment arrangements, repurchase agreements (could be a sale with right of return, or depending on terms could be effectively a lease or a financing arrangement), and the gross vs net revenue issue for principle/agent situations (airline and hotel booking sites are a popular example. If they’re an agent they’re required to report their commission on a net basis but would likely prefer to look bigger by calling it a $110 sale and $100 cost of goods sold, instead of just $10 revenue). If you’re interested in management schemes to mislead the users of financial statements, check out the SEC’s online archive of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) here. Some of them just deal with individual professionals who should know better, but they can be pretty interesting, whether they involve poor ICFR, or intentional deception on the part of upper management (it's on management either way). | It means that you state the fact and represent that it is true If you make a material false representation in the formation of a contract and the other party enters the contract in reliance on that, then that contract is void. This would appear to be the case here. When a contract is void neither party can enforce their rights, nor are they required to perform their obligations under that contract. The practical effect for a cryptocurrency broker is they have your money and your crypto coin and you can’t sue to get either back. | To examine this further and answer your question, we need to look at Copyright (and fair use) as well as Defamation. Alas, I am unsure as to how taking legitimate headlines from around the world and attributing their source is 'fake news' - but I'll accept that it's 'fake news' for the purposes of exploring this topic. A lot of the potential (or motive) for a person or company to litigate against you will be context specific and detailed to how you have used their work and portray their journalists and characters - misquotes etc. As an exception to British copyright law, fair dealing is governed by Sections 29 and 30 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, which outlines three instance where fair dealing is a legitimate defence: If the use is for the purposes of research or private study; If it is used for the purposes of criticism, review or quotation; Where it is utilised for the purposes of reporting current events (this does not apply to photographs) However, where you may come into problems is: A statutory definition for fair dealing does not exist; it will always be a matter of fact, degree and interpretation in every fair use case. Nor is there a percentage or quantitative measure to determine fair dealing. The Intellectual Property Office lists the key factors used to determine the validity of whether a particular dealing with a work is fair as follows: Has the use of the work impacted negatively on the market for the original work? If the creator or owner has lost potential revenue through the re-use of their work, it is not likely to be fair. Was it reasonable and necessary to use the amount of work that was taken? Also: Fair use for parody, caricature or pastiche The UK copyright law on fair use of works for the purposes of creating a parody or pastiche is also listed in Section 30A, Schedule 2 (2A) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. References to all here. Guidance from the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) states that fair use needs to be “fair and proportionate” and does not protect an individual from any other rights an author may have. Those other rights may involve claiming defamation if this material creates fake news and uses the names of real journalists or companies etc - and if they allege that your AI fake news has caused serious harm in any way to their reputation - they could sue you for breach of the Defamation Act 2013. All of this is entirely contextual however as to how your AI might display or make fake news and how Google caches it and displays it - and if it could be portrayed as 'real' or believable for example. You are also doing this at a time where 'anti fake news' law is evolving... and even though you say it's fake news for AI experiment purposes - it's a growing field of concern for many. (see here) Copyright law is a vast and evolving area - and nothing is clear cut. It really depends if a major news company didn't like what you were doing and took exception to it and issued challenges on many areas of law based on that. | Insiders, such as a CEO, are allowed set up predetermined trading plans to avoid accusations of insider trading: Rule 10b5-1 is established by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to allow insiders of publicly traded corporations to set up a trading plan for selling stocks they own. Rule 10b5-1 allows major holders to sell a predetermined number of shares at a predetermined time. Many corporate executives use 10b5-1 plans to avoid accusations of insider trading. See also: What constitutes illegal insider trading What is insider trading exactly? | An investor can require, as a condition of making an investment, that key management and creative employees of the company agree to a non-compete agreement. If such employes choose not to sign such an agreement, the investor will not invest. This is quite common. If Alice has signed such an agreement, she may not be able to start a new company with such new applications without permission from the existing company. She can surely write such applications for the existing company and get it to modify its business to use them. If Alice (still) owns a controlling share, she can simply order the company to modify or expand its business model. If she has sold enough of the company that she no longer controls it, she must persuade those who do control it to adopt her ideas. Any non-compete agreement must be limited, both in the range of activities it covers, and in the tiem for which it is valid. Some US states impose specific limit on these factors. An agreement tht exceeds such limits will not be enforceable. If Alice was employed by the company at the time she wrote any of these apps, the code may well be owned by the company, either under the work-made-for-hire copyright rule (see 17 USC 101) or under a specific contract of employment. Investors are likely to demand that such a contract be signed before they invest in a tech startup. Alice will also have a duty not to act contrary to the company's interests while employed by it. In the absence of non-compete agreements, Alice might not be prevented from founding or joining a competing company, but may not be able to use work done while employed by the first company for the benefit of a new one. | This is not "libel," which is a form of defamation (publishing a false and defamatory statement that injures another). "Bait and switch" is a type of violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Law. That Law makes it illegal for a business to engage in any false or deceptive practices, or to perform any false or deceptive acts, in commerce. Read more about it on the Massachusetts' state government site. If the restaurant's conduct was deceptive and it caused you harm (for instance, you would not have gone into the restaurant and ordered at all if you had known you had to order a drink to get the favorable price on sliders,) there may be a violation. | Does B have a legal obligation to inform A that changes were made to the document? This is definitely not a simple yes-no question. One ought to consider not only the tenets of contract law, but also notions of equity and of public policy. On the one hand, courts acknowledge modified contracts that result from a battle of the forms. On the other hand, sliding changes in the contract without adequately directing the counterparty's attention to them tends to contravene the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In the scenario you outline, imagine the inefficiency and risk of mistake if the parties engage in several rounds of offers and counter-offers by sliding changes scattered all over the latest draft of a contract (this is totally feasible, especially as laws nowhere limit the number of times a party can make a counter-offer). Unless each party is conspicuous about his latest changes to the contract, the dynamics can easily become a matter of which party inadvertently binds himself to unacceptably detrimental clauses (some of which might re-occur after being stricken in a previous draft). This hinders the contract law prerequisite that a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. Although the parties are responsible for reading the contract, subjecting the offeror/offeree to devote valuable resources each time a newly altered contract goes from one direction to the other seems contrary to public policy. Furthermore, that defeats the purpose of negotiations and of the prior efforts each party spent toward the contract (such as valuations and risk analysis). I'm just curious to understand what legally prevents this type of things from happening in general. An offer may include language to the effect of accepting the contract 'as is'. See the provision in the Uniform Commercial Code (for instance, see MCL 440.2207(2)(a)) whereby alterations are precluded "[if] the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer". The aforementioned statute also precludes terms which significantly alter the contract. See MCL 440.2207(2)(b). In a context of loan contracts --apropos of your example--, a borrower's unilateral alteration of the interest rate, of payment schedules, etc. constitute material alterations. Indeed, financial institutions are utmost sensitive to changes in interest rates and the timing of cash flows. Even in the case of an offeree's immaterial alterations of a contract, an offeror might prevail under principles of equity. This is more evident in the case of entities which enter and manage a multitude of contracts simultaneously, be it via contracts of adhesion or upon negotiations with each counterparty. In line with my point on public policy, the additional cost of filtering a counterparty's last minute occurrences would make it impossible for economies of scale to develop. |
How are corporations imprisoned? If a corporation is criminally charged while handling privacy data wrongly (assume such a law exists if it does not) in India who is liable? Is it the chairman, deparment of privacy, employees involved, the majority shareholder who financed the company or someone else? Assume the company was not set up just to do illegal activity and the majority shareholder and chairman took reasonable steps to ensure privacy and left the rest to privacy experts and lawyers in the privacy department. | A corporation can be criminally charged, this is not infrequent. If there is a guilty verdict in such a case, the penalty is normally a fine. Not infrequently, there would be a civil case over the same or related conduct, which might result in an injunction or other court order to address future actions and attempt prevent further actions of the same sort. In some cases, an officer, employee, ort agent of a company may also be criminally charged. This is not automatic by position in the company. For there to be a conviction on any such charge, it must be proved that the person charged had himself or herself actually committed a crime, with the usual element of intent for that crime. That would depend on the exact statute involved and its provisions. A person who had knowingly or willfully misused data protected under a privacy law would probably be guilty of a crime. Exactly what crime would depend on the country and the specific conduct alleged. Different countries have different laws on such issues, and many countries have several different privacy laws which apply in different situations. Without a more specific hypothetical indicating just what such a person had done, one cannot say just what charges might be valid or what evidence would be needed to establish guilt. A shareholder would not be guilty of anything just by being a shareholder. Such a person would need to have taken some action in violation of some law to be guilty of any crime. | I can’t speak for Indonesia but if you did this in Australia you would be a criminal. You either committed fraud or are an accessory to fraud. You would probably be considered an accessory at and after the fact which means you are subject to the same maximum penalty as if you had committed the fraud yourself - 10 years in jail. In addition, you are liable to repay the money taken, jointly and severally with your ‘friend’. However, if they can only find you, you cannot recover from your ‘friend’ as you were engaged in a joint criminal enterprise. Scams such as you describe are distressingly common and many people fall for them. As such, assuming the court accepted your story (because you might actually be the fraudster and have just made it up) you would be unlikely to get close to the full sentence and if you caught the judge on a good day, might even escape jail. If you are lucky, the jury might acquit, even though, on the facts, they shouldn’t - juries do what juries do. If you’re really lucky the police might decide not to prosecute. | The GDPR as such puts obligations on the Data Controller (DC), that is the person or firm or other entity who determines the purposes for which data is processed. The entity that hires the developer and operates the web site is responsible for compliance with the GDPR and other laws and regulations, such as the e-privacy directive and its implementing laws. However, it is highly likely that in commissioning a web site the DC would specify that it be designed to aid compliance with the GDPR and other relevant laws, and if the developer did not do that it might be a breach of contract. Indeed, even if GDPR-friendliness was not explicitly required by the contract between the developer and the DC, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purpose would probably apply. A designer who, knowing the site is to be hosted and operated within the EU, failed to design it to facilitate GDPR compliance might well be in violation of those warranties. But that would depend on the specifics of Italian law. But note that GDPR compliance is not a matter of web site design, but of the ongoing practices of the operation of the site. There are various ways to comply with the GDPR, no specific technology or design need be used. The DC must so operate the site as to comply. If the DC fails to do that, penalties could be imposed on the DC, not on the developer. | Does a bail-jumper have any recourse from being apprehended with the help of illegally obtained information? No. The bail-jumper has no recourse from being apprehended with the help of illegally obtained information for reasons discussed at greater length below in response to another question posed which is somewhat broader. Say that a person is a bail-jumper, that is, someone who fails to appear in court after being let out on bail. If they are apprehended by a bail bondsman with the help of illegally obtained information, do they have any sort of recourse? The person apprehended has very little recourse. The relevant case law has held that an apprehension of a bail-jumper by a private sector bail bondsman or a private sector bounty hunter hired by a private sector bail bondsman, is not "state action" and hence not subject to the constitutional protections that apply to illegal conduct by law enforcement officers acting under color of state law. This is true even though bail bondsman attempting the apprehend a bail-jumper is given profoundly broad statutory authority to take actions that would otherwise be illegal for a private person to engage in when doing so, and even though the bail bondsman is, in substance, enforcing a direction of a court which is a governmental agency. Certainly, nothing equivalent to the exclusionary rule or Miranda or a lawsuit against the bail bondsman under Section 1983 for a violation of the bail-jumpers civil rights would be available. (Also, the exclusionary rule that applies to exclude evidence obtained illegally in violation of the 4th and/or 6th Amendments doesn't operate to prevent a criminal defendant detained by law enforcement from being detained on an outstanding warrant, even if the arrest is based upon illegally obtained information, although if law enforcement did it, the bail-jumper could bring a 1983 actions against the offending law enforcement officers subject to qualified immunity.) The bail-jumper would probably have a right to sue the company that disclosed the information illegally for breach of a privacy tort if this was done in a timely fashion. But, attorneys' fees can't be recovered in a case like that, the statute of limitations is typically short, and damages that could be awarded would normally not extend to any harm involving the criminal defendant's failure to be successful in bail-jumping. So, ordinarily the damages would be nominal at best. Likewise, there might be a claim against the bail bondsman for participation in a civil conspiracy with the company that provided the information to commit a privacy tort. But, this has all of the downsides associated with suing the company providing the information, and also, would pose an additional problem: it is quite likely that a suit against the bail bondsman by the bail-jumper for acts occurring while the bail-jumper is jumping bail is either contractually waived by the bail-jumper in a bail bond agreement with the bail bondsman that courts would uphold despite the fact that it arguably involves an intentional tort by the bail bondsman, or would be barred by a bail bondsman's immunity from liability created under an applicable state statute or the common law of that state created by judicial decisions. Furthermore, in some states, a suit like this by a bail-jumper against the bail bondsman and also against the company providing the information, would be barred under the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" that bars someone who has engaged in illegal or improper conduct in connection with the claim for which relief is sought from utilizing the courts in connection with that set of facts. Realistically, probably the best legal strategy for criminal defendants who have obtained private bail bonds would be to bring a class action against the companies that provide the information and the bail bondsmen who have used it, ideally brought on behalf of criminal defendants who are not bail-jumpers as well as those who are bail-jumpers, seeking injunctive relief only to prohibit continuation of this practice prospectively, subject to contempt of court sanctions from the issuing court if the company or bail bondsman defendants did so. | No Let's assume that Google and Huawei had a valid contract that obliged Google to provide certain services and failing to provide them would be a clear breach of contract that would normally entitle Huawei to damages. Once Huawei was put on the entity list so that supplying such services would be illegal under US law, the contract was discharged by frustration because performance of the contract is now illegal. That is, the contract is at an end and the future rights and obligations of both parties are a nullity. Under contract law, if Hauwei had paid in advance for these services, too bad for Huawei. If Google was owed money for services already provided, too bad for Google. It’s possible that each party in those circumstances could bring an equity case for unjust enrichment but that is at the discretion of the court and would require, among other things, the aggrieved party having ‘clean hands’. As a prescribed organization, Huawei might struggle to do that. | Yes. This is legal. The only possible liability for a truthful and accurate disclosure of fact is a defamation action (in the absence of a privacy clause in the contract) and this is truthful so it would not violate anyone's legal rights. Credit reporting agencies routinely collect such information and court actions to collect unpaid debts are also a matter of public record. Credit reporting agencies in this business also have some additional obligations (such as the obligation to remove an entry after a period of time and an obligation to present rebuttal statements from the person affected). But, you should understand that merely publicly sharing truthful information about a factual matter is not really what a "blacklist" means. Normally, a blacklist includes an implied understanding that certain actions will be taken as a result of placement on the list rather than merely sharing information for what it is worth. An example of a law prohibiting a true blacklist from Colorado is the following: § 8-2-110. Unlawful to publish blacklist No corporation, company, or individual shall blacklist, or publish, or cause to be blacklisted or published any employee, mechanic, or laborer discharged by such corporation, company, or individual, with the intent and for the purpose of preventing such employee, mechanic, or laborer from engaging in or securing similar or other employment from any other corporation, company, or individual. Incidentally, I'm not convinced that the statute would be constitutional if enforced under modern First Amendment jurisprudence, although one U.S. District court case from 1971 did uphold its validity in the face of a somewhat different kind of challenge. Resident Participation, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971). | Why do you think they have the same shareholders? There’s no reason to believe that they are related corporations just because they share an address. I am shareholder and director of 4 corporations. 3 have the same shareholders in the same proportion. The other has different shareholders. All of them have their registered office at my accountant’s premises. It’s a small suburban practice so there are probably only a few hundred companies at that address. A large city practice would have thousands or tens of thousands. The property management company probably provides the same service. | united-states Corporations cannot be sentenced to imprisonment or death; it would be an absurdity. They can certainly be sentenced to pay a fine, as well as various other punishments. A fine can be so large that it takes away all the corporation's assets, effectively destroying it; this is the closest thing to a "death penalty". There's a good summary in "Corporate Criminal Liability: An Overview of Federal Law" by Charles Doyle, prepared for the Congressional Research Service. Sentencing is discussed on page 20. Corporations cannot be incarcerated. Nor can they be put to death. Otherwise, corporations and individuals face many of the same consequences following conviction. Corporations can be fined. They can be placed on probation. They can be ordered to pay restitution. Their property can be confiscated. They can be barred from engaging in various types of commercial activity. The rest of the section discusses these various possibilities. Under "Fines" is the following note: The corporate fine Guidelines begin with the premise that a totally corrupt corporation should be fined out of existence, if the statutory maximum permits. A corporation operated for criminal purposes or by criminal means should be fined at a level sufficient to strip it of all of its assets. See the article for further information, together with citations for all its claims. |
How does the U.S. or Canadian government prevent the average joe from obtaining dimethylmercury for murder? Arguably, using dimethylmercury is the perfect murder weapon as it is the hardest to trace since lethal symptoms occur only after 5 months on initial contact (rapidly absorbed through the skin), giving you plenty of time to get a new passport and exit the country. Essentially, once you obtain dimethylmercury, you gain the ability to kill anyone you don't like with near impunity. Put a few drops on their toilet seat or door handle, and you're done. Trying to create dimethylmercury from scratch is out of the question for the average joe. If anything, they'll probably kill themselves in the process. Surprisingly, typing "buy dimethylmercury" on Google instantly gives you a website to buy 10g 95% Dimethylmercury for $500: https://www.chemicalbook.com/Price/DIMETHYLMERCURY.htm Lethal dose is 400mg, so 10g / 400 mg = 25 kills For most criminals, paying $500 to kill 25 people is a pretty good deal considering it is cheaper than most guns. There's gotta be a catch, right? It can't be this easy to obtain the perfect murder weapon. | The case US v. Siesser is about such an attempt, where violation of 18 USC 229 was one of the charges (to which he pleaded guilty). It is a chemical weapon under the provisions of that chapter – it's not the chemical per se, it's the chemical when used for a purpose (like, killing people). Specifically A toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a purpose. You could buy it to calibrate NMR devices, I guess. There may be specific state regulations as well. | Yes, in Ukraine, it is legal for doctors to prescribe it, for pharmacies to sell it if prescribed, and for patients to buy it. It is registered with the State Register of Medicines of Ukraine. I’ve seen published cases where the facts mention prescriptions and sales in 2020. It is also frequently supplied through public procurement (as Hydazepam or Gidazepam). As you already noticed, hydazepam is not on the effective list of narcotics, psychotropic substances, and precursors by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. I’ve even encountered a recent court decision citing an expert report from the end of 2019 stating that it doesn’t belong to them under the list which was effective then. In 2019, a procedure was adopted for determining analogous substances, which reproduce the psychoactive effects of the drugs from the above-mentioned list. But no list of such analogous substances has been published yet. According to the effective procedure, the list must be published at the website of CMHMDAMH. | It has apparently been used to get first degree murder down to second degree murder in the "famous" "Jenny Jones" case from 1954. Other cases seem as if it was used as a defense, but the defendant ended up pleading guilty to a lesser crime. | The answer is going to depend on what jurisdiction you're talking about. But I can give you some general principles that apply, in most cases, in the U.S. at least. "Homicide" is a general term for the killing of one person by another. If someone died, and another person caused it, it's homicide. "Murder" and "manslaughter" are specific crimes, usually now defined by state criminal statutes. The specifics are going to differ from state to state, but in general, murder is the more serious crime and carries a more serious punishment. So if a person dies at another person's hand, it is a homicide, and it may also be murder or manslaughter. The way the law distinguishes between murder and manslaughter usually has to do with the killer's mental state. For example, a state with three homicide offenses might break them down like this: Murder: "I killed him because I wanted to steal his wallet." Voluntary manslaughter: "I killed him because I just found out he was sleeping with my wife." Involuntary manslaughter/negligent homicide: "I didn't mean to kill him, but I was drunk and didn't see the stop sign." These homicide offenses will then be further subdivided into degrees based on aggravating or mitigating factors. For instance, in some states there is a very limited definition for first degree murder, which may be the only offense that allows the death penalty (example: murder of a police officer, murder while serving a life sentence). | In the U.S., Law enforcement favors going after the distribution of narcotics over the use. Going after the users just means dealers will seek out new customers whereas going after dealers means eliminating the supply chain. And Law Enforcement would much rather have a dealer flip on a manufacturer at that. The bigger the fish they bring in, the more damage they can do to the supply chain. The U.S. has recently been moving towards treating the use of illicit substances as a disease rather than an crime, especially when the use is tied to addiction. To this end, the current trend is to get the users to clinics that can specialize in breaking addiction rather than jailing a user. Prisons and jails do not have a strong track record for this, but they do have programs for substance abuse. The U.S. also favors plea bargins rather than taking every case to trial. 90% of all legal cases are settled out of court with a negotiation between the prosecution and the defense. Usually this acts in a "you scratch my back" arrangement where the offender will plea to a lesser charge and in exchange, help the investigators find that bigger fish. This may be testifying against them or giving them the supplier or even acting as a mole. This also benifits the state as the prosecution doesn't have to pay for all the costs of arguing a case a trial. For example, if the cops bust a user, he will be charged with Possession, but they might drop charges if the user can name the dealer and will testify against him. If the cops bust the dealer, the dealer is charged with Possession (with intent to sell), but if he's low on the totem pole, they can ask him to name the supplier he gets his goods and testify against the supplier and in exchange, they drop the charge to Possession. They will be less inclined to bring this fact up, but Possession is easier to prove in court than Possession (With Intent to Sell) because the former requires finding drugs on the person and his property. The later needs to prove that the drugs were not for personal use but instead for distribution to others. Almost universally, anyone convicted on mere possession charges probably did something a lot worse. Law enforcement tends to charge as many crimes as possible... as long as they can prove guilt on one, they can put someone away for a while. Al Capone famously went to one of the most notorious prisons in the United States for Tax Evasion (a very white collared crime that typically results in fines and very minimum jail time. While we're on the subject, the IRS has a 98% conviction rate, and ties with Secret Service (the guys who protect the President) for most successful Federal Law Enforcement Agency, to give you an idea of where the priorities lie in the United States. All Federal Law Enforcement is ridiculously good, to the point that bringing charges against anyone is almost as good as saying they're guilty). Another reason Use of drugs isn't pushed is that, well, producing that evidence is difficult. The common user bust is drinking and driving (since alcohol is legal in the U.S., use based crimes are the top level of enforcement. You legally cannot hold a firearm in the U.S. while drunk, even if you could do so while sober). A brethalizer is built to measure the amount of alcohol is in one's system and if it is over the limit for what is safe. Most illicit drug tests don't do this and rather look for chemicals in general and will ping if there's any trace... even if the last use was a month ago. Certain substances linger for a while, especially if they can deposit in hair folicle. You could be six months sober and still ping the test. Other issuses include drugs that contain components of legal substances. Opiods (the big problem drug right now) are manufactured from the Poppy Plant... which also is grown for legal consumable products. There are cases where the Opiod tests pings positive on people who have consumed Poppy-Seed Bagels (perfectlly legal and quite common) for breakfast the day of the test. Other tests aren't reliable and will give a false positive from time to time. Edit: Typically, Possession of a controlled substance assumes you will use it. Reasonable Doubt is harder to make for having the stuff then it is for using it. Someone under the influence could claim they were drugged and law enforcement would have to prove that they weren't to convict (There's actually a known problem where law enforcement agents can get dosed by accident while handling contraband evidence. There was an episode of CSI: Miami where one character had this happen to her... and they realized where the drugs were hidden in a warehouse she served a warrant on but didn't find any evidence. DVD extras featured a police consultant who explained that the whole sequence was thought up because it happened to her for real.). Having the stuff in your possession is much more difficult as they have to show you had it (someone slipping it into your pocket without your knowledge is your job to prove). In the U.S., Prosecution Discretion means that the Prosecutor can choose not to press the case for any number of reasons, they don't have the resources to fight it, to they don't think they can win with the evidence they have, to political motives (they don't agree with the law... this can be risky depending on the nature of the crime). Typically a simple possession charge where the amount is clearly small enough that it's only for personal use and no other crimes are charged wouldn't be worth the amount of resources to fully prosecute. TO give an example, while Marijuana is legal in the State of Colorado, it's still illegal under Federal Law, so smoking for recreational use in Colorado is still a crime, but not one enforced by the State of Colorado but the Department of Justice (U.S. Federal Law enforcement department... usually). Remember the Feds generally deal with bigger crimes than someone getting high under the bleachers while listening to Jimmy Hendrix, so it only really comes up if you did something bigger (kidnapping a girl, driving over state lines into Colorado, go to a school to get high under the bleachers while listening to Hendrix would get you a Federal Possession charge... but the real concern is the Kidnapping, not controlled drug use). And most crimes that occur in entirely one state, Feds are content to let those states deal with the problem and rarely get involved. | You get a lab to test it You should clearly document the chain of custody (ideally with photos) from the unopened packaging to the lab. Any decent sized city will have several labs with the capability to tell you what’s in a pill and provide an expert report. | Since no jurisdiction is specified, I decided to search in maryland in the united-states As far as I can tell, there is no state or federal law which prohibits a private individual from owning a decommissioned military tank. Most public highways and roads have weight limits, and many tanks would exceed them. Most tanks, or at least most older tanks, are not in any case "street legal" not having required headlights, brake lights, air bags, and other safety devices. Treads must be modified to avoid road damage. None of this would be relevant if the tank was kept on private land and not used on public roads or streets. If somehow the main gun or a mounted machine gun were still in place, and not disabled, permits would be required that are almost impossible to obtain. Specifically: "State Laws and Published Ordinances – Maryland Statutes current through chapter 18 of the 2020 session lists Code section 4-401 which provides that: (c) Machine gun. "Machine gun" means a loaded or unloaded weapon that is capable of automatically discharging more than one shot or bullet from a magazine by a single function of the firing device. Section 4-402: (a) Evidence of possession. The presence of a machine gun in a room, boat, or vehicle is evidence of the possession or use of the machine gun by each person occupying the room, boat, or vehicle. ... (c) Registration of possession. (1) A person who acquires a machine gun shall register the machine gun with the Secretary of State Police: (i) within 24 hours after acquiring the machine gun; and (ii) in each succeeding year during the month of May. Section 4-501 (b) Destructive device. (1) "Destructive device" means explosive material, incendiary material, or toxic material that is: (i) combined with a delivery or detonating apparatus so as to be capable of inflicting injury to persons or damage to property; or (ii) deliberately modified, containerized, or otherwise equipped with a special delivery, activation, or detonation component that gives the material destructive characteristics of a military ordnance. (2) "Destructive device" includes a bomb, grenade, mine, shell, missile, flamethrower, poison gas, Molotov cocktail, pipe bomb, and petroleum-soaked ammonium nitrate Section 4-503 (a) Prohibited. A person may not knowingly: (1) manufacture, transport, possess, control, store, sell, distribute, or use a destructive device; or (2) possess explosive material, incendiary material, or toxic material with intent to create a destructive device. | I can't comment on what the legal situation would be in your home country, but as a matter of U.S. law, the hypothetical scenario you've described is not illegal. First, because you aren't a U.S. citizen and because you aren't operating in the United States, the U.S. government probably has no jurisdiction over you, your website, or your conduct. Even if it did, the most relevant statute, 18 U.S. Code § 1017, would not apply. The statute prohibits the "fraudulent or wrongful" use of the FBI's seal. But "fraudulent" and "wrongful" generally refer only to conduct where one uses deception or other means to obtain money, property, etc. to which they have no lawful entitlement. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399 (1973). Because you aren't using the seal to obtain anyone's property through deception, this use would not fall within the statute's proscriptions. Even if the government sought to prosecute you, you would have a valid First Amendment defense. The First Amendment protects the right to free speech, and it does not allow statements to be criminalized merely because they are false. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). This outcome should be unsurprising to most U.S. observers. I think most people would agree that the U.S. obviously cannot prosecute a Hollywood producer for making a movie dramatizing the FBI's efforts to shut down the Pirate Bay, even if it displayed the FBI's seizure message on a monitor in the course of the movie, and even if it showed the seal being used on a completely fictional website. The hypothetical you're describing is not materially different. In both cases, the seal is being used to falsely create the impression -- for entertainment purposes -- that the FBI has shut down a website. Saying false things for entertainment purposes is not a crime in the United States. |
