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Has the patent process been patented? After reading What topics can I ask about here? in Patents SE I've decided this question is off-topic there, so I'll ask here. Has there been an application for a process patent for the patenting process itself? It would probably be beneficial to license it freely, but I'm just curious if such an application has been filed, and if so, if one was granted.	Yes, in a sense. One patent is US 7444589 Automated patent office documentation by AT&T. Another is US 6434580B1 System, method, and recording medium for drafting and preparing patent specifications from NEC. In most locations patents on a business method are not allowed but, although controversial, they are allowed in the U.S. Of course the fundamental requirement for patentablity is to be new. Since patenting itself is very old any patent on the topic would need to cover some narrow aspect, like the AT&T and NEC patents. I do not understand the assumption that such a patent would necessarily be licensed freely.	In the US, you have a 1 year grace period from the time of public disclosure to the deadline for filing the patent application. This can lead to a US patent, which can be used to sue anyone infringing the patent within the US. However, most foreign countries do not offer this grace period, and so the possibility of protection in these countries for the matter disclosed in the arxiv publication has been lost.	What you're talking about is called black-box reverse engineering. It can be done, and as long as you are meticulous in your record keeping the fact that it has been done should be an appropriate defence against copyright infringement. But that doesn't help against patent claims - while in copyright cases the fact that code has or has not been directly copied is critical, in patent cases it its irrelevant: if you use a patented method, it's a violation. You therefore will need to be careful about any patents that may have been issued to the original author, as well as avoiding copying.	Of course windmills/turbines in general are not new and one would not need a license or permission to make and sell a "generic" wind turbine. But there are new types of wind mills invented and patented all the time. Examples are US7821148B2 Wind turbine and US8441138B2 Wind turbine. Patents are complicated and an inventor of a new type of windmill might need to license other people's patents that are broader in order to be able to make their new invention. Most windmill inventions are to improvements in components. It is a very rich field. As a small example, I helped a client get a patent on a device that is attached inside a windmill tower that prevents maintenance workers hitting their heads on part of the structure as they climb up. The second part of your question was how you can protect an invention you might make. Technology can be protected by patents both design and utility and some things might be able to be kept trade secrets (but not both for the same thing).	A pending patent has no legal effect. It only has effect if it is granted, and software patents are very hard to obtain these days. Also, any legitimate claimant to a patent would provide the Patent and Trademark Office patent pending number, allowing you to verify that there really is a filing and to alert the PTO if there have been misrepresentations made about who the inventor of the patented item is in fact. Lying on a patent application can have severe consequences.	In your example is the spare part the subject of a design patent? I assume it is not. When you combine the spare part to create a “different product” does the finished product resemble the drawings in the design patent? If, in its intended use, the final thing is close enough to the design patent to fall within its scope then you might by indirectly infringing by inducing people to infringe. The scope of a design patent is very difficult to determine reliably. This has nothing to do with how you got the components of your product, just how the completed thing looks. Copyright does not cover products (unless it is a model of a building or a statue or mold for a statue).	From what I can see on the USPTO registry, "tweet" is still not trademarked for the purposes you're talking about. Twitter has been working to secure that trademark, but I can't find any record of them having actually secured it. Just the same, I'd predict that using it will get you at least a cease-and-desist letter, and possibly a lawsuit. Whether you'd win that case seems to be a very open question, but that presumes you have the resources to litigate.	This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta.
How do UK pranksters "trollstation" get away with repeatedly impersonating police officers? This video is one of many in which the YouTube prank posse known as "trollstation" impersonate police officers and run around the streets of London generally causing mischief. I always thought that impersonating a police officer was a very serious crime under English law, but they don't seem to get arrested or punished, despite widely publicising their pranks in videos seen by millions of people. They also seem to commit the separate crime of wasting police time, for example by approaching cops in the street and falsely confessing to crimes. My question is, is impersonating a police officer only illegal in some circumstances? (They notably aren't using the costume to get any kind of benefit or con anyone) Are they just lucky not to get arrested? Or is it simply that the police don't charge them because the negative PR of arresting beloved YouTube personalities who are very popular with young people wouldn't be worth it? I guess I'm just amazed this is legal. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yL8WUHewGM0	It's illegal if the intent is to deceive. Under S50(1) of the Police Act 1996: Any person who with intent to deceive impersonates a member of a police force or special constable, or makes any statement or does any act calculated falsely to suggest that he is such a member or constable, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both. Their intent would need to be proven. It will be fact-specific; in some cases far easier to prove than in others. The criminal justice system is overburdened and underfunded so it is no surprise that these trolling videos are given no priority whatsoever. Further complicating the matter is the need to correctly identify the individual to prosecute. Doing so would require a fair amount of police time, time that could perhaps be spent on more urgent priorities given the relative lack of harm these videos are doing compared to more serious crimes. However, in this video (Would You Help a Police Officer Having An Asthma Attack?) an S50(2) offence would seem to have been committed by the actor wearing the police clothing: Any person who, not being a constable, wears any article of police uniform in circumstances where it gives him an appearance so nearly resembling that of a member of a police force as to be calculated to deceive shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. It does appear that both offences are being committed in these various videos, and the only reason people aren't being prosecuted is practical: there are more serious crimes to focus on, and the police would need to identify who exactly committed this crime--given these all happened at least two years ago, it would be challenging to say the least. They also seem to commit the separate crime of wasting police time, for example by approaching cops in the street and falsely confessing to crimes. Under S5(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1967, wasting police time is a criminal offence. Bringing proceedings in court requires the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) since those proceedings could have a chilling effect on the propensity of the public to report genuine matters to the police in the future. It is likely that while "wasteful employment" of police time was caused by these people, so committing the offence, it is likely viewed simply as "part and parcel" of the job and the officer likely didn't spend any time at all investigating the confessions (depending on their nature). Of course, even if the officer did spend time investigating the false confessions, the DPP would need to give their consent so unless the person has a demonstrated history of doing this (that would stand up in court) or the time wasted was of a particularly serious nature (e.g. the man who falsely claimed to be the Yorkshire Ripper), it seems unlikely consent would be granted.	It is probably illegal, just not pursued. In the case of something like bank robbery, you'd have a victim that filed a police report. A murder would need to be discovered somehow - either a missing person report or a dead body. If the porn shoot happened somewhere that a member of the public saw it and subsequently filed a police report, the video could be used as evidence. Absent a report, the police simply have no reason to look into it (unless the police catches them in the act, but we probably don't see those videos posted online). Why would these public offenses go unreported? Perhaps nobody sees it. Perhaps the bystanders in the video are paid extras. Maybe they're filming in what appears to be public but is actually private property. Perhaps they have a permit to use a public space for this purpose. Perhaps they just got lucky. Again, there might be some confirmation bias here - you're not going to see as many videos of folks they catch breaking the law, since they will either be interrupted and stopped or (maybe) have their videos ordered taken down.	I know one can "make a complaint" but I'm wondering if there's generally any legal obligation for these complaints to be taken seriously, and if there's any feasible way a driver could validate the encounter. . . . Furthermore, even with evidence, is there any way a citizen could ensure that legal action be taken against the officer for a proven traffic violation? Beyond reporting it to the department and hoping for the best? A prosecutor is under no legal obligation to press charges (and police have no affirmative duty to enforce the laws on the books) ever, even if there is blatant and clear evidence of murder, let alone a traffic violation. Usually, there is absolutely no way to compel charges to be brought against the offender (with a handful of states providing an exception where one can seek the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute if the circumstances warrant that would never be invoked for a mere traffic offense). Very few states allow anyone other than a prosecutor (or sometimes in minor cases, a law enforcement officer) to bring criminal or quasi-criminal charges. Of course, if compelling evidence of a violation is found and shared with the media, there may be powerful political pressure to bring a prosecution, but how that is developed would entirely depend upon the circumstances. Still, the relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement is so symbiotic, that prosecutors are loathe to press charges against law enforcement officers in all but the clearest of cases, especially for offenses occuring while a law enforcement officer is on duty in his home jurisdiction. Legally speaking, do civilians have any right to apprehend an officer for a traffic violation? While this would depend upon state law, most states treat traffic violations as a class of offense different from other misdemeanors and infractions and never authorize a citizens arrest for a traffic violation. Normally, only law enforcement officers can stop and cite people for traffic violations that aren't actually misdemeanor crimes. For example, in Colorado, true traffic infractions are defined as civil matters for which someone may be stopped and subjected to a citation but not arrested (even by a law enforcement officer). See Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-4-1701(1). In Colorado, only more serious traffic offenses (e.g. hit and run) are crimes subject to arrest. In the case of a traffic offense which is a crime (probably not speeding), the general rules applicable to citizens arrests would usually apply.	An individual has no authority or legal basis to demand a personal "fine" for a perceived offense. The actions in the two scenarios would both be blackmail. although whether they would be prosecuted is quite another question. It would be reasonable for the shopkeeper to demand compensation for the lost merchandise. The offender (or the offender's parents) might offer to pay, either because they thought it the right thing, or in hopes to induce the shopkeeper not to call in the police. But if they specifically made "no police" a condition of payment, that would be bribery or attempted bribery. The resident in scenario 2 could demand compensation for an alleged civil wrong of excessive noise, whether or not the passer-by was speeding. ote that the amount of noise made would not be directly related to the speed of any driver (although no doubt there would be some relation) and no one driver would be responsible for keeping the resident up. I doubt that a civil suit, if pressed that far, would prevail, although it would depend on the factual details. The specific law of the local jurisdiction would also matter. But the moment there is a threat to bring evidence of a possible crime to the police, and a request for money instead, that is blackmail.	united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority.	a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself.	It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power.	This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate."
Stand the Patriot act in the U.S.A. a the Enabling act in Nazi Germany on equal footing? We all know that after 9/11 the Patriot Act (and new law) was constructed to give the U.S.A. more power in combating Islamic terrorists (the war on terror). After the fire in the Reichstag in Nazi Germany, the Enabling act (a new law) ensued which was meant to give Hitler absolute power (thereby abolishing the Reichstag) to fight (arrest, torture, kill) the communists who were seen as terrorists. In the U.S.A. too, people could be arrested more easily (Bush didn't take absolute power though), tortured (Guantanamo Bay), and killed in faraway lands (think of Afghanistan). I know a question comparing the U.S.A. and Nazi Germany lies very sensitive but I really can't see any difference in changing the law and using the change for political reasons. Many people though believe the Nazis put the building themselves on fire, as many people nowadays believe that the 9/11 terrorist attack was a U.S.A. government conspiracy. The F.B.I. knew already four days before the attack what was going to happen. And what to think about W.T.C. number seven? Etc. Can we say these two acts stand on equal footing?	No The Enabling Act was a law by which the Reichstag effectively abolished itself - adding legislative power to the government (Article 1, sentence 1). Government laws would be prepared by the Chancellor (Adolf Hitler) and published in the Reichsgesetzblatt (Artical 3, sentence 1). The law expires on the 1st of April 1937 or after the forming of a new government (Artical 5, sentence 2). Given the suppression and intimidation of members of that body it is likely that the law itself was unconstitutional. With this legal facade, the Nazis proceeded to institute a militaristic, undemocratic and illegal regime. The Patriot Act did not amend the constitution and is subject to all the constitutional constraints on legislative and executive power. It delegated powers to the President that were within the constitutional power of the congress to so delegate. In particular, it did not in any way transfer legislative power to the executive; that would be unconstitutional. Further, it did not purport to put the powers of either branch beyond judicial review.	Congress has always had the power to conduct an investigation and to issue subpoenas, although that power has just been assumed. It was first invoked in 1795, in the case of Robert Randall and Charles Whitney, in regards to an attempt to bribe members of Congress. This power ultimately follows from Congress's constitutional power to legislate augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause, and (Barenblatt v. United States 360 U.S. 109) which implies powers to do things "in pursuance of its legislative concerns". It was there held that Congress's "legislative authority and that of the Subcommittee to conduct the inquiry under consideration here is unassailable". Anderson v. Dunn 19 US 204 earlier recognized the power of Congress to issue warrants and hold people to answer for charges – to conduct trials (in this case for torts against the Sergeant at Arms of the House), and notes that the Speaker is "duly authorized and required to attest and subscribe with his proper hand, all such writs, warrants, and subpoenas issued by order of the said house", which presupposed that the House has the power to give such orders. McGrain v. Daugherty 273 U.S. 135 held that "Deputies, with authority to execute warrants, may be appointed by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate". Since Anderson, the courts have also recognized the power to hold a person in contempt for not obeying an order to testify: But what is the alternative? The argument obviously leads to the total annihilation of the power of the House of Representatives to guard itself from contempts, and leaves it exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate against it. This result is fraught with too much absurdity not to bring into doubt the soundness of any argument from which it is derived. There are two kinds of sanctions for not testifying: the "inherent contempt" power, and statutory power. The former is a common-law sort of power officially recognized since Anderson. Statutory power is encoded in 2 USC 192, which says Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months This article provides a detailed analysis of the history and legal foundation of congressional comtempt power. Whether or not in the present case there is "contempt of Congress" can't really be answered yet. Congress does not have an absolute power to compel answers, e.g. the 5th Amendment protects witnesses in some ways, and Congress cannot compel a person to testify if doing so is against the law. There is a uniform refusal by governments to refuse to comment on any on-going investigation, which is often invoked in Congressional hearings. I don't know what the legal foundation of that position is, and there doesn't seem to be any case low on point. Once someone is punished for such refusal and appeals to SCOTUS, the picture should become clearer.	The First Amendment does indeed guarantee the freedom to express any idea or viewpoint, the limitation being incitement to immediate lawless action, recently reaffirmed in Snyder v. Phelps (many free speech cases have been about criminal restrictions on speech, this applied even to a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress). There isn't a clear line that distinguishes "advocating violation of the law" and "inciting to immediate lawlessness". Saying "(You should) shoot The Man whenever you see him" would be protected expression, but "There's a cop, somebody kill him" would be incitement. It also has to be a "credible" incitement, so saying "Kill him now!" to a room full of pacifist nuns would not constitute incitement. Things said to an angry mob would be more along the lines of incitement.	Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all "completely illegal" regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a "criminal conviction"). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been "decriminalised" - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority.	Murder is one of the few cases where the intention and not just the act is relevant. The act – killing a person – is the same for Mord and Totschlag, whereas fahrlässige Tötung covers acts that have caused the death of a person. The language of the Stgb labels the perpetrator who killed someone as a murderer or manslaughterer depending on their intention. That a person and not an act is punished is often criticized, but it has no practical consequence. Clearly, the intention isn't that the second one is free. Courts are able to interpret the law reasonably. However, the distinction between two kinds of killings seems to have no basis in reality and robs courts from flexibility to find a just sentence. There are occasional attempts at reform, but none will be successful while CDU/CSU is part of the government.	The main question is whether the US has jurisdiction outside the US, which means either "in another country" or "in no country" (viz. the high seas or outer space). It has generally been felt (legally) that the US has no jurisdiction over foreign countries, see especially Banana v. Fruit, 213 U.S. 347 "the general rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where it is done". This is known as the "presumption against extraterritoriality": it is a presumption, not a rigid absolute rule. However, there are exceptions. The Alien Tort Statute (one of the first laws of the US) says "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States". An application of that law is Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, where defendant tortured and murdered plaintiff's daughter, all parties being in Paraguay at the time: the court held that the US did have jurisdiction, under the ATS. Nevertheless, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 which involves an extraterritorial kidnapping, SCOTUS seems to have said that this law is primarily about granting jurisdiction, and not about creating new torts, and they indicate that the wrongful acts within the scope of the ATS are, specifically, "offenses against ambassadors, violation of safe conducts, and piracy" (at any rate, it's clear that damage arising from pollution would not be within the class of bad acts referred to by ATS). Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. reaffirms the limit on what torts can be pursued under ATS. In this case, the issue is whether RDP might be corporately liable for acts that could be illegal under US law, and the court says "[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none" (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.). Accordingly, Taylor Jr. was held liable for his role in torture in Liberia, since the Torture Victim Protection Act does specifically allow for actions against individuals acting in their official capacity, outside the US, for torture and extrajudicial killing. "Sanctions against" is kind of open-ended. The US government can (under some circumstances) prevent US persons from doing things with respect to some other country, such as the restrictions against doing business with or visiting Cuba, Albania, North Korea etc. as have existed withing the past quarter century. Were I interested in sending money to a person in Iran vs. a person in Canada, I would have more problems in the former case owing to "sanctions". I think we can safely conclude that the US cannot (in terms of US law) declare that "whatever acts of a foreign entity overseas offend the federal government shall be litigated as though the acts were committed within the proper jurisdiction of the US" (or, more simply, "the proper jurisdiction of the US government is the universe"). Congress has not yet passed such a law about extraterritorial pollution, so until it does, it cannot sanction overseas polluters. When/if it does, it presumably can, though enforcement is another (political) matter.	Maybe, but we'll probably never know for sure. Officially, of course, he was not punished for his speech. He was punished for selling explosives without a license, which he admitted to. (He was also charged with illegally storing explosives and illegally mailing 'injurious material," but those charges were dropped in exchange for his guilty plea on the first count.) Whether those charges were a pretext to retaliate is probably unknowable. While it's a well-known fact that law enforcement frequently retaliates against people for exercising their right to free speech, this guy's story doesn't sound very credible. There is precedent for a prosecution for distributing Pest Control Report 2000, including the prosecution of white supremacist Leo Felton, a sad-sack loser who used the same material to build a bomb around to incite a "racial holy war" the same time. And just about a month after Ver's conviction, the man who owned the company that manufactured the product was convicted of violating federal explosives and transportation laws. Several months after that, he and his company entered into a consent decree with the Consumer Product Safety Commission ordering them to stop manufacturing Pest Control Report 2000.	The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
GDPR Compliance - Tell EU users not to sign up I have a client that wants to approach GDPR compliance by simply putting a notice on his subscription forms along the lines of "Don't sign up, Europeans" From what I gather about GDPR compliance, I'm pretty sure that won't pass muster. Correct?	I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope).	It doesn’t make you exempt from the GDPR if that’s what you’re asking The hash you produce is linked to one (or a small number) of computers and it therefore serves as an ID number. Because that ID number is linked to the owner of the computer it is personal information and if you are collecting it, you must comply with the requirements of the GDPR - valid legal reason, deletion when no longer required, deletion on request, data security etc.	The CEO wants to "fool" users You are essentially admitting that the company you are working for is about to deceit its customers and asking whether that is legal. The relevant set of laws is rather sparse and does not give direct answers in regards to oAuth tokens or other details of that level (which is probably making your CEO think he can "handle" the arising questions). Probably the most relevant bit of legislation that applies here is The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to online privacy and data security policies. I am pretty sure that, in practice, if the users take your company to court, it will be held liable because: users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? While the users are still allowing you to read their data it is completely up to the Terms/EULA what you can do with it. However, once you have made the users think that they have withdrawn your access (e.g. they "deleted" oAuth tokens), you are no longer authorized to read the current data (although the Terms may still allow you to use the old data you obtained when you had access). Silently continuing to access their data without their knowledge/approval is definitely a deceit. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database There would be nothing wrong with that if it was in the Terms. But if it is not, that would be a blatant (and easily punishable) breach of privacy. Note that you may also be held personally liable for this wrongdoing (if/when proved so). "Just doing your job" claim will not work.	I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy.	The GDPR does indeed require that the password be stored "securely". It does not specify the technology which must be used for that purpose. Hashing the PW is a common method, and should be sufficient if properly implemented (strong hash function, use of salt, etc). But other methods of securing the password might be sufficient. Encrypting the PW rather than hashing it, so that an authorized person could decrypt it temporarily might be OK. Or perhaps a security app can separately retrieve only the specified characters of the PW through some sort of encryption. Or perhaps the ISP is not using proper security. In the case of Knuddles in the linked news story, an actual breach occurred which led to the poor security being reported. You could send a report to the appropriate national Data Protection Authority.	Don't collect or process personal data Many (though of course not all) websites can easily be run without collecting or otherwise processing any personal data. The position of GDPR is that if you are not able to fulfil the basic, simplest core conditions for processing personal data (understanding what you're processing and why and why it's allowed, describing it in a privacy policy, having a non-underage person who's responsible for that) then you are not allowed to process personal data of other people. So don't. Build your website so that any personal data are not collected.	The GDPR doesn't generally distinguish public from non-public personal data. If you have a good reason to contact the professor, do send them an email. GDPR does not prevent this. If you're sending this email for “purely personal or household purposes”, then GDPR doesn't apply anyway. There are rules in the ePrivacy Directive against unsolicited emails, but these specifically relate to emails for direct marketing purposes. A company is not allowed to send out spam marketing, regardless of whether they obtained the email address from a public data source. Companies can send email marketing to their own existing customers, or to people who have given consent. Consent is defined in a fairly restrictive way (as a specific, informed, freely given, and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes), so that mere publication of an email address cannot be interpreted as consent to receive marketing from a particular company.	I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.
What does the word "appropriate" mean in the American Service-Members' Protection Act? The President is authorized to use all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any person described in subsection (b) who is being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court. This law seems to be generally understood as allowing the invasion of the Hague (hence the popular nickname, "Hague Invasion Act"), but that seems fundamentally at odds with the word "appropriate". What actions might the word "appropriate" disallow if not invasion?	In this context, the phrase "use all means necessary and appropriate" should be viewed as a single phrase rather than words in isolation, and it essentially simply confers discretion on the President to decide what is necessary and appropriate, rather than being a limiting direction. The word "appropriate" is included in the phrase to avoid a crabbed construction of the word "necessary" to mean "only if absolutely necessary", and to instead mean "related to carrying out the objective" even if the means chosen are not actually the only way that the objective could be accomplished. It is a close relative of the constitutional grant to Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution to enact legislation "necessary and proper" to carry out the enumerated powers of Congress set forth in that section, and has a very similar meaning. Taken as a whole, the primary limitation imposed by "necessary and appropriate" it to prohibit the President from using this statute as a grant of authority to do something completely unrelated to getting someone out of International Criminal Court custody (e.g. providing disaster relief to fire victims in California, or ignoring an environmental regulation in connection with building a border wall with Canada).	Law The origin of the phrase is from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). It specifically rules on the limitation of freedom of speech (first amendment): The original ruling is this: The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. As pointed out by @phoog, this does not saying anything about the lawfullness of shouting "fire", it says that if your speech creates a clear and present danger, the first amendment will not protect you, even if the danger does not result in actual harm. Commentary If these instances are correct then it would seem clear that Freedom of Speech is being honored as it's the result of speech, not the speech itself, that could be an offense. You seem to think that it should be illegal, but only if it results in a panic that endangers people. If people ignore you, you think it should be protected by your first amendment rights. That's not how the law works. The law tries, among other things. To establish norms for human behaviour. For example, you will be punished for driving an automobile while intoxicated, even of this does not result in you running over somebody. In the words of the supreme court: If your actions "are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger", the congress has the right to prevent you from doing so, despite the first amendment.	The relevant statute, 28 USC 455 simply states what shall be, and does not suggest that the law could be enforced by any particular means. There have been cases where there was a suggestion of a hint of impropriety at SCOTUS and yet things proceeded. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 Rehnquist did not recuse himself despite being a White House lawyer and having expressed an opinion on the legality of certain arrests, and that was the end of that matter.	I am not sure what you mean by "accept". A citizen need not agree that any particular law is desirable, or good policy, or even rational. What a citizen must do is comply with all laws, or risk proceedings to enforce them, criminal or civil depending on the law in question and the specific circumstances. More exactly all valid laws must be complied with. In the US and many other places there are mechanisms for challenge laws as invalid. It is not generally a defense against an accusation of breaking a law that the law is not rational.	The executive branch of the US government, or specific parts of it, can demand that a person do particular things, when a statute has authorized such a demand. Such demands are not usually made at the level of the President of the United States, but the president could order a specific official to take such action. For example a National Security Letter orders a person to turn over specific information, and not tell anyone about doing so, as described in this article from The New Yorker. 50 USC 3162 provides that: (a) Generally (1) Any authorized investigative agency may request from any financial agency, financial institution, or holding company, or from any consumer reporting agency, such financial records, other financial information, and consumer reports as may be necessary in order to conduct any authorized law enforcement investigation, counterintelligence inquiry, or security determination. Any authorized investigative agency may also request records maintained by any commercial entity within the United States pertaining to travel by an employee in the executive branch of Government outside the United States. ... (2) Requests may be made under this section where— ... (B) (i) there are reasonable grounds to believe, based on credible information, that the person is, or may be, disclosing classified information in an unauthorized manner to a foreign power or agent of a foreign power; (ii) information the employing agency deems credible indicates the person has incurred excessive indebtedness or has acquired a level of affluence which cannot be explained by other information known to the agency; or (iii) circumstances indicate the person had the capability and opportunity to disclose classified information which is known to have been lost or compromised to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. "authorized investigative agency" is defined as: an agency authorized by law or regulation to conduct a counterintelligence investigation or investigations of persons who are proposed for access to classified information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such information; Accordingn to this ACLU page: In April 2007, the ACLU filed a FOIA request seeking information about the Department of Defense and CIA's use of National Security Letters. After filing a lawsuit, the ACLU received over 500 documents from its request. According to this ACLU page: An ACLU lawsuit revealed that the CIA has also used National Security Letters to demand Americans' personal financial records without prior court approval. The CIA has acknowledged using National Security Letters "on a limited basis" to obtain financial information from U.S. companies. According nto this NY Times article from Jan 13 2007: The C.I.A. has also been issuing what are known as national security letters to gain access to financial records from American companies, though it has done so only rarely, intelligence officials say. There are other circumstances in which an executive branch government official may order a private citizen to take specific action. Indeed, this happens in almost every case of a police arrest, except those done by an arrest warrant (which is a court order). During the Korean War, President Truman issued an order seizing a number of steel mills, to be operated by the government, in order to stop a strike which was, he said, impeding the military effort and thus the security of the United States. This order was challenged in the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) and was overturned on the ground that the President was not only not-authorized by any law, but had failed to follow the provisions of a law dealing with situations of the kind at issue. In that case the Court made it clear that such a seizure would have been permitted if done in conformance with a statute, and might have been permitted had no law dealt with such cases.	The clause you highlighted has an "or" in front of it: "..., or in such pretended character...". It's only one alternative. Demanding or obtaining money, etc, is sufficient to violate the statute but not necessary. Looking at the previous clause, it is still a violation if the pretender merely "acts as such", which I suppose is what people allege this person is doing. She can be guilty without having demanded or obtained anything, so the question about whether it's a "thing of value" is moot. As to the "nonexistent agency" issue: a useful source for information about how federal criminal laws are interpreted and enforced is the Justice Department's Criminal Resource Manual. (The link may be a past version; they seem to have reorganized their documents and I can't find a version not marked as "archived", but I think the information is still valuable.) 18 USC 912 is discussed in sections 1469-1477 of that version. Section 1474 examines the meaning of the "acts as such" element, and includes this note: It is not necessary that the act be one which the pretended officer would have authority to perform if he were in fact the officer he represents himself to be. Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916); United States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d at 98. Nor is it necessary that there be in fact such an officer as the defendant pretends to be. Caruso v. United States, 414 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1969). Caruso in particular was a case in which the defendant, as part of a scam, claimed to be the Administrator of a Veterans Hospital. He was convicted, and appealed on the basis that the government had not proved that the office of administrator existed. (Just as in this case, the government certainly could not prove that the Freedom to Breathe Agency existed, since it does not.) The Fifth Circuit found that his point had "no merit" and, citing Brafford v. United States (6 Cir. 1919, 259 F. 511, 513), that it was "immaterial whether or not there was any government officer or employee with the precise title [the defendant] assumed". I realize that claiming to be a nonexistent officer is not exactly the same thing as claiming to represent a nonexistent agency, but I would expect that courts would treat it the same.	You don't say who is telling you that you need to do these things, and it does matter. Educational institutions are required to maintain a discrimination-free environment, so if a student makes inappropriate remarks to another student, they have to address the matter (if they ignore it, saying "Boys will be boys", they can get sued). They will have previously spelled out procedures for addressing such accusations, which probably include giving a good talking-to to the guilty party, and maybe some harsher sanction like suspension. The school district might then have in mind a parent-teacher conference, with the underlying threat being to turn the matter over to the police: did the letter come from the school district? A minor can commit a crime, such as assault or threatening: in Oklahoma, this includes Ok. Stat §21-1172, which makes it a crime to send a message that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, and a first violation of the law is a misdemeanor. For an adult, the penalty can be a year in prison and $500 fine, but that is unlikely for a minor. There may be a hearing in Juvenile Court with some disposition, and if the charges are proven then the court has wide latitude in meting out punishment. Did the letter come from the juvenile court system? The Oklahome law regarding children and juveniles is here. When the Office of Juvenile Affairs engages in "the intake process", they are investigating the case to make a recommendation to the DA. "Intake" is defined as a mandatory, preadjudicatory interview of the juvenile and, if available, the parents, legal guardian, or other custodian of the juvenile, which is performed by a duly authorized individual to determine whether a juvenile comes within the purview of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code, whether nonadjudicatory alternatives are available and appropriate, and if the filing of a petition is necessary Since "intake" is juvenile justice jargon, I assume this is a legal proceeding, not a parent-teacher conference. An actual criminal charge might result from the hearing, which is brought about by a referral. Because detention is a real possibility, consulting an attorney is wise. Whether or not it is a good idea to have the attorney present for the proceeding is something only your attorney can say (in his professional judgment). There is really no way to know in advance what they already know.	The basic legal principles are as follows. First, a government may pass a law criminalizing an act, for example this Ugandan law which penalizes homosexual acts, their attempt, and aiding and abetting same. Second, a government has the subpoena power to compel a party to provide evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, unless there is some specific restriction enacted in the country – I find no applicable restrictions in Uganda. In principle, the government could subpoena records of an internet service, in order to find violations of the law. Enforcement of the subpoena is relatively simple within the country, but enforcement against a website in Norway, for example, would be virtually impossible, in that Ugandan courts do not have authority in Norway and Norwegian courts will not recognize such an order. Uganda is not a party to the Hague Service Convention, so the Norwegian courts will simply not consider the subpoena.
Are Christine Blasey Ford's lawyers in legal jeopardy? On September 27, 2018, Dr. Christine Blasey Ford testified before the US Senate Judiciary Committee about her memory of an alleged sexual misconduct, which occurred in 1982, by someone she remembered to be the SCOTUS nominee Brett Kavanaugh. This is not a question about the misconduct, her credibility, or the quality of her memory. So, please, don't jump to answer it as if it were. The question is exclusively about her lawyers' role in that testimony. Here's a few facts related to her travel to testify: It came out during the testimony that she traveled to the destination of the testimony by air. She testified that she did not know that there was an offer for the Senate committee to come to hear her story in California (her state of residence). It's been widely reported that her testimony was delayed by 4 days to a week because her lawyers indicated that she was afraid to fly. This delay produced a one-week delay in the confirmation process of a SCOTUS judge. During the testimony she characterized this as a miscommunication, and the delay, as a misunderstanding. Her lawyers tried to shut down this line of inquiry as protected by the attorney-client privilege because it was related to what her lawyers told her of what was told to them by the Senate functionaries responsible for arranging the testimony. My question is in what legal jeopardy would the lawyers be if Dr. Ford were given a transactional immunity. Since the attorney-client privilege is with the client, it does not spread to the lawyers if the client is immunized, or does it? If it turned out that they misled the client (deliberately or not) about the Senate's offer to expedite the testimony, this would have been an act of obstructing a nomination of a SCOTUS judge. Should this result in a delay in the confirmation (assuming the confirmation does go through), this delay may result in judge Kavanaugh not being one of the presiding judges on one of the cases heard by the SCOTUS. Would this not be an obstruction of justice (quite literally)? And while Dr. Blasey Ford characterized this as a misunderstanding, this is her view on the facts. But if this results in an indictment, wouldn't the judgement of how to view the facts be with the jury (rather than Dr. Ford -- a witness)? She would be an immunized witness compelled to testify, would she not?	To consider obstruction of justice, it's not necessary to consider the impact of a delayed nomination on the work of the Supreme Court. 18 USC 1505 provides that a felony has been committed by Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress Since there's no suggestion of threat or force, the issue would be whether the lawyers' actions were corrupt, and whether the delay constituted an impediment. I am doubtful that either could be established. Furthermore, section 1515(c) says that This chapter does not prohibit or punish the providing of lawful, bona fide, legal representation services in connection with or anticipation of an official proceeding. Returning to your theory about preventing or delaying the confirmation of a nominated justice, there does not appear to be anything in the law that criminalizes this. The court having 8 members does not prevent it from hearing any case unless 3 of the 8 have recused themselves from the case, as the Supreme Court's quorum is six justices.	Judges simply do not supervise each other in a courtroom in terms of keeping each other "honest." That's simply not how the courts work. Judges are independent in order to not be influenced by bias. A judge would look very unkindly upon a lawyer who requested another judge be in the courtroom in an extra-judicial sense, or in some sort of legal sense as (wrongly) perceived by the lawyer. A lawyer is an officer of the court, and as such, knows what is legal in an administrative sense, and would simply not request another judge be in the courtroom. A lawyer can request a different judge be assigned or take over a case, but the request must generally have a legitimate reason that has a legal basis, i.e., a documented conflict of interest on the part of the judge, or evidence of racial bias. And it is up to the court to grant a change. Yes, judges have been found to be corrupt and have been removed from the bench. But that doesn't happen very often, and that removal is part of the judicial process to keep judges honest and get rid of "bad" judges. Yes, judges do issue rulings that are struck down on appeal; that's why there is an appeal process. That is the legal mechanism to keep judges "honest." So, the remedy for what is perceived as an unfair judge or a biased ruling is an appeal to a higher court.	I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand.	No The case was dismissed on procedural reasons. Like this. Well, perhaps not so pedantic but there are things that have to happen before the Supreme Court can get involved and they haven’t. For example, the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction in a limited classes of case; if this isn’t one of those (and it isn’t) it has to be heard in a court that does and then get appealed up the chain. When they have, the court will make a decision on the merits.	The question didn't mention marital status, but since states formally recognize that relationship it's helpful to start there. tl;dr: The Supreme Court decided state laws that required a woman to notify her spouse were unconstitutional. Thus it's unlikely there'd be grounds for suit. Background The central mechanism of Roe v. Wade (U.S. 1973) was a balancing act between what it decided was a 14th amendment right to privacy and the state's interest in both the health of the woman and the potentiality of life. Because Roe explicitly recognized a state interest, Pennsylvania passed a statute in 1982 that required informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period. It also mandated parental consent for minors (with some exceptions) and spousal notification. This reached the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of SE Penn. v. Casey (U.S. 1992). There, the court upheld most of the Pennsylvania law (reinforcing its statement in Roe that a state does have an interest) but struck down the spousal notification portion. To do that, it determined the appropriate test was whether a state was placing an undue burden---a significant obstacle---in the path of a woman seeking an abortion prior to fetal viability. It reasoned that: state regulation impacts a female's liberty more than male's during pregnancy (by way of biology) if a man and woman disagree, only one can prevail not all women are equally impacted by a notification mandate (for reasons of domestic violence, etc.) Combining this with the notion that women do not lose any constitutionally protected liberty upon marriage, it decided spousal notification would be a significant obstacle and thus an undue burden. In other words, unmarried women don't have spouses to notify, so placing a notification requirement on married women creates an additional burden that the court found undue. To get back to the question, the father certainly has a right to file a suit against the female (...and it happens from time to time). However, it likely wouldn't go far. Since unmarried women were the baseline in Casey, it's unlikely there'd be grounds for either married or unmarried fathers to sue their female partners. This comes up frequently under the moniker of "Father's Rights," which has gained less traction in the U.S. than in other countries. That said, Wisconsin recently introduced a bill that would allow fathers to proceed against abortion providers.	Yes. The precedent is President Gerald Ford's pardon of his predecessor Richard Nixon in proclamation 4311 before any possible prosecution had started. The pardon was granted specifically to prevent the disturbance of "the tranquility to which the nation has been restored" by "the prospects of bringing to trial a former President of the United States" (emphasis mine). It is noteworthy though that a pardon can be rejected by the recipient, and that there may be good reason to do so, because accepting one is an admission of guilt.1 In the words of the Supreme Court (Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915): There are substantial differences between legislative immunity and a pardon; the latter carries an imputation of guilt and acceptance of a confession of it [...]. (Again, emphasis mine.) Proactively pardoning large swathes of current and former government officials, family members and other people connected to the Trump administration would therefore be a double-edged sword: It surely may save a lot of the money and headache coming with being the target of an (even unsuccessful!) investigation; but it may also amount to admitting that the Trump administration was essentially a criminal organization. 1 As always, things are a bit less clear-cut when one takes a closer look. Because I googled "prospective pardon" after the correct remark by JBentley I stumbled upon the entirely relevant and eminently readable Congressional Research Service reports on pardons. The first one is a "pardons FAQ", the second one is a more thorough legal exploration of what pardons actually do. The bottom line is that the Supreme Court and Federal Courts have edged away from a 19th century opinion (Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1866)) which viewed a pardon as an all-encompassing expungement. Newer decisions (prominently, Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 86 (1915) which I quoted) don't.	(My expectation is that the proof has to be replicated and the conviction cannot be introduced as evidence). Your expectation is incorrect. The name of the legal doctrine that allows a criminal judgment to have this effect in a civil case is called "collateral estoppel" which is also sometimes called "issue preclusion". See, e.g., A-1 Auto Repair & Detail, Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy, 93 P.3d 598, 600 (Colo. App. 2004) ("Hardy contends Colorado law does not allow courts to apply collateral estoppel, now commonly known as the doctrine of issue preclusion, when the first adjudication is criminal and the subsequent litigation is civil. We disagree.") Similarly, a case out of California stated: To preclude a civil litigant from relitigating an issue previously found against him in a criminal prosecution is less severe than to preclude him from relitigating such an issue in successive civil trials, for there are rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and of a unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record paid for by the state on appeal. Stability of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safeguards. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 606, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962) (citations omitted). To the best of my knowledge, this is the rule in every U.S. jurisdiction (with the possible exceptions of Puerto Rico and Louisiana which are not common law jurisdictions). It is also the historical rule in British common law, although I don't know if this continues to be the case in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Procedurally, the determination that collateral estoppel applies would usually be made on a motion for summary judgment, or in the preparation of jury instructions which state that liability has been established and that the jury is to limit itself to determining causation and damages, rather than as an evidentiary matter. I've used this doctrine once or twice. For example, I used it in a case where someone fraudulently sold ditch company shares worth several hundred thousand dollars (in Colorado, water is gold) that he didn't own (a transaction that could not be unwound because the buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value and the seller had apparent authority as a trustee of a trust owning the shares even though he didn't have the actual authority to sell them under the trust) and then spent the money he received before he was discovered (if I recall correctly, for gambling debts). He was convicted criminally and then my client, the victim, sued for money damages including statutory treble damages for civil theft and attorney's fees based upon collateral estoppel and an affidavit as to damages in a motion for summary judgment. From a practical perspective the four main difficulties are that (1) people convicted of crimes often lack the income or assets to pay judgments, (2) there are double recovery issues involved in reconciling restitution awards in a criminal case (where the measure of damages is narrower) and damage awards in a civil case (where the measure of damages is broader), (3) there are priority issues involved in reconciling criminal awards for fines, restitution and costs, in each case with civil awards for damages, and (4) if the defendant declares bankruptcy, the non-dischargeability of the civil judgment must be affirmatively raised and proved (often this is elementary but there are strict time limits) in the bankruptcy proceeding. Tactically, it is often better to sue first, collect what you can, and to bring a criminal complaint only when it turns out that the perpetrator is judgment-proof.	A case for negligence or some other tort would likely never reach the stage where we could answer this question, as lawyers are generally immune from suit for their litigation conduct. I don't know of any case with facts likey you've described, but my understanding is that the litigation privilege precludes virtually any tort action based on a lawyer's statements in the course of the proceedings. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, for instance, has specifically acknowledged that claims for defamation, extortion, fraud, perjury, forgery, slander of title, injurious falsehood are unavailable: The policy reasons for the privilege have often been repeated: In fulfilling their obligations to their client[s] and to the court, it is essential that lawyers, subject only to control by the trial court and the bar, should be free to act on their own best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of later having to defend a civil action for defamation for something said or written during the litigation. Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
If two gunmen are in a standoff, can either of them kill the other and claim self defense in the USA? Because of recent news about the Kenosha shootings, and people claiming the shooter might walk free because he can claim self-defense, I've started wondering this question. I've seen pictures of another person having been shot in the arm, holding a gun. To me it seems like, if that person who got shot in the arm would have killed Kyle Rittenhouse, he could just as easily have claimed "self defense". This brings me to the question: if person A gets provoked / threatened by person B, causing A to shoot B in legitimate self-defense (regardless of if this was the case in the Kenosha shootings), if this then makes person C feel threatened, if then A and C end up in a standoff aiming their gun at the other, would then both people have a legitimate case if they claim self-defense for shooting the other, or not?	Rules about self-defense in the US vary from state to state, but generally a person can raise a defense that they legally used deadly self-defense if they had a reasonable fear of death or grievous bodily harm, with some exceptions (exactly how these are worded changes from state to state): A person often cannot claim self defense if they are already committing a forcible felony (but it depends on the circumstances) A person cannot claim self defense if they are the aggressor in a fight or took aggressive actions toward another person who then attacked them. So, with that in mind, let's assume that Person A has a valid deadly self-defense claim against Person B. When considering self defense, the question is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have feared death or grievous bodily harm. So, the exact sequence of events matters. Consider the following four scenarios: C watches B attack A and then A shoots B, C pulls out his gun and points it at A before A turns to him and points his gun in response C watches B attack A and then A shoots B, A then points his gun at C and C pulls out his gun in response C doesn't see B attack A and only sees A shoot B, C pulls out his gun and they stand off C doesn't see B attack A and only sees A shoot B, A then points his gun at C and C pulls his in response In some of these situations, A may be considered the aggressor against C even though he had a valid self-defense claim against B. In others, a jury may find that a reasonable person in C's position would not expect A to shoot them just because they shot an attacker, and therefore C is the aggressor by drawing on A. This all assumes a hypothetical where these people exist in a void, things like their relationship, the situation around the three subjects, and any other relevant facts could be introduced and considered in the analysis. In theory, a situation could exist where both sides have a valid self-defense claim against each other, the third example possibly being that situation.	Yes In 2010, on the last day of her testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Justice Elena Kagan, was asked “Do you believe it is a fundamental, pre-existing right to have an arm to defend yourself?,” by Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma. When Kagan began to answer by stating that she “accept[ed]” the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, which held that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms, Coburn interrupted to clarify that he was not asking whether she believed the right to be protected by the Constitution, but rather whether she considered it to be a “natural right.” “Senator Coburn,” replied Kagan, “to be honest with you, I don’t have a view of what are natural rights independent of the Constitution.” The full exchange is as follows: Coburn: Do you believe it is a fundamental, pre-existing right to have an arm to defend yourself? Kagan: Senator Coburn, I very much appreciate how deeply important the right to bear arms is to millions and millions of Americans. And I accept Heller, which made clear that the Second Amendment conferred that right upon individuals, and not simply collectively. Coburn: I'm asking you, Elena Kagan, do you personally believe there is a fundamental right in this area? Do you agree with Blackstone [in] the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defense? He didn't say that was a constitutional right. He said that's a natural right. And what I'm asking you is, do you agree with that? Kagan: Senator Coburn, to be honest with you, I don't have a view of what are natural rights, independent of the Constitution. And my job as a justice will be to enforce and defend the Constitution and the laws of the United States. Coburn: So you wouldn't embrace what the Declaration of Independence says, that we have certain God-given, inalienable rights that aren't given in the Constitution that are ours, ours alone, and that a government doesn't give those to us? Kagan: Senator Coburn, I believe that the Constitution is an extraordinary document, and I'm not saying I do not believe that there are rights pre-existing the Constitution and the laws. But my job as a justice is to enforce the Constitution and the laws. Coburn: Well, I understand that. I'm not talking about as a justice. I'm talking about Elena Kagan. What do you believe? Are there inalienable rights for us? Do you believe that? Kagan: Senator Coburn, I think that the question of what I believe as to what people's rights are outside the Constitution and the laws, that you should not want me to act in any way on the basis of such a belief. Coburn: I would want you to always act on the basis of the belief of what our Declaration of Independence says. Kagan: I think you should want me to act on the basis of law. And that is what I have upheld to do, if I'm fortunate enough to be confirmed, is to act on the basis of law, which is the Constitution and the statutes of the United States. See Transcript	“Never” is a very big word… If a burglar stabs someone in claimed self defense, then we have evidence that this was an armed burglary, so that won’t go down well for that burglar. And your rights to self defence are greatly diminished if you caused that situation illegally. So should you get into the situation, try to run away if at all possible. If you had any chance at all to escape your self defence argument will not be accepted. The only possible situation with self defence is if you are threatened with illegal violence that cannot be justified by the fact that you are a criminal. For example you enter a home, two people with guns inside catch you, bind you to a chair so you are no danger at all, and instead of calling the police they announce they will kill or maim you. This is of course very unlikely to happen.	Edit: because this question has tagged the United States, the answer below discusses US law, not the law of any other country. Because they're separate crimes that, as a general rule, don't merge, and prosecutors like to charge multiple crimes when they can because it gives them leverage in plea negotiations. You could also charge attempted murder if there's been an actual murder, it's just that it would kind of be a waste of time since they would merge upon conviction. You're close on the view that assault is attempted battery. But, note that generally assault is placing someone in imminent fear of receiving a battery, whereas as an attempt usually requires a 'substantial step' towards commission of the actual offense, so the ambit of assault is slightly larger than the ambit of attempted battery (again, generally speaking).	No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412	Exactly the same thing that stops the same rogue lawyer from putting on a mask and robbing a bank. One is the crime of fraud and the other the crime of armed robbery but they are both crimes. People commit crimes all the time; that is why nearly 1 million people in the U.S. are in jail right now - some of them may even be in there for crimes they actually committed! Were your lawyer to commit this crime he may get caught or he may not; if he does he's going away for a long time and can never work as a lawyer again. So it's simply a matter of risk assessment; oh, and ethics	I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.	In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?
Statute of limitations if law changes Let's say the statute of limitations on wrongful death is 3 years. 5 years pass. Then, the statute of limitations is completely removed. Can the lawsuit be filed now? Does the statute permanently invalidate the case the first time or does it depend on current law?	Stogner v. California, a criminal case, held that "A law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution". In 1798, in Calder v. Bull, SCOTUS long ago decided that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to civil cases. In that case, Calder had been entitled to property under a will, and the Connecticut legislature changed the law. The Supreme Court held that the legislative act was not an Ex Post Facto law. Chase's reasoning, which relies on the distinction between ex post facto law and retrospective law, is this: In my opinion, the true distinction is between ex post facto laws and retrospective laws. Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law. The former only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive, and it is a good general rule that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement, as statutes of oblivion or of pardon. They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facts committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto within the prohibition that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law, but only those that create or aggravate the crime or increase the punishment or change the rules of evidence for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time or to save time from the statute of limitations or to excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the like, is retrospective. But such laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference between making an unlawful act lawful and the making an innocent action criminal and punishing it as a crime. The expressions "ex post facto laws" are technical; they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors. So, yes it can.	Are arbitration agreements subject to a 6 year statute of limitations in NJ? Yes. Remember the precedents from NJ that I cited in response to one of your recent posts: a state may not "subject an arbitration agreement to more burdensome requirements than those governing the formation of other contracts" This implies that the statute of limitations for arbitration agreements is the same as for contracts in general. If it were otherwise, that departure would constitute a greater burden on whichever party happens to oppose the enforcement of the arbitration agreement.	There have been instances where the US Supreme Court has held over cases to the next term, and instances where they ordered a case re-argued in the next term. Brown vs Board of Education was a particularly well known case that was reargued. I believe that such occasions are rare, and that the court makes a significant effort to decide each case in the same term where certiorari is granted. Once exception is when the Court has a vacancy and is waiting fora new Justice to be confirmed, and the Justices in office are tied. Then cases with 4-4 splits are often held and re-argued. More often, the Justices decide, after granting certiorari, that this was a mistake, and dismiss the case altogether. The phrase used is that the writ is "dismissed as improvidently granted" or "DIGed". This has the same ultimate effect as if certiorari had never been granted -- the lower court decision is left standing, and no Supreme Court precedent is created. This is still fairly rare. To the best of my knowledge there is no rule requiring decision within any specific time, but I have never heard of a case held over for more than one term.	Maybe, but probably not, although this would be a question of fact to resolve on a case by case basis under broad legal standards by a jury, and would also depend upon the state where it took place, and upon the nature of the employer of the paramedic. The hypothetical facts in this case are rich enough and ambiguous enough that the case could go either way depending upon how it was presented and what could be proven at trial. This is a case it would be good to take to a medical malpractice/personal injury lawyer in the jurisdiction where it happened to be evaluated. Usually a PI lawyer would not charge you for doing so or would ask for only a nominal fee. Additional factual investigation would probably also be necessary regarding some of the key facts identified below. It's complicated and there are multiple issues presented in this case where the law is not uniform from state to state. The general rule is that a medical professional has to carry out the delivery of medical care to a patient with the reasonable care that would be taken by a medical professional of that type. If the medical professional fails to take reasonable care, and that negligence failure to do so causes injury, then there is civil liability for medical malpractice. A threshold issue would be whether a medical professional-patient relationship was established. This would be a question of fact for a jury and would be a question upon which various potentially applicable state and federal laws would often not be uniform. On these facts, it could easily go either way. In federal court and in a majority of state courts (although there is variation from state to state) you need to know the name of the paramedic you dealt with who provided the bad advice to bring a successful lawsuit before suing. In a minority of states, you could sue first and get the name of the paramedic in discovery through the court process from the hospital after the lawsuit was commenced. The standard of reasonable care liability in this case would be judged by the standard of a reasonable paramedic, not a reasonable doctor. But, often states would have statutes that would limit the liability of paramedics in these situations to liability for gross negligence (which the facts in the question would probably not suffice to show), but not for ordinary negligence (which a jury could come out either way upon and which would hinge heavily on expert testimony). These tort reform type laws differ considerably from state to state. Whether or not particular conduct was negligent or grossly negligent, is a question ultimately decided by a jury under very broad and general legal standards after the fact in a trial, based largely upon expert testimony, on a case by case basis, unless the facts are unequivocally clear one way or the other, which is rarely the case. With my layman's level of knowledge about what a reasonable paramedic should be able to diagnose, I could see this determination going either way. Two cases with identical facts in front of the same judge in separate trials, in which juries are presented with exactly the same evidence could come out differently. The resolution of one case of the question of whether a particular act constituted negligence giving rise to liability is not binding as precedent and is not admissible as evidence in another case (subject to a narrow exception called "collateral estoppel" which applies when the same individual is sued by multiple people for the same conduct in different lawsuits that have resulted in final orders resolving key questions of fact that the lawsuits have in common). Many states would require that someone suing the paramedic have a medical professional certify that the paramedic's actions constituted legal negligence before the suit could go forward in a court. If there is a medical professional-patient relationship, and if the medical professional was found to have negligently caused injury, the medical professional's employer would have vicarious liability in some (but not all) states under a respondiat superior doctrine. Usually, the paramedic at an ER would be an employee of a private EMS ambulance company or a municipal fire department, and not of the hospital that runs the ER. But, some hospitals have their own in house paramedics. Also, some hospitals are run by for profit or nonprofit private companies, some are state or local governmental agencies, and some a federal government agencies. Usually only a small minority of the medical professionals in a hospital are employed by that hospital, and most of them merely have "privileges" to provide medical services for which they bill patients separately while working for their own professional corporation through which they are self-employed. Legally, the hospital itself is more like a hotel or a WeWork office space than to being a firm that directly provides medical services, although it isn't quite that black and white. Holding the ER directly responsible for failing to have good triage policies, as opposed to holding the paramedic responsible and assigning vicarious liability to the employer of the paramedic, would be very difficult, although not necessarily impossible if the ER had official policies that fell far below the standard of care for emergency room triage. It would be very uncommon for an ER to have bad policies of this type. Typically, ERs are only held directly liable for bad triage policies when, for example, they have a policy of not evaluating at all someone who does not have health insurance, which is a practice expressly prohibited by federal law. If the paramedic's employer was a government entity such as a fire department or a government owned hospital, the paramedic would be entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless an exception applied. Usually there is an express exception to absolute immunity for medical malpractice liability by a medical doctor who has established a doctor-patient relationship with a patient, when the medical doctor is employed by a state or local government, usually there isn't when the doctor is employed by the federal government. But these laws differ from state to state in fine details that matter in a case like this one regarding whether the exception to immunity from liability is limited to medical doctors or applies also to paramedics. Causation would also be an important factual issue for trial. There is liability only to the extent that taking a non-negligent action could have prevented the harm. If you are infected with COVID, one common consequence is a stroke, and if someone had a stroke while infected with COVID, the case that taking them to the ER would have prevented the stroke from doing serious damage in the long run is weaker. On the other hand, guessing that a stroke was really something else, might or might not be reasonable. The injured person would also have to prove that the EMS response occurred at a time within the roughly 1-2 hours after the start of a stroke when it is possible to take medical action that could do something about a stroke. If the stroke had already happened an hour and a half later and it was rush hour and would have taken half an hour to get to the nearest hospital, causation might be absent and there would be no liability. There would be a legitimate question of fact over whether there was an actual diagnosis and treatment, or whether there was a refusal to get treatment. The reasonable care test is a balancing test. It takes into consideration not just the potential benefits of taking action, but also the cost that would be incurred if action was taken, and the downside risks of a proposed action. The paramedic's concerns about getting a COVID infection at the ER when the person responded to didn't appear to have it at the time would make the cost of a false positive diagnosis higher and would thus influence what would constitute reasonable care in this situation as the jury applies the relevant legal test. Liability would be evaluated based upon what the paramedic reasonable understood he was being told. This would be a question of fact for the jury. It is likely that different people who were present understood what was being said differently. Even if bystanders understood what was being said and meant, what matters is what the paramedic reasonably understood was being said and meant. Given the communication difficulties involved, that question could go either way.	Is this something for small claims court Yes. The explicitness of your prior leases overrides the statutory variations that might exist among jurisdictions in this regard. And the total of 50$/month for six or seven years indicates that you would have to pursue recovery in small claims court (at least if the landlord refuses to reimburse you). In Wisconsin, the statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years. See 893.43. Statute of limitations means the lapse of time upon which claims of certain type are no longer actionable. Thus, you would only be able to recover the fees of the latest 6 years except for this year's lease, since your current lease no longer specifies that the landlord will cover that cost. For more information on small claims courts, see chapter 799 of the Wisconsin statutory law.	The important question is: was the £200 a fine (which is paid to the state) or compensation (which is paid to you)? Assuming it was a fine He doesn't (at the moment) owe you anything. However you can sue him for damages. Usually a claim for damages is time-barred after six years (and it is now seven years). However you weren't able to sue him yourself until you were 18, so you may have a couple of years left. However the clock may have started ticking immediately after the attack, on the grounds your parents or guardians could have sued. Talk to a solictor about this possibility; they should give you a free 30 minute consultation, and would probably take a case on a contigency fee (no-win no-fee) basis if it has any chance. In principle, you could have applied to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for compensation - but you are too late for that; you have to apply within two years (there are some exceptions, but none seem to apply to you). Assuming it was compensation He owes you £200. Now you need to enforce that payment - and again, the problem may be the six year clock. You will definitely need to talk to a lawyer about that. My gut feeling is that the £200 was probably a fine rather than compensation.	He is mistaken. The statute of limitations for suing someone for a car accident, and for enforcing an oral promise, are both far longer than 3-4 months. You could get an estimate of the damages, report it to his insurance company, and, if the insurance company does not cooperate promptly, bring suit in a court of limited jurisdiction or a small claims court. Even if you don't retain a lawyer to take on the case for you fully, if you need to sue, you should hire a lawyer to coach you on the high points of how to represent yourself in this case, particularly with regard to how to fill out the Complaint, how to serve the other driver with process, and what evidence you need to present in what manner a trial.	Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy).
Identification requirement https://abcnews.go.com/US/white-georgia-sheriffs-deputy-beating-black-man-viral/story?id=72981224 A Lyft/Uber is pulled over for a broken headlight. Why is the passenger compelled to produce identification to law enforcement? Are identification rules uniform throughout the US or does it vary widely from state to state?	Identification rules vary from state to state, but there is no state which would require a person in Mr. Walker's position to identify themselves to law enforcement. The passenger is compelled to produce identification to law enforcement through the threat of illegal violence.	If being able to distinguish colors is a bfoq - Bona Fide Occupational Qualification - then you may ask about it or test it and disqualify people from hiring based on the results. In fact, a Jury found that color vision is a BFOQ for police but demanded accommodation and in that case the Appeals court denied accommodation is necessary. Other courts found that at times color blindness doesn't count under the ADA at all. Some federal regulations even demand specific ability to have some 3-color vision, as you need to distinguish Red-Green-Amber. Remember Different color blindnesses see differently, and the following picture illustrates this at a traffic light. Deuteranomaly alters the color picture different than Protanopia, which is different from tritanopia, and then there's the unpictured achromatopsia, which is totally Black-White, among many many other types of color-blindness known to man: Can someone with any of the three pictured color visions distinguish the traffic light colors but or the position in the traffic light? That is the question that the federal regulation for color vision above demands, making it a requirement for truck driver licenses. What does that mean?! For example, a job that relies on distinguishing colors would be sorting or quality control based on the paint of a product. Take for example this sample from the AOA (American Optometry Association) for testing color blindness: Assume the products come only in the colors of the second row, and only those. If you can't distinguish between the ca. 6 greens, yellow, and about 7 variants of red, then they could not have the qualification, no matter what other qualifications you might have, you could not fulfill the required qualifications for the job of evaluating the color of these items. On the other hand, a colorblind person can be especially valuable when you deliberately look for color combinations that are still well distinguishable even to people with color distinguishing impairments - and then being normal does not qualify the Bona fide occupational qualification.	There is no state that requires you to show ID to obtain medical care. To the extent that this is done it is done at the behest of whoever is paying for the care to determine that you are someone who is authorized to benefit from this payment, and not an imposter, or as a matter of policy of the doctor. (An exception to this general rule applies when one wants to pick up a prescription for a controlled substance or a Sudafed product, where you must indeed show ID to show that your name matches a prescription or to insure that the right name is entered into the Sudafed database.) It might be more convenient for the doctor in terms of collection of bad debt, insurance policy claims (where an insurance card would normally be required, at least), protection against fraud claims from an insurer, and medical record keeping to have a name, so a doctor might make it a policy to require ID, but it is not required by law (except where a government benefit provider like Medicaid or Medicare is involved and has a regulation requiring it). For example, in the Las Vegas shooting, where there wasn't time to process paperwork, hospital triage officials simply assigned an alias to every incoming patient and wrote it in marker on their body to keep the medical records straight, and to allow that alias to track medical costs to be billed when the time came to get the proper intake paperwork filled out and the file sent to the accounting department. There are also other circumstances that do not involve emergency treatment (e.g. STD testing, methadone treatment at free clinics, and clinical trials) where an alias rather than a true name is sometimes used to keep track of patients.	In Massachusetts law it says the following: The term ''police officer'' as used in this section shall mean a police officer in uniform or, if out of uniform, one who has identified himself by exhibiting his credentials as such police officer while attempting such arrest. So, showing a badge or ID card or possibly even an official business card would be sufficient under the law.	California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.	This seems to be the relevant code: https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2016/321L.pdf (8 pages). The permit is supposed to be returned to DMV if the person to whom it was issued dies or moves out of state (321L.3(1)(a) and (b)), but I see no requirement that the vehicle in which it is displayed must be tagged in Iowa. It is also plausible that the jeep owner is driving a handicapped person around, since a placard may be used by a passenger. On the other hand, the Colorado tags themselves may be illegal since people are supposed to register within 30 days of moving to Iowa (http://www.iowadot.gov/mvd/vehicleregistration/register.htm). Iowa is a rather long commute from Colorado.	It seems that the Iowa authorities did attempt to notify the driver. If the letter of notification was returned because the driver changed his or her address, that is not the DOT's fault -- drivers are supposed to notify the authorities of changes of address -- indeed driving with a license with an out-of-date address is itself a violation in some US states. If the error was made by the postal service, that is still not the DOT's fault but they might be more willing to accept an appeal from the driver. In general, authorities must make a reasonable attempt to notify people of court or administrative actions, but if those notifications fail, the authorities can go ahead in many cases. Try explaining that one doesn't owe taxes because an IRS notice was misdelivered. It would be too easy to avoid unwanted governmental actions if nondelivery of mail were a valid excuse. It may well be that there is a procedure to get the suspension waived or ended early, perhaps involving taking the class that should have been taken, and perhaps paying an additional fine. Details of such procedures vary. A local lawyer who deals with traffic issues frequently would probably know what steps might be taken. It may well be that the original ticket mentioned a possible suspension, but it may not have. That also varies by state.	Does the party have any legal leverage to engage the police (or other competent authorities apart from private investigators) to help locate the witness and serve the summons on them? Not really. Legal process is not infrequently served by a sheriff's deputy. But the deputy will not generally take any initiative to locate a person to be served beyond what it provided by the litigant. The main reasons to have a sheriff's deputy serve someone with process is the fear that the person served might react violently. Or is it just the party's bad luck that the witness cannot be located and served on? Pretty much.
Can lifeboat passengers claim the necessity defense if they are charged with murder for cannibalism? Suppose a ship at sea suddenly develops problems and the passengers are put into life boats. One boat carrying 20 people gets lost. After 8 days without food and water, the passengers decide to kill one of the passengers and eat him. They kill a 7 years old boy and feed on him. When they get back to shore, they are charged with murder. If the passengers plead necessity as a defense, will they succeed?	The stated facts are an almost carbon copy of the facts in R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273 DC so we know the answer - No The court ruled that cannibalising the boy was not urgently necessary. Even though the cabin boy would almost certainly have died of natural causes, the sailors killed the boy intentionally and were guilty of murder. There was some degree of necessity arising from the threat of starvation but, at any moment, a ship could have sailed over the horizon to save them as, indeed, the three were rescued. Since they could never be sure that the killing was actually necessary from one minute to the next, the defence was denied. Specifically, cannibalism is not the crime; murder is. Necessity requires: an urgent and immediate threat to life which creates a situation in which the defendant reasonably believes that a proportionate response to that threat is to break the law. In practice, necessity is only a defence to relatively minor crimes, like breaking traffic rules in a race to a hospital or breaking a window to escape a burning building - the consequences of the breach have to be relatively trivial in relationship to the consequences of adhering to the law.	Engaging in unlawful conduct does not completely preclude a claim of self-defense under Wisconsin law ...but it does raise the bar in some circumstances: Criminal conduct by the defendant removes the presumption that "force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm" when defending against unlawful forced entry to one's own property. A much higher burden on use of force is imposed if engaging in unlawful conduct that is "of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack." Anyone intentionally provoking an attack by any means, lawful or unlawful, "with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant," is not entitled to self-defense at all. Section 939.48 of Wisconsin law governs the standards for self-defense. 939.48(1) sets out the general standard: A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. 939.48(1m)(ar) provides presumptions in favor of the defendant and no duty to retreat when defending against unlawful entry to one's own property (an implementation of the castle doctrine), but those presumptions are removed by 939.48(1m)(b)1. if (among other things), "[t]he actor was engaged in a criminal activity." More relevant to a case that occurred outside is 939.48(2), which lays out how provocation affects a claim of self-defense: (a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self-defense, but the person is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely to cause death to the person's assailant unless the person reasonably believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm at the hands of his or her assailant. (b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. (c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense.	The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence.	He is probably guilty of negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter, at most (a minor felony), and is possibly not guilty of a crime at all. The primary distinction between classes of homicide is mens rea (i.e. intent). The only affirmative act he took was to move the pillow. He did so both without intending to or knowing that he would kill Jane (the intent necessary for murder), and also, without clear actual knowledge that he would be creating a risk that Jane would die (a reckless state of mind that would support a conviction for manslaughter). Also, note that Walter himself, at this time, is not engaged in a felony, so he is not guilty of felony murder. We can presume he is present with the consent previously given of the owner of the property and did not mean anyone any harm. Likewise, this is not what is meant by "extreme indifference" for purposes of a murder statute, the paradigm of which is shooting randomly into a crowd knowing that someone will almost certainly be killed without knowing or intending that any particular person will die. The mental state necessary for negligent homicide is the equivalent of "gross negligence" in a civil case and is called "criminal negligence" in a criminal case. To be criminally negligent a person must fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a certain result will occur, and the risk must be of such a nature that the defendant's failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from a reasonable person's standard of care. If a jury found that a reasonable person ought should clearly know that moving a pillow put Jane at risk of dying, then he might be guilty of criminal negligence. But, if a jury found that a reasonable person would not know that moving the pillow put Jane at grave risk of death, his action would not be criminally negligent. There are also at least three questions of causation which is not entirely independent of the question of negligence. First, generally an act is only considered a cause of a consequence if it is a foreseeable result of the action. If Jane's vomit caused death is not a foreseeable result of moving the pillow, then her death might not be legally caused by moving the pillow. Second, how likely is it that she would have died even if Walter had never entered the room. There are lots of ways that the pillow could have been jostled during the night leading to the same result. If it likely would have happened anyway, Walter's involvement might not be the legal cause of the death. Third, how much fault should be attributed to Jane? This is closely related to the second question. If her death was primarily caused by her getting dangerously high and placing herself in a vulnerable position, perhaps Walter's involvement is not a meaningful cause of the death. A New Mexico court has held that the defense that the victim was negligent has value only if it establishes that the victim's negligence was the sole cause of the accident. State v. Maddox, 99 N.M. 490, 660 P.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1983). But, what about Jesse's negligence? Under a relevant standard criminal jury instruction in New Mexico: The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's act was a significant cause of the death of __________________ (name of victim). Evidence has been presented that the negligence of a person other than the defendant may have contributed to the cause of death. Such contributing negligence does not relieve the defendant of responsibility for an act that significantly contributed to the cause of the death so long as the death was a foreseeable result of the defendant's actions. However, if you find the negligence of a person other than the defendant was the only significant cause of death, then the defendant is not guilty of the offense of __________________ (name of offense). Caveat: A number of states impose strict criminal liability on drug dealers, often for murder, if someone died from using a drug sold by them, but often it has to be a child, and often the drug has to be the proximate cause of death, e.g. due to an overdose or impurity in the drug. I would presume that Jesse and not Walter supplied the drugs to Jane, that Jane is an adult, and it is not obvious that the drug itself (as opposed to the vomiting due to the manner in which the drugs were used) was the proximate cause of death, so a statute like this might not apply in any case. This brings us to the hard part of the question: Without the pillow Jane rotates on her back and starts to vomit and cough, still sleeping. At first Walter tries to react, running to the other side of the bed to help her, but then he stops and decides to do nothing as she dies. Note that if Walter had moved the pillow without knowing that he was creating a risk, left the room ignorant, and then this happened, surely Walter would have no legal liability for Jane's death. If Walter develops the necessary intent for criminal liability, this probably doesn't happen until he observes that she is starting to choke on her vomit and might die. Even then, he does not intend for Jane to die and probably doesn't even know for certain that she will die from his inaction, so he is probably, at most reckless, if he has a duty to rescue for criminal law purposes. Generally, under both civil and criminal law, there is no duty to rescue, even if you can do so without any risk of harm to yourself. But, there is an exception, at least in civil liability, for a duty to rescue that arises from the fact that you put the person at risk of peril through your affirmative actions. Does this apply here, at all, or in a criminal case? The first question is the exact language of the homicide statute. Some homicide offenses require affirmative acts, while others can arise from acts or omissions where there is a legal duty to act. Every crime requires some voluntary act or omission, and the voluntary act itself was not a crime and perhaps was not even a tort, at the moment it was taken, because Walter did not realize that his act created a risk of harm. He create a peril, but he did so innocently. A pretty standard formulation is that an omission is only a crime when the law creates a legal duty to act, but this is, of course, a question begging standard as it doesn't clarify whether there is a legal duty to act, which is at issue here. As the previous link notes, creation of a peril can give rise to a legal duty to act, but only sometimes. (4) Duty arising from creation of peril. If a person acts culpably to imperil another, he or she has a legal duty to rescue the victim. The cases are split on whether a duty to rescue arises if someone innocently or accidentally imperils another. This case would fall in the category of someone who innocently or accidentally imperils another, in which the cases are split, which which the linked article cites the following authority: Compare Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 24-25, 141 N.E. 510, 511 (1923) (defendant under duty to try to extinguish a fire that he accidentally set to his house and thus was guilty of arson when he did not) with King v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 654, 659, 148 S.W.2d 1044, 1047 (1941) (defendant who, in lawful defense of a third person, shot and wounded an attacker was under no duty to seek medical attention for the wounded assailant). A commentary that is part of a California standard jury instruction (for involuntary manslaughter, not murder for which this kind of liability is presumably not available) makes the following observation: A legal duty to act may also exist where the defendant's behavior created or substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim, either by creating the dangerous situation or by preventing others from rendering aid. (People v. Oliver (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 147-148 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138] [defendant had duty to act where she drove victim to her home knowing he was drunk, knowingly allowed him to use her bathroom to ingest additional drugs, and watched him collapse on the floor]; Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681] [defendant had duty to prevent horses from running onto adjacent freeway creating risk].) These examples would suggest that an innocently or accidentally created risk is sufficient to create a duty sufficient to support involuntary manslaughter liability for an omission under California law, and would probably lead to involuntary manslaughter liability in the case in the question as well, under California law. New Mexico, unlike California, does not have a standard criminal jury instruction or really definitive section of its criminal code that clearly resolves this question, although the fact that California which uses a murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter distinction in the same way that New Mexico does, limits criminal liability for omissions to involuntary manslaughter suggests that New Mexico would as well. The New Mexico case State v. Greenwood, 2012 -NMCA- 017, 271 P.3d 753 (N.M. App. 2011), touches on the issue, suggesting that there may be liability only for involuntary manslaughter (or certain specialized crimes based upon a relationship such as that of a nursing home to a resident of a nursing home) based upon an omission, and that the liability for an omission can only arise when there is a legal duty, but almost implies that only contactual duties are sufficient. It does so at paragraph 35 which says: Importantly, even if the LINKS contract relating to Jared were to have been renewed and to have been in force at the time of Jared's death, we are not convinced that it would be the sole basis or even a controlling factor in determining Defendant's legal responsibility under the Act. Defendant's criminal liability must exist solely based on an omission— a failure to act when she had a legal responsibility to act. See Deborah A. Goodall, Penal Code Section 22.04: A Duty to Care for the Elderly, 35 Baylor L.Rev. 589, 594 (1983) (stating that " authorities have long agreed that before an omission can constitute an offense[,] there must first be a duty to act" ); see also People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1907) (" The law recognizes that under some circumstances the omission of a duty owed by one individual to another, where such omission results in the death of the one to whom the duty is owing, will make the other chargeable with manslaughter. This rule of law is always based upon the proposition that the duty neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral obligation. It must be a duty imposed by law or by contract, and the omission to perform the duty must be the immediate and direct cause of death." (citation omitted)). But, this could be dicta because it was a case where any legal duty would arise under contract rather than for another reason, and as is the case in many smaller states, there is simply no case that has ever been decided in New Mexico which is squarely on point. Under British criminal law, in similar circumstances, a homicide conviction was vacated: R v Khan & Khan (1998) CLR 830, confirmed that there is no separate category of manslaughter by omission unless the omission constitutes a breach of duty to act. The defendants supplied a 15-year-old prostitute with twice the amount of heroin likely to be taken by a regular user. The defendants left her unconscious in the flat, returning the next day to find that she had died of the overdose. Had medical assistance been called, the girl would probably not have died. The unlawful act was supplying the drug but the death was caused by the quantity injected by the victim. The trial judge invited jury to consider liability on the basis of the defendants' failure to summon medical assistance. On appeal, the conviction was quashed because the brothers had not accepted a duty to act before she took the heroin. A dissertation on when criminal liability is imposed for omissions in Scottish law can be found here. New Mexico, whose laws really should govern, has just two homicide statutes: § 30-2-1. Murder A. Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused: (1) by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; (2) in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony; or (3) by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life. Whoever commits murder in the first degree is guilty of a capital felony. B. Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, a person who kills another human being without lawful justification or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another. Murder in the second degree is a lesser included offense of the crime of murder in the first degree. Whoever commits murder in the second degree is guilty of a second degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. Walter doesn't qualify for any of these prongs of the statute. § 30-2-3. Manslaughter Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. A. Voluntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. Whoever commits voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. B. Involuntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection. Whoever commits involuntary manslaughter is guilty of a fourth degree felony. Clearly, Walter also does not qualify as guilty of voluntary manslaughter. There is no quarrel or heat of passion. So, either Walter is guilty in New Mexico of involuntary manslaughter, or he is not guilty of homicide at all. New Mexico also has an unusual, and rather merciful "excusable homicide" provision at New Mexico Statutes § 30-2-5, that should also be considered: Homicide is excusable in the following cases: A. when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act, by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent; or B. when committed by accident or misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, if no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used and the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner. Arguably, Walter falls under "excusable homicide" part A, as moving the pillow was a lawful act done without unlawful intent and that is what caused the death.	Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo!	Just below the section you quoted it says: (3) The victim’s prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a prosecution under this section. There is no stated provision for the case you mention. I suspect that the law would apply. Whether the authorities would choose to prosecute in such a case is a very different question. There might be caselaw of this subject. I wouldn't know. If this is more than hypothetical, i would urge consulting a lawyer with local knowledge of criminal practice.	I would just like to clarify, in addition to the other answers and what Dale M alluded to, one important detail: Unless you are carrying out the death penalty, no one under any circumstances is allowed to kill anyone else. What you are sometimes authorized to do, is to use deadly force. There is an important distinction between the two. When using deadly force, you are using extreme force to stop someone doing something, which may result in getting that person killed, but killing isn't the point, stopping whatever he is doing is. If instead of a knife you had a gun on the train, you shot the guy in the face, his crime spree came to and end, yet he was still alive but unconscious, and you decided to "finish the job" and shoot him some more, you'd be going to prison. The language is important. Even if in self defense situations, if you say that you were shooting to kill, you're going to be in serious trouble, but if you say you were shooting to stop, you're in the clear.	The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions "based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'", which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute.
Can plaintiff or defendant question judge? I watch a lot of Judge Judy, and many of you know its irritating. She has said she cannot look into the evidence or she has so many other work to do. How can a judge behave like this to public? Is she a public servant? How can a judge say what ever they want and nobody can react? Is that the law? Nobody over the judge in the court? I saw another real court video, a girl said "adios" to the judge and the fine amount was doubled. Any where written how to behave in the court and what all things anyone can say?	First, Judge Judy is not a real court. Judith Sheindlin was a real judge, but then she retired to be on TV. The show depicts arbitration proceedings, which both parties agreed to. If both parties want it, and if he agrees, you can have arbitration proceedings where R. Lee Ermey presides and keeps order by means of screaming at you and ordering calisthenics on the spot (where failure to comply means you lose automatically). Judge Judy is not a public servant on the show; she's a TV personality. That said, real judges have substantial power to keep order in the courtroom and to enforce proper decorum. Part of proper courtroom decorum is that you respect the authority of the court, and that you respect the judge. Failure to do so can be criminal contempt of court. Contempt of court in the presence of the judge is the only situation I'm aware of in American law where you can do something wrong and be pronounced guilty of a crime and sentenced to jail on the spot without the ability to even say anything in your own defense beforehand (some places require opportunity to be heard before sentence is imposed or the order becomes final, but not all do). Part of the point of this is that courts only have authority because people are willing to obey them; one of the actual reasons for summary direct criminal contempt is to vindicate the authority of the court. If you're acting like the court can't tell you what to do, the court can send you to jail to make the point that they absolutely can tell you what to do (in practice, jail sentences are often commuted when the contemnor apologizes). With the "Adios" thing, that wasn't a fine: it was bail. Bail is the amount you pay to guarantee you'll show up in court later (if you show up you get it back; if you don't the court keeps it). Disrespecting the court means they're less convinced you will show up because of a sense of obligation, so they can increase bail to add financial incentive. In his personal capacity, a judge can be criticized like anyone else. In his courtroom, a judge is not the peer of anyone else in the room. The judge is the court; he represents the law (judges used to be stand-ins for the King; now that the US is based on the rule of law rather than the rule of a King, judges are stand-ins for the law). A phrase sometimes used is that you may or may not respect the judge, but you respect the robe. So, yes. If you think a judge is disrespecting you, you are expected to take it and not show disrespect right back. You are expected to show respect to the judge, to the proceedings, and to the other people in the courtroom. Judges occasionally abuse this; there are stories of "black robe fever," in which a judge goes off on someone in the courtroom for no good reason. But that doesn't excuse anyone else in the room from their duty to show respect to the judge while in court.	There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context.	You're wrong in the first sentence So I agree, that a hung jury is in fact reasonable doubt by lack of concurrence, the defendant should be acquitted. No. A hung jury just means they can't decide on any item they should decide about, for whatever reason. Maybe they all want to see the defendant guilty but can't decide if it is murder 1st or 2nd degree, or one of them is just trying to stay out of work and just is contrarian to whatever the jury deliberates, wether guilty or not guilty. In either case they can not tell the judge what they can't agree about. They can only tell the judge that they can't agree on a verdict. Since the judge can't assume anything about the deliberations, he can only reset trial and swap the jury for one that actually might be able to decide. The whole Jury is tossed out, their deliberations don't matter anymore - their hung state does not influence the re-trial.	A witness is not evidence, but what a witness says (their testimony) may be evidence. Or, the body of a person who happened to be a witness is evidence. I suspect that there is a translation problem. It is always physically possible to try pay a person to lie and AFAIK never legal: the person who lies and the person who induces the lie will be punished by law. The witness who testifies will have to swear that their testimony is the truth.	The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence.	Telling to "shut up" may amount to misconduct: Judicial Conduct Investigations Office can investigate "offensive language". Otherwise, judges are in charge of everything that happens in the courtroom. They have full powers to limit time that a party can speak and tell to sit down and be quiet. Helpful article: Judicial conduct: when it goes wrong	Generally speaking, courts take whatever time they need to write their decision and then release it close to immediately. In cases where a judge believes she has the information she needs, she may rule "from the bench," announcing a decision and entering an order for the parties to comply, and then follow up with a written order later. The research process is fairly open-ended, but legal research databases are pretty advanced, and a good researcher can generally get his hands on the vast majority of what he'll need in very short order. But practically speaking, there are few limits on how long that process takes. A litigant who was growing impatient could seek a writ of procedendo to force a court to move faster, but my experience indicates that most attorneys wouldn't attempt that move unless a decision had been pending for at least a year with no action, which would be unusual.	The only relevant case heard by SCOTUS is Nixon v. US, 506 U.S. 224, where a federal judge was tried and convicted for actual crimes, but would not resign his position so continued to draw his salary. The key legal question was whether the matter is "justiciable" (meaning, not a political matter but a legal matter). Nixon's argument was that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, and the court held that the question (more specifically what it means to "try") is nonjusticiable. White & Blackmun, and Souter, wrote concurring opinions (which might be called on in a subsequent impeachment case) that reminds the reader (and future court) what was not part of the holding of the court, and what might therefore allow future impeachment review. White writes The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us even to consider his contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore reach the merits of the claim. I concur in the judgment because the Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" petitioner. He observes that the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed a trial by reasonable judges. But, I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to "try" impeachment cases. When asked at oral argument whether that direction would be satisfied if, after a House vote to impeach, the Senate, without any procedure whatsoever, unanimously found the accused guilty of being "a bad guy," counsel for the United States answered that the Government's theory "leads me to answer that question yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. Especially in light of this advice from the Solicitor General, I would not issue an invitation to the Senate to find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business, to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment process. Souter in his opinion states that One can, nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply" 'a bad guy,'", judicial interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. In other words, review of an impeachment is largely but not entirely off the table, at least until SCOTUS declares that impeachments are completely unreviewable, no matter what, period (unlikely to ever happen).
What exactly are an officer's requirements in order to demand ID in the US (New York)? I watched a YouTube video recently which depicted the following situation, and I'd like to learn more about what peoples' rights are and what an officer's obligations are in a situation like this: A filming crew flew a drone above property to photograph a private business operation. The security for that private business followed the filming crew down the road, and soon a police vehicle showed up, passed the security vehicle and pulled over the crew. The initial encounter went as follows: Officer: "Good morning folks, (identification), just trying to- had some people ask questions why you're flying a drone over their property." Driver: (silence) Officer: "You guys got any ID on you?" Driver: "Why am I being stopped?" Officer: "You're being stopped because people identified your vehicle as flying a drone over the top of their property and we're just trying to figure out what you guys are up to." Driver: "That's illegal?" Officer: "Well they just wanted to know who you were, they couldn't identify who you were. Do you guys have any identification on you?" Now, the easiest thing to do here is obviously show ID. But my question is: Has the officer fulfilled the conditions necessary in order to demand ID at this point? My concern is this: The officer could be friends with the owner of the facility they were photographing and helping his pal out by going get the name of the people photographing their operation. The law (in most US states) states that an officer can only demand you show ID if you're suspected of committing a crime. Right? That's to keep officers from being able to pull over and annoy anyone they don't like or have a personal or monetary motive to harass. Right? So it seems to me the officer couldn't identify a specific crime the driver had broken, and would be required to name the specific law broken. But I don't know that for sure, which is why I'm here. Is the officer obligated to name the specific law the driver broke before demanding ID, if the driver requests to know which law they broke? To continue the transaction where it left off: Driver: "So because they wanna know who we are, you're going to tell them?" Officer: "Well I'm just going to ask you- I'm asking if you have any identification." Driver: "I do. What crime am I suspected of committing?" Officer: "Well, I'm just asking to see your identification Sir. I'm trying to identify you. Driver: "I'm telling you no." At this point the officer has failed to name a specific law the driver is suspected of breaking. Does he need to in order to demand ID? The officer doesn't seem to know what law he suspects the driver of breaking, so he goes back to his squad car and presumably investigates. He claims to speak to his supervisor. Presumably, at this point the supervisor would look up a specific law to suspect the driver of breaking right? So it seems to me like the officer has two options: Return to the vehicle and say "You've been suspected of X (specific law broken) crime, I need to see your ID" or "You're free to go". Anyway, that doesn't happen. The detainment goes on for an hour and the driver continues to request to know what crime he's suspected of and refuse to show ID until the officer identifies the crime he's suspected of committing. At one point another officer even states "There is no crime." in response to the driver asking "Why can't you tell me what the crime was?" This continues until the officers place the driver and passengers under arrest and bring them to jail. I see these kinds of videos often, and often times its clear the driver is just trying to cause unnecessary drama, but in a few cases, like this one, it seems to me like the driver is genuinely trying not to forfeit rights designed to protect citizens from harassment. I'm no legal expert though, and I'm not claiming to be right. I'm asking for an expert explanation of what rights a person has in this situation, what obligations the officer has, and whether or not this encounter was ultimately a legal / illegal detainment and arrest.	There are a variety of situations like border crossings, entry into official buildings, etc. in which there is a general right for law enforcement to demand identification on a suspicionless basis, none of which seem to apply in this case. But, the most common justification for demanding ID is to make what is called a Terry stop (after the name of the U.S. Supreme Court case that upheld the legality of these stops in the face of 4th Amendment limitations on searches and seizures). Wikipedia accurately summarizes the law in this area as follows. A Terry stop is: a brief detention of a person by police on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity but short of probable cause to arrest. The name derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that police may briefly detain a person whom they reasonably suspect is involved in criminal activity; the Court also held that police may do a limited search of the suspect's outer garments for weapons if they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person detained may be "armed and dangerous". To have reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop, police must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts" that would indicate to a reasonable police officer that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity (as opposed to past conduct). Reasonable suspicion depends on the "totality of the circumstances", and can result from a combination of facts, each of which is by itself innocuous. The search of the suspect's outer garments, also known as a patdown, must be limited to what is necessary to discover weapons; however, pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine, police may seize contraband discovered in the course of a frisk, but only if the contraband's identity is immediately apparent. In some jurisdictions, persons detained under the doctrine of Terry must identify themselves to police upon request. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), the Court held that a Nevada statute requiring such identification did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, nor, in the circumstances of that case, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self incrimination. New York is one of the many states that has a stop and identify statute, that allows an officer to insist on presentation of an identification any time there is a legal basis for making a Terry stop. The New York stop and identify statute is N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §140.50. This says: 1. In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest without a warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 2. Any person who is a peace officer and who provides security services for any court of the unified court system may stop a person in or about the courthouse to which he is assigned when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 3. When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions one and two a police officer or court officer, as the case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search such person for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, he may take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person. 4. In cities with a population of one million or more, information that establishes the personal identity of an individual who has been stopped, questioned and/or frisked by a police officer or peace officer, such as the name, address or social security number of such person, shall not be recorded in a computerized or electronic database if that individual is released without further legal action; provided, however, that this subdivision shall not prohibit police officers or peace officers from including in a computerized or electronic database generic characteristics of an individual, such as race and gender, who has been stopped, questioned and/or frisked by a police officer or peace officer. In this particular case, if the law enforcement officer were more clever, he would have said that he was concerned that the crew might be using the drone to case the property in order to commit a crime there in the future. And, if he had said that, this would surely pass muster for reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and would have provided a legal justification for demanding ID. The "about to commit a crime" justification for a Terry stop makes it, in practice, much broader than probable cause for an arrest, which requires that the police believe that a crime has actually already been committed or is in progress, not just that someone is about to commit a crime (a person may be subjected to a Terry stop even if his actions which tend to show he is about to commit a crime have not yet progressed to the level of an attempted offense for which someone may be convicted and are not truly imminent). (Actually, strictly speaking, the officer is only entitled to determine the information that an ID would reveal, and not to insist that someone actually have the ID on his person, under state law, although a local ordinance or court interpretation of the law could possibly give him the authority to actually demand an ID to determine this information. For example, California courts have held that a duty to provide basic information implies a duty to provide it in a verifiable manner.) The fact that the law enforcement officer failed to articulate any legal basis for the stop, yet went on to arrest the individuals, weakens the case that the stop was valid considerably, because generally, at least in theory, a law enforcement officer is supposed to be able to articulate the reasonable suspicion for the stop at the time that the stop is made and not days later after the fact. In addition to stop and identify laws, some states (including Colorado) have held that failing to provide an ID on demand, under the "totality of the circumstances" can sometimes constitute obstructing a police officer and provide a basis for an arrest. It isn't inconceivable that a law enforcement officer in this situation could make that argument and prevail at least in showing probable cause for arrest on that basis, even if it wasn't a sufficiently solid argument to give rise to an obstructing a police officer conviction.	As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury.	Bobstro gave the practical answer, that it's a stupid idea for many reason. This is for the US in general, states may have laws that say otherwise. It is not illegal to provoke someone or a government official (police), it's done all the time in protest (not riots). It is not illegal to run from a cop who has not detained you in any way, or has not issued an order to you. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that people not suspected of criminal activity can ignore a police officer who approaches them. Wisconsin has even said, that even after a police officer knocked on your window, you can still leave. However, it may give probable cause, especially with the statement of "Oh shit! The police!" It IS illegal to run from a cop who has detained you or issued a lawful order. The order "STOP" is a lawful order, and from that point on, you are committing a crime if you do not stop. For your case, check out the NYTimes article "Supreme Court Roundup; Flight Can Justify Search By Police, High Court Rules".	If you comply without protest, this will be taken as consent to a search, and make anything found admissible. One can verbally object. The ACLU suggests the form "I do not consent to searches" to any request to search your car, your house, your person or any other property of yours or under your control. There is no need to give any reason for your refusal. However, one is required to follow any "lawful orders" given by police officer during a traffic or pedestrian stop.[1] Failure to follow lawful orders may well be a separate crime. Even if the lawfulness is suspect, it is usually better to comply and challenge the order later, in court. One might make a second objection, such as "I don't see that you have probable cause for a search, and I do not give consent. Are you ordering me to permit a search?" If the officer clearly orders you to open the trunk, one might place the keys in reach of the officer, while not opening the trunk oneself. That might help establish that there was no consent to the search, and require probable cause to be established before anything found could be used in a trial. One might also repeat, as the officer opens the trunk "I am not consenting to any search." If it is possible for any person present to record video without obstructing the officer(s) that might hrlp to establish the absence of consent and other relevant facts, later. People in general have a right to make such recordings, but not to obstruct or interfere with police activity. Duty to Obey The Washington Post in an opinion article dated July 23, 2015 "Sandra Bland and the ‘lawful order’ problem" wrote: The Bland video brings up an overlooked problem with the law of police-citizen encounters. The police can back up their orders with force because it’s often a crime to disobey a lawful order from a police officer. But from a citizen’s perspective, it’s often impossible to know what is a lawful order. As a result, it’s often impossible for citizens to know what they can and can’t do during a police encounter. The first problem is knowing what counts as an “order.” If an officer approaches you and asks you to do something, that’s normally just a request and not an order. But if there’s a law on the books saying that you have to comply with the officer’s request, then the request is treated as an order. You can’t know what is an “order” unless you study the law first, which you’re unlikely to have done before the officer approached you. In the case of Oregon v Rose Mary ILLIG-RENN, 42 P.3d 62 (2006) The Supreme Court of Oregon held that ORS 162.247(1)(b), a statute that makes it a crime to "refuse[] to obey a lawful order by [a] peace officer." is constructional against challenges under the Oregon and US Federal constitutions. Sources [1]: Virginia Code section 18.2-464. Failure to obey order of conservator of the peace Virginia Code Section § 18.2-463. Refusal to aid officer in execution of his office. Florida Statutes 316.072(3) "OBEDIENCE TO POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.—It is unlawful and a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, for any person willfully to fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law enforcement officer, traffic crash investigation officer as described in s. 316.640, traffic infraction enforcement officer as described in s. 316.640, or member of the fire department at the scene of a fire, rescue operation, or other emergency. " (Oregon) ORS 162.247(1)(b) Interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer A person commits the crime of interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer if the person, knowing that another person is a peace officer or a parole and probation officer ... Refuses to obey a lawful order by the peace officer or parole and probation officer. California Vehicle Code - VEH § 2800 (a) It is unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order, signal, or direction of a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code, when that peace officer is in uniform and is performing duties pursuant to any of the provisions of this code, or to refuse to submit to a lawful inspection pursuant to this code. North Carolina § 20-114.1. Willful failure to obey law-enforcement or traffic-control officer (a) No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law-enforcement officer or traffic-control officer invested by law with authority to direct, control or regulate traffic, which order or direction related to the control of traffic.	The police performed an "open air sniff". Federal and Pennsylvania law differ on this. Under Federal law, this is not considered a search and can be done on any vehicle- usually to get cause for a more invasive search. (Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005).) Under Pennsylvania law, an open air sniff requires reasonable suspicion. This is lower than probable cause- all it requires is that a reasonable person could suspect from the facts that a crime may have or could be committed. Being overly nervous during a routine traffic stop driving someone else's car could potentially be considered reasonable suspicion- as I only have your second-hand account, I won't speculate further. If there was no reasonable suspicion, any evidence found by that search, or evidence found by a search justified by it would be suppressed. Fourth Ammendment rights also apply here. The police cannot detain someone solely for the purpose of waiting for a sniffer dog. They have ways and techniques to waste time for this purpose, but if the stop was concluded before the dog arrived, your husband would be free to leave. Again, I have only your second-hand account so I won't speculate on whether this happened. He should speak to his lawyer about specifics of the case.	In New South Wales it is entirely legal to film police (or anyone else). However, as discussed (What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?) audio recording is more restricted: you must either have the permission of all the participants in a conversation or be a party to the conversation. I do not imagine the law is any different in Victoria.	I suspect that you would not be convicted in the present case, because the jury would be sympathetic to the plight of the person being dragged out and unsympathetic to the behavior of the draggers. However, we should set aside the emotional elements of a jury trial and focus on legal principles. The basic question is whether a person has the right to use force to defend against an unlawful battery: "a person is privileged to use such force as reasonably appears necessary to defend him or herself against an apparent threat of unlawful and immediate violence from another". This right to defense also extends to defense of others. But it has to appear to be to unlawful, which is to say, you have to reasonably believe that the force used against the victim is unlawful. If a couple of thugs try to drag a person away, then an observer probably has a reasonable belief that this is an unlawful battery. But if a couple of police officers are observed dragging a person away (arresting him), apparently acting officially, the force used (up to a point) is apparently lawful and would not constitute battery of the victim. For defensive force against police to be lawful, the forced used by the police must be excessive. The outcome then depends on what a reasonable person would conclude (this is where the jury or judge makes a rather subjective decision). If a reasonable person would conclude that the assailants are acting lawfully in arresting the person, then a higher bar must be clear to justifiably use force in defense of others. Wearing a jacket that says "Police" favors the "appears lawful" side (though if you happened to know for a fact that the person wearing the jacket is not a police officer, then the "police exception" would not be applicable). In the relevant case, the facts point to the appearance of a lawful arrest (even if were to turn out to be judged unlawful). In the case that this is an apparent arrest, it would have to be the case that a reasonable person would find the force used to be excessive. Generally speaking, force used by officers is held to be reasonable, except in some cases where it is not. See for example the matter of Eric Garner, where the officers involved were not indicted. On the third hand, in this case, it might matter what the actual legal status of the "officers" is (they are not Chicago police).	In the U.S. there is no law that requires you to ever say a word to a law enforcement officer, and lawyers generally encourage you to minimize what you communicate to them anyway. I can't think of any situation where a request for information could not be demanded in writing. As a practical matter, in some situations you will probably be subject to some extra scrutiny and inconvenience: E.g., in a stop-and-identify situation, you could hand the officer a note saying, "Please make any requests for information from me in writing." The officer may infer that you have some disability, but if he does not (or discovers you don't) he may get irritated enough to subject you to harassment for "contempt of cop". Of course, if you can understand him, you are still required to obey an officer's lawful orders no matter how they are communicated. But "speak" is not a lawful order.
Are cops required by law to have "reasonable suspicion" in order to detain a person? If so, do they have to inform the detainee about the suspicion? I was stopped while cycling on hwy 59 in Texas, about 50 miles south of Huston. Officer started asking me questions about my travels. I asked: "Have I done anything illegal? Officer: "No, but I need your ID" I: Am I being detained? Officer: No. I: Am I free to go? Officer: Hmm.. No. I: Do you not have to have a "reasonable suspicion" to detein me? Officer: No, I do not. I need to know who you are. What if a truck passes you by, and the wind draft pushes you into the ditch and you die. We need to know who to send the body to. I thought he was joking, and I started to walk away. Then another officer (ID 13378) came and said I had to show ID or he will arrest me. I gave him my ID and I was on my way quickly. My question is: Did the cops act illegally in any way there? Do they or do they not have to have a reasonable suspicion to detain people on the road? I love cycling my way to wherever I need to go. I comply even with what I consider illegal requests from cops, but it is getting aggravating after too many encounters. I wrote a few emails to the state, but no answer 😕 Edit: I tried ACLU and same, no answer, no reply. I tried to simply tell cops "NO, it's not ok" and I got arrested for obstructing an officer (I have a question about it here ) I tried cycling south of the US-MX border. That seems to have worked great :) If the answer is "no, the cops are not required to tell the detainee the reason for stoping" (which is counter intuitive), can someone back that up with an actual law or case law please?	If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.	In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless.	Does said police department have any obligation to ID, investigate and detain / arrest the false caller? No. See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 US 748 (2005). Usually, police do investigate, but that is a matter of department policy and political expectations, not a legal obligation to do so.	How far can one go to defend him/herself from an unreasonable search and seizures, in the same sense of one defending him/herself from an unlawful arrest? Not very far. Basically all you can do is try to talk the officer out of it. He thinks he sees evidence in sight... If the police officer reasonably believes that there is evidence of a crime in plain view, then the officer can proceed to seize the evidence. If the property owner tries to use force to prevent the seizure, then the officer can arrest the property owner. ... the property owner ... highly believes there is no possible way he could have seen the evidence from outside his property. It doesn't matter what the owner believes (unless the owner can somehow convince the officer before the search). What matters is what the court believes. But the owner cannot bring the matter to court before the officer enters the shed. If the officer insists on entering the shed and the owner can establish in court that the officer couldn't see the evidence and that there was no other lawful basis for a warrantless search or seizure, then the evidence will be inadmissible. The owner might also be able to prevail in a civil suit for the violation of civil rights, but the bar for such a suit is very high, so the likelihood is very small.	The legality of the stop may be somewhat up in the air, but it would seem that the vehicle is not in the Texassure database, so it is reasonable to think that the person driving is not insured, and therefore is breaking the law. And that is all that is required: that the suspicion is reasonable. Until someone makes a sufficiently persuasive legal stink about this, it is probably a legal stop. This article gives some legal discussion. One applicable case is US v. Broca-Martinez, a Texas case where a person was pulled over for being "unconfirmed" w.r.t. the insurance database: the court held that this was a reasonable suspicion. Thereafter, a charitable interpretation is that you misunderstood the request in providing your sister's information when he asked for your license and insurance: but you are expected to understand that when they request your license and proofs of insurance, they mean you the driver, and not the car owner. That they is even more suspicious, although I understand your confusion. At your hearing you cane explain why you didn't comply with the first officer's request, and the judge may they chalk this up to a simple misunderstanding rather than intentional deception. The problem is that you are expected to know – whether or not you've ever been pulled over before – that you have to provide license, registration, and proof of insurance. You will have a hard time making it believable that you didn't understand what the officer told you and what the law requires.	In the U.S. there is no law that requires you to ever say a word to a law enforcement officer, and lawyers generally encourage you to minimize what you communicate to them anyway. I can't think of any situation where a request for information could not be demanded in writing. As a practical matter, in some situations you will probably be subject to some extra scrutiny and inconvenience: E.g., in a stop-and-identify situation, you could hand the officer a note saying, "Please make any requests for information from me in writing." The officer may infer that you have some disability, but if he does not (or discovers you don't) he may get irritated enough to subject you to harassment for "contempt of cop". Of course, if you can understand him, you are still required to obey an officer's lawful orders no matter how they are communicated. But "speak" is not a lawful order.	england-and-wales NO Unlike some other jurisdictions, there is no requirement for an officer to have "probable cause1" or suspect an offence as the police can stop a vehicle for any reason under section 163 Road Traffic Act 1988: (1) A person driving a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road must stop the vehicle on being required to do so by a constable in uniform or a traffic officer. (2) A person riding a cycle on a road must stop the cycle on being required to do so by a constable in uniform or a traffic officer. (3) If a person fails to comply with this section he is guilty of an offence. There is no associated power to search the vehicle or its occupants but under section 164 and section 165 the driver must produce inter alia their licence, name, date of birth, address, insurance details and other relevant documents as the case may be. Note that although vehicle stops can be random, police officers are subject to the public sector equality duty under section 149 Equality Act 2010 and not permitted to stop a vehicle solely based on the occupants' protected characteristics. 1The term "probable cause" is not used in the UK, but roughly equates to somewhere around reasonable suspicion / reasonable belief	The police officers themselves are covered by Qualified Immunity - to put it briefly, a government official acting in their official capacity in a discretionary act (as in, they have some discretion in whether/how they carry out the act) is immune from suit so long as they pay reasonable deference to relevant law. In the case of the police, so long as the search or seizure itself is reasonable (either because there is a warrant, or because they had probable cause), they can take appropriately destructive measures to carry out their duty. Even if the search or seizure is later found to have been unreasonable, an officer may still have Qualified Immunity unless their action violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would have known" (Harlow v. Fitzgerald). However, a search/seizure doesn't give the police license for arbitrary destruction, whatever they do has to be reasonably pursuant to the legal search/seizure. For example, if a suspect is barricaded in a house with a gun, they can knock down doors, windows and walls to apprehend them. On the other hand, that does not mean the officers can then break open safes to try and find evidence - once their probable cause for the entry is fulfilled (apprehending the suspect), they need to get a warrant to do more than a plain sight search of the house. Warrants will specify what items are being searched for, so even with a warrant the police have to take reasonable measures to carry it out - an example of an unreasonable measure would be to tear into walls in order to try and find a stolen bicycle. On the other hand, tearing into walls could be justified if their warrant included searching for drugs from a dealer, where it is not uncommon to hide them in the walls. States and the Federal Government enjoy Sovereign Immunity from suits in most cases. There are some exceptions, but none would apply in this case so long as the general policy of the police department was not illegal or unconstitutional. However, county and city governments do not enjoy Sovereign Immunity and state governments and the Federal Government often allow suits against them for negligence from their actors, so someone injured by unreasonable police action can usually try to recover damages from the officer's department.
Under what circumstances can the police detain you? after watching the video about the recent fiasco in Mckinney Texas I was curious about whether any of the teens that the officer pulled over had the legal right to just walk away. Under what scenario is a police officer allowed to detain you? Do they need a reason to believe that you committed a crime, or can they just detain you without any reason at all? If you need a state, use Texas, if you need a city, use McKinney. Please make it clear under what scope the laws actually reside.	Brief detentions and reasonable suspicion You can be briefly detained by police if they have reasonable suspicion that you committed a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) What reasonable suspicion "means" can only be fully understood by reference to subsequent case law (which I will expand this answer to do), but as a basis, the court said in Terry that: the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion This standard has been reiterated as recently as in Heien v. North Carolina 574 U. S. ____ (2014), where they say "All parties agree that to justify this type of seizure [a traffic stop, in the case of Heien], officers need only reasonable suspicion — that is, a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of breaking the law" (internal quotation marks omitted). The reasonable suspicion standard was also used recently in Navarette v. California 572 U. S. ____ (2014). They reiterated that reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990). A mere "hunch" does not create reasonable suspicion, but the level of suspicion required by the reasonable suspicion standard is "obviously less than is necessary for probable cause". Arrests and probable cause To be arrested, police require probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) In more detail, probable cause exists (from Brinegar v. U.S.): where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed Also: The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. As in the case of reasonable suspicion, the probable cause analysis is case-by-case and fact-intensive, so to understand the contours of probable cause will require reference to much subsequent case law. In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) the question before the court was entirely "whether or not the record in the case before us can support a finding of probable cause for the petitioner's arrest". In that case, it turned out that the information they had received about the arrestee was not sufficient for probable cause, but regardless, the test the court applied was whether the police had probable cause for the arrest. Notes While I am confident in the correctness of this answer, what each of these standards means will take hours of work to flesh out, which I plan to do. The courts have repeatedly reiterated and referred to these decisions/standards, but the analysis is very fact-intensive and is done case-by-case. Also, I realize the presentation is a little scattershot, as I'm first just looking to include relevant cases and statements the court has made about these standards, but I'll re-make it into a coherent story every once in a while.	It is possible that there is such a booklet in some jurisdiction, and that local police are required to carry that booklet and show it to persons on demand. This link (apparently) publicly provides the police manual for the city of Seattle, except it is 5 years and a major lawsuit out of date. No provision seems to exist that requires showing authority to detain, when requested. There is no general requirement for all police and all laws, in the US, and the full set of state, county and city codes would be impractical to lug around. If required by law to carry and display some such document, then by law a person can demand to see a police officer's authority to detain. Even without such a law, you have a First Amendment right to challenge the detention, but that does not also enable you to resist arrest. A detention is not invalidated by the fact that the detainee is unsatisfied that the detention is legal.	In the United States, the government has, multiple times, destroyed homes while trying to catch a fugitive. And the homeowner sometimes makes a claim in federal court that this is an unconstitutional taking without compensation in violation of the 5th Amendment. In Lech v. Jackson, the 10th Circuit decided that the police and city were not liable for destroying a house while trying to arrest a criminal who had fled there. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. But in Baker v. City of McKinney, Texas, less than 3 months ago, a district court declined to dismiss a case in which police destroyed a home to catch a fleeing criminal. Allegedly, in this case the police were given a key to the door, a garage door opener, and the code to the back gate by the homeowner - and instead of using those, they used explosives on the garage door and used a BearCat to knock down the fence and the front door. I'm not sure to what extent those facts, perhaps showing that the scale of the destruction was unnecessary, matter. To the best of my knowledge the case is still ongoing.	Hot Pursuit What you're describing is a hot pursuit, and in the US, common law says that police officers crossing state lines while in hot pursuit is absolutely allowed. An active pursuit is considered an exigent circumstance, which gives police all kinds of temporary powers they don't normally have.	"Police" that one would generally encounter in the US are local or state agencies, and the ordinary crimes you mentioned are matters of state law, so they would be reported to local or state police. (There are federal law enforcement agencies, but they only deal with specialized areas of federal law, and you wouldn't ordinarily encounter them in daily life.) On the other hand, immigration is a matter of federal law. The responsibilities of local or state police are governed by state law, and the federal government cannot compel state officers to enforce federal law. A specific state's law could potentially require state and local police to ask about people's immigration status and/or ask the federal government to check on the status of someone they suspect might be illegal. I believe a few red states have enacted, or are considering, such laws, though they usually deal with people stopped by police rather than people filing a report. Some of these laws have been challenged in court, and I am not sure which exact parts of which laws are still being implemented for each of those states. Most states do not have such laws.	I think you're being confused by two separate definitions of "police power." The police power under the 10th Amendment has nothing to do with "the police," i.e. people with guns and badges and uniforms who make arrests. It refers to the authority of a government to make rules for the general welfare. Police power is almost always exercised by the legislature, and when the executive exercises it (e.g. by issuing regulations) it's typically operating under conditions set by the legislature. The United States has police power in a few situations: DC, federal property and territories, US-flagged ships on the high seas, etc. Outside of those situations, the United States instead has enumerated powers. Congress has a power to tax and spend to promote the general welfare, but otherwise it can only legislate to achieve one of the enumerated powers in the Constitution. Now, courts have read Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce very broadly, but there does need to be some relation to enumerated powers. You're asking about the Capitol Police, but they don't have "police power" in the 10th Amendment sense. They have the power to carry guns and to arrest people for crimes committed against the United States. This power is limited based on geography and/or the nature of their task; for instance, they have nationwide arrest powers "[i]n the performance of their protective duties," but not when they're traveling outside DC on other official duties (e.g. to attend training). While there's no litigation I can dig up that's directly on point, courts have repeatedly ruled that Congress has the power to do some not-entirely-legislative tasks in order to protect its own functions. For instance, in Anderson v. Dunn (1821), the Supreme Court upheld an inherent power of the House to hold private citizens in contempt of Congress for disobeying its subpoenas and for the Sergeant at Arms to arrest them and bring them before the House. It seems likely Congress would also have the authority to protect its own members from physical violence. The GAO did an analysis when it was analyzing whether there was a constitutional problem with making Capitol Police IG personnel into special deputy US marshals, and it concluded that there was no issue with congressional employees exercising arrest powers in order to physically protect the legislative branch.	D should be subpoenaing anything and everything they need from anyone and everyone, including E. No matter how good terms you are on, if you are involved in a lawsuit you should not be relying on anyone's good faith to supply you what you need. Suppose you ask nicely and they say yes but, for whatever reason, they don't supply them by your court date. Without a subpoena, if you ask for a continuance the judge will say "tough t*^%^$s"; with a subpoena they will say " Yes certainly, oh, and Mr Sheriff, here is a warrant for the documents, go and get them for me please. Oh and a warrant for the arrest of the person who ignored my subpoena." Where do you want to be?	A related post is here. Are police required to record in car dashcam video for traffic tickets in NJ, USA? Probably not. Is there any way to find out if they aren’t telling the truth? Ask and hope you are not lied to. Can I contact the police chief, mayor, or municipal judge? You can contact the police chief or mayor if you can get through to them. They are not required to answer you unless you make a formal discovery request or public records request. You cannot make ex parte contact with a judge when the other side's lawyer (in this case, the city's lawyer) is not present. How can I defend myself in court trial if the judge always believes highly credible police officers over defendants if I don’t have video? You can tell your side of the story under oath with any details that makes your story believable. You are correct that the judge will usually believe the police officer and not you. So, usually you will lose. This is one reason that most people try to plea bargain their traffic tickets, rather than going to trial. Due process rights give you an opportunity to tell your side of the story when contesting a ticket, but it doesn't give you a right to win (even if you are actually in the right) if the judge or other trier of fact doesn't believe what you have to say. It does not appear that you have a right to a jury trial in a traffic case in New Jersey, although this depends to some extent on the kind of violation being charged, so you are probably stuck with the beliefs of the municipal court judge about who is the more credible witness.
Told by police that I'm being detained. No probable cause or statute/law given. Am I free to leave? I recently watched this video on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FSJTxalznxE It's of a man open carrying a shotgun and filming from a public street. Nothing he did was illegal which later in the video is even confirmed by the female officer. Yet when the man asks the cop if he was being detained she responded "Yes" and when asked for a reason, she said something along the lines of I'm carrying out an investigation from a call we received. I read another post on this website about what constitutes probable cause and it's my understanding that in the instance of this video, the police officer did not have probable cause to detain this man. Given that there is no probable cause as per my personal understanding of the situation and that no law was broken, according to the officer's own words, would it be illegal to walk away from the cops? Bonus question: If this man decided to run away, what reasons do the cops have to chase after him and if they did in fact chase after him, what would the reason for his arrest be?	There is a lot of confusion over the difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause. They are not the same thing. Reasonable suspicion is any justifiable belief that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Probable cause requires an officer to have actual, tangible evidence that you have committed a crime. Only after probable cause has been established can an officer arrest you (with limited ability to search your immediate person and effects). Reasonable suspicion only requires some articulatable justification that you did something wrong. The police can detain you on reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you why. This is called a Terry stop (after Terry v. Ohio where the Supreme Court ruled this was legal). However, they can only detain you long enough to ascertain whether or not they have probable cause to arrest you. If after conducting a preliminary investigation they can't find probable cause to make an arrest, they have to let you go. In that video, we have a guy walking around in Texas with a shotgun and some shells. We never see what this guy looks like or how he's carrying himself, but he appears to be a troll. The cops received a call, so they investigated. They had all the reasonable suspicion they needed to detain him. Texas is an open carry state (a person can walk around openly with a gun), and it is not a stop-and-identify state (the police cannot demand that you ID yourself). Therefore the man did not break any laws. But neither did the police officers. They were doing their job by asking questions, and after failing to find any evidence, they let him go. If he had run before the officers had cleared him to leave, they could have chased him down and arrested him. That is, after all, what a detention is. You don't get to run away because you don't recognize a cop's authority to stop you. And fleeing a law enforcement officer is a crime. But you do have the right not to answer any questions, including (in some states) what your name is.	You did not commit any crime, but that does not mean you cannot be charged with a crime. Up to the point where you take the item back out of your pocket, a police officer would have probable cause to believe you were attempting to steal the merchandise, and probable cause is all he would need to charge you. At trial, the government would have the burden of proving that you intended to actually steal the item, but it can satisfy that burden merely by showing that your actions were consistent with such an intention. You would have the option of testifying that you planned to pay for the item. From there, it would be up to a jury to decide whether it believes you. If so, you should be acquitted. If not, you would likely be convicted, and your conviction would likely be affirmed on appeal.	In Massachusetts where I live, here are the general guidelines: In re G.L. c. 268, § 32B(b). A person can be charged with resisting arrest only when the officer is acting under the color of his official position (meaning he is on duty and acting according to those duties). The Commonwealth must also prove that the defendant knew that the person seeking to make the arrest was a “police officer.” The Commonwealth may do so by proving that the officer was in uniform or, if not in uniform, identified himself (herself) by exhibiting his (her) credentials as a police officer while attempting to make the arrest. Such credentials would include such things as a badge, insignia, identification card, police radio, or other police equipment such as a clearly identified police vehicle. Thus, in Massachusetts according to usual legal interpretation: (1) The officer must be on duty and acting in an official capacity. (2) The officer must be provably known to be a police officer by some means to the person charged. Resisting arrest must be ancillary to some other charge. You cannot just be charged with "resisting arrest" unless you are actually being arrested on some other charge (or interfering with someone else being arrested). So, as far as a search is concerned, even if the resisting arrest charge were thrown out, the real question would be why was the person being arrested in the first place? That would determine the admitability of the evidence.	The answer provided by Dale M is half right, but there are a few things that I think are wrong. Firstly, the actual reality of the situation doesn't matter. What matters is that you act in a reasonable manner, performing assessments of the situation as a reasonable person would do. If you misread the situation, and end up killing a police officer that was acting in a lawful manner, it doesn't necessarily mean you were acting unlawfully yourself. Because police officers are generally exposed to situations where they would be forced to use their firearm, that obviously would impact how a reasonable person would see the situation, but the test for reasonableness would not go out the window. In addition, even if you were found to not be acting in a reasonable manner, there is certainly a question if you would be found guilty of a lesser charge of manslaughter rather than murder. It's possible the self-defence claim would be upheld as an imperfect defence.	So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense.	Assuming, pending information about the jurisdiction, that this happened in the US, the answer is it depends. As described in Justia's Vehicular Searches article and Wikipedia's Motor vehicle exception article, Under US law police can search a motor vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause. This doctrine was first stated by the US Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132 (1925) and later modified or repeated in Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). All of these cases involved contraband, but in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court broadened the rule to evidentiary searches. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458–64 (1971) In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) the Court ruled that the search must be reasonably contemporaneous with the stop, so that it was not permissible to remove the vehicle to the station house for a warrant-less search at the convenience of the police. Subsequent cases have widened the scope of the exception, although the probable cause requirement has remained, and stops must have at least "articulable and reasonable suspicion". In the case of an ordinary traffic stop, the police may conduct a Terry-type search, based on "articulable suspicion". However, if the police arrest the driver, that is grounds to search the car under Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) Under Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S.(and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 note 9 (1982).) police may remove the car for a search elsewhere if they have probable cause to believe that there is contraband (such as alcohol, drugs, or weapons) in the car. Thus the arrest justified a search, as described in the question. It might not have justified the tow if there was not probable cause to suspect contraband. But that depends on the detailed facts, and judging those is beyond the scope of this site. In Collins vs Virginia (2018) the Court ruled that a warrant-less search of a car parked on the owner's property and within the curtilage was not justified. (The "curtilage" is the area near the house which gets additional Fourth Amendment protection, almost as if it were inside the house). However, in that case no arrest was made at the time of the search, and the search was based on an officer recalling the car having been used to elude arrest some two months previously, not just a few minutes before, so that case may not apply in the situation described above. If there was no probable cause, any evidence found might be subject to suppression, and a suit for damages under sec 1983 might be brought against the officers and the police force, but that would depend on the specific facts, and would in practice require a lawyer skilled in such matters.	This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best.	No An arrest is the act of detaining a person or property by legal authority or warrant and has been made when a police officer or another individual makes it clear to the person that they are no longer a free person. A person does not need to be physically touched to be placed under arrest as words alone are capable of bringing about an arrest if they establish that the person is no longer a free person. Now, if a LEO asks you to accompany them, then, so long as you have the choice not to, you are not under arrest.
