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Why is murder considered a more serious crime than attempted murder? By its sentencing guidelines (the world over?), murder is considered a more serious crime than attempted murder. If intent to kill has indeed been proven, does the latter crime reward incompetence with leniency? i.e. shouldn't the incarceration of such a criminal be intended to either rehabilitate them, or to protect the public from them? So if the intent for an attempted vs. successful crime is the same, wouldn't it take the same effort to rehabilitate them, or require the same precautions to contain them?	Your question is the subject of longstanding and ongoing debate that has generated countless articles and books and dissertations, so you're probably not going to get a fully satisfactory answer here. But here's the short version: Different systems operate on different assumptions. Your question suggests you are not a retributivist, i.e., someone who views sentencing as a means for taking retribution for the criminal's offenses. Some systems (most, I imagine) are built around that idea, but some view criminal sentencing primarily as a means of preventing recidivism, or as a means for achieving rehabilitation, the interests you indicated you see as more important. And even within those systems, there are still different ideas about what you're actually trying to do. Again, you've indicated that you subscribe to an intent-based system (a punishment keyed to what the criminal intended to do), but that approach competes with harm-based sentencing (punishment for the harm the criminal actually caused). While equal punishments make sense from an intent-based approach, they are less justifiable from a harm-based approach. Few would say that attempted murder inflicts the same amount of harm as completed murder, and so that system does not call for the same amount of punishment. Because there are different approaches, sentencing guidelines vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which I would classify as adopting a harm-based retributivism, treat attempts less severely than completed offenses, but other systems treat them equally.	What they teach in self-defense courses is legally irrelevant, though has a practical basis. Under the law, options 1 and 2 are "preferred" because those actions cannot be considered criminal. Shooting a person is potentially a crime (assault or homicide): but it can be legally excused under those circumstances deemed to be "self defense". If shooting a person is justified in self defense, it isn't assault or murder. It is legally "better" to main than to kill, because maiming is less force than killing, and the general rule is that one should use the least force necessary to defend yourself. That is because on the one hand you should not use force against another person, but on the other hand you have a right to live and if a person attempts to deprive you of your life, you are justified to use force to stop them. The degree of force allowed is related to the threat posed. Every legal system encourages putting "shoot to kill" in last place – no jurisdiction favors using maximum possible force in self defense. I think what is confusing you is that as a practical matter, shooting to maim is riskier, and the consequences of erring in favor of less force may be your death. It has nothing to do with killing witnesses (which is illegal), even if that is what they taught you in your self defense class. Brandishing a weapon is also illegal but involves even less force, and is even less effective as a means of self defense.	As you describe it, the survivor knows that the action will result in death, and premeditatedly undertakes the action. So we turn to the murder statute in that (unspecified) jurisdiction, which will be like this: A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when: (a) With a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (b) Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person So the charge is first degree homicide. Because the murder statute might leave a person wondering if "it counts" when the conduct follows somebody's rules, the jury is given instructions clarifying what words mean: for first degree homicide in general see these pages. Most relevant here are the elements of "extreme indifference", also the definition and elements of premeditation. In general, if I say "It's okay if you kill him", that does not make it legal to kill a person, so organizationally sanctioning the move does not legalize it.	For the record, factual impossibility is rarely a defense to a crime. In United States v. Thomas the court decided that men who believed they were raping a drunken unconscious women were guilty of attempted rape, even though the woman was dead at the time. In this case there is no facts that made the offense impossible to commit. The suspect clearly submitted a false prescription and obtained the drugs he or she wished to obtain. There is no impossibility. Instead the police officer, as the saying goes, has the suspect "dead to rights". This is not legal advice. Consult an attorney for that.	Modern legal systems frown on individual retribution. A victim of a crime is not allowed to punish the perpetrator of the crime; that falls to the state. The answer is therefore yes; the person could be arrested, tried, and punished, including by imprisonment.	It is not entrapment because entrapment must be done by officers of the State (police usually). A member of the public inducing another to commit a crime is not entrapment and not a defense to having committed it. Entrapment is a "thing" in Ireland as it is in all common law jurisdictions, however, the specific limits on what police can and cannot do vary by jurisdiction. Police posing as underage children to catch pedophiles is legal throughout Australia (i.e., not entrapment). Police are more restricted in Canada and the USA but I believe that online "trawling" by police is legal in those jurisdictions too, however, they must remain more "passive" than Australian police. Yes, there is a crime being committed, the crime of attempting to engage in underage sex. It doesn't matter that the actual crime attempted is impossible to commit because the "victim" is not actually underage. Evidence is evidence – it doesn't matter who collects it. However, amateurs in the handling of evidence are more likely to botch it up in a way that would allow the defense to have it ruled inadmissible than professionals (although even they can botch it up).	In the United States, many jurisdictions have criminal offenses outlawing behavior that may include what you're describing here. In Ohio, for instance, disorderly conduct (R.C. 2917.11) includes "insulting, taunting, or challenging another, under circumstances in which that conduct is likely to provoke a violent response." In Indiana, there's the offense of provocation (IC 35-42-2-3), which is even broader and includes "recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally [engaging] in conduct that is likely to provoke a reasonable person to commit battery." It looks like this has been interpreted to include even actions that don't directly involve the provoked person, such as kissing another man's wife. Beyond the criminal offense, there are also jurisdictions that will permit a civil suit for damages resulting from the criminal act. There are also states where this could constitute intentional interference with business relations or intentional interference with an employment contract. In any of those cases, your co-workers could be looking at damages for lost wages, loss of reputation, etc.	Exactly the same thing that stops the same rogue lawyer from putting on a mask and robbing a bank. One is the crime of fraud and the other the crime of armed robbery but they are both crimes. People commit crimes all the time; that is why nearly 1 million people in the U.S. are in jail right now - some of them may even be in there for crimes they actually committed! Were your lawyer to commit this crime he may get caught or he may not; if he does he's going away for a long time and can never work as a lawyer again. So it's simply a matter of risk assessment; oh, and ethics
What's the difference between gross negligence and criminal negligence? What's the difference between gross negligence and criminal negligence? A simple example that would show the difference would be appreciated.	Criminal negligence pertains to criminal acts, which are prosecuted by the government and where a defendant can be convicted and punished. There will be a statute explaining where "criminal negligence" is relevant and when it is applicable. Here is the section in Washington law about criminal negligence: A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. There are a number of criminal offenses where being "criminally negligent" in doing the thing is sufficient, for example mistreatment of a child or manslaughter. First degree murder requires "premeditated intent to cause the death of another person" which does not does not include "criminal negligence" (there is a separate clause about "under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life" which is different from criminal negligence). "Gross negligence" can arise in a number of other non-criminal circumstances, and is defined (and discussed) here. Gross negligence is the failure to exercise slight care. It is negligence that is substantially greater than ordinary negligence. Failure to exercise slight care does not mean the total absence of care but care substantially less than ordinary care. This concept arises under numerous laws such as the gross negligence of government officers in fish and wildlife matters, where the game wardn can be sued and found civilly liable for gross negligence in performance of duties. He can't be imprisoned (it's not a crime), but he can be fired or forced to compensate the damaged party. There is no clear difference in what level of negligence we are talking about, instead the difference has to do what what kind of law we are concerned with. Usually (?), crimes are intentional acts where the prosecution has to prove that the defendant intended to do so-and-so. But laws are also written so that certain levels of bad behavior also punishable, such as tricking a person into falling to their death as part of a jackass stunt. One use of "gross negligence" in a civil case is that certain act may be immunized against liability arising from simple negligence (Good Samaritan law for example), but not gross negligence.	As @cpast says in their comment, these are not equivalent punishments, the fine is for the lower end of the scale where incarceration is not warranted and the maximum gaol term is for the most egregious cases. That said, your supposition is almost certainly correct; statutes tend to be a "set and forget" thing, legislatures have a lot to do and going back to old laws to update fines in line with inflation is probably not high on their list of priorities. In order to overcome this problem all jurisdictions in Australia have adopted the Penalty Unit; fines in statutes are stated as a certain number of penalty units and the value of a penalty unit is set in various ways that usually do not require a vote in parliament.	There are both statutes and customs aimed at preventing "Malicious Prosecution" and "Abuse of Process." (In Pennsylvania, for example, the 1980 Dragonetti Act allows the victim of a frivolous lawsuit to counter-sue for compensatory damages.) One can also buy insurance against this type of risk: Umbrella liability policies will generally provide a defense against civil lawsuits and any damages awarded, as will many business insurance policies. Of course, none of this is to say that a skilled legal team can't avoid all of these countermeasures and, in practice, take up a significant amount of your time and trouble. We do not have a perfect system of justice.	“homicide by misadventure." . . . is when somebody accidentally kills somebody else while engaged in a legal activity and without any intent to cause harm. There is a criminal offense sometimes called negligent homicide, and sometimes called involuntary manslaughter (in some jurisdictions this is limited to, for example, vehicular homicide and homicide caused with a deadly weapon or involving a child or vulnerable adult). Where this offense is present, it requires a level of intent of at least "criminal negligence" which is roughly equivalent to "gross negligence" in civil lawsuits and is almost, but not quite recklessness. But if the conduct causing the death involves merely ordinary negligence at a level providing a basis for a civil action for negligence, or only involves acts which unforeseeably cause death despite the fact that the person carrying out the act used the care of a reasonable person under the circumstances (in which case there is a basis for a civil lawsuit only in the rare circumstances where there is strict liability), this is not a crime. Sometimes, however, the conduct involved may violate some other law (e.g. speeding or hunting after having already reached one's game kill limit) that is a lesser crime, even though it is not a homicide crime.	You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment.	I think that the language In consideration of permission to use, ... Recreational Sports Department ... arising from, but not limited to, participation in activities, classes, observation, and use of facilities, premises, or equipment. would be read as limiting the waiver to cases in some way connected with the RSF. Even so limited it is rather broad, and may not be enforceable. In particular public facilities are not always allowed to obtain a waiver of otherwise valid negligence claims. If it were interpreted to mean "all claims on any matter, even ones having nothing at all to do with the RSF" then I think it would be so broad as to be unenforceable as unconscionable, and as misleading, so that there was no meeting of minds.	Yes. And also no. See What is the difference between Common Law and Civil Law in the U.S.? A common law system is a common law system and that obviously encompasses criminal law. But that’s not the only definition of common law. In most common law jurisdictions, most crimes are now statutory crimes. That is, what they are and the punishment for them is detailed in an Act of Parliament (or local equivalent). However, the codification of what were once common law crimes is not (and arguably cannot) be complete. There still exist common law crimes which can be pulled out when needed. For example, in DPP v Pusey, the defendant was pulled over by several police officers and, while this was happening, a large truck collided with the stopped cars and the police officers were killed. While they were dying Pusey took out his phone and recorded their deaths while mocking and taunting them. This was not against any statutory criminal code in Victoria. So, the Director of Public Prosecutions pulled out the archaic common law offence of outraging public decency. In addition, statutory crimes are necessarily interpreted by judges and aggregate a collection of common law rulings around them.	In the US this is generally governed by state law: RCW 4.24.350 in Washington state. The criminal jury is not empowered to make such a decision, but a separate civil trial for malicious prosecution would be possible. Plaintif (ex defedant) would have to prove that the action was instituted with knowledge that the same was false, and unfounded, malicious and without probable cause in the filing of such action, or that the same was filed as a part of a conspiracy to misuse judicial process by filing an action known to be false and unfounded The basis for the lawsuit would be the objective facts that prove that the prosecution was false and malicious, and not the fact of acquittal or the subjective opinion of a juror.
Will SCOTUS be forced to rule on birthright citizenship soon? John C. Eastman, professor of law, Chapman University, wrote this in Newsweek a few days ago: Indeed, the Supreme Court has never held that anyone born on U.S. soil, no matter the circumstances of the parents, is automatically a U.S. citizen. Granted, our government's view of the Constitution's citizenship mandate has morphed over the decades to what is now an absolute "birth on the soil no matter the circumstances" view—but that morphing does not appear to have begun until the late 1960s, after Kamala Harris' birth in 1964. Some other legal scholars previously expressed similar opinions. Matthew Spalding, of Hillsdale College wrote in WSJ: Even when the justices expanded the constitutional mandate U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), the decision cited as establishing birthright citizenship, they held only that the children of legal permanent residents were automatically citizens. The high court has never held that the clause confers automatic citizenship on the children of temporary visitors, much less of aliens in the country illegally. Will Kamala Harris's vice-presidential run force SCOTUS to make a decision about birthright citizenship before the election? Edit: I'd like to emphasize that this question is not about how the Citizenship Clause should be interpreted (which is discussed in a separate question, as @phoog pointed out, and in Prof. Eastman's article itself), but whether SCOTUS can be expected to opine on it, in light of recent controversies.	Probably not, because there is no legal case or controversy, and the law is clear enough. In US v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, SCOTUS held that A child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution The opinion has a long analysis of the "subject to jurisdiction" clause, reasoning that this excludes only children of diplomats, who are not subject to US law. Harris's parents were not immune diplomats so she was never immune to US jurisdiction. They are never forced to take any case, and are especially not likely to take a case so lacking in legal merits.	Here is everything that I learnt throughout this process: I was not born a U.S. citizen, and I did not naturalise. Instead, I inherited U.S. citizenship at the moment I became an LPR (Legal Permanent Resident), because I both had a parent with citizenship and I was under the age of 18. There is no paperwork to file to inherit citizenship this way, it is completely automatic and as a result there are people in the U.S. that do not know they are citizens. In order to assert that I was now a U.S. citizen, I just had to apply for either a U.S. passport, or a Certificate of Citizenship. There is no deadline to do this, because I was a fully-fledged citizen from the day of approval of my Permanent Residence application. When I applied for my U.S. passport, I simply had to prove that I was a child at the time of receiving my Green Card, and that one parent was a U.S. citizen. This is exactly what I had to provide the German consulate. I provided my own birth certificate, my I-485 form (with approval date) and my father's naturalisation certificate. Those were accepted without question. To obtain a copy of my Form I-485, I had to file a FOIA request--I used a Form G-639 to make it easier--and I emailed it to [email protected]. I did attempt to get a copy of my passport application, as I filed that while under 18, but I was told by the State Department that they did not have a copy of it (curiously, several months later a full copy of my original passport application arrived by post from the State Department...). The response was not a surprise as when I applied for a passport at the age of 17, I was told by the official that they do not keep a record of my application, so I should also have a Passport Card in case my passport goes missing and I must prove citizenship. Under German citizenship law, one loses citizenship when "voluntarily" obtaining another citizenship. The reason that I did not lose my citizenship when I became a U.S. citizen was because: I was a child, and it happened automatically. Therefore, it is not considered voluntary. Luckily, I did not have to explain this, since it was a consulate in the U.S. (Houston, TX) that I visited, they were well aware of the way in which I inherited U.S. citizenship. However, I had some trouble when dealing with the London embassy as they did not understand all of the U.S. citizenship qualifiers. I hope this helps anyone else that finds themselves in a similar situation! I was completely lost when I started this process, but three months later I have my German passport in my hand.	Only for certain parts of the constitution, and not for the parts you are asking about. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has squarely stated that neither the First Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment "acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens."13 For more than a century, the Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause is "universal in [its] application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to differences of ... nationality."14 The Court has repeatedly stated that "the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."15 When noncitizens, no matter what their status, are tried for crimes, they are entitled to all of the rights that attach to the criminal process, without any distinction based on their nationality.16 Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens? - David Cole, Georgetown University Law Center	Is it a correct inference that the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" extends to even a private corporation? No. It's not even a correct inference that it extends by its own terms to state and local governments. In Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights was enacted as part of the federal constitution and only restricts the exercise of the federal government's authority. State and local governments are instead bound by the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Over the years, the courts have held that state action that deprives someone of fundamental rights deprives them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Wolf v. Colorado (1949), the Supreme Court held that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a fundamental right, so state action violating it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most of the Bill of Rights has been held to be "fundamental," and people routinely say "the state violated the Fourth Amendment" instead of "the state violated the Fourteenth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable search of the sort that would violate the Fourth Amendment if conducted by the federal government." Courts will say "the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth." But the point is that the Fourth Amendment itself is not applicable to anyone except the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, only restricts the states. The Fourth Amendment only restricts the federal government. With rare exceptions, neither applies to private entities.	While the Supreme Courts of Germany, Honduras, India and Italy have asserted such authority, the U.S. Supreme Court's justiciable decisions about a U.S. Constitutional Amendment are generally limited to a determination of whether the amendment was lawfully adopted pursuant to Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which states: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. Usually, U.S. Supreme Court litigation over a constitutional amendment would be over whether the process of Article V has been conformed to in a particular case (which has been litigated in several prior cases). The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), that even some procedural issues are political questions for Congress to resolve that are non-justiciable, in part because the mode of ratification is expressly delegated to Congress in Article V. As the summary of Coleman at the link above explains: In an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court held that the Kansas legislators had standing to sue, but found that two of the plaintiffs’ claims raised political questions that could only be resolved by Congress. With respect to the whether the Kansas legislature’s previous rejection of the Child Labor Amendment precluded its subsequent ratification, the Court stated that this “should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the amendment.” But, with respect to the language in bold in the quoted language of Article V above, the U.S. Supreme Court could determine that a constitutional amendment is unconstitutional. This narrow ground, however, is the sole basis upon which it may do so.	Would such a person be considered a "natural born citizen," for the purpose of qualifying for the presidency, from October 25th 1994? In other words, after having lived in the US for at least 14 years, could such a person run for the office of the president or the vice president? This is an unresolved issue. Some scholars believe that to be a "natural born citizen" you have to be a citizen on the day that you are born. Other scholars believe that a "natural born citizen" is someone who gains citizenship by a means other than naturalization. No binding precedents resolve the issue because the phrase "natural born citizen" is used nowhere else in the law besides qualification to be the President of the United States, and the issue can't be resolved until someone is purportedly elected because there isn't an actual case or controversy until then, and there haven't been an examples that have come up that have tested this issue. My personal guess is that the courts would make every effort to find that someone who has been elected by the citizens of the United States as President, despite the inevitable debate by the public over someone's qualification as a "natural born citizen" during the campaign, is eligible to hold that position, because to do otherwise would seem massively undemocratic. So, I suspect that retroactive citizenship at birth would be held by the courts to make someone a "natural born citizen" and eligible to serve as President. Then again, I could see this issue being resolved by the courts on basically partisan lines too with conservative judges tending to hold that a liberal candidate was ineligible for office, and liberal judges making the opposite conclusions about a liberal candidate. This is one fair reading of what happened in the case of Bush v. Gore. Would the answer depend on whether the person had been naturalized before 1994? The citizenship by naturalization is irrelevant to whether you have another grounds for claiming citizenship that was present at birth or did not arise from naturalization. On October 25th, 1994, the naturalization became redundant.	The 14th amendment guarantees equal protection under the law for all citizens of the US. It's my understanding that this means from the Federal Government, and doesn't exactly apply when it's a "states' rights" kind of issue. Your understanding is incorrect. The primary original purpose of the 14th amendment was to prevent states from passing laws that treated former slaves differently from other citizens, and indeed to clearly declare that they were in fact citizens, thus reversing the decision in Dred Scot v Sandford 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). That decision held that black people could not be US citizens and had no rights granted to citizens under the US Federal Constitution. Of course the amendment is applied in a much wider scope than merely granting citizenship to the former slaves freed by the 13th amendment. The Equal Protection Clause** generally requires that laws not make arbitrary and unjustified distinctions between people, nor treat different people in the same legal situation differently. The clause does not, however, prevent laws from treating who are in some significant legal sense in different positions differently. What is and is not a violation of the clause has been the subject of many legal cases and much debate. The clause requires "state action" to be invoked. and is generally only applies to state and local governments, and those in their employ or acting on their behalf. However, the US Supreme Court held in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) that the 5th amendment imposes a similar requirement of equal protection on the Federal government. The amendment, and the equal protection clause, do not guarantee any particular outcome in judicial cases. It is not clear from the question what equal protection issue, if any, might be at issue in the particular matter described. If the issue is one of treatment under the laws of a country other than the US, even though the people involved are US citizens, the US constitution, including the amendment will not apply.	Technically, they were born in the United States, at least under US law, and the law of any existing nation. The United States never recognised the Confederacy, nor did any other country. There are occasional wingnut groups who declare themselves separate from the United States, but a simple declaration of secession does not create a country – you also have to win the war. The Supreme Court affirmed that the secessionist states were always an integral part of the Union in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869). Since they only had jurisdiction if Texas was a state at the relevant time (some time on or before January 15, 1865), by accepting the case, they implicitly affirmed that Texas was part of the Union. Further, in the judgement itself, they explicitly stated that the acts of secession of not just Texas, but every rebel state were “absolutely null”.