I have legal status but don't reside in US, can I trade stocks? I secured a B2 visa for my brother's commencement ceremony, and attended it. Being an Indian citizen, I have been living in India since then. Brokerages allow people with legal status in US to open accounts. Can I now open a trading account with brokerage and trade from India? | Yes, You May According to this page from Invest-faq It is perfectly legal for non-resident aliens to trade equities on exchanges in the United States using US brokerage houses directly. (A “non-resident alien” (NRA) is the US government’s name for a citizen of a country other than the US who also lives outside the US.) ... Of course there are certain formalities concerning tax treatment of such accounts, and these formalities must be clarified with the brokerage house when the account is opened. Individuals who are not US citizens must complete a W-8 form, which is a certificate of foreign status, and return it to the brokerage house. The specific rules of how these accounts are taxed are described in IRS Publication 515 (Withholding of tax on non-resident aliens) and IRS Publication 901 (Tax treaties). The tax treaty is especially important. If the individual’s country of residence has an agreement (tax treaty) with the US government, those rules apply. The relevant Investopedia page says: There is no citizenship requirement for owning stocks of American companies. While U.S. investment securities are regulated by U.S. law, there are no specific provisions that forbid individuals who are not citizens of the U.S. from participating in the U.S. stock market. However, even if a non-U.S. citizen can legally trade U.S. stocks and bonds, it may still be required (in addition to being advisable) for them to consult with an investment firm and use the services of a professional. ... One of the goals of the Patriot Act of 2001, passed following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was to prevent individuals with any links to terrorist activities from funding their illegal activities through the American capital markets. The act led to brokerage firms implementing more stringent requirements for verifying customer identities, particularly for non-U.S. citizens. Part of this legislation also requires stockbrokers to report any suspicious account activity to the U.S. government. However, these regulations obviously do not impact the majority of international investors because the vast majority of investors do not have any criminal associations. Some brokerage firms may require non-U.S. citizens to produce additional types of identification documents in order to comply with their individual policies. This can include visa information, a valid Social Security number, or a Certificate of Status of Beneficial Owner for United States Tax Withholding and Reporting form (also called a W-8BEN). Some brokerages may also require non-U.S. citizens to submit paper applications versus submitting online applications to open accounts. The Forbes article: "If You Trade Around The World, You Need To Know IRS Rules" says: Non-resident aliens are subject to tax withholding on dividends, certain interest income and sales of master limited partnerships like energy companies. They have U.S. source income — effectively connected income (ECI) — on real property and regular business operations located in the U.S. A non-resident alien living abroad can open a U.S.-based forex or futures trading account and not owe any capital gains taxes in the U.S. U.S. tax law has long encouraged foreign taxpayers to invest and trade in U.S. financial markets ... A non-resident alien living abroad can also open a U.S.-based securities account, but there could be some dividend tax withholding. If the non-resident spends more than 183 days in the U.S., he owes taxes on net U.S. source capital gains, even though he may not trigger U.S. residency under the substantial presence test. Thus having a visa of any kind is not required. Anyone anywhere in the world who is not associated with terrorism may trade on US exchanges provided they comply with the appropriate tax, identification, and other laws of the US in doing so. | Both of your question are creatures of contract. Their disclosures when you set up the account (or potentially amended disclosures or terms they've mailed to you subsequently) control both of these questions. They don't have to share the results of their internal investigation against you (they do have to give you proof that the deposit/transfer was fraudulent), but that does not give you access to their internal investigative process or its findings. They cannot shut down your account based on protected reasons (race, class, gender, religion, etc.), but the can certainly close an account pursuant to their operating procedures, their rules, terms and conditions or disclosures - all of which you agreed to (implicitly or explicitly) when opening the account. There is likely nothing you can do about either of these issues, unless the contract you formed with them by opening the account gives you that right, which would appear in their terms of service, disclosures, etc., and these almost always protect their right to do most anything when it comes to protecting the overall best interest of the corporate entity. | Yes From the American perspective: U.S. law does not mention dual nationality1 or require a person to choose one nationality or another. A U.S. citizen may naturalize in a foreign state without any risk to his or her U.S. citizenship. Source: U.S. Department of State — Bureau of Consular Affairs And from the British: Dual citizenship (also known as dual nationality) is allowed in the UK. This means you can be a British citizen and also a citizen of other countries. Source: Gov.Uk 1Section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states that “the term ‘national of the United States’ means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” Therefore, U.S. citizens are also U.S. nationals. Non-citizen nationality status refers only individuals who were born either in American Samoa or on Swains Island to parents who are not citizens of the United States [Source: Dept of State, as above] | Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability. | I suspect that this person could get a green card under 8 USC 1259 or 1255a, since it seems that he entered in 1952 or so, which was long before the Reagan amnesty. These sections of the code concern those who entered the US before 1972 and 1982, respectively. You might try asking on Expatriates as there are many people there who are familiar with immigration law. A consultation with an immigration lawyer is probably advisable. | will these assets be considered as income by the IRS, even though the account money predates her becoming a US person? No. Even if there was no income, is it possible that the person still had to pay other taxes related to foreign assets (i.e. does the IRS tax assets, not only income? There are fines related to failure to disclose foreign bank accounts which are quite draconian. The fines are high out of concerns about money laundering and terrorism funding, without a legislative, IRS or judicial recognition that these issues can arise in far less nefarious circumstances. But the fines are not truly taxes. They are fines for failure to file an information tax return or make a disclosure that is required by statute. If the disclosure had been made in a timely manner, there would have been no actual tax due and it is not illegal to have the accounts, so long as they are disclosed. Resolving an irregularity of this kind is quite tricky, can go very badly if done incorrectly (e.g. hundreds of thousands of dollars of civil tax fines or worse and possible impairment of immigration status), and calls for specialist international tax administration counsel. I've encountered a case like this in my own practice and referred it out to specialist counsel rather than handling myself, even though I regularly handle less demanding international tax questions in my practice. This is a "brain surgery"/"rocket science" class difficulty problem as far as lawyer expertise requirements are concerned. | The Facebook forum doesn't prevent a contract from being formed. But, for a contract to be formed there must be an affirmative agreement, not silence (at least in cases that aren't between merchants). If they later decide to work together without reaching an agreement on the details, the draft contact could be considered, but the Facebook forum for its delivery and that fact that it wasn't expressly assented to might reduce its weight as part of the evidence in an attempt to determine what the terms of their oral or implied agreement to work together involved. It would be very unusual for a broker not to get a signed agreement in writing to pay his fees, although an oral or unsigned agreement to pay a broker is not necessarily barred by a statute of frauds. A finder of fact would be quite skeptical of a broker's claim to have an agreement in those circumstances and often the professional regulatory provisions related to brokerages would require that fee agreement must be signed and in writing even if contract law does not require that this be done. | Do the exchanges need to check with each government to make sure the information is valid? Or is submitting documents enough? They need to understand the (usually very complicated) laws governing financial services and data protection in every jurisdiction where they operate. The specific requirements will vary from one jurisdiction to the next. The usual way of acquiring this understanding is to hire a lawyer (or several). |
In case a company is flooded by "asymmetric" GDPR-related requests (request via email, preferred answer via postal mail), how should a company react? Concerning the individual's right about information about one's data, Art. 12 GDPR ("Transparent information, communication and modalities for the exercise of the rights of the data subject"), (3) says ... Where the data subject makes the request by electronic form means, the information shall be provided by electronic means where possible, unless otherwise requested by the data subject. Now if someone askes a company for his data via email (free) and wants to get the answer via postal mail, the company has some cost (letter, print-out, stamp), which is minor, but becomes huge if a large number of people perform such requests someone with bad intentions sends lost of requests via different emails (easy to generate anonymously) and requests postal mail answers to different addresses which are taken e.g. from some phone book. Here it is nearly impossible to prove that the requests are "unfounded or excessive" as described in (5) of Art. 12 GDPR because they look like coming from a lot of different people. Some online tools could easily be abused to create such requests (for sure this is not the intention of such a tool, but the whole question came to my mind when I was playing around with this tool in the link). Question: In case a company is flooded by such "asymmetric" requests, how should a company react? Start answering via email and ignoring the requester's wish to get postal mail? | In case a company is flooded by such "asymmetric" requests, how should a company react? Although article 12.5 refers to singular "a data subject", it can be inferred that exposing the controller to significant expenses is not part of the legislative intent. Accordingly, the company may have requesters choose between paying a reasonable fee for the ensuing administrative costs or withdrawing the requirement that delivery be by postal mail. The bad faith scenario you outline seems to be a non-sequitur, since generally a pattern (or a high number) of requests for postal mail delivery should prompt the controller to suspect that some or many might not be legitimate. A requester with bad intentions would be unable to prove the identity of the various data subjects he impersonates or alleges to represent. | An app(lication program) is software run on the end-users machine. That does not fall under the GDPR. Any processing (including storage) you do on user data has to be compliant with the GDPR. Allows a user to authenticate via e.g. Facebook and stores some basic data (optional) Authentication via Facebook leaves GDPR compliance to Facebook (AFAIK). It would be a good idea to provide alternative authentication methods, such as Google and an "own account" user name and password so that the user doesn't have to share information with a multinational company in order to use your service. The "basic data" will need to be processed according to the GDPR. As long as the "optional" part is "opt in" (i.e. the user needs to at least click on something) then this means you have permission to process that data. Providing this "basic data" as a JSON or CSV file should meet data portability requirements. Allows a user to upload a GPX file (a route or some other activity) Stores the above file to Google's database Allows the user to analyze that file. Since the user is actively choosing to upload each file you have permission to do this. You should make it clear in your privacy policy that the data will be held by Google. Doing so should not be a problem as Google has set up the legal framework to do this under the GDPR. You don't have to store the information encrypted, but you should use encryption (e.g. HTTPS) for any data transmission. Allowing the user to analyse the file is not an issue; either the user is doing it on their own machine (GDPR irrelevant) or you are doing it under user instruction (meaning you have consent). Since the user has uploaded GPX files they already have data portability on those files. You should tell your users that while you will employ best endeavours you don't promise to keep their files accessible and they should maintain their own private copies. That way if your entire database gets corrupted they can't blame you for loss of data. Finally, make sure there is a "Close my account and delete all my data" option. | If you are purely a designer (and not contracted for the daily operation of the site), the answer is "no". GDPR Article 4 defines the "roles" responsible for complying with GDPR, and there are two: Controller and Processor. The Controller is the one who calls the shots. In particular: Decides what personal data to process. This is usually the owner of the web site. The Processor is the one that actually does the processing. This is usually some company providing some sort of data processing service (e.g. SaaS, PaaS, etc.). The relationship between the Processor and the Controller must be contractual. The contract is called a DPA (Data Protection Agreement or Data Processing Addendum). As a designer, you don't fit into any of these roles. If your contract with the client is silent on liability for GDPR compliance, then you have no liability. This goes for projects completed both before and after the May 25 deadline. Of course, if there are GDPR clauses in your contract, then you must fulfil them just as have to fulfil any other contractual obligation. But unlike the controller and the processor, there are no automatic legal liability for a designer or programmer. | The CEO wants to "fool" users You are essentially admitting that the company you are working for is about to deceit its customers and asking whether that is legal. The relevant set of laws is rather sparse and does not give direct answers in regards to oAuth tokens or other details of that level (which is probably making your CEO think he can "handle" the arising questions). Probably the most relevant bit of legislation that applies here is The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to online privacy and data security policies. I am pretty sure that, in practice, if the users take your company to court, it will be held liable because: users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? While the users are still allowing you to read their data it is completely up to the Terms/EULA what you can do with it. However, once you have made the users think that they have withdrawn your access (e.g. they "deleted" oAuth tokens), you are no longer authorized to read the current data (although the Terms may still allow you to use the old data you obtained when you had access). Silently continuing to access their data without their knowledge/approval is definitely a deceit. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database There would be nothing wrong with that if it was in the Terms. But if it is not, that would be a blatant (and easily punishable) breach of privacy. Note that you may also be held personally liable for this wrongdoing (if/when proved so). "Just doing your job" claim will not work. | You premise is correct. The processor is someone that processes data on your behalf, and since the GDPR definition of processing is extremely broad, that is about every third party subcontractor that you use for data processing, including various cloud providers. I'm afraid it will soon become a huge mess with a gazillion contracts to sign. I disagree. Yes, the GDPR says that a contract between the controller and processor must exist, but Article 28 of the GDPR does not say anything about how the controller shall document these instructions. Basically, in cases like the one you describe where John Doe relies on a web agency for having a contact form on the web, there will be a standardized (by the web agency) service agreement between the John Doe (controller) and the web agency (processor). There is nothing stopping the parties from agreeing that this service agreement that John Doe accepted as part of the onboarding procedure is also the DPA as required by the GDPR. Putting something like the following in the service agreement would do it: The parties agree that this Service Agreement between You (controller) and Us (processor) set out Your complete and final instructions to Us in relation to the processing of Personal Data and that processing outside the scope of these instructions (if any) shall require prior written agreement between You and Us. You also agree that We may engage Sub-processors to process Personal Data on Your behalf. The Sub-processors currently engaged by Us and authorized by You are listed in Annex A. I think we will se a lot of amendments in service contracts as the GDPR gets better understood, but I don't really see a flood of DPAs in addition to these amended service contracts. | Art 13 GDPR is about information to be provided when data is collected directly from the data subject. This information can be provided directly during/before collection. It is not generally necessary or useful to send the data subject an email with this information. Usually, a SaaS website will provide the information under Art 13 as part of their privacy policy, and link it in easy to find places. Also consider the EDPB guidelines on transparency, which suggests a layered approach: in addition to a detailed privacy policy, summarize key information directly when the data is collected, e.g. next to an input form. | No, it is not legal. Regardless of their location, the only legal options for companies serving to EU residents are to either deny access altogether or to make consent truly optional1 Recital 42 states (emphasis mine): Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement[...] Recital 43 states: Consent is presumed not to be freely given [...] or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. 1 Of course, remember that consent is only one of several means that allow them to process data. For example, if you were getting a trial account for a limited time, it would be considered a legitimate business need to ensure that you are not just opening new trial accounts when the old ones expire. So, if they wanted some data from you to ensure that you are not a previous user and you refused to provide it, then they could deny giving you that trial account without breaking the GDPR. | There is a lot going on in this question, so I'll pick out some individual aspects. Last but not least, I'll discuss if GDPR even applies. Does the GDPR require consent for X? Almost always, no. Consent is only one of many legal bases of processing. A common alternative to consent is a “legitimate interest” where a balancing test is performed between this legitimate interest and your interests, rights, and freedoms. Consent is typically only appropriate if this balancing test fails, for example if you would not reasonably expect this processing activity to occur. It's worth noting that it's a reasonably common occurrence that businesses are sold or merged. This is not unexpected. In general, you would not be required to consent to such a transfer. What can a company do with personal data acquired through a merger/acquisition? The GDPR does not provide explicit provisions for this case. But it might be useful to think about the two cases where (a) the new company is a continuation or successor of the original one, and (b) where the data is transferred (“sold”) to an otherwise unrelated company. In case (a) where the business is continued as normal, there is no change. In case (b) where data is transferred to a separate company, things are more complicated. The original company would need a legal basis for transferring the data. But as mentioned above, there might be a legitimate interest. Arguably, such a transfer could also be based on Art 6(1)(b) if the transfer is necessary to continue to provide the service, for example if the original company would otherwise have to terminate service. Of course, activities like data brokering where access to data is granted to unrelated third parties would generally fail to be covered by contractual necessity or a legitimate interest, and would probably need consent – but that doesn't seem to be the case here. When a data controller (such as the new company) acquires your personal data from sources other than directly from you, then they are subject to the notice requirements in Art 14. They have to actively notify you about their processing activities. But because you received emails that mentioned the transfer, this condition might have been met. Of course the new company continues to be bound by the purpose limitation principle as detailed in Art 6(4) – they can only use the data for purposes that are compatible with the purposes for which the data was initially collected. Thus, the new company cannot arbitrarily widen processing purposes, though some change in scope is certainly permissible. How does the GDPR right to object and to restrict processing apply here? The Art 21 GDPR right to object means that if the legal basis for a processing activity is a “legitimate interest”, then you can ask for an opt-out. But in some cases, this objection does not have to be granted. An objection essentially requires the controller to repeat the legitimate interest balancing test, taking into account the “grounds relating to [your] particular situation” that you provided in the objection. The Art 18 GDPR right to restrict processing is an alternative to the right to erasure. It applies only in narrow circumstances, for example while an objection is being checked. It is likely that you were informed about the transfer to a new company about 1 month in advance, so that you would have been able to prevent this transfer by closing your account prior to the deadline. If the new company conducts processing activities based on a legitimate interest, then their presumably GDPR-compliant privacy notice about which you were notified will certainly explain that you have a right to object. Is the new company GDPR-compliant? That is impossible to tell, but nothing you've shown so far indicates that they're non-compliant. My largest issue with this story is that the new company is from Australia, a country with extraordinarily bad privacy protections (as of 2022). However, due to the way how the GDPR treats international transfers of data, this doesn't prevent Australian data controllers from being GDPR-compliant, although it does make it difficult for other companies to use services based in Australia. Does GDPR even apply? Whether GDPR applies to a non-European company depends only on whether they either offer goods or services to people who are in Europe (“targeting criterion”), and whether the monitor people's behavior that takes place in Europe. Factors such as your citizenship would be irrelevant. I'll ignore the monitoring criterion, and focus on the targeting criterion. I'll assume that you are in Europe (EU/EEA or UK). Whether a company is targeting people in Europe depends primarily on the company's intentions. It does not matter whether the service is accessible from Europe. Thus, it is quite possible that the original company was not subject to the GDPR. Then, any questions about GDPR, consent, and data transfers are moot. In contrast, the new company clearly mentions GDPR-compliance, which would only matter if they intend for people in Europe to use their services. So GDPR probably applies to them, giving you the full suite of GDPR data subject rights as (hopefully) outlined in their privacy notice. And as long as they notified you that they acquired your personal data in accordance of Art 14, I don't seen anything that they might have done wrong in respect to this acquisition/merger. |
How does GDPR deal with combined personal data? There is a person named aa 1 where aa is their first name and 1 is their surname. Now some other person makes an email named [email protected]. Whose personal data is this? aa 1's or that other person's? How is a request from the real aa 1 answered then to access the email? | I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data? | It is the data controller's responsibility to respond to data subject requests. If you provide a B2B service, you are most likely a data processor who only acts on the controller's behalf, on the controller's explicit instruction. This will depend on your contract with the controllers, your customers (see Art 28). Typically a processor would merely forward any data subject requests to the controller. Only if you are contractually obligated to serve data subject requests would it be possible for you to respond directly. If a processor were to fulfil a data subject request on their own initiative, that would arguably be a GDPR violation. However, the processor has to assist their controller with compliance per Art 28(3)(e), e.g. by implementing an admin interface through which the controller can service GDPR requests. The core issue here is that controllers and processors have slightly different obligations in order to be GDPR compliant. Controllers owe compliance to the data subjects, but processors only act on the controller's behalf and owe compliance to their controllers – they have no direct relationship with data subjects. Assuming you were a controller, then yes, I would assume you would have to decrypt any data that you are able to decrypt in order to fulfil a data subject request. Access requests can only be denied if: Art 12(5): they are “manifestly unfounded or excessive” (which the controller has to demonstrate), or Art 15(4): the access would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others”. Art 11(2): the controller can demonstrate that they are actually unable to identify the data subject so no data subject rights in Art 15–20 apply. A request is not automatically excessive just because it will require substantial CPU time, this exception is more often triggered when data subjects request the same data very frequently (e.g. every week). You are not required to provide or search data that you don't have access to (e.g. E2E encrypted data). Your use of per-field encryption is a very strong security measure (depending on how keys are managed). But GDPR is not about achieving maximum technical data protection, but merely requires appropriate safety measures (see GDPR Chapter 4, especially Art 32). Asymmetric encryption of small fields within a database is unlikely to be appropriate, taking into account the cost of processing and the data subject's ability to exercise their rights. A different security measure to ensure that every business only sees the correct data would be through testing and code review of your SQL queries, and full disk encryption of the server storing the database. In practice, asymmetric encryption is most often just used to encrypt a symmetric key, which is then used for the actual data. But which measures are appropriate also depends on the risk to data subjects – your approach could make sense for very sensitive data. Art 14 does not play a role here. It is about transparency of processing: that you need to (a) notify the data subject that you're processing their data, if feasible, and that you (b) provide information about this processing, usually in form of a privacy policy. Art 14 is the pendant to Art 13, which applies when data is obtained directly from the data subject. The Art 15 right to access and the Art 20 right to data portability are distinct from the right to be informed. In any case, it is the controller's responsibility to fulfil these rights. | Yes, this violates the GDPR if the user is in Europe. Data which is tied to a personal device can be tied to the person who owns it. From "What Is Personal Data" by the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (emphasis added): Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. What identifies an individual could be as simple as a name or a number or could include other identifiers such as an IP address or a cookie identifier, or other factors. If it is possible to identify an individual directly from the information you are processing, then that information may be personal data. If you cannot directly identify an individual from that information, then you need to consider whether the individual is still identifiable. You should take into account the information you are processing together with all the means reasonably likely to be used by either you or any other person to identify that individual. The bit about "all means reasonably likely" in the last bullet includes the kind of de-anonymisation tactics described in the NYT article. There are 6 lawful bases for data processing in the GDPR, and all processing must fall under at least one of them. (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) Selling data isn't covered by any of the others, so consent must be obtained. Permission must be clear and positive, and you cannot predicate delivery of a service on the processing of data that isn't necessary for that service. So for instance you cannot say "You can use this service as long as we are allowed to collect and sell your data" because selling the data isn't necessary to the provision of the service. From "Consent" by the ICO: Consent requires a positive opt-in. Don’t use pre-ticked boxes or any other method of default consent. Explicit consent requires a very clear and specific statement of consent. Keep your consent requests separate from other terms and conditions. Be specific and ‘granular’ so that you get separate consent for separate things. Vague or blanket consent is not enough. [...] Avoid making consent to processing a precondition of a service. This applies to any processing of data about individuals within the EU, so just being an American company doesn't get you a free pass to ignore the GDPR if your app gets used by Europeans. The "Legitimate interests" basis is more problematic, in that the company collecting the data has to conduct a vague "balancing test" to determine if this basis applies. For direct marketing the ICO has written this, which says that direct marketing may be a legitimate interest, especially if you can show that the user has expressed interest in such adverts. For instance a location service which promises to tell you about nearby special offers would fall into this category. Against this, the impact on the user's privacy has to be considered, and location data is "special category data" because it can reveal medical information (e.g. hospital attendance) or religious affiliation (e.g. which church you go to). So unless the relationship between the recorded location data and the service is very direct its not going to pass the balancing test. The company would also need to distinguish