Can online physical threats be reported as crimes and to what agency? Someone has made repeated physical threats (essentially, that they will beat me up) in multiple FB discussions. This person presents themselves under their real identity (is not a troll with a fake name) and I know that because we used to be friends and still have mutual friends. We live in different US states but the threats, of which I have screenshots, were made in a different language though I am sure it can easily be certifiably translated. Can I report these threats to a law enforcement agency and which agency should it be, considering we live in different jurisdictions?	Yes, although whether you get any response depends on a lot of factors. Specific, credible threats are much more likely to get a response than "I'm gonna kick your ass, amphibient, you (insert opposing viewpoint/sports team/etc)." The law broken in question would be: 18 U.S. Code § 875.c: Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. As you are in different states, this would need to be reported at a national level. This would be done at https://www.ic3.gov/complaint/default.aspx. Whether or not this is the best option depends on what you hope to accomplish and whether the other person is likely to act on those threats.	Probably not Now, some US constitutional rights do get interpreted very broadly, and it's possible this might be the case here too. But fundamentally, this situation is not equivalent to the security contractors example you mentioned. The crux is that Facebook already has every right to delete your posts for whatever reason they want. A security contractor does not have any intrinsic right to conduct searches (warrantless or otherwise) on your person, residence or effects. Facebook can choose, at their sole discretion, to delete all your posts, delete none of your posts, or delete some of your posts according to whatever metric they came up with. In this case, the metric is 'did the government flag this as misinformation'. The government isn't censoring you - Facebook is, and Facebook is allowed to do that (they happen in this case to be following the government's advice on what specifically needs censoring, but where they choose to get their advice is also purely their business). A security contractor, by contrast, can't do much of anything to you, except when they have been specifically deputized by the government to do so by some legal process. If this happens, then they are said to be acting 'under color of law', and suddenly First (and Eighth, etc) Amendment restrictions do begin to constrain their actions. Facebook is not getting any kind of state power delegated to them, and thus they aren't considered to be acting 'under color of law'. They aren't doing anything they were not already allowed to do.	No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.	It's exactly the opposite. All arrests are public record under California Government Code 6254(f): Notwithstanding any other provision of this subdivision, state and local law enforcement agencies shall make public the following information, except to the extent that disclosure of a particular item of information would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation: (1) The full name and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency, the individual’s physical description including date of birth, color of eyes and hair, sex, height and weight, the time and date of arrest, the time and date of booking, the location of the arrest, the factual circumstances surrounding the arrest, the amount of bail set, the time and manner of release or the location where the individual is currently being held, and all charges the individual is being held upon, including any outstanding warrants from other jurisdictions and parole or probation holds. Other than the "endanger the safety" exception, which could be applied case-by-case, there is no general exemption for refugees or asylum seekers. Trials are also public, see What does it mean that a trial in a US court is "Public"?. Members of the public cannot be excluded from a trial, and the defendant can't "opt out" of this. This is considered to be a central feature of US justice systems and an important check on possible abuses of the criminal judicial process.	So first things first, whether or not Stand Your Ground is in play, the burden of proof is always on the State to prove any crime did happen and any defense does not. Another thing that I think you confused in your question is it seems apparent that you think Stand Your Ground is Self Defense. This is not true. In the United States, self-defense is always a legal right for a victim of a potential crime, regardless of if your state has Stand Your Ground or Duty to Flee laws. Self-Defense typically can include justifiable homicide as you are not privy to the intent of the bad actor. Under Duty To Flee laws, you cannot claim self defense if you could reasonably get away from a criminal action safely... if given the choice between fight or flight, you must flee the scene. Stand Your Ground contradicts this and says that if you are in a public place and a criminal is trying to make you a victim, you have every right to defend yourself without any duty to remove yourself from the situation first... basically at this point, you can make either choice and not worry about losing justifiable Homicide. Making a criminal arrest of a Stand Your Ground claimant at the seen is not necessarily required. While the claim may be disputed, in the case of firearms, using an illegally owned weapon is typically ground for arrest regardless... (probably not in cases where the illegal gun was introduced to the scene by the dead criminal... and the victim picked it up in a scuffle... though this requires some measure of sorting out). Legal Fire Arms are very well documented and the fire arm in question will be confiscated as evidence. If it is found that it was not a justifiable homicide, the person in question is probably at the address tied to the gun. Now, again, Stand Your Ground only applies to steps needed for Self-Defense, it is not self-defense itself. Self-Defense authorizes only the amount of force needed to safely resolve the situation, up to and including leathal force, but it does not require you to kill the perpetrator in every instance it is invoked. For example, if merely pointing a gun at a perpetrator is enough to stop the crime, you do not get to pull the trigger. That flips it back into homicide. Similarly, if I pull my gun and the guy advances anyway, I may fire and if the guy is on the ground and out cold (thus, no longer a threat), I don't get to walk up, and put a second bullet between his eyes, execution style. This too is murder. As a bit of anecdotal evidence, when I was living in Florida, I worked for a man who just recently purchased a firearm for self-defense (in the home only) and he said that when he was filling out paperwork with the police, the cop looking over his paperwork said, "Now remember, if you have to use that, shoot to kill. It's less paperwork for us." Now, I wasn't there when to cop said it, I don't know what his tone was. I took it as the cop being a little funny, but maybe a little inappropriate. I cannot speak to how much that is indicitive of FL Police culture. It was hearsay on my part... I just thouht it was funny and... demonstrates the attitude towards self-defense. Essentially, by the time cops arrive at the scene, they HARD PART is over... they merely have to collect evidence and take witness statements. If the shooter is cooperating and his story checks out, it will look very bad if they detain a crime victim who defended himself. It's just bad PR. Ultimately, his job is to collect all evidence, not determine if the case should go to trial. As I mentioned, the gun was legally owned in the specific case, and more than likely the CCTV tape is collected, but not yet viewed. Hindsight may be 20/20 but at the time, I do not think it's fair to say that the cop knew this might not be such a clear cut case. In such cases, the cop may not make an arrest because there is not any crime that he can charge the man with and he is cooperating. And keep in mind that in the heat of the moment for the shooter, he may not even realize he did something that might break his self-defense case. Cops can detain a person claiming Stand Your Ground for just about any legitimate reason, even suspicion of homicide that the detainee will claim is self-defense.	It may depend on what offences are suspected of being committed. One example is: In the united-states under 18 U.S. Code § 2258A an Electronic Service Provider (ESP) is required to report apparent violations of sections: 2251 [Sexual exploitation of children] 2251A [Selling or buying of children] 2252 [material involving the sexual exploitation of minors] 2252A [material constituting or containing child pornography] 2252B [Misleading domain names with intent] 2260 [sexually explicit depictions of a minor etc] The report is made to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) who in turn forward the information to the relevant domestic or foreign law enforcement agency. The ESP is protected from commiting distribution or related offences when making the report by virtue of subsection (g)(4): Permitted disclosure by a provider.— A provider that submits a report under subsection (a)(1) may disclose by mail, electronic transmission, or other reasonable means, information, including visual depictions contained in the report, in a manner consistent with permitted disclosures under paragraphs (3) through (8) of section 2702(b) only to a law enforcement agency described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of paragraph (3), to NCMEC, or as necessary to respond to legal process.	"Police" that one would generally encounter in the US are local or state agencies, and the ordinary crimes you mentioned are matters of state law, so they would be reported to local or state police. (There are federal law enforcement agencies, but they only deal with specialized areas of federal law, and you wouldn't ordinarily encounter them in daily life.) On the other hand, immigration is a matter of federal law. The responsibilities of local or state police are governed by state law, and the federal government cannot compel state officers to enforce federal law. A specific state's law could potentially require state and local police to ask about people's immigration status and/or ask the federal government to check on the status of someone they suspect might be illegal. I believe a few red states have enacted, or are considering, such laws, though they usually deal with people stopped by police rather than people filing a report. Some of these laws have been challenged in court, and I am not sure which exact parts of which laws are still being implemented for each of those states. Most states do not have such laws.	How does John protect himself from false claims (e.g. if the woman decides to roll down the stairs and blame him)? It would be very helpful if John has evidence of Oxana making false statements about him or others, and/or of Oxana threatening to make them. False accusations are common --and hardly ever prosecuted-- in a context of divorce. Examples of that are police reports (here and here) and excerpts of court proceedings that ensued during my father's (desisted) proceedings to divorce his 2nd wife (for additional excerpts, see also at 22:49-24:29). According to one of those police reports, my father's 2nd wife allegedly extorted him with "You'll have to pay me even until my ring!" (see page 15 of the pdf file) at the time they were going through the divorce proceedings he filed. Based on your description, it is not far-fetched that John could end up experiencing a similar mess as reflected in these police reports. Note: I don't know whether the poorly written quote from page 15 of the pdf was my father's translation of their interactions or whether he merely transcribed them to the police. Is there any downside to basically putting a camera in every room of the house except hers? John is strongly suggested to check Ohio law to avoid criminal charges. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 750.539d(1)(a) prohibits to "Install, place, or use in any private place, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing, recording, transmitting, photographing, or eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in that place.". As a wife, Oxana would be reasonably entitled to that privacy in rooms other than --and including-- her room. Moreover, placing cameras in every room will not preempt false accusations. For instance, Oxana could still calumniate John by falsely alleging that he and the daughter went to a hotel to have intercourse. How do you find a good divorce lawyer? Before you even decide to retain a lawyer, see this report about New Jersey Family Court, where judges and attorneys allegedly are in the habit of dragging divorce cases for as long as it is profitable to the lawyers (obviously, at the expense of the parties pursuing the divorce). I don't really follow --and have never litigated-- divorce matters, but the multi-year divorce & custody case of Tsimhoni --formerly presided by Michigan infamous judge Lisa Gorcyca-- illustrates that NJ is not the only state where parties fall prey of legal malpractice. John should search for Ohio court opinions related to divorce matters and get acquainted with the applicable concepts, laws, and doctrines. For that purpose, one free, very useful resource is http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch . Court opinions usually cite relevant statutes, whence John can get an idea of what laws are decisive on divorce matters. Is it reasonable to ask for some sort of record of past outcomes (are there standards to provide full and complete records like for financial companies)? It is reasonable, but no, there are no such standards at all. An attorney will most likely allege grounds of attorney-client privilege, the extensive time that would be needed to redact court documents, and possibly other excuses to deny John's request. Instead, John should go to the court in his county and study as many files of divorce cases as he can. A number of courts display some information of cases in their website. For example, some Michigan trial courts have deployed Odyssey (see here and here), whence a party could search from home whether an attorney has litigated cases in that court and how long they've taken. To see the contents of complaints/motions/etc., John can read them only in the courthouse, unless the county court has configured Odyssey (or its equivalent) to allow the public to read the contents from elsewhere. I don't know what progress Ohio courts have made on this. Regardless of the attorney's transparency to share with John any redacted records about his performance, another important variable is the judge. In this regard, see the next item. Is it reasonable to ask to pay way less if the lawyer fails to get certain terms? Unfortunately, that is neither reaonsable nor realistic. Just from meeting with John, it is impossible for the attorney to know aspects such as: whether John is truthful and the meritorious party; how much trouble Oxana will cause during the divorce proceedings (see the aforementioned police reports); how vexatious the opposing counsel will be; whether John will weaken or sabotage his case during an unforeseen situation or lose control as a result of exasperation; whether the case will be presided by a judge who follows the law (instead of incurring personal bias or influence trafficking); if the judge engages in influence trafficking instead of following the law, whether the attorney is in cozy terms with that judge; whether the opposing counsel is in even cozier terms with that judge; in the event that the matter is appealed, any of the three previous items may apply; whether the parties settle (or John desists for whatever reason). Given the multitude of unknown/uncertain variables and possible outcomes, no person (attorney or otherwise) could establish beforehand the semi-contingent pricing that you have in mind. Do the lawyers even do anything other than fill out paperwork? Yes, they do, but that doesn't necessarily mean that what their work is any effective. Even if the lawyer is diligent, the court might negligently fail to enforce its own orders.
My mother passed away without a will or a spouse we are now in probate, and my mother owes $80,000 on her home which is appraised for a 120,000 My mother passed away on February 5th of this year. My eldest brother signed his right away to administrate the probate. My mother had no spouse and there are only 3 heirs: me (the youngest) and 2 older brothers. I live 4 and a 1/2 hours away, and I am disabled, yet even though we are still in probate, my brother acting administrator has already kept to himself or gave to my other older brother all of my mother's possessions. My mother had sufficient money in her bank account to cover all debts and funeral costs. My mother's home was appraised for $120,000, however she still owes 80,000 on the home. My brother tells me that there have been several interested parties but after inspection it has fell through a couple times or the parties did not come to an agreement. My brother has already given all of my mother's possessions to himself or my other brother, or sold them, not to cover any debts owed by her, just so they could get the stuff out of the house so they could sell it, so they tell me. When they were dividing all of this stuff up they did not even call and tell me they were doing so. I am so sorry if I am not doing this correctly, as I mentioned I am disabled and I'm very confused. Can anyone tell me what the best option would be concerning the sale of her home? I guess my question is if they are unable to sell the home, does the estate just lose out on all the money that my mother paid on the home since it appraised for much more then she owes or what would be the best situation for me and my brothers?	What happens when a person dies intestate is that the court appoints someone to be the executor. That person is supposed to settle the decedent's debts, and divide the remainder equally among the siblings. It is virtually guaranteed that the mortgage-holder will get their share – you can't just sell a house with a mortgage and run. In the meantime, the estate has to keep paying the mortgage and property taxes. The executor has wide latitude to dispose of the estate, and clearing out personal possessions is a necessary part of liquidating the estate. Those possessions being part of the estate, they "count", therefore that mink coat worth $10,000 can't just be "taken" by the executor in order to tidy things up. But that broken weed-eater worth $1 can just be thrown away and not stored for some months, waiting for the final reckoning. The executor is entitled to compensation for his work and reimbursement for his expenses, so nickle and diming the small possessions is probably economically counterproductive. The executor has the legal power to determine how the legally required distribution is carried out, that is, the law doesn't require a majority vote of the heirs in order to dispose of each and every item of property. If there is an actual legal dispute, if you believe that the executor is improperly carrying out the job, you can hire a lawyer to have him removed, or otherwise put pressure on him to get a change in how things are. This will probably cost you more than you might get from the estate. It is possible that the real estate market will not support the current sale price and therefore a lower asking price is necessary (i.e. the executor needs a reality check). A combination real estate agent + lawyer could help you figure out what to do with the house to make it sell.	One often has to show a family relationship or other legitimate grounds to access a death certificate even though it is a public record and I suspect that this is the case in Nebraska as well. But anyone who has access to a death certificate has access to all of it, including the cause of death. If the cause of death is initially undetermined, the coroner's office would have discretion about whether to update the death certificate as new information becomes available to the coroner, and a family member could make a personal appeal to the coroner not to exercise his discretion in this manner. But there is no legal grounds upon which a family would have a right to go to court to prevent a coroner from updating a death certificate on any grounds. Keep in mind also that cause of death on a death certificate isn't even a complete sentence worth of explanation and is in very medical/scientific terminology. Some government investigation reports are available for the public to see in an open records request under state law, but there is usually an exception for ongoing criminal investigations which is calculated to provide tactical benefit to the government in its efforts to catch criminals, rather than to preserve the feelings of the next of kin. There might be grounds for the next of kin to ask a court to redact a government investigation report which would otherwise be available to the public in an open records request, and to seal the unredacted copy, either because leaving it open could facilitate identity theft, or because the material revealed would appeal to the prurient interests of third-parties reading it without advancing a valid public interest (i.e. if it would be basically pornographic for many people requesting it).	Until the estate is settled and the interest in the house is definitively resolved, the estate has to pay property taxes. There is no requirement for the house to be insured, unless there is a mortgage and insurance is mandated by the lender. The duties of the personal representative generally include taking reasonable steps to protect the assets of the estate, which would include reasonable insurance coverage -- which the estate would pay for. Necessary maintenance would also be included in the things that are to covered by the estate, for example the cost of repairing a broken water pipe (which can cause serious loss, if not repaired). Freshening up the paint in preparation for selling the house, assuming that the house is to be sold and the assets divided, would also be covered by the estate. Utilities, on the other hand, are not within the realm of things that need to be done to protect the interests of the beneficiaries: that is a benefit to whoever lives there, making it their responsibility. The question is foot-dragging is a separate issue, one that should be resolved with the aid of your lawyer. I do not understand why he would maintain that the estate is responsible for paying the utilities.	This will depend on the exact wording of the will. If the will is well-drawn, it will provide alternative recipients in case the primary recipient of a bequest dies before the testator (will-maker) does. But as a general rule, if A makes a will leaving particular property to B, but B dies before A does, that bequest is void. If the will specifies an alternate recipient, the property goes to the alternate. If not, or if all specified alternates die before the testator does, the property becomes part of the residual estate of the testator. (The residual estate is that part which is not subject to a specific bequest.) The testator can specify a line of descent for a bequest: "I leave my house to Joan and her heirs". In that case, if Joan died before the testator, the house would go to whatever person or persons inherit from Joan. This was once a somewhat common form of bequest, but now is much less common. A will normally includes language leaving the residual estate to some person (or several people) or some entity (it can be an organization, such as a church or a charity). This is often done with language such as "I leave all the rest of my estate to ..." OR "Everything not include above i leave to..." or "I give all the remainder and residue of my estate to...". The executor does not choose, but rather follows the directions of the will on who gets the residue of the estate. I am not sure what happens if the will does not name a residuary legatee, or if the person so named dies before the testator. That will depend on the specific law of the jurisdiction. In the US, this means state law, and will vary from state to state. The comment by Dale M says that assets not provided for in the will are inherited as if the person was intestate, that is, as if the person had no valid will. The law in each jurisdiction specifies exactly what rules are followed in the case of intestacy. In general this is that property goes first to the teatator's spouse and children, but if there are no living spouse and children, to more distant relatives. Eventually, if no relatives close enough can be found, property escheats, that is, goes to the government. The exact rule varies by jurisdiction -- in the US by state.	If it looks like a gift and sounds like a gift and there is no evidence that it should not be considered a gift, well, what else could it be? Given the value of a house and depending on jurisdiction, there may be a gift tax involved. This is normally an obligation placed on the giver, not the receiver. It is unlikely to be a concern to you but a separate check would be wise for your own sake. If all ownership documents are clear that you and you alone own (and pay regular costs of, and maintain) the house, it is extremely unlikely that any private individual can take it away from you, regardless of their relationship to you. There doesn't appear to be any legal basis for their claims; they are hoping you will bow to social and emotional pressure. Your best course of action is to call their bluff. Request a written statement (ideally through their lawyer) that identifies the reason for their claims of ownership or otherwise why the property should be transferred to them (ideally checked by your lawyer) and proceed from your lawyer's advice.	The best course would be to contact the public defenders office and explain the situation to their intake or consultation services. Remember, you don't have to be going to trial to avail yourself of their services and sometimes, helping cops makes the cops suspicious about you (it would not be the first killer who cozies up to the police to learn what they know about his crime). If the Public Defender thinks you're rich enough not to need their services, you should call criminal defense attorney practices. Most law offices will offer consultation free of charge as part of client intake, so they will be willing to hear your case and offer advice. In either case, check with the lawyer that attorney client privilege is in effect. If they say yes, explain in detail to them, everything you know and want to discuss, even if some of it could criminally implicate you in this or another crime. Treat it as your deathbed confession and you know full well which circle of hell you're going to if the priest doesn't absolve you of sins (okay, too Catholic... but the Lawyer is not going to turn you in if the privilege is in effect... he could lose his license to practice law over it... we can make all the evil lawyer jokes we want, but this is one of the few sacred tenants of their profession.). Listen to his advise. Also see if you can find a second opinion. It's not that the first guy gave bad advice, but the next guy might give you something different. If you still do not feel comfortable, then keep your mouth shut. If they arrest you for the murder, do not talk until you have an attorney present and prepare to tell him exactly what you did. Especially if you did do it. Always answer your attorney truthfully.	The will further states property shall be sold and offspring are to split the proceeds. However, the will does not specifically designate who inherits the property/deed. This is an instruction regarding who inherits the property. It means that the executor of the probate estate (in an official capacity), who takes title by operation of law upon appointment, is directed to sell the property rather than to distributed it in kind. Will there be legal or financial problems with a foreign executor? Not necessarily. Generally, the main issue is that a foreign executor must sign a document expressly submitting to the jurisdiction of the probate court when appointed in addition to other documents that are signed by all executors. Pre-death, in the will, would it be better to designate the American resident offspring as executor? Not necessarily. Hands on administration of the estate and dealing face to face with a local probate lawyer is easier for a resident of the state where the assets are located and the decedent resides, but in these days of telecommunications this isn't a decisive factor. The relative competencies of the prospective executors is more important. If both offspring agreed, can the overseas offspring easily transfer executorship to the American offspring, or will there be legal or financial consequences? Assuming that they are the only interested parties in the estate, they can do so. You can't be compelled to serve as an executor just because you are nominated by a will to do so. If one person declines to serve, the person with next highest priority which would likely be the other sibling, may apply to the probate court to be appointed. The main financial consequence is that typically, whoever does the job is entitled to reasonable compensation from the estate for their services. Would there be legal or financial deed ownership issues, since neither offspring specifically inherited the property? No. Could a court order the property to be auctioned out from under the offspring? If all interested parties agree, they can defy the will. The normal process, however, is for the executor to follow the will and to sell the property in a commercially reasonable manner, typically by engaging a real estate agent to handle the sale. If the executor fails to take action, and an interested party objects, it would be more common for a probate court to remove the executor and appoint another one, than to order a sale at auction, which would typically be a course of last resort. This said, under appropriate circumstances, the court of probate jurisdiction would have authority to order an auction of the house. Most commonly, a court order to sell a decedent's house at auction would arise when the decedent (i.e. the dead guy) only owned an undivided partial interest in the house (called a tenancy in common interest) and the non-deceased third party co-owner of the house (perhaps a brother or ex-wife of the decedent) declined to cooperate in selling it. If a court determines the overseas executor offspring receives the property deed, the overseas executor wants to remain executor but give deed to American offspring for easier selling of the property, would the property have to go through titling and closing costs for the transfer, and then again for property sale to a third party? This question reflects a fundamental misunderstanding about how probate works. Title to the property vests in the estate by operation of law upon the death of the decedent. The executor has authority, once appointed, to take actions such as signing a deed to a third-party buyer, on behalf of the estate. There is no intermediate closing and transfer of title to vest title to the property of the decedent in the name of the estate before it goes from the estate to the third party. The net proceeds of the sale to the third party (after costs of sale and prorations of things like property taxes and prepaid insurance) are then placed in a bank account for the estate and paid to the heirs after expenses of administration are paid. There is nothing that makes it significantly harder for an overseas executor to close than a domestic one. The title company handling the sale emails the deed (and any other paperwork that needs to be signed) to the executor. The executor prints the documents to be signed, signs the non-notarized documents, and signs the deed in the presence of his friendly neighborhood notary in the foreign country where the executor lives, who notarizes the deed. The executed deed, together with a document called an apostille proving that the notary is really a notary, is sent back to the title company (probably with a scanned copy by email and a hard paper copy following by express delivery). Coordinating time zones may be a pain depending on the location of the particular foreign country in question (but the closing does not have to happen for all parties at exact the same time), and if the overseas executor is someplace primitive and remote with no internet access or computers or printers or faxes and no notaries, that could be a problem. But there are increasingly few places like that in the world.	I know it's not a huge amount of money, but I'm not currently in a position to pay it. Is it still legal to send invoices this long from the past? Yes, it is legal. And the surveyor is still within the statute of limitations to sue you for breach of contract. Beyond the purely legislative aspect, personally I would encourage you to pay the surveyor once you are in a position to do so, even if the statute of limitations had expired. From your description, it seems that the surveyor acted with nobility in that Even though he didn't mention any payment, he sent me the survey. and there is no indication that the survey was faulty. Thus, it would be opportunistic not to honor your part in the contract under pretext of the statute of limitations. Consider this: You would not wish to be deprived of compensation today (or once the debtor becomes able to pay you) simply because years earlier you were too overwhelmed to send an invoice for work you actually performed.
Can I sue for being banned from a federal museum? When I was three years old, my dad received a notice from our local interpretive center banning him and his children from the premises. This museum is federal property, coordinated and overseen by US fish and wildlife and the Corps of Engineers. We were banned in 2002, and in 2015 my dad was sent another letter lifting our ban. I was 16 at this time. Is it lawful to ban a minor from federal property?	Banning you from the museum raises questions about your due process, equal protection, and First Amendment rights. Generally speaking, a person banned like this would be unlikely to collect any damages, but may be able to obtain injunctive relief to prevent the museum from enforcing its ban. Of course, it would depend on the reason for the ban and the procedures the museum went through in imposing the ban and permitting you to challenge it. In your case, though, the ban has already been lifted, so there's probably not much room for any kind of legal action. EDIT: Since there are several people contesting -- with no law to support them -- the validity of this answer, here's a case discussing the First Amendment implications of access to museums: As a limited public forum, there are certain First Amendment activities permitted on [National Civil War Museum] grounds and others that are not. For example, lectures or programs on a Civil War topic authorized by the museum and the public's attendance at these activities would be permitted uses, but activities concerning other topics (including the immorality of homosexual activity) would not. Diener v. Reed, 232 F. Supp. 2d 362, 385 (M.D. Pa. 2002), aff'd, 77 F. App'x 601 (3d Cir. 2003).	This has yet to be specifically decided in the federal courts. The Post Office can set "rules of conduct" for its facilities. Prohibiting photographing is plainly a restriction on one's First Amendment rights, and it is established beyond question that a government cannot issue / enforce a blanket prohibition of public photographing. Someone would have to take a case to court to determine whether this limitation on First Amendment rights passes the relevant level of judicial scrutiny. The rationale (as set forth by the USPS) is that such photographing may be "disruptive". One can perhaps analogize the right to film police with a new-found right to film post office, following from a right to public oversight over the government. DHS gives general guidance of its own (with a pile of redacted stuff), directing you to 41 CFR 102-74.420. Permission is thus required, until the courts find that to be an unconstitutional restriction (I would not expect there to be such a finding). But it is not unthinkable that the courts could at some point so rule. The YouTube aspect of the question is irrelevant: if you have the right, you have the right, and it doesn't derive from nor is it blocked by an intent to distribute on YouTube.	Who knows. It doesn't matter. 17 USC 102 lists the kinds of things protectable by copyright under US law. These are: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. A landscape feature is none of these and is not subject to copyright protection under US law, nor I think under the law of any other country. The "copyright notice" has no legal effect. 17 USC 120 Specifically prohibits copyright being used to prevent the taking of pictures of a building from a public place. In many countries Freedom of panorama (FOP) specifically permits publication of photos taken from public places. Se also this article on FOP. FOP is an exception to copyright protection, which applies to copyrighted architectural works and publicly posted works of art, such as sculptures. Since landscape features are not copyrightable at all, FOP does not strictly apply to them, but all the arguments for FOP would apply to them even more strongly. In US Law, particularly under the Fiest vs Rural case, only works with original content, created by a person, are protected by copyright. (Other countries generally have similar limits on copyright.) But a feature of the landscape is not the original creation of any person. (If someone carved the landscape into a designed shape, it might be protect able as a sculpture.) 3 and 4. If it were a building, you could take pictures of it from a public place or a private place where you have a legal right to be, under 17 USC 120 . But since a part of the landscape is not protected by copyright at all, this is not really relevant. No under the US First amendment there is generally a right to say even false things. But if the landowner attempts to enforce this "copyright" it would be considered frivolous and any court proceeding would be promptly tossed out. The sign gives the landowner no rights s/he would not otherwise have.	The ruling that allows the ban on child pornography is based on two SCOTUS decisions: Miller v. Califorina, which legally defined "obscene" and declared obscenities to be beyond the protection of the First Amendment (just an fyi, the definition includes that the material is lacking in "serious scientific, literary, artistic, or political value" which the courts usually don't hold a high threshold of quality above. Obscenity laws are also, per Miller, to be in the power of the most local levels of governance among a body of people (so while the U.S. cannot ban content on a web forum, the forum's own rules may). The other case is law is New York v. Furber which held that there is a compeling government interest in protecting the physical and mental health and well being of a child and that the manufacture and sale of child porn leads to the abuse of children and tramautic memories of the experience that last for much of their lifetime that overrides any protection offered by the First Amendment, thus the material need not be legally obscene to make illegal. It's that compelling government interest that forms the basis of the answer. Because that is the justification for the illegalization of child porn and as such it would not always fall to obscenity laws without the interest, there is a bit of a loop hole. To be illegal, the pictures in question must have a real child featured in the porn in question. Thus pictures depicting fictional characters in their entirety (such as cartoon depictions of children) and erotica (literature featuring sexual content) are not illegal under Ferber and must fall to Miller to determine if it is illegal. Because Miller leaves the rules to the lowest level of community law possible, these pictures can be against the rules of many websites, 4chan is (in)famous for having next to no standards, this kind of material is perfectly legal on this site as far as higher levels of government are concerned and it falls to the moderation team of 4chan (such as they are) to limit the offensive content. It is because these materials do not depict actual real children that they are legal. This is due to the fact that these works can just barely qualify as having an artistic or literary value (the bar is very very low as to what qualifies as "merit" under Miller). It's also acceptable to make pictures of a real child portraying a fictional character who in the story is a victim of child pornography, regardless of the work's depiction so long as you aren't actually having the child actor strip on camera. This can be done by giving the child flesh colored clothing that covers the areas deemed obscene and using shoot angles that depict the child's skin that is legally allowed to be exposed (to hid the fact that for legal reasons the child is legally dressed on the set. Other production tricks are to hire actors who are older than 18 years old, but look younger than they are and can play a kid.). So long as you are not actually making child porn (showing the "no-no areas" on a real child), you can make fiction works that depict fictional characters involved in such activities in artistic ways to make any statement you want on the subject matter. In your two examples, Operation Avalance targeted sites that had materials such as pictures and videos that depicted actual children in pornographic situations. In the case of the Megaupload, the U.S. was requesting extradition for money laundering and racketeering in connection with the legal seizure of Megaupload following investigations into the site concerning digital piracy. I'm unaware of actual instances of child porn involved, but not saying it's not impossible. Extradition only works if the country requested (Here New Zealand) chooses to honor the request (the U.S. and New Zealand have an extradition treaty and very similar laws so extradition is both required per treaty when requested AND the accused person would face similar charges if the crime was committed in the requested country.).	Assuming that all of these locations are in the same state, this is not an issue of federal law and is not governed by the U.S. Constitution. The geographical jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement officers is exclusively a matter of state law and has no single correct resolution. Different states handle the issue differently. Even if state law or the state constitution prohibited the arrest, this violation of state law or the state constitution, would not give rise to a federal claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which may vindicate only federal rights, and could not form a basis for a collateral attack on a state court conviction in a federal court habeas corpus petition which is likewise limited to vindications of federal law rights. Any remedy would have to be secured in the state court system invoking state law rights (assuming for sake of argument that state law provides such a remedy), or in a diversity lawsuit in federal court applying state substantive law, if the defendant was from another state and the amount in controversy was in excess of $75,000.	In general, ownership of a thing includes the property right to dispose of or destroy the thing. However, there may be statutory prohibitions for special categories of property. Many countries have entered into treaties that obligate them to identify, protect, and conserve for future generations the cultural heritage in its territory. This includes "architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting." See e.g. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. How this protection is realized is dependent on the nation's domestic implementation. For one example of a protection regime, see british-columbia. When a work has been designated as a "Provincial heritage object" on the Provincial heritage register (Heritage Conservation Act, s. 3(1)), the owner is prohibited from damaging, desecrating, or altering that work without a permit (s. 12.1(2)(a)). There is also a complex web of import and export restrictions relating to objects that a country has identified as cultural heritage. Many countries make it an offence to import an item from another country that has identified the object as cultural heritage without an export permit from that other country. That export permit will often not be provided to an entity without demonstrated capacity to preserve the cultural property. The permit can also subject to conditions (presumably, at least to not destroy the thing). See generally "Guide to Exporting Cultural Property from Canada," "Cultural property export permits." I am not familiar with the United States' implementation, but it is a party to the World Heritage Convention and has passed various statutes dealing relating to the protection of cultural moveable property.	Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant).	18 USC 1752: (a) Whoever— (1) knowingly enters or remains in any restricted building or grounds without lawful authority to do so; [...] shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). (b) The punishment for a violation of subsection (a) is— (1) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, if— (A) the person, during and in relation to the offense, uses or carries a deadly or dangerous weapon or firearm; or (B) the offense results in significant bodily injury as defined by section 2118(e)(3); and (2) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, in any other case. (c) In this section— (1) the term “restricted buildings or grounds” means any posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area— (A) of the White House or its grounds, or the Vice President’s official residence or its grounds; [...] An ex-president does not have "lawful authority" to occupy the building. They may be not only removed, but also arrested and criminally prosecuted. "Squatter's rights" or other eviction protections would come from the District of Columbia's local laws, over which federal law takes precedence. So they would not apply here.
Unintentionally assisting someone's suicide Let's say I drop my gun on the street (accidentally or not). A man walks by, picks up my gun, and shoots himself in the head. Should I be convicted?	The legal question is whether you can be convicted of a crime under the laws of some jurisdiction on earth. I'll start by assuming that you are in a jurisdiction where you can legally possess firearms and carry them in public. Since you added "and commits suicide", I assume you're not asking if it is a crime to drop a firearm, the question is just criminal culpability for this consequence. Now we will zoom into the laws of a specific jurisdiction, Washington state. RCW 9A.36.060 says A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he or she knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide. The question then is whether your act "knowingly causes or aids" an attempted suicide. You turn to the jury instructions to see what that means: A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a [fact] [circumstance] [or] [result] when he or she is aware of that [fact] [circumstance] [or] [result]. [It is not necessary that the person know that the [fact] [circumstance] [or] [result] is defined by law as being unlawful or an element of a crime.] If a person has information that would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that a fact exists, the jury is permitted but not required to find that he or she acted with knowledge of that fact. [When acting knowingly [as to a particular fact] is required to establish an element of a crime, the element is also established if a person acts intentionally [as to that fact].] The outcome depends on specific circumstances. For example, "accidentally and unknowingly drop and leave" will not sustain a conviction. "Intentionally drop and leave" could, but you would also have to other information connecting the suicide to the availability of a weapon. If you intentionally drop and leave a firearm at a shooting range, a reasonable person would not think "OMG someone might see this weapon and kill themselves with it! Hahaha!". You can spin a yarn where you know that Smith is suicidal and will kill himself if he has a weapon, so that dropping the gun off constitutes "knowingly aiding".	It would depend on your intent, among other things If the prosecution stand a reasonable chance of proving you intended to kill that person by infecting them with coronavirus, they may choose to charge you with attempted murder. Obviously, it would be highly fact-specific. In the alternative (and the far more likely prospect) they could charge you with assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s47 of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861 (OAPA) or inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to s20 OAPA. The exact alternative charge would depend on the effects suffered by the victim and whether it could be proven that you were responsible. If so, and the infection was particularly severe, it could be an s20 offence (GBH). If not, it would probably be an s47 offence (ABH). Of course, if the person caught it and died, and the causation test was passed, etc. then you'd be looking at a murder charge. The same with attempted murder if they didn't die but the causation test was proven and your intent was also proven. However, realistically the most likely charge is ABH or GBH.	The "felony murder" doctrine, which applies in most of the U.S. (including California), holds criminals engaged in "dangerous felonies" responsible for any deaths that occur during the commission of such crimes. In the given example, the hostage taker and anyone who is an accessory to that aggravated assault would, if convicted, also be guilty of murder for deaths that occurred in connection with the incident, regardless of their intent.	This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't	This is the Texas law pertaining to self defense, which says that "a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force". Relatively little of the law pertains to firearms, and none of it restricts the right to self-defense based on whether you are a resident, or you are using your own firearm vs. a borrowed one. The one provision, subsection (b)(5), that refers to firearms is an exception whereby force is not justified, namely if the actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's differences with the other person while the actor was: (A) carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02; or (B) possessing or transporting a weapon in violation of Section 46.05. (Sect. 46.02 is about conditions unlawful carrying of weapons, which covers such things as under-age carrying of certain knives, or not having control of your weapon, or being a felon in possession, etc. 46.05 is about machine guns, explosives, zip guns etc.) Deadly force is covered by a separate section, 9.32, adding the requirement that the actor "reasonably believe[] the deadly force [to be] immediately necessary". (A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or (B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Note that "deadly force" is defined as "force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury". Sec. 9.33 likewise allows deadly force to be used analogously in defense of a third person, and intreestingly, in 9.34(b), "A person is justified in using both force and deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force or deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an emergency". In addition, deadly force can be justified in defense of property, per sec. 9.41, if you "reasonably believe[] the force [to be] immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property", and you may also use force to recover or re-enter the property (as long as the force is used "immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession", and "the actor reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when he dispossessed the actor; or the other accomplished the dispossession by using force, threat, or fraud against the actor"). Sec. 9.42 then provides the possibility of justified use of deadly force in protection of property, if the force is immediately necessary (A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or (B) to prevent the other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the property; and (3) he reasonably believes that: (A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; or (B) the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The short version is, if deadly force is justified in the particular circumstances, then deadly force with a borrowed weapon is justified. However, there are federal laws regarding non-resident aliens possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(B) says that It shall be unlawful for any person...who, being an alien (A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or (B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)))...to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce Under subsection (y) there are exceptions for licensed hunters, government representatives etc. You can also petition the Attorney General for an exception. The point is that federal law would make possession of a firearm illegal for most visa types: here is the list.	From a comment on the question: They did damage the trailer door and headlight is smashed This seems like the best thing to focus on, especially if you can show that it was not damaged before they towed it. The unusual method of towing (with video evidence) may be a factor in whether they are considered negligent. If the damage to the door looks like they caused it directly by breaking in, that would also help your case. You also asked in your comment if you should go to the police or to a lawyer first. Might as well go to the lawyer and see what they tell you to do. I'm not sure what the police would do if there is no clear crime that has been committed. (The lawyer should have better advice about whether/why to go to the police.)	Let's say you leave fake drugs in someone's yard. Eg, you expect the police to be dumb enough to believe it and arrest the other person Obstructing a public officer, specifically "deliberately hindering a public officer from carrying out official duties". Trespassing.	Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo!
Pretending to be from the "Freedom to Breathe Agency": impersonating an officer? There's a woman going around claiming to be from the federal "Freedom to Breathe Agency", telling store workers that they can personally be sued for telling customers that they need to wear a mask. Multiple people have said that she should be arrested for impersonating a federal officer. However, 18 U.S. Code § 912 - Officer or employee of the United States says: Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. IANAL, but I don't think tricking an employee into believing that they can be personally sued for asking a customer to wear a mask counts as "thing of value". So what does "act as such" mean when the person claims to be from a non-existent agency? Since there isn't any federal Freedom to Breathe Agency, there doesn't exist any way that an employee of it would act. (NOTE: The woman claiming to be from the "Freedom to Breathe Agency" might very well have committed other crimes. I'm solely asking about the crime of impersonation.)	The clause you highlighted has an "or" in front of it: "..., or in such pretended character...". It's only one alternative. Demanding or obtaining money, etc, is sufficient to violate the statute but not necessary. Looking at the previous clause, it is still a violation if the pretender merely "acts as such", which I suppose is what people allege this person is doing. She can be guilty without having demanded or obtained anything, so the question about whether it's a "thing of value" is moot. As to the "nonexistent agency" issue: a useful source for information about how federal criminal laws are interpreted and enforced is the Justice Department's Criminal Resource Manual. (The link may be a past version; they seem to have reorganized their documents and I can't find a version not marked as "archived", but I think the information is still valuable.) 18 USC 912 is discussed in sections 1469-1477 of that version. Section 1474 examines the meaning of the "acts as such" element, and includes this note: It is not necessary that the act be one which the pretended officer would have authority to perform if he were in fact the officer he represents himself to be. Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916); United States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d at 98. Nor is it necessary that there be in fact such an officer as the defendant pretends to be. Caruso v. United States, 414 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1969). Caruso in particular was a case in which the defendant, as part of a scam, claimed to be the Administrator of a Veterans Hospital. He was convicted, and appealed on the basis that the government had not proved that the office of administrator existed. (Just as in this case, the government certainly could not prove that the Freedom to Breathe Agency existed, since it does not.) The Fifth Circuit found that his point had "no merit" and, citing Brafford v. United States (6 Cir. 1919, 259 F. 511, 513), that it was "immaterial whether or not there was any government officer or employee with the precise title [the defendant] assumed". I realize that claiming to be a nonexistent officer is not exactly the same thing as claiming to represent a nonexistent agency, but I would expect that courts would treat it the same.	Am i going to jail? I'm so scared. No, probably not. The details depend on jurisdiction, but normally the only crime you could be accused of would be that of forgery. However, forgery by definition requires an "intention to deceive". So my personal advice would be to come clean immediately: Go to your employer, and tell them you did not understand the checkout system and accidentally signed yourself, instead of having the customer sign. If you do that, what you did would not count as forgery, because (as you explain) you did not do it on purpose to trick someone. Now, your boss may still decide to discipline you in some way, maybe even fire you, but that's out of your hand. If they are reasonable, they'll hopefully understand a minor mistake on the first day. That said, it is possible your jurisdiction has special penalties for incorrectly filling out medical documents, so there may be more to it - but I doubt it. To be sure, try asking someone you know and trust who is familiar with the legal rules around medication. Or book a single consultation with a lawyer - this is not cheap (typically around $100 in the USA, or 100€ in the EU), but will give you peace of mind. You could also try asking around if there is a local initiative which offers legal help, possibly a professional organization or trade union.	That the cop claims to be your friend is not more illegal than a salesman claiming that he has "the best offer" for you because he likes you (in fact didn't you see any film about the good cop/bad cop routine?) The term you are looking for is Entrapment. The (very simplified) basic idea is that police officers can promote the comission of a crime to catch criminals but cannot "trap" innocent people into it; the difference being that their persuassion should not turn otherwise innocent people into criminals. An extreme example would be if the cop threatens the target into commiting a crime. For the more usual situation when a cop promotes a crime to catch the criminal, I saw it explained (just for illustration purposes, it is not that you are safe when the cop insists a third time) as it follows: Legal: Cop) Oh boy! The place where I work is full of cash and they don't even have alarms or store it in a safe box. If someone helps me, we could go this night and take all of it. Are you interested? Target) I don't know. Cop) Trust me, it will be easy, nobody is there at night and it will be just a couple of hours. Target) Ok, count me in. Illegal Cop) Oh boy! The place where I work is full of cash and they don't even have alarms or store it in a safe box. If someone helps me, we could go this night and take all of it. Are you interested? Target) I am not a thief. Cop) Come on, it will be easy, the place is insured and nobody will be hurt. Target) Not interested. Cop) We can get 5000 US$ each one, just for a night of work. Didn't you told me that you had troubles with your bank? You could solve those overnight! Target) Maybe you are right, but I have no experience with these things... Cop) Do not worry, I will tell you what you need to do. Target) Ok, count me in. Note that it is not only "the cop insisted a lot". For the drug dealer example, if the cop insisted a lot but, when agreed, the boy produced the drug from his pocket, already packaged for sale, it would not be entrapment. OTOH, if the guy had told "I do not know where to buy drugs" and the cop had told him "go talk with X so he sells you the drug", then it could be considered entrampment. In any case, this is generic information only, entrapment is difficult to prove and will depend on the views of the judge/jury so, no matter how enticing that criminal offer is, just don't do it.	Yes, why not? It happens all the time. Usually the witness will just say, "I am not sure" or "I don't remember, exactly". Also, if Bob is the only witness, how would anyone prove that he was committing "perjury"? In the case of an uncooperative or dissimulating witness, Judges sometimes can hold them in contempt of court, but it is pretty rare. In general, the court has to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the witness is refusing to testify honestly. (See "Federal Grand Jury Practice and Procedure" by Paul Diamond) It depends very much on the situation. Note that just trying to act "drunk" would not be a good idea, because that is contempt of court.	Keep in mind that there are two kinds of legal consequences. One is criminal liability for violating a criminal statute, in a prosecution that must usually be brought by a government official. Merely causing emotional distress, in and of itself, is not generally a crime. For that matter, inducing someone to have sex with you through lies about anything other than the identity of the person having sex is usually not a crime. But inducing someone to disclose secrets or take actions that they otherwise would not have taken based upon a statement like this could be wire fraud, theft, extortion, or a variety of other crimes, depending upon what the person A was induced to do by the messages. Knowing what was sent, in isolation, doesn't tell you everything you need to know. While practicing medicine or other healing arts without a license is a crime or at least a civil offense, this wouldn't necessarily qualify, because person B is pretending to create someone treating person B, not pretending to practice medicine on person A. No one who wasn't in on the prank had medicine purportedly practiced upon them. But if the text were use to cause someone to act in reliance on a medical opinion (e.g., to get an employer to grant family leave to person A) then it might be illegal practice of medicine. The second is civil liability, in the form of a lawsuit for committing a civil wrong, called a "tort" or breaching a contract, or for other private individual initiated requests for remedies. The conduct in the question, conceivably gives rise to civil liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, or civil fraud. But to know that it isn't enough to know what was said. One also has to know what happened on the other end of the communication. Did person A believe the text? Did person A suffer extreme emotional distress? Did person A part with money or information that couldn't have been obtained without a false statement of fact? Was person A's reputation harmed somehow?	Potentially, yes - especially if its the government you lie to in your CV/resume or course of work. Wayne Simmons, a regular Fox News commentator who claimed to have worked for the Central Intelligence Agency for almost three decades, was arrested on Thursday for allegedly fabricating his agency experience. CNN Money reports that Simmons appeared in court on Thursday, where he faced charges of major fraud against the United States for falsely claiming to be a former “outside paramilitary special operations officer”—a padded resume that federal officials say he used to successfully gain government security clearances. https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/10/wayne-simmons-cia-arrested-fox-news/ Simmons claimed to have been an "outside paramilitary special operations officer" for the CIA from 1973 to 2000. Not only did he use that claim to get guest appearances on Fox News, but the government claims he used it to gain security clearances and a defense contractor gig that included advising senior military personnel overseas. He's now being charged with wire fraud, major fraud against the United States, and making false statements to the government and could face 35 years in prison. https://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/2015/10/can-you-get-arrested-for-lying-on-your-resume.html Making false or fraudulent statements also may be punishable by fine or imprisonment. https://www.usajobs.gov/Help/working-in-government/fair-and-transparent/signature-false-statements/	The answer from @BlueDogRanch is right as far as it goes, but omits a critical point. There are certain acts that are excluded from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act and granting a visa when it should have been denied is almost certainly one of them. The critical provisions are 28 USC § 2680(a) and (h). 28 USC § 2680. Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-- (a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. . . . (h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law. The decision to grant or deny a visa is generally placed in the discretion of a visa officer, evaluating the facts when informed by guidelines established by the U.S. Secretary of State and Department of Homeland Security which is a quasi-judicial role, and is subject to administrative appeal in some cases. As a result, even if that discretion is abused, the employee and the agency are immune from liability under the FTCA. The claim may be barred under 2680(h), as well, if the visa officer is sued for conspiring to cause one of the enunciated intentional torts and the visa officer is not a law enforcement officer. Also, if liability exists at all under the FTCA, it arises against the United States and not against the employee personally: The general rule is that federal employees enjoy absolute immunity from tort claims that challenge negligent or wrongful acts performed while acting within the scope of government employment. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229-30 (2007). The source of this absolute immunity is the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as the Westfall Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2010). Under the Westfall Act, the exclusive remedy for anyone injured by the negligent or wrongful act of a federal employee acting in the scope of employment is a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2010). The bottom line is that there are no private causes of action that arise under the immigration laws for a person not personally claiming improper denial of an immigration benefit. Cf. Mirmehdi v. United States, 662 F.3d 1073, Footnote 4 (9th Cir. 2011) (no cause of action exists for selective enforcement of the immigration laws); Tsolmon v. United States, 15-20609 (5th Cir. November 7, 2016) (discretionary exception clause barred FTCA action for failure to follow department policy re potential visa issue). But see Watson v. United States, 14-CV-6459 (E.D. New York, February 25, 2016) (discretionary acts exception did not apply to the deportation of a child who was a known U.S. citizen by immigration officers since this is beyond the scope of their authority). There is also no constitutional right to have the government deny a visa to someone not entitled to a visa under U.S. law or immigration guidelines. If someone brought a suit of the kind described in the question, they would almost certainly lose, probably on a motion to dismiss by the government filed before they were required to answer the complaint on the merits. A sufficiently negligent decision might constitute good cause to fire the visa officer from that person's civil service job, if their supervisor chose to seek the termination of the visa officer's employment. I will refrain from answering whether the sovereign immunity that exists in this circumstance is good policy as the question asks as that would be beyond the scope of this forum and implicate wide ranging questions of pure opinion. Suffice it to say that U.S. law on this question would not necessarily apply in every country.	This is not possible, simply as a matter of definitions and legal terminology. Someone who is "represented by one or more attorneys" is by definition not pro se which means representing yourself without an attorney. There are very rare instances in criminal trials involving serious consequences in which a pro se defendant is allowed to have an attorney advisor who does not represent them in court in an agency capacity, but, first, people who do that almost always lose and are almost always mentally ill (although not necessarily eligible for an insanity defense), and second, because courts generally don't allow this in any other circumstance (at least in court). The concept of getting advice from an attorney without having full fledged representation is called a "limited representation" and the law regarding limited representations more generally varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even between different courts in the same place. For example, Colorado's state courts and Colorado's federal courts have different rules for limited representations.
How are affirmative defenses of duress and necessity treated in U.S. law? Duress and Necessity are two common law "affirmative defenses" that can be argued for acquittal of a criminal charge. However I can't find clear law or precedent for either in the United States. Are they viable defenses in practice? Does any jurisprudence provide particular guidelines to their application in criminal law? Is "duress" limited to circumstances of a threat of "imminent harm"? Or are less imminent circumstances of coercion – e.g., extortion, blackmail, or psychological manipulation – viable affirmative defenses under legal doctrine of duress?	Yes, both duress and necessity remain viable defenses. The contours of these defenses will vary from state to state, but many states use the Model Penal Code. MPC § 3.02(1) lays out the necessity defense, which it calls justification: Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and (b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and (c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear. MPC § 2.09(1) lays out the standard for duress: It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. So MPC § 2.09 does not explicitly make imminence a requirement for the duress defense, but it adopts an objective standard, which permits the jury to factor in that consideration. A "person of reasonable firmness" would be less able to resist robbing a bank if the threat was to kill their child in 30 seconds than if the threat was to kill their grandmother in 50 years, during which the defendant can call the police to investigate the threat and the odds are good that granny dies anyway. I'd guess most duress cases fall somewhere in the middle, so it becomes a question for the jury whether the threat was serious enough and imminent enough to merit justification.	The clause refers to what might be a lawsuit, which can be adjudicated in appropriate government courts (cf. the choice of law clause), but instead would be submitted to an arbitrator. The contract will spell out the details. An offence is a punishable criminal act, which is outside the scope of civil suits. In US law, the government prosecutes the wrong-doer, not e.g. one of the parties to the contract (if for example the vendor ships an illegal substance to a customer). The same goes for a "breach of law", depending of course what you mean by breach of law. A breach of contract could not be pursued in court, given a mandatory arbitration clause. The fact that the two parties are in different countries does not nullify a mandatory arbitration clause, at least between the US and the UK.	In the specific example you have given, Florida law could not be applied. A state has jurisdiction over a crime under constitutional due process limits on the scope of a state's criminal jurisdiction if the crime is either committed within the state (regardless of where the harm occurs) or is directed at or impacts the state (the classic example is a gunshot fired from the Ohio side of the state line killing someone located in Indiana, which could be prosecuted in either state, or in both states as it doesn't violate double jeopardy to be prosecuted for the same offense by more than one sovereign). Sometimes these issues are framed not as "jurisdictional" per se, but as "conflict of law" questions limited by the constitution. The proof that a crime was committed in the territory where it is applicable is called proof of locus delecti and depends upon the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it. To determine where a crime is committed depends on what acts constitute the crime, something that leaves considerable room for flexible interpretation and a careful reading of the exact wording of the relevant criminal statute. The most important limitation on the territorial jurisdiction of a U.S. state is the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This applies directly in the case of federal criminal prosecutions in the federal courts, and applies in state courts because it is incorporated to apply in state court cases through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States under 20th century case law applying the "Selective Incorporation doctrine." The Sixth Amendment mandates that criminal trials be conducted “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” If a suspect is not present in a state to be criminally prosecuted, then the options available to a state are (1) to toll the running of the statute of limitations while the suspect is outside the state to the extent permitted by the relevant state statute and the U.S. Constitution, (2) to bring a civil lawsuit against the suspect instead of a criminal prosecution, or (3) to seek extradition of the suspect, which must be granted under certain circumstances under the United State Constitution and reads as follows in the pertinent part: Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2: A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. (Note that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil lawsuits. Civil lawsuit trials can be conducted in a state other than the state where the breach of contract or tort giving rise to the lawsuit took place for jurisdictional purposes and not infrequently is brought in another state, although constitutional choice of law rules limit the circumstances under which a particular state's laws can be applied to a particular set of circumstances in a lawsuit.) The Sixth Amendment, on its face, prohibits Florida from prosecuting a case in the example given in the question involving a crime that was committed solely in Washington State. Of course, the exact definition of the crime might determine where it was committed. In traditional "common law" "blue collar" crimes there is usually no ambiguity over where it is committed except in the most extraordinary circumstances, but in prosecutions of conspiracies and crimes involving economic activity (such as owning or mailing something), the question of where a crime is committed can grow much fuzzier. For example, one could imagine a differently defined crime prohibiting providing funds to finance a purchase of marijuana in excess of 20 grams being committed both in Washington State and Florida at the same time (e.g. perhaps a purchase of marijuana in Washington State was financed by a Florida bank by delivering cash to a courier in Florida who is bound for Washington State knowing that the cash would be used to finance a marijuana purchase). Similar ideas apply in international circumstances where the Sixth Amendment and Extradition Clause do not apply. But, in those cases, the more flexible and less well defined "law of nations" as interpreted by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court and the President still does impose some territorial boundaries on prosecutions for actions which are not crimes in the country where they are committed under that country's domestic laws. But, those boundaries are not so hard and fast and the idea that a crime is committed in places where it has an impact allow for considerable flexibility in prosecuting crimes committed outside the United States. It has also been well settled since the earliest days of the United States that "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (U.S. Supreme Court 1825) and that this applies to states applying each other's penal laws as well. So, Florida cannot enforce a violation of the criminal laws of Washington State in its courts either. If you get in a bar fight in Seattle, you can't be prosecute for assault in a court in Orlando, even if both of the parties to the bar fight were Orlando residents and U.S. citizens. Some notable cases resolving the question of whether locus delecti is present in a particular case include the following: In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) although none of the defendants had entered the District of Columbia as part of their conspiracy to defraud the United States, they were convicted because one co-conspirator had committed overt acts in Columbia (225 U.S., at 363). So conspiracy is a continuing offense committed in all the districts where a co-conspirator acts on the agreement. Similarly, In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257 (1890) the sending of letters from New York to postmasters in Connecticut in an attempt to gain postage on credit, made Connecticut, where the mail he addressed and dispatched was received, an appropriate venue (136 U.S., at 266—268). A typical state statute on the subject from Colorado's Revised Statutes (2016) is as follows: § 18-1-201. State jurisdiction (1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commits, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if: (a) The conduct constitutes an offense and is committed either wholly or partly within the state; or (b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt, as defined by this code, to commit an offense within the state; or (c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within the state, and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or (d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense prohibited under the laws of this state and such other jurisdiction. (2) An offense is committed partly within this state if conduct occurs in this state which is an element of an offense or if the result of conduct in this state is such an element. In homicide, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death or the death itself; and if the body of a criminal homicide victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state. (3) Whether an offender is in or outside of the state is immaterial to the commission of an offense based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state. Case law under this statute sometimes describes the issue presented under this statute a question of "sovereign jurisdiction." See, e.g., People v. Cullen, 695 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1984).	In the third of your sources (Harassment act, section 5), near the end, it says: If the defendant breaches an order under section 5 or 5A of the PHA 1997 without reasonable excuse, she/he will be guilty of a criminal offence (section 5(5) PHA 1997). The penalty that may be imposed upon breach of the new section 5A restraining order is identical to that which can be imposed under section 5. (Emphasis added) In Item 2 of the first source (darlingtons.com) it says: If a person disobeys the terms of an Order of Court which carries a penal notice, he will have breached the Injunction. As to whether such a breach constitutes contempt, will be considered on a case-by case approach according to the particular facts of the given case. The seriousness of the breach, and the question as to whether such action undermined or ‘laughed in the face of the Court Order’ so as to be contemptuous, will be determined by the Court. In item three of this same source it says: If the Court considers that the breach was intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice, the Court has power to commit a person to prison, and/or impose a fine. In short it appears that the court is expected to use judgement on a case-by-case basis. Violation of a restraining order because the person subject to the order had to provide emergency medical or fire or rescue services, or otherwise provide needed assistance in an emergency, with no improper motive, would, I should think, not lead to any penalty for contempt. US practice also expects a court to exercise judgement when sentencing for contempt.	California law has a general defense of necessity. It appears that it's not in statute, but rather comes from common law. It's described in what appears to be the official jury instructions at CALCRIM 3403. The defendant is not guilty of (insert crime[s]) if (he/she) acted because of legal necessity. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that: (He/She) acted in an emergency to prevent a signiﬁcant bodily harm or evil to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else); (He/She) had no adequate legal alternative; The defendant’s acts did not create a greater danger than the one avoided; When the defendant acted, (he/she) actually believed that the act was necessary to prevent the threatened harm or evil; A reasonable person would also have believed that the act was necessary under the circumstances; AND The defendant did not substantially contribute to the emergency. The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each of the six listed items is true. It seems like all six requirements would apply in your hypothetical case, so if you could prove them, you'd be off the hook for a violation of Cal. Penal 148(a)(1) as cited by user6726.	How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.	A couple of SCOTUS decisions bearing on this are Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, where the courts took pains to deny that "probable cause" is related to a number. From Texas v. Brown, the Court frequently has remarked, probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely required that the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief," Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 267 U. S. 162 (1925), that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct, or more likely true than false. A "practical, nontechnical" probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 From Illinois v. Gates, The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. The question is framed in terms of probability that a certain individual is guilty, but that is not the basis for issuing a search warrant. Rather, a warrant may be issued if there is a fair probability that evidence bearing on a crime will be found. That would include evidence that exonerates a person (the system is not set up to only favor convictions). It would be highly impractical to assign a numeric value to probability of finding evidence, since there is more to the matter than just declaring "It must have been one of these three people".	A threat is not a threat if its lawful Let's look at a particular statute s249K of the Crimes Act 1900 [NSW]: (1) A person who makes any unwarranted demand with menaces: (a) with the intention of obtaining a gain or of causing a loss, or (b) with the intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty, is guilty of an offence. s249I defines "unwarranted": (1) For the purposes of this Part, a demand with menaces is "unwarranted" unless the person believes that he or she has reasonable grounds for making the demand and reasonably believes that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. If you genuinely believe that you have reasonable grounds for your demand and that a lawsuit is a proper means of enforcing that demand, then threatening to initiate one is not blackmail.
Did the UK Prime Minister just accidentally claim to have committed treason? Section 3 of the Treason Felony Act 1848 says: If any person whatsoever shall, within the United Kingdom or without, compass, imagine, invent, devise, or intend to deprive or depose our Most Gracious Lady the Queen, from the style, honour, or royal name of the imperial crown of the United Kingdom, or of any other of her Majesty’s dominions and countries, or to levy war against her Majesty, within any part of the United Kingdom, in order by force or constraint to compel her to change her measures or counsels, or in order to put any force or constraint upon or in order to intimidate or overawe both Houses or either House of Parliament, or to move or stir any foreigner or stranger with force to invade the United Kingdom or any other of her Majesty’s dominions or countries under the obeisance of her Majesty, and such compassings, imaginations, inventions, devices, or intentions, or any of them, shall express, utter, or declare, by publishing any printing or writing or by any overt act or deed, every person so offending shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be transported beyond the seas for the term or his or her natural life. The Prime Minister has written to claim of his own Withdrawal Agreement from the EU: We are being told that the EU will not only impose tariffs on goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland, but that they might actually stop the transport of food products from GB to NI. I have to say that we never seriously believed that the EU would be willing to use a treaty, negotiated in good faith, to blockade one part of the UK, to cut it off, or that they would actually threaten to destroy the economic and territorial integrity of the UK. He goes on to mix language such as "actively undermining the Union of our country" and "we cannot leave the theoretical power to carve up our country – to divide it – in the hands of an international organisation." with remarks describing the EU as "friends". The Prime Minister was both personally responsible for the very agreement he is now complaining about, and also responsible for it being pushed through Parliament at speed and with less oversight than would be normal for such an agreement. Many of the issues now being considered problematic were raised not only at the time, but years earlier. My question is: Do the Prime Minister's current statements mean that his previous actions in signing the Withdrawal Agreement were threatening to "deprive" the monarch of her territory, and that by pushing it through Parliament at speed and in the manner in which he did, that he "intimidated or overawed" at least one of those Houses in this regard? As I have no legal training, I cannot trust my own interpretation of the Act: my interpretation would mean all republicans would be in prison for life, which clearly doesn't happen. I am not asking if the Withdrawal Agreement actually has the effect that the Prime Minister claims it has, but rather what would be true if one assumes it has the effect that the Prime Minister claims it has.	Do the Prime Minister's current statements mean that his previous actions in signing the Withdrawal Agreement were threatening to "deprive" the monarch of her territory, and that by pushing it through Parliament at speed and in the manner in which he did, that he "intimidated or overawed" at least one of those Houses in this regard? No. The Queen will not be "deprived" of any of her territory. She is still Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland has not reunified with Ireland, nor has Scotland declared independence and also removed her as Head of State. He also did not "intimidate or overawe" at least one of the Houses. This is for two reasons: The prime minister has political and legal legitimacy through the holding of a (sometimes substantial) majority in the Commons. If the Act passes the Commons, it will be because the prime minister enjoys the support of the MPs on their side (or at least a majority of MPs in the House, e.g. the Tory-DUP agreement of recent years). Under the Salisbury Convention, the House of Lords will not block any legislation that was promised in a Government's election manifesto. While the prime minister did not enter office on the back of a General Election when he agreed the Withdrawal Agreement with the EU, the subsequent amending and implementing Act of 2020 was mentioned in the Government's election manifesto in December 2019 and therefore the Lords will not block such legislation. Given these two facts, it is almost impossible to declare that either House were "intimidated or overawed". For example, the prime minister did not hold a gun to the heads of his MPs, he did not surround the House of Lords with an army until they voted the way he wanted them to. The fact that the Commons willingly supported his legislative programme, and by convention the Lords didn't block it, is evidence that the prime minister and his government enjoys political, and subsequently legal, legitimacy. In any event, the Queen cannot commit treason against herself. Anything done on the advice of her ministers cannot, on the face of it, constitute treason. Furthermore, the Prime Minister has not, on the facts, done anything that constitutes treason. Even if he were to technically commit treason by the letter of the Act somehow, the matter would have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt and it is highly likely that all but the most obvious and egregious examples would not meet the threshold for prosecution. For example, it would almost certainly not be in the public interest to prosecute a prime minister for delivering on their legitimate policy aims in line with the legal (correct) functioning of our legislative system. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any court agreeing that such activities are treason when the relevant Acts passed both Houses, and the Government of the day had legitimacy in the Commons with a substantial majority after a General Election in which the legislation formed a key manifesto commitment, and the Salisbury Convention means that the Lords didn't oppose it; they would likely hold that such activities are the intended outcome of our current democratic system. I cannot think of any examples (barring something like murdering the monarch) where a sitting prime minister could conceivably be charged with treason. Even advising the Queen to abdicate would not constitute treason, provided that the necessary Act had passed in both Houses. Perhaps it might be treason if the prime minister advised so without any legislation in place, but that would seem more of a political matter for Parliament to deal with in reality. I suppose it is possible that if a prime minister advised the Queen to abdicate without the legitimate consent of Parliament (as expressed through the passing of legislation), it is possible that they would be removed from office if a no-confidence motion was passed by the Commons and then they might be prosecuted, but it seems most unlikely.	The starting point of any analysis has to begin with asking what the scope of the Act's application is i.e. what acts fall under its remit and what does not. The question is whether Parliament intended the Act to apply to ANY alteration to the structure, or only a certain class of acts. Clearly it is not the former. With the latter then in mind, statements like that you pointed out merely acknowledge that the Party Wall Act does not cover every single conceivable alteration to a shared structure, as that statement has to be viewed in its entire context. You have left out the second half of the statement that stipulates the core principle of the Act, which is that the Act only imposes the req to serve notice only if, generally, the alteration would cause much structural change or damage. The de minimis threshold can be inferred from the list of activities covered under section 2. Notice that the general character of the listed activities envisage acts which are atypical (in the sense of just drilling holes etc.). This can also be inferred from Parliament's intent in its drafting of the Act as a whole. Also, it might just be common sense.	Since the US Federal government didn't try to pass any such law (nor would it have been politically possible in the period shortly before the US Civil War), there is no way to know with assurance how such a hypothetical law would have been addressed by the Supreme Court of the day, nor by the various states. Congress legally could have prohibited the importation of slaves after 1808, the constitution specifically grants this power. Congress legally could have prohibited interstate commerce in slaves. Congress could have repealed the Fugitive Slave Act. Congress legally could have imposed heavy taxes on the ownership of slaves. If heavy enough these could have been a de facto abolition. A series of Presidents could have appointed Justices inclined to overturn the Dred Scott decision (denying the possibility of citizen ship for most Negros, and denying that a "free" state could free slaves temporarily resident there). Congress could have passed laws requiring negro votes to be counted in federal elections. Various of the above hypothetical measures might have made slavery less economic, and thus less common, in time. Note that it is not likely that any actual Congress would have passed most of them. But I do not see how, absent a constitutional amendment, and absent a war, a simple Federal statute could have constitutionally abolished slavery de jure throughout the US. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was legally justified as a war measure, a confiscation from those in rebellion. It did not affect loyal slave states, such as Maryland. And it was never seriously tested in court anyway.	england-and-wales No. Reconciliation between victim and attacker has no bearing on the guilt of the attacker. It may have a bearing on the decision to prosecute: A victim can be forced to testify, but they may well not make a very convincing witness if they are. Also, in past times (when the police were the prosecutors for most crimes), they often had a "least said, soonest mended" approach to domestic violence. It may also have a bearing on the sentence. Note: England and Wales is a jurisdiction where prosecutions can occur without a complaint (in general).	The Queen (or King) is not the government; she represents the State. The difference is often ignored by ministers, but is important particularly in constitutional cases. Miller began as Miller v Home Office, a judicial review case. When it became clear that the question was what powers the government actually had in a certain situation, the Supreme Court decided that constitutional points should be argued by, effectively, an amicus curiae on behalf of the state, with government lawyers defending their own viewpoint (and other interested parties intervening). This made it, in their view, a case of the state versus the government, with 'Miller' being either an acknowledgement that the applicant remained a party or a means of distinguishing this case from all the other "R. -v- Government" cases over the years, depending on your point of view.	They still have the power They generally don’t because: Most activities of a criminal nature no matter how novel can be shoehorned as a new instance of an existing crime. Parliament is much more pro-active in its legislative agenda. The judicial system moves much more slowly.	This is the cited article. Thankfully, the interviewee provided a scan of the police letter he received, so the rest of this question is relatively easy to answer. He was specifically charged with Störung der öffentlichen Ordnung (lit. Disturbance of the public order) persuant to § 81(1) of the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz, which reads (after putting it through Google Translate): Who by a behavior that is likely to arouse legitimate annoyance, disturbs public order, commits an administrative offense and is punishable by a fine of up to 500 euros, unless the behavior is justified, in particular by the use of a constitutionally guaranteed right , In the event of aggravating circumstances, instead of a fine, imprisonment can be imprisoned for up to one week, or up to two weeks for repeated offenses. This law is almost certainly constitutional as it specifically allows exercise of constitutional rights. Note this also includes human rights, as Austria has included the European Convention on Human Rights as part of its constitution. Given that, I'm guessing if the interviewee had wanted to, he would have had a decent shot at having this charge dismissed.	Legally there is no problem. What you say is protected speech under the 1st Amendment as long as it is either true or a matter of opinion. However Ron Beyer's comment is a good one; while legal this sounds very inadvisable. You would be far better off hiring a lawyer. The Mr Dicks of this world make money from the widespread fear of legal action. He will probably fold as soon as he sees a letter from a lawyer threatening a lawsuit. Until then stalling doesn't cost him anything so he will carry on doing it. BTW, don't delay. I don't know about the US, but over here in the UK there are a number of ways that people like Mr Dick can make it hard to collect. Don't give him time to play shell games with his assets.
A legal payment for a product, but obtaining it at illegal place I'm in the US, and I was looking for the legal ways to watch English Premier League. Unfortunately, most of the legal streaming services do not support Linux, and I have a Linux. Technically, I could watch on my phone with a much smaller screen, because Android is supported. Also, I could install windows or android emulator on my system and use a browser from there to watch games. But all of these are complicated, hence the question: Can I pay legally for a service to watch a game, and then use illegal websites to watch it? Is it legal? Probably I am not gonna do that, but what is the answer?	Because of the nature of online distribution, "watching" a show involves copying, so you need permission from the copyright holder to make those copies. You get permission indirectly, when you access a show via a legal licensee who has permission to distribute. A pirate site has no permission, therefore you cannot legally sub-license the show, and in so doing, you infringe copyright. The issue is not whether you "paid for it", it is whether you have obtained proper permission. Under copyright law, a rights holder can simply arbitrarily deny you permission to copy the work.	I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B).	IANAL, just a programmer with an interest in legal rules. Due to the very permissive nature of the MIT license, no, it does not appear that anything illegal has been done. Specifically, the section to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software (emphasis mine) grants everyone the right to modify your code and share those modifications, provided one includes the license. Since this person has included your license (including your copyright notice), they have followed the conditions of the license and are able to share your stuff. Legally. Ethically, I still think its ****. This might be a good starting point in selecting a license (note the Modification column). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_free_and_open-source_software_licenses The CC-BY-SA license family, as mentioned by Ron Beyer in comments is on this list, for example. TL;DR: You unfortunately granted a more permissive license than what you wanted/needed to. This was a BadThing(TM), analogous to giving too broad of access rights to a method or class. Determine your desired permissions, then select a license that matches what you'd like to grant.	Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful.	I suspect this relates to the UK TV Licencing provisions as listed here, Specifically : Can I watch TV on my mobile phone without a TV Licence? If you’re using a mobile device powered solely by its own internal batteries – like a smartphone, tablet or laptop – you will be covered by your home’s TV Licence, wherever you’re using it in the UK and Channel Islands. However, if you’re away from home and plug one of these devices into the mains and use it to watch live on any channel, TV service or streaming service, or use BBC iPlayer*, you need to be covered by a separate TV Licence at that address (unless you’re in a vehicle or vessel like a train, car or boat). I've said "I suspect" as I don't know for certain what Starbucks are doing, but it looks like this is means that either they are not providing you with use of their Licence at those premises, or that they don't have one for those premises (particularly likely if they're not in the UK, also possible if they are). Without mains power connection (ie. batteries only) it would be the user's home Licence that was relevant. TV Licencing is covered by Part 4 of the Communications Act 2003. [Edit : The official source of the summary at my first link can be found at Schedule 1 paragraph 2(c) of the Statutory Instrument. Thanks to Carcer for the comment.]	Many products can be used for illegal purposes, so selling something that could be used for illegal purposes won't generally result in liability for the producer. Think of software used for computer system and network security testing; it's both useful for legitimate testing and securing systems, but of course it can be used by hackers to find and exploit security holes. Clorox can be used to clean the bathroom or poison someone. If you look at the Terms of Service for https://donotpay.com/learn/terms-of-service-and-privacy-policy/ , you'll see DoNotPay is Not a Law Firm DoNotPay provides a platform for legal information and self-help. The information provided by DoNotPay along with the content on our website related to legal matters ("Legal Information") is provided for your private use and does not constitute advice. We do not review any information you provide us for legal accuracy or sufficiency, draw legal conclusions, provide opinions about your selection of forms, or apply the law to the facts of your situation. If you need advice for a specific problem, you should consult with a licensed attorney. As DoNotPay is not a law firm, please note that any communications between you and DoNotPay may not be protected under the attorney-client privilege doctrine. and Your use of the Service is subject to all applicable federal, state and local laws and regulations. Unauthorized use of the Service is prohibited, and violators can be prosecuted under federal and state laws. Virginia law and Federal law will govern the interpretation and enforcement of these Terms. That's for the web service, but it's useful to point out the distinction between a user using DoNotPay for themselves and getting a script to read in court, and the DoNotPay service actually participating in a court appearance representing the user. The reason DoNotPay pulled the plug on the court appearance, as pointed out in the article https://www.businessinsider.com/donotpay-ceo-says-risks-jail-ai-robot-lawyer-used-court-2023-1 is that DoNotPay's AI "robot" lawyer was going to actively argue in court, and the state bar objected, because that's what only lawyers are licensed to do. If the DoNotPay source code was released and someone used it on their own computer to analyze a legal situation and give themselves options and offer decisions, this could probably be seen as little different than someone reading books that analyze the law and strategies and offer options of how to go about representing oneself in a court. The software would be used to make decisions before and after court; the software is not actively arguing and making decisions for the user in court. Of course, in this brand new world of AI, the final assessment of whether or not AI software can be used to give others (or oneself) legal advice - either in court and/or prep for court - will likely have to be finally determined by litigation and courts. The idea of open source or closed source could possibly come into play to determine exactly how the software works, but would not be the sole criteria to determine if the use of the software is legal or not. The software could be simply a "decision tree" (little different than textbooks) that follows a hard-coded if/else script, such as If you get a ticket, go to court; if you plead guilty, this is what happens; if you plead not guilty, these are your options. Or, the software could have true AI aspects, i.e. it develops arguments for being not guilty from your past legal history, and develops and responds to the court's actions with counter arguments, and actually gives opinions to the user on what they should do. If the software is open source, we all see how it works and if it is a decision tree or real AI (and the software can also be modified by users and other developers.) If the software is closed source, we can't see how it works, and we don't know if it is a decision tree or AI, unless it it is opened, possibly through court order during possible litigation to determine if it is giving legal advice. Again, AI is a brand new thing in the legal world.	Note: IANAL Does the placement of a sticker stating, "We accept XYZ credit cards," essentially obligate a business to accept that card? It depends on whether you mean whether they are obligated to provide goods/services to someone who presents the card, or whether, having provided goods/services, they are obligated to accept the card as payment. For the first question, the answer is "no". The credit card brand could theoretically go after them, however, as names of credit networks are trademarks, so claiming to accept a card but not doing so is trademark infringement. For the second, the answer is "pretty much". Since they misrepresented their establishment, there is no mutual assent and therefore no contract. If they try to use "defrauding the innkeeper statutes", those require fraudulent intent. If you fully intended to pay for you meal by a credit card, and it was their choice to refuse payment, then you have no fraudulent intent. The only avenue I can see for them is some sort of equity argument, but that would be problematic, especially if they ask for the retail, rather than wholesale, price, and not worth the hassle of collecting. So, legally, you can just walk out, but in practice if they have a bouncer they might make trouble for you.	it would violate law? It would be very dependent of what your jurisdiction is and what the software does. I would expect most software that would be lawful to install at your home would be lawful to install at your company, but there may be exceptions. To put an hyperbolic example, if you work at the CIA and you install some remote access software that allows you to access your workstation from a non-secure PC through non-secure methods, I am pretty sure that would be illegal, even if you had the best of intentions. A recent scenario taken from real life involves some members an organization who are required to use official e-mail servers for FOIA purposes setting up their own private mail servers. Of course, YMMV. can I purchase it for myself, and then use at workplace Even if the software is legal it does not mean that it is ok to use it at the workplace. Most business have rules about what software may be installed in the PCs, who may install it and how to manage it. Your software could introduce security vulnerabilities that your IT team may need to be aware of, or incompatibilities with other software. It may introduce legal liabilities (you install a "home edition" licence in a corporate environment where that licence is invalid). Your company may discipline you if you breaking those guidelines and install software without authorization, even if there is no harm for them for this action. On top of that, if your actions cause some damage to the company, it can sue you to get you to pay for those damages. Before taking any action you should inquiry about your company's IT policy and, if your company does not have one or if the policy is not clear about allowing you to install the software, ask the people in charge (preferably in writting).
Is a teacher/school administrator allowed to force me to decrypt my phone? As in: My phone was just confiscated, but not before I shut it off. If they wanted to look through it without a warrent, can they force me to decrypt it? EDIT: USA is country-of-residency	Public schools are on a shorter legal leash than private schools are, because they must behave like proper governments do and respect the constitutional rights of their charges. (First Amendment rights are much broader in public schools than they are in private schools). Assuming that we're in a public school, a search of your phone is governed by a watered-down version of the 4th Amendment. They may search your phone if they have a reasonable suspicion that there is evidence of a violation of the law or a school rule, but this is passive with respect to you providing information -- if the phone is on, they can snoop around if they have a reasonable suspicion. The 5th Amendment would be relevant to passcodes: they cannot compel you to give up your passcode. If there was plainly-visible evidence of wrongful activity on the phone which they saw, and then you shut the phone down, then analogous to in re Boucher the courts could order you to reveal your password, under the "foregone conclusion" doctrine. However, it's the courts and not the schools who get to make that determination. One way the school could literally force you, bypassing the legal system, would be to physically threaten you, by beating you or threatening you with a gun or whip. Such physical coersion would be a felony, and it is almost inconceivable that they would do that. What they might maybe do is give you a non-physical ultimatum, of the type "decrypt the phone / reveal the password or we will... expel you / fine you / fail you in your English class / not let you go to any more football games / turn the phone over to the police". The question is, what would be legal versus illegal by way of consequences? I know of no constitutional right to attend football games anywhere, so they might well be able to get away with that deprivation. You might have a contractual right to attend games at a private school. With a private school, there is some contractual agreement between the school and you (least likely, assuming you're a minor) or your parents~guardians (most likely). That contract could imply certain rights, such as attending games, and might spell out a procedure for them to terminate that right. If they don't follow the process, they could be in breach of contract. Apart from contractual rights (which probably involve your parents, not you, but also would be considerable, for example the right to attend and be graded fairly in the English class), you have no protected rights. As you can see, the answer has a lot of "it depends" in it. Suppose your public school had a reasonable suspcion that you had engaged in a criminal activity, and might prove that by looking at the phone – which you shut down. They cannot use physical force against you, but they can try to persuade you, by offering you something that you want which they can legally take away – like attending a football game. If they try to deprive you of something that you have a right to, you can sue them to prevent that. However, they can also seek a court order to compel you to reveal the password, and it is certainly not illegal to inform you that if you don't unlock the phone, they will seek a court order. Whether or not the courts will grant the request is not obvious (incidentally, if the device is fingerprint-protected, you are hosed, since forcing a person to prove fingerprints is not against the 5th). If the school can be very specific about having seen criminal evidence, they have a leg to stand on, otherwise you cannot be compelled to testify against yourself (coughing up a password is a form of testifying against yourself).	A fundamental requirement of criminal culpability is intent. Based on the description this whole process is happening after a user has already had their phone seized. If a person was not aware of Signal's hidden files to damage the police's data forensics software, they will not have met the criminal intent requirement, either maliciously or under a criminal negligence theory. None of the prongs of CFAA are strict liability statutes (18 U.S. Code § 1030 "Whoever having knowingly accessed a computer..."), so that would not apply here. If we imagine a person that is aware of all the information from Signal about their app intentionally abusing Cellebrite's package and with intention to cause damage downloads Signal's malicious files to their phone, I think it's an open question whether or not they would be liable under the CFAA. Specifically, 18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(5)(A) (emphasis mine) Whoever knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; An argument on this could go both ways. On the one hand, the owner of the phone could be found to not have substantially caused the information to be transmitted to a protected computer, as the police were the integral cause for that in executing their warrant. On the other hand, this sort of file could be considered a digital "booby trap," and booby traps are illegal for essentially this reason, that they have a foreseeable effect of causing harm to people who are lawfully inside a building without the owner's permission. In this case, the owner's trap was sprung by law enforcement but still placed by the owner in order to damage them.	united-states "I know is it illegal for authorities to question a suspect when their lawyer isn’t present" This is not really true, at least in the US. The suspect must explicitly ask for a lawyer. Even saying "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" (ie Davis v. U.S. (512 U.S. 453 (1994)) isn't enough, they have to say "I want a lawyer". Until they invoke the right, an officer can question all they want (provided they were informed of these rights, except for certain situations which are relatively complicated. See Miranda Rights). So no, an officer questioning you without a lawyer is neither a crime nor illegal. Once you invoke your Miranda right though, they have to respect that. With or without your lawyer, this is called interrogation. You can filter your responses through a lawyer, or waive your right to a lawyer and answer directly.	Ark. Code 5-60-120 is very clear that the act of intercepting is a crime. Not just "recording and using", not just "recording", but intercepting in any way. Specifically: It is unlawful for a person to intercept a wire, landline, oral, telephonic communication, or wireless communication, and to record or possess a recording of the communication unless the person is a party to the communication or one (1) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception and recording. Intercepting is illegal, therefore it is not "okay". Perhaps the "sort of a lawyer" was speaking of the probability of getting caught doing it.	It doesn't really require anything beyond your say-so that it is what you say it is; that would be enough to satisfy the requirement for authentication. From there though, as with any evidence, it's going to be up to a jury to decide how much weight to give the evidence. So the more you can show them to prove that the record is real -- and to knock down any questions the opposing party will raise -- the more likely they are to believe it. So if you just bring a printout that looks like it could easily have been forged, the jury may be thinking about that. If you can bring in a data forensics expert to say the document couldn't have been faked, that's probably going to help. Addendum: As a practical matter, I wouldn't expect this to be much of an issue. Unless you're dealing with a savvy opposing party, the authenticity of e-mails seems to be generally assumed. Courts (1) generally assume that parties aren't perpetrating frauds; and (2) are generally run by judges with little to no technical savvy, who don't realize that one could forge an e-mail, let alone all the different ways it could be done. I've personally entered countless e-mail printouts without them being questioned, even though either party could have just gone down into the e-mail thread and changed what the other side had said earlier in the conversation. To avoid the issue, though, it might be that sending the e-mail to a Gmail account would elimimate the question.	There is RIPA which allows a court to force you to divulge a decryption key. The penalty for not doing so is up to two years in prison, five if terrorism is involved. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), Part III, activated by ministerial order in October 2007,[20] requires persons to supply decrypted information and/or keys to government representatives with a court order. Failure to disclose carries a maximum penalty of two years in jail - Wikipedia - Key Disclosure Law Section 49 of Part III of RIPA compels a person, when served with a notice, to either hand over an encryption key or render the requested material intelligible by authorities. Anyone who refuses to decrypt material could face five years in jail if the investigation relates to terrorism or national security, or up to two years in jail in other cases. Controversially, someone who receives a Section 49 notice can be prevented from telling anyone apart from their lawyer that they have received such a notice. - The Register - UK police can now force you to reveal decryption keys - Refuseniks face jail time The act can be read on the government website It describes, for example, grounds for not complying ... 53 3) For the purposes of this section a person shall be taken to have shown that he was not in possession of a key to protected information at a particular time if— (a) sufficient evidence of that fact is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it; and (b) the contrary is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.	This could be a violation of 18 USC 1030 (and a crime). A number of things go into requirements for conviction under this law. First, it has to be a computer, which is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device Any printer that I have encountered in the past 40 years counts as "a computer". Second, (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—...(C) information from any protected computer; It is highly likely that the person printing has to receive some information from the printer, and respond accordingly so you have your "obtains information" element. Maybe not useful information, but information nevertheless. It also has to be a protected computer, (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States Well, a computer connected to the internet is a protected computer, see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918. Also, the access must be "without authorization or exceeds authorized access". The law doesn't explain with "without authorization" means, but the latter is defined as to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter If the law were stated in terms of "prohibited access", meaning "express denial of permission", and if the computer owner had set the computer to "prohibited access" by default (password protected), there would be no issue -- accessing the computer is prohibited. "Unauthorized" can also mean "has not been explicitly authorized", i.e. lacking any indication one way or the other. Every computer access is initially unauthorized, until authorization is granted; and re-trying a login after mis-typing a user name (and being denied access) is not a violation of this law. There does not appear to be case law that addresses the status of computers just left open to the public, and whether using a computer that is so exposed constitutes "unauthorized access". Also, it is not clear that the defendant in this case has "obtained information", since with printing, information flows into the computer. There is also a clause about recklessly causing damage, but I don't see what damage would result ("damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information"), and how printing would be "reckless". It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be deemed to be a crime, though if you experiment, you could be on the cutting edge of new case law.	A teacher could not instruct students in how to build explosives for use in Federal crimes: It shall be unlawful for any person to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction [...] with the intent that the teaching, demonstration, or information be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence (source) This Federal statute creates a law preventing the teaching (in any context, including schools) of bombmaking for the purpose of committing a federal crime. So "bombmaking" is one subject that cannot be taught, although I don't think that there have been any prosecutions of regular K12 teachers under this law.
Can a minor possess an AR-15 rifle in Wisconsin? This stems from the Kyle Rittenhouse discussion: Wisconsin prohibits possession of rifles by minors, but the same section seems to say that it only applies when the rifle is "short-barrel". Can a minor possess an AR-15 rifle in Wisconsin?	I used photoshop to do rough calculations. Using Kyle's height as a reference point (162cm / 5ft 4"), as this is what was listed on his arrest warrant. I roughly measured his rifle to be 80cm (31.4") long from the very end of the stock to the very tip of the barrel. So it is definitely longer than 26" overall as per the second clause in user6726's citation of Wisconsin law. The barrel measures in at 16.8" from breech face to the tip of the barrel. Despite the possible margin of error that can be made in measuring objects in this manner, I think that the length of the rifle is not an issue in the law debate surrounding Kyle as far as I'm concerned as it seems to be a legal "long barrel rifle" Edit: To those who know more about rifles/guns and where exactly the breechface starts on the rifle in the photo pictured below, please let me know if the measurement is too short or too long.	Examples Detention: A person suspected of a felony can be detained at gunpoint (and, in many jurisdictions, subject to "citizen's arrest"). A more clear example is when you encounter someone committing a felonious assault. You can brandish your gun and order them to stop. If they do stop, then you cannot shoot them unless there is no alternative to preventing them from inflicting grievous bodily harm on another. Defense: If you reasonably feel that another person poses a real and grievous physical threat, you can brandish a gun in defense. A common example is the slight woman followed into a vacant alley by a large man. She can brandish a gun to keep him at bay, but she cannot shoot him if he is not making explicit threats and (supposing one accepts the "Tueller rule") makes no aggressive motion within 21 feet of the woman. Law One helpful explanation of the distinction, by a MO attorney citing the MO Supreme Court: While deadly force can only be used to meet the threat of deadly force, the threat implied by brandishing is justified by a low level threat. “When a person has reasonable cause to apprehend on the part of another a design to inflict a great personal injury, and there was reasonable cause for him to apprehend immediate danger of such design being accomplished he is justified, and has the right, ‘to avert such apprehended design,’ and in proper circumstances the right of attack may be essential to the right of self-defense.” More detailed analysis can be found of California Penal Code 417 (California's law against "Brandishing," which is similar to brandishing laws in most states): [I]f you were lawfully defending yourself or defending another person, California's self-defense laws will excuse your otherwise criminal act. You lawfully act in self-defense or in defense of others when you reasonably believe that you or another person is about to suffer imminent harm, and you fight back with no more force than is reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. I.e., sometimes it's enough to say, "Stop!" But sometimes it's necessary to present a gun for the bad guy to get the message. Additionally: Simply drawing or exhibiting a weapon isn't enough to justify a conviction for 417 PC. In order for prosecutors to convict you of brandishing a weapon or firearm, you must do so in a rude, angry, or threatening manner. The same law review provides illuminating comparisons with the related offense "Assault with a Deadly Weapon" (ADW — CA 245 PC).	If the police confiscate a weapon that isn't owned by the suspect, would they have grounds to keep it? Not forever. For example, let's say the gun was owned by a friend or parent? What if the gun was owned by a Trust with several trustees? Third party owners of property lawfully seized from someone else can recover it. For example, I once took legal actions to recover a gun for a client that was in a gun repair shop that was seized in a criminal investigation because most of the inventory of the shop where it was being repaired consisted of stolen firearms and the primary business of the gun repair shop was fencing stolen property (a fact of which my client was completely unaware and shocked to discover). But, that was only possible once the trial was over because the guns seized were part of the evidence in that trial. A similar process applies when there is a civil forfeiture of property owned by a third-party. Could the owner (personal or trustee) recover the gun from police custody independently of a court finding on the suspect? Sort of. But it isn't entirely independent, since the firearm might be needed as evidence or might need to be kept out of the possession of the person from whom it was seized to effect the red flag order while it was in place in a way that that the third-party owners would have to assure. An example might be where a gun is confiscated via red-flag law, where no crime has been committed, but the suspect won't get his day in court for 6 months. Would the true owner, or partner owners if in a Trust, be denied their property or could they go ahead and recover it pre-trial (ie. the day after it was confiscated)? In the case of a red-flag seizure, the existence of the gun wouldn't be evidence in the court proceeding, so it wouldn't have to be retained for that purpose prior to trial. But, the owner of the gun would probably have to petition the court to regain possession and would have to demonstrate that the red-flag order would continue to deny the person who had the gun possession of it until the red-flag order period expired (if ever). If the trustee was the red-flag order target, or was someone related to him (or her), that might be a showing that the trustee could not make. Caveat Of course, red-flag laws are specific pieces of state legislation. Each one is different. Many would provide a specific statutory procedure for how this issue would be handled. For example, in some places, the proper means to regain possession of property held by law enforcement in connection with a criminal case is a motion filed by a third-party intervenor in the criminal case, while in others, the property process is to bring a civil action for replevin (a lawsuit to regain physical possession of particular items) against the law enforcement officer in possession or constructive possession of the property in question.	Yellowstone is part of the National Park Service. Parts of it are located in Idaho, Montana and Wyoming. The rules concerning firearms on National Park Service properties are set forth at the National Park Service website. Some key excerpts from this are as follows: In areas administered by the National Park Service, an individual can possess a firearm if that individual is not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing the firearm and if the possession of the firearm complies with the laws of the state where the park area is located. 54 U.S.C. 104906. . . . Unless expressly authorized, Federal law prohibits the possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon in NPS facilities. These buildings include, but are not limited to, government offices, visitor centers, ranger stations, fee collection buildings, and maintenance facilities. 18 U.S.C. 930. . . . Unless authorized, the use or discharge of a firearm within a park area is prohibited. 36 CFR 2.4(b) and 13.30(c). In parks where hunting is specifically mandated or authorized by federal statute, firearms may be used to hunt in accordance with NPS regulations and state laws. 36 CFR 2.2. The referenced statutes state (emphasis added): 18 U.S. Code § 930 - Possession of firearms and dangerous weapons in Federal facilities (a)Except as provided in subsection (d), whoever knowingly possesses or causes to be present a firearm or other dangerous weapon in a Federal facility (other than a Federal court facility), or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. (b)Whoever, with intent that a firearm or other dangerous weapon be used in the commission of a crime, knowingly possesses or causes to be present such firearm or dangerous weapon in a Federal facility, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. (c)A person who kills any person in the course of a violation of subsection (a) or (b), or in the course of an attack on a Federal facility involving the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, or attempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be punished as provided in sections 1111, 1112, 1113, and 1117. (d)Subsection (a) shall not apply to— (1)the lawful performance of official duties by an officer, agent, or employee of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, who is authorized by law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of any violation of law; (2)the possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon by a Federal official or a member of the Armed Forces if such possession is authorized by law; or (3)the lawful carrying of firearms or other dangerous weapons in a Federal facility incident to hunting or other lawful purposes. (e)(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2), whoever knowingly possesses or causes to be present a firearm or other dangerous weapon in a Federal court facility, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. (2)Paragraph (1) shall not apply to conduct which is described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (d). (f)Nothing in this section limits the power of a court of the United States to punish for contempt or to promulgate rules or orders regulating, restricting, or prohibiting the possession of weapons within any building housing such court or any of its proceedings, or upon any grounds appurtenant to such building. (g)As used in this section: (1)The term “Federal facility” means a building or part thereof owned or leased by the Federal Government, where Federal employees are regularly present for the purpose of performing their official duties. (2)The term “dangerous weapon” means a weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, animate or inanimate, that is used for, or is readily capable of, causing death or serious bodily injury, except that such term does not include a pocket knife with a blade of less than 2½ inches in length. (3)The term “Federal court facility” means the courtroom, judges’ chambers, witness rooms, jury deliberation rooms, attorney conference rooms, prisoner holding cells, offices of the court clerks, the United States attorney, and the United States marshal, probation and parole offices, and adjoining corridors of any court of the United States. (h)Notice of the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) shall be posted conspicuously at each public entrance to each Federal facility, and notice of subsection (e) shall be posted conspicuously at each public entrance to each Federal court facility, and no person shall be convicted of an offense under subsection (a) or (e) with respect to a Federal facility if such notice is not so posted at such facility, unless such person had actual notice of subsection (a) or (e), as the case may be. . . . 54 U.S. Code § 104906. Protection of right of individuals to bear arms (a)Findings.—Congress finds the following: (1)The 2d amendment to the Constitution provides that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”. (2)Section 2.4(a)(1) of title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, provides that “except as otherwise provided in this section and parts 7 (special regulations) and 13 (Alaska regulations), the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon, trap or net”. (3)The regulations described in paragraph (2) prevent individuals complying with Federal and State laws from exercising the 2d amendment rights of the individuals while at System units. (4)The existence of different laws relating to the transportation and possession of firearms at different System units entrapped law-abiding gun owners while at System units. (5)Although the Bush administration issued new regulations relating to the 2d amendment rights of law-abiding citizens in System units that went into effect on January 9, 2009— (A)on March 19, 2009, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction with respect to the implementation and enforcement of the new regulations; and (B)the new regulations— (i)are under review by the Obama administration; and (ii)may be altered. (6)Congress needs to weigh in on the new regulations to ensure that unelected bureaucrats and judges cannot again override the 2d amendment rights of law-abiding citizens on 83,600,000 acres of System land. (7)Federal laws should make it clear that the 2d amendment rights of an individual at a System unit should not be infringed. (b)Protection of Right of Individuals To Bear Arms in System Units.—The Secretary shall not promulgate or enforce any regulation that prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm, including an assembled or functional firearm, in any System unit if— (1)the individual is not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing the firearm; and (2)the possession of the firearm is in compliance with the law of the State in which the System unit is located. The references regulations in Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations state (emphasis added): § 2.2 Wildlife protection. (a) The following are prohibited: (1) The taking of wildlife, except by authorized hunting and trapping activities conducted in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section. (2) The feeding, touching, teasing, frightening or intentional disturbing of wildlife nesting, breeding or other activities. (3) Possessing unlawfully taken wildlife or portions thereof. (b) Hunting and trapping. (1) Hunting shall be allowed in park areas where such activity is specifically mandated by Federal statutory law. (2) Hunting may be allowed in park areas where such activity is specifically authorized as a discretionary activity under Federal statutory law if the superintendent determines that such activity is consistent with public safety and enjoyment, and sound resource management principles. Such hunting shall be allowed pursuant to special regulations. (3) Trapping shall be allowed in park areas where such activity is specifically mandated by Federal statutory law. (4) Where hunting or trapping or both are authorized, such activities shall be conducted in accordance with Federal law and the laws of the State within whose exterior boundaries a park area or a portion thereof is located. Nonconflicting State laws are adopted as a part of these regulations. (c) Except in emergencies or in areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, the superintendent shall consult with appropriate State agencies before invoking the authority of § 1.5 for the purpose of restricting hunting and trapping or closing park areas to the taking of wildlife where such activities are mandated or authorized by Federal statutory law. (d) The superintendent may establish conditions and procedures for transporting lawfully taken wildlife through the park area. Violation of these conditions and procedures is prohibited. (e) The Superintendent may designate all or portions of a park area as closed to the viewing of wildlife with an artificial light. Use of an artificial light for purposes of viewing wildlife in closed areas is prohibited. (f) Authorized persons may check hunting and trapping licenses and permits; inspect weapons, traps and hunting and trapping gear for compliance with equipment restrictions; and inspect wildlife that has been taken for compliance with species, size and other taking restrictions. (g) The regulations contained in this section apply, regardless of land ownership, on all lands and waters within a park area that are under the legislative jurisdiction of the United States. . . . § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a) None of the provisions in this section or any regulation in this chapter may be enforced to prohibit an individual from possessing a firearm, including an assembled or functional firearm, in any National Park System unit if: (1) The individual is not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing the firearm; and (2) The possession of the firearm is in compliance with the law of the State in which the National Park System unit is located. (b) (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section and parts 7 (special regulations) and 13 (Alaska regulations), the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon, trap or net (2) Weapons, traps or nets may be carried, possessed or used: (i) At designated times and locations in park areas where: (A) The taking of wildlife is authorized by law in accordance with § 2.2 of this chapter; (B) The taking of fish is authorized by law in accordance with § 2.3 of this part. (ii) When used for target practice at designated times and at facilities or locations designed and constructed specifically for this purpose and designated pursuant to special regulations. (iii) Within a residential dwelling. For purposes of this subparagraph only, the term “residential dwelling” means a fixed housing structure which is either the principal residence of its occupants, or is occupied on a regular and recurring basis by its occupants as an alternate residence or vacation home. (3)(i) Traps, nets and unloaded weapons may be possessed within a temporary lodging or mechanical mode of conveyance when such implements are rendered temporarily inoperable or are packed, cased or stored in a manner that will prevent their ready use. (ii) An individual may carry or possess an unloaded bow or crossbow when accessing otherwise inaccessible lands or waters contiguous to a park area when other means of access are otherwise impracticable or impossible if: (A) The individual is not otherwise prohibited by law from possessing the bow or crossbow; and (B) The possession of the bow or crossbow is in compliance with the law of the State in which the park area is located. (c) Carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle, vessel or other mode of transportation is prohibited, except that carrying or possessing a loaded weapon in a vessel is allowed when such vessel is not being propelled by machinery and is used as a shooting platform in accordance with Federal and State law. (d) The use of a weapon, trap or net in a manner that endangers persons or property is prohibited. (e) The superintendent may issue a permit to carry or possess a weapon that is not otherwise authorized, a trap, or a net under the following circumstances: (1) When necessary to support research activities conducted in accordance with § 2.5. (2) To carry firearms for persons in charge of pack trains or saddle horses for emergency use. (3) For employees, agents or cooperating officials in the performance of their official duties. (4) To provide access to otherwise inaccessible lands or waters contiguous to a park area when other means of access are otherwise impracticable or impossible. Violation of the terms and conditions of a permit issued pursuant to this paragraph is prohibited and may result in the suspension or revocation of the permit. (f) Authorized Federal, State and local law enforcement officers may carry firearms in the performance of their official duties. (g) The carrying or possessing of a weapon, trap or net in violation of applicable Federal and State laws is prohibited. (h) The regulations contained in this section apply, regardless of land ownership, on all lands and waters within a park area that are under the legislative jurisdiction of the United States. . . . § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a) Irritant chemical devices, including bear spray, may be carried, possessed, and used in accordance with applicable Federal and non-conflicting State laws, except when prohibited or restricted under § 13.50. (b) Paragraphs (d) through (g) of this section apply to all park areas in Alaska except Klondike Gold Rush National Historical Park, Sitka National Historical Park and the former Mt. McKinley National Park, Glacier Bay National Monument and Katmai National Monument. (c) Except as provided in this section and § 2.4 of this chapter, the following are prohibited - (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying a weapon, trap, or net; (3) Using a weapon, trap, or net. (d) Firearms may be carried, possessed, and used within park areas in accordance with applicable State and Federal laws, except where such carrying, possession, or use is prohibited or otherwise restricted under § 13.50. (e) Traps, bows and other implements (other than firearms) authorized by applicable State and Federal law for the taking of fish and wildlife may be carried, possessed, and used within park areas only during those times when the taking of fish and wildlife is authorized by applicable law or regulation. (f) In addition to the authorities provided in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, weapons (other than firearms), traps, and nets may be possessed within park areas provided such weapons, traps, or nets are within or upon a device or animal used for transportation and are unloaded and cased or otherwise packed in such a manner as to prevent their ready use while in a park area. (g) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, local rural residents who are authorized to engage in subsistence uses, including the taking of wildlife under § 13.480, may use, possess, or carry traps, nets and other weapons in accordance with applicable State and Federal laws. . . . § 13.50 Closure and restriction procedures. (a) Applicability and authority. The Superintendent will follow the provisions of this section to close an area or restrict an activity, or terminate or relax a closure or restriction, in NPS areas in Alaska. (b) Factors. In determining whether to close an area or restrict an activity, or whether to terminate or relax a closure or restriction, the Superintendent must ensure that the activity or area is managed in a manner compatible with the purposes for which the park area was established. The Superintendent's decision under this paragraph must therefore be guided by factors such as public health and safety, resource protection, protection of cultural or scientific values, subsistence uses, conservation of endangered or threatened species, and other management considerations. (c) Rulemaking requirements. This paragraph applies only to a closure or restriction, or the termination or relaxation of such, which is of a nature, magnitude and duration that will result in a significant alteration in the public use pattern of the area; adversely affect the area's natural, aesthetic, scenic, or cultural values; or require a long-term modification in the resource management objectives of the area. Except in emergency situations, the closure or restriction, or the termination or relaxation of such, must be published as a rulemaking in the Federal Register. (d) Written determination. Except in emergency situations, prior to implementing or terminating a closure or restriction, the superintendent shall prepare a written determination justifying the action. That determination shall set forth the reasons the closure or restriction authorized by paragraph (a) of this section has been established. This determination will be posted on the NPS Web site at www.nps.gov. (e) Restrictions on taking fish or wildlife. (1) Except in emergencies, the NPS will consult with the State agency having responsibility over fishing, hunting, or trapping and provide an opportunity for public comment, including one or more public meetings near the affected NPS unit, prior to implementing a closure or restriction on taking fish or wildlife. (2) Emergency closures or restrictions may not exceed a period of 60 days and may not be extended without following the nonemergency procedures of this section. (f) Notice. A list of closures and restrictions will be compiled in writing and updated annually. The list will be posted on the NPS Web site at www.nps.gov and made available at park headquarters. Additional means of notice reasonably likely to inform residents in the affected vicinity will also be provided where available, such as: (1) Publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the State or in local newspapers; (2) Use of electronic media, such as the internet and email lists; (3) Radio broadcast; or (4) Posting of signs in the local vicinity. (g) Violating a closure or restriction is prohibited. While the website notes that "Visitors should not consider firearms as protection from wildlife," this is advice, rather than a prohibition on using firearms in that fashion. It is a warning that firearms are a poor choice rather than a prohibition on using them for self-defense purposes. Also, if a use of firearms as self-defense against wildlife is determined to be unjustified, the park visitor might be charged with hunting without a permit. The state gun control laws in the pertinent states are summarized as follows (by the High County News newspaper) (apologies for the small print):	If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase.	There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced.	Illegal weapons Weapons are defined and are made illegal by statute. In many states, it is illegal to possess brass knuckles. For example, California penal code 12020(a)(1) makes it illegal to possess "any metal knuckles", "writing pen knife", "any leaded cane", among other things. I don't know of any state where it is illegal to pick up a stick, or keys, etc. So, yes, there is a legal distinction between your four scenarios. The mechanic is committing a crime by merely possessing the brass knuckles. The others are not committing a crime by the mere possession of the things you mention (unless there are states where they've been made illegal). Effect on a self-defense analysis Courts would have the jury go through the same self-defense analysis in each of these cases, regardless of the legality of the weapon used. We've described that analysis here. A pure self-defense analysis does not factor in the legality of the weapon that is used. But, if the weapon has been made illegal because of its disproportionate ability to injure, etc. that might weigh against the reasonableness of the force that was used when choosing to use that weapon in self-defense. Possession of an illegal weapon might also weigh against the credibility of the owner of that illegal weapon.	It is not necessary for a combatant to actually carry arms to become a legitimate target. An uniformed mechanic carrying a screwdriver at an airbase is a combatant, entitled to the protections of the conventions but also a valid target. Of course a civilian commander-in-chief does not wear insignia, but he is presumably recognizable. Civilian targets can be attacked according to the tests of military necessity and proportionality. It can be legal to attack a bridge even if it was built by and for civilians, it can be legal to attack a factory producing arms, it can be legal to attack a power plant also serving a barracks. Taking out a key command-and-control node sounds like miliary necessity to me, but surely there would be lawyers for either viewpoint.