Can you have valid Terms and Condictions when there is no entity mentioned? I was reading the terms and conditions here https://www.binance.com/en/terms. What exactly are they? Are they a natural person? Are them a company? And if so where are they registered? Do they have multiple registrations? What is their domicile?	Can you have valid Terms and Condictions when there is no entity mentioned? No, but the example you post is inapplicable because the terms clearly state in the beginning that the agreement is between "you" and "Binance operators". The latter is defined shortly thereafter. Thus, it certainly identifies the entity. A contract does not need to exhaustively list all information such as parties' registration(s) or domicile. As long as a reasonable person is able to grasp who are the entities entering a contract, that contract is binding and enforceable. If it cannot be ascertained from the contract who the counterparty(-ies) is(are), then neither party can prove that he and other entity(-ies) knowingly and willfully agreed to an exchange of considerations or promises thereof. Accordingly, nobody would have standing to sue others for breach of contract.	The United State doesn't have a national sales or value added tax, so the IRS would only care about the phone sale insofar as it might represent income to the seller. Insofar as it's income to the seller, it doesn't matter whether the transaction is cash, bitcoin or barter, the seller is supposed to account for it in their income taxes. If you are suggesting that bitcoin sales could be hidden, well, folks have been hiding cash transactions since taxes were invented. Worst case, the IRS discovers that the seller's spending is wildly out of line with their stated income and they begin a criminal investigation.	I think you're viewing the use of pronouns and contracts wrong. You are speaking to the Licensee, not some third person. So you would say "You agree to give us all your bases", not "The]y agree to give us all your bases". If you were to use a third person pronoun in describing what the other person is gonna do and what you'll do for them, calling the Licensee "they" is positively confusing, and more likely to cause problems. I hope they see my point.	You have two downvoted answers here. One of them is actually correct, one is nonsense. Question: Which one? Answer: Doesn't matter. If you provide this service without getting advice from a competent lawyer first, your risk is much too high. Making the wrong decision (either giving up on a good business idea without reason, or providing a banking service without license) will cost you much much more than paying a lawyer for advice.	I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.	First of all, in a GDPR contest, the process described is not strong anonymization. It may be hard for an outsider to go from the stored record to any PII, it is much easier for an outsider to "single out" an individual. This means that given a known individual, one can determine whether that person is among those listed in the records, or can determine this to a significant degree of probability. For this only the algorithm and the rotating salts are needed, one need not break the hash. Note also that the GDPR specifies that if a person can be singled out with the assistance of the site operator the data is not considered anonymized. Thus this data needs a lawful basis under the GDPR, and the various other GDPR requirement all apply. However, even if the data were totally anonymized, and say just added to a count of users with this or that User Agent, the process of reading local data (including but not limited to cookies) itself requires informed consent, and so a cookie banner or other interaction with similar info under the e-Privacy directive (EPD). The EPD, being a directive and not a regulation, must be implemented by national laws, and the exact provisions in those laws may differ somewhat from country to country. But I believe that all of them require consent before any local data is read.	In the US, "insider trading" includes both legal and illegal versions. When a corporate employee buys or sells shares of their company, they are insiders and they are trading (there is a requirement to report to the government). The illegal version involves breach of fiduciary duty or confidence. The relevant section of the federal regulations is 17 CFR 240.10b on "Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances", and you will note that the section does not rely on the term "insider" in the law part, instead it directly characterizes what acts are illegal. Thus it would not matter, from a legal perspective, if someone considers you an insider. It is illegal to trade in securities using a “manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance”. This relates to what is commonly known as insider trading via rule 240.10b5-1, by defining as manipulative and deceptive trading on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information (emphasis added to focus on the core requirements). Whether or not you have a "duty of trust or confidence" is determined by common law standards, that is, it depends on how courts have ruled on similar matters. For instance if the CEO of Apple tells you "Our computers explode and it's gonna be on the news tonight, the stock is gonna tank, but it would be illegal for you to act on that information", then it would be illegal, because you are aware that the CEO has a duty to not use that information (thus you "inherit" the duty). This also holds if he doesn't tell you that acting on the information, since it is expected that you know that the CEO of Apple could not legally act on that information (even if in fact you are unaware of the law -- ignorance of the law doesn't get you anywhere good). However, if you are unaware and could not know that the person making the factual disclosure is divulging information that he has a duty to shut up about, then you might not get prosecuted.	You say the permission was "public", therefore I am going to assume that it cannot be argued that there was no agreement. There are two possibilities: If Company B has given consideration for the promise then there is a binding contract and Company A may be able to end it but could not seek redress for when it was in place. If there is no contract then the principle of promissory estoppel should have essentially the same effect. An agreement, including an IP licence, does not have to be in writing nor does it have to have any particular form.
How does one prove that a sweepstakes winner was chosen randomly? From here, it states: If you are running a sweepstake, you absolutely must choose your winner randomly. Additionally, these people are ineligible to enter: your family, anyone who lives at your address, any of your employees or contractors, your sponsor, and your sponsor’s employees or contractors. In that case, would there be a legal requirement that a third party inspects and monitors the random selection process?	You present ordinary fact testimony regarding how the winner was actually selected and then you hire an expert witness to conclude that this process is sufficiently close to random for the purposes for which it is being used. In some cases of "safe harbor" random selection methods like rolling dice, drawing cards, drawing lots, pulling the short straw, flipping a coin, activating a random number generator, pulling a slip out of a hat, etc., you could dispense with the expert testimony because there is case law already establishing that the method in question counts as a random method of selection.	I make a copy of any important receipt printed on thermal paper, since the terms of many sellers and manufacturers require receipts for disputes. But I'm not aware of any law that says they have to make it convenient to maintain a receipt or other proof of purchase. However, when a company makes their terms unclear, unexpected, or difficult to comply with it seems there is often a lawyer ready to step up and file a class action lawsuit. Here's one archive to give you an idea of what companies will settle. In the United States the FTC is also empowered by law to "protect consumers," which means that if "disappearing" receipts become a widespread problem for consumers they could take action on the government's authority: The Federal Trade Commission Act is the primary statute of the Commission. Under this Act, the Commission is empowered, among other things, to (a) prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; (b) seek monetary redress and other relief for conduct injurious to consumers; (c) prescribe trade regulation rules defining with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or practices; (d) conduct investigations relating to the organization, business, practices, and management of entities engaged in commerce; and (e) make reports and legislative recommendations to Congress. Given the above, I wouldn't be surprised to see either a class-action lawsuit or FTC rule that requires retailers to provide "durable" receipts, or some convenient substitute.	You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do.	Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams.	Game of skill? Nonsense. There are skills that can help you out / prevent you from making bad decisions, but it's still gambling nonetheless. There is no gambling license you can obtain to operate an online poker site, or really any other online site that allows gambling, in the United States. It is completely against the law. In fact, the FBI shut down a few of these poker sites back in 2011 for fraud. Read up on United States v. Scheinberg.	It's probably not unlawful to ask, but an answer cannot be required immediately. Per the Department of Labor, Susan has 60 days to elect COBRA coverage (the qualifying event here being the termination of Susan's employment): Your plan must give you at least 60 days to choose whether or not to elect COBRA coverage, beginning from the date the election notice is provided or the date you would otherwise lose coverage under your group health plan due to the qualifying event, whichever is later. It would be unlikely for an employer to discourage an employee from electing COBRA coverage due to costs to the employer, as you suggest: Susan is still employed and thus could be treated differently in her last two weeks depending on how she responds because the company is struggling financially and is looking for every opportunity to save money. Susan electing to use COBRA coverage is unlikely to cost the company money, because the employer is permitted to charge her the entire cost of the coverage, plus 2 percent to cover the cost of administering it (additional DoL source). As far as privacy goes, I don't think anything illegal has occurred here. The most prevalent law regarding privacy of health information, HIPAA, generally does not apply to employers. Susan could, of course, request a private discussion, and any response from Emily could not rise to the level of illegal harassment or create a hostile work environment.	Is the question just whether a company can contact its customers to ensure that they're happy with the company's services? If so, the answer is generally yes. I can think of no reason why this would change based on the fact that someone saw her using the services of a competitor. Your mother seems to be treating the phone call as an accusation, but it appears to be standard customer-relationship maintenance. If she chooses to approach it differently, she can use it to improve her bargaining power with Gym 1.	There is no money being offered or given to the voter. There is a long-running traditional bipartisan expenditure in Pennsylvania known variously as street money and get out the vote money that is legally used to reimburse volunteers for expenses to drive voters to the polls. The second article linked asserts this is a first amendment protected right. This seems in line with such historical expenditures.
What does the US Constitution's Eighth Amendment mean by "punishment?" Historically, the word "punishment" in the Eighth Amendment refers to sentences imposed by a court after a defendant has been found guilty of a crime. However, it seems to me that actions taken by government actors could be considered de facto punishments. For example, if a police officer shoots and kills a person while they are in the process of committing a crime, this could be interpreted as a "punishment." Assuming the prior (that police actions done in the course of duty might be "punishments"), then it stands to reason that such punishments could be cruel and unusual. So, under this interpretation, a police officer shooting and killing a person for a petty crime could be ruled unconstitutional, if it was cruel or unusual. Does this interpretation have any legal basis? Has anyone attempted a legal argument as such?	A punishment is basically a harm to someone's person, liberty, dignity, or property imposed primarily for the purpose of harming someone, rather than to accomplish some non-punitive end such as apprehending a suspected criminal, securing compliance with a court order, exchanging truthful facts, or compensating someone for harm legally attributable to the person upon whom the act is imposed. If a police officer shoots and kills a person while they are in the process of committing a crime, that is not a punishment, because the officer is not trying to punish someone for committing the crime, but to prevent the crime from continuing and/or to apprehend the suspect. If the use of force is justified by a law authorizing it under the circumstances, then it is legal and there are no civil or criminal consequences. If the use of force is not justified by a law authorizing it under the circumstances it might be a crime, it might be a "tort" (i.e. a civil wrong for which you can sue someone, especially if it arises at common law), or it might be a civil rights violation. Law enforcement officers generally have broad absolute immunity from common law tort liability incurred the course of their duties in carrying out their jobs, and have "qualified immunity" from liability for civil rights violations which limits their liability to cases of intentional violations of clearly established constitutional rights. In a case arising from an excessive use of force against someone who is not in custody, generally speaking, the constitutional right violated is the 4th Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures and to be free from seizures that that are not supported by probable cause. Generally speaking, the law does not recognize an excessive use of force in connection with the criminal justice system as a "taking" for which there is a right to both due process and fair market value compensation (to somewhat oversimplify). Generally speaking, an 8th Amendment analysis involving the use of force (as opposed to taking of money or property in the criminal justice system which are subject to the excessive fines clause of the Bill of Rights), begins, and the 4th Amendment seizure analysis ends, when someone is in custody. A police officer who arrests someone and then beats them up or rapes them and then releases them, might be entering into 8th Amendment, rather than 4th Amendment territory, although the dividing lines are not always clear.	Yes The rule against prosecuting a sitting President is not a law, it is a Justice Department opinion and policy. The justification for it is that dealing with a criminal case would be severely distracting to the President, and thus harmful to the nation. Besides, the opinion goes on, any serious issue can be dealt with by impeachment. That reasoning obviously does not apply to a former President. Article I, section 3, paragraph 7 of the US constitution says: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. (emphasis added) This clearly contemplates the criminal prosecution of a former office holder, after such a person was removed by an impeachment. There is no exception for a President. Therefor a President can be criminally charged and prosecuted for actions during the presidency, provided that the evidence to establish probable cause is there, and that a Grand Jury indicts said former President. So far as I know there has never been a case where such a thing was done. President Ford's pardon of President Nixon stopped any Federal prosecution of him. I think there have been cases were former US Judges, after impeachment, were criminally prosecuted. But that is not quite the same thing -- no one claims that sitting judges are immune to criminal charges. To be clear this would not apply just to issues that a President had been impeached for. A former President is no different from anyone else in this respect. Any such person can be prosecuted if there is probable cause, and convicted if there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal violation of some law, even if the violation occurred while the president was in office.	It excludes pain and suffering incidental to lawful capital and corporal punishment Many countries around the world still execute people. As far as is known, no form of capital punishment is totally painless - even lethal injection involves a needle. In any event, the anticipation of capital punishment is likely to cause suffering. Similarly, corporal punishment such as caning is still a lawful sanction in many jurisdictions. This clearly causes pain - that’s the point - but it isn’t torture. It would also exclude lawful corporal punishment of students by teachers where this is still legal. Or of military personnel by their superiors, again, where that is legal. Now, organisations like Amnesty International consider all of those things to be torture. I don’t think they are wrong in taking that position but, under the convention, they aren’t legally torture.	No, each state is a "sovereign" and whenever a statute describes a crime it is always some act committed by a "person" and these two categories are mutually exclusive. See, for example, US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947): "In common usage, the term `person' does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so." Repeated by US Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653, 667 (1979): "In common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it."	In the specific example you have given, Florida law could not be applied. A state has jurisdiction over a crime under constitutional due process limits on the scope of a state's criminal jurisdiction if the crime is either committed within the state (regardless of where the harm occurs) or is directed at or impacts the state (the classic example is a gunshot fired from the Ohio side of the state line killing someone located in Indiana, which could be prosecuted in either state, or in both states as it doesn't violate double jeopardy to be prosecuted for the same offense by more than one sovereign). Sometimes these issues are framed not as "jurisdictional" per se, but as "conflict of law" questions limited by the constitution. The proof that a crime was committed in the territory where it is applicable is called proof of locus delecti and depends upon the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it. To determine where a crime is committed depends on what acts constitute the crime, something that leaves considerable room for flexible interpretation and a careful reading of the exact wording of the relevant criminal statute. The most important limitation on the territorial jurisdiction of a U.S. state is the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This applies directly in the case of federal criminal prosecutions in the federal courts, and applies in state courts because it is incorporated to apply in state court cases through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States under 20th century case law applying the "Selective Incorporation doctrine." The Sixth Amendment mandates that criminal trials be conducted “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” If a suspect is not present in a state to be criminally prosecuted, then the options available to a state are (1) to toll the running of the statute of limitations while the suspect is outside the state to the extent permitted by the relevant state statute and the U.S. Constitution, (2) to bring a civil lawsuit against the suspect instead of a criminal prosecution, or (3) to seek extradition of the suspect, which must be granted under certain circumstances under the United State Constitution and reads as follows in the pertinent part: Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2: A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. (Note that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil lawsuits. Civil lawsuit trials can be conducted in a state other than the state where the breach of contract or tort giving rise to the lawsuit took place for jurisdictional purposes and not infrequently is brought in another state, although constitutional choice of law rules limit the circumstances under which a particular state's laws can be applied to a particular set of circumstances in a lawsuit.) The Sixth Amendment, on its face, prohibits Florida from prosecuting a case in the example given in the question involving a crime that was committed solely in Washington State. Of course, the exact definition of the crime might determine where it was committed. In traditional "common law" "blue collar" crimes there is usually no ambiguity over where it is committed except in the most extraordinary circumstances, but in prosecutions of conspiracies and crimes involving economic activity (such as owning or mailing something), the question of where a crime is committed can grow much fuzzier. For example, one could imagine a differently defined crime prohibiting providing funds to finance a purchase of marijuana in excess of 20 grams being committed both in Washington State and Florida at the same time (e.g. perhaps a purchase of marijuana in Washington State was financed by a Florida bank by delivering cash to a courier in Florida who is bound for Washington State knowing that the cash would be used to finance a marijuana purchase). Similar ideas apply in international circumstances where the Sixth Amendment and Extradition Clause do not apply. But, in those cases, the more flexible and less well defined "law of nations" as interpreted by Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court and the President still does impose some territorial boundaries on prosecutions for actions which are not crimes in the country where they are committed under that country's domestic laws. But, those boundaries are not so hard and fast and the idea that a crime is committed in places where it has an impact allow for considerable flexibility in prosecuting crimes committed outside the United States. It has also been well settled since the earliest days of the United States that "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (U.S. Supreme Court 1825) and that this applies to states applying each other's penal laws as well. So, Florida cannot enforce a violation of the criminal laws of Washington State in its courts either. If you get in a bar fight in Seattle, you can't be prosecute for assault in a court in Orlando, even if both of the parties to the bar fight were Orlando residents and U.S. citizens. Some notable cases resolving the question of whether locus delecti is present in a particular case include the following: In Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) although none of the defendants had entered the District of Columbia as part of their conspiracy to defraud the United States, they were convicted because one co-conspirator had committed overt acts in Columbia (225 U.S., at 363). So conspiracy is a continuing offense committed in all the districts where a co-conspirator acts on the agreement. Similarly, In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257 (1890) the sending of letters from New York to postmasters in Connecticut in an attempt to gain postage on credit, made Connecticut, where the mail he addressed and dispatched was received, an appropriate venue (136 U.S., at 266—268). A typical state statute on the subject from Colorado's Revised Statutes (2016) is as follows: § 18-1-201. State jurisdiction (1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commits, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if: (a) The conduct constitutes an offense and is committed either wholly or partly within the state; or (b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt, as defined by this code, to commit an offense within the state; or (c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within the state, and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or (d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense prohibited under the laws of this state and such other jurisdiction. (2) An offense is committed partly within this state if conduct occurs in this state which is an element of an offense or if the result of conduct in this state is such an element. In homicide, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death or the death itself; and if the body of a criminal homicide victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state. (3) Whether an offender is in or outside of the state is immaterial to the commission of an offense based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state. Case law under this statute sometimes describes the issue presented under this statute a question of "sovereign jurisdiction." See, e.g., People v. Cullen, 695 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1984).	Only Parliament has the power to define crimes in law (well, also in the UK there are common law crimes, where ages ago the courts defined punishable wrongs). The police have the power to enforce existing law, but not the power to create new crimes. Part of police power is the power to use force to enforce laws. If a person is trying to kill another (which is a crime), the police can use force to stop the person from committing this crime. Police power can be statutorily encoded (Parliament passes a law saying what police can and cannot do), or it could be part of common law. As for laws regulating a suspect, there may be a specific statutory prohibition – "you may not reach into your pocket" – or there is a common law inference to be made, that if the police have the power to order you to not reach into your pocket you may be forced to comply. The subtle distinction here is that if it is a crime to reach into your pocket when told not to, you can be prosecuted and imprisoned. If there is no such crime, you just have the consequence that you can be roughed up to some extent for disobeying the police order. One act of Parliament is the Offences against the Person Act 1861 §38 which says Whosoever . . . shall assault any person with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of himself or of any other person for any offence, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, NB "assault" does not require physical contact: creating apprehension suffices. Another law is the Police Act 1996 §89 which says Any person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty, or a person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both These laws do not exhaustively list all of the things that are forbidden (e.g. they do not say "may not bite. nor scratch, nor kick..."), instead, the prohibitions fall under the general rubric of assault and resisting. Under the circumstances, it is possible that the person could be criminally prosecuted, but even in lieu of a prosecution, it is strongly probable that the police use of force in this instance was lawful. One would have to await the outcome of investigations and litigation to know for sure.	That statute, which was struck down by the Supreme Court in US v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, does not define desecration. Case law on point is not forthcoming since there is no enforceable law on the topic and as long as the First Amendment holds, we can't test laws prohibiting flag desecration. The general meaning of the word is to treat disrespectfully, irreverently, or profanely, and that clearly is not the case in the present usage. A different statute yet to be written might outlaw "any modifications of the flag" (and would suffer the same fate as 18 USC 700), which could be technically violated in the application of a thin blue line to a flag.	The statute in question (which is unusual and not part of the law in most U.S. states) is as follows: (a) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) observes the commission of a felony under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that an offense had been committed in which serious bodily injury or death may have resulted; and (2) fails to immediately report the commission of the offense to a peace officer or law enforcement agency under circumstances in which: (A) a reasonable person would believe that the commission of the offense had not been reported; and (B) the person could immediately report the commission of the offense without placing himself or herself in danger of suffering serious bodily injury or death. (b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. There is no indication that violation of this section gives rise to civil liability. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez came to its conclusion that there was no civil liability of a police department or police officers for failure to enforce a restraining order in the face of language in a state statute whose plain language fairly clearly created a mandatory duty to that effect. The offense of unlawful restraint Texas Penal Code § 20.02 is as follows: (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly restrains another person. (b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person restrained was a child younger than 14 years of age; (2) the actor was a relative of the child; and (3) the actor's sole intent was to assume lawful control of the child. (c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is: (1) a state jail felony if the person restrained was a child younger than 17 years of age; or (2) a felony of the third degree if: (A) the actor recklessly exposes the victim to a substantial risk of serious bodily injury; (B) the actor restrains an individual the actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty or in retaliation or on account of an exercise of official power or performance of an official duty as a public servant; or (C) the actor while in custody restrains any other person. (d) It is no offense to detain or move another under this section when it is for the purpose of effecting a lawful arrest or detaining an individual lawfully arrested. (e) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person restrained was a child who is 14 years of age or older and younger than 17 years of age; (2) the actor does not restrain the child by force, intimidation, or deception; and (3) the actor is not more than three years older than the child. In practice, almost any restraint by a police officer would not obviously be outside the immunity for a lawful arrest sufficient to give rise to the duty to report a felony. Also, the person who decides whether to press charges is the prosecuting attorney who has a strong long term strategic interest in maintain a positive relationship with law enforcement and who often subjectively views law enforcement as his client even though this is the correct as a matter of legal doctrine. Question 1: Are any police on the scene responsible for reporting the crime of unlawful restraint which has become a felony in their presence? In general law enforcement may have a duty under department policy as a matter of employment law, but there is no general legal duty for a police officer to report a crime committed in their presence. Law enforcement officers, like prosecutors have wide discretion over whether they will choose to enforce crimes in the U.S. But, since Texas has a mandatory reporting law, this comes down more to a matter of interpretation and a restraint by an officer would almost never never give rise to a felony due to the privilege for an arrest. Also, it isn't at all obvious that a law enforcement officer has to report the crime to anyone but him or herself to satisfy the requirements of the law, and there is no duty for a law enforcement officer to act upon a report of a felony. Question 2: Would the police in not reporting the crime be implicating more involvement than mere presence and thereby threaten their immunity stance? Generally not. To have liability personally, the law enforcement officer would have to be a co-conspirator. Usually conspiracy liability would require an affirmative action in support of the illegal action and not merely inaction in the form of failing to report a crime. Police have qualified immunity from civil liability for any act that is not a clearly established violation of a constitutional right. If the police do not owe a duty to protect the person being unlawfully restrained, it would seem they still owe a duty to uphold the laws of the state like they would for the crimes of jaywalking, driving without a seat belt, or rape. This is mistaken. Law enforcement officers have no legally enforceable duty to uphold any laws. They may have a moral duty to do so, and they may have a strong employment relationship pressure to do so, but a law enforcement officer faces neither civil nor criminal liability for merely failing to enforce a criminal law when they know a crime has been committed. If the police do not owe a duty to the citizen to arrest another officer for violating the law do they at least owe a duty to the law to make a criminal complaint regarding the violation they witnessed? Arguably, there is a criminal law duty to report a clear felony, but since the duty is only to report the matter to a law enforcement officer and they are a law enforcement officer, it isn't clear that this statute applies at all. A report of a suspected felony is not a criminal complaint. And if so, and if they do not, would they be more accountable than the populace who are required by law to report felonies? No. As noted above, they are arguably less accountable than members of the general public.