between knowing the current location and keeping a record of historical locations; the two need separate justification. And of course nothing about this covers the sale of the data; this is considering a company which sells advertising space in it's app, not one that sells the data itself. | Earlier this year, the Internet lawyer Arnoud Engelfriet wrote a blog post about exactly this topic. As it is written in Dutch, I will summarize it here: As you also said, deleting posts breaks the flow of the archived conversation and it makes your archive incomplete. This is a problem for the freedom of expression and information. But Art. 17(3) GDPR includes an exception to the right of erasure for this situation. So posts do not need to be deleted. However, profiles are not included in this exception. So they must be removed, but they can be pseudonymized. For example replace the username with user89432, and remove all details from the profile. If other posts contain the nick of the author of an anonymized post, that is considered an journalistic, academic artistic or literary expression, so Art. 85 GDPR would apply, so the right of erasure does not apply to that. Bottom line: you only have to pseudonymize the account, if that person wants to be removed from the forum. | GDPR gives you a lot of flexibility here to choose either DPA. From Art 77: Without prejudice to any other administrative or judicial remedy, every data subject shall have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of his or her habitual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringement if the data subject considers that the processing of personal data relating to him or her infringes this Regulation. However, the DPA from the company's country would be designated the lead supervisory authority for this investigation. If multiple DPAs are involved, they would coordinate with each other. There is no EU body that you could contact directly. But if the different DPAs have a dispute regarding this investigation, the EDPB would provide a consistency mechanism. This mechanism has been used in the past e.g. to force the Irish DPA to correctly apply the GDPR against companies from the Meta group, like WhatsApp and Instagram. Though it might slow things down, it could be advantageous to have multiple DPAs involved, precisely so that the investigation is double-checked. If the lead supervisory authority declines the case, this would also enable the other DPA to do its own investigation. So, it would be a good idea to lodge a complaint with the DPA of your home country, and let it forward the issue to other DPAs as needed. However, contacting the DPA in the company's country would also be fine, especially if you are fluent in the relevant official language, and/or if you live in Ireland. | Are my assumptions correct? Yes, this is precisely the sort of thing that would fall under the purview of "the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party", as it fundamentally enables you to deliver the service to the data subject, and its also difficult to argue that "such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject" given its a fundamental part of delivering the service before any consent can be given. Its not the intention of the GDPR to solely require a direct relationship between the data controller and data subject, its intention is to allow the data subject to control more of the relationship than they did previously - in some cases, that control remains with the data controller, which is why not all of the lawful basis for processing rest on consent. So long as you ensure that the CDN provider has a relevant privacy policy and is identified as a data processor in your privacy and data policy then you are good to go. In my mind, this is similar to the issue of how the data subjects packets get to you from their computer - we aren't including all of the network providers who carry the packets between the data subject and the processor (despite the fact that those providers will have access to much of the same information as the CDN, such as IP address, source, destination etc), even though in many cases we don't know that information (for example which route it will take over the internet). The only difference here is that as the data controller, you know about the CDN and can include it in your policies, so you should. | An app(lication program) is software run on the end-users machine. That does not fall under the GDPR. Any processing (including storage) you do on user data has to be compliant with the GDPR. Allows a user to authenticate via e.g. Facebook and stores some basic data (optional) Authentication via Facebook leaves GDPR compliance to Facebook (AFAIK). It would be a good idea to provide alternative authentication methods, such as Google and an "own account" user name and password so that the user doesn't have to share information with a multinational company in order to use your service. The "basic data" will need to be processed according to the GDPR. As long as the "optional" part is "opt in" (i.e. the user needs to at least click on something) then this means you have permission to process that data. Providing this "basic data" as a JSON or CSV file should meet data portability requirements. Allows a user to upload a GPX file (a route or some other activity) Stores the above file to Google's database Allows the user to analyze that file. Since the user is actively choosing to upload each file you have permission to do this. You should make it clear in your privacy policy that the data will be held by Google. Doing so should not be a problem as Google has set up the legal framework to do this under the GDPR. You don't have to store the information encrypted, but you should use encryption (e.g. HTTPS) for any data transmission. Allowing the user to analyse the file is not an issue; either the user is doing it on their own machine (GDPR irrelevant) or you are doing it under user instruction (meaning you have consent). Since the user has uploaded GPX files they already have data portability on those files. You should tell your users that while you will employ best endeavours you don't promise to keep their files accessible and they should maintain their own private copies. That way if your entire database gets corrupted they can't blame you for loss of data. Finally, make sure there is a "Close my account and delete all my data" option. | Under the GDPR, consent is not the only legal basis that allows processing of your personal data. Other legal bases such as legitimate interest exist as well. So the question is: does the company have a legitimate interest to send you these emails? The answer is that this case is more about direct marketing, less about personal data. The circumstances under which direct marketing emails can be sent are covered by the ePrivacy directive, which is implemented in the UK via PECR (Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003). PECR and ePrivacy introduce a concept known as soft opt-in: where a natural or legal person obtains from its customers their electronic contact details for electronic mail, in the context of the sale of a product or a service, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, the same natural or legal person may use these electronic contact details for direct marketing of its own similar products or services provided that customers clearly and distinctly are given the opportunity to object, free of charge and in an easy manner, to such use of electronic contact details when they are collected and on the occasion of each message in case the customer has not initially refused such use. (ePrivacy Directive, Art 13(2)) In plain language, they are allowed to send unsolicited marketing emails to existing customers, under the following restrictions: this only applies to customer relationships the marketing must be for similar products or services you must be able to object to further messages, i.e. unsubscribe upon collection of contact details you were given the opportunity to opt out |
Have brokerages like Robinhood broken contracts with their customers by refusing to execute orders? The following question is related to this one. However, my question regards the contractual duty whilst the linked one considers the brokerage's obligation to the state. Some brokerage firms like Robinhood refuse to honor orders buying Game Stop stocks. Is this a violation of contract? What specific clause do the brokerages like Robinhood invoke to do this? | No Restrictions on Trading. I understand that Robinhood may, in its discretion, prohibit or restrict the trading of securities, or the substitution of securities, in any of My Accounts. Doing this is explicitly permitted by the contract. | If an offer is accepted, you have a contract Oral contracts are binding for most transactions. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? However, from the circumstances, it’s not clear that there was an offer subject to acceptance. Had the wages been agreed? The hours of work? The annual leave? The sick leave? If these were undetermined then there is no contract. | If you do not get anything from this "contract", and all it says is that you will pay someone a sum of money "on demand", it does not meet the basic requirements to form a contract, and in particular, there is no consideration being received by you. It would therefore not be a contract and would have zero legal force. If you do receive consideration, demonstrating that you signed the contract under duress will require specific legal advice, and you need a practicing lawyer in your jurisdiction. | UK-based answer here: The crux of your question revolves around whether the buyer(B) had committed an illegal act by withholding information that would have prevented the seller(A) from selling the good at the price he did. The act that B would seemingly be guilty of would be fraudulent misrepresentation A misrepresentation is a false statement of fact or law which induces the representee to enter a contract. The important thing here is if there is a "false statement". In your scenario, there was no false statement made, let alone one which induced A into selling his stamp to B. So there is no fraudulent misrepresentation, or misrepresentation of any kind. Looking at the law of fraud: s3 Fraud Act 2006: A person commits fraud by failing to disclose information when => The defendant: failed to disclose information to another person when he was under a legal duty to disclose that information dishonestly intending, by that failure, to make a gain or cause a loss. With regards to the scenario you've given, no fraud would have been committed because the buyer was under no legal duty to disclose such information | First of all, there is no breach - they said they would pay it "over the course of the first year"; in what way is the first week not part of the first year? Second, breaching a contract doesn't always allow the aggrieved party to terminate it: in fact, being able to terminate is only for the most egregious of breaches or ones that are specifically spelled out as giving a right to termination. For example, failure to deliver (or pay) on time or in full would not allow termination, only damages. | No Or at least not necessarily. Contract terms are legally one of three types: Conditions, Warranties, or Intermediate. Breach of any term allows the aggrieved party to sue to recover damages - monetary compensation to restore them to the position they would have been in had the breach not occurred. Breach of a condition also (or instead) allows them to terminate a contract. Breach of a warranty does not. Intermediate terms are terms that might be a condition or might be a warranty depending on how egregious the breach was. A contract can explicitly make a term a condition, the historical and still used phrase being that X is “of the essence”. If the contract is not explicit (most aren’t), then that is the concept that the court uses to decide - is the term “of the essence”, that is, absolutely fundamental to the performance of the contract. Similarly a term can be explicitly a warranty, usually by saying party Y “warrants” something. Most incidental or procedural terms are warranties - if breached, they never give rise to a right to terminate. Most terms are intermediate, particularly most terms about time. Normally, intermediate terms are warranties but if a breach is egregious enough, then this can elevate the term to a condition. Payment terms are a classic: if you are a day or a week late in making payment, the other party can’t cancel the contract. If you are a year late, they can. Somewhere in between, your breach changes the term from a warranty to a condition. For your situation, the early delivery is clearly a breach of a warranty, not a condition. If it even is a breach - the contract may say that they are obliged to deliver by 1 December: delivery on 1 November is clearly in compliance with that term. If it is a breach, you do not have the right to terminate the contract and if you tried you would be breaching the contract yourself by repudiation. By the way, repudiating the contract is definitely breaching a condition. A huge number of contract disputes turn on who validly terminated and who repudiated the contract. If it is a breach, you can sue for damages which, since they have not charged you for November, would be what it cost you or what you lost by having their bin on your premises for a month. My guess that this would be in the order of zero. | Is she allowed to short the stocks of some company trading in this other metal, before she publishes her result ? Generally speaking, yes. The main exceptions consist of her being under certain form of fiduciary duty toward the company of which she is shorting stock, or (2) her transactions being motivated by superior knowledge resembling insider trading or fraud. Absent an element of fiduciary duty or insider trading, what you describe is an entirely valid arms-length transaction. Indeed, this happens all the time in financial markets, except that a lawful asymmetry of information may come in forms other than the scientific discovery of new metallic alloys (example: statistical models developed by the entity). Searching for case law containing the terms in italics will show you how these concepts supposedly are applied. For instance, see Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust, 925 F.Supp. 1270 (1996): No fiduciary relationship exists ... [where] the two parties were acting and contracting at arm's length. Moreover, courts have rejected the proposition that a fiduciary relationship can arise between parties to a business relationship. (citations omitted) You will notice that the court in Procter & Gamble points to case law in the sense that a party's superior knowledge imposes on him a contractual duty to disclose that information. But the notion of superior knowlege as applied in case law seems typically narrowed down to situations where the seller conceals defects for which he is responsible (Haberman v. Greenspan, 82 Misc.2d 263 (1975)) or when the concealment resembles fraud. Haberman points to a case of fraud where (1) the seller of a boat before the sale took it from where it lay and placed it afloat in a dock to prevent the examination of the bottom which the seller knew to be unsound [...]; and (2) where the seller of a log of mahogany turned it in order to conceal a hole (citations omitted). That is different from the superior knowledge that a party obtains through the design of superseding techniques. It would be extremely inept for a court to rule against a party for trading without first bringing everyone up to speed as to her superseding developments. Not only that would contradict the tenets of trade secrets, perhaps patents, and so forth, but in the context you outline it would create inconsistencies with respect to other financial instruments associated to the same perception of downside risk that is inherent to taking a short position on stocks. | A contract that tells one party or another to do an illegal thing is void ab initio: courts will not recognize it or give force to it. A contract which doesnt explicitly tell either party to do something illegal but if during the course of fulfilling either party's end of the bargain they commit an illegal act it is up to the courts discretion what happens, whether to find the contract void or to maintain the contract (its a matter of public policy whether they allow the contract to continue existing, or if the contract was such that illegal acts were expected to be commited then the court will likely remder it void) Either way, you cannot indemnify someone for committing an illegal act. |
HR1 would force states to have independent districting. How does the federal gov't have authority to require this? Section 2401-2422 of the H.R. 1 - For the People Act of 2021 would require states to set up independent districting commissions in order to prevent gerrymandering. This seems pretty clearly to infringe on state's rights, and doesn't seem like it would be under the federal government's authority to require (as good for democracy as it would be). I've skimmed the text, but I am not a lawyer--was this written in some way which tries to anticipate this challenge? At the moment, it appears there's little chance of this bill passing the senate, but presumably the authors would still try to write it such that it would stand up to any potential challenge as strongly as possible, should it get passed. Is this part of HR1 written in such a way that it appears to be enforceable, based on the authority of the federal government? If not, is there such a way for the federal government to require states to set up independent districting commissions without amending the constitution? | The US Constitution doesn't say one way or the other how a state's representatives are to be chosen, so until this law was passed in 1841, a state could have all of their representatives elected at-large, without districts. It is only recently that SCOTUS has gotten involved in redistricting questions: here is a summary of leading redistricting rulings. A recurring theme in these rulings has been the Equal Protection Clause, where certain redistricting plans (or non-plans) were found to violate that clause (especially ordering a state to redistrict when it refused to do so with the result being that population changes diluted the vote of those living in certain districts). Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 held that The constitutional requirement in Art. I, § 2,that Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States" means that, as nearly as is practicable, one person's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's thus redistricting is a justiciable question, answerable with respect to the federal government's need to enforce the 14th Amendment. It is not necessary to amend the Constitution further to specify a means of enforcing that clause. | Article IV, Section 4 says this: The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government That would mean no state can be a kingdom. PS in response to comments: This section does not mean the federal government is guaranteeing to the states that the federal government will be republican in form; rather the federal government is required to guarantee that the state governments will be republican in form. That is done when Congress looks over a proposed state constitution before admitting a proposed new state to the Union. That has not always been done, since in particular it was not done in Kentucky. (On February 4, 1791, Congress passed an act saying the district of Kentucky in the state of Virginia would be admitted as a new state, of course with the consent of the Virginia legislature that had been expressed in 1789, but would not be admitted until almost 16 more months passed. The politicians of Kentucky had requested the long delay so they could use the time to negotiate compromises on details of their state constitution, which hadn't been written yet. That was the first time Congress passed a law admitting a new state, but because of the delay, Kentucky became the 15th state rather than the 14th (Vermont is the 14th).) | The true answer is this is fundamentally unclear and ratification would definitely set up for a Supreme Court showdown. The Supreme Court would in my opinion need to resolve 3 issues: Are Congressionally imposed deadlines in resolutions proposing an amendment to the States for ratification binding? Does a state withdrawal of its ratification of an amendment annul its ratification of the amendment? Who decides when an amendment is ratified? For the first question this is perhaps the most unresolved question. Clearly if the deadline is imposed in the text of the amendment it is binding. For example, see the text of the 18th amendment, Section 3. What is not clear is what if any binding effect a deadline in the text of the resolution proposing an amendment has as to the validity of the proposed amendment. Article V makes no provision on such deadlines. In fact the most recent amendment ratified was submitted for ratification on September 25, 1789, but ratified May 5, 1992. In this instance the Archivist of the United States declared the amendment ratified, but Congress also acted to do so and several members scolded the Archivist for doing so before Congress acted. However, there was no resolution of who had to actually approve the ratification. For the second question there is absolutely no answer to this question except Coleman v. Miller which suggests this is a political question. This essentially means that the question should be resolved by Congress, not the courts. Lastly, for the third question see also my response to the first question. If Congress is indeed the ratifier, what happens if one Congress decides the amendment was not ratified, but a future one decides it was? Honestly, ratification of the ERA would open a whole can of worms and make it difficult to really resolve this issue. Probably the most direct method to force the Supreme Court to rule on this issue would be someone challenging their requirements to register with the Selective Service System. | Any court from a municipal traffic court on up can declare a law unconstitutional and the U.S. Supreme Court is almost never the court that does so in the first instance. Also, while the jurisdiction stripping law that you suggest might be unconstitutional, it is not obviously unconstitutional. The relevant language is in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution (this has been modified by the 11th Amendment in ways that are not pertinent to the issue at hand): The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-- to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. The key language being the language in bold, who scope and limitations are the subject of hot debate in legal scholarship. For example, both military tribunal law for non-soldiers and the collateral review of death sentences implicate this provision. An issue related to U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction over military court-martial court composition will be heard this year in oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court. There is also debate over whether the jurisdiction of every single federal court can be removed from a matter within the judicial power of the United States. In that regard, keep in mind that the United States federal court system did not have direct appeals of criminal convictions at all until the 1890s, although you could challenge, for example, the jurisdiction of a criminal court over your case with a writ of habeas corpus which is a collateral attack on a conviction in a separate civil lawsuit formally directed at your prison warden. That being said, as far as I know, a law is considered in effect until declared unconstitutional. It is illegal to break an unconstitutional law, until declared so. You are wrong. A law that is unconstitutional on its face is, in terms of legal theory, unconstitutional immediately upon enactment and a court simply acknowledges that fact. It is not illegal to break an unconstitutional law even if no court has yet declared it to be unconstitutional (in U.S. jurisprudence). A law that is unconstitutional as applied is unconstitutional in application at the moment it is applied unconstitutionally, and again, a court merely acknowledges that fact. | Generally, no. Legislatures pass laws. The fact that someone else knows more about the thing they're passing laws about is utterly irrelevant -- the power to make laws is given to the legislature, not to experts. If the legislature thinks experts should make the rules on something, they can delegate (this is why the FDA approves medicine rather than Congress), but the legislature of a state generally has the power to pass any law that is not unconstitutional. Your analogy to paper money is a poor one: that's a federalism thing, not an expertise thing. Congress has established a system of paper money, and states can't interfere with that. It's not that the Fed thinks paper money is good, it's that Congress said paper money shall be a thing. That could stop a state from banning an FDA-approved drug; however, since marijuana is illegal under federal law, it would be odd to conclude that banning it at the state level as well is preempted. Legislators aren't inherently experts on anything (except being elected). That doesn't matter. They have the authority to pass laws, even if those laws directly go against the views of people who are recognized experts in the area. You appear to think there must be a judicial remedy against bad policy. You would be wrong. The role of the courts is not to decide what policies are good or bad; they are concerned only with what is legal. Deciding what policies are good or bad is a matter for the democratically elected representatives of the people, or for the people themselves in states with ballot questions. It is not the job of the courts. | Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination. | You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right. | Here's what I had to do : After going through this harrowing phase, I thought I will post an update in case some one is in such a situation. The Northern Territory's Personal Violence Restraining Order act has a clause (section 21) which basically says if the applicant believes a third party knows the defendant's name then the applicant can request the court to order the third party(power, water, electoral roll, etc) to provide the name if the applicant has already made reasonable efforts in finding out the persons name and hasn't been able to. The third parties will only oblige to a court order. I am almost certain every state/territories' act (in Australia) will have such a clause. It was a challenge to get the court registry to accept the application as the front counter staff/supervisor/supervisor's supervisor were all unaware of this provision (to make an application for a PVRO but get the judge to first order the third party). I had to carry with me the act with the highlighted portion for them to read, analyse and consult with other court staff to even take my application in. At least in the NT there are community legal help services available for no fee and I highly recommend them. |
Is the historic behavior occurring on Reddit (millions of people promoting the buying and holding of GameStop stock) illegal? I've been a member of the subreddit r/wallstreetbets for some time now, it's this hilarious cult-like community that jokes about investment gains / losses and people celebrate making / losing money on the stock market. Recently it's gained millions of followers and there's a massive movement going on, you've probably seen it all over the news. Is this illegal? How far, exactly, can people go, verbally, with publishing their positions before Reddit can be sued or fined by the SEC, or the individuals posting the content cited? To clarify the verbiage I'm talking about, here are some examples of top recent posts on the subreddit that promote buying or holding GME stock: (Sorry about any explicit language) Title: Guy living in his truck update: $600 -> 130k in 16 days. If I can hold you can f*cking hold 💎 💎 💎 Title: THEY ARE BLEEDING AND THEY ARE DESPERATE!!!!! Comments: Title: 6M in GameStop GME. Following through. Can’t stop, won’t stop, lift off Title: Billboard in Oklahoma City, OK! If someone can rent out a billboard for GME you can hold your shares!!! 💎 🖐!!!! (Left watermark for credit)Billboard in Oklahoma City, OK! If someone can rent out a billboard for GME you can hold your shares!!! 💎 🖐!!!! (Left watermark for credit) Content: Title: Used some of my GME tendies to buy Nintendo Switches from Gamestop, then donated them to a Children's Hospital. Comments: | Lying about a stock position can be a form of securities fraud, for example in a pump and dump scheme giving false information to the public (e.g. on Reddit) about a stock after buying it at a cheap price to "pump" its value to sell it later. Saying that people should buy a stock and hold it because it harms specific short sellers of that stock is probably not fraud - US law protects speech which is not false statements of fact in almost all contexts. However, specific statements about how much someone has made investing in the stock could be illegal if the statements are untrue (looking specifically at the person claiming they turned $600 into $130,000 in 16 days). It's also possible that some of the users of the subreddit are professional investment advisors and their statements would have to come with certain disclosures per SEC rules, but it's hard to tell from SEC's FAQ whether that applies to statements made anonymously. | Could a phrase "Don't buy from X" with indirectly implied material be considered defamatory? No. The phrase is only an order, wish, or instruction, which is different from making a direct or veiled statement of fact. Even in jurisdictions where a statement of opinion could be actionable, a stated wish of that sort cannot be construed as defamatory. anyone that reads the marketing material would indirectly have a false picture about company X. It depends on the contents of the marketing material, on which you did not elaborate. Persuading the customers on the basis of truthful representations as to why X's product is better than A's does not mean that people have a false image about X. The context and exact wording of someone's statements could amount to omitting and/or juxtaposing facts in a way that conveys some falsity, but your description gives no indications of that being the case here. | After a buyout, can a company legally continue to use old testimonials? Yes. What you describe would not suffice for a finding of false and misleading practices. For purposes of pricing the acquisition, it is most likely that company's A prestige was factored in. After all, as Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. US Dept. of Homeland Sec., 909 F.3d 446, 461 (2018) points out, "reputation is an asset that companies cultivate, manage, and monetize". As company A has --or could have-- monetized its reputation via the acquisition price, it would be inconsistent to preclude company B from using an asset for which it paid. | Assuming the USA, since that's where they appear to be located. Spreading misinformation is not illegal- it is protected by the first amendment. There are exceptions but I can't see how any would apply here. You haven't mentioned any that you think apply. If some of the videos on the site guaranteed results or made medical claims, maybe that could be considered false advertising. However, I see no evidence of this. Users are advertised that paying for access to a bunch of hocum videos will get them access to a bunch of snake oil and this appears to be the case. | That's an old idea that has been tried several times before (such as the first, being Unvarnished: Website Lets You Review People (And Trash Them) | HuffPost, which no longer exists); and one of the latest incarnations is Peeple (mobile application - Wikipedia). There are lots of legal liabilities, including defamation and harassment/stalking, even with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act | Electronic Frontier Foundation which (mostly) protects the website owner from others' speech posted on the site (your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction). The only way such a site would survive is to do what Peeple and other sites have done: greatly limit the speech allowed, such as limiting to only positive reviews, giving the subject complete control over what does appear on their profile, only allowing "opt-in" profiles, verify identities, etc. You would have to implement full GDPR compliance; but various lawsuits will either shut you down before you get far enough to launch or soon after and force you to greatly limit the scope of the site. Most lawyers would advise you to find something else to do with your time and money. | Note that what is being bought or sold here is actually information about the exploit. Attempting to criminally penalize the transmission of information in the US often runs into First Amendment issues. If a person has good reason to know that information is going to be used to commit a crime, or is likely to be so used, and there is no plausible legitimate use for the information, that person might be charged with complicity or conspiracy for distributing the information. But where there are legitimate uses, that is much less likely. Here the information could be used to defend against the exploit, or to identify and remove software subject to the exploit, or for research into such exploits generally. There may be other legit uses as well. Some years ago the Federal government attempted to prosecute a person for exporting a book describing how to create an encryption program. The courts eventually ruled that this was protected speech. I suspect a similar ruling would be made in the sort of case described in the question, but the details would matter. | I can't see anything to say this is a state-wide ban. Do they have to give an opportunity to return unused fireworks for a refund? The ban imposed by Portland Fire and Rescue appears to relate to the use, not possession, of fireworks so I assume that the stores' / State's regular refund policies would apply. Due to unusually hot temperatures and dry conditions, PF&R is announcing an immediate ban on the use of all legal and illegal fireworks... | I can see at least two defenses. Game of Skill Defense. Already mentioned in the comments. Entertainment Defense. One could claim the game itself is a form of entertainment and, therefore, all funds spent while playing the game are for entertainment purposes only vis-a-vis the game itself. And not any alleged gambling within the game. Consider the fact that the gambling rewards, after all, (i.e., mining stuff) are limited to being used inside the game and have zero utility outside the game. Ergo, all payments are strictly for entertainment purposes. |