What would have happened to Mel Gibson and Danny Glover in real life? In Lethal Weapon 2, the bad guy — if memory serves, a diplomat from South Africa — commits a bunch of crimes. Then, as he's getting away on a yacht, he taunts the policemen characters played by Mel Gibson and Danny Glover, waving a diplomatic passport around and saying "Diplomatic Immunity!". At which point, the character played by Glover promptly shoots him in the head, using a clearly legal response of "... just been revoked". Now, this being a Hollywood film, they rode off into the susnset sequel; but what would the likely consequences have been, both for them as police officers as well as for United States, if this had happened in real life? I would especially prefer answers that reference specific actual precedents of a similar occurrence, or established formal rules.	The consequences for the US are perhaps better addressed at Politics; if you're really interested in those consequences, you can re-post this question there. For the police officer shooting a diplomat, the officer may be charged under state law, whatever is normal for an incident of this type; it doesn't matter whether the person is a US citizen or a diplomat or any other kind of alien, regardless of immigration status or lack thereof. If the person is a diplomat, however, the officer is also liable to be prosecuted under federal law, namely 18 USC 1116, which makes it a crime to kill, among others, a "foreign official"; the definition of that term includes any person of a foreign nationality who is duly notified to the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign government or international organization, and who is in the United States on official business, and any member of his family whose presence in the United States is in connection with the presence of such officer or employee. The characterization of the response "just been revoked" as "clearly legal" is inaccurate; a police officer has no power to revoke diplomatic immunity. In fact, only the diplomat's own country can waive this immunity. The United States cannot do so; it can only expel the diplomat.	"If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining.	There was a case like that in 2010 in germany tl;dr synopsis of the German article: The police raided the private home of an alleged member of a criminal gang. This was performed as a no-knock raid. The police officers did not announce themselves as such when they started to break open the door. The suspect had reason to believe that a rival gang was planning an attempt on his life. So the suspect believed that the people trying to break into his home were actually members of said gang trying to murder him. The suspect used a firearm to shoot at the intruders through the door, lethally injuring a police officer. When the police officers then identified themselves as such, the suspect surrendered immediately. A court later ruled that killing the police officer was self-defense, because they were reasonably convinced that the defendant was unaware that he was dealing with police officers, believed to be in a situation where his life was in danger and where lethal violence was the only way to save his life. Here is the verdict. [In German, of course]	Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings.	Eddie Slovik was executed by firing squad for desertion during World War II (the only U.S. solider to have the death sentence carried out for desertion during the war). He requested from his commander an assignment behind the front lines, was denied, and took it upon himself to leave his post, walk to the rear and presented a note to a cook there confessing to the crime of desertion. Hundreds of U.S. soldiers (on both sides) were executed during the Civil War for desertion, or "simply walking away." Ebenezer Leffingwell was almost executed during the Revolutionary War for "running away from where the firing was, with every mark of fear and trepidation." This case is complicated by the fact that, after first being told to return, Leffingwell made a feint to do so then tried to desert again. After Col. Joseph Reed again "admonished" him with the broadside of his saber and instructing him back to the fight, Leffingwell turned and attempted to fire his weapon at his superior, though it failed to discharge. General George Washington approved the sentence, and Leffingwell received a last minute pardon after his grave had already been dug and the firing squad had lined up. To answer your title question, there is this quote from Wikipedia: The maximum U.S. penalty for desertion in wartime remains death, although this punishment was last applied to Eddie Slovik in 1945. No U.S. serviceman has received more than 24 months imprisonment for desertion or missing movement post-September 11, 2001 It also highlights § 885. Art. 85 from the 2012 edition of US Manual for Court Martial: Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.	He is probably guilty of negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter, at most (a minor felony), and is possibly not guilty of a crime at all. The primary distinction between classes of homicide is mens rea (i.e. intent). The only affirmative act he took was to move the pillow. He did so both without intending to or knowing that he would kill Jane (the intent necessary for murder), and also, without clear actual knowledge that he would be creating a risk that Jane would die (a reckless state of mind that would support a conviction for manslaughter). Also, note that Walter himself, at this time, is not engaged in a felony, so he is not guilty of felony murder. We can presume he is present with the consent previously given of the owner of the property and did not mean anyone any harm. Likewise, this is not what is meant by "extreme indifference" for purposes of a murder statute, the paradigm of which is shooting randomly into a crowd knowing that someone will almost certainly be killed without knowing or intending that any particular person will die. The mental state necessary for negligent homicide is the equivalent of "gross negligence" in a civil case and is called "criminal negligence" in a criminal case. To be criminally negligent a person must fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a certain result will occur, and the risk must be of such a nature that the defendant's failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from a reasonable person's standard of care. If a jury found that a reasonable person ought should clearly know that moving a pillow put Jane at risk of dying, then he might be guilty of criminal negligence. But, if a jury found that a reasonable person would not know that moving the pillow put Jane at grave risk of death, his action would not be criminally negligent. There are also at least three questions of causation which is not entirely independent of the question of negligence. First, generally an act is only considered a cause of a consequence if it is a foreseeable result of the action. If Jane's vomit caused death is not a foreseeable result of moving the pillow, then her death might not be legally caused by moving the pillow. Second, how likely is it that she would have died even if Walter had never entered the room. There are lots of ways that the pillow could have been jostled during the night leading to the same result. If it likely would have happened anyway, Walter's involvement might not be the legal cause of the death. Third, how much fault should be attributed to Jane? This is closely related to the second question. If her death was primarily caused by her getting dangerously high and placing herself in a vulnerable position, perhaps Walter's involvement is not a meaningful cause of the death. A New Mexico court has held that the defense that the victim was negligent has value only if it establishes that the victim's negligence was the sole cause of the accident. State v. Maddox, 99 N.M. 490, 660 P.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1983). But, what about Jesse's negligence? Under a relevant standard criminal jury instruction in New Mexico: The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's act was a significant cause of the death of __________________ (name of victim). Evidence has been presented that the negligence of a person other than the defendant may have contributed to the cause of death. Such contributing negligence does not relieve the defendant of responsibility for an act that significantly contributed to the cause of the death so long as the death was a foreseeable result of the defendant's actions. However, if you find the negligence of a person other than the defendant was the only significant cause of death, then the defendant is not guilty of the offense of __________________ (name of offense). Caveat: A number of states impose strict criminal liability on drug dealers, often for murder, if someone died from using a drug sold by them, but often it has to be a child, and often the drug has to be the proximate cause of death, e.g. due to an overdose or impurity in the drug. I would presume that Jesse and not Walter supplied the drugs to Jane, that Jane is an adult, and it is not obvious that the drug itself (as opposed to the vomiting due to the manner in which the drugs were used) was the proximate cause of death, so a statute like this might not apply in any case. This brings us to the hard part of the question: Without the pillow Jane rotates on her back and starts to vomit and cough, still sleeping. At first Walter tries to react, running to the other side of the bed to help her, but then he stops and decides to do nothing as she dies. Note that if Walter had moved the pillow without knowing that he was creating a risk, left the room ignorant, and then this happened, surely Walter would have no legal liability for Jane's death. If Walter develops the necessary intent for criminal liability, this probably doesn't happen until he observes that she is starting to choke on her vomit and might die. Even then, he does not intend for Jane to die and probably doesn't even know for certain that she will die from his inaction, so he is probably, at most reckless, if he has a duty to rescue for criminal law purposes. Generally, under both civil and criminal law, there is no duty to rescue, even if you can do so without any risk of harm to yourself. But, there is an exception, at least in civil liability, for a duty to rescue that arises from the fact that you put the person at risk of peril through your affirmative actions. Does this apply here, at all, or in a criminal case? The first question is the exact language of the homicide statute. Some homicide offenses require affirmative acts, while others can arise from acts or omissions where there is a legal duty to act. Every crime requires some voluntary act or omission, and the voluntary act itself was not a crime and perhaps was not even a tort, at the moment it was taken, because Walter did not realize that his act created a risk of harm. He create a peril, but he did so innocently. A pretty standard formulation is that an omission is only a crime when the law creates a legal duty to act, but this is, of course, a question begging standard as it doesn't clarify whether there is a legal duty to act, which is at issue here. As the previous link notes, creation of a peril can give rise to a legal duty to act, but only sometimes. (4) Duty arising from creation of peril. If a person acts culpably to imperil another, he or she has a legal duty to rescue the victim. The cases are split on whether a duty to rescue arises if someone innocently or accidentally imperils another. This case would fall in the category of someone who innocently or accidentally imperils another, in which the cases are split, which which the linked article cites the following authority: Compare Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 24-25, 141 N.E. 510, 511 (1923) (defendant under duty to try to extinguish a fire that he accidentally set to his house and thus was guilty of arson when he did not) with King v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 654, 659, 148 S.W.2d 1044, 1047 (1941) (defendant who, in lawful defense of a third person, shot and wounded an attacker was under no duty to seek medical attention for the wounded assailant). A commentary that is part of a California standard jury instruction (for involuntary manslaughter, not murder for which this kind of liability is presumably not available) makes the following observation: A legal duty to act may also exist where the defendant's behavior created or substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim, either by creating the dangerous situation or by preventing others from rendering aid. (People v. Oliver (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 147-148 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138] [defendant had duty to act where she drove victim to her home knowing he was drunk, knowingly allowed him to use her bathroom to ingest additional drugs, and watched him collapse on the floor]; Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681] [defendant had duty to prevent horses from running onto adjacent freeway creating risk].) These examples would suggest that an innocently or accidentally created risk is sufficient to create a duty sufficient to support involuntary manslaughter liability for an omission under California law, and would probably lead to involuntary manslaughter liability in the case in the question as well, under California law. New Mexico, unlike California, does not have a standard criminal jury instruction or really definitive section of its criminal code that clearly resolves this question, although the fact that California which uses a murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter distinction in the same way that New Mexico does, limits criminal liability for omissions to involuntary manslaughter suggests that New Mexico would as well. The New Mexico case State v. Greenwood, 2012 -NMCA- 017, 271 P.3d 753 (N.M. App. 2011), touches on the issue, suggesting that there may be liability only for involuntary manslaughter (or certain specialized crimes based upon a relationship such as that of a nursing home to a resident of a nursing home) based upon an omission, and that the liability for an omission can only arise when there is a legal duty, but almost implies that only contactual duties are sufficient. It does so at paragraph 35 which says: Importantly, even if the LINKS contract relating to Jared were to have been renewed and to have been in force at the time of Jared's death, we are not convinced that it would be the sole basis or even a controlling factor in determining Defendant's legal responsibility under the Act. Defendant's criminal liability must exist solely based on an omission— a failure to act when she had a legal responsibility to act. See Deborah A. Goodall, Penal Code Section 22.04: A Duty to Care for the Elderly, 35 Baylor L.Rev. 589, 594 (1983) (stating that " authorities have long agreed that before an omission can constitute an offense[,] there must first be a duty to act" ); see also People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1907) (" The law recognizes that under some circumstances the omission of a duty owed by one individual to another, where such omission results in the death of the one to whom the duty is owing, will make the other chargeable with manslaughter. This rule of law is always based upon the proposition that the duty neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral obligation. It must be a duty imposed by law or by contract, and the omission to perform the duty must be the immediate and direct cause of death." (citation omitted)). But, this could be dicta because it was a case where any legal duty would arise under contract rather than for another reason, and as is the case in many smaller states, there is simply no case that has ever been decided in New Mexico which is squarely on point. Under British criminal law, in similar circumstances, a homicide conviction was vacated: R v Khan & Khan (1998) CLR 830, confirmed that there is no separate category of manslaughter by omission unless the omission constitutes a breach of duty to act. The defendants supplied a 15-year-old prostitute with twice the amount of heroin likely to be taken by a regular user. The defendants left her unconscious in the flat, returning the next day to find that she had died of the overdose. Had medical assistance been called, the girl would probably not have died. The unlawful act was supplying the drug but the death was caused by the quantity injected by the victim. The trial judge invited jury to consider liability on the basis of the defendants' failure to summon medical assistance. On appeal, the conviction was quashed because the brothers had not accepted a duty to act before she took the heroin. A dissertation on when criminal liability is imposed for omissions in Scottish law can be found here. New Mexico, whose laws really should govern, has just two homicide statutes: § 30-2-1. Murder A. Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused: (1) by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; (2) in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony; or (3) by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life. Whoever commits murder in the first degree is guilty of a capital felony. B. Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, a person who kills another human being without lawful justification or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another. Murder in the second degree is a lesser included offense of the crime of murder in the first degree. Whoever commits murder in the second degree is guilty of a second degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. Walter doesn't qualify for any of these prongs of the statute. § 30-2-3. Manslaughter Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. A. Voluntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. Whoever commits voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. B. Involuntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection. Whoever commits involuntary manslaughter is guilty of a fourth degree felony. Clearly, Walter also does not qualify as guilty of voluntary manslaughter. There is no quarrel or heat of passion. So, either Walter is guilty in New Mexico of involuntary manslaughter, or he is not guilty of homicide at all. New Mexico also has an unusual, and rather merciful "excusable homicide" provision at New Mexico Statutes § 30-2-5, that should also be considered: Homicide is excusable in the following cases: A. when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act, by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent; or B. when committed by accident or misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, if no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used and the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner. Arguably, Walter falls under "excusable homicide" part A, as moving the pillow was a lawful act done without unlawful intent and that is what caused the death.	The answer might be found in Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty: A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. So a person on a 'celestial body' (and the Treaty includes the Moon as a celestial body) is under the jurisdiction of the country who registered the launch vehicle which carried them. If they attacked another person while on the Moon, they would be subject to the criminal law of that country. I believe all space-faring nations have ratified the treaty.	Does the doctrine of sovereign immunity extend to state officials acting in their official capacities to serve the government? Or it doesn't and people can sue officials and the representatives of the government instead of suing the government itself? The law isn't entirely uniform but generally a government official (state or federal) acting in their official capacity is immune to suits for money damages, but not for suits for injunctive relief involving their official actions, or declaratory relief regarding rights they are charged with enforcing. The main exception is that government officials are liable for money damages for intentional violations of federal civil rights made under color of state law if the rights are "well established." Governmental entities are liable for civil rights violations only if they are committed by government officials duty to a policy (whether or not officially adopted) of the employing government. There are some exceptions to sovereign immunity for official conduct, generally involving negligence in circumstances where private employees would also be liable (e.g. negligently driving a government car causing an accident). There is almost never sovereign immunity from contactual liability, but individual government officials are almost never parties to government contracts, and instead are disclosed agents of the government acting on its behalf to agree to a contract. State officials acting in their official capacity are also not immune from criminal liability under criminal laws related to misconduct by government officials, although the law expressly exempts from criminal liability many kinds of justified used of force by government officials.
In Germany, is there a reward for reporting possible tax fraudsters or money launderers to the authorities? I could well be wrong and I don't want to go into specifics here, but... Let's assume I know of a business that in reality generates a few hundred thousand euros in revenue and yet shows a P+L with revenue far in excess of those numbers. This could imply they are laundering money — paying some tax just to get the money into circulation. Who would I report this suspicion to? If I were proven right, would there be a reward?	You can report your suspicions to any German police station or any prosecution service (Staatsanwaltschaft). Furthermore, in this case to any tax authority (Finanzamt). Your report may be made anonymous. You will not get a reward.	In the UK, generally there is no duty to report crime. There are circumstances where there is a duty to report suspicious activity or 'knowledge' or 'suspicion' of a crime. These include: financing of terrorism money laundering or dealing in other proceeds of crime (criminal property) or fraud in a regulated sector (e.g. solicitors, accountants, insolvency practitioners, finance, gambling) (unless the information comes to the person in 'privileged circumstances') In respect of such circumstances, as soon as Bob 'knows' or 'suspects' Rob is engaged in such behaviour Bob must report this to the authorities and must not tell Rob about it (the offence of 'tipping off'). Bob commits an offence if he doesn't report it. In terms of failure to report money laundering that could lead to a maximum of five years in prison and/or a fine. Depending on the circumstances an additional risk of failure to report is being perceived to have participated in the commission of the crime.	No, it doesn't seem like you did anything wrong. You can't have committed fraud because you didn't have the intent of entering the museum without paying. Fraud is defined in section 263 StGB: (1) Whoever, with the intention of obtaining an unlawful pecuniary benefit for themselves or a third party, damages the assets of another by causing or maintaining an error under false pretences or distorting or suppressing true facts […] You had no intention of obtaining an unlawful benefit. You presumably did not misrepresent your disability status. German criminal law has a related violation in Section 265a StGB, “obtaining benefits by deception”: (1) Whoever obtains the output of a machine or the services of a telecommunications network which serves public purposes or uses a means of transportation or obtains entrance to an event or facility by deception with the intention of not paying the fee […] Again, your lack of intent means that you haven't committed this crime. Interpreting what actually happened: The K20 ticket fees are reduced for severely handicapped people with 50% GdB (degree of disability indicating the person's difficulty of participating in society, in particular that person's difficulty for working a normal job, as determined by the VersMedV). You were not attested such a degree of disability via the German system, and therefore were not eligible for the discounted entrace fee of EUR 10. The museum has no obligation towards you to actually collect those fees. They can waive them whenever they want, for whatever reason they want. The museum could have given you the discounted price even without suitable evidence of your disability. Instead, they waived the fee entirely. If anyone is going to have problems here, it is the person at the ticket counter for failing to collect the appropriate fees. But that is an internal issue for the museum. You legally obtained a valid ticket to visit the museum. Translations were taken from the official page https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html	This question sounds to me like there is an inferred intent of the person giving the invoice to manipulate their value added tax rate due to the misclassification, and then an unrelated issue related to an overly high charge for the services which are basically independent. Is the classification of the job material in some way to either of those issues in a non-obvious way that you haven't clarified in your question? I will answer on the assumption that it is not, because at first glance, it is hard to see why this would matter with respect to either issue. A CVR listing is sort of half way between a U.S. Secretary of State company listing and a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission company listing with more than just bare bones contact information but less than a full fledged public company's disclosure statement. The fact that the company's business type classification is not a precise match for the kind of work that they did for you on this job is not obviously material to either what VAT taxes would be due (which usually depends upon the particular kinds of goods and services involved in the transaction) or the rate that a company can charge for a particular kind of work done. The fact that a company is classified in one category that describes the overall enterprise doesn't mean that every last thing done by the company must precisely fit that description. The mismatch could also conceivably be nothing more than a clerical error made by somebody preparing the CVR listing, in which case, again, the answer is "so what?" Therefore, as far as I can tell from the limited information in the question, this is just an immaterial error with no relevance to any of the likely disputes that you might have in this case. Usually, an immaterial error in a public record or invoice would not be a ground to object the amount that a company charged for the work, nor would it be something that would be appropriate to complain about in any way that would bring you an advantage that I can see in this transaction. This doesn't mean that you don't potentially have grounds to object to the invoice and dispute the higher than expected charges. But, bringing up the issue of the CVR code doesn't appear to add anything to your rights in this dispute. This said, I can certainly imagine circumstance where the wrong CVR code could be a hint that something else really is amiss. For example, suppose that you need a license to do a cleaning job since it involves environmental hazards and waste disposal, but you don't need a license to do management consulting, because who cares if someone is stupid enough to take your bad management advice. In that situation, the company might be misclassified because it doesn't have and perhaps cannot get for some reason, the business license that it needs to do the cleaning job. Charging for services while not having the proper business license might very well be illegal and a ground not to pay, and the error in the CVR filing might actually be an attempt to circumvent this problem. But, that kind of possibility relies upon pure speculation and without more facts there is no good reason to assume that something nefarious is going on here.	This answer is for the US (at least). You're assuming that if income is not in dollars or some other national currency, then it is not taxable. That is false. "Barter" income, in which you are paid in other property or services, is taxable just as if you were paid in cash, based on the "fair market value" (in dollars) of the property or services you received in exchange. See https://www.irs.gov/publications/p525/ar02.html#en_US_2016_publink1000229343. So the employees would be required to report the dollar value of their scrip as income. If they willfully failed to do so, or intentionally gave a dishonest estimate of its value, they could be prosecuted for tax evasion. Obligatory: https://xkcd.com/1494/ Dale M suggests, in a comment below, that the same rule applies in all other countries. This seems plausible, but to be certain, one would have to check them all, which I haven't done.	In the Netherlands, this qualifies as a deceptive trade practice (misleidende handelspraktijk) and is therefore directly illegal. It's likely also an unfair trade practice, (oneerlijke handelspraktijk) as the claim appears intended for end consumers. This means that the seller cannot count on the consumer knowing anythong about stuffase. It is a dutch implementation of EU directive 2005/29/EG, so similar laws apply in other EU countries. But the illegal per se part might vary.	No, filing a police report in good faith does not expose you to liability Of course, making false allegations or allegations where you are recklessly indifferent to the truth to police is both a serious crime in itself and defamation. Of course, breaking a contract is not a crime and the police are unlikely to take any action. If you borrow money from the bank and don’t pay it back, that’s not stealing or fraud unless it can be proven that you had no intention of paying it back when you borrowed it. This is a civil matter for the bank, not a criminal matter for the police.	Generally speaking, fraud in connection with an affirmative statement, in both criminal and civil cases, is limited to false statements of a presently existing material fact. Future income is not a presently existing fact. So, simply incorrectly stating your future income is not fraud. But, you are affirming when you make such a statement that you presently sincerely believe that you will have a future income of approximately the amount stated. And, if you make a statement about your future income when you do not actually believe that you will have that future income, then you have still committed fraud. In practice, there are lots of gray areas where a judge or jury considering the case would have to weigh the facts and your credibility. If you represented that you predicted that you would have an income of $1,000,000 in the next year, when you had never done so before and didn't even have any plausible plan other than playing the lottery for doing so, this would almost surely be credit card application fraud. On the other hand, if you represented that you predicted that you would have an income of $50,000 in the next year, when your income in past years had ranged from $30,000 to $45,000 from self-employment, and you believed sincerely that improvements in your marketing efforts and current economic trends were going to make the coming year your best year ever for income from self-employment that would give you a $50,000 income in the coming year, that would not be fraud. Where exactly the line between not fraud and fraud is drawn would be for the tier of fact to decide when and if the case went to trial.
The big-boys want to use our condo-fee to repair their private portion I live in a small condominium with eight units. Two units have their private balconies with private entrance. They want to have a major repair done for their private portion. The expected cost is about 20K and they added this cost to the condo-fee which is to be shared among the units. This means that my yearly condo fee effectively raised from $1.2k to about $2k. However, from my understanding, the repair cost of any private portions cannot be shared. I explained the law to the owners but they are not supporting me. One of the big-boys explicitly says that: "I do understand the law but I want to have my balcony repaired with your money anyway" Do I have to sue them to fix this issue? A lengthy law-suit is too costly for me. If I refuse to pay $2k and only pay 1.2k, will I be facing any legal troubles?	You did not specify a country or the specific contracts that might rule your condominium. At least in some jurisdictions indeed the repair cost of private portions cannot be shared. Moreover, you may not be required to pay some costs for common portions if you refuse to do so and won't make use of them. Do I have to sue them to fix this issue? A lengthy law-suit is too costly for me. If I refuse to pay $2k and only pay 1.2k, will I be facing any legal troubles? You will probably manage to continue paying just 1.2k, and have them have to sue you if they want to collect that supposedly owned money from you. However, there might be some requirements about providing notification of your refusal in a certain way or before some time elapses. I would recommend you to consult a local lawyer, it will be well-spent money. Plus, that refusal is actually sent by your lawyer (rather than just telling you how/what to say), should make your "law-understanding neighbor" think twice about going forward with their attempt of having you pay for it.	I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed.	What the landlord is doing is forcing you to abide by the terms of your lease agreement. You most likely agreed to a 1 year lease on a signed document, which means you're pretty much screwed because if he wanted to, he could force you to fulfill the lease and pay him anyway. However, his remarks about when you can notify to terminate are wrong. See end of answer. About Terminating Your Lease Early However, there are a few loopholes you can exploit. The easiest one is to get him to increase your rent. Ask about it, tell him that you're considering staying but tell him you want to know if he's going to increase the rent by much. If he declares that he is going to increase the rent, perfect. Get him to send it to you in writing (which he is legally required to do). Just in case though, have him on speaker phone and record every conversation you have from now on without telling him. This is legal (see this answer) and is a powerful form of evidence, so exploit the hell out of it. If you can get him to tell you that he's going to increase your rent, then you can legally submit a notice to terminate tenancy on the grounds that you do not wish to pay the increase. In this case, the amount of notice that you have to give is capped to the day that the rent increase is to take place. If you try this, do everything you can to get it in writing. Don't feel proud of snaring him and immediately announce that you're leaving because of this as soon as he says it on the phone, because you're screwing yourself out of going through the proper channels to make sure you not only win, but you've made your case air tight. Also, feel free to let you landlord know that he owes you money. Landlords in Ontario have to repay you a capped interest rate on your last months' deposit every 12 months. This rate is decided annually and for 2015 is capped at 1.6%. If your landlord wants to be anal about the rules and stick the letter of the law to you, do it back. Becoming a pain your landlords ass is a great way to get them to either become more flexible, or make a mistake that will give you an out. Notice that if he does increase the rent, he can demand that you increase your last months deposit and force you to pay it. You could "accidently" make him aware of this right in a conversation where you are concerned about a rent increase immediately after letting him know that he owes you money for the interest. "I'm concerned about the rent increase because I have to increase my deposit by law too." This way, he'll hopefully have the thought "I can avoid having to give him any money by increasing his rent by the same interest rate, so he'll owe me what I owe him, therefore I owe nothing. I'm so smart!" Then he cheerfully gives you a notice to increase rent, at which time you invoke your right to terminate tenancy on short notice due to an increase in rent. Your Landlord Is Wrong All that aside, your landlord committed an illegal act when they refused your notice to terminate, because he's denying you your rights under the RTA. From the Residential Tenancies Act: A tenant may terminate a tenancy at the end of a period of the tenancy or at the end of the term of a tenancy for a fixed term by giving notice of termination to the landlord in accordance with section 44. 2006, c. 17, s. 47 The details adjust a little bit depending on your circumstances, but the conditions in section 44 are basically to ensure the following: You are giving 60 days notice. You are not giving 60 days notice where the termination date you provide is less than the previously agreed term, except in special cases like the one I mention about increased rent. There is nothing in section 44 that can be confused to mean that you must wait until you have passed the end of your term before you can decide to leave. I suspect your landlord is deliberately interpreting the use of wording like "may terminate at the end of" to imply you have to wait to give your notice. A notice of termination is not a termination. It is a notice that in the future, you are going to terminate. Let's remove the confusion by replacing the word "terminate" with "vacating the premises and not paying another cent". That should remove any ambiguity that could be abused. So frankly you can simply go straight to the board, file the appropriate form with them and just pack up and leave when you've reached the date specified in the notice to terminate. Your final month is covered by your deposit. File the form immediately, let them know about the conversation you had with your landlord, then go to your bank and cancel the cheques you've already written (except for your deposit cheque) and simply ignore the landlord, carrying on with your moving plans. You should ask the Board if this illegal act has any ramifications. Perhaps because he has done this, this gives you an immediate out or something else. Call the Board and tell them what happened and ask them. They have an obligation to inform you correctly. Sources: Landlord Tenant Board of Ontario FAQ Final Note The Board is there to serve you, free of charge. They have a duty, as it is their explicit directive, to assist you in all matters regarding being a tenant. Phone them, talk to them at length, demand assistance. They are to inform you of your rights and guide you on the appropriate action, forms and procedure to assist you in resolving any issues you have. Note that I wrote the whole bit about getting out of your lease early legally before I refreshed my memory on the fact that you can/should give your 60 days notice before the end of your lease period. That makes the case much simpler as a I note in my answer. I left the information I already wrote however because it could be applicable or at least be of some help to others. Also note that if you're saying that the landlord came to get more cheques on the basis of his lie that he used to refuse your attempt to legally leave, then you'll need to cancel those cheques. That costs money. That alone is enough of a case to take him before the Tribunal and force him to repay the cost of those cancelled cheques. You may even successfully claim further damages or the Tribunal may voluntarily award you money for the actions your landlord is deliberately taking to deprive you of your rights. Talk to the Board.	You inspected the property online and based on that inspection you signed the lease. You have a legally binding contract. Now, it is not at all like the pictures How? I mean, are these pictures of a different house? If that is so then your contract is void for fraud. However, if the pictures are of the actual house and you just imagined from them that the house would be other than it is then tough luck for you. the stairwell in the house is a huge safety hazard for children OK. Does it comply with relevant building codes? If not then the landlord needs to bring it up to standard: you cannot walk away from the contract. Is it in need of repair? If so, the landlord needs to repair it: you cannot walk away from the contract. If it is compliant and in good repair and you think it is a hazard notwithstanding then you need to manage that hazard: this is not the landlords problem. I refused to move into the house That's fine: so long as you keep paying the rent there is no obligation on you to move in. If you stop paying the rent then it would appear that you have repudiated the contract and the landlord can sue you for damages - probably the costs of finding a new tenant and the rent up until that tenant takes over.	The relevant part of Texas law is in the property code, §§92.101-92.109 §92.104 allows them to "deduct from the deposit damages and charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the lease or as a result of breaching the lease", and then they must "give to the tenant the balance of the security deposit, if any, together with a written description and itemized list of all deductions" (except when there is uncontroversial rent owed). §92.109 states what the landlord's liability is, namely a landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of this subchapter is liable for an amount equal to the sum of $100, three times the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld, and the tenant's reasonable attorney's fees in a suit to recover the deposit. This requires bad faith, not just being wrong. If you dispute the deductions, you can sue the landlord to recover the deposit. The law also provides that "In an action brought by a tenant under this subchapter, the landlord has the burden of proving that the retention of any portion of the security deposit was reasonable". In order to extract more money from you for putative damages, the landlord will have to sue you and establish that there was an additional $2,000 damages. If the court finds that you did actually did damage the apartment, you may be ordered to compensate the landlord. Until you get such an order, you don't owe them anything; you may be able to recover the damage deposit if the "damage" was insignificant. This sketches the process of suing in Justice Court to get your deposit back, highlighting details like the demand letter that you might not have known you have to write. As far as your credit history is concerned, this is not entirely clear. The Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates the industry of credit reporting, and crucially you can dispute false claims of debts. This does not prevent a person from making such a claim. I do not have an account with the Big 3 reporting services, so I don't know what their standards are for recording a putative debt. However, you can insert a suitable statement in your record disputing the validity of the claim. It is most likely that the landlord would sell the putative debt to a collection agency. That industry is regulated by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and there is a procedure about disputing an alleged debt.	You are describing a liability suit. My sense is that based on the facts you describe you will face two serious challenges to making a successful case. Damages and liability. In order to win a liability case, you must first establish that you have been damaged in some way. According to your facts, your damages are at best, the replacement value of a used controller. I'm guessing that's what, $20 or so? That doesn't cover the cost of an attorney's time to even begin to hear your version of the facts, much less give you advice or pursue a case for you. After you establish damages, you must prove the company is responsible or has some share of liability for causing your damages. Again, I think this is going to be an obstacle for you. Not placing a warning that the game will affect you by causing you to throw your controller and be mean to your mom would be unprecedented if you were to prevail. AFAIK.	The official judgements do not reveal the funding for these lawyers; so where can I find this information? Nowhere. The commercial arrangements between lawyers and their clients are private and confidential like any other business transactions. You have no more right to know this then you do to know how your neighbour pays their mortgage. how could she have funded litigation in the EWHC and then EWCA before the UKSC? She may have rich parents or another benefactor who has in interest in her or the outcome of the case. She may have won the lottery. She may be the heiress of a dead rich uncle. By the way, "having" student loans does not mean you "need" student loans. Interest rates on student loans are cheap - if I need to pay $10,000 for a course and have $10,000 earning 5%, I would be nuts to use that if I could take out a loan at 3%.	Let me start by saying that real estate contracts are some of the most heavily regulated contracts and details vary enormously by jurisdiction. That said ... To vary a contract, the contract must actually contain provisions that allow for it to be varied and variations must be in accordance with those. These sorts of clauses are common in long-term contracts (building, mining, logistics etc) but are less common (but not unknown) in transactional contracts like real estate sales. If the contract does not contain such provisions then it can only be varied by a collateral contract which has the same basic requirements of any contract - in this particular case, were you offered something in return for agreeing to delay settlement? If you weren't you do not have a collateral contract that varies the original contract. Notwithstanding, even though the other party delaying settlement from the 11th to the 18th is a breach of the contract by them, by agreeing to it you would be prevented from enforcing your rights under the contract by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This presumes that they actually settle by the 18th - if they don't all bets are off and you can enforce the rights you have from their breach by failing to settle on or before the 11th - just don't agree to any more extensions. What you remedies are will be detailed in the contract. These would normally include issuing a notice for them to settle by a given date - if they don't do that you can terminate the contract and keep the deposit. You could also sue for damages. Don't do any of this (or anything else) without getting legal advice first. Edit The OP has put in a comment a rather vital piece of information: there is a clause making settlement contingent on the buyer selling their condo. If the delay is in accordance with that clause then the vendor is stuck, even if settlement takes 10 years.
Borrowing from a relative or friend without documentary evidence — is it money laundering? Suppose a person borrows money from a relative or friend, say, 10 million USD, without documentary evidence — the transaction is purely based on trust and cultural norms. If the borrower invests the money in real estate and after 5 years returns the borrowed amount to the lender, can this be treated as money laundering?	According to the United States Treasury Department: Money laundering is the process of making illegally-gained proceeds (i.e. "dirty money") appear legal (i.e. "clean"). Typically, it involves three steps: placement, layering and integration. First, the illegitimate funds are furtively introduced into the legitimate financial system. Then, the money is moved around to create confusion, sometimes by wiring or transferring through numerous accounts. Finally, it is integrated into the financial system through additional transactions until the "dirty money" appears "clean." I have no idea if the $10m are proceeds of crime so we apply the duck test - "If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck and swims like a duck; its probably a duck" A person has gifted another person $10m - there is nothing illegal about giving someone a gift, however, this is a pretty substantial gift. I am calling it a gift because there is no enforceable contract that requires repayment. There is an expectation that the receiver will invest this money for a period of time, hey, if I had $10m I'd probably invest it too. And then return it to the giver; with or without the earnings (you do not say). Again there is nothing wrong with reciprocating a gift; reciprocity is a cornerstone of most societies, however, this is a pretty detailed understanding of what reciprocity means. Quack, quack, quack - its money laundering. Many jurisdictions in the world have "unexplained wealth" laws which basically require a person to explain their unexplained wealth or have it confiscated. If it isn't money laundering it is certainly at risk of this.	This is a good example of the life of the law being experience and not reason. While there is a logical argument that this isn't theft, in reality, this conduct would universally be considered an open and shut case of shoplifting and anyone who tried this would surely be convicted of a crime with consequences far more severe than creating a tort debt for conversion of the property. Also, you do intend to permanently deprive the store of its property. The fact that you intend to remedy that by paying for it doesn't change that. You aren't borrowing the property with an intent of returning it.	It looks to me as if "money laundering" is a misunderstanding; though any organization has a duty to prevent this, charities have no special responsibilties. However, charity law does in general terms prevent a charity from giving money to a cause that does not further the charity's aims. The Charity Commission's guidance says "Charities can only spend their money on projects or activities that support the aims stated in their governing document" (and although it goes on to outline exceptions, you still need to obtain the Commission's agreement to return a gift from a source you find objectionable, for example). The rationale is that people gave money to the University to further the cause of education; the researchers have no right to divert that money to Shelter (or another charity like the Roman Catholic Church) without the giver's consent. My experienced but non-expert view is that these payments would be a breach of the law, though they would probably be treated as a de minimis exception; you can't blame the University's legal team for insisting they should not be made.	I think the key word here is "assume". A person, N, who is clearly the next of kin of a recently deceased person D may not assume that s/he is D's sole heir, or indeed is D's heir at all. N must wait until D's will (if any) is known, and an executor or administrator is lawfully appointed. Only the executor may lawfully dispose of D's property, by conveying it to specified beneficiaries, selling it, giving it away, or by any other means. Anyone who does so without the proper executor's authority is probably technically guilty of theft, although in a case like the one in the question, a prosecution would be very unlikely. But N would be liable to any heir H for the value of items properly left to H but disposed of by N. H might not choose to pursue such a claim, but would be legally able to. N should remember that the value, monetary or sentimental, of objects may not be known to N, and may be much greater to H than N is aware of. I suppose that in the case of objects of slight value which must be dealt with promptly, such as perishable food on D's premises, reasonable steps would not be objected to.	Depends where you are At common law, theft (or more generally, larceny) requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. However, many jurisdictions have removed this element from the crime. For example, s118 of the new-south-wales Crimes Act 1900 says: 118 Intent to return property no defence Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused's own use, or for the accused's own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal.	The official judgements do not reveal the funding for these lawyers; so where can I find this information? Nowhere. The commercial arrangements between lawyers and their clients are private and confidential like any other business transactions. You have no more right to know this then you do to know how your neighbour pays their mortgage. how could she have funded litigation in the EWHC and then EWCA before the UKSC? She may have rich parents or another benefactor who has in interest in her or the outcome of the case. She may have won the lottery. She may be the heiress of a dead rich uncle. By the way, "having" student loans does not mean you "need" student loans. Interest rates on student loans are cheap - if I need to pay $10,000 for a course and have $10,000 earning 5%, I would be nuts to use that if I could take out a loan at 3%.	What you describe is forbidden by corporate law in every jurisdiction with which I'm familiar. I don't know the law in Quebec, but in principle: An entity in control of a corporation can't use that control to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of other shareholders. (If he does so through deceit then he is committing the common law tort of fraud, and quite likely a criminal offense.) A trustee or fiduciary that uses his control of assets to enrich himself at the expense of those to whom he owes a duty (e.g., minority shareholders) is guilty of various statutory offenses, among which may be "Breach of Fiduciary Duty" and "Fraudulent transfer." Sales of corporate assets in general must be done through an "arms-length" mechanism. If they are being auctioned off, and the auction isn't open, so that an insider is able to purchase them below "fair market value," then, once again, a fraud has been committed. The grading and remedies vary by jurisdiction. Of course, whether it's worth pursuing a remedy through legal action depends (as always) on: the amount at stake, the cost of pursuing the remedy, statutory allowances for punitive damages, the likelihood and cost of collecting on any judgement won. Only a lawyer familiar with the jurisdiction, the complaint, and the corporation's governing documents could help you answer that question.	Choice of jurisdiction: You’re pretty much free to choose your jurisdiction. You don’t have to contract under German law. The German state will intervene though if you’re doing criminal stuff. Legally, the best is of course to draft a written agreement. You’re completely free in the terms (unless it becomes immoral, § 138 BGB), but a loan, § 488 BGB (Darlehensvertrag), with a 0% interest rate (if it’s meant as a short-term aid) is standard. The next level is to collateralize your loan, specifically with a pledge, §§ 1204 ff. BGB, i. e. your friend gives you a valuable item which you may (and actually have to) sell for profit if he doesn’t return the loan. However, unlike contract law, in property law you are not completely free regarding the terms (numerus clausus of property law, Typenzwang des Sachenrechts). Here it becomes too difficult though for the layman, so I wouldn’t recommend that unless you know what you’re doing. Ultimately, I/we think it’s nice of you to consider helping out your friend, but as Nike Dattani already portrayed it can get really nasty if you intend to legally enforce such matters. Trish mentioned the saying: Friendship ends where business begins. I, too, suggest to refer your friend to a pawnshop, research (third-party) microloan opportunities, and help him without directly giving him cash, dine together and offer company (i. e. address the psychological dimension financial troubles entail). PS: § 9 SGB Ⅰ: Germany is (to some degree) a welfare state. Maybe your friend is eligible for some kind of assistance. However, and probably typical of Germany, if you want to get money, you have to fill in forms.
Is it legal in the US to force you to buy insurance (as a bundle) for something you already have insurance for? For example, a company that rents out car parking spaces requires that I will also buy insurance for the property inside my car, while I already have insurance for the property inside my car. For example, the company may require that the coverage for the property inside my car may only be part of home owner insurance, but not car insurance. If the coverage for the property inside my car is part of my car insurance, the company does not accept this coverage and forces me to buy another policy that covers again the property in the car, which is already covered by my car insurance.	Each of the 50 states plus non-states has their own laws, but there is nothing general about contract or other law in the US that forces a rental facility to accept customers who don't have / won't get the insurance that they require. It is a reasonable requirement, because it protects their interest insofar as angry customers might sue the facility because their car was broken into, and many of them would mistakenly believe that their car insurance covers theft or destruction of contents (thus leading to a desire to sue, to cover the property loss). It may be just too much hassle and too risky for them to assume the correctness of a customer's claim that they already have adequate coverage and will maintain said coverage, with no practical means to verify the claim.	I doubt that they are legally required to get your VAT as a condition of registration. However, they are a private company, and they are allowed to attach almost any restriction they want to registration. It is more likely that they require your VAT for some of the business interactions that they expect will happen after you register for the site and have decided to make it a condition of registration.	Although the local mechanic was suggested by you he was paid by the dealer, and hence was acting as the dealer's agent in the repair. If the dealer did not want to accept this then they could have simply insisted on doing the repair themselves. The dealer is responsible for the actions of their agent, and they cannot run out the clock on the warranty simply by failing to repair the fault. You could write to the dealer saying that you will accept their third repair on the understanding that the fault and two attempts to repair it predate the expiration of the warranty and hence you retain the right to return the car if this third attempt at repair does not remedy the problem. Or you could simply insist on returning the car for a refund. If they won't take it, write a letter stating that either they agree to take it back or you will take action in the county court to recover your money. Most businesses will conceed at this point because spending time in court is expensive even if you win. I say "write" because that means they can't deny agreeing later on. You can of course hand them the letter yourself rather than sending it by post.	Bearing in mind that you are legally required to have liability insurance in Wisconsin (or a surety bond), and the reason for that is so that people can know with reasonable certainty (and not just hope) that if someone plows into them the guy at fault will cover the damage, you would expect that insurance policies can't be written so that the insurance company can wash their hands of the matter. So per Wisc. Stat 632.32(6)(b) in the liability insurance section of state insurance law, No policy may exclude from the coverage afforded or benefits provided... Any use of the motor vehicle for unlawful purposes, or for transportation of liquor in violation of law, or while the driver is under the influence of an intoxicant ...	No While you can be bound to terms you had the opportunity to read and didn’t, you cannot be bound to terms that you did not have the opportunity to read. That doesn’t mean that you don’t have a contract but it will be on different conditions to those in the undisclosed terms. For a contract to be valid, the parties must agree on the essential terms, for a phone contract, what service the phone company is giving and how much the consumer pays. Incidental terms can be left undefined and they will, if needed, be filled in by a court with reasonable terms. However, this only happens to the extent necessary to give effect to the primary purpose of the contract. For example, late fees or termination fees are not strictly necessary (common law principles of damages for breach of contract work just fine) so, if the undisclosed terms include them, they will be unenforceable. Notwithstanding, it’s quite likely that refusing to disclose in the advance violates state or Federal consumer protection laws against misleading or deceptive conduct.	united-states I am skiing and cause unintentional injury to another slope patron/client. How would I protect myself from being sued? Use reasonable care to avoid harming others, and follow all applicable rules of the ski area. Keep your equipment in good repair. Don't ski when you are drunk or high or in circumstances you can't handle. Try not to collide with people. If you do collide with someone do what you can to mitigate their injuries, identify ways to document facts favorable to you, and promptly contact your insurance company. Is there insurance if sued that could protect my assets if found negligent and cover legal costs of lawyer and trial, regardless if found negligent? For this, you need liability insurance. In the United States, liability insurance is typically included in homeowner's or renter's insurance. These kinds of liability insurance typically cover the cost of a legal defense of a covered claim and any damages awarded or paid in a settlement of those claims (up to the policy limits). These kinds of liability insurance would typically cover liability arising from a skiing accident and most other claims for negligence, but would typically not cover claims related to intentional acts or a criminal prosecution. A homeowner's or renter's insurance policy would also not typically cover vehicle accidents (e.g. your liability while operating a snowmobile), claims related to a business or an occupation, or claims related to contractual liability.	No one is required to have Public Liability Insurance If a contractor (or householder) wants PL insurance they are free to take it out but there is no legal requirement to do so. There may be contractural requirements. For example, a mortgagee may require a mortgagor to have property insurance and PL usually comes bundled with this (but check your policy because it may not be so). Or a householder principal may require their contractor to have PL insurance but a wise principal also requires evidence of cover. Whether a person has PL insurance or not, they can be liable to the public for damage. Insurance does not remove liability, an insurer just indemnifies their insured from the costs of defending or settling a claim. Liability In general, the head of claim for liability is typically negligence. Whether a person is negligent depends on if they had a duty of care and failed in that duty among other things (see Is there liability for pure accidents?). The contractor could be liable. The householder could be liable. Both could be liable. Neither could be liable. In normal circumstances, a plaintiff will sue everyone they can think of. At that point, it would be nice to have insurance so you can say to your insurer: "You deal with it."	There is a clear conflict of interest - or the potential for the appearance of a conflict of interest - here. On the one hand, you are supposed to be looking for a good deal for your employer - within reason, of course. On the other hand, you want to make as much money for yourself as you can by claiming as high a rental fee as is reasonable. Most employers have policies against this. This is like hiring your side company as a vendor. You should follow your employer's policies for making sure his is totally above board, or just stay elsewhere.
Can I refuse to tell Settlement Conference Deputy Judge my employment or daily life? I'm Plaintiff in Small Claims Court case in Ontario Canada. Defendant filed Defence. So Settlement Conference coming up! I read Charter Basics \| Your Right to Silence What is the Right to Silence? In the Canadian legal tradition, the right to silence is a subset of the larger principle against self-incrimination. It is closely related to the rules governing confessions and is also enshrined under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. At its most basic, the right to silence means that absent any legal obligation to the contrary, no one is obliged to speak to the police or respond to police questioning1. For accused or detained people, this is a Constitutionally protected right. The right to silence means that a detainee has the right to choose whether or not to speak or give a statement to the police2. Regardless of what the police might say, an accused person has absolutely no obligation to assist the State with an investigation or prosecution. In my honest opinion, Defendant's lawyer lied some parts of Defence. I looked up Defendant's lawyer at Law Society of Ontario website, and his record and history are not clean. I don't want him or public know my employment or what I do everyday. I know people have falsely accused at workplace or like debt collectors, harass you at work or employer.	You're only required to show up for a settlement conference. You're not required to do or say anything at the conference. Nothing you say or do or fail to say or do can be used at trial, and every that happens there is kept strictly confidential. The judge is there just to give advice to both parties and for procedural reasons. The judge will not order you to respond to any questions the defence may have. From "Important Information About Your Settlement Conference" by the Superior Court of Justice, Office of the Chief Justice: A settlement conference is an informal, confidential meeting between the parties in the presence of a judicial officer (a judge or deputy judge). The judicial officer at your settlement conference will not be the judge at your trial. You may feel free to discuss your case openly at your settlement conference. What you say cannot be repeated at trial. Your discussions at a settlement conference are strictly confidential, and will remain so. Unless you consent, the matters discussed at the settlement conference, and during any negotiations, shall not be disclosed to anyone. You must never mention the settlement conference during the actual trial. Note that normally there is no discovery process in Ontario Small Claims Court, but there is one exception. The judge at a settlement conference can make an order requiring you to produce documents, but this will only be for documents that you yourself would want to provide as evidence at trial and have failed to provide to the defence as required before the settlement conference. Unless you have some document listing your employment that you would need to rely on to win your case, you won't be required to provide anything to the defence that would reveal where you work.	You know that a judicial proceeding has been filed against you when you are "served" with notice. In fact, legal proceedings cannot generally proceed without somebody swearing that you were served notice. If a criminal complaint is being pursued against you then you might also learn of this fact when an investigating law enforcement agent contacts you to question you or arrest you. "Filed a case" could mean all sorts of other things. For example, it could be that they filed a police report, or filed a complaint with some company or non-law-enforcement entity. It could be that they have in fact filed a claim in a court of law and whoever is serving process just hasn't been able to find you. In any of these events I don't know of any way that you could proactively determine that without knowing exactly where and how the "case" was "filed." Actually, if a criminal complaint was filed against you and approved then a court in another state could have issued a warrant for your arrest. Contact your local police and they should be able to do a nationwide search for open warrants on you. Police will not typically release information on "open investigations." So even if you knew the exact agency where it was filed they may not tell you anything. If they decided not to investigate it then you might have a right to request the complaint under open-records laws – that depends on the state and the agency.	Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints.	I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.	Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.	Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on.	Yes, Defendant may compel Plaintiff to appear and may cross-examine Plaintiff personally. The right to counsel does not include the right to have an attorney testify for you at trial. At trial or deposition, Plaintiff's lawyer generally has no business testifyng at all, and his statements would not be evidence. If the attorney's testimony is necessary for trial, he would likely be disqualified from representing Plaintiff. Defendant is unlikely to persuade the judge to question Plaintiff for him. The judge might ask questions to clarify answers that Defendant elicits himself, but he might also just rule based on whatever information he receives, regardless of how clear it is.	A subpoena is nothing more than court process compelling someone to testify as a witness or to produce documents in their possession, custody and control, or both, usually in connection with a court case. Most people who are subject to a subpoena are not being asked to offer testimony that could implicate them in a crime. They simply have evidence relevant to a case. For example, bank records are routinely subpoenaed to generate evidence that can be used in a civil or criminal case against someone, even though no one accuses the bank of doing anything improper. Many witnesses are also just not bothered to testify or actively don't want to testify, even though the evidence would not personally reflect poorly on them in any way, if they are not compelled to do so. For example, they may simply be very busy at profitable activities, or may fear retaliation from people involved in the case. Also, subpoenas are not infrequently issued where the witness is personally happy to testify but needs court process to get permission to be away from work or other obligations. A subpoena can also overcome legal obligations to not voluntarily provide information even when it is not legally privileged. For example, a lawyers ethical obligation not to voluntarily share information about a client (even information that isn't attorney-client privileged like the existence of an attorney-client relationship or the amount of money that the attorney holds in a trust account for the client's benefit) is broader than the attorney-client privilege and a lawyer can be compelled to provide such information by subpoena. To invoke the 5th Amendment in a case where you are not a defendant, you must have some good faith belief that your testimony would expose you to criminal liability, something that the vast majority of witnesses under a subpoena do not. You cannot invoke the 5th Amendment, for example, to protect yourself from having to testify regarding something that may be highly embarrassing and may even constitute a violation of the law, but is not a crime. For example, you can't invoke the 5th Amendment to prevent yourself from having to admit under oath in court testimony that you cheated on your boyfriend with someone else, or that you forgot to lock up the office the night before it was burglarized, or that you lied about having won a military decoration that you publicly claimed to have won but really didn't, or that you are in default on your mortgage, or that you are out of legal immigration status. The 5th Amendment can also not be invoked to prevent you have having to testify about violations of professional ethics that are not crimes. For example, an attorney could be compelled to testify that she failed to keep confidential information private by telling her bartender client secrets. A subpoena is basically useless against a defendant in a criminal case, who has the right not to be compelled to testify in his or her own case. But, in a civil case, you can subpoena someone to testify against themselves and they then have the choice of invoking the 5th Amendment and having an adverse inference entered against them (usually resulting in them losing the case if they are a party to it), or not invoking the 5th Amendment and testifying even though truthful testimony on the subject may be incriminating and may be used against you in a criminal prosecution. Someone can also be compelled to testify regarding matters that could be self-incriminating in a civil or criminal case if someone with authority to do so (generally the relevant prosecuting attorney) grants the person compelled to testimony immunity from prosecution (usually all that must be granted is immunity from prosecution based upon the testimony offered, called "use immunity", which is still less than someone admitting to criminal conduct might need to feel comfortable if testifying voluntarily).
Can a photo that contains a trademark be used by a political campaign? There's a current kerfuffle regarding a campaign photo used by the Biden campaign. The photo shows the logo for the Washington Redskins in the original photo but removed in the photo displayed on CNN. Since the original story, though, the Biden campaign has said that they supplied the altered photo to CNN and the campaign had removed the logo because it is "copyrighted" and that such a step is "a very common practice on campaigns." The original photo is still located on Facebook where it was initially used to celebrate Father's Day. Is there anything about copyright, or trademark, law that would require such editing?	As far as I am aware both these answers are incorrect, but as I am not a lawyer let me quote the World Intellectual Property Organization (part of the UN): Photos of trademarks Unlike copyright law, trademark law as such does not restrict the use of a trademark in a photograph. What it does forbid is the use of a trademark in a way that can cause confusion regarding the affiliation of the trademark owner to the image. If consumers are likely to mistakenly believe that the trademark owner sponsored a photograph, then there may be trademark infringement. For example, if a Nike logo was visible on the t-shirt worn by the boy in our photo-shoot scenario, this could be seen as an attempt to appropriate consumer goodwill associated with the Nike trademark. So, caution is required if photographing someone wearing or consuming a trademarked product. Source: IP and Business: Using Photographs of Copyrighted Works and Trademarks (emphasis mine) So the basic idea is that if the Washington Redskins would not want to be associated with the Biden campaign, they could file a lawsuit claiming that the photo suggests there might be an affiliation between the campaign and the sport organization. In other words, the question one has to ask is: Is there a chance we might benefit in any way from the goodwill associated with the trademark? The way it was explained in a copyright course1 I watched was that: you don't need to worry about a McDonald's in the background of your photo you need to be careful where you use a general photo of a specific McDonald's and taking a photo of a political candidate in front of a McDonald's is not acceptable without permission2 The verdict The biden campaign claimed that A campaign aide told Fox News the logo was removed from the photo because it is "copyrighted" and claimed that such a step is "a very common practice on campaigns." To my knowledge that are no actual copyright concerns here, but - just like with the aforementioned course - trademark matters often get covered in the same setting as copyright laws, so I have a very easy time believing that this is 'a very common practice on campaigns'. It's incredibly unlikely that for this specific photo the Washington Redskins would have actually claimed that Biden was benefiting from the goodwill associated with their brand (especially considering all the controversy surrounding them), but it's a completely believable general policy. The interesting thing is that they didn't care as much about postings on social media compared to more traditional channels, but this is in line with what I have seen in many companies and organizations. 1 - This course was trying to generalize international law in a way that content producers won't get in trouble anywhere rather than exclusively explain US law. 2 - The example didn't use a 'political candidate' explicitly, but something along the lines of a recognizable public figure who is not just getting a burger	As is typical with legal matters, "it depends". It is not copyright infringement to mention the name of an artist or work of art. It may be infringement of trademark, or of the right of publicity. For example, Apple Computers has trademarked the name "Apple" in the domain of computers, so you cannot call your computer company "Apple Computers", without their permission. You also cannot advertise in a way that implies that Taylor Swift endorsed your product, without her permission – this is the "right of publicity" (the name may differ, e.g. "passing off" depending on jurisdiction). The situation in the US is highly variable, since it depends on state law. The legal inclinations of the particular artist may be irrelevant, since they often have legal arrangements with publishers, and if you are going to get sued, it might be the publisher that sues you. Hiring an attorney to evaluate the specifics of your idea is the only reasonable approach to the matter.	No, it is not illegal to use the symbol of the federal government for your own personal use as it is a public domain symbol. However, the USMC will frown upon it. Marines have a sort of warrior culture ethos to them, when compared to the other branches of the U.S. military and a strong culture among those who served. Among Marine culture "there is no such thing as a former Marine"... that is, once you enter the service, you are a marine even if you retire (a former Marine is usually someone who was dishonorably discharged OR committed an action that would have gotten him/her discharged had they not retired). They do not take kindly to Stolen Valor (pretending or seeming to pretend you served when you did not). While this is legal to do per SCOTUS rule, it's not considered advisable. Most of the US military have dim views of Stolen Valor and will react very negatively. And seeing as how the Marines like to boast in song that they Guard Heaven for God upon Death, these are not enemies you would like to make. Tread extremely cautiously while doing this.	It's questionable, because if you design your own visual interpretation of the T-Shirt then it isn't necessarily the one from the book and thus your art has it's own copyright. However, if the current Copyright Holder and Possible Trademark owner is selling the shirt it could be an issue because yours is not official but being sold as one. If you're making it for non-sale and just cosplay, than you have a better arguement.	You could sue them for commercially exploiting your image without permission, so the waiver is necessary. It is entirely legal to require of tenants (even if weird) that they be part of an advertising campaign, in a specified way: it's also your right to refuse to sign. There is a minuscule chance that there is a local ordinance prohibiting such a clause.	You can, and many authors and other creators of fiction do, use the names of real newspapers, real brands and products, and real people without obtaining permission from anyone. As long as those names are not being used to market or identify goods or services, the use cannot be trademark infringement. There idea that you cannot "defame the brans" is in fact much narrower than many people think, and than it used to be. Particularly in the united-states free speech rights often supersede protections against so-called trademark "defamation". In the US all of the examples in the answer by Jack Edwards would be clearly legal, an they probably would be in many other countries as well, if they appeared in a work that was clearly fictional. If a work mof fiction uses the name of a real person, and other identifying details that make it clear just which real person is being mentioned, and if statements that seem to be statements of fact, not opinion are made about that person, and if those statements are false and negative, and if a hypothetical reasonable person would believe that those statements are about the real person, not a fictional person, thereby harming that person's reputation, then if all that is true, the person might have a valid claim of defamation.	The US flag is not protected by copyright. Nothing as old as the flag is protected by copyright under US law. Indeed no work published in the US prior to 1925 is now protected, except for works of non-US origin protected under the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA) 4 USC sec 8 purports to PRESCRIBE the treatment of the flag, and paragraph (g) says: (g) The flag should never have placed upon it, nor on any part of it, nor attached to it any mark, insignia, letter, word, figure, design, picture, or drawing of any nature. However, as this Wikipedia article points out, 4 USC 8 and related sections are advisory, not binding, and no penalty is provided for violating them. 4 USC 3 provides a $100 fine: or 30 days jail time for: Any person who, within the District of Columbia, in any manner, for exhibition or display, shall place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing, or any advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, colors, or ensign of the United States of America; or shall expose or cause to be exposed to public view any such flag, standard, colors, or ensign upon which shall have been printed, painted, or otherwise placed, or to which shall be attached, appended, affixed, or annexed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, or drawing, or any advertisement of any nature; or who, within the District of Columbia, shall manufacture, sell, expose for sale, or to public view, or give away or have in possession for sale, or to be given away or for use for any purpose, any article or substance being an article of merchandise, or a receptacle for merchandise or article or thing for carrying or transporting merchandise, upon which shall have been printed, painted, attached, or otherwise placed a representation of any such flag, standard, colors, or ensign, to advertise, call attention to, decorate, mark, or distinguish the article or substance on which so placed shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $100 or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days, or both, in the discretion of the court. The words “flag, standard, colors, or ensign”, as used herein, shall include any flag, standard, colors, ensign, or any picture or representation of either, or of any part or parts of either, made of any substance or represented on any substance, of any size evidently purporting to be either of said flag, standard, colors, or ensign of the United States of America or a picture or a representation of either, upon which shall be shown the colors, the stars and the stripes, in any number of either thereof, or of any part or parts of either, by which the average person seeing the same without deliberation may believe the same to represent the flag, colors, standard, or ensign of the United States of America. 18 USC 700 was a criminal statute punishing anyone who: mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States But 18 USC 700 was struck down by the US Supreme Court as a violation of the First Amendment in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) Se also the full text of the decision. The decision said, in relevant part: The Government concedes in these cases, as it must, that appellees' flag burning constituted expressive conduct, Brief for United States 28; see Johnson, 491 U.S., at 405-406, 109 S.Ct., at 2540, but invites us to reconsider our rejection in Johnson of the claim that flag burning as a mode of expression, like obscenity or "fighting words," does not enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). This we decline to do.4 ... Although the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Government's asserted interest is "related 'to the suppression of free expression,' " 491 U.S., at 410, 109 S.Ct., at 2543, and concerned with the content of such expression. The Government's interest in protecting the "physical integ rity" of a privately owned flag5 rests upon a perceived need to preserve the flag's status as a symbol of our Nation and certain national ideals. But the mere destruction or disfigurement of a particular physical manifestation of the symbol, without more, does not diminish or otherwise affect the symbol itself in any way. ... As we explained in Johnson, supra, at 416-417, 109 S.Ct., at 2546: "[I]f we were to hold that a State may forbid flag burning wherever it is likely to endanger the flag's symbolic role, but allow it wherever burning a flag promotes that role—as where, for example, a person ceremoniously burns a dirty flag—we would be . . . permitting a State to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox' by saying that one may burn the flag to convey one's attitude toward it and its referents only if one does not endanger the flag's representation of nationhood and national unity." Although Congress cast the Flag Protection Act of 1989 in somewhat broader terms than the Texas statute at issue in Johnson, the Act still suffers from the same fundamental flaw: It suppresses expression out of concern for its likely communicative impact. The above quotes without acknowledgement West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) where the majority opinion includes the often-quoted passage: If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. Any legal device to prohibit modified versions of US flags, particularly when these are in fact being used to make or symbolize political arguments or positions, would fall under the same rule, and would be equally unconstitutional.	You cannot use a trademark in a way that may cause confusion that your goods and services are associated with or endorsed by the trade marked goods and services. If you are clear that they are not then you shouldn't have any problems on that front. You also cannot defame the brand: that is make derogatory comments that are not true. On a practical note, when Pepsi (for example) sends you a cease & desist notice, what are you going to do? They can go to the petty cash tin for $2 million to make your life a legal hell for 18-36 months: how much do you have to defend your rights?
Can a school provide preferential treatment for one allergen and not another? Our daughter is allergic to dairy milk. We provide her almond milk at home, however our school has told us we cannot bring in almond milk due to concerns about nut allergies, and that we should provide soy milk instead. We do not want our daughter drinking soy milk and feel that the school's policy is discriminatory due to the fact that both soy and dairy are potential allergens and they are allowing those, while banning nuts. Therefore they are providing preferential treatment for children with one medical condition while not providing the same considerations/protections for children with another medical condition. Are we correct in our assessment that this is a discriminatory practice? We are willing to work with the school to develop sane practices based on CDC recommendations, such as allergy-free tables in the lunchroom, etc.	It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin A medical condition like an allergy is not necessarily a physical disability. The school is arguably fulfilling its obligations under WHS legislation by banning nut products if that is what a risk assessment indicates. It may also be necessary to ban milk products if that is required for your daughter's safety. If (and I do not know) nuts pose a greater risk than milk then banning the former and not the latter may be perfectly justified. Ask to see the risk assessment.	Does CCPA impact whether or not this is allowed? Probably not. Public schools are divisions of state government and there are limits to how much the federal government can dictate the operations of state and local governments. Limitations on whether public schools can monetize data collected from students (13+) would arise under state law. The state law could certainly expressly authorize the practice (and to some extent does already with profit generating sports teams and yearbooks). State law could likewise prohibit the practice. For the most part, state law is silent and it doesn't happen that much because it isn't very profitable. Is there different guidance for public (government-managed and nonprofit) vs private schools? The legal analysis is very different. I'm not as familiar with this area of law, however, and will leave that question to someone else. As a practical matter, private schools are in a very good position to obtain express consent to do so from parents and students, so that is usually how the issue is resolved, I suspect.	It is entirely legal to discriminate on arbitrary grounds. What is not legal is to discriminate on the basis of a protected category, for example race. The law say that you cannot favor or disfavor a customer because of their race. Federal law specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, but not age or gender (disability is more complicated). Moreover, the grounds are not arbitrary. The establishment is at legal risk if a customer does not wear eye-protection, and you have no right to compel them to assume that risk: it's a perfectly normal business decision. The law states that "Customers are not allowed to use a tanning device unless the customer uses protective eyewear", and verifying that you have such eyewear is the minimal way of assuring compliance with the law.	Yes. HIPPA does not apply to exchanges of information between professors and students, it only governs disclosures of medical information by medical providers and insurance companies. Educational privacy laws might prohibit the professor from sharing that information with someone outside the educational institution, but that is a different question entirely, than whether this information can be requested from a student. If you have a disagreement with the professor's decision, your remedy would be to ask the department chair, or the dean with jurisdiction over that professor, or provost (a.k.a. the chief academic officer) at the institution to reconsider this decision (ordinarily, in that order).	Clause (c) says that while schools cannot generally restrict otherwise legal expressions by students, a school run by a religious organization can restrict such speech in terms of its tenets. It then becomes a matter of fact to be proven in court that the church has a particular tenet. So if you are asking whether it is correct that the religion exception is narrowly limited to contradictions of the religion's tenets, that is correct.	If the requirement is imposed by an employer, then the basis for an exemption, if any, would be whatever the employer choose to allow, unless some applicable law required some particular exemption. Such mandates are not common. Indeed I do not recall hearing of any such absolute mandates. But an employer could choose to impose one, and I have heard (and read) discussions of hospitals, for example, requiring COVID-19 vaccinations to be taken by employees when available. If an employer mandates a vaccination, it is up to the employer to decide when, and if, an exemption is warranted. It is up to the employee to decide whether to comply by accepting the vaccination or refuse at the risk of being fired. I do not know of any law which would specifically require an employer to grant exemptions in particular circumstances. A law might exist, or be passed, requiring such exemptions. If the employee had a particular medical condition which makes a vaccination si9gnificantly more risky for that employee than for an average person, and if that condition was considered to be a disability (not all or even most medical conditions are so considered) then the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) would require the employer to offer a "reasonable accommodation" to the employee, if one is available. Exactly what accommodation is "reasonable" is a fact-based determination, and would depend on the reason for the mandate, the cost and burden of the accommodation on the employer, and the degree if risk to the employee with and without the accommodation. In some cases no accommodation is found to be "reasonable", and in such cases the ADA does not mandate any accommodation at all. The ADA generally specifies whet must be done when an employee has \ a disability, but dopes not specify exactly how a disability must be proved. A medical certificate is common, but njot invariable, iof an employer questions the existence o a disability. The ADA would not require an exemption for a "Religious/Philosophical" objection. Soem state laws protect religious scruples in various particular employment situations. In some but not all states objections on such grounds for vaccinations otherwise required for school attendance are honored. The exact grounds accepted vary from state to state. A specific state would need to be listed for a more specific answer to be given, and I am not aware of any state that has such a requirement for exemption from a private employer's vaccine mandate. Addition: It seems from comments that some employers, such as hospitals and the military, already require vaccinations for some diseases. This seems reasonable to me, and does not change my answer otehrwise.	I’m guessing you have seen a sign in a business that read - “Management reserves the right to refuse service to anyone”. At least in the US, they do not need a reason as long as the reason isn’t unlawful discrimination. They can decide not to serve you.	Under 42 USC 2000a(a): All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. So a business may be generally prohibited from discriminating against you on the basis of your religion, but I don't know of any law that requires stores to accommodate whatever aversion or hostility you may feel toward gay people or their allies. On the contrary, such businesses have a First Amendment right to display such decor. So legislation that required them to stop speaking out in support of nice gay people would be struck down as unconstitutional.
Why wasn't Acosta arrested on conspiracy charges and/or the obstruction of justice? In the Jeffrey Epstain case in which a pyramid scheme of international sex trafficking and abuse came to light, the FBI filed a fifty three page indictment in June 2007. However, the then Attorney-General of South California. Alexander Acosta agreed to a 'plea-deal' which more or less granted immunity to Epstein and four other named Co-conspirators and incredibly, any unnamed potential Co-conspirators. This agreement shut down the FBI probe completely. However, a federal judge later found that the victims rights had been 'violated' in this agreement, and called the deal a 'conspiracy' and ordered the case to go ahead. The Trump administration later selected Alexander Acosta to stand as Labour Secretary. When the the evidence for the secret back room deal, or rather 'conspiracy' came to light, the ensuing outrage forced his resignation from his post. Given that it appears that he was defending the rights of people involved in a pyramid scheme of sexual abuse of young and vulnerable women, why hasn't Acosta been charged with obstructing justice and/or conspiracy?	A prosecutor's discretion is almost unassailable. The main reason for this is to prevent prosecutors from having to defend in a legal forum every single decision made. In a civil matter, prosecutors have absolute immunity form being personally sued for their actions (again, to prevent a prosecutor from being sued from every single defendant). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosecutorial_immunity Misconduct by prosecutors may be resolved by reversal or retrials of court proceedings. But this is not something that really has criminal penalties. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosecutorial_misconduct#:~:text=In%20jurisprudence%2C%20prosecutorial%20misconduct%20is,is%20similar%20to%20selective%20prosecution. Occasionally, a prosecutor may be subject to discipline from the state's Bar. This is rare, and is not much of a deterrent. https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/harmful-error/misconduct-and-punishment/ Theoretically, a prosecutor who out and out breaks the law can be prosecuted. Examples seem to be rare, and are more about government malfeasance (expense reports, misuse of government equipment, etc.). Due to the above standards, proving criminal conduct around prosecutorial discretion will be extremely difficult, as will finding a fellow prosecutor willing to even go down that road. It is in no prosecutor's interest to set the precedent of prosecutors being jailed for their behavior. So, why has nothing happened? Because in general, prosecutors can get away with almost anything. And I will add, Because America seems to like it this way.	There are cases out there like Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, State v. Unnamed Defendant, Williams v. Unnamed Defendant; there have been indictments of John Doe who was only identified via a DNA profile. Not knowing the actual name of a person wouldn't pose a problem per se, and it seems that when the name is not known, John or Jane Doe is generally filled in. There was in instance a year ago in the UK where rioters who refused to identify themselves, and prosecution decided to drop the case.	It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.	You don't really need any reasonable doubts about the currently available evidence to get it started. If an investigating authority thinks a crime has been committed and not yet been adjudicated, it is free to investigate, even if others disagree. There are plenty of avenues for starting an investigation: Congress can exercise its oversight power to initiate an investigation. State legislatures can do the same, so you could petition the New York Legislature, the Virginia General Assembly, or the Pennsylvania General Assembly. At both the state and federal level, attorneys general have the authority to initiate an investigation of crimes committed within their jurisdictions. At both the state and federal level, a judge's authority to appoint a special prosecutor is a power considered to be inherent in the courts, so nearly any court could appoint someone to pursue the investigation. Of course, the prosecutor's authority could be jurisdictionally limited -- if a New York state judge appointed a prosecutor, he wouldn't really have much authority to investigate federal crimes, and if a small-claims court judge in Idaho appointed a prosecutor, he'd be limited by both his lack of authority to investigate events outside his jurisdiction and the practical difficulties of enforcing a subpoena from out of state. Even at the local level, law enforcement and legislative bodies have the authority to launch investigations. If NYPD or the Somerset County Sheriff or the Arlington County Board want to investigate, they could do so. I don't know what the relevant rules are in each jurisdiction, but some states allow lawsuits for civil damages based on criminal activity. So if the gist of the sponsor's complaint is that someone used "explosives and/or incendiaries" to kill his son, it may be that he could bring a lawsuit over that, which would in turn open up the the tools of civil discovery. Of course, that's only if the claim isn't time-barred; now that we're nearly 17 years out, I'd guess that it would be too late. And there's always the possibility of continuing an independent investigation. Using the same tools that the press uses -- interviews, freedom-of-information laws, etc. -- any member of the public is free to make an inquiry into any matter of public concern. Obviously, I'd expect any of these authorities to be reluctant to take up the cause due to the investigatory consensus against the inside-job/cover-up theory, and I'd also expect -- for the same reason -- that any authority that tried to take it up would run into serious roadblocks from all the other authorities that have declined.	Yes, there is legal precedent against this that would only apply to a government employee. First, let's discuss the private sector. In this case, you are a private employee that comes to your place of work and accuses you of "stealing the cookies from the cookie jar" which is a serious criminal offense. They wish to talk and your boss is in the room. You plead the 5th, but your boss says you're fired if you don't talk to the cops. This is legal because you still have the right to refuse to talk, you just lose your job. A private employer has the right to free association, and wants nothing to do with cookie thieves, alleged or actual. However, in the government employ, your boss is an agent of the government. This same situation is different because the government pays the boss and the agent... so in essence the government is saying talk or be fired. This is unconstitutional as the government cannot retalitate against you for your refusal to talk. Generally, in order to talk to you, the investigator would need either a signed Garrity Statement or a Signed Kalkines Statement. The former is a statement saying that they are investigating a wrong doing but you cannot lose your job if you refuse to speak to the investigators, where as Kalkines says you must talk but you are granted immunity for your part in the wrong doing, so long as you make truthful statements. For more on this, check this legal blog. There is also the matter that a false accusation (and let me be clear... this is academic, I'm not saying the accusation in the real life topic is false, nor am I saying that the defense is false... we're merely discussing a possibility) is made to your employer and they do not offer the job on the basis of the accusation alone, this is grounds for defamation actions... and in certain jurisdictions, it's criminal defamation, so there could be jail time. It's interesting you mentioned teachers, because this happens alot. Kids do know that there are certain things that get a teacher fired quickly, so teachers do get the occasional false accusation of sexual assault (I know one teacher who has had multiple accusations over the course of her career). One of the few good things I can say about the Teachers Union is they cover the legal defense of accused teachers. The accusations do get the teacher removed from the class for sometime, but they don't lose their jobs over this matter. It's followed up but the accusation doesn't immediately lead to the teacher getting fired..	Yes The rule against prosecuting a sitting President is not a law, it is a Justice Department opinion and policy. The justification for it is that dealing with a criminal case would be severely distracting to the President, and thus harmful to the nation. Besides, the opinion goes on, any serious issue can be dealt with by impeachment. That reasoning obviously does not apply to a former President. Article I, section 3, paragraph 7 of the US constitution says: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. (emphasis added) This clearly contemplates the criminal prosecution of a former office holder, after such a person was removed by an impeachment. There is no exception for a President. Therefor a President can be criminally charged and prosecuted for actions during the presidency, provided that the evidence to establish probable cause is there, and that a Grand Jury indicts said former President. So far as I know there has never been a case where such a thing was done. President Ford's pardon of President Nixon stopped any Federal prosecution of him. I think there have been cases were former US Judges, after impeachment, were criminally prosecuted. But that is not quite the same thing -- no one claims that sitting judges are immune to criminal charges. To be clear this would not apply just to issues that a President had been impeached for. A former President is no different from anyone else in this respect. Any such person can be prosecuted if there is probable cause, and convicted if there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal violation of some law, even if the violation occurred while the president was in office.	There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.	The circuits all over the place on this one but I don't see these facts fitting according to the strictest rule. It is within the discretion of the police to decide whether delaying the arrest of the suspect will help ensnare co-conspirators, as exemplified by this case, will give the police greater understanding of the nature of the criminal enterprise, or merely will allow the suspect enough "rope to hang himself." U.S. V. Garcia 79 F.3d 74 (7th Cir. 1996) See also Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S. 293 (1966) A suspect has no constitutional right to be arrested when the police have probable cause. The police are not required to guess, at their peril, the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction. EDITING THE ANSWER in light of some comments. Florida recognizes sentence manipulation and outrageous government conduct as defenses. United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) Outrageous government conduct and sentencing factor manipulation focus on the government's behavior. Outrageous government conduct occurs when law enforcement obtains a conviction for conduct beyond the defendant's predisposition by employing methods that fail to comport with due process guarantees. Under this standard, the conduct must be so outrageous that it is fundamentally unfair. See United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir.1987) In the Ciszkowski case, the defendant was charged with murder for hire as part of a sting. As part of the sting, the government provided Ciszkowski with the gun. The gun had a silencer, the silencer converted his crime to a more serious offense. Ciszkowski argued that he did not know the gun had a silencer and accused the government of sentence manipulation. He lost. The court tells us that the standard for establishing that the government's conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to constitute sentencing factor manipulation is high as gives us some cases where the court declined the finding. See United States v. Bohannon, 476 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir.2007 (government's selection of age of "minor" victim for sting operation was not manipulation even though the selected age resulted in enhancement under guideline); United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1370-71 (11th Cir.2006) government's purchase of crack cocaine rather than powder cocaine was not manipulation despite sentencing differential); United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1412-13 (11th Cir.1998) (government informant's selection of a fictitious amount of drugs to be stolen by defendants was not manipulation of the quantity) Now, about this doctor. The reason this is might be troubling is that this doctor might have entrapped the suspect. For example, if the suspect went to the dr and just wanted some aspirin but the dr convinced him to ask for vicodin and pain killers in some excessive amount (I don't know, I do not want to make up facts). This could be entrapment by a citizen acting purely on his own; if this is the case there is no entrapment. See Worley v. State, 848 So. 2d 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) However, when the person making the inducement is acting as an agent of the government, courts may allow an entrapment defense. The government is responsible for the actions of its agents. But keep in mind that you still need to establish both elements of entrapment. Per United States v. Isnadin, No. 12-13474 (Feb. 12, 2014): The entrapment defense involves two separate elements : (1) Government inducement of the crime, and (2) lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant. The defendant bears an initial burden of production to show that the first element, Government inducement, is met. Once the defendant makes this initial showing, the burden shifts to the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. For any of these defenses to work, the guy who was filling the prescription can not have been predisposed to commit the crime except for the actions of the government and its agents inducing him.
Term limits extensions https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/10/politics/michael-cohen-trump-cnntv/index.html What would need to happen in order to enable a US president to govern for a 3rd term?	The two-term limit is embeded in the Constitution at the Twenty-Second Amendment. A third term would therefore require a constitutional amendment to allow more than two terms. Under Article V, constitutional amendments can happen in one of two ways: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof.	You are correct that the existence of a lawsuit -- on First Amendment or Fifth Amendment grounds -- is not a strong basis for believing that Acosta will have his pass reinstated. People file losing lawsuits all the time. But that doesn't really tell us anything about the merits of his case, which I discuss below. Temporary restraining order: The standard for TROs is well-established: This court may issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction only when the movant demonstrates that: there is a substantial likelihood plaintiff will succeed on the merits; plaintiff will be irreparably injured if an injunction is not granted; an injunction will not substantially injure the other party; and the public interest will be furthered by an injunction. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Rothe, 150 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2001). I'd normally expect the court to be pretty speech-protective in a First Amendment TRO case, but because this is the White House, they'll probably give a fair amount of extra weight when figuring out how to balance everything here. I would not, however, expect either of the factors that you mentioned -- that this is a Fifth Amendment case and that few people have press passes -- to do much to change the court's analysis. I suspect it's going to come down to who is more credible about what happened and why. Fifth Amendment: The Constitution does not promise us much at all in terms of outcomes. What it does promise is that the government will go through reasonable procedures to arrive at those outcomes. As you seem to have identified, that's exactly what Sherrill was about. Sherrill does not say that everyone has the First Amendment right to a White House press pass; it says that that everyone has the Fifth Amendment right to due process when the White House decides whether to grant or deny a press pass -- especially because of the First Amendment interests implicated in those decisions. The basics ingredients of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision-maker, and that's all that Sherrill calls for: a publicly disclosed procedure by which the journalists can apply for credentials and appeal adverse decisions. Here, it's unclear whether the White House has provided Acosta with any notice or any opportunity to appeal his decision. If that's the case, they've almost certainly run afoul of Sherrill. But again, you are correct that this does not mean he gets his press pass back. If they find that the White House violated the Fifth Amendment as explained in Sherrill, the remedy will simply be to force it to go through the prescribed procedure. First Amendment: If it turns out that they use that procedure as a pretext to punish Acosta for protected speech, we would be out of Fifth Amendment territory and into First Amendment territory. If a court found that the White House had revoked his pass because he was from CNN, because they didn't like the questions he was asking, or because he didn't provide fawning coverage of the president, it is virtually certain that the White House would be forced to restore his credentials. But if they determine in a fair way that Acosta should have his pass revoked because he was violent, because he was infringing on other people's ability to do their job, or because he was otherwise violating established rules, a court would probably say that any of those was an acceptable justification. In that case, CNN would need a new White House correspondent.	Trump was an officer of the government, and Twitter wasn't. The First Amendment forbids the government and its agents from viewpoint discrimination, but private companies are not bound by it and can discriminate as much as they please. (There was a question as to whether such discrimination might affect whether the company enjoys a shield from liability under 47 USC 230, but even so they have the right to block and censor as they wish if they are willing to risk that liability.)	Double jeopardy in its usual sense wouldn't attach because impeachment is not a criminal proceeding, which is the only thing double jeopardy applies to (esoteric estoppel matters not withstanding). You might recall that OJ Simpson was tried and acquitted of murder in a criminal court, and then subsequently tried and found liable in a civil court for those murders. There was no double jeopardy protections of which he could avail himself. But the constitution says that the Senate shall have the sole power to try impeachments, so for the most part we can expect that whatever they say goes. So they can dismiss for any reason they desire, in principle. The impeachment of Senator Blount is one example: the House impeached him, and on the same day the Senate expelled him under their constitutional power to do so, and then dismissed the impeachment for lack of jurisdiction (arguing that Congress members cannot be impeached; the impeachment was otherwise still relevant after his expulsion because it could result in preventing him from gaining office again). The costs here are political: in your hypothetical situation with very strong evidence, if popular opinion turns too strongly in favor of conviction then refusal to do so may cost the Senators and their party in subsequent elections. Attempts to argue arcane technicalities might not save you at the ballot box. Under existing impeachment precedent (as well as Congressional rules precedents), the courts would be loathe to get involved by default. Though if the action was sufficiently egregious (not even superficially resembling what a judge might call a trial, say) maybe they would feel judicial intervention and action was warranted and justified. But that's purely speculative.	The president alone has power, under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, to grant pardons for federal offenses. Many states have an analogous power for governors, to pardon state offenses. In some states, though (for example Minnesota), there is a board in charge of the process (made up, in Minnesota, of the Governor, Chief Justice and Attorney General). Likewise, in Canada, pardons are granted by a board. Although POTUS has the power, in terms of implementation it is a bit more complicated, since he doesn't sit around wondering "Who should I pardon": he has an Office of the Pardon Attorney who makes recommendations. However, there are other ways to get out of jail (besides doing the time), namely having the conviction overturned, being paroled, and credit for good behavior. Federal parole is no longer an option, but the other avenues are open, at least in principle.	Yes The rule against prosecuting a sitting President is not a law, it is a Justice Department opinion and policy. The justification for it is that dealing with a criminal case would be severely distracting to the President, and thus harmful to the nation. Besides, the opinion goes on, any serious issue can be dealt with by impeachment. That reasoning obviously does not apply to a former President. Article I, section 3, paragraph 7 of the US constitution says: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. (emphasis added) This clearly contemplates the criminal prosecution of a former office holder, after such a person was removed by an impeachment. There is no exception for a President. Therefor a President can be criminally charged and prosecuted for actions during the presidency, provided that the evidence to establish probable cause is there, and that a Grand Jury indicts said former President. So far as I know there has never been a case where such a thing was done. President Ford's pardon of President Nixon stopped any Federal prosecution of him. I think there have been cases were former US Judges, after impeachment, were criminally prosecuted. But that is not quite the same thing -- no one claims that sitting judges are immune to criminal charges. To be clear this would not apply just to issues that a President had been impeached for. A former President is no different from anyone else in this respect. Any such person can be prosecuted if there is probable cause, and convicted if there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal violation of some law, even if the violation occurred while the president was in office.	Article II of the Constitution does say that "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors". So it is true that a president or a federal judge could be impeached and removed from office, and it has happened to some extent 19 times – in 8 cases it went all the way to removal (as opposed to acquittal or resignation). However, this would not be a very effective way to avert a "crisis". Any judicial ruling is subject to appeal by a higher court, until you get to the Supreme Court. Moreover, impeaching a lower judge does not erase his or her rulings. So ultimately, a matter will be decided by SCOTUS. In anticipation of such a ruling, Congress might decide to get rid of some Supreme Court justice who they think might stand in the way. That was attempted with Samuel Chase, who was acquitted. Such a decision is not subject to judicial review (Nixon v. United States 506 U.S. 224). However, SCOTUS can also overturn that decision though that would be very unusual. It would also be very unusual for Congress to impeach a Supreme Court justice for having a position that they disagree with. At any rate, there is no such thing as a "deadlock" between branches of government. When the court rules, that is the end of the matter from a legal perspective. It is, in fact, entirely possible that a general will rule that the court or the president (or both) are wrong and will declare what the law now is, but that takes us out of the realm of legal discussions.	It would not prohibit Colorado from passing the law, but it could prohibit implementing the law. SCOTUS rulings (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779) establish that neither Congress nor the States can require additional qualifications of federal candidates beyond those listed in the Constitution. The relevant question is whether a law imposes an additional "qualification" on a candidate for president. Every state imposes at least one requirement on a person seeking to be a candidate on the ballot in a state: they must somehow "register" as a candidate. So the Qualifications Clause is not interpreted to mean "anybody can run for president as long as age and natural-born". The Anderson-Burdick doctrine allows certain kinds of requirements to be imposed on candidates, namely those that relate to a state's interest on properly managing elections. A no-felon law would clearly go way beyond the accepted state interest (regarding management of elections) reflected in Anderson-Burdick, and would be found to be as unconstitutional as requiring a candidate for president to have a law degree, or prohibiting a candidate from having a law degree.
Is it legal to copy a software license text from other companies to write my own? I am writing a software license myself before I hire a lawyer. Is it legal to copy a software license text from other companies to write my own? I could not find anyone talking about the copyright of the software license itself. But many software licenses have the same text. I found this post (Is it legal to copy a website's terms of use?) but not sure if this applies to a software license	Software licenses are protected by copyright, meaning that you need the author's permission to copy them. One way to get permission is to buy a license, since many of them are for sale. Sometimes (e.g. CC licenses) a license to copy the license is granted. You can also read and understand what is in a license, and use that knowledge to write your own. This is different from copying the license, since what you are extracting from the existing licenses is the ideas, not the specific expression.	Q1 and Q2 are definitely not copyright violations. Copyright protects original expression. Your questions are yours; the only things you are using are the names, and copyright doesn't cover them on their own. The quotation in Q3 might conceivably come under copyright. However in practice it is very likely to be fair use (unfortunately nothing is definitely fair use until a court rules on it, but I can't imagine a short quotation in a quiz being an issue).	They have copyright in their additional text, and possibly in things like their visual design choices (fonts, layout etc). They may also have introduced a few deliberate typos to detect any literal copies from their version (rather as mapmakers add a few imaginary features to their maps). None of this creates any rights to the original text. You are still free to produce your own copies of the original text. Just get it from some other source so you can be sure not to include anything of theirs.	Numbering is for the sake of clarity, and is not intrinsically required. If you refer to a section, you need a way to say which section you mean, and a vague description like "up there where I talked about copying" is insufficient. You can refer to a section by a title, if you need to refer to sections within the contract, as long as your titles match what you refer to them as (and you don't have two sections called "Your Rights").	This is going to depend on several things. First of all, do you have a lawful, licensed copy of the SDK? My understanding is that Nintendo only licensed the SDK to selected game companies. If what you have is an unauthorized copy, you do not have the legal right even to use it. If what you have is properly licensed, then you do. Or is what you have an unofficial SDK created by someone other than Nintendo? Secondly, what does the license agreement that comes with the SDK provide? Does it require developers to register with Nintendo? If it does, you will need to comply. Nintendo cannot prevent others from writing programs designed to run on their hardware. But they can control who uses their development software, if they choose to. You cannot reproduce in your game any of Nintendo's copyrighted software (or anyone else's) without permission. That applies even more strongly if you intend to sell the software. But you can use any development software for which you have a valid license in whatever ways its license permits. I would expect this includes creating games. It would include selling games that you create that do not use any of Nintendo's code, unless there is a specific provision forbidding that in the license agreement.	It's a contract violation if you're under the EULA. It may be a contract of adhesion, but such "clickwrap" contracts been found to be acceptable and enforceable in software EULAs out of necessity. However, there may be some limits. If you're not under the EULA, as you argue, then you lack a license to use the software at all and it's an outright copyright violation and/or a theft or misappropriation of the software. Whether or not you can be sued depends in part on what you do with it — if you don't release the material or otherwise cause damages then there's not much to sue for... Added for clarification: to answer the framing question, supposing neither contract or copyright applied, one could be sued in tort or in equity (i.e. for unjust enrichment).	Your answer (in the US) is the same as feetwet's answer to the earlier question you linked: Is it possible to protect a business idea? - Law Stack Exchange. You can't copyright an idea for software. You can't copyright an idea for a pitch of a TV show or an episode of an existing TV show (Google "copyright TV series idea"). You can't copyright a combination of ideas for a TV show, i.e., one that uses software as the plot line or in the screenwriting or taping process. Once you do the work - develop software or write a script - you have legal protection (which varies, depending on jurisdictions). You can copyright the software you have developed. You can copyright (or commonly register) the TV script you have written. Or, in the US and other jurisdictions, your work is copyrighted as soon as you produce it.	You cannot do this through any established public license that I know of, but you could write your own. The model would be any educational use or non-commercial use license, such as CC NC licenses. The main challenge is defining the excluded classes of usage. That is why you should engage an attorney to draft this for you. I don't think there is any point in adding a $5M penalty clause. You offer a separate paid license for individuals who do not want to comply with the particular terms of your license, and set the fee to whatever you want. Saying that you're gonna fine violators is a bad idea because penalty clauses are illegal. Instead, the standard approach is a liquidated damages clause, where you state what a reasonable estimate of your damages would be. In the case of software that is available for purchase, illegal copying of the software obviously results at least in the cost of the software qua lost revenue as damages. Plus shipping and handling.
Is it illegal to proactively request to accommodate people? I am at a point in my career where I foresee me being involved in interviewing and hiring within the next 5 years. I am already involved in some manner with the process of terminating people because I distribute work and my input is sought regarding specific employees who are not performing well. Personally, I regularly have to deal with a mental condition that has a heavy stigma tied to it. I deal with it in a manner that works for me to the point that I foresee positive things on the horizon regarding my career. I do not reveal this condition because I don't want my career to take a hit. I can say that getting to the point I'm at with my personal mental condition required a lot of work on my part and would've been a lot easier if it were possible for me to be forthright about it and get appropriate accommodations. Some of the people whom I've had to give negative reviews on and were later terminated, I strongly suspected there may be an underlying mental condition. I don't think you can ask someone directly if they have a mental condition because this is a workplace, but can someone pro-actively inquire if any special accommodations are required (even if an employee did not request accommodation)? I don't mean a general question like, "Is there anything you need?" I'm specifically referring to a scenario where the employee has some sort of invisible condition that the ADA would require accommodation if requested. I would prefer to proactively inquire about their need for accommodation without requiring them to disclose whatever reason they need the accommodation.	The EEOC has an answer for your question, here. You cannot ask if the person has a disability, or anything that is likely to reveal if they have a disability. They also say that You can ask an applicant with a disability which is obvious or which the applicant disclosed if he will need a change to the work environment or to the way a job is usually done, if you reasonably believe that he will need a reasonable accommodation to perform the job. Since you're talking about invisible disabilities, there's nothing you can legally ask.	In Canada can employer force employees not to discuss wage? Not in Ontario. That would violate Section 74(1) of the Employment Standards Act, 2000: No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall intimidate, dismiss or otherwise penalize an employee or threaten to do so, (a) because the employee, (v.2) discloses the employee’s rate of pay to another employee for the purpose of determining or assisting another person in determining whether an employer is complying with Part XII (Equal Pay for Equal Work) See also Section 74.12(1)(a)(v.2). What if the employee signed a confidentiality agreement where they agreed not to discuss wages? The agreement would be void in that regard. See Section 5 of the same Standards: [...] [N]o employer or agent of an employer and no employee or agent of an employee shall contract out of or waive an employment standard and any such contracting out or waiver is void. The allowed exceptions are any clauses that provide a greater benefit to an employee than the employment standard (see 5(2)).	The agency is allowed a reasonable time to implement the request, given the nature of the request and surrounding circumstances. Superficially, it would seem that the request is to continue working at home as has been the case for a couple of years, so the agency would not seem to have to change anything in order to implement the request, and unnecessary delays would be a violation of ADA. There is no fixed time requirement for evaluating and implementing the request.	How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.	1) Bob could disclose the PTSD condition and seek accommodation for it (in reality, controlled narcotics aren't actually used to treat PTSD but it isn't hard to imagine a situation where another controlled substance, e.g. ketamine, was used to treat this or some other Americans with Disabilities Act recognized disability and the absence of that disability was not a bona fide qualification of the job). The legal analysis in the case of the FBI (a federal government civilian civil service employer subject to special rules applicable to governmental employers), and a private employer, is not exactly the same, but it ends up in the same place. 2) Medical marijuana is, as a matter of federal law an oxymoron, because it is a Class I controlled substance that as a matter of law (contrary to reasonable facts) has no medical applications, and the FBI is charged with enforcing this law (among other agencies), so medical marijuana would legally disqualify someone from FBI employment. In Colorado which has legal under state law medical marijuana, employers have been allowed to discriminate based upon medical marijuana use because an employer is at a minimum allowed to treat federal law as enforceable. It is conceivable that some U.S. state other than Colorado which allows medical marijuana at the state level might reach a different conclusion as a matter of state law on the employment discrimination point, but potentially, the employer could appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court on a pre-emption argument so it would be a tenuous legal position to take.	This is the overview of employment discrimination by the EEOC (no legal reason for them to specifically put this under "youth"). To "discriminate" against someone means to treat that person differently, or less favorably, for some reason... The laws enforced by EEOC protect you from employment discrimination when it involves: Unfair treatment because of your race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, age (age 40 or older), or genetic information. Harassment by managers, co-workers, or others in your workplace, because of your race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, age (age 40 or older), or genetic information. A subtype of harassment is "hostile environment harassment". See the EEOC page on harassment. It is unwelcome conduct that is based on race... Harassment becomes unlawful where 1) enduring the offensive conduct becomes a condition of continued employment, or 2) the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to create a work environment that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive. Also it is illegal to punish a person for complaining about harassment. On the face of it, this could constitute racial harassment. The EEOC suggests that it is illegal here, in their FAQ Are White employees protected from race discrimination even though they are not a minority? Yes. You are protected from different treatment at work on the basis of your race, whether you are White, Black, or some other race. Although this is an advisory from the Dep't of Interior and not the EEOC, it is reasonable to assume that it was at least minimally vetted by competent lawyers who know discrimination law. What is prohibited is Unwelcome conduct, verbal or physical, including intimidation, ridicule, insult, comments, or physical conduct, that is based on an individual’s protected status or protected activities under Personnel Bulletin 18-01, when the behavior can reasonably be considered to adversely affect the work environment, or an employment decision affecting the employee is based upon the employee’s acceptance or rejection of such conduct (where race is a protected status). I don't know of any case law that establishes for certain that what you describe is illegal. The ministerial exception allows a religion to follow the rules of the religion in hiring its ministers, but otherwise doesn't exempt religions from prohibitions against discrimination.	I think there's a reasonable argument to be made. ADA requires reasonable accommodations for disabilities, but there's always going to be a fight over what is reasonable. What's pretty clear, though, is that the museum is not required to make accommodations that would "threaten or destroy the historic significance of an historic property." So they'd have to think about what accommodations they can make without endangering the exhibit. To me, anyway, asking to walk up and touch it with gloves sounds reasonable; asking them to build scaffolding so you can touch every inch of it that others can see does not sound reasonable. But I'm not a conservator. It may be that even a gloved hand would endanger the exhibit. If that's the case, the accommodation is probably not a reasonable one, and you'd probably need to think about other possible compromises.	Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice.
What are the circumstances that require disclosure of an old legal name, when the name change case has been sealed? I've previously had my name changed in a district court in the state of Utah. The case was filed as an adult name change and the case itself was order sealed by the judge who heard it. All of my identification has been changed to reflect this fact, and copies of the court order to seal were provided to the issuing agencies as well. I'm applying to the Division of Occupational Licences to get practice a regulated profession in the state of Utah. Part of the application asks 'all previous legal names.' Am I required to disclose my old name here despite the fact that the case was sealed? The statutes governing name changes in Utah do not provide any guidance for this situation. As an admittedly rough comparison, the application also calls to disclose old criminal records unless they have been expunged. (Which, so far as I understand it, is the practical equivalent in the State of Utah) This despite that the governing statute, the Utah Expungement Act, states that DoPL may access expunged records upon request.	Was the case Sealed? Or is it considered to be Private? Those are two different cases. I was not able to find any laws regarding sealing, or expunging records of Name Changes, but was able to find the Utah Law for Criminal Records. I can only assume they draw from one another. All that being said, assuming your whatever case is sealed, then Some records are sealed. In these kinds of cases, even information about the existence of the case is not publicly available. A person seeking access to a sealed record must petition the court for permission to unseal the records. Rule 4-202.03 states that, ....no one may access a sealed court record except by order of the court. A judge may review a sealed record when the circumstances warrant. From that I can assume that, The records are not public. The records will not show up in a routine check The records will be known only if a there is a court order. Comparing it with the Expungement Act, Continued Use of Sealed Records After sealing, BCI continues to index and maintain all expunged records of arrests and convictions, but the records will not be released to the public. BCI will not divulge any information contained in the expunged records to any person or agency without a court order, unless authorized by statute to do so. Upon request, the following organizations may receive information contained in expunged records: the Board of Pardons and Parole Peace Officer Standards and Training federal authorities, unless prohibited by federal law the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and the State Office of Education Both cases above require a court order to get that seal record information. However, from what I gather only expunged criminal records can be access upon request by the Division of Occupational Licences. Bottom line, it sounds like you are safe to mark is no previous name, but you may lose your license in the future if something goes south. I will recommend you to get a professional look into the word of the law and provide you with a written statement of the actual law. Another thing you can try is write to the court who sealed your case, present them the situation and explain what you have found so far, and ask for guidance.	If the offence was minor than it may be considered 'spent' under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. A conviction resulting only in a fine is usually spent after five years. Spent convictions do not normally need to be disclosed, but you should check this with whoever is asking for the information. Your mother can apply for a copy of her own criminal record by asking Disclosure Scotland for a basic disclosure; this costs £25 and takes around two weeks if the application is made online. Due to a quirk in the Disclosure and Barring Service, this is the only way a person can apply for their own disclosure certificate. Anyone in the UK can apply to Disclosure Scotland, even if they do not live in Scotland.	The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time.	Name-changing can facilitate escaping liability, so that e.g. if you are liable to someone for $20,000 and you change your name, you may be able to evade that liability. If a name change is made public, then others who have a legal claim against you are officially put on notice that Elmore James is now known as Lee Smith, and paperwork naming the respondent can be properly filled out. A criminal background check will not catch fact such as that you earlier caused damage to another person's property.	From the German lawyer association ("Deutscher Anwaltverein") one can find the following (Google-translation): In the case of a purely preventive identity check, the officers are initially only allowed to determine the identity of the respondent. This means that you can ask for your name, date and place of birth, home address and nationality and have your ID shown - by the way, as a German citizen you don't have to always have your ID with you. "You don't have to answer any questions beyond that," says lawyer Robert Hotstegs from the German Lawyers' Association (DAV). Of course, police officers often try to gather more information with emphatically casual questions. "Well, where do we come from" or: "And where are we going now?" Are typical examples. The police are not allowed to insist on an answer. Anyone who, as a respondent, is voluntarily too willing to provide information can harm themselves and possibly even give rise to concrete suspicions. So they are allowed to ask such things, but you don't need to answer everything. How to handle such situations, again according to the link above: “I recommend answering the survey as briefly and politely as possible. This has a de-escalating effect and helps to end the unpleasant situation as quickly as possible, ”says Attorney Hotstegs. However, you should always answer the questions about yourself. Because if the police cannot determine the identity of a person or only with great effort, they may take further measures to determine the identity. This includes taking it to the police station and, under certain circumstances, a search. Otherwise, these measures are not permitted without a specific reason.	For example, is there a way to search my identity (SSN) in property records and get an official document verifying there are no matching results? No. You can search by name on a county by county basis, however. A certified search result from your county of residence to corroborate you affidavit or declaration and attached as an exhibit to the affidavit or declaration might be worth including (even if it is something of a matter of form over substance). You might also considering attaching a copy of your lease to the place where you reside in New Jersey if you have one. Both of these documents would only corroborate that you don't own what you claim to be your residential address, rather than proving by themselves that you own no real estate in New Jersey. But the authorities you are seeking to prove something to will inevitably have to take you at your word regarding what your residential address is anyway. For purposes of tax exemption in another country, I need to prove that I do not own a house or an apartment in my current state of residence, which is New Jersey. How can I do that? Usually, you would do this by executing an affidavit or declaration under the penalty of perjury to that effect.	These situations do come up (and incidentally, this is nothing new, it has been a difficult and recurring legal issue since at least the 18th century), and they really suck to be in, and often there aren't easy answers. There are a lot of legal doctrines out there that are designed to avoid a hard clash of conflicting court orders and to prevent someone from suffering contempt of court sanctions when they are in this bind. Generally, litigants caught in this bind look for these outs. For example, when particular property or records are at issue, often the person in question will "interplead" the property placing it in the jurisdiction of a court to resolve and out of their hands. There is a doctrine called in custodia legis which provides that once something is in the custody of a court that another court may not exercise jurisdiction over it. The entire sub-field of civil procedure pertaining to jurisdiction and venue is designed to avoid these conflicts. U.S. law has a whole sub-field a statutes and legal doctrines like the Rooker-Feldman doctrine designed to prevent these conflicts from coming up when they arise between federal and state courts. One of the most important legal doctrines is that a person cannot be punished for contempt of court for failing to do something that the person being held in contempt of court does not have the ability to do. One argument, which doesn't always work, is that once you are subject to a legally binding court order that has been served upon you that you may not legally defy that court order in order to follow the order of a court which cannot override the decisions of the court issuing the first order. Usually, contempt citations are directed at individual employees or agents rather than at entities. For example, in a dispute over Indian Trust Funds against the United States government, contempt citations were brought against the Secretary of Interior personally and could have sent that individual to jail for not complying. One way the an individual can get out of the order relating to an employment or professional duty is to resign from office and thus deprive oneself of the ability to perform the order. But, the short answer is that there is no one simple legal rule for resolving these situations, and the litigants stuck in these situations look for every available legal argument to resolve it until it is resolved.	If you are a citizen of Cyprus, you fill out the name change affidavit on a form available form your District Administrative Office before a notary, submit it with 80 Euros, and hope that the Registrar at the District Administrative Office approves your application. Your affidavit will state, among other things, your proposed name, which must be acceptable by Cyprus standards, and your reason for the change, which probably shouldn't be "to assist me in avoiding an outstanding warrant for my arrest for murder and high treason against the government of Cyprus" or "to steal the identity of my next door neighbor." If it is approved, you are done and can now go about the arduous process of changing your name with everyone you need to do business with from bank accounts to property registries to ID cards and passports to leases to car titles to professional licenses. If it isn't, you figure out why and either change your application accordingly or see if you can find an attorney to help you contest the denial in the appropriate tribunal. If you are not a citizen of Cyprus, you probably need to go to the country in the E.U. where you are a citizen, if there is one.
Will an expunged arrest still show up on a background check? I was arrested, but not convicted. I got my arrest expunged about a year ago. Will it still show up in a background check? Is there any way to fix it if it does?	See the answer to this question. It is remotely possible that it will show up, but the new S.C. law also says that an employer cannot use that information. On the other hand, that law is not yet effective (it becomes effective Dec. 27 2018), so for the rest of the year, the information could be used, if an employer obtains is. There is a law-enforcement exception that arrests can always be used against you if you apply for a law-enforcement related job. Under the current law (has been in effect for a while), the record is "under seal", so revealing the record in the course of a background check would be a violation of the relevant court order. The law specifies a punishment for illegal disclosure: A person who intentionally violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both. however, accidental disclosure is not a crime. You might think that you could at least sue them for accidental disclosure, but the law also says Unless there is an act of gross negligence or intentional misconduct, nothing in this section gives rise to a claim for damages against the State, a state employee, a political subdivision of the State, an employee of a political subdivision of the State, a public officer, or other persons. If the government person who releases the information intentionally does so, you can sue. Perhaps an accidental release could be found to be grossly negligent: that would depend on the circumstances.	According to the ACLU, there are certain questions you have to answer when entering the US, and in some states you may have to identify yourself when stopped and told to identify yourself. Nonimmigrant non-citizen may be required to answer questions about immigrant status posed by an immigration officer. Otherwise, you are not required to answer questions by police. A judge can order you to answer questions, but the police cannot. Also, "obstruction of justice" covers things such as destroying evidence, assaulting a process server, communicating with a juror, and can cover investigative demands by prosecutors, but not being uncooperative with police.	Double jeopardy applies to the same facts, not to the same sorts of crimes. Say if you are tried and acquitted of murder of person A, that won't later save you from being tried for murder of person B. Same applies to your question: if the documents/testimony on the second occasion are different from the first occasion, there is no protection. If they are the same, there is.	Promoting the comment to an answer based on the feedback. Canada is not going to extradite him but they may deport him if he committed any immigration fraud. Typically applications for Visa or Work Permit include many question on your history including "have you ever been convicted for a crime". So either he lied on the application or the Canada didn't care about his criminal record. If he lied, you may have a lever: contact the immigration fraud department https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/protect-fraud/report-fraud.html	I'm assuming you are talking about "warrants in debt" and not arrest warrants. A warrant in debt is that the creditor has filed with a court for the repayment of a debt. The court will then issue a judgement (in default if you do not appear) either for the creditor or the debtor. After that, the creditor can then (if they win) seek things such as garnishment to repay the debt. Now in the UK, they have accepted the "Electronic Communications Act of 2000" which means that a Qualified Electronic Signature (QES) is as legally binding as a "wet ink" signature. Non-QES signatures may also be binding, but that requires additional evidence. Let's take an example of a small personal loan. Let's say you apply electronically for a loan of X amount. The loan is approved and the money is transferred into your bank account electronically. You spend the money but make no attempt to repay the loan. First the bank will make attempts to collect the debt via normal means, then they may sell the debt to a debt collector. The debt collector will apply for a "warrant in debt" to take you to court for the amount (possibly with fees). If you do not appear, a default judgement will be applied to you. If you signed the loan application with a QES compliant system, that signature is all the debt collector will need to show that you accepted the debt and the repayment terms. If you did not sign with a QES system, they can still submit the application but they may have to prove other things, like: Your intent to obtain money for some purpose Your action in keeping/spending the money No action on your part to return or rectify the transfer Any payments you may have made towards the loan (shows that you acknowledge the loan and terms) So no, as of at least 2000 most countries accept some type of electronic signature to be legally binding. An entirely different topic would be if the debt is legal without the paperwork. Many debt collection agencies buy debt in bulk that may not be much more than an Excel sheet with the amounts and names/addresses and other personal information. A lot of times the entire debt "paper trail" is not transferred with these debt purchases so a debt collector may have purchased $10 million worth of debt for $50,000 that is nothing more than an Excel sheet. I believe in the US this has held up, but I'm not sure about the UK/rest of the world. What the YouTube people may be saying is that they don't have anything regarding the debt as far as binding paperwork goes. That may be something completely different.	A warrant is never automatically issued. A warrant (I assume you mean arrest warrant) can be issued under court orders, if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. If a court orders A to pay money to B and A does not, A can be arrested. A court will not sua sponte make such an order without some petition by a harmed party. So B could sue A for the amount owed, and the burden is on B. There are criminal laws that pertain to check bouncing, for example in Washington under RCW 9a.56.060 it is a crime, but not every check-bouncing is a crime. You have to have "intent to defraud", "knowing at the time..that he or she has not sufficient funds". If convicted you will be fined, and may be imprisoned. Even in the case of a fraudulent intent, there is no automatic warrant (the police do not know what has come to pass). B does not "press charges", but they can complain to the police who may investigate and find that there is evidence of fraudulent intent (which can lead to an arrest warrant). They may also conclude that the evidence of fraud is insufficient.	First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not.	You've omitted a critical part of paragraph (b)(2)(C): make arrests without a warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of the officer or agent or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if the officer or agent has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony So if the crime in question is a felony, the agent does not have to have witnessed its commission; they only need "reasonable grounds to believe" that the person they're arresting did it. One possible felony that may come into play is 18 USC 1361: damage or attempted damage to federal property in excess of $1000 is punishable by up to ten years imprisonment. Anything greater than one year is a felony.
If a teenager runs away illegally but turns 18 before being found, are they still in danger? Could the police still take them back home against their will or otherwise prosecute them?	Sometimes running away is a juvenile offense, but it is not an offense for which an adult aged eighteen or over would be arrested or punished. An adult would not be returned home.	I understand that you are wondering why illegal immigrants are not more often deported by the authorities. This answer has grown a bit out of proportion because I also try to explore the general refugee situation. That seems appropriate because the large number of migrants makes the question of deportation more pressing. We would not be very concerned about just a handful. Numbers First of all, while in 2015 about a million migrants entered Germany, only 282,000 asylum requests were decided; a lot of them probably dated from 2014 (the asylum seekers often needed weeks to even file their request due to adminstrative overload). Of those 282,000, 90,000 were rejected. The others have been granted asylum or refugee status (there is apparently some distinction). This means that the vast majority of ("true" or "alleged") refugees who came to Germany in 2015 are waiting for their request to be processed. Legal And Police Situation Did many of those 90,000 stay in the country? I don't know. Possibly. Some may still be tolerated ("geduldet"), i.e. the deportation may have been postponed according to par. 60a AufenthlatsG. The remaining ones are indeed obligated to leave the country. They are informed of the decision and have to leave within a period of time between 7 and 30 days. If they don't leave, they will be subject to criminal prosecution because they violate par. 95 of the Aufenthaltsgesetz. Of course it's usually not known to the authorities that somebody is still — illegally — in the country. Short of raids or coincidental run-ins with the police, e.g. because of traffic violations, illegal immigrants fly under the radar here like in all other countries (I suppose you are aware of the current discussion in the U.S.). I assume that illegal immigrants are not high on the priority list of the police, given that the cost/benefit ratio of actively searching them is probably quite bad; criminals solely due to status violations don't do much damage as such, compared to other criminals. One must assume though that some of the illegal immigrants will steal or deal drugs for a living, since they cannot officially work or receive subsidies; that exposes them to the authorities as much as other criminals, making it more likely to be caught. Deportation So the question which remains is what happens to the relatively small portion of migrants who are here illegally and who are found out. It seems easy: Deport them! The law provides the option to deport them without notice (because they would flee upon receiving a notice). Deportation to the EU Border State Migrants coming through other European Union countries should be processed at the port of entry, according to the Dublin Regulation. That was how Germany, with no external borders, cowardly used to shield itself from migrants. There is some legal debate whether an asylum seeker who against all Dublin Regulations reaches Germany (or even just the German border) can legally be turned away. A legal scholar in an interview in the current Spiegel magazine claims that every request must, according to European law, be at least checked first before the asylum seeker could be sent back to the port of entry. The big problem here is that the current crisis overwhelmed the EU border countries, in particular the already struggling Greece (which has only 11 million citizens). German courts have forbidden to send asylum seekers back to Greece and a few Balcan countries because of their dysfunctional asylum processing. Apart from the legal situation everybody just acknowledges that the Dublin Regulations were not meant to deal with the current number of refugees. Therefore, sending refugees back to Greece is currently not an option. That means asylum seekers will have their requests processed in Germany for now, a procedure which takes many months. There are no new numbers; mid-2015 the time was already about 5 months. Now it seems that you need already months to just file the request. The administration is hopelessly understaffed. New clerks need substantial legal and adminsitrative education so that it takes months or years from the top-level budget decision for new positions to when they are put to work. Deportation to Their Home Country Back to the question where to deport illegal migrants to. For citizens of safe countries, that seems obvious. (As discussed, migrants from unsafe countries will be granted refugee status, or they will at least be temporarily tolerated.) But the migrants often destroy their papers and simply refuse to tell where they come from. Some countries flatly refuse to provide replacement documents for their own citizens; they also refuse to take anybody without papers back, effectively making it impossible to deport migrants to them who do not cooperate. That seems to be the case for some North African countries (cf. this German Spiegel article). The German government will probably have to pay the countries in exchange for them to take their citizens back. Of course, deportations happen, and they are not pretty. Looking a little closer, a multitude of practical and legal problems emerge. First there is the fairly extreme effort to charter a flight and provide a couple police men, a doctor etc. to accompany the person. The migrants are frequently desperate, some hurt themselves to a degree which makes it impossible to transport them. If they are too desperate or violent, the pilots may not fly for safety or ethical concerns. Other passengers complain on regular flights. Doctors refuse to cooperate, or testify suicidal tendencies. Migrants have suffocated in police custody during a deportation attempt. Conclusion Legal Situation I cannot see a wide-spread disregard for the law by the German government. If anybody is violating European law, it's Greece and possibly some Balkan states on the migration land route. But in all reality these smaller countries are totally overwhelmed, so the situation is more a factual impossibility to obey the law, which cannot be helped as long as the facts are what they are. Note that the Dublin Regulations do not forbid Germany to welcome immigrants or accept requests for asylum. On the contrary: according to the legal scholar in the Spiegel magazine Germany has an obligation to at least minimally process asylum requests, once the asylum seekers have reached the border. (And since sending them back is not an option, the request is processed in Germany entirely.) There is no violation of the law there. Practical Aspects of Deportation; Alternatives At the end of the day forced deportations are an expensive, undignified, violent affair; I would simply consider it unsuitable for mass deportations. The authorities quickly reach the limit of what is doable with the current budget, personnel, and with respect to human rights — there is a legal and ethical limit to applicable violence against basically peaceful individuals. (I assume that Donald Trump has no idea what he is talking about when it gets to the ground work. "He has a big mouth and nothing behind it", as we say here.) Bottom line: If somebody doesn't want to leave, there is little you can do in a free country. I do not think that the government has deliberately decided to ignore the law; it's rather that the law is hard to enforce. That happens a lot, if you think of it. If one is adamant at making migrants leave, the only mass solution I can envision is to make it attractive to leave. I can imagine that 10,000 or 20,000 Euros per person is a sufficient incentive for migrants who did not flee from acute danger. I also think that it would be a good deal, long-term. Of course one will have to ensure that the migrants indeed leave, and do not come back too soon, or nothing would be gained. One could perhaps pay the premium through the governments of their home country, possibly in the form of real estate or a pension. That would combine an incentive for the home countries with one for their citizens. This economical calculus would only work if the home countries stayed stable for an extended period of time (or the returned migrants would have to migrate again, this time with a good reason). It must be the goal of the European countries to aim at stability in those regions. But that is the goal anyway, I hope; its importance was fairly prominent in recent months.	No, the minor cannot be in violation either being on the property of residence or the sidewalk in front of that property. Montgomery County Curfew Law: Section 1-2 (Offenses): (a) A minor commits an offense if he remains in any public place or on the premises of any establishment within the unincorporated areas of the county during curfew hours. Section 1-3 (Defenses): (a) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 1-2 that the minor was: (1) Accompanied by the minor’s parent or guardian; (2) On an errand at the direction of the minor’s parent or guardian, without any detour or stop; (3) In a motor vehicle involved in interstate travel; (4) Engaged in an employment activity, or going to or returning home from an employment >activity, without any detour or stop; (5) Involved in an emergency; (6) On the sidewalk abutting the minor’s residence or abutting the residence of a next-door neighbor if the neighbor did not complain to the police department about the minor’s presence; (7) Attending an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by Montgomery County, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor, or going to or returning home from, without any detour or stop, an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by Montgomery County, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor; (8) Exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution, such >as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the right of assembly; and (9) Married, had been married, or had disabilities of minority removed in accordance with Chapter 31 of the Texas Family Code. (b) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 1-2 (c) that the owner, operator, or employee of an establishment promptly notified the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department, or the appropriate Constable’s office, that a minor was present on the premises of the establishment during curfew hours and refused to leave. Your property is not public, so you cannot be in offense of this ordinance being on your private property. You also cannot be in violation being on your sidewalk (or a neighbors sidewalk if that neighbor has not called police on the offender).	When a criminal act takes place, the state in which the act took place has jurisdiction. State of residence of perpetrator or victim is not at all relevant. It also would not matter where the minor was "staying", all that matters is where the act took place. If that was California, California Penal Code 261.5(c) says Any person who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. Additionally, (261.5(e)(1) states Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an adult who engages in an act of sexual intercourse with a minor in violation of this section may be liable for civil penalties in the following amounts:... (C) An adult who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor at least three years younger than the adult is liable for a civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000)	The legal question here is whether police have an enforceable power to enjoin a person from visiting a particular person or from entering a particular jurisdiction (especially the one where they have police powers). The obligation to obey police orders generally ends at matters regarding arrest, traffic orders, or crowd control. Freedom of travel is a fundamental constitutional right, along with freedom of association. That does not mean that you can go absolutely anywhere you want and do anything you want with whoever you want, but it does mean that any restriction have to be encoded in law, and such laws have to pass strict scrutiny. Any enforceable legal restrictions would have to emanate from the courts.	I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.	It is illegal to break into the house even if you don't steal anything. It is illegal to steal the drugs even though the owner of the drugs possessed them unlawfully. So that's at least two crimes. On top of that, the thief will be committing the crime of illegal possession of a controlled substance after the theft.	The bouncer is employed (or (sub)contracted) by the owner/lessee of premises - someone with the right to evict persons from their private property per the common law rights to exclusive use of one's property. When the bouncer evicts you, they are exercising this right on behalf of and as the agent for the owner, who could do it, but instead has assigned limited agency to the bouncer to do that for them. Entrance to (and remaining on) a property may be authorised and revoked at any time - at the time that consent is not given or is withdrawn, you become a trespasser and the police may be called upon to forcibly remove you from the premises. For example, I can have a party at my house, but if I don't like someone, I'm entitled to ask them to leave. I could also ask a friend to ask that person to leave, if I didn't want to do it myself. Note that bouncers aren't empowered to physically evict anyone except for the general right to use reasonable and proportionate force. For instance, someone that was just standing around in the nightclub probably couldn't be physically thrown out, but someone who was causing harm to themselves or others could be restrained or repelled as appropriate (and if restrained, you'd need to be very careful to do so in the course of effecting a citizen's arrest, otherwise you'd probably be committing false imprisonment). There may be statutory provisions that bestow additional rights and responsibilities upon bouncers, but this is the basic premise. I'm fairly certain that this would apply in all Australian jurisdictions; probably in all common law jurisdictions.