What is the legal definition of at the entrance (parking sign law) This is specifically in regards to parking sign law in Mesa, AZ. The legal wording is The owner or the agent of the owner of any private parking area shall be deemed to have given consent to unrestricted parking by the general public in such parking area unless such parking area is posted with signs as prescribed by this Section which are clearly visible and readable from any point within the parking area and at each entrance thereto. I could not find a clarification of what "at the entrance" means. I can see two interpretations: Physically situated at the entrance. Clearly visible and readable from the entrance.	Because the ordinance does not say "and from each entrance", it cannot be interpreted to mean that the signs must both be visible and readable anywhere in the area as well as being visible and readable from the entrance. The use of distinct prepositions in the conjuncts means that the notice requirement can be satisfied by different signs: it's not that a sign has to have both properties.	No, even if not used, they are explicitly required by federal law! The History of handicapped parking started in the 60s. In the late 1960s, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act banned discrimination against disabilities and then the Amaricans with Disabilities Act entered Congress in 1988. It passed as law in 1990 and included section 4.6 Parking and Passenger Loading Zones (linked in its 1998 revision): 4.6 Parking and Passenger Loading Zones. 4.6.1 Minimum Number. Parking spaces required to be accessible by 4.1 shall comply with 4.6.2 through 4.6.5. Passenger loading zones required to be accessible by 4.1 shall comply with 4.6.5 and 4.6.6. 4.6.2 Location. Accessible parking spaces serving a particular building shall be located on the shortest accessible route of travel from adjacent parking to an accessible entrance. In parking facilities that do not serve a particular building, accessible parking shall be located on the shortest accessible route of travel to an accessible pedestrian entrance of the parking facility. In buildings with multiple accessible entrances with adjacent parking, accessible parking spaces shall be dispersed and located closest to the accessible entrances. 4.6.4* Signage. Accessible parking spaces shall be designated as reserved by a sign showing the symbol of accessibility (see 4.30.7). Spaces complying with 4.1.2(5)(b) shall have an additional sign "Van-Accessible" mounted below the symbol of accessibility. Such signs shall be located so they cannot be obscured by a vehicle parked in the space. So, how many do you need? Well, 4.6.1 points to 4.1.2 Accessible Sites and Exterior Facilities: (5) (a) If parking spaces are provided for self-parking by employees or visitors, or both, then accessible spaces complying with 4.6 shall be provided in each such parking area in conformance with the table below. Spaces required by the table need not be provided in the particular lot. They may be provided in a different location if equivalent or greater accessibility, in terms of distance from an accessible entrance, cost and convenience is ensured. [table] Except as provided in (b), access aisles adjacent to accessible spaces shall be 60 in (1525 mm) wide minimum. (b) One in every eight accessible spaces, but not less than one, shall be served by an access aisle 96 in (2440 mm) wide minimum and shall be designated "van accessible" as required by 4.6.4. The vertical clearance at such spaces shall comply with 4.6.5. All such spaces may be grouped on one level of a parking structure. The table demands that for 500-1000 2% are handicapped parking. As a result, your 500 parking lots would demand 10 handicapped spots, at least one of which needs to be van accessible.	It refers to whoever the judge reasonably says it refers to. The referent of that specific clause N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(b)(6) is not analyzed in any court ruling that I have been able to locate, but case law such as State v. Krueger, 241 N.J. Super. 244 has addressed other discretionary provisions of the statute, and has upheld the propriety of such discretionary acts as ordering restitution "as long as (1) there is a reasonable relationship between the restitution and the defendant’s rehabilitation, and (2) there is a factual underpinning supportive of the restitution". The court concludes that we are entirely satisfied that the debarment was reasonably designed to “assist” defendant in “leading] a law-abiding life” and was thus permitted under N.J.S.A. 2C:45-la....The condition of probation was substantially related to an appropriate penological and rehabilitative objective followed by numerous citations.	In California, the law for public bridges and highways appears to be as follows (emphasis mine): CA St & Hwy Code § 30843 (2017) Any person who operates a motor vehicle over a toll bridge or toll highway crossing and the approaches thereto constructed or acquired by any bridge and highway district, at the entrance to which appropriate signs have been erected to notify traffic that it is entering upon a toll bridge crossing or its approaches and is subject to the payment of tolls beyond the sign, is guilty of a misdemeanor in each of the following cases: (a) If the person refuses to pay the tolls. (b) If the person turns, or attempts to turn, the vehicle around in the bridge, approach, or toll plaza where signs have been erected forbidding the turning. (c) If the person refuses to pass through the toll gates after having come within the area where signs have been erected notifying traffic that it is entering the area where toll is collectible or where vehicles may not turn around and where vehicles are required to pass through the toll gates for the purpose of collecting tolls. So it appears the "last exit before toll" signs are sufficient. It doesn't say anything about posting the actual cost of the tolls.	This varies depending on the specific law of the state or locality involved. In New York, the word "POSTED", along with the name and address of the owner is sufficient to notify people not to intrude, and anyone ignoring such a sign is technically trespassing (although, in practice, if such a person leaves the property when asked, did no damage, and appeared honestly ignorant, it is likely that no legal action would be taken). In California, as specified by penal code section 553 (quoted in the linked answer) a sign for this purpose must include: the words “trespassing-loitering forbidden by law,” or words describing the use of the property followed by the words “no trespassing.” in letters at least two inches tall, and follow other specifications in the law. The word "Posted" is neither required nor sufficient, although the law calls land with such signs "posted property".	Very likely. You may own your parking space, but when you bought your condo you also signed a contract agreeing to abide by the rules of the condo association. Condo associations typically have rules that all cars parked on the property must be registered with the association. If you didn't register your friend's car with the association, they have no way of known that it isn't some random person trespassing to score free parking. Some associations may have additional rules limiting parking to residents of the building. Get in touch with your association and find out what the rules are. You should have been given a copy of the association rules when you closed on the purchase of the condo.	"Public place" is not a good description of a bar. "Public accommodation" would be a better description. But it isn't a public accommodation 24-7-365(366). It's only a public accommodation during the hours it is open to the public. Presumably the owner is free to close it to the public and rent it to some private group. During the rental period, it's up to the private group to decide who to admit. (The owner would have a veto for anyone who can't be admitted, for example, because the person isn't old enough to enter a bar.) The private group is not bound by the policies that prohibit unfair discrimination by public accommodations.	This question is controlled almost entirely by local municipal and county ordinances. It is not a question of federal law that is uniform across the U.S. and in most cases it is not even a question of state law. So, there is no single answer to your question. Most localities regulate this with some combination of hotel specific building codes (usually incorporated by reference from a uniform building code promulgated by a private non-profit organization as a model building code provision) and hotel specific local zoning ordinances.
I'm gonna be the cutter for a Youtube channel - Should I ask for a contract? So I contacted a youtube channel which has about 300k subscribers and they would like me to be their musicvideo cutter. Every week they release a new video and I should cut it. I will be given the raw material soon. They haven't talked about money yet, but I will ask for it. The musicvideo will not be super-duper edited (just a standard video with some cuts and transitions, that's what they want). My question is: Should I ask for a contract, when asking for the money? I would be appreciated about some help.	Should I ask for a contract, when asking for the money? The proper time to define or formalize a contract is not when asking for the money, but when agreeing what tasks are expected from you and how much you will charge therefor. That way both parties will be clear on what is expected from each other. And if a dispute is brought to court, the fact-finder will have an objective document from which to identify who breached the contract. It is always recommendable that the contract be self-contained, and that relevant interactions between the parties be in writing or memorialized in some way that leaves no room for unverifiable allegations of the type "I said, he said".	You are required to provide a copyright notice on your work, such as putting (c) rhino 2016 in the liner notes. Nothing precludes you from licensing that copyright in any way you want, such as Creative Commons. As long as you aren't in violation of the last sentence (your work is not primarily the samples, and you actually made a song with them), then others should be able to use your work with no restrictions other than what you yourself place on the work. The purpose of requiring a copyright notice on derivative works is to give notice of who the actual author is and distance the original author from the derivative work. If you take their samples and make a song that is later at the center of a lawsuit (copyright, defamation, etc), the the copyright notice will hopefully steer people first to the derivative author and not the original author. That is the purpose of the clause in the copyright grant above.	Yes australia This is a straight up and down case of “deceptive and misleading conduct”. There is plenty of case law to support that testimonials (which this is) must be genuine, not paid for as they are from an actor. Further, they cannot be cherry-picked. If 5 real people reacted and 2 reacted negatively, you cannot just show the 3 who reacted positively - you have to show them all or otherwise disclose that 3 out 5 people loved the product. When actors (or people who are otherwise getting paid) are used that fact must be disclosed if it is not clear from the context. In a typical ad where people are just shown using the product without giving a personal endorsement it’s sufficiently clear that they are actors. However, in the type of ad you describe if they were actors this would need to be stated. Television and radio personalities must disclose when they are being paid for an endorsement under enforceable codes. Influencers are required to do so under non-binding codes, however, it is likely that breach of these codes would also be a breach of the law.	It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages.	There's existing copyright infringement and future copyright infringement. Let's say you sold a million records with infringing contents. That's copyright infringement. It has happened, you can't undo it. Now you get sued. If you think you will lose, it would be a good idea to change the music to be not infringing, so the next million records are not infringing and add to the damages. It doesn't fix the infringement that has already been done, but makes sure there is no further infringement. And infringement after you were told about it and asked to stop might be punished more harshly.	Yes (probably), under COPPA The FTC has stated that YouTube content creators could be held liable under the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), a United States law that "imposes certain requirements on operators of websites or online services directed to children under 13 years of age, and on operators of other websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information online from a child under 13 years of age." (source) The FTC's FAQ on complying with COPPA notes that "operators will be held to have acquired actual knowledge of having collected personal information from a child where, for example, they later learn of a child’s age or grade from a concerned parent who has learned that his child is participating on the site or service." It also has the following question/answer (emphasis added): I operate a general audience video game service and do not ask visitors to reveal their ages. I do permit users to submit feedback, comments, or questions by email. What are my responsibilities if I receive a request for an email response from a player who indicates that he is under age 13? Under the Rule’s one-time response exception (16 C.F.R. § 312.5(c)(3)) you are permitted to send a response to the child, via the child’s online contact information, without sending notice to the parent or obtaining parental consent. However, you must delete the child’s online contact information from your records promptly after you send your response. Assuming the FTC is correct that content creators (not just the service itself) are responsible for COPPA compliance, a Discord server administrator would likely be required to ban/delete the account of a user upon discovering (acquiring actual knowledge) that the user is under 13. It may be a defense that they believed the user's retraction and claim that it was a lie, but I wouldn't want to be stuck arguing that in court (an underage user who doesn't want to be banned certainly would have a good reason to lie about their age upon finding out that they would be banned for having admitted their actual age).	The only issue relevant to your age is the (ir)revocability of the license. GPLv3 purports to be an irrevocable license. To be really irrevocable, the license would need to grant certain rights in exchange for something of value, that is, you need a license that passes muster as a contract. Copyright licenses are typically treated as contracts, but it is not clearly established in law that licenses are contracts or are not contracts. Out of the goodness of your heart, you can grant permission to use your property, but you can also withdraw that permission. If you have a contract granting perpetual permission to use your property in exchange for something of value, then you can't later withdraw that permission. In the case of Jacobsen v. Kratzer, the sides advances opposing theories that the license was a "bare license" vs. was a contract. (The matter was ultimately settled out of court). This article puts together the legal factors surrounding the notion of license as contract, see p. 21 ff, and esp. §IV for arguments that licenses should be contracts, to be fully enforceable. A contract for non-essentials formed with a minor is not enforceable, until you are 18. You could therefore revoke the license, until you are 18. Anyone who uses the software does so at their peril. However, if the license is not a contract, no existing legal doctrine (in the US) whereby the permission is irrevocable. In other words, yes you can, at their peril. The whole license-as-contract issue is very complicated, and I'm only focusing on the revocability issue. There is a separate question whether one can sue a user for both copyright infringement and breach of contract. The case of Artifex v. Hancom, see also this analysis, found that (in the particular case), plaintiff can pursue the matter as both infringement and contract breach.	An incomplete list: Getting the money. How did you plan to get paid? Credit card? Paypal? Integrating those into a website in compliance with their terms of service is not easy. (I wouldn't touch credit card numbers, in particular, even with a ten-foot pole. Too much liability risk for weak implementations. Too many highly skilled attackers to pounce on any mistake.) Distributing the App. Places like the Apple App Store have their own terms of service, especially regarding payment and in-app purchases. At a guess, Apple would reject your app, but if they allowed it, how does your withdrawal policy fit with the 30% cut they want from the initial transaction? Holding the money. So there are user accounts with a credit balance that can be withdrawn again. Would you be able to repay them if all users withdraw at the same time? Where do you keep the money? Currency risks. Say international customers pay in currency A, which the payment provider transforms into currency B. Then they want their money back, but exchange rates have changed. What do they get? Knowing your customer. There would be money laundering concerns. Do you have the infrastructure to identify your customers? Can customers change the (re)payment method from one account to another? Can you handle withdrawals if a user no longer has the same credit card, for instance? Scammers leaving you to hold the bag. Say a scammer tricks a victim into making a deposit, and then finds a way to redirect the withdrawal (see above). Would you be able to deal with the legal and administrative fallout?
License agreements: if I can use X by doing Y, can I use X without doing Y? To hopefully make this question more clear, here is an example: Software company X creates software product Y under the freemium business model — the user of Y is allowed to use it at no cost with some restrictions, but must pay for extra features. In the license, it is stated that by purchasing the extra features of Y, the user is allowed to use the extra features. However, it does not explicitly state that the user cannot use the extra features if they do not purchase them. Does this create a loophole in which the user can legally use a modified version of the software that allows the extra features to be used without payment? If something is not explicitly denied, is it allowed?	No When I go into my grocery store, I can use the lettuce if I pay for it. The grocer does not explicitly state that I can't use the lettuce if I don't pay for it but that doesn't mean I can. Replace "lettuce" with "software" (or any other property you don't own) and you have the same situation.	From your question(s), as well as your various comments, I understand you to have two general inquiries: 1. Is there any infringement of copyright laws if you use things like the titles of books, games, apps, names, address (and any other number of things) which you will then put into datasets that will be licensed for proprietary commercial purposes? You may freely put titles, names of people, places or things into datasets without fear that you are infringing on copyright or any other laws. That is clear. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive it cannot be protected by copyright. So, there is no point in discussing the doctrine of fair use in this context, because Fair Use is a defense, or a legal safe harbor that is merely an exception to copyright infringement allowing people to use a copyrighted works under specific circumstances. As I understand your intended endeavor, you will not be infringing on any copyrights to the extent that you are merely using factual data, like names of copyrighted things for the purpose of creating a dataset or an application to help access it. This is why I say you need not concern yourself with the test for Fair Use with regard to this issue. The Copyright Office states clearly, despite what people may think, that there are no exclusive rights in brief combinations of words such as: • Names of products or services • Names of businesses, organizations, or groups (including the names of performing groups) • Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage names) • Titles of works • Catchwords, catchphrases, mottoes, slogans, or short advertising expressions • Listings of ingredients, as in recipes, labels, or formulas. When a recipe or formula is accompanied by an explanation or directions, the text directions may be copyrightable, but the recipe or formula itself remains uncopyrightable. Hence, these things are not registrable under a copyright. While something may be potentially attached to or included in copyrighted material, is not in and of itself subject to the protections of these laws. If it (whatever it is) cannot be registered for a copyright, it is not copyrightable. Because copyright registration/notices have been optional since 1989, when the U.S. attached itself to the Berne Convention, whereby copyright protection is automatic as soon as a work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” (written down, recorded, painted, etc.) it’s protected. No notice is required. Registration only becomes required for litigation or enforcement purposes. But this is really extraneous to your inquiry anyway, as far as it applies to the actual data. When you get into copying whole databases for your purpose, that analysis is different. 2. You want to "scrub" the internet for information that you intend to put into your proprietary datasets and use for commercial purposes, some or most of which is already in a database or some organized form, and you want to know if there is some sort of copyright or duty owned to the person who originally databased the materials? Since ideas, procedures, principles, discoveries, and devices are all specifically excluded from copyright protection, if you want to compile this type of information from the internet for the purpose of creating datasets, or searchable databases, this is permissible. That said, there are protections for existing databases under copyright law, provided under the concept of a "compilation copyright". A compilation copyright protects the collection and creative assembling of data or other materials. Compilation copyrights protect the collection and assembling of data or other materials, such that databases are generally protected by copyright law as compilations. Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is defined as a "collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17. U.S.C. § 101. The preexisting materials or data may be protected by copyright since the selections of materials and the form they take in an existing database may be original enough to be subject to a copyright. However, the data itself is merely information and is not protectable. The Copyright Act specifically states that the copyright in a compilation extends only to the compilation itself, and not to the underlying materials or data. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). As a result, "compilation copyrights" can't be used to place protection upon those things that are otherwise not protectable. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a compilation work such as a database must contain a minimum level of creativity in order to be protectable under the Copyright Act. Feist makes clear that even a copyright protected database does not hold the right to prevent an individual from extracting factual data from the database (so long as you're not copying the entire database as a whole). If you take an already compiled and copyrighted dataset in its entirety, you must obtain a license for its use. However, if you are merely amassing great amounts of data to then put into your own dataset, that you are free to do. The big issue will be (and you seem to realize this) where you will amass this data from. Some websites have specific licenses in place that say you cannot use or rework their content. However, many times these websites simply throw these license requirements out there for users to see, despite the fact that they may not be (and some would argue) are not enforceable. The courts have heard arguments that "contracts" (the end-user licenses) that protect databases and information on websites is beyond the protection available through copyright law should be "preempted" by the Copyright Act itself. The preemption argument goes like this: Federal law controlling something that is subject to interstate commerce or use, should be controlled by the federal laws. So,since the federal government has enacted the Copyright Act to govern any protections to any original works, states should be (arguably are) prohibited from having contradictory laws. Because of the ability of a federal statute to preempt state law, and the fact that the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 301 sets forth specific preemptions, no state may create rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under the Act. It is this concept of preemption that prevents copyright protection from varying depending upon the state where a work of authorship is created. Arguably, the same is true for the internet, and supposed contractual relationship created through licenses that dictates how non-copyrightable material may be used. In the case of ProCD, Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. the court examined whether an end-user of a CD ROM phone database was subject to the license, when they extracted a large portion of the database and made it available over the Internet. The database was almost the same as the type of data in the Feist case-The lower court rejected all copyright claims and found that the shrinkwrap license that controlled the end user's right to use the data was both unenforceable (as a shrink wrap license) and preempted by the Copyright Act. As a result, there was no relief available to the creator of the phone database and the end-user was free to extract the data and use it as he saw fit. However, on appeal this decision was reversed (7th circuit). The appellate court did acknowledge that the database (on the CD) was not original enough to be protected by copyright (finding no copyright infringement by the end-user); However, they did find the end-user was breach of contract, since the shrink-wrap license prohibited the end-user's conduct. What this tells us is that these licenses (on websites) may or may not be enforceable. While the 7th Circuit found a contract right pursuant to the license, despite the preemption argument, another appellate court that is more liberal may find otherwise. Also, this was a disk, not the internet, which is the "wild west" of information, largely unregulated and unlitigated as it pertains to the legality and enforceability of (some) regulations that do exist. License agreements for site use on the internet are everywhere. If you take a database from some site that has a license saying you cannot take their work and add to it, or whatever, and you do add it to other databases that are not licensed and then make your own dataset - chances are you are NOT going to be infringing on anyone's copyright. That said, you may be in breach of contract (the license) if they find out about it, and sue you (using it doesn't put you in breach; only getting sued and having a court determine you're in breach puts you in breach. It may be a distinction worth contemplation, but that is up to you). The safest, bet would be to get a license from them to rework the materials. If the material is generic enough, and will be changed enough, that you are creating your own new (copyrightable) work - I'm not sure how they would know you "scrubbed the data in contravention of their license agreement ( I have NO CLUE if there is coding or metadata attached to it such that it's identifiable in that way. I have not tech background and do not endorse taking what's not yours). But if they can and do know, they could cause problems for you. Lastly, I will just say that the internet is littered with sites that claim copyrights, or impose unenforceable licenses on material that is ripe for public use. Just because it says it's theirs does not make it so. The inverse is also true. Just because a site does not claim copyright to something, does not mean it is in the public domain. I would recommend either sticking to public domain/use sites for your scrubbing endeavors, or seeking permissions from the sites who impose licensing requirements. Short of that, I would recommend (as I already have) seeking an formal legal opinion to say that you are not imposing on anyone's copyrights (this could only be done once you showed an attorney every place you took material from, as well as what the material is), and that the licenses from sites with generalized information that may try to limit use, are unenforceable. I would do this before you invest a lot of time or money into something that is largely based on the accumulation of other peoples work product. I wish there was an answer certain, but there just isn't without seeing everything in the end.	If you create a new work that is derived from or based on someone else's work, it is a derivative work, and you cannot do so without permission from the original copyright holder. If the original work is made available under a CC-BY_SA 4.0 license, you have permission, but it comes with conditions. One of those is that you must attribute the original work -- you must say what work yours is based on and who created it. Another is that you must license your own derived work under the same CC-BY-SA license (or a compatible one). This does not mean that your work is not copyrighted -- it is. But it does mean that you must grant to others the same rights that the creator of the work you used granted to you. That is what the "share alike" or SA part of the license means. if you don't like that, you should not use a work licensed under CC-BY-SA terms to create your own work. If you publish your work but fail to grant that license to others, you are infringing the copyright of the work you used, and could be sued. Note that if you had created a compilation rather than a derived work -- for example if you created an album of images from various sources, some of them under CC-BY-SA licenses, you would retain a copyright on the collection as a whole, and that would not have to be under CC-BY-SA. But in this case you say that you used the other person's image as a background for your own illustration. That is creating an "adapted" or derivative work, i am fairly sure, and invokes the share alike clause of the license. You might also want to consider the different case mentioned in If I include an unmodified CC-BY-SA work in a book, does the whole book have to be CC-BY-SA?	If you own the copyright (because you wrote the book), you can do whatever you want with it. If someone else has the copyright, you have to get their permission to do what you propose. That could be the author, the author's estate, or some other party. It then depends on what the interest of the rights-holder is: they could say "No way!", "Sure, for a payment of $100,000", "At $1 per copy, here is how you must keep track of copies", "Okay, as long as you include this notice that prevents further re-distribution" or "Huh, I never thought of that. Sure, I grant you complete license to do whatever you want". A publisher is relevant only when the publisher requires a transfer of copyright to the publishing company, or if the rights-holder has granted them a certain type of license (e.g. an exclusive license). If the author has granted someone else an exclusive perpetual right to distribute, then they cannot also grant you a license to distribute for free. That is really the author's problem, though, since the publisher doesn't hold the copyright so can't sue you, instead the publisher would sue the author for breach of contract.	Makerbot's explanation of the Terms is accurate This is comparable with most other services that host and display User-created content - even with SaaS providers, as per Interpretation of content ownership/usage in service provider agreement. They are correct that they are asking for the lots of broad rights, but it's all qualified with (my emphasis): 3.2 License. You hereby grant, and you represent and warrant that you have the right to grant, to the Company and its affiliates and partners, an irrevocable, nonexclusive, royalty-free and fully paid, worldwide license to reproduce, distribute, publicly display and perform, prepare derivative works of, incorporate into other works, and otherwise use your User Content, and to grant sublicenses of the foregoing, solely for the purposes of including your User Content in the Site and Services. That is, if they use your User Content for a purpose other than including it in the Site and Services (and you have not agreed to this use), you may be entitled to relief in the form of an injunction or damages.	The second paragraph is an invitation for people who don't want to follow the terms of the GPL (e.g. who want to incorporate it into a larger closed-source work, or make closed-source modifications) to contact XXX for a less onerous (but more expensive) license. That would require that XXX have full rights to the software, that they did not for instance incorporate others' GPLed code. It would be a stretch to read the second paragraph as attempting to limit the first paragraph, particularly given the "please".	My question is, because I am not making any income from the distribution of the game, would the use of the copyrighted music fall under Personal Use? There are some "private use" exemptions in Australian copyright law but they have some fairly narrow conditions. These exemptions are fairly narrow because the point of copyright law is not to prevent you from making money with someone else's intellectual property but to protect the other person's ability to make money with it. If Alice writes a song and Bob distributes it free of charge, Alice loses revenue. Similarly, it is Alice's right to decide whether that song should be included in a freely available open-source software product, and her right to decide whether to allow that use without charge or in exchange for a license fee.	You seem to assume that copyrights require paperwork such as registration. This is wrong, copyright is automatic. And it prevents the downloader from making the sort of change that you suggest. In fact, it prevents the downloader from using your template at all. The only reason the downloader can use that template is because you've granted him a specific license to ignore some copyright rules, but the default remains. And you did not grant the right to alter the template to free users.