What is the extent of this "invention" clause in this contract? OWNERSHIP OF WORK PRODUCT, IDEAS, INVENTIONS, DISCOVERIES AND TRADEMARKS I shall promptly disclose to (COMPANY) all ideas, inventions or discoveries, whether or not patentable, which I may conceive or make, alone or with others, during my employment, whether or not during working hours, and which directly or indirectly: relate to matters within the scope of my duties or field of responsibility during my employment by (COMPANY); or are based on my knowledge of the actual business or the actual or anticipated research and development of (COMPANY); or are aided by the use of time, materials, facilities or information of (COMPANY). The following paragraphs can be read here. (pastebin) Hello. I hope you can provide some advice on my situation. This is a part of my employment contract. I have omitted the name of the company. My location is NJ. I work as a cloud engineer. Recently I've been thinking about a particular app/business idea and I've been putting some time and effort into it outside of work (weekends, or in the evenings during the week). Since I would eventually like to implement this idea as a website / web application and utilize cloud technology in doing so, could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? Even though it is completely and utterly unrelated to the business model of my employer and I have not used work hours in my implementation of this idea? Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? What is the extent and limitations of such a clause, which I have agreed to? | could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)". | Be careful of the 10% time “perk”. It is not your own time. It is work time where you are self-directed. Any project unrelated to your work should be on your actual own time not dork time that is free of specific assignment. Fortunately the section 39 of the UK patent law is short and relatively straightforward. It is focused on “the course of your usual duties” not on whose time you were on or whose equipment you were using. It belongs to them if - (a) it was made in the course of the normal duties of the employee or in the course of duties falling outside his normal duties, but specifically assigned to him, and the circumstances in either case were such that an invention might reasonably be expected to result from the carrying out of his duties; or (b) the invention was made in the course of the duties of the employee and, at the time of making the invention, because of the nature of his duties and the particular responsibilities arising from the nature of his duties he had a special obligation to further the interests of the employer’s undertaking. Otherwise it’s yours. See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-patent-act-1977/section-39-employees-inventions-right-to-employees-inventions | This could be a problem if the consultancy agreement contains a provision that assigns to the client any copyright in any code created by the consultant. That is why there should be no such provision. In the absence of such a provision, the consultant owns the copyright in the code, so it would be impossible for the consultant to infringe that copyright. Even so, copyright protects a particular expression of an idea, not the idea itself. The idea of an "analyze data" class containing a "read data" function is not itself subject to copyright protection. It could potentially be patentable as a "process," but it would fail to meet the criterion of novelty. It would also fail to meet the criterion of non-obviousness. On the other hand, a software developer cannot (without permission) copy source code that is protected by copyright simply by changing the names. Changing the names would constitute the creation of a derivative work, and the right to create derivative works is also protected by copyright. | I'm not familiar with the case you're citing, but it sounds like this may be an application of the doctrine of "inevitable disclosure" or "inevitable use." A classic case would go something like this. WonderWidgets has discovered that by treating its widget molds with a teaspoon of ground cinnamon, it can create a superpowerful widget that is impervious to normal wear and tear, and will last forever, with very little additional expense. To protect its competitive advantage, WonderWidget takes all sorts of measures to ensure that AAA Widgets never learns about the benefits of the cinnamon additive. WonderWidgets hires Jane, an engineer with a PhD in cinnamonology to make improvements to the additive. She signs a confidentiality agreement promising to protet the company's trade secrets. After a year with WonderWidgets, Jane is recruited by AAA Widgets. WonderWidgets sues them both to prevent them from consummating an employment relationship. Assuming that the information Jane acquired from WonderWidgets is a protected trade secret, the idea here is that everyone knows exactly why AAA is hiring Jane, and that it would basically be impossible for Jane to work for them without applying the knowledge she acquired from WonderWidgets, i.e., there her employment would lead to an inevitable disclosure of WonderWidgets' trade secrets. I think most people would agree that there's at least a reasonable argument to be made in favor of WonderWidgets, there are also efforts to apply this doctrine in much shakier circumstances. For instance, WonderWidgets might try to prevent its janitor from going to work for AAA because it taught him how to mop floors, and it has cleaner floors than AAA, and therefore its cleaning techniques must be superior, and therefore those techniques must be protected. There are some states in which WonderWidgets would win the cinnamon case, and some where Jane would win, because the state doesn't recognize inevitable-disclosure at all. I don't know of any states where WonderWidgets would win the janitor case. Of course, most cases are not as clean-cut as either of these hypotheticals, but I'd say the one you're asking about is closer to the second one than the first. | In Germany, there is no concept that corresponds directly to public domain. You automatically hold the Urheberrecht (~ copyright) for all creative works that you make, and it can't be given up or transferred (§29 UrhG). The work only enters the Gemeinfreiheit (~public domain) 70 years after your death. You can however license Verwertungsrechte (economic usage rights). When you make creative works in the course of employment (see §43 UrhG), your employer automatically gets the Verwertungsrechte necessary in the context for the work, which is typically an exclusive right (no one else, not even you, can use the work). Your are not in an employment relationship with your school, so it has no rights to your works and cannot prevent you from publishing them on copyright grounds. When you see advice on the internet to check with your school first, that is U.S.-specific advice. Since you're still a minor (7–17), you only have limited capacity to enter contracts or legal transactions (bedingte Geschäftsfähigkeit). While you are able to make transactions involving your own means (e.g. buying something with your pocket money) or make transactions that are only to your benefit (such as accepting a gift), other transactions are schwebend unwirksam (~ pending ratification), until your parents agree. The relevant law is in §107 and §108 BGB. This is a problem with open source licenses. If you publish software under a license, this license is schwebend unwirksam. Someone might start using the software under the license. But then if your parents refuse ratification, the license would be invalid, and everyone would have to stop using your software and destroy any derivative works they made. This is a bit of a problem, especially since open source licenses are otherwise assumed to be irrevocable. So if you want to offer a license (including open source licenses), please give legal certainty to the recipients of the license and ask your parents for their consent first, possibly even in writing. Per §107 BGB, the license you offer with their consent will be valid. | If it's patented then it doesn't matter that you independently came up with it. Most software is not patented, though. Most developers do not even think about patents when writing code. In theory you could spend your time keeping up to date on software patents so that you avoid infringing. But this probably only makes sense for specialists who would want to read the latest patents in their field anyway. All software is protected by literary copyright, though. In this case they will try to prove that you did not independently created it, and did copy it. Whelan v. Jaslow in 1986 ruled that structure, sequence and organization of a computer program were protected by copyright. So you could be liable even if you did not just copy and paste sections of code. But even if you're worried the court would get things wrong and think you copied a program when you never even saw it in the first place, there is really nothing you can do about it. | Yes, your clause specifically limits you to only working for COMPANY, even in your off time. Canada does not have a law protecting your right to work secondary jobs (moonlighting) in your off-duty hours. This means that any contract clause specifically limiting you to work with the employer only is valid, and breaking it is cause for justified dismissal. Based on this, do I need to ask for explicit permission to work on such projects? Yes, you will need to disclose any potential "business or occupation whatsoever". You could play contract games by saying "it's only a hobby" or "it doesn't make any money", but you will be opening yourself up to issues. The best thing to do is to disclose your project to your employer and get in writing their permission to work on it with specific terms that you will not be using company time or resources in any way. See: Patterson V. Bank of Nova Scotia | Patenting a new invention doesn't extend the term of the patent on the old invention. The later patent covers the new parts of the new invention, but not the parts that were in the old patent. The whole point of patents is to provide protection against even independent reinvention for a limited time, after which the invention becomes free to use for everyone (and since you disclose how it works in the patent, other people actually can use it themselves). |
Does legitimate interest need to be justified in response to a GDPR DSAR? In the response to a GDPR Data Subject Access Request, in describing the lawful basis under which the data controller is processing my data, I got this: We process your personal data for our legitimate interests including: to enforce compliance with our Terms of Use and applicable law. to protect the rights and safety of our Members and third parties. to meet legal requirements. to provide information to representatives and advisors to help us comply with legal, accounting or security requirements. to prosecute and defend legal proceedings. to respond to lawful requests by public authorities. to provide, support and improve our Services. for our data analytics projects. Is this a complete answer to the question, or can I require them to detail exactly what justifies them gaining this legitimate interest? There is nothing in anything else they have sent that would indicate a justification to my non-lawyer eyes. | When responding to a DSAR (Art 15), the controller must list the purposes for which the personal data is being processed. When obtaining personal data (Art 13 & 14), the controller must inform the data subject about the intended purposes of processing, the legal basis, and if the legal basis is a legitimate interest, those legitimate interests pursued by the controller or a third party. Usually, this information is combined into a single document and then published as a privacy policy, to which the data subject is referred when responding to a DSAR. I cannot find a reason to provide further justification on the legitimate interests. However, in the Guidelines on Transparency, the WP29 (adopted by the EDPB) write: The specific interest in question must be identified for the benefit of the data subject. As a matter of best practice, the controller can also provide the data subject with the information form the balancing test, which must be carried out to allow reliance on Article 6.1(f) as a lawful basis for processing, in advance of any collection of data subjects' personal data. To avoid information fatigue, this can be included within a layered privacy statement/ notice (see paragraph 35). In any case, the WP29 position is that information to the data subject should make it clear that they can obtain information on the balancing test on request. This is essential for effective transparency where data subjects have doubts as to whether the balancing test has been carried out fairly or they wish to file a complaint with a supervisory authority. – WP29 (2018): Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679. WP260 rev.01. URL https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=622227 So the WP29/EDBP is of the opinion that data subjects are entitled to get the controller's balancing test (sometimes also called a legitimate interest assessment). I can see no explicit legal basis for this interpretation, and it can just be inferred indirectly from the more general transparency principle or accountability principle. I am not necessarily convinced this interpretation would be upheld by a court. The ICO instead sees a more limited scope: You must tell individuals: what your purpose for processing personal data is; that you are relying on legitimate interests as your lawful basis; and summarise what the relevant legitimate interests are. – ICO: Legitimate interests: What else do we need to consider? In: Guide to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). URL: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/legitimate-interests/what-else-do-we-need-to-consider/ A summary of the legitimate interests points to a fairly terse list similar to that which you have shown. Note that in the given list of alleged legitimate interests, there are some odd entries such as “to meet legal requirements”. This indicates Art 6(1)(f) legitimate interest is incorrect, and Art 6(1)(c) legal obligation should be used instead as the legal basis, unless the legal requirement does not stem from EU or member state law. Also, any “advisors” should instead be bound as data processors, which would make it unnecessary to find a legal basis to share personal data with them. “Data analytics projects” is incredibly vague, and not a legitimate interest unless the data analysis is performed for achieving another purpose such as to “improve our Services”. | Per Art 12(6), they are allowed to ask for additional identify verification: where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. Additionally, Recital 64: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. A controller should not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential requests. There is no consensus regarding what this means in practice: Must the controller use all measures that they can be reasonably be required to use? Or only those measures to verify the identity to a reasonable level of certainty? I agree with you that asking for a passport is excessive, and that email verification would be sufficient. However, that is just my personal opinion. The GDPR can also be interpreted in a way that asking for a copy of your passport is OK. Where they process a copy of your passport, that is personal data as well. You also have data subject rights with regards to this processing, for example the right to be informed of the purpose of this processing and of when the data will be deleted. If it is only used for the purpose of verifying your identity, the copy of your passport should be deleted immediately afterwards. The data controller may have additional obligations because a passport or ID card is a very sensitive document. E.g. Art 87 allows member states to impose additional rules. Most sensible controllers will therefore want to avoid processing passports, unless they only operate in specific EU member states. | Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person, whether that information is public or not. The student website is definitely processing personal data of faculty. Any website is also necessarily processing personal data of visitors due to technical reasons, even though hosting has been outsourced to a third party. There's always a server, you just might not be managing it yourself. Thus, GDPR applies. Just because it processes personal data doesn't mean that the student website would be illegal. It just means the students are responsible for GDPR compliance of that website. Since the website is controlled by students and not by the university, the university DPO has no say here and the university can't demand the website to be hosted in a particular manner. Nevertheless, the DPO's suggestions might be quite sensible. Typical GDPR compliance steps include: having a clear purpose for which the personal data is being processed having a legal basis for that processing (here, probably a “legitimate interest” which will require a balancing test), see Art 6 providing transparent information to the data subjects providing a privacy notice to website visitors, see Art 13 notifying faculty per the requirements in Art 14 GDPR preparing to fulfill data subject rights such as access, rectification, and erasure when using a legitimate interest, there's also a right to “object” (opt-out) implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure security and compliance of your processing activities, see Art 24+32 making sure that third parties to which you outsource processing activities are contractually bound as “data processors” to only use the data as instructed by you, see Art 28 if you transfer data to non-European countries, having appropriate safeguards in place Does this sound complicated? It can be complicated. The point is that the internet is no longer the lawless Wild West. Just because you can easily publish a site with personal data, doesn't mean that you should. The GDPR is about requiring data controllers to find an appropriate balance with the rights and interests of the affected persons. Of course there are countries with less regulation, but there are also countries with fewer taxes and that isn't necessarily good for society. The easiest way to avoid these responsibilities will be to stop publishing the site as students – and instead taking up the university DPO's offer to have the university run the site. Which is less fun, of course, but the adult thing to do. If this motivates you further: note that the data controller (the people responsible for the site) must publish their contact information in the privacy notice, typically name + email + street address. The GDPR contains no exceptions that would help here. There is an exception for purely personal or household activities. But if the website would be available to the general public, it would be difficult to argue that this is purely personal. There's also case law such as the Lindqvist case requiring a narrow interpretation of that exception. In Art 9, the GDPR does mention that some restrictions are lifted if the data subject made the information public themselves. But that isn't relevant here, because Art 9 is only about extra-protected sensitive data, e.g. health information, union membership, or sexual orientation. | The data controller is correct: they can take up to three months (approx. 90 days) to process a request, though this is only allowed in exceptional cases. From Art 12(3) GDPR (emphasis mine): The controller shall provide information on action taken on a request under Articles 15 to 22 to the data subject without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request. That period may be extended by two further months where necessary, taking into account the complexity and number of the requests. The controller shall inform the data subject of any such extension within one month of receipt of the request, together with the reasons for the delay. You have not received a response in that timeframe, so the data controller has failed to meet its obligations. The polite thing to do would be to remind them that the time has run out, and that you would like a response ASAP. You can lodge a complaint with your supervisory authority. A letter from the data protection authority tends to speed things up a lot :) In principle, you could sue them to get a response. In practice, this is likely to be too expensive to be worth it. | It depends. Can the data controller or another person, with "means reasonably likely to be used," (see clause 26 of the preamble of the GDPR) use that data alone or in combination with other data to identify a natural person? If yes, it is personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. If no, it is not personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. Anonymous data is not subject to the GDPR. "The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes." Assigning an unique alphanumeric code to a thing does not necessarily make the code and/or the thing "personal data". But if you have a set of data that is or can be linked by the unique alphanumeric code (e.g. as a primary key in a set of tables) and you can use it to identify a person, then it is personal data. Either way, to be GDPR-compliant / to mitigate risk you should make some kind of record to reflect that process of thinking and what you decided. And if the answer is Yes, it is personal data, then you should record your "lawful basis" for processing the data and how you decided that. | GDPR recital 64 says: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. A controller should not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential requests. The GDPR does not specify exactly what methods of verification are "reasonable". GDPR Article 11 paragraph 2 provides: Where, in cases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the controller is able to demonstrate that it is not in a position to identify the data subject, the controller shall inform the data subject accordingly, if possible. In such cases, Articles 15 to 20 shall not apply except where the data subject, for the purpose of exercising his or her rights under those articles, provides additional information enabling his or her identification. This is amplified by Recital 57 which says: If the personal data processed by a controller do not permit the controller to identify a natural person, the data controller should not be obliged to acquire additional information in order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of complying with any provision of this Regulation. However, the controller should not refuse to take additional information provided by the data subject in order to support the exercise of his or her rights. Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. GDPR Article 12 paragraph 6 provides: Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. All of the above seems to indicate that the Data Controller must follow reasonable practices, but is not required to guarantee a positive response to a Data Subject who cannot supply reasonable evidence of identity. Moreover the Controller is required to reliably ascertain the identity of the Subject before providing information or acting on a request. Incidentally, good security practice is that the site does not retain the actual password. instead it hashes the password with a good cryptographically secure hash function, and stores the hash. This means that the site cannot reliably determine if a password is unique among all passwords saved by the site, and searches among passwords are not normally done, and would not be reasonable. A site using an email address as the User Identifier would normally enforce at the time an account is created that the email is unique among all emails registered on the site. A user who cannot provide the email would typically be rejected as not able to be identified, unless the site retains additional ID info not listed in the question. I think such a practice would be considered to be reasonable in the current state of technology. | An Art 15 Subject Access Request (SAR) “shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” It would be a grave violation of privacy for an email provider to search its users' account contents. It is therefore likely that the email provider would refuse to fulfil that subject request, unless required to perform a search via a court order. Instead, the SAR could be directed to the account holder (Alice or Dave), if they are subject to the GDPR. Depending on the exact legal framework, emails might be protected under confidentiality of communications rules, making such searches similarly illegal to wiretapping. At least in germany, I am fairly certain that an email provider would be criminally liable if they were to disclose emails from their users' email accounts to a third party. | The material scope of the GDPR (Article 2) is limited to the processing of personal data (including mere storage) by automated means or as part of a filing system. The question of whether your activity falls within this scope hinges on what you actually do with the data once you take possession of it. You have mentioned saving the contact information of people you have met at conferences, which could refer to simply retaining it for later use, or to the technological process of storing data in a computer. The former, if not done in any structured way (a filing system) would not fall within the scope of the GDPR. The latter, even if poorly executed, such as a photo stored on a business smartphone or a text document thrown onto your workstation's desktop, would always fall within scope as computerised data is processed "by automated means". When the contact information you receive identifies a specific person, as distinct from just a corporate switchboard number and company name for example, it is personal data. When you get that personal data from the person it identifies (data subject), and you're otherwise in scope, Article 13 is invoked, requiring you to provide a list of information, "at the time when personal data are obtained", unless "the data subject already has the information." This is known as the right to be informed. The requirements differ when personal data are not obtained directly from the data subject. I would argue it is unreasonable to be expected to provide the information to the data subject over a cup of coffee or in a quick business card exchange, but if you start entering it into a spreadsheet or your CRM, you need to provide the required information, which may be as simple as a follow-up email thanking them for their time and letting them know you'll keep their contact details on file, along with a link to your organisation's privacy policy, assuming it covers this use, or if not, a specific privacy notice. You will of course be required to comply with other requirements such as the principles of data minimisation and identify a lawful basis, maintain adequate security by implementing technical and organisational measures, hold contracts with any third parties who process personal data on your behalf, and have a process for upholding data subject rights and responding to requests to exercise them - among others - but you should already be doing that for your other processing activities unless exempt. Additional information Edits have been made as clarifications and questions were forthcoming. Email marketing You need to consider the applicable country's implementation of Directive 2002/58/EC as amended ("ePrivacy Directive"). For example, in the UK you could send such messages without consent to contacts at incorporated companies or public sector bodies, but would have required consent for sole traders, private individuals, or partners in an unincorporated partnership. In Ireland, you have an exemption to consent for existing customers who were offered the opportunity to opt out when their email address was collected, but must use the email address for marketing within 12 months. Each EU country will have a different implementation of the Directive. In the Netherlands, Article 17 of the Telecommunications Act implements Directive 2003/58/EC and thus provisions for direct marketing by email. Processing by automated means Processing by automated means refers to processing of personal data in electronic, rather than manual form. All electronic processing is within the material scope of the GDPR, while only manual processing that forms or is intended to form part of a filing system is. Recital 15: The protection of natural persons should apply to the processing of personal data by automated means, as well as to manual processing, if the personal data are contained or are intended to be contained in a filing system. Art. 4(2): ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means ICO guidance What is personal data?: The GDPR covers the processing of personal data in two ways: personal data processed wholly or partly by automated means (that is, information in electronic form); and personal data processed in a non-automated manner which forms part of, or is intended to form part of, a ‘filing system’ (that is, manual information in a filing system). |
Sell food products on Amazon in Germany as a side job I'm from Iran and I live in Germany. I work here as a software developer. I have plans to import Saffron (Packed and ready for sale) from Iran with help of a 3rd party company and sell them on Amazon here in Germany. I know because of the US sanction on Iran it's difficult to import this product, but let's say the 3rd party company can do it legally and I can receive it here. My question is if I can start selling it on Amazon as a side job. Do I need to register a company or register my work somewhere for that, or it's just as simple as signing up as a seller on Amazon and start selling? (Obviously, I'll pay taxes for it) And does this product need to go through some food health verification process here in Germany before I start selling them? I'm looking for some general advice on this topic. Any helps would be appreciated. I don't want to spend a lot of money at the beginning to get professional advice from a lawyer and then realize I'm not allowed to do this job! | A very good starting point is the webpage of the IHK Munich ("The Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IHK) for Munich and Upper Bavaria") for people who want to import food as a business. It is in German, but Google translate might be helpful. They say in their introduction: Food imported into Germany must not only comply with European food law, but also German food law. The importer of products is seen as the manufacturer of these goods and is responsible for ensuring that only safe food is placed on the market. He is fully liable for the imported products. There are always three legal areas to be observed when importing food. These are food law, customs law and the issue of licenses. Then it goes into the details like e.g, food quality check procedures and so on. Since you are fully liable it would be a good idea to found a company for this activity. In your case a UG (a kind of Ltd also known as "Mini-GmbH", 1 EUR minimum capital stock, but typically 1k EUR or more) or a GmbH (German version of Ltd, capital stock 25 kEUR) would probably the best thing. Also, make sure you get a written ok from your employer, who has a veto in case (1) you are competing with him, (2) of concerns you might spend too much time on this activity. | Under German law, yes sure. As long as you keep to all regulations. You have to declare your taxes. This is income, whether it comes from inside Germany or not and whether it is paid into a German bank account or foreign. You have to have a health insurance and likely need to pay into the social security and pension funds. As your employer most likely does not do this for you as a German employer would be required to, you will need to pay both the employee and the employer's part yourself. So yes, if you pay your taxes on it and have health and social security insurance, Germany does not care where the money comes from. Now whether the company in Mauritius is legally allowed to hire and pay you under their law? I have no idea. Please note that filling out all the right forms correctly is not for the faint of heart. And finding out that you did it wrong only years later is painful and costly. Also calculate your costs before you do anything. Paying both parts for your health insurance for example can easily be up to 400€ a month more then a German employee at a German company, so run your numbers. You may be better off being officially self-employed or even incorporated. Just because it's legal, does not mean it's a good idea. Hire a professional to advise you on the economic and bureaucratic side of this. | Germany would not extradite to Saudi Arabia. India and Kuwait might, because they and a few other countries have extradition treaties with KSA. To put this squarely in the realm of illegal (it's not clear that accidentally encountering Shiite material online is a crime in KSA), assume that the person deliberately watched porn then fled to India. Generally speaking, this is a severe enough offense to allow extradition under the India-KSA treaty. However, India gets to review the request for exceptions. Under article 3, the central question is whether this is a political crime. There are enumerated acts that are not deemed to be political. Watching porn is not a listed exception. Accordingly, India could determine that this is a political crime, and refuse to extradite. If the crime is advocating atheism, however, then under Article 3 (1)(j), this is presumably not an excludable offense, because atheism is officially terrorism in KSA per Royal Decree 44 (I can't find an official copy). On the third hand, India may still reserve the right to apply their definition of terrorism. Even if there were an extradition treaty between Germany and KSA, German law Act on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters of 23 December 1982 §3(1) would currently preclude extradition because Extradition shall not be granted unless the offence is an unlawful act under German law or unless mutatis mutandis the offence would also constitute an offence under German law. There might be acts that are offenses in both countries, but not e.g. "watching porn" or "advocating atheism". The boundaries of blasphemy under German law are not clear to me. Section 166 of the Strafgesetzbuch imposes a maximum of 3 years in prison for blasphemy, so it could be an extraditable offense. Sect. 6 of the "Cooperation" law also sets forth exclusions for reasons of political and religious persecution. Also, KSA would have to assure Germany that the death penalty would not be imposed. | What would be the most reasonable thing to do? Live with it. Oh, and stop breaking the law with your automated emails. Illegality on their part does not justify illegality on your part. Also, it’s likely that this activity has caused your email address to be blocked automatically which may explain why they aren’t contacting you. From a legal point of view, that’s the only reasonable option. You do have valid grounds for a lawsuit for the value of the watermelon but the cost of filing will be a couple of orders of magnitude greater than the value of the melon so doing so isn’t “reasonable”. If you want to vent, the internet offers a wide variety of social media platforms for which that seems to be their primary focus. But that’s got nothing to do with the law. | The exact laws will vary by region and country, but the laws will range anywhere between illegal and almost illegal. If you want to operate as legal as possible then you will have to disclose to the buyer that the software is malware or a crypter and you should require for the buyer to sign an agreement to only use the software for legal and educational purposes. Hiding the disclosure in a long Terms of Service agreement will likely not be sufficient. You will have to explicitly advertise that the software is malware and a crypter and that you are looking for reputable tech firms to buy your software in order to improve their software. If you sell software without disclosing to the customer that the software contains malware or a crypter then you are exposing yourself to a lawsuit for products liability, invasion of privacy, fraud and misrepresentation, the cost of damages, and possibly criminal liability. | Would I be allowed to market this product as "Cocaine cola" or "Cocaine soda?" england-and-wales Possibly not if you were to try and register the name, as this may well fall foul of s.3(3)(a), Trademarks Act 1994 which says: A trade mark shall not be registered if it is— (a) contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of morality... The government's Manual of Trade Marks Practice, at section 5.8, explains that: Marks which may be ‘contrary to public policy’ are those, for example, that make specific references to illegal drugs such as cocaine... (my emphasis) | The relevant section of US patent law was already posted in an answer on one of the questions you linked, but I'll repeat it: 35 USC 271 (a): Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. Merely making a patented invention is infringement; it isn't relevant whether you sell it. It is also infringement if you use it yourself, regardless of who made it or whether you paid them, or whether you would have otherwise bought it from the patent holder. There are some special exceptions for things like certain kinds of pharmaceuticals, but I browsed the rest of 35 USC Chapter 28, and didn't see anything that would appear to be relevant in this case. | That is private. Who you work for is not information that is disclosed publicly by any state actor in Germany, just like your taxes. In fact, that or who you are employed at is often regarded as personal and private information. Nigh impossible through agencies Public agencies like the Fiskus (tax), Agentur für Arbeit, and immigration are not allowed to give any information about a person to anyone but that person or another agency that has the right to that information. Yes, (generally speaking) the tax office may not even say that a person exists (or doesn't) and what their tax number is to anyone but the person in question. |