How can I compel my neighbor to address damage they are causing my property? My neighbor has an energy efficient low e window. They have had it for about 10 years, but over time it has slowly been causing damage (melting) our vinyl siding. This article (Glare from energy-efficient windows can melt siding, vehicles) details the way the damage occurs. Pictured below is an example of said damage which is very similar to mine. My neighbor is unwilling to talk about it, despite multiple attempts to speak with them. I have tried to explain the situation to them, and have offered to cover 100% of the expenses to simply add a full screen (currently there is a half screen, but I believe adding a full screen would help alleviate the issue), but they refuse to speak to me about it, and deny that their window does any kind of damage. I'm not seeking monetary damages necessarily, I simply want to stop further damage from occurring. What legal recourse do I have? This is in the state of Maryland.	I do not believe you have a remedy. The legal theory upon which a lawsuit or legal right would be based is that the windows constitute a "private nuisance". In Maryland, in a case involving an alleged light related nuisance, a recent appellate court decision set forth the legal standard an reviewed its application in the case of a drive in theater: A finding of private nuisance requires a two-part analysis: (1) viewing the defendant's activity, was the interference unreasonable and substantial? and (2) viewing the plaintiff's alleged harm, was the inconvenience or harm caused by the interference objectively reasonable? First, the court found that Bengies failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Royal Farms' use of its lights at nighttime was unreasonable and substantial: The Royal Farms' lighting is not aimed or directed or oriented towards the drive-in.... There is simply no reasoned or rational basis to conclude that these very typical and ordinary commercial lights, employed lawfully by a business on the far side of the road from the drive-in could conceivably have constituted the type of substantial and unreasonable interference with the operation of the drive-in required by Maryland Law before a fact-finder can conclude that there is nuisance. Blue Ink, Ltd. v. Two Farms, Inc., 96 A.3d 810, 821 (Md. Spec. App. 2014). Cf. Brozynski v. Kerney, 2006 WL 2160841, at *2 (Tex. App.--Waco Aug. 2, 2006) (glare from all night use of very bright Christmas lights did not, as a matter of law, constitute a private nuisance, but the suit was not so devoid of an argument for a change in the law that it was sanctionable as frivolous without evidence of an intent to harass by bringing the suit). An energy efficient window would generally constitute the same kind of "typical and ordinary" building material "employed lawfully" (and, indeed, sometimes required by building codes). Most jurisdictions would not recognize window glare as a "nuisance" and would consider the melting of your siding to be ordinary wear and tear that you must bear and replace from time to time.	Shouldn't the village compensate me or him for allowing the sale with wrong measurement or for changing the rule? No. It is very common for local governments to make changes to zoning ordinances, building codes, etc, that have the effect of restricting the way that property can be used. In most cases this is not considered to be a "taking" for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, even if it reduces the value of the property, and the government does not have to compensate the property owner. See for instance Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Roughly speaking, the Takings Clause only applies if the regulations are so restrictive that the land cannot really be used at all. Here you are still perfectly able to use the existing house, and it sounds like you can even build an addition - you just can't build in the exact way that you want. You'll either need to design your addition to comply with the current setback rules, or see if you can get the village to approve a variance.	In Texas, if the lease states that the landlord can inter for some purpose, the landlord can enter for that purpose. I assume there is no statement in the lease. Then the landlord has no right to enter except in emergencies and for routine inspections or repair. This right, however, stems from the courts and not statutes, and you could theoretically sue the landlord to prevent such an inspection (you would need a good attorney, to overcome the presumption that reasonable routine inspections with notice are allowed).	My guess is the answer to this question is going to be in your lease. You likely signed a lease that agreed that you would pay accept this practice and spelled out what ever rights you have to challenge the billings. My guess is they are as limited as the courts will allow in Florida. And the only way to ensure access to those records would be to get the court to compel they provide you with the records. Perusal of the Water codes in Florida does not appear to directly engage this practice(I could have missed it). However it appears that there is code regulating the management of electrical limits the billing to no more than the actual costs to the customer of record(probably your real estate management company.) According the the NCSL (This refers to electrical service. I am assuming there is similar language used elsewhere for plumbing, or that the intent of the law is uniformity of these codes in all utility billings. Where individual metering is not required and master metering is used in lieu thereof, reasonable apportionment methods, including submetering may be used by the customer of record or the owner of such facility solely for the purpose of allocating the cost of the electricity billed by the utility. The term “cost” as used herein means only those charges specifically authorized by the electric utility's tariff, including but not limited to the customer, energy, demand, fuel, conservation, capacity and environmental charges made by the electric utility plus applicable taxes and fees to the customer of record responsible for the master meter payments. The term does not include late payment charges, returned check charges, the cost of the customer-owned distribution system behind the master meter, the customer of record's cost of billing the individual units, and other such costs. Any fees or charges collected by a customer of record for electricity billed to the customer's account by the utility, whether based on the use of submetering or any other allocation method, shall be determined in a manner which reimburses the customer of record for no more than the customer's actual cost of electricity. Each utility shall develop a standard policy governing the provisions of submetering as provided for herein. Such policy shall be filed by each utility as part of its tariffs. The policy shall have uniform application and shall be nondiscriminatory (Fla. Administrative Code §25-6.049). Now here is where the 3rd party comes in. The 3rd party is the one levying fees for the management on your landlord. Granted if you follow the strings ill bet you find that the billing company is owned by the same company that owns your rental management firm. So your landlord can collect no more than what it costs to provide you with the service, but part of providing the service is employing this 3rd party utility management firm.	Unless there is some surprise in the wording of your contract, you have no realistic legal recourse. You had a hope that the warranty could provide something which it does not provide. A "reasonable person" would read the wording of the contract and understand that it requires pre-approval, and does not include an exception clause "unless it gets really cold". You could hire a lawyer to sue them and maybe a judge would find against the company on some social policy grounds, i.e. the contract is against public policy (after all, under landlord-tenant laws, in the analogous situation the landlord would be obligated to fix the heat problem). Since these contracts are quite widespread and well-known, and legislatures have not declared them illegal, it is safe to conclude that there is no public policy being violated. So even if a sympathetic judge were to rule in your favor, it would be overruled on appeal. If the warranty company delayed processing your request in order to get you to blink and break the terms of the contract, that could be held to be a bad-faith dealing. It is more likely that it is just a very slow process, slower than the average HVAC contractor, who would buy full-price replacements and have many workers on call to address your needs.	They almost surely have no liability to you for the loss of, or damage to, your property, as the standard rental agreement that you signed almost certainly relieves them of this responsibility. If you have insurance (even though you didn't provide them with proof of insurance) that would probably cover your loses. If not, you are probably just screwed and have no recourse.	If a contract does not say what one of the parties wishes it would say, before signing it they should renegotiate the lease. Once the parties have an agreement as witnessed by signatures, a party cannot change the terms of the contract by declaring that some provision of the lease is a "typo". If they want to renegotiate the terms of the contract after the fact, they can, if the other party is willing to give in on the particular point. So as it stands, it seems that the landlord is in breach of contract. This section of Maryland's landlord-tenant law is relevant to this situation. (b) In general. -- A tenant may deduct from rent due to a landlord the amount of payments made to a utility service provider for utility service if: (1) An oral or written lease for an affected dwelling unit requires the landlord to pay the utility bill; and (2) (i) The tenant pays all or part of the utility bill, including payments made on a new utility service account; or (ii) The tenant pays any security deposit required to obtain a new utility service account. (c) Waiver not permitted. -- A tenant's rights under this section may not be waived in any lease. There is no provision under the law whereby the landlord can be penalized for the inconvenience that you've suffered. This section of the public utilities law addresses the problem of the landlord's debt, in particular: (c) If utility service at an affected dwelling unit is subject to the threat of termination or actual termination, a tenant residing in the affected dwelling unit: (1) may apply for a new utility service account in the tenant's name; and (2) may not incur liability for charges due on the landlord's account. In particular, (d)(3) says A utility service provider may not refuse or otherwise condition a tenant's ability to establish a new utility service account in the tenant's name because of arrearages on the landlord's account. So the utility company is wrong, and so is the landlord.	Is this charge legal in Georgia? No. It seems unlawful. First, it appears that the landlord was negligent and failed to mitigate damages. Since in general utilities are billed monthly, it is unreasonable for the landlord to have waited this long for a $2 charge that occurred on the first day of your tenancy. Second, legislation typically sets a deadline for a landlord to send a former tenant an itemized bill to cover for damages other than normal tear and wear. According to O.C.G.A. § 44-7-34(a), that deadline in Georgia is 30 days. Whereas the $2 charge is right (at least from a moral standpoint, as you mention), the $50 surcharge is devoid of merit.
What was wrong with the 2010 Flash Crash? While looking for recent market crashes, I came upon 2010 Flash Crash. However, I am unable to understand what wrong the alleged perpetrator, Navinder Singh Sarao, did. Entering an "order to sell stocks (or shares)" and "then cancelling those orders", should not a crime, should it? A trader (or an investor) can change his or her mind at any time before the order goes through. I am not saying that nothing went wrong, but just trying to understand.	The criminal complaint against Sarao can be found on the US Department of Justice's website. He was charged under four different sections of US Code: 18 USC 1343, which prohibits the use of inter-state or foreign telecommunications in the furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. 18 USC 1348, which prohibits fraud concerning securities and commodities markets. 7 USC 13(a)(2), which prohibits manipulation of commodities markets. 7 USC 6c(a)(5)(C), which specifically prohibits "spoofing" of commodities markets. It's this last one that you seem to be most interested in. Spoofing is defined as "bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution." In other words, it's legal to change your mind after you place an order, but it's not legal to place an order that you have no intent of following through on. This section was actually enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, which took effect a few months after the "Flash Crash"; the charge against Sarao under this section stemmed from actions he took later, in 2014. The charges against Sarao specifically relating to the "Flash Crash" were under the wire fraud and securities fraud statutes instead. In the end, Sarao pled guilty to one count of wire fraud (covering his ongoing actions from 2009–2014) and one count of spoofing, presumably as part of a plea deal.	Critique I'm technically a director of a company ... You either are or you aren't - there is no "technically" involved. ... is not currently trading ... And doing nothing can create a conflict of interest? How? You mustn’t be involved either directly or indirectly with any other trade or business competing in or conflicting with the interests of our Company. "competing or conflicting" is the key here - if the "other trade or business" can adversely affect the performance of your employer then you have a conflict, if not, you don't. are only related in such that they are both technology based but otherwise are unrelated. Sorry, but that is so vague as to be totally useless - what company today is not "technology based"? Pharmaceutical companies are technology based, so are construction companies, so are law firms but one would hardly call them "related". Solution Conflicts of interest are easy: If you don't think you have a conflict of interest and they don't think you have a conflict of interest then you don't have a conflict of interest. If either or both of you do; then you do. Tell them about it! Conflicts of interest are a problem because people think that if you are keeping secrets then you are doing it for a nefarious purpose! In 90% of cases declaring the potential conflict resolves the conflict because the other party says "That! Don't be silly; that's not a problem!" or words to that effect. In the 99.9% of the remaining 10% of cases then sensible people can come up with sensible solutions, for example: If you want to be involved with another business whilst working for us then you’ll need to get a letter from the Director of your area confirming that they’re happy for you to do this.	My thinking is that there was no meeting of the minds, thus no acceptance. ( I can see that shipping the goods implies acceptance, however I understand that acceptance implies a meeting of the minds - and there would have been subterfuge to modify the return page with the lower amount - thus at the moment of apparent acceptance there was no actual acceptance) I doubt you would have a case against the other party criminally, but quite possibly in a civil court.	She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove.	First of all, this assumes that the debt consolidation firm would be willing to buy, and the CC company willing to sell. With a trial already scheduled, this might well not be the case. Secondly, when (if) the debt consolidation firm buys the debt, they buy the rights of the seller. In many states the trial could go forward, with the debt consolidation firm substituted as plaintiff. It is not automatic that a sale of the debt would postpone the legal case. Certainly if this happened once, it seems very unlikely that a second debt consolidation firm would buy the debt from the first. And as the comments by Moo and ohwilleke suggest, such a scheme would be fraudulent and criminal, if discovered. It might also constitute contempt of court for intentionally abusing the process of the court. Not a good or safe idea.	There are two different kinds of transactions that are implicated by your question. The first is a stock stock split. This simply turns 1 share into X shares and trades out existing shares for new shares. This has no economic effect and is simply done for the convenience of trading shares for prices that are easy to work work on a practical basis, for example, in software listing stock prices. The second is an initial public offering, which, confusingly, means not just the first time that newly issued stock is sold to the public by the issuer, but any time that newly issued stock is sold to the public by the issuer. The possibility of dilution is real in this situation. Abuse of that possibility is primarily managed through the fact that the Board of Directors whose approval is required to issue new stock and sell it to the public, have a fiduciary duty to the company to sell the new stock at a price commensurate with the fair market value of the currently outstanding stock. If the Board of Directors breaches that fiduciary duty to the company, then shareholders may bring what is called a derivative action to enforce the duty that the Board of Directors breached to the company. Lawsuits of this kind make up a significant share of the total volume of cases in the Delaware Chancery Court, a state court in the U.S. state of Delaware where most large publicly held companies are organized. These cases are also often litigated in the state courts of New York State and of California, both of which are also popular states for publicly held companies to be incorporated in. Also, keep in mind that the Board of Directors is elected by the existing shareholders, and while most publicly held companies have "Soviet style ballots" in director elections from a pre-set slate of candidates, a proxy fight to run a competing slate of candidates is allowed is existing shareholders are unhappy with their performance. Normally, as a matter of practical reality, the Board of Directors is quite responsive to coalitions of shareholders with substantial holdings who care about the value of their shares as opposed to political issues only tangentially related to the company. A Board of Directors is usually aligned with the interests of the existing shareholders and doesn't have an incentive to screw them over by diluting the value of their shares. People who don't like how a Board is running a publicly held company usually sell their shares and invest in some other company instead, rather than risk being diluted. SEC approval and approval from state securities regulators is also required for an initial public offering (including a subsequent offering of new shares by a public company) but that approval requires only full disclosure of the transaction and the company's financial situation, and cannot be denied on the basis that the transaction is unfair to existing or to new shareholders on account of the price of the offer. It is allowed because the whole purpose of a publicly held company is to raise capital to engage in business activities. When a publicly held company needs more money to do something it has several choices: An initial public offering of corporate bonds. An initial public offering of new stock. A private loan from a bank or affluent individual. Options 1 and 3 increase the debt to equity ratio of the company and increase the company's risk of default on existing loans, while imposing a minimum cashflow requirement that it may not be able to fulfill in the event of a short term economic disruption (like the current pandemic). In the case of a very big investment, there may simply be no lender who has the capacity to lend enough money privately. Option 2 makes the company more creditworthy and can be economically desirable to existing shareholders is the shares are sold at a price that makes it a cheaper source of capital than borrowing money at the interest rates currently available to the company. If the capital raised makes possible an investment that increases profits for the company by a greater percentage than the existing shareholder's interests are diluted, it is a good deal for existing shareholders.	In theory, what Dale says. However, in practice: Nope, and that's why the trader is in Timbuktu. And I apologize profusely to the Malian people, I have every reason to think it is a fine country in which citizens obey international laws and honor claims, unlike certain other countries. In anglo/Five Eyes nations, Timbuktu tends to simply be used as a metaphor for "a country far, far away and different in its ways than us". If Bob is regularly buying things in the USA or Timbuktu, then either Bob works for Aperture Science and is using portals, or more likely Bob is using mail order. And now, we get to the nut of it. Most mail order sales are done by mail-order sellers who deal in volume. Those people choose their jurisdictions and venues carefully. And they have help. Do European or British consumer rights legislations bind the American/Malian trader to protect Bob, as the GDPR would? No! That's WHY they're in Timbuktu! (or, wherever they actually are; generally behind what I'll call the Red Curtain.) The point of being there is to be untouchable by civil action or government penalty due to that government's non-enrollment in international agreements, and outright obstruction of such actions. Yes, they and their legal team have crunched the question of "what happens when a European or Briton sues us? What happens when an Anglo or EU government tries to action us?" Their companies are structured so they slough those off at minimal real loss. Ever notice how many sellers have a company name that looks like they rolled their face across a keyboard? That's a sockpuppet shell company, and they have thousands of them. If their other layers of defense fail, they simply fold that company and create another. Their government lets them do this, because they chose jurisdictions wisely. A huge fraction of mail order sales are done on this basis, typically through web sites which purport to be "only a marketplace connecting buyers to sellers"... even though some of those marketplaces also provide warehousing and shipping services to the third party ("only a warehouse" and "only a drop-ship firm")... and even though they are known for selling their own products, and use the smallest text on the page to mention that this particular item is from a third party. Not mentioning any names. This type of "be fully complicit in selling junk, while the seller of record hides behind the Red Curtain and uses arrays of shell companies to limit exposure" has become systemized in much of the mail order world. Another scheme I've seen is to trick American consumers into being the seller of record; these people end up "holding the liability bag", and are typically not insured and not collectible in any practical way. Of course you have lovely companies like Eaton, Midnight Solar, Harsco Rail, Roshel, ILSCO, etc. who will meet GDPR simply because it's the right thing to do, even if they don't have feet on the ground inside the EU or UK against which those governments might action. But nobody asks if they're subject to GDPR, do they?	It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages.
Can I get in trouble for unknowingly receiving and selling stolen property? UNITED STATES: WASHINGTON STATE: PIERCE COUNTY: TACOMA CITY My friend gifted me a bunch of useless crap, and I'm trying to sell garbage on offer up now. Can people get in trouble for unknowingly receiving stolen property and attempting to sell it? Or does one have to KNOWINGLY receive the stolen property? And what are the consequences? I specifically asked my friend if any of this stuff was stolen and he said no.	In theory its only a crime if you know, or reasonably suspect, that it is stolen. The fact that you have to ask means that you have some level of suspicion, so that's not good to start with. In practice merely being investgated by the police will bring you a world of hurt long before it gets to trial. How much can you afford to spend on legal fees, and will you be able to make bail?	Because one is theft and the other is breach of contract Theft is taking someone’s property with the intent of permanently depriving them of it. It has always been a crime, in fact, it’s a toss up whether theft or murder was the first crime ever. Not giving someone something you lawfully owe them but that they never possessed is not theft because it lacks the dispossession aspect required of theft. That’s simply failing to pay a debt and that is just breach of contract. Now, there was a time, back in the nineteenth century when not paying your debts would land you in debtors prison but society moved on. Now, there are jurisdictions (australia) which are considering making wage theft, the deliberate and systemic underpayment of workers a crime. Perhaps society is moving on again?	Is a warrant needed for search or seizure while the garbage is still on private property, as in the garbage cans in this situation? No. The garbage cans as you describe are deposited "for the express purpose of having strangers take it", California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (citation omitted). That willful and informed act strikes any reasonable expectation of privacy. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection", Id (citations omitted).	You have the right to notify the owner of the car of their vehicular trespass and the consequences of that. You do not have the right to damage the car in giving said notice. You have the right to offer to clean the gum off whatever part of the car you stuck the notice to. If you succeed in cleaning it,the other party will not have a legal cause of action, in all likelihood, since there is no damage (though with a bit of imagination they might come up with some 'missed business opportunity' loss). The court would probably find your choice of sticker to be negligent (put the notice under the wipers? use painter's tape -get some if you don't have any). The rationale 'we had no other choice' holds no water: there are alternatives. 'Criminal Damages' is a concept in UK law, but it relates to willful damage such as vandalism, not accidents. It would be an issue if you had planned to cause damage, but that seems not to be the case here.	I do not believe that Idaho has such a law. This is not the end of the analysis, however. It isn't clear that saying you do not have a conviction, when in fact, you have a conviction that was dismissed, is a permissible ground for an Idaho employer to, for example, justify the termination of your employment for an improper reasons (e.g. national origin) when the employer, after the fact, discovers that you have a conviction that you did not disclose because it was dismissed. An Idaho court could easily rule that the non-disclosure of a conviction which was dismissed was not a material fact upon which an Idaho employer could justify terminating your employment when it was discovered after the fact. Likewise, fraud prosecutions generally require a misrepresentation to be made regarding a "material" fact, and not just any fact. In the same vein, while misstating your middle name might be a misrepresentation, it might not be an actionable misrepresentation of a material fact.	Your landlord has an obligation to allow "quiet enjoyment" of the premises. Essentially this means that, unless they are damaging his or her property, the tenants are entited to act as though it were their own property. Many people take drugs at home. Between the tenants and the landlord this is not something the landlord is allowed to get involved in. If you believe there is criminal activity going on, you can but are not obliged to report it to the police.	Grand theft, a term which is used in some jurisdictions, is "big theft". It is defined in California in terms of what and how much you steal, for instance "over $950" except over $250 for domestic fowl (and other things). It also includes any auto theft. Otherwise, it is known as petty theft ("small theft": the terms derive from French and sometimes spelled "petit"). On the other hand, Washington state does not use those terms, instead they have 1st, 2nd and 3rd degree theft, as well as theft of motor vehicle, two degrees of taking of motor vehicle, and so on.	I would think that this would be treated the same as lost property. In most places, if you notice lost property (for example because the postman hands it to you) you have the choice of ignoring it (don't touch it, don't accept it from the postman), or you have to make reasonable efforts to find the owner and return it. If you as the sender had no idea who received the package so you cannot contact them, and there was nothing in the package identifying the sender, the receiver would be able to keep the package when their efforts of finding the owner fail. But if you manage to contact them, then the receiver knows the owner, so there is no legal excuse to keep the package.
Offense that was expunged still showing up A friend of mine (yes, I'm aware of how that sounds, but it's true) had a felony expunged from his record 10 years ago. Recently when getting screened for a job it showed up and now his job is at risk. How is this possible? And are there any legal actions that can be taken to prevent it from happening again?	Expungement rules and effects vary greatly by state. Good reading on the question can be had here, with notable exceptions to expungement here. Of particular relevance to this question: In some states, individuals who want to work as public school teachers, corrections guards, or police officers should expect that their employers will have access to expunged records. Agencies reviewing applications for professional licenses, including law, pharmacy, or medicine, may also have access. Even in the most favorable circumstances an expungement can't destroy or seal non-government records. For example, if a newspaper reported on a charge or conviction there is no way to eliminate that public record. The mechanics of expungement can also break down. For example, in Pennsylvania it's up to the applicant for expungement to list all the government agencies and entities on which the Order for Expungement should be served. If they forget or aren't aware of some agency that has records covered by the expungement then those records won't be destroyed. (Though if they are later discovered the Order can be served on them and they are still required to comply.)	As explained in the comments, a sentence is more than one year is the operational definition of a felony in many context concerning the collateral consequences of a sentence. For example, a sentence of more than one year causes a person to be deportable, while one of less than one year generally does not. Another consequence is that the offense will count as a prior felony in the event of a new conviction which can result in a much longer sentence for a subsequent offense. In many states, a prior felony means losing the right to vote and the ability to have or obtain a license in many professions. Sentences of more than one year are also generally served in a state prison rather than in a county jail. Both of these factors make a sentence of 366 days significantly more serious than one of 364 days.	You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on.	Can someone be arrested for not being ‘nice’ to police? Yes. The arrest may later be declared unlawful, and the cop could later be disciplined by his boss, but if a cop wants to arrest you now for any reason they just can. Seems weird and an abuse of power to me. The available means of dealing with abuse of power have never been in excess. Could they win such a case? Yes. So could your friend. It depends on many many factors.	Who in the fraternity would be prosecuted if this became an issue? A lot of people could be held liable for this, including people who are not even in the fraternity. Anyone who has knowledge of the machine or the fact that it was possible for minors to access alcohol through it could technically be held liable if a prosecutor wanted to make that case. Presumably the building is owned by someone else and just leased out to fraternity members, and they very well could be held liable for sale to minors also. Would the machine be safer if it just accepted cash (so that no electronic paper trail was created), with a big warning sign WINK WINK that anyone under the age of 21 was strictly prohibited from purchasing from it? No. Payment method is irrelevant here. There are a number of states that legally allow vending machines to sell alcohol, but vendors are required to verify the age of any person accessing them and ensure that those cards aren't being used by people not authorized. What you describe is an extremely relaxed environment where admittedly no one is attempting to verify identities. The "accepting cash" scenario is no different than a liquor store selling alcohol to anyone that comes in just because they're willing to pay with cash instead of a credit card. Sales to minors laws are not "as long as you warn them, you're safe" laws. They require vendors to actively check IDs and ensure that alcohol is not landing in the hands of minors. Accepting cash just to erase the evidence doesn't meet that burden. There are a lot of legal troubles with the situation that could get a lot of people charged with multiple offenses. That you have underage fraternity members living there suggests you should not have alcohol readily accessible in the house at all, as most state laws expressly forbid providing access to alcohol, not just serving or selling. Them being there provides access to it, even if it's just a case in the fridge with a note on it. Not to mention, you technically cannot sell alcohol, as I highly doubt your fraternity has a liquor license to be able to do so. There's a big difference between asking everyone to pitch in to buy the case versus actively selling individual cans through a vending machine. The vending machine itself is violating liquor laws in your state merely by existing.	There is no hard and fast rule to determine what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the first instance, the judge (or jury, when there is a jury trial) decides this on a case by case basis. If the officer testifies that the matters recorded in the ticket are true because it was the officer's practice to always record accurately what happened in a ticket, this would ordinarily not be grounds for reversal of a conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence, unless other evidence somehow put the officer's testimony in serious doubt (e.g. a social media post clearly putting the officer in another location at the time that the ticket was allegedly issued). Normally, the only kind of evidence that would not result in a ticket being upheld on appeal would be the failure of the officer to testify at all.	Unfortunately, the police are correct The limit on filing a civil claim (a lawsuit where you seek monetary compensation) is before you turn 40. If you were 11 in 1985 then it is too late to sue your assaulter. For criminal prosecution, the law was changed in 2016. Prior to the change, the limitation was the same as for civil cases. After the change, there is no limit but only if the offence was committed on or after 1 January 2017. Assuming that your reference to Kelly is to this guy - the alleged offences were committed in the 1990s and the prosecutions are under Illinois, Minnesota and Federal law (the Federal crimes alleged are not the sexual assault of a minor). Each state has it's own rules.	Such a search would have been emotionally satisfying for many people, but it would almost certainly not have been legal. Evidence that someone committed a crime is not always sufficient to permit a search of their home. An arrest warrant requires probable cause to believe the target individual committed an offense, and a search warrant requires probable cause to believe that the target location will have evidence of a crime. So whatever evidence they had that Epstein committed a crime, they would generally need a separate warrant to search his properties for evidence of that crime. There is no "emergency clause" for search warrants. I imagine you're thinking of the "exigency" exception to the requirement that the police obtain a warrant before searching property, which allows a search in cases where there is an actual emergency, where evidence is being destroyed, or when someone ducks into private property while officers are pursuing them. "Reasonable suspicicion of possible threats to ... potential victims" would not be enough to justify a search based on an exigency. If Epstein is already in jail, he doesn't really pose a threat to anyone, he isn't able to destroy any evidence, and no one is pursuing him anywhere.
Are there any parts of human rights which are not already part of US law? Apart from healthcare (which is subjective and not a specific right), are there any parts of US law which violate the human rights set out in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights or any of those rights not included in any US state laws?	According to the ACLU, lots Including: life sentences without parole no legal right to sue for being illegally tortured by the US systemic socioeconomic generational inequality corporal punishment lack of legal protection based on gender mass immigration detention mass and racially discriminatory incarceration lack of ratification (along with Somalia) of the UN declaration on the rights of the child lack of protection of voting rights of minorities failure to ratify the UN declaration on the rights of the disabled the only liberal democracy to still have the death penalty To be fair, many other countries have failed on some of these metrics but, as in many things, the US is No 1 among the OECD.	Probably not, because there is no legal case or controversy, and the law is clear enough. In US v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, SCOTUS held that A child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution The opinion has a long analysis of the "subject to jurisdiction" clause, reasoning that this excludes only children of diplomats, who are not subject to US law. Harris's parents were not immune diplomats so she was never immune to US jurisdiction. They are never forced to take any case, and are especially not likely to take a case so lacking in legal merits.	Can any one uses this law to sue US for killing people in Iraq for example? No. This proposed law is limited to suing people or organizations involved in supporting terrorism in the US. The problem with it is if it becomes law and is used, the precedent will be set to allow lawsuits against foreign actors for such decisions. So a middle eastern government, e.g. Iraq or Iran, could pass a law allowing lawsuits against those who could be in some way responsible for war crimes during the Iraq war. So someone could sue the individuals directly responsible, their commanders for not stopping them or preventing them, the organization to which the individuals belonged, the government of the individuals, the members of the coalition, and the United Nations. And this would be done in that country's courts, not international courts with some claim to impartiality. The proposed law is a bad idea, but quite popular. There were some low level members of the Saudi Arabian government who supported actions taken by the group involved in the 9/11 attacks. The families of the victims are understandably annoyed by this. And yes, they are actually seeking justice, just not in the best way. This wouldn't make a good basis for blackmail, as there is no way to stop it. Blackmail is based on offering two alternatives and allowing the victim to pick one. This wouldn't be controllable like that. Once launched, it would be difficult to pull back.	You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right.	It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin Tobacco use or non-use doesn't make the list. That's the legal position; if you want advice on how to handle the workplace stuff post your question on the Workplace Stack Exchange.	Your distinction between civil rights and civil liberties does not enjoy support from the legal perspective. Typically, the law addresses rights, and "liberty" is invoked only in rhetorical flourishes (at least in the US legal context). "Right" is about the relationship between a person and actions. Liberty may be a consequence of certain rights. Government protection of rights typically takes the form of forbidding the government to do certain things (things that interfere with a person's right to do certain things). The right to due process protects your right to live your life free from government interference, except when certain conditions are present (as stated in a law). Due Process (as a procedural requirement on government action) is neither a right nor a liberty, it is a restriction addressed to government power. Its purpose is to protect the rights of individuals.	No, there is no obligation to repeal It is common for statutes held to be unconstitutional to be left on the books decades later, and for others which quite likely would be so held if anyone tried to enforce them to be similarly left for even longer periods. It is somewhat less common for state constitutional provisions, but it does happen, and as those commonly take more than a simple legislative act, there is even less motivation to go through the troublesome process in such cases. There are even a few provisions in the US constitution which have become obsolete, but not actually amended away. For example, the so-called 'three-fifths compromise', which counted slaves as worth 3/5ths of a person for computing representation, was effectively repealed by the Civil War and the 13th amendment, but was not formally removed. That section was actually formally replaced by the 14th.	Yes, of course slavery is illegal. "Involuntary servitude" imposed upon someone through due process of law is not slavery. This is analogous to a death sentence for a capital crime, which, because it is imposed by due process of law, is not murder. Similarly, the judicial imposition of a fine, or the forfeiture of other property, is not theft. Now, rhetorically, one can speak of the conditions of modern imprisonment as "state-sanctioned slavery," just as death-penalty opponents speak of "state-sanctioned murder" and recipients of parking tickets can speak of "state-sanctioned theft." But there's a big difference between rhetoric and the law.
Why don't Commonwealth judges always write out the headings "Ratio Decidendi" and "Obiter Dictum", to definitively distinguish them? I ask solely about Anglo-American written judgments. Why don't judge's written judgments always comprise the headings "Ratio Decidendi" and "Obiter Dictum", just like how the headings "Material Facts" and "Issues" are always used to separate the Facts v. Issues? This view appertains to each judge deciding a case. So if a case comprises 5 justices, there can be a total of 5 "Ratio Decidendi" and 5 "Obiter Dictum" headings that appear. Obviously "Ratio Decidendi" will never be empty. "Obiter Dictum" can be empty if a judge has no obiter to "dictate", but always printing this heading will assist all readers to definitively distinguish what is ratio and obiter, and to forestall the following bafflements. Glanville Williams: Learning the Law (2016 16 edn). p 110. It is a mistake to suppose that every case has one and only one fixed and incontrovertible ratio decidendi. What exactly is the ratio decidendi of a case is often a matter for much argument. Also, the pick-lock art of distinguish depends upon a critical examination of all the facts of the case that might by any possibility be regarded as material. Holland, Webb. Learning Legal Rules (10 edn 2019). pp 220-221. 7.8.2 Multiple and Inconclusive Rationes It will not now come as a surprise that a case can be said to have different rationes in that there may be different interpretations of what is the proposition of law for which the case stands as authority. Equally, you need to be aware that: (i) even ‘crystal-clear’ judgments occasionally contain more than one ratio; and (ii) that in some cases no one can find the ratio. Different formulations of a ratio At section 7.3 we noted that a judge may reformulate the ratio by using different words later in his judgment. Th at certainly adds confusion but in many ways it is part of a normal thought process. Here, we have in mind a slightly different position—where a judge says: ‘I find for X for the following reasons . . . I would also say that there is another (unconnected) reason for which I find for X.’ Which is the ratio? This occurred in the Court of Appeal case of Turner v London Transport Executive [1977] ICR 952. The traditional answer is that both statements are ratio . Later judges do not, however, follow a consistent line when dealing with such cases; they ‘relegate’ one of the statements to mere obiter dictum: see Lord Denning’s comments on Turner in Western Excavating v Sharp [1978] ICR 221; [1978] 1 All ER 713 (also Court of Appeal). [...] No clear ratio We also have in mind a number of confusing cases which the lawyer usually relates as being ‘an authority for any proposition of law for which you care to use it’. This will arise where the judges are agreed as to the decision (X won) but present their reasons in quite different formulations. Bell v Lever Bros is one example.	Because they are only apparent with hindsight The judge writing the judgement does not decide what is dicta and what is obiter - that is for some future judge considering a different case and deciding if they are looking at a binding (dicta) or persuasive (obiter) precedent. First of all, the vast majority of cases follow precedent; they do not set it. If you are trying to disentangle dicta and obiter then you are usually looking at the case of an appeal, not a trial judgement. Most trials turn on the facts, not precedent-setting points of law - usually, there is no dispute about the law at all. Even then, most appeal decisions don't set a precedent either and sink into obscurity until at some point in the far future when a lawyer doing research on a particularly tricky case has an "ah-ha" moment and says "Look at what Justice Bozo said in paragraph 365 of this 56 page judgement about a tangentially related issue between different people at a different time in a different place - I need to spin this as dicta." Meanwhile, the lawyer on the opposite side has a different precedent from a different case that contradicts this one - one of them must be wrong. So a trial judge faced with this paradox has to resolve it; they don't get to say "this is too hard". Basically they have 2 methods of doing so: The decide that one (or both) are obiter and make the decision based on the precedent that remains. They decide that both are ratio and write a judgement that they know has to be appealed because they have to follow both precedents and they can't. At least in Australia, this is becoming more and more common. The judge basically says "I have two conflicting binding precedents, I pick this one for [reasons]. Now go off to the Court of Appeals to see if I got it right. I look forward to finding out." Of course, the winner isn't going to appeal and it may not be in the loser's commercial interest to do so. So maybe the question just gets kicked down the road for some other poor bloody judge to have to deal with.	Because the ordinance does not say "and from each entrance", it cannot be interpreted to mean that the signs must both be visible and readable anywhere in the area as well as being visible and readable from the entrance. The use of distinct prepositions in the conjuncts means that the notice requirement can be satisfied by different signs: it's not that a sign has to have both properties.	The Constitution does not state your opinion of SCOTUS's job, instead it just says that there shall be one supreme court with judicial power, and it says what kind of cases are within the jurisdiction of that court. Thus The Constitution does not mandate whether rulings will adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis, will be based only on a narrowly literal interpretation of The Constitution, or will be based on a general sense of justice. The Constitution also does not say anything about the rules of that Supreme Court, therefore the court is free to set its own rules, and to allow or to not allow amicus briefs. Many points raised in amicus briefs fall on deaf ears, sometimes because they are based on non-shared legal assumptions. You can read a very brief summary of the over 140 amicus briefs in this case here. If you read various SCOTUS opinions over the past 225+ years, you will see that the court does make reference to fact, not just statements of the law and constitution. This brings it well within the scope of "potentially relevant" to determine some fact. The lawyers get to argue how facts relate to legal conclusions, but the basic fodder for any legal decision is some set of facts. The specific briefs you mentioned are: Pro-Life Obstetricians and College of Obstetricians. The latter's argument is self-summarized as Amici’s position is that laws regulating abortion should be evidence-based, supported by a valid medical or scientific justification, and designed to improve—not harm—women’s health Pro-Life Obsetricians' position is self-summarized as support for a law that rationally furthers Mississippi’s interest in protecting women’s health from risks posed by later- term abortions, which are now well established in the literature These statements refer to interpretive doctrines previously established by SCOTUS, but not literally expressed in The Constitution. In US v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 introduced concepts of constitutionality (not literally stated in The Constitution) whereby cases could be reviewed either with "strict scrutiny" for protection of Constitutional rights or else discernment of a "rational interest" in government taking a certain action. Either of these kinds of judicial review require a comparison of law to "the facts". Hence "the facts" can be legally relevant.	"Precedent" refers to a finding of what the law is. A jury only finds facts, and operates (supposedly) within the meaning of the law as already established. All the jury reports is "yes" and "no" to questions of fact (with some reference to existing law): they do not report, at least in any official way "we interpret the law as saying X". So it would be impossible for a jury to "set precedent" in the case law sense. In a notorious case, they might "set precedent" in inspiring other jurors to act similarly, but this is not enforceable precedent in the way that case law precedent is. In the US, if the jury acquits the defendant, that is the end of the matter and there is no re-trial. As for the UK, I am not sure but I think that the prosecution being unhappy with the jury's decision does not create an exception to the double jeopardy rule.	The concept of prima facie is common also in civil proceedings (and, impliedly, administrative ones). See the results from this query, most of which are civil cases. For instance, this memorandum opinion begins by acknowledging that the plaintiff-appellees "have met their burden of establishing a prima facie case for defamation". In theory, the purpose of prima facie elements is to establish "high-level" uniformity as to what items a plaintiff or prosecutor, as the case may be, will need to prove in order to prevail in a case. That uniformity is necessary for --and consistent with-- the so-called "equal protection of the laws". From a standpoint of equal protection, there is no reason why a case being criminal vs. civil should make a difference regarding the applicability of the concept of prima facie elements.	The appellate court reviews based upon the trial court record. To the extent that it turns on questions of law, including interpretations of written documents whose authenticity is not in question, this review is de novo. Likewise, decisions on this issue made on a paper record and argument of counsel, without an evidentiary hearing that resolved material disputes of fact between the parties, are reviewed de novo. So are procedural question, like whether an evidentiary hearing should have been held. But, in cases where there is a mixed issue of fact and law, the appellate court defers to all findings of fact made in the trial court from an evidentiary hearing held in the trial court that are supported by admissible evidence in the trial court record. Since the material facts relating to the enforceability of arbitration are frequently not in dispute in a case like this and arbitration rulings are often made without evidentiary hearings, as for example, in this case and in this case, an appellate court often does engage in de novo review. But, the appellate court is not permitted to re-weigh the credibility of witnesses, for example, in a manner contrary to the trial court's findings of fact supported by admissible evidence in the record, if an evidentiary hearing was held and this was necessary to resolve disputed issues of fact that were material to the question of whether arbitration could be compelled. While what I have said above is somewhat different than the standards, for example, in New Jersey as stated in this document quoted below, this is to some extent a function of the facts of the referenced cases. None of which involve a refusal to compel arbitration following an evidentiary hearing involving disputed findings of fact. Appellate courts "review de novo the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration." Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020). See Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020). "Under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7, either party may move to confirm an award within three months of the date of its delivery. Once confirmed, the award is as conclusive as a court judgment. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-10." Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 292 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 158 N.J. 392, 398 (1999). N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 provides a court may vacate an arbitration award for: 1) corruption, fraud or undue means; 2) evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; 3) misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; or 4) the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. "Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276 (2010)). "To foster finality and 'secure arbitration's speedy and inexpensive nature,' reviewing courts must give arbitration awards 'considerable deference.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201-02 (2013)). "[A]n arbitrator's award resolving a public sector dispute will be accepted so long as the award is 'reasonably debatable.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013)). "An arbitrator's award is not to be cast aside lightly. It is subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Kearny PBA Loc. # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979)). Certain statutes, including the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -30, set "strict limits on the appeal of an arbitration award." Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 2008). In support of a contrary view that even the findings of fact of the trial court are subject to de novo review are statements like this one (from this case): The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). But, the cited cases don't mean precisely what they are purported to say in the rare case where the decision rests, for example, on resolved a disputed credibility decision between two witnesses over whether the purported arbitration document is authentic in an evidentiary hearing. Those cases are merely dicta as applied to that fact pattern. The case containing this quote was decided at the trial court level on the pleadings alone without receiving any testimony or documents in an evidentiary hearing (see footnote 1 at page 2). Hirsch was decided in motion practice without an evidentiary hearing (see page 184) and the case itself says (at page 186): Orders compelling arbitration are deemed final for purposes of appeal. R. 2:2–3(a); GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572, 587, 17 A.3d 177 (2011). We review those legal determinations de novo. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995) (“A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.”). The decision in Frummer was similarly qualified and also relied upon interpretation of written instruments whose execution was undisputed that was resolved in motion practice without any mention of an evidentiary hearing. The Court in Frummer said at page 13: We review the denial of a request for arbitration de novo. See Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 393 N.J.Super. 560, 572-73, 925 A.2d 22 (App.Div. 2007). "A `trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Id. at 573, 925 A.2d 22 (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995)). See also this case stating that: The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). Again, however, I would question whether this holding is dicta because it involves the interpretation of written instruments whose authenticity is in doubt, and not, for example, a dispute over whether the person who signed the documents is the same person who is a party to this litigation and not someone else with a very similar name that was resolved in an evidentiary hearing.	The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 9th Circuit. The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 7th Circuit. These decisions are not binding precedents, even as to federal law, on state courts, or in any other circuits, although they are persuasive authority in all jurisdictions that don't have a contrary binding precedent. When two circuits reach contrary legal conclusions in binding precedents, this is called a circuit split. Sometimes, circuit splits are resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court (a large share of its docket is devoted to such cases). Sometimes Congress wakes up and enacts a law that resolves the dispute if it involves a non-constitutional issue. Sometimes (arguably, most of the time), circuit splits go unresolved for years or even decades, and the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in one part of the United States is different from the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in another part of the United States. In some other circuit where the legal issue that is the subject of the circuit split is question of first impression with no binding case law decided in that circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, the parties will offer up persuasive authority from the 7th and 9th Circuits that have previously issued binding precedents on the issue and will try to argue that the one that favors them is correct, or that there is a third way to consider the issue that also favors them. Indeed, often the U.S. Supreme Court deliberately refrains from resolving circuit splits until a clear majority has emerged favoring one view or the other. Even simply counting how many circuit splits exist is a surprisingly tricky matter. For example, one database estimates that 29%-41% of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in recent years resolved circuit splits (at the same link) but that was realistically an underestimate. the question is whether geographic or the temporal instancy in opposing decisions makes one over the other binding authority. There is not. There is no procedural rule that resolves a circuit split.	For the same reason you can’t ask the parties to a contract what they meant Legislation, once enacted, stands on its own independent of the people who drafted it, introduced it to Parliament and voted for or against it. These are not the same people in any event and since the legislation might have been passed anywhere between the 13th and 21st centuries, a lot of them will be dead. There’s a fundamental issue of fairness here. The people who are obliged to comply with the law (you and I) can’t ask the politicians so neither can the judges who have to decide if we did. Further, the judiciary cannot interact with the executive or the legislature in this way without violating the principle of separation of powers. Imagine you are charged with a crime and your guilt or innocence turns on the interpretation of the statute. Do you really want politicians who are looking at how the case plays out on Twitter telling the judge which interpretation to use i.e. effectively telling them whether you are guilty or not?
Can you explain the "Rule of Three Scores"? In plain English? The term is used several times at https://sfgov.org/civilservice/rule-111a-position-based-testing and I can't fathom the meaning. I searched the site and found a definition (copy below, indented). But even after (roughly) understanding what eligibles, appointing officer, and more are, I still can't grok it. To me it seems akin to intentionally obfuscated source code. I can't grok what's in italics. Even after finding this help while drafting this. I can't grok what it means to consider a score. I think "employee organization" = union, but I'm not sure. Sec. 202.6 Certification - Rule of Three Scores The names of eligibles with the three highest scores on the list of eligibles for a position, who are available for appointment, are certified to the appointing officer. When there are two or more approved personnel requisitions on file for the same class, the number of scores certified shall be equal to the number of positions to be filled plus two scores. An eligible list adopted under the Rule of Three Scores shall in all cases be exhausted when eligibles standing at less than three scores are available. Use of the eligible list when there is less than the minimum certification available shall be at the discretion of the appointing officer. If all eligibles at a score waive appointment or fail to respond within the time limits provided in these Rules, the appointing officer may request supplementary certification(s) from the next highest score. Is it language designed to be impenetrable other than to a union's lawyers? That's my hunch, but it's just a WAG I'm hesitant to even mention.	Put most simply: A "score" is the examination score for a job candidate who performed well enough to be considered for a position. It is more helpful to think of it as the candidate himself. "Certifying" a score mostly just means that the commission transmits the score to the hiring officer and promises that it's accurate. So whenever there is an opening for a position, the civil service commission must certify/send a list of scores/candidates for the hiring officer to consider, i.e. choose from. The Rule of Three Scores says that list must have at least two more scores than there are open positions. If the city is hiring 50 police officers, the list must have at least 52 scores (50 positions plus 2). If it is hiring three secretaries, the list must have at least five scores (3 positions plus 2). It's called The Rule of Three Scores because the existence of a list presumes at least one opening, which necessitates at least three scores. For example, if the city is hiring one fire chief, the list must have at least three scores (1 position plus 2).	Barrister to instructing solicitor: “Am I working for the plaintiff or defendant?” Plaintiff Your honour, this excellent study and the expert testimony you have heard from the authors, clearly demonstrates that whiteboard testing is sexual discrimination by another name. The clear correlation between the gender of the interviewee and their ability to perform this task, which is unrelated to the job and is actually a test of how good the person is at handling performance anxiety, is being used to prejudicially and unlawfully screen out female applicants. Defendant Your honour, this discredited paper and the inconsistent testimony of the author clearly demonstrated that the methodology was flawed and the conclusions are unsupportable. When pressed, it turned out that the number of females encompassed by the catch-all word “all” was 6 - hardly a sample big enough to draw any meaningful conclusions from. Further, it turned out that the number of men who also improved was unknown because they didn’t test them! So we have the authors of a study with gender discrimination in its very methodology drawing asinine conclusions from it about gender discrimination! It may be that whiteboard testing is better at finding competent actors than programmers and this may make it a terrible recruitment tool. However, my client can run their businesses in whatever inefficient way they choose so long as it isn’t unlawful discrimination - and this isn’t that.	united-states In the US, such an IOU may be grounds for suit The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) which has been enacted (with minor variations) in every UIS staye, governs such matters. UCC § 3-104 provides that: (a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), "negotiable instrument" means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it: (a)(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder; (a)(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and (a)(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money UCC § 3-106 provides that: (a) Except as provided in this section, for the purposes of Section 3-104(a), a promise or order is unconditional unless it states (i) an express condition to payment, (ii) that the promise or order is subject to or governed by another record, or (iii) that rights or obligations with respect to the promise or order are stated in another record. A reference to another record does not of itself make the promise or order conditional. UCC § 3-108 provides that: (a) A promise or order is "payable on demand" if it (i) states that it is payable on demand or at sight, or otherwise indicates that it is payable at the will of the holder, or (ii) does not state any time of payment. Thus it appears that the IOU described in the question would be a negotiable instrument under the UCC. Since it has no specified date, it is treated as payable on demand, in the absence of any specific language to the contrary. UCC § 3-301 provides that: "Person entitled to enforce" an instrument means (i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 3-309 or 3-418(d). A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument. UCC § 3-303 provides that: (a) An instrument is issued or transferred for value if: ... (3) the instrument is issued or transferred as payment of, or as security for, an antecedent claim against any person, whether or not the claim is due; Thus the person to whom the IOU was originally given would be entitled to enforce it, assuming it had not been negotiated to some other person. The IOU w3as security for the loan, and thus was issued for value, and is binding. UCC § 3-501 provides that: a) "Presentment" means a demand made by or on behalf of a person entitled to enforce an instrument (i) to pay the instrument made to the drawee or a party obliged to pay the instrument or, in the case of a note or accepted draft payable at a bank, to the bank, or (ii) to accept a draft made to the drawee. UCC § 3-502 provides that: (a) Dishonor of a note is governed by the following rules: (1) If the note is payable on demand, the note is dishonored if presentment is duly made to the maker and the note is not paid on the day of presentment. A note that has been dishonored may be sued on to enforce payment. The specific procedures, and what courts such a suit may be brought in, will vary significantly by state. Not all states have smal claims courts, and those that do have significant differences in what cased they will hear.	He has this phrased like it's the ability to decide which laws you follow, and that it's an ability being withheld from the general public (although I seriously doubt that at least the former is the case). This is yet another false claim made by "freemen" or those who claim "common law defences". Notice of Understanding has no legal meaning unless the context demands that it evidences a meeting of the minds for the purposes of contract formation. It is a well-settled principle of common law that in order to be bound by a contract, there must be an agreement. Put simply, I cannot bind someone simply by sending them a Notice unless it is a right conferred on me by some earlier statute or legislation, or legally binding agreement. I tried searching for a solid definition, but all I could find was people/organization's Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights. The reason you've found nothing official about the terms Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights is that there is nothing official or legal about those terms. They are ordinary terms with ordinary meaning being bastardised by deluded people who believe they can fine the government and refuse to be bound by the law of the land. Of course, none of this holds up. What is the purpose of declaring your Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights? It might make you feel better, even though it has no legal, practical or other effect.	If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same.	While it is true that jury instructions are typically less than optimal, it is ideological hyperbole or cynicism to claim that instructions are purposely confusing. The ultimate source of the confusion is that the legal system has to assume (pretend) that it has clear-cut rules that any reasonable person can easily understand and automatically apply. In order to maintain uniformity of the law, there is an externally-defined instruction that a judge may read (rather than giving his personal spin on what "reasonable doubt" means or what the relationship is between "reasonable doubt" and convicting a defendant). Once the relevant body of government (committee of judges and lawyers) has established the apparently correct formula for expressing the applicable legal concept, they don't mess with it, until SCOTUS overturns decisions enough times based on crappy instructions. Legal professionals are trained to carefully scrutinze language so as to achieve a single interpretation of a given clause (never mind the fact that there turn out to be many such interpretations). Since they can apply these interpretive rules, it is assumed that anyone can apply them. But in fact, we know that people don't just use literal semantic principles to reach conclusions – but the law resist pandering to that imperfection in human behavior. There is a huge literature on problems of jury instructions, some of the better of which relies on psycholinguistic experimentation to establish that a given instruction is confusing or gives the wrong result. See for example Solan's "Refocusing the burden of proof.." (and references therein) that addresses the problem of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which has the unintended consequence of implying that the defense has an obligation to create a doubt (which is not the case, and allows conviction if there is the weakest imaginable evidence which hasn't been refuted). But who gets to decide what the improved instructions should say? The instructions have to correctly state what the law holds (where "the law" means not just statutes, but the trillions of relevant court decisions and applicable regulations). Thus there is massive inertia, and improved jury instructions will not come about quickly.	There are two kinds of evidence for discrimination. The primary evidence is direct, that is, statements by an employer, for example "We need to make sure not to hire a ___ for this position". The act of hiring a person that has a certain demographic property is never evidence for discrimination, because discrimination law treats all races and religions (etc) the same, so hiring a European is not intrinsically discriminatory, nor is hiring an African or Asian. Discrimination is also not defined in terms of the sameness or difference of an employee and a supervisor. Another possibility w.r.t. a discrimination claim is demonstrating a discriminatory pattern. However, the law does not demand exact proportional representation of all protected demographic classes. It is possible that certain circumstances would be compelling enough that illegal discrimination could be established, but this would require showing a pattern, and would not be useful in an individual action. There is no law requiring employers to be up-front about hiring decisions. There is also no law requiring posting a job (I assume this is not a government job), and no law requiring consideration of more than on candidate. It might be contrary to company policy. This is not murky from a legal perspective, even if it is scummy from an HR perspective.	No law prevents this -- the court may use its judgement on which petitions to accept. Under the current rules, any petition which four Justices choose to accept will be accepted and given a hearing. The traditions of the court indicate various reason for acceptance, but these are not legally binding. No Court to date has failed to accept a significant number of petitions for "cert".
Does killing witnesses before trial suppress them? If a witness is killed, or dies, before formally testifying at a criminal trial in what manner, if any, can his relevant statements be admitted or used against a defendant? For example, if sworn testimony has been recorded can that be admitted? What about unsworn written testimony? What about hearsay?	There are instances when the testimony may still be admitted. For example, a deposition may be admitted at trial either for impeaching or when a witness cannot attend, which involves the circumstance of death (FRCP 32(a)(4)(a)). Additionally, regarding hearsay, there are numerous exceptions. My Evidence professor said in class "If you cannot find a way to get evidence around a hearsay objection, you are not trying hard enough." One such hearsay exception states in the committee notes: Accordingly, the committee has amended rule 803(8) to refer to the provision of [proposed] rule 804(b)(5) [deleted], which allows the admission of such reports, records or other statements where the police officer or other law enforcement officer is unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process.	As the answer by Iñaki Viggers says, you should submit an affidavit, not simply a letter to the court. An unsworn letter will probably not be admissible at all. It is common for a witness to tell his or her story to the lawyer for the side that wishes to use the affidavit, and for the lawyer to then draft the actual affidavit in such a way that it will be acceptable to the court where it will be used. Then the lawyer sends it to the affiant (the person who would be a witness if s/he came to court, who is making the affidavit) with instructions. Generally an affidavit must be notarized or otherwise sworn to in front of an appropriate official. However, a person can draft his or her own affidavit. It is usual for it to be headed with the name and case number of the case where it will be used. It should include a statement that everything in it is true, and that the affiant swears (or affirms) this under penalty of perjury. It should include only relevant facts that the affiant has personally witnessed, not anything heard from anyone else, or guessed at or deduced. The facts should be stated clearly and simply. The affidavit should be signed in the presence of a notary, who will witness the signature and the oath that the contents are true. This WikiHow page describes the process in detail, with a template form.	The burden for proving claims in civil actions is "preponderance of evidence," i.e., merely that "more than 50% of the evidence favors a conclusion." However, the standard for conviction of any crime is "beyond a reasonable doubt." I.e., if the defense can raise reasonable doubt about one's guilt then the defendant should be acquitted. There is quite a bit of space between the two standards, which is compounded by prosecutorial discretion to even bring criminal charges.	You can't prove a negative, so they can't be convicted of perjury for lying about whether they remember; Yes, they can. The government can convict the witness of perjury by proving that they did remember. This may be difficult, but it's not impossible. Now you may say that we can't ever prove with certainty what a person did or didn't remember. But the legal standard isn't certainty, it's beyond a reasonable doubt. So a jury is allowed to draw a reasonable inference about whether they remembered, based on evidence of their outward behavior and other circumstances. As an extreme example, suppose Alice was overheard chatting freely about topic X an hour before the trial, but when asked about topic X on the stand, said she didn't remember. When presented with evidence of her earlier conversation, a jury could reasonably infer that she was lying about not remembering. Is it possible that she truly had a memory lapse in the intervening hour? Sure, anything is possible. Is it reasonable to believe that she did? Probably not. The US Department of Justice's Criminal Resource Manual has this to say on the subject: Witnesses who claim not to remember, rather than deny a fact, may be prosecuted for perjury. However, the government must prove both that the witness at one time knew the fact and that the witness must have remembered it at the time he or she testified. United States v. Chen, 933 F.2d 793, 795 (9th Cir. 1991). If the dates of the transaction and testimony are sufficiently close, memory may be inferred. Instances in which the witness remembered other events that occurred at the same time or earlier than the event in question, or mentioned the event either immediately before or after his testimony, would be probative of the witness's memory at the time of the testimony. The two witness rule does not apply to prosecutions based on false memory lapses, and circumstantial evidence is sufficient, since there is no direct evidence possible concerning what the defendant actually believed. Gebhard v. United States, 422 F.2d 281, 287 (9th Cir. 1970). There's a similar issue in all laws that deal with a person's knowledge or intent. Suppose Alice hits Bob with a stick and he dies. To convict Alice of murder, it must be proved that by hitting Bob, she intended to kill him. Can we ever really know what was in her heart? Maybe not, but if there is evidence that shortly beforehand, she told someone that she was going to kill Bob, it would be a reasonable inference that this was her intention.	That will amount to refusal to testify. The judge will warn you that, for a summoned witness, a refusal to testify means contempt of court and you will be asked that question again. After a second "No" you go to jail for contempt of court, and the trial will most likely be adjourned until you make up your mind to answer "Yes".	A courtroom is not a podium A court is a forum for resolving a specific dispute. Testimony is restricted for a number of reasons the most all encompassing of which is relevance. For testimony to be admitted it has to go to the issue in dispute. For a person charged under the laws of, say, India, it cannot be in any way relevant what the laws of, say, China have to say about the issue. Similarly, for a person charged with a Federal crime, state law is irrelevant (and vice-versa). There is no free speech issue here because testimony is given only for the purpose of resolving the case. If it’s not relevant to that you can’t introduce it and, if you persist in trying the court can hold you in contempt.	Misstating the truth is not perjury Perjury is deliberately lying under oath to gain a material advantage. For the situation you describe: You might be wrong and they actually do live where they say they do they might be wring and they genuinely think they live where they say they do, being wrong is not perjury it’s unlikely to administrate info in the form actually carries the penalty of perjury, it probably isn’t testimony unless it will positively and substantially affect the outcome of the case in their favour, it isn’t material You lack standing to interfere in the case in any event If this were brought to the attention of the court the most likely outcome would that it would just be corrected.	No. As the defendant's lawyer, they will have been privy to privileged communications. As such, it would be unfair to the defendant if they now started prosecuting. Also note that a victim very rarely has their own lawyer in a criminal case. The prosecution lawyer is acting for "the Crown" (essentially, "society as a whole"). (There are exceptions, if the victim is bringing a private prosecution - but this is very rare for serious cases such as rape).
What are your rights as a father in Arizona? Facts regarding the Father: Acknowledged by court & mother as the biological father On child's birth certificate Legally married to the mother Facts regarding the Mother who is petitioning to bring the child out of state Mother has previously fled the state, prior to a formal custody agreement (though a text-message exists for an informal agreement) Mother was told by police officers on a recording that she would need a custody agreement Mother denied the father all communication with the child Mother was ordered to return the child to the state Mother was ordered to respond to emails within 24 hours, among other orders. Mother has disobeyed these orders, multiple times. At a previous hearing, the judge said "what about the father's rights?". What exactly are the rights of the father in Arizona?	Married (or married at the time of birth) fathers have equal rights to custody as mothers in AZ. There are no (active) laws establishing that a mother is to be given more rights to a child in a custody arrangement than a father. This is a little different for unmarried fathers because paternity is not assumed, it must be established. Married fathers are presumed to be the father of the child automatically. AZ used to follow the tender years doctrine where preference was given to mothers during the child's younger years. There is an entire somewhat interesting history there on the linked page. This has mostly been phased out in the United States in favor of the "best interest of the child" doctrine. So provided that you are financially stable, have a stable living environment, and can provide for your child, you as the father should have equal standing in a court with regards to custody. I say "should" because many judges still lean towards the mother. For your specific case I'd immediately talk to a family court advocate. They can get you in front of a judge with your estranged wife either being "in absentia" (not present) or ordered to be in court and produce an order to return the child to the home state. It will also help a custody case later on to establish that you are actively seeking a relationship with the child and you are being denied that (keep records of everything, phone calls, texts, letters, emails, etc).	This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best.	Short Answer I was wondering if it exists the possibility of signing a legal agreement before impregnation that states legally that both parents compromise into offering shared physical custody of the child to each other in case of divorce or separation. Do theses types of contract exists? are they legal? I currently live in Switzerland, but the question is meant generally. Agreements of this type are not valid in Switzerland, the U.S., Australia, or any other jurisdiction of which I am aware. There are some fine nuances to this general rule, however, that are explored below. Obviously, of course, there are many countries in the world, and there could be an outlier out there somewhere. Exceptions For Choice of Family Religion Agreements In particular, in some countries, such as Israel and India, the substantive family law rules that apply to a married couple and their children are governed by the religion of that family as determined by law. Thus, Muslims families and Hindu families in India, for example, are governed by different laws related to child custody. In these countries, there is a legislatively approved set of family laws for each faith, but the laws for members of one religion are not the same as the laws for members of another religion, and there are typically rules to determine which sets of family law to apply in cases where the parents of a child belong to different religions. Pre-nuptial agreements in these countries may govern, to some extent, how a married couple's religion is determined for intra-national choice of law purposes, although they cannot specifically resolve custody issues on a pre-dispute basis. U.S. Law In General This would not be enforceable in most U.S. states. Agreements between parents in matters involving children (even post-dispute) are generally not legally binding, because the court has an independent duty to evaluate the best interests of the child under the circumstances as they actually present themselves. Courts can and do appoint third-party guardians ad litem to evaluate the best interests of the children when they have any reason to doubt the judgment of the parents. Put another way, pre-nuptial agreements and post-nuptial agreements, may govern property division and maintenance and restoration of name and inheritance rights and enforcement of economic provision rules, in the event of death or divorce, but may not govern parental responsibilities or child support or the circumstances under which the marriage may be terminated. Post-Dispute Agreements In practice, if parents come to a post-dispute agreement that happens to track the outlines of a non-binding pre-dispute agreement regarding parenting time and parental responsibilities, and the agreed resolution seems reasonable after perfunctory due diligence, a Court would usually ratify that agreement without much second guessing. But, the pre-dispute agreement would be only marginally relevant in the event of a dispute and would not have legal validity. It might be considered by a court as one factor among many in addressing the parenting dispute, as a source of ideas for a resolution and to ascertain the expectations and perspectives of the parents, but would not be given much weight in most cases. Exceptions For Dispute Resolution Method Agreements The exception would be that in some jurisdictions, a mediation or arbitration clause for parenting disputes in a material agreement would be honored, although the same substantive law would apply, in theory. Exceptions For Assisted Contraception And Surrogacy Agreements Note, however, that most jurisdictions in the U.S., do honor and give legal effect to a contract regarding the intended parent in a medically assisted conception or surrogacy contract, in which a pregnancy arises through some means other than intercourse between a man and a woman which of the source of the sperm and egg from that man and that woman that gives rise to a fertilized egg (e.g. cases of sperm donation, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, etc.). In those cases, the default rule is generally that the legal parents of the resulting child are the intended parents under the contract. But, this is purely an agreement governing paternity, and not parenting once a child is born. Swiss Law While I do not have first hand knowledge of Swiss law, a digest of Swiss law prepared by Westlaw (a major law book publisher and online legal research provider) does state the rule of Swiss law clearly, however: The areas a pre-nuptial agreement can cover are fairly limited. The following cannot be determined in advance: The preconditions for a divorce, nullification or separation of a marriage are ultimately governed by law. Any agreements that are not compliant with the law are invalid. Agreements on arrangements for children, in particular about parental responsibility, visiting rights or maintenance, made in advance, are not binding. Any amounts saved in pension funds during a marriage are divided in the event of a divorce. Waiving such a division is only possible under very restrictive conditions. Agreements in a marital contract that are not compliant with the law are invalid. This source also identifies the precise statutes and treaties that apply to resolve these questions of Swiss law. Choice of Law and Forum Related Issues There is also an implicit choice of law issue presented. Choice Of Law and Forum Agreements Are Usually Void Generally speaking, under U.S. law, these issues are governed in domestic cases by the state that is the "home state" of a particular child under a statutory test and the parents may not contractually agree to a choice of venue. In international cases by the state and country that are the home state and country of the child under a test established by treaty which may not be contractually agreed to in advance. Since the applicable statutory tests in the U.S. usually direct a court to apply the laws of the state with which the child has the strongest residential connection (except for Native American children whose family law disputes are subject to tribal law), and since laws relating to divorce and parenting are matters of state and not federal law for the most part (except as to choice of law and choice of forum issues, and certain federal welfare program guidelines for child support that states have economic incentives to comply with and all do), the law governing parental rights and responsibilities (and over the circumstances when a couple may get divorced) may change over time as the family (and each particular child) moves over the course of their lives. In international cases where there is not treaty in place between the potentially relevant countries (and in which diplomatic personnel or members of foreign royal families or families of heads of state are not involved), a U.S. court will generally apply the law of its own state in all cases where it has jurisdiction over the child, or of both parents. Jurisdictional disputes and inconsistent decrees are resolved in part through diplomatic channels at the national level in these cases. There Is Little Variation In U.S. Substantive Custody Law In practice, this isn't a very important observation in domestic cases, however, because almost every U.S. state gives judges extremely broad discretion to handle custody disputes on a case by case basis under a "best interests of the child" standard during the last several decades (even though this isn't constitutionally required), subject only to the barest U.S. constitutional limitations prohibiting decisions that amount to a termination of a legal parental relationship without certain forms of due process, and there aren't huge differences in the case law applying that standard in practice between states. The differences between particular judges in a particular county would typically be as great or greater than the difference between different states, when it comes to final outcomes in disputed and litigated cases. Before the best interests of the child standard was adopted more or less universally, many states had a sex specific "tender years doctrine" that presumptively gave custody of younger children to mothers and older children to fathers. But that standard was held to be unconstitutional because it discriminated based upon sex. In each state where the tender years doctrine or similar sex specific custody doctrines were held to be unconstitutional, the "best interests of the child" standard was adopted rather than a gender neutral standard that provided more guidance to judges such as a dictate to maintain the status quo as much as possible such as a "primary caretaker presumption" (which many judges applying the "best interests of the child" standard actually apply in practice). Most European countries also follow the "best interests of the child" rule for child custody. One of the big differences between jurisdictions in their laws typically involve issues like the standing of people other than parents to intervene in parenting litigation, such as grandparents, stepparents and social workers, and the rights of these third-parties vis-a-vis the legally recognized fathers and mothers of a child, and the circumstances under which an adoption and related relinquishment of parental rights is valid. The procedures that apply in family law cases also often differ significantly between jurisdictions. Exception For Post-Dispute Choice of Law and Forum Agreements However, once there has been a litigated dispute in the first instance, that jurisdiction will generally retain authority over the parenting of the child set forth in a decree. But if there is an agreement of the parents which has been ratified by a court regarding choice of law and venue that will be honored in a post-dispute settlement agreement. Also, there are typically statutory circumstances that cause the original jurisdiction to address a parenting dispute to lose authority over the child. For example, suppose that a couple divorces in England with a separation agreement approved by a court that states that the divorce court in London shall have continuing jurisdiction over future custody and child support disputes and the London divorce court approves that agreement. A U.S. or Swiss court would usually defer to the London divorce court for these matters at that point, unless some emergency or change of circumstances undermined the relevance of London to future disputes involving the child.	You can't sue her for not having insurance. You sue for the damage you suffered. You can name her as a defendant alongside her son on the theory that she contributed to the accident by letting her son use the car, and then let the judge sort out who gets landed with the liability. Depending on the rules in your jurisdiction you might have to pay her travel expenses and/or lost wages if the judge decides she wasn't to blame (and the same for her son, but that sounds like a slam-dunk). However you might be better off going for victim restitution. That way the order gets made as part of the criminal case against the son. Less hassle for you, and the state authorities are responsible for actually getting the money out of them. Edit: It turns out that Idaho has the Family Car Doctrine in its law, so the mother is legally liable for her son's accident (thanks to ohwilleke for the pointer).	1: What's the correct process to get a restraining order? The police aren't involved in the formal process, although sometimes people go to the police and are told that they have to go to a judge instead. The aggrieved plaintiff presents an ex parte affidavit or makes statement in person under oath to a duty judge (who often asks clarifying questions). If this statements states a basis for a protection order one issues with a prompt return date (a week or two). At the return date the order either becomes final if the defendant doesn't show up, is vacated if the plaintiff doesn't show up, or is tried in an evidentiary hearing if both show up. Of course, a court order is ultimately just a piece of paper and there is no legal recourse against the government if they don't successfully stop the person restrained from doing something. Also enforcement of restraining orders was a lot more lax in 1987 than it is today, and men asking for restraining orders were taken less seriously then, than they are now, by most judges. 2: Can Dan keep his adultery secret during that process? Not really. In the initial ex parte hearing, Dan can probably tell the story artfully in a way that hides the adultery, but in the adversarial hearing, if there is one, the other side (or their lawyer) can ask him under oath about the affair and he has to answer truthfully in a public court hearing setting. 3: Is it plausible that Dan's family and friends don't learn about that process? Yes. Unless he's famous enough to make the newspapers (which in a decent sized city is pretty famous), and if he initiates the process, the only person who gets formal notice before the order issues is the court, and if the court issues the initial order, the only person who gets notice is the defendant. If Dan doesn't call family or friends as witnesses and don't tell his workplace why he's at court, nobody is told. It isn't a secret. It's a matter of public record that could be subsequently discovered at any time. But there is no active means of notification of friends and family in the short term. Realistically, Dan might ask a cop or a lawyer what to do, get accurate or inaccurate information, and decide not to pursue it for fear of creating sworn proof of his affair at a hearing. Cops love to provide legal advice that they aren't qualified to dispense. Dan's concern is particularly relevant because this happened in New York State in 1987 when New York State didn't have no fault divorce at the time, and the outcome of divorce proceedings on the merits for property division and alimony and custody would have been heavily influenced by marital fault in the divorce case. Revealing an affair under oath as he might have been required to do at a hearing would have crushed him in a subsequent divorce outcome if his wife found out and decided to divorce him.	What kind of contract would that be? One about... arbitration? One about "I hereby relinquish my claim for payment of X?" --- children cannot be taken away from their father, no matter what. - OP That contract is void in germany because this contract not only violates public policy, it tries to modify something that is regulated by law into a way that does offer less than the law demands as a minimum. That's not allowed in Germany. Further, a clause that gives custody to the father by default is also Sittenwidrig in Germany, and thus void under §138 BGB. So would be a clause that gives it to the mother by default by the way. In a case of controversy, only a court order can assign guardianship. And only the court can take guardianship away. When the kid is born its guardianship gets assigned to the parents as guardians by §1626 BGB. While it is possible to give your partner guardianship if you're not married under 1626a BGB it is explicitly impossible to assign guardianship for any compensation to either party (e.g. the mother or the new guardian may not receive anything other than the guardianship in the specific paper) under 1626b BGB. Thus a contract that does anything else in addition to guardianship, like a prenup, voids at least the guardianship clauses. And you have to tell the court about that assignment of guardianship under ($1626d BGB). Now comes the kicker: §1628 BGB forces the parents to apply to the court to solve any problems of huge impact, such as guardianship: So technically, mediation results are fully non-binding and you can not mandate it. Also, since all marriages are through the state, it needs a formal instrument of the state to be dissolved. The only three ways that the state ever allowed this to be done after WW2 were a) annulment through a court, which only was possible till 1998, or b) divorce through a court, c) death of one of the marriage partners. Yes, it takes a judge to divorce a marriage under $1313 BGB or one of the two married to die. Because you can't divorce without a filing in court, a clause that demands to divorce in some way that is not including §1313 BGB, that clause would be void. It might be legal to have a clause that demands to try to solve issues in arbitration before filing for divorce or sorting the belongings in such a way, but it can't supplant the court requirement.	I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data?	If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.
Is it legal for a parent who is against vaccines to prevent their child from receiving the preventative vaccine against rabies? So this is a modified version of a question I asked on Biology.SE. I know that the vast majority of US states allow parents to opt out of giving their child a vaccine for religious reasons, and roughly half allow parents to opt out for philosophical reasons. Does this include rabies? The only laws that I can find on the matter require pets to be vaccinated; there is no mention of children in any law I can find. The last question I asked was closed because it was considered irrelevant and too open ended (I'm guessing because I focused too much on the ethics of forcing pets to be vaccinated, but not children), but this time I'm just asking what the legality is for parents to vaccinate their children against rabies if they were bitten by an animal. Also, would legal implications change if the animal that bit the child later tested positive for rabies or if the child insists on getting a rabies vaccine but the parent refuses? Can the parent be charged for a crime if the child develops symptomatic rabies and dies?	I'm just asking what the legality is for parents to vaccinate their children against rabies if they were bitten by an animal. Also, would legal implications change if the animal that bit the child later tested positive for rabies or if the child insists on getting a rabies vaccine but the parent refuses? Can the parent be charged for a crime if the child develops symptomatic rabies and dies? In this circumstance, while a parent has fairly broad discretion, once the necessity of preserving a child's life comes into play and rabies can be deadly, that discretion ends and the child's life takes priority. Failing to do so could constitute child abuse and result in termination of parental rights and criminal sanctions for child abuse causing death or something similar. Simply failing to treat rabies out of good faith ignorance of the option, however, would ordinarily not be a criminal offense.	A police officer (or any other random person) would not be guilty of a crime or subject to civil liability for standing by and watching a suicide occur when it could be prevented, unless the person attempting to commit suicide was in his custody and he failed to take reasonable care to prevent a suicide in which case the officer could be subject to civil liability. It would not be a violation of the law, however, for a police officer (or in most cases, even a private citizen) to intervene to attempt to stop an attempted suicide. Likewise, prisons and prison guards can have civil liability for failing to prevent the suicide of someone in their custody. Of course, a police officer might still receive a negative employment evaluation from his supervisor for such conduct, or might even be fired for it depending on the rules of a particular department, as it would reflect poorly on the police department and show bad judgment on the officers part. In general, an affirmative duty enforceable by a lawsuit to take reasonable efforts to prevent someone from committing suicide applies in circumstances where the person attempting to commit suicide is in someone else's care and custody and has their liberty constrained. So, there could be liability on the part of a hospital or treating medical personnel (I've actually brought such a case that was dismissed due to malpractice in missing a deadline by local co-counsel who was then disciplined for ethical violations by the State of Illinois for his conduct.) In the absence of such a relationship, a legal duty to take affirmative action to prevent a suicide generally does not arise. Certain medical facilities and providers are required to make anonymized incident reports for the purpose of creating national public health statistics on a periodic basis. In certain extreme circumstances, there are duties to report someone who is a threat to others which may also include a risk of suicide, to authorities, but those are quite narrowly interpreted, and actual legal consequences from failing to warn are very rare. There may be other reporting requirements in educational institutions and for mental health professionals, but I am not personally aware of them and I do not believe that they are national in scope. Usually, for criminal liability, there would have to be actual affirmative acts to aid or to attempt to cause a suicide.	england-and-wales The law on this point in England and Wales has recently changed. The main statute here is section 4 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, amended in 2019 to add an exception relevant to police dogs. Under subsection (1), you commit an offence if you cause a dog (as an example of a "protected animal") to suffer unnecessarily. The necessity conditions in subsection (3) include the example of protecting yourself or someone else, in (3)(c)(ii), but this list is not exhaustive. Nonetheless, that specific defence is excluded by the new subsection (3A) in the case when the dog is a police dog being used by an officer "in a way that was reasonable in all the circumstances". This exception was added precisely to cover the example of a police dog being used to apprehend a suspect, to stop people from claiming self-defence; it's known as "Finn's Law" after a police dog who was stabbed in those circumstances. If this came up in practice, for the scenario you suggest, then the court would have to deal with (among other things): Was the officer's conduct reasonable in all the circumstances? Could the person have avoided harming the animal? Was the level of harm to the animal proportionate? The answers would depend on the exact facts involved, so it's not possible to say in a vacuum whether the elements of the offence could be proved. Note that the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, which might otherwise apply to the officer in charge of the dog for letting it be "dangerously out of control", actually does not by virtue of section 10(3) so long as it is being used "for a lawful purpose". Meanwhile, as a civil matter, there is a strict liability provision in the Animals Act 1971 which might catch police dogs. That Act distinguishes between animals of a dangerous species, where the liability always applies, and others where it only applies if the animal meets certain conditions. These have attracted some criticism by senior judges over unclarity in their drafting - see for example Ford v Seymour-Williams [2021] EWCA Civ 1848 and Mirvahedy v Henley [2003] UKHL 16 - but on the basis of those decisions, one could argue that the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal which are not normally found in animals of the same species in the case of a police dog specifically trained to attack on command. However, on the other side, whether the claim is under the Animals Act, or for battery, etc.: The police may argue that the damage was due to the suspect's own fault. An example I found cited in Street on Torts is Dhesi v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2000] WL 491455. A claimant bitten by a police dog was held to have accepted the risk of sustaining damage when he refused to come out of his hiding place, after being warned a dog would be sent in to flush him out; this engaged section 5(1) of the Animals Act and defeated strict liability. The police can argue that their use of force was reasonable for the purpose of preventing crime and/or arresting a suspect. (The same argument by which human officers can use force.) The police can argue that the dog was no more dangerous than an ordinary dog, that the officer did not know it could cause such severe damage, etc., thus removing it from the category of animals where strict liability applies. The police have some protection from civil suit, known as "Hill immunity" after the case Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1988] UKHL 12, which is not absolute but is very likely to defeat claims where officers were not unusually negligent, not acting outside the bounds of their duties, exercised reasonable care and skill, or did the best they could in a fast and confusing situation. See the recent judgements in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, a case where officers arresting a suspect accidentally hurt an elderly lady, for a very thorough discussion of duty to bystanders and police negligence in general. So again, it all depends on the fact pattern in the specific case, but you may or may not be able to win a civil claim against the police based on the harm done to you by a police dog, even when you didn't hurt the dog.	Self-Defense is an active Defense for Homicide (note, this is the legal term for taking a life. Criminal Homicide and Justified Homicide are two subsets of Homicide and are denoted by illegal actions and legal actions. Homicide as a result of Self-Defense is a Justified Homicide, regardless of the weapon, so long as it was applied with the minimal amount of force required to stop the criminal harm to oneself). Suppose you use a taser and the current causes the attacker to go into cardiac arrest and die. Your intention in using the taser was to stop the criminal from injuring yourself, your property, or another person or their property (defense of others). Even though the Taser is non-leathal, it's more like less lethal. Death by Taser is uncommon, but not impossible or rare. It would be handled as a defensive use of a weapon (same as if the attacker was killed by a gun) and processed as such. Pennsylvania is a Stand Your Ground State, meaning that in a public place, you do not have a duty to flee if your attacker approaches you in a public place, you do not have to prove that you could not flee in order to claim self-defense. However, if you pull a weapon and your attacker decides to flee, you can not give chase and kill him upon capture. You also need to have a reasonable expectation that the attacker is about to use deadly force (this normally means having sight of the weapon or what would reasonably look like a weapon i.e. a realistic toy gun without the orange safety cap would be reasonable). You also cannot claim self-defense if you were engaged in another crime when the attacker approached you (i.e. If you rob the Krusty Krab and the Hash Slinging Slasher approaches you with a knife, sucks to be you cause you don't have a right to be in the Krusty Krab after closing.).	This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.	It excludes pain and suffering incidental to lawful capital and corporal punishment Many countries around the world still execute people. As far as is known, no form of capital punishment is totally painless - even lethal injection involves a needle. In any event, the anticipation of capital punishment is likely to cause suffering. Similarly, corporal punishment such as caning is still a lawful sanction in many jurisdictions. This clearly causes pain - that’s the point - but it isn’t torture. It would also exclude lawful corporal punishment of students by teachers where this is still legal. Or of military personnel by their superiors, again, where that is legal. Now, organisations like Amnesty International consider all of those things to be torture. I don’t think they are wrong in taking that position but, under the convention, they aren’t legally torture.	In Illinois: The General Assembly has established numerous protections for the generous and compassionate acts of its citizens who volunteer their time and talents to help others. Basically, if you are a licensed medical profession, or have had successful training in CPR provided by the the American Red Cross or the American Heart Association, and you try in good faith to save somebody's life and fail, you are not liable for their death, under the assumption you did not cause harm in the first place (i.e. you can not stab someone in the chest, attempt CPR, and be exempt from lawsuit(s)). Note that this doesn't apply to just CPR or physicians. This also covers dentists, Pharmacists, Optometrists, Physical Therapist, etc.	Questions about whether a certain action is "just" tend to be maters of opinion, politics and philosophy, but it can be addressed from the perspective of legal theory (especially following the model of common law, where legal principles are based on concepts of just and proper action). Whether or not a certain action is actually legal in a certain jurisdiction depends on the laws of that country -- I suspect that the answer is different for the US versus China. The first question would be whether those government officials have the legal authority – I assume they do. Such authority is generally governed by some specific circumstances, for example, "poses an imminent and grave threat to public health". It is basically not a legal question whether quarantining in the face of this viral threat is necessary from a public health perspective, that is a medical question. What the law would say is that if this is a serious threat, then a person's liberty can be curtailed to a limited extent, because a person does not have the right to harm others because they don't want to do some thing that protects the rights of others (be vaccinated, stay in quarantine until it is safe). However, principles of legal justice also say that the government's response should be proportionate, e.g. shoot-on-sight in response to a sneeze is not proportionate. Quarantining has long been recognized as a valid, just and legal response to such extreme medical threats. Historically speaking, quarantining used to be the only effective action that a government can take against e.g. smallpox, plague, Spanish flu, Ebola.
Who has standing for wrongful death claims? A person's estate, relatives, and dependents generally have standing to sue for damages under wrongful death statutes. Do any other persons or entities have standing to sue for damages under those or any similar or analogous statutes? For example: A decedent's employer who has lost income due to business disruption from the unexpected loss of the employee? An employee of the person who reasonably expected long-term employment? E.g., a nurse who provided care for a chronic health condition of the decedent?	In the United States, wrongful death is generally a statutory cause of action, rather than a common law tort, so the potential plaintiffs are generally limited to those specifically identified in the relevant statute. In California, for instance, California Code of Civil Procedure Section 377.60 limits the action to the following plaintiffs: The decedent’s surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, and issue of deceased children If there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the persons, including the surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would be entitled to the property of the decedent by intestate succession. If they were dependent on the decedent, the putative spouse, children of the putative spouse, stepchildren, or parents. A minor who resided for the previous 180 days in the decedent’s household and was dependent on the decedent for one-half or more of the minor’s support. In the absence of a constitutional problem (an equal protection violation, most likely), courts have no authority to extend standing to anyone outside the statutorily designated categories. Ferry v. De Longhi Am. Inc., 276 F. Supp. 3d 940, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“The decision of the Legislature as to just how far to extend a statutorily created right of action ‘is conclusive, unless it appears beyond rational doubt that an arbitrary discrimination between persons or classes similarly situated has been made without any reasonable cause therefor.’”)	The common law rule was that to inherit you have to outlive the decedent from whom you are inheriting, and that the inheritance would pass to your estate if you died before distribution was made. Statutes in some jurisdictions provide that someone must survive for a longer period than that to be eligible to inherit, often five days, in order to simplify the factual issues in the common situation of a joint accident. Pennsylvania is one such state. But a will or trust can deviate from the default rule, and in U.S. practice, driven by federal estate tax laws, it isn't uncommon to require someone to survive the decedent by at least six months to inherit from them under an instrument. In this case, where more than a year has passed since the death, the inheritance would not lapse for these reasons. It also isn't uncommon for a trust, either established during life, or established at death, to provide that distributions from the trust are made at the discretion of the trustee and to require in those cases that the person receiving the distribution also be living at the time of the distribution. These trusts also typically contain specific provisions that spell out the rights of a beneficiary who dies before the trust is fully distributed.	A company is liable for the actions of its agents This is known as vicarious liability and some well-established situations where this happens is in employer-employee and company-officer, "executives", if senior enough, would be both employees and officers. Without it, the concept of a company just doesn't work - a company is only a record in a database, it can only act through human agents. So, if an employee or officer of the company by act or omission causes harm in the course of executing their duties, then the company has caused the harm. It is not enough for a company to have adequate "internal procedures", it (which is to say the people with the power to act for it) must ensure that those procedures are followed and actually work. The allegations include that at least some senior personnel were aware that breaches of the law were occurring and they did not take steps to stop them - what they know, the company knows; what they do or don't do, the company does or doesn't do.	The will is overridden by the new law. Suppose the owner had not died: then he would have to comply with the change in the law. When a person inherits property, they gain the right to that property which the originally had, and they do not gain any additional immunity to the usual obligation to obey the law.	No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.	No. The custodial person that is meant by this are usually the parents or another court-appointed person that stands in for their parents. I think the common law term closest is "legal guardian". The details are defined in § 1616 ff. of the German civil code.	Sadly, her assets will go into probate, and a judge/probate master will have to rule on how they're disbursed. Typically someone will be appointed as Administrator to the mother's estate. The administrator will contact all creditors, assemble and inventory/appraise the assets (i.e. furniture, car, house, bank accounts, etc.) and pay funerary expenses. Since she died intestate, there will be certain specific rules about who inherits the proceeds. The best avenue for the OP is to petition the court to appoint her as administrator of the estate.	Wills typically handle this by specifying a survivorship period. Such a clause may say, in effect, "I leave all my assets to my spouse, provided they survive me by at least 30 days, and otherwise to beneficiaries X,Y,Z." That way, if your spouse dies shortly after you, your assets go to X,Y,Z, rather than going to your spouse and then to their beneficiaries. Another issue this avoids: suppose you are in an accident together, and by the time rescuers arrive, you are both dead. Without a survivorship period requirement, courts might have to try to determine whether one of you survived a few seconds longer than the other, in order to decide whose beneficiaries get the assets. That could be difficult and error-prone, not to mention gruesome and upsetting to loved ones. But with such a requirement, it's not necessary. The linked article notes that in many jurisdictions, if you don't specify a survivorship period, there may be a statutory period that applies automatically.
What do I need to do to sell my late father's firearms in Arizona? My father passed away in April of this year, and despite insisting he had a will, he apparently never got around to actually making one. Luckily, all of his assets were jointly owned by him and his wife, so we were able to avoid probate for the big stuff. Unfortunately for us, though, he left behind a large number of firearms and ammunition that we don't really plan on keeping. As we intend to sell the majority of them, what steps do I need to take for us to do so? Can I contact a few dealers to see if we can sell them, or do we need to go through a lawyer to do so? Do we need to file an AZ Small Estate Affidavit (personal assets under $75k) before we can do anything with these? If so, how do we go about valuing them? Due the the number of firearms, my step mother is understandably worried about transporting them around town. I've tried looking around online, but searching for "guns" and "laws" on the internet turns up a lot of less-than-credible sources.	There are no rules against private sales of firearms in Arizona. If you (or your mother) own the guns, you can sell them to anyone you like unless you have reason to believe they are a prohibited possessor. There is no legal requirement for you to validate their identity. There is no limit on the number of guns you can sell to one person. A bill of sale is optional. You don't need a lawyer and, honestly, I'm not sure what a lawyer would do to help you sell a gun. The laws, being what they are, lead some to conclude that this must be how prohibited possessors get their guns. It's not. Most "illegal" guns are bought through straw purchases in which a person with a clean record buys a gun for someone who is not legally allowed to own one. You can work through a licensed dealer if it makes you feel better. If you don't want to use a dealer, you can simply require that a buyer have a concealed carry license as evidence that they are not a prohibited possessor. The CCW is not a surefire way to guarantee anything though. Personally, I would transact a private party sale with individuals via a dealer. You're in AZ. There is no shortage of gun buyers! At the risk of breaking site rules, you can also list guns online. For example, www.gunbroker.com is a popular site and follows an eBay-style bid structure (I have no affiliation to them). This model ensures that you get market price for the gun rather than trusting that a dealer is going to give you a fair price (they won't; they make their money buying cheap and selling at market rate).	That really sucks. I've had similar experiences when handling the probate proceedings of lawyers who were not good about returning original wills to clients. I am providing an answer under general principles without researching Oregon specific accounting, record retention and probate laws, to at least give you a start although I recognize that a better answer would research these questions. The accounts/clients from her business were sold to another woman. Is it legal for us to transfer everything to her possession? Probably yes. There should be a government agency in Oregon that regulates accountants that has rules regarding that question. The linked rule seems to govern this situation. It says in Rule 801-030-0015(d) that: (d) Custody and disposition of working papers. (A) A licensee may not sell, transfer or bequeath working papers described in this rule to anyone other than one or more surviving partners or stockholders, or new partners or stockholders of the licensee, or any combined or merged organization or successor in interest to the licensee, without the prior written consent of the client or the client’s personal representative or assignee. (B) A licensee is not prohibited from making a temporary transfer of working papers or other material necessary to the conduct of peer reviews or for the disclosure of information as provided by section (1)(b) of this rule. (C) A licensee shall implement reasonable procedures for the safe custody of working papers and shall retain working papers for a period sufficient to meet the needs of the licensee’s practice and to satisfy applicable professional standards and pertinent legal requirements for record retention. (D) A licensee shall retain working papers during the pendency of any Board investigation, disciplinary action, or other legal action involving the licensee. Licensees shall not dispose of such working papers until notified in writing by the Board of the closure of the investigation or until final disposition of the legal action or proceeding if no Board investigation is pending. So, a transfer to a successor firm appears to be permitted. What if she refuses to take the documents? Her probate estate could retain them and stay open, they could be returned to clients, or there could be a rule established by the Oregon body that regulates accountants that authorizes a central depository of such records. In Colorado, for example, in the case of law practices with no successors, original wills and estate planning documents can be deposited in the records of the court with probate jurisdiction that has jurisdiction over the territory where the decedent's practice was located. But, I could not locate any provision of this kind in Oregon law. Is it legal for us to destroy/shred/etc. the documents? In many cases, yes. Some states, by statute or regulation, and others by custom, allow business records to be destroyed as a matter of course, normally one year after the longest statute of limitations that could apply to a dispute where the records would be relevant (often seven years since the longest normally applicable tax statute of limitations is six years). Destroying tax returns is usually not a big concern because a transcript of the old tax returns can be ordered from the tax collection agency where they were filed. But, business records related to purchases of property and capital improvements and depreciation, and related to divorces, can be relevant for decades after they were created, so the more honorable course of action would be to make at least a cursory effort (such as a postcard sent to a last known address of each client with a deadline for requesting a return of their file) to return the files of clients that include original business records as opposed to mere copies of tax returns. Oregon has a seven year retention rule for most purposes pursuant to Rule 801-030-0015(e) which is linked above: (e) Retention of attest and audit working papers. (A) Licensees must maintain, for a period of at least seven years, the working papers for any attest or compilation services performed by the licensee together with any other supporting information, in sufficient detail to support the conclusions reached in such services. (B) The seven-year retention period described in paragraph (A) of this subsection is extended if a longer period is required for purposes of a Board investigation as provided in paragraph (d)(D) of this rule and OAR 801-010-0115(3). The referenced rule in that rule states: (3) Requirements upon resignation. Upon resignation, a former licensee is required to: (a) Surrender the CPA certificate or PA license to the Board; (b) Take all reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable harm to any client, including but not limited to providing written notice of resignation under this section to all clients and inform all clients of where client records and work papers will be stored and of the clients’ right to secure copies of all such records and work papers at no cost to the client; (c) Maintain client records for a period of at least six years, or return such records to the client; and (d) Continue to comply with the requirements of OAR Chapter 801 Division 030 pertaining to confidential information and client records. (e) For the purpose of subsection (b) above and unless otherwise required by the Board, a resigning licensee of a registered firm is required to give written notice to only those firm clients for which the resigning licensee was the sole or primary CPA on an engagement, an engagement leader, or the client relationship manager. In practice, the consequences of destroying a record that shouldn't have been destroyed are likely to be minimal, because any recovery would be limited to the assets of the estate and there is a time limit for making claims against estates which is quite strict, and your grandma has no license to revoke. But, again, the honorable thing to do in order to honor her legacy and do right by her former clients would be to either transfer the records to a successor firm or to attempt to return them, as she would be required to do if she had surrendered a license during life.	I think you're referring to this image: This is the prosecutor pointing the AR-15 at the jury. Evidence, including guns, is allowed in the courtroom, but the prosecutor was widely criticized for his dramatic antics: pointing it directly at the jury, with his finger on the trigger (the rifle should have been checked for being empty, but not having your finger on the trigger unless you intend to shoot, no matter what, is elementary gun safety).	Laws regarding billboards and advertising are very local in nature and are typically handled under city/county zoning ordinances. Start with calling your local county zoning office. They will tell you the city/county laws regarding your particular residential zoning overlay, if city or state laws supersede county laws, and recent changes in law that might matter and if the sign might be grandfathered. There can be different types of "residential" zoning and the city/county will tell you this; some allow limited commercial use and signage, and some don't. The housing subdivision you are in may also have covenants; you'll know if there are covenants if you received information when you bought property in that subdivision. 1,2,3,4,8: These depend on local laws. 5: Very generally speaking, land owners typically do not have absolute rights to land usage; that is the rationale behind zoning laws (among others, like health and public safety, building codes, national defense, etc.), because some types of land usage impact adjacent users and the general public. 6, 7: Potential consequences include fines and requirements to take the billboard down, but again, those possibilities are very localized. The size of the billboard could come into play; again, this will be very localized. Some signage may be grandfathered, too. In order for the city/county to look at the situation and possibly take action, you may have to file a written protest with the zoning office; they would help with the process. You may have to present your case at a public city council or county commission meeting, but that basically involves saying such and such is happening and you want the city/county attorney to look into relevant laws. It would help your case if you had a list of names of others in the area who are also unhappy about the billboard. I doubt you will need legal representation to lodge a protest, but if it comes to that, Google for free legal aid in your area. If the city/county attorney won't take action (which is possible, as this involves prosecutorial discretion as to if the city/county wants to press the issue with the landowner), you can look for free legal aid in your area and consider your options.	I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with.	A child is not property, therefore a (deceased) parent cannot transfer ownership. In case the sole custodial parent dies, the court will appoint a guardian for a minor child, and will take into consideration the wishes of the deceased parent, however their primary duty is to protect the interest of the child. It follows from this that objections to nomination of Smith as guardian are more easily sustained, since the requirements for being a guardian (e.g. in Washington) are stricter than the requirements for receiving $100,000. RCW 11.130.090 excludes any guardian who has been "convicted of a crime involving dishonesty, neglect, or use of physical force or other crime relevant to the functions the individual would assume as guardian", but such a person is not barred from inheriting property. There are limited formal grounds for contesting a will: testator mentally incompetence, formal failure of the document, (the laws surrounding signatures and witnesses), no clear indication that the document is intended to be a will, forgery or fraud, undue influence (such as a gun to the head), or mistake (for example, mistakenly believing that their child was dead therefore leaving it all to a neighbor). So it is possible, but not so easy, to contest a will. Organ donation takes place under separate laws: you can't wait for the probate process to get finished in three months before donating organs.	Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.	ORS 166.220 suggests this would be illegal - specifically its "unlawful use of a weapon" if a person (emphasis mine): Intentionally discharges a firearm, blowgun, bow and arrow, crossbow or explosive device within the city limits of any city or within residential areas within urban growth boundaries at or in the direction of any person, building, structure or vehicle within the range of the weapon without having legal authority for such discharge. So what's "within range"? With a homemade bow of unknown construction, draw weight, and unknown arrows I'd say it's pretty much going to be something you find out when an arrow goes that far. I wouldn't expect it to match the range of high-end bows and arrows (I've seen 40lb recurves cover ~250 yards) but 100 yards plus doesn't sound ridiculous - more if it's got some elevation to it. The point is you really don't want to find out the hard way when a shot goes astray giving your neighbours the old King Harold treatment.
If a hacker is infected as a result of their actions, is the victim liable? If a hacker gained unauthorized access to a computer network, downloaded a virus that was on a computer and infected their own system, would the victim of the hacker be liable for damages? Does it make a difference if the victim is the one who developed the virus, or if the victim is aware that the virus exists (whether it be active or not) on their system? Would the victim be obligated to mark viruses as such, even if there is no intention of distributing them in any way? If possible, please point out if there are differences in the law in areas, i.e. if something applies only in USA, or only in Europe, Australia, Russia etc. Thanks.	In common law jurisdictions like the United States, this would probably be controlled under normal tort principles, which would mean that the answer turns on the hacking victim's state of mind. If the victim is unaware of the virus or unaware of the hacker, she probably has no duty to the hacker, and therefore cannot be held liable for any injury he suffers as a result of her failure to address the virus. But if this a case of a victim laying a trap for a potential hacker, then you have a variation on the old "spring gun" cases. The classic example is Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971). In that case, a man owned an house -- abandoned for about a decade -- that kept attracting burglars and vandals, even after he boarded it up and posted "no trespassing signs." So Briney rigged up a shotgun to fire at anyone who entered the bedroom. About a month later, two antique collectors went into the house looking for old bottles and jars. One of them, Katko, opened the door to the bedroom, and the gun basically blew off one of his legs. Although he was convicted of breaking into the house, Katko sued Briney for negligence. The jury awarded Katko $20,000 for medical expenses and the like, as well as $10,000 in punitive damages. Consistent with the approach of most courts, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the verdict: The value of human life and limb, not only to the individual concerned but also to society, so outweighs the interest of a possessor of land in excluding from it those whom he is not willing to admit thereto that a possessor of land has ... no privilege to use force intended or likely to cause death or serious harm against another whom the possessor sees about to enter his premises or meddle with his chattel, unless the intrusion threatens death or serious bodily harm to the occupiers or users of the premises. So I'd argue that a person who leaves a virus lying around his computer, hoping to infect a hacker, is like Briney, intentionally laying a trap to injure someone who he could probably just defend himself against instead, and therefore liable to the hacker for injuries. But I could also argue it the other way: Briney's trap was designed to inflict bodily harm or even death against a person who posed no real threat, given that the property was abandoned, while a computer virus merely disables the hacker's weapon, and is used against someone who is attacking property that has greater value than an abandoned house, given the quantity and often extremely sensitive nature of contents on a personal computer. So the answer, as always, is that it could go either way.	There is a legal concept of de minimis: the idea that some offenses, civil or criminal, are too small to be worth prosecuting. For example, a photograph of a city scene that incidentally captured part of a copyrighted billboard in one corner of the image infringes the copyright on that billboard. But if the copyright holder were to sue, it's virtually certain the suit would be thrown out due to the minimal nature of the infringement. Technically speaking, yes, what you describe is a crime. But any prosecutor who tried to bring charges to that effect is likely to be chewed out by the judge for wasting everyone's time. (Incidentally, assuming the reporter and property owner are US citizens, the crime is failure to cross at a designated crossing point (19 USC 1459, a customs offense) rather than improper entry (8 USC 1325, an immigration offense).)	Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details.	If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible.	There are some problems with this kind of vandalism, one of them clearly that the internet is international and vandalism can be performed from everywhere on servers everywhere in the world. And so it may be (both technically and legally) difficult to get hold of the vandal. Therefore, most wikis primarily focus on blocking offending accounts or their IPs and hope that this helps at least for a while. Only if it doesn't and the vandalism continues for extended time periods, legal measures are considered. Legally speaking though, vandalism is prohibited by many jurisdictions and of course by the terms of use of the wiki operators. For instance, the Swiss criminal code Art 147 explicitly puts "abusing of data processing equipment" under penalty and hence gives website operators a legal backup for setting up rules for the use of their services. Computer fraud Art. 147 1 Any person who with a view to his own or another's unlawful gain, by the incorrect, incomplete or unauthorised use of data, or in a similar way, influences the electronic or similar processing or transmission of data and as a result causes the transfer of financial assets, thus occasioning loss to another, or immediately thereafter conceals such a transfer shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. 2 If the offender acts for commercial gain, he shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding ten years or to a monetary penalty of not less than 90 daily penalty units. Technically, the law even requires prosecution ex officio, even though without a hint from the operator, the police won't start an investigation. I'm sure the US has a similar law. The problem is, as with all internet crimes, it's practical application, particularly because often website operator and offender are not living in the same country. Edit After reading the exact text again (it was unavailable yesterday) Art 147 is mostly about fraud performed by computers (classical "hacking") but it shouldn't be difficult to argue that fighting and reverting vandalism requires significant (technical and personal) effort and hence the operator looses money. Additionally, there's Art 144bis which matches even better for the scenario here: Damage to data Art. 144bis Any person who without authority alters, deletes or renders unusable data that is stored or transmitted electronically or in some other similar way shall be liable on complaint to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender has caused major damage, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed. The offence is prosecuted ex officio. Any person who manufactures, imports, markets, advertises, offers or otherwise makes accessible programs that he knows or must assume will be used for the purposes described in paragraph 1 above, or provides instructions on the manufacture of such programs shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender acts for commercial gain, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed.	My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here.	united-states - cfaa The last person to have control of the AI executed the code in a knowing manner about the risk that the self-replicating program could get itself unauthorised access to computers and disk space that this person has no authorisation to use. Because of how it spread, it is more likely classified as malware. "Creating a botnet" is typically violating the authorisation to use the computers that are part of the botnet. As the last user is responsible for letting his malware free, his act breached these provisions: (a) Whoever— (5) (B) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or (C) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage and loss. He intentionally let his program free knowing very well that it will spread to computers that are classified as protected. As a result, he will be treated just the same as if he had written and released... ILOVEYOU - however in contrast to that case, the gap of non-applicable laws has been closed more than 20 years ago. Private PCs are off limits for the AI because of that stipulation, but even Webspace can't be gained to save itself to: The problem lies in the fact that authorization to space can only be gained in some sort of agreement between legal entities (companies and humans) - which is a contract. An AI however isn't a legal entity, it is classified as a widget. Widgets are not able to sign contracts on their own, and to gain access to webspace, one usually has to agree to a contract. The contracts the AI tries to sign would thus be void ab initio and have no force. As a result, because the contract for the webspace is void, the access to the webspace is by definition without the required authorization - the contract granting it never existed, so the access is unauthorized. The AI now fills disk space and uses resources in an unauthorized manner, which is damage. As a result, the one who knowingly set the AI free is fully responsible and criminally liable for his AI, should it spread. How far can it legally spread? If the AI is programmed to only act in ways inside the law, it won't leave the owner's system and won't proliferate, as it can't gain access to new space in a legal manner.	Illegal to write? No. Notwithstanding the First Amendment which would almost certainly make a law prohibiting it illegal, writing such things is an essential part of an IT security professional’s toolkit. You can’t protect against worms if you don’t know how they work. Illegal to distribute on an unauthorised computer? Absolutely. This would be a clear breach of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
Unreasonable terms in a will I'm trying to find information on whether a will in the UK is unenforceable, based on the fact that the terms in it are unreasonable, and can't seem to find any information - all advice on the enforceability of the will is based on things like whether the person writing it was of sound mind, etc. Say a will has a stipulation that the executors own a property, and are required to let out that property to a particular business, but are not allowed to sell it for 10 years; this means they must take all the necessary responsibility for being landlords of the property, but are not allowed to get out of the arrangement at any time through selling it. Is this reasonable/enforceable? How about if they were not allowed to sell it for 20 years, or 100? Surely there must be some set of rules as to what terms of a will can actually be enforced?	Conditions in a will are.. complicated. As a rule of thumb you can impose conditions but that doesn't mean they are always going to be upheld. Some will be ruled void where they are considered "against public policy" - where it's against the public interest to consider the condition valid. e.g: encouraging someone to commit a crime; inducing the future separation of a married couple; unreasonable restrictions on marriage; depriving a parent of control over their children; requiring a child to change their religion. That sort of thing. Another way is if the condition is "impossible" (or so improbable/impractical as would make no real difference) e.g. you can't say "they have to leap the grand canyon on a skateboard" or "must visit mars and bring back ice cream first" that sort of thing. Alternatively if the condition is too vague or uncertain e.g. "the beneficiary will inherit when they are ‘suitably’ married" or impractical to enforce e.g. "no one with the surname Booth may enter the property on a Wednesday". I'm not sure those are going to apply here - the condition sounds specific and not particularly difficult to achieve or to measure compliance. That doesn't mean it's going to stick though - you can challenge the condition in court and they might chose to void the condition. Since the condition sounds like what's called a "condition subsequent" (i.e. it comes into effect after receiving the "gift") the court can use discretion to have the gift still take place if the condition is voided. How about if they were not allowed to sell it for 20 years, or 100? The 100 years variant could fail under "impossible" - since it would take the time period the beneficiary was required to comply with the condition past the point they could reasonably be expected to comply with it (since people typically live that long), similarly with the 20 years (or even the 10) if it was going past the remaining expected lifespan of the recipient. Basically it boils down to "challenge it in court and see what they say" - but as ever consult an experienced solicitor before doing anything along those lines. Having a condition declared void doesn't always translate as "you get it free and clear" - in some circumstances it means the gift becomes part of the Residuary Estate instead.	Yes that seems to be the case. The section after the one you quoted, 551:11 Share of Unnamed Child says: If the property not devised nor bequeathed shall be insufficient to satisfy the just share of such child, after allowing advancements received by him, the same shall be made up in just proportion from the property devised or bequeathed to others. The page "Can I Disinherit My Child?" from a law firm blog, says: New Hampshire has a strong policy of protecting “pretermitted heirs,” which are heirs that were not mentioned in a Will. N.H. R.S.A 551:10 states that [e]very child born after the decease of the testator, and every child or issue of a child of the deceased not named or referred to in his will, and who is not a devisee or legatee, shall be entitled to the same portion of the estate, real and personal, as he would be if the deceased were intestate. Simply put, you do not name or refer to your child in the Will, then he can claim an inheritance as if you died without a Will. Historically and currently, the rationale is that if you did not mention him anywhere in your Will, you most likely forgot about him, because it is human nature to forget things. However that same blog page also says: There are various ways to disinherit a child. The most often used method is to specifically name or refer to the child, or a class, such as “my children” or “my son, Alex, and his issue,” that you intend to disinherit, and you must then state that you intend to disinherit that child. Another way to disinherit a child is to state that you give that particular child one (1) dollar, or a small sum of money. So it would seem that if one chose to include language such as: I leave to any other children I might have, and to their issue, if any, the sum of $10, jointly. then such possible surprises are covered. This would be after mentioning specifically any children one wanted to leave larger amounts to.	I can't say how they are typically settled, and there are no hard-and-rules that I can find. However, Gov.uk offers this: You’ll have to pay the person or business you owe the money to, or their solicitor. The name and address will be on the judgment form. Do not pay the court. Make sure you can prove you’ve paid. Send a cheque or postal order by post, or make a bank transfer. Do not send cash through the post. Keep a record of your payments and make sure you pay in time. If you’re paying in instalments, ask the person or business you owe the money to about the best way to pay. You may want to set up a standing order to pay the money directly from your bank account. As for A insisting on a cash payment, it's B's debt and as long as it's not unreasonable and in accordance with the Order B should decide on how it is settled if they can't come to an amicable arrangement.	Since you asked about any jurisdiction, and presumably any common law jurisdiction, in which one of the elements of theft is the intention to permanently deprive the owner of the property, here's the UK* answer. Regarding borrowing specifically, the UK statute referring to theft - the Theft Act 1968 - provides for this in section 6(1): A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal. In other words, a thief may say 'I only wished to borrow it', but that won't necessarily amount to a defence under English law. It depends on how long (s)he borrows it for, and how (s)he treats it while borrowing it. In addition, the case law clarifies what is meant by 'his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other's rights'. This has been held to mean: Selling, Bargaining with. R v Cahill, R v Lloyd Rendering Useless. DPP v J Dealing with in a manner which risks its loss. R v Fernandes, R v Marshall Borrowing in certain circumstances. R v Lloyd Pawning. s6(2) Theft Act 1968 Not enough to just deal with it. R v Mitchell So how do we prove whether someone intended to deprive the owner of the property permanently, or at least permanently enough to amount to an offence under the Act? The answer seems to be that we look at how they deal with it, and what condition they leave the property in. If they do any of the things listed above, with the exception of no. 6, then they have demonstrated an intent to permanently deprive; if they merely use the property, then that isn't enough to show such intent. You asked specifically: I am looking for an answer that explains whether someone who credibly asserts – e.g., by advance sworn affidavit – that they intend to return the item can be convicted of theft, or any other crime, for taking someone else's property for an extended but not infinite period of time. In the case of R v Lloyd, the court held borrowing would become intention to permanently deprive the owner of the property if 'all goodness, virtue and practical value is gone'. So if someone swore they were planning on returning the item, the court could nonetheless convict them of theft if they held on to the item for so long, and treated it as their own to such an extent, that all its value was gone. (In R v Lloyd, the items in question were films, and as they were returned in much the same condition as they'd originally been in, this was held not to be intention to permanently deprive, and therefore not to be theft.) *By 'UK' I mean 'English and Welsh'; the answer may be different in Scotland.	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".	If three people inherited a house in equal shares, then a new deed should have been prepared and filed with the appropriate governmental authority (the county in most US states) before probate is closed. When that is done the authority of the executors over the house as executors has ended. However, if I understand you correctly, the two former executors are also two of the three heirs to the house. Thus they own a 2/3rds interest in the house. At least they can sell their interests without your consent, leaving you a minority owner with the purchaser owner a majority. In some jurisdictions they may be able to force a sale, paying you your share of the purchase price. But this would be because of their majority ownership, not because of their former status as executors. Addition: In some states co-owners who are joint tenants may not sell their interests without the consent of the other co-owners, but this is jnot true in North Carolina According to the site of the Hutchens Law office: ownership as tenants in common provides each party with the right to sell, gift, devise, or otherwise convey their interest in the property without the permission of the other owners. This means that the ownership interest is freely alienable or transferable. As a result, an owner may sell or give their interest in the property to anyone they want, or they may willingly or by judgment use their interest in the property to secure or satisfy a debt with a creditor. Therefore, parties entering into an agreement to purchase property as tenants in common should be aware that they may ultimately end up owning the property with a stranger. If this were to happen, there is a way out, but it may be costly. At any time, if the parties can't agree, any owner may petition the court for a partition of the property. The court could require one owner to buy another out or force the sale of the property. The court will decide the ultimate outcome based on equity. ... [I]f the intent of co-owners holding interest as joint tenants is to automatically transfer their interest at death to the survivor, the language must be on the conveying instrument as right of survivorship is not automatic with joint tenancy in North Carolina and if the language in not included, the decedent's interest will pass to his heirs. ... However, any owner has the right to convey their ownership interest during their life; and if they do, the survivorship agreement ends, and owners simply become joint tenants by operation of law. In North Carolina there seems to be little practical difference between co-owners who are tenants in common, and those who are joint tenants without a right of survivorship. But whichever form of co-ownership is chosen: tenants in common, joint tenants without a right of survivorship, or joint tenants with a right of survivorship, each of the co-owners has a right during his or her lifetime to sell, give away, or use as collateral on a loan his or her share of the property, without consulting the other co-owners. They cannot force the other co-owner(s) to sell, except by starting an action of partition in a court, when a judge would decide. An unrelated buyer might be unwilling to purchase only a 1/3 or 2/3rds interest, because the remaining co-owner(s) would still have full rights to use and occupy the house, can could sell to a different buyer. All co-owners are responsible for their proportionate shares of all expenses, including mortgage payments, repairs, and taxes.	You are talking about "joint tenancy." I am familiar with bank accounts having multiple owners characterized as "Joint tenants with rights of survivorship" (JTWROS). This keeps the account out of probate: a death certificate simply removes the name of any owner who dies. But a probate court afraid that a deceased may not have enough assets to satisfy debts can still freeze the account for the duration of probate. These really are not tools for estate planning. For example, you can't use them to avoid gift or estate taxes. Also a JTWROS account is fully exposed to the liability/creditors of every owner. So no, a JTWROS does not shield assets from creditors. Finally, encumbrance of or distribution from a JTWROS account requires the consent of every owner. Any unresolved disputes are probably headed to court.	Pretty much any time a contractual, statutory or case law precedent uses the word "reasonable" what it means is that the decision regarding what is and is not reasonable is vested in the trier of fact (i.e. the judge in a U.K. landlord-tenant case) to decide on a case by case basis in light of all of the facts and circumstances presented at trial, rather something to be decided as a matter of law by an appellate court absent of extreme abuse of discretion by the judge in determining what is reasonable. Put yourself in the judge's shoes and consider the range of opinion that people who are judges in a case like this might have, and you have your answer. A reasonable amount of time balances out factors like the availability of repair contractors at a reasonable price, the magnitude of the repair, and the extent to which the repair impairs the habitability of the premises, and assumes a time frame that would apply if the landlord is diligent and trying to solve the problem in good faith. A reasonable time to fix a broken heating element is different in July than in January. If three different inspectors failed to determine the cause of the problem, that is going to work in favor of the landlord for a longer period of time. So will the significant extent of the damage (apparently). On the other hand, the fact that the repair rendered the premises completely uninhabitable argues for a shorter time period. Starting late to address an urgent problem could be breach, although it doesn't sound like this has happened here if some action has been taken that would seem to be reasonable under the circumstances and the results have been inconclusive about what to do. Unnecessary foot dragging could also be a fact in reasonableness, because ultimately the duty is to get the job done. There may also be a parallel duty of the landlord to provide a habitable premises and to compensate you for time when this is not provided, in addition to the duty to repair within a reasonable time. Asking to be paid for alternative accommodations while diagnosis and repairs are underway would be a logical demand to make before suing for a fairly small dollar amount in an ongoing lease. You would probably focus on failure to repair in a reasonable time more if you seek to terminate the lease entirely and rent elsewhere instead in the face of repair delays, hoping to avoid the duty to pay rent for the remainder of the lease term due to the landlord's breach of the duty to repair under the lease.