Can an employer fine an employee in Virginia? My son just started a job with a franchisee of a well-known delivery company. The franchisee is located in Virginia, and some of the items in the employee handbook sound fishy to me. He was given a sheet that listed several offenses along with the associated monetary fine. Three which stood out were: Excessive tardiness and absences - $200 Failure to clean the delivery truck - $50 Accident - $200 per pay period, "until the company is made whole" I have no idea how they plan to impose these fines, immediately make him pay or withhold the amount from his paycheck, but I would think that the only recourse an employer has for failing to perform assigned duties is termination, and a civil suit for actions that cause financial harm. Is this a case where employment terms, no matter how onerous, are allowed, or does this company have no idea what they are allowed to do with their employees?	Not by payroll deduction, unless the agreement to do so was not a condition of employment While it is true (as Just a guy's answer notes) that under § 40.1-29(C) an employee may agree via "written and signed authorization" to an employer withholding money from paychecks, the agreement to do so must be voluntary and not a condition of employment/continued employment. § 40.1-29(D) of the Code of Virginia states: No employer shall require any employee, except executive personnel, to sign any contract or agreement which provides for the forfeiture of the employee's wages for time worked as a condition of employment or the continuance therein, except as otherwise provided by law. This does not mean that an employee who damages company property or otherwise negligently causes the company financial harm is not liable for such damages, though. Damages to a vehicle or costs incurred for cleaning it might be possible damages. "Excessive tardiness and absences" seems like it'd be difficult, but not impossible, to prove monetary damages for. But to recover these damages against the employee's will, they'd have to file a lawsuit: they cannot simply deduct the damages from wages unless the employee voluntarily agrees to pay them that way (a blanket authorization as a condition of employment does not count). This article has some more information and a couple relevant examples (including one about vehicle damage).	No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.	I've litigated cases like these before. The IRS enforcement reaction is swift and severe. Penalties for the employer are heavy and rarely waived. It would be rare for a business like this to stay operational long enough to issue a W-2. A business like this would probably be shut down by the IRS and have the people responsible for the payroll function, at a minimum, promptly burdened with tax liens, within four to six months. These cases also constitute a significant share of all criminal tax prosecutions. The odds of someone doing this spending several years in federal prison is high. Generally speaking, if the wrongdoing is fully on the part of the employer without the collusion or knowledge of the employee, the IRS will not force the employee to double pay the taxes that should have been withheld by the employer in this situation. Instead, this IRS will try to recover the amounts that were withheld from the employees but not delivered to the IRS. It will seek to recover these amounts from the employer and also from other responsible persons in the organization (and from outsourced professionals) with the authority to pay the IRS who did not do so. There may be circumstances, if push comes to shove, where the IRS could collect from the employees in a case like this one (I've never had occasion to need to research that issue), but that would be the rare exception and not the rule, in practice. On the other hand, if the employer simply does not withhold taxes or prepare W-2s at all, and either 1099s people who should have been classified as employees (or files no information tax returns at all), the IRS will generally insist that the employee pay income taxes on the full amount owed and that they pay the employee part of payroll taxes. It will also pursue the employer for the employer's share of payroll taxes. The employer will also be jointly and severally liable for any taxes that should have been reported and subjected to withholding that are not paid by the employee (perhaps because the employee spent all the money). Sometimes cases like this are also criminally prosecuted, but it is less common to do so.	I will assume B.C. as your specific jurisdiction: there could be provincial differences. As phoog says, you certainly may mention this problem to management, who have an interest in keeping you happy. No law against that. As for the "legality" of sexual harassment, the CBA BC branch says that "Sexual harassment, which is discrimination based on sex, is illegal under the BC Human Rights Code". It is interesting to see what the code actually says. Section 8 Discrimination in accommodation, service and facility says (1) A person must not, without a bona fide and reasonable justification, (a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public, or (b) discriminate against a person or class of persons regarding any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or class of persons. The question is whether using the term "babe" constitutes discrimination against a person regarding service because of sex. This article on the Law Society of BC web site specifically identifies "verbal harassment" as an instance: Verbal harassment – This comes from anyone within the firm and or other workplace or a person who does business with the firm or company. Some examples are: referring to an adult as a babe, honey, girl or stud; whistling at someone; turning work discussion to sexual topics; asking personal questions of a sexual nature; making sexual comments about a person’s clothing, anatomy or looks; or asking someone repeatedly for dates and refusing to take no for an answer. (emphasis added). In case you're thinking that maybe there's a difference in what the code says regarding services and what it says regarding employment, section 13 Discrimination in Employment says: (1) A person must not (a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ a person, or (b) discriminate against a person regarding employment or any term or condition of employment because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or because that person has been convicted of a criminal or summary conviction offence that is unrelated to the employment or to the intended employment of that person. In other words, it is defined simply in terms of "discrimination", which means "making a distinction". It is known that unwanted sexual advances constitute illegal discrimination, see Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. [1989] 1 SCR 1252. The court found that Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Sexual harassment in the workplace is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job‑related consequences for the victims of the harassment. They did not, however, find that this is the only form of sexual discrimination (obviously, since it isn't). I can't point to case law indicating whether gender-biased expression are actionable, but that would be consistent with the letter of the law and "babe" is indeed an example cited in the Law Society article.	I assume you're talking about this case: Bus lane camera mistakes woman's sweater for number plate. No he couldn't just ignore it - because that doesn't actually result in it getting put in front of a human (judge or otherwise). Instead the fine would escalate and ultimately be passed to a collections agency. Only challenging the Penalty Charge Notice (as this person did) would get a human involved. As a bonus, if the automated fine happens to come with a S172 notice to identify the driver ignoring that is an offence in of itself (irrespective of the original alleged offence), and in many cases carries a worse penalty (£1000 and 6 points IIRC). what if this item of clothing became fashionable and was therefore causing this person to receive hundreds of these fines every week? While it's unlikely to get to that stage - the item of clothing on its own wouldn't do it, there needed to be a specific partial-obscurement of the garment as well, it's not impossible, after all perhaps it's their favorite sweater, they always carry their bag like that and cut across the bus lane on their way to work etc. In those circumstances there's nothing legally that changes, I'd expect the poor vehicle owner to be on first name terms with the people at the council enforcement call centre in question sooner rather than later. Re edit: Suppose I want to annoy somebody as much as possible, what's to stop me from printing a t-shirt with their actual number plate on it, then walking around past all sorts of cameras, knowing that they will receive multiple fines every day and have no choice but to keep calling and explaining. After all, the council has no duty to make it easy for someone to get through on the phone, so, potentially, I could walk around bus lanes and car parks all day. I could get some friends to do this all over the country in different local authority areas and the victim could - literally - have not enough hours in the day to have to keep fighting false fines. Would they not have some recourse to sue for harassment or "vexatious litigation"? In all honesty I don't know for sure what would happen in this scenario - I can't think of a similar enough case. But I would expect targeting an individual in this manner would qualify as harassment pretty easily and for which there are both criminal and civil actions that can be taken. I suppose hypothetically you could argue that the "number plate shirt" is effectively being used to make false allegations that the car's registered keeper had committed crimes, which opens up avenues to prosecution for Perverting the Course of Justice or wasting police time. But I have no idea how likely that would be to be pursued.	Unless it is prohibited by law in some state (such as California), a server's employment contract can have a clause holding the server responsible for an unpaid tab. Even in lieu of such a clause, since in most states employment is at-will, the employee can be fired if they do not do as told. There is a limit to the effect that their wage cannot be reduced below minimum wage. The question of the political rationale of this practice is outside the scope of law, but there are some legal factors that can lead to getting compensation from a server, even if pay-docking is prohibited. If a server intentionally colludes with a dine-and-hash customer, the server is liable. The server might also be negligent, for example they may have failed to notify management of evidence of an impending dine-and-dash such as overhearing a conversation, or watching the customers trickle out; or, disappearing for an unreasonable time for a smoke break (leaving the table unattended). Liability requires a lawsuit where the court decides if the server should pay.	I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply.	What can you do? Can you sue the debt collector? Can you sue your employer for improperly cooperating? Yes. Also report the debt collector to the appropriate regulatory agency for violation of laws relating to debt collection. Possibly refer the debt collector and/or employer to law enforcement and the DA for theft and fraud. Honestly, this is a pretty rare fact pattern. Far more common is for the debt collector to have a court judgment obtained by default against the debtor and for the debtor to not realize that the debtor has been served with process or for the debt collector to have used "sewer service" in which the process server lied about delivering process to the debtor. More to the point, what needs to be done to halt this process until the matter is sorted out? Probably it could be stopped with a temporary restraining order from the court in which the lawsuits are filed. But a letter to the employer and debt collector pointing out the there is no court order of judgment would probably stop the employer from coooperating. Is is possible to accomplish this pro se, or would you need a lawyer? You need a lawyer. This is very hard to do right pro se.
What power does the supra-national European parliament have regarding the control of Golden Visa/Passport schemes run by many EU member states? What power does the supra-national European parliament have regarding the control of Golden Visa/Passport schemes run by many EU member states? The EU report on the Investor residency and citizenship Schemes urges member states to take safety steps like rigorous checking for money laundering etc.., or things like sharing of the data about the rejected applicants to each of the member states (so that a rejected applicant does not succeed in applying in another state). This is primarily to safeguard the whole of the EU from potential criminals/terrorists. EU is apparently urging member states (in its report) to take proper measures for a safe Golden Visa scheme and has also decided to form a committee that will itself monitor the issues and take appropriate actions to make these schemes safe. The EU apparently cannot interfere in National legislation of member states to remove these schemes that have the potential of fraud and other security risks. It just directs member states to be careful as a golden visa scheme introduced by national legislation directly affects other member states due to free movement rights. But can the EU altogether scrap each and every golden visa scheme (currently around 20 member states run such schemes) of all member states? Does the supra-national parliament legally have the sort of power to do a thing like that?	No, it can't unilaterally scrap such schemes Immigration is a shared competence between the Union and Member States under Article 4(2)(j) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This means that the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts. However, it is predicated on a triad: the Commission (proposer of legislation), Parliament (co-decision maker), and the Council of the European Union (co-decision maker). The Parliament would not be able to propose and enact legislation scrapping the schemes by itself. The matter of proposing legislation would fall to the European Commission under the ordinary legislative procedure. Such a proposal would go before the Parliament and the Council of the European Union for a "co-decision". Either side may amend, accept, or reject the proposal. While the Parliament may accept any proposed legislation from the Commission, the Council is unlikely to agree. This is because the Council is comprised of government ministers from each Member State. In the matter of immigration, it is likely that the Home Affairs minister of each Member State would meet as the Council to consider the proposed legislation. Given the obvious conflict of interest for each "golden visa" scheme, it seems unlikely that the Council would agree to curtail or scrap the system given the advantages it provides that Member State, and the need to be "competitive" with other Member States (even though such competition should not really exist, to ensure the harmony of the Union). Therefore, the Council would likely reject the proposed legislation and assuming the subsequent conciliation committee cannot get both the Parliament and the Council to agree on the matter, the proposal will be abandoned.	"Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights" on the website you linked to is very clear that the Charter of Fundamental Rights only means the EU institutions can't discriminate based on age, and that EU law is not allowed to be age discriminatory. It doesn't mean that individual acts of age discrimination are illegal: In contrast, the provision in Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The practice of youth and senior discounts is older than the charter of fundamental rights. The charter will be interpreted in the light of continuity, it definitely wasn't the intention to outlaw price discrimination. There are specific laws that make price discrimination based on certain principles legal, e.g. UK equality act: Age discrimination - when discrimination is allowed in the provision of goods or services	Yes Companies can own companies - that’s what subsidiaries are. On a practical level, you know this is true because you actually have an example. Companies House would not have allowed its registration (barring error) if it was illegal. Why can’t it open a bank account? Banks (or any other business) can choose who they will and won’t do business with. Unless it’s discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, it’s not illegal. Since juridical persons don’t have protected characteristics (apart from nationality) it’s virtually impossible to illegally discriminate against them.	It would probably already be illegal based on national laws that comply with Directive 95/46/EC (of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995). What's new with GDPR include: the sanctions that can be imposed the accountability i.e. you must be able to provide documented evidence on your practices even before something happens the obligation to report all data breaches. So you'd definitely have more concrete responsibility to follow good security practices under the GDPR.	This is a good question, as it raises an issue which places the controller's interest in providing a smoothly functioning customer sign up process against customers' right not to have their data leaked. Note that it is not necessary to consider "enumeration" here. Even just being able to check whether one person has a registered account raises the issue. The relevant provisions of the EU GDPR (or in the UK, the UK GDPR as defined in sections 3(1) and 205(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018) are (emphasis added): Article 4(2): 'processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction So, disclosure of the fact that a user has a registered account amounts to "processing". Article 6(1): Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of these, only (a) and (f) are likely to be of any relevance: (a) is not too useful since it isn't feasible to design a sign-up system that depends on the user's consent (which they may not give). That leaves us with (f). As noted by the Information Commissioner's Office, "Legitimate interests is the most flexible lawful basis for processing, but you cannot assume it will always be the most appropriate. It is likely to be most appropriate where you use people’s data in ways they would reasonably expect and which have a minimal privacy impact, or where there is a compelling justification for the processing.". The legitimate interest here would be that you need a sign up system which prevents duplicate registrations. Remember though that the processing has to be "necessary" for the purposes of the legitimate interest. One might argue that it is not since you could design the system to give the appearance of accepting the duplicate registration followed by sending an email to the account holder to inform them. On the other hand this will result in a less user friendly experience which could itself be a legitimate interest. Ultimately this is a balancing exercise and it is hard to say whether you have struck the right balance until someone complains to the ICO or the court and a decision is issued. The fact that the practice is widespread among well-resourced and large companies would tend to indicate that it is lawful albeit this is not conclusive in the absence of a court decision. I'm not aware of any cases involving this particular issue but would be interested to hear from others on this point. If the processing is unlawful then Article 18 is applicable: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller restriction of processing where one of the following applies: [...] (b) the processing is unlawful and the data subject opposes the erasure of the personal data and requests the restriction of their use instead Where processing has been restricted under paragraph 1, such personal data shall, with the exception of storage, only be processed with the data subject’s consent or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or for the protection of the rights of another natural or legal person or for reasons of important public interest of the Union or of a Member State. In other words, the data subject could ask you not to disclose their registration status via the sign up page, and you would be obliged to comply with the request. Separately from the above points, in order to be lawful you must provide the data subject with certain prescribed information at the time when the data is collected. Of particular relevance here are the following items: Article 13(1): Where personal data relating to a data subject are collected from the data subject, the controller shall, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with all of the following information: [...] (c) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing; (d) where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party; So even if you conclude that the processing will be lawful you will have to give some consideration to the basis so that you can comply with the above provision.	The sovereign has the power to prorogue parliament at will, but actually exercises the power only on the advice of the PM (actually, according to paragraph three of the decision, it is exercised on the advice of the privy council). Other of the sovereign's powers are delegated to the courts. The court is not unfamiliar with exercising the sovereign's power to void her own acts, as acts of parliament and acts of government ministers are also nominally acts of the sovereign. While the courts cannot void acts of parliament, they can indeed void executive acts. Two relevant quotes follow. From paragraph 30, relating to the sovereign's lack of discretion in exercising the prerogative to prorogue parliament: It is not suggested in these appeals that Her Majesty was other than obliged by constitutional convention to accept that advice. In the circumstances, we express no view on that matter. That situation does, however, place on the Prime Minister a constitutional responsibility, as the only person with power to do so, to have regard to all relevant interests, including the interests of Parliament. From paragraph 32, on the justiciability of questions concerning prerogative powers: ... political controversy did not deter the courts from holding, in the Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, that an attempt to alter the law of the land by the use of the Crown’s prerogative powers was unlawful. The court concluded at p 76 that “the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him”, indicating that the limits of prerogative powers were set by law and were determined by the courts.	Why do other countries, like America, not allow this? It is the way that U.S. courts have interpreted the constitutional amendment requirement and reflects a policy judgment that letting someone go free now and then is better than frequently forcing someone to be tried more than once. That value judgment flowed from concerns about and fear and skepticism of the British colonial criminal justice system and the Star Chamber in England with which they were familiar. The U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand didn't have an independence revolution in their history to create the same kind of deep distrust of authority, especially in the criminal justice area. The U.S. was founded by terrorists. Few other former British colonies were. Quoting Dale: "As a constitutional protection, legislative change like this is not available in the United States." Is that really true and can someone expand on this? When the courts determine that the constitution requires something it can't be changed with ordinary legislation. Either the constitution needs to be amended to change it (which is very hard), or the courts can change their interpretation (which is unlikely in an area so settled in the law and which is relatively uncontroversial between liberals and conservatives in the U.S.). If it is, this is a big problem in my opinion. The powers that be in the U.S. don't agree. This kind of case is exceedingly rare. And, there are much bigger problems with the system that obscure that one. Also, the dual sovereignty doctrine allows federal prosecutions in some wrongful acquittals that really matter (e.g. for civil rights violations by law enforcement).	The European Convention on Human Rights has an article about privacy (article 8). Note that this is from the Council of Europe, which is not the same as the European Union: non-EU member states such as Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan are also part of the Council of Europe and therefore the ECHR. I'm not sure if you first have to go to a lower court, but the European Court of Human Rights is the authority on this (commonly mistaken for the European Court of Justice, but they are distinct entities). According to this ruling of the ECtHR, it is not illegal to monitor your employees' communications per se. However, the monitoring has to be: for legitimate purposes ("the employer had only accessed the account in the sincere belief that it contained only messages of a professional, not personal, nature"), proportionate ("it was the only possible way available"), and communicated to the employee (or, if the monitoring is not announced, at least the restriction on personal use should be communicated, for example through company policy). In the European Union, there is also the GDPR, but this does not change much. It applies to your employer the same as any other organisation and basically says that they have to be reasonable about it: collect only what they need, for a legitimate purpose, and tell you about it. I think you should be able to request a copy of any data they collected about you, ask a human to review an automated decision, and your other usual rights. They don't need your consent to start collecting data, as Esa Jokinen already commented: "GDPR doesn't even require consent to handle PII data, but the consent is just the last option when there's no other legitimate reason to process the data." In fact, your employer probably cannot ask you for consent: because of the employer–employee imbalance of power, the consent would probably not be considered to be freely given (where this article mentions "The GDPR states", I think they are referring to recital 43).