Under what circumstances are you required to stop and/or answer questions by the police? After this case of suspected harassment by the police in England in response to refusal to provide a name while walking to catch a train I wondered when you are required to stop, and when you are required to answer questions as a pedestrian. From the linked pages, it would seem the answer is that you are not required to answer any questions. You are required to stop if you are either legally arrested or are going to be searched. To be legally arrested the police must: identify themselves as the police tell you that you’re being arrested tell you what crime they think you’ve committed explain why it’s necessary to arrest you explain to you that you’re not free to leave To detain you for a search the police must tell you: their name and police station what they expect to find, for example drugs the reason they want to search you, for example if it looks like you’re hiding something why they are legally allowed to search you that you can have a record of the search and if this isn’t possible at the time, how you can get a copy From my reading, unless all of one of these sets of actions have been completed, you are allowed to continue about your business as if the police were not there. Is this interpretation correct? | Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP. | Police are not required to tell you their name From this response to a FOI request: There is no specific written requirement for Police Officers to verbally give their name and/or number to a member of the public if verbally requested to do so. However Police Officers are required to comply with the Police Code of Ethics, which is overseen and published by the College of Policing. However, it goes on to say that, subject to certain exemptions, uniformed police must wear a name badge and display their number on their epaulettes. | Self-defence has nothing to do with whether you are performing an arrest (lawful or otherwise) Self-defence is a plea that you used reasonable force to protect yourself, others and in some jurisdictions, property, from immediate harm. There is, as you say, a “whole spectrum” of both the perception of the threat and the force used that go into determining if the actions of the defendant amounted to self-defence or not. That’s why it’s up to the jury to decide on a case by case basis. A person who has the power of arrest (law enforcement officers and citizens who actually witness a crime) is authorised to use reasonable force to effect that arrest. Of course, effecting an arrest may cause a situation to escalate to the point where self-defence becomes an issue. | Silence is not cause. However, this may not prevent a search. The officer does not need to tell you that he has probable cause, he must simply have it in order to conduct a search. If he obtained the probable cause before he pulled you over (this is likely), then he will order you out of the car and search over your vociferous (and silent?) objections. If the officer does not have probable cause, searches anyway, and can't come up with a convincing one in time for the court date, then yes you have a claim. But remember, just because the officer didn't inform you of the cause doesn't mean it didn't exist. Always consult an attorney before any legal action. | Police have discretion in the enforcement of the law Which is to say, police get to decide which crimes they make arrests for, which they handle with warnings, which they report and which they ignore. This applies whether they are in uniform, undercover or off-duty. If they abuse this discretion then they are liable to disciplinary action. If they apply it corruptly or otherwise illegally then they are liable to criminal sanction. | An existing law actually prohibits using census data "against" a person, see this recent question. The 5th Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") is not interpreted to imply an absolute privilege to not answer, it means that your answer cannot be used against you in a criminal case. You can be compelled to testify "against yourself" if you are granted immunity from prosecution. | Is mere accusation without evidence other than testimony of the accuser, grounds for arrest in the UK? It depends on the circumstances, especially when dealing with non-recent allegations where independent and corroborative evidence may be difficult to locate and/or recover, but in my experience it is very rarely an option to arrest soley on the say-so of one complainant unless there is a compelling reason to do so. It's also fraught with potential risks - Operation Midland being a prime example of when it can go horribly wrong. Also, no-one can "call the police and have someone arrested" in the united-kingdom - the police are under a duty to carry out a "proportionate investigation" in to allegations of crime and then make their own minds up on how to proceed based on the available intelligence and evidence. Focussing on england-and-wales, the most commonly used power of arrest* is at s.24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which, along with PACE Code G, requires an officer to: Reasonably suspect that an offence is being, has been or will be committed. On a scale of 0 to 10 - with 10 being total knowledge and 0 being no opinion at all - suspicion may be as low as 2 or 3 whereas belief starts at 7 or 8. And reasonably believe an arrest is necessary. One commonly used mnemonic for the Necessity Test under s.24 is: ID COP PLAN: Investigation - prompt and effective investigation of offence or conduct Disappearance - prevent prosecution being hindered by disappearance of a person Child / Vulnerable person - protection of Obstruction of highway Physical injury to themselves or someone else Public (in)decency Loss or damage to property Address not know Name not known I cannot say why the officer did not make an arrest in the OP's case. I surmise that he did not deem it necessary based on the above mandatory criteria but rather considered that a voluntary attendance interview would be the most appropriate course of action given the circumstances and information available to him at the time. *There are other statutory and common-law powers of arrest, but they all follow the same procedures as above | Nothing is typical Investigators have wide discretion on how (and if) they pursue an investigation of an alleged crime. When they make an arrest is part of that discretion. Making an arrest starts all sorts of clocks running on the legal process and investigators may not want to do that for all sorts of legitimate reasons. |
Can I request a copy of my personal data (GDPR) from email-scammers and sue them if they don't comply? So, I've been receiving a lot of spammails recently and I'm pretty fed up with them. I've also been wondering, how they got access to my mail-address, so I sent a request of information so I can see, what data they store about me, where they got it from and whom they sent it to. Could I sue the company behind the scam, if they don't comply the GDPR? (Please excuse the bad English, I'm not a native speaker) | Sure, you can make such a request, but its not likely to help you. Scammers are criminals and don't generally care about GDPR compliance. Scammers are criminals, and won't just publish their real world identity. Serving them with a lawsuit will be difficult, especially if they are from outside the EU. GDPR lets you sue data controllers, but it's not worth it. You can sue for compliance (e.g. to compel fulfillment of your access request), and you can sue for damages stemming from GDPR violations. Compared to the damages you have suffered, a lawsuit is very expensive. | [I'm not so well-versed on US and Russian law, thus I will limit my answer to EU law.] Your specific use of a user identifier, as I understood from your question, can be classified as personal data, so in your case, the GDPR seems to apply. This means that you need to have a) legitimate purposes to process that personal data (e.g. crash reporting) and b) a legal justification for each purpose of processing: it could be based on consent or another legitimate purpose (inc. your own legitimate interests). Consent might not be the best option for you, but it's up to you to decide. In any case, you need to assess the risks to the data subjects (your users) before you decide. How likely is it that you will get breached, and what potential harm will that cause to your users? These are some guidelines; my recommendation is that you read the law and the guidelines by the Article 29 Working Group and European Data Protection Board, or hire some good experts on this. There is no easy answer, or one size fits all solution. The GDPR isn't so hard to understand or implement, but it does require some change in mindset. With the new law, processing personal data carries a higher risk of penalties, so you should do it only when it's absolutely necessary, and with respect to the rights of your users. | No. As long as you don't see and have no means to access this data, but it is under the control of the user at all times, you are neither the controller or the processor of this personal data, and the GDPR does not apply to you. | An Art 15 Subject Access Request (SAR) “shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” It would be a grave violation of privacy for an email provider to search its users' account contents. It is therefore likely that the email provider would refuse to fulfil that subject request, unless required to perform a search via a court order. Instead, the SAR could be directed to the account holder (Alice or Dave), if they are subject to the GDPR. Depending on the exact legal framework, emails might be protected under confidentiality of communications rules, making such searches similarly illegal to wiretapping. At least in germany, I am fairly certain that an email provider would be criminally liable if they were to disclose emails from their users' email accounts to a third party. | It seems like some law must have been breached during the sharing of this information? Possibly, even probably. The scrutiny of your personal account in order to glean personal data (your IP address) and then using that personal data to match accounts may contravene Recital 50 of the GDPR: The processing of personal data for purposes other than those for which the personal data were initially collected should be allowed only where the processing is compatible with the purposes for which the personal data were initially collected. If the website terms which you agreed to don't include this data matching, then that processing is not lawful. The rest of Recital 50 is relevant and worth quoting in full: If the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, Union or Member State law may determine and specify the tasks and purposes for which the further processing should be regarded as compatible and lawful. Further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes should be considered to be compatible lawful processing operations. The legal basis provided by Union or Member State law for the processing of personal data may also provide a legal basis for further processing. In order to ascertain whether a purpose of further processing is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are initially collected, the controller, after having met all the requirements for the lawfulness of the original processing, should take into account, inter alia: any link between those purposes and the purposes of the intended further processing; the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the controller as to their further use; the nature of the personal data; the consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects; and the existence of appropriate safeguards in both the original and intended further processing operations. It seems to me that an anonymous account could reasonably expect that the "further processing" of data matching is not in the public interest, an exercise of official authority, scientific or historical research or statistical. There is no link between the data matching exercise and the purpose for which IP addresses are normally collected: the operation and physical security of the website. Now, it may well be that the website terms do allow this data matching to discover links between accounts, or in any case prohibit having two accounts and allow reasonable methods to discover such links. It's also possible that a court has ordered the processing (as Iñaki Viggers has mentioned. We don't have that information; but ostensibly one wouldn't normally expect a personal account to be examined in this way, and certainly wouldn't expect any link discovered to be relayed to a third party. | The data controller is correct: they can take up to three months (approx. 90 days) to process a request, though this is only allowed in exceptional cases. From Art 12(3) GDPR (emphasis mine): The controller shall provide information on action taken on a request under Articles 15 to 22 to the data subject without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request. That period may be extended by two further months where necessary, taking into account the complexity and number of the requests. The controller shall inform the data subject of any such extension within one month of receipt of the request, together with the reasons for the delay. You have not received a response in that timeframe, so the data controller has failed to meet its obligations. The polite thing to do would be to remind them that the time has run out, and that you would like a response ASAP. You can lodge a complaint with your supervisory authority. A letter from the data protection authority tends to speed things up a lot :) In principle, you could sue them to get a response. In practice, this is likely to be too expensive to be worth it. | Please note that Google Analytics do not anonymize the data you collect on its behalf unless you configure it to do IP-anonymization. If you use Google Analytics and do not use this feature, you need to have a DPA (Data Processing Addendum) in place with Google in order to comply with the GDPR. This is a real hassle, so unless you absolutely need fine-grained demographic data, it is strongly recommended that you use IP-anonymization. According to our data protection supervisory authority, this is sufficient to comply with the GDPR vis-a-vis Google Analytics. Does data that is anonymized need to be collect in the event of a GDPR Subject Access Request? No. But as the controller, you need to make sure that is is anonymized. | You won't be able to get around self-doxxing yourself. § 5 Abs 1 TMG requires tele-media service providers like you to list den Namen und die Anschrift, unter der sie niedergelassen sind the name and the address where they reside or are established Similarly, Art 13(1) GDPR requires you to provide the identity and the contact details of the controller In a German context, it is generally accepted that both of these involve a ladungsfähige Anschrift, i.e. a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit (not a post box). These requirements exist for both natural persons and legal entities, and for both businesses and non-commercial activities. The TMG Impressumspflicht talks about “geschäftsmäßige, in der Regel gegen Entgelt angebotene Telemedien” but in practice this only requires that the service could be paid (not that you're actually making any money), and that the service is offered routinely/business-like (not necessarily commercially). It does not matter where your service is hosted as long as you live in Germany. The TMG and GDPR might not apply if the forum is run purely privately, e.g. if it is only made available to a few close friends or family members. |
Can states and localities have stronger immigration status-based employment discrimination laws than the federal law? 8 USC §1324b prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or prospective employees on the basis of immigration status, if the individual in question is a citizen or national of the United States, a lawful permanent resident (with a proviso that I won't discuss here), or an asylee or refugee. I'm wondering whether the existence of 8 USC §1324b rules out the possibility of any stronger state law. For example, suppose a state had a law that says employers can't discriminate against people with Temporary Protected Status (TPS). This doesn't directly conflict with federal law, since TPS people have an immigration status that allows them to work for any employer. However, I am not sure whether the concept of field preemption would apply here. | It is well established that the federal government has complete control over immigration. See especially Arizona v. US which holds that States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. De Canas v. Bica (1976), 424 U.S. 351 is also relevant to the application of field preemption to INA. In this case, the courts found that Congress had not (at that point) entered the field of employment of unauthorized workers, so state laws were not preempted by federal law. Laws can change, and with them, potential state powers. In Arizona the court held that Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where a “federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject” and with respect to issues of immigration, Because Congress has occupied the field, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 adds provisions to the Immigration and Nationality Act, including employment-related law, thus Congress has entered the field of regulating immigration with respect to employment. Current 8 USC §1324b arises from various amendments to the INA, where the present expression "protected individual" was inserted, by Public Law 101-649, to replace earlier "citizen or intended citizen". Congress also introduced Temporary Protected Status in §302 of the law, which has specific (more restricted) provisions regarding employment. The evidence clearly indicates that Congress intended to include employment issues w.r.t. their supreme power regarding immigration. These discrimination provisions are in the field of immigration, and not discrimination legislation (where Congress has not preempted the field). Congressional silence must, in the light of what Congress did say, be interpreted to mean that the US immigration policy only offers certain specific protections, and states cannot add to or subtract from those protections. | As Tom says and these guys reiterate (I'm quoting those guys), "Employment relationships are presumed to be “at-will” in all U.S. states except Montana. The U.S. is one of a handful of countries where employment is predominantly at-will". Montana (Dept. of Labor and Industry) also states that they are the only ones in the US like that. Montana Code 39-2-904(1)(b) states that a discharge is unlawful if "the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of employment". (2)(a) then states that "During a probationary period of employment, the employment may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the employee on notice to the other for any reason or for no reason". There is a presumptive 6 month probationary period in case an employer say nothing, but it could be longer or shorter (it can be 7 years for university professors, and I don't find anything in the code preventing an employer from setting the probationary period at 50 years). | Under U.S. federal law, and under the few state laws of which I am aware, it is not unlawful to expand a pool of applicants based on a protected class such as race, age, sex, etc., but it is unlawful to select an applicant for employment based on a protected class. An advertisement could lawfully encourage applications by persons having certain protected attributes (e.g., born and raised in South America; Native American; Veteran; transgender) in order to diversify the workforce, but it could not lawfully suggest that hiring preference would be given to applicants with those protected attributes. That's a fine line, and it's easy for an employer to cross it, either willfully or inadvertantly. It's best--from both a practical and a legal perspective--to determine the hiring criteria and process before seeking applicants; and to separate that screening process from the advertising process. The advertising process could, for example, target underrepresented groups as long as it did not preclude other persons/groups from learning about or applying for the opportunities. | There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake. | It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power. | This law regulates employers, and New York City only has jurisdiction over employers in New York City, so this law would not protect residents of New York City seeking employment outside of New York City. Generally speaking, the law of a jurisdiction can only apply to someone who has "personally availed themselves" of the benefits of operating in that jurisdiction such that it is foreseeable that they would be subject to the laws of that jurisdiction. An employer not operating in New York City seeking employees at large wouldn't meet that requirement. While this concept is usually applied in the context of the personal jurisdiction of a court, it is also not irrelevant to choice of law questions. As with any law, there are edge cases that could be challenging in which the applicability of the law could be unclear. For example, it isn't clear whether this rule would or would not apply to an employer looking for an employee in its Chicago office (e.g. working for the Chicago Mercantile Exchange) that conducts interviews and makes hiring decisions for the job at a job fair intended for NYU Alumni that is conducted at its New York City campus, even though it doesn't have offices for the conduct of its primary business in New York City and the staff conducting the job fair are based in Chicago. It might. But, suppose that the law did apply to the conduct of the employer at the job fair. Would it also apply to a follow up interview in Chicago, or to employees interviewing for the same job at a similar job fair on the Stanford University campus? In these cases, probably not. | In the US, there have been a few cases (EEOC v. The Children's Home, Inc., Michael W. Naylor v. City of Burbank) in the realm of employment discrimination. There may well be more cases which are settled without going to court. There are somewhat more court cases in the UK, see here for a number of relevant categories. In addition, there are significant cases regarding discrimination against gay males, for example Bostock v. Clayton Co, decided by SCOTUS this summer. | The employer might be liable for a discrimination claim, under the doctrine of disparate impact. See Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc and references cited therein. The idea is that an employer can be liable absent proof of intentional discrimination when a practice disproportionately affects protected classes of individuals, and the practice is not justified by reasonable business considerations. So it would depend on why this particular state of affairs in employment came about. There is a test known as the 80% rule which attempts to quantify the notion of "under-representation" as evidence of discrimination. This test (not widely respected by the courts these days) might constitute evidence of discrimination, if a protected class is demonstrably under-represented. The current standard seems to be by comparison to random selection. In EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, the court found that a grooming policy had a disparate impact on members of a religion (Sikhism), and was thus contrary to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, although a requirement to shave does not obviously discriminate on the basis of religion. This points to an important element of a successful disparate impact claim, that there has to be a policy with a causal effect. In the above scenario, there is no proposed policy that has this effect. Note that the burden of proof is on the person suing for relief – they must have a theory of something the company does that causes this hiring pattern, a practice that is discriminatory. The identified policy (whatever it might be) could be justified by a business necessity defense (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424), by showing that the practice has a demonstrable relationship to the requirements of the job. That, b.t.w., would not excuse a racially or religiously discriminatory hiring policy for a factory manufacturing menorahs or kinaras. If a company recruiting locally in Boise ID had a 75% black work force, it would be reasonable to suspect that something was up. But legally, without showing that this results from a unjustified policy of the company, mere statistically anomalous distribution is does not sustain a claim of discrimination. |
Which country's jurisdiction applies on YouTube channels? When a video is uploaded to YouTube, it is visible to the rest of the world, meaning YouTube displays it everywhere. Does this mean all countries' law applies to it? If the videos are in English and are about science in general, does this mean if some countries someday ban (imprisonment) science videos or use a specific colour in videos, can they extraterritorially enforce this imprisonment if they are in some other countries like the USA or India? I mean, can a country just bring any YouTuber to a jail outside its borders (using its national language as the language of the video) who uploads content of international appeal because of some law? Also, can a country just hold liable for YouTube's data privacy practices a YouTuber outside its borders and enforce the judgment if the practices of both YouTuber and their channel and YouTube is legal in their home country? One last thing is whether the inclusion of ads makes a difference? | Does this mean all countries law applies to it? Basically yes. If the videos are in english and are about science in general does this mean if some country some day bans ( imprisonment ) science videos or use of a specific colour in videos can they extraterritorialy enforce this imprisonment if they are in some other country like USA or India? With respect to criminal cases, only if it can arrest that person or convince another country to arrest and extradite that person. Generally speaking, countries will only extradite someone if it is a serious offense under the domestic laws of the country of arrest as well as the country requesting that the person be handed over, and also only if the crime occurred in or was targeted at the requesting country. Sometimes the arrest is not legal in the place where it is made. For example, in this case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court (the quote is from the official syllabus to the case): Respondent, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly kidnapped from his home and flown by private plane to Texas, where he was arrested for his participation in the kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent's pilot. After concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico (Extradition Treaty or Treaty), and ordered respondent's repatriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the United States had authorized the abduction and since the Mexican government had protested the Treaty violation, jurisdiction was improper. Held: The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country's criminal laws. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). I mean can a country just bring to jail any youtuber outside its borders ( using its national language as the language of the video ) who uploads content of international appeal because of some law? If the country can manage to arrest the person, yes. There are high profile cases from Saudi Arabia where that has happened. See, e.g., here and here (a blogger and his sister arrested in Saudi Arabia, while his wife and children flee to Canada), here (journalists for Lebanese periodical arrested in Saudi Arabia in relation to years old publications) here (more journalists arrested in Saudi Arabia), here ("A male Saudi Arabian teenager has been arrested in Riyadh over a series of online videos of conversations between him and a female Californian streaming-video star that went viral."), here (Yemeni blogger), and here (Washington Post journalist tortured and killed in Saudi Arabian embassy in Turkey at the direction of a senior member of the Saudi Arabian royal family). Also can a country just hold liable for youtube's data privacy practices a youtuber outside its borders and enforce the judgement if the practices of both youtuber and their chanell and youtube is legal in their home country? A country can hold anyone liable for anything its domestic laws allow it to hold someone liable for, and can enforce that judgment against any assets it can exert power over. Some countries with similar legal systems recognize each other's court judgments widely. Countries with very different legal systems often don't recognize each other's judgements. For example, most European countries do not recognize U.S. money judgment for torts (i.e. civil wrongs such as personal injury awards). Similarly, the U.S. does not recognize most foreign defamation judgments, and does not recognize most judgments of Saudi Arabian courts. One last thing is wether inclusion of ads make a difference? Usually not. But it can matter for purposes of assertions of lawsuit liability over someone outside the jurisdiction seeking to impose liability for something that harmed someone in their country. If conduct amounts to "doing business" in the country seeking to impose liability or amounts to a "purposeful availment" of the laws of the country seeking to impose liability in some why, an imposition of extraterritorial liability is more likely, and that tends to happen more in cases where there are ads that are commercial targeting the people of the country where the courts seek to impose liability. | No. There are certain provisions of section 230 that carve out what liability these companies have for third party (i.e. User) speech on their web pages in 230(e). 