Can a university make rules about students' lives outside campus? I recently noticed that my university has a Covid-related policy stating that students are not permitted to attend public gatherings off-campus. Today, they officially stated that students breaking this rule can be expelled. The institution is private but receives federal funding. While I understand the rationale behind this rule (and agree that going to parties etc. in these times of pandemic is not a responsible behavior), it raises the following question in my mind: Can a university make rules about what students can and cannot do during their free time? I assume that they have a right to control and regulate events that involve their name and reputation (e.g. events organized by an official student association) but where is the limit? What about events that have nothing to do with the university? For instance, can they prevent their students from attending political events? Can they make rules about anything, e.g. "you cannnot eat burgers on Tuesdays" or something absurd like this? Is the answer the same for employers and employees?	With respect to disciplining its students and employees, a private school can basically do whatever it wants. There's more freedom to do so with respect to students than with employees, who have greater protections derived from anti-discrimination laws, collective-bargaining agreements, and the like. If a private school wants to impose a No Burger Tuesdays and a complete ban on political activity, that's probably going to be permissible. The First Amendment will protect the school's right to associate with only those who meet its standards, as absurd as those standards may be. Again, there are exceptions to this rule, like Title IX, which requires equal educational opportunities regardless of sex, but they don't have much bearing on your question. Even for a public school, there will be quite a bit of latitude here, because these rules don't actually regulate off-campus conduct. If a student wants to attend an off-campus public gathering, the campus police aren't going to lock him in his room or arrest him for leaving campus. The rule is simply that if you attend a public gathering off campus, you may not come back on campus afterward to threaten the lives of your classmates.	It is not illegal to make sound, but there may be limits on what sound you can make, when and where. At the state level, in Oregon, you can see what the general limitations on "noise" are here. State law is basically irrelevant, you have to consult local law. Let's say that the event is in Cannon Beach, then here are the restrictions. Between 10pm and 7am, the amplitude limit is 50 dB. Note however that exceptions are allowed, for example: Sounds caused by organized athletic or other group activities, when such activities are conducted on property generally used for such purposes, including parks, schools, churches, athletic fields and waterways; provided, however, that said exception shall not impair the city’s power to declare such events or activities otherwise to violate other laws, ordinances or regulations and one can apply for a variance, which upon due consideration by the chief of police can allow e.g. a music festival. But that's only Cannon Beach. Unincorporated areas are only subject to county-wide restrictions, which tend to also be quite minimal (owing to the fact that farms are typically "out in the county", and county governments tend not to ticket farmers when their cows are noisy). The first step would be to determine whether the event was in (prima facie) violation of the local noise ordinance, if any. The second would be to determine whether – assuming a variance had been granted – the person granting the ordinance had abused their discretion.	Anyone has a right to report illegal activities that it is aware of to the authorities. This is in fact where 99.9% of police investigations start. In addition, students of a school (or, more generally, members of any organisation) are eligible to be investigated/disciplined by the school in accordance with the rules of the school providing that the investigation and punishment are in accordance with the law. This would normally permit (require?) notification of any child's parent or guardian. In loco parentis does not arise - the school is acting as a responsible citizen; not as a substitute for the children's parents.	The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home.	I'll start with a list of issues presented and also note at the outset that the question correctly notes that both the school district (which is an entity distinct from the county), and the superintendent of schools, are protected from civil liability to a significant extent by the doctrine of sovereign immunity which is outlined here. Two specific provisions bear particular note: an exclusion of liability for someone who has reported a suspected child abuse case, and immunity for a school teacher who acts in good faith with regard to supervision, care and discipline of students. 1. What duty does a public school board in the U.S., or do specific employees of that school board, have to prevent a violent crime from being committed by one student against another student, when that student has no prior history of serious misconduct? Short of malice directed at a victimized student there is no liability under state law. There is also no well established constitutional right violated that could give rise to civil rights liability. Students commit crimes against each other all of the time and school officials are almost never responsible for those crimes. 2. What duty does a public school board in the U.S., or do specific employees of that school board, have to prevent a violent crime from being committed by one student against another student, when that student has a history of prior serious misconduct? The legal standard is the same but the practical analysis might be more fact intensive. Still, outright malice directed towards a victim would pretty much be the applicable legal standard and is unlikely to be present in this case, absent awareness, for example, of conditions of probation or pre-trial release after the first case that weren't enforced. 3. Is a public school in the U.S. permitted or required by law to advise parents of students at the school that student transferring into the new school has a history of violent criminal conduct? Juvenile justice law and educational privacy laws profoundly limit the extent to which a public school, or its officials are allowed to disclose that a student transferring into a school has a history of violent criminal conduct. There is no clear duty of the public school in the U.S. to disclose this fact broadly. 4. Is a statement by a superintendent to parents in a public school district that transgender girl does not pose a threat to cis-gender girls in restrooms an actionable fraud (and does it matter if there is a history of prior misconduct by a particular student in this case of which the superintendent was aware)? The statement is not, in general, false. If it was made after knowledge of this particular student, that might be a different matter, but as noted above, there are severe legal limitations on what the board is allowed to say. It isn't inconceivable that the school board or superintendent could have said more than it did to at least some people. But there isn't a clear legal duty to do so. It also isn't clear what the superintendent actually knew when he made a report to the school board even tough the information should have been shared with him. It is possible that only a lower level official in the school system had actual knowledge at that time. 5. What crime, if any, did the father of the first rape victim commit for trying to warn the parents about someone who attacked his daughter? This is partially speculation, but the father appears to have been arrested for the manner in which he acted disturbing the peace, speaking out of turn, and refusing the leave a meeting when requested, rather than sharing the information per se. 6. Did the school superintendent commit a crime somehow connected to the second rape by concealing the risk posed by the student in question? The school superintendent has a duty to report child abuse to authorities and failure to do so (if it was not done) would be minor crime. My impression of the fact is that the first rape was reported to juvenile justice system officials and resulted in action being taken. So, it does not appear that this duty was breached. According to the article: The boy was arrested and charged for the first assault in July but released from juvenile detention while prosecutors waited for DNA rape kit evidence to come back. Loudoun County Commonwealth's Attorney Buta Biberaj says at the time they had no reason to believe the boy should have stayed in juvenile detention. “If that case had gone forward and we were not able to substantiate beyond a reasonable doubt the allegations that were made by the victim, he would've been out anyway,” she said. “The best decision was made with the facts that were known." This does not, however, give him criminal liability for a subsequent rape of one student by another in which he had not involvement sufficient to constitute criminal conspiracy to commit sexual assault which was the case here. 7. Does the school board have defamation liability for calling the father of the victim of the first rape a transphobe? No. The school board has sovereign immunity from suits for money damages seeking to establish liability in relation to statements made in their official capacity, apparently in good faith. It also isn't clear that the statements made were actionable in the first place, or that such statements were even made by them. The school board also does not appear to have had actual knowledge of what happened until a decisive school board meeting after the second assault. 8. Does the public have any power to remove an appointed official such as the superintendent in this context? No. The political remedy is to elect a new school board that would select a different superintendent.	There’s some truth in it When a matter, particularly a criminal matter, is before a court or sub judice, public comment is forbidden and may be contempt of court unless they are “a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.” Technically, it only applies to media reporting (probably including social media) and only while the proceedings are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a warrant, or a summons. Notwithstanding, there is nothing preventing an organisation having a “no comment” policy on any matter once there is police involvement.	The ARRL has a page that explains PRB-1. This FCC report and order requires local government (usually the zoning authorities) to accommodate amateur radio, especially the antennas. Nothing from the FCC gives amateur radio operators a privilege to operate amateur radio while on private property, against the wishes of the property owner. If the college is operated by a city or state, there is a small chance they might be considered a local government for purposes of PRB-1, but one would be trying to apply the report and order to a situation that is not what PRB-1 was aimed at.	There are a number of areas in which the US states can pass laws only to the extend that they do not conflict with Federal laws passed by Congress. When a federal law clearly says that states may not pass laws on a given subject, the issue is clear. When it specifically invites state laws, the issue is also clear. But when a Federal law imposes certain regulations in a given area, it may not be clear if a state may go beyond the Federal requirements. Sometimes it can. For example, there is a Federal Minimum Wage. But states are free to impose higher minimum wage levels, and some have done so. So when a court decision or legal article says "Congress having occupied the field" it means that a set of Federal laws is intended to be a compelte regulation of a given area, and states may not add additional regulations of their own in that area. I am not sure what rules apply to disclosure of information by the Capitol police.
Does expungement of a case refer to online history? When a court's expungement order stipulates that all entities with related data to the case, and data collection and data reseller companies destroy any and all records related to a case; does this mean the private online person search sites must destroy all references to the cases that were expunged? Or do I need to reach out to each of these individual “background search” sites to request that their information be updated to reflect the order?	In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.	As pointed out in comments, the exact answer depends on the jurisdiction, and on the nature of the crime(s). As a general statement: In many jurisdictions, old criminal records are sealed (=made less available), or even completely deleted after some time. The timespan will depend on many factors, particularly (but not only) on the number and severity of the crimes. Extremely serious crimes may never be sealed/deleted. Sometimes the sealing/deletion may be automatic, sometimes only at the request of the perpetrator, and there may be additional conditions. As an extension of the above, some jurisdictions have special rules for criminal records created while the perpetrator was a minor. Some time spans may be shortened, or minor crimes may be excluded. So, to directly answer the question: Yes, crimes as minor may be kept in your records and influence sentencing as an adult, or they may not - it depends. That is about all you can say in general.	These images were quickly taken down to settle this problem. It doesn't settle the problem, at least under US law, because a former infringer may still owe statutory damages under 17 USC 504 (and I imagine under some analogous Canadian law). Ceasing the infringement does not extinguish the plaintiff's right to those damages, although it may limit the size of the damages. However, the opposition in question continued to try and sue for more, claiming that the information on these properties were taken from them (which is apparently incorrect and lacks proof) Information, in and of itself, is not subject to copyright protection in just about any jurisdiction in the world (see for example 17 USC 102(b)). It has been suggested in the comments of another answer that this may nevertheless be a trade secrets violation, but that would only be the case if the information had been non-public and the site appropriated the information from an unpublished source belonging to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff deliberately caused this information to be published on their own website, then trade secret law certainly does not apply to it. Nevertheless, if the site copied literal text or images from the plaintiff's website, or closely paraphrased it, that is an infringement of copyright. Copyright protects the creative elements of the text, even where the text is serving a primarily utilitarian or functional purpose. but they continue to drag this on in an assumed attempt to try and make the defendant basically spend all their money fighting this off before it gets before a judge. It is unclear what you mean by this. The normal process is for the plaintiff to send the defendant some sort of written demand, the defendant either complies or they don't, and then the plaintiff either files a lawsuit or they don't. If the plaintiff never files a lawsuit, the defendant is under no obligation to continue interacting with the plaintiff, and can simply wash their hands of the matter. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be wise, as settling is often more cost-effective than going to court. Ignoring the plaintiff increases the likelihood of a lawsuit being filed. But if there is no lawsuit, then there is nothing to "fight off" in the first place.	The 4th Amendment exclusionary rule applies automatically in cases where law enforcement obtains evidence illegally (subject to exceptions not applicable here). In its 1920 decision in Burdeau vs. McDowell, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 4th amendment is not applicable to searches by private parties, even when such searches are clearly illegal. This rule doesn't apply, however, if the private citizens was acting as an agent of the government. A more recent case reaffirming and clarifying Burdeau is United States v. Jacobsen 466 U.S. 109 (1984) in which a private courier finds drugs in a package and shows it to police who test the contents (the search was upheld as valid). If the defendant makes that argument, the defendant seeking to exclude the evidence bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the private citizen acted as an agent of the government. U.S. v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1987). Another case discussed here notes that: As it relates to computer files, states still differ on how broad the application of the Private Search Doctrine runs, but all seem to agree that if a document or photo has been opened by a private party, an officer can review that file or photo without a warrant. In People v. Wilson, 56 Cal. App. 5th 128 (2020), police opened 4 images they received from NCMEC (the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children) who received the images in a CyberTip from Google. Neither NCMEC nor Google had opened these images in this case, but all 4 images had been reviewed by Google in the past and identified previously as child porn by their matching hash values. So here, the officer’s actions—consisting of opening the electronic files submitted to it by NCMEC and viewing the four images attached to Google’s Cybertip—did not exactly replicate Google’s private actions. The Wilson court set out to determine the degree to which the officer’s additional invasion of Wilson’s privacy exceeded the scope of Google’s private search (the search of his emails against known hash values). Before the officer even received Wilson’s photographs, Google had already reviewed identical images in the past; scanned all of Wilson’s electronic communications to search for content with matching hash values; flagged four of Wilson’s images as matching images Google had previously observed; classified the matching images as depictions of prepubescent minors engaged in sexual acts; forwarded all four images to NCMEC as part of a Cybertip report; and terminated Wilson’s account. The Jacobsen case above explained that, “[t]he Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated.” Id. at 117. Because Google’s actions already frustrated any expectation of privacy Wilson possessed in the four photographs at issue, no privacy interest remained in the four images, so no expectation of privacy was violated. Wilson at 219. Because the assigned hash values, or “digital fingerprints,” are representative of the contents depicted in the photographs themselves, the government gained no new material information by viewing the images. The agent merely confirmed Google’s report that Wilson uploaded content constituting apparent child pornography. Id. at 220. When someone who is not law enforcement obtains evidence illegally, the court sometimes engages in a non-constitutional discretionary balancing test to determine if the evidence is admissible. Sometimes it comes in, sometimes it doesn't. I'll find a case setting forth the exact test if I have time. The fact that evidence is "irrefutable" (not that there is any such thing) and widely publicly known is absolutely irrelevant. The fact that a juror knows it would be grounds for excusing the juror for cause and for moving the venue of the trial where they can find enough jurors who aren't familiar with the evidence if they can't manage it in the usual venue.	Court filings are, in general, matters of public record. This does not automatically put them into the public domain. This will mean that, absent a special order of the court, anyone will be able to read this filing as pert of the court records. Many courts now make all or parts of their records available on the web. But the copyright holders will possibly retain their rights to authorize the making of further copies, and surely retain the right to authorize the making of derivative works, and their other rights that are part of the copyright bundle, such as the rights of public performance. These rights would not be retained if the work had been placed in the public domain.	The GDPR does not mandate specific features, but that any processing is lawful and transparent etc. So what would be the purpose of storing a revision history? Once that is clear you can work out an appropriate legal basis (e.g. a legitimate interest) and then figure out which data subject rights apply. For example, let's assume that there is a security interest in keeping a revision history, so that (a) mistaken edits can be rolled back, and (b) the user can be notified of possibly unauthorized changes. This would be a legitimate interest primarily of the account holder, secondarily of you as the system operator. Of course, such security requirements have to be proportional, but I'd see that as given when there's a payment method on file. You are required to apply appropriate safety measures and to apply the data minimization principle. E.g. is it necessary to store this revision history for all eternity? No, one or two months will likely be sufficient. Who should have access to this data? If the purpose is to defend against unauthorized access, it could make sense to only give out this data on request, and otherwise only make it available to support and security staff. Now we can discuss how this interfaces with rectification or deletion. That the user is able to rectify their data themselves is very good. However, that doesn't imply a prohibition on keeping a revision history: the revision history indicates what data was stored at what point in time, and is by definition correct. This assumes that you are not using the revision history for any other purposes. When the legal basis is a legitimate interest, a request for erasure has to be preceded by (or implies) an objection (opt-out) to further processing. The objection must weighed against the legitimate interest: the objection can be denied when there are overriding grounds to continue processing. This might be the case for a security purpose: if someone with unauthorized access can just erase their traces, the purpose cannot be achieved. But perhaps the user could opt out when they create their account? Or opt-out later, but with some delay to still achieve the security purpose at the time of opt-out? In any case, erasure is required when the data is no longer necessary for its purpose – this ties back to picking an appropriate retention period, as discussed above. So it's not really possible to provide a general answer, and it really depends on the specific purpose you are trying to achieve.	The first question would be whether those papers are indeed "legit", and we don't do product reviews. Assuming the company didn't mess up and she was legally served, the next question would be whether she responded (in the legal sense) or not. If she failed to respond at all within 21 days (add 9 days if she is out of state), then your next step would be to file default divorce paperwork (presumably that's covered in the service you paid for). If she agreed to the divorce and the courts knows that, then you file some more paperwork and she doesn't have to show up to anything. If she disagreed, there will be an "answer" and possibly a counterpetition. There is an exchange of paperwork w.r.t. assets, a mandatory mediation stage, more paperwork, disclosures etc. and a pre-trial conference, followed by a trial. If you are at this stage, attendance is mandatory. As long as you have proof of service, nobody requested a postponement, and there is some evidence to support your claim, a default judgment can be issued. It's not clear what "divorce proceeding" you are referring to that involves her attendance. However, you can file divorce paperwork yourself or using an online service, and using an online service does not render the paperwork illegitimate. It's not guaranteed that the service did what would be necessary for you to get the outcome you desire, but that's beyond the scope of what we can tell you.	This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer.
Legal standing of pro-LGBT decor in stores In this question, there are several items (such as decor) mentioned and recommended towards the end of making a business appear more LGBT-friendly. However, it is my understanding that the law DOES NOT require accomodations for LGBT customers. The law DOES require accomodations for religious customers. Religion is a protected class. Sexual orientation and gender identity are not. As a Christian, what legal standing would I have to demand that pro-LGBT items such as rainbow flags, pronoun pins, and other items be removed while I am in the store? Realistically, I would never enter a store that displayed pro-LGBT items and would leave immediately if I saw such items, but let's say I wanted to force the store to remove their pro-LGBT items. Could I? Is there not a legal obligation on businesses to be more Christian-friendly?	Under 42 USC 2000a(a): All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. So a business may be generally prohibited from discriminating against you on the basis of your religion, but I don't know of any law that requires stores to accommodate whatever aversion or hostility you may feel toward gay people or their allies. On the contrary, such businesses have a First Amendment right to display such decor. So legislation that required them to stop speaking out in support of nice gay people would be struck down as unconstitutional.	It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin A medical condition like an allergy is not necessarily a physical disability. The school is arguably fulfilling its obligations under WHS legislation by banning nut products if that is what a risk assessment indicates. It may also be necessary to ban milk products if that is required for your daughter's safety. If (and I do not know) nuts pose a greater risk than milk then banning the former and not the latter may be perfectly justified. Ask to see the risk assessment.	Let's deal with the somewhat misguided notion of "public space": what it means and what it doesn't: "publicly owned" is not equivalent to "public space" - Camp David is "publicly owned"; it is not "public space". "privately owned" can be "public space" - the publically accessible parts of shopping malls are privately owned public spaces. "public space" does not mean you have unconditional access. Access may be limited or subject to restrictions placed on it by whoever has lawful authority over it. For example, the aforementioned shopping mall is not public when the mall is closed, roads may be closed for maintenance, street festivities or emergencies etc. So: if you are in a place where you have permission of the lawful authority to be (public spaces give you this implicitly, private spaces require explicit permission), and the lawful authority has not placed restrictions on photography, and the subject does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy (like they would in a public toilet), and the subject matter is legal (e.g. considering restrictions on sexual or commercial activities), then you can take photographs.	This could be a violation of the Fair Housing Act, but Fair Housing v. Roommate.com, 521 F.3d 1157 says that we find that the FHA doesn’t apply to the sharing of living units The crux of the argument is that a room in a house is not a "dwelling", since it is not a complete living unit. Whether or not courts outside the 9th Circuit follow suit remains to be seen. Florida state law (760.29) states exceptions to its anti-discrimination laws, covering for instance Any single-family house sold or rented by its owner, provided such private individual owner does not own more than three single-family houses at any one time. If that is the case, then the exemption exists if the rental a. Without the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real estate licensee or such facilities or services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such licensee or person; and b. Without the publication, posting, or mailing, after notice, of any advertisement or written notice in violation of s. 760.23(3) Another exemption exists if Rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his or her residence. Your attorney (hint) will be able to interpret that complicated section of the law.	I know of no laws at the federal or state level that explicitly extend their protection to poly relationships. However, any law that purports to outlaw a polyamorous relationship among consenting adults should be looked at very skeptically, as it would likely be found unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. While that case dealt with homosexual relationships, it seems unlikely that the courts would conclude that heterosexual couples, throuples, etc., are entitled to less protection. Adultery laws exist in many jurisdictions, and many of them have survived constitutional challenges. But as far as I know, all those challenges relied on legal principles and precedents -- in particular, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) -- that Lawrence explicitly overruled. In this regard, I would not expect anyone in a polyamorous relationship to encourter meaningful legal jeopardy as a result of that relationship, assuming that the relationship(s) were otherwise legal and out in the open. If A is unaware of her spouse's relationship with C, for instance, that could cause problems in a divorce proceeding. I don't know of any legal options specifically designed for this sort of arrangement, but the more interconnected and interdependent these groups are, the more likely it becomes that some sort of written agreement would become worthwhile -- not as a response to legal danger arising from the polyamorous nature of the relationship, just to address the fact that someone is eventually going to fall short, potentially causing problems for the whole group. There are many lawyers who specialize in LGBT issues, and I'd imagine that some of them would be able to provide more detailed advice about how to deal with this type of situation.	It's hard to prove a negative, and I'm not sure which specific part of the quoted Terms you object, to, but it specifically states that content access may be done to: Comply with the law Protect its customers; and Protect the security of its business; and Protect its business interests. It's unlikely that access of information to comply with the law is illegal. At least one EU directive, Directive 95/46/EC, sets limits on the collection and use of personal information. We're concerned with the first condition for lawful data processing, and the second principle of data quality. Data processing is only lawful if the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party; or processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; or processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party; or processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interest pursued by the controller or by the third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection. The principles of data quality, which must be implemented for all lawful data processing activities, are the following: personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully, and collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes. They must also be adequate, relevant and not excessive, accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date, must not be stored for longer than necessary and solely for the purposes for which they were collected; special categories of processing: it is forbidden to process personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. This provision comes with certain qualifications concerning, for example, cases where processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or for the purposes of preventive medicine and medical diagnosis. So, let's say that someone has given their consent. It'd be at least a little questionable whether the inspection of private information could mean that they access personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. I'm a bit less clear on US laws, but you'd probably look for laws around Personal Identifying Information, as that's where a lot of focus has been.	No, given McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 and In Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582. The principle is that laws with religious origins are constitutional if they have a secular purpose. In Braunfeld, the defendants who were Orthodox Jews could not operate their business from sunfall to sunfall on Friday-Saturday, and sought to operate on Sunday contrary to a Pennsylvanis law prohibiting retail sales of their commodities on Sunday. The court rules that the law "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor constitute a law respecting an establishment of religion, and it does not prohibit the free exercise of appellants' religion, within the meaning of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment". Their argument was based on the fact that to comply with the requirements of their religion plus the statutes of Pennsylvania, they would suffer economic loss. The court historically reviewed blue laws and concluded that the requirement to be closed on Sunday is not necessarily tied to religion, noting for example that in 1776 Virginia seemed that "all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion" and repealed laws penalizing expression and observations of religions, but also maintained laws prohibiting Sunday labor. Restrictions are possible on "people's actions when they are found to be in violation of important social duties or subversive of good order, even when the actions are demanded by one's religion". The matter has not come before SCOTUS since then (the constitutionality of blue laws is now "established law", until these rulings are overturned, analogous to Dobbs overturning Roe).	Adding m/w/d in a job posting is not explicitly required by any German law. It is however the established way to implement the requirements of the AGG (~ general equal treatment act) which in turn implements various EU directives. Protected classes under the AGG are race, ethnic origin, gender, religion or belief system, disability, age, and sexual identity. Of these, only gender manifests itself in the German language, making workarounds necessary that indicate that no gender is preferred. Within certain bounds, the German language can use gender-neutral terms, for example a job called “Lehrer/-in” or “Lehrer*in” could also be called “Lehrkraft”. If you are able to use gender-neutral language in English but are still subject to German law, adding “m/f/d” is probably not necessary but still a very sensible idea as it corresponds to German best practices. If you fail to add some explicit note that applicants of all genders are welcome, nothing bad will happen automatically. However, a person with a not-explicitly listed gender may apply for the job, get denied, and then sue with the argument that they were denied because of their gender. The employer would have the obligation to prove that their job postings are non-discriminatory.
Can the law limit what heath care providers I see if I have commercial and medicaid? There's a bit of story to this: We had been trying to find a therapist for my son. We wanted one that we felt comfortable with. We didn't care if the provider was out of network or if we'd have to pay for their services out of pocket. We found one that we all really like and have seen them for several sessions now. We have commercial health insurance through my work, and my son also has insurance through the state (Wisconsin) under Medicaid. My commercial insurance has zero out of network coverages. The provider billed my commercial insurance first for the services, knowing that it would likely be declined due to being out of network. After it was declined, the provider then sent the claim to Medicaid, and they declined it too, saying they won't cover any of it since it was out of network to my commercial insurance. I'm fine with that, we just pay for the services out of pocket and that's that. Apparently not. The provider has told us that we can no longer see them because they cannot accept payment from us. The provider said they heard this from a representative at Medicaid and that they read it in some documents. One supporting quote that I was provided with to support their claim that they can no longer see us is this: BadgerCare Plus and Wisconsin Medicaid will not reimburse the provider if the commercial health insurance plan denied or would deny payment because a service otherwise covered under the commercial health insurance plan was performed by a provider outside the plan. In addition, if a member receives a covered service outside their commercial health insurance plan, the provider cannot collect payment from the member. The provider went back to the representative to confirm that they can't bill us even if insurance isn't involved and they were told: No they can’t, that would be considered fraud. Is this legal? How can I not just pay for a service out of pocket? What fraud would I or the provider be committing? I'd understand if we went into this whole thing thinking that it was going to be covered by insurance, but we knew insurance likely wasn't going to cover it. Any help or advice would be really appreciated.	This is "Topic #601" in various ForwardHealth interpretative statements about BadgerCare Plus and Medicaid. The last 3 paragraphs say: When commercial health insurance plans require members to use a designated network of providers, non-network (i.e., providers who do not have a contract with the member's commercial health insurance plan) will be reimbursed by the commercial health insurance plan only if they obtain a referral or provide an emergency service. Except for emergency services and covered services that are not covered under the commercial health insurance plan, members enrolled in both a commercial health insurance plan and BadgerCare Plus or Wisconsin Medicaid (i.e., state-contracted MCO (managed care organization), fee-for-service) are required to receive services from providers affiliated with the commercial health insurance plan. In this situation, providers are required to refer the members to the commercial health insurance plan's network providers. This is necessary because commercial health insurance is always primary to BadgerCare Plus. BadgerCare Plus and Wisconsin Medicaid will not reimburse the provider if the commercial health insurance plan denied or would deny payment because a service otherwise covered under the commercial health insurance plan was performed by a provider outside the plan. In addition, if a member receives a covered service outside their commercial health insurance plan, the provider cannot collect payment from the member. If we take these statements by the Dept. of Health Services as correct interpretations of the law, then it seems that their interpretation is correct: "providers are required to refer the members to the commercial health insurance plan's network providers" (you as a patient have no choice) and "the provider cannot collect payment from the member" (they are encouraged to refer you to a network provider, because they are prohibited by law from taking payment from you). If you had received the services from the provider and not mentioned any insurance, this would have been treated as a normal doctor-patient case, and they would not know that the state would prohibit them from receiving payment from you. By going through the motions with insurance, I regret to say that you exposed them to relevant knowledge which they cannot take back or deny. The fraud would be between the provider and the state, via the provider's relation with this program. That does not endorse the DHS legal interpretation, but since they are the ones who wrote the regulations, it is fairly likely that (by definition) they got it right.	Just at the offset this does not constitute legal advice, just some opinions I have on this point. Technically, you would not be prohibited to generate speech and use it however you like. Under normal circumstances any output generated by the system that does not contravene the service agreement would be your intellectual property. This would include the text and speech generated. Once you go about the request limit you would naturally be required to pay, but until that time you can use the service as a paying customer. Just to clarify this point I would like to make reference to the service license agreement, clause 3, which make reference to the following prohibitions: (a) copy, modify, create a derivative work of, reverse engineer, decompile, translate, disassemble, or otherwise attempt to extract any or all of the source code of the Services (subject to Section 3.4 below and except to the extent such restriction is expressly prohibited by applicable law); (b) use the Services for High Risk Activities; (c) sublicense, resell, or distribute any or all of the Services separate from any integrated Application; (d) create multiple Applications, Accounts, or Projects to simulate or act as a single Application, Account, or Project (respectively) or otherwise access the Services in a manner intended to avoid incurring Fees or exceed usage limits or quotas; (e) unless otherwise set forth in the Service Specific Terms, use the Services to operate or enable any telecommunications service or in connection with any Application that allows Customer End Users to place calls or to receive calls from any public switched telephone network; or (f) process or store any Customer Data that is subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations maintained by the Department of State. Unless otherwise specified in writing by Google, Google does not intend uses of the Services to create obligations under HIPAA, and makes no representations that the Services satisfy HIPAA requirements. If Customer is (or becomes) a Covered Entity or Business Associate, as defined in HIPAA, Customer will not use the Services for any purpose or in any manner involving Protected Health Information (as defined in HIPAA) unless Customer has received prior written consent to such use from Google. Similarly, as specified here: Customer will not, and will not allow third parties to: (i) use these Services to create, train, or improve (directly or indirectly) a similar or competing product or service or (ii) integrate these Services with any applications for any embedded devices such as cars, TVs, appliances, or speakers without Google's prior written permission. These Services can only be integrated with applications for the following personal computing devices: smartphones, tablets, laptops, and desktops. In addition to any other available remedies, Google may immediately suspend or terminate Customer's use of these Services based on any suspected violation of these terms, and violation of these terms is deemed violation of Google's Intellectual Property Rights. Customer will provide Google with any assistance Google requests to reasonably confirm compliance with these terms (including interviews with Customer employees and inspection of Customer source code, model training data, and engineering documentation). These terms will survive termination or expiration of the Agreement. You should also take a look at this and this. However, as per the terms of the agreement the speech generated would be your intellectual property, unless otherwise specified. Good luck!	Parents have a legal obligation to care for their minor children: it is illegal to harm a child through action or inaction. State law and associated welfare programs are complex: you can start here. If surgery is medically necessary, her insurance should cover it. If her parent do not have medical insurance, they still have the obligation of care; though various governmental programs may alleviate the problem, such as the state medical assistance program. The parents may therefore be in violation of the law, and anyone may report this to DSHS (specifically through Child Protective Services). This obligation terminates when the child turns 18 (assuming that someone does not petition for adult guardianship). Legislation is not crystal clear as far as what constitutes "injury of a child ...under circumstances which cause harm to the child's health". CPS has no authority to compel parents to pay for a medical treatment, but they can go to the courts on behalf of the child. At that point, it's hard to say what the court would order. For example, if the parents are capable of providing medical insurance and just willfully chose to not cover their child, the court could order them to get insurance. It is virtually guaranteed that the courts would not order the immediate amputation of the child's feet, and there would be no legal basis for ordering the parents to pay for the procedure in a decade, after the child is an adult. However, if you are suggesting that there is an immediate treatment (which the parents have opted to not provide, hence the prospects of later amputation), then it is reasonably likely that the courts would order the parents to provide for the treatment (if it would be possible for them; otherwise, the state may intervene and provide for the treatment).	Insurance is regulated at the state rather than the federal level in the United States, and the terms of individual insurance contracts also matter. Most states prohibit insurance of intentional unlawful acts as a matter of public policy, either under common law doctrines or under express statutes or regulations. The public policy is that no one should be insulated from liability for their own intentional acts. And, in insurance policies for individuals who are not employers, this is typically accomplished with an intentional acts exclusion in the language of the policy. (Negligent acts are almost always insurable. The status of acts that constitute gross negligence, willful and wanton conduct, reckless conduct, or bad faith conduct, varies somewhat from state to state.) But, the situation is muddier when the insured is an employer or an entity. It frequently is possible for an employer or entity to insure itself against unauthorized misconduct by employees or officers or directors who are breaching their duties to the employer or company, rather than carrying out the official policies of the company. Factories don't knowingly do anything. People in or connected to factories do things and know things. And, if a factory employee is cutting corners in violation of his job responsibilities and that hurts the company, that could be an insurable risk. But, if a factory employee is acting in accordance with the directions of the CEO and Board of Directors in causing the factory to emit waste violating the law, and if the people giving him orders known that this violates the law, then this is probably not an insurable loss of the company as a matter of public policy. Another complication involves the question of who is insured. The Town of Greenfield may be able to legally buy insurance that compensates it for the costs of having to deal with intentional environmental law violations by factories undertaken as a matter of corporate policy in the town, even though the corporation couldn't buy this insurance. Indeed, the Town could even impose a tax on the corporation that requires it to pay the premium on the Town's insurance policy. But, this wouldn't relieve the corporation of liability or violate public policy because the insurance company would have a right of "subrogation" to sue to owner of the factory to reimburse it for the full amount of any claims that it had to pay to the Town. This is true even if the corporation and the responsible individuals in the corporation are, in fact, judgment proof or bankrupt, so that the subrogation right is actually meaningless in fact. It is also probably legal for a company to "self-insure", i.e. to set aside reserves of its own money to pay for it violations of the law in the future without regard to intent, and to have administrators employed to process payment in those situations, because then it is not actually insulated from harm for its own wrongdoing. But, this is risky because a policy of condoning illegal conduct could subject the company to punitive damages and sanctions in addition to compensatory damages. It also matters what kind of harm the insurance policy pays for. It would not be illegal, in almost any state, to issue an insurance policy that pays for a criminal defense lawyer for someone who is accused of a crime. But, it would be illegal in almost every state to issue an insurance policy that pays for fines and court costs and restitution imposed as punishment for committing a crime. Paying for a criminal defense lawyer, or a bail bond, at a time when you are presumed innocent, is not a form of punishment and hence is an insurable expense.	Late to the party, but I'll answer anyways. In general, providers have a lot of wiggle room when sharing information with parents, on condition that the patient hasn't explicitly objected despite having opportunity to do so. HIPAA allows the provider to make a judgment call on whether such information can be shared without explicit consent: Quoting Title 45 § 164.510 : (i) Obtains the individual's agreement; (ii) Provides the individual with the opportunity to object to the disclosure, and the individual does not express an objection; or (iii) Reasonably infers from the circumstances, based the exercise of professional judgment, that the individual does not object to the disclosure. HHS does discuss disclosure to family members in their FAQ : A covered entity is permitted to share information with a family member or other person involved in an individual’s care or payment for care as long as the individual does not object. A parent of a child who has just turned 18 is likely still somewhat involved in the child's care, so, absent either an objection or a reason to believe the child would object if asked, sharing is probably not a violation.	It's probably not unlawful to ask, but an answer cannot be required immediately. Per the Department of Labor, Susan has 60 days to elect COBRA coverage (the qualifying event here being the termination of Susan's employment): Your plan must give you at least 60 days to choose whether or not to elect COBRA coverage, beginning from the date the election notice is provided or the date you would otherwise lose coverage under your group health plan due to the qualifying event, whichever is later. It would be unlikely for an employer to discourage an employee from electing COBRA coverage due to costs to the employer, as you suggest: Susan is still employed and thus could be treated differently in her last two weeks depending on how she responds because the company is struggling financially and is looking for every opportunity to save money. Susan electing to use COBRA coverage is unlikely to cost the company money, because the employer is permitted to charge her the entire cost of the coverage, plus 2 percent to cover the cost of administering it (additional DoL source). As far as privacy goes, I don't think anything illegal has occurred here. The most prevalent law regarding privacy of health information, HIPAA, generally does not apply to employers. Susan could, of course, request a private discussion, and any response from Emily could not rise to the level of illegal harassment or create a hostile work environment.	As discussed in this investopedia article contributions may be limited for Highly Compensated Employees (HCE). This article discusses the Actual Deferral & Actual Contribution Percentage Tests (ADP/ACP) which are used to determine limits for HCEs. However, in a unionized company, there can be other considerations . Union Bargaining agreements can override the plan terms, and cause a reduction in the contribution limits. The article "Challenges of Retirement Plans with Union Members" says: Retirement plans at organizations where the workforce is largely unionized have the unique challenge of being obligated to negotiate plan terms with the union. It’s a process that can be very burdensome, experts say, but also very rewarding. When a retirement plan is run at an organization with a union, the collective bargaining agreements trump the retirement plan document, as specified by the National Labor Relations Act, according to David Kern, partner with the labor and employment practice and chair of the National Labor Relations Act team at Quarles and Brady LLP, in Milwaukee. “Any changes to the plan need to be bargained with the union,” Kern says. Retirement plans at non-union organizations typically have a provision that the employer has the right to modify the plan at any time, says Amy Ciepluch, chair of the employee benefits and executive compensation team at Quarles & Brady. At a union shop, however, “that type of language would not trump what a collective bargaining agreement guarantees. The collective bargaining agreement would govern.” However, the federal limit on total retirement contributions is unchanged. So an employee limited in 401K contributions can increase contributions to an IRA or other retirement account.	IANAL, and I don't live in America, but some of this depends on their intent. If they gave the drugs away by mistake, they probably have not broken any laws. If they were given away deliberately (and you would need to prove this – which might be hard) then yes, he has broken laws. Either way, I expect you have a right to compensation (i.e. $900) from the physician to "make you whole again." If required necessary you could file for that in your local small claims court: The physician will either come to the party pretty quickly and sort it out, or the court will award you the money you need to buy the replacement meds. (But you will need to evidence the replacement cost, for a start....)
When can "exact change" policies be enforced? In general, "exact change" policies are legal. The Department of Treasury provides this helpful explanation: The Coinage Act of 1965, specifically Section 31 U.S.C. 5103, entitled "Legal tender," ... states: "United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues." This statute means that all United States money as identified above are a valid and legal offer of payment for debts when tendered to a creditor. There is, however, no Federal statute mandating that a private business, a person or an organization must accept currency or coins as for payment for goods and/or services. Private businesses are free to develop their own policies on whether or not to accept cash unless there is a State law which says otherwise. For example, a bus line may prohibit payment of fares in pennies or dollar bills. In addition, movie theaters, convenience stores and gas stations may refuse to accept large denomination currency (usually notes above $20) as a matter of policy. But in practice doesn't this mean that "exact change" policies can only be enforced when payment is required before a good or service is provided? Because I can incur a debt in most commercial situations. E.g.: I drive into a parking garage that lists rates on a sign that also warns, "Exact change required." Later when I go to leave I am asked for exact change at the exit. I say, "Well, I don't have exact change, but I do owe you money for parking here. Federal law says I can satisfy this debt with legal tender. So start counting the pennies, or just let me out!" I go into a store that says, "No bills larger than $20 accepted." While shopping I drink a soda and eat a few snacks. I go to check out and all I have is a $100 bill. Once again I say, "All I have is this $100 bill. I am in debt to you for the food I've already consumed, and this bill is legal tender for satisfaction of that debt. Either make change or thank you for the free snack." I get in a taxi, enjoy a meal in a restaurant, etc. All of these are paid after the service has been consumed. Are they not then debts that must be discharged if I offer legal tender?	If a business literally has an "exact change only" policy, that can't be enforced in post-pay situations. But if they have a "you are free to overpay, but we won't give you change back", that's different, especially if it's communicated from the beginning. If they tell you they don't give change, then you're taking their goods/services implicitly agreeing to their terms.	It will vary by jurisdiction. This is a complicated area of law, but usually an advertisement or a display of goods in a shop is not an "offer" (in the contract law sense of the term), but an invitation to treat (or "invitation to bargain" in the US). The "offer" is the shopper saying "I'd like one of those please" or putting the goods on the band for the till. The "acceptance" is the checkout girl saying "that'll be ..."	Is it legal to sell currency at a price lower than face value? Yes. In fact, to donate is the act of transferring for free the ownership of something. Outlawing a transaction that is less extreme than a donation would be inconsistent with the lawfulness of donations. A significant departure from the market exchange rate does not affect the validity of currency exchange. A "sale" of currency in terms of itself is not illegal, since the transaction can be viewed as a combination of two transactions performed instantaneously and involving the fiction of an intermediary currency. Offers of currency for less than face value also happen very often when transacting the bonds issued by a country's central bank. Any two parties can transact those bonds in secondary markets. The scenario you describe obviates redemption periods, fluctuation risks, and various formalities, but those differences are inconsequential from a legal standpoint.	Extrajudicial implies there is some weight of law behind the casino behaviors you describe. I don't think there is. For example, refusing to cash out chips could just be a management intimidation tactic to try to coerce the customer into agreeing to be "questioned." Which the customer would be under no legal obligation to do. Card counting can't be proven if the counter is not using a device of any kind. The casino can refuse to serve the customer and expel the customer but they can't unilaterally keep the customer's money by not cashing the customer's chips without a judgment. I am not an attorney. This answer is not legal advice.	According to United States federal law, 1 U.S. Code § 109 - Repeal of statutes as affecting existing liabilities: The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. The expiration of a temporary statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the temporary statute shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. So it depends on whether Congress expressly said what to do, and if they didn't say anything, it defaults to being able to still prosecute. But this only applies to federal laws, not state laws. There's also an exception to this. In United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934), the Supreme Court said that a prosecution for a violation of the National Prohibition Act could not be continued. However, this was a special case, as the constitutional provision (the 18th Amendment) that allowed the act in the first place had just been repealed (by the 21st Amendment).	The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement).	Yes. It is normal. Almost all credit card agreements are drafted in that way. Implicitly, however, changes in the credit card agreement must be prospective only and cannot alter rights that vested under prior versions of the agreement (e.g. charging a lower interest rate). A key factor is that a credit card agreement is terminable at will with respect to new transactions by either party by ceasing to make new transactions under the new terms, or ceasing to authorize further transactions under the old terms.	Generally not. Federal court uses a principle known as the enrolled bill rule -- in deference to the coequal status of the three branches of government, the "enrolled bill" (the thing printed on fancy paper that actually went to the President for signature) is irrebuttable evidence that the law was properly passed. The courts cannot deal with inquiries into whether legislative process was followed; it's the legislature's job to decide what the right process is. They can't even look into whether the same text passed both houses -- as a matter of law, the enrolled bill is conclusive evidence that it did. Senate rules are enforceable in the Senate. But the Senate is the body in charge of enforcing them, not the courts.
Amendment disallowing more amendments What would happen if a constitutional amendment were passed that forbade the passing of any more amendments? Would it be able to achieve that, or would something get in the way? I realize this would be practically impossible to pass, in addition to being a terrible idea. This is purely hypothetical.	Dale M's answer is not supported at all by history, or any mode of constitutional interpretation. I also don't find it likely. I'd say that if a duly ratified amendment said as much, that would be the law. It is certainly correct that the court could try to narrow the meaning. It's also possible to simply not follow the Constitution (as we do with state immunity and the 11th amendment). But to assume that would be done here is just speculating blindly. Of course, this question doesn't warrant much more attention than blind speculation, so my comment is not a very offensive accusation. As a few counter points, we have radically change the form of our government many times within the current constitution. Reconstruction, The New Deal and so on, all represented huge changes. Most importantly, the 17th amendment can easily be viewed as more radical than the question's proposed amendment. It completely flipped the political system upside down, orienting power in the people and the federal government, and treating the states as some weird intermediary: but we now see it as a relatively boring enactment. Certainly we could come to see the formal abolishment of the amendment process similarly, especially if it were (which it would need to be) accompanied with a new found comfort with non-textual interpretation to effectively "amend" through interpretation, i.e. If the textualists lost badly this amendment would seem like a relatively natural way of announcing their demise. Remember that Scalia's whole point, is that strict originalism (not saying he was actually so strict himself) would democratize by forcing change through the amendment process. If we rejected that notion (as deceptive, for example) we could (as in its not completely ridiculous to imagine) announce that rejection with the proposed amendment.	There are two ways to change a constitution: Through amendments to the current constitution. By starting a new constitution. When you start a new constitutional process from scratch, its legitimacy will not depend on the provisions of the old constitution. This process will develop outside the framework established by existing laws. You could say that the constitution is self-affirming: its legitimacy cannot come from any law because there are no laws higher than the constitution. From that point on everything could be (theoretically) possible as a way to legitimate the new constitution: a referendum (in the multiple varieties that it could be present), approval by an assembly, military intervention... The success or not of a new constitution would depend on the forces that support and oppose it.	Your assumption is incorrect -- the Bill of Rights proper does not apply to the states, and pre-14th Amendment only bound the federal government. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 US 243. States could do whatever they wanted, subject to federal legislation on the matters given to the federal government and subject to their own constitutions. After the Civil War, the federal government was much less OK with so-called "black codes," restricting the rights of freedmen based on explicitly racial distinctions, with not even a fig leaf of justification that it applied to all citizens. The federal government could prevent federal discrimination, but no tools existed to prevent state discrimination. Hence, the 14th Amendment, which bound the states to adopt certain standards in their lawmaking and let Congress take action against those that didn't.	The U.S. could pass a law directing Apple to create software for fair compensation. Similar statutes have been passed in wartime compelling companies to do all sorts of things and companies don't have all of the rights of individuals. If it can be done (not obvious in the case of existing products in the market place), it might be possible for the government to compel it to do so; if it can't be done, it can't be compelled and not all things are possible retroactively. There would also be a constitutional contracts clause issues with such a law impairing contracts between Apple and its customers when applied to existing phones retroactively. Whether it could require Apple to create a law enforcement back door depends upon whether 4th Amendment privacy rights trump the creation of a means to do so. There is an expectation of privacy in electronic records, but it is not absolute. But, there is no law on the books requiring this from Apple. It does not flow naturally from existing powers of law enforcement under existing statutes. It goes beyond what a subpoena would ordinarily require someone to do, and a subpoena is the main means by which governments compel people to provide information. In my opinion, a court faced with that question would rule that a statute requiring Apple to do this prospectively would be constitutional, but no such statute exists. However, this is currently an open legal question because there is no statute of the kind that have been litigated in a manner that produced a binding precedent.	None. The federal government is allowed to prohibit coffee drinking under its power to regulate interstate commerce. Prohibition would not have required a constitutional amendment under modern constitutional jurisprudence either. By analogy, this would be no different (constitutionally) than a law prohibiting putting lithium in sodas (something that used to be done in 7 Up) or putting cocaine in sodas (something that used to be done in Coca-Cola). Conceivably, the law might have to allow a religious exemption in certain circumstances under the 1st Amendment's free exercise clause, but while many faiths prohibit drinking coffee (most notably, offshoots of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints), none of which I am aware require it as a matter of religious doctrine sincerely espoused.	Religious protection from federal warrants is not a First Amendment issue. If protected at all, the best argument would be in RFRA, the federal statute implemented in 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1 et seq. It provides that the "Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion..." except if the burden "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." It is my guess that every court in the U.S. would agree that a search warrant issued upon probable cause is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and having an agent or two walk through the house (or whatever is necessary in order to exercise that warrant) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.	1911-1913 very shady time in USA political history. They could amend the Constitution to make a law Constitutional. There's nothing shady about that in the least. In fact, it is the point of constitutional amendments: to provide a mechanism to change the constitution when it prohibits something that an overwhelming majority of people -- well, of congress and of state legislatures -- think should be allowed. A constitutional amendment can reverse the provisions of Article I; it can reverse a constitutional ruling by a court (or at least reverse the ruling's effect); and it can certainly overcome arguments by Jefferson and Jackson, which have very little legal weight if any. Wasn't the whole point of the revolutionary war ... It doesn't matter what the point of the war was. What matters is that the constitution controls what the government can and can't do, and the constitution can change. The constitution countenanced slavery until it didn't. The constitution required senators to be chosen by state legislatures until it didn't. The constitution forbade income tax until it didn't.	Yes. Operating under those assumptions, this would be a First Amendment violation under controlling law in D.C. The starting point is Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977), which held that "denial of a pass potentially infringes upon first amendment guarantees." In that case, the Nixon White House refused to issue a press pass to a reporter for a liberal magazine, but refused to explain why beyond citing "reasons of security." The D.C. Circuit said that if the White House intended to open itself to the press, it needed to do so in ways that did not offend the First Amendment. White House press facilities having been made publicly available as a source of information for newsmen, the protection afforded newsgathering under the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press requires that this access not be denied arbitrarily or for less than compelling reasons. Not only newsmen and the publications for which they write, but also the public at large have an interest protected by the first amendment in assuring that restrictions on newsgathering be no more arduous than necessary, and that individual newsmen not be arbitrarily excluded from sources of information. Given these important first amendment rights implicated by refusal to grant White House press passes to bona fide Washington journalists, such refusal must be based on a compelling governmental interest. Clearly, protection of the President is a compelling, “even an overwhelming,” interest... However, this standard for denial of a press pass has never been formally articulated or published. Merely informing individual rejected applicants that rejection was for “reasons of security” does not inform the public or other potential applicants of the basis for exclusion of journalists from White House press facilities. Moreover, we think that the phrase “reasons of security” is unnecessarily vague and subject to ambiguous interpretation. Therefore, we are of the opinion that appellants must publish or otherwise make publicly known the actual standard employed in determining whether an otherwise eligible journalist will obtain a White House press pass. Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129–30 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In a nutshell, Sherrill is saying that when the government is granting press credentials to some and denying them to others, First Amendment principles require it to meet basic due-process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, those denied with an explanation for the denial and an opportunity to contest that denial. In this case, it's not clear whether the White House has provided Acosta with a hearing and notice at all, which would itself be a violation if that situation continues for too long. But even if it does, the White House could not use the procedure to punish Acosta for exercising the First Amendment principles that the procedure is designed to protect. If the opposite were true, i.e., Acosta "laid hands" on the intern, I'd guess that that would be enough to revoke his credentials, assuming the White House went through the appropriate procedure. Sherrill explicitly recognizes protecting the President and his family as a valid basis for denying access, and I assume the courts would extend that protection to White House staff, especially if the White House were to argue that an assault on staff suggests that the person can't be trusted around the president himself.
Is an independent contractor liable? If an independent contractor performs work or provides consulting services to another company, and that company suffers a loss (or deems to suffer a loss) due to the independent contractor, can they sue the independent contractor? What kind of measures can be taken to safeguard the IC from this? Is it better to be an employee or an IC of said company to avoid this type of liability?	Yes, independent contractors are liable for their acts and omissions The contract between the contractor and the principal should set out what the contractor is expected to do and the standard to which they are expected to do it. If the contract does not set this out then they will be required to perform to the standard of a reasonable person doing that sort of work plus any statutory requirements. So, if they are a plumber, then they are required to install the plumbing to the applicable building codes and to the standard that a reasonably competent plumber would do so. If they fail to do the work or fail to do it to the required standard then they are liable for any damages the principal suffers as a result. Further, an independent contractor is liable for any tort that they may commit against a third party. So, to continue the plumber example, if the plumber negligently installs pipe for a builder and that pipe breaks damaging a tenant's goods (i.e someone outside the contractual chain), then that tenant can sue the plumber for negligence but cannot sue the builder or landlord. Employees are the same but also different Employers are vicariously liable to third parties for the acts and omissions of their employees except where they are on a frolic of their own (i.e. doing something that is clearly outside the scope of their employment). At common law, the employee is also liable to the third party and the employer, however, such claims are rarely pursued because a) where there is insurance, the employee is also covered b) the employee may lack the assets to meet the damages and so be "judgement proof" c) it's really bad PR and d) many jurisdictions prohibit it by statute (e.g. new-south-wales). Protection for an independent contractor Insurance Public & product liability certainly. Motor vehicle insurance if applicable. Professional indemnity insurance if the work is of a "professional" nature, that is, involves providing advice rather than just goods and services. Protection for an employee Insurance Check that your employer has the right insurance and that it covers their employees. Is it better to be an employee or an IC of said company to avoid this type of liability? Like you have a choice. The nature of the relationship will determine if you are an IC or an employee. If you are clearly running an independent business then you are an independent contractor. If you are clearly a wage or salary earner then you are an employee. If it's unclear, you are still one or the other and you don't get to choose. See Indepdendent/Contractor vs Regular Employee	If your friend was a salaried W2 full time exempt employee hired by the company to, among other things, write software like this, then the fact that it was developed "off the clock" with the employee's own resources means nothing once he gives it to the company. I mean if I give you a present and it blows up and breaks your arm, I'm still liable even if we didn't have a "contract" - especially if I knew it would blow up. Your friend's position is even worse since the relationship entails the employee's having the employer's best interests in mind. If I were your friend, I'd either figure out how to fix this or take gnasher729's advice from the comments and find a country where it's easy to hide from parties public and private. Maybe buy a bunch of canned food and go live on a boat?	That is, you don't even have to give them a copy of the contract. In the same way you might reference some legal code without actually copying the legal code directly into the contract. If you do not communicate material terms of the contract to your contractor, the contract will be unenforceable due to lack of meeting of minds. Referencing "some legal code", provided that that code is publicly available is fine: your contractor can look it up and decide if they are happy with it. But doing the same with "Independent Contractor Agreement #123" will only work if you provide a copy of it to your contractor. For example, it can be attached to the paper being signed as a Schedule. So, in a nut shell, abstracting prose out is fine as long as it is communicated/attached.	If it is a business expense, yes It depends on the nature of the "job". If you run a business based in the UK and the job is a contract to your business, then the costs involved in performing the work are tax deductible. If you are an employee and the base location of your job is in France, then these are personal expenses and not tax deducatable.	What happened is that you created a legal mess. You are obviously on the hook for copyright infringement. The maintainers of the project will scramble to replace your code with newly written code. They will likely ask your company which code they are complaining about - that puts your company into the problematic situation that they shouldn't identify code that isn't theirs, that it will be hard to sue for infringing code when they didn't give the project maintainers a chance to fix it, and that everything they identify will be replaced. Since it is your actions that caused the trouble, anyone suffering damages from your actions can sue you.	Was the technician negligent? Just because he broke the oven, doesn't mean that he negligently broke the oven. In breaking the oven, he would have to have done something that a reasonable technician would not have done. Even if he was negligent, is the liability for his negligence excluded by the contract you signed when you hired him? And, if so, is such a limitation allowed under local law? In many parts of the USA, the answer is yes. In either circumstance, the technician is liable for nothing. Notwithstanding, assuming the technician is liable, there is little doubt they are liable for the cost of the repair. They are unlikely to be liable for the cost of providing access as, by the contract, you are responsible for providing this.	Is this how it works? Am I supposed to pay the full quote regardless? No. The contractor is plain wrong. Your agreed commitment to obtain materials directly from the retailer supersedes the initial agreement that totaled 30K. In other words, you two amended the contract. Since then, your obligations under the amended contract were to provide the materials he requested and to pay for labor costs. the contractor is insisting on the full amount, claiming that had I not paid the material I wouldn't have known the difference in cost and he was taking the risk with the quote. That is inaccurate. Once he delegated to you the task of obtaining materials directly from retailer, he exempted himself from any and all risks of giving an inaccurate estimate of the cost of materials. In fact, he shifted to you that risk.	An employer doesn't have the authority to authorize its employees to violate the law. An employee who personally participates in a crime has both criminal and civil liability for the employee's actions. Private sector employers have vicarious respondeat superior civil liability for the actions of their employees taken in the scope of their duties. In other words, anything that an employee of a private sector employer is liable for, the employer is also liable for. Governmental employers do not have vicarious respondeat superior civil liability for the civil rights violations of the employees. Direct civil as opposed to vicarious civil liability, and criminal liability for an employer (governmental or private) is generally limited to acts carried out by employees of the entity at the direction of senior management or pursuant to a policy, explicit or implicit, of the employer. This said, it is the nature of large employers to break tasks into component parts spread over many employees in different parts of the employing entity. In some circumstances, an individual employee's role may be such that the employee lacks sufficient information about the overall course of action of the employer to know that their actions are part of an overall course of conduct by the employer that constitutes a crime or tort. For example, to retreat to an old school example, suppose that there is an employee who sits in front of a shredding machine all day and feeds paper into and clears paper jams, etc. whose job is to shred whatever documents are put in a bin next to his work station. This guy, who makes no decisions regarding what is to be shredded and has no real knowledge of why documents are being shredded, probably doesn't have criminal or civil liability if his labor is used to illegal destroy some documents. For all the shredder guy knows, he could simply be destroying redundant copies of documents to free up space in the filing cabinets while a single archival copy is retained. Typically, criminal laws require some level of mens rea (i.e. intent) which may be intent to do something in particular, it may be knowledge of certain facts, or what have you. An employee is generally only going to face criminal liability is the employee who carries out the wrongful act on behalf of the employer does so with the requisite knowledge and intent set forth in the criminal statute.
How can the US House of Representatives transition to be elected by proportional representation? Would editing "PL 2 USC 2c" work? Here is context for my question: I am a student studying political science. I am researching policy that could be used to dismantle the stranglehold that the Democratic and Republican parties have on American elections. In some ways it seems that our national electoral system is engineered for the success of only these two parties. In recent years, some ideas have been floated to make third party campaigns more viable, such as ranked choice voting. However, maybe I think these ideas don't go far enough to dismantle the two-party system. Let's say I have one objective: Transition the United States House of Representatives to be elected by a system of proportional representation. This applies only to the US House, not the Senate, not state assemblies, not anything else. Just the House of Representatives. (Here is my understanding of proportional representation, I would love more insight: Proportional representation is an electoral system used by democracies all around the world, but not by the United States. We use a "first-past-the-post" system to elect representatives. In proportional representation, everyone within a state would vote for a party, not a candidate. Let's say, in the state of Colorado, the Democratic Party gets 35% of the vote, the Republican Party gets 35%, the Libertarian Party gets 15%, and the Green Party gets 15%. Each of those parties would get a number of Colorado's US House seats proportional to their share of the vote. For example, the Libertarian Party would get 15% of the seats.) So my objective is to transition the House of Representatives to a system of proportional representation. To my understanding, our "first-past-the-post" system is federally reinforced, since "PL 2 USC 2c" mandates that representatives be elected via single-member districts. As far as I know, as long as these single-member districts exist, we cannot have proportional representation. What is "PL 2 USC 2c?" What does it mean? What does it legally mandate? What is the legislative process for overturning or editing an article of public code like "PL 2 USC 2c?" Can it be edited to let states choose how to elect their representatives, so that proportional representation can be implemented on a state-by-state basis? Are there Constitutional obstacles to proportional representation and specifically to editing "PL 2 USC 2c" in this way? Obviously, in practice, these proposals would be met with resistance from legislators, and accomplishing this would be a bureaucratic nightmare. I am not interested in hearing about those kinds of obstacles, I am simply wondering if this can be accomplished legally. Thank you all so much.	In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress or in any subsequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative (except that a State which is entitled to more than one Representative and which has in all previous elections elected its Representatives at Large may elect its Representatives at Large to the Ninety-first Congress). 2 United States Code § 2c. What is "PL 2 USC 2c?" First of all, it is 2 U.S.C. § 2c, not "PL 2 USC 2c" which mixes two ways of citing to statutes PL for "Public Law" is used with a public law number to identify the Act of Congress by which a provision was enacted (and sometimes additional Public laws amend a statute). 2 U.S.C. § 2c means "Section "2c" of the Second Title of the United States Code" which is a codification of all public acts passed by Congress and still in force of general applicability. What does it mean? What does it legally mandate? 2 U.S.C. § 2c mandates that for years after the effective date, when a state with two or more members of Congress draws Congressional Districts after a U.S. Census that it must do so into single member districts. It does not mandate a "first past the post" voting system (also called a plurality vote system) and indeed, some states (e.g. Louisiana) have a system in which a winner in a Congressional district must receive a majority to win in the first round, and if that does not happen there will be a runoff between the top two finishers in the first round, and one state (Maine) has ranked choice voting in single member district Congressional races. There is some dispute over whether systems like ranked choice voting count as proportional representation. They do not cause political parties to receive seats in proportion to the number of votes cast for them. But they do eliminate spoiler effects which strongly discourage the formation of third-parties in the U.S. What is the legislative process for overturning or editing an article of public code like "PL 2 USC 2c?" It can be changed by an ordinary law passed by majorities in the U.S. House and U.S. Senate in identical form and not vetoed, or vetoed and then overridden by a two-thirds majority in each house of Congress within the time allowed by the U.S. Constitution. Can it be edited to let states choose how to elect their representatives, so that proportional representation can be implemented on a state-by-state basis? Yes. Generally one says that one "amends" a statute, however, rather than "editing" it. Are there Constitutional obstacles to proportional representation and specifically to editing "PL 2 USC 2c" in this way? No. As long as proportional representative is only within the Congressional seats allocated to a particular state, there is no Constitutional obstacle. But, a national scale proportional representation system would pose constitutional issues. 2 U.S.C. 2c was enacted in order to end the previously common practice of having multi-member districts in which you could vote for as many candidates as there were seats available at large, with the highest X vote getters in the X member district winning. When people vote on party lines, that causes the party with majority support to get all of the seats in the multi-member district much as the plurality winner in a state in all but two U.S. states in Presidential elections gets 100% of the electoral college votes in a state. But, the drafters of 2 U.S.C. 2c underestimated the potential for gerrymandering to circumvent the benefits of having single member districts.	Yes, the President can certainly veto such a law. Per the US Constitution (emphasis added): Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. This can have a very real effect: legislators are under no obligation to vote the same way on a veto override as on the original bill. The reason the President needs to supply written objections in the first place is that it lets legislators reconsider, see if they're swayed, or see if they think this is a matter where a Congressional majority needs to be respected even if they disagree (they can change their mind in either direction). They can also get a sense of public reaction. And because the threshold for this is "present and voting," it's possible that just more legislators show up. Even if legislators won't be swayed, it still matters for pocket vetoes. That's where the President neither signs the bill nor returns it within 10 days; normally this is equivalent to signing, but if Congress adjourns in the meantime, it means the bill does not become a law. Because "Congress adjourns" is a necessary part of a pocket veto, it's impossible to override the veto (you can't do it if you're not in session). And even when this doesn't apply either, it matters for politics. Example of a futile veto: Public Law 100-4. Passed 406-8 in the House, 93-6 in the Senate. Vetoed; veto was overridden 401-26 in the House and 86-14 in the Senate (note that at least 7 Senators who voted for the bill voted not to override the veto). Example of an effective veto: While technically there was a conference report agreed to by both houses, and it doesn't seem to have had a roll-call vote (my guess is it was agreed to by unanimous consent; side note: many, many laws don't have roll-calls to check on, because they're passed by voice vote or unanimous consent), H.R.10929 from the 95th Congress was passed in the House by a vote of 319-67 and in the Senate by 87-2. After President Carter vetoed it, the House voted on whether to override the veto. The motion to override was defeated 191-206: after the veto, they couldn't even get a simple majority to override the veto of the bill which had been passed by an overwhelming supermajority. I mentioned it above, but the two-thirds threshold is "present and voting." As a general rule, any time you see a fraction of something needed for a vote to succeed in a deliberative assembly, then unless it specifies some other denominator, it's talking about the fraction of members present and voting. Relevant CRS report on override procedure.	Title 52, section 30121 of the US Code is the section regulating election spending by foreign nationals. Specifically, it forbids both making and accepting said contributions, as well as banning independent expenditures: (a) Prohibition It shall be unlawful for- (1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make- (A) a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election; (B) a contribution or donation to a committee of a political party; or (C) an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an electioneering communication (within the meaning of section 30104(f)(3) of this title); or (2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive a contribution or donation described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) from a foreign national. (1) would get you. (2) would get Trump. Extradition may be difficult, but you have committed a US crime if Trump takes that contribution, and if you do turn up in the US then the US might prosecute you for it (they almost certainly won't, but they could).	Not less than a full house of Congress, and perhaps Congress as a whole, might have standing. It is hard to see anyone else who would. The law of Congressional standing (the link is to a report of the Congressional Research Service, a policy research arm of the Library of Congress that does research for Congress) is quite involved and is not perfectly consistent and clear. Congress would argue that it has suffered an institutional injury as an institution and perhaps authorize someone to bring suit on its behalf via a joint resolution. As the Court explained in Arizona State Legislature, an “institutional injury” is an injury that “scarcely zeroe[s] in on any individual member,” but rather “impact[s] all Members of Congress and both Houses . . . equally.” There is considerable uncertainty regarding how this would be applied which is not really at issue in this case at the present time since Democrats control both houses of Congress and support the President in this policy. Individuals legislators lack standing to sue in a case like this one. See also Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, "Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court", 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571 (2014); Matthew L. Hall, "Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation", 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1539 (2012). A blog entry from a law professor considers the question and comes up with the Congressional standing analysis above, the notion that a loan serving company paid on the dollar value of the loans serviced might have standing (which isn't inconceivable but is a stretch), and finally considers "competitor standing", a minority view that I do not think is sound in these circumstances (because the forgiveness is retroactive only and does not change competitive positions going forward).	If the U.S. adds a new territory, are the people currently living there able to become president? No. Or does the territory have to become a state in order for the people to be eligible to become president? Not necessarily. What does "natural-born citizen" mean? The meaning of the natural born citizen clause of the constitution is unclear in many respects, but virtually all scholars agree that a person who was a US citizen at birth, and who has remained a US citizen until present, is a natural-born citizen. There is a small minority of scholars who insist that a US citizen at birth is only a natural-born citizen if they were born in the US (for example, Ted Cruz would not be considered a natural-born citizen). There is an even smaller minority who insist that a person must have at least one US citizen parent in order to be a natural-born citizen. But for all practical purposes, these minority viewpoints are irrelevant. The only thing that matters is whether someone was a US citizen when they were born. Citizenship of people living in US territories When a US territory is created, the people living there don't automatically become US citizens, and if Congress eventually gives them US citizenship, the canon of presumption against retroactivity applies: a statute should not be read to be retroactive unless there is evidence that it was intended to apply retroactively. That means the people who get US citizenship under the statute don't become natural-born citizens; they're considered to have been automatically naturalized when the statute went into effect. But if there's a statute saying that people born in the territory are US citizens at birth, then people born in the territory after the effective date of that statute are natural-born citizens, since they are citizens at birth. I will use Hawaii as an example. Hawaii became a territory in 1898. Citizenship was granted in 1900. Statehood was not granted until 1959. 8 USC §1405 governs the citizenship of people born in Hawaii: A person born in Hawaii on or after August 12, 1898, and before April 30, 1900, is declared to be a citizen of the United States as of April 30, 1900. A person born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900, is a citizen of the United States at birth. A person who was a citizen of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898, is declared to be a citizen of the United States as of April 30, 1900. So, Hawaiians didn't become US citizens when Hawaii was annexed. They were granted US citizenship 2 years later. A person born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900 is a natural born citizen. Applying the presumption against retroactivity, we see that a person who was born in Hawaii between August 12, 1898 and April 29, 1900, or who was a citizen of independent Hawaii when it was annexed by the United States, was not a natural born citizen and could not have become President. In addition to the presumption against retroactivity, there is also another canon of construction that applies here: Congress could have used the "is a citizen of the United States at birth" language for the other two categories of Hawaiians too, but chose to omit it. Presumably, Congress acted purposefully in doing so, with the intent of granting citizenship at birth to only one of the three categories. (I can't remember whether this canon has a name.) Can Congress grant natural-born citizen status retroactively? If the US were to acquire a new territory and saw fit to bestow citizenship retroactively to birth on some natives of that territory, would those people be eligible for the presidency? No one knows the answer to that question. As an example of when Congress has granted citizenship retroactively, the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 created 8 USC §1401(h), which granted citizenship retroactively to birth to individuals who had been born outside the US to a US citizen mother and alien father prior to May 24, 1934. This act was necessary because, prior to that date, only US citizen fathers could transmit citizenship, not US citizen mothers. A person granted citizenship under this statute would be over the age of 89 now, so we're unlikely to see one run for president. It's an open question whether someone who obtained US citizenship through this statute would be considered eligible for the presidency. One could argue that "natural-born citizen" implies a person who actually was a citizen when they were born and that retroactive grants of citizenship are a mere legal fiction that cannot override the meaning of the constitution.	The First Amendment protects your right to financially support whatever viewpoint you want to express, which can include supporting law-making. However, various laws prevent you from paying elected officials to act in a particular way, therefore a financial reward for a "yes" vote or a "no" vote on an issue would be illegal. If the offer (to Congressmen / legislators) is "vote yes on this and we will give you $100,000", that is prohibited. Your proposal seems to be for a constitutional amendment enacted under Art V, which means that the House and Senate have both adopted the amendment as a joint resolution, such as this one, or this one which was actually passed. This is the resolution that sent the ERA to the states. It is reported that Alice Paul and Crystal Eastman wrote the ERA in the 20's – they were not in the House or Senate. Your proposal would need to distinguish authorship from "being the one to introduce". It would probably be illegal to pay a Senator / Representative to bring a resolution to the floor; it would not be illegal to pay an individual to write a law. It is not clear whether you would have to excludes members of Congress from being said author's, and the probability is zero that the original author's text would be adopted without modification (i.e. you'd have to come up with a "profit-sharing" plan). It is also unclear what legal actions could be take against you for collecting money for a clearly unattainable purpose (identifying "the unique person who write the text").	TL;DNR: Madison, Hamilton, Justice Harlan & Justice Scalia agree with you. Justice Black does not. You raise an interesting question. As you point out, the Qualifications Clause, Art I, § 2.1, (those who vote for the House of Representatives “in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature”) gives states the power to establish voter qualifications. Yet 18 U.S.C. § 611, passed as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, (the IIRIRA) makes it illegal for most aliens to vote in federal elections. What gives? First, the IIRIRA is purely symbolic. It literally has no effect on who can vote in the US. For almost a century, every state has prohibited aliens from voting in state elections. Under the Qualifications Clause, this means no aliens can vote in federal elections. (Before WWI, many states allowed aliens to vote.) Second, some people argue Congress has control over voter qualifications under the "Elections Clause," Art. I, § 4.1, which gives Congress the power to regulate the "Times Places and Manners of holding elections." Like Dale M, these people read, "Manners of holding elections” to include the qualifications for voting. This reading of the Elections Clause is inconsistent with several of the sources of constitutional authority Americans typically consult, including the text, the intent of the Founder and precedent. All of these support the “Qualifications Clause” reading of the Constitution. 1) Constitutional Text: Reading the Elections Clause as giving Congress control over voter qualifications, renders the Qualifications Clause almost completely meaningless. Yet everyone agrees the Constitution should be read so that all its parts mean something – no part should be rendered superfluous. 2) Intent of the Founders: When the Founders debated voting qualifications, they were clearly worried that politicians would manipulate the electoral rules to favor them. The Founders believed the Qualifications Clause kept both national and state politicians from stacking the electoral deck. First, by giving the power of deciding who could vote to the states, the Clause prevented national politicians from choosing their own electorate. Secondly, by requiring the states to use the same qualifications for voters in state and national elections, the Clause prevented state politicians from manipulating the rules in national elections. As for the Electoral Clause, in Federalist 60, Hamilton was clear who controlled voter qualifications: “The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen…are unalterable by the [federal] legislature…” 3) Precedent and practice: For most of our history, people acted consistently with Hamilton’s statement. They tolerated a wide variation in who was allowed to vote across states. As noted above, many of those states specifically allowed aliens to vote. (And, starting in 1787 with the passage of the Northwest Ordinance, Congress passed a series of laws allowing aliens to vote in territories.) When Americans did make nationwide changes to voting qualifications, they did so by amending the Constitution. There are only a handful of Supreme Court decisions involving federal control over voting qualifications. In 1970 the Supreme Court upheld a federal law changing the voting age to 18. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Black, relied on the Elections Clause to say that Congress had the power to change voting requirements. None of the other Justices shared Black's views on the Elections Clause. Instead, they agreed with Justice Harlan, who said, “nothing” in the Constitution, “lends itself to the view that voting qualifications in federal elections are to be set by Congress.” (These Justices used the Equal Protection Clause as the basis for federal control over voter qualifications.) Since then, no Justice has followed Justice Black. Instead, they have followed Justice Harlan. For example, in 2013, Justice Scalia, (in an opinion joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy, Roberts, and Sotomayor) said, “the Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in them.” From this evidence, I’d say you were right to be puzzled about the constitutional authority for the IIRIRA. A federal law preventing aliens from voting in federal elections undermines the text of the constitution by rendering the Qualifications Clause superfluous, goes against the clear intent of the Founders, and is inconsistent with 200+ years of history and precedent. It only survives because it has no practical effect on voting in the US.	The 14th amendment guarantees equal protection under the law for all citizens of the US. It's my understanding that this means from the Federal Government, and doesn't exactly apply when it's a "states' rights" kind of issue. Your understanding is incorrect. The primary original purpose of the 14th amendment was to prevent states from passing laws that treated former slaves differently from other citizens, and indeed to clearly declare that they were in fact citizens, thus reversing the decision in Dred Scot v Sandford 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). That decision held that black people could not be US citizens and had no rights granted to citizens under the US Federal Constitution. Of course the amendment is applied in a much wider scope than merely granting citizenship to the former slaves freed by the 13th amendment. The Equal Protection Clause** generally requires that laws not make arbitrary and unjustified distinctions between people, nor treat different people in the same legal situation differently. The clause does not, however, prevent laws from treating who are in some significant legal sense in different positions differently. What is and is not a violation of the clause has been the subject of many legal cases and much debate. The clause requires "state action" to be invoked. and is generally only applies to state and local governments, and those in their employ or acting on their behalf. However, the US Supreme Court held in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) that the 5th amendment imposes a similar requirement of equal protection on the Federal government. The amendment, and the equal protection clause, do not guarantee any particular outcome in judicial cases. It is not clear from the question what equal protection issue, if any, might be at issue in the particular matter described. If the issue is one of treatment under the laws of a country other than the US, even though the people involved are US citizens, the US constitution, including the amendment will not apply.
How can a different company make a sequel if the original game company goes bankrupt? Say a game company goes bankrupt but another company wants to make a sequel. Is it possible for the other company to obtain rights to make a sequel? Who would they even contact about this?	A company does not cease to exist simply because it goes bankrupt. The company may wind down its operations, but it may just go through a process of restructuring its debts. If the company is merely restructuring, the bankruptcy would not probably not have much effect on its ownership of intellectual property such as copyright and trademark rights. So it would retain those interests in the video game, and the company making the sequel would need to obtain licenses from the original company. If the original company is going through bankruptcy in anticipation of shutting down completely, you can expect it to sell off all its assets, which would include its copyright and trademark interests in the game. In that case, the company making the sequel could either attempt to purchase those rights itself, or it would need to obtain a license from whoever does buy those rights.	I find the "is collapsing" statement troubling. Companies grow, shrink, and restructure all the time. Nelnet might be coming apart, or somebody might be trying to generate clicks for a news story. The normal situation, when a company goes into bankrupcty proceedings, is that a trustee tries to recover as much of the assets as possible to pay out creditors. This would suggest an increased, not decreased, attempt to collect repayments.	Not only can’t you trademark it, you can’t use it The original logo is covered by copyright which belongs, prima facie, to the original artist. It doesn’t matter that they are based in Russia; Russia and the US are both signatories to the Berne Convention which means they protect each other’s copyright. That means you can only use it if it is fair use (it isn’t) or if you have the copyright owner’s permission (you don’t). Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Not if the seller didn’t have permission to make those changes. Creation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights copyright gives. The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. See above. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. They already have copyright. They would need to register it in the US before they could sue but there is no impediment to them doing so. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bounded by any terms of the stock photo website Makes no difference. Just because you didn’t steal the car, that doesn’t make it ok for you to drive it. The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. Not relevant at all. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image. You can’t sell something you don’t own. If the seller had no right to upload the photo (as it seems they didn’t), the terms of the website don’t matter. The true owner never agreed to those terms and isn’t bound by them.	The first thing that has to be done (in court, or via lawyer-to-lawyer communication) is that The Company has to prove that they own the copyright. If they accomplish that, you can defend yourself by providing proof of a license to download and redistribute. From what I can tell, you cannot directly prove that, since the rights-holder did not give you the license. The issue is that a third party cannot impose a license on a work simply by putting it out there with a file that claims to be a license from the artist. So this brings in the Free Music Archive: they presumably have some evidence that the rights holder did indeed grant the alleged license, and may be able to provide proof. Your argument may be credible, in the sense that you had a good-faith belief that the item was so licensed, and the website would provide a basis for concluding that that belief is reasonable. If the work was licensed, then the some rights holder would know that, but not necessarily the current one. Assume the artist made a recording, transferred the rights to Company A, who later sold the rights to Company B who is now coming after you. Artist may have licensed it when it was his, and forgot to tell A. A may have licensed it when they sold the license to B. Artist may have improperly licensed it after he sold the work to A (under the "I wrote it, I have the right to do whatever I want" non-legal theory). A might have improperly licensed the work after selling the right to B (maybe by mistakenly including it in a package deal, i.e. via bookkeeping error, rather than ignorance of the law). Or, they may simply have forgotten. If this is a DMCA takedown notice, the notice-giver could just be abusing the system. But we don't know how you were contacted, so I'll leave DMCA out of this for now.	For works released after 1989, Copyright notices don't have any legal consequences in the United States. They are just a friendly reminder of who created the work and that they take their copyrights seriously. But those notices are not required anymore to enforce your copyrights on the works you created. If you have proof that you own the copyright on something and when it was created, and if it's still within the term limits, then you can take legal actions against people who violate your copyright. Disney has a history of repeated worldwide lobbying for extending the expiration durations in copyright laws in order to avoid any of their classic cartoons from falling out of copyright protection. So it could be that they try to intentionally muddy the waters and make it harder to find out which of their works expire when. That way people are less sure about what Disney works are and are not in the public domain, making it more risky to use them. But that's just my theory.	The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed.	am I required to send the stuff back? No, but you should be able to prove that you met the conditions of the original contract between you two. There is no gift. There is a compensation that forms part of the contract between the offeror and you. The offeror's preference to call it a "gift" does not change the legal fact that his offer and your acceptance to complete Nightwave Season 2 constitutes the formation of a contract. From that standpoint, you are entitled to keep the items he mailed to you as long as you honor your part in that contract. You are right by conjecturing that a party is not allowed to unilaterally alter a contract. Any modification has to be agreed upon by all parties to that contract. However, a consent or agreement may be inferred from the parties' subsequent conduct. Hence the best way to pre-empt or supersede any such inference consists of letting that party know that you disapprove of the belated alteration(s). The absence of a written agreement can only complicate matters, though, since it appears that neither party has an objective, directly credible way to prove the terms of the original contract. Perhaps such terms can be deduced from the subsequent emails that he has been sending you, but that is impossible to ascertain without knowing the wording of the subsequent communications between you two. Lastly, enforceability of your contract is less clear if completing Nightwave Season 2 through someone else's performance amounts to an unlawful act. Not being knowledgeable of the terms and conditions of that game (?), I am unable to state with certainty whether the offeror could lawfully recover from you the items he mailed.	The board rules. Companies usually go to great lengths to be sure the company owns the IP developed within and for the company. But the company is governed by its board of directors and that board can decide to take the company in a new direction where some IP that the company owns would no longer be a key asset for ongoing business. Selling that IP to another organization might, then, be logical. Boards are elected by, and represent, the owners of the company.
Legality of second-hand selling and swapping I was wondering if there are any restrictions in some parts of the world to sell second-hand/share items such as books/CDs due to copyright/intellectual properties? I'm asking because I know that in my country selling such items or giving it to people is legal because it is just considered as selling one copy of your personal item and not copying the info inside of it.	Under U.S. copyright law, the First Sale Doctrine protects such conduct. As the U.S. Justice Department explains: The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. The right to distribute ends, however, once the owner has sold that particular copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) & (c). U.S. law with respect to the First Sale Doctrine is typical, and copyright law is fairly uniform internationally due to some relevant intellectual property treaties. But there are hundreds of countries in the world, and some of them might not include the First Sale Doctrine in their jurisprudence. For example, I do not know how this would be handled under the laws of the People's Republic of China, or under Islamic law.	If you do not have permission to make and distribute reproductions of the work, then it is illegal to make and distribute reproductions of the work. US copyright law Indian copyright law	There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order.	Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer.	Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...".	If someone gave a gift than requested it back is it legal? The request itself is legal, but that does not mean that you have to comply with it. I never promised anything that tied to the tablet. So I'm not sure if it counts as a conditional gift. It does not. An unconditional gift (which initially you did not even want) fails to meet the elements of a cognizable doctrine such as contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, or unjust enrichment. he says he will report the tablet as stolen if I don't return it He might get in trouble if he does that, since he knows or should know that the tablet was never stolen. He gave it away despite your initial refusal(s). As such, he might incur false reporting of a crime.	TLDR: it's illegal to BUY it. It's illegal to USE it. Know your suppliers. That's certainly an interesting question, in light of how the market has changed in recent years, particularly due to Amazon/eBay, but even moreso due to Amazon Fulfillment and competitors. Over on diy.se, this is a constant vexation, because we see people buy crud like this all the time, and they need help installing it. And we find it's illegal to install, not even safe, and needs to be sent back in lieu of listed product. The advanced nations do have a highly effective apparatus for screening and blocking dangerous goods. However, these protections are geared toward bricks-and-mortar retail. Can you count on something bought at Wickes, Redoute or Home Depot? By and large, yes. Is it legal to export it to you? Yes, for all practical purposes. The people selling it are in an unreachable bastion in a foreign country that would not cooperate with their extradition, and would interfere with investigation. The government knows perfectly well that the stuff is complete crud, and doing so aligns with its national policies of raising hard currency and building industrial capacity, while harming the capacity of other nations. Is it legal for the item to be listed on Amazon or eBay? Amazon and eBay say "Yes". Their position is that they are merely a platform which connects buyers and sellers. They surely have excellent lawyers. Amazon is more like eBay than you might realize. Amazon opened their retail site to third party sellers. Third parties can sign up as additional sellers of a particular SKU, or write their own product listings. Since Amazon's behavior has been unchallenged, the answer seems to be "yes". Is it legal for Amazon to bring it into their warehousing systems? Amazon also opened their warehousing system to third party use. That can be for companies that don't sell on Amazon... or it can be for companies that do both Amazon and off-Amazon sales; in the latter case you order elsewhere but Amazon fulfills (ships) the item. When a company both sells the item on Amazon and it ships from an Amazon warehouse, it qualifies for "Prime" shipping where Amazon offers that. Amazon also offers "Commingling" for established SKUs. The idea is that if you have widgets in the Madrid warehouse, and I have widgets in a Warsaw warehouse... and a Madrid customer buys mine - why not ship them yours since they are all the same? I get credit for the sale and Amazon "owes you one". When you get a sale in Madrid, Amazon has one in Barcelona so they ship that one to your customer. Commingling is great, but what happens when I inject a pallet full of those SKUs - and they're counterfeits? Amazon doesn't know the difference, and your Warsaw customer gets my counterfeit. So do Amazon's Berlin and Wroclaw customers. Amazon ships them around the network to balance the warehouses, and now my counterfeit has contaminated the supply. I'm sitting in China. Whatcha gonna do about it? Again, Amazon has top lawyers, who have surely done their diligence. Still, the program is ambitious, and e-commerce giants break the law all the time with their ambitions. In the US, there's the "Express Shipment" rule, which allows small orders ($800 or less) with no duty and an informal entry process. So they ship to Mexican warehouses, and then bring the items over by the truckload. Wait, how can a truckload be less than $800? Because they don't bring it over until there's an end-user customer order, and they argue "these are for individual customers". This qualifies them to breeze through customs, bypassing the quality and safety controls that prevent Home Depot from doing the exact same thing with a truckload that hasn't found customers yet. Is it legal for you (as the end consumer) to import it? No. The rules for Conformité Européenne are that the importer is responsible. When you as an end customer buy mail-order from China, you are the importer. Under EU law, if you bring a CE-marked item into the EU, you are responsible for meeting the CE design standards, and doing in-house lab testing to affirm the performance of the product. By having the CE mark on the thing you imported, you are attesting to having done that. Further, the various nations may require that a certified independent testing lab verify your testing and claims. This was historically done by national testing labs like BSI, TUV, CSA or UL. However by treaty they are largely cross-recognized: US OSHA keeps a canonical list of "Nationally (by USA) Recognized Testing Labs" (NRTLs) that every other agency and many other countries defer to. Big Clive is probably fine, since Clive's purpose is public ridicule, not usage. Is it legal for you to install it in your house? Oh, heck no. Every nation has rules as to what certifications equipment must meet to legally be installed in a building's electrical system. For instance North America's El NEC, widely adopted or copied, has 110.2: 110.2 Approval. The conductors [wires] and equipment required or permitted by this Code shall be acceptable only if approved. "Approved" means by competent testing labs; i.e. OSHA's list of NRTLs. So no, you can't install non-approved equipment in any jurisdiction with a similar rule (and you pretty much need such a rule for inspections to have any teeth).	It should not surprise you that copyright protects the right to (among other things) make copies. There are limited exceptions that are considered "fair use", like if you reproduce a limited amount of text for educational, reporting, or review purposes. Giving your friend a copy of a large portion of the text just because they want it would almost certainly violate copyright. Whether the book is available or out-of-print has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on who holds the copyright or whether your actions violate it. This is very different from giving your friend the book itself. The book itself is covered under the "first sale doctrine", meaning that by buying a copy of the book, you buy the right to sell, transfer, or dispose of that particular copy, but it doesn't give you the right to make more copies. I will note that in practice, it is vanishingly unlikely that the copyright holder would ever learn of your isolated instance of limited infringement in the first place (especially since it's out of print), much less bring legal action against you for making a single copy that did not affect their bottom line.
Can one "donate" to enter a prize draw? If someone incites donations by including donors into a prize draw, is it still donation? Or is it contract? Gambling maybe? Passport: Back to Our Roots is doing that: "Everyone who donates will be entered into a prize draw to win entry for themselves and a friend". Basically, if you want to attend a gig you can try winning "entry" by entering the draw — which you can do by either donating, or "for free by post". The hitch is that the gigs "will happen when it’s safe for gigs to happen properly" — which may happen later than sooner, if at all. Does that sound like a scheme for gig organisers to avoid having to refund / being held to account? Is it legal-proof? If someone wins entry (having paid a "donation") but the organisers never deem it safe for the gig to happen, will the donor be entitled to a refund?	Free draws are outside the remit of the Gambling Act 2005 per this guidance from the Gambling Commission (section 4 from page 5 onwards). an arrangement is a lottery only if the participants are required to pay to enter. Therefore, free draws always have been and remain exempt from statutory control. Schedule 2 to the Act gives details of what is to be treated as amounting to ‘payment to enter’ for the purposes of distinguishing free draws from lotteries. Given that there is an alternative route (sending a letter by post) to entering the prize draw, it can be regarded as a "free draw" and is not considered gambling. To answer the other questions: Does that sound like a scheme for gig organisers to avoid having to refund / being held to account? Is it legal proof? No. It seems entirely pragmatic to be upfront that the gigs will not be going ahead until it's safe enough to withdraw social distancing guidelines. I don't know what you mean by "legal proof" here. If someone wins entry (having paid a "donation") but the organisers never deem it safe for the gig to happen, will the donor be entitled to a refund? It seems unlikely that there is a contract here. You are not buying a ticket, merely the right to enter a draw which may reward you with a ticket. I suppose you could argue that a contract has been formed if you have the right to dispose of your right to enter the draw, but it seems worthless to me and I can't imagine that any valuable consideration has exchanged hands as a result. Still, it would be a matter for a court to decide on the facts at the end of the day.	A private venue normally has discretion over who may attend their premises, as long as it is not because of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination law. Note that the communication, as quoted, did not say that the banned person was a threat, but only that one of the performers felt uncomfortable. I do not think that the banned person has any legal recourse, unless they can plausibly assert that this is a case of unlawful discrimination, which the question does not suggest.	In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say.	I think the law there is quite clear - you have 14 days to return the goods for a full refund, except for digital content, which you can't return once you started downloading it. That's what it says. The arguments that you try to give were quite obvious to the law makers. I think you can assume they were aware that "digital content does not have a physical form". Now if you purchased, but haven't downloaded or started downloading yet, then obviously you can get your money back. You came up with some theory that this is a "visual vanity item". You can't see it unless you download it. Once you download it, that's it. If you don't download it, you can return it. Let me repeat this: Your fancy analogies mean nothing. There are in the EU laws about being allowed to return goods for a refund. There's the general rule for buying in a store (no right other what the store offers voluntarily), online purchases (some days to return), and online purchases of digital goods (no return once you started downloading). That's the law. Your attempts at redefining the situation are totally pointless. The law says what it says. What you try to redefine doesn't mean one thing. The law clearly distinguishes several situations, and analogies don't count. What happens counts. You bought from a digital item from an online store that needs to be downloaded. And as soon as you start downloading, there is your right to return it gone. And your reasons for wanting to return the goods are completely irrelevant. You don't need any reasons, and having reasons doesn't help you.	It is certainly possible to transfer a copyright or other IP without an explicit charge, indeed it can be a pure gift, and normally would be when it is left by will, as is common enough. From a paid consultant it might be clearer to include a statement that the transfer is part of the consulting assignment, rather than putting a price of zero in a blank. But one could instead convey a permanent non-exclusive license, granting permission to use or modify the work in any way desired, ans saying that this is provided as part of the consulting process. Then there would be no question of what rights the consultant retained, or that the same or a very similar solution could be provided to different clients. Indeed such a license would not be so very different from a CC-BY license, or any of several open source licenses, although I would not use one of those by name. But the legal effect would be much the same, and the wording could be similar. Otherwise there could be a later claim that the right transferred precluded the consultant from using the same solution for other clients. Even if such a claim was not legally sound, and was not upheld, it could be a distraction and costly of time and energy at least.	Potentially -- this is almost exactly how Pachinko parlors in Japan operate, with non-cash prizes being given out, but with "known" nearby establishments (sometime located in the same physical building) that will buy them for cash. Other options include the giving of vouchers/gift cards as prizes. Whether this is legal or not is a question of if the buyer is "truly" acting independent of the gambling establishment. The general legal term for this is "arm's length transactions". A completely unrelated organization is presumed to be acting in its own best interest, in an "arm's length" manner, though this can be overcome with evidence of collusion. If the casino is willing to "buy back" its marker at a given price (much like Las Vegas casinos are required to do), this can be done with independent intermediary negotiators in a legitimate arm's length transaction. In the Japan example above a "three-shop system" of nominally independent shops circle goods between them to effectively "legalize" (or at least not draw the ire of authorities over) cash gambling payouts.	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.	Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams.
Is "intent" taken into account by US Law (in this circumstance)? I could imagine that "I was just cleaning the gun and it went off" might be an acceptable defence against killing someone, but, in a comment to a question on our Politics site about trump inciting voters to to vote twice, someone said Whether such prosecution is successful may well hinge on the intent of the voter. If a voter is able to convince a magistrate that the transgression was innocent, he may get off with a slap. OTOH, if the voter says that he felt it was his duty to "test" the system or that he was following DJT's instructions, a significant fine and jail time may follow. Is there any way that "intent" would make a difference in such a case?	It would depends on the laws of the particular state, since each state has its own laws pertaining to voting. The law in North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. §163-275(7), says that it is unlawful For any person with intent to commit a fraud to register or vote at more than one precinct or more than one time, or to induce another to do so, in the same primary or election, or to vote illegally at any primary or election The corresponding jury instruction says what it means to have an intent to commit a fraud: Intent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence. It must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred. You arrive at the intent of a person by such just and reasonable deductions from the circumstances proven as a reasonably prudent person would ordinarily draw therefrom. Specific intent is a mental purpose, aim or design to accomplish a specific harm or result. If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the defendant voted more than one time in the same election event, the (name election event or contest),and that defendant did so with the intent to commit a fraud, then it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. If you do not so find, or if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, then it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty The prosecution would presumably construct an argument that the defendant intended that is vote be counted twice, and if they can prove that intent, then the jury should convict. Defense could argue that the intent was based on a reasonable belief that their absentee ballot was not counted thus disenfranchising defendant, and defendant acted with the lawful intent that their vote be counted, once. Because NC law contains procedural provisions to filter out double-voting, defendant can reasonably have a non-criminal intent, even if they are mistaken about the efficacy of those safeguards. However, the Ohio law does not carry an intent element: (A) No person shall do any of the following: ... (2) Vote or attempt to vote more than once at the same election by any means, including voting or attempting to vote both by absent voter's ballots under division (G) of section 3503.16 of the Revised Code and by regular ballot at the polls at the same election, or voting or attempting to vote both by absent voter's ballots under division (G) of section 3503.16 of the Revised Code and by absent voter's ballots under Chapter 3509. or armed service absent voter's ballots under Chapter 3511. of the Revised Code at the same election; This doesn't even require that you know that you are voting twice. So it depends on the particular law of the state.	It is constitutional to imprison a person for committing a crime, though I suspect that a life sentence for brawling would be held to be cruel and unusual punishment. It's rather hard to tell what punishments will be held to be cruel and unusual, but 2.5 years for involuntary manslaughter is not unusual. The crime of involuntary manslaughter in Massachusetts does not require any physical aiding. It is unlawful killing unintentionally caused by wanton and reckless conduct... Wanton and reckless conduct is intentional conduct that created a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another person.... It is conduct involving a grave risk of harm to another that a person undertakes with indifference to or disregard of the consequences of such conduct Whether conduct is wanton and reckless depends either on what the defendant knew or how a reasonable person would have acted knowing what the defendant knew The First Amendment does not give one carte blanche to say anything you want. There are a number of crimes and torts which involve saying something: threatening and extortion, bribing, fraud, incitement to riot, disturbing the peace, defamation, perjury and lying to a government official, and so on.	The only relevant case heard by SCOTUS is Nixon v. US, 506 U.S. 224, where a federal judge was tried and convicted for actual crimes, but would not resign his position so continued to draw his salary. The key legal question was whether the matter is "justiciable" (meaning, not a political matter but a legal matter). Nixon's argument was that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, and the court held that the question (more specifically what it means to "try") is nonjusticiable. White & Blackmun, and Souter, wrote concurring opinions (which might be called on in a subsequent impeachment case) that reminds the reader (and future court) what was not part of the holding of the court, and what might therefore allow future impeachment review. White writes The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us even to consider his contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore reach the merits of the claim. I concur in the judgment because the Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" petitioner. He observes that the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed a trial by reasonable judges. But, I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to "try" impeachment cases. When asked at oral argument whether that direction would be satisfied if, after a House vote to impeach, the Senate, without any procedure whatsoever, unanimously found the accused guilty of being "a bad guy," counsel for the United States answered that the Government's theory "leads me to answer that question yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. Especially in light of this advice from the Solicitor General, I would not issue an invitation to the Senate to find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business, to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment process. Souter in his opinion states that One can, nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply" 'a bad guy,'", judicial interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. In other words, review of an impeachment is largely but not entirely off the table, at least until SCOTUS declares that impeachments are completely unreviewable, no matter what, period (unlikely to ever happen).	I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.	While I am not a lawyer, this is fairly well settled in US constitutional theory. The framers thought of impeachment is something very much like a legal process, which is shown, among other things by the procedure in the Senate being referred to in the Constitution as a "trial" and a vote to remove being described as a "conviction". The use of the term "High Crimes and Misdemeanors" also suggests a legal process. In The Federalist, Hamilton took the view that the trial was to determine "guilt or innocence", but would be inherently political.[A] But there is no supervising authority, and the Congress (and each house of it) is a very political body. Procedures for drafting and passing Articles of impeachment in the House are whatever the House chooses them to be on each particular occasion. Procedures and rules of evidence in a Senate trail are whatever the Senate chooses them to be on each occasion. There is no standard format which is binding, or even customary. Thus in practice an impeachment will be a political issue whenever the Congress treats it as one. Early in the history of the US there was an opinion among some legislators and politicians that an impeachment was simply a statement that "we want your offices to give them to better men"[B], suggesting that it be treated much like a vote of no-confidence in the UK parliament. In the impeachment of Justice Chase the Senate did not vote to convict, and this was held to establish the principle that actual wrong-doing, not mere political dispute, must be the basis of any impeachment. In the impeachments of Federal Judges, the procedure has been essentially legal, with accusations of actual crime, such as bribery or malfeasance in office, being the basis of impeachments, and Senate trials being quite similar to criminal trials. This was perhaps particularly apparent in the impeachment and trial of Justice Chase. The articles of impeachment drafted in the case of president Nixon also looked very much like an indictment for ordinary crime. The trial never took place, but discussions of its format at the tiem suggested that it would have also been somewhat like a criminal trial. But the impeachments and trials of Presidents Clinton and Trump had a much more political aspect to them. While accusations were made of actions alleged to be not just politically unacceptable but unlawful, the Senate essentially inquired not into the truth of the accusations, but into whether they were improprieties deserving of removal at all. This was essentially a political, not a legal decision, and was made in a quite partisan way in each case. The US Supreme Court has held that it has no authority to approve or disapprove the outcome of any impeachment proceeding (not does any other federal court). An "impeachable offense" is whatever the House choose to list in an Article of Impeachment, and a "removable offense" is whatever the Senate chooses to vote for removal on the basis of. Thus those preparing proposed articles or advocating them in a Senate trial will be as legalistic or political as they think the occasion demands. Notes and sources The Federalist on Impeachment [A] Essay number 65 of The Federalist (by Alexander Hamilton) begins: THE remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will, therefore, conclude this head with a view of the judicial character of the Senate. A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt. ... What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution itself? Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation as the representatives of the nation themselves? It seems that Hamilton's ideal was that of a legal proceeding, a court, which was to determine "guilt or innocence". But he was well aware of th importance that political factors (and factions) might assume in any impeachment trial, and regarded this as inherent in the nature of such a proceeding. Most constitutional scholars seem to have followed this line of thought. Giles [B] Senator William Branch Giles, leader of the Senate forces favorable to the Administration of President Jefferson, is reported by John Quincy Adams to have said: Impeachment was not a criminal prosecution ... and a removal by impeachment was nothing more than a declaration by Congress to this effect: "You hold dangerous opinions, and if you are suffered to carry them into effect, you will work the destruction of the Union. We want your offices for the purposes of giving them to men who will fill them better." quoted from Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (J.P.Ipperncot & Co; 1874) Volume 1, page 322; quoted in Grand Inquests By Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist (William Morrow & Co; 1993) page 27 (Chapter 1) The Wikipedia article on Giles (linked above) says: Giles strongly advocated the removal of Justice Samuel Chase after his impeachment, urging the Senate to consider it as a political decision (as to whether the people of the United States should have confidence in Chase) rather than as a trial.	In the United States, many jurisdictions have criminal offenses outlawing behavior that may include what you're describing here. In Ohio, for instance, disorderly conduct (R.C. 2917.11) includes "insulting, taunting, or challenging another, under circumstances in which that conduct is likely to provoke a violent response." In Indiana, there's the offense of provocation (IC 35-42-2-3), which is even broader and includes "recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally [engaging] in conduct that is likely to provoke a reasonable person to commit battery." It looks like this has been interpreted to include even actions that don't directly involve the provoked person, such as kissing another man's wife. Beyond the criminal offense, there are also jurisdictions that will permit a civil suit for damages resulting from the criminal act. There are also states where this could constitute intentional interference with business relations or intentional interference with an employment contract. In any of those cases, your co-workers could be looking at damages for lost wages, loss of reputation, etc.	This is actually a very complicated question, about (1) the scope of "knowingly", (2) what kind of "intent" is required for conviction, (3) how does the jury understand and evaluate concepts of intent and (4) how does an attorney persuade the jury that the situation does or does not satisfy the particular intent requirement. One thing we can dispose of quickly is the possibility that the law says that the accused has to actually know that the act is against the law. It is a standard legal fiction (2,400 years old) that the accused knows the law, or should have known. As for the 4th element, persuasion, on the strong side we have statements of intent by the accused – "And I pulled out my rifle and blew his head off, and I laughed the whole time". What the jury has to decide is whether the accused had in mind a conscious purpose of doing some act (that is, it wasn't just an accident like butt-dialing, or an instant stimulus-response reaction to some event). "Intent" generally falls in the realm of acting "purposely", which the Model Penal Code §2.02 defines as: A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. which more or less means what you think "with intent" means. That doesn't say what they intended to do, it just distinguishes intent from negligence and accident. The prosecutor would then present factual evidence that the accused had a bad intent, like showing that he actually made an attempt to access credit card account data (that such data had been accessed when he broke into the system), etc. We can sort of dispose of the other scope question about "knowingly", namely, what things would he have to know? The chunk accessing a protected computer without authorization can be interpreted in a number of ways, having to do with which elements of the clause are known to the accused. You might know that you were accessing but not know that you were unauthorized; you might know that you were accessing and unauthorized, but not know that the computer is protected. The only reliable way to know which is which is to study the case law on a statute and see if there is a controlling decision that say e.g. that you have to know that you are accessing and are unauthorized, but you don't have to know that the computer is protected. I haven't determined (yet) is there is decisive case law on this, but I'm betting that the outcome would be that not knowing of the protected status of a computer carries no weight. As for what kind of intent, there is a distinction between "specific intent" and "general intent". The distinction comes down to having some evil purpose like "make him suffer" (general intent) versus a specific evil purpose like "kill him". Finally, the people who actually decide, the jury, will be given instructions that say what they have to look for. Here is the tip of the tip of the iceberg, from California's criminal jury instructions. The judge will say... The People must prove not only that the defendant did the acts charged, but also that (he/she) acted with a particular (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The instruction for (the/each) crime [and allegation] explains the (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required. A[n] (intent/ [and/or] mental state) may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state), you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state). If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not, you must conclude that the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable. and then there will be some specific elaboration of whether they have to find that the accused just generally intended to do bad, versus intended to specifically defraud.	Start with the premise that Person A has so far engaged only in speech, which is presumptively protected by the First Amendment. So unless the speech is for some reason unprotected, the police should not involve themselves. This of course begs the question of whether this speech is protected. The First Amendment does not protect "true threats," which includes "those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). So the question for the police is whether Person A's texts were meant to communicate a serious intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. Removing First Amendment protection won't be as simple as letting B testify that he truly felt threatened, as the question is whether A meant to communicate a threat. But that also means that for A, it won't be enough to simply deny any violent intent, so the "nothing illegal" disclaimer won't be enough. In the end, this is a question for a jury to decide, should the case ever reach that far. The jury would essentially be asked to engage in mind-reading, determining what A was thinking when he sent those texts. The jury should be instructed to take several factors into consideration when it makes that decision, including the "context" of the remarks (the explicit disclaimer of violence helps A), the "conditional nature" of the threat (the three-strikes langauge helps A), and the "reaction of the listener" (calling the police hurts A). Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). Practically speaking, if B were to call the police, I'd expect them not to investigate, unless they were awfully bored. If they decided to, I don't think there would be any actionable violation of A's rights, given their obvious inability to divine A's intent based solely on B's account. A court would likely allow them to investigate, but I doubt a prosecutor would allow them to bring charges based on the facts you've described.
What's the penalty for selling stolen digital files? Is there a penalty for selling stolen digital files? Is it the same as selling other illegal goods? Is there no specific provision about it? If applicable, is there a Massachusetts-specific provision on this?	While it seems like a simple question, the answer is somewhat complicated. As is frequently the case for "white collar" misconduct, There are several civil and criminal legal theories that could be applied, depending upon the nature of the offense, at both the federal and state levels (e.g. how was it done and what is the relationship of the offender to the victim). The penalty will generally be specific to the legal theory under which punishment or compensation is sought. One of the more obvious ones (if the stolen files are legitimately classified as trade secrets) is violation of the state's trade secret law: If a court finds that a defendant has unlawfully taken a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following penalties and remedies: Criminal Penalties: Unlawfully taking a trade secret (defined above) constitutes the crime of larceny in Massachusetts and is punishable by up to five years imprisonment, or by a fine of up to $25,000 and up to two years imprisonment. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 30. Damages: A court can make a defendant pay money damages to the plaintiff in an amount up to twice its actual damages. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42 Injunctive Relief: Massachusetts law gives a court the power to restrain the defendant from "taking, receiving, concealing, assigning, transferring, leasing, pledging, copying or otherwise using or disposing of a trade secret, regardless of value." See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42A. It appears that a court could order you not to publish a trade secret if it found that you had unlawfully taken it from the plaintiff. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution may limit the court's authority to do so, however. Another would be a civil action for conversion of intellectual or intangible property, or a criminal action for theft or sale of stolen goods. Depending upon the means by which the files were obtained, it might implicate common law fraud and criminal fraud offenses (including wire and mail fraud), and state and federal laws involving computer crimes. Another legal theory could be tortious interference with contract or tortious interference with business prospects. Less aggressively a common law constructive trust could probably be imposed on the digital files and the proceeds from them, and the person receiving the proceeds of the stolen files could be sued for unjust enrichments/restitution. In many cases, it would be a civil and criminal federal copyright law violation (if the victim owns the copyright and the files are copyrightable material). The proper offenses and hence the available remedies, would depend to a significant extent both legally and from a practical and litigation tactics perspective, on the means by which the digital files were obtained.	They can charge you with anything they think you did. And yes, the circumstances play a large part in the decision to arrest, charge and prosecute. However, circumstances include you: Reputation is everything. If you are a 17 year old male troublemaker with a long juvie rap sheet, including 3 past instances of stealing golf carts, then expect to be charged with the theft. Honestly you would probably be charged with the theft if you had simply stayed away and called the cops to report it abandoned. If you came upon it in your vehicle and it's obviously blocking the road and your apparent motive is to figure out how to move it so you can get by, then you're probably in the clear. If you're a 44 year old owner of a golf cart business, PAL supporter, city councilwoman and know half the cops including one in the car that stopped you, then, they're going to pretty much listen to you as far as what's the deal with the cart. Probably ask you for help moving it safely, might even ask you to get your cart-hauler to take it to impound. You won't hear from the D.A. obviously; nobody will say "Sue Councilwoman stole a golf cart" because it would sound absurd and make the speaker appear to be a politically motivated liar. That's the power of reputation; no one would speak it even if you did steal it. (Of course if you got caught doing it on a Ring camera, well, the hero takes a fall!) Anything in between, they'll deal with it in proportion to both the facts about you and the fact about the situation. You do not have a right to get the same credibility as the councilwoman; that is earned. That's the power of reputation.	You can report it to the publisher(s) Protection of copyright is a matter for the individual rights holder: some (I’m looking at you Disney) are vigilant, thorough and draconian in protecting their rights, others don’t care at all. Unless you are the rights holder it’s none of your business. In much the same way that the guy charging your neighbour for 4 hours gardening but being long gone in 2 isn’t. If you like your neighbour or feel duty bound to do something, you tell them and then leave it to them what they do with it. This is not a matter for the authorities as it doesn’t rise to the level of criminal copyright infringement. Just like the gardener above, this isn’t a crime.	Assuming USA law: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2315 If you accept or buy goods that are knowingly stolen you may be fined or imprisoned. If you buy goods and later find out they were stolen you can sue for a refund. However, I'd say the likelihood of getting your money back is incredibly low.	Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this.	Physical content The main consideration with physical content is that reading it does not require making a copy, so uncomplicated copyright law is what’s relevant. Copyright law is about making copies (also distributing). Purchase a novel (a physical book which was legally obtained). There is no copying involved (you do not in fact make a copy in your mind, if you're a human). Under the First Sale doctrine, once a copy is sold by the rights-holder (e.g. the publisher, initially to the bookstore or distributor), that owner can do whatever it wants with that specific copy, including reading or re-selling (and anying thereafter can likewise). Books are sold, not licensed. Copyright relates to copying, not reading. It’s true that all (legal) rights are reserved, but the power to prevent resale is not a right. Book (or anything else) on the ground. As above, with the complication that you aren’t at least immediately the rightful owner. But, you don’t have to be the owner of a protected work to read it (otherwise libraries would not exist). The rightful owner might unsuccessfully try to sue you for reading their property, but reading does not cause damage, and your act is innocent (not even negligent), and not wrongful. Eventually (depending on jurisdiction) you may become the owner if the original owner does not reclaim the book. Reading a copy made by someone else. See above about the relationship between reading and copyright. The teacher might maybe be liable for infringement, but you are not culpable (assuming you didn’t encourage the teacher to make an illegal copy). Digital content However, every item of digital content has to be copied many times, in order to actually be read. E.g. a copy is made to video display memory from RAM, which is copied some number of times from RAM to RAM as the program formats and sizes, ultimately reading a copy stored on disk storage (which is installed from.... using N temp files) Typically what happens is that you acquire a copy of a license to use the content. Some number of copies may be statutorily permitted, e.g. the myriad transitory copies created across the internet as you download the work, or on your computer as you install it. The law addresses this matter in part at 17 USC 117, saying that it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful. Since Congress chose the word “program” rather than “file”, the plain reading of this is that permission is always required to read digital content. One may assume, when you purchase an electronic book at the store (you thus own the recording medium), that the work also comes with specific permission to make those automatic copies required to actually read the book on a computer. In order to read the book you must make some number of copies. Seeing stuff on a web page. Let’s also assume that the material is on the page without permission, but you don’t know that, and it just jumps out at you. This raises an interesting question regarding statutory language and web pages. The statutory language is not at all clear about link-clicking (the statutes don't say anything about "links"), and I don't know of any relevant case law (probably because it would be ludicrous to go after an innocent link-clicker) Infringement is defined in 17 USC 501(a): Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright and if you infringe, you may be liable. 17 USC 106 spells out those rights: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; … (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; … When you go to a web page and click a link, are you reproducing the protected material? Or is the website owner reproducing the material, and pushing it onto you? I don’t know of any decisions that address this kind of technical question. There is no question that the person hosting the infringing material is liable, the question is whether you would be as well? It would be highly unjust to hold the innocent link-clicker responsible. There is a bit of protection for innocent infringement in 17 USC 405(b) Any person who innocently infringes a copyright, in reliance upon an authorized copy or phonorecord from which the copyright notice has been omitted and which was publicly distributed by authority of the copyright owner before the effective date of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, incurs no liability for actual or statutory damages under section 504 for any infringing acts committed before receiving actual notice that registration for the work has been made under section 408, if such person proves that he or she was misled by the omission of notice. In a suit for infringement in such a case the court may allow or disallow recovery of any of the infringer’s profits attributable to the infringement, and may enjoin the continuation of the infringing undertaking or may require, as a condition for permitting the continuation of the infringing undertaking, that the infringer pay the copyright owner a reasonable license fee in an amount and on terms fixed by the court. (c) Protection under this title is not affected by the removal, destruction, or obliteration of the notice, without the authorization of the copyright owner, from any publicly distributed copies or phonorecords. (You could be prevented from further use of the infringing material, and liable for specific lost profit). Infringement is not defined in terms of what you know or believe about the copyright status of work. Nevertheless, I would expect that in addressing the question of whether a person had in fact made a copy that they would look at the mental state of the individual, looking for mens rea. This could distinguish clicking a link that unexpectedly pushes protected material onto you, versus attempting to obtain protected material by clicking on a link.	In general, you cannot contract to do anything illegal. However, ... An argument could be made that permission has been granted to, for example, enter property and remove the item. If permission has been granted, entering property and taking an item is not a crime.	Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details.