What does it mean that something is enforceable? What does it mean that a contract (or a sentence) is enforceable? Does it always mean that force can be used to fulfil such contract? Does it always mean that failing to fulfil such contract would result in a jail sentence for whomever has failed to fulfil it? Are there kinds or degrees of enforceability?	You can obviously write anything into a contract that you like. However, the laws of your country always apply, and the laws can tell you that some things are not valid, even if they are in a contract. Such things cannot be enforced. Things in a contract that are valid according to the laws can be enforced. An extrem example would be a contract saying "user6726 pays gnasher $20,000, and gnasher kills user6726's spouse". Since killing your spouse is a very serious crime, even if we both signed it, and even if you paid the $20,000, you couldn't enforce me doing my side of the contract. What does it mean if we say a contract can be enforced? It means if we both sign a contract, and you do your side of the bargain, and I don't do mine, then you can take me to court. If the court agrees, the court can order me to do what the contract says, and/or to pay you damages. If I refuse, the court has ways to "convince" me to do my side of the bargain. For example, they could send bailiffs to my home, who take my property and sell it in an auction to pay for what I should have paid. They can not in most countries send me to jail. Sometimes one side cannot fulfil their side of the contract. If there is a contract that you build a brand new home for me, and I pay you a million dollar, but I not only don't have the money but am hugely in debt, then I can't pay you. Some people will say that you can't enforce your contract which is legally imprecise. You can take me to court etc., but you can't take money from my empty pockets. I might be in trouble though if I signed the contract knowing that I can't pay you; that could be criminal fraud and I might go to jail if a judge and jury believe that I committed fraud.	I've never heard the phrase used this way, and it wouldn't make any sense, anyway; "indemnity" is security against a consequence, so the existence of civil and criminal consequences would be a double non-indemnification. Maybe ask the lecturer for a published example of this usage.	So, the plain meaning rule is a general rule, and, as with most general legal rules, there are exceptions. One such exception is that if a statute uses a word that has a commonly understood legal meaning, even if that differs from the ordinary meaning, then that legal meaning applies. "Persons" is commonly understood in legalese to include corporations (just take my word for it), so when used in a statute it's going to include corporations and other entities. A similar example is that the word "he," when used in a statute, is not construed to only include males within its ambit. Note that there can be exceptions to this rule too. Since your example is a criminal statute, note that, under certain circumstances, criminal liability can be imputed to a corporation or other entity.	Why isn't forcing users to accept new Terms of Service by threatening financial loss, (like denying access to purchased content, or inhibiting or prohibiting the ability to earn an income), considered extortion and therefore illegal? Usually this is not illegal, and even if it is, it usually doesn't constitute extortion (or extortion's civil counterpart, which is called "duress", which is an affirmative defense to contract enforcement). Generally speaking, exercising a legal right someone already has, for a purpose that is not improper, does not constitute extortion. A TOS Rarely Creates A Reasonable Expectation That It Won't Change Most importantly, in the case of terms of service governed information technology services, the firm that creates the terms of service reserves, at the outset, the right to change them at any time. So, the user has no reasonable expectation that the terms of service won't change in a manner that they dislike. There is no implied promise to never change anything material about the service. Terms of service are usually specifically drafted from the outset to avoid creating something that looks like a property interest on the part of the user in having the service continue to work in a particular manner. TOS Terms May Not Be Unconscionable Both the original terms of service and any subsequent amendment of them, is not permitted to be "unconscionable" (e.g. it can't make the life of your first born child a liquidated damages provision that applies if the terms of service are breached). But, there isn't much of a legally protected reliance interest in not having the terms of service changed in this situation (although almost every general rule could conceivably have some exception to it, probably far more factually extreme than the fact patterns identified in the question). If a term is unconscionable, it may not be enforced as contrary to public policy, without regard to what prior versions of the same agreement may have stated. TOS Changes Are Usually Prospective Only On the other hand, a terms of service amendment is generally only effective prospectively and does not generally change rights that have fully accrued and vested prior to their amendment, at least until the user takes some act to affirmatively continue to use the service going forward. When there are vested rights under old versions, the remedy is not to characterize the change as extortion, however. It is to not apply the amendment to the terms of service retroactively to the already vested rights. For example, if the old terms of service did not contain an arbitration clause, and litigation was in progress under the old terms based upon old transactions, and then a new terms of service were adopted that mandated arbitration, this amendment would not generally be applied to require the pending lawsuit in court to be stayed and transferred to an arbitration forum. The right to litigated vested when the lawsuit was filed.	Normally, statutes don't crawl out of law books and enforce themselves. And, government officials have broad sovereign immunity for most of their activities, so in most cases the only remedy available if someone in the government doesn't enforce a law according to its terms is to seek an injunction ordering the government to carry out the law. Impossibility is a defense to an injunction request. Also, enforcement of many laws is vested entirely in the discretion of the executive branch and can't be compelled judicially at all. When compliance can be judicially compelled because someone has standing to do so and the language makes the action required by statute truly mandatory, short of demanding full compliance with the law, a judge can set deadlines for compliance (a recent example of that involved a judge ordering the federal government to reunite migrant parents and children who had been separated). In the absence of a court order, the attorney-general for the jurisdiction (or an assistant AG tasked with the job) and the chain of command managers responsible for the function and often aides on the chief executive's staff will come up with a compliance plan that is within the realm of the possible. If none of those approaches is workable, the chief executive or top aides to the chief executive will typically approach friendly members of the legislature to seek a legislative work around. A substantial share of the bills in Congress or a state legislature at any given time that almost never make headlines are bills addressing situations like these that come up from time to time, for example, when a statutory requirement that used to become workable, ceases to be due to unavailability of resources or some technical barrier. Most of these bills pass on a bipartisan basis as a matter of course without the general public even noticing it. Most large omnibus laws are followed a few months later by a technical corrections bill address problems discovered in trying to implement the law.	"Tamper" implies action taken with intend to improperly change the meaning. "Alter" simply means "change". "Mutilate" simply means "damage" but in this context implies "Make unreadable". "Obliterates" here means 'make unreadable" or "remove". As a practical matter, there is not much if any difference between these words in this context, and no authority will spend any time at all considering whether some action is 'tampering" or "mutilation". The word "or" is used precisely to avoid such arguments. Any of these shades of meaning is equally forbidden. English-language laws and regulations often specify multiple synonyms or near-synonyms , connecting them with "or" so that anything within the more general scope of the concept is included. Charles Rembar, in his book The Law of the Land, asserted that this dated to the period in England shortly after the Norman Conquest, and that lawyers tended to include equivalent terms from Latin, Norman French, and English. He mentions such combinations as "Give, devise, and bequeath" and "Promise, covenant, and agree" as typical and often-used examples of this tendency. When this sort of multiple terminology is used, it is generally only useful to try to understand what is covered by the combined phrase, and of no value to try to determine which term covers which part of the concept. In the cited cases, anyone who tries to change a passport to say something that the government didn't intend, or who tries to damage or destroy a passport, or anything similar, would be guilty of the forbidden act. And similarly, anyone who tries to make an MVID read differently, or to make it unreadable, would be guilty.	it's not illegal to sign a contract that demands illegal things, however, such a contract, in general, is called an illegal contract. Illegal contracts are null and void. Contracts that violate public policy never have force in the first place. A contract can't force people to declare lies under oath or demand them to murder someone. Thus, a contract demanding such is illegal. As a result, such a clause would not just be unenforceable, it might void the entire contract wholesale if it is not severable. In the least, any clause demanding illegal acts was null and void ab initio, and never was valid. void contracts in law germany explicitly makes contracts void that are "Sittenwidrig" in § 138 BGB and also illegal ones in § 134 BGB Declarations to the Agentur für Arbeit are made under threat of perjury, and thus lying is illegal. It is also Sittenwidrig. This makes the provision void. Murder is illegal, inciting to murder someone is illegal, and so a contract to murder someone for pay is void. Such a contract also is Sittenwidrig. Selling the right to ask to marry your daughter per see isn't illegal, but it is Sittenwidrig and as such the contract is void. california judges refer to such contracts as illegal contracts, defining this as a test where making non-enforcement of such a contract something of public interest: It is in the public interest that people tell the truth to the unemployment office, so a contract demanding you to lie is illegal. It is illegal to lie on the stand (perjury), and thus the contract is illegal. Conspiracy However, the contract can also be evidence of criminal activity in itself: It manifests the will of two parties to commit an illegal act. That is the core of a conspiracy charge. Conspiracy is illegal and usually a felony. germany: Conspiracy to commit a crime is §30 STGB	No enforceable contract can contain illegal clauses and work Contracts can not remove some rights and never can bypass obligations. Talking to the police at times is a requirement by law, as is taking to the labor board. Responding to a subpoena is legally forced by the court. An NDA might limit the amount what you can say, and a contract might limit who you can sue, but can not ban you from suing at all. In germany, a contract that tries to curtail such requirements would be Sittenwidrig and make all clauses that try to limit the rights fully Void and nill ab initio - in fact, it can be used as evidence against the drafting party that they tried to do so. So to stay legal and keep the clause working in the limited fashion where it is not demanded, the clause cuts the contract to explicitly exclude such situations.
Are public defenders commonly paid "per defense"? In Better Call Saul, Saul is upset that he's being paid "per defense" (1): Is this a common practice? Don't criminal cases vary significantly in complexity? How is this addressed with respect to public defender compensation? (1) as opposed to "per defendant", but that's besides the point.	The answer depends on the jurisdiction, the court, and how the public defender system is set up. This answer addresses state court indigent defense at the trial level. In many jurisdictions, state courts are organized by counties. In many of these counties, particularly larger and urban counties, public defenders are a department of county government (like the district attorneys who prosecute, or public works, or the tax assessor). These defenders are county employees, and paid a wage. They are not compensated "by the case." In other jurisdictions, there may be no county-level public defenders. Courts there will appoint private attorneys to defend indigent defendants, and will compensate the defenders pursuant to a fee schedule promulgated by the court, or the judge's whim. The fee schedule may be time-based or flat fee, and usually provides differentials for type of case, amount of time required, investigative and witness fees, and often allows the lawyer to seek additional compensation if the lawyer thinks it's warranted. The court may decline the lawyer's motion, of course, at the risk that the lawyer won't take future appointments, a serious difficulty for the court which must, under the law, provide counsel for indigent defendants who face incarceration. More than this, it's tough to generalize. The setup in Los Angeles County, California, for instance, will be different than the experience in Alliance, NE, or a small county in another state. The same challenges face the federal courts. I'm only familiar with the California federal courts at the trial level, where a parallel system applies, with defenders on salary and employed by the federal government. While some states provide representation on appeal using defenders employed by the state government, other states rely on individual lawyers being appointed, rather like the trial-level system. Source: I'm a prior county public defender and private attorney in California.	Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings.	There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.	I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983.	So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification.	Yes, this is allowed. A famous example was the Rodney King beating, where police officers were acquitted at the state level but convicted federally. US v. Lanza formalized the rule, and it has survived the application of the double jeopardy rule to the states. It's called the separate sovereigns doctrine, and also applies to prosecutions by two states (see Heath v. Alabama) and by an Indian tribe and the feds (see US v. Wheeler). It does not apply between DC and the feds or territories and the feds, because DC and territorial laws are established under the power of the federal government. These prosecutions are uncommon. As far as the feds go, they normally consider a state prosecution to have satisfied the federal interest in the case (win or lose). But prosecution by multiple sovereigns is not barred by the Fifth Amendment.	The purposes of criminal justice include (this list is based on the Sentencing Act 1991 in Victoria): Deterrence Rehabilitation of offenders Denunciation ('this behaviour is wrong') (Retribution can also be a purpose.) What the question is talking about is rehabilitation. As discussed in the book 'Starship Troopers', you can't expect a person to improve their behaviour if they are not shown how. Some simple examples in practice include violent offenders being sent to anger management classes, or bad drivers being sentenced to remedial training. Why aren't all offenders put into rehabilitation programs? Some reasons include: Cost. It would be very expensive to offer all the rehabilitation which would help all offenders. Often this kind of thing is court-ordered, so if the judge does not know about relevant programs or does not assess the offender's needs correctly, then the offender will not be sent to them. The offender is unwilling to participate in programs that are available, and there are limits to how much coercion a given society is comfortable applying. There is no 'one size fits all' rehabilitation. Some people need to talk about what makes them use drugs, others need to talk through their childhood issues, others need training so they can get a job and not fall back into bad habits when they are released from prison. Perhaps North Korea has a great curriculum for putting lots of people in a camp and they come out model citizens, but I'm not aware of the details. Can a person really be forced to do anything? Even the army can't do that. The army might put you in prison, but that's redundant for a person who is already a prisoner. You can always threaten to kill them, I suppose, whip them, or brainwash them with electrodes perhaps, but that depends on your principles as a society. I think it's fair to say that, these days, the trend is towards what the question suggests, which is putting as many offenders as possible into rehabilitation. In 2014 it was reported that Texas took the money it would have spent on building a new prison and used it on rehabilitation instead, and there were suggestions that that worked well.	Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.
Drink and riding (bicycle) offence in Germany I am charged with a criminal offence in a drink-and-riding-a-bicycle case. I have received a letter mentioning the alcohol content 1.66 promile. I have accepted the charges and agreed to pay the fine. What are the possible fines for this offence? Is there any possible legal effect on my resident permit? How long will the record stay in the register? I do not have a driving license.	The fine would typically be around your monthly income. Legal basis: drunk driving per §316 StGB is punishable by up to one year in prison, but per §47 and §40 StGB short sentences are converted to a fine that depends on your daily net income (Tagessätze). There is likely no impact. Despite this being a crime, it will not appear in your criminal record that some employers need. Legal basis: Per §32 BZRG the criminal record will not show convictions with ≤ 90 Tagessätze. However, other government departments can request full access. You will get three “Flensburg points” which has no immediate effect, but can lead to increased penalties for your next traffic violation. Where the points have been awarded for a crime, they will expire after 5 or 10 years. You can voluntarily visit seminars to remove points at a rate of one per five years. Legal basis: per Appendix 13 FeV, drunk driving (§316 StGB) gives you two or three Flensburg points, depending on whether your license (implied for bikes) is suspended and the amount of alcohol in your bloodstream. Retention period is covered in §29 StVG. Seminars are covered in §4(7) StGB. Other effects: You may be ordered to do the MPU psychological evaluation and can be banned from using a bike if you fail. You will also have to take an MPU if you want to get a driving license.	Is there anything I can do so that the authorities investigate and revoke his privilege of driving a car? Yes. Next time he drinks and gets behind the wheel, call the police and tell them that you are witnessing an intoxicated person about to drive. If the police witness him behind the wheel while intoxicated, he'll be issued a DUI, perhaps face jail time, and will have his license revoked. I would suggest visiting your local chapter of Alcoholics Anonymous. They experience situations like this all the time and can work with you to help this individual.	This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas).	There seems to be no current applicable prohibition state law in Iowa in Iowa Code 39A, the Election Misconduct and Penalties Act. It is also not at all clear that precinct caucuses count as "elections" as applicable to the sections with criminal prohibitions (the precinct caucus does not appear to constitute a "primary election" under Iowa law).	If you have a license and drive but forget your license and get pulled over what happens? You could receive a summons or citation (a.k.a. "ticket") for failing to carry a driver's license. Section § 46.2-104 of the Virginia Code states that it is a traffic infraction with a $10 fine to not have your license while driving. The operator of any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer being operated on the highways in the Commonwealth, shall have in his possession: (i) the registration card issued by the Department or the registration card issued by the state or country in which the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is registered, and (ii) his driver's license, learner's permit, or temporary driver's permit. Every person licensed by the Department as a driver . . . who fails to carry his license. . . for the vehicle which he operates, shall be guilty of a traffic infraction and upon conviction punished by a fine of ten dollars. (Emphasis added.) Do you get a penalty for forgetting it at your house? Yes, if you have a valid license that you left at home, you can get the case dismissed by showing the license to the the court (presumably a clerk), but you will still have to pay "court costs." However, if any person summoned to appear before a court for failure to display his license . . . presents, before the return date of the summons, to the court a license or permit issued to him prior to the time the summons was issued . . . or appears pursuant to the summons and produces before the court a license or permit issued to him prior to the time the summons was issued . . . , he shall, upon payment of all applicable court costs, have complied with the provisions of this section. Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-104 (2016).	If I attempt to carry such a product into the country, but then honestly declare it at the border (I would like to declare 10 kg of marijuana, sir), can I be prosecuted for attempted smuggling? This depends on the jurisdiction and its definition of "smuggling." In the US, as an example, smuggling implies fraud or "clandestine" action. Openly bringing a forbidden item and declaring it would not meet the definition of this crime. Or will I simply be faced with the choice of turning around or forfeiting my goods and continue without trouble? Depending on the product in question, probably not. In the marijuana example, even if you are not guilty of smuggling, you are guilty of possessing and transporting a controlled substance (see 21 USC subchapter I). You could also be charged with intent to distribute, which would likely be a more serious crime. You could also be charged under the laws of the state in which the port of entry is located. With regard to the methyl alcohol example, I do not know whether bringing it to the customs desk at a port of entry would constitute a crime.	Arrests For Crimes A charge must be identified very early in the criminal justice process, typically upon booking an arrested person at a police station or jail, which will usually take place minutes to hours after an arrest is made. At the latest, a provisional charge will be revealed at a first appearance before a judge (which will usually take place within a day, or sometimes a bit longer on a weekend or holiday in rural areas whether it should or not), although the charges identified at that time can be amended later in the process. A plea of guilty or not guilty is entered at an arraignment, which sometimes is combined with a first court appearance and sometimes is conducted separately. A preliminary hearing happens much later in the criminal justice process, after an arraignment (which is sometimes combined with a first court appearance), and after counsel is assigned to represent the person who is charged. A preliminary hearing is an adversarial mini-trial before a judge at which the prosecution presents evidence sufficient to establish probable cause on previously disclosed charged in a somewhat summary fashion (not necessarily everything to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt), and the attorney for the defendant can cross-examine witnesses, object to questions improper under the rules of evidence, and introduce exonerating evidence (although this last option is only rarely utilized). A preliminary hearing is a substitute for a grand jury indictment as a means to screen whether charges are supported by probable cause. Usually, but not in absolutely all cases, if the arrest is pursuant to an arrest warrant, the arrest warrant will be presented to the person being arrested immediately prior to, at the time of the arrest, or immediately after the arrest is made, and the arrest warrant will provide some insight into the charge. But, unless a state statute or court rule provides otherwise, a charge does not usually need to be disclosed during the actual process of making an arrest, or while the person arrested is being transported to a police station or jail for booking, although the charge often is disclosed at that time or even before the arrest is made. Frequently, someone is read their Miranda rights before the charge is identified. Some of the fine details are a matter of state specific court rules and statutes, but the general outline of the process described above is the U.S. constitutional requirement. The process for arresting a minor is not very different from the process for arresting an adult, but usually, when a minor is arrested, a parent or guardian must be promptly notified of the arrest and the charge, if possible. Many states have a minimum age for arresting a minor for committing a crime or juvenile delinquency offense, which is typically somewhere in the range from age seven to age twelve, although there is considerable variation on this point. This is an area of the law where active efforts to pass reform legislation to take a less punitive approach with younger minors are underway. Minors Taken Into Custody For Other Reasons Also, while adults are overwhelmingly arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime, a minor is sometime placed under law enforcement or social services custody in a manner that looks like an arrest, but isn't, for a reason other than a charge that the minor is actually believed to have committed a crime. For example, suppose that a five year old child is found in an apartment at which two adults presumed to be the child's mother and father, are found dead (the reason for their deaths doesn't really matter). In that situation, the law enforcement officer at the scene would generally take physical custody of the child pending the arrival of a social services officer at the scene who would then take physical custody of the child from the law enforcement officer until another suitable guardian could be located, even though there is no suspicion that the child committed a crime. The name for this process varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In New York State, for example, this is called "person in need of supervision" case (PINS for short), which is sometimes thought of as a civil custody matter and is sometimes classified as what is called a "status offense" that justifies the government taking custody of a minor even though the minor has not committed a crime.	I'm answering your title question and assuming that you meant to present a circumstance that would actually trigger criminal liability, but based on the ages you've actually used in your hypothetical, you may not have done so. I'll ignore that complication and just present what the law is. Yes, there are some U.S. laws that people can be found to violate while in another country. The Department of Justice has a "citizen's guide" explaining extraterritorial sexual exploitation of children. The main offences are: 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a): Transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity 18 U.S.C. § 2423(d): Travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c): Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places For § 2423(a), there must be the intent to engage in "any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense." For § 2423(b) and (c), "illicit sexual conduct" means, among a few other things: "a sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Chapter 109A includes § 2243(a): Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any Federal department or agency, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who (a) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and (b) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