230(e)(2) says that nothing in Section 230 may be construed to limit or expand laws reguarding intellectual property. These services are still on the hook if users post trademark or copyright infringing material to the site. Other such matters similarly not permitted include obscenities laws, exploitation of children laws, state laws, communications privacy laws, and sex trafficing laws. As a special note that section 230 was created to allow for emerging internet technologies and buisness to not have to worry about third party speech on their platform from holding them liable as a publisher. Thus, if I was to sue youtube for defamation of character based on a video you uploaded, calling me a Sith Lord, I could not sue Youtube (who has lots of money) but would rather have to sue you (who I presume does not have lots of money... at least not youtube/Google levels of money). Thus youtube cannot be civilily liable. It can still be criminally liable and liable for copyright infringement. | Yes (probably), under COPPA The FTC has stated that YouTube content creators could be held liable under the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), a United States law that "imposes certain requirements on operators of websites or online services directed to children under 13 years of age, and on operators of other websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information online from a child under 13 years of age." (source) The FTC's FAQ on complying with COPPA notes that "operators will be held to have acquired actual knowledge of having collected personal information from a child where, for example, they later learn of a child’s age or grade from a concerned parent who has learned that his child is participating on the site or service." It also has the following question/answer (emphasis added): I operate a general audience video game service and do not ask visitors to reveal their ages. I do permit users to submit feedback, comments, or questions by email. What are my responsibilities if I receive a request for an email response from a player who indicates that he is under age 13? Under the Rule’s one-time response exception (16 C.F.R. § 312.5(c)(3)) you are permitted to send a response to the child, via the child’s online contact information, without sending notice to the parent or obtaining parental consent. However, you must delete the child’s online contact information from your records promptly after you send your response. Assuming the FTC is correct that content creators (not just the service itself) are responsible for COPPA compliance, a Discord server administrator would likely be required to ban/delete the account of a user upon discovering (acquiring actual knowledge) that the user is under 13. It may be a defense that they believed the user's retraction and claim that it was a lie, but I wouldn't want to be stuck arguing that in court (an underage user who doesn't want to be banned certainly would have a good reason to lie about their age upon finding out that they would be banned for having admitted their actual age). | You can always get in trouble. Copyright is always protected by the laws of a particular nation, by the courts of that nation. Because of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, I can sue you outside of my country, and will be treated as a person of that country. The conventions don't say who has jurisdiction, that is where you have to sue, so you have to resort to conventional jurisdictional principles. If you are in Europe, under the Brussels Convention, that means I have to sue you in your country of domicile (if you reside in multiple European nations, I get to decide which country to sue you in). The English courts are slightly different in that they generally hold that you sue in the country where the act took place, but (Lucasfilm v Ainsworth) you can sue in UK courts for infringement that occurs in the US. As you can see, this can get complicated. I can't sue you in Mongolian courts (assuming neither of us has any connection at all to Mongolia), but I could sue you (being a hypothetical UK citizen) in UK courts if you did the infringing deed while in Mongolia. Mongolian courts enforce Mongolian copyright law, US courts enforce US copyright law. Therefore you first have to decide what country you plan to sue in (from the plaintiff's perspective). | This has some basis in law. You need permission from a person to commercially exploit their likeness especially in California, and a waiver is a way of staving off future lawsuit over right of publicity. YT has a privacy policy whereby a person who have been filmed can request removal of the video (see also this, because they don't explain the policy in a single place). Because YT is commercially exploiting people's personalities, this is necessary. | As stated in the answer to What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?; if either of the participants is in Australia than unless all parties have given consent then the recording is illegal. Notwithstanding its legality, property in the recording vests in the person who made it. There is no law against him keeping it. There is no law against him publishing it unless the material contained is offensive, hate speech or defamatory (see Customer feedback gathering in Australia). | You're largely correct, though there's some vocabulary you're using that could go either way in terms of proper understanding. My comments on your understanding, presuming we're dealing with two Berne countries (UCC is largely irrelevant these days): My understanding of copyright is that it grants the author an exclusive right to distribute their work in whatever manner they'd like for some amount of time (determined by the copyright duration in a country). Generally correct though there can be many exceptions here (fair use, technical/temporary copying, first-sale doctrine, etc.). Can a person in Country A legally use the adapted work? I'm assuming no [...], Basically correct, whoever holds rights to the original work could theoretically still assert their rights in Country A on any portion of the derivative work that was part of the original. [...] does that mean that the author of the work created in Country B does not technically have all the rights to the work they created, since they have no control over whether their work can be distributed in Country A? This is splitting hairs, but while the derivative author has the rights given to them by copyright law, they aren't absolute. In particular in this case, regardless of which country, they still don't have any inherent exclusive rights over the original work. With respect to country B, those exclusive rights have expired so they don't bind the derivative author, but they haven't expired in country A. If that is the case, then would these rights be "granted" to the author of the adaptation when the copyright finally expires in Country A? Again splitting hairs, but its more helpful to express that no rights are actively granted by the expiration of copyright in Country A, it's just that no one holds those rights anymore (here there might be a language issue too, generally in copyright law "rights" refers to those exclusive actions that may be taken by the copyright holder, and not always to the "right" i.e. "freedom" for someone to do something). | Very similar to how MySpace done it all those years back.... MySpace did it differently back then because they got sued for copyright violations for the music their users were uploading and streaming. https://www.google.com/search?q=myspace+lawsuit+music These days, you can upload music to MySpace, but they have licenses and agreements with music publishers, and are clear to their users what can be legally uploaded: https://help.myspace.com/hc/en-us/articles/202591770-Music-Upload-Requirements And remember.... By uploading any content to Myspace, you hereby certify that you own the copyright in or have all the necessary rights related to such content to upload it. Don't step on someone else's hard work. And Myspace is are clear on how they handle copyright violations: https://help.myspace.com/hc/en-us/articles/202055394-Copyright-FAQs Myspace will respond to allegations of copyright violations in accordance with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). The DMCA provides a process for a copyright owner to give notification to an online service provider concerning alleged copyright infringement. Now, with your question: you are allowing users to both upload music and stream it. Streaming is legal in the UK; see an older question here on LSE Is Streaming Copyrighted Content Illegal in the UK But the hosting - storing the actual files - of copyrighted material is not legal. But my app knows no detail of the song uploaded. Could be anything.... This doesn't matter; the files are on your server. You run the risk of legal action being taken against you for the actual .mp3 file of copyrighted music on your server. You are the owner of the webserver, and thus control the files on it, along with your knowledge of building an App that allows users to upload the files. Even if you claim to know nothing about what users upload with the App you built, the music files are on your server. What happens also depends on where the server with the music files is located, i.e. in the UK (action against you legally possible), or elsewhere (legal action against depends on the country and their laws and agreements with other countries). If your server is in a third-party country and can't be taken down, but you are a UK resident, the music companies can still go after you in other respects, as the paying owner of the server, the owner of the domain registration, even possibly as the creator of the App itself. |
Why are private game servers illegal? Over on Arqade we were discussing a question which was asking about private servers for a game called World of Warcraft. The discussion was about if using and/or hosting a private server is illegal not just against the TOS. If it is illegal what laws is it breaking? | Ok, so it looks like there really are many questions being asked. 1) Is it illegal to host / own / operate a private server for games that require a server of such? And why? 2) Is it illegal to host / own / operate a private server for WOW? And why? 3) Is it illegal to join a private server for games that require a server? and why? 4) Is it illegal to join a private server for WOW? Answers 1 & 2) This depends on the game that is being hosted. There are many games that require servers in which this is not only legal, but encouraged by the company. MineCraft is one that comes to mind. You can host MineCraft servers, and even modify the server code. You can even charge for this service. However,for games like WOW, In short, yes if the server is profiting or If the server is running stolen or leaked software or If the server is distributing client files. If the server was recreated from the developers own mind, and was only compatible with the WOW server, then it's a bit more gray and depends on the Judge's level of understanding of technology. 3 & 4) This comes down to the EULA. If the EULA is like MineCraft, then you are good to go. If the EULA is like WOW, which forbids both modification of the client and participation on emulated servers then it is a violation of EULA. If WOW did not have the second part of "participation on emulated servers", then a user could modify on the router level to point to a private server. | user662852 has a good point -- whoever own the property has the right to make the rules. Is the property, land+construction in fact your's or does it belong to the HOA who just grant you access as a lease holder? Different states has different rules, but in my state it is illegal to maroon a property and there must be a access to public streets even when this necessitate passing over somebody else land. However that is irrelevant if the HOA owns the land your house is build on. I think you will have to look at your HOA agreement and see what it says. | I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws. | Using Tor is not illegal. Nor is hiding your IP address, which is - among other things - what Tor does. Going to .onion links is not illegal. What you find and interact with at those .onion sites may be illegal. See Law StackExchange Is it legal to host a directory of .onion urls? Running a Tor Relay is not illegal. That could change. Running an Exit Relay could expose your IP address as the Relay, so that could lead investigators of illegal activity to you. Read https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html.en As always, check your state laws http://statelaws.findlaw.com/criminal-laws/computer-crimes.html And do your own research with the links above and at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(anonymity_network) and at https://www.torproject.org/ | There is no contract between you (the licensee) and the licensor of the software. The creator of the open source software just says "here's the software, you may use it if you like, as long as you fulfil some conditions. ". No contract, no liability. I think the developer would only be liable if they intentionally created software that causes damage. (Which has happened, some open source browser plugins have recently been modified to run bitcoin mining software, or worse. I suppose the miscreants could follow all the GPL rules or whatever license is used). | "Public domain" refers to things in principle copyrightable but where protection has lapsed, been repudiated, or is a statutory exception (such as government works). A website is not "in the public domain". The idea that a website is "public property" is (*cough*) mistaken. There are basically two ways in which a web interaction could be illegal. The first regards whether accessing another person's computer is illegally accessing a computer, which is a crime. Authorization essentially comes down to "permission": if the owner permits me to access the computer, I am authorized. Putting stuff out there on a web server is an open-ended grant of permission to look at a web page. That simply means that if I create a web page (with a bunch of links or not), I am granting you permission to interact with my computer to that extent. It does not create permission to hack into a password-protected subdirectory. An ordinary web crawler automates what a clicking human does. Copyright law is also relevant, in that the stuff I put on my webpage is not to be copied without permission. Any webpage access necessarily involves automatic copying from machine to machine: in putting stuff out there for the world to see, I am saying that the world can do that level of automatic copying that arises from normal html-and-click interactions. It does not mean that you can download and do stuff with my copyrighted content (i.e., it is not an abandonment of copyright: I did not put that stuff in the public domain). Putting a web page out there in an unrestricted fashion means that you've given a certain level of permission to "copy" (at least in the automatic server-to-browser viewing sense). I may want to impose conditions on peoples' access to my stuff, so I can impose terms on such material. For instance, I may require users to agree to certain conditions before accessing the CoolStuff subdirectory. Users then have to jump through a minor hoop and agree to those terms. In that case, my permission is conditional, and if you violate the terms of that agreement, I may be able to sue you for copyright infringement. It could then be a violation of my terms of service (TOS) if I say "you may not crawl my website" (in less vague language). A TOS gets its legal power from copyright law, because every webpage interaction involves copying (I assume that technical point is obvious), and copying can only be done with permission. You may technologically overcome my weak click-through technology so that the bot just says "sure whatever" and proceeds to illegally use my web page: I can sue you now for copyright infringement. The robot-specific methods of meta-tags and robots.txt have no legal force. Although there is a way to say "no you may not," which is tailored to automated access, the meaning and enforcement of these devices has not yet reached the law. If my page uses NOFOLLOW and your program doesn't know or care, you (your program) do not (yet) have a duty to understand, detect and respect that tag. Prior registration is also not a legal requirement, and very many pages that are on the master crawl list get there from being linked to by someone else's web page. Again, there is at present no legal requirement of pre-registration (and there is no effective mechanism for verifying that the site owner has registered the site). Archiving and especially re-displaying someone's content is, on the other hand, not legal. It would be plainly copyright infringement if you were to scoop up someone else's webpage and host it. You can analyze their material and somehow associate it with some search terms, and display a link to that page, but you cannot copy and republish their material. You can put very short snippets out there taken from a web page, under the "fair use" doctrine, but you can't wholesale republish a webpage. (It should be noted that the archive.org is an internationally recognized library, and libraries have extra statutory powers to archive). | I realize it has been eight months, but I believe I can offer an opinion. Given the nature of the question, please keep in mind that I am not a lawyer and my opinion is no substitute for professional legal counsel. [Preparing this post has been an educational experience and my opinion should in no way be interpreted as expert opinion] Assuming you have not infringed on any patents, the relevant legal challenges Valve could try include breach of contract, copyright infringement, and trade dress infringement. Breach of Contract The potential breach of contract occurs because the Steam client setup application requires you to accept a contract of adhesion (The License) before the software can be installed. I could not find a copy of The License online in plain text (this is separate from the Steam Subscriber Agreement, which you also agree to by accepting The License), but you can read it any time by running the Steam client setup application which is available at [redacted due to low rep - the Steam website]. These so-called "shrink wrap licenses" are of questionable legal value, depending on how the licensee assents to the contract. People often bring up Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. In that case, the only reference to a license was on the download webpage, and it was only visible if the user scrolled down past the download button - Netscape argued unsuccessfully that clicking the download button indicated assent to the terms of the license. The Steam client setup application has a prominent dialogue box showing the terms of The License and requiring your explicit assent before installation can continue. A more relevant case may be ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, where the Seventh Circuit ruled that a license agreement was valid where the licensee had to click on a dialogue box assenting acceptance to the agreement. In short, you may be required to defend yourself under the terms of The License. If the licenses are thrown out as unenforceable, the prosecution would probably move towards copyright infringement. Section 1 Paragraph C of The License states (emphasis added): Except as expressly set forth elsewhere in this License Agreement, you may not, in whole or in part: copy, photocopy, reproduce, translate, reverse engineer (with the exception of specific circumstances where such act is permitted by law), derive source code from, modify, disassemble, decompile, or create derivative works based on the Program. Now you assert that there has been no reverse engineering, that you made yours "completely from scratch using completely different styling and images (even different website inside the client that is mine)". You may be challenged on these claims in court, for example comparison of source codes could rule out reverse engineering. I will touch on derivative work status later. Note that under Section 5, the provisions of Section 1 Paragraph C do not apply after you have uninstalled the Steam client software. This means in the case that you [can prove you had] uninstalled the Steam client software before making your own client, you would have a defense to breach of contract under Section 1 Paragraph C. However... The License also includes the terms of the "Steam Agreement", viewable online at http://www.steampowered.com/agreement. The Steam Agreement takes effect when you register for your Steam account. Section 2 Paragraph G of the Steam Agreement echoes the above referenced Section 1 Paragraph C of The License, and even survives termination of the Steam Agreement (your steam account being cancelled). Now assuming you can provide defense against reverse engineering, you may need a defense against the charge that your work is a derivative work. Your case may be pretty strong if you can show that your client was indeed written from the ground up - which rules out the possibility of deriving your program code from Steam's code as literary copyrights go. The prosecution could try saying you have copied the audiovisuals of their program, but your program was written "from scratch using completely different styling and images". Eventually prosecution may have to move into trade dress infringement. Copyright Infringement In a case of alleged copyright infringement, the first order of business is to prove there is a copyrighted work to begin with. The work in question is the Steam client by Valve Corporation. Again, I am not an expert but I could not find any copyright registration for the Steam client (http://www.copyright.gov/records/ -> Post-1978 Records -> Search by Name "Valve Corporation"). Copyright registration is required before infringement suits can be filed. Valve can register after infringement occurs but they will be limited to actual damages and profits. Nevertheless Valve does claim copyright over its product. A notice is posted on The License and Steam Agreement, and from the client itself the Help menu contains a command "Legal Info" which opens a webpage containing a copyright notice. Since 1979 it has not been necessary to post a copyright notice, but a notice helps break a defense of innocent infringement. You imply that you copied elements of the Steam client "to give customers a similar feel to what they are used to [the Steam client]". In your specific case innocent infringement may not be a valid defense. It seems you are most concerned about copyright infringement over the menus. An extremely relevant case is Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc. In that case the First Circuit held that the menu heirarchy for Lotus 1-2-3 (the progenitor of virtually all menu heirarchies today) was uncopyrightable as a "method of operation" under U.S.C. 17 Section 102(b). We think that "method of operation," as that term is used in [U.S.C. 17 Section] 102(b), refers to the means by which a person operates something, whether it be a car, a food processor, or a computer. Thus a text describing how to operate something would not extend copyright protection to the method of operation itself; other people would be free to employ that method and to describe it in their own words. Similarly, if a new method of operation is used rather than described, other people would still be free to employ or describe that method. We hold that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable "method of operation." The Lotus menu command hierarchy provides the means by which users control and operate Lotus 1-2-3. If users wish to copy material, for example, they use the "Copy" command. If users wish to print material, they use the "Print" command. Users must use the command terms to tell the computer what to do. Without the menu command hierarchy, users would not be able to access and control, or indeed make use of, Lotus 1-2-3's functional capabilities. If specific words are essential to operating something, then they are part of a "method of operation" and, as such, are unprotectable. This is so whether they must be highlighted, typed in, or even spoken, as computer programs no doubt will soon be controlled by spoken words. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision with an even court (Judge Stevens recusing), so no national precedent was set. Nevertheless the ruling has not been overturned - the First Circuit goes into great detail explaining their decision, and I do recommend reading the ruling. We have already discussed derivative works and reverse engineering with contracts, and the same defense would apply under copyright law: source code comparison. Trade Dress Normally things like design and layout are left to patent law. A desperate prosecution, however, may claim that by copying their "look and feel" you infringe on their trade dress. The relevant text is part of U.S.C. 15 Section 1125(a) (emphasis added): (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which- (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. (2) As used in this subsection, the term "any person" includes any State, instrumentality of a State or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. (3) In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional. Defense against such a claim would be showing that the elements of Steam's "look and feel" were adapted because of functional reasons - see example rationale in the previously mentioned Lotus v. Borland. Overall, so long as you did write the program from scratch and there are no patent violations, you have in my opinion a strong case. There may be moral questions about unfair competition (why should you be allowed to capitalize off Valve's work put into the Steam client?), to which I would point out that your product does not appear to be in direct competition with the Steam client. Without direct competition or confidence in evidence of IP infringement it is quite unlikely Valve will file suit against you. If you would rather avoid even the possibility of legal action, you could always contact Valve directly and ask for a license. | I believe you have just misunderstood what you paid for. Blizzard's End User License Agreement says: Your use of the Platform is licensed, not sold, to you, and you hereby acknowledge that no title or ownership with respect to the Platform or the Games is being transferred or assigned and this Agreement should not be construed as a sale of any rights. It also says: Blizzard may change, modify, suspend, or discontinue any aspect of the Platform or Accounts at any time, including removing items, or revising the effectiveness of items in an effort to balance a Game. Blizzard may also impose limits on certain features or restrict your access to parts or all of the Platform or Accounts without notice or liability. |
Is it legal for a stock broker to restrict trading on a specific stock? Brokers like Robinhood are restricting purchases of GameStop stock driving the price down. Is this market manipulation and against the law? Or does the SEC permit this? You can find an article talking about this here, Robinhood blocks new purchases of GameStop stock Robinhood, TD Ameritrade restrict trading of GameStop, AMC stock | Brokers are not required by law to trade every available stock. They are ultimately private business people, not public services. Also, when there is circumstantial evidence that illegal securities fraud and market manipulation is underway in the shares of a particular security, as in the case of GameStop, there may be more liability exposure from allowing the broker's customers to trade in the stock, potentially exposing them to securities fraud, than there is to barring trading in the stock. Also relevant: "Nasdaq CEO Friedman says the exchange will halt trading in a stock if they link unusual activity to social media chatter.": Friedman said the Nasdaq's role as a "self-regulatory organization" is to make sure activity in the market is "legitimate" and to root out manipulation in the market. She did not detail what kind of technology the Nasdaq uses to "evaluate social media chatter," but she said if the Nasdaq can match unusual trading with social media activity, the exchange will halt the stock and potentially engage with the SEC to evaluate and investigate. One illegal market manipulation activity that the SEC goes after is a "pump-and-dump" scheme. An investor buys a stock, and then publicly "pumps" it, by spreading a rumor or another catalyst for the stock go up. Other people see the rumors and buy the stock, causing the price to rise. The person who originated the rumor sells the stock to them at a higher price in a "dump," and takes the profits. Friedman said the Nasdaq collaborates with the FINRA and SEC to identify and investigate pump and dump schemes, but she said it's unclear whether the current Reddit activity qualifies as a pump and dump scheme. "Regulators kind of have to catch up with the technology that's now available," Friedman said. Background on the economic and regulatory motivators for the action taken can be found here: [T]here is a two-day settlement between if you buy the stock today, those brokerage firms that you bought that stock on have to fund that trade with the clearing central house called DTC for two whole days. And because of the volatility of stocks, DTC has made the cost of the collateral of the two-day holding period extremely expensive. | It would depend on how the ownership contract is written. 30% sounds like a minority stake, so I don't know how they could block new investments unless the contract requires a super-majority to approve new rounds of financing. How does the remaining 70% of ownership feel about this? If they are abiding by the terms of the ownership contract I don't see that this is questionable behavior on their part. This is a business relationship. Business partners may come to have different outlooks on the future of the company, and the best way to protect their investment. Consider flipping the viewpoint: "I'm a minority owner in a company I no longer have confidence in. I would like to dissolve the company and sell off the assets to re-coup as much of my original investment as I can. The other owners want to chase this to the bitter end, and do a new round of financing, which will significantly dilute my shares, without (in my opinion) giving the company a real chance of success. What can I do?" When the founder of your friend's company accepted money for shares in the company, they gave up absolute control over the company's direction. Assuming none of the parties are acting in violation of the ownership contract, the most reasonable way to resolve a conflict like this is to buy out the dissenting shareholders. | The order itself is here. It applies to "any United States person", which includes citizens, LPRs, entities with a US basis, and any other person in the US including tourists. It applies to transactions, and not static possession. There is no exception to the effect that "you can trade as long as it's not on the NYSE", and it says Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited The order is not just directed at brokers, or the NYSE, it applies to everybody / everything everywhere, if you are a US person. Apparently there was some unclarity on the OTC question, which was clarified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, to the effect that it includes OTC trading. | I think you would have difficulty distorting the situation - Pokemon Go is not magic that defies existing laws, and this would be no different to a mall issuing a trespass notice (which is effectively how they would kick you out) for any other reason. I would question the ability of a store to "Arrest" you - that is a job for the police - After they trespass you (ie by giving you notice to leave), if you come back again then they can call the police to arrest you - but its not as clear-cut as someone seeing you playing a game and arresting you. I don't think Pokemon players are a "protected class" of people, so finding a valid cause of action might be tricky. About the best you could do would be to talk with your wallet (ie shop elsewhere with your friends), but for my money that would make me more likely to go to that mall ! | I am not aware of any law making this illegal. You need to avoid any "bait and switch" tactics, though, like initially offering cola for $1 and then not actually letting them buy it for that price. | australia Companies can have different classes of shares with different rights: rights to dividends, voting, distribution of assets on winding up etc. Basically, it’s pretty much completely customisable. | This is from a Canadian point of view, but the rules regarding how corporations run is generally pretty standard. I took a few classes in corporate governance, but I'm working mostly from memory, so hopefully most of the information is accurate! A corporation is its own entity, separate from any shareholders, and it can make whatever policies it wants. Unless you are an officer or on the board of directors, your participation in the company usually will be limited to voting in shareholders' meetings and receiving dividends. Refusal of service is a policy matter, so the fact that you are a shareholder (or anyone else, for that matter!) should be irrelevant. In fact, you might be denied service because you're an officer due to conflicts of interest. If the company was unincorporated, you may have more rights, but you'd probably be subject to some sort of agreement. | If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase. |