Does the CEO of a company have any legal responsibility to act in the interests of its shareholders? Does US law include anything that places a burden of responsibility on a company's CEO to act in the interests of its shareholders, even if the CEO owns a majority share in the company? Let's say, as extreme example, I'm the 51% owner & CEO and the board representing 49% of the company's shareholders has an issue with me giving 100% of the company's assets away to charity - do they have any legal recourse? I'm interested in any relevant US code or legal precedent.	No, but ... The CEO is an officer of the company (as are the directors and any others with the ability to substantially exercise control over the company) and as such, owes fiduciary duties to the company - not to the shareholders or any subset of them. For example, if it is in the best interests of the company to enter a trading halt but not in the best interests of the current shareholders then the duty on an officer is to do what’s best for the company. As another example, for a crime many limited by guarantee rather than by shares it’s rarely in the owner’s interest to have that guarantee called but it might be in the company’s interest.	Websites are not ships that can choose a flag of convenience to govern which country's laws govern them. Generally speaking an analysis of which jurisdiction's law applies (which is strictly speaking a "choice of law" question as much as it is a jurisdiction question) isn't undertaken on a website by website, or business by business basis. Instead, jurisdiction and choice of law are evaluated on a claim by claim basis. The owners of a website may be subject to some claims in India, to some in Bhutan, and to others in the United States, depending upon the claim. Without knowing who is trying to sue for what, you can't know. Generally speaking, a business that operates in multiple jurisdictions, like a website, will be subject to the laws of all of the jurisdictions in which it does business in regard to claims with a connection to those jurisdictions. Of course, as a practical matter, only claims that can be enforced against the owners of the website are relevant, which usually means that only claims brought where the owners reside or own assets are relevant. If the website owners own property or have amounts payable to them in India, there is a very good chance that India can, as a practical matter, assert jurisdiction over them. And, it is likely, as a practical matter, that Saudi Arabia or China would not be able to assert jurisdiction over them in a meaningful way. The fact that businesses can be conducted through legal entities further complicates the analysis. But, at any rate, the place to begin is to realize that the question "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall?" is basically a category error. You need to ask "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall when it is sued or prosecuted for X kind of matter by someone who lives in Y?" So, really, this one question is actually dozens or hundreds of questions that each have to be analyzed individually.	Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful.	Yes, an HOA has a duty to treat all members equally You have my condolences. Dealing with an HOA board and/or fellow residents can be frustrating and exasperating. Unfortunately, as a practical matter, the high cost of legal advice often mean boards can ignore the law. In Pennsylvania, as everywhere, the Board of an HOA has a fiduciary relation to the owners. Because they are a fiduciary the Board has a legal duty to run the HOA for the benefit of the owners, not themselves or their friends. As the PA statutes puts it, the Board "shall perform their duties...in good faith...in the best interests of the association..." The duty to act "in good faith" is usually interpreted as including a duty to "treat all community members equally..." (For more on "fiduciary," "good faith" and "equal treatment" see here, here and here.) Whether you are being treated equally depends on the particular facts of your situation, and on how exactly PA courts have interpreted PA law. While you might be able to find a good answer on line, chances are you'll need to talk to a PA attorney with experience in condo law. You should also check your condo's governing documents. They may contain specific provisions about how decisions about additions such as lighting are to be handled.	TL;DR Yes, but there are very important side effects you might want to know. [Next three paragraphs are obsolete because further case detailing, but are relevant as the original case is still readable]. He has to either sell shares to you1 or give away shares to you2. There might be, however, family business law applicable, making an exemption from taxes quoted in the footnotes detailing the previous paragraph. Ask your father whether he knows anyone or not. And from then on you might be responsible for taxes imposed on the company (go ahead with the TS;DR). That’s a side consequence. If the workshop or office is free from VAT, I don't know why would anyone have to pay taxes from the place's acquisition. You would normally pay ITP-AJD from that transaction, but it certainly [(article 6)] looks like nonresident nationals are free from it. The important bit is that, as wrote in the previous answer's version, you can be called co-responsible for company's taxes if things go wrong. 1: Then you pay ITP-AJD taxes for that, because of its article 6.1 A) if you came back to Spain (or you appear in census fiscally in Spain). I don't say you're not subject to some other tax or some other case of this tax. Not to mention maybe you are not subject to this, but your brother might be. 2: Then you are subject to ISD taxes because of its article 3.1 b), read article 20.2 c) too as a confirmation that LLC shares are subject to this tax. TS;DR He told us that first we would need to be registered as self-employed workers, then this business would be put in our name and every month each of us would have to send to a bank account (local to my home country) 95% of the revenue. My brother and I would each keep the remaining 5%.   [Next two paragraphs are obsolete because further case detailing, but are relevant as the original case is readable]. All of this is known as simulation, at least in the Spanish legal framework. That's something you might want to search about. Ask your father how is he going to sell [which percent shares?] of his company to you and your brother, and for which price (of course don't tell here).   [...] every month each of us would have to send to a bank account (local to my home country) 95% of the revenue. My brother and I would each keep the remaining 5%. My father's new business is not yet active nor registered (as per my knowledge). His plan is to make my brother and I owners of the space where this business would take place, and then we would register and start this business without legally involving my father. You would be owner of a company, and its office or workshop, but not of its revenue. That could be argued as a case of absolute(resource in Spanish language) simulation. You want to read article 43.1 g) and h) of Law 58/2003. Your Spanish income might be subject to IRNR, maybe not. If a very large income, then most likely. We're discussing percentages, so nobody can know for sure. But that's better, for too large quantities could even make enough bulk for a criminal offence (in case not declared). So if it feels like a lot of money (what you earn in clear numbers, not what you de facto keep), then you might want to make sure you tax pay it3 (probably making sure your father knows altogether this plan of yours). You could eventually [my guess] even be charged with ISD for that revenue transfer back to Spain (if the receiver misses to pay them), if you're not co-owner of the bank account. 3: So you might end up with net loss! Depending on tax rates [am not familiar with]. I am basically clueless about the laws in this regard, while he is a lawyer. [...] Then make him teach you whatever necessary until you trust him more than Stack Exchange. Is this a legal way to avoid extra taxes or is this a way for seeking legal trouble? Possibly both. I think you shouldn't approve este negocio if you don't know (1) what's the current accounting situation of that company, (2) the current taxes situation of that company, and specially (3) what's your participation (and your brother's, and your father's) quota at any point in the company's life, from which some of the legal responsibilities might be derived. In general, you want to read section 3.a "responsibles" of chapter II "taxpayers" of title II "taxes" of Law 58/2003. That's only for the truly worst of cases. In a wonderful world it's an overcautious baseline. But if things go wrong; and this could not necessarily be caused by your father, but by partners/associates/co-managers/co-de-facto-owners of him, or even mid-tier managers or high profile employees; it would be the appropriate base line (only tax related, not considering other kind of civil responsibilities that could apply). If the company does its taxes alright, there should be however nothing to worry about. For me all of this can be narrowed down to two-three essential things: (1) trust in your father (and his future employees and his future potential partners/associates/co-managers/co-de-facto-owners), (2) how much are you wanting to play things safe or risky on your side, and (depending on earnings volume) (3) how likely are you going to be subject of IRNR investigations, or your money transfers out of your account be investigated because missed ISD duty (if whoever receives misses a large ISD duty). DISCLAIMER: This is not your legal advisory, it's a vague, yet somewhat informed, entry level reference in order to guide you. Here's no responsibility for any damages caused. If on doubt, always choose to go hire a lawyer.	Acme is bound by Bob's actions so long as they were conducted with "apparent authority" from the perspective of Client C and involved his work duties, even if he carried them out contrary to company policy - unless Client C knew for a fact that Bob was violating company policy and didn't have authority within the company to do so when he was doing these things. Acme, directly, or Acme's insurance carrier, in a subrogation suit after it has settled the claim from Client C, could probably sue Bob, especially if he willfully violated company policy for the purpose of harming client C. This is rarely done, but ultimately Bob owes duties to Acme which he violated which probably give rise to liability, although proving that and collecting the judgment would both be difficult. If Bob had authority within the organization to deviate from company policy, however, which he would have a good cause to claim that he did, this would be a full defense to such a suit, since Bob was always acting as a disclosed agent of Acme. Client C probably cannot sue Bob directly, whether or not it sues Acme. In contract matters (which this would include) a disclosed agent is not responsible for the acts he carries out on behalf of his principal. For example, an employee who signs a promissory note on behalf of a company in an official capacity as a disclosed agent of the company isn't responsible for paying the note. This is different than the rule in tort cases where the principal and anyone whose actions personally caused the tort caused the problem is liable. For example, if the employee got into a car accident that was his fault while he was driving on the job for the company, both the company and the employee would be liable to the person who was hurt. The circumstances that you describe sound more like a breach of contract than they do like a tort, so Bob would probably not have any personal liability to Client C. Could Bob or Acme (or both) face any criminal liability? Unless Bob was the CEO or other senior officer of the company, Acme wouldn't face criminal liability, because he is too far down the chain of command to cause Acme the entity to have the requisite criminal intent. Realistically, failing to "verify that equipment rental invoices match delivery records before notifying the client to approve the invoices for payment" does not amount to a crime no matter who does it. This might be careless or a breach of contract, but it is not fraud or theft because it lack the necessary criminal intent. If Bob actively photoshopped equipment rental invoices with a specific intent to defraud Client C, he would probably be criminally liable for fraud, although even that isn't an open and shut case as it still basically involves failure to perform a contract according to its terms and a mere breach of contract is generally not a crime unless you intended not to perform it in the first place, when you entered into the contract.	That isn’t a “takeover” Most importantly because not-for-profits do not exist as financial vehicles for their owners, they are a resource of the community for the benefit of their members, both current and future - that’s why they get tax concessions. Further, what you describe isn’t a takeover, it’s the members of an organisation expressing their democratic rights to have the organisation run by the people they choose to run it. The correct response from an ex-board member in this situation is to congratulate the winners, wish them luck, and offer them whatever transitional and ongoing support they can in the best interests of the organisation. A board member has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the organisation irrespective of their personal feelings and desires. You can disagree with the direction a new board is taking an organisation but that’s their call, not yours. Indeed, many not-for profits benefit, some even need, renewal at the board level. A junior sports club needs to be run by the parents of the children playing now, not those who played 30 years ago. What can you do? There are a number of things that can be done, however, given the fiduciary duty the directors owe to the organisation, some of these are … problematic to outright illegal. The list below is arranged from least problematic to least most problematic. Get big. The Red Cross and Amnesty International don’t have to worry about this because they have so many members that a small clique can’t gain control. Restrict membership. The organisation exists for a purpose, it is perfectly legitimate to restrict membership to people who are actively pursuing that purpose. For example, returned services organisations can legitimately restrict voting members to those who served overseas on active duty. Similarly, sporting clubs can legitimately restrict voting membership to those (or the parents of children) who are actively playing or coaching the sport. Stagger board elections. Board members serve for 2 years and only half the board is up for election at each AGM. Local law may prohibit this but it does provide for greater stability generally. Create executive positions that aren’t elected. For example, there can be an executive role for “past-Presidents” or Guardians who are appointed for a long-term, possibly life. Such roles legitimately create corporate memory and incidentally guard against the type of rapid turnover you are worried about. However, depending on local law, this might be illegal. In some jurisdictions, companies can set up poison pills to enhance the rights of existing shareholders over the rights of future shareholders. However, these are not legal in the UK for example and do not apply to the type of organisation you describe which has members rather than shareholders. Even if it is legal, such structures are often not suitable for not-for-profits as they may be ineligible for tax exemption, charitable status or to be tax-deductible gift recipients. Before doing anything, get legal advice.	The danger is not “piercing the corporate veil” (which basically removes your personal protection against problems that the company might have), but being accused of tax evasion, which the director of the company is fully responsible for. I suggest you read your tax laws very, very, very carefully or better yet, ask an accountant. An additional risk is that once the inland revenue has their eye on you, they will handle you extra carefully. Not something you want.
Can a vaccine be required by law? This question came up because I read that Bolsonaro, Brazil's president, was criticized by the opposition for saying that COVID-19 vaccinations won't be mandatory. The opposition said that the vaccine should be a requirement, which means that if they were in power, then everyone in Brazil would be forced to get vaccinated. Specifically for the United States, is it possible that getting vaccinated become a law? In other words, I would be breaking the law if I decide not to get vaccinated. Is something like this remotely possible? The reason I ask: countries are trying to develop a vaccine as fast as humanly possible and possibly trying to cut corners to have the vaccine approved. Superpowers like the US, Russia, and China are all making claims. Here in the US, being an election year, the CDC is already saying that two unidentified vaccines will be available in October or November. I feel this is being done in a hurry, and I wouldn't want the government to force me to get vaccinated with a brand-new drug with limited testing.	It was decided back in 1905 in the case of Jacobson v Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, that mandatory vaccination laws are constitutional in the US (the specific example being mandatory smallpox vaccination - through vaccination, this illness was eradicated globally). The court observed that in every well ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. An American citizen, arriving at an American port on a vessel in which, during the voyage, there had been cases of yellow fever or Asiatic cholera, although apparently free from disease himself, may yet, in some circumstances, be held in quarantine against his will on board of such vessel or in a quarantine station until it be ascertained by inspection, conducted with due diligence, that the danger of the spread of the disease among the community at large has disappeared. The power of the government to protect is not totally unfettered: its actions must be necessary. Smallpox being prevalent and increasing at Cambridge, the court would usurp the functions of another branch of government if it adjudged, as matter of law, that the mode adopted under the sanction of the State, to protect the people at large was arbitrary and not justified by the necessities of the case. We say necessities of the case because it might be that an acknowledged power of a local community to protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all, might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons. An attack on a mandatory vaccination law would probably focus on the question of necessity.	It would not prohibit Colorado from passing the law, but it could prohibit implementing the law. SCOTUS rulings (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779) establish that neither Congress nor the States can require additional qualifications of federal candidates beyond those listed in the Constitution. The relevant question is whether a law imposes an additional "qualification" on a candidate for president. Every state imposes at least one requirement on a person seeking to be a candidate on the ballot in a state: they must somehow "register" as a candidate. So the Qualifications Clause is not interpreted to mean "anybody can run for president as long as age and natural-born". The Anderson-Burdick doctrine allows certain kinds of requirements to be imposed on candidates, namely those that relate to a state's interest on properly managing elections. A no-felon law would clearly go way beyond the accepted state interest (regarding management of elections) reflected in Anderson-Burdick, and would be found to be as unconstitutional as requiring a candidate for president to have a law degree, or prohibiting a candidate from having a law degree.	You can't just interpret the word "require" in isolation, you have to focus on what is allowed vs. disallowed by law. Guidance point K.1 starts with the rhetorical question Under the ADA, Title VII, and other federal employment nondiscrimination laws, may an employer require all employees physically entering the workplace to be vaccinated for COVID-19? They respond that no federal EEO laws prohibit such a requirement "subject to the reasonable accommodation provisions of Title VII and the ADA and other EEO considerations" (thus providing an answer to the question whether it can always be "required". However, they do not discuss the possibility that other laws (non-EEO, state, local: also contract law) that would prevent an employer from "requiring" a vaccination. They do not elaborate on ways that an employer might "require" a vaccination, leaving it to the inventive reader to figure out what legal leverage a company might have to get compliance. Assaulting non-compliant employees is not legal; withholding wages is not legal. Reassigning a non-compliant worker to working in the sub-basement may be legal, requiring a non-compliant worker to wear an anti-vaxer warning badge might be legal. Firing the employee, or reducing their hours to 0 until they comply, might be legal. But the EEOC is not advising employers in safe ways to sanction non-compliant workers, they are just stating their interpretation of applicable anti-discrimination law. Indeed, they can only address matters of discrimination, because that is what they address in general. They do not write the labor law regulations, that's the job of the Dept. of Labor. They are not giving legal advice as to the scope of allowed requirements set by employers.	The answer is they are quite different. The SCOTUS found almost 100 years ago that the Several States have the power to require vaccinations. This is one of the "reserved powers" under the constitution. The Texas Heartbeat law creates a regulation on doctors (similar) and a civil cause of action (very different). However, the biggest difference is that the older case permits the state to require medical treatment while the Texas law requires a medical justification for treatment. It seems uncontroversial to require a doctor's services to perform an abortion. However, now the Texas legislation is in effect codifying the medical ethics requirement to "do no harm." Medical ethics do allow exceptions based on a specific situation, and so does the law. A mandatory vaccination law is almost the opposite. It guides doctors that the general risks of vaccination are not strong enough to be considered harmful when weighed against the benefits of the vaccination. But, of course, medical ethics would also allow exceptions based on specific situations, and so should the law. Fizz already cited the case: Zucht v. King https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/260/174.	In the absence of a contractual agreement saying otherwise, the lawsuit would probably just be subject to normal rules of tort liability. In that case, the contractor would probably lose his case unless he could prove that the one worker infected another through an act of negligence or could otherwise prove that the infected worker knew he was infected and posed a risk to others. In the basic negligence situation, the contractor would likely rely on the general duty we all have to avoid creating unreasonable risks of injury to third parties, and he would need to argue that Worker A somehow breached that duty. Coming to work knowing you're infected would almost certainly satisfy that standard, but it might be enough to simply show that Worker A was at a large gathering of unmasked people whose vaccination status was unknown. From there, he would also need to prove that breaching that duty caused him some injury, presumably by infecting Workers B through M, causing a work slowdown, causing missed deadlines, causing late fees, etc. The contractor might also pursue a claim for reckless, rather than negligent, conduct, if Worker A knew he was infected and came to work just the same. Or he might pursue an intentional tort claim if there was some reason to believe that Worker A was actually trying to get other people sick, as opposed to just ignoring the fact that such a risk existed. As I understand it, several states have also passed laws limiting liability for exposure to COVID in the workplace, so it's possible that none of these claims would be viable, no matter how strong the evidence.	Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.	They can't overturn the decision; but they don't have to. The holding in Dobbs was that the US Constitution does not provide a right to an abortion, and so a state law prohibiting abortions is not unconstitutional. Congress can't "overturn" it in the sense that they can't make the Constitution provide such a right, short of a constitutional amendment. But that in itself doesn't stop them from providing such a right in other ways, e.g. through ordinary legislation. Under the Supremacy Clause, such a law would supersede any state bans; provided that it falls within the scope of Congress's enumerated powers, which assertion would itself probably be challenged in court. If it's within their legislative power, then there's no conflict with Dobbs. To give a more mundane example, nobody thinks that there is a constitutional right to have an airline ticket refunded within 24 hours of purchase. If the Supreme Court ever had occasion to rule on the question, they would surely hold that nothing in the US Constitution says that people have this right. But Congress does have the power, under the Commerce Clause, to pass legislation that confers such a right on consumers. They have done so, and this law would not in any way conflict with the aforementioned hypothetical Supreme Court ruling.	It means what it literally says, that safety and effectiveness have not been established in certain contexts. The rationale behind saying this is §201.57 of 21 CFR 201, a regulation that mandates giving warnings. It is permitted to use a device or prescribe a substance where it is not yet proven that it is effective or safe for that usage, but you must not imply that it is perfectly safe and effective in all contexts. This part of the federal regulations dictates language aimed at particular scientific uncertainties. Insofar as a patient is expected to give informed consent for a treatment, informing the patient that a treatment is to some extent unproven is an essential part of the information that must be given for informed consent. So you can interpret it as a flag to the patient (or the prescribing doctor) that there is greater risk.
In the USA, can treason be protected by the First Amendment? Mildred Gillars was convicted of treason September 10, 1948. As I understand it, first Amendment protects unpopular speech, but is confined and not unlimited. The classic example is that one can not yell "fire" in a crowded movie theatre and incite a panicked exodus. I imagine free speech as a box: if the speech is within the box the content is protected by the first amendment. Using the box analogy, Why is the Gillars radio broadcast not protected under the first amendment? How exactly did the Gillars broadcast "cross the line"?	It might be more helpful to reverse the analogy. Unprotected speech is a box, and everything that doesn't fit inside the box is free speech. The box is small and strangely shaped, and therefore, very few things will fit inside. The government has spent centuries trying to cram things into it, so we have a pretty good idea of what fits and what doesn't: Content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few historic and traditional categories of expression long familiar to the bar. Among these categories are: advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); obscenity, see, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); defamation, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); speech integral to criminal conduct, see, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); so-called “fighting words,” see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); child pornography, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); fraud, see Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); true threats, see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), although a restriction under the last category is most difficult to sustain, see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). These categories have a historical foundation in the Court's free speech tradition. The vast realm of free speech and thought always protected in our tradition can still thrive, and even be furthered, by adherence to those categories and rules. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717–18 (2012). Although I don't know that I've ever seen the Supreme Court acknowledge it explicitly, one of the common threads you'll see in most of these categories is that First Amendment protection begins to weaken when words are spoken with some kind of ill intent and are likely to cause some kind of societal harm. So the Gillars case falls into the "speech integral to criminal conduct" category. She appealed her conviction on First Amendment grounds, but the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Although the First Amendment would protect someone who hated the American government and went on the radio to denounce the American government, it does not protect those who commit the act of treason, even if speech is their weapon: There is no question in our mind that words may be an integral part of the commission of the crime if the elements which constitute treason are present; that is, if there is adherence to and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy by an overt act proved by two witnesses, with intention to betray, though the overt act be committed through speech. ... While the crime is not committed by mere expressions of opinion or criticism, words spoken as part of a program of propaganda warefare, in the course of employment by the enemy in its conduct of war against the United States, to which the accused owes allegiance, may be an integral part of the crime. There is evidence in this case of a course of conduct on behalf of the enemy in the prosecution of its war against the United States. The use of speech to this end, as the evidence permitted the jury to believe, made acts of words. The First Amendment does not protect one from accountability for words as such. Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1950). This is probably one of the least-developed exceptions to First Amendment protection, and therefore one of the hardest to understand. For a deep dive, I'd recommend Eugene Volokh, The "Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct" Exception, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 981 (2016).	The fact that something is illegal does not imply that it is illegal to post pictures of it happening. In general, under U.S. law, free speech protects almost all forms of communications subject to a handful of narrow exceptions and this is not one of them. There are many legitimate reasons one might want to post video of a fight (e.g. to identify crime perpetrators for purposes of prosecuting them), but no legitimate purpose is legally necessary. Surely as a platform Reddit cant hide against it being a platform of free speech in this case? They most definitely can. Reddit is also not responsible for user posted content under Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act, even if it were illegal for the person posting it to post the content	The only real answer is that the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the constitution, and specifically the argument that the 13th Amendment prohibits a draft for compelled military services has totally rejected that argument. For many years now the US has not used a draft, and it is obviously possible for the US to have an enduring and powerful military without any draft, which was perhaps not apparent to the Justices in 1918. A draft had been common in this country from the colonial period, through the Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. In reaction to the problems during the Vietnam War, and the great opposition to any draft at that time, the US has not used a draft since, although it retains a legal requirement to register for a possible draft, and the legal authority to impose one should it be thought wise. Note that this was not because of the 13th Amendment. Note also that compelled service by the citizens (or residents) in a locality, particularly to fight fires and floods, when the usual forces are inadequate to that end, has been commonly used. Such compulsory service has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th Amendment. Also, as mentioned in comments, citizens can be compelled to do jury duty, which could in theory be considered "involuntary servitude" but has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th amendment. The answer by Trish (now deleted) thoroughly described the many differences between a slave and a drafted soldier. Still, drafted military service might be thought to be a form of involuntary servitude. But the Court (and the laws and other courts as well) have not treated it as such. In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) the Court thought the idea that compulsory military service constituted involuntary servitude was so wrongheaded that it thought a very brief mention sufficient to refute this contention. It wrote (at 245 U. S. 390): Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement. It is clear from the text of that opinion that the justices thought that the existence of a power to draft soldiers was essential to the implementation of the constitutional power (article I section 8): To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; The opinion discusses the history of compelled military service in the United States, in the colonies before there was a United States, and in Great Britain before that. The opinion says that: Compelled military service is neither repugnant to a free government nor in conflict with the constitutional guaranties of individual liberty. Indeed, it may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the right of the government to compel it. and Further, it is said, the right to provide is not denied by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot include the power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This however but challenges the existence of all power, for a governmental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can only be exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a power. One may disagree, but that is the law of the land as interpreted by the final body authorized to make such interpretations, the Supreme Court, and it remains good law today.	As many parties as have standing. The First Amendment protects the right to petition for redress of grievances, so any limitation on that right would be highly disfavored. When there's a rush of cases like this, though, there are a few option for dealing with them. For instance, a plaintiff may seek class certification, permitting him to stand in for similarly situated parties so they don't need to litigate themselves, or a court may consolidate the cases if they are sufficiently similar.	The problem is that the Constitution does not provide a freestanding right to "self-determination," to self-defense, or to bodily integrity. To the extent the courts recognize any of these as implied rights, they are subject to balancing against other rights or governmental authority. Analogizing to the Second Amendment can be helpful. There's a lot of gray area in Second Amendment law, but it's pretty clear that I have a right to keep a knife on my bedstand, but not to build a nuclear arsenal in your backyard. Why not? Because you have a right to keep people off your property, and because the government has an interest in protecting its citizens, infrastructure, and natural resources from the risks associated with my incompetent exercise of my Second Amendment rights. So what interests are at stake in the abortion question? Roe held that women have a right to privacy that protects access to abortion, but it also recognized that the government has an interest in protecting potential life. The question was how to balance the privacy interest against the interest in protecting potential life. Roe said the woman's rights generally outweigh the government's interests up until the point of viability, at which point the government's interests begin to outweigh the woman's privacy interests. But Dobbs appears poised to change that by saying that the woman's right to privacy does not exist at all. Dobbs likewise rejects the idea that the right to due process or any other constitutional right protects the right to abortion. Therefore, it concludes, a woman has no rights that can outweigh the state's interest in protecting the potential life she is carrying. Dobbs also recognizes -- but does not take a position on -- the argument that a fetus is actually a person itself. If a legislature were to adopt that position, and the courts were to accept it, we would find ourselves in a position where whatever rights a woman has to self-determination and bodily integrity would have to be balanced against the fetus's rights to self-determination and bodily integrity.	One could make a First Amendment challenge to mask requirements through either the Free Exercise Clause or the Free Speech Clause. Neither approach is likely to succeed. Because going without a mask is not recognized as "expressive conduct," it is not protected by the Free Speech Clause A free-speech challenge would likely also fail for two reasons. As you correctly suggested, the First Amendment protects more than just speech, also protecting "expressive conduct," such as flag burning, dancing, and wearing armbands. Of course, literally any conduct could have some secret expressive meaning in the mind of the person carrying out -- "I shot him in the face to say I didn't like him" -- so we have a question of where to draw the line between what expressive conduct does and does not receive the strong protection the First Amendment affords to speech. The Supreme Court detailed that test in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and it's now generally formulated as asking two questions: Did the speaker actually intend to convey a particularized message through his conduct? Are the people who see the conduct likely to understand that message? At the Sturgis rally, or at the statehouse protests over COVID restrictions, or some similar event that is explicitly opposed to masks, refusing to wear a mask goes a long ways in communicating an opposition to the mask requirements. But in the vast majority of cases, no one you run into in the normal course of daily life is likely to recognize that you are not wearing a mask because you are trying to communicate a message, let alone decipher what that message is. Do you believe that mask mandates are tyranny? That COVID-19 is a hoax? That life is meaningless and we should all welcome the hastening of human extinction? None of that is clear to the average viewer, which is who the courts are going to be concerned with. Because refusing to wear a mask is generally insufficient to convey a specific message, I'd argue that it is not expressive conduct. Because mask requirements are neutral as to religion and generally applicable, they do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. A religious challenge ("My religion prohibits wearing masks") is likely to fail because "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'" Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). This means that if the mask ban generally applies to everyone and you just happen to belong to a religion that forbids mask-wearing, you can't use that affiliation to escape the law's requirements. (The outcome may be different when you run the problem through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or state-level analogues, which impose more stringent tests for infringements on religious liberty.)	Sure: No Constitutional rights are totally unencumbered. Even natural rights like the "right to life" are legally "infringed" through various theories (e.g., self-defense, capital punishment, warfare). The Second Amendment has been interpreted as a right to keep and bear weapons that would reasonably be used in self-defense or in military service. You don't have to go to strategic weapons like nukes to find "reasonable infringement" of that right. For example, even though the military and even police routinely use explosives, individuals are absolutely subject to the whims of a federal regulatory agency (the BATFE) as well as state restrictions if they want to keep and bear detonators. Also, I'm not aware of an absolute prohibition on the possession of nuclear devices by non-government entities. E.g., various government regulators oversee private entities that operate commercial and research nuclear reactors and other activities that put them all-but in possession of nuclear arms. If an individual really wanted to legally keep and bear a nuclear weapon it could probably be done with enough money and oversight. (Amendment: Except, as cpast points out in the comments, that there is a law against private possession of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Which just goes back to the broad answer to your general question: In practice there are no unencumbered rights. Constitutional "rights" might better be called things that require "strict scrutiny" and "narrow tailoring" of government infringement.)	The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate.
Promotion of illegal activity on social media platforms Even though Tesla vehicles manufactured today have the internal hardware to be fully self-driving, they still need to undergo software upgrades before self-driving becomes fully functional. Furthermore, no state, as far as I know, allows autonomous vehicles to operate without a driver. Nevertheless, videos are circulating on TikTok showing Tesla vehicles on the road with no driver and passengers in the back seat. Isn't TikTok legally required to remove these videos? I reported one and was notified that it didn't violate their community standards. I'm not trying to be a Karen, but I think they give people the wrong message and are dangerous.	The First Amendment states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. It thus protects such videos. An analogous situation is that there is network news coverage of riots, bank robberies, terrorist attacks and assaults. Backpage was seized because it facilitated prostitution, not just reported or even encouraged it. That is basically where the line exists.	I know of an app that did similar. They sold membership access and linked Youtube videos. One of the Youtuber's started to take legal action against them. I don't know what happened but the app blocked their content from being shown. Updated this comment to remove incorrect information. After looking at Youtube's recent terms and conditions; you aren't allowed to link, embed or use the API if you want to put content behind a paywall, or show it alongside advertising: Under the section: Permissions and Restrictions https://www.youtube.com/static?gl=GB&template=terms So long as your app is free, and doesn't contain advertising you are probably okay.	As always, it depends. However, it is by no means certain that any public facing hobby project, such as a web app, is exempt from having to comply with the GDPR. Since the GDPR is only a few days old, we have of course no case law based upon the GDPR itself yet. However, when considering this, one should take the following two facts into consideration. 1. The "personal use exeption" in the GDPR is not new. The personal use exemption is unchanged from the article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. (There as a lot of lobbying for removing "purely" from the sentence – but drafters wanted to keep it.) 2. Case-law under the previous regulation restricts the scope of the exception The ECJ has ruled on the scope of the personal use exception in two cases: C-101/01 C-212/13 In both these cases, the ECJ took an extremely restrictive view, and concluded that the personal use exemption did not apply to the processing done by these individuals. In C-101/01 it can be argued that the hobby project as a blogger was connected to the controllers professional activity (she was a catechist in a local church, and blogged about her work. including her colleagues). But in C-212/13, there no such connection to professional or commercial activity. Here, the controller operated a CCTV to protect his home, but set it up to also capture public space, and that was enough for the ECJ to decide that the personal use exception did not apply. Discussion Case-law based upon Directive 95/46/EC is in no way binding for a future court that need to rule based upon the GDPR. We need to wait for case-law decided under the GDPR to be able to have some degree of certainty about the scope of the "private use exception" under GDPR. However, given what we know about how the ECJ has ruled in these cases in the past, I think it is hazardous to think that just because what you are doing on the web is just a "hobby project" not connected to professional or commercial activity, you are exempt from complying with the GDPR. Conclusion IMHO, you may be exempt, or you may not be exempt. I think it really depends on your activity in your hobby project, and to what extent this project processes the personal data of other people than yourself.	Owing to the First Amendment, in the United States your recourse would be limited to civil action based on violations of terms of service (meaning that "the authorities" are not going to knock on their doors to tell them to behave). This is not "spam" (which could be regulated) as the term is generally understood. It is annoying, but probably does not constitute threatening or child porn. It might involve violation of an anti-impersonation law such as this one from Texas, if the offender uses the persona of a real person as opposed to a fictitious person). That law, moreover, does not criminalize simple annoying. Prosecution may be possible in the UK.	Since there is no search or seizure involved in having a driver's license, requiring a person to update their address is not a violation of the 4th Amendment. It is also not "testifying against oneself in a criminal case", so it does not violate the 5th. As has been repeated many times, driving is a privilege and not a right, meaning that there is no fundamental constitutional right to drive. Strict scrutiny would not render the requirement to have a license unconstitutional, and it certainly would not invalidate the requirement to give a correct address and update that address as necessary. There may be issues regarding a requirement to produce identification, but there is no legal precedent for the idea that an ID law law and a federal "must show" statute would violate the 4th (that is not to say that the courts could not find there is such a basis if the question arises, but it has not yet been found). Since there is no national ID law, one can only conjecture what the outcome of judicial review would be, but if such a law survived strict scrutiny, it would be inconceivable that a portion of the law requiring you to keep your address current would fail such scrutiny. A curiosity search would still be barred.	You are wrong that they never get into legal trouble. It isn't terribly common but it certainly happens to those that get relatively prominent. Many of the folks doing the copyright infringement are judgement proof. It makes little sense for Disney, for example, to sue some guy living in his parents' basement for uploading a clip of their movie when that guy has no assets. Financially, it wouldn't be worth the cost of a lawyer. Many of the folks doing the copyright infringement are in jurisdictions that look the other way. If you're a Russian citizen pirating content owned by American companies, the Russian authorities aren't going to cooperate and arrest you and the American companies likely can't recover any judgement they'd get because you don't have any assets in America. There is a whack-a-mole problem. If there are hundreds of people posting pirated content to Facebook and each one is running hundreds of pages, that's tens of thousands of pages posting content. By the time you identify and close all of them, the pirates will have created tens of thousands of new pages. There is a cat-and-mouse problem. Copyright owners have automated tools to scan for their IP to issue takedown notices. Piraters know this so they modify the video (posting it as a mirror image or adding some additional video elements) in order to evade the automated tools. If copyright owners have to manually identify pirated content, it's realistically not cost effective to do so. The humans finding that content would cost more than the business loses in revenue to pirates. Tracking down the actual human/ business behind the copyright infringement is often a fair amount of work and may involve motions in courts in multiple countries. That work tends not to be highly prioritized by law enforcement. If you're a small fish, it is unlikely that anyone would go to the effort of unmasking you in order to sue.	The legal issues are too black and white to have any meaningful impact on an ethics discussion. The IP belongs to A and B can't use it. A's not planning to build a product around the patent is irrelevant to the law and I do not see it bring up any ethical issue, but some people who do not understand patent law might. There might be ethics issues if A hired Josh with the specific plan to fire him as soon as the application was filed and intentionally misled him about these plans. Another issue might be Josh's duty to not disclose A's confidential information (the application does not become public right away), and Josh's duty to not draw B into developing an infringing product.	IANAL, just a programmer with an interest in legal rules. Due to the very permissive nature of the MIT license, no, it does not appear that anything illegal has been done. Specifically, the section to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software (emphasis mine) grants everyone the right to modify your code and share those modifications, provided one includes the license. Since this person has included your license (including your copyright notice), they have followed the conditions of the license and are able to share your stuff. Legally. Ethically, I still think its ****. This might be a good starting point in selecting a license (note the Modification column). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_free_and_open-source_software_licenses The CC-BY-SA license family, as mentioned by Ron Beyer in comments is on this list, for example. TL;DR: You unfortunately granted a more permissive license than what you wanted/needed to. This was a BadThing(TM), analogous to giving too broad of access rights to a method or class. Determine your desired permissions, then select a license that matches what you'd like to grant.
What exactly did Harvey Weinstein do to be convicted of rape in the third degree? If a man puts gun to a woman's head to force her to engage in sex, that's rape in first degree. So what is rape in the third degree? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvey_Weinstein_sexual_abuse_cases#Sexual_harassment_or_assault Why exactly was Harvey Weinstein convicted of third-degree rape? I do not see any detail anywhere. He is convicted of third degree rape and that's it. What exactly that he did that the jury think truly happen that cause his conviction? We'd never know. For example, some argue that all penetrative acts, or all prostitution, as non consensual, for example. In US, for example, you can't hire a girl to be both personal assistant and sugar baby. So saying that third degree rape happens if the sex is not consensual don't really add much. It'll be pretty helpful if anyone can have a sample, like in Harvey's case, of what exactly he did that results in his conviction? Did he offer money? Fame? Promotion? Does that count as non consensual?	He was indicted on many charges including 1st degree rape. So your question is why the jury returned the specific verdict, and did not convict on all charges. There is no record of the jury deliberations, so the best we can conjecture is that they didn't find the other charges to have been proven, and in lieu of a tell-tale juror, we can't know what evidence persuaded the jury. He was convicted on counts of criminal sexual assault in the first degree and rape in the third degree, but acquitted of two counts of predatory sexual assault, and it is suggested by media who make suggestions that this is because the jury did not believe the testimony of Annabella Sciorra. The crime of third degree rape (the charge involving Jessica Mann) is when a person engages in nonconsensual sex with another person. The crime of first degree rape, a charge that he was acquitted on, is when a person subjects a victim to nonconsensual intercourse through forcible compulsion, or when they are incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless. A person is guilty of a criminal sexual act in the first degree if they engage in oral or anal sex with someone who is incapable of consent, or if they use forcible compulsion. The statutes are here, §130.00 ff.	Without a witness willing to break their silence, we will probably never be certain. It is possible that this was harassment (current ordinance, not 1999 – version in force at that time not available), defined in Arvada if one has the intent to annoy (etc.) and "Repeatedly insults, taunts, challenges, or makes communications in offensively coarse language to another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response" (the "record" indicates that there was a pattern of such conduct). We don't actually know that he was fined (hearsay...).	Was This An Egregiously Lenient Sentence? Yes. Did he get lighter punishment than he "should have" (in some sense)? Yes. A six month sentence for a non-negligent homicide was virtually unprecedented then and remains extremely low. Even a six month sentence for the rape of an adult woman (which is generally a comparable or less serious offense than manslaughter) by a privileged white offender generates immense controversy today as it did in the case of the sentencing of Brock Turner for that offense in 2016 (something that ultimately cost the judge imposing that sentence his job). There is no way that intentionally hitting someone is negligent homicide. It is at a minimum reckless, and honestly, is hard to see as anything other than intentional conduct. While it wasn't premeditated and hence wouldn't qualify as first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, this would be a fairly straightforward case for a second degree murder charge and a sentence of a decade or more. The intentional part apples to the act of hitting someone, not the result of causing their death. This intent was present here. Where Did The System Fail? in what way did the legal process fail? Or do you think that there was any failure at all in the legal process? Was the substantive law at fault? No. The substantive criminal law in 1963 was very similar to what it is now and would have authorized a much more severe sentence on the crime of conviction and would have made a more serious charge of murder viable. Arguably the substantive law should have had a mandatory minimum sentence for homicide, but since judges very rarely impose such lenient charges for homicide in cases like this one where there was no good reason for leniency, many states don't do that now and it isn't a problem that legislators would reasonably have believed that they had to worry about. Allowing leniency in some extraordinary cases that capture considerations that the law does not expressly mention is often a good thing, rather than a bad one. Did The Appellate Process Fail? No. The defendant's conviction was not wrongfully reversed on appeal, and it is generally not possible for a defendant's sentence to be increased on appeal in these circumstances. Arguably, this is not an ideal rule of law (and it is not the law in most countries in these circumstances). But this was not a major problem with the legal system that was a primary reason causing the outcome in this case to be an exceptional miscarriage of justice. The Judge's Sentence Was An Abuse Of Discretion. The judge imposed a very light sentence within the statutorily allowed range of discretion. While we can't literally read the mind of the judge and the judge doesn't acknowledge this as a basis for the sentence, given a larger pattern of similarly lenient sentences of similarly situated people given light sentences by judges, we can make a very reasonable guess about the most likely and plausible reason for the lenient sentence. The most likely and plausible reason for the sentence is the one identified by Bob Dylan. A high status white man killed a low status black woman, and the judge felt that, as a result, it didn't justify as serious of a sentence. The actual chain of reasoning in the judge's mind consciously may have involved considerations like the view that the victim was an "eggshell" victim, and the likelihood that the defendant was capable of reforming his conduct after a short sentence and thus didn't present a threat to the public. But the courts very rarely grant leniency to someone on the grounds that the victim was "fragile" - usually this justifies a more severe sentence. And the documented fact that the perpetrator routinely assaulted others with his cane casts grave doubt on the extent to which he could be rehabilitated more easily than a typical defendant. Also, even if the charge of conviction was manslaughter, this case would have been considered at the high end of the range in terms of the culpability of the offender who went around assaulting many people at a public gathering seriously enough to cause harm, and to in one case cause a death of a more fragile victim. The sentence should have been at least at the midpoint of what is allowed (currently about five years out of ten possible) in a case like this one. Further, while Maryland is not in the "Deep South" it is a Southern state with a history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, and the judge in this case would have lived under and seen enforced to his benefit, Jim Crow laws in Maryland during his lifetime. The Civil Rights movement had not succeeded to the point that racism was a completely disavowed and unacceptable form of motivation in 1963, particularly in even parts of the South outside of the "Deep South" at that time. As a reference point, President Biden, in nearby Delaware, was starting to make a name for himself in politics at the time as a defender of segregation in the school system and an opponent of busing to desegregate schools. This issue got him elected and re-elected. Biden reformed his views later, but racism was alive and well in Chesapeake Bay area at the time. Was Prosecutorial Discretion An Issue? Possibly To Some Extent. The prosecution's decision to press charges for manslaughter rather than murder was also questionable, but less obviously so. Today, common practice would be to bring both murder and manslaughter charges in a case like this one. The facts would have supported a second degree murder charge. The fact that the prosecution originally brought a murder charge suggests that it knew that the facts supported that charge, and was influenced by some political or tactical consideration, or by judicial pressure, to drop the more serious charge before trial. But without insight into what that reason was (which is much less obvious than the judge's motivations) it is hard to judge whether the prosecutor should have acted differently under the circumstances. The fact that the prosecution pressed charges, took the case to trial, and got a conviction at all also suggests that the prosecutor's conduct was not at the bottom of the barrel compared to more racist prosecutor exercises of discretion in 1963 elsewhere in the U.S. The prosecutor had the full legal ability to decline to press charges at all without facing any legal consequences for failing to do so. Further, while it is certainly plausible that prosecutor's racism figured into this decision, it is also important to note that the prosecutor has to consider the attitudes of a likely jury pool when bringing charges. Even if the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty of murder under the law, the prosecutor has to consider whether the odds of getting a conviction from a local jury that is likely to have considerable racial bias influences what charges are right to bring in order to get a maximum conviction, as opposed to what charges the prosecutor believes are legally justified. Likewise, if the judge indicated the he would be likely to dismiss the murder charge before trial in a preliminary hearing, that would also make a prosecutor's decision to comply with an implicit judicial suggestion to stay in the judge's good graces for the remainder of this case, and for future cases before the same judge, understandable. However, if electoral public pressure, or the defense counsel's pressure or influence, caused the prosecutor to give up on a murder charge that a conviction would probably have been secured upon, this is much more problematic and would suggest racial and status bias on the part of the prosecuting attorney's office. Was Jury Conduct An Issue? No. The conduct of the jury in this case was not an issue, even though the potential of jury nullification that didn't happen was a factor that may have influenced the charge brought by the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant on the most serious charge presented to it.	The first thing it depends on is where you live. The US has no law requiring niceness, but perhaps niceness-enforcement exists somewhere in the world. The second thing it depends on is exactly what he does, where and how. If he comes into people's houses uninvited and starts harassing them, that is generally a crime. If he makes nasty remarks to people walking down the street, you can't even sue him. If the person commits in a crime, you can report him anonymously. However, for there to be any prosecution, someone will have to testify in court: anonymous criminal testimony is inadmissible in the US. If there is no crime, just a potential civil action, the part would hire an attorney to file a complaint, etc. and that party would be named (not anonymous), would have to testify, and would also have to have been harmed. The police will not get involved in a civil dispute. Based just on what you have said here, your attorney would very likely say that there is no case to be pursued, and your only solution is to ignore him.	Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals.	Probably murder. Because "victim 2 was then shot by this man in self defense" hasn't been determined by a neutral third party investigation or jury - it is just his own rationale for shooting. He may not be charged, or he may be tried and acquitted on the basis of self defense, but he isn't in a position of authority to simply make a "rightful death" call on his own, (is there such a thing?) and dispose of all the evidence. Obstruction of justice would probably be the minimum charge for covering up evidence of the murder of Victim #1. There is really no valid reason for covering up a double homicide, and his actions could easily result in a double murder charge.	The state argued, and the jury was convinced, that Mr. Holle turned over his keys specifically intending to facilitate the robbery. They necessarily found that Mr. Holle was not telling the truth when he said he thought it was all a joke. I don't know what evidence they had to demonstrate that, but I could imagine that there was testimony indicating Mr. Holle knew that these people had engaged in similar acts before, that the group spoke of the plan with a level of specificity that made him aware they were not joking, or that he saw them taking other steps to prepare that let him know they were planning a crime. It doesn't matter if he wasn't renting the vehicle or didn't have an agreement to divide the spoils. The question of "why" he facilitated the crime is technically irrelevant to the legal question of whether he facilitated the crime. Nonetheless, I could imagine several reasons why he would have lent his car: he wanted to ingratiate himself with this group, he was bullied into doing it, he believed he would get some of the pot they stole, he didn't like the target, and so on. The fact that he was risking prison time is a uniquely poor argument that he didn't know what he was doing. The risk of punishment is always present for committing a crime, and yet we know that people commit crimes all day, every day. Why do they do it? Probably a good question for psychology.SE.	There is actually a rather recent law in Germany which would make nonconsensual distribution of images which could damage the reputation of a person illegal: §201a StGB [de\|en] "Violation of intimate privacy by taking photographs or other images". This law says that: whoever, without being authorised to do so, makes available to a third party a photograph or other image of another person which is of such a nature as to significantly damage the reputation of the person depicted incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine. But even if the person has not already done so, just threatening to commit this crime might also be a crime according to §253 StGB [de\|en] "Extortion": (1) Whoever unlawfully, by force or threat of serious harm, coerces a person to do, acquiesce to or refrain from an act, and thereby damages that person’s or another’s assets for the purpose of wrongful personal enrichment or enrichment of a third party, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) The act is unlawful if the use of force or the threat of harm is deemed reprehensible in respect of the desired objective. (3) The attempt is punishable. (4) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. An especially serious case typically occurs where the offender acts on a commercial basis or as a member of a gang whose purpose is the continued commission of extortion. Considering the repercussions in the Saudi-Arabian culture and legal system for promiscuity, especially for women, it is hard to deny that there is a threat of "serious harm" in this case. So it might be a good idea to file a police report with the police of the federal state where the perpetrator lives. The police of most federal states allow to do that through their respective websites (look for the keywords "Internetwache" or "Strafanzeige"), so there is no need to travel to Germany to do so. This does of course require that there is enough information available to obtain the real identity of the perpetrator, which can be difficult with people you only know through online services.
Is not having a valid car insurance a misdemeanor in Orange County, California? My doubt arises after having received correspondence back from the Superior Court of California County of Orange. I pleaded guilty on a traffic ticket I had pending since three years ago only after asking repeatedly if this could constitute a misdemeanor to the OC court phone line operators and ensured that no, that it was just "a traffic ticket". However in the notice I see references to misdemeanors/felonies. I am not concerned about the penalty amount but the fact that having a misdemeanor in my record could affect my application for permanent residency (I am an immigrant applying for a Green Card). Below, I attach excerpts of the transcript: The Court is in receipt of the correspondence submitted electronically for the above case and the following was determined: ... To the Original Citation defendant pleads GUILTY to all counts. ... Pay Criminal Conviction Assessment Fee per convicted count of $30.00 per misdemeanor/felony and $35.00 per infraction pursuant to Government Code 70373(a)(1). Civil Assessment pursuant to Penal Code 1214.1 imposed on ... to remain ... Does this indicate that I have plead guilty to a misdemeanor?	According to Vehicle Code 19029, this is an infraction and not a misdemeanor. Government Code 70373 lumps criminal and traffic offenses together in adding a $35 processing fee, hence the mildly concerning language.	Code sections cited in this answer are to the New Mexico Criminal code, Chapter 30 as they were in my answer to the linked question, and to chapter 59A. Neither the landlord (whom I will cal LL) , nor any ordinary citizen, is legally required to report information that s/he may have about a crime to the police or other authorities. LL cannot actively conceal or destroy or tamper with evidence (section 30-22-5. of the NM code), nor assist the criminal by more than silence which would be a crime iunder section 30-22-4, Harboring or aiding a felon. If the police question LL about the crime, s/he should not lie. Apparently lying to officers during an investigation is not a crime in New Mexico, although filing a false crime report is, under section 30-39-1. If LL were to make an insurance claim while omitting or misstating a materiel fact (such as that LL knows who broke in) that would be a violation of Section 59A-16-23 paragraph (2) which prohibits: for the purpose of obtaining money or benefit, present or cause to be presented a false or fraudulent claim or proof in support of such a claim for payment of loss under a policy I am not sure if LL owes an affirmative duty to the tenant. If LL does owe such a duty, the tenant may have grounds to sue LL if LL fails to help the tenant recover the stolen property, but it is probably not a criminal matter.	There is a note attached to the relevant section of the Revised Code of Washington. It used to be "not more than one year", but in 2011, Substitute Senate Bill 5168 changed this and many similar instances to "up to 364 days". They explained their purpose in the first section of the bill: The legislature finds that a maximum sentence by a court in the state of Washington for a gross misdemeanor can, under federal law, result in the automatic deportation of a person who has lawfully immigrated to the United States, is a victim of domestic violence or a political refugee, even when all or part of the sentence to total confinement is suspended. The legislature further finds that this is a disproportionate outcome, when compared to a person who has been convicted of certain felonies which, under the state's determinate sentencing law, must be sentenced to less than one year and, hence, either have no impact on that person's residency status or will provide that person an opportunity to be heard in immigration proceedings where the court will determine whether deportation is appropriate. Therefore, it is the intent of the legislature to cure this inequity by reducing the maximum sentence for a gross misdemeanor by one day. In federal law, 8 USC 1227 (2) (A) (I) provides that: Any alien who— (I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status under section 1255(j) of this title) after the date of admission, and (II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is deportable. The Washington State legislature didn't think that deportation was an appropriate punishment for an alien who committed a gross misdemeanor. Therefore, they reduced the maximum sentence by one day so as not to trigger deportation under 8 USC 1227 (2) (A) (I).	To be very straightforward, yes, a police department would very likely have records of their past interactions with you in the form of police reports. They cannot just throw them away because it's been scrubbed from your public record. They detail the interactions the police officer had with you. That being said, those records would not show up in a general inquiry into your record, because those records are meant to protect the officer and the department as a reference point they can go back to in case some dispute arose in the future. If a police officer really wanted to find them, they'd have to do a bit of digging for them. The difficulty in finding them would depend on what system the particular police department uses to store those records. Smaller departments may just file them in a cabinet somewhere, whereas larger ones may actually have their own searchable database. But a traffic cop out on the street is only gonna see what you're seeing at the DMV - nothing. There is also a formal NCIC database, but traffic violations would never end up in there. That is a national database that basically stores red flag persons of interest (think stolen vehicles, sex offenders, and gang members). Sometimes multiple departments within a state will share their information with each other, but a department's database is usually kept to that department only. Also keep in mind court records. The court case that had a violation removed under such and such conditions is still gonna be a public record. Those records would generally be available to a judge overseeing your case so if you repeatedly end up in court for the same thing, they're gonna know and they're gonna stop scrubbing it from your record or offerring certain options because you're clearly not learning your lesson. Many laws allow you to have one offense stricken per year and similar stuff like that, but that kind of stuff doesn't just permanently disappear. They have to keep record of it in order to know you've already had your once per year etc. Also a note about parking violations: not all of those are actually issued by police. If it was issued by a private firm then that is not something that would ever show up on your record. It would just be in a database somewhere with whatever private firm issued the fine. Those kind of tickets get sent to collections and hurt your credit score if you don't pay them, rather than affecting your driving record.	There is no hard and fast rule to determine what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the first instance, the judge (or jury, when there is a jury trial) decides this on a case by case basis. If the officer testifies that the matters recorded in the ticket are true because it was the officer's practice to always record accurately what happened in a ticket, this would ordinarily not be grounds for reversal of a conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence, unless other evidence somehow put the officer's testimony in serious doubt (e.g. a social media post clearly putting the officer in another location at the time that the ticket was allegedly issued). Normally, the only kind of evidence that would not result in a ticket being upheld on appeal would be the failure of the officer to testify at all.	This is SB 5605 in Washington, effective July 28, 2019, which allows a person to vacate a misdemeanor conviction for marijuana possession. The process allows a person to withdraw a guilty plea, or has the court vacate a conviction after a not guilty plea, and then the court dismisses the charges. That doesn't create a right for compensation for then penalty imposed, but it does remove any legal disabilities arising from the conviction. It depends on whether that state has such a law: such laws exist in a number of states, and apparently in California it does not even require application.	Let's be quite brutal here. Inexperienced driver doesn't mean the driver made a mistake. Lots of friends in the car doesn't mean they interferred with his driving. Loud music in the car is totally legal. "Perhaps was distracted" - "perhaps" you were distracted by looking at the passengers of this car instead of yielding? It seems that you drove without due attention. You noticed at the last moment that you had to yield. "Yielding" isn't just stopping right at the last second, you have to drive in a way that it is visible for others that you are going to yield, and you didn't. The other driver was 100% correct to assume that you wouldn't yield. Then you come up with an accusation that a police officer was biased. That's a very, very strong accusation. It's impossible for you to prove. It's the kind of accusation that will cause the judge to believe that you can't accept your own faults, and that you need the maximum possible fine to make you realise your mistakes. That's why you need a lawyer. A lawyer will either make sure that you only say things in court that actually help your case. Or will advise you not to fight this in court at all, if that is better for you. If you go to court on your own, you'll only get yourself into trouble. And if there was bias by a police officer, and a witness lying, and a driver driving without attention, then a lawyer with experience in these things might be able to prove that it court, although that would be a very tough call, but you on your own don't have a chance in hell. You say "the shop owner lied". The shop owner says "no, I didn't". So what's your next step? You don't know. Your lawyer knows. That's why you need a lawyer.	No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412
After exchange of contracts in property purchase, what happens if someone has COVID-19 on the completion date? Say I am selling my home to a buyer and also purchasing a house from someone, and the chain of sales goes no further than this (for the sake of simplicity). All house sales are in the UK, where you agree on a date of completion (date of move) and exchange contracts prior to completion to make this legally binding. If anyone pulls out of the process after exchange of contracts, then there is a contract breach, and this can be particularly problematic for a buyer pulling out. An answer here suggests some of the potential knock-on effects of not completing a property transaction after exchange of contract. At the current moment in time, the UK government has guidelines that instruct people to isolate for 10 days upon suspicion of COVID-19 symptoms or a positive COVID-19 test. From the government, it suggests you risk a £1000 fine for breaching self-isolation (as far as I can gather from the website. I'm unsure if there are further penalties). Let's say we get to 5 days before the transaction completion date stated in the contracts, and the person at the top of the chain (the person I am buying from) makes me aware that they have got a positive test for COVID-19 and have to self-isolate for the 10 day period. This would overlap with the completion date set out in the contract and mean that they can no longer complete on that date if they are to follow government guidelines. Now, I presume that all parties can mutually agree to either ignore the date (complete but remain put where they are) or rescind the contracts and set a new completion date. However, can someone in the chain refuse to do this and force through the completion date despite the COVID-19 guidelines? As an example, could the people purchasing my property just say they don't really care about my purchasing transaction and still want the completion date honoured? Would I have good legal standing to refuse them based on the circumstances, or would I still be liable to a lawsuit if I refuse the transaction?	too long, didn't read: You would be liable for a claim for breach of contract. The self-isolation guidance is voluntary in this scenario and in any event the relevant legislation allows you to leave to "fulfil a legal obligation" such as completing a contract. Therefore, the court would probably give judgment for the claimant on the facts you've given us. Your requirement to self-isolate The Government guidance for self-isolating on suspicion of, or a positive test for, coronavirus is entirely voluntary. You are only subject to legal obligations to self-isolate, and the associated risk of a £1,000 fine, if you enter England from a non-exempt country under Clause 4 of the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) Regulations 2020. Therefore, in the given situation, you would not be legally obliged to remain within the property for the entirely of the quarantine period. You would be able to seek alternative accommodation. Indeed, even if you were subject to Clause 4, subclause 9(c) explicitly states: (9) During the period of their self-isolation, P may not leave, or be outside of, the place where P is self-isolating except— (c) to fulfil a legal obligation, including attending court or satisfying bail conditions, or to participate in legal proceedings, Fulfilling the terms of the contract of sale would count as needing to "fulfil a legal obligation" so you would not be fined under the legislation and it would not be a defence to any lawsuit. The court's view Given that the self-isolation guidance is voluntary and, in any event, the relevant legislation has the "legal obligation" escape hatch, the court would likely treat this as a standard breach of contract and find that you had no exceptional circumstances that caused you to breach the contract by failing to vacate the property on the day of completion. Conclusion You would be open to a claim for breach of contract. Your defence would be unlikely to succeed on the merits and the court would likely side with the claimant.	The part of the statute (which is part of an article of the Uniform Commercial Code model language applicable to the sale of goods) that you are discussing reads as follows: 1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. I have put the critical language of (1)(c) for the purpose of understanding what they are talking about when they are talking about "cash sales" in bold. You are asking: Please explain it to me and tell me what a "cash sale" has to do with voidable title. Doesn't cash sale just mean you are paying cash for something? That sounds perfectly innocent to me. Items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) involve circumstances which are examples of transactions in which a buyer of goods obtains voidable title from the seller. This means that the sale can be undone if the seller acts promptly enough, but the sale can't be undone if the buyer in turn sells the goods to a good faith purchaser for value (i.e. someone who pays a meaningful price for the goods without knowledge that the seller only has voidable title). If the goods have been sold to a good faith purchaser for value, however, then the seller who could otherwise undo the sale entirely can now only sue the buyer for damages (usually the agreed purchase price, or fair market value if no purchase price had been agreed upon yet). When it says in (1)(c) that "it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale"," what the statute is describing is a transaction where the original deal was that you will deliver goods to me with the understanding that I will pay you for the goods in full with currency or other "good funds" (like a wire transfer), roughly contemporaneously. But, what actually happens is that you deliver the goods to me and instead of promptly paying you the cash you are owed for the goods, I don't actually pay you anything. This could happen because I was trying to cheat you and get something for nothing, in which case I would have also committed fraud which also falls under (1)(d). More innocently, suppose that I run a small grocery store and you run a dairy that delivers milk for resale to my grocery store every morning at 5 a.m. before banks open, in time for the morning rush of innocent customers milk to put in their coffee on their way to work, before the banks open, and then I go to the bank when it opens every day at 9 a.m. and take out some cash and hand it over to your money collector, when your money collector stops buy my grocery store around lunch time. But, today, I was stunned to discover that all of the money in my bank account had been frozen due to a garnishment on a money judgment against me that I hadn't been aware of because the process server who was supposed to give me notice of the lawsuit against me instead threw the court papers in the sewer and lied on the return of service saying that he'd delivered the court papers to me, so that unbeknownst to me, a default judgment was entered against me. The sale would be voidable in both cases, the one where I was trying to cheat you while telling you that it would be a "cash sale" and the one where I innocently found out that I didn't have the money to pay you that I had no reasons to think that I wouldn't have available to me. And, in each situation, if my grocery store sold half the milk that was delivered to me in the morning rush, those sales would be valid and irreversible, even though I completely stiffed the dairy owner and there was a total failure of consideration in what was supposed to have been a cash sale transaction. But, the dairy owner would have a right, when he found out that he wasn't getting paid at noon and the sale turned out to have been a voidable one, to take back all the milk that hadn't been sold to my customers yet in the hope that he could sell it to someone else who was actually willing and able to pay for it instead. In general, under circumstances when a sale is voidable, if I haven't resold the goods to a good faith purchaser for value, then you can legally force me to return the goods and have the sale invalidated. But, if I have sold the goods to somebody else for a more than nominal price, and the person who bought the goods from me doesn't know that I cheated you by not paying for the goods, then you can't undo my sale of the goods that I didn't pay for to the good faith purchaser for value. Situation (1)(c) is very similar to situation (1)(b), in which you give me the goods and I give you are personal check for the purchase price, but the check is then dishonored by the bank (something that could been my intentional plan to cheat you, but which could also have been my failure to keep track of the balance in my bank account as I wrote checks). Both of these situations involve broken promises which may or may not have been made with no intent to honor those promises in the first place. Situations (1)(a) and (1)(d), in contrast, involve out and out fraud and deceit, but not "fraud in the factum". In other words, what (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) all have in common is that the goods were voluntarily delivered by you to me, even though your voluntary delivery was obtained by improper means such a deceit regarding who is buying the goods. ("Fraud in the factum", which is also void, involves situations when, for example, I ask you for you to sign what I tell you is a birthday card, when what I have actually done is have you sign a letter authorizing your delivery man to deliver lots of goods to me, and then I use that letter to have goods delivered to me.) In case (1)(a) this would often be a sale on credit or open account to someone you believe to have good credit but who is in fact someone else with bad credit. For example, you make a sale to George Shrub, thinking you will be delivering goods to George Shrub, Sr. who has good credit, but instead you are tricked into delivering the goods to George Shrub, Jr. who has multiple bankruptcies and never pays his bills on time. In case (1)(d) there are myriad possible examples. For example, I may have given you counterfeit money to get you to deliver the goods to me. Or, I may have purchased your cow in a barter exchange for beans that I told you were magic beans, but that were really just ordinary beans. But, in both (1)(a) and (1)d), as well as in (1)(b) and (1)(c), you are voluntarily delivering the good to me and then not getting what you thought you had bargained for in the deal, sometimes with evil motives and sometimes for innocent reasons, so voidable title arises. In contrast, suppose that I snuck into my stockyard one night and stole the goods from you. In that situation, you would have a right to get your goods back not only from me, but even from a good faith purchaser for value to whom I sold the stolen goods, because out and out theft that does not even involve consent procured through fraud or a broken promise, doesn't give me any title to the property, not even voidable title. Similarly, suppose that I pointed a gun at you in your shop and insisted that you deliver the goods to me or else I will kill you. Again, in that situation, you aren't giving me even voidable title to the goods, and you can sue a good faith purchaser for value from me to get the goods that I never had any colorable claim to have ever owned back. The language in the first sentence of (1) goes along with the language about voidable sales of goods in the rest of (1), because the first sentence of (1) covers situations when I may not have 100% ownership of goods that I sell to some else. For example, suppose that I have a pedigreed male dog that I have purchased the pet rights in from a breeder, while the breeder has retained the stud rights in the dog. (Yes, these transactions really happen. I've litigated them.) Under the first sentence of (1), I can sell the pet rights I have in the dog to you, but I can't sell the stud rights that I don't own to you because I don't own them. And, unless I am a pet store owner to whom the dog has been "entrusted" (and I'm not a pet shop owner), I probably can't destroy the stud rights through a sale of the dog to you when I am purporting to be selling you both the pet rights and the stud rights, even if you are a good faith purchaser for value, because I am not a merchant to whom the "entrusting" doctrine applies. So, if I sold the dog, the owner of the stud rights could still enforce those rights against the person to whom I sold the dog. Parts (2) and (3) deal with an exception to the general rule in the first sentence of (1) called "entrusting" which is quite similar to voidable title. Entrusting involves you leaving your goods with a merchant who is in the business of selling those kinds of goods. So, if I leave my nice clothes with a consignment shop or a pawn shop and the consignment shop or pawn shop sells my clothes to someone and give the buyer good title, and I can't undo that sale even if you didn't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I had entrusted to the consignment store or pawn shop (e.g. perhaps they were only allowed to sell my wedding dress for a minimum price of $100, but instead sold it to someone for $30 which they didn't have permission to do, then the buyer of my wedding dress for $30 would still have good title to the wedding dress and the sale couldn't be undone). But, on the other hand, if I leave my nice clothes with an automobile parts shop or a grocery store or a stationary store, and they don't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I left in their care, and then they sold my nice clothes to one of their customers, that sale made without my permission would be void and could be undone, even if their customer paid more than a nominal price for my nice clothes and had no knowledge that the merchant didn't have my permission to sell my nice clothes. This is because we don't believe that someone who buys, for example, my wedding dress from an automobile parts shop or grocery store or stationary store, can legitimately say that they really believed in good faith that the seller really had your permission to sell my wedding dress, because that is not an ordinary merchant-customer transaction for them.	Contracts contain an implicit term that obligations will be carried out in a reasonable time While the situation is unusual and we obviously don't have the specific terms of the agreement, it would appear that the vendor agreed to contribute to half the cost of the roof repair and your sister was obliged to contribute the other half and arrange for the roof to be repaired. Implicit in this is that she would do this within a reasonable time. Your sister does not have the right to keep the money in limbo indefinitely. It's open to argument whether a year is a reasonable time or not. Similarly, if your sister is in breach of the agreement, the vendor would probably only be entitled to damages for what they have lost; they would not normally be entitled to terminate the contract. Their damages might be assessed as the difference between what their share costs now compared to what it would have cost a year ago - this may be nothing or a lot depending on how prices have changed - and interest lost on the balance that should have been returned to them.	Having done a bit of brief research, I find that "legit" is a synonym for "good". So, no. The header announcing a "principal amount" serves no purpose and could be misinterpreted as indicating that there is a loan. There is no reason to indicate the date twice, which gives rise to two different values of "date". The phrase "For value received" can be interpreted in at least two ways, one being "in exchange for some unspecified value to be received at some future date by Promisor", and "in exchange for a specific value already received by Promisor". Under the later interpretation, Promis(s)ee probably could not breach but under the former, Promis(s)ee could. So it makes a difference. You can just pay to the Promis(s)ee, and not imply that you are creating a pay-to-order instrument such as a check. That still leaves you the option to pay with a check. Or was the intent to say "pay on demand"? The expression "the sum of £500 shall the Promisor fail to meet his target" is not grammatical in US English, and I'll leave it to a UK speaker to judge if this is, over there. I assume that this is supposed to express conditionality, in which case "if" is a useful term. Then the meat of the contract, I guess, is that if the Promisor fails to meet somebody's target of 47.5 work hours per week, then Promisor has to pay Promissee £500 (and not otherwise). It's really not clear how anyone would know whether "meet a target of 47.5 work hours per week" has come to pass. Does that mean "work at least 47.5 hours per week"? Does that mean "for each of the three weeks within the time period" (or did you mean "work 47.5 hours within some one week, within the 3 week period"). Being explicit that the work obligation extends for 3 weeks would be legit (vide supra). Supposing that the second clause means "Promisor will pay £500 by 5:00pm 2 July 2016", you should put it that way. Or if you mean "Promisor will pay £500 by 5:00pm 3 July 2016", say that. Deadlines for performance should be stated very directly and clearly, and require no calculation and interpretation. And I'd suggest including a clause stating that "Promissor" and "Promisor" are used interchangeably in this contract. Or else be consistent in spelling. Note that almost any contract can be given some interpretation. From the perspective of creating a contract, the first concern should be over clearly expressing the intentions of the two parties in written form. After all, you don't have a contract if there is no meeting of the minds.	Is there a way for us to prevent the sale of the house until they have moved the fence? For example, it seems that filing suit against the current owners doesn't necessarily prevent the sale, and that the suit would be pointless after the sale is complete. You can't prevent the sale, but if you file suit to adjudicate the boundary dispute and file what is called a "lis pendens" giving notice that the suit is filed in the real estate records, the buyer will taken subject to the lawsuit and realistically, won't close in the first place. The prospect of an impending sale is unlikely to be something that would cause the court to take expedited action or issue a temporary restraining order, because you can preserve your rights with a "lis pendens" which doesn't take a court order. The absolute minimum amount of time in which you could get a court order on the merits without a temporary restraining order is perhaps three to four months, which is almost surely too long to prevent a sale of a house. The suit isn't pointless after the sale is complete. You can still enforce the boundary against the new owner. And, often, a new owner, having no ego in the placement of the fence, might settle the case sooner than the old owner would have. But, better practice in terms of neighbor relations would be to file suit first, so that the new buyer, if the buyer goes forwards with the sale, is aware of the defect. The old owner is also more likely to have evidence useful in the lawsuit you bring. Short of filing suit, send a letter to the realtor and the neighboring property owner with a copy of the survey advising them of the problem. If you could somehow figure out who was handling the closing, you could tell them too. This will impose upon them a legal duty to advise the new buyer before closing, and if they fail to do so, they expose themselves to the risk of a fraud lawsuit from the new owner. But, while this is cheaper, it also presents a risk that they won't warn the buyer who will then not have notice and the risk of being sued for fraud may cause the seller and the seller's realtor to resist your suit more aggressively and to be less prone to settle it. If you wanted to be really aggressive, you could give the neighbor notice that the fence is over the line and that you will destroy it if the neighbor doesn't act, and then tear down the fence, which is strictly speaking within your rights if you can do so without a breach of the peace, because it is on your property. I wouldn't recommend this approach, however, as it could lead to violence or police involvement that depending on the policeman who isn't trained in real estate law, might get you arrested which is not good even if the charges are later dismissed.	The law applicable to immovables is the law of the situs (lex rei sitae), i.e. the law of the country where the immovable property is located. This is important because this law changed after the annexation. Therefore, the mortgage may not exist anymore as a security. The lex rei sitae in regard to immovables is usually not subject to a choice of law agreement. Consequently, the law of the country of the creditor, which applied to the mortgage agreement is not applicable. As far as the loan is concerned, the courts in the new country have jurisdiction over a claim for payment under the loan agreement and may apply the law of the country of the creditor and order payment. If you are unable to make payments, your house maybe subject to insolvency rules and sold, the proceeds then paid to your creditors. The country of the creditor may also have jurisdiction, if you are still a national of this country and nationality is a ground for jurisdiction in that country. Assuming the property is your only valuable asset, a judgment in favour of the creditor needs to enforced in the "new" country. Whether this actually happen, depends on the law of the "new" country, and most importantly probably on the relationship between the two countries after the annexation.	Short Answer Something must be filed within 90 days of the last work done on the property (in your state, there is minor variation in state law from state to state on the exact deadlines, but these are typical for the U.S.). If no work is done on the property after closing and nothing is recorded by a lien claimant by then, you are in the clear after three months. Filings by the current owner can shorten the deadlines as explained below, but you can never know if there was some contractor that the seller didn't mention. In practice, however, a seller will usually sign an affidavit at closing that there is no unpaid work outstanding, and in reliance upon that affidavit the title insurance company will issue a title insurance policy under which it promises to pay any liens that are filed after closing. If a lien is filed, the title insurance company will sue the seller for fraud and breach of contract damages, unless the lien filing was frivolous, in which case the title insurance company will pay for the lawsuit to remove the frivolous lien (and sue the person who filed it for slander of title). In practice, title insurance companies almost never pay claims because they review the public records for lien filings before closing and are ruthless about suing sellers who mislead them. Most of the cost of a title insurance policy goes towards this due diligence prior to closing. Long Answer The statutory basis of the short answer is as follows: A lien under M.G.L. c. 254 Sections 2 and 4 is dissolved unless the person claiming the lien shall record a statement signed under the penalties of perjury giving an account of the amounts due to them. The notice of contract must be recorded not later than the earliest of: – 60 days after filing or recording a notice of completion; – 90 days after filing or recording of a notice of termination; – 90 days after the contractor, subcontractor, or supplier last performed labor or provided materials. See M.G.L. c. 254 Sections. 2 and 4. In addition to filing the notice of contract, one must serve the Notice of Contract upon the owner to create a mechanic’s lien. See Ouellet v. Armstrong, 18 Mass L. Rep. 100 (2004)(failure to provide actual notice of the recording of the notice of contract is fatal to a mechanic’s lien claim). M.G.L. c. 254 Sec. 8 provided that a contractor’s, subcontractor’s or supplier’s lien will be dissolved unless the party claiming the lien records the sworn statement of account not later than the earliest of: – 90 days after filing or recording a notice of completion; – 120 days after filing or recording of a notice of termination; – 120 days after the contractor, subcontractor, or supplier last performed labor or provided materials. See M.G.L. c. 254 Sec. 8. After the statement of account is recorded, the general contractor must file a civil action in the appropriate county within 90 days of filing the statement of account and record the complaint in the registry in the county in which the land is located. See M.G.L. c. 254 Sections 5 and 11.	You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.
Can I get sued for putting bleach in someone's drink? I had a slushie order, and we were out of water. There was a bottle of clear liquid, which I mistook as water. I put in around 3 ounces. Later, My boss informed me that the clear liquid under the water can was not back-up water, but BLEACH. The problem was that they informed me AFTER I had already served the customer! Can either I or the restaurant get sued for this? ( I do not know what is the percentage of concentration.)	Depending on the bleach, you could have just killed the customer, so why in hell are you worried about being sued (to which the answer is a solid “yes”, by the way)? Most bleaches are a horrific poison for which there is little recourse once swallowed - it can easily result in death or permanent life altering injuries. Being arrested for manslaughter or assault is a real likelihood here, both yourself and your manager. Get legal advice, now.	In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.	If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible.	In Florida, as in most common-law jurisdictions, you may legally use force to defend yourself and others from someone else's imminent physical assault. Florida makes it explicit. 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person. (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. The force you're defending against must be imminent, though. You can't just believe you may be in danger; you have to believe you are. Further, you must reasonably believe not only that use of force is necessary to defend against that danger, but also that you have to use that much force. Once you believe any of those statements to be false, or any of those beliefs become unreasonable, you're no longer protected by 776.012. If you continue to use force past that point, you're no longer defending; you're attacking. Yes, there may be criminal charges. I mean, use of force is illegal by default, and justified or not, you did just knock a guy out. The government has a duty to ensure that your use of force was lawful, and if it finds reason to believe otherwise, you may be charged. Yes, you might be held liable for the attacker's medical expenses. Mix Tape Guy is likely to try to sue in any case. He has some small chance of winning, partly because civil and criminal trials present different burdens of proof. If you weren't charged, or were found not guilty (and didn't get off on a technicality), then that chance remains pretty small. But if you are tried and found guilty of assault, you're much more likely to lose. Yes, you might be held liable for damage to the restaurant etc. Same story as with Mix Tape Guy. The outcome will depend heavily on the outcome of the criminal trial. If you weren't charged, or you were found not guilty, then you're less likely to have to pay to fix the restaurant. If you're tried and found guilty, you'll almost certainly have to chip in.	You can sue the shop for defective installation, or you can sue the manufacturer for a defective part. You will have to prove that it is the fault of the person that you are suing, so the shop will probably argue that it was a defective part that they couldn't have known about, and the manufacturer will probably argue that it was due to defective installation. If you have competent third-party testimony that proves that the part itself was defective, you may prevail, though if you can get them to write up a technical report that supports your contention, the manufacturer may simplify things by compensating you, if you waive your right to sue for damages. However, this may not be an option unless the shop retained the filter and can point to a specific manufacturing defect.	Would I sue seller or manufacturer for a new appliance that does not function correctly? You have viable claims against both seller and manufacturer, and you may sue both of them in the same complaint. Hopefully the tech's assessment that you "should get a new machine" is in writing, since that evidence seems dispositive (i.e., decisive) and immune to manufacturer's potential denial. Regardless of what approach you choose, the award you might be granted is subject to the prohibition of double recovery. It seems that the seller's directions were purposefully dilatory. Coupled with its subsequent pretext about expiration of the 30 day period, seller's conduct is in violation of legislation regarding unfair and misleading practices. Your post does not specify which jurisdiction in the US you have in mind, but consumer protection laws are rather uniform all over the country. If the provision of 30-day return period is reflected in a document such as the invoice, or in seller's signs/advertisements, you also have a claim of breach of contract for seller's failure to abide by the corresponding clause or policy. A similar rationale applies with respect to the manufacturer. The manufacturer is not entitled to arbitrarily postpone compliance as to the warranty. Seller's 30-day deadline serves as comparison in your argument that the manufacturer's open-ended schedule is excessive, a schedule which is on top of the delay from the interactions with both techs. if I win, what do I do with the dishwasher? Wait for the party who reimburses you or replaces the dishwasher to determine whether it opts to take the defective dishwasher. That party is responsible for transportation costs and related expenses if it decides to pick up the appliance. If the party is not interested in retrieving the defective appliance, make sure it signs a waiver. Otherwise you would be at risk that that party maliciously tries to turn the tables by alleging that you unlawfully got a second dishwasher for free.	I think this is a lot like this question Liability for poisoning food one expects to be stolen because you are causing harm to someone/something when they are using your things without permission. That question says that if you expect someone to do something with something that you have purposely made wrong then you are legally responsible for the effects.	Even though student status is not on the list of protected classes, this still might be discrimination. By proxy. Status as student can be a proxy for age, race, and/or color. Maybe even religion if there is a religious school nearby! In fairness to the store manager, when a pack of ten kids comes rolling in on the way home from school things can get pretty hectic. Rather than try to kick out the problem kids many managers will attempt to avoid the problem in the first place. Also, a sign like this might help the manager be less discriminatory. For example, let's say he lets all kids in and only kicks out the ones who are causing problems. If those problem kids are all in one protected class and it's different from the kids who don't get kicked out, the manager looks like he's discriminating based on that protected class. Discrimination by proxy can be hard to prove and I am not sure of the burden of proof in Canada. I have read that "Canadian experience" is used as a proxy in employment discrimination and has been getting some attention lately. That might be a good issue to keep an eye on as it may define proxy discrimination jurisprudence.
Any strong barrier for private universal healthcare? I'm posting this in "Law" because I'm specifically not looking for economic reasons. Here's the context: Imagine people were very highly motivated to provide healthcare to anyone that needs it, so they start the equivalent of a national insurance that indiscriminately gives money for those who don't have it and need it. Basically, they do what they'd want the government to be doing, but as a non-government institution. I did try some research, but found nothing close to this proposition, aside from a post here. Other things all refer to the high cost, so I'm wondering about other blockages not related to cost. In other words, if people were willing to pay the price, could it be legally done? Would there be anything, aside from monetary cost, preventing this from working?	You are describing a charity. In the simplest case, a charitable foundation could be established to receive donations and dispense payments for medical services. There are various irrelevant non-legal reasons why it might not work (e.g. insufficient contributions relative to demand). The main legal concerns of such a foundation are its tax liability (do they have to pay income taxes on contributions?), and local regulations (how do you distinguish between a scam and a real charity?). The tax question is primarily about 501(c)(3) status, and for the most part there should be no problems with charitably dispensing contributions, though there is a requirement that no part of the net earnings of a section 501(c)(3) organization may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual – perhaps the CEO would be an exception to the universality of the program (but providing equivalent service could be a pre-tax employment benefit). A recipient does not have to pay tax on a gift, owing to the "medical exclusion" Registration is a state-level matter, here is the Washington law. Nothing in that law says "you can't provide coverage of medical expenses", and no maximum income level is imposed on the recipient of a charitable gift. The concern of these regulations is mainly record-keeping and access to records, not on specific ways of benefiting the community. Since unlike taxes contributions cannot be coerced, this means that some people might not pay what other people deem to be "their fair share", which is, again, a political issue.	In the US, it depends on why you are doing this, and how you go about performing the operation. There are approved devices and procedures, and there is the other stuff. In an emergency that is life-threatening or threatens severe debilitation, it is permitted for a physician to try an extreme measure – if the state has a "Right to Try" law. Otherwise, a review and official approval by the relevant IRB is required. The devices are regulated by the FDA, but the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, so the feds don't have a say in whether a procedure is allowed. Nevertheless, use of unapproved devices can be taken to be evidence of failing to meet the required standard of care, in the case of a malpractice suit or punitive action by the state regulatory board. There is no specific law prohibiting removing lots of organs and replacing them with prostheses, though arguable what happened was that the brain was removed (it's not that a replacement shell was built around the person). Ordinarily, intentionally "killing" a person is illegal (except in case of sanctioned execution or self-defense). There is zero case law that would tell us whether removing a brain from a body "kills" the person. Most likely, there would be a prosecution for unlawfully causing a death, and either the legislature would tune up the law w.r.t. the definition of "causing death", or the courts would do so.	You are correct in that the GST is 10%. It never has been (and likely never will be!) 2.5%. You're also correct that some items (generally considered as 'essentials') are GST free. For example, the ATO includes 'most basic food' on its list of GST-free items. However, these GST-free items are completely GST free, and restaurant meals certainly don't class as basic food. Perhaps interestingly, the wholesale sales tax when it was first introduced in 1930 was set at 2.5%, but it wasn't at that rate for long (see A brief history of Australia's tax system). If I had to guess, I'd say this is probably a dodgy set up in this restaurant's point-of-sale system (there's also no such thing as 'GST2'). Hopefully their returns to the tax office are not as dodgy!	I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify.	There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.	It probably does, up to a point. Roe v. Wade asserts a right to privacy, discussed in §VIII. Granting that there is no explicit enumeration of a right to privacy in the Constitution, its implicit presence is discerned via a long series of constitutional rulings of a diverse nature. It is not clear what is the extent of This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people... However, even in the case of explicitly recognized rights, they are not absolute: you cannot commit fraud or threaten a person with death and escape punishment by citing the 1st Amendment, you cannot own a machine gun and cite the 2nd in your defense. Fundamental rights are strongly protected, but they may be limited in a fashion that survives strict scrutiny. This means that the encroachment is necessary to a "compelling state interest", it is "narrowly tailored" towards that end, and is the "least restrictive means" to achieve that end. The question arose in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 where Jacobson was criminally arraigned for refusing to comply with a mandatory vaccination law (applicable to all persons over 21). The court noted that the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. The liberty secured by the 14th Amendment, this court has said, consists, in part, in the right of a person 'to live and work where he will'...; and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense... According to settled principles, the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety. The right to compel vaccination is reaffirmed in Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174. There is currently no mandatory vaccination law applicable to adults; were such a law to be created (analogous to the earlier Mass. law regarding smallpox vaccination), it could easily pass judicial review as long as it is "minimalist". The question of "compelling government interest" would distinguish between mandatory Ebola or zombie-fever vaccinations vs. shingles or (ordinary) flu. School-related vaccination laws are the most minimal way to achieve the desired outcome, so a law requiring everybody to submit might not pass a strict scrutiny review.	No Always assuming that the government has operated within the limits of its powers or, at least, that if they have exceeded those powers the excess was in good faith. First, there is the issue of sovereign immunity. Basically, a government can be held liable only when it consents to be held liable. Most governments never waive this with respect to their lawmaking powers because they have to be able to make laws in what they see as the public interest without fear of litigation. See, for example, cases on plain paper packaging of cigarettes. Second, most governments have the power to regulate commerce and to deal with public emergencies. There is an issue which comes up in Federations about which government has the power but even if a law is invalid, it does not follow that compensation is payable. It certainly isn’t if the law is valid.	This happened recently in Washington state, when the state Supreme Court ordered the state government to comply with a constitutional funding mandate (McCleary v. Washington, 2012). The state did not comply for 6 years and was fined ($100,000 per day) for 3 years. I don't recall that the state paid a penny, and the courts did not demand payment of fines for that period. Public opinion did not have any obvious effect, but you could take this to Politics SE to get a lot of opinions as to whether public opinion mattered. The federal government can't get involved, unless they (the federal government) first make a federal issue out of it, perhaps because of some law suit. Power of enforcement is essential non-existent, given a sufficiently non-cooperative state government. I should point out that the court's order was a bit vague, that is, it was not "release Smith from custody instantly", it required the government to act to the satisfaction of the court.
Where does the legal principle of "can't benefit twice" come from? I've been told there is a legal principle (in UK law, specifically England) that a person cannot be allowed to benefit twice from a court's decision. I've found criminal law which addresses that, and inheritance precedents, but this is a civil case. Specifically an insurance company is trying to avoid paying benefit, relying on an argument that lawful tax avoidance was used to defer tax on certain funds, and so requiring them to pay benefits in relationship to those funds would be the equivalent of allowing the policyholder to benefit twice - first in avoiding tax, and then again by receiving insurance cover for the loss of those funds. I have been told that this inability to benefit twice is a well-established principle of english common law - but I can't find it. Certainly there's no issue with the insurance company needing to pay the benefit twice, and if they are allowed to benefit by avoiding paying on the policy then they would be benefiting from the policyholder's careful and lawfulapproach to paying only the tax required under the law. No doubt this is basic law 101, at least I hope so! If anyone could point me to actual law, and also real cases where this might have been applied in any similar way in a civil case, I'd be very grateful.	The earliest mention of the principle that I can find is in Rolston v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [1975] NI 195, where the matter of compensation for the widow of a police officer murdered in Northern Ireland arose. I am sure there are earlier cases that express the same principle in different terms, however. It is a broad principle that applies to most areas of civil law, and I cannot find an original source for it. I imagine that it is simply "received wisdom" that has been repeated long enough to become a cornerstone of the law of restitution in England and Wales. There is currently no statutory basis for the principle so I cannot cite any relevant Acts of Parliament either.	Sec. 171.208(c) of the law provides: (c) Notwithstanding Subsection (b), a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed or induced in violation of this subchapter, or for the particular conduct that aided or abetted an abortion performed or induced in violation of this subchapter. The apparent intention, as I see it, is that a defendant is only supposed to have to pay the $10,000 damages once, so that it's not possible for a large number of plaintiffs to sue and collect. Some others have pointed out that there may be a loophole in case there are judgments in several cases before the defendant pays for the first one, and that in such a situation the defendant might be required to pay more than once. It doesn't seem to me, on its face, that such a loophole was intended, but we may have to wait and see how courts handle it. In any case, it would seem that the defendant could minimize this possibility by paying the judgment as quickly as possible.	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".	This is a well established model in the UK. One route is the umbrella company. Y here would be the umbrella company. A would then either be providing services to Y or be employed by Y. You may be wondering what use it is if A is employed by Y. The answer here is that whilst A may not benefit from the tax treatment, X does not bear the burden of running PAYE etc. Further, because of regulations such as IR35, it may be that there is a doubt as to whether employment tax apply even if there is a contract for service. Essentially disguised employment means taxes are levied on the employer as if an employment existed; however, in this situation X has the comfort that if this arises they will (normally) fall on Y rather than X. Another route is the service company, where normally A himself will own it (or it is owned between A and A's spouse), take a combination of salary and dividends out (using two allowances if owned between spouses), and he will bill X or Y; companies exist which will perform all the necessary paperwork to do this (in which case Y is called a managed service company), as opposed to a personal service company (if A sets it up himself). It's not clear where you are based, but if you are based outside the UK (and possibly if you are inside the UK) there are accountancy companies that specialise in setting all this up.	Who Is On The Risk? This depends upon the language of the respective Gecko and NoState policies, the liability of each insurer is determined independently, and it is possible that neither, one or both of them would be "on the risk" as they say in the industry. Usually, insurance policies are drafted on either an "occurrence" basis (i.e. when the "incident" occurred), or on a "claims made" basis (i.e. when the "incident" was reported to the insurer). Unless the homeowner was awfully mindful and called his insurance agent almost simultaneously with the fire department, NoState would be on the risk if it was a claims made policy, and Gecko would not be on the risk if it was a claims made policy. In ordinary U.S. homeowner's insurance policies, an occurrence policy is much more common than a claims made policy. So, one would first look at the definition of an occurrence in the Gecko policy and see if there was an occurrence prior to the expiration, in which case the Gecko policy would cover it, and then one would look at the definition of an occurrence in the NoState policy and see if there was an occurrence after the policy term commenced, in which case NoState would cover it. The same principles discussed in this answer would apply in a non-U.S. case, but the typical language found in a homeowner's policy in non-U.S. jurisdictions might very well be different. There is a very decent possibility in this situation that this would count as an occurrence for both Gecko and NoStates' policy, although if only one of the policies was on the risk, it would probably be the Gecko policy and not the NoState policy. There is no one uniform definition of occurrence, many definitions of when an occurrence takes place are not sufficiently precise to exclude either Gecko or NoState in this fact pattern, and generally speaking, there is a legal rule that interprets legal language in an insurance contract in favor of the insured to the extent that there is any doubt as to its meaning. If both policies were on the risk, they would each have to provide coverage to the extent of their contract, although there would usually be some anti-double recovery language in each policy to prevent the insured from getting more payments for any particular kind of loss than the total losses of the insured. The relative burdens of each insurer would be worked out in a negotiation involving the Gecko, NoState and the insured, and by a court if the negotiations did not result in an agreement. A negotiated deal would reflect any uncertainty regarding the likelihood that Gecko or NoState respectively would be required to pay. For example, if Gecko was clearly on the risk according to its policy language, and NoState was only probably on the risk but not clearly based upon its policy language, in double recovery situations, NoState might pay less than 50% of the portion of the loss that would otherwise give rise to a double recovery. What Is Covered? The amount of coverage (e.g. replacement value v. current value of the building and property therein, temporary accommodations, etc.) would depend entirely on the coverage set forth the insurance contract of each insurance company that is on the risk. Coverages vary a great deal and influence insurance premium prices. Usually, for example, you would be able to get policies with or without temporary accommodations coverage as you wished when you purchased the policy and that decision would govern what the insurance company on the risk would have to pay for when a claim was made by the insured. As an aside, keep in mind that a significant part of the payment would go to the mortgage holder, if any, and that a homeowner's insurance policy almost never covers the part of the value of a home that is attributable to the land that it is build upon, rather than that building that was destroyed itself. If your house was worth $300,000 and subject to a $150,000 mortgage, and was built on a lot worth $100,000 if it were vacant, the insurance payout would typically be $200,000, of which $150,000 would be paid to the bank holding the mortgage and $50,000 would be paid to the home owner who would also retain title to the parcel of real estate that the house was built upon. With the same facts, but a $250,000 mortgage, an insurance payout of $200,000 would go to the bank holding the mortgage, no payment would be made for damage to the house to the home owner directly, and the homeowner could continue to retain the title to the parcel of real estate that the house was built upon subject to a remaining $50,000 mortgage balance. What what would happen next would depend upon the fine print in the mortgage. The amounts paid to the mortgage holder, as well as the amounts paid to the home owner, would both contribute to the amount of the insurance company's subrogation rights discussed below. Subrogation Bonus question - can either/both Gecko or NoState sue Samsing? Any insurance company who pays an insurance claim caused by the tortious fault of another (e.g. Samsing, if its product was defective in a manner sufficient to give rise to legal liability) has a right to sue the party at fault for the loss the insurance company suffered in what is called a subrogation lawsuit. If both companies paid, both would have subrogation claims against Samsing for the amount that they paid. The insured could also sue Samsing for any losses suffered, whether or not they were covered by insurance, but any insurance company that paid a related claim would also have a lien on any recovery of the insured in a suit by the insured against Samsing, for any loss paid by the party at fault to the insured that was within the scope of what the insurance company paid the insured for. If the insured had losses beyond what was covered by the insurance payment, or losses different in kind from what was covered by the insurance payment, and the insured recovered damages from the party at fault for those losses, this additional recovery would not be subject to the subrogation lien. For example, damages recovered from the party at fault for emotional distress, pain and suffering, permanent physical impairment, and temporary accommodations (if none of the insurance policies on the risk covered temporary accommodations) would not be subject to a subrogration lien of the insurance company or companies that paid claims to the insured for other damages suffered by the insured in connection with the incident. Also, if, for example, the insurance policy had a policy limit of $100,000, but the insured suffered $150,000 of damages and recovered that from Samsing in either a collected court judgment or a settlement payment, the $50,000 of excess recovery for economic damages beyond the subrogation lien would belong to the insured. Since the insured would typically sue with a lawyer hired on a contingent basis, usually, the insured lawyer would reach an agreement with the insurance companies holding the subrogration liens for them to pay a contingent fee to him on the same basis as his primary client if he recovered funds subject to the subrogration liens, so that his client would not walk away empty handed after using his entirely recovery to pay his attorneys' contingent fee, or would reach some other agreement addressing the same problem.	I think the question answers itself : what's being put forward as a problem (that official organisations can cover their members' liability at events) is actually their main advantage. Liability doesn't go away - assuming your friend's lawyer's advice was accurate, it might have been better phrased as "liability will be on the participants". I'm not sure it's entirely right (though it might just be overly specific) in the way it's been reported - if there was anything that could be considered incitement to, or encouragement of, unlawful activity, there may be an additional liability on the person whose name is attached to the group, and possibly the platform used (though this is a young area of law at the moment). What's covered by the insurance will be dependent on the policy, so that's not a question that The Bloke On The Internet can answer. In terms of discounts, I don't see any reason these couldn't be offered on a social media group - or that there would be a significant difference between a social media group, an official or unofficial website, or coupons published in a magazine or distributed in flyers on a street corner. It's worth bearing in mind that distributors don't do this out of kindness - it's just advertising. If an official club, or the associated manufacturer (the owner of the brand), believed there was quantifiable loss - primarily financial, but possibly reputational - there may be grounds to demand any unofficial group cease and desist, irrespective of where (social media, websites, physical premises) they had a presence. But perhaps the greatest advantage (though I'm drifting off topic for this SE) for an official group is that it can use whichever medium it considers most useful at the time, or a combination of several. One tied to a specific social media platform will always be limited in its longevity.	Now I'm having another conversation with a lawyer and I'm not particularly happy (not to say outraged) that to answer a simple question they require £95 + VAT for 30 minutes Skype session. Maybe it is a common practice in law industry - in my industry (web development) we share our knowledge in an open-source manner. The rate you were charged is actually reasonable for such a limited engagement. Few lawyers are willing to even consider providing any advice on such a limited basis. Most would try to limit their clients to cases generating thousands of pounds in an in person visit. Lawyers are in the business of selling knowledge and time, not documents and results. An open-source approach would undermine their business model just as much as it would for the movie industry or the recording industry. While I appreciate professional legal advice (I know it is required) I have a belief that by obtaining some knowledge first I'll be in a position to ask better questions. This belief is not necessarily very well founded in this context. The reality of information about the law is that the raw data has limited usefulness. One of the main things that a legal education provides is an ability to "issue spot" so that you know what points need to be researched and where to look for them. Without the overall context that a legal education provides, knowing what issues you should be looking for is difficult or impossible, and this is particular true in Anglo-American common law systems, where the law is embedded in an opaque network of appellate cases rather than laid out more or less completely in a carefully organized statute. Also, you are almost completely unqualified to distinguish between a simple question and a hard one. Just as it is difficult for a non-expert to know what is difficult or impossible for a computer to do (e.g. turning raw image input in the models of reality is very hard for computers but easy for people, while intense calculations are simple for computers but hard for people), it is often very difficult for a non-lawyer to know what is an easy or hard legal question. For example, the rights of neighboring home owners when trees start to grow across property lines seem like simple questions but are actually extremely complex legally, as is another simple question such as explaining what a book means in IP terms as a book migrates to a new platform. But, some seemingly complex points (e.g. detailed questions of tax law or civil procedure) can have very simple and clear answers. Finally, keep in mind that in a situation like spousal alimony, if you've done as much research as you state, it is very likely that a definitive answer that you are looking for simply does not exist. There a lots of legal questions that do not have clear objective answers. This is because trial judges in family law matters have wide discretion in a lot of the fine points of alimony decisions, much of it exercised at the trial court level that does not generate binding legal precedents and is not widely available to researchers. Therefore, there is really no substitute in evaluating how judges will exercise that discretion for the collective experience of an attorney who has been through the process many, many times before the particular group of judges who are likely to handle your individual case. In sum, while I understand your frustration, a lot of it is rooted in common, but inaccurate assumptions about how the legal system works.	I assume that the loan was legal, in light of rule changes pertaining to non-borrowing spouses. If so, there is really no recourse other than to repay the loan. This article explains the current options / restrictions in an understandable manner, but of course it is too late to do anything about it. If there was actually fraud or coercion in the loan, or if the elder party was mentally incompetent, there might be some legal recourse, but we don't have any evidence of fraud, coercion or incompetence here.
Can a minor serve as a company's registered agent? Can a minor serve as a registered agent for a company in Massachusetts?	tl;dr It seems like a bad idea. Massachusetts's statutes don't seem to expressly prohibit it—and I didn't find any Massachusetts cases where the registered agent's age was at issue. But registered agents have some fiduciary duties, and the agent has to have the capacity to receive all forms of legal process. Some possible roadblocks are: "minor" is a broad term that courts don't seem to have interpreted in the context of registered agents, and each form of legal process sets its own requirements. Background First, the term "minor" encompasses extremes: a 1 year old doesn't have the capacity to receive and forward legal process to the intended party, but a 16 year old might. Some jurisdictions recognize a "suitable age and discretion" rule, though it hasn't been extended to the context of registered agents. See, e.g., Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. 4(e)(2)(B). Massachusetts isn't one of those jurisdictions. See Mass. R. Civ. Pro. 4(d)(1). In the broader law of agency, minors do have the capacity to serve as "agents"—though their ability to affect the legal relations of the principal is limited. For example, the enforceability of minors' contracts is an issue, and minors can't enter into durable powers of attorney or serve as trustees. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.04. The problems associated with appointing a minor as an agent in Massachusetts are longstanding. In Commonwealth v. O'Leary, 143 Mass. 95 (1886), a mother had her minor daughter enter into a contract of sale for alcohol for the mother's use. While the court recognized the daughter as the mother's agent, it still characterized the transaction as an illegal sale "to" a minor. In the case of a registered agent, the primary action Massachusetts expects of the agent is the receipt and forwarding of the principal's legal correspondence. Courts have found that this creates a fiduciary duty on the registered agent's part. See Int'l Envtl. Mgmt. v. United Corporate Servs., 858 F.3d 1121 (8th Cir. 2017). This makes sense because the service of process satisfies constitutional requirements embodied in the Due Process clause. So in predicting whether a court would extend the "suitable age and discretion" rule to registered agents (or even needs to), it would likely consider that the agent has fiduciary duties, albeit more limited than those of a typical trustee. Second, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156B § 49 governs corporations and requires that the agent be capable of receiving "all lawful processes in any action or proceeding". When the agent is an individual (as opposed to a company), that person must be a resident of Massachusetts and have a "business address in the commonwealth". Mass. Gen. Laws 156C § 5 governs the process for LLCs, and Mass Gen. Laws 156D § 15.07 details it for non-Massachusetts companies. Massachusetts's statutes don't expressly prohibit minors from serving as registered agents, but the agent must have the capacity to receive all forms of lawful process. Thus if some lawful process requires delivery to an adult, the minor wouldn't be capable of receiving it.	Caveat Keep in mind that words do not have uniform definitions for all times and places and contexts. Words can have different meanings in particular contexts and can be defined in a contract or statute to have a meaning different from the common meaning. "Person" Usually Includes Entities Of Any Kind This said, usually the term "person" in the law refers to any human being and any trust, estate or entity that is capable of suing and being sued and entering into contracts. An "entity" in this sense would often include partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, non-profit associations (whether or not incorporated), business trusts, joint ventures, local governments, states, the federal government and foreign governments. (I break out trusts and estates separately because there is divided authority in different jurisdictions over whether trusts and estates are entities, or are simply a special hat that the trustee or executor wears that are not entities, which can be relevant in some highly technical situations.) Agency Situations The term "person" is also often used in the sense that it refers to the principal and not the agent, when an agent is taking action on behalf of the principal. Thus, if there is a law that says "a person who enters into a real estate contract must disclose that person's taxpayer identification number", and someone with a power of attorney from you signs a real estate contract on your behalf, the power of attorney agent should disclosure your taxpayer identification number and not theirs. Why Is The Term "Person" Defined So Broadly? One important reason for using the term "person" to apply to entities as well as human beings, is that it allows for statutes and contract terms or case law legal rules to be stated in very general terms without being wordy in a way that accurately reflects how those legal rules or contract terms should apply to entities. For example, a statute using the word "person" might say: A person who is engaged in business in this state must register with the department of business licenses. By using the word "person" in this way, the statute wouldn't have to say instead (probably less accurately and less comprehensibly): Any individual, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, business trust, non-business trust, estate, governmental entity, or other entity, including the principal of any agent acting on behalf of the principal, engaged in business in this state, must register with the department of business licenses. The phrasing without the word "person" would be more likely to create loopholes because some kind of entity is omitted, and would be prone to ambiguity because one would have to decide which words that define the kind of persons and entities that are covered modify which other words in the sentence. Thus, using the word "person" is often makes entities more rather than less accountable to the law, by making legal language more clear and more general (and hence containing fewer loopholes). "Individual" or "Natural Person" Usually the term "individual" or "natural person" would mean a human being, although, of course, there are other senses of the word "individual" such as "an individual Widget" referring to exactly one Widget in particular, as opposed to Widgets in general. Alternative Definitions Of "Person" There are isolated times when the word "person" would not include minors and incapacitated people who are incapable of suing or entering into contracts in their own name due to lack of legal capacity. It isn't uncommon to have a definition of "person" in a statute or contract that omits governmental entities, that omits all kinds of entities, or that omits particular kinds of entities (e.g. foreign entities or corporations). For example, a tax statute might define "person" in a way that includes natural persons and entities, but excludes governments. Some of the definitions of terms like these in the bankruptcy code are particularly non-intuitive.	I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies.	Anyone who is an employee as defined in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 USC 201 et seq.(or parallel state minimum wage laws) and is not within the scope of an exemption to the minimum wage law, must be paid minimum wage. The relevant question is whether or not the person is an employee who is not exempt from the minimum wage requirement as defined in the FLSA. The question is a mixed issue of fact and law in which the characterization given to the relationship by the company and the person doing the work is one factor, but not the only or the controlling factor, in determining employee status. The exact nature of the work governs whether the FLSA's minimum wage requirement applies or not. For example, "employee" is defined for puroses of the FLSA at 29 USC 203(e) to exclude "any individual employed by an employer engaged in agriculture if such individual is the parent, spouse, child, or other member of the employer’s immediate family" and certain kinds of volunteers. Piecework pay is allows under certain limited circumstances by 29 USC 207(g) when the usual result is that reasonable workers earn the minimum wage. Tipped employees (which is a form of revenue sharing) also receive special treatment. Most of the exemptions are found at 29 USC 213. Most relevant to your question is 29 USC 213(a)(1) which includes an exception for an "outside saleman" who is paid on a straight commission basis, and 29 USC 213(a)(5) and (a)(6) which contain exclusions for certain farming and fishing occupations. Straight commission compensation without regard to the minimum wage is generally not permitted with regard to an employee who is an "inside salesman" (e.g. someone who works at a retail store in a mall or at a phone bank for a telemarketing company), or for anyone other than an outside saleman in non-agricultural jobs. Independent contractor status generally depends upon the degree of control that the company has over the manner in which the work is performed, the assignability of the contract to do the work, and the extent to which the worker does work for many different companies on a contract basis while complying with employment related laws for the contactor's own employees (e.g. worker's compensation). The working for many different companies on a contract basis prong of the test is frequently controlling in practice. Six of the main factors considered by the Labor Department in determining independent contractor status are discussed in Fact Sheet #13. A true independent contractor may be paid on a revenue sharing basis without regard to minimum wage, although in practice, if this results in the independent contractor earning less than minimum wage, there will be strict scrutiny of the practice. Typical independent contractor arrangements that would be allowed would include an attorney working on a contingent fee basis, or an independent broker or realtor working on a straight commission bais. More often than not, a true independent contractor is someone you couldn't even imagine being an employee subject to minimum wage laws of the company in light of the overall relationship and often this will involve a business to business contract, rather than a business to a non-professional individual contract with only personal services involved. There are some safe harbor provisions that if met can insure independent contract status, but it is very common for someone who legally is an employee to be misclassified as an independent contractor in an attempt (often futile if the matter is pressed by regulatory or tax officials) to avoid compliance with laws incident to the employment relationship.	Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive.	You premise is correct. The processor is someone that processes data on your behalf, and since the GDPR definition of processing is extremely broad, that is about every third party subcontractor that you use for data processing, including various cloud providers. I'm afraid it will soon become a huge mess with a gazillion contracts to sign. I disagree. Yes, the GDPR says that a contract between the controller and processor must exist, but Article 28 of the GDPR does not say anything about how the controller shall document these instructions. Basically, in cases like the one you describe where John Doe relies on a web agency for having a contact form on the web, there will be a standardized (by the web agency) service agreement between the John Doe (controller) and the web agency (processor). There is nothing stopping the parties from agreeing that this service agreement that John Doe accepted as part of the onboarding procedure is also the DPA as required by the GDPR. Putting something like the following in the service agreement would do it: The parties agree that this Service Agreement between You (controller) and Us (processor) set out Your complete and final instructions to Us in relation to the processing of Personal Data and that processing outside the scope of these instructions (if any) shall require prior written agreement between You and Us. You also agree that We may engage Sub-processors to process Personal Data on Your behalf. The Sub-processors currently engaged by Us and authorized by You are listed in Annex A. I think we will se a lot of amendments in service contracts as the GDPR gets better understood, but I don't really see a flood of DPAs in addition to these amended service contracts.	Voidable Contracts First of all, it is not generally correct that "minors are unable to sign contracts". However, in many cases, minors can disaffirm contracts. (This is also called "voiding the contract, and such contracts are called 'voidable".) This means that, up until the minor becomes an adult, and for a limited time after that, the minor can cancel the contract and cease to be bound by it. There are some kinds of contracts to which this does not apply. Under the traditional common law, the major exception was contracts for the purchase of "necessities" for the minor or the minor's family. The term "necessities" included food, clothing, and shelter. Contracts for "necessities" could not be disaffirmed. In addition, contracts to purchase goods that had later been sold to a third party for value, and the goods delivered to that third party could generally not be disaffirmed. However, many US States and other jurisdictions have modified these rules by statute. California, for example, has specific laws governing contracts for minors engaged in art, film, and entertainment work and in professional sports. These laws spell out procedures that must be followed to make such contacts not subject to disaffirmance, including a court hearing and payment of a part (15%) of the earnings into a trust. See the Findlaw page "Is It Legal to Sign a Contract With a Minor?" which states: For most contracts, the general rule is that while it's not illegal to enter into a contract with a minor, the contract is voidable at the discretion of the minor. Voidable contracts are usually valid contracts and are binding unless the child cancels it. On the other hand, if the minor turns 18 and doesn't cancel the contract within a reasonable period of time, the contract could become binding and enforceable. The page goes on to mention some specific state provisions in Texas, New York, and California, none of which seem to be relevant to the situatiin described in the question. The page "Can a Minor Enter Into a Contract?" from HG Legal Services states: Many people who are under the age of 18 have some type of employment. Additionally, there are many children in the entertainment industry. Both California and New York have passed legislation that limits such a minor’s right to disaffirm the contract. Some laws allow courts to first approve the contract so that the infant cannot later attempt to void it. Additionally, contracting with the infant’s parent rather than directly with the infant can bind the child in some cases. Some states allow infants to work so long as they acquire a work permit. (Note that in legal usage "infant" means the same as "minor", that is, a person not yet adult. It does not mean a baby.) Note that if a minor disaffirms a contract, the entire contract is undone. The minor cannot pick and choose which sections to disaffirm (cancel). Goods or money received by either party under the contract must be returned, for example. When a transaction cannot lawfully be undone, then it may not be possible for the minor to void the contract. The possibility of disaffirmance means that one cannot rely on a contract with a minor in the same way one can rely on a contract with an adult. If it is important to have a binding agreement, such as an NDA, with a minor working as an intern or employee, one would need to take steps to ensure that the contract is binding. In some cases having a custodial parent approve such a contract might be useful. The specific steps that would accomplish this in a particular jurisdiction, if it is possible at all, are something that a lawyer could advise on. Labor law In addition to the issue of possible disaffarmance, in many jurisdictions child labor laws restrict and regulate any employment of a minor, and this will probably include a position as an intern. A work permit may be required, and the hours of work may be limited, particularly during the school term. Employee Status The question reads: I'm looking to hire a few minors as paid software engineering interns. [emphasis added] A paid intern is an employee. Minimum wage laws will apply, unless there is a specific exception 29 U.S. Code § 203 (part of the US Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)) defines an "employee" in subsection (e) as "the term “employee” means any individual employed by an employer." with exceptions and different definitions for government workers, farm workers, volunteers, and certain other cases which do not seem tol apply here. Subsection (g) reads "“Employ” includes to suffer or permit to work." The US Department of labor "Fact%Sheet%#13:%Am%I%an%Employee?" further defines "employee" and gives tests for whether a persron is an employee or an independent contractor. It states that "most workers are employees". It gives various factors to consider in deciding whether a worker might be a contractor or an employee. These include: Work that is integral to an employers business is usually done by employees, not contractors. If a worker exercises managerial skills, and if so, if these affect the worker's chance of profit or loss, the worker is more likely a contractor The relative investment by the worker in facilities and equipment. If there is little, the worker is more ;likely an employee. Workers who must use independent business judgement are more likely to be contractors. Detailed control of hours of work and methods indicates that the relationship is more likely one of employment. Employment Under Copyright Law 17 USC 102 states that: A “work made for hire” is— (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned ... It part (1) of this definition that is relevant here The US Copyright office Circular 09 "Works Made for Hire" states: To help determine who is an employee, the Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed identified factors that make up an “employer-employee” relationship as defined by agency law. The factors fall into three broad categories. Control by the employer over the work. For example, the employer determines how the work is done, has the work done at the employer’s location, and provides equipment or other means to create the work. Control by employer over the employee. For example, the employer controls the employee’s schedule in creating the work, has the right to have the employee perform other assignments, determines the method of payment, or has the right to hire the employee’s assistants. 3 Status and conduct of employer. For example, the employer is in business to produce such works, provides the employee with benefits, or withholds tax from the employee’s payment. These factors are not exhaustive. The Court left unclear which of these factors must be present to establish the employment relationship under the work-for-hire definition. Moreover, it held that supervision or control over creation of the work alone is not controlling. However, all or most of these factors characterize a regular, salaried employment relationship, and it is clear that a work created within the scope of such employment is a work made for hire (unless the parties involved agree otherwise). Examples of works made for hire created in an employment relationship include: A software program created by a staff programmer within the scope of his or her duties at a software firm [Emphasis added] ... The closer an employment relationship comes to regular, salaried employment, the more likely it is that a work created within the scope of that employment will be a work made for hire. But because no precise standard exists for determining whether a work is made for hire under part 1 of the definition in section 101 of the copyright law, consultation with a lawyer may be advisable. If a work is made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is the author and should be named as the author on the application for copyright registration. Respond “yes” to the question on the application about whether the work is made for hire Given all this, it seems likely that "paid interns" in the situation described in the question will be employees for purposes of copyright law, and their works in the course of employment will be works madwe for hire, with the employer being legally the author. This conclusion does not depend on an employment contract, adn an action by the intern to later void such a contract will not change the copyright status of the work. Conclusion The copyright of works (including software) produced by such interns is likely to be a work made for hire, with the employer being the author and initial copyright holder. This is true regardless of any contract, because a contract is not the key factor which makes a person an employee under US law, rather the nature of the relationship is. It would be wise to consult a lawyer with experience in employment law and the laws governing minors in the relevant jurisdiction before entering into such an arrangement.	The LLC is its own legal person. Your contract with the LLC it is not affected in any way by a change in the ownership of the LLC.