Can I monetize a Pokemon themed App in Google Store I have created a Pokemon themed app , and I'm going to upload it to Google Store but I have some doubts. I have two versions of the app , one free and another "premium" which costs 2$ , also I want to introduce ads in the app in order to get some money . Is this legal ? Can Pokemon turn down my app ? Do I need to specify something in the description in order to tell Pokemon that the content I use don't belong to me ?	Your app is a simple case of copyright infringement. All the Pokémon are copyrighted, the lettering and names are also protect by trademarks. Trying to claim fair use will be outright impossible: you'll use huge portions of the individually protected Pokemon (the iconic ones like Pikachu) and you are usurping a market they are already in. They have given licenses for apps (Pokemon Go). Pokemon are artistic and some form of fiction. The last straw might be if you'd do a rather obvious parody, but even then, I see no way to show Fair Use with what you stated. No disclaimer can change that, and publishing your work might open you to a huge lawsuit with damages for each individually protected Pokemon you infringed on. With between 750 $ minimum and 150,000 $ absolute upper limit per infringed item (last is for willful infringement), you don't want to infringe on Pokemon, as you could be very easily liable for a number in the 6 to 9 digits! Even if Nintendo might only try to get the statutory damages for all the 900 Pokémon, that is a number of at least 675,4000 $. And that's before looking at Trademarks. Pikachu has about 6 live word marks and there are 111 different Pokémon trademarks filed (some expired or dead)!	Ok, so it looks like there really are many questions being asked. 1) Is it illegal to host / own / operate a private server for games that require a server of such? And why? 2) Is it illegal to host / own / operate a private server for WOW? And why? 3) Is it illegal to join a private server for games that require a server? and why? 4) Is it illegal to join a private server for WOW? Answers 1 & 2) This depends on the game that is being hosted. There are many games that require servers in which this is not only legal, but encouraged by the company. MineCraft is one that comes to mind. You can host MineCraft servers, and even modify the server code. You can even charge for this service. However,for games like WOW, In short, yes if the server is profiting or If the server is running stolen or leaked software or If the server is distributing client files. If the server was recreated from the developers own mind, and was only compatible with the WOW server, then it's a bit more gray and depends on the Judge's level of understanding of technology. 3 & 4) This comes down to the EULA. If the EULA is like MineCraft, then you are good to go. If the EULA is like WOW, which forbids both modification of the client and participation on emulated servers then it is a violation of EULA. If WOW did not have the second part of "participation on emulated servers", then a user could modify on the router level to point to a private server.	Technically, as I've read the unreal license agreement, the person who made the mod would owe Epic 5% royalties on all your sales related to the mod, even if they did not collect the sale price. You cannot be a party to a license you did not agree to, but Epic has very strange royalty terms that seem unreasonable on the surface and I'm not sure they've tested that in court. Here is what the license says: Royalty You agree to pay Epic a royalty equal to 5% of all worldwide gross revenue actually attributable to each Product, regardless of whether that revenue is received by you or any other person or legal entity, as follows: a. Gross revenue resulting from any and all sales of a Product to end users through any and all media, including but not limited to digital and retail; b. Gross revenue resulting from any and all in-app purchases, downloadable content, microtransactions, subscriptions, sale, transfer, or exchange of content created by end users for use with a Product, or redemption of virtual currency, either within a Product or made externally but which directly affect the operation of the Product; c. Gross revenue from any Kickstarter or other crowdfunding campaign which is directly associated with Product access or in-Product benefit (e.g., in a multi-tiered campaign, if an amount is established in an early tier solely for Product access, your royalty obligation will apply to that amount for each backer with the same access, but not on additional amounts in higher tiers based on ancillary benefits); d. Your revenue from in-app advertising and affiliate programs; e. Revenue from advance payments for a Product (from a publisher or otherwise); f. Revenue received in connection with a Product’s inclusion in a streaming, subscription, or other game-delivery service (e.g., Apple Arcade, Microsoft GamePass, or any similar or successor services), including without limitation development funds and bonuses; and g. Revenue in any other form actually attributable to a Product (unless excluded below). So the first part says "regardless of whether that revenue is received by you or any other person or legal entity". So somebody else may have revenue attributable to the product (aka a 50% increase in sales due to this mod), and you owe it even if you are not collecting or receiving that money directly. The last part (g) also says that revenue in any other form attributable to the product. Epic's license doesn't allow you to make a "front-end" to a paid product and release the front-end free, and collect money on the back-end. So if revenue is attributable to the product you develop, you owe royalties on the sales related to the product regardless of you collecting that income or not. Notice how it doesn't say "directly attributable to each Product...", it says "actually attributable to each Product". This is the part I find a bit egregious and not sure it will hold up in court, however the terms of the license are written so that the developer of the Unreal product has to pay royalties even if they don't collect money from it themselves.	Generally, no, this will not violate copyright. Your end user might violate copyright, but that is their problem not yours. Your program is a tool, just like a word processor is. If I copy a Harry Potter book into a word processor that does not make the word processor maker liable. There is a concept of "contributory infringement", which I think is what you are concerned about. I don't know about Danish law in particular, but most countries would require evidence that you had reasonable knowledge that actual copyright violation was occuring, rather than just being aware that it might happen in theory. This is normally applied to file sharing services who have to have "notice and takedown" measures, file filters and the like. This isn't your concern as you never have any access to the files created by your users. You can also be found liable if you induce anyone to commit copyright violations. Don't draw your customers attention to the custom monster feature as a workaround for those copyrighted monsters, as that could be considered to be inducement. Also don't provide any "wizards" or similar tools which make it noticeably easier to duplicate the custom monsters (e.g. if you notice that the copyrighted custom dragon stats are all on a linear scale with dragon size, don't create a "dragon creation wizard" embodying that fact.) This assumes that your program runs entirely on the end user computer. Its different if you provide any kind of cloud storage for generated characters.	Check your license! By operating the original client, you might have agreed to a license, the EULA. Check that license for what it says about you being allowed to do with the product. In a recent case of Bungie vs. Elite Boss Tech, a US court found in a default judgment that a certain cheat software that would interact with both the game's client and the company's servers among other things did... constitute copyright infringement [as a derivative work] was a breach of contract [formed by the EULA and agreeing to the Terms of Service for the game] was interference with Contractual allegations [of other users that obtained the software] However, not all internet games or experiences are locked down like that. Other companies do offer an open API set or terms under which a client's software may be modified. As a very generous example, LindenLabs does for its SecondLife Virtual World, for which they provide not just the framework, but also the terms under which you are allowed to make a third party Viewer Sometimes, the Terms of service are rather hidden. For example, the Chinese Go platform Fox Weiqi operates in china. To get to the terms of service, you need to download the free client, go to Settings (via the cog), then choose 野狐围棋用户协议, which is Chinese for Wild Fox Go User Agreement. This links to https://edu.foxwq.com/complex/useragreement.html. The user agreement is of course in Chinese, but Google Translate manages to get that to English. It contains the following clause: 7.2 Unless permitted by law or with the written permission of Yehu, you shall not engage in the following acts during the use of this software: ( 1 ) Delete the copyright information on the software and its copies; ( 2 ) Reverse engineer, reverse assemble, reverse compile the software, or try to find the source code of the software in other ways; ( 6 ) Log in or use Yehu Go and its services through third-party software, plug-ins, plug-ins, systems not authorized by Yehu, or make, publish, and disseminate the above tools; ( 7 ) Interfering with the software and its components, modules, and data by itself or authorizing others or third-party software While it takes a court to see if the terms hold water and are actually enforceable because of how the EULA is offered, the face value of those clauses is, that it is forbidden unless you have a specific law that allows such or you obtain written permission. With that kind of possible liability that might cost millions, there might be serious legal problems. Read your license agreement and terms of service and consult a lawyer.	You must get opt-in affirmative consent to process personal data, including tracking people's use of your site or providing targeted advertising. The banner on StackExchange is likely in violation of the GDPR. Do not copy it. It does not have an explicit opt-in, only an opt out which is onerous (leave the site, then manually go in and delete any cookies they set, which may be hard to identify if they are from 3rd parties). The sites you mention that have a gateway are a more correct implementation. Consent must be acquired before processing of data begins, and it must be explicit.	If the app (and the service accessed from the app) truly doesn't have any EULA, ToS, or license agreement, to include restrictions on reverse engineering, you can probably create an alternate front end, so long as you aren't using their logos, etc. However, their data may be a different beast, depending on the nature of it. For example, extracting data from Twitter would potentially violate Twitter's license on the original text copyright held by the authors in question. Wikipedia explicitly includes redistribution in their license agreement with authors/content creators. If all you are extracting and storing is the temperature at a particular weather station, you might have less of a concern. Anything beyond merely factual runs the risk of a copyright infringement as you store the data in your own database.	They have copyright in their additional text, and possibly in things like their visual design choices (fonts, layout etc). They may also have introduced a few deliberate typos to detect any literal copies from their version (rather as mapmakers add a few imaginary features to their maps). None of this creates any rights to the original text. You are still free to produce your own copies of the original text. Just get it from some other source so you can be sure not to include anything of theirs.
Minor's legal right to his personal property I am the legal guardian of my 14-year-old grandson and have been since he was 2 years old. He has resided with his Aunt for the past 6 years. Due to issues concerning his safety in her home, he has requested to reside with me. I have brought him to live with me and now his Aunt is refusing to return clothing, personal items, etc. to him. I have bought many of the items in question, my grandson has purchased some of the items himself, and many were gifts he received. Does he have any legal rights to these personal items? If so, what is the process to get these items back?	Children own their personal property Although legal guardians may place limits on access or use. Unless the aunt is a legal guardian she has no right to retain them. Ask for their return. If she refuses, sue for their return.	If you are facing felony charges, you need to hire a criminal defense lawyer, not ask for legal advice on the Internet. Do not talk to the police without your lawyer present. Do not attempt to represent yourself in any kind of hearing. Ignore any advice based on what seems fair or reasonable to someone on the Internet unless it is based on a real case in North Carolina or written by a real lawyer. That said, it appears to me that you have at least two strong defenses. First, if you you returned the laptop (It will help if you sent it by registered mail or otherwise kept a receipt, although, remember, they need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you kept it), that shows you had no “intent to steal” or “purpose to steal” it, which is a necessary element of the crime. Second, according to the University of North Carolina criminal law blog, you appear to have been charged with the wrong offense (although I don’t think that will actually help you if the prosecutor decides to bring the charge that matches what your former employer alleges you to have done). It cites a relevant North Carolina Supreme Court ruling on the difference between larceny and embezzlement, State v. McDonald, 45 S.E. 582 (N.C. 1903). I would focus on getting yourself cleared of these charges first. You can ask your lawyer if there is any recourse you might have against your former employer. I’m skeptical that suing them would be worth it, but I don’t know the circumstances. If you have proof of what they said to you and about you, hang on to it.	I'm based in England, but I'm sure the principle is similar in Canada. The night club or concert venue is private property. When someone owns or rents private property one of the main things they are buying is the right to control who is present on that property, and generally they can use reasonable force to remove people who are not authorised. Security guards generally act as agents for a property owner, tenant or similar.	My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here.	Joint tenancy means that you both have equal (full) rights to the entire property, so just as you don't his permission to live there or to invite guests, he doesn't either. Unless they threaten you in some way (and you get a court order barring them from entering), there is no legal means to deprive an owner of their property rights, while they are still an owner.	In principle, a verbal contract is just as binding as a written contract. The catch is that it can be difficult to prove what was said. Unless you have witnesses, it would just be your word against his. As DStanley says in the comments, if you have proof that you paid half -- canceled checks or receipts or whatever -- that would be evidence that there was some sort of agreement. Whether your daughter is allowed to drive the car on a specific day depends not just on who owns the car but who has legal custody of your daughter. If a friend of hers said that it is okay with him for her to drive his car to a wild party where there will be drugs and an orgy, the fact that he has full title to the car does not mean that her parents have no right to tell her she can't go! You didn't say what the custody arrangements are, but if you have full custody or shared custody, this would give you certain rights to tell her what she is and is not allowed to do.	In most states, the answer would be less clear, as First Amendment protections begin falling away quickly when you enter private property. In California, though, there is some strong precedent indicating that this behavior would be protected. In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 902 (1979), the California Supreme Court held that "the soliciting at a shopping center of signatures for a petition to the government is an activity protected by the California Constitution." That case adopted the reasoning of a dissent in a previous case where the court had rejected such an argument: It bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under consideration the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment. As a result of advertising and the lure of a congenial environment, 25,000 persons are induced to congregate daily to take advantage of the numerous amenities offered by the [shopping center there]. A handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in connection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations ... would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights. I'd bet there is case law addressing religious leafleting, as well, but I don't know California law well enough to cite to it. Even if there isn't, though, the First Amendment's requirements of content-neutrality in government decisionmaking would probably require that the same protections be extended to religious speech. Of course, the answer to these kinds of questions always depends on the specific facts, requiring you to engage a lawyer to get a reliable answer. For a lower cost, you could also just ask the local police if they would enforce a request from the property owner to have you removed.	This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best.
Non-profit granting rights of use of software to for-profit we have two organizations - one for profit and one non-profit, that are related. The Non-profit benefits from use of Slack, GSuite and other tools at a discount due to the non-profit nature of the organization. The for profit organization is donating resource time, office space to the non-profit. In this case, would the non-profit be allowed to 'license' the use of the SaaS to the for profit (in exchange for the office space, resources, technical help, etc)? I imagine that the main problem would be in the T&C of these tools (Slack/Gsuite for non profits, etc), but could not find anything myself. Thanks! Brian	You can't grant or license that which is not yours. For example, the Slack terms of service say: We grant to Customer a non-sublicensable, non-transferable, non-exclusive, limited license for Customer and its Authorized Users to use the object code version of these components, but solely as necessary to use the Services and in accordance with the Contract and the User Terms. So Slack's agreement with Org A does not give A any right to let any other organization B use the software. It does not matter how A and B are related, nor whether B is nonprofit or for-profit, nor what A would be getting in exchange. If B wants to use it, they need to make their own agreement with Slack.	The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.	In the EU, software license resale is legal, even if explicitly forbidden by terms of any EULA or other contract imposed upon the parties. To quote the European Court of Justice's press release on its ruling in a case in Germany between Oracle and a German reseller, An author of software cannot oppose the resale of his `used' licences allowing the use of his programs downloaded from the internet. [...] The principle of exhaustion of the distribution right applies not only where the copyright holder markets copies of his software on a material medium (CD-ROM or DVD) but also where he distributes them by means of downloads from his website. Where the copyright holder makes available to his customer a copy – tangible or intangible – and at the same time concludes, in return form payment of a fee, a licence agreement granting the customer the right to use that copy for an unlimited period, that rightholder sells the copy to the customer and thus exhausts his exclusive distribution right. Such a transaction involves a transfer of the right of ownership of the copy. Therefore, even if the license agreement prohibits a further transfer, the rightholder can no longer oppose the resale of that copy. There are many such companies in the EU who resell software legally, including used OEM Windows licenses that are far cheaper than retail copies. This is, in my opinion, a fantastic thing -- but undoubtedly has been behind the trend towards time-limited licenses rather than perpetual ones, which we all arguably suffer from today.	Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.	If an infringement suit is filed, the plaintiff(s) would have rights of discovery. They could subpoena the source code in such a case for comparison. They could take the depositions of EvilCorp's developers and ask them about the libraries that they used. There might well be other ways to achieve the same effect.	The second paragraph is an invitation for people who don't want to follow the terms of the GPL (e.g. who want to incorporate it into a larger closed-source work, or make closed-source modifications) to contact XXX for a less onerous (but more expensive) license. That would require that XXX have full rights to the software, that they did not for instance incorporate others' GPLed code. It would be a stretch to read the second paragraph as attempting to limit the first paragraph, particularly given the "please".	Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it.	Probably not An employee is someone that the employer "suffers or permits to work" - moderators would appear to be caught by this. There are specific exemptions carved out in the public and not-for-profit sectors where they "a) work toward public service, religious or humanitarian objectives; b) not expect or receive compensation for services; and c) not displace any genuine employees." However, they very specifically say “Under the FLSA, employees may not volunteer services to for-profit private sector employers.” So on the face of it, a moderator is an employee and is entitled to minimum wages and conditions for the hours they work. AOL settled a lawsuit in 2009 with their moderators who were suing for wages for an undisclosed sum and so the case did not set a precedent. This article suggests that "for-profit companies don’t have volunteers; they have lawsuits waiting to happen" and uses examines the situation at Reddit (which could equally apply here). Facebook employs moderators so the precedent exists that this is work that employees do. When the lawsuit happens, we'll find out. It will turn on the particular facts - some types of mods for some companies may be employees while others may not.
Mail-in ballot dropbox What prevents authorities from setting up a dropbox for mail-in ballots at local voting precincts (maybe something similar to testing where you do not need to exit your automobile)? I ask because in the context of COVID-19 and problems with the US mail system, it could make sense to setup collection centers. I am not interested in the politics, however, I am interested in understanding if the dropbox laws (if any) renders the headlinesmoot.	It depends on whether state law allows the use of drop boxes. Many states do -- in 2016, a little over 15% of ballots nationally were returned to drop boxes. Several states require drop boxes; some specify how many are required. (As far as I can tell, no state requires a drop box in every precinct.) For example, Washington, which is a "vote by mail" state, allows voters to either mail ballots back, or return them to a drop box. The law requires the county to provide: "a minimum of one ballot drop box per fifteen thousand registered voters in the county and "a minimum of one ballot drop box in each city, town, and census-designated place in the county with a post office.* In Washington general elections, between 40-50% of ballots are returned to drop boxes -- in 2016, 57% were. Predictably, the use of drop boxes has been in the news recently.	Huge difference between a car and a house. For example, at least in Pennsylvania no warrant is required to search a vehicle on public roads. In other states there are so many easy pretexts that you practically have little protection from a full vehicle search (although the pretext will have to withstand strict scrutiny if evidence found in a search is used to charge you with a crime). Your house, on the other hand, still enjoys very strong fourth-amendment protections: One of my favorite U.S. Supreme Court cases on the subject is Florida v. Jardines, in which SCOTUS ruled that even approaching the front door with a drug-sniffing dog without a warrant constituted an illegal search. (The majority opinion is worth reading for its illumination of current law on this question.)	Residents agree that the receipt of mail by any individual not listed as a Resident or Occupant in this Agreement at the Leased Premises shall be proof of occupancy of that individual and a violation of this Agreement. I assume that the lease states that only the listed individuals can reside in the unit. Maybe they think that this says that receipt of mail by an unlisted person is a further violation of the lease, I don't think that is clearly enough stated that the courts would agree that receiving mail is itself a violation of the lease. Instead, it seems to be intended to say something about an existing clause – you can't have other people living there. The courts would look at the requirements of the lease, and ask "did you comply"? The question of whether you did a certain thing is a question of fact that has to be resolved in court. However, the revised lease language does not state that all mail must be addressed to Johnny Johnson – it only addresses receipt by a person not on the lease. You are (apparently) on the lease, so you may receive mail there. Nothing in the lease controls how such mail can be addressed. If you receive mail addressed to Tommy Thompson, your defense is that you received the mail, and you are on the lease, so you will not have violated the new clause.	Maybe, but probably not The geographic location of the organisation is immaterial: under Article 3.2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: ... (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. Posts anyone (not just EU citizens) make to Reddit (or anywhere else) while they are physically located in the EU or UK engage the GDPR. Pushift.io is therefore captured by the GDPR and any denial of that is just plain wrong. Given the denial, it is likely right out of the gate that they are non-complient. For example, they are unlikely to provided the required information under Article 14. More importantly, it seems that they have not determined the lawful basis for processing the data under Article 6 - they can possibly rely on the public interest basis (preserving deleted publication is arguably a public interest) or a legitimate interest but that requires a balancing of their interest against the data subject's. That said, the right to be forgotten is not absolute, the reasons that might be applicable here are: The data is being used to exercise the right of freedom of expression and information. The data is being used to perform a task that is being carried out in the public interest or when exercising an organization’s official authority. The data represents important information that serves the public interest, scientific research, historical research, or statistical purposes and where erasure of the data would likely to impair or halt progress towards the achievement that was the goal of the processing.	It is a false statement to claim to live in one county when you actually live in a different one. It becomes perjury (a crime) when you falsely swear to that statement on your status report, and you are required to report changes in "household situation" within 10 days. There isn't an exception allowing you to give a false address "in case it costs more to report truthfully". The only legal solutions are to report truthfully and pay more, or move again, report truthfully, and not pay more.	I did the Googling: Prior to the case described in this article, a notice was to be deemed served if the sender can sufficiently prove that the letter was properly addressed, pre-paid and posted. Law - Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 The case made it clear that the same law also sets a condition, where if the letter was not received at said mailbox, or too late received, the notice is to be deemed not served. The receiver is not required to prove that the letter has not arrived in the mailbox. Also, if your mail has been tampered with, you should contact Royal Mail - they will perform an investigation and put your mailbox in order. I work with tenants and landlords, thus lots of official notices. In this practice, it's often a recommended action to follow up on a notice and make sure the receiver has indeed received and acknowledged the notice. I don't know if it's a legal requirement, but often in disputes (which go to arbitration by a 3rd party), if one party states they did not receive the notice and the other party can't sufficiently prove that they did everything in their power to contact and confirm the delivery of the notice, the notice is regarded as not served. I believe you cannot deny post. If it's in your mailbox, it's your responsibility to check and read it.	If the sticker is not easily removable, it would likely fall under defacement of the mail which is illegal according to 18 U.S. Code § 1705 - Destruction of letter boxes or mail: Whoever willfully or maliciously injures, tears down or destroys any letter box or other receptacle intended or used for the receipt or delivery of mail on any mail route, or breaks open the same or willfully or maliciously injures, defaces or destroys any mail deposited therein, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. They do not have the right to deface your mail while they are holding it for you, and just because it's not inside an actual mailbox because it doesn't fit is not an exception. However, that requires arguing that a sticker is actually defacement. If it can easily be removed, like a sticky note, then you likely won't win that argument. In fact, many universities which must handle mail services for students advise that rubber banding a note around the mail is acceptable, as is writing student information onto the mail. So complaining about the sticker would likely just cause them to attach it in a different way that does not qualify as defacement. You can't completely stop them from advertising their stuff, and it's really not much different than if they had gone around and put a door hanger on all of your doors.	You did not mention the country where you are, but this sounds like a very bad idea. Any working "glitter bomb" will be a low-grade bomb and setting one of those is extremely illegal. If you know when the next parcel will arrive, my advice would be to arrange for a credlible witness and to take pictures of the parcel before you open it any further. Then report the damage to the sender. If it was a commercial parcel, ask for a full refund. Enough of that and the postal inspectors will wonder why their machines are "damaging" so much mail.