Trademark/Copyright of Fantasy species in games / tabletops / books I'm a game developer trying to make something fantasy related I'm heavily inspired by the fantasy genre but I am trying not to get sued, not worried just was researching the topic and could not find anything useful What are some general guideline/principles to follow when making a game (or other work) fantasy related, I am thinking in regards to dungeons and dragons, tolkien fantasy, hp lovecraft dark fantasy, ... etc Has there been a situation when someone sued someone about a fantasy creature characteristics, names, looks ... etc Thanks | You should probably look up the Open Gaming Liscense (OGL) and what you can or cannot do with respect to it. Generally, classic fantasy monsters (Dragons, Manticores, Sasquatch, Vampires). Are fair use. OGL also allows for creatures that are similar to D&D exclusive monsters to exist so long as the name is changed sufficently. Most "monsters" are in what's called Public Domain and are free to use and modify. Additionally "powers" of a monster (or superhero) aren't generally copyrighted but the totatllity of their use in a work can be (does your superhero fly? Is super-strong? Is invulerable? Can be fine. Is he named Clark Kent? That's a problem). Fair Use also allows for some parody but again, it's a defense to copyright infringment and not a liscenses to take someone elses work wholesale. It also doesn't stop them from suing you, as you have to claim fair use as your defense if and when each suit arises. I'd recomend looking at National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc. for an example of an intellectual property dispute that is close to yours. Note that Fawcett won at trial but lost on appeal and rather than take the matter before SCOTUS decided to settle out of court. | The board is more complicated than you describe. It is a somewhat stylized world map, broken up into regions that do not necessarily correspond to countries. They have names that don't necessarily express what the region is geographically (particularly Ukraine, which extends far to the north of real-world Ukraine). There are defined water routes between certain regions that do not touch. Someone else starting from a world map would be very unlikely to duplicate the Risk board. I believe your friend's board would count as a derivative work. Now, the copyright holder is highly unlikely to come after your friend. I've seen stories of people who made their own X boards, publicized them, and the game company did nothing about it. The company (Hasbro? they own most of those games) would likely consider it as an extra bit of publicity. | Your client is confused about how copyright law works (at least in the United States and virtually every other country I've ever heard about copyright in). If I were guessing, they read something like this from the United States Copyright Office: The copyright in a derivative work covers only the additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work. Protection does not extend to any preexisting material, that is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a third party. and figured that because it's a derivative work, the copyright only covers the additions and changes they make, and there's no copyright protection for the original work. This misunderstands the law: the original work still has its own copyright (assuming it hasn't expired), and permission from the holder of the copyright on the original work is required to create that derivative work in the first place*. The copyright on the derivative work is separate—that is, both copyrights exist in parallel. * Some exceptions, such as fair use, exist, but would be unlikely to apply to the situation you describe. | The argument would have to be either a derivative work under copyright, or a trade dress/trademark claim. Neither sounds very solid at all. Neither copyright nor trade dress/trademark protect ideas like a TV format. They can only protect very similar expressions of an idea that necessarily flow one from the other and, for example, the game mechanics can't be protected by copyright. | No, this is not true. Copyright can be enforced selectively. You are confusing copyright with trademark. Company can lose its trademark if they aren't protecting it. All the meanwhile they can choose to ignore some copyright infringement while enforcing their rights on others with no legal problems what-so-ever. In order to illustrate the difference: for example, if someone would make a clone of Super Mario and would call their clone as well "Super Mario" and maybe even would call themselves "Nintendo", even if they have programmed the whole game by themselves from scratch and the art and music would be all different, they wouldn't be infringing the copyright but challenging protected trademarks. In your case, the naming was identical, the art and everything was too similar to the original and therefore the clone was challenging the trademark that needs constant protecting. | It is a fact that a particulate chess game was played on a particular date by certain specific players, who made specific moves. Facts are not protected by copyright. Anyone is free to report such a game, including the exact moves, and the names of the players. Such games are often used in books about chess, and the same thing is done in books about other games, such as bridge and go, where a record of the play is often kept. If someone else has described or analyzed such a game, you may not copy that person's wording without permission (except to the limited extent permitted by fair use or fair dealing). A chess diagram simply represents the position of the pieces in a standard way, and has no original content beyond those facts, and so is not protected by copyright either. If a person has invented a chess game or a series of chess moves that never took place to illustrate a point in analyzing chess, re-using that sequence of moves might make the new analysis a derivative work of the previous one, if the coverage of the invented sequence of moves is extensive. But that would not apply to the moves of an actual game that was actually played. There have even been cases of fictional stories based upon real historical chess games. For example "Unicorn Variation" by Roger Zelezney. 17 USC 102 says: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. This is the "fact/expression distinction" by which it is said that facts are not protected by copyright, although the form of expressing those facts often is. The same section has the list of kinds of protected works. This includes literary, dramatic, musical, and pictorial works, dance, audiovisual, sound and architectural works. A chess game does not fall into any of those categories. Thus it is ineligible form protection on two separate but related grounds. Beyond that, under the Feist vs Rural decision, a work must have an element of originality to be protected by copyright, and a list of the moves made by chess players has no original content, although an analysis of a game would. The copyright laws of many other countries have been interpreted similarly. As to the question of offense, in the US at least, and in most other countries, a true statement is never legally defamatory, even if the subject dislikes it. If it is true that Player X lost to Player Y on such and such a date, reporting that fact cannot be libel or any form of defamation. Otherwise the loser could never be named in any sports reporting. | On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article. | The general idea of such an app is not subject to copyright protection. Ideas never are protected by copyright. So creating an app based on the functionality of a fictional app would not be a copyright violation. The logo might, if it is original enough, be protected by copyright. Any or all of the "name, the logo and the color scheme" might well be subject to trademark protection. (Names and other short phrases are not protected by copyright.) You would be wise not to use these identifying elements of the show, but instead create ones sufficiently different that no reasonable person would be confused into thinking that your app had been used on the show, or was sponsored, endorse, or approved by the show or its creators. An explicit disclaimer saying that you are in no way associated with the show or its creators, and your app is not approved by or endorsed by them would also be wise. Otherwise you might be accused of trying to pass off your work as affiliated with they show, or to trade on the show's reputation and fame. Whether you make your app an open source work is not in any way relevant to copyright or trademark claims. Whether you charge for your app is of only limited relevance to a copyright claim. Whether you sell or market your app, or use it to advertise some other product or service is relevant to a trademark claim, as trademarks are only protected against their use "in trade" which generally means commercially. However, non-commercial use of a trademark may constitute "dilution" of the mark, which may give rise to a cause of action against the person using it. |
CAN-SPAM Act - Commercial Advertisement or Promotion CAN SPAM Act requires telling your email recipients where you're located: Your message must include your valid physical postal address. This can be your current street address, a post office box you’ve registered with the U.S. Postal Service, or a private mailbox you’ve registered with a commercial mail receiving agency established under Postal Service regulations. The FDC defines the CAN SPAM Act as including "all commercial messages, which the law defines as “any electronic mail message the primary purpose of which is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial product or service,” including email that promotes content on commercial websites". Some emails are sent without explicit commercial content. For example: A user signs up and receives a verification email After confirming account, they receive a welcome email If they request a password reset, they get an email with password reset link When they complete a purchase, they get an email confirmation their purchase When tracking information is available they get tracking After completing a purchase, they're asked to leave feedback or a review for the product they purchased Does any of this constitute commercial advertisement or promotion? Would a business be required to include a business address at the end every email sent from the list above? Thanks | All oif those except perhaps the feedback seem to be "transactional" content to which the CAN SPAM requirements do not apply. The feedback request looks to me as if it first the 'other" class in the linked FAQ, and so also would not trigger the requirements. | There is no requirement that a service company do customer surveys at all, or that it report the results. If they use customer surveys in advertising and the results are falsified or misleading, that might constitute false advertising, and be subject to government enforcement. But if the report survey data as of a particular date, and mentions that date in the ad, that is probably not misleading enough to be unlawful, even if the company knows that later surveys show different results. If the company just tosses all bad survey results and reports only the good ones, that is probably misleading. But they can report specific "customer testimonials" even if they are not typical, as long as they do not claim that they represent the average customer experience. | This has yet to be specifically decided in the federal courts. The Post Office can set "rules of conduct" for its facilities. Prohibiting photographing is plainly a restriction on one's First Amendment rights, and it is established beyond question that a government cannot issue / enforce a blanket prohibition of public photographing. Someone would have to take a case to court to determine whether this limitation on First Amendment rights passes the relevant level of judicial scrutiny. The rationale (as set forth by the USPS) is that such photographing may be "disruptive". One can perhaps analogize the right to film police with a new-found right to film post office, following from a right to public oversight over the government. DHS gives general guidance of its own (with a pile of redacted stuff), directing you to 41 CFR 102-74.420. Permission is thus required, until the courts find that to be an unconstitutional restriction (I would not expect there to be such a finding). But it is not unthinkable that the courts could at some point so rule. The YouTube aspect of the question is irrelevant: if you have the right, you have the right, and it doesn't derive from nor is it blocked by an intent to distribute on YouTube. | You can write anything you want (basic First Amendment protections): the question is whether one would be liable for damage that arises from what you're written, or whether you can distribute what you've written. Distribution may be restricted, thanks to the Commerce Clause (hence FDA regulations, which figure prominently in the analysis). Most software writers are not medical practitioners, and vice versa, and what the software writer does is implement something described by a competent medical practitioner. It is logically possible that a med. practitioner might also try to write software (no problem) and distribute it (possibly a problem); or, a software writer might read up on something on Wikipedia and try to implement it (again, no problem) or distribute it (possible problem). Damages can be sorted into two categories, implementation errors and scientific errors, and having ruled out deliberate sabotage, we are left with negligence. If the software writer failed to use suitable care in writing code that sums a set of numbers, the software writer has been negligent. If the person purporting to have the qualified scientific knowledge mis-states the formula, that person has been negligent. It is possible for many parties to be negligent (the programmer failed to be diligent in understanding the software requirements; the medical professional failed to adequately explain what was required of the program). The FDA does regulate medical devices, and "device" is construed pretty broadly (condoms are non-exempt class 2 medical devices). There is FDA guidance on medical software which makes it clear that the device manufacturer shoulders the regulatory burden. Anytime you manufacture a tangible thing (which is within the scope of FDA regulation for medical devices), you have to have the thing approved. Many (most?) medical devices implement software, and are thus within the scope of FDA scrutiny. It is not illegal to write software that ends up being implemented in an unapproved medical device, but the unapproved medical device itself is illegal. It is reasonably likely that purported medical software (not a gadget with software build in) would be held to be a non-exempt device. To know if something is exempt, you would look at the exemptions list, and determine that your program (or thing) is not on or implied by anything on that list. The visual acuity eye chart is a class 1 exempt item, as is the manual toothbrush. There is no way to specifically look for things that are only software, or that contain software, so the search through the list would have to be guided by knowledge of the subject area. Canada is helpful in explaining when software is a regulated medical device. This is non-probative w.r.t. US law but gives you an idea what is likely to be considered a "device". Under Canadian law, the software would be clearly a regulated medical device. The FDA has a power-point that attempts to say something about the matter which warns you that you are on your own and "You will need to go back to study and use the source regulatory documents" to make the determination. Eventually, slide 13, they hint that if you intend the software to be used in diagnosis, prevention, or treatment, then it is a device (so, yes, the aforementioned software would be a device, and probably not exempt from regulations). General purpose software (word processors, web browsers, communications software, etc.) are not indented to be used for a regulated purpose, although they can be so used, and thus they are probably not subject to FDA regulation. There is a murky relationship between regulatory approval and liability. Being approved by the government does not convey immunity to negligence suits (see Wyeth v. Levine), but being approved can have weight in determining whether a party was negligent, since regulatory scrutiny ostensibly filters out errors that could have been caught. Federal approval does not preempt state tort law, as the court ruled. Regulations pertaining to medical devices hold for anything that qualifies as a device, and is not defined (negatively) in terms of disclaimers. If you sell a medical device but label it saying "this is not a medical device, it is not created by a competent medical practitioner", that doesn't make it not a medical device. Unfortunately, what counts as a regulated device is based on intended use, and there is an obvious connection between disclaimers and intentions. Taking MS Word as an example, MS does not as far as I know say that "Word is not intended to be used as a medical device". It can certainly be used to diagnose, teat, and prevent medical conditions, but so too can a screw driver or pretty much anything else. The number of non-medical uses vastly outweigh the medical uses, so it would be deemed not to be a regulated device. A program which prescribed a set of prayers to be uttered in case of illness would be subject to First Amendment override of any FDA regulations. Quack medical devices are prohibited (that's why there is regulation of devices in the first place), but discerning the fine line between permitted actions based on nutty beliefs and forbidden actions is not easy. The FDA also has guidance on the distinction between "Complementary and Alternative Medicine", which does not clearly state that, for example, a software reading of your cakra-energies based on a computer program's questions is not a medical device. They do say of mind-body medicine (mentioning yoga, biofeedback and tai chi as examples) that "CAM practices in this domain would not be subject to our jurisdiction under the Act or the PHS Act", but then say "any equipment or other products used as part of the practice of mind-body medicine may be subject to FDA regulation, depending on the nature of the product and its intended use" (hence a yoga-enabling program may be subject to regulation). | In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it. | Do not throw away mail that is not addressed to you. If you receive misaddressed mail, write "Not at this address" on the envelope and put it in a mailbox, or give it to the mailperson (source: United States Postal Service - Reporting / returning misdelivered mail). Also, if you contact USPS they may redirect the misaddressed mail for you. 18 U.S. Code § 1702 - Obstruction of correspondence Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or any authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail carrier, or which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. | The law doesn't work like that. You don't need a law to allow you to send someone a letter, just as you don't need a law to allow you to do anything at all. You are free to do anything you like unless there is a law which says you can't do that thing. There is no law which specifically says that TV licensing cannot write to unlicensed properties. More generally, there is Section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which provides at sub-section 1: A person must not pursue a course of conduct — (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. Sub-section 3 provides that the above rule is not breached if "in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable." Section 7 provides that "course of conduct" means there must be at least two occasions of that conduct, and that harassment includes alarm and distress. It is a fast and straightforward matter to notify TV licensing that you don't need a TV Licence. You are free to do that at any point before or after you receive a letter. If you do so, they will stop writing to you for two years. It seems unlikely therefore that a court would make a finding of harassment. It is reasonable conduct for TV Licensing to write to properties which its records show are unlicensed given that they will stop doing so if you ask them to. "What is the worst that can happen due to ignoring these seemingly empty threats?" If you do not do any of the following: Install or use a television receiver. Have in your possession or control a television receiver which you intend to install or use or which you know or believe someone else intends to install or use, then you can safely ignore the letters free of consequence. If you do any of the above then you will commit an offence under Section 363 of the Communications Act 2003 and you can be prosecuted. | We can start by looking at the text of the law. US federal law 18 USC § 2252A(a)(3)(B) says: Any person who... knowingly... advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the material or purported material is, or contains— (i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct... shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). I'm not sure how much posting the name without the link would protect you, given that you posted it with the explicit intent that someone would go and look at it. On the other hand, your intent was not to "advertise" or "promote" it, and you didn't actually "distribute" the material. |
Resume Writer asks: Who owns the copyright - me or my client? I'm a professional resume writer (among other things). Clients regularly pay me to completely overhaul their resumes. Over the years I've amassed a large collection of well-written resumes. I would like to self-publish a book on Amazon on the topic of resume writing with lots of full resume examples as well as bullet point/resume section examples so that people can more easily write their own resume. (I've found that the problem with most of the books on the market is a lack of examples). Initially I had tried to find a lawyer to help me understand how much of the content of each resume I needed to modify in order not to infringe on the copyright that I presumed my former clients’ owned. Then, reading a copyright book I learned about the idea of copyright ownership. Since I am an independent contractor (I work for myself via my website, and since I have never used a formal contract with clients (and certainly never signed a ‘work for hire’ agreement with any of my clients), then the question I have for you is - do I own the copyright to the resumes that I have written over the years? The intuitive answer seems to be ‘no’ but the legal answer seems to be ‘yes’. Have you ever dealt with this specific question before? I was not able to find anything online about it - yet it seems to be a rather important question since many people have their resumes written for them each year and probably assume that they are the ‘owner’ of their resume (since it derives from their personal life story). As far as my book goes - does this mean that (in theory) I could publish a resume I wrote for a past client (perhaps only changing their name/phone/address as a courtesy) with no legal ramifications whatsoever? Again, my intuition is ‘no’ but the legal answer seems to be ‘yes’. Of course, in practice, I would modify any resume I published significantly enough that the original client would not be identifiable. My process: I’m including a link to a folder where I’ve placed 4 files to illustrate my process: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1TBlQH1yco-UDS02le58Dti_xrUzMQEX-?usp=sharing File 1 = Client’s original resume that they wrote on their own before working with me File 2 = A brainstorming document the client filled out. This served as the basis for a 1.5-hour conversation where I asked questions to learn more about their work history. File 3 = The new resume I wrote for the client (from scratch). File 4 = A modified version of the resume from File 3 - this is how I thought I might modify an actual resume for publication in the book (Changing dates, names, locations, and modifying some, but not all, bullet points). I think there is a good possibility that my understanding of the law is totally off base. This is an interesting Q&A post on Avvo.com https://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/are-resumes-sent-to-companies-subject-to-privacy-l-1809029.html Are resumes sent to companies subject to privacy laws? Question: I submitted a resume to a company last year. I recently "googled" myself and found that I was able to download that resume that I submitted to that company off of their "secure" server in its original form. All my private history on that resume is publicly available to anyone who knows to look for it. I feel like this is a severe breach of privacy and would like pursue legal recourse if possible. Looking to understand how and if this is possible? Answer: Unless you had an expectation of privacy in distributing your resume, hard to see how you would have a claim. Generally resumes are created to be published and shared with others. Not sure how or why they would have made it accessible on the Internet, but again without there being an expectation of privacy there is no claim. I would recommend contacting the company and asking them to remove it. Hope this helps. I am also redirecting this to the Privacy practice area as you may receive a different take from that group. I'm adding some more details here in response to some of the answers and comments: On the question of whether my work is a derivative work or not. In one sense, the resume 'derives' from a client's life story and personal experience. That said, I saw online that facts are not copyright-able and also saw that when an interview is conducted its the interviewer (me) or the memorializer of information (me) who owns the copyright. As to the actual transformation of the client's story into a resume. The resumes I write are what I have coined as story-based resumes and are quite different from the classic resume. Each is very unique. Here's an example of how the client originally presented their most recent position (in the resume they had written) and how I presented it. Client's Work Zurich North America, Schaumburg, IL Claim Specialist II January 2018- Present Handles complex commercial line claims for Property & Business Income damages. Develops and maintains strong business relationships by regularly communicating with customers, brokers, and inside staff. Evaluates claim facts and plans for appropriate negotiation strategies to bring claims to resolution. Trains and mentors new adjusters. My Work At ease managing complex claim discovery process and multi-party negotiation calls with CEOs, CFOs, brokers, assessors, technical experts and legal counsel; Many variables influence coverage and judication around repair, replace, write down; A typical claim: ------- $10M new airport construction; Contractor (insured) poured concrete on a cold day → runway cracked; Investigated opposing narratives from engineer ‘use a sealant’ and airport leadership ‘replace runway’; Analyzed policy in which cracking was excluded but extreme temperature changes were not; To resolve claim, reviewed contract (contractor ←→ airport) and sought input from legal team ------- Airport owner, ‘We’re on this call to make a decision right now!’; The owner’s attempt to reframe priorities and fast-track Zurich’s due diligence procedures elicited a firm, but emphatic, response from me; A harmonious working relationship was maintained Took on 3 water damage claims at a hotel with an upset owner; Reanalyzed colleague’s prior work and assumptions on claims; To owner’s dismay, I declined his $30k concession fee claim but managed to offset that (and create goodwill) by consolidating his 3 water claims into 1 On the question of privacy. I did see an interesting paper here (but didn't yet pay to download it). I wonder if a person's narrative about their professional life is similar to that of a biography? Lives and works — biography and the law of copyright https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies/article/abs/lives-and-works-biography-and-the-law-of-copyright/B9295A91FBF801BF3B70B4DF852BFEF2 This is also an interesting paper Protecting Privacy Through Copyright Law? Pamela Samuelson* but the cases she highlights (e.g. pictures from Julia Roberts' wedding being published) seem to be too far removed from my situation https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435288 view here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aLDiU7wSyep3_U9G8QDr3gEhYYNkMsRh/view?usp=sharing In making their now famous argument for recognition of a legal right to privacy, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis relied surprisingly heavily on copyright norms and caselaw to support the idea thatprivacy was and should be a protectable interest.1 They observed: The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to whatextent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others. Underour system of government, he can never be compelled to express them (except when upon the witness stand); and even if he has chosen to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given them. The existence of this right does not depend upon the particular method of expression adopted. It is immaterial whether it be by word or by signs, in painting, by sculpture, or in music. Neither does the existence of the right depend upon the nature or value of the thought or emotions, nor upon the excellence of the means of expression. The same protection is accorded to a casual letter or an entry in a diary and to the most valuable poem or essay, to a botch or daub and to a masterpiece. In every such case the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to the public.2 The right to control the dissemination of these works may be partly grounded in property rights. But Warren and Brandeis thought that this was not the entire explanation. “[W]here the value of the production is found not in the right to take the profits arising from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all, it is difficult to regard the right as one of property, in the common acceptation of that term.”3 Suppose, for instance, a man recorded in a letter or diary entry that he did not dine with his wife on a certain day. Warren and Brandeis reasoned that “no one into whose hands those papers fall could publish them to the world, even if possession of the documents had been obtained rightfully; and the prohibition would not be confined to the publication of a copy of the letter itself, or of the diary entry; the restraint extends also to a publication of the contents. What is the thing which is protected? Surely, not the intellectual act of recording the fact that the husband did not dine with his wife, but that fact itself. It is not the intellectual product, but the domestic occurrence.”4 The article discussed numerous copyright cases in which copyright claims were used to protect the privacy interests of individuals.5 Warren and Brandeis concluded that a right to privacy should be recognized as a separate legally protected interest rather than being a nascent interest indirectly protected by copyright or other laws. | This is a common issue when a contractor is hired to write a technical document. Under united-states law, at least, the answer is clear. The contractor owns the copyright unless there is a written agreement transferring the copyright. This may or may not be a work-for-hire agreement, and there are some significant differences in the effects if it is, but an agreement in writing there must be. Otherwise the author (the contractor) retains the copyright. If you were an employee, the result would be the reverse. Even though you hold the copyright, I think you should, at a minimum, change any identifying details. There might be an invasion of privacy issue otherwise, and there surely would be an ethical issue. However, you do not hold the copyright of any original version that the client wrote. The client holds that, unless there was a written agreement giving you the copyright. If your final resume is sufficiently close to the original as to be a derivative work then you must have the client's permission before publishing it. If this is in the US, the issue of the client's copyright on the original version might be avoided via a claim of Fair Use (FU), as a comment mentions. This is a specifically US legal concept, although some other countries have a somewhat similar but narrower concept of Fair dealing. There is no automatic formula for what use will be considered a fair use -- the specific facts of the matter must always be considered. The statute lists four factors to consider, but the court may consider others as well, and caselaw says no one factor is dominant in all cases, they must be balanced The four factors as set out by 17 USC 17 are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Here as the writer would be using the whole work, factor (3) , the amount of the work used, would tilt against FU. The use is not educational or non-profit, nor transformative, so factor (1) also tilts against FU. There is probably no market for the original, which tilts factor (4) toward FU. The original is highly factual which tilts factor (2) toward FU. There is no telling where a court would come out, and the OP doesn't want to rely on a risky issue. If anyone were to relay on fair use for this sort of thing, consulting an attorney who could look at specifics would be a good idea. | On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article. | It does not matter whether the document is authentic, because it is true, by law. Under copyright law, you must have permission of the copyright holder to copy any protected work (original creative work not created as a work of the US, as an example under US law). This is true whether or not the copyright holder tells you that copying requires permission. A matter for more concern is "false permission", where a person without the right to grant permission utters something that the courts would usually interpret as being "permission", for example releasing a Harry Potter book under CC-0. The legal requirement is that you have actual permission, not that a prohibition was not communicated to you. It is in your interest to know whether the actual person making available a work under some license actually has the right to grant a license. But there is no way to know for certain who holds copyright. You can, however, attempt to determine that a work has been registered with the US copyright office, looking here. Works are still protected when not registered, so failing to find a copyright registration does not guarantee that the work is "open access". It would tell you who the registered copyright holder is. There is no "innocent infringement" defense, but under §504(c)(2), your liability for statutory damages can be reduced to as little as $200, if you can prove that there were no indications that the work is protected. | If you own the copyright (because you wrote the book), you can do whatever you want with it. If someone else has the copyright, you have to get their permission to do what you propose. That could be the author, the author's estate, or some other party. It then depends on what the interest of the rights-holder is: they could say "No way!", "Sure, for a payment of $100,000", "At $1 per copy, here is how you must keep track of copies", "Okay, as long as you include this notice that prevents further re-distribution" or "Huh, I never thought of that. Sure, I grant you complete license to do whatever you want". A publisher is relevant only when the publisher requires a transfer of copyright to the publishing company, or if the rights-holder has granted them a certain type of license (e.g. an exclusive license). If the author has granted someone else an exclusive perpetual right to distribute, then they cannot also grant you a license to distribute for free. That is really the author's problem, though, since the publisher doesn't hold the copyright so can't sue you, instead the publisher would sue the author for breach of contract. | The leading case in this area is Commun. for Non-Violence (CCNV) v. Reid 490 U.S. 730 (1989).1 There are two routes to employers automatically being the first owner of copyright in a work produced by a hired party: in an employee-employer relationship, or in certain works by independent contractors if an express agreement is made. CCNV construed the definition of "work made for hire" in 17 USC 101 to split paid work into two categories: work done by "employees" and work done by "independent contractors". Copyright in "employees" are automatically owned by the employer. Copyright in work by independent contractors can also be owned by the employer if it falls under a set of specific categories of work (which course materials are certainly included in) and "parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire". The term "employee" above takes on a special meaning in this context. The court held that the test is to use common law agency principles: To determine whether a work is a "work made for hire" within the § 101 definition, a court should first apply general common law of agency principles to ascertain whether the work was prepared by an employee or an independent contractor The court listed 12 (non-exhaustive) factors to be taken into account when deciding whether a hired party is a an employee under common law agency and thus the work would be automatically considered a "work for hire": the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished the skill required the source of the instrumentalities and tools the location of the work the duration of the relationship between the parties whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work the method of payment the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party whether the hiring party is in business the provision of employee benefits the tax treatment of the hired party This is a case-by-case judgement, and courts have not made a ruling that applies to all university course materials universally. I'm sure we could all imagine arrangements that would fall squarely on the "employee" side of the test, and thus give the employer first ownership of copyright in course material just as easily as we could imagine arrangements that would fall squarely on "independent-contractor" side. There are arguments on both sides regarding whether the typical university professor or lecturer relationship would be considered an "employee" relationship for the purpose of the "work made for hire" definition (I'll come back to reference some law journal articles later). Regardless, even if particular relationship is found to be an "independent-contractor", the employer can still be the first owner of copyright in the works if "parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire" (assuming the work is one of the categories listed in the 17 USC 101 definition of "work made for hire" part (2), and course material certainly is). Last, even for independently contracted work that doesn't fall under one of the special categories in "work made for hire" (2), parties could agree to a contract requiring assignment of copyright. In this case, the employer wouldn't be the initial owner, but they would be due equitable assignment of the copyright by the author. 1. There are various reasons why Weinstein (mentioned in the question) is not relevant. Weinstein doesn't hold that the author of course material is automatically the copyright owner. Weinstein is pre-CCNV. Weinstein was a Seventh Circuit opinion; CCNV is a Supreme Court opinion. The test that was being used at the time by the Seventh Circuit (an "actual control of the work" test) was rejected by the Supreme Court in CCNV. | Probably not. It sounds like you've copied the complete work without any meaningful transformation. You've reduced the market for the original work by hosting your own copy. The fact that your purpose "is to share the information" doesn't really do you any good, as that is also the purpose of the original work. You're almost certainly outside fair-use territory. If you're looking for a "kosher" way to do this, the generally accepted practice is to link to the article and either paraphrase or excerpt the most relevant portions. That said, the fact that this piece came from a university may help you out. If it's a public university, it may be that its "news" articles are actually public records and not protected by copyright. For more information on how to run a fair-use analysis, see the answer here. | It is not possible to say that this is generally fair use, although sometimes it would be. A copy for personal use is still a copyright right violation on its face, and fair use does not categorically exclude non-commercial or personal use of copyrighted works. It is a highly fact specific inquiry. The likelihood of anyone discovering that you have done so and deciding to sue over it is slight, but that doesn't mean that there isn't potential copyright infringement liability. Compare this to speeding. People do it all the time, and even driving one mile per hour above the speed limit is still a traffic violation. But it is rare for less serious violations to be ticketed. | I would argue that no, there is no copyright for the restored work. Independent copyright is only possible for any original material added, as previously discussed on this site. In this case, the added work was a technical process rather than a creative process, and technical processes cannot be protected by copyright. Copyright licenses would therefore be ineffective. However, I believe one could still impose a license based on owning the copy as opposed to the copyright (contract might be a better term in this case). However, if a third party managed to obtain a copy through some other avenue, any such contract would not be binding on them and nothing could be enforced against them unlike with copyright laws. Another way a license might be imposed is through patent protections, as technical processes can be protected via patents. However, I'm not as familiar with patent law, and this doesn't appear to be the claim being made. |