Have any corporations ever been indicted for torture? Generally when torture is discussed it's usually governments that are in the firing line. However, given the immense power in the modern world of corporations I'm curious as to whether any corporations have ever been indicted for torture. Jurisdiction: Either Europe or the United States	Civil lawsuits seeking damages for torture or similar grave misconduct by corporations outside the United States are often brought under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act (a.k.a. ATS) in U.S. federal courts. Multiple cases brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act have involved claims that U.S. corporations, through their agents carrying out company policy, tortured people outside the U.S., or were complicit in conduct that caused someone to be tortured by a government. One example is the case of Wang Xiaoning v. Yahoo! In 2007, the World Organization for Human Rights USA filed a lawsuit against Yahoo! on behalf of Chinese dissidents Wang Xiaoning and Shi Tao (Guao Quingsheng), claiming jurisdiction under the ATS. According to the complaint, Wang and Shi Tao used Yahoo! accounts to share pro-democracy material, and a Chinese subsidiary of Yahoo! gave the Chinese government identifying information that allowed authorities to identify and arrest them. The Complaint alleges that the plaintiffs were subjected to "torture, cruel, inhuman, or other degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, and forced labor." Yahoo! settled the case in November 2007 for an undisclosed amount of money, and it agreed to cover the plaintiff's legal costs as a part of the settlement. In a statement released after the settlement was made public, Yahoo! said that it would "provide 'financial, humanitarian and legal support to these families' and create a separate 'humanitarian relief fund' for other dissidents and their families." Corporations can also be prosecuted criminally for crimes. Pacific Gas & Electric was recently convicted of manslaughter in a California State Court related to deaths caused by wildfires that were caused by reckless disregard to maintenance and safety by the corporation. The fines were largely waived in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings with the permission of the prosecution, in order to free up funds to pay compensatory damages to parties prevailing in civil lawsuits and funds to comply with orders from utility industry regulators in the state. Arthur Anderson, then one of the "Big Six" accounting firms in the United States was convicted of fraud related criminal charges in relation to the collapse of Enron, an oil company for which it was an accountant, that resulted in the demise of the firm, even though the conviction was ultimately reversed on appeal by the U.S. Supreme Court. I am not aware of a case in which a U.S. corporation has been prosecuted criminally for authorizing its agents to torture someone or being complicit in torture, but it certainly could be done (and probably has been done). The federal Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and parallel state statutes, are specifically designed to authorize both criminal and civil actions against corporation or de facto entities engaged in criminal activity. The statute was designed to target organized crime activities, particularly those involving corporations used as fronts for criminal activity, and in the criminal context, the focus of prosecutions has largely continued to be on old school mafia type organized crime gangs and cartels. But private civil actions authorized by RICO against companies engaged in a pattern of criminal activity usually involve allegations of a pattern of fraud and other forms of white collar crime. This would be a likely statute to invoke in a criminal case alleging that a company had engaged in a pattern and practice of torturing people. In practice, the difference between a civil lawsuit in which compensatory and punitive damages may be imposed, and a criminal prosecution of a corporation, in which fines and restitution may be imposed, is subtle indeed when it comes to the remedies available in each case, even though procedurally, the two kinds of legal proceedings are very different, which is why usually a civil lawsuit, rather than a criminal conviction, would be the legal tool of choice when a corporation engaged in conduct, through its agents, which is criminal in nature. Also, it is possible, but harder, to prosecute officers, employees and agents of corporations in addition to the corporations themselves, for criminal conduct. Indeed, this is the usual approach. But it is harder to convict an individual because you have to show that the individual had the requisite intent and was personally involved in the criminal conduct. This typically requires access to internal communications in a firm which can be difficult to obtain in a criminal proceeding that doesn't have as much pre-trial discovery, and can be difficult to establish because responsibility within a large corporation is often diffuse. Generally speaking, prosecutors have seen the Arthur Anderson case as an unjust one and a cautionary tale that encourages them to think twice before prosecuting a major U.S. corporation criminally, rather than merely bringing a civil lawsuit against it.	The country where the accused person was arrested would extradite that person to one of the countries where the crimes had been committed. The extradition treaties or the law of the arresting country might have a rule to define how to choose which country took precedence. (Perhaps the earlier crime, or the more serious crime if they were different, or the closer ally might get priority.) Once the accused was extradited, s/he would be tried, and if convicted, sentenced. Once the sentence was completed, that person would be turned over to the second country for trial and possible sentence there. Sometimes, particularly if the sentence is long, an accused will be turned over to the second country for trial soon after conviction in the first country, under an agreement that the person would be returned to serve the sentence in the first country after the trial was over, whatever the outcome, and then sent back to the second country to serve any sentence imposed there. Or the second country could choose to count time served in the first country against its sentence, but I believe that this is not usual. Consider the case of Frank Abagnale who was sought by some 12 different countries when he was arrested in France. He was convicted and served time in France, then extradited to Sweden, where he was also tried, convicted and served time. Italy had requested his extradition, but he was deported to the US, where he was also tried, convicted, and served time.	The private organizations, in difference to international organizations (the organizations, members thereof are the countries) or the countries are not subjects of international law. They are also not a subject of criminal laws, so they technically can't break the law. The people can. If the actions of such organizations will break some laws, the people staying behind that organization will be made responsible. Either it will be single individuals, or the whole organization might be declared criminal (such as mafia or a gang) and there everyone, including stakeholders or casual employees/contractors might be subjects to interrogation, arrest and sentence. As for the problem you describe, when the organization made something illegal under one jurisdiction, and the stakeholders are sitting in other country, where such actions are not illegal, they might only partially be safe. They might be arrested not only in the country where the legal actions are taken, but also in third countries, that have extradition agreements with that country.	No, it does not follow. Mostly, because that's not what is actually happening with sanctuary cities. First, there is no actual definition of a sanctuary city, neither in the law or, more specifically, in immigration policy. Here's what happens in sanctuary cities. Section 1373(a) of Title 8 of US Code states that local and state governments are prohibited from enacting laws or policies limiting the exchange of info re: citizenship w/Department of Homeland Security. So if you work for the local Department of Human Services, and someone shows up to sign up for public benefits and you find out they are undocumented immigrants, if you wanted to report that person to ICE, no government could forbid you from doing so. Conversely, the federal government can't force you to report that undocumented immigrant. Likewise, the detainers that ICE issues, which are requests to the local government to inform them when a given undocumented immigrant is to be released, are not mandatory. If that action is taken, the jail can hold the undocumented immigrant up to 48 hours for ICE to act. If ICE doesn't act, the person must be let go. A report by the DOJ's inspector general looked at a random sampling of cities that receive federal funding and found that each of them had certain policies in place that limited cooperation with ICE and ICE's detainers. However, the same inspector general found that Section 1373 is not applicable to detainers. In sum, the IG determined that, although there were no explicit policies forbidding state or local employees from cooperating with ICE, non-compliance with detainers in some jurisdictions at the very least were "inconsistent with ... the intent of Section 1373." Legal arguments abound. One argument is that the administration is interpreting Section 1373 too broadly in order to include both types of sanctuary cities. Another is that Section 1373 violates the anti-comandeering doctrine of the 10th Amendment. I guess the real answer is, "stay tuned," but for now, no it does not follow that it is a violation of federal law for a government official to declare a state/city to be a "sanctuary city."	You have asked about "United Kingdom", but I can only answer about England and Wales; the law in Scotland is very different (rather more different in some respects than the difference between E&W and the State of New York). There is no time limit per se on manslaughter charges; if the police find evidence for a manslaughter charge after 80 years, there is no difficulty (in principle) in bringing a charge against the now-centenarian (provided they are competent to stand trial, and they can get a fair trial, and so on). However, in the case you mentioned I would have thought the major problem would be a defence of autrefois convict - in other words, the defendant can (usually) only be charged once with charges arising from a particular set of facts. It is just possible that the subsequent death constitutes a new fact which allows a new prosecution. On the other hand, the rule for murder used to be that if the victim survived a year and a day then it wasn't murder (even if they then died of their injuries). Finally, the case certainly would not be reopened with a charge of manslaughter. It would be "causing death by dangerous driving", which is a very different offence. Edit My thanks to ohwilleke whose comment about the "year and a day" rule prompted me to do a little research, and discover the Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996. Section 2(2) clearly covers the present case (in both legs), and says that the perpetrator can be re-prosecuted, but only with the permission of the Attorney General. The act is very brief, and I encourage you to read it all. (And incidentally, does not apply to Scotland.)	It's not an interrogation Nothing makes Mr. Hansen a police investigator. He is a private person talking with another private person. His testimony or the recording of the interview might or might not be admissible in trial, that's for the court to decide. But Miranda warnings are only needed when you are under arrest or when you are in a custodial interrogation. Hansen, agent of the police? There's arguments that Hansen might or might not have acted as an agent of the police, and in one case he was deputized. However, that does not change that for Miranda you need an arrest or custodial interrogation (e.g. where one is not free to leave). As far as I am aware, none of the people interviewed was in such a situation and technically free to go at any time - making Miranda not required.	What a country claims to be the case certainly doesn't guarantee what is the case. The constitution (at least as of 2012) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (aka North Korea) says: Article 67. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and social organizations. Needless to say, North Korea is not generally considered a bastion of free speech. The People's Republic of China has a similar provision in its constitution. When we get to countries where those outside the country consider there to be some level of freedom of speech, there are still restrictions. In the UK, the Official Secrets Act makes it a crime for any person to republish leaked classified information. Germany makes it illegal to deny that the Holocaust happened. Until 2013, Canada made it illegal for a person to use telecommunications to say something that would expose people to hatred for some reason covered by antidiscrimination law. Many, many countries criminalize child pornography. Many, many countries have copyright laws. "Free speech" does not mean "you can say whatever you want and the government can't stop you." It means "as a general rule, the government can't restrict what you're saying because they don't like it." I am unaware of any country with a functional government with unfettered freedom of speech.	Unless the Youtube Video shows them committing a crime, then no, they couldn't be arrested and tried for a crime. Them saying it, not under oath, is just hearsay that has no evidentiary value unless there is already other evidence they have committed a crime. In that case, its an admission. But there must be other, either circumstantial, or actual physical evidence of a crime. Past intoxication is not a crime, either. Possession of drugs, if caught with them is. But saying you got high is not. People have walked into police stations and confessed to murders. But with no evidence, no body, no name of a missing person, they can't even be held after the holding period for investigatory purposes expires. If the video shows them committing assault, or breaking and entering (there actually are idiots who post this stuff), the video is actual evidence of a crime and it is often used against them. The statements can be used to begin an investigation, but people don't usually confess to anything worth pursuing even an investigation. The fact that someone says they used to do something criminal is not enough. For all you ( meaning anyone ) knows, the statute of limitations has expired because they "pirated games" 10 years ago. Your comment is right on.
Are editable word documents ('.docx' files) accepted in court as evidence? I keep most of my business documents in Microsoft Words (.docx) file format. Problem is these documents can be edited and tampered with. For my signatures, I just copy and paste a signature image onto the file. Question, will these documents hold in the court of law? If yes, what prevents someone from altering the contents of the document?	Whether they are admissible as evidence is up to the trier of law The “trier of law” (judge) decides what evidence is admissible according to the rules of evidence. Documents of most kinds are not admissible on their own (exceptions include “business” documents like invoices and receipts). To be admissible, someone (presumably you) has to testify as to what they are, how they were created and maintained and why they are relevant before the judge will decide if they will be accepted as evidence. Whether they prove anything is up to the trier of fact Evidence is not proof The “trier of fact” (jury in a jury trial, judge in a bench trial) decides what weight to give to any and all evidence presented. They may accept the testimony about the documents or they may reject it. If presented with conflicting testimony they have to decide which they prefer. Judges have to give reasons for their decisions which can be appealed. Juries don’t. Files that are readily changeable are likely to be given less weight than files which have a verifiable audit trail. For example, if you kept your .docx files in a GitHub repository they will be stronger evidence than those kept on a local hard drive.	In-house counsel is presumed to be intimately familiar, in a way that retained counsel is not, with both the day-to-day operations of the business and its longer-term strategic planning. So imagine that you're in an R&D intensive industry, and you've been sued by a competitor. The competition's in-house counsel has served you a request to produce documents relating to the research that you're working on, your plans to monetize it, your assessments of the market, etc. Do you want someone to reviewing those documents on their way in to C-suite conference? Courts recognize that providing those documents to in-house counsel creates an almost unavoidable risk that that information will be (mis)used for purposes beyond the litigation. If you've only got your in-house counsel on the case, you can expect a court to be much more reluctant to enforce those kinds of discovery requests than it would be if you had outside counsel who isn't involved in the business. Vorys wrote a good article about this in 2004: http://ccbjournal.com/articles/4159/exclusion-house-counsel-discovery-sensitive-data	Evidence is simply those things (verbal and physical) which are given to the court as evidence. When a witness gives testimony, that’s evidence. When a gun is submitted as an exhibit, that’s evidence. When an expert report is tendered, that’s evidence. Basically, whatever either party in the case submits to the court to prove their case is evidence. There is noting objectionable about the sentence - they are saying the statement is true, as they will be required to do in court and that they intend to submit it as evidence. While it’s not evidence yet, when submitted to the court, it will be. Courts have rules about what is allowed to be put into evidence (e.g. relevance, hearsay) and there may be some parts of the statement that fall foul of these - the other party can object to the proposed evidence on those grounds and the first party can withdraw it, the parties can agree on a modification or the judge rules on it. This can (and should) be done now in order to save time in the hearing. Evidence and proof are not the same thing. The judge will consider and weigh all the evidence and, where it is contradictory decide which to believe and which to reject in order to determine if the party which has the onus of proof has met it.	They are both “documents” under most rules of evidence Basically, there are only two sorts of evidence: Testimony. What a witness says to the court. Although, in practice a lot of testimony is said out of court and given in writing but it’s still testimony. Documentary. Everything else.	What if somebody copies your signature on a contract that says you can't sue them? what can the judge do to stop this paradox? I will assume that by "copying the signature" you mean "without the person's consent". In that case, the contract is void and consequently unenforceable. However, it would need to be proved that the person whose signature was unlawfully used did not intend to be a party to that contract. For a contract to be valid, the parties must have knowingly and willfully entered it, whether it is via a document or through their subsequent conduct/actions. False pretenses, identity theft, and akin offenses preclude these two essential requirements of any contract. Moreover, if the person who forged the signature is a party to the contract, then that unlawful act clearly contradicts the prerequisite "covenant of good faith and fair dealing" that is presumed in contracts. The remedies or actionability available to a person whose signature has been forged depend on the laws of each jurisdiction.	If Bob acknowledges how he has altered the evidence at the time he submits it, there shouldn't be any issues with it turning into falsification, which generally only becomes a problem when it's done with an intent to mislead the court. More likely, an opposing party would raise an authenticity objection, i.e, that the evidence has been altered and is therefore not trustworthy. It's probably going to be up to the judge whether to sustain that objection or not, and I'd expect the court's decision to turn in large part on how plausible it finds Bobs allegations of fraud and retaliation. I'd also expect that the Court would be less concerned with the pitch alteration than the redaction of portions of the recording. If we don't know what Bob is saying, it makes it hard to understand the full context of the conversation. Of course, all of this assumes that Bob hasn't already been forced to turn over the original recordings to Company, which he will be. The parties have a right to each other's evidence, and they are required to identify their witnesses to each other. The moment Company knows about the recording, it is going to submit a discovery request demanding a copy, and Bob will be obligated to comply. If Bob objects that doing so would expose the representatives to retaliation, I would expect the court to warn Company against tampering with witnesses and then order Bob to comply with his discovery obligations.	There aren't bright line rules in the area of fair use (which is the core issue - you are clearly copying a work that has copyright protected portions, at least - the question is whether fair use provides a defense and whether some portions are not copyright protected). This inquiry is fact specific and driven by general standards. Context such as whether the use would be free or commercial matter as well. For your own notes, anything goes pretty much. This generally wouldn't constitute "publication" of the work and would be for personal educational used by someone who paid for the book anyway. For shared notes - it depends. Also not all kinds of copying is created equal. Some parts of textbooks are themselves in the public domain or not protectable by copyright. For example, even a lengthy quote from a scientific journal article would probably be allowed with attribution. It would also be easier to evaluate based upon the type of textbook. A history textbook can have protection similar to trade non-fiction and can have very original exposition. An algebra textbook, less so. Your question also points to an end run. If the professor is the author of the textbook (many of mine were in something of a racket), you could get permission from the author.	The copyright owner is whoever first put the material in fixed form. It is most likely that that is the note-taker (you). It is possible (and highly unlikely) that the lecturer read (had memorized) a prepared script and you copied that script mechanically, and if that were the case, he would hold copyright and you infringed by making a copy. Typically, a note-taker follows the logic of a lecture and expresses those ideas in his own words (the notes do not match a plausible verbatim class lecture). Since expression is protected and ideas are not, that makes it most likely that you would prevail in a suit. The equations are almost certainly not protected.
Has the United States ever agreed to extradite anyone to any of the EU nations for a procedural crime? Has there ever been a case of an attempt to extradite a US citizen to any of the EU states? I don't necessarily mean a procedural crime (like lying to the police or lying on some official form). Tax evasion would probably be just as demonstrative. Has there ever been a case of the US agreeing to extradite anyone for a non-violent crime after they were accused, or convicted, in any of the countries that comprise the EU?	The U.S. routinely extradites criminal defendants located in the United States to the E.U. Each year since 1990, OIA has opened between 670 to 950 extradition cases based on requests from U.S. prosecutors and foreign governments. During the same time period, OIA closed between 380 to 960 cases per year. OIA's case closure rate has not kept pace with the number of new cases, resulting in a pending caseload 2 that has increased over 100 percent since 1990. As of November 2000, OIA had 3,636 extradition cases pending - approximately 1,100 cases where fugitives wanted by foreign governments were believed to be in the United States and approximately 2,500 cases where fugitives wanted by the United States were believed to be in foreign countries. . . . According to OIA records, about 25 staff attorneys and 11 paralegals are assigned to four country teams that are responsible for processing requests from both U.S. prosecutors and foreign governments. The country teams process cases that fall within the following geographic areas: Team I (United Kingdom/Africa) - responsible for Ireland, Africa, and the United Kingdom (UK) and its dependencies, and English-speaking Caribbean nations. At the time of our review, Team I had 386 open extradition cases, 107 of which involve the UK. Team II (European) - responsible for Europe (except the UK) and the Caribbean islands controlled or formerly controlled by European countries other than the UK. At the time of our review, Team II had 609 open extradition cases. Unlike the other country teams, no one country dominates Team II's extradition cases. The top four countries are: Switzerland with 86 cases, Federal Republic of Germany with 72 cases, the Netherlands with 66 cases, and France with 60 cases. Team III (Latin American) - responsible for Mexico, Central and South America, and Spanish-speaking Caribbean nations. At the time of our review, Team III had 1,693 open extradition cases. More than half of these cases (849) involved Mexico. Team IV (Asia/Canada) - responsible for Asia (which includes the Middle East), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific islands. At the time of our review, Team IV had 942 open extradition cases. Slightly less than half of these cases (456) involved Canada. From a 2002 report of the U.S. government. The process is summarized here. Each extradition treaty typically contains a list or description of covered cases and a list of categories of excluded cases. Extraditable offenses. All treaties include provisions defining which crimes are extraditable. Treaties agreed upon prior to the 1970s typically include a negotiated list of specific extraditable offenses (such as specific crimes like "murder," "manslaughter," and "larceny") and only allow extradition for the crimes that are listed in the treaty. Modern treaties have largely done away with these lists, however, and use a "dual criminality" approach instead. This more flexible approach examines the conduct that serves as the subject of the request. Exceptions to Extradition. Every extradition treaty contains exceptions to the parties' extradition obligations. The most common exceptions include: Political and Military Offenses. These provisions are aimed at crimes such as treason, sedition, and other offenses that could be used to target political opponents or otherwise cause the requested country to become entangled in the domestic politics of the requesting country. To clarify and limit the contours of the "political offense" exception, most US bilateral treaties now carve out violent conduct such as bombings and kidnappings from that exception, even if the subject alleges that the conduct in question was politically motivated. Nationality. Many countries refuse to extradite their own nationals, and extradition treaties may include exceptions for this policy. The US government has long taken the view that nationality should not be a bar to extradition, since the requesting country in an extradition case should have the right to pursue criminal charges against persons who violate its laws regardless of nationality. The US government accordingly extradites its nationals and seeks to limit nationality-based denials in new US extradition treaties. Prior Prosecution. These "non bis in idem" provisions of most extradition treaties protect subjects from transnational "double jeopardy." They bar extradition where the person has already been convicted or acquitted for the same conduct that is the basis of the extradition request. Capital offenses. Although the US tries to limit the application of this exception, many US treaties have provisions permitting the requested country to demand assurances that the death penalty will not be sought or imposed. Some countries that do not impose the death penalty domestically will not agree to extradite to the United States in a case where the death penalty is a possible punishment, or at least reserve the right to deny extradition if the crime could carry a death penalty. Extraterritoriality. Some extradition treaties limit their scope to crimes committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting country. The United States has pushed to eliminate these restrictions in recent years. Basically, dual criminality limits extradition to offenses that would be felonies in both the sending and receiving countries. As another source explains: Extradition is generally limited to crimes identified in the treaty. Early treaties often recite a list of the specific extraditable crimes. Jay's Treaty mentions only murder and forgery; the inventory in the 1852 treaty with Prussia included eight others;27 and the 1974 treaty between the United States and Denmark identified several dozen extradition offenses: Murder; voluntary manslaughter; assault with intent to commit murder. 2. Aggravated injury or assault; injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. 3. Unlawful throwing or application of any corrosive or injurious substances upon the person of another. 4. Rape; indecent assault; sodomy accompanied by use of force or threat; sexual intercourse and other unlawful sexual relations with or upon children under the age specified by the laws of both the requesting and the requested States. 5. Unlawful abortion. 6. Procuration; inciting or assisting a person under 21 years of age or at the time ignorant of the purpose in order that such person shall carry on sexual immorality as a profession abroad or shall be used for such immoral purpose; promoting of sexual immorality by acting as an intermediary repeatedly or for the purpose of gain; profiting from the activities of any person carrying on sexual immorality as a profession. 7. Kidnapping; child stealing; abduction; false imprisonment. 8. Robbery; assault with intent to rob. 9. Burglary. 10. Larceny. 11. Embezzlement. 12. Obtaining property, money or valuable securities: by false pretenses or by threat or force, by defrauding any governmental body, the public or any person by deceit, falsehood, use of the mails or other means of communication in connection with schemes intended to deceive or defraud, or by any other fraudulent means. 13. Bribery, including soliciting, offering and accepting. 14. Extortion. 15. Receiving or transporting any money, valuable securities or other property knowing the same to have been unlawfully obtained. 16. Fraud by a bailee, banker, agent, factor, trustee, executor, administrator or by a director or officer of any company. 17. An offense against the laws relating to counterfeiting or forgery. 18. False statements made before a court or to a government agency or official, including under United States law perjury and subornation of perjury. 19. Arson. 20. An offense against any law relating to the protection of the life or health of persons from: a shortage of drinking water; poisoned, contaminated, unsafe or unwholesome drinking water, substance or products. 21. Any act done with intent to endanger the safety of any person traveling upon a railway, or in any aircraft or vessel or bus or other means of transportation, or any act which impairs the safe operation of such means of transportation. 22. Piracy; mutiny or revolt on board an aircraft against the authority of the commander of such aircraft; any seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence, of an aircraft. 23. An offense against the laws relating to damage to property. 24. a. Offenses against the laws relating to importation, exportation or transit of goods, articles, or merchandise. b. Offenses relating to willful evasion of taxes and duties. c. Offenses against the laws relating to international transfers of funds. 25. An offense relating to the: a. spreading of false intelligence likely to affect the price of commodities, valuable securities or any other similar interests; or b. making of incorrect or misleading statements concerning the economic conditions of such commercial undertakings as joint-stock companies, corporations, co-operative societies or similar undertakings through channels of public communications, in reports, in statements of accounts or in declarations to the general meeting or any proper official of a company, in notifications to, or registration with, any commission, agency or officer having supervisory or regulatory authority over corporations, joint-stock companies, other forms of commercial undertakings or in any invitation to the establishment of those commercial undertakings or to the subscription of shares. 28. Unlawful abuse of official authority which results in grievous bodily injury or deprivation of the life, liberty or property of any person, [or] attempts to commit, conspiracy to commit, or participation in, any of the offenses mentioned in this Article, Art. 3, 25 U.S.T. 1293 (1974).28 While many existing U.S. extradition treaties continue to list specific extraditable offenses, the more recent ones feature a dual criminality approach, and simply make all felonies extraditable (subject to other limitations found elsewhere in their various provisions). . . . Want of Dual Criminality Dual criminality addresses the reluctance to extradite a fugitive for conduct that the host nation considers innocent. Dual criminality exists when the parties to an extradition treaty each recognize a particular form of misconduct as a punishable offense. Historically, extradition treaties have handled dual criminality in one of three ways: (1) they list extraditable offenses and do not otherwise speak to the issue; (2) they list extraditable offenses and contain a separate provision requiring dual criminality; or (3) they identify as extraditable offenses those offenses condemned by the laws of both nations. Today, "[u]nder most international agreements ... [a] person sought for prosecution or for enforcement of a sentence will not be extradited ... (c) if the offense with which he is charged or of which he has been convicted is not punishable as a serious crime in both the requesting and requested state.... "45 Although there is a split of authority over whether dual criminality resides in all extradition treaties that do not deny its application,46 the point is largely academic since it is a common feature of all American extradition treaties.47 Subject to varying interpretations, the United States favors the view that treaties should be construed to honor an extradition request if possible. Thus, dual criminality does not "require that the name by which the crime is described in the two countries shall be same; nor that the scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions."48 When a foreign country seeks to extradite a fugitive from the United States, dual criminality may be satisfied by reference to either federal or state law.49 U.S. treaty partners do not always construe dual criminality requirements as broadly. In the past, some have been unable to find equivalents for attempt, conspiracy, and crimes with prominent federal jurisdictional elements (e.g., offenses under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations [RICO] and Continuing Criminal Enterprise [CCE] statutes).50 Many modern extradition treaties contain provisions addressing the problem of jurisdictional elements51 and/or making extraditable an attempt or conspiracy to commit an extraditable offense.52 Some include special provisions for tax and customs offenses as well.53 Extradition requests are routinely granted for non-violent felony cases as required by the applicable extradition treaties. Statistics on the precise nature of the offenses processes is harder to find. Eventually, pretty much every commonly committed offense identified in an extradition treaty as eligible for extradition will be used as a basis for an extradition. Procedural crimes like perjury, and felony tax fraud, would usually satisfy the dual criminality requirement. Another doctrine may be creating confusion. Almost no country conducts trials arising from procedural and tax offenses arising in another country's legal or tax system in its own courts, or punishes violations of those offenses in its own criminal justice system. But this isn't a barrier to extraditing a defendant in such an offense to the country whose legal process or tax system was abused to face trial in the courts of the harmed country for the harmed country to punish, if the procedural or tax offense would have been a serious crime if committed against the sending country.	It's not odd to extradite people who are accused of crimes. The US has extradition treaties with many countries: see List of United States extradition treaties - Wikipedia. Extraditions are also recognized by international law: Extradition - Wikipedia As for El Chapo, the reason for his extradition is The decision to extradite Mr. Guzmán was an about-face for the Mexican government, which once claimed that he would serve his long sentence in Mexico first. However, after his Houdini-like escape in 2015, when his associates tunneled him out of Mexico’s most secure prison, officials began to reconsider.... When he was recaptured early last year, after one of Mexico’s most exhaustive manhunts, the government publicly said it would allow the extradition of Mr. Guzmán, thus relieving itself of the potential embarrassment of another escape and preventing further souring of its relationship with the United States. El Chapo, Mexican Drug Kingpin, Is Extradited to U.S. - The New York Times	Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree.	On the first page of https://www.gov.uk/duty-free-goods/overview you find: "You can bring some goods from abroad without having to pay UK tax or ‘duty’ (customs charges), as long as they’re for your own use." And on the next page "... will use them yourself or give them away as a gift". This clearly doesn't cover anything that you bring into the UK to sell it. And a bit further on the site it says "You must tell customs (known as ‘declaring’) on arrival in the UK if you have goods: ... that you plan to sell". Since you are asking here, it is quite obvious that you intend to sell :-) You said "e.g. say this guys comes every month from Russia to France for unrelated business, each time he fills up his luggage with the maximum allowed amount of goods that comply with custom laws". If this guy sells the stuff to you, then the maximum allowed amount of goods to import without paying taxes is zero. Once he is willing to pay taxes, there is no limit. Obviously regularly importing things from Russia or France and selling in the UK at a profit means that he is running a business in the UK, which means he would have to register a business, pay corporation taxes etc. It's all a matter of degree; for small amounts nobody cares (up to some limit you don't need to register a business or pay taxes; I don't know the details).	Since you don't say which country you're in, it's likely that you're interested in United States law. You are probably in the clear here, though you're getting close enough to the edge of breaking the law that I wouldn't be confident about not being prosecuted and/or convicted. The relevant laws in this case appear to be 18 USC 471, 18 USC 472, and perhaps 18 USC 514. All three of them begin "Whoever, with the intent to defraud...". It's questionable whether creating counterfeit money as a burglar decoy counts as defrauding the burglar.	At the federal level, per 18 USC 751, escaping is a crime. In United States v. Allen, 432 F.2d 939 it was held that an arrest need not be lawful in order for an escape to be illegal; Laws v. US states that "This court has said that a sentence imposed for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751 is 'not affected by the validity of the sentences being served at the time of the escape'", giving numerous citations. I don't find cases where the escapee was exonerated; prosecutors have the discretion to not prosecute for committing a crime, so it would be hard to find a case where the legality of such a conviction was upheld (also, hard to find a jury willing to convict in such circumstances).	When you breach a contract, you can get sued in local court, and if you don't show up to defend yourself, default judgment will be entered against you. Then the aggrieved party will have to collect, but the court in Washington (to invent a jurisdiction) can't enforce an order against a person in Norway (to invent another jurisdiction). So the aggrieved party would need to take enforcement of the judgment to the Norwegian courts. In the actual case of Norway, this is fairly simple, you just call an attorney in Norway to do the paperwork. It might be harder if the other jurisdiction is Belarus. If you return to the US, even if there is a money judgment against you for the rent owed, you will not be arrested for that debt. Depending on the state (about half of the states), you might be arrested for failing to comply with a court order to pay the debt. The difference lies in refusing to comply with a court order, versus simply having a debt. The State Department conveniently lists the reasons for denying a visa. Owing money or having an uncollected judgment against you is not one of the possible reasons, in fact even having been ordered by a court to pay, ignoring the order, and the court issuing an arrest warrant does not make you inadmissible.	If the FBI has reason to believe they have committed a crime under US law Being an official of a foreign (or domestic) government in a military or civilian capacity does not make a person immune from US law except in the specific case of diplomatic immunity. There are some US laws that apply even if the perpetrator is not and has never been in the US, for example, computer hacking and fraud. So, if the FBI has probable cause they can ask for and get an arrest warrant. If the US were at war with this person’s country then, barring war crimes or crimes against humanity, military action against the US is not a crime. Naturally, exactly the same circumstances apply to US citizens vis-a-vis foreign laws.
Were the US Articles of Confederation formally repealed? The Constitutional Convention was originally intended to revise the Articles of Confederation. At some point, the framers decided to start from scratch instead, and produced the Constitution, which fully came into effect when ratified by 13 states in 1790. For the most part, the Constitution of 1787 covers the same topics as the Articles of Confederation, and obviously the Constitution takes precedence in case of conflict. However, nowhere in the US Constitution does it mention the Articles of Confederation, nor does it explicitly state that it supersedes it entirely. So, what, if anything, would prevent Canada from hypothetically demanding to be admitted as the 51st state, as stipulated in Article Ⅺ? Canada acceding to this confederation, and adjoining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States.	See Article VI of the Constitution: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. This seems to me that it pretty clearly establishes the Constitution as taking the place of any previous laws. In particular, Article XI of the Articles is in conflict with Article IV Section 3 of the Constitution ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union"). The Constitution says that Congress's action is required to create a new state, and doesn't mention any exceptions. The Constitution's terms presumably take precedence. If Canada wanted to become a state, it would have to be admitted by Congress under Article IV Section 3.	The Eleventh Amendment has generally been construed to bar suits against a state by citizens of that state in federal court. There are all sorts of caveats, though, and it's possible that the doctrine is still evolving. The text of the Amendment reads: The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. It doesn't contain explicit language prohibiting the citizens of a state from suing it in federal court. That extension surfaced throughout the 1880s and was formalized in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), lends support to Hans, albeit as a 5-4 decision. Cornell has a nice article on the current and historical view of sovereign immunity. It notes that the Supreme Court has left a number of important questions unanswered—including the nature of the states' immunity. It likewise tries to wrestle with the Article III question.	Probably not Maryland gave consent by ceding the land that became DC back when DC was first formed. Virginia had originally ceded a matching piece of land, which would have made the district a neat square 10 miles by 10 miles. Decades later, the Virginia General Assembly voted (in February 1846) to request the return of Alexandria in a process known as retrocession. On July 9, 1846, Congress voted to return all the area that had been ceded by Virginia. Since then, the district has consisted only of the land originally ceded by Maryland. When Article IV Section 3 says "by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states" it means by joining two states into one new one, or by cutting off parts of two of more states and making them a state -- doing either of those requires the consent of the states involved, but not an amendment. Article I Section 8 could be satisfied by creating a smaller district, perhaps just the Mall and the public buildings surrounding it, including the White House and the Capitol, but no residential areas. In any case nothing in Article I Section 8 mandates the creation or retention of a Federal district. It could be argued that making DC a state would require the consent of Maryland, which once included that land. Or it could be argued that Maryland's original cession left it with no further authority over that land (I favor the latter view). But no consent of Virginia would be needed, because none of its original land is included in the current district. In any case, Article IV Section 3 seems to give Congress this power, with no need for an amendment, only possibly for Maryland approval. So it appears that the primary body that would have to approve statehood for DC would be Congress. Whether approval from Maryland would also be needed is unclear -- probably not. No other body would need to approve. However, there is no case law on the matter, and such a move might well be challenged by those who would not want DC to elect two senators.	They don’t, or not necessarily The primary purpose of a constitution is to define the structure, operation and limits on government. It contains the laws that the government cannot change except by any procedure included in the constitution. It isn’t necessarily to spell out the rights of citizens. Some do, some don’t. The median age of constitutions is 19 years - half of them are older than this, half of them are younger. Coincidentally, or perhaps not, this is close to the 20 years that Thomas Jefferson thought a constitution should last since “the earth belongs to the living, and not to the dead.” The US Constitution is the oldest (and shortest) still in modern use - it’s influential but it’s a poor example of what modern constitution’s are like. For some particular examples: the United Kingdom (a unitary state) does not have a written constitution. It’s unwritten one has only one clause - Parliament is sovereign. UK citizens have a bill of rights but that is under an Act of Parliament, they are not constitutional rights. New Zealand (a unitary state) has a constitution but that constitution is an act, or more precisely acts, of Parliament and their bill of rights is also an act of Parliament. Australia (a federal state) has a constitution which is an act of the UK Parliament with a single right (freedom of religion) and no bill of rights. Australians have an implied right of political discourse because the High Court has determined that that is necessary for the democracy described in the constitution to work. Their other rights are those that exist at common law. People in the state of Victoria have a bill of rights (made by Parliament) but no other state or territory has adopted one. the French (unitary) constitution creates the position of “Defender of Rights” but what those rights are and the procedures for defending them are delegated to parliament to decide.	To pick up on your comment 'Does this mean if I wish to build a chair for personal use, then since trade of chairs exists between states, Congress has the authority to outlaw possession or manufacturing of chairs?': Yes. For example, the US Congress can legislate to prohibit a farmer from growing wheat for use on his own farm, on the basis that there is interstate trade in wheat and therefore the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the growing of wheat: Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. If you grow marijuana, or build a chair, or whatever, you conceivably affect the number of marijuanas, chairs, etc that are traded between states. Therefore you affect interstate commerce. Therefore the US Congress can regulate you. The fact that your marijuana or your chair or your what is trivial in the scheme of the national economy is irrelevant if the aggregation of all regulated marijuana, chairs or wheat is significant: 317 US 111, 127-128. If the law didn't prohibit possession of marijuana absolutely but instead prohibited, say, the carrying of marijuana in schools, then the US Congress might have trouble relying on the Commerce Clause: see United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549 and replace 'marijuana' with 'handguns' (OK the marijuana/handgun analogy is bad but hopefully this illustrates that there are at least some limits on Congress' power -- it's not just 'any physical object that relates whatsoever to interstate trade therefore unfettered federal legislative power').	The U.S. law rule is that treaties and laws are co-equal and that one does not supersede the other. In the U.S., the rule is that the last passed law or treaty prevails, over earlier passed laws or treaties if they conflict. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, "Treaties as laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes" 80 Indiana Law Journal 319 (2005) citing cases including Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). But, this is not self-evident, Indeed, it is a minority rule of law to the point of pretty much being an outlier. In the vast majority of countries other than the U.S., domestic laws are subordinate to treaties, and there is some hint in the structure of the U.S. Constitution and the discussions of the Founders regarding the treaty power, that this how the Founders assumed that conflicts between treaties and domestic statutes would be interpreted, even though the U.S. Supreme Court ended up interpreting the constitution differently. Few countries in the world give so little legal effect to international treaties and international law, more generally, as the U.S. does. In contrast, in Europe, many human rights protections arise from international treaty obligations that override domestic laws, rather than from their own domestic constitutional law. Also, while this rule seems simple and mechanical, it rarely presents in the fashion, because there are a variety of tools, such as interpreting treaties and statutes in a manner that avoids a conflict (particularly with respect to questions such as whether a treaty should be considered "self-executing" or not, and a rule of construction that one enactment that does not expressly overrule another should not be deemed to do so implicitly unless there is no interpretation that can resolve the conflict otherwise), that muddy the waters. As Ku, explains in the law review article linked above: Although the Constitution declares that treaties are the "supreme Law of the Land,"the status of treaties in the American legal system is plagued by uncertainty. A court considering a private individual's claim under a treaty must first consider a number of complex questions such as whether the treaty is "self-executing," whether the treaty's effect is otherwise nullified by conditions placed on it during ratification, whether the treaty exceeds constitutional limitations on the exercise of the treaty power, and whether the treaty conflicts with inconsistent federal and state law.... For instance, in recent years the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has twice found that U.S. domestic law limiting habeas corpus appeals violated U.S. treaty obligations to guarantee consular notification rights to foreign nationals charged with capital crimes.' The ICJ found a conflict between the treaty and U.S. law even though the U.S. government offered a plausible alternative interpretation of the treaty that avoided conflict with domestic law. (Despite these findings, the U.S. did not enforce the alleged treaty obligation.) A good example of this is the case of Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. ___ (2014) (note that it is important to provide a year when discussing the Bond case, because the U.S. Supreme Court made two successive rulings in this case and also established an important precedent in an unrelated case with the same name). Wikipedia's summary of the case explains how the case avoided having to resolve constitutional issues in the case (references to Holland are to State of Missouri v. Holland, linked and discussed below): Carol Anne Bond is a microbiologist from Lansdale, Pennsylvania. In 2006, her best friend became pregnant. When Bond discovered that her husband was the child's father, she attempted to poison her former friend by putting organoarsenic and potassium dichromate on the woman's door knob. Bond was caught, and was convicted under the Chemical Weapons Act. In her appeal, she argued that applying the chemical weapons treaty to her had violated the Tenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals ruled that Bond lacked standing to make a Tenth Amendment claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed by stating that individuals can bring Tenth Amendment claims. The Court then remanded the case for the Third Circuit to decide the case on the merits. On remand, the Third Circuit found that "because the Convention is an international agreement with a subject matter that lies at the core of the Treaty Power and because Holland instructs that 'there can be no dispute about the validity of [a] statute' that implements a valid treaty, we will affirm Bond's conviction." Bond again appealed to the Supreme Court, asking the court to overrule Holland or to find that her actions were not covered by the CWA. The case attracted a great deal of attention, with US Solicitor General Donald Verrilli arguing for the government and former Solicitor General Paul Clement arguing for Bond. Senator Ted Cruz wrote an essay for the blog of the Harvard Law Review, urging the Court to overturn Bond's conviction. Chief Justice Roberts opened his opinion by vividly describing John Singer Sargent's life-sized painting of mustard gas victims. Roberts closed by noting, "There are no life-sized paintings of Bond's rival washing her thumb." In its judgment, the Court unanimously concluded that the convention was not meant to cover local activities such as Bond's poisoning attempt. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts declined to define the scope of Treaty Clause powers, invoking constitutional avoidance. Because the Chemical Weapons Convention is not self-executing and because it requires implementation by a signatory to be "in accordance with its constitutional processes," Roberts focused his attention on statutory interpretation of the federal criminal code. According to Roberts, one of the key "background principles of construction" is federalism; there must be a "clear indication" by Congress if it intends to "dramatically intrude upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction." The Court concluded that there was no such clear indication in the text of the criminal statute. Roberts rejected the Solicitor General's interpretation of the statute, noting that the government's reading would make it a federal offense to poison children's goldfish and that state authorities are fully capable of punishing burrito poisoners. Finally, Roberts briefly responds to Justice Scalia's interpretation by noting that adopting "the most sweeping reading of the statute would fundamentally upset the Constitution's balance." A well-known line from his opinion is at the end: "The global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard, or to treat a local assault with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon." Thus, rather than ruling that a law implementing a valid treaty was unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the law implementing the treaty in a manner that did not mean something that would potentially make the law unconstitutional. The question states: Obviously, the Constitution supersedes both laws and treaties This is mostly correct under U.S. law (although it took many decades before that rule was established in precedent), but it was not obvious under U.S. law, it is not true in every country, and it is not entirely settled law in the U.S. even today. A plurality of the justices Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), which enforced the Fifth and Sixth Amendments against a contradictory treaty, stated: There is nothing in this language which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. A plurality decision, however, is not controlling authority that must be followed by lower courts. But, in State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) had previously reached an arguably contrary conclusion. The official syllabus to that decision noted that: Protection of its quasi-sovereign right to regulate the taking of game is a sufficient jurisdictional basis, apart from any pecuniary interest, for a bill by a State to enjoin enforcement of federal regulations over the subject alleged to be unconstitutional. The Treaty of August 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, with Great Britain, providing for the protection, by close seasons and in other ways, of migratory birds in the United States and Canada, and binding each power to take and propose to their lawmaking bodies the necessary measures for carrying it out, is within the treaty-making power conferred by Art. II, § 2, of the Constitution; the Act of July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755, which prohibits the killing, capturing or selling any of the migratory birds included in the terms of the treaty, except as permitted by regulations compatible with those terms to be made by the Secretary of Agriculture, is valid under Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution, as a necessary and proper means of effectuating the treaty, and the treaty and statute, by bringing such birds within the paramount protection and regulation of the Government do not infringe property rights or sovereign powers respecting such birds reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. With respect to right reserved to the State, the treaty-making power is not limited to what may be done by an unaided act of Congress. Many legal scholars expected that Bond (2014) would resolve the tension between Reid and Holland, but instead, the U.S. Supreme Court punted, and declined to reach that issue in that case. Arguably, Reid and Holland are not truly in conflict, because Holland addresses the scope of the treaty power in light of federalism concerns, which isn't necessarily identical to the scope power of Congress to enact domestic laws pursuant to U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8 in light of federalism concerns, while Reid concerns constitutional provisions which have been interpreted to flatly prohibit the government from abridging certain individual rights at all. U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 8 limits the authority of Congress to enact domestic laws to certain enumerated subjects (with all other powers reserved to the states), while the treaty power is not limited to any particular subject-matter (in part, because states are not permitted under the constitution to enter into international treaties, so the federal government needs to handle treaties involving both national and state level concerns, while states have plenary power to enact domestic laws in all circumstances where they are not expressly prohibited from doing so).	Only for certain parts of the constitution, and not for the parts you are asking about. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has squarely stated that neither the First Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment "acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens."13 For more than a century, the Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause is "universal in [its] application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to differences of ... nationality."14 The Court has repeatedly stated that "the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."15 When noncitizens, no matter what their status, are tried for crimes, they are entitled to all of the rights that attach to the criminal process, without any distinction based on their nationality.16 Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens? - David Cole, Georgetown University Law Center	Since electors are in fact free to vote for whoever they want (though don't usually deviate from their assignment), the branch of federal government that would be most involved is Congress. A constitutional amendment would be required, to repeal Article II Section 1 Clauses 2 and 4 and the 12th Amendment (i.e. eliminate electors entirely), and substitute a different method. Most of the work would be done by the states, in ratifying the amendment. [Addendum] It is true that it is constitutional to require a pledge of faithfulness (Ray v. Blair 343 U.S. 214). A bit over half of the states have laws requiring 'faithful voting', though the laws have not been enforced. Washington RCW 29A.56.320 may be typical, in that the law simply says "thou shall" with no mechanism for enforcement. Even with strict enforcement such as class X felony penalties, this cannot implement IRV. The number of electors is not proportional to population (there is the "plus 2 for senators" factor), and various other reasons why state-based electors cannot be morphed into an IRV-like system.
Would working for another nation's armed forces be treason for US troops? I am writing a historical fantasy story, and have come to a rather sticky in-universe legal situation. My main characters are the crew of a US Navy seaplane from WWII, and they've ended up in a new world of similar tech level. Now, they're still loyal service members of their nation, but they don't have any knowledge of this place they've been dumped into nor any contact with the United States but they have made contact with the local's military. The major problem the bomber's crew has is that they have no money or identification here, aliens in more then one sense of the word. They can't refuel their plane here without committing a crime and stealing the fuel, and spare parts are limited to the few onboard that they were carrying on their bombing run. One theory for their next course of action would possibly have the crew make an alliance of sorts with the local military, possibly agreeing to trade some knowledge and/or the services of their aircraft to the locals in exchange for fuel, parts, identification, and possibly cash to sustain themselves and their aircraft. So, what I'm wondering is if they can somehow pull this off without committing treason against the USA by military law, or are they in a real Morten's Fork situation here?	It's only treason if they wage war with the US Treason is unique in American law: It is the only crime that is defined in the Constitution. It is made a crime in the US code (18 USC §2381) not "military law." Following the Constitution's Treason Clause, USC §2381 has two prongs. To be guilty of treason, one must either: Levy war against the United States; or Adhere to its enemies, giving them aid or comfort. Since this country is not at war with the US, the first prong does not apply. "Enemies" has been interpreted narrowly, to mean only enemies in a real war. Thus, one can only be guilty of treason in the US during wartime, so the second prong does not apply either. The Founders defined treason narrowly and put it in the Constitution to de-politicize it. According to James Madison (in Federalist 43), in the past, “violent factions” had often used “new-fangled and artificial" definitions of treason to “wreck their alternate malignity on each other…” To keep from repeating this sorry history, the Constitution “opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger,” by defining what constituted treason and specifying how it was to be proved. Exactly how narrowly treason is defined can be seen in the Supreme Court's 1807 decision in Ex Parte Bollman. This case arose out of the Burr Conspiracy, Aaron Burr's plan to carve a new country out of the US. Bollman was charged with conspiring with Burr. The Court ordered Bollman released. In his opinion, John Marshall explained why: However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war, and actually to levy war, are distinct offenses. If you want to read more about treason, here's a short article by a law professor, and here's a nice overview of the topic from the Congressional Quarterly. Denationalization: Another problem they probably don't have to worry about If you are looking for reasons for these patriots to worry about joining the military of another country, treason is not the only legal danger they face. Volunteering in the armed services in another country's military can also lead to losing one's citizenship, even if that country is not at war with the US. During WWII, loss of citizenship was controlled by §401 of the Nationality Act of 1940. Under §401(c) US citizens could serve in foreign armed services if "expressly authorized by the laws of the US." Otherwise, the law only provided for the denationalization of any citizen who served in a foreign military in which he had or acquired nationality. The 1940 Act said nothing about serving as an officer or intending to renounce American citizenship. Those provisions were added in later Acts. How to apply real law to an imaginary world You will have to stretch the words of the Nationality Act of 1940 and the "Neutrality Acts* to get them to apply to this imagined situation. Instead of parsing these texts ever more finely in the hope you can figure out how to apply them to a situation those who passed these laws did not (and probably could not) imagine, a simpler and more direct approach would be to interpret these laws light of their purpose. The purpose of §401 of the Nationality Act is clear: If an American citizen shifts (or splits) his allegiance from the US to another country, he will lose his citizenship. §401 lists various acts that will be taken as evidence of shifting (or splitting) allegiance. So unless your guys do things that show they have changed their allegiance, they will be fine. Keeping your guys on the right side of the Neutrality Acts might be a little trickier. Their purpose is simple: To keep anyone from dragging US into war before Congress declares it by making sure every American remains neutral between "belligerents." Unless you've built this world in such a way that the US could be easily dragged into a war on it, it seems your guys won't violate the purpose of the Neutrality Acts. (The Neutrality Acts are about "belligerents," so unless there's a war in this other world, the Acts probably don't apply anyway.)	It's a bit of an oversimplification. You're correct that there is a federal law against murder, 18 USC 1111. However it applies only to a murder committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This covers situations like crimes committed on federal lands such as national parks or federal buildings, or crimes on US-flagged ships at sea, aircraft in flight, or in space. It does not apply to "ordinary" crimes committed at most locations within the US. 18 USC Chapter 51 covers a few other situations, such as murder of a federal officer, foreign diplomat, by incarcerated or escaped federal prisoners, US nationals murdering each other while abroad, and so forth. The idea is that these restrictions keep the laws within the enumerated powers of Congress as stated in Article I Section 8 of the US Constitution. A federal statute covering all murders throughout the US would probably be unconstitutional for this reason. So while what he says is not strictly correct, it is true that in the vast majority of cases, murders are covered by state laws and not by federal laws. Even if one was to agree with Ramaswamy that medical abortions are a form of murder, even still, no federal murder law currently on the books would apply to a typical abortion, except under very unusual circumstances.	18 USC 960 provides a disincentive against such actions. Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both Also see 18 USC 959, covering enlistment. "At peace" is not statutorily defined, so it is not obvious whether the US is "at peace" with Ethiopia (Tigray war) or Russia (various offenses). A formal state of war has not existed between the US and another nation for 70 years.	Does he have some kind of libel or invasion of privacy case? The description of the "art work" is somewhat inconclusive. I will assume that the red lipstick and blue eye shadow in the fictional poster are suggestive of that soldier's "makeup". If the World War Two soldier were still alive and a straight male, he might have a claim of defamation insofar as the poster portrayed him as having a sexual orientation which is inaccurate, detrimental to his reputation, and tending to dissuade others from associating with the soldier. Policies against sexual discrimination aside, no straight male likes being falsely characterized as to sexual orientation (in part because of the undeniably harmful, lasting impact something like this would have in his environment). The defendant's possible allegation that the "art work" was hyperbole would be unavailing. That is because the suggestive poster is likely to impinge on viewers a detrimental concept of the soldier even if it is obvious to those viewers that the poster was not an actual, color photograph taken of him during the World War II. In most jurisdictions in the US, the defamed soldier would need to file suit within a year from the publication of the poster (an exception is Tennessee: six months) because the statute of limitations for claims of defamation is shorter than most others.	There is no possibility of legally holding a country "to account" for an action. An individual could be legally tried for a crime (murder), and a country could via a political process be made to suffer the consequences if a leader performs some act (it need not be illegal). Germany, Iran and Russia have historically suffered certain consequences of actions held to be "officially sanctioned", and individuals such as Adolf Eichmann have been specifically punished; Fahad Shabib Albalawi and 4 others were sentanced to death for involvement in Khashoggi's murder. Punitive recourse against a country is always via political / military action. Khashoggi, specifically, was apparently a lawful permanent resident of the US, which is probably sufficient connection to the US for a suit based in the Alien Tort Statute. There have been various suits filed against individuals under this act, some of which succeeded, for example Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876. An individual could be sued under the Alien Tort Statute, but a foreign government enjoys sovereign immunity (the US government has limited its liability on that grounds, but Saudi Arabia has not). His fiance might then sue some individual, but Saudi Arabia itself could not be "held to account".	It would be a violation of 18 USC 1001, which is the law against making false statements to the federal government. Paul Mozer, who was a Salomon Brothers trader, received a four month sentence for doing something along those lines in 1994. Bidding on something implies an intent to pay for the thing, which in this case is a falsehood: in so doing, one "falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact" (that you don't intend to pay for the thing).	Probably The US, like all other nations, has absolute sovereignty over its airspace. There is no clear line between airspace and space but 60,000 feet is clearly in the former. The US, like all other nations except Lichtenstein for some reason, is a signatory to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation which, among other things, makes it an act of war to use force against a civilian aircraft. Now, acts of war are not, per see, illegal - there are international laws about armed conflict and there are philosophical arguments about just and unjust wars but war itself is a political rather than a legal construct. Article 5 of the convention gives the right to all other states the right to operate civil aircraft within US airspace (and vice-versa) without prior permission (apart from regularly scheduled flights which do require permission) subject to compliance with the convention. Relevantly, unmanned balloons are dealt with in Annex 4 - it states that permission is not needed for light meteorological balloons but is needed for any other balloon which might enter foreign airspace. The Chinese claim that the balloon was “mainly” meteorological but the convention requires it to be “exclusively” meteorological. It also requires it to be “light” meaning having a payload weighing less than 4kg - unless the payload of this ballon was made of unobtainum, it weighed more than 4kg. They also argue that it drifted off course and entered US airspace inadvertently. This would be a legitimate claim if the entry of US airspace was unlikely at the planning and launch stages of the operation. We simply do not have the information to assess this claim. The US claim that this was a surveillance aircraft. If this is so, then the aircraft is not a civil aircraft and the Chicago Convention does not apply which brings us back to pure sovereignty - the US can do what it likes with things in its own airspace. There is a treaty between NATO members and former Warsaw Pact members dating from the 1990s that allow surveillance overflights of each other’s territories. However, there are two problems with this: China was never a signatory, and the US withdrew during the Trump Presidency. So, if this wasn’t a balloon that inadvertently and unexpectedly drifted off course, the US was allowed to shoot it down.	It is true that any work of the US government is not subject to copyright in the United States; it may be subject to copyright abroad (the relevant law excludes US government works from US copyright protection; other countries have their own copyright laws that generally don't explicitly exclude US government works, and so the works may be copyrighted there). A government work is defined as something produced by a government employee in the course of his official duties. It doesn't include everything released by a government agency; for instance, if a contractor makes something and the contract specifies that the government gets the copyright, the work is copyrighted (since it wasn't made by a government employee). If a foreign cosmonaut or astronaut composes and sings an original song in a livestream, then NASA may not have copyright in the livestream but the foreign astronaut would have copyright in the song. That said, NASA has a page of guidelines for reuse of their media, where they say that their stuff normally isn't copyrighted unless otherwise noted. They don't make any sort of guarantee, but they suggest you'd probably be fine embedding it, at least as far as they're concerned.
Should I ask author/publisher for permission if I want to create a free game out of the book? I want to create a free and open-source (licensed with GNU (A)GPL v3) using the plot and maybe the title of the book. I won't sell it and will have no income from it. I have some questions: Should I ask the heir of the book author (he died) for permission even if I won't sell the game? If no, what law/international convention does allow me to do so? If I have to ask, would it be enough to get permission via email or should I sign a contract with the right holder? If I got permission for non-profit use of the book plot (or if I don't have to get that permission), can I collect non-binding donations on the game's website? Thank you very much.	You don't just want to ask, you are required to obtain a license (or in other terms: the OK of the author). Your game is based on a book. That makes your game a derivate work. Under berne convention, any signer state has to make sure that the author has the right to authorize any derivate. That includes translations, films, or games. Without a license, you violate copyright law. It doesn't matter if your game is free. To stay safe, you need to obtain a license. Quite some authors would be happy to cut a deal, license or guidelines for fan-projects. As an example, the late Sir Terry Pratchett OBE has specific guidelines on what is ok and what not. Ask your author* about these questions and consult a Lawyer! Only then make your fan project! * This means the author, their estate or whoever they assigned their rights in the work to. Some examples: For that teenage wizard in a private castle charter school that'd be a certain J.K. Rowling. For those hairy-halflings running all over the continent hunted by orcs that'd be the J.R.R. Tolkien-Estate. And for those space wizards using blades from solid light that'd be The Walt Disney Company or one of their subsidiaries.	Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.	It's possible that CAD has a separate licence from the authors of ABC that allows them to produce a closed source copy. If not, they have no right to distribute CAD. However two wrongs don't make a right, and so you don't get to violate the copyright of CAD.* Unfortunately, unless you are one of the authors of ABC, you have no standing to sue the authors of CAD. You can only notify the authors of ABC and hope they do. If the authors of ABC don't have the resources to pursue the matter, you may be out of luck. That's one of the reasons the FSF gets copyright assignments for their projects. * It turns out that this is a much more debateable issue than I first thought. Some courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work is not copyrightable.	According to the current version of the TOS: You own the rights to the content you create and post on Medium. By posting content to Medium, you give us a nonexclusive license to publish it on Medium Services, including anything reasonably related to publishing it (like storing, displaying, reformatting, and distributing it). In consideration for Medium granting you access to and use of the Services, you agree that Medium may enable advertising on the Services, including in connection with the display of your content or other information. We may also use your content to promote Medium, including its products and content. We will never sell your content to third parties without your explicit permission. This explicitly says you own your content, although Medium has some rights to do some things. And they won't sell it without permission, so unless Medium itself is publishing this book, it would seem to be copyright infringement. (Of course, I don't know what the TOS said when you originally wrote the article.) If what was copied was not copyrightable (like a quote from the Constitution, or a simple uncreative graph of something obvious) then it wouldn't be infringement. But your article was probably more than that.	The Harry Potter company and John Williams may or may not want credit, but they almost certainly want money. You have to get their permission, at least for their creations. In the case of Für Elise, you can freely use the original score to "rework" that piece, but you can't "rework" a version that is itself a recent "reworking" (known as a derivative work). Anything that Jon Williams created is protected by copyright, so you need to negotiate a license to create a derivative work, and he/they get to dictate the terms (like, half of the 69 cents per copy). That might include some attribution statement such as "with permission, copyright Warner Brothers", or whatever is stipulated in the license agreement.	Copyright law is a country-by-country matter. Most countries are signatories to the Berne Convention, which provides a common framework, but there are still variations, generally in the duration of copyright or the definition of copyrightable material. According to the Hirtle chart, a video game that was first published in Europe in the year 2000 and subsequently published in the United States is still copyrighted in both the United States and whichever European countries it was published in. It is likely to be a work of corporate authorship, so the US copyright will expire on January 1, 2096 (unless a law extending the duration is passed). In the United States, the requirement to register a copyright was eliminated in 1989 as part of the Berne Convention Implementation Act; registration still provides benefits when filing a copyright-infringement lawsuit. Most European countries eliminated their registration requirements much earlier, if they had them at all: the Berne Convention dates from 1887. Copyright does not simply cease to exist when the owner does, or if the owner cannot be determined. The difficulty of tracking down copyright holders for old or little-known works is the driving force behind orphaned works legislation. There are no orphaned works laws in the United States, and since copyright is country-by-country, European laws won't help you if you're interested in publishing in the US. In order to track down the copyright holder, you'll need to figure out who originally held the copyright (probably the publisher, but it could be either development company, or both, or the game might be a collective work of the individuals who worked on it). If it was a work of corporate authorship, and none of the game-copyright sales mention it, copyright will have been transfered when the company owning the copyright was sold (as part of a general "and all intellectual property" clause).	Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? Yes. Copyright protects particular expressions of ideas and knowledge, not the ideas and knowledge themselves. Using a map for research purposes when the map or a modified version of it does not appear in the final work does not make the final work a "derivative work" covered by copyright.	A book (or any other creative work) published in the 1800s is now in the public domain everywhere in the world (excepting odd cases like Peter Pan where a special rule applies in some jurisdictions.) Anyone may legally quote from such a work at any length with no legal requirement for permission. In fact there is no legal requirement to attribute the quote to the author (although there is an ethical requirement). In fact one may publish a new edition of such a work, unchanged or modified in any way one chooses, with no legal need to obtain permission from anyone or to pay any royalties or fees. If the work were recent enough to still be protected by copyright, a limited quote could be used under fair use, fair dealing or another exception to copyright under the laws of most countries. The exact rules vary by country, and are often highly fact-dependent, so the exact details will matter. If one wanted to quote enough from a recent work that permission is required, the copyright holder, who is often not the publisher, would need to grant permission. That is often the author or the author's heir, but it can be a person or firm to which the author transferred the rights. Sometimes the rights-holder can be hard to identify. Update: it would be possible for a work published in, say, 1890 by an author then young who lived to a fairly old age, dying in, say 1960, to still be protected in some countries, although not in the US. (Anything published before 1925 is now PD in the US.) But Charlotte Bronte died in 1855, and all of her work has long been in the public domain
Meaning of word "remodeled" in California seller disclosure? On California C.A.R. TDS forms sellers have to disclose any unpermitted work properly so that buyers would not later sue seller for misrepresenting property. On disclosures I have seen words "[re]built", "remodeled", "converted" being used to disclose unpermitted work. What are main differences between these words in common law? Can seller state "bedroom was remodeled without permits" to imply that what is actually garage on building blueprints is now being called bedroom? Or would seller have to use verb "rebuilt without permits" or "converted without permits" in a such disclosure to imply that non-living space is being used as living space?	The words words "[re]built", "remodeled", and "converted" are not terms of art at common law. They would be interpreted on a case by case basis under the circumstances, typically in a lawsuit for a fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, or breach of a contractual covenant, with an eye towards where the use of a particular word in a particular context was, or was not, misleading. Also "converted" is a term with a technical legal meaning but not in the sense that you are using the word (the technical term of art legal meaning is to take or obtain property of another in a tortious, i.e. wrongful, manner for which there is a civil damages remedy). Often a court would refer to an ordinary, non-legal, dictionary to aid it in evaluating the meaning of these terms.	You have to take the General Notes part in its full context. The relevant clause says The term “Common Area” as used herein means all portions of the Project except the Units, and without limiting the generality of the forgoing, all structural projections within a Unit which are required for the support of a Condominium, gas, water pipes, all sewers, all ducts, chutes, conduits, wires and other utility installations of the structures wherever located (except the outlets thereof when located within the Units)… The most proximal expression is "wires and other utility installations", so construing "outlets" as covering gas, water, sewers, ducts etc. would be contrary to the interpretive principle known as the Last Antecedent rule. Nothing in the context requires a broad-scope interpretation of the "outlet" exception. This being in the US, courts would use ordinary English usage to understand what an "outlet" is, that is, even if "you could argue" that something is an outlet, the term "outlet" is used in the context of buildings to refer to an electrical outlet. The way this works is that you would need to get an expert witness to testify as to the common meaning of "outlet" in this context. There are two approaches to doing that. One is to get testimony of a contractor, as to what they mean when they say "outlet". However, contractors speak a special language (and not consistently so), and it's dubious that either party of a contract could have understood "outlet" in a special way shared by contractors. So the other approach (exemplified by Heller) is to call on a language and usage expert. A DIY approach is to google things like "sewer outlet", "electrical outlet" and so on, to see if you get many hits. You do not have a sewer outlet in your unit. You might have a water outlet if you work on cars and brought one inside the unit, but clearly context dictates that that is not relevant. The way courts resolve these matters is to determine what the ordinary meaning of a term is, and set aside specilized and technical meanings. See for example Nix v. Hedden where SCOTUS ruled that a tomato is not a legal fruit, because scientific definitions notwithstanding, a tomato is clearly a vegetable in common usage. Note that I am specifically addressing the question you posed, about "outlets". IO believe that attention to "outlets" is misguided. Focus should be on the regulation about "the HOA not being responsible for water leaks between units or interior damage", which is what they are invoking. By your description, the hole in the pipe which constitutes the source of the leak was behind the wall. The problem is that "between units" can have two very different meanings, one being "from one unit to another", and the other is "which takes place in the area that exists between units". Since you do not own the area behind the walls (presumably: property descriptions can be less than totally clear), there was no leak from one unit to the other. There was a leak which took place in the space between units. The definitions for the project clearly indicate that such behind-the-wall stuff is "common area". If a breech in the drain pipe occurs outside the wall and leaked into the unit below, that would be a leak outside the common are, and would be a leak between units in the "from one to the other" sense, although the water would have to pass through the common area. But if it originated on the other side of the wall, it originated in the common area which is always present between units. Suppose, being devil's advocate, that you own not just the stuff inside the walls but also the stuff behind the walls, up to the next unit's walls. But if you apply that analysis of property boundaries, then the adjacent unit's property is the stuff inside his walls and between, up to your walls, so unless you are very special, you don't own the area between the walls. So to reiterate, "outlet" is a irrelevant. What matters is the interpretation of "leak between". Under neither interpretation of that expression is a leak behind the wall the responsibility of the person "upstairs".	For the US: I believe 17 U.S. Code § 120 applies here: 17 U.S. Code § 120 - Scope of exclusive rights in architectural works (a)Pictorial Representations Permitted.— The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does not include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place. So long as the building is located in or visible from a public place, anyone should be allowed to distribute models of the building Edit (more information, but I believe original answer still suffices): So we know from 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8), that architectural works are copyrightable, and the extent of this copyright protection extends to copyright over the blueprint itself and/or the right to produce the building. This seems to only mean that an architect would own copyright in a model of a building if he specifically creates a sculpture of the building and then copyrights it. It doesn't appear that designing a building or having blueprints of it grants the creator rights over a sculpture of the building, the rights to such a sculpture would have to be obtained seperately. TL;DR You should be allowed to sell models of a building so long as they are not models based off the actual blueprints of the building, and that these models haven't been manually copyrighted by the architect beforehand. (i.e making the building hasn't granted a copyright over models of the building beforehand)	Desuetude is the Latin word. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desuetude Typically there is more to it than just that there was no enforcement for a while. It usually occurs when prosecutors agree not to prosecute and judges don't punish or punish harshly for it. Normally an HOA is just rules for your apartment building and not actual laws so it would not apply there.	You can be held liable for rent after you are off a lease. Rewriting a lease only affects future obligations, and doesn't extinguish past obligations. However, you appear to have released X from all obligations via paragraph 2. If you plan to sue for past rent, the court will have to interpret the statement that "The landlord, Y, and Z agree to relinquish X from any obligation regarding the lease as mentioned above", which is non-standard English. It is extremely likely that the court will interpret this to mean "release". You might argue, using earlier emails, that all parties had a clear understanding that this means "from all future obligations, but not past obligations", but that is not what the written agreement says, and the parol evidence rule, which is codified as explicit law in California, says execution of a contract in writing... supersedes all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument That clause lets X off the hook, in exchange for his claim on the security deposit and for relinquishing his tenant rights to the unit. You cannot sue X for any rent.	Michigan law say nothing about landlord entry, so whatever it says in the lease is what is allowed. Various sources like this comment on the lack of such statutory regulations. There does not appear to be any relevant case law for Michigan which impose restrictions on a landlord's right to access a rental. Since there is no statutory or case law restriction on landlord's right to access his property, landlord's agent would have the same right to access. That would mean that if the listing agent were authorized by the landlord to enter, then the agent could enter, and it would not be necessary for the landlord to accompany this agent whenever entry was needed. That does not mean that a "listing agent" that happens to work with a landlord has an independent right to enter the landlord's property. The same would go for repairmen. It is actually not clear to me whether there could be blanket permission for any and all with access to the lock box to enter, since pretty much any realtor can enter a house for sale, subject to whatever the stated limitations are, and they don't call the owner for each entry. I suspect that one would not have legal grounds for imposing a particular additional restriction on a landlord's right to access and permit access to the property, since there's no overriding statute, and restrictions on landlord access mainly derive from statutes.	Short Answer The question of whether a real property mortgage is recourse or non-recourse is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the real property is located. The place where the parties to the agreement reside, or where the documents are signed, is irrelevant. I am not aware of any exceptions to this rule anywhere in the world. In some circumstances, the parties may reach an agreement regarding whether a real property mortgage is recourse or non-recourse if the law of the jurisdiction permits agreements of this type. But, often the parties are not allowed to vary this aspect of their real property mortgage agreement by contract. Choice is law for loans secured by collateral which is property other than real property is pretty much irrelevant in the U.S. This because the law is the same in every U.S. state, territory, or district. Long Answer Background regarding recourse and non-recourse loans To clarify, the terms "recourse" and "non-recourse" are normally used to refer to the remedies available in the event of foreclosure of a loan secured by property that serves as collateral for the loan. When the collateral is real property, the core documents in the transaction are a promissory note that represents a borrower's promise to reply the funds borrowed from any assets available to the borrower that is not exempt from creditor's claims, and a document representing the fact that the collateral may be seized if the promissory note is not paid as agreed, and that the creditor's interest in that collateral has priority over all third parties seeking to collect their debts out of that property which cannot be erased by transferring the property to someone else. This document is sometimes called a mortgage, and a substantially equivalent document used mostly in the Western U.S. is called a deed of trust. I will call this document a mortgage for simplicity, whatever its true name in your locality. In the case of a recourse mortgage, if the borrower defaults, the lender can foreclose on the mortgage, which results in a foreclosure sale at which the lender can bid all or part of the debt secured by the collateral together with any additional cash desired, and their parties may make cash bids. Ignoring for the moment the complications involved when there are multiple mortgages and liens with different priorities encumbering the real property, the person who makes the highest bid at the foreclosure sale is given ownership of the real property in exchange for paying the price bid at the foreclosure sale either in cash (in the case of a third-party bid) or in the from of a reduction in the debt owed, in the case of a lender bidding the debt owed against the property. If the mortgage is a recourse mortgage, then if the lender bids less than the full amount of the debt owed on the promissory note and is the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, then the debt owed on the promissory note is reduced by the amount of the bid made by the lender and the remainder of the balance owing on the promissory note is a personal debt owed by the borrower to the lender called a deficiency judgment. For example, suppose that you buy a house for $1,000,000 with a $200,000 down payment and an $800,0000 recourse mortgage loan. Some time later, the balance owed on the mortgage loan from regular monthly principal and interest payments is $775,000. But, due to a collapse in the real estate market in the real estate market where your house is located, your house, which had a fair market value of $1,000,000 when you bought it, now has a fair market value of $725,000. You lose you job due to the same economic downturn that has caused the market value of your house to decline and are unable to make mortgage payments. The lender forecloses on your house and bids $725,000 at the foreclosure sale, even though you still owe $775,000 on the promissory note. After the foreclosure sale is completely, the lender owns your house, and you still owe the lender a deficiency judgment of $50,000. The lender may now collect the $50,000 deficiency judgment in much the ame way that the lender would collect a judgment entered by a court on an unpaid credit card bill for $50,000. The lender can garnish your wages (once you get some), can seize your bank accounts, and can seize other property which you own which is not protected by a statutory exemption from creditors. In a recourse mortgage the economic risk of declining property values that wipe out the down payment equity is born by the borrower. In contrast, if you had a non-recourse mortgage, the lender's sole remedy would be to seize the collateral and the lenders would not be able to obtain a deficiency judgment no matter how little your house was worth. Operationally, this means that the lender is required to bid the full amount of the debt owed by the borrower to the lender at the foreclosure sale, even if the property is worth much less than the amount of the debt owed. In the case of a non-recourse mortgage the economic risk of declining property values that wipe out the down payment equity is born by the lender. Choice of Law For Real Property The place where the documents are signed and the domiciles or place of organization of the parties to the agreement are irrelevant to the question of whether a real property mortgage is recourse or non-recourse. In the U.S. (and everywhere else that I am aware of), the law governing security interests in real property, such as mortgages and deeds of trust and liens is the law of the place where the real property is located. So, if you take out a mortgage on property in a non-recourse state, the mortgage will be a non-recourse mortgage. Usually, in a non-recourse state, it is not possible for a lender and a borrower to mutually agree to make the mortgage a recourse mortgage when the default rule is that mortgages are non-recourse mortgages. In contrast, if you take out a mortgage on property in a recourse state, the mortgage will be a recourse mortgage, unless the borrower and lender expressly waive the right of the lender to obtain a deficiency judgment in a foreclosure within the mortgage document. Choice of Law For Other Property The law governing security interests in property other than real property in the U.S. is usually the Uniform Commercial Code which contains choice of law rules. While, in theory, different rules that states could adopt regarding whether security interests in property other than real property are recourse or non-recourse, in practice, every U.S. state has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code as a matter of state or territorial or district law, and at the level of generality of whether a security interest (which is the legal name for a mortgage with collateral other than real property under the Uniform Commercial Code) is recourse or non-recourse, the law is uniform throughout the United States, although there might be slight technical differences between the laws of different states or other jurisdictions within the U.S. based upon the version of the Uniform Commercial Code that is on the books or the decision of state legislators to deviate from the uniform statute's language. The Uniform Commercial Code of each state contains choice of law rules determine which state's version of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to a case. And, the choice of law rules of the Uniform Commercial Code in the state where a lawsuit pertaining to the personal property security interest is what a court in that state applies to resolve the choice of law question. These rules are generally consistent with each other. Footnote on Macroeconomic Implications Of Recourse v. Nonrecourse Mortgages The incentives of lenders and borrowers when entering into mortgage loan arrangements is different in recourse and nonrecourse mortgages, particularly, when the decision to give a borrower a loan is made by a third-party mortgage broker subject to bureaucratic conditions, or by a low level bank employee who acts in the same way, rather than by someone with an economic stake the financial well being of the lender. When mortgage loans are non-recourse, down payments are small, and housing prices are rising, and may be entering a real estate bubble, a borrower is in a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation. If real property values collapse, the borrow loses only his small down payment. If real property values go up, the borrower can sell the property and pocket all of the profits (in some circumstances the profits are even tax free). The borrower has little incentive to worry about the possibility that the fair market value of the real estate could collapse at some point. But, if the decision to allow the borrower to borrow is made by an employee or broker with nothing to lose if a loan is authorized when it shouldn't have been because the risk that the property values will collapse due to a real estate bubble are too great, the mortgage broker has an incentive to be lax in underwriting the loan to make sure that the borrower can really make the payments and that a foreclosure of the loan will realize enough value to pay of the loan if a real estate price bubble collapses. And, since the bank can get its money back and more by foreclosing if the borrower doesn't make payments while prices are going up, there isn't much of an incentive to make sure that the evidence of the borrower's ability to make the payments on the mortgage is accurate. The incentive of the broker or employee is usually to get as many mortgages processed as possible, even if that means overlooking problems with paperwork in a loan application, or using an appraiser who will say that the property being financed is worth what is necessary to get the loan approved, even if you know that the appraiser is cutting corners or just making up inaccurate values to get what the broker wants done. These events can conspire to make a real estate mortgage very bad and to expose the entire community of lenders who make loans in a non-recourse state to catastrophic losses in the event that a real estate bubble collapses. In contrast, this is much less likely to happen in a recourse mortgage state, where the risk of a downside loss deficiency judgment discourages borrowers from trying to finance the purchase of a house that could easily lose more value than the down payment if it was apparent that a real estate bubble was developing. So borrowers would self-police. The reason for this extended footnote and story is that this was one of the root causes of the financial crisis. A handful of states with big real estate markets and non-recourse mortgages (California, Florida and Texas mostly) started to experience real estate bubbles and mortgage lenders, because they had bad incentives in their mortgage origination systems didn't do enough to prevent themselves from financing the purchases of overprices houses. Eventually, the real estate bubble collapsed, lots of borrowers with overpriced houses and little money down defaulted on very large mortgage loans, and the lenders took huge losses on their real estate mortgage portfolios which were supposed to be ultra-low risk but weren't because the people evaluating the real estate mortgage investments overlooked or willfully ignored the risks. This, in turn, resulted in losses so great at the financial institution level that almost every major investment bank in the country and almost every subprime lender in the country went out of business or went bankrupt, and the collapse of this part of the financial industry, in turn, wrecked havoc on every firm in the economy that relied of these financial institutions as a source of investment or a source of financing for their unrelated businesses. The result was the worst recession since the Great Depression.	Preface and Caveats The question doesn't specify where this happened. I am providing an outline of the way that most U.S. states would handle this situation, if the fats are as they are much more likely to be and not as claimed in the question probably due to a misunderstanding of the underlying transaction. I identify areas where state laws most often vary and don't describe those areas of the law in detail since that is impossible without knowing where this happens. This is a matter of state law and varies from state to state, although most U.S. states are quite similar until you get to the fine details. Atypical language in the contract between the contractor and the client could also lead to a different conclusion. I don't know how this would be resolved in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. Background: The Structure Of A Typical Construction Loan Financed Construction Project In business and contractual disputes you can only understand the answer if you understand the underlying business transaction, which the question itself doesn't spell out very fully. The fact pattern identified in the question is so unusual that I strongly suspect that there is a misunderstanding of the facts, or an inadvertent misstatement in the language used in the question due to sloppy writing that flows from not appreciating the importance of some key facts. The transaction was almost surely structures more or less as follows (for background, I'm presenting a more general very of this kind of transaction rather than the simple one with no subcontractors or material suppliers involved, because this context helps someone understand why the laws are written the way that they are written.) Usually, the client owns real property, takes out a construction loan from a bank secured by the real estate, and hires a general contractor. The client will usually make some down payment to the general contractor who will take care of paying the subcontractors and material suppliers, and will pay the balance of the amount due to the general contractor through proceeds of the construction loan disbursed by the bank which are drawn as the work is done and payment is earned. Typically, each drawn cycle, which is often monthly for a smaller project and weekly, biweekly or semimonthly in a larger project, materials suppliers and subcontractors submit invoices and lien waivers to the general contractor based upon the work done. If the work is complete, a complete lien waiver is submitted, if he work in only partially finished, a partial lien waiver is submitted. The general contractor substantively reviews the invoices based upon a physical review of the construction site and a review of the subcontract. If there are problems it is rejected and must be resubmitted by the material supplier or subcontractor. If it is approved, the general contractor attaches that invoice as a supporting document to a draw request for the draw cycle summarizing all validly submitted invoices from material suppliers, subcontractors and itself, and also attaching a partial lien waiver from the general contractor. Then, the general contractor submits that draw request to a bank officer handling the construction loan as an agent of the property owner-client, and also a client representative for approval. The bank officer and client representative make a much less probing review of the draw request, looking only for obvious irregularities or suspicious amounts, and if everything is in order, they approve the request. Then, the bank write a check in the draw amount approved to the general contractor. The general contractor then disburses the invoiced amounts to the materials materials suppliers and subcontractors and pays itself the amounts that it has earned. Sometimes, however, the general contractor gets a valid invoice from a material supplier or subcontractor, and receives funds from the client in the form of a downpayment or a loan draw, but doesn't pay the subcontractor or material supplier with those funds. Also, sometimes, the general contractor does work that it is entitled to be paid for or incurs an obligation to a material supplier or subcontractor, but the client doesn't pay or the bank doesn't disburse the funds requested even though the request is valid. When a general contractor, material supplier or subcontractor doesn't get paid for work that is actually done at a particular piece of real estate, the law gives the firm that wasn't paid for its work on that particular piece of real estate what is called a mechanic's lien encumbering that piece of real estate. The details of how a firm with a mechanic's lien gives notice to the world of its rights, the priorities of lien's vis-a-vis each other, and the way that mechanic's liens are enforced varies significantly from state to state. But typically the notice must be given very promptly and not long after notice of non-payment is given, a lawsuit to foreclose on the real estate encumbered by the lien is commenced. An unpaid material supplier or subcontractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the general contractor for breach of contract, and sometimes also for misappropriation of disbursements from the client or the bank. An unpaid general contractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the owner of the property for breach of contract. The Facts In The Question and Analysis The first paragraph of the question tells us what went wrong. The client paid an employee of the general contractor (probably a project manager) instead of the firm the employee worked for (basically embezzling the money by deceiving the client into thinking that the employee was authorized to receive a payment to the employee's firm on its behalf when that wasn't the case), and the firm of the employee who was paid now wants to get paid. This happens and lawsuits usually follows when it does. But exactly what happens next depends upon the facts in the next to paragraphs. The next two paragraphs of the question, however, are probably confused and incorrect. The next two paragraphs say: Two weeks later, the client received a letter from the contractor's lender asking the client for money owed to the contractor, saying that if it was not paid, the client could be double charged. Does the client owe the contractor's lender? What probably actually happened is that the finance office of the contractor submitted a draw request to the bank officer in charge of the client's construction loan with the bank, and also gave a notice of the draw request to the client. The client tells the bank officer not to approve the draw request because the client has already paid the draw request directly to the employee of the contractor (probably the project manager) without the knowledge of the firm the employee worked for. What Happens Next If The Facts Are As I Believe Them To Be? When this happens, the finance officer at the contractor firm talks to the client figures out what happens and then talks to the employee to whom the payment was made. If the employee promptly turns over the funds the the contractor firm, the finance officers at the contractor firm scolds the employee for screwing up the system and the client for making a payment to the wrong person and there is no harm, no foul, and the matter is over. But if the employee who took the client's money doesn't turn over the money which the client can prove to the contractor firm that he paid to the employee, several things are likely to happen. Non-Lawsuit Actions: The client will direct the bank not to pay the draw request. The employee who took the money from the client is fired (no big deal, he was probably long gone). The contractor firm and/or the client will often, but not always, report to the police that the employee embezzled the funds from the client, and if the police find it credible, will issue an arrest warrant. The main reason not to do so is that the facts are uncertain enough that the police and prosecutor don't want to touch it (e.g. the client paid the employee in cash and didn't get a receipt, or the employee when asked says that the payment was made but was a "tip" or was payment for something unrelated), or the client and/or the contractor firm don't want to harm their reputations by making public the fact that there was a theft on this job. Three lawsuits could be brought, although, in practice, these might be consolidated as claims against different parties and cross-claims between defendants, in a lawsuit brought by the contractor, or in some other configuration. The contractor firm sues the employee who took the money for converting money from a client intended for it (probably both as a tort and as a breach of fiduciary duty by an agent of the construction firm). The contractor firm sues the client for breach of contract. The question is about the liability of the client in this second lawsuit. The client might also bring a counterclaim against the contractor for negligent supervision of its employee if the employee did indeed abscond with the money and the facts support that counterclaim. If the client prevailed on that counterclaim, the judgment on the counterclaim for negligent supervision (e.g. if the contractor knew that the employee had a history of doing things like this and didn't warn the client) would be setoff against the breach of contract judgment, rather than being a defense to the breach of contract claim. The client sues the employee for fraud, conversion or theft. What Are The Rights Of The Parties In These Lawsuits? In the second lawsuit, the client has breached the contract. The contract said to pay the firm, the client paid someone else, and so the obligation under the contract was not satisfied. The disputes in the lawsuit between the contracting firm and the client will be over whether the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds as an agent of he contracting firm, over whether the payment that the client says was made to the employee was made at all, and over the purpose of the payment if a payment was made to the employee but the employee claims that it was a "tip" or a payment for something else (e.g. the employee also had a catering side hustle and the employee says it was for catering services). The issue of whether the client made the payment at all may be hard to prove if the payment was made in cash and the employee didn't provide a receipt and will come down to the credibility of the client and employee's testimony at trial. if the payment was made with a check or credit card, bank records will make it an open and shut case on that issue that will probably not be disputed at trial. If the facts reveal that the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds from the client for the contractor firm and that the payment was for work on the project and not something else, then the the payment made by the client to the employee satisfies the client's duty under the contract even if the employee wasn't actually authorized to receive the funds for the contractor firm. So, the client wins and the contractor firm's sole remedy is to sue its employee for misappropriating the client's funds. On the the other hand, if the employee did not have apparent authority to accept the funds from the client, or the payment was for something other than work on the project, or the client fails to prove that the payment was ever made, then the client owes the money to the contracting firm and must pay the contracting firm for the amount due (plus interest, litigation costs and possibly attorneys' fees depending on the terms of the contract). The client may pay that obligation out of separate funds of the client's own, or may authorize a the bank officer to make a draw on the construction loan to pay the amount owed. The construction loan bank of the client wouldn't sue the client or demand payment from the client for the amount that should have been paid to the contractor firm but was instead paid to the employee. It didn't pay money to someone it shouldn't have paid it to unless the client authorized the bank to do so. And, the bank won't pay the contractor without the client/borrower's say so. If the client authorized a draw payment from the construction loan to the employee rather than the contractor firm, the client still owes the bank for what it paid to the employee at the direction of the client (in addition to all other draws on the project), although the client may have a suit against the bank officer for negligence in administering the loan by failing to flag that the payee was wrong (which might lose but isn't a sure loss). The amount owed to the contractor firm proceeds under the analysis set forth above. What If The Facts Are Right? If, improbably, the facts as stating in the question are actually what happened, the client will owe or not owe the contractor money under the same analysis as above. But the client will not have liability to any company that the contractor got a loan from (which would not encumber the client's real estate), since the client has no contractual relationship with the contractor's lender. Post-Script On Double Payment Prevention Laws The question hinges on the unfairness of the client having to possibly pay twice for the same construction work. In some situations, where the general contractor firm is at fault for causing the double payment to happen, the law protects the client from double payment, even though those laws don't apply here. I explain why these laws don't apply below. Basically, the client has to eat the double payment when the double payment occurs because the client screwed up though no fault of the general contractor and the general contractor doesn't benefit from the double payment. Some states have laws designed to prevent property owners, often only residential property owners having work performed on their own residences, from having to double pay for work done in some circumstances. But these laws usually only apply when the client pays the general contractor firm as the client is supposed to, satisfying his contractual obligation, and the general contractor doesn't pay the subcontractor, causing the subcontractor to sue the general contractor for breach of contract and the owner to enforce the subcontractor's mechanic's lien. In those situations, the double payment prevention law eliminates the subcontractor's mechanic's lien rights when the client pays the general contractor in full, and the subcontractor is left only with a lawsuit against the general contractor who didn't pass on the client's or the client's bank's payment to the general contractor for the subcontractor's share of work to the subcontractor. In this case, the double payment laws usually wouldn't apply because the legal issue here is whether the client paid the contractor, or was deceived by the employee into paying someone other than the contractor in an act of conversion/embezzlement/fraud.
Why was Judge Jacksons ruling in DoJ vs Microsoft overturned in the anti-trust hearing of 2001? In United States vs Microsoft, a 2001 anti-trust case in which the DoJ, 18 states and the District of Columbia alleged that Microsoft had abused its monopoly position was heard by Judge Jackson and he found for the plaintiffs and ordered the company to be broken into two separate units. However, the judgement was overturned on appeal with the appeal judge accusing Judge Jackson of unethical behaviour to which Judge Jackson replied that Microsoft executives had proved, time and time again, to be inaccurate, misleading, evasive and transparently false ... Microsoft is a company with an institutional disdain for both the truth and for rules of law that lesser entities must respect. It is also a company whose senior executives are not averse to offering specious testimony to support spurious defenses to claims of wrong-doing. Q. Given that his findings of fact were not overturned why was Judge Jacksons original ruling overturned by the appeals court?	First of all, the case US v Microsoft was originally a 1998 case, not 2001. Jackson entered his judgment in June 2000. Microsoft appealed timely. It went from Jackson's district court, straight to the Supreme Court, using 15 U.S.C. §29(b), and the Supreme court issued 530 US 1301. While the states filed for being heard, the Supreme Court declined them, remanding the whole case back to the lower courts. In No. 00-139, direct appeal [to the Supreme Court] is denied, and case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Clerk is directed to issue the judgment forthwith. In No. 00-261 [the request of the states to be heard], certiorari before judgment is denied. The case thus went to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, and due to the time it takes to schedule, became a 2000 case. The court noticed, that while Jackson was still on the case he had given interviews about it: The Court of Appeals held that: [...] (6) district judge’s comments to the press while the case was pending required his disqualification on remand. Immediately after the District Judge entered final judgment on June 7, 2000, accounts of interviews with him began appearing in the press. Some of the interviews were held after he entered final judgment. (p.107) Microsoft urges the District Judge’s disqualification under § 455(a): a judge ‘‘shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The standard for disqualification under § 455(a) is an objective one. The question is whether a reasonable and informed observer would question the judge’s impartiality. (p.114) Our application of Liljeberg leads us to conclude that the appropriate remedy for the violations of § 455(a) is disqualification of the District Judge retroactive only to the date he entered the order breaking up Microsoft. We therefore will vacate that order in its entirety and remand this case to a different District Judge, but will not set aside the existing Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law (except insofar as specific findings are clearly erroneous or legal conclusions are incorrect). (p.116) When Jackson gave the interviews, he violated the Code of Conduct for judges because the appeals process was not yet complete and he was still on the case. As such, he created the image, that he might not be impartial: Canon 3A(6). The admonition against public comment about the merits of a pending or impending matter continues until the appellate process is complete. If the public comment involves a case from the judge’s own court, the judge should take particular care so that the comment does not denigrate public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality, which would violate Canon 2A. A judge may comment publicly on proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity, but not on mandamus proceedings when the judge is a litigant in an official capacity (but the judge may respond in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 21(b)). Jackson did not appear as he was to be heard in the Circuit Court. As shown above, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals found, he did violate the code of conduct and disqualified him under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). While this did suffice to overturn the verdict prescribed by Jackson, the court did not throw out the findings of fact that had been issued well before the interviews and noted that the traditional setup might be inadequate for this case. They remanded back to a different judge to decide a remedy under a different scope. The case didn't end there, Microsoft attempted to get even the findings of fact thrown out based on the very ruling that sent it back for remand, claiming that the judge had shown to be biased way earlier, during the trial and before the finding of facts. They did so by appealing a second time to the Supreme Court in August 2001 but the court rejected to hear the case in October. In the end, DoJ and Microsoft settled in November 2001, the settlement was accepted by the District Court in 2002, and affirmed by the appeals court in 2004, as some states didn't want that one.	Your assumptions are incorrect. Courts allow oral arguments (when they do allow them) so that attorneys have a chance to better address a judge's concerns. The idea is that it lets an attorney not only present the core of his case, but it also lets him address any problems with his reasoning that the judge may have or help the judge explore a complicated question. Without that all you have is the back-and-forth in writing with opposing counsel, which is useful, but may not actually address the issues that are important to the judge. There is some difference in how you present arguments on paper as opposed to in oral argument, but the distinction is largely one of style rather than substance. An argument that is great on paper is still great when presented out loud, you just present it differently because you are presenting it in a different medium. For example, you have to present oral argument with the assumption that the judge may interrupt you at any time to ask a question they are interested in, derailing your entire pre-planned argument into a tangential point the judge considers important. This is great because it lets you address what the judge is concerned about, but it requires a different preparation and some changes to the format of your argument. For example, while you will front-load both oral and written arguments with a roadmap, both your roadmap and your first sentence are much more important in oral argument.	The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal.	Perjury is not 'not telling the truth'. It requires (in most jurisdictions) being proven to have deliberately lied under oath. As Xavier pointed out, you are not on oath when entering a plea (among other reasons, you would be required to incriminate yourself). Secondly, "I am not guilty" could mean anything from "the prosecution wrongly think that what I did is illegal" to "this law is unconstitutional" even if the facts are not in dispute; either may be mistaken without being a lie. If the facts are in dispute, the jury will have to deliver a verdict that implies (it does not state, let alone prove) that they disbelieve one party; deliberate falsehood, whether by a defendant or a police officer, would be several steps beyond that.	Yes it affects them. Judges are pursuing their vocation as a career and there are career paths within the judicial system just as there are in every other career. Screw up too many times and your career ends at your present level. Judges are also professionals and most take professional pride in doing their jobs well. Having a decision overturned is professionally embarrassing. As a matter of public policy, there is no sanction that is directly applied to the judge otherwise judges would be too cautious to make decisions. Anyone who makes professional decisions will get them wrong from time to time - they generally are not punished. That said there are judicial errors that stem from making the wrong judgement (so to say) call and judicial errors that stem from royally screwing up. The former are far less damaging than the latter. For an example of the former, a judge is applying a relatively new statute for which there have been no other decisions and interprets the legislation in a reasonable way but one the appeal court disagrees with. For an example of the latter, deciding the matter on a basis which neither party put before the court and which the judge did not draw to the parties attention during the trial - as a common law country, the New Zealand legal system is adversarial: the court exists to decide the dispute between the parties on the basis the parties argue, not to go on a "frolic of its own". In addition, appeal courts can only overrule a decision if the judge has made an error of law, not if they have made an error of fact. A judge is allowed to be wrong about the facts but not about the law. In practice, the distinction is not trivial. In a jury trial, the jury decides the facts, the judge decides the law - appeals can only be on the basis of what the judge did, not on the basis of what the jury did (barring egregious misconduct by the jury). In a judge only trial the judge decides both but an appeal can only be on matters of law.	A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.	If Bob acknowledges how he has altered the evidence at the time he submits it, there shouldn't be any issues with it turning into falsification, which generally only becomes a problem when it's done with an intent to mislead the court. More likely, an opposing party would raise an authenticity objection, i.e, that the evidence has been altered and is therefore not trustworthy. It's probably going to be up to the judge whether to sustain that objection or not, and I'd expect the court's decision to turn in large part on how plausible it finds Bobs allegations of fraud and retaliation. I'd also expect that the Court would be less concerned with the pitch alteration than the redaction of portions of the recording. If we don't know what Bob is saying, it makes it hard to understand the full context of the conversation. Of course, all of this assumes that Bob hasn't already been forced to turn over the original recordings to Company, which he will be. The parties have a right to each other's evidence, and they are required to identify their witnesses to each other. The moment Company knows about the recording, it is going to submit a discovery request demanding a copy, and Bob will be obligated to comply. If Bob objects that doing so would expose the representatives to retaliation, I would expect the court to warn Company against tampering with witnesses and then order Bob to comply with his discovery obligations.	This wouldn't be customary and is probably improper, but the judge may have been trying to do you a favor. In the absence of being under oath, the judge could not consider anything said in your closing statement as evidence. If you are under oath, the judge can weigh something you say in your closing statement against the other evidence when making a ruling.
Is it possible to be awarded damages in a First Amendment case? The case is a de facto promotion of religion by a local municipality. A private citizen has placed a religiously promotive flyer on the notices board at the department of a local municipality. The board is enclosed by a locked, plexiglass window, and it is to the outside of this window the flyer has been taped. While not responsible for putting it up, after about 2 months of it being there with staff able to see it 7 days a week, standing next to it, posting official notices, they have "adopted" it and are now liable for its presence. I say three days was sufficient time to be responsible in removal. I plan on waiting until it's removed by anyone before filing a complaint and suit just so it's as huge as possible, exposing their negligence, "sticking it to them" for the schadenfreude, but I wonder if there's any personal damages to possibly be awarded, or -- as I suspect -- would it all be in the form of contributions to secular, church-state separation organizations and having to allow every other type of religious and areligious promotion for an equal amount of time?	In a civil rights action in which someone prevails (which is by no means certain in this case, but not impossible either), there is at a minimum an award of nominal damages (i.e. $1) and the reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs incurred in the lawsuit. A jury could also award a prevailing party non-economic damages, and/or exemplary damages (a.k.a punitive damages) in connection with a violation of civil rights. There might also be injunctive or declaratory relief stating that this was a violation of civil rights and requiring the government to adopt practices to prevent harm going forward. It is hard to see how there would be any economic damages at issue in this case, but it isn't impossible to imagine some circumstances in which they could be proven, perhaps.	The First Amendment does indeed guarantee the freedom to express any idea or viewpoint, the limitation being incitement to immediate lawless action, recently reaffirmed in Snyder v. Phelps (many free speech cases have been about criminal restrictions on speech, this applied even to a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress). There isn't a clear line that distinguishes "advocating violation of the law" and "inciting to immediate lawlessness". Saying "(You should) shoot The Man whenever you see him" would be protected expression, but "There's a cop, somebody kill him" would be incitement. It also has to be a "credible" incitement, so saying "Kill him now!" to a room full of pacifist nuns would not constitute incitement. Things said to an angry mob would be more along the lines of incitement.	The only way in which you could be "incorrectly listed as a defendant" is if somehow your name was typed in as a party (there would be a glaring gap, that no paragraph of the complaint says anything about you as a defendant). Assuming the situation is nothing so bizarre as a typo, you are a defendant. Whether or not you are liable in this case is a matter of fact and law, and the plaintiff's attorney has probably done due diligence in suing everybody imaginable. Perhaps the plaintiff lied to his attorney about material facts (read the complaint); or perhaps there is a credible legal theory under which you would be liable (read the complaint). Your attorney will take care of your problems, to the best of his ability. He may be able to persuade the plaintiff's attorney that they stand no realistic hope of winning and some chance of getting smacked for pointlessly involving you. If the plaintiff's attorney isn't persuaded by the argument, your attorney could submit the legal arguments as a motion to dismiss. If the judge is not persuaded (at this stage), you (your attorney) will have to counter the arguments presented at trial.	Neither of the posters in question would constitute a "true threat" which can be subjected to legal sanctions consistent with the First Amendment. The nature of the communication, in the context provided in the question, is clearly metaphorical. The U.S. Supreme Court, incidentally, will be hearing arguments in the case of Counterman v. Colorado on April 19, 2023, pertinent to this question, in which the issue presented is: Whether, to establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective "reasonable person" would regard the statement as a threat of violence. This would, however, be a far closer case under British law, as illustrated by a recent case in which a British teenager was sentenced to 11 year years in prison for inflammatory Internet postings that it was established were a major factor that pushed the people who carried out mass shootings at a Buffalo, New York grocery store and a Colorado Spring gay nightclub to carry out their attacks. As reported by CNN: Daniel Harris, 19, from Derbyshire in northern England, posted videos shared by Payton Gendron, who pleaded guilty to the shooting in Buffalo, as well as videos linked to Anderson Lee Aldrich, the suspect accused of killing five people in a mass shooting at an LGBTQ nightclub in Colorado Springs, Colorado, last November, the court heard, according to PA. Sentencing Harris in court in Manchester, northern England, Judge Patrick Field was quoted by PA as saying, “What they did was truly appalling but what they did was no more than you intended to encourage others to do when publishing this material online.” The postings made by Daniel Harris which led to his conviction would almost certainly not have been actionable under U.S. law which has much stronger First Amendment protections than the U.K.	Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.	The ordinance is not very specific about how notice is to be given: therefore, it need not be in writing, and it need not be sent by mail. It would not be surprising if the "notification" came in the form of a city person inspecting the reported obstruction, walking up to the house and knocking and finding nobody home (thus triggering the "In case the owner cannot be found" condition), whereupon the city removes the rocks. That clause does not mean "In case we do not know who the owner is", it almost certainly means "in case the owner cannot be contacted immediately". Article III is in general about obstructions on streets, which are not allowed, except by permit in section 78 under "Permit to Obstruct Traffic Lane". Assuming that no obstruction permit was obtained, what usually happens is that an officer is sent to tell the owner to remove the obstruction (more or less immediately), and if nobody is at the site whom they can tell, they probably won't go any further (e.g. asking neighbors where the owner is). There is no legal definition of "reasonable time", instead the law simply takes that to mean "the amount of time a reasonable person would require". It would thus depend particularly on the size of the obstruction and the volume of traffic. One measure would be how quickly the rocks were moved -- if it was a matter of days and there was no notice, written or otherwise, then there would not be the kind of urgency that might justify the "We knocked and nobody was home" version of notification.	False statements are generally protected by the First Amendment. If the video was an obvious gag or work of fiction, in which a reasonable person would understand that you were not truly endorsed, your false statement would almost certainly be protected by the First Amendment. But many false statements are not protected, typically because of their negative effects on other parties. Classic examples include defamation, perjury, and fraud. A lie about an endorsement could easily fall on either side of that line. If you are making the video in a context in which reasonable viewers would be led to believe that you truly were endorsed by that company, I could easily imagine a set of circumstances that would lead to liability: If you're releasing the video as part of a commercial endeavor, you're looking at possible claims for false advertising, unfair competition, and trademark violations (false designation, dilution, etc.). If your video is harmful to the company's reputation, you're facing a potential claim for product disparagement or trade libel. These are the corporate equivalents of the libel actions most people are more familiar with, and they generally require proving the same kinds of facts. A right of publicity/misappropriation of identity action is possible but very unlikely. Most states are very stingy about allowing businesses to bring these claims, so this one would probably be very jurisdiction-specific. Proving the case generally requires the company to show (1) that you made a commercial use of their identity, (2) that they did not authorize it, and (3) that the use caused economic harm. Beyond those, there's a whole host of business torts that I could try to squeeze this into but that are probably less likely given the hypothetical you've presented. I'd also note that your assumption about proving damages is not well-founded. Especially among the largest companies, businesses are very protective of their brands, and they invest absurd amounts of money to protect them. Pick any company with a high enough profile that someone would want to fake their endorsement, and I'd be willing to bet that their legal department could pretty quickly prepare a detailed estimate of the related damage to their brand. If a case went to trial, you'd normally expect to see an economist present an expert report calculating damages, which would begin (but not end) with any unjust enrichment you experienced because people thought you had the company's endorsement.	Typical in any of the several united-states No, this fails to meet two of the core elements of libel. The statement must be Adverse (fails) Stated by one party To a second party About a third party (fails) The case you're thinking of, where a company brags excessively about their company or products, are covered by a variety of securities and trade laws, such as false advertising. Many of these are applicable in the Federal domain, i.e. are Federal rather than state laws. Edit: Now I see you've changed the question a bit to claiming to be first. Yes, the injured party can sue for that, but they are more claiming false advertising than libel. Accusing someone of not being first-to-market is not a particularly powerful or damning claim. Oreo didn't invent the sandwich cookie nor did Apple invent the computer. So such a claim is really a lot more about the publicity than actual, provable damages; so the controversy is more likely to be aired outside the court system, or in the courts but mainly for the publicity. (an example of the latter being the "Taco Tuesday" trademark-busting action; IIRC Taco Bell even paid the other party's legal fees, despite prevailing.)
Has there been a SCOTUS case which clarified the meaning of the phrase "to promote the progress of science and useful arts"? The US constitution article 1 section 8 gives the Congress an enumerated power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." Generally, this is understood to be the power which allows Congress to create intellectual property laws (supporting copyrights, trademarks, and patents). Has there been a case which clarified what constitutes a "useful art" or "progress of science"? Specifically, this power can easily clash with the 1st amendment prohibition on the restriction of speech and press. So it's not hard to imagine that there would have been some conflicts that the court would have opined on. Has that happened? If so, what's the case? This is not a question about "fair use", by the way. Fair use is an exception to the existing restrictions on intellectual property. This is a question about what type of expression may not be copyrighted at all.	The issue is discussed in quite a few cases, including an in depth discussion in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Official Syllabus of that decision summarizes its analysis: The Copyright and Patent Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science ... by securing [to Authors] for limited Times ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings." In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years: Under the 1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act), copyright protection generally lasted from a work's creation until 50 years after the author's death; under the CTEA, most copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death, 17 U. S. C. § 302(a). As in the case of prior copyright extensions, principally in 1831, 1909, and 1976, Congress provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing and future copyrights alike. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain, brought this suit seeking a determination that the CTEA fails constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Petitioners do not challenge the CTEA's "life-plus-70-years" timespan itself. They maintain that Congress went awry not with respect to newly created works, but in enlarging the term for published works with existing copyrights. The "limited Tim[e]" in effect when a copyright is secured, petitioners urge, becomes the constitutional boundary, a clear line beyond the power of Congress to extend. As to the First Amendment, petitioners contend that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech that fails inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations. The District Court entered judgment on the pleadings for the Attorney General (respondent here), holding that the CTEA does not violate the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" restriction because the CTEA's terms, though longer than the 1976 Act's terms, are still limited, not perpetual, and therefore fit within Congress' discretion. The court also held that there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of others. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. In that court's unanimous view, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, foreclosed petitioners' First Amendment challenge to the CTEA. The appeals court reasoned that copyright does not impermissibly restrict free speech, for it grants the author an exclusive right only to the specific form of expression; it does not shield any idea or fact contained in the copyrighted work, and it allows for "fair use" even of the expression itself. A majority of the court also rejected petitioners' Copyright Clause claim. The court ruled that Circuit precedent precluded petitioners' plea for interpretation of the "limited Times" prescription with a view to the Clause's preambular statement of purpose: "To promote the Progress of Science." The court found nothing in the constitutional text or history to suggest that a term of years for a copyright is not a "limited Tim[e]" if it may later be extended for another "limited Tim[e]." Recounting that the First Congress made the 1790 Copyright Act applicable to existing copyrights arising under state copyright laws, the court held that that construction by contemporaries of the Constitution's formation merited almost conclusive weight under Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 57. As early as McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, the Court of Appeals recognized, this Court made it plain that the Copyright Clause permits Congress to amplify an existing patent's terms. The court added that this Court has been similarly deferential to Congress' judgment regarding copyright. E. g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417. Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress could evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together an unlimited number of "limited Times," the court stated that such legislative misbehavior clearly was not before it. Rather, the court emphasized, the CTEA matched the baseline term for United States copyrights with the European Union term in order to meet contemporary circumstances. Held: In placing existing and future copyrights in parity in the CTEA, Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutionallimitations. Pp. 199-222. The CTEA's extension of existing copyrights does not exceed Congress' power under the Copyright Clause. Pp. 199-218. (a) Guided by text, history, and precedent, this Court cannot agree with petitioners that extending the duration of existing copyrights is categorically beyond Congress' Copyright Clause authority. The case most squarely on point to your question held that a telephone book is not sufficiently original as a constitutional matter to be subject to copyright. It held that originality, for copyright purposes, is constitutionally mandated for all works. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See also: Under the Copyright and Patent Clause, Congress' copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012). Under this clause, Congress, to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation, may guarantee to authors and investors a reward in form of control over sale or commercial use of copies of their books. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). This clause is both grant of power and limitation; this clause is limited to promotion of advances in useful arts. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). The economic philosophy behind this clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is best way to advance public welfare through talents of authors and inventors in Science and useful Arts. Mazer v. Stein , 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The Copyright Act of Congress, R.S. § 4952, as amended by the Act Mar. 3, 1891, c. 565, 26 Stat. 1106, giving to authors the exclusive right to dramatize any of their works, is valid as applied to pantomine dramatization by means of moving picture films. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). This section does not limit the useful to that which satisfies immediate bodily needs, and painting and engraving not intended for a mechanical end are among the useful arts, the progress of which Congress is empowered by this section to promote. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). No authority exists for obtaining a copyright beyond the extent to which Congress has authorized it; a copyright cannot be sustained as a right existing at common law, but depends wholly on the legislation of Congress. Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888). Legislation concerning trademark protection is not authorized by this clause. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). A list of U.S. Supreme Court cases on the issue of copyright at Wikipedia includes many additional copyright cases that don't implicate the U.S. Constitutional language. It is also worth noting that while the U.S. Supreme Court is the final and most authoritative interpreter of the U.S. Constitution, that any court presented with an issue of constitutional interpretation can, and indeed, is duty bound, to interpret the constitutional in a legally authoritative way, which in the case of appellate courts (state and federal) serves as a legal precedent for other cases that "makes law" on the issue.	NOTE: This answer assumes jurisdiction in the US. No. Length does not determine whether or not something is fair use or not. There was a court case (Harper & Row v Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), all credit to Dawn) where it was determined that just a few paragraphs from a 300+ page biography were infringing content, due to them capturing the "heart of the work". As user6726 said, in your example the clips you mentioned are most likely licensed. Also, courts tend to look poorly on things that are simply "shared" claiming fair use against copyright claims. Now, if you were to use a short clip as an example of something you were explaining, teaching, or critiquing, that would be different and would more likely be fair use. It is important to note that there is (by design) not a clear cut line if something is or is not fair use. There is a set of guidelines, but determination is made on a case by case basis There are a couple of cases that it is out and out NOT fair use, but none for fair use. This is because fair use is an affirmative defense, which is to say, you admit to the offense, but claim an exception to the rule. Self-defense as a defense to charges of homocide, assault, etc. works in a similar manner.	In United States law, this distinction has been justified by First Amendment values. See Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). copyright's idea/ expression dichotomy "strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression." No author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates. If copyright protected ideas, it could effectively prohibit the communication of particular thoughts, topics, facts, propositions, etc. By restricting the protection to expression of those ideas, copyright is giving protection to (and incentivizing) the production of a expressive work in the world. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas. However, ideas can be protected by patent. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). The manner of doing something--a process--this is an idea that can be protected by patent.	Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...).	Maybe. It might fall under "fair use", which overrides the general requirement to get permission. The way to find out is to do it, get sued, then try to defend your action by using the fair use defense. If they win in the lawsuit, you can't, if you win, you can. There are four "factors" that have to be "balanced", plus a fifth. The factors are "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes", "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole", "the nature of the copyrighted work" and "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work". The fifth consideration is "transformativeness". W.r.t. purpose of the use, your use would likely be found to be "fair", except for the Youtube monetization problem. The "nature of the copyright work" question is primarily about "artistic works" versus "factual works", so it would depend on what you are taking from. One second might not be substantial, unless that one second is the only reason people pay to watch the copyrighted work. That interacts with the substantiality desideratum: could people get the crucial amusement content of the paid work for free by watching your video? You can read some case law in the links here, and you basically have to get an attorney to analyze your plans to tell you what your risks are.	There is no special exemption where academic work is unprotected by copyright. You can quote from academic sources to the same extent that you can copy from non-academic sources, without getting permission. In fact, it is legally impossible to tell if a source of "academic" versus "non-academic". Attribution is not particularly relevant for copyright, what matters is permission (when required). It may be that a copyright holder will grant permission for an extensive quote provided you attribute the source, and it may be that academic publishers or authors are more willing to grant permission than other publishers / authors. On the other hand, many academic works are very expensive, so that distributing the text for free may have more "effect on market", and may result in disinclination to grant permission to quote. On the third hand, such quotes are more likely to be squarely directed at the "commentary" motivation behind fair use law. The point here is that there isn't a special law about just academic sources.	The Fourteenth Amendment generally requires the states to recognize the same individual rights that the Bill of Rights requires Congress to recognize. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Supreme Court recognized that this includes the First Amendment right to free speech: For present purposes, we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States. We do not regard the incidental statement in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 259 U. S. 543, that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no restrictions on the States concerning freedom of speech, as determinative of this question. There is some debate as to exactly which language in the Fourteenth Amendment makes this happen -- probably the due-process clause, maybe the privileges and immunities clause -- but there isn't any real debate as to the outcome. The executive branch is likewise unable to enforce speech restrictions because all its programs are authorized and funded by Congress. There has been some argument in line with your proposed reading to the contrary, but the courts consistently enforce the First Amendment against the executive branch and even against themselves.	The copyright Act gives copyright owners certain rights: right to reproduce the copyrighted work right to prepare derivative works based upon the work right to distribute copies of the work to the public right to perform the copyrighted work publicly right to display the copyrighted work publicly The audiobook you create from a copyrighted work is a derivative work (perhaps it is a reproduction; for the analysis it does not matter). It works the other way also. A derivative work is a work based on or derived from one or more already existing works. Common derivative works include translations, musical arrangements, motion picture versions of literary material or plays, art reproductions, abridgments, and condensations of preexisting works. It is a violation of the copyright to create derivative works without permission. The commercial nature of the derivative work does not come into play in this situation. Commercial use might be an issue in a fair use defense, but fair use is not applicable based on these facts. Fair use might apply given facts such as: Ten students own copies of the printed work. These students are blind. A teacher reads the book and provides the recording to the students.