How Are LLC Liabilities Prioritized? e.g. Are Bank Loans Paid Before Legal Settlements? Consider an LLC that owns a rental home worth $700,000 and has bank debt of $500,000. A renter slips, falls, sues, and wins a $300,000 settlement. Is the bank debt senior to the lawsuit, leaving the lawsuit $100,000 short? LLC members are wiped out, but with the limited liability of an LLC the story ends there? What if the $500,000 loan is owed to one of the LLC members? Does that change anything, assuming the member has a fully documented and separate loan agreement with the LLC?	Is the debt secured? Lenders can lend money secured or unsecured. If they lend it secured then what is the security? That is, what property secured the loan? For your example that could be a mortgage over the land or a charge over the assets of the LLC or both. In this particular example, it doesn’t make a difference but if the sale of the property only realised $400,000 and the security was a mortgage only then only $400,000 is secured and the rest is unsecured. Further, in some jurisdictions it is a requirement that security interests be “perfected” by complying with administrative provisions to register the security interest on some sort of public record. If this doesn’t happen, the debt is unsecured. Secured creditors rank ahead of unsecured creditors and in the order spelled out in the contracts or equally if the contracts are silent. Unsecured creditors rank in the order spelled out in 11 USC 507. The members of the LLC are not necessarily protected from the bankruptcy if it is possible to pierce the corporate veil.	There is no misrepresentation by the bank as you describe it, there is negligence by the account holder to comply with the terms of the account. The bank made no representation at all regarding a balance due. If you want the bank to be at fault, they the customer would have to demand a declaration as to the existence of a balance due (choose your words carefully), and the bank would have to have falsely asserted that there is no present or future obligation. This is not going to happen. All the bank can say is that they have no present record of charges. The customer's question might be something like "Do you guarantee that there will be no charges to this account as of now". Of course, the bank cannot know whether there is a forthcoming paper charge that was made at some mountain resort. If case they did make such a promise, you could disavow the debt, using your reliance on their assertion as the basis for denying the debt. There is no law requiring banks to warn people of their contractual obligations when they close an account. I've never encountered a credit card contract that includes such a clause, but I suppose some bank might include a mandatory-warning clause, in which case they could be in breach of contract.	Yes, you can sell an interest in a debt; this is an alternative to paying a debt collection agency on recovery. The contract that you have with the debtor may have limitations of the transfer of rights and obligations under the contract that may prevent this. The value of the debt to the agency depends on the status of the debt and the credit worthiness of the debtor. If you have a judgement debt from a court, they don't come any more rock solid than that - the only limitation is the debtor's ability to pay. If the debtor has assets or a solid income stream an agency may pay 70-80% of the face value of the debt.	While I am a U.S. attorney, the U.K. and U.S. are essentially the same on these issue in practice: "reasonable wear and tear" is a classic issue of fact to be decided by the judge (unlike the U.S. there are never juries in U.K. landlord-tenant disputes) based upon the evidence presented to him and his or her good judgment if the case goes to court. There won't be a lot of case law that is specific enough to provide guidance in your particular case (if any) because cases like these aren't worth appealing and creating case law on and because the law intentionally vests judges with great discretion on these issues and only intervenes in appellate decisions when a judge is deeply out of line. The legal definition of "reasonable wear and tear" is basically vacuous and don't provide much meaningful guidance. I know you are joking, but no, do not set it on fire. You will find yourself incarcerated for arson, with a felony criminal record and a restitution judgment in the amount of the damages and a fine and court costs as well, and your credit record will be screwed and no one will rent to you ever again if they find out by doing a cursory background check. Your mum probably won't even invite you to Christmas dinner this year. If they charge your security deposit and you don't think you owe it, you would have to sue them for a return of the part of your security deposit you don't owe, knowing that you face a risk of paying their legal fees if you lose, but will get your fees if you hire a lawyer and win (caveat: there are more nuances to fee shifting in the U.K. courts than I spell out here which are rather technical). If they say you owe more than your security deposit and you don't pay, they can sue you for the balance, knowing that they face a risk of paying your legal fees if they lose, but will get their fees if they win. In practice, it doesn't really make economic sense for either party to hire an attorney because the amount of the fees is so high relative to the amount of money at stake. The security deposit is 2-4 hours of legal time, and the amount claimed is maybe 7-14 hours of legal time, neither of which is sufficient to address the respective issues economically in a fully litigated hearing. Short of going to court, you can provide them documentation and your video to show that you are right and to discourage them from docking your security deposit (in full, anyway) or suing you, ideally A.S.A.P. before they are too committed to taking legal action. You could also propose a compromise and see if you can get them to agree to it with neither party facing the risk of going to court.	By default, the tenant is liable for all rent until the end of the lease. E.g. if neither the tenant nor the landlord can find a suitable and credit-worthy replacement tenant (e.g. if the market has crashed), then the whole lease must still be accounted for by the original tenant, and the lost "rent" becomes "damages". However, there is also a concept of damage mitigation, and California Civil Code 1951.2 explicitly defines that it's the landlord's duty to mitigate damages. This means that the landlord cannot simply sit still and collect the rent on an empty apartment. Because of this, some smaller landlords in California outright have a policy that you can cleanly break the lease by paying for 2 months of rent as a penalty. (It appears that a good summary of various examples about landlord/tenant damage mitigation is available at UniformLaws.org.) However, when it comes down specifically to the SF Bay Area with the ever increasing rents and the lowest residential vacancy rates in the nation, and also especially with the corporate landlords that already have sufficient resources in place to readily advertise and promote an abandoned unit, it can probably be argued that, in practicality, requesting more than one month of rent (in damages) as a penalty for breaking the lease is simply unreasonable.	Most limited liability companies (LLCs) are small, closely held firms that are owned entirely or in substantial part by active employee-manager-owners with modest capital contributions. LLCs with large numbers of owners typically have a large share of non-employee investor ownership and are most common in oil and gas firms and in real estate firms that either develop, or buy and hold, real estate. Most large accounting and law firms and many other professional service firms are organized as LLCs or LLP (limited liability partnerships), which are owned by the senior employees whose contributions as employees dwarfs their contributions as investors. (Non-lawyers and non-physicians aren't allowed to have ownership interests in law firms and medical practices, respectively). These are the largest firms in the world with significant employee ownership. Start up tech firms organized as LLCs also often give equity stakes to employees even below the senior-managerial employee level. Rank and file employees are sometimes given an ownership interests in firms, but this is more commonly done through an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) or certain other tax encouraged mechanisms for employee ownership in corporations (e.g., incentive stock options), or in the context of a firm organized as a cooperative (which is taxed essentially like a C-corporation but with an entity level deduction for cooperative dividends paid to members), than it is as an LLCs. One important reason for this is that pass-through taxation (which applies to LLCs not electing to be taxed as corporations) is not workable as a means of imparting ownership to large numbers of rank and file workers, because the compliance paperwork of sending out dozens or hundreds of K-1s to these workers is daunting, and because the prospect of a disconnect between allocated income and loss, and actual distributions (e.g. taxation on "phantom income" of the entity that is not distributed) is problematic.	I'm assuming it would NOT be a good idea to just accept the funding as a person (sole proprietorship). Correct. Would the time be right to form the LLC first, before starting the campaigns on the crowdfunding sites? Or would it be permissible for the entity to be formed IF and once the funding is available? For instance, if the campaign on Kickstarter raises 800 thousand dollars, can an LLC then be created, a bank account opened, and the funds deposited there? Or must the entity be created prior to the asking for startup funds? An entity should be (really must be) formed before funds are raised. This is not a hugely expensive thing to do. For a lawyer drafted one, you are talking on the order of $500-$2000, plus some state filing fees which are modest. I know it's kind of a chicken-and-egg situation, but there isn't a lot of funds available yet for hiring attorneys and drawing up papers before the money is raised. Or should this be something for just forming a very quick LLC and then worrying about the right entity after the funds come in? If you can't afford the money necessary to hire a lawyer to form an entity without crowdfunding, you aren't ready to open a manufacturing company. You really shouldn't consider trying to start a project of this magnitude unless you have at least several tens of thousands of dollars of personal funds on hand prior to the crowdfunding effort. You should also have a detailed business plan in place with fact checked budget lines and reality checked revenues estimates before stating your campaign. If you plan to have patents, you need to at least begin the process of applying to protect them legally, with pre-campaign funds too. Realistically, most people at your stage do a small round of friends and family and personal savings fundraising and often also find an angel investor or two, before going to the general public in a crowdfunding effort. If you can't convince those people that your project is worth investing in, you are probably not ready to run a manufacturing company which will require you to successfully make many similarly difficult pitches to a variety of people. What legal entity(s) would be best for startup funded by kickstarter or other investment? At the state law level a C-corporation and an S-corporation are the same. The distinction is made with a separate tax filing with the IRS in S-corporations. Crowd funding is a term that is often ambiguous and can be used in a multitude of contexts. If it is more than a gift (i.e. in exchange for stock or bonds) there are also securities regulations exceptions that the offering must be tailored to. If the funds are donations for a charitable project, a non-profit corporation would usually be the right choice and 501(c)(3) status needs to be obtained in advance. If funds are raised in exchange for equity interests or non-U.S. citizens/permanent residents own some of the interests, a C corporation would usually be the only permitted choice. If the funds are raised in exchange for interest paying loans/bonds, or the funds are non-tax deductible gifts rather than investments, then financing isn't a concern for choice of entity, and either an LLC or an S-corporation is usually preferred (or perhaps a limited liability limited partnership in lieu of an LLC which has a different control structure). If funds are raised for an operating business with assets that are leased or tend to depreciate in value and has less than 75 owners, and has owners who are also senior employees of the company, an S corporation will usually be the best choice. If funds are raised for a business that will hold assets expected to appreciate in value, or has a financing or control structure more complex than equal shares of common stock plus bonds, an LLC will usually be preferred. Assuming someone is going to start a business that is to design, build and manufacture a small electronic handheld device. A C-corporation or S-corporation rather than an LLC or LLLP is probably preferred for a venture like this one, with the tax classification dependent upon the means of financing and the nature of the owners. Usually, you would use an S-corporation if possible, and a C-corporation if not. A two entity structure, with an LLC owning the IP (if any, other than a trademark for the products), and then licensing it to an S-corporation operating company, would also often make sense in this scenario. I live in Texas, but I assume that the business entity would or could be formed in Nevada or Delaware or anywhere there are more favorable conditions. Not really. A Texas entity would be just fine in this context. A Delaware entity has higher registration fees and legal fees to prepare one, and the advantages it provides for big businesses will often be disadvantages in the kind of entity you are considering. The benefits of Nevada and Alaska trusts are much greater than the benefits of Nevada and Alaska corporations or LLCs. Also, the Texas entity may be more suited to addressing Texas community property issues.	In general, the law seeks to make all parties whole. There is no mechanism for profit-sharing between thieves and their victims. Victims of theft are entitled to receive their money back plus the applicable rate of interest (called the judgment rate). They are not entitled to profits or windfalls above and beyond the statutory judgment rate of interest. What if the act of stealing the money has destroyed the owner's business and has left him with a lot of debt and bankrupt? Criminal statutes provide for the return of stolen funds plus interest. Recovery of damages, as you describe, is provided by civil statutes and common law. So, to recover damages, the victim would need to sue the thief in civil court.
Joint liabilty for flat occupant and contracted rent Three months ago my friend Bob moved into a flat paid for by Adam, an investor in the start-up company that Bob and others co-founded (long story). Adam signed a 6 month lease with the landlord. Relations between Adam and Bob's company have now broken down. Adam is refusing to pay the remaining 3 months rent. Bob has been informally told by a friend's lawyer (another long story) that because he lives in the flat he is jointly liable for the remaining 3 months, even though he never signed anything. Is this true? I know Bob got this from a lawyer, but it seems strange so I thought I'd ask here. Bob's company and Adam have no written agreement (yes, really), but the intention was for the rent to form part of Adam's investment in the company. Bob does have a shareholder's agreement with the other founders. (I know this sounds weird. There is a culture clash behind it all, but its not relevant to the question).	he is jointly liable for the remaining 3 months, even though he never signed anything. Is this true? That seems unlikely. The lease is between Adam and the landlord. Although the lease might have language making all tenants jointly and severally liable, it would affect Bob only if it can be proved that he was aware of those terms when he moved in. Your description does not elaborate on any agreement(s) between Adam and Bob. But Adam is not allowed to impose on Bob any obligations merely because relations between them broke down. Absent a contract between Adam and Bob, the question of whether Adam is entitled to any recovery from Bob could only be assessed on equitable grounds.	Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable.	I am not a lawyer: If they sue you it will probably be for fraud, then the DA will investigate and can easily find out who you are. If they can prove that you signed the contract is another story. If the clause in the contract is valid yet another. Getting a lawyer might be wise, especially if your visa depends on a clean legal record. Have you talked to them yet? If you can afford it, you or your new company could pay off he months salary to the old company. In my opinion it's fair, they probably turned down a lot of other applicants an will either need to search again or find a good temp to replace you. Think there was something that you cannot quit a contract before it starts, but another option would be to start working for them and then realizing during the test period that it's a bad match. However, best lawyer up! Search for "Kündigung vor Beschäftigungsbeginn" (Cancellation before the start of employment) Quick google suggests that they might be right if they have it in the contract, but the lawyer will know for sure. Look for someone who does "Arbeitsrecht".	You signed the lease In general, this is definitive of your intention to have a month-to-month lease. Any correspondence that you have prior to you signing that you wanted or even agreed on a yearly lease is only evidence that such things formed part of the negotiations but, for whatever reasons, what was ultimately agreed was a month-to-month lease. If you can prove misrepresentation you might be able to get what you want but the usual remedy is recission (ending) of the contract, not a change to the contract. However, given that the type of lease is such a fundamental feature and is usually prominent on the document, proving you were misled rather than agreeing to a month-by-month lease will be difficult.	What should I do? Don't get intimidated, don't sign/accept/submit to his "agreement" now that you are securing employment elsewhere, and make sure that henceforth all your communications with the CEO & his startup be --or continue to be-- in writing. The CEO's attempt to be reimbursed is pure non-sense because hitherto there is no mutually agreed clause between you two to that effect. Generally speaking, compensation is for the professional's work, not for his employment spanning "n" pay periods. Having there been no employment/founders agreement of any type, he will be unable to prove that this was agreed any differently in your case. Furthermore, the CEO's threat to seek reimbursement of your earned compensation unless you submit to his "mutual" agreement not only amounts to extortion, but it also reflects his cluelessness about contract law. For instance, that contracts which are signed under hardship or duress are voidable. By contrast, submitting to his conditions will needlessly impose on you the burden of proving duress once you decide the situation is unsustainable. This is in addition to the legal weight with which your acceptance and subsequent conduct would support the CEO's allegation(s) that you two have "at all times" been in a cognizable contractual relation. Being realistic, it is highly doubtful that a startup which pays you weeks late is able --or even willing-- to spend money on a lawyer for nonsense like this.	By default, the tenant is liable for all rent until the end of the lease. E.g. if neither the tenant nor the landlord can find a suitable and credit-worthy replacement tenant (e.g. if the market has crashed), then the whole lease must still be accounted for by the original tenant, and the lost "rent" becomes "damages". However, there is also a concept of damage mitigation, and California Civil Code 1951.2 explicitly defines that it's the landlord's duty to mitigate damages. This means that the landlord cannot simply sit still and collect the rent on an empty apartment. Because of this, some smaller landlords in California outright have a policy that you can cleanly break the lease by paying for 2 months of rent as a penalty. (It appears that a good summary of various examples about landlord/tenant damage mitigation is available at UniformLaws.org.) However, when it comes down specifically to the SF Bay Area with the ever increasing rents and the lowest residential vacancy rates in the nation, and also especially with the corporate landlords that already have sufficient resources in place to readily advertise and promote an abandoned unit, it can probably be argued that, in practicality, requesting more than one month of rent (in damages) as a penalty for breaking the lease is simply unreasonable.	Financially, the landlord can take you to court and get a judgment against you where you have to pay that rent, so you won't save any money. If you hire an attorney to defend you in the lawsuit, that will cost you extra money, so you could be worse off than just paying rent and staying there. The lease might have late payment fees, and if you that would be additional money that you would owe. In addition, there could be some reputational damage to you that could affect your ability to secure a lease in the future (a black mark on your credit history). Also note that in Georgia, a landlord has no obligation to seek an alternative tenant, so he can let the unit sit empty for 4 months (though he cannot collect twice on the same unite).	If the landlord has a right to charge a late fee (and that late fee is not a penalty) then that right accrues from the instant that the rent is late i.e. any time after 5:00:00 pm precisely if that is the time stated in the lease. If only a day is stated then it would be midnight. For case law on the penalty doctrine see PACIOCCO & ANOR v AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED [2016] HCA 28 which involved a challenge to a bank charging late payment fees on credit cards.
Does America run on Dunkin? I hear this slogan very often when I drive to work. It is very offensive. They shouldn't generalize and say everyone does this or that if it's not true. Are this type of slogans legal? I became American and know people who never been or ate Dunkin donuts and this slogan makes me feel like I'm some fat man who fills himself with grease and over sweeten donuts. What bothers me the most is that they say something so freely that is not true. America doesn't run on Dunkin! :-) Is it legal for a company to use slogans that contains generalized terms which include me even though I don't fit into the category?	The legal term for this sort of thing is puffery: a statement that is obviously exaggerated and which no reasonable person would take literally. According to the US Federal Trade Commission, puffery is [a] term frequently used to denote the exaggerations reasonably to be expected of a seller as to the degree of quality of his product, the truth or falsity of which cannot be precisely determined. The FTC's policy on deceptive practices (PDF) notes that The Commission generally will not pursue cases involving obviously exaggerated or puffing representations, i.e., those that the ordinary consumers do not take seriously. The nature of the statement "American runs on Dunkin'" is both sufficiently vague and sufficiently exaggerated that a reasonable person wouldn't understand it to be literally true, and therefore it would not be illegal in the government's eyes.	I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify.	Do flight attendants have an unlimited leeway of forcing the passengers to listen to their gibberish that are completely unrelated to their duties? Pretty much, I'd say. It may not be a good customer experience, but the flight attendant certainly isn't doing anything illegal. You don't have a legal right not to hear speeches that offend your IP sensibilities. I don't think it's legally any different than if they were showing an in-flight movie that you didn't like. If you try to forcibly stop him, you are likely to be found in violation of 49 USC 46504, which prohibits "assaulting or intimidating a flight crew member or flight attendant of the aircraft, interferes with the performance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessens the ability of the member or attendant to perform those duties". Even if making speeches about Mickey Mouse is not part of his duties, anything physical you did to try to stop him would likely tend to also lessen his ability to perform his actual duties. Violation of 49 USC 46504 is a felony and carries a prison term of up to 20 years. If you try to shout him down, you might be charged with disorderly conduct under state or local law, like this guy. You could probably push your call button to summon another flight attendant, and politely state that you object to the loquacious crew member's behavior, and could they please ask him to stop. Alternatively, you can put on your noise-cancelling headphones and turn up the volume on your music. Anything beyond that and you're in a bad legal position. Of course, you can certainly file a complaint with the airline after the fact. There's a fair chance you'll get an apology, maybe some extra air miles, and the flight attendant might be disciplined or fired. But that's an internal customer service or personnel matter; nothing to do with law.	The purpose of that disclaimer is not to prevent reprimands or legal action. It's really as simple as it appears -- it's to inform the readers that the tweets in fact contain the opinion of the person who wrote them and are not intended to be understood as the official position as that person's employer. This is especially important for people who occasionally or frequently convey their employer's official position. It's not supposed to be some kind of magic word that causes something to happen. It's just an attempt to convey accurate information and avoid misunderstandings.	A slogan such as "The Stripe of Bitcoin" might well be taken to indicate that the seller of a product or service is trading on the good reputation associates with the mark "stripe". If so, that would probably be a form of trademark infringement, assuming thst "Stripe" is protected as a trademark, unless the permission of the holder of the trademark "Stripe" was obtained. Payment processing and cryptocurrency handling are sufficiently closely related that customer confusion is possible. Note that competitive use is generally permitted. One can, for example market a soft drink with the tag "The cola that's better than Coke" without permission from Coca-cola (which i doubt anyone would ever get). This is because when a marketer says "X is better than Y" no one reasonably thinks X is sponsored or approved by Y, nor will anyone be lead by this tag into thinking that X and Y are the same. Other forms of nominative use are also allowed without permission from the trademark holder. For example, a computer component might have been advertised as: "compatible with Intel Pentium", as this is just using a trademark to name a related product, and does not imply affiliation or sponsorship. But a tag such as "The Rolls-Royce of pencils" might be ruled to be infringing, even though Rolls does not, as far as I know, make pencils. Note that the details of trademark law vary significantly from one country to another. Note further that trademarks protected in one country may not be protected in another. The question does not specify any jurisdiction, so no answer can refer to the particular country that the asker may have in mind.	It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin A medical condition like an allergy is not necessarily a physical disability. The school is arguably fulfilling its obligations under WHS legislation by banning nut products if that is what a risk assessment indicates. It may also be necessary to ban milk products if that is required for your daughter's safety. If (and I do not know) nuts pose a greater risk than milk then banning the former and not the latter may be perfectly justified. Ask to see the risk assessment.	I've been wondering if it is possible to hire / create a company with someone who would open a restaurant in my place and manage it according to my guidelines. Yes, of course. You can do it just like you described: Create a company, hire employees, (let them) open the restaurant. You, as the owner of the company, could set up whatever guidelines you have in mind, and your employees would be bound by them (limited only by general laws, such as on health and safety). Some caveats, however: You will need money to set this up - for buying / renting space for the restaurant, for paying your employees, obtaining supplies, initial marketing etc. It may take a while until the restaurant earns money (if ever), and you'll need money in the mean time. Someone will need to manage, that is make decisions. You can do that yourself, but then you will work for the restaurant (which you write you do not want to do). Or you can hire someone to do it for you, but that will cost more (in salary), plus you will have to find someone you can trust. That's a tradeoff for you to make. I guess it'd be like an intellectual property. That depends, but usually there will be little in terms of intellectual property. If you have a unique idea for the restaurant, you could patent it, but there are many restrictions on what you can protect, and ways around it, plus this also costs money (a lot if you need a lawyer's advice). Apart from that, you can register a trademark for the restaurant, but that only protects the name / logo, not any ideas. Finally, some of your ideas might be considered trade secrets, but again the protection is limited. In general, there is no blanket "idea protection". If you have a good idea for a restaurant, in most cases other restaurants will be able to copy them, possibly with slight changes - take that into account.	Could a phrase "Don't buy from X" with indirectly implied material be considered defamatory? No. The phrase is only an order, wish, or instruction, which is different from making a direct or veiled statement of fact. Even in jurisdictions where a statement of opinion could be actionable, a stated wish of that sort cannot be construed as defamatory. anyone that reads the marketing material would indirectly have a false picture about company X. It depends on the contents of the marketing material, on which you did not elaborate. Persuading the customers on the basis of truthful representations as to why X's product is better than A's does not mean that people have a false image about X. The context and exact wording of someone's statements could amount to omitting and/or juxtaposing facts in a way that conveys some falsity, but your description gives no indications of that being the case here.