Power Of Attorney Over Mom: Step Children versus Biological Son Backdrop: A Florida woman informally separates from her second husband. They have not lived together for years. The woman a mother had one sole biological son from a prior marriage. She was a step-mother to her second husband's 7 children but never adopted any of them. After the separation, she maintains contact with her adult stepchildren. The woman has been diagnosed with several health-related issues: high blood pressure, diabetes, and neuropathy. In addition to that, the woman has a family history of dementia. The biological son and mother have decided to be proactive and pursue a power of attorney and a living ( -?) will. The second husband and his stepchildren have been omitted from all of those items. Question: Given that the woman is not legally separated or divorced from her second husband, might he or her stepchildren have strong legal reasoning to protest any power of attorney or will set by the women and her biological son? | Sources Florida Power of Attorney from the Florida Bar Association is a consumer pamphlet summarizing the laws in regard to a power of attorney. The actual laws are in the Florida Code sections 709.2100 thru 709.2402 Health Care Advance Directives from the Florida Health Care Administration is a consumer guide to Living wills, surrogate designations, and related issues. Florida Living Wills Laws from FindLaw lists legal provisions related to living wills in Florida. The relevant code sections are stated as 765.101, and subsequent sections (Health Care Advance Directives). Terminology The person who makes the Power of Attorney (POA) is the principal -- the mother in the situation described in the question. The person appointed to do things for the principal is known as the agent, and is sometimes also called the attorney-in-fact. A Limited POA gives the agent power only over a particular transaction, or over a single or small number of types of transactions. One might give a limited POA to manage a particular investment, or to sell a car or a house, say. A General POA gives the agent power to do anything that the principal could do in person, or anything except for some specifically excluded things. A Durable POA remains in force even if the principal becomes incapacitated (for example with serious dementia). It includes specific language to this effect. It is usually also a general POA. Any POA that is not durable is not in effect when the principal becomes incapacitated. The situation described in the question would often be met with a durable POA. A durable POA: contains the words: “This durable power of attorney is not terminated by subsequent incapacity of the principal except as provided in chapter 709, Florida Statutes,” or similar words that show the principal’s intent that the authority conferred is exercisable notwithstanding the principal’s subsequent incapacity. (Section 709.2104) A Medical POA, sometimes also called a Healthcare POA grants the agent power to make medical or health choices for the principal. It is also known as a health care surrogate designation. It is normally a separate document form a POA dealing with non-medical issues, sometimes called a financial POA, even if the same agent is appointed for each. A living will is "a written or oral statement of the kind of medical care you want or do not want if you become unable to make your own decisions." (from the Advance Directives pamphlet linked above) Living wills and Healthcare POAs are collectively known as Advance Directives. The pamphlet says: [I]f you have not made an advance directive, decisions about your health care or an anatomical donation may be made for you by a court-appointed guardian, your wife or husband, your adult child, your parent, your adult sibling, an adult relative, or a close friend. Under section 709.2102: “Incapacity” means the inability of an individual to take those actions necessary to obtain, administer, and dispose of real and personal property, intangible property, business property, benefits, and income. Agent Any competent adult that the principal selects may be an agent. The pamphlet linked above says: Any competent person 18 years of age or older may serve as an agent. Agents should be chosen for reliability and trustworthiness. Certain financial institutions with trust powers also may serve as agents. The agent may hire assistants, such as a lawyer,, an accountant, or a realtor. But the agent may not delegate or transfer his or her powers as an agent, or appoint a sub-agent. The agent must act as instructed by the principal. When no specific instructions apply, the agent must act in the best interests of the principal, to the best of his or her understanding and ability. Creating a POA The POA must be in writing, and signed by the principal and two witnesses, and notarized. The principal must be competent when the POA is signed -- that is, must be in condition to understand the purpose and effect of the POA, and what is going on generally. (See the definitions section above.) The agent must accept the POA, and often signs the POA to acknowledge the POA and accept the responsibility of acting as agent. A POA may appoint backup agents to act if the first agent is unable to act, or resigns, or dies. It may also appoint multiple agents any of whom may act, but this can cause problems if the agents disagree. The text of a POA may be drafted by a lawyer. But there are also software programs that will produce the text of a POA, after appropriate information is entered and questions are answered as to the desired effects. Such programs normally produce text tailored to ma particular state's laws. Ending a POA The principal may revoke a POA at any time, if the principal is competent. A principal may also revoke a living will or other advance directive at any time. The agent may resign at any time If either agent or principal dies the POA is ended. (If a POA appoints multiple agents, it ends only if they all die or resign.) If the agent becomes incapacitated, the agents power ends. If there is not other agent, the POA ends. If the agent is married to the principal, a divorce or separation or a petition for a divorce, ends the agent's authority, unless the POA explicitly says it will continue after a divorce or separation. If a legal process to appoint a guardian is started, the POA is suspended, unless the agent is the principal's "parent, spouse, child, or grandchild". (This may include stepchild.) If a guardian is appointed, the court will rule on whether the POA continues; often it will not, unless the agent is also the guardian appointed. Florida code section 709.2109 (3) (Link above) says: If any person initiates judicial proceedings to determine the principal’s incapacity or for the appointment of a guardian advocate, the authority granted under the power of attorney is suspended until the petition is dismissed or withdrawn or the court enters an order authorizing the agent to exercise one or more powers granted under the power of attorney. However, if the agent named in the power of attorney is the principal’s parent, spouse, child, or grandchild, the authority under the power of attorney is not suspended unless a verified motion in accordance with s. 744.3203 is also filed. If the POA includes an ending date or condition, it ends when this occurs. A third party, one who is neither the agent or the principal, can only have a durable POA revoked by petitioning a court to do so, usually in connection with the appointment of a guardian. The court will do this only if a guardian is needed, and that the action of the agent under the POA is not sufficient to serve he interests of the principal; or if the agent is shown to have been untrustworthy or neglectful, or has become incapacitated. Living wills normally remain in effect unless revoked, even if a guardian is appointed. Conclusion No one has an automatic right to be appointed as the agent, no matter what relationship to the principal that person has, or for how long a relationship has existed. The principal may choose any agent that s/he trusts and thinks will be able to do the job well. The husband or stepchildren described in the question will not be able to have the POA set aside by a court unless they can show that the son has not acted in the mother's best interests or has acted dishonestly in regard to the mother, or has misused the powers granted by the POA. If they can show that the son used undue influence to get the mother to sign the POA, that might cause a curt to rule against the POA. But they have no automatic claim to cancel the POA, just because they are related to the mother. The Florida laws about a POA are very similar to the laws in NJ and NY that I have had occasion to deal with before. I held a durable POA and a healthcare POA for my father, who lived in NY state. | In england-and-wales this would fall within the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and depends on whether he lacks the mental not physical, capacity to make the decision for himself. Can he: Understand the information relevant to the decision Retain that information Use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision Communicate that decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means). If the answer to any of these is"no" then he cannot lawfully give true consent. Although the Act allows for others, such as a power of attorney, to make decisions on behalf of someone lacking the mental capacity, s.27 specifically excludes the decision to marry. | In addition to the general considerations of (1) who is allowed to use non-deadly physical force to maintain order in a shop (which I think that one could do if "deputized" by the property owner or to protect the property of another as well), and (2) the use of non-deadly physical force to make a citizen's arrest (which many of these scenarios would justify as the disorder would be a crime if committed by an adult), (3) I suspect that there is also some point at which a bystander may intervene to prevent harms associated with an unsupervised minor being at large and in need of supervision. Generally speaking, intervention with the minimum reasonable non-deadly physical force to prevent property damage, or an assault, or a threat, is going to be permissible. As to the third reason: for a mentally normal ten-year-old that might be a stretch; for a four-year-old or a clearly impaired older child it might not. One could approach the child, say, "where's your mom or dad", "do you have a babysitter or sibling around?", "what is your name?", or "are you lost?" and detain the child until a satisfactory answer is provided or a suitable authority arrives, to prevent the problem of a child being lost, abducted or hurt by the child's own actions. It would be quite hard for a parent, guardian or babysitter to complain about this kind of conduct when the child was unsupervised and is released as soon as you confirm that this really is a responsible adult or older minor who is responsible for the child. It would be important in doing so to not secret away or isolate the child, to try to determine the location of the child's caretaker, to refrain from doing anything that would harm the child, and to seek assistance from an authority within a reasonable time. Typically, if no caretaker appeared, a cop would come and the cop would oversee the situation until a social worker could come. For example, Colorado has the following statute that would apply once a cop arrived (omitting lengthy provisions that apply to newborn children): § 19-3-401. Taking children into custody (1) A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court: (a) When the child is abandoned, lost, or seriously endangered in such child's surroundings or seriously endangers others and immediate removal appears to be necessary for such child's protection or the protection of others; (b) When there are reasonable grounds to believe that such child has run away or escaped from such child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has not made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home; . . . (1.3) A child shall be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe the child has run away from the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian and the child's parents, guardian, or legal custodian has made a report to a law enforcement agency that the child has run away from home. (1.5) An emergency exists and a child is seriously endangered as described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section whenever the safety or well-being of a child is immediately at issue and there is no other reasonable way to protect the child without removing the child from the child's home. If such an emergency exists, a child shall be removed from such child's home and placed in protective custody regardless of whether reasonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. (2) The taking of a child into temporary custody under this section shall not be deemed an arrest, nor shall it constitute a police record. A child is considered neglected or dependent under circumstances including the following (provisions related to drug or alcohol abuse by parents omitted): § 19-3-102. Neglected or dependent child (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; I don't have easily at hand legal authority authorizing a third-party who is not a law enforcement officer to take custody of a dependent or neglected child until a law enforcement officer arrives, but I strongly suspect from the context that this is allowed either under common law, or a statute that I have not located, or some legal fiction (e.g., that the citizen is implicitly deputized by the law enforcement officer after the fact), or simply as a matter of custom and ordinary practice not codified in any authoritative legal source. | Yes The only accurate thing in the linked article is: "I am not a Constitutional lawyer." That could be taken further into "I have no real idea how our legal and political systems work." One of the tasks of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is to interpret the laws of Massachusetts including the Massachusetts Constitution. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health the court decided that the Constitution provided for equal protection and due process and that if the state wished to discriminate against people on the basis of sex they needed a good reason. The reasons the state put forward were: providing a 'favorable setting for procreation'; ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the department defines as 'a two-parent family with one parent of each sex'; and preserving scarce State and private financial resources. On 1. the court said marriage is irrelevant for procreation and vice-versa. On 2. they said Massachusetts law on child welfare dealt with the "best interests of the child" and that it is not in those interests for the state to deprive the child of benefits because it doesn't like the sexual orientation of the parents. On 3. they said equal protection means equal protection. In a common law legal system like Massachusetts where courts have the power to strike down legislation then that takes effect as soon as the decision is published. The law ceases to exist without the legislature or the executive doing anything. Now, the people of Massachusetts are free to amend their constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage or remove equal protection rights if they want. However, at the time and subsequently, the majority don't want. | Usually and ideally, a GAL would take an active role in parenting questions, while taking a secondary role in property division and maintenance with the primary concern being that the economic arrangements are sustainable and don't subject the child to hardship when with the other parent (e.g. many divorcing parents fail to realize that maintaining two households will result in more child related expenses than one). I will assume that you are asking from the perspective of a party to the divorce and not from the perspective of a mediator, although the phrasing is not entirely clear. Some basics: Have a good command of the facts about your finances, your ex's finances, and the children's schedules and needs (assuming that there are children). For example, it would be good to have school calendars as far forward as they are available, to know the children's medical providers, and to have a firm command of their extracurricular activities, their friends and the requirements of any childcare providers. Often child support worksheets will be mandatory for a settlement to be approved, so get those worksheets and fill in the facts you know already. Bring a calculator so you can consider new assumptions and evaluate financial proposals accurately. If you think you have received inaccurate disclosures, be prepared to explain in detail what you think is inaccurate and why you think that this is the case. If domestic violence has been an issue, there are restraining orders that are or have been in place, there are abuse or neglect allegations present (including emotional abuse of a spouse or children), or the co-parents have had trouble coordinating and reaching decisions without outside assistance, be prepared to explain these situations in factual detail so you can avoid summarizing the situation in a vague way. Bring anything you might need to refresh your recollection about relevant facts with you to mediation. If you haven't received full disclosure of your spouse's finances, insist on receiving that, ideally before going to mediation and absolutely before reaching a deal. Spend time considering possible resolutions of property, maintenance and parenting matters in advance. Very early on in mediation each of you will be asked what you want and mediation shouldn't be the first time that you have thoughtfully considered the question. Spend time thinking about what you need on a non-negotiable basis to survive - to be able to meet basic needs for food, shelter, clothing, health care, etc. for you and your children, and also about what your ex needs and how your ex can achieve it. Proposing ways to achieve objectives that your ex hasn't considered that are viable is a good way to get a resolution. Ideally, attend a parenting class (mandatory in many jurisdictions before getting a divorce that involves children) before attending mediation. Keep in mind that children are not prizes or bargaining chips and that you need to consider their needs as well as your own. Your kids love both of you even though you can no longer manage to live with each other. Do not utilize the children as sounding boards for mediation stances and do not try to use them as decision makers or conduits for communication between the co-parents. Recognize that in most states, marital fault is irrelevant, and that starting a new relationship is natural and routine, even if it makes your skin crawl that your ex is starting a new relationship. Take an attitude of focusing on what the deal does for you rather than what the deal does for your ex. This is about you getting what you need, not about making your ex worse off. Be prepared to walk away from mediation without a deal if necessary, because your ex won't accept a reasonable deal. Maybe half of mediations end without a settlement. Recognize that it may be possible to reach partial resolution (e.g. splitting up tangible personal property; figuring out how holidays will be handled with the children; agreeing on schools that children will attend; figuring out who, if anyone, will continue to live in a marital residence; stipulating to the value of particular assets; stipulating regarding each party's income; stipulating regarding what is and isn't separate property where you can agree; agreements to disclose information), without resolving all issues. Partial resolutions reduce uncertainty and make it easier to prepare for and conduct a permanent orders hearing on the remaining issues. Even if you can't afford to hire a lawyer to represent you in the entire case, pay for an hour or two of a lawyer's time to evaluate what kind of property division, maintenance award and parenting arrangements are within the range of the possible and likely if you go forward to a permanent orders hearing. Be prepared to put the terms of anything that is agreed to at mediation in writing. Mediators will usually tell you if they need forms signed, payments made, or a "mediation statement" in advance. Do everything required on time. A "mediation statement" is a summary of the key facts and your position on a fair resolution and could be a couple to a dozen pages depending upon the complexity of the case. Be clear in a mediation statement about what is O.K. to share with the other side and what is for the mediator's information only. When a mediator asks for a mediation statement the main reason for doing so is to save time that the mediator is charging you per hour for 50-50. A mediation statement can make getting the mediator up to speed on the facts more efficient and less likely to omit important facts and the mediator needs to learn the key facts to be effective. | What factors might a court consider in these circumstances? Is it true that anyone can just walk up and file a document in any case, with no requirement to identify themselves? If nobody admits to filing a document, it is likely that the court would grant a motion to strike the document and disregard it (revising a past ruling if the issue was raised within the six months allowed for reconsidering rulings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) or the state equivalent). A court document must, on its face, indicate a filing person and be signed to be accepted by the clerk of the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or the state equivalent. But, if the document appears on its face to be legitimate, the person filing it will not generally be required to prove their identity. This happens even less often now than it used to (in the past, fake filings were often made by members of "sovereign citizens" movements to harass governmental officials), because in both the state courts were I practice and in federal court, documents must usually be filed with the court by lawyers via e-filing using a password protected e-filing account. Usually, only parties without lawyers and out of state lawyers who are still in the process of setting up their e-filing account file court documents in person. When documents are filed in person, they are also often delivered via courier rather than by the person who actually signed the documents. And, as a matter of practical reality, third-parties almost never file fake documents in court (in part, because there is usually someone present who is in a position to call attention to the fraud to the court). Still, this can happen, although it is very rare. I've only seen a situation like this come up once in twenty years of practice. (My account below oversimplifies some of the technical details of what happened to get to the gist of the points relevant to this question.) In that case, a lawyer was representing an ex-husband in a post-decree alimony modification case that had been appealed filed a bill of costs that she sought to recover on behalf of her client for the appeal, but she filed it in the wrong court (she filed it in the appellate court where she had represented her client, rather than, as required, in the trial court where another attorney had represented the ex-husband). When an order awarding him costs was not entered by any court, the ex-husband filed an (untimely) bill of costs in the trial court under his appellate lawyer's name using the appellate filing as a model, without her consent, by forging her name on the document. The lawyer didn't discover this (because she was retained only in the appeal and had never entered an appearance in the trial court and thus didn't have access to the trial court file, and because the court doesn't automatically send you a copy of your own filings) until I responded on behalf of the ex-wife to the forged bill of costs alleging that it was untimely which I served a copy of upon the ex-husband's lawyer as required by the rules. At that point, the ex-husband's lawyer immediately called me and the court to explain that she did not file this document and that it was forged (otherwise should could have been sanctioned for knowingly filing the bill of costs knowing that it was out of time and was frivolous at that point and could have been deemed to be responsible for further trial court proceedings of the ex-husband in the case, like keeping him appraised of deadlines, court rulings and filings by other lawyers in the case, since it appeared that she'd participated in the trial court case). Ultimately, the court declined to award the costs because they were filed in an untimely manner and because they were not really filed by the lawyer as claimed. So, the the court disregarded the bill of costs and denied this relief to the ex-husband. (If I was the judge, I would have hauled the ex-husband into court and held him in contempt of court sua sponte, but in this very busy court where hearings in divorcees are often scheduled two or more years out from the scheduling date, the judge didn't have the time to devote to issues like that.) | Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms. | No To declare that a parent is "unfit" in the US requires at least a decision by a government agency (often called "child protective services" or "child welfare" depending on the state) usually confirmed by a judge. Medical testimony may be persuasive, but neither doctors nor hospitals may make such determinations. |
Is it legal to record TSA agents? Flying through security checkpoints in the US, I have seen and experienced passengers getting chewed out for choosing opt-out pat-down screening, with agents being extremely annoyed about the extra time required and ranting about how terrible the consequences would be if everybody did so. Such passengers sometimes lose property beyond prohibited items, and are powerless to do anything about it. If the passenger tries to complain after, the TSA can simply deny the truth and claim it doesn't happen, or claim the passenger was doing something wrong. The passenger may not have any access to TSA video records which would disprove their claims, as that's considered secret, unless the records clearly show that the passenger was in fact in the wrong. Signs in security screening areas clearly prohibit recording, communicating the message that the passenger cannot have any recording evidence and their word is easily discounted compared to someone in uniform. The elimination of ways in which officers can be held accountable opens the door to abuse of power (regardless of whether or not agents legally have much power) and leads to more situations in which the accountability is desired/necessary. What does the law actually say regarding passengers' rights (or prohibitions) on recording interactions with TSA officers? What punishments are they allowed to institute on a passenger who attempts to record, beyond seizure of the passenger's property and detention past the passenger's flight departure time? | TSA states TSA does not prohibit photographing, videotaping or filming at security checkpoints, as long as the screening process is not interfered with or sensitive information is not revealed. Interference with screening includes but is not limited to holding a recording device up to the face of a TSA officer so that the officer is unable to see or move, refusing to assume the proper stance during screening, blocking the movement of others through the checkpoint or refusing to submit a recording device for screening. Additionally, you may not film or take pictures of equipment monitors that are shielded from public view. Since it is not forbidden, the law doesn't directly say anything: your right to photograph and the absence of any prohibition from the 1st Amendment. So they may not punish you at all for photographing them. | If I have correctly untangled the law, Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act part 3 identifies as a condition where you are not prohibited from revealing personal data: The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. The Animal Welfare Act 25(1) says An inspector may require the holder of a licence to produce for inspection any records which he is required to keep by a condition of the licence I can't tell if you are required to keep customer names, but if you are, it looks like the pieces fit together and you would have to provide the records. Call a solicitor to be sure, though. | There's a critical error in your argument but no transfer of goods or services will be present. Actually: No, there is a transfer of service made by booking: resources are put aside by the service provider to be available for the booking person once they arrive. That is a service. These resources are not available to be sold otherwise: a room is booked and thus blocked from being rented to someone else, or a seat on the plane is booked and not offered to others, and so on. As long as the booking person arrives, no damage happens. However, if they no-show, there is damage: the resources go to waste unused: the room stays empty, or the plane flies with one less person. And the cancellation/no-show fees that are contractually obligated to make the damaged party whole (to compensate for the wasted resources) are also not paid. Knowingly using a fake credit card number or empty debit card that can't pay the fees and planning not to show up would be clearly fraud. One such paragraph that might be used to hunt down could be 18 USC §1341 - aka "mail fraud" - or much more likely, 18 USC $1343 - wire fraud. The latter is because any fraud on the internet is wire fraud. Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud [including a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services], or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. | If there's a reason to believe that your machine has data that would be relevant to a lawsuit, then yes, it is subject to inspection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34: A party may serve on any other party a request ... to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control: ... any designated documents or electronically stored information—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form. So if there's a lawsuit where there becomes a question about what you downloaded from the network, then it's quite plausible that your device could be demanded or subpoenaed. But that's not the same thing as "forfeiting" your device. The normal procedure in such a case would be that the agency's lawyers would notify you of the demand, and you would take your device to an ESI expert, who would make a digital image of the device's hard drive. The parties would then fight about what portions of that image they are allowed to access, but you would have your device again while that was going on. | The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal. | The recording is not illegal because you've been told it would happen, and by not hanging up, you've agreed to have a conversation that can be recorded. This was determined in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. applying the exception of Penal Code 632 that communications are not considered confidential if there is a reasonable expectation that the call will be overheard or recorded - being explicitly told that the call will be recorded makes this true. It would not be illegal for them to only record their own statements during the call, nor for you to record only your statements, either. In particular, the company is allowed to record the part of the call where they make this statement, as they are not recording a conversation, only their own (likely pre-recorded) statement (again?). Indeed, including their statement about the recording in the recording is common practise partly for protection against claims that the other party was not informed of the recording occurring. | You have no right to privacy in public What you do and say in public is … public. In general, in common law jurisdictions, anyone and everyone has the right to record you unless you have a “reasonable expectation of privacy”. Where the exact line on that is situational but if you are shouting racist slurs, you don’t have it. The person who made the recording owns the recording and none of the people in the recording have a say in what they do with it. However, under privacy laws like the GDPR, a person’s image and voice are personal data so any data processor must have a legal reason for processing it. However, such laws do not usually extend to private individuals acting in a private capacity. So images captured on a private phone are unlikely to be caught while images on a corporate CCTV system will be. | You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't. |
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