Can a prisoner choose not to be autopsied after execution or is it a legal requirement? I'm a writer so I've been trying to do some research for one of my MCs who ends up getting executed but has the ability to come back from the dead, preferably with a body intact so an Autopsy isn't something they'd desire after the execution and would try to deny that procedure from happening in the first place. Some background information that might be necessary: My MC is executed in Tennesse by Lethal injection, in late 2019 under the Federal government (the mc was a former government spy) for the conviction of 4 homicides of other agents, treason and espionage. Now, I have been trying to read and research prior to posting here but it's not all clear as there's a lot of contradictive answers online. Some say it's compulsory, some say that prisoners are able to side-step the autopsy afterwards, which leaves me more questions than answers. Would this be something that they'd be allowed by choice or something that their lawyers could do for them or is it ultimately going to be overruled as a legal requirement for all executed prisoners?	Florida law (§922.11) does provide that The body of the executed person shall be delivered to the medical examiner for an autopsy. After completion of the autopsy, the body shall be prepared for burial and, if requested, released to relatives of the deceased. If a coffin has not been provided by relatives, the body shall be delivered in a plain coffin. If the body is not claimed by relatives, it shall be given to physicians who have requested it for dissection or to be disposed of in the same manner as are bodies of prisoners dying in the state prison. Tennessee, on the other hand, is reported to have honored requests to not autopsy and autopsied only 1 of 6 executed prisoners. The Tennessee law (38-7-106) says that A county medical examiner may perform or order an autopsy on the body of any person in a case involving a homicide, suspected homicide, a suicide, a violent, unnatural or suspicious death, an unexpected apparent natural death in an adult, sudden unexpected infant and child deaths, deaths believed to represent a threat to public health or safety, and executed prisoners. When the county medical examiner decides to order an autopsy, the county medical examiner shall notify the district attorney general and the chief medical examiner. The chief medical examiner or the district attorney general may order an autopsy in such cases on the body of a person in the absence of the county medical examiner or if the county medical examiner has not ordered an autopsy. The district attorney general may order an autopsy in such cases on the body of a person in the absence of the county medical examiner or the failure of the county medical examiner to act. The authority ordering the autopsy shall notify the next of kin about the impending autopsy if the next of kin is known or reasonably ascertainable. The sheriff or other law enforcement agency of the jurisdiction shall serve process containing such notice and return such process within twenty-four (24) hours. The medical examiner has discretion (autopsy is not an obligation). Louisiana law is a little unclear at the statutory level, because The coroner shall either view the body or make an investigation into the cause and manner of death in all cases involving the following... (2) Sudden or violent deaths...(9) Deaths due to drowning, hanging, burns, electrocution, gunshot wounds, stabs or cutting, lightning, starvation, radiation, exposure, alcoholism, addiction, tetanus, strangulation, suffocation, or smothering... (12) Deaths in prison or while serving a sentence. The coroner can discharge that obligation by non-invasive means. Lousiana has a religious-objection provision: If the family of the deceased objects to an autopsy on religious grounds, the autopsy shall not be performed unless the coroner finds that the facts surrounding the death require that an autopsy be performed in the interest of the public safety, public health, or public welfare. In such cases the coroner shall provide the family his written reasons for the necessity of the autopsy. It's hard to see how there could be a public interest reason compelling an autopsy in the case of a governmental execution, but this is fiction. Some states have a law providing for religious exceptions to autopsy. You can make a request in S. Carolina, and here is the law in California (moot for the moment since there are no executions in California). You could try "forum shopping" (changing the state so that you don't get a mandatory autopsy law), but a search of all 50 states is really impractical.	The same thing that happens to everyone else Being declared legally dead does not mean that you are dead; it simply allows your assets to be distributed as if you were. If you turn up alive, you go through a bureaucratic procedure to have the record of your death removed, get a new driver's licence, etc. You usually don't get your assets back. If you happen to commit a crime during this period you get arrested, charged and tried just like everybody else.	(Lots of digging) https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/609.341 The above is a series of definitions for the purposes of criminal statues. Way down (noting that the page notes that this section was amended in 2021, so almost certainly in response to this case, given the amount of attention it has received), as subdivision 22, we have the definition: Subd. 22.Predatory crime. "Predatory crime" means a felony violation of section 609.185 (first-degree murder), 609.19 (second-degree murder), 609.195 (third-degree murder), 609.20 (first-degree manslaughter), 609.205 (second-degree manslaughter), 609.221 (first-degree assault), 609.222 (second-degree assault), 609.223 (third-degree assault), 609.24 (simple robbery), 609.245 (aggravated robbery), 609.25 (kidnapping), 609.255 (false imprisonment), 609.498 (tampering with a witness), 609.561 (first-degree arson), or 609.582, subdivision 1 (first-degree burglary). Thus, it looks like your Minnesota government website is not complete. However, the above seem like the most likely crimes to warrant inclusion on the register. The prominent reason in this instance is the registration will hamper Chauvin from regaining employment as a police officer in Minnesota or any other state. Where I live, there are reports of "problematic officers" being "shuffled" between departments; this would explicitly prevent that.	In the US, Pennsylvania specifically, the court in Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313 says that the law recognizes property in a corpse, but property subject to a trust and limited in its rights to such exercise as shall be in conformity with the duty out of which the rights arise. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307 likewise states in this country it is, so far as we know, universally held that those who are entitled to the possession and custody of it for purposes of decent burial have certain legal rights to and in it, which the law recognizes and will protect. Indeed, the mere fact that a person has exclusive rights over a body for the purposes of burial leads necessarily to the conclusion that it is his property in the broadest and most general sense of that term, viz., something over which the law accords him exclusive control. This is in contrast to the English legal tradition where the church has jurisdiction over a corpse, giving rise to a doctrine that a corpse is not property, citing a dictum from Lord Coke that It is to be observed that in every sepulchre that hath a monument two things are to be considered, viz., the monument, and the sepulture or burial of the dead. The burial of the cadaver that is caro data vermibus is nullius in bonis, and belongs to ecclesiastical cognizance; but as to the monument action is given (as hath been said) at the common law, for defacing thereof. This article provides further analysis and case citations, mostly in the US. The topic of body-ownership is the subject of a book-length analysis (ten Have & Welie, Ownership of the human body). I think, according to this article, that under Islamic law, a body (living or dead) is not property, so an advance directive is not an absolute right.	I'll give you the situation in Washington, which is probably similar to the situation elsewhere. RCW 68.50.130 say that you have to follow the law in disposing of a body. To perform a cremation, you need a license. The regulations established by the Department of Licensing say that cremations take place in a crematory, and the facility must be licensed. We turn to the definition of crematory, which is a building or area of a building that houses one or more cremation chambers, to be used for the cremation of human remains This applies to hydrolysis facilities as well, but not composting facilities (which can simply be "real property").	When a person unlawfully kills someone else they have committed a crime against the state (murder, manslaughter etc.) and a civil wrong (a tort) against the victim (specifically, the tort of wrongful death). The state responds with charging the perpetrator with a crime and attempting to prove that they did the deed "beyond reasonable doubt". If convicted the criminal is "punished" by incarceration or death or a fine or community service etc. The victim (through their estate) or other affected people (family, dependents etc.) can respond by suing the perpetrator for compensation (money) for the damage they caused. If the plaintiff proves their case "on the balance of probabilities" the perpetrator will owe the plaintiffs whatever damages the court awards. There are many crime/tort mirrors (many have the same name): theft and conversion, trespass and trespass, fraud and fraud, kidnapping and false imprisonment etc. Because of the different threshold of proof between criminal and civil liability, it is much easier to win a civil case.	If a defendant has committed a crime, they would choose to self-represent to ensure that no one else would know about the circumstances of their crime. Although lawyers are ethically bound to not disclose information that would not be in the interest of their client, the decision to breach this duty would be up to the sole discretion of the individual in question. In cases where the exchanged information may used to provide evidence against the client, the lawyer is compelled to disclose the truth to the courts/law enforcement. This is deeply misguided. Criminal defense lawyers usually represent people who are guilty and there is no ethical problem with doing so, nor does this mean that the lawyer will disclose privileged information that is prejudicial to the defendant in the course of the representation. The notion that a lawyer would be compelled to testify against his client to the courts/law enforcement is simply not how the system works. It is true that a lawyer cannot ethically put you on the stand to offer testimony when the lawyer knows that your testimony to the court will be an outright flat lie, and that this lie is your strategy to prevail in your defense, but that is the sole meaningful limitation on what a lawyer can do for you. However, I can't think of a single instance, in which a desire to defend yourself at trial with a lie has caused someone to represent themselves. Usually, someone with that kind of motive will simply lie to their lawyer as well. It never makes sense to represent yourself if you are innocent and want to be acquitted of the charges against you. But, keep in mind that this is a small subset of all criminal defendants. Criminal defendants are overwhelmingly guilty of something. Usually, a criminal defense lawyer works to either exploit prosecution mistakes or lack of knowledge that prevent the prosecution from proving that guilt, or work to make sure that the defendant is not convicted of a more serious crime than the one committed, and/or work to see to it that their client does not receive an unnecessarily harsh sentence when alternatives are available. In real life, people represent usually themselves, either because they are denied access to counsel (which can be done in a criminal cases where the prosecutor waives the right to seek incarceration as a sentence), or because they are "crazy". Many people who represent themselves in a criminal cases do so because they want to proudly claim that they committed the crime as a means of obtaining of forum for public recognition of what they believe was righteous action even if this could lead to their death. Many terrorists, domestic and foreign, fall into this category. For example, the fellow committed a massacre at a Colorado abortion clinic tried to do this (if I recall correctly, he was later found incompetent to face a trial and has been committed to a mental institution until he becomes competent, if ever). Other people represent themselves out of a strongly felt guilt that they feel a moral duty to confess to, even if this means that they will face severe punishment for doing so. One subset of this group of people are people known as "death penalty volunteers" who try to get sentenced to death and try to waive all appeals and post-trial review. Sometimes they also plead guilty in the belief (often, but not always, inaccurate) that their swift guilty plea when they aren't actually guilty will protect someone else whom they know to be actually guilty. Other people represent themselves because they have deeply held, but paranoid and inaccurate views about the legal system such as members of the "Sovereign Citizens Movement" who think that if they say the "magic words" that they cannot be convicted and that lawyers are a part of a conspiracy designed to prevent them from doing so. Another situation that comes up is when an affluent person who is not entitled to a public defender as a result, chooses to represent themselves, usually with respect to a fairly minor charge like a traffic violation that carries a risk for a short term of incarceration, to save money. But, this is rarely a wise choice. But, unless you plan on pleading guilty or being found guilty at trial, self-representation does not make sense, and even if you plan on pleading guilty, a lawyer is usually worth it. For example, even if the direct consequence of a guilty plea is minor, the collateral consequences of that conviction (e.g. loss of eligibility to work in certain jobs and/or deportation and/or loss of a right to own a firearm) may be consequential and something that a non-lawyer would not realize was happening. Or, maybe you think you are guilty of crime X so there is no point in fighting the charges, but actually, the language of that statute has been defined in a manner that means you are really only guilty of less serious crime Y.	Police can lie However, in the United States they have to read you your Miranda warning (most other democratic countries have similar warnings): You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time. They have told you everything they are required to tell you - effectively “we are not on your side.” After that, they can lie their asses off. Of course, they wouldn’t ask you for a DNA sample - they’d ask you if you’d like a glass of water. Then they’ll take the DNA from that.
I believe an electric/gas supply company has forged a backdated letter to me. Is there any way I can prove this? Currently engaged in a dispute with a gas/electric supplier and applying something called the "Back Billing Code", referring to the company, by law, only having the right to bill me for the year prior to their first letter to me. This has been going on for months and suddenly out of nowhere, they have produced a digital copy of a letter they sent from years ago that I am certain I never received. It's suspicious because: a. I have never had any problem receiving letters from them or anyone else - reliable postal system here. b. This is the only letter, in a long period of letter drought, that they claim to have sent (despite having sent me several unimpeded letters since this dispute began - why no follow up to the original?) c. It has taken them ages to reproduce this letter after a lot of talk about its existence If I had received this letter none of this would have began in the first place! From my interactions with them I think their ethos would absolutely allow this sort of fraud, but can I do anything about it?	I believe in truth, justice and equality for all What I get is something else. Nobody cares what you believe: what can you prove? And what can they prove? They say they posted you this letter. You say you never received it. If it goes to court they will submit evidence about how their internal letter generation and postal system works, this either will or will not convince the court on the balance of probabilities that the letter was posted. If it does convince the court, you will provide evidence of how you deal with incoming mail and that it never arrived, this will either convince the court that the postal service did or did not deliver the letter to you. Then you’ll know who wins. As to your allegations of fraud: never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by incompetence- theirs, the postal service or yours.	Electric power is a highly regulated industry, and you can probably file a complaint with the Texas Public Utilities Commission. The suggest before you file a complaint, contact them. Rather than calling them on the phone, send them a letter stating why they owe you a refund, and you can add a statement that you expect the refund within 14 days. Also explain your history of trying to get a refund, and you can express the desire to avoid having to file a complaint with the PUC. Send the letter certified, return receipt requested (keep a copy). If for some reason they don't issue the refund, you have the link to the PUC.	Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible.	If someone sends you something that you did not request, that is "unordered merchandise", and under US law, can be treated like a gift meaning that you do not have to return the goods or pay for it. Under the circumstances that you describe, this is not classic unordered merchandise. The vendor simply has to claim (and prove) that you did order the merchandise, which could be done in small claims court. What is unclear at present how any person could, out of the blue, decide to send you the same thing a week later. Innocent error is one possibility (slip-up by either party or some communication error by Ebay), as is fraudulent skullduggery (credit card fraud). The point is that the vendor would have to prove that you did indeed order the goods, so if they want to avoid paying for shipping (if we are still talking about a non-litigious response), they would need to provide compelling proof that you did indeed order the goods. This almost certainly will involve Ebay's tech staff (who would be in the best position to say where the order actually came from). So, yes, you could be sued in small claims court, and it really depends on how strong their proof is that you ordered the goods.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.	The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X.	A text message is just as legally binding as a letter, and the lion's share of the cases have held that a text message from a known sending phone number is equivalent to a signed letter. One would have to carefully parse the exchange of communications to see if they amounted to a binding offer and acceptance, but the fact that it was in a text message, rather than on a piece of paper is irrelevant. Indeed, generally speaking, such an offer and acceptance, if the words exchange show that, could be binding even if made orally, if it could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Procedurally, however, once a judgment has been entered, as is the case here, the process of proving that you have complied with a stipulation regarding what is to constitute payment in full may be challenging. I'll leave the question of civil procedure in Connecticut small claims court to someone more knowledgable about it than I am as that could vary a lot from state to state, or even from court to court based upon local practice within the state.	Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.
European consumer protection law for virtual goods? I've purchased vanity content on two occasions on the game 'League of Legends' - April 6th and April 10th. I have now decided that I want my money returned (a combination of lack of friends any longer playing the game, extremely volatile and childish community, and the company's attitude towards the players). The company is Riot Games. The purchases were made once using Maestro and once using a Visa. The law described here allows me to get a refund within 14 days of the purchase, regardless of a reason. Though there is a clause which makes me unsure if this falls under my category. exceptions include: ... "online digital content, if you have started downloading or streaming it" The digital content does not have any physical form, it is a 'skin', a cosmetic feature that is permanent. It is not 'consumed' or used like a movie or a song would be. Though the attitude Riot Games' are taking is interfering with me enjoying this content. Am I lawfully allowed to demand my money back? The 14 day period ends for the first item on April 20th, and they've already confirmed they received my communication in regards to this. If I'm successful in retrieving my money, my game account will be disabled - I am ok with this. Can they fight my demand? Am I correct in this situation?	I think the law there is quite clear - you have 14 days to return the goods for a full refund, except for digital content, which you can't return once you started downloading it. That's what it says. The arguments that you try to give were quite obvious to the law makers. I think you can assume they were aware that "digital content does not have a physical form". Now if you purchased, but haven't downloaded or started downloading yet, then obviously you can get your money back. You came up with some theory that this is a "visual vanity item". You can't see it unless you download it. Once you download it, that's it. If you don't download it, you can return it. Let me repeat this: Your fancy analogies mean nothing. There are in the EU laws about being allowed to return goods for a refund. There's the general rule for buying in a store (no right other what the store offers voluntarily), online purchases (some days to return), and online purchases of digital goods (no return once you started downloading). That's the law. Your attempts at redefining the situation are totally pointless. The law says what it says. What you try to redefine doesn't mean one thing. The law clearly distinguishes several situations, and analogies don't count. What happens counts. You bought from a digital item from an online store that needs to be downloaded. And as soon as you start downloading, there is your right to return it gone. And your reasons for wanting to return the goods are completely irrelevant. You don't need any reasons, and having reasons doesn't help you.	To answer this based on contract law, one would have to know where the company is located, where you are located, and what the terms of use specify regarding jurisdiction and possible mandatory arbitration. Next, you write that you have "all the proof" that your account was "broken into." Proof in a legal sense? I think you would be writing things differently if you had as court judgement in this regard. And how did it happen? In my experience, there are several scenarios: You were tricked into revealing your credentials, or your own computer was compromised to gain your credentials, or you re-used the same credentials on different systems and one of those was compromised. The most likely scenario by far. There was a security breach on the site of the game company, either revealing your credentials or allowing direct access. There was an accidental software bug on the site of the game company which affected your inventory. There was a deliberate software change on the site of the game company which affected your inventory, e.g. to improve play balance. The latter three options are all possible, but the first option happens much more frequently. And from the viewpoint of the company, this is indistinguishable from you acting foolishly and losing it. The thief would have been acting with your credentials, after all. And that is where the term you quote comes in. The company is in a contractual relationship with their customers, so they cannot disclaim all responsibility for everything that happens through their terms of service. In some jurisdictions, sneaking an illegal clause into the boilerplate terms of service weakens the legal force of the whole document, so they make this sort of disclaimer. But if lost things could be restored too easily, the thrill would go out of ownership.	They must give you a refund By saying they don't give refunds that are required by law they are engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct which will expose them to some serious fines. Report them to the relevant Italian authority. Presumably, you paid for this service with a credit/debit card. Contact your card provider and dispute the transaction - they will put the money back in your account and that will probably the last you hear of this company.	This a bit dubious. You write "I know you can make a digital copy of a book or CD you own." but that is true only under limited circumstances. Making such a copy for one's own personal use would likely be fair use (in the US). Selling copies would pretty clearly be copyright infringement. Giving away free copies to significant numbers of people would also be infringement. Temporarily lending copies ro a small number of people might be considered fair use or might not. For the board game, you could allow others to play with the copy you own in person. But COVID makes that unsafe. Assuming the game art is under copyright protection (some older games might have protection expired) selling such images or making them widely available would clearly be infringement. Making them available only during the course of play to a limited group, with technical measures to prevent or discourage copying and no fee charged might pass as fair use, and the game company might well not want to pursue the matter in any case. If you create new art which can be used for the same game, it would be somewhat less likely to be considered infringing/ Even then selling access would probably be trademark infringement, and perhaps infringe the copyright on the rules of the game. There would be legal risk in doing this sort of thing.	There are several things going on with Akinator and their use of trademarked names and characters. If you look at akinator.com Legal Notices it says: 2 – Copyright – Reproduction rights All the content of this site falls under French and international legislation on copyright and intellectual property. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part of this website, in any form or by any means is strictly prohibited without prior authorisation of the publications director. All products and trademarks mentioned are property of their respective owners. (emphasis mine) The fact that they mention that all trademarks belong to their respective owners is good, but it's a formality. What it appears the site really relies on for use of trademarked characters is what's called Nominative Use, which is a type of "trademark fair use." The product or service cannot be readily identified without using the trademark (e.g. trademark is descriptive of a person, place, or product attribute). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominative_use Akinator has to use the names and trademarks to identify those names and trademarks. Akinator could possibly be sued to establish their type of fair use is not valid in their case, but it's probably not worth it for the companies to pursue. And, most companies would rather people use and see their trademarks in a marketing and money-making fair use sense rather than sue to stop their use. See In the US, when is fair use a defense to copyright infringement? for a full description of Fair Use. Now, when you get to the "answer" part of the game, you will see a "copyright" link. Part of that resulting page says Displayed pictures are accessible from the web. It is Elokence's policy to respond to notices of alleged copyright infringement that comply with applicable international intellectual property law and make the necessary changes. In respect of Elokence's Intellectual Property Policy, Elokence operates a complaints procedure accessible via the form below. So the company has given itself a further bit of protection by only using images on the web they can link to (at least in the web browser game; I don't know about the App), so that means the image is already "out there", uploaded by someone else, and Akinator can claim they didn't upload it. And, further, there is a contact form for trademark holders to send DMCA takedown notices for their work. It's a belt and suspenders approach to the use of trademarks in their game.	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".	Makerbot's explanation of the Terms is accurate This is comparable with most other services that host and display User-created content - even with SaaS providers, as per Interpretation of content ownership/usage in service provider agreement. They are correct that they are asking for the lots of broad rights, but it's all qualified with (my emphasis): 3.2 License. You hereby grant, and you represent and warrant that you have the right to grant, to the Company and its affiliates and partners, an irrevocable, nonexclusive, royalty-free and fully paid, worldwide license to reproduce, distribute, publicly display and perform, prepare derivative works of, incorporate into other works, and otherwise use your User Content, and to grant sublicenses of the foregoing, solely for the purposes of including your User Content in the Site and Services. That is, if they use your User Content for a purpose other than including it in the Site and Services (and you have not agreed to this use), you may be entitled to relief in the form of an injunction or damages.	Your terms and conditions must comply with the laws in: Your jurisdiction (California) Your customer's jurisdiction (each of the US states, Canadian provinces and ultimately countries and sub-jurisdictions in Europe) If they do they will generally be enforceable; if they don't then they will not be enforceable and you may be exposing yourself to civil and criminal sanctions. While not immediately relevant to you, Australian Consumer Law has such sanctions to goods sold into Australia from anywhere in the world; I am not familiar with other jurisdictions. With respect to your comment that you will not accept returns or refunds, this would expose you to potential fines in Australia of $220,000 for an individual or $1,100,000 for a corporation - under Australian Consumer Law returns and refunds are a consumer right. I strongly suspect that most of the jurisdictions you are selling into would take a similar position. A general "catch-all" like "to the extent permitted by law" may reduce the risk of being prosecuted but it would not eliminate it entirely. Again, in Australia, the provision is that you must not engage in deceptive and misleading conduct - merely suggesting that you will not give a refund even with the limitation above - may still be deemed "deceptive and misleading" if the court feels that a reasonable consumer might assume that they are not entitled to a refund. You need professional legal advice on this.
Verifying LEO status online Is it possible to verify (online) if a Florida neighbor is an active Law enforcement officer? Is there a single agency in which all Florida LEO must register? The neighbor claims to be a law enforcement officer, however, history indicates that one can not take him at his word.	Try the phone or email contacts at Florida Department of Law Enforcement - Home. The state of Florida doesn't appear to maintain a statewide officer registry, but that department should be able to verify someone is or isn't a officer in conjunction with the police department closest to your location. If this neighbor is threatening or attempting to enforce the law while not showing ID that proves he/she is an officer, that's serious, and you should call the local police department. Talking about being a LEO while drinking beer at a BBQ is less serious, but still could be a third degree felony. See Statutes & Constitution - Florida State Statutes: 843.08 False personation.—A person who falsely assumes or pretends to be a firefighter, sheriff, officer of the Florida Highway Patrol, officer of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, fire or arson investigator of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Corrections, correctional probation officer, deputy sheriff, state attorney or assistant state attorney, statewide prosecutor or assistant statewide prosecutor, state attorney investigator, coroner, police officer, lottery special agent or lottery investigator, beverage enforcement agent, or watchman, or any member of the Florida Commission on Offender Review and any administrative aide or supervisor employed by the commission, or any personnel or representative of the Department of Law Enforcement, or a federal law enforcement officer as defined in s. 901.1505, and takes upon himself or herself to act as such, or to require any other person to aid or assist him or her in a matter pertaining to the duty of any such officer, commits a felony of the third degree,	You are not obliged to say anything to a police officer during a traffic stop, in fact you are generally better off staying silent. This is your Fifth Amendment right to silence. The only exception to this is that the officer could ask for your name and you are obliged to give it under Arizona Laws 13-2412, but the answer to that is language-independent and is usually already answered with your driver's license in a traffic stop. If you did choose to communicate only in German, this may have the effect of frustrating the officer's investigation but if you only make truthful statements in German it is unlikely to be obstruction of their investigation. Arizona Laws 13-2409 is I believe the relevant section (emphasis mine): A person who knowingly attempts by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation or force or threats of force to obstruct, delay or prevent the communication of information or testimony relating to a violation of any criminal statute to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury or who knowingly injures another in his person or property on account of the giving by the latter or by any other person of any such information or testimony to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury is guilty of a class 5 felony, except that it is a class 3 felony if the person commits the offense with the intent to promote, further or assist a criminal street gang. In general, a law that required you to give answers to a police officer during an investigation in English if you understand English and have waived your right to silence would violate your First Amendment right to free speech (as it is in effect "forced speech"). However, you would need to be careful not to tell the police officer that you do not understand English if that is not true, as it could be misrepresentation. Police officer training likely includes instructions for detaining someone that cannot understand them and the police can detain you and wait for an interpreter to continue their investigation if they determine that is necessary. You may actually be shooting yourself in the foot by doing this, because the time it takes for them to get an interpreter likely extends the amount of time the detainment can last while remaining "reasonable," so you may be waiting by the side of the road longer than you would have if you had simply told the officer that you were invoking your right to silence and followed the officer's instructions without speaking. As an aside, as more people are educated on their rights via the Internet and understand why they should always invoke their right to silence when detained, police officers will get more used to people they pull over immediately and politely telling them that they are going to invoke their right to silence. I doubt most police officers will hold it against you as long as you are otherwise cooperative and don't yell at them or berate them.	The answer by @A.fm. isn't wrong, but it also is unduly optimistic. In my experience, in real life, people are more likely to lie when they are under oath than when they are not under oath, and law enforcement officers tend to be particularly good at lying on the stand because they testify frequently in court cases. In almost all places in the United States (and most foreign jurisdictions), in a pure battle of credibility in the eyes of a judge or jury between a law enforcement officer and an individual citizen charged with a crime, the law enforcement officer's account is going to be found to be more credible (beyond a reasonable doubt) about 90% of the time or more, unless you have a majority-minority jury or an outlier extremely liberal judge or the law enforcement officer has a personal involvement in the case (e.g. it involves a family member of the officer). The likelihood that it will be resolved one way or the other does depend significantly on race and social class, however. The credibility imbalance is still great and favors law enforcement, but not as extreme, when it is between an unrelated third-party witness and a law enforcement officer. In the absence of hard evidence or a law enforcement insider witness willing to testify in your favor, it is almost impossible to win a credibility contest in a case like the ones you suggest. One important step an attorney can take, however, is to seek discovery on any prior instance in which the testifying officer has been disciplined for untruthfulness or had his testimony in court found to be untruthful. This will usually be fruitless, but levels the playing field to closer to 50-50 if you get lucky and received such evidence. Such a request also provides a means of collateral attack on a conviction if the law enforcement officer has a history of untruthfulness that wasn't disclosed by the prosecution after such a request is made by a defense lawyer. So, what does protect you? Mostly the desire of the bosses of law enforcement officers (who are ultimately politicians, mostly local politicians in the United States) to see the law enforced in a non-corrupt manner and the fear of a law enforcement officer that he or she might be found to have lied using physical evidence unknown to him at the time (like a secret recording of an interaction). Law enforcement officers usually don't have much to gain from lying (although this equation changes a law when police department can receive assets seized in civil forfeitures that they are involved in) and usually they want people who are "bad guys" to be in jail to protect "good guys" although they aren't always very concerned about the means by which they achieve these ends. Of course, "usually" is a weasel word here and there are many exceptions that crop up in real life (e.g. when police have engaged in misconduct and want to protect themselves from the consequences of that misconduct). The other obvious solution (so common that in certain eras of U.S. history there were travel guides targeted at African-American motorists to help they carry out this approach) is to avoid places with police who have historically been corrupt. The United States has a uniquely bottom heavy law enforcement structure. Something on the order of 95% of law enforcement officers are employed by local governments or are otherwise tightly constricted geographically (e.g. rangers in national or state parks). And, even the small number of state law enforcement officers are heavily concentrated doing traffic enforcement on major state and federal highways. Similarly, lots of federal law enforcement agencies are broken up into geographic divisions some of which are known to be more corrupt than others (e.g. there is more corruption in the border patrol on parts of the border with Mexico than on most of the border with Canada). So, if you want to avoid the risk of encountering bad cops, stay away from places that are known to have bad cops. The solution may seem like a "cop out" (sorry, pun intended), but it is actually a pretty unique feature of the American law enforcement system. Most countries (e.g. the U.K., South Korea, Russia, Japan, Spain, Mexico, France) have a much more centralized law enforcement bureaucracy, which is fine when the people are the top are scrupulously non-corrupt, but which also makes it much easier for the rot of corruption to become geographically widespread and hence unavoidable from the point of view of an individual citizen. In contrast, in the U.S., even in the most corrupt of times (e.g. the Prohibition era), there are almost always many jurisdictions where law enforcement is not corrupt and corrupting the entirely system is much more difficult than in most countries.	Assuming that all of these locations are in the same state, this is not an issue of federal law and is not governed by the U.S. Constitution. The geographical jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement officers is exclusively a matter of state law and has no single correct resolution. Different states handle the issue differently. Even if state law or the state constitution prohibited the arrest, this violation of state law or the state constitution, would not give rise to a federal claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which may vindicate only federal rights, and could not form a basis for a collateral attack on a state court conviction in a federal court habeas corpus petition which is likewise limited to vindications of federal law rights. Any remedy would have to be secured in the state court system invoking state law rights (assuming for sake of argument that state law provides such a remedy), or in a diversity lawsuit in federal court applying state substantive law, if the defendant was from another state and the amount in controversy was in excess of $75,000.	An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all?	We need to assume that the stop was legal (not a high hurdle to clear), that is, there was some reason to stop you. Even so, following Utah v. Strieff, police don't actually have to have a reasonable suspicion to stop you and if in the course of an ID check they discover that you have a warrant out for your arrest, the arrest is still legal. So if the police stop you, RCW 46.61.020(1) says: It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person to refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer or to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his or her certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his or her insurance identification card, or his or her vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof or to refuse to permit the examination of any equipment of such vehicle or the weighing of such vehicle or to refuse or neglect to produce the certificate of license registration of such vehicle, insurance card, or his or her vehicle driver's license when requested by any court. Any police officer shall on request produce evidence of his or her authorization as such. There is no law that says "you have to provide ID only if accused of a crime", or "police can pull you over only if you are suspected of a crime". Various traffic infractions will get you pulled over but are not crimes; random sobriety checks are legal. However, note that the requirement to provide ID applies to the operator. There is no law requiring citizens to carry identification papers (but there is a law requiring a vehicle operator to carry a specific form of ID). In some states there are "stop and identify" laws which allow police to demand ID from a person suspected of a crime, but Washington does not have such a law.	Neighbors(including us) around the property started to mow the part in front of their yard(the weeds grew very high) and continue to do so(is it illegal for us to mow this overgrown land?). There are probably city codes around maintenance of lawns, cutting grass and clearing weeds. You should alert the relevant authorities and they will make sure that the maintenance occurs. You should probably not do it yourself since (a) you don't owe the owner any favors and (b) you might cause trouble for yourself. Recently there was some mowing by large tractors but very little was cut and most of it grew back. The question is really whether their activities bring them into compliance with applicable city codes or not. If they are compliant and you simply don't like how they maintain their property, that is tough luck. If they are not compliant, you are well within your rights to vigorously report them to relevant code enforcement authorities. This overgrown golf course is home to many wild animals(coyotes, snakes, foxes, alligators, etc..) See above 1) Is there any legal action that we can take to force the land owner to maintain the land? See above 2) Could this land somehow under some law be divided and given to the maintainers. This is an interesting question. Technically there are circumstances wherein you could take what's called adverse possession of part or all of the property. This would probably include doing things like actually residing on some piece of that land and establishing a residence there - perhaps getting mail or paying taxes there or paying utilities or operating a business - for a certain period of time without any interference from the technical owner. If you can meet the requirements of adverse possession then you might be able to become a legal owner. Unless you have little to lose, however, actually doing it might be difficult. 3) Is it legal to walk/drive on this land. (I see people walking their dogs, and driving atv's and motor bikes on the golf course) Unless you have been given notice otherwise, it is perfectly legal to walk wherever you like. It is the owner's responsibility to provide reasonable notice and take reasonable precautions against unwanted trespass; e.g., putting up a wall or fence, closing and/or locking a door or gate, posting signs and/or hiring security to patrol the property and enforce property rights - or occasionally checking to make sure their property isn't overrun with squatters.	In most states you are required to pull over to the side of the road and come to a stop for any vehicle displaying flashing red and/or blue lights, whether oncoming or overtaking. If you don't you are guilty of a moving violation.1 If the vehicle with the lights then pulls in behind you the same law forbids you from moving your vehicle. So that's the law for being pulled over by an unmarked car. If you are concerned that you were stopped in this manner by someone not authorized to do so (police impersonators have been known to do this) you should call 911 and get the dispatcher to confirm whether the apparent emergency vehicle is legitimate. In general, if you fear for your safety, you can stay in your car and ask to be escorted to a known police station before exposing yourself. E.g., here's the advice of one Ohio State Highway Patrolman: If the area where you stop looks desolate, Miller said you don't have to stop there. In fact, he said, "Proceed to that well lit area or a public building, the fire department, hospital." [B]efore you even stop, if you don't feel safe, "Use your cell phone to dial 9-1-1 and talk to the dispatcher, let her know what's going on, give your location and have her guide you as to what she wants you to do." There are some jurisdictions that restrict the use of "unmarked" cars by police.
Getting the neighbor kids off my lawn? We've had 4 sets of neighbors kids grow up around us with no issue. Nice kids, nice parents, etc. The latest family has two young boys who like to camp out on my lawn and in my garden. I'm aware of the law regarding an attractive nuisance, the need to secure a pool or treehouse etc. In this case, the kids aren't the issue. The parent has been known to be litigious, and I'd like to protect myself in advance from getting sued for something nonsensical, like his son running where he shouldn't and hurting himself. Like any New England property there are small decorative retaining walls as well as large granite stones serving that function. Short of fencing in the entire perimeter of my land, is there any preemptive legal thing to do? Basically saying "Look, you kids are running all over my property. I've warned them that thy can get hurt falling on a rock or wall. Now, you are warned as well. Please remind your children to play in their own yard." If nothing like this, how to handle this situation?	I would serve the parents (certified mail), with a "cease and desist" letter, telling them that the children are repeatedly trespassing on your property and that you want them to stop; even get the police involved if you have to. I know it sounds harsh, but you said New England; that's where I live and I know the trespass laws are not in your favor ... especially when it comes to kids. Take Connecticut as an example: This is their law on trespass and kids (not just attractive nuisance!): A possessor of land owes each person who enters his land a certain duty of care based on the person's status. The legal significance is that a possessor of land has the duty to an invitee to inspect the premises for hidden defects and to repair or erect safeguards, if necessary, to make the premises reasonably safe. He has no duty to inspect or to repair or erect safeguards for licensees. But he is liable if he knows of a condition, realizes it involves unreasonable risk, has reason to believe the licensee will not discover it, and he permits the licensee to enter or remain without warning or making the condition reasonably safe. Generally, an owner owes trespassers no duty of care because he has no reason to expect them to be on his property. Therefore, he does not have to warn or protect them from potentially harmful conditions on the property. However, an exception applies if a property owner knows, or has reason to anticipate, that children will trespass on his land. In this case, a special duty arises and the owner must take steps to protect children from any of the property's dangerous conditions. The post you just made indicates even you think that the rock walls, or other "normal garden features" could be dangerous; and they can be! The law requires that you take reasonable steps to eliminate the condition or by otherwise keeping children away from it. DUTY OWED TO TRESPASSER In Connecticut, the following rules apply to a possessor of land with respect to a trespasser. He may not intentionally harm the trespasser or lay a trap for him. The trespasser is entitled to due care after his presence is actually known. There is no duty owed regarding the condition of the premises. The possessor of land has no duty to trespassers if he is engaged in a dangerous activity until the person's presence is know. The possessor of land has no duty to warn trespassers of dangerous hidden conditions (Conn. Law of Torts, § 47). Duty Owed to Trespassing Children Connecticut's appellate courts have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts rule regarding the duty of a property owner to trespassing children (Duggan v. Esposito, 178 Conn. 156 (1979), Neal v. Shiels, Inc., 166 Conn. 3 (1974), Greene v. DiFazio, 148 Conn. 419 (1961), Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110 (1937), Yeske v. Avon Old Farms School, Inc., 1 Conn. App. 195 (1984)). Under this rule, if an owner knows or has reason to know that children will be on his property, he has the duty to protect them from injury by either fixing the harmful condition or ensuring that the children will not have access to that part of the property. The rule states that a possessor of land is liable for harm to trespassing children caused by an artificial condition on the land if (1) the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass in that place, (2) the condition is one the possessor knows or has reason to know and should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to children, (3) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk, (4) the utility of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight compared with the risk to children involved, and (5) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise protect children (Restatement (Second), 2 Torts 339). Put in the letter that you are disclaiming any liability for injury to them that may occur on your property, and make them aware of all the ways they could be injured – so they've been informed. You don't have a duty to remove rock walls because unsupervised kids jump off them. They are not invitees, they are trespassers. So make it known you do not want them on the land and for any further breach you will call the police. Because otherwise you could be responsible. Using CT again as an example, you could include the legal statute about trespass in your notice: Trespass Crimes and Infractions A person commits first degree criminal trespass when (1) he enters or remains in a building or any other premises after the owner or an authorized person personally communicates an order to leave or not enter and (2) he knows that he is not licensed or privileged to be there. This crime also applies to entering or remaining at a place in violation of a retraining or protective order. This is a class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison, a fine of up to $2,000, or both (CGS § 53a-107). A person commits second degree criminal trespass when he enters or remains in a building knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so. This is a class B misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in prison, a fine of up to $1,000, or both (CGS § 53a-108). A person commits third degree criminal trespass when, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any premises for hunting, trapping, or fishing or enters or remains in premises that are posted in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders or that are fenced or enclosed to exclude intruders. This also applies to state lands near state institutions. This is a class C misdemeanor punishable by up to three months in prison, a fine of up to $500, or both (CGS § 53a-109). It is a defense to these crimes if (1) the building was abandoned, (2) the premises at the time of entry were open to the public and the person complied with all lawful conditions on access and remaining on the premises, or (3) the person reasonably believed that the owner (or someone else with the power to do so) would have or did license him to enter or remain on the premises (CGS § 53a-110). A person commits simple trespass if, knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters premises without intent to harm any property. This is an infraction punishable by a fine, currently $77 plus costs and fees if paid by mail (CGS § 53a-110a). A separate infraction covers trespass on railroad property when a person enters or remains on the property without lawful authority or consent of the railroad carrier. This is currently a $121 fine plus costs and fees if paid by mail (CGS § 53a-110d). You could just substitute your state's laws if you're in MA, or RI, or wherever. You could have a lawyer draft this letter for probably $200 (free if you have a friend who practices :~) and that will really scare them. Tell them they will be liable for any damage the kids cause/or may cause to your property. But without doubt, put them on notice!	Probably not It’s extremely likely that the adjoining properties have easements for support over the land which gives them the right to build on it. Even if they don’t, he can’t damage their property by removing the essential structures on his land. He could sue for trespass which his neighbors could easily settle by offering to compensate him for his loss - the $50 the land is worth.	There is no general rule about ownership: one parking lot I know is owned by the city, another is owned by the company that operates the mall, and in a third case it is owned by a third party who doesn't operate the mall. Either way, the owner of the parking lot has the property right to limit how it is used, and their agents (security guards, for example) can request that you refrain from skateboarding. They can evict you; they may not have the legal authority to physically toss you off the property, but they can probably perform a citizen's arrest for trespassing. None of this depends on how many cars are in the parking lot. It is more likely that a governmentally-owned parking lot will have a corresponding law restricting its use (whereas in the case of a private parking lot, restrictions center around general property law and the law of trespass).	I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.	In some states there is a law know as Caylee's Law, for example Connecticut General Statutes 53-21a(d) which requires reporting a child's disappearance: Any parent, guardian or person having custody or control, or providing supervision, of any child under the age of twelve years who knowingly fails to report the disappearance of such child to an appropriate law enforcement agency shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. For the purposes of this subsection, “disappearance of such child” means that the parent, guardian or person does not know the location of the child and has not had contact with the child for a twenty-four-hour period. Assume that they have done as the law requires, i.e. reporting the disappearance. It could be a crime for the parents to fake the kid's death, depending on what you did to "fake" the death. They might legally do things that could lead a person to think the child died; but telling the police, in the course of an investigation, that the child died in an accident, would be a crime. The parents would not have to convince the school district of anything, though someone at the school might alert the authorities that the child was gone (but they would know that anyway). They might well have to convince the police of something (i.e. that they didn't kill the child). It would certainly be a felony to lie to the IRS (i.e. claim the child as a dependent). It would also be a crime to continue to receive welfare payments or other benefits based on the fact of having a child.	"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.	Finding S seems to be hard and I have not much hope, if her siblings cannot provide any information. I think the "inhabitants registry" (Einwohnermeldeamt) is not allowed to give you her first address in Spain ("Zuzugsanschrift im Ausland") (§§ 44 and 45 Bundesmeldegesetz (BMG)). The best option I see is a court auction (Zwangsversteigerung), more precise a "Teilungsversteigerung". If one of S's siblings want money for the land, he can ask for a court auction at the local court (Amtsgericht). The court will get S's first address in Spain (§ 34 BMG) and if it cannot deliver its letter to S, there will be a "public delivery" (öffentliche Zustellung) through a posting in court. It would take a while, but in the end the land could be yours. Be prepared that the cost for the court auction will be much higher than the 1000€. If you plan to take this way, ask a lawyer for detailed advice. Also you need one of S's siblings to participate in the process. If the trees are really a danger for your house, the heirs could also have an obligation to remove them. Maybe this could help you too.	No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.
HOA building a Community pool which I don’t want I’ve lived in my neighborhood for 9 years And pay HOA dues I have a pool The HOA is now wanting to build a Community pool and raise our fees. I would not have built here if they had had a Community pool because I planned my own pool. Can they make me pay for a pool I will never use. Or do they have to let me opt out because pool dues were not in my Original restrictions and fees	This is the problem with democracy Sometimes you lose the vote and have to do things you don't want.	Very likely. You may own your parking space, but when you bought your condo you also signed a contract agreeing to abide by the rules of the condo association. Condo associations typically have rules that all cars parked on the property must be registered with the association. If you didn't register your friend's car with the association, they have no way of known that it isn't some random person trespassing to score free parking. Some associations may have additional rules limiting parking to residents of the building. Get in touch with your association and find out what the rules are. You should have been given a copy of the association rules when you closed on the purchase of the condo.	Shouldn't the village compensate me or him for allowing the sale with wrong measurement or for changing the rule? No. It is very common for local governments to make changes to zoning ordinances, building codes, etc, that have the effect of restricting the way that property can be used. In most cases this is not considered to be a "taking" for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, even if it reduces the value of the property, and the government does not have to compensate the property owner. See for instance Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Roughly speaking, the Takings Clause only applies if the regulations are so restrictive that the land cannot really be used at all. Here you are still perfectly able to use the existing house, and it sounds like you can even build an addition - you just can't build in the exact way that you want. You'll either need to design your addition to comply with the current setback rules, or see if you can get the village to approve a variance.	Here is a document from the city, which says p. 16 that Oakland does not have an Ordinance or Regulation restricting the amount of rent a master tenant charges a subtenant. This assumes that subletting is not prohibited by the lease.	Short Answer Does statute prescribe algorithm for calculating quorum? No, but it does provide a default and minimum quorum for board meetings (indirectly through a non-condo statute), which is sufficient to resolve the questions asked for a five member board, in most cases, although the bylaws could set a higher quorum than the minimum or default requirement which are the same in this case. A Florida HOA must be either a for profit corporation or a non-profit corporation. Either way, in all three cases, three members constitutes the minimum quorum for the Board. Presence could be virtual (e.g. by Zoom or Conference Call) rather than in person, and in some case, proxy voting is allowed under very specific limitations and circumstances not discussed at length below. A majority of those present, when there is quorum, must vote in favor to pass an action, unless the bylaws or declarations or other law provides otherwise with respect to a specific vote. When four or five people are present, that means three votes in favor. When three people are present, that means two votes in favor. There are provisions for a board lacking a quorum to fill vacancies prior to a unit member's election if the bylaws do not forbid this, or to have a court appoint a receiver if no quorum can be secured until one is secured. Long Answer There are specific mandatory provisions in F.S. 718.112(2) for bylaws, and HOAs are required to be formed under the Florida For Profit Corporation or Florida Non-Profit Corporation Statutes both of which have default quorum provisions in the bylaws do not so provide under F..S. 718.111(1). The default rule for members meetings is F.S. 718.112(2)(b)(1) which provides that: (b) Quorum; voting requirements; proxies.— 1. Unless a lower number is provided in the bylaws, the percentage of voting interests required to constitute a quorum at a meeting of the members is a majority of the voting interests. Unless otherwise provided in this chapter or in the declaration, articles of incorporation, or bylaws, and except as provided in subparagraph (d)4., decisions shall be made by a majority of the voting interests represented at a meeting at which a quorum is present. . . . 4. A member of the board of administration or a committee may submit in writing his or her agreement or disagreement with any action taken at a meeting that the member did not attend. This agreement or disagreement may not be used as a vote for or against the action taken or to create a quorum. 5. A board or committee member’s participation in a meeting via telephone, real-time videoconferencing, or similar real-time electronic or video communication counts toward a quorum, and such member may vote as if physically present. A speaker must be used so that the conversation of such members may be heard by the board or committee members attending in person as well as by any unit owners present at a meeting. Proxies where permitted by statute, however, may be used to meet a quorum. The provision of board meetings is mostly at F.S. 718.112(2)(c) which provides in pertinent part: (c) Board of administration meetings.—Meetings of the board of administration at which a quorum of the members is present are open to all unit owners. Members of the board of administration may use e-mail as a means of communication but may not cast a vote on an association matter via e-mail. A unit owner may tape record or videotape the meetings. The right to attend such meetings includes the right to speak at such meetings with reference to all designated agenda items. The division shall adopt reasonable rules governing the tape recording and videotaping of the meeting. The association may adopt written reasonable rules governing the frequency, duration, and manner of unit owner statements. And goes on to discuss proxy voting. Voting rights also have to be discussed in the Declarations which may or may not cover a director quorum. Board vacancies are discussed at length in F.S. 718.112(2)(d). Vacancies may be filled by existing board members without a quorum until the next unit owner's meeting unless the bylaws provide otherwise. 9. Unless otherwise provided in the bylaws, any vacancy occurring on the board before the expiration of a term may be filled by the affirmative vote of the majority of the remaining directors, even if the remaining directors constitute less than a quorum, or by the sole remaining director. In the alternative, a board may hold an election to fill the vacancy, in which case the election procedures must conform to sub-subparagraph 4.a. unless the association governs 10 units or fewer and has opted out of the statutory election process, in which case the bylaws of the association control. Unless otherwise provided in the bylaws, a board member appointed or elected under this section shall fill the vacancy for the unexpired term of the seat being filled. Filling vacancies created by recall is governed by paragraph (j) and rules adopted by the division. 10. This chapter does not limit the use of general or limited proxies, require the use of general or limited proxies, or require the use of a written ballot or voting machine for any agenda item or election at any meeting of a timeshare condominium association or nonresidential condominium association. Notwithstanding subparagraph (b)2. and sub-subparagraph 4.a., an association of 10 or fewer units may, by affirmative vote of a majority of the total voting interests, provide for different voting and election procedures in its bylaws, which may be by a proxy specifically delineating the different voting and election procedures. The different voting and election procedures may provide for elections to be conducted by limited or general proxy. Also pertinent is this section: 718.1124 Failure to fill vacancies on board of administration sufficient to constitute a quorum; appointment of receiver upon petition of unit owner.— (1) If an association fails to fill vacancies on the board of administration sufficient to constitute a quorum in accordance with the bylaws, any unit owner may give notice of his or her intent to apply to the circuit court within whose jurisdiction the condominium lies for the appointment of a receiver to manage the affairs of the association. The Florida Non-Profit Corporation Act provides the default rules for quorum in non-profits which are by far the most common way to organize an HOA. It states in pertinent part that: 617.0824 Quorum and voting.— (1) Unless the articles of incorporation or the bylaws require a different number, a quorum of a board of directors consists of a majority of the number of directors prescribed by the articles of incorporation or the bylaws. Directors younger than 18 years of age may not be counted toward a quorum. (2) The articles of incorporation may authorize a quorum of a board of directors to consist of less than a majority but no fewer than one-third of the prescribed number of directors determined under the articles of incorporation or the bylaws. (3) If a quorum is present when a vote is taken, the affirmative vote of a majority of directors present is the act of the board of directors unless the articles of incorporation or the bylaws require the vote of a greater number of directors. (4) A director of a corporation who is present at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee of the board of directors when corporate action is taken is deemed to have assented to the action taken unless: (a) The director objects, at the beginning of the meeting or promptly upon his or her arrival, to holding the meeting or transacting specified affairs at the meeting; or (b) The director votes against or abstains from the action taken. So, in the usual case, a five member board has a quorum of at least three members since it cannot be less than one-third under state law if it is a non-profit rather than a for profit HOA. This would seem to be true even if there are vacancies since the "prescribed" size of the board is still five members. The same rule applies in for profit Florida corporations. Many bylaws incorporate by reference, Robert's Rules of Order Revised which provides for quorum in Section 64 which states (in pertinent part), which reaches the same conclusion: A Quorum of an assembly is such a number as must be present in order that business can be legally transacted. The quorum refers to the number present, not to the number voting. The quorum of a mass meeting is the number present at the time, as they constitute the membership at that time. The quorum of a body of delegates, unless the by-laws provide for a smaller quorum, is a majority of the number enrolled as attending the convention, not those appointed. The quorum of any other deliberative assembly with an enrolled membership (unless the by-laws provide for a smaller quorum) is a majority of all the members. In the case, however, of a society, like many religious ones, where there are no annual dues, and where membership is for life (unless it is transferred or the names are struck from the roll by a vote of the society) the register of members is not reliable as a list of the bona fide members of the society, and in many such societies it would be impossible to have present at a business meeting a majority of those enrolled as members. Where such societies have no by-law establishing a quorum, the quorum consists of those who attend the meeting, provided it is either a stated meeting or one that has been properly called. In all ordinary societies the by-laws should provide for a quorum as large as can be depended upon for being present at all meetings when the weather is not exceptionally bad. In such an assembly the chairman should not take the chair until a quorum is present, or there is no prospect of there being a quorum. The only business that can be transacted in the absence of a quorum is to take measures to obtain a quorum, to fix the time to which to-adjourn, and to adjourn, or to take a recess. Unanimous consent cannot be given when a quorum is not present, and a notice given then is not valid. In the case of an annual meeting, where certain business for the year, as the election of officers, must be attended to during the session, the meeting should fix a time for an adjourned meeting and then adjourn. In an assembly that has the power to compel the attendance of its members, if a quorum is not present at the appointed hour, the chairman should wait a few minutes before taking the chair. In the absence of a quorum such an assembly may order a call of the house [41] and thus compel attendance of absentees, or it may adjourn, providing for an adjourned meeting if it pleases. In committee of the whole the quorum is the same as in the assembly; if it finds itself without a quorum it can do nothing but rise and report to the assembly, which then adjourns. In any other committee the majority is a quorum, unless the assembly order otherwise, and it must wait for a quorum before proceeding to business. Boards of trustees, managers, directors, etc., are on the same footing as committees as regards a quorum. Their power is delegated to them as a body, and their quorum, or what number shall be present, in order that they may act as a board or committee, cannot be determined by them, unless so provided in the by-laws.	If it's not in the lease agreement, then you did not agree to it. Even in the absence of the law prohibiting the late fee, the landlord would not be able to impose it because it is not in the lease. It is of course up to you whether you want to test it. It may be more trouble than it is worth. Then again, it's probably not worth the landlord's trouble to begin eviction proceedings over a late fee. Paying late and refusing to pay the fee would probably sour your relationship with the landlord, which is usually something you want to avoid. If you do pay late at some point, you may want to point out to the landlord the relevant provision of Massachusetts law. The matter would probably end there: either the landlord doesn't know about it, or the landlord is hoping that you don't know about it. Pointing it out in a polite manner will inform the landlord of the law and that you are acquainted with the law. Unless the landlord is quite unreasonable, that should take care of it. Whether there is any law prohibiting landlords from announcing an intention to take a prohibited action is indeed a different question. Is there any legal reason for me to bring this up and get the landlord to formally acknowledge that they will not in fact charge illegal late fees? No. You have a contract with the landlord that already says you are going to move in. He cannot modify that contract simply by sending you a letter.	Non-Profits Need Not Have Owners But Must Have A Lawful Purpose Any non-profit company, for example, a 501(c)(3), is ownerless and can be run by a self-perpetuating board if desired, rather than having delegates that provide an outside source for new board members. In that case you have to set forth a purpose of the company or trust, to which its assets and profits must be used, and it must be managed in accordance with that purpose. You can also have a "private foundation" that is effectively ownerless, again with a designated charitable purpose. Generally speaking, the law limits how much compensation can be paid to officers and employees of such a company and restricts self-dealing transactions by such a company. You probably cannot create a valid trust or business with no beneficiaries and no designated charitable purpose which is supposed to merely accumulate its profits and assets. Ownerless Cooperatives Are An Oxymoron Your reference in this and other posts to an "ownerless cooperative" is basically an oxymoron. A cooperative is an entity owned by a class of people who have a contractual relationship with the entity (usually consumers or producers) who are the owners of the company with voting control and who are entitled to an adjustment of their transaction prices with the cooperative via a rebate or surplus check proportionate to the dollar volume of their dealings with the cooperative (Northwest Mutual, must rural electric companies, and most credit unions would be examples of consumer cooperatives, Ocean Spray is a good example of a producers cooperative). An ownerless entity is pretty much by definition not a cooperative. An excellent overview of forms of entity organization other than investor owned stock corporations can be found in The Ownership of Enterprise by Henry Hansmann. The Life Of The Law Is Not Math Or Logic Honestly, it sounds like, in your several posts on the subject, that you are attempting the hide the ball of an ulterior purposes which is material to the legality and organization of an entity. The law is not like science or mathematics. You can't prove a bunch of isolated propositions and then string them together logically. The law operates on an entire comprehensive "fact pattern" and even if every step of your chain of reasoning to an ultimately result is supported by legal authority, this does not mean that this will be the result you get when you put all of the pieces together. That kind of logical reasoning doesn't work in a legal context. The heading of this section is a paraphrase of a famous statement about the law by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience... The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. from "The Common Law" (1881) at page 1. Blockchains Are Not The Legal Innovation That They Claim To Be Using blockchain technology to manage "tokens" of voting control in an entity is ultimately completely irrelevant. Blockchain technology is just another alternative to certificated shares, shares kept on an ownership ledger, or shares kept through secondary shareholding intermediaries or brokers. The technology used to keep track of voting control or economic ownership is irrelevant, and some common entities (e.g. homeowner's associations) have ownership that is basically determined via a crude public blockchain called the county clerk and recorder's records. People who think that blockchains provide any significant legal innovation into anything (e.g. here) are fundamentally misguided and typically are not people familiar with the law who have misconceptions about how the law works. Also, contrary to the hype, blockchains are not fraud-proof and indeed, involve serious systemic risks of instability because an error in an old transaction can disrupt lots of current claims. Claims such as those made here that blockchain transactions are irrefutable are naive and basically false. A block chain is a bit like a real property record system without an adverse possession rule to make ancient glitches irrelevant. Moreover, blockchains are a solution to a non-problem. Authenticating ownership and voting rights, economic entitlements, and corporate actions is something that has never posed a very significant economic problem ever since writing was invented. These are economic problems that were already effectively solved in the days of the Minoans, and widespread ownership of well authenticated entities by numerous ever shifting groups of owners was a problem well in hand by the days of the British East India Company. Anonymous Ownership Or Contribution Records Are Illegal Truly anonymous ownership, however, is legally prohibited, even though ownership need not be made a matter of public record. In the case of for profit entities, by securities regulation which requires disclosure for purposes of exercising voting rights and for disclosing large blocks of ownership as required by law, and for purposes of tax law. In the case of non-profit entities, it is prohibited by virtue of laws regulating private foundations that impose tax requirements when certain concentrations of contributions come from a small, related group of people. In the case of political organizations, campaign finance laws require disclosure.	Update: I've filed a complaint with the CA Attorney General. They automatically forwarded the complaint to Comcast and sent me a notice in the mail. If you have filed a complaint against a business, we will forward your complaint to that business and request that it contact you promptly to resolve the issues you raised. Please note that we cannot represent you, advocate for you with the business, or force the business to satisfy individual requests for relief. Please contact the business directly to discuss your complaint. While we cannot provide specific legal advice, please see the information below, which may help address your concern. For more information about the CCPA, please see https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa and https://cppa.ca.gov/. [...] If a business has violated the CCPA, you may notify the Office of the Attorney General by filing a consumer complaint. While we cannot file an action on behalf of an individual consumer over an individual violation, consumer complaints are an important source of information for the office. We will review consumer complaints to identify patterns of misconduct and to determine what law enforcement actions to take. You can sue a business under the CCPA only if your unencrypted and un-redacted personal information was stolen in a data breach as a result of the business's failure to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to protect it. You must generally give the business written notice of its violations and 30 days to fix the violations before you can sue. For more information about when you can sue for a CCPA violation, visit https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa If you want to consult an attorney, you can obtain a referral to a certified lawyer referral service through the State Bar at (866) 442-2529 (toll-free in California) or (415) 538-2250 (from outside California), or online at https://www.calbar.ca.gov. If you cannot afford to pay an attorney, contact your local legal aid office to see if you qualify for free or reduced-rate legal assistance. For a referral to local legal aid offices, visit https://lawhelpca.org/ and click on the Search for Legal Help tab. Comcast responded immediately to the forwarded complaint and appears to have deactivated my login, but nearly a month later have still not confirmed whether any personal information has been deleted. I'd strongly recommend anyone in a similar situation to file a complaint as well. There's no guarantee the Attorney General or California Privacy Protection Agency will act on it, but it can increase the civil penalty to the company by $5,000 per complaint (see section 1798.155) and makes it more likely they will comply. Don't waste your time with any unnecessary calls from the business or obfuscating information yourself as a commenter here mentioned. Just submit your CCPA request in writing, complete the identity verification, wait the 45 days as allowed by the law (or 90 if an extension is requested, see section 1798.130), and file a complaint if it's not completed. Update 2: I received a forwarded letter from Comcast to the Attorney General in response to my complaint. They lied and backdated their alleged completion date of the deletion request to fall within the 45 day deadline, despite emails I sent past their claimed date repeating the request as I was still able to login. Before filing a complaint, make sure to take screenshots showing you logged into the account and email it to the business in order to document it.
Is a state issued ID required to see a doctor with insurance? Suppose there is someone who has insurance but they do not have a state issued ID card, let's say they only have a school ID. If this person goes to a doctor's office and shows their school ID and insurance card and provides all details such as their DOB an SS number, can the doctor still refuse to see them because they did not show a "proper" ID (a state issued one)? A related question is does this ID check come from the insurance companies or is it a legal requirement in some or all states?	There is no state that requires you to show ID to obtain medical care. To the extent that this is done it is done at the behest of whoever is paying for the care to determine that you are someone who is authorized to benefit from this payment, and not an imposter, or as a matter of policy of the doctor. (An exception to this general rule applies when one wants to pick up a prescription for a controlled substance or a Sudafed product, where you must indeed show ID to show that your name matches a prescription or to insure that the right name is entered into the Sudafed database.) It might be more convenient for the doctor in terms of collection of bad debt, insurance policy claims (where an insurance card would normally be required, at least), protection against fraud claims from an insurer, and medical record keeping to have a name, so a doctor might make it a policy to require ID, but it is not required by law (except where a government benefit provider like Medicaid or Medicare is involved and has a regulation requiring it). For example, in the Las Vegas shooting, where there wasn't time to process paperwork, hospital triage officials simply assigned an alias to every incoming patient and wrote it in marker on their body to keep the medical records straight, and to allow that alias to track medical costs to be billed when the time came to get the proper intake paperwork filled out and the file sent to the accounting department. There are also other circumstances that do not involve emergency treatment (e.g. STD testing, methadone treatment at free clinics, and clinical trials) where an alias rather than a true name is sometimes used to keep track of patients.	Yes. There is both a duty to disclose and permit inspection of certain records (e.g. those that adversely affect either party's case or support another party's case) and a right for the court to demand access to other specific records. In england-and-wales the applicable rules are found in Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules. For example: Standard disclosure 31.6 Standard disclosure requires a party to disclose only– (a) the documents on which he relies; and (b) the documents which – (i) adversely affect his own case; (ii) adversely affect another party’s case; or (iii) support another party’s case; and (c) the documents which he is required to disclose by a relevant practice direction. Specific disclosure (1) The court may make an order for specific disclosure or specific inspection. (2) An order for specific disclosure is an order that a party must do one or more of the following things – (a) disclose documents or classes of documents specified in the order; (b) carry out a search to the extent stated in the order; (c) disclose any documents located as a result of that search. Party's control 31.8 (1) A party’s duty to disclose documents is limited to documents which are or have been in his control. (2) For this purpose a party has or has had a document in his control if – (a) it is or was in his physical possession; (b) he has or has had a right to possession of it; or (c) he has or has had a right to inspect or take copies of it. Right of inspection 31.3 (1) A party to whom a document has been disclosed has a right to inspect that document except where – (a) the document is no longer in the control of the party who disclosed it; (b) the party disclosing the document has a right or a duty to withhold inspection of it, or (c) paragraph (2) applies. (2) Where a party considers that it would be disproportionate to the issues in the case to permit inspection of documents within a category or class of document disclosed under rule 31.6(b) – (a) he is not required to permit inspection of documents within that category or class; but (b) he must state in his disclosure statement that inspection of those documents will not be permitted on the grounds that to do so would be disproportionate. Inspection and copying 31.15 Where a party has a right to inspect a document– (a) that party must give the party who disclosed the document written notice of his wish to inspect it; (b) the party who disclosed the document must permit inspection not more than 7 days after the date on which he received the notice; and (c) that party may request a copy of the document and, if he also undertakes to pay reasonable copying costs, the party who disclosed the document must supply him with a copy not more than 7 days after the date on which he received the request. And, in case there's any doubt that this applies to electronic records: Meaning of document 31.4 In this Part – ‘document’ means anything in which information of any description is recorded;	The Highway Code said: Vehicles. Any vehicle driven by a learner MUST display red L plates. In Wales, either red D plates, red L plates, or both, can be used. Plates MUST conform to legal specifications and MUST be clearly visible to others from in front of the vehicle and from behind. Plates should be removed or covered when not being driven by a learner (except on driving school vehicles). [Law MV(DL)R reg 16 & sched 4] The good old Highway Code "Must" vs "Should". "Must" means that it is a legal issue, anything that is "Should" is only advisory	HIPAA does not legally protect physicians from disclosing PHI to another party, although there are a few exceptions: HHS provides an excellent resource on these, but the regulation most relevant to your question is Permitted Uses and Disclosures (5) Public Interest and Benefit Activities, which includes "Required by Law. Covered entities may use and disclose protected health information without individual authorization as required by law (including by statute, regulation, or court orders)." These statues, regulations, and court orders vary from state, but almost all of them refer to STDs and not genetic conditions (in some states, physicians are required to disclose positive STD test results to known sexual partners, but I can't find similar legislation for genetic tests). Here's an example of a voluntary patient information disclosure form – you'll notice that an individual has to specify the parties to whom they're willing to have PHI disclosed. The example you provided is still a violation of the Privacy Rule in the U.S., but this is a very curious grey area in bioethics and law. Disclosure of Genetic Information Within Families: How nurses can facilitate family communication. Gallo et al. Am J Nurs. 2009 Apr; 109(4): 65–69. (Emphasis mine.) HIPAA and Genetic Disclosure Does the law affect families? The privacy rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) went into effect on April 14, 2003. The rule created new requirements for health care providers, third-party payers, and health care clearinghouses to protect the privacy and security of health information, including genetic information, that could identify a person. A person's decision not to disclose her or his risk of developing a genetic condition to a family member may pose a dilemma for the health care professional, who has to choose between ethical obligations to inform the at-risk party and legal requirements to respect and protect the patient's privacy. The potential for harm to family members often plays a large role in the decision. For example, in rare cases, the use of a certain surgical anesthesia can cause death in people with the mutation that disposes them to malignant hyperthermia. Likewise, strenuous exercise can bring on sudden death in people with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. In such cases, clinicians should carefully explain the reasons for sharing information with family members, strongly encourage patients to notify at-risk relatives, and offer to help develop a plan for notifying them. When patients choose not to notify family members, clinicians typically respect the decision. There are situations, however, in which the clinician may consider overriding the patient's preferences because the family member is judged to be in danger of serious or immediate harm or there is a high likelihood that a dangerous condition will occur that can be either prevented or adequately treated with early recognition. Clinicians who believe it is necessary to override a patient's wish regarding the notification of family members, should consider consulting an ethics committee or legal council. In most situations, though, the risk of serious harm associated with nondisclosure is not clearly immediate. For instance, if a woman has tested positive for the BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation but doesn't want to upset her two sisters by sharing that information with them, the need for disclosure isn't clearly urgent. Each sister has a one in two chance of carrying the same mutation. It would be understandable for the patient to try to learn more about what the mutation means for her and her children and to give careful thought to whether and how she'll share her test results with her sisters. Clinicians can best help family members by clearly informing patients who test positive for genetic conditions or the mutations that cause them about the risks faced by their family members, discussing the value of disclosure and offering assistance with it. The "Duty to Warn" a Patient's Family Members About Hereditary Disease Risks. Offit et al. JAMA. 2004;292(12): 1469–1473. (I can send you the full-text of this if you want it; it contains an excellent overview of cases and their outcomes relating to disclosing genetic information in the U.S. under HIPAA.) In general, the special nature of genetic tests has been viewed as a barrier to physicians' breaching the confidentiality of personal genetic information. However, the failure to warn family members about hereditary disease risks has already resulted in 3 lawsuits against physicians in the United States. While the findings of case law and the state and federal statutes that bear on the issue of "duty to warn" of inherited health risk are still being defined, we believe that health care professionals have a responsibility to encourage but not to coerce the sharing of genetic information in families, while respecting the boundaries imposed by the law and by the ethical practice of medicine. ...in considering whether to breach patient confidentiality to warn of risks of a genetic disease, clinicians need to balance the actual risk of that disease, the efficacy of potential preventive interventions, as well as emerging legal considerations and potential liabilities. Overriding patient confidentiality and genetic privacy might very well mean violation of HIPAA and certain state regulations, with attendant civil or criminal liability. At the same time, in one state appellate court decision that has not been overturned, the estate of a physician was held liable for his failure to warn relatives of hereditary disease risk.	Unless the notary personally knows the signer, the notary should, and normally will, ask for identification, and the name that the notary puts in the notarization certificate should be copied exact6ly from whatever ID is presented. For Alan Jones to sign as J7, he would need some sort of official proof, acceptable to the notary, that he is "J7". What would that be? I doubt that any notary would certify such a doccument. (If the document is signed as "Alan Jones" but the ID says "Alan J Jones" I am not sure if the notary must follow the ID or may follow the document, assuming that the notary is convinced that the two are the same person. Many notaries in practice will follow the ID.) I agree that the normal way would be for the document to say "Alan Jones, also known as 'J7'", and possibly include wording such as "I Alan Jones, am the person who posts on site XYZ.com as "J7", and specifically who posted a message starting {quote} at {timestamp}." (Or it could give the secure hash of the message, or of several messages.) This would clearly est6ablish a link between the document and the online conversations/acts that it is meant to refer to. The questions says: a need has developed for Alan Jones to sign a document using the name J7 I doubt that doing such a thing is either required or helpful. Rather I suspect he will need to sign a document in which he acknowledges being the particular "J7" involved in the matter.	This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.	No. HIPAA places no limits on who you may share your medical records with - only on those with who your doctors (et al) can share. The HIV laws you refer to, place a positive obligation on you to share the information.	This practice is known as "rescission". It is legal under 45 CFR §147.128 in some circumstances. The regulation says (a) A group health plan, or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage, must not rescind coverage under the plan, or under the policy, certificate, or contract of insurance, with respect to an individual (including a group to which the individual belongs or family coverage in which the individual is included) once the individual is covered under the plan or coverage, unless the individual (or a person seeking coverage on behalf of the individual) performs an act, practice, or omission that constitutes fraud, or makes an intentional misrepresentation of material fact, as prohibited by the terms of the plan or coverage. The law also prohibits surprises: A group health plan, or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage, must provide at least 30 days advance written notice to each participant (in the individual market, primary subscriber) who would be affected before coverage may be rescinded under this paragraph (a)(1), regardless of, in the case of group coverage, whether the coverage is insured or self-insured, or whether the rescission applies to an entire group or only to an individual within the group. (The rules of this paragraph (a)(1) apply regardless of any contestability period that may otherwise apply.) Note that the regulation pertains to insurance plans, and not employers. The employer may in good faith believe that you are stuck with the medical bills, but their opinion does not matter as far as this regulation goes. However, the employer also does not have the right to "declare" on behalf of the insurance company that your wife was covered. If you assume that she had coverage because the employer (mistakenly) said you did, but there was actually no coverage, then that is between you and the employer, or possibly you and the doctor. A prior question is whether she was actually covered in that past period. The contract between the insurance company and the employer might hypothetically state that only employees are covered, and may have accidentally submitted enrollment information with mistaken information ("X is an employee"). Since there was no intentional misrepresentation (we assume), coverage cannot be rescinded. Also note that rescission is retroactive cancelling, not prospective cancelling ("henceforth, you are not covered").
Is it lawful for banks to turn away minors? Is it okay for a bank to turn away minors solely based on age even if they have a parent/guardian to sign/co-sign on the minor's behalf? Would it be considered age discrimination?	It is age discrimination, and it is legal. There is a federal prohibition against discriminating in employment provided that you are at least 40 years old. There are innumerable laws that require age discrimination w.r.t. being under 18, such as the lack of a right to vote. Contracts with minors, such as are involved with opening a bank account, are generally invalid with the exception of "necessities", education and insurance in Massachusetts. No law compels a bank to "accept" any person (to open a saving or checking account – even more so with accepting a loan application). A bank account would be a "public accommodation", which is not subject to a "no age discrimination" requirement at the federal or Massachusetts level.	You tag the question with "criminal law", suggesting that by "illegal" you mean "is it a crime" -- that would depend on jurisdiction, but in the US or my state, it is not a crime. There are crimes that you could commit with such an account, but violating the TOS is not itself a crime. However, it is illegal, a breach of contract, as you can see from the TOS "You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission".	No. According to the Section 18 of the U.S. Code, § 2251: (a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct,shall be punished as provided under subsection (e) [...] and a minor is defined (Section 18 of the U.S. Code, § 2256) as "any person under the age of eighteen years". As such, you cannot be considered a pedophile. However, if you have sexual intercourses with animals, depending on the State laws on the matter, you might be charged with bestiality or similar offences.	Children/youths are allowed to make some decisions themselves even before becoming adults. In the US, COPPA has privacy protections for children under the age of 13. This means that many US-based or US-oriented online services refuse to provide services to people younger than 13. The terms of service often include language to the effect that no part of the service is intended to children under 13. In the EU, the GDPR lets member states pick a cutoff age between 13 and 16 years. Children below this age cannot give consent themselves. However, this is a very narrow condition as consent isn't generally needed to use a website (cookie consent banners are extremely common though). For example, Stack Exchange bans under 13 year olds, and under 16 year olds in the EU: 3. Age Eligibility You must be at least 13 years old to access or use the Network or Services, including without limitation to complete a Stack Overflow account registration. By accessing or using the Services or the Network in any manner, you represent and warrant that you are at least 13 years of age. If you are under 13 years old, you may not, under any circumstances or for any reason, access or use the Services or Network in any manner, and may not provide any personal information to or on the Services or Network (including, for example, a name, address, telephone number or email address). If you are located within the European Union, you must be at least 16 years old to access or use the Network or Services, including without limitation to complete a Stack Overflow Account Registration. By accessing or using the Services or the Network in any manner, you represent and warrant that you are at least 16 years of age. If you are under 16 years old, you may not, under any circumstances or for any reason, access or use the Services or Network in any manner, and may not provide any personal information to or on the Services or Network (including, for example, a name, address, telephone number or email address). Source: Public Network Terms of Service These age limits are solely related to privacy laws. This is not about whether the child has legal competency to enter into contracts, or about your rights as a parent to supervise the development of your children. As a matter of internal policy, but in respect of this legal landscape, many parental control/surveillance software tools limit the available degree of control/surveillance as the children become older. While this may not be required in your particular jurisdiction, software providers are often interested in applying uniform policies across multiple jurisdictions.	If one day the child goes around to the father's house, perhaps in a state of upset, and says, "That's it, I'm staying," what is the legal position of the father? An eleven year old child really has no say in the matter. A judge in a custody case may consider what the 11 year old has to say but is unlikely to give it much weight. (In contrast, a judge is likely to give a lot of weight to the views of a child who has a job, who is doing O.K. in school, and is a year or two from becoming a full fledged adult.) This is up to his parents to resolve absent circumstances not present here (e.g. the child has made bona fide allegations of child abuse, or the parents are both incarcerated). And, if the parents can't resolve the dispute, it is up to a court in a case where parenting time is at issue (probably either a legal separation or a divorce in this case). For example, while (as noted below) the police will not generally drag a child kicking and screaming to the other parent without a court order, if the child is at his father's house, the father can absolutely drag the child kicking and screaming to the child's mother's house, no matter how much the child doesn't like it. Moreover, while the father will not be violating any law, if he does not do that, a child custody judge is likely to look dimly upon a parent who intentionally withholds visitation from another parent without good cause, when the court considers what kind of child custody arrangements to put in place. And, the court has extremely great discretion in these matters. The judge is also likely to be pretty unhappy with both of the parents for failing to be capable of communicating or cooperating over child rearing related issues, because they are apparently so focused on not getting along with each other over their issues with each other. In particular, if the mother calls the police claiming "child abduction," what will be the police position? Will they come to the door of the father? Will they drag the child kicking and screaming back to mother's house? It is not generally illegal for a married parent in a situation where there is no child custody order in place to have that parent's child with them over the objection of the other married parent. Absent a court order to the contrary, the police will probably call this a "civil matter" and will be unlikely to take any action until there is court guidance, absent exigent circumstances like evidence of recent not previously adjudicated claims of child abuse or neglect. The way to resolve this would be with a court filing of some sort seeking to resolve the parenting time issue, if necessary, on an emergency basis. Post-Script Whether or not the parents want to end the marriage, this situation is long overdue for court intervention. I've had couples who "pull the trigger" too soon, but this would not be a case of that type. Either the father or the mother needs to find a solicitor (if at all possible to afford that) and get the court system involved. If there is a breakdown in communications over matters related to the child, and the child is not cooperating in the face of an ambiguous parenting situation involving two parents who can't communicate about their child, the situation is out of control. Prompt court action could prevent a more negative outcome in the future by creating stability and structure in the situation.	Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful.	Federal law governing copyright, and state and federal law governing trademark, do not make any stipulations about the person enjoying the particular property right. In lieu of a specific restriction, the person may be an alien, a prisoner, a public employee, a corporation, or an astronaut. There are limits on minors and contracts, but no contract is required to write a book, make a sculpture, or create a distinctive business mark. (Those limits potentially raise questions about a minor signing away their author's rights if they create a work for hire, which you didn't ask about. A contract is typically necessary to profit off of such a creation, but not always). The copyright office even says that you can register copyright (important, registration is necessary to get maximal protection). There is a bit of an issue that a minor has limited ability to sue (for infringement), so in Utah Rule 17 you would need a guardian to sue for you, likewise in federal court (same number!).	Even though student status is not on the list of protected classes, this still might be discrimination. By proxy. Status as student can be a proxy for age, race, and/or color. Maybe even religion if there is a religious school nearby! In fairness to the store manager, when a pack of ten kids comes rolling in on the way home from school things can get pretty hectic. Rather than try to kick out the problem kids many managers will attempt to avoid the problem in the first place. Also, a sign like this might help the manager be less discriminatory. For example, let's say he lets all kids in and only kicks out the ones who are causing problems. If those problem kids are all in one protected class and it's different from the kids who don't get kicked out, the manager looks like he's discriminating based on that protected class. Discrimination by proxy can be hard to prove and I am not sure of the burden of proof in Canada. I have read that "Canadian experience" is used as a proxy in employment discrimination and has been getting some attention lately. That might be a good issue to keep an eye on as it may define proxy discrimination jurisprudence.
Criminal record expungement in Texas In 2010, I was arrested and charged with felony evading arrest/detention with a motor vehicle. This is a state jail felony in Texas. The charge was later reduced from a state jail felony to a Class A misdemeanor. I was convicted and served 90 days in county jail with no probation afterwards. I am worried that even though I don't have a felony on my record, having a Class A misdemeanor could potentially make finding a job more difficult. I took an online quiz that said I was eligible for "background check removal." Is this the same thing as having it expunged? And if not, is it possible to have this conviction expunged from my record?	Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records.	"Awaiting sentencing" either remanded in custody or on bail. "Sentence completed" which may, or may not, after time become "Spent" (see here) and note that: It is against the law for an organisation to obtain information about an individual’s spent cautions or convictions unless the law specifically states that they can ask an exempted question; usually when someone is applying for a job or role that is exempt from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 Source For completeness: checks are made with the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS).	Can you plead guilty to a crime, get probation and simultaneously avoid a conviction? Yes. In a deferred prosecution, there is not a conviction. If a defendant follows the terms of the program faithfully, the charges are dismissed and a guilty plea is never entered. It is a bit like a conviction with a probation sentence, but milder, because if you carry out the deferred prosecution terms you never receive a conviction and the associated collateral consequences of a conviction such as the one that you allude to in your question. Therefore, this individual would not be statutorily disqualified from purchasing an FDIC insured bank.	Whatever crime or infraction you are charged with, it applies to you personally however they spell your name and however you spell your name. Whether or not you should go depends on the alternative that you face (large fine or jail time for failure to appear?). An argument that you didn't commit the offence because they misspelled your name would hold zero water.	Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence.	Legally, they cannot just nab you. The usual (?) option is that authorities in the US request extradition pursuant to the US-Mexico extradition treaty via the Department of Justice, and if the paperwork is in order, this can result in a Provisional Arrest Warrant (and arrest) in Mexico, which will be carried out by the Mexican federal police. This is true whether or not you go to the US consulate. After a hearing in the Mexican courts you might be extradited (or not, but DoJ presumably doesn't proceed with cases that they will lose). Extradition is not possible for every offense, so you would have to look at the offenses listed in the treaty, and whatever the Arizona warrant is about. You can't be extradited for parking tickets, you can be extradited for murder: whatever it is, it has to be a crime in both places, and has to be subject to a minimum one year imprisonment. Also, if you are a Mexican citizen as well, you cannot be extradited unless the Mexican authorities agree to (whereas there is no choice if you are only a US citizen). An alternative is deportation, which would overcome limitations related to extradition, but it's not clear what the requirements for deportation from Mexico are (typically illegal presence, unclear whether Mexican authorities can or would try an end-run around official extradition procedure). Although consulates enjoy a degree of immunity from local law, a consulate in Mexico is still Mexican territory, subject to Mexican law. If you are in the consulate, Mexican authorities cannot enter without permission to arrest you. They also cannot arrest you without a warrant (see Art. 16 of the Mexican constitution). Consular staff also cannot arrest you (if you are not caught flagrante delicto). Nor are they authorized to execute a US warrant in Mexico (thus they have to go through the process of judicial review to send you back to the US, and why a Mexican warrant is required). See this Q&A, relevant to the status of embassies: what is relevant to us is that both the US and Mexico operate under the rule of law, so the issues surrounding Syrian refugees in the Syrian embassy do not arise here.	If the passport that was stolen is a U.S. one, you should report it by any of the channels outlined on the State Department's page Lost or Stolen Passports. The paper-reporting option is via form DS-64, which asks, among other things, whether you filed a police report; so it might be good to do that first. Form N-565 is a similar form for requesting the reissue of a naturalization certificate, and it, likewise, asks about any police report. Withholding someone's ID documents, knowing that they are necessary for travel, would be "false imprisonment" under both state and federal statutes. Also, 18 USC §§1426 and 1427 cover the crimes of "Reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers" and "Sale of naturalization or citizenship papers"; a 10-year felony for a first offence. "Whosoever unlawfully ... disposes of a ... certificate of naturalization, ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ... 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime)," If the police take your report but don't scare the possessor of your documentation into immediately returning it, you could sue him or her for the actual expenses of obtaining replacements in Small Claims court. If the mispossessed passport causes big enough damages, I guess you could sue in any court that has jurisdiction.	If A reasonably suspects that B committed a felony, A may arrest B, which means that A may also use reasonable force to detain B. They can also arrest for a misdemeanor committed in their presence, if it constituted a breach of peace. It is, of course, up to A to be correct that the act is a felony or a breach of peace, and to know what is reasonable force. If your arrest is in fact not lawful, you may be sued (battery or false imprisonment) or prosecuted (battery or unlawful imprisonment). Punching a person in the shoulder is the felony of battery, and direct observation creates highly reasonable suspicion. In such circumstances, anyone could have arrested the child. Unlike a police arrest, a citizen is not required to Mirandize an arrested suspect. This memo summarizes citizens arrest law including case law for Washington state. The right to perform citizen's arrest is statutorily recognized as a defense under RCW 9A.16.020 The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases: ...(2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him or her to a public officer competent to receive him or her into custody
Is it legal for public schools to require video for remote classes? Is it legal for public schools to require a student to run a webcam-video for remote classes in Massachusetts?	The first sub-question here is whether (public) schools can compel (parents of) students to acquire internet service, a computer, and a webcam. The MA Dept. of Education maintains that public schools must purchase at public expense textbooks and other instructional materials and supplies intended for use and re-use over a period of years, and computers fall in the category of materials intended for schools to purchase and use and re-use. There is no legislative authority to compel parents to purchase equipment or sign up for internet services. If there is a choice between in-person and online instruction, the legal requirement to attend school can be satisfied by in-person instruction. The second sub-question is whether, if a child does have the technical ability to be connected to class via the internet, can they legally require the camera to be turned on? Every district has rules, so if there is a rule requiring parental consent in this situation, then parental consent is required. If it is legal at that level, there is still a legal risk to the school. Schools can generally do those things that are reasonably necessary for educating students as long as it doesn't infringe on fundamental constitutional rights, and the camera-on requirement is educationally reasonable. The risk to the school is violating the federal law FERPA, specifically a potential violation of the privacy requirements. Schools must protect personal information, which includes anything streaming from the camera (pictures, for example, are personally identifiable information). If you assume that they have an absolutely secure connection, then there is no risk of privacy violation. However, if you believe, even reasonably so, that a school practice creates a risk of breach of privacy, that still does not create a special right to avoid school.	No These are derivative works and making them is copyright breach. Doing this as a hobby or even for the entertainment of friends in private is likely fair use. Distribution or performance in public (monitored or not) is likely not fair use and you would need a licence. Here is a summary of the relevant law in australia.	This may well be infringement, but I agree that you should start by reaching out to the instructor. You don't want to pay a lawyer if the matter can be be adjusted peacefully. In the US there is a special limited exemption to copyright for "use in classroom instruction" which might apply in such a case. I am not sure if there is a similar provision in Canadian copyright law. But the instructor is likely to change his practice if you notify him of your objection, even if he has the technical right to use the photo. At least it is worth finding out. If he won't, then you can always consult a lawyer.	I believe that you have misinterpreted the case, not least because the Hudgins v I.R.S case involves this only peripherally. The original case Diviaio v Kelly was dealing with a request for the number of photographs taken of the plaintiff and if these had been disseminated outside the CIA. This is in no way shape or form a request for records (the records were found to be legitimately exempt). I see no problem in your FOI request. In fact, I can foresee the response: These, http://www.maine.gov/legis/ros/meconlaw.htm, are the laws we use to justify these actions. In a common law jurisdiction, a person (including the government) does not have to prove they are abiding by the law. The onus is on you to prove they aren't; they do not have to help you make your case.	Copyright almost certainly exists in the images, since presumably someone took those pictures and so they would own the copyright of those images. However, that doesn't mean you don't own the film, you just that don't own the copyright. You can have it developed to see what's there without copying the images. Just tell the developer you only want the film developed and for no prints to be made. If there's child pornography you could end up in a lot of hot water. While you'd be innocent of any crime, if the developer reports the images to the police you'll have to convince them that you had no idea what was on the film. It's extremely unlikely that there's anything untoward on the film however. I'd note however that unless the film is only a couple years old then it's likely the pictures have faded significantly. If it's ten or more years old, there might not be anything recognizable.	In a narrow sense, since you are a student at the U, you are bound by a contract you signed when you registered for classes. Read it, and you'll probably find a clause or two that states that you are not allowed to abuse, script, attempt logins or otherwise use the computer systems in any way other than typical, day to day use. The U's recourse is to kick you out and possibly take you to civil court to recover damages, and possibly refer you to the local county attorney for criminal charges, depending on the existence of criminal statutes for computer access in your jurisdiction. In a broad sense, pentesting can be either a civil infraction or a crime, depending on the terms of service for the system you are trying to exploit, what exactly you do, the jurisdiction, etc. See State Computer Crime Statutes and Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act - Wikipedia. See also LE answer When is a permission required to attack a system?	Course assignments, like practically every other piece of written content created in the past 100 years or so, are copyrighted. You cannot copy or redistribute them without the permission of the copyright holder. In most cases that would be the course instructor, but it could also be the university, or the publisher of a commercial book or other resource where the questions came from. The instructor might be happy to give you permission if you ask - many professors would be pleased to have their creations reach a wider audience. In any case, it is perfectly legal to talk about the assignment you were given, as long as you do not copy or replicate the text of the assignment itself. Reading it verbatim or with trivial alterations would be a problem, but describing it completely in your own words doesn't infringe copyright. A separate issue is what is allowed by your university rules. University rules aren't laws, but you can still be punished academically if you break them (grade penalties, suspension, expulsion, etc). The university might have a policy against sharing, or even discussing, assignments without permission. This might include forbidding actions that the law itself allows. In particular, they might forbid you from talking about your solutions to the assignments, which copyright law would have no problem with (your solution is your own creative work, and the copyright on it belongs to you). So again, ask your instructor what they would allow. Also, academic ethics (which again is not a law, but might be enforced by your university) would generally require that you give proper attribution to the author of the assignment you are discussing. Note that there are plenty of online collections of so-called "open courseware", where the university deliberately makes their course materials public, under some sort of open license such as Creative Commons. MIT's repository is one of the most famous. So if you can't get permission to use the materials from your Penn State courses, you could always make videos about MIT's assignments instead.	Copyright law requires permission of the rights holder to e.g. post material. The terms of that permission could be very complicated, as seen in royalties contracts with publishers, but they can also be simple. If someone asks "can I post your video on my website" and you say "Sure, as long as you give me credit", then they can post the video on their site as long as that say something like "This video was made by Jake" or something like that. There is no exception to permission where permission is retroactively withdrawn just in case it turns out that one can make money off of the video. However: you gave That Guy permission, and that does not mean that the hundreds of Other Guys have permission. So you can pursue all of the Other Guys and demand that they take the video down, or require some payment to get your permission.
What part of the U.S. code requires Donald Trump to vacate the White House if he loses in November? President Trump has made some... remarkable and entertaining... remarks about his willingness to leave the White House if he should loose the POTUS election in November. This got me thinking. I'm not a lawyer or a politician, but I have been trained all my life to simply "know" that the White House is where the POTUS lives. Period. The idea that somebody might not leave it is... well... it's unique. Is there a portion of the U.S. code requires a past-president to vacate the White House? I suspect it's technically owned by the United States Government and, as landlord, said government has the right to evict whomever it wants ... but even the image of The Donald hanging on by his fingernails while sunglass-laden G-men holding, not a warrant, not a subpoena, but an eviction notice drag him out. It would make a good play. But I digress. Is there a law that states the building must be vacated? (As a bonus question, is it possible to invoke squatter's rights for the White House?) Please note that my question is, I believe, a duplicate of this question, except that the answers don't address the legality that the question implies. If I need to abandon this question for that one, I'm happy to, but I don't have enough rep to bounty that question and point out that no answer describes any law enforcing anything.	18 USC 1752: (a) Whoever— (1) knowingly enters or remains in any restricted building or grounds without lawful authority to do so; [...] shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). (b) The punishment for a violation of subsection (a) is— (1) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, if— (A) the person, during and in relation to the offense, uses or carries a deadly or dangerous weapon or firearm; or (B) the offense results in significant bodily injury as defined by section 2118(e)(3); and (2) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, in any other case. (c) In this section— (1) the term “restricted buildings or grounds” means any posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area— (A) of the White House or its grounds, or the Vice President’s official residence or its grounds; [...] An ex-president does not have "lawful authority" to occupy the building. They may be not only removed, but also arrested and criminally prosecuted. "Squatter's rights" or other eviction protections would come from the District of Columbia's local laws, over which federal law takes precedence. So they would not apply here.	Embezzlement is criminally prohibited by 18 USC 666, and this DoJ manual page on what is embezzlement cites the answer in Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268 that Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom such property has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has lawfully come. It differs from larceny in that the original taking was lawful, or with the consent of the owner, while in larceny the felonious intent must have existed at the time of the taking Following other case law, the elements of the crime are there was a trust or fiduciary relationship between the defendant and the private organization or State or local government agency; the property came into the possession or care of the defendant by virtue of his/her employment; the defendant's dealings with the property constituted a fraudulent conversion or appropriation of it to his/her own use; and the defendant acted with the intent to deprive the owner of the use of this property. This page lists over 32,000 disbursements; filtering just for rent give over 2,400 disbursements, a number of which are recent and made to some business with Trump in the name (Trump Tower LLC etc). The conversion would have to be fraudulent to be embezzlement. There actually is not any evidence provided that a transfer violated FEC regulations (we have dates, amounts, and recipient), so we would have to speculate about what else is true. There are processed disbursement images up to 10/21/2020 such as this receipt for 3 charges for food and lodging paid to Trump Hotel Collection. In fact this payment was made by Donald J Trump for President, Inc. although the search term was the aforementioned PAC: I will overlook that anomaly. This is the FEC page on that committee (you have to follow the committee number because the name was also used in the 2016 campaign but was terminated). There vast numbers of filings linked there, but nothing that I saw indicates that Trump is in any sense an employee of the organization, so there is no actual evidence that there were any "Trump actions". First, it would have to be shown that there were Trump actions. Second, it would have to be show that the action was fraudulent. Technical misappropriation is not fraudulent. This FEC page describes the safe harbor provisions for misappropriation. This page specifically addresses embezzlement. Although they use the word "embezzlement", they do not purport that misappropriation constituted embezzlement as defined above, to point out that civil penalties may result from violation, see 11 CFR Part 104. Ultimately, the legal propriety of the disbursements depends on its purpose: here is what the FEC say about illegal conversion for personal use (food for daily consumption, mortgage or rent for personal residence, tuition...). The available evidence does not even suggest embezzlement.	The president is not permitted to blackmail the Supreme Court, but what you've described isn't blackmail. Blackmail is a threat to expose someone's crimes. You're probably thinking of something more like extortion, which is outlawed under 18 U.S. Code § 875: Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. There are three problems with your theory I see right away: With the facts: As you noted, the President's statements were "seemingly unrelated," which is essentially an admission that there's no indication one has anything to do with the other. Under those circumstances, you can't establish that he's making any kind of threat. With the statute: "Extortion" is generally understood to refer not merely to a threat to do something unpleasant. Instead, extortion is inducing another person to turn over property by the wrongful use of force, violence, or fear. There's no property at play here, and it's not unlawful to study changes to the court (nor would it be unlawful to actually make changes to the Court, which the president doesn't even have power to do anyway). With the First Amendment: The President has a First Amendment right to advocate for changes to gun laws, and for changes to the composition of the Supreme Court. That right does not evaporate when it is informed by the court's conduct. So the Biden situation is not really a good fit with the hypothetical you've described, which presents a much stronger factual basis from which to find a threat. Because it also appears you're using wrongfully inducing fear of economic injury to obtain another person's property, and because you have no right to do so, you would be liable for extortion, while the President would not. EDIT: Although the top-line questions has been reframed, I'll just note that the answer remains basically the same. Bearing in mind that the president has no power to force any Supreme Court justice into retirement, one might rephrase the question this way: "If the Court rules that a constitutional amendment has Meaning X, can the president threaten to support a constitutional amendment?" The answer should be obvious: The president is free to support policies to change the constitution, at any time, for any reason.	If the Senate took the extreme measure of attempting to abolish the Supreme Court, there's nothing in the Constitution that requires them to confirm any of the President's nominees. However, attempting to dismantle one of the three branches would be nothing short of a coup d'etat. The president has some options here: He [the President] may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses [of Congress], or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper. -- Article 2, Sec. 3 Basically, this means that, in an extraordinary circumstance (total defiance of the entire Senate would easily qualify), the President can lock the Senate in their chamber until they straighten their heads out. And when I say "lock them in", I don't mean that figuratively. The Constitution requires that a majority of each house be present to constitute a quorum to do business. The President could order up to 51 Senators to convene, and if they refused, could order the FBI or whoever to physically arrest them and drag them to the capitol building. This was actually done in Wisconsin by Gov. Scott Walker in 2011 when 14 Democrat Senators fled the state to avoid the quorum needed to vote on a controversial bill that they couldn't block. It would be messy for sure, and as far as I know, has never been done with the U.S. Senate. But there is precedent for it. Additionally, the President could use his vacancy power and just appoint a justice. Legally, he would have to wait for the Senate to be in recess, and the Senate would likely arrange things so that never happens. However, if there were no justices left, he could just appoint a Chief Justice (the Constitution provides that there be at least one justice). Even if he did this in the most "in-your-face" illegal way, with both middle fingers extended, the only judge that can tell him he did wrong is the guy he just seated. Of course, the Senate would move to impeach that judge, and probably the President too for having appointed him illegally, but you need a supermajority of both houses to remove them from office. If you had such a supermajority, then the game is over at this point; there's no way the President would step down in such a situation (who would force him?) and we're in a civil war because we don't have a functional government anymore. In reality, this isn't an "interesting twist in constitutional law that the Founding Fathers may not have considered." It's that if Congress ever went totally off the rails like that, the President, or the people would have to step up and hope they could end the standoff peacefully without resorting to violence, because this is the kind of thing that revolutions are fought over.	There appears to be no general federal statute addressing the legality of a male entering a female-labeled bathroom, or vice versa, within federal jurisdiction. There are various regulations that touch on bathrooms, for example the OSHA regulations pertaining to sanitation require that "toilet facilities, in toilet rooms separate for each sex, shall be provided in all places of employment in accordance with table J-1 of this section", but "Where toilet facilities will not be used by women, urinals may be provided instead of water closets". These are regulations imposed on employers, and there is no provision for enforcement by employers, for instance no clause saying that the employer must call the police, or in any way intervene or sanction an employee, if a person enters a bathroom of "the wrong sex". It is apparently not a crime, as reflected anywhere in the US Code, for a male to enter or remain in a female bathroom, or vice versa. Building managers have some discretion regarding the operation of federal facilities, for example courthouses, which could extend to requesting a male to not enter a female bathroom or vice versa, but there isn't a practical way to determine what departmental regulations exist that would allow eviction of a bathroom-cross-user. Federal law does not protect against sex/gender discrimination in public accommodations. As for Maryland law, the owner of private property has the right to control his property up to the point that state law take that control from him, and therefore in principle he could call the police to remove a person trespassing in a bathroom (this article addresses the trespass angle in North Carolina). Maryland does not appear to have any case law or statutory exception to trespass laws related to labeling of bathrooms, so enforcement actions would be at the discretion of the owner. At the lower end of the political hierarchy, Baltimore has an ordinance requiring single-use bathrooms to be gender neutral, and a proposal exists to enact a state law with this effect. In other words, there does not appear to be any direct, enforceable legal requirement regarding bathroom entry and sex. Trespass laws could be used, but are at the discretion of the property owner (who might be civilly sued for his actions, but the police don't decide the merits of a discrimination suit before evicting a trespasser).	Yes, the President can certainly veto such a law. Per the US Constitution (emphasis added): Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. This can have a very real effect: legislators are under no obligation to vote the same way on a veto override as on the original bill. The reason the President needs to supply written objections in the first place is that it lets legislators reconsider, see if they're swayed, or see if they think this is a matter where a Congressional majority needs to be respected even if they disagree (they can change their mind in either direction). They can also get a sense of public reaction. And because the threshold for this is "present and voting," it's possible that just more legislators show up. Even if legislators won't be swayed, it still matters for pocket vetoes. That's where the President neither signs the bill nor returns it within 10 days; normally this is equivalent to signing, but if Congress adjourns in the meantime, it means the bill does not become a law. Because "Congress adjourns" is a necessary part of a pocket veto, it's impossible to override the veto (you can't do it if you're not in session). And even when this doesn't apply either, it matters for politics. Example of a futile veto: Public Law 100-4. Passed 406-8 in the House, 93-6 in the Senate. Vetoed; veto was overridden 401-26 in the House and 86-14 in the Senate (note that at least 7 Senators who voted for the bill voted not to override the veto). Example of an effective veto: While technically there was a conference report agreed to by both houses, and it doesn't seem to have had a roll-call vote (my guess is it was agreed to by unanimous consent; side note: many, many laws don't have roll-calls to check on, because they're passed by voice vote or unanimous consent), H.R.10929 from the 95th Congress was passed in the House by a vote of 319-67 and in the Senate by 87-2. After President Carter vetoed it, the House voted on whether to override the veto. The motion to override was defeated 191-206: after the veto, they couldn't even get a simple majority to override the veto of the bill which had been passed by an overwhelming supermajority. I mentioned it above, but the two-thirds threshold is "present and voting." As a general rule, any time you see a fraction of something needed for a vote to succeed in a deliberative assembly, then unless it specifies some other denominator, it's talking about the fraction of members present and voting. Relevant CRS report on override procedure.	Owners can't be evicted from their own property. That's one of the fundamental rights of real estate ownership. You may have a contractual basis for a lawsuit that either leads to payment or provides for forfeiture of their share, but that relies on the details of your specific case and will require specific legal advice from your own lawyer.	Anti-discrimination laws in the U.S. have exceptions for someone who rents a room in a landlord's own residence, but generally speaking, for other purposes, there is not a distinction in U.S. or Florida law. People who stay at a place with the permission of the owner for a very brief period of time and not pursuant to a lease, such as someone who gains use of a particular seat in a movie theater pursuant to a purchased ticket, is, however, not a tenant with the full rights of a tenant, and is instead a licensee who does not have a property right to use that space, only a contract that can be terminated by the property owner or their agent at will, potentially with breach of contract damages if this is done without justification, but not with liability for violating a tenant's rights. In some cases, someone whose housing, at least part of the time, is for the convenience of the employer, like a medical resident who uses a sleeping room at a hospital, or a member of the crew of a ship who sleeps on the ship incident to their duties, may have reduced rights relative to housing when their employment is terminated for cause, although this is only sometimes clearly enunciated in statutes or case law and the law would not be terribly consistent in this area.
Is saying "I want to kill somebody" publicly illegal? I was thinking about a hypothetical legal question. Could I, in the United States, legally say I want to kill someone? This is a civilian who is not well known and is not a government official. I am asking this because I heard you can get arrested for saying you want to kill the POTUS, even without intent of doing it. Does this apply to a desire to murder, say, a coworker but not to actually carry it out? I am a nonviolent person and I do not believe in murder war or anything like it.	Threats are illegal Whether “I want to kill X” is a threat or not depends on context. “I want to kill my ex” while bitching with mates down the pub - not a threat. Same thing said to the ex in the middle of a screaming match might be a threat. Breaking into their house and writing it in the blood of their cat on their bathroom mirror is definitely a threat.	In the US, there are no (and can be no) laws against hate speech. You also cannot sue a person for using an ethnic or similar epithet. A false accusation, however, might be grounds for a defamation lawsuit. Word connotations do not matter, what matters is the denotation, for example calling someone a "rapist" denotes a specific criminal act. Even calling someone a rapist isn't necessarily defamatory, since hyperbole abounds especially on the internet, so in order to actually be defamation, the statement would have to be understood as a particular accusation (a form of unlawful sexual assault). A defamatory statement has to be made with reckless disregard for the truth of a statement, which is not the case in the situation you describe (perhaps the person correctly said that so-and-so is a therapist, but was ineffective in their use of English).	The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate.	I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty").	What Is Treason? Treason is the only crime defined in the U.S. Constitution, at Article III, Section 3 which says: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted. Now let's apply that to your examples. Options For Dealing With The Secretary Secretary X refuses to perform his duty, he can be fired. But does that count as treason? When would his refusal count as treason, if ever. I am assuming that Secretary X is a civilian and not an active duty member of the military forces. The law requires this but there is a process by which a waiver of that limitation can be obtained. But, it is useful in any case to point out the differences between a senior civilian governmental official and a member of the military (different issues still would apply to civilian civil servants who are not political employees and are members of a civil servant's union as well). It would be hard to imagine a fact pattern in which mere failure to perform his duties would constitute treason, although I wouldn't necessarily say that it is categorically impossible that such fact pattern might exist. The President could fire the Secretary for failure to perform his duty, or for that matter, for no reason whatsoever, and appoint someone else to be acting Secretary. If the Secretary also committed some crime by doing more than simply failing to act in some respect (e.g. engaging in espionage), the process would be the same as any other federal criminal prosecution. But, you could fire someone and deny them all authority immediately and without due process or cause, while you would need probable cause to bring criminal charges. Options For Dealing With General A General A is suspected of plotting treason either by conspiring with a foreign power or plotting a coup. The President can investigate the claims and find if there is probable cause to believe that General A is engaged in this conduct, and if so, can order the General's arrest. The General could be tried in a Court Martial for conduct in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but, treason is not a crime covered by the UCMJ. The applicable offense for a coup participant under the UCMJ would be Article 94: ART. 94. MUTINY OR SEDITION (a) Any person subject to this chapter who-- (1) with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, refuses, in concert with any other person, to obey orders or otherwise do his duty or creates any violence or disturbance is guilty of mutiny; (2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority, creates, in concert with any other person, revolt, violence, or disturbance against that authority is guilty of sedition; (3) fails to do his utmost to prevent and suppress a mutiny or sedition being committed in his presence, or fails to take all reasonable means to inform his superior commissioned officer or commanding officer of a mutiny or sedition which he knows or has reason to believe is taking place, is guilty of a failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition. (b) A person who is found guilty of attempted mutiny, mutiny, sedition, or failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court- martial may direct. The President, however, also has the power to order any member of the military to do just about anything, with or without cause. For example, the President would be entirely within his rights to order General A to report to the Barracks at Fort Levenworth (a military prison) or to a maintenance detail in a South Korean Army base, as active duty personnel individual assigned to that duty (i.e. not detained as a prisoner) and to await further orders. If General A disobeyed this order, then General A would have committed an offense under the UCMJ and could be detained and tried for violating a valid military order. Thus, the President could assign suspected coup participants to duties where they would not be helpful in carrying out a coup without due process even though he couldn't have them arrested on a mere suspicion, even under the UCMJ. The President can't just reduce the General's rank outright, as the General has a property interest in that rank earned over the course of a career. It would take a Courts-Martial to do that. But, the General could be assigned to a new post with the same rank at any time without due process. Suspension of Habeas Corpus Is the belief that a coup is underway enough evidence to suspend Posse Comitatus or Habeas Corpus. I'll address the first part of this question under this heading and the second part under the next heading. The suspension of Habeas Corpus is discussed at Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution (pertaining to the legislative branch) and states: The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. By implication, the fact that the provision is located in Article I pertaining to Congress and not Article II pertaining to the Presidency or Article III pertaining to the judicial branch, suggests that only Congress main suspend the writ of habeas corpus. A Civil War case addressed this separation of powers issue and held that the President may not suspend the Writ of Habeas corpus without the approval of Congress, but its status as valid precedent is contested: Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487), is a well-known and controversial U.S. federal court case which arose out of the American Civil War. It was a test of the authority of the President to suspend "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" under the Constitution's Suspension Clause, when Congress was in recess and therefore unavailable to do so itself. U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney ruled that the authority to suspend habeas corpus lay exclusively with Congress. The Executive Branch, including the Army, failed to comply with Taney's Merryman opinion, and John Merryman remained inaccessible to the judiciary (and the civilian legal authorities generally) while Congress remained in recess. Taney filed his Merryman decision with the United States Circuit Court for the District of Maryland, but it is unclear if Taney's decision was a circuit court decision. One view, based in part on Taney's handwritten copy of his decision in Merryman, is that Taney heard the habeas action under special authority granted to federal judges by Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. According to this view, Merryman was an in-chambers decision. Due to its vague jurisdictional locus and hastened disposition, the nature of the Merryman decision remains contested to this day. The separation of powers issue regarding the power of the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus was not addressed squarely in the later and more famous Ex Parte Milligan, 72 U.S. 2 (1866) (which undisputedly remains good law) which held that neither the President nor Congress could suspend the writ of habeas corpus to allow the trial of civilians within the United States by a military tribunal outside a war zone. As Wikipedia explains: The president's ability to suspend the writ of habeas corpus without congressional approval was not addressed in this case, most likely because it was a moot issue with respect to the case at hand. (President Lincoln suspended the writ nationwide on September 24, 1862, and Congress ratified this action on March 3, 1863, with the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act. Milligan was detained in October 1864, more than a year after Congress formally suspended the writ.) The intertwined political and legal history of habeas corpus suspension in the United States is addressed here. A coup is generally not an invasion, although it could be if coordinated with a foreign power. Instead, a coup would probably be a form of a rebellion, which could justify the suspension of habeas corpus. So, Congress could probably suspend the writ of habeas corpus if it felt that a particular coup was a rebellion. A Congressional determination that a particular coup was a rebellion for purposes of suspension of the writ of habeas corpus would probably be a political question beyond court review. But, Congress could do this only once the rebellion was actually in progress and not merely contemplated. This is because, as Milligan makes clear, suspending habeas corpus in advance of an active rebellion that prevents the courts from functioning is unconstitutional anyway. Honestly though, suspension of habeas corpus would probably be pretty irrelevant in a coup. Typically, a coup lasts for a matter of hours or days, maybe a couple of weeks tops. Courts in which one could seek redress from allegedly unlawful detention using a writ of habeas corpus simply don't act that fast, and Congress would be hard pressed to act that fast as well. The coup will have prevailed (in which case the constitution is basically irrelevant) or will have failed (in which case habeas corpus will provide little relief to coup participants) by the time that the courts can get involved. Also, since a coup generally involves members of the military, whose habeas corpus rights arise only once they have exhausted their avenues for relief under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the writ of habeas corpus wouldn't be a remedy available to them anyway. The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus would only be relevant to civilians involved in the coup, who are tried after Congress has suspended the writ, and who have been detained long enough for judicial relief from military detention to be relevant. Also, the post-9-11 experience has been that, contrary to common belief, civilian courts are actually a faster way of resolving cases of non-uniformed persons who commit violent, war-like acts than military tribunals and impose penalties that are just as harsh as those imposed by military tribunals. Convicting these people turns out to be easy. Indeed, in practice, many rebels and terrorists openly admit their crimes without even receiving plea bargains in exchange. So, there would be little benefit to be gained from suspending the writ of habeas corpus in order to allow the use of military tribunals rather than civilian courts to punish civilian participants in a coup. Why Would The President Want To Suspend Posse Comitatus? It makes no sense, however, to talk about suspending the Posse Comitatus Act during a coup, which is exactly the opposite of what you would want the military to do in that situation, if you are the legitimate President. You would want to suspend the Posse Comitatus Act and related laws when there was a grass roots insurgency or an invasion that had not penetrated the military, not during a coup. A coup d'etat is the recognition of the authority of someone other than the legitimate political leaders of a country as the leader of a country in a manner that denies the legitimate political leaders of a country authority by its own military or some subset of that military. The Posse Comitatus Act passed in 1878, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, is a criminal law passed by Congress that makes it a crime to use the military to enforce domestic law, especially criminal law, within the territory of the United States outside military bases (although the term Posse Comitatus is sometimes used more colloquially to refer to a group of laws and regulations with the same effect including but not limited to the true Posse Comitatus Act, such as the Insurrection Act of 1807, 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335). In a coup, by definition, the military is following illegitimate leaders and the whole point is to prevent martial law from being imposed by the military in that situation, which Posse Comitatus is supposed to prevent them from doing. Coup participants could be prosecuted for violating the Posse Comitatus Act by imposing martial law while they are members of the U.S. military on active duty. It would make no sense for the President to suspend it.	"Does threatening to attack cultural heritage constitute conspiracy to commit a war crime..." Almost certainly not. It's a threat to commit a war crime, but is probably not illegal in and of itself. On the other hand, if the Commander In Chief were to ask his generals what would be involved in mounting a cruise missile attack on the Meidan Emam in Esfahan, that would be conspiracy to commit a war crime (as would supplying the requested information).	Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence.	The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law

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