Why require unanimous jury for 'not guilty' verdict? People say that the rationale for requiring unanimous jury decisions is rooted in favouritism of the defendant. But is that true? Without referencing certain game theoretic experiments/models, it seems unusually unfair to require that all jurors vote "not guilty" in order to be acquitted. If a minority of jurors believes in the accused's innocence, it seems like the unanimity requirement may push this minority towards voting "guilty" despite their beliefs.	The question to be answered is "did the state prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt", the answer to which should have no reasonable doubt. The interests of the defendant are sufficiently protected by the basic burden of proof requirement. The alternative that a single vote of not guilty exonerates the defendant would seriously hobble the interests of the people, and the alternative of automatic mistrial would make trials prohibitively expensive. The unanimity requirement does mean that in case of initial disagreement, parties have to re-think their positions, which is not a bad thing. The question of whethar a supermajority of guilty votes suffices for conviction was decided in a recent case, Ramos v. Louisiana, allowing conviction with a 10-2 vote. The court takes unanimity to be a basic common law right from the 14th century. Louisiana and Oregon had unconventional schemes allowing less than unanimous decisions: the reasoning behind the unanimity requirement is discussed extensively in that opinion. Since Alito, Roberts and Kagan dissented in part, the rationale for the other view is also spelled out.	The jury never finds there was “no crime” They either find that the state has proven that this particular defendant committed this particular crime (guilty) or they have not proven it (not guilty). Another jury at another time may find the opposite - this does sometimes happen where a guilty verdict is appealed and the appeals court orders a retrial. For another defendant charged with a different crime (e.g. accessory to the first crime) before another jury, the result of another trial is both irrelevant and inadmissible.	In the US this is generally governed by state law: RCW 4.24.350 in Washington state. The criminal jury is not empowered to make such a decision, but a separate civil trial for malicious prosecution would be possible. Plaintif (ex defedant) would have to prove that the action was instituted with knowledge that the same was false, and unfounded, malicious and without probable cause in the filing of such action, or that the same was filed as a part of a conspiracy to misuse judicial process by filing an action known to be false and unfounded The basis for the lawsuit would be the objective facts that prove that the prosecution was false and malicious, and not the fact of acquittal or the subjective opinion of a juror.	Judges do not decide, jurors do (however, if a judge is the fact-finder, then the judge makes such a determination). The main input that the decision-maker gets is a jury instruction. In order to unify "reasonable doubt", "reasonable price", "reasonable delay" and so on, appeal is often made a mythical being, "the reasonable man", so reasonable force would be the degree of force the reasonable man would use in a given situation. I will draw from California criminal instructions ('cuz I have them) but similar instructions can be found across jurisdictions. For example, one instructions says "A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes". Or from a negligence instruction "A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk". More detailed appeal to The Reasonable Person is found in the justified homicide instruction: Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified. When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed. The defendant’s belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true. There is no explanation of what it means to be "a reasonable person". Since nobody believes that they themselves are unreasonable, a simple and also wrong way of judging the matter is to subjectively judge whether you yourself would do the same thing, if you were in that situation. Very often, instructions do not even bother to say what "reasonable" means, so (re interpreting expert testimony) "You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence"; (re corpus delicti) "That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed"; "Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty", "when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable" The closest the law has come to articulating an objective characterization of "reasonableness" is in "reasonable doubt" instructions. One characterization is in People v. Feldman, 71 N.E. 2d 433. It is not a doubt based upon sympathy or a whim or prejudice or bias or a caprice, or a sentimentality, or upon a reluctance of a weak-kneed, timid, jellyfish of a juror who is seeking to avoid the performance of a disagreeable duty, namely, to convict another human being of the commission of a serious crime A somewhat improved characterization is the Calcrim instruction Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt There is room for improvement, but it points in the right direction. On rare occasions, a law is written that actually includes a definition. The Gas Price Spike Act HR 3784 said The term ‘reasonable profit’ means the amount determined by the Reasonable Profits Board to be a reasonable profit on the sale. It is then up to the board to subjectively determine what that profit is. (BTW this did not become law). [Addendum] It's actually very difficult to determine what reasoning judges use in those cases where they are the determiners of fact. They will likely call on their knowledge of law, asking "are these circumstances sufficiently like past circumstance A where the defendant was convicted, or more like B where the defendant was acquitted".	See jury-nullification. I'm not a legal historian, so I can't say for sure what the laws on jury acquittals were at that time in that jurisdiction. However, when a jury has final discretion to acquit a defendant of a crime that's it: They can effectively ignore laws if they want to acquit someone. Such acquittals do not set a precedent or have any bearing outside of the trial in which they issue their verdict.	Generally speaking, jury trials in England and Wales are allowed (but can be waived by a defendant in most cases) for offenses punishable by more than six months of incarceration (i.e. serious misdemeanors and all felonies), with exceptions for domestic violence cases, serious and complex fraud cases, Diplock courts in Northern Ireland prior to 2008, cases where there is a serious risk of jury tampering, and in cases where double jeopardy defenses are at issue. It appears that jury trials are mandatory, however, and cannot be waived by defendants, in some serious criminal cases. (Historically, trial by jury was suspended in most cases during World War II.) English law enforcement officials can also detain people without trial for limited periods of time (generally up to 28 days prior to 2011 and now 14 days) without criminal charges in terrorism cases. This detention without trial procedure was instituted at the same time that the Diplock court system was shut down. (Courts-martial present another issue entirely.) Diplock courts were instituted out of concerns about jury nullification and jury tampering, and the latter concern remains an all purpose reason to deny a jury trial in a particular criminal case. Importantly, since 1967, juries in England and Wales need not be unanimous. Up to 2 dissenting votes are allowed on a jury of 12 and up to 1 dissenting vote is allowed on juries with 8 to 11 members remaining at the time of deliberations. The failure of up to three jurors on a jury of twelve (used in the Crown and High Courts) to complete the trial is allowed without a substitute and up to 1 juror who doesn't complete a trial is allowed in a jury of eight in County Court. From the first link above: A coroner must summon a jury for an inquest if the death occurred in prison or in police custody, or in the execution of a police officer's duty, or if it falls under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, or if it affects public health or safety. Coroner's juries have 7-11 members and a minority report of 2 members of that jury can be its verdict. In civil cases, juries are used in eminent domain valuation cases, where the judge might be seen as having a conflict of interest. Further, as explained in the first link above, they are also used as follows: In 1998 less than 1% of civil trials in England and Wales were jury trials and these were principally defamation cases. Section 69 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, which replaced s. 6 of the 1933 Act in respect of High Court trials, provides that trial shall be by jury on the application of a party where the court is satisfied that there is in issue: a claim of fraud against the party; or a claim in respect of libel, slander, malicious prosecution or false imprisonment unless the court is of the opinion that the trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or accounts or any scientific or local investigation which cannot conveniently be made with a jury. FYI, Scottish practice with regard to jury trials is completely distinct from the practice in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and is beyond the scope of this answer. Both the size and process of the jury, and its availability are different in Scotland.	Once a case has been commenced, you can definitely lose, or you can probably lose. If you decline to proceed, you definitely lose. If you proceed, the jury (or judge as the case might be), might find some witnesses more believable than others and might find that the forensic evidence is not as convincing as it seems. Empirical evidence suggests that criminal trials reach the correct conclusion in about 90% of cases that aren't resolved on an uncontested basis. Generally speaking, the Crown is only going to press a case where the prosecutor subjectively believes that they are correct that the defendant is, at least, guilty of something. So, a Crown prosecutor can also justify "rolling the dice" in a case with a low probability of winning, because at a minimum, a factually guilty defendant (whether it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or not in a particular trial with a particular finder of fact) has to suffer through a trial which is a form of punishment (particularly if the defendant can't secure pre-trial release). Also, while the Crown prosecutor ultimately represents the state and not the victim, the victim of a crime is a quasi-client and sometimes a victim who often has personal knowledge of a defendant's factual guilt, really wants to have their "day in court" and a chance to present their case to the public for all to hear. Law enforcement officers working on the case may want it to go to trial for similar reasons. Strategically, bringing even weak cases to trial also makes a Crown prosecutors threat to go forward with a trial even in a seemingly weak case more credible and that can increase the prosecutor's negotiating power. Also, a trial always reveals information, and sometimes the information revealed in a trial that is lost can provide value in future law enforcement efforts. Finally, prosecutors are humans and people, in general, don't like to admit their own mistakes. So, they may go forward even when their case is weak because they don't want to admit that they were mistaken and would prefer to have somebody else say they were wrong than to admit error. The personality type that doesn't admit mistakes is pretty common in this area.	"Since state level crimes are prosecuted in the state they happen and potential jurors are eligible voters, would this make it impossible for anyone who voted in the election to serve on such a jury as they would obviously prefer their side to win?" No. A conflict of interest is a particularized and personal interest in the case that is different from an interest of a member of the general public or of a voter or of a taxpayer in general. Someone who wouldn't have standing to bring a case will generally not have a conflict of interest for purposes of being a juror.
Why is this contract worded like a client is talking to himself? I'm looking at a sample contract for a graphic designer who is planning on doing freelance work. I don't understand why it says that the Client should obtain all copyright permissions for materials included in the designs at their own request, like said client is asking himself to get copyright permission? It reads, Client shall obtain all necessary copyright permissions and privacy releases for materials included in the designs at Client’s request. Client shall indemnify Contractor against all claims and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, due to Client’s failure to obtain such permissions or releases. Shouldn't it read, Client shall obtain all necessary copyright permissions and privacy releases for materials included in the designs on their own"?	No, the clause is correct. The reason it is put in is to protect the designer from the client's mistakes (or lies) about whether the material the client wants to use is copyrighted. To see how this works, suppose the client gives the designer a photo, and says she has the rights to it. It turns out the client doesn't have rights, and the true owner sues. The designer will undoubtedly be named in the suit. This clause will probably not protect the designer against the true owner, so she may end up having to pay damages. However, this clause gives the designer grounds to sue the client to recover any damages she suffers.	are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.	Wikipedia and you likely have no contract. If you don't have to click "I agree" to access the data, its likely there is no contract. Therefore this is a pure IP law question. The ONLY IP law issue that I see is copyright. The DATA is not subject to copyright. Only the expression of that data. So copying the html and selling that IS potential copyright infringement. Copying the data in some other format and using that is not. Finally, even if you do copy the full html (i.e. full expression), this MAY be licensed by their terms of use (as you suggested they have licensed some content). That is a more particularized legal question that I can't answer here.	In the U.S. the text and drawings of a patent application/patent may be copyrighted by the author. If such protections are being claimed, the patent application must contain this authorization from 37 CFR 1.71 (d) and (e)- e) The authorization shall read as follows: A portion of the disclosure of this patent document contains material which is subject to (copyright or mask work) protection. The (copyright or mask work) owner has no objection to the facsimile reproduction by anyone of the patent document or the patent disclosure, as it appears in the Patent and Trademark Office patent file or records, but otherwise reserves all (copyright or mask work) rights whatsoever.	Contracts are a relationship between two or more people Just as it is meaningless to speak of marrying yourself, it is equally meaningless to speak of a contract with yourself. Even if you were to draft such a thing, you would not have standing to sue because you can’t sue yourself. Your example probably isn’t a “one person contract” It’s a contract between the car owner (person 1) and the car yard (person 2) - probably a corporation. The fact that person 1 is representing both parties to the contract doesn’t make it a “one person contract”. There are potential conflicts of interest with this but they are not necessarily ones that can’t be overcome. However, if the car owner runs a business as a car dealer as a sole trader, then, no, they cannot make this kind of contract.	Should I ask for a contract, when asking for the money? The proper time to define or formalize a contract is not when asking for the money, but when agreeing what tasks are expected from you and how much you will charge therefor. That way both parties will be clear on what is expected from each other. And if a dispute is brought to court, the fact-finder will have an objective document from which to identify who breached the contract. It is always recommendable that the contract be self-contained, and that relevant interactions between the parties be in writing or memorialized in some way that leaves no room for unverifiable allegations of the type "I said, he said".	It's not illegal to say things in your profile. SE requires you to license your content to them on a non-exclusive basis pursuant to CC BY-SA 4.0. "Non-exclusive" means that you can also license the material to others on some other basis, e.g. CC0. In that case, a person who uses your material can rely on the other license that you granted. If SE wanted to, it could prohibit putting licenses in a user profile, in which case you would have to promulgate your more generous license elsewhere.
When the Director differs from the script Let's assume Alice wrote a bestseller. Then she made a script from it. This script is then given to the movie studio in Hollywood, who contracts Director Bob to make the actual film. The studio doesn't have the greatest lawyers, so it signs conflicting contracts: The contract between the studio and the author was written by the studio's lawyer, but the author demanded two provisions: It explicitly states that the studio or its employees and contractors may not alter the script (except for minimal things) without the written approval of the change by Alice, though it is not expressly said if said approval needs to be prior or could be gotten after the fact. The very next clause prescribes that if the approval provision is breached, the license to make and distribute the adaption is void without the need of further notice. The contract of the studio with the Director was drafted by the Director's lawyer as his standard contract and the studio representative just signed it off after being handed it. It allows him artistic leeway over how to alter the script but never specifies what that means. It doesn't contain any damage clause. During the negotiation with the representative, Bob did not inquire about the licensing contract the studio had with Alice or the script author and thus didn't read it, though he could have gotten a copy if he had asked. Filming starts, and Director Bob does as he does, starting to edit the script by altering the dialogue and merging characters as he sees fit, using what he calls artistic leeway. He also never sends his alterations to the studio to have them check them for approval by the author. Then, Alice decides to request a pre-premiere of the film and is given so by the studio (Director Bob would never approve!). As a result, Alice discovers the substantial alterations and points out that the license was voided, prohibiting the distribution. Which brings us to the questions of law of this situation: Was the studio representative [grossly] negligent in granting Director Bob the artistic leeway clause, not expressly informing Bob about the licensing terms and not checking up on changes when it was bound to get approval for such by its contract? Is Director Bob liable for the expenses and damages incurred by bringing the studio into the breach of its licensing contract? Did, through the voiding of the license, the film become an unlicensed derivate and thus it is wilful copyright infringement? If so, at what moment did it become so?	Was the studio [grossly] negligent in granting Director Bob the artistic leeway clause and not checking up on changes when it was bound to the contrary by its contract? The studio (or its agent/representative, per your subsequent edit) was even reckless for agreeing to artistic leeway despite knowing that the production ought to adhere to Alice's script. The term artistic leeway denotes or implies permission to make non-negligible changes to the script. The contract between studio and director should have addressed the issue carefully. Is Director Bob liable for the expenses and damages incurred by bringing the studio into the breach of its licensing contract? The director cannot be liable for violating constraints which are missing in his contract with the studio. In fact, the term artistic leeway gives the misleading impression that the studio is not under such constraints. Did, through the voiding of the license, the film become an unlicensed derivate and thus it is wilful copyright infringement? If so, at what moment did it become so? it is not expressly said if said approval needs to be prior or could be gotten after the fact The film becomes an unlicensed derivate if Alice is not timely informed about the non-negligible changes the director made. Timely in this context refers to the possibility of rolling back the changes in the event that Alice rejects them. The hypothetical scenario you outline is the converse of the movie example in section Practical Consequences of this page. Here, Alice took the precaution of requiring the second clause you mention.	Not very novel What you are talking about is a derivative work. This is arguably the most famous example: It's an interesting example because Leonardo da Vinci did not have copyright in the original but Marcel Duchamp and Francis Picabia do have copyright in the derivative. Even though the changes are physically small, they are enough. A crucial factor in current legal analysis of derivative works is transformativeness, largely as a result of the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. The Court's opinion emphasized the importance of transformativeness in its fair use analysis of the parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" involved in the Campbell case. In parody, as the Court explained, the transformativeness is the new insight that readers, listeners, or viewers gain from the parodic treatment of the original work. As the Court pointed out, the words of the parody "derisively demonstrat[e] how bland and banal the Orbison [Pretty Woman] song" is. For an author to have copyright in the derivative they must: Meet the (low) threshold of originality for copyright to exist. Make their derivative lawfully - either because they have permission or because their use falls under an exception to copyright like fair use or fair dealing. However, they do not have copyright in the original elements. For example, I could take the Mona Lisa and give her different clothes, a different background or a hat I will not be infringing their copyright. If I give her a different style of moustache? However, there is an issue with "I have copyright on the contents of the post" when you don't. Even if your work is derivative, you do not have copyright in the original parts and do not have the right to licence them. So, for example, this post is a derivative work of the Wikipedia page linked to above and I have copyright in my original contributions because: They meet the threshold of originality I have permission to make the derivative either through the Wikipedia licence or because my use is fair use. I can give Stack Exchange a licence for my work but I cannot give them a licence for the original work including, for example, the image and quote above. So, someone could quote my entire answer subject to the licence or fair work, but they couldn't copy just the image or quote.	If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible.	If you're in the U.S., then section 117 of the Copyright Act is likely what you're looking for. The U.S. Copyright Office says: Under section 117, you or someone you authorize may make a copy of an original computer program if: the new copy is being made for archival (i.e., backup) purposes only; you are the legal owner of the copy; and any copy made for archival purposes is either destroyed, or transferred with the original copy, once the original copy is sold, given away, or otherwise transferred. Based on the information you provided, it sounds like you meet all three of these criteria. They also note that your particular software's license agreement might include special conditions that affect your right to make a backup copy. Such a warning would only make sense if it was legally possible for the software distributor to make such a limitation, so I'm afraid the direct answer to your main question is "yes". It's definitely not the norm - at least in my experiences - but it is a possibility so you'll need to consult your program's license agreement. There's also a possibility that the company misunderstood you and was thinking that you were running a backup server (in the sense of a redundant infrastructure) and not making an offline backup of your entire server. It's quite normal to require an additional license for the former case.	You did not specify a jurisdiction, so this answer looks at the Berne Convention and the United States. To summarize, you are correct about joint works; the "death of the author" is taken to be the death of the last surviving author. The general approach for works with corporate authorship is to specify a fixed term that takes into account both the date of creation and the date of publication, if there is one. Here's what the Berne Convention has to say in Article 7bis: The provisions of the preceding Article shall also apply in the case of a work of joint authorship, provided that the terms measured from the death of the author shall be calculated from the death of the last surviving author. This is pretty clear; your presumption is correct. In article 7, there is special consideration for cinematographic works: (2) However, in the case of cinematographic works, the countries of the Union may provide that the term of protection shall expire fifty years after the work has been made available to the public with the consent of the author, or, failing such an event within fifty years from the making of such a work, fifty years after the making. That is, the copyright term is fixed at fifty years from the date of creation, but if the work is published within that fifty-year term, then the copyright term extends until fifty years after the date of publication. That's the 1971 text; I suppose the specific duration may have been adjusted in the meanwhile. The United States Code, at 17 USC 302, has similar provisions about copyright term in joint works: (b) Joint Works.— In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors who did not work for hire, the copyright endures for a term consisting of the life of the last surviving author and 70 years after such last surviving author’s death. In a "work made for hire," the copyright is owned by the employer; this would cover movies and other cases in which the creation is attributed to a corporation rather than an individual. These cases are covered by the next paragraph: (c) Anonymous Works, Pseudonymous Works, and Works Made for Hire.— In the case of an anonymous work, a pseudonymous work, or a work made for hire, the copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first. [...] The deleted text concerns anonymous and pseudonymous works.	The GPL does not explicitly specify a time within which the source code must be provided, which probably means a "reasonable time" is allowed. What is "reasonable" would eventually be evaluated by a court, if the matter ever got that far. But please note that only the copyright holder (or the holder's authorized agent) can sue for infringement. The license does not give other people a right to sue for infringement, and I doubt that any license could grant such a right. One could inform the copyright holder who could sue, but the holder need not sue, and undertaking such a suit would involve expense, time, and effort. Whether the offer to provide the source constitutes a binding agreement is not clear, and may well vary in different jurisdictions. The question does not state any particular jurisdiction.	Law (regardless of its type) supersedes contract, provided it has jurisdiction over the persons bound by that contract. Contract provisions that are counter to law are generally held to be void. State law has authority over an employer's policies or hand book. However, there may be exceptions in state law (so I would double check). A frequent exception (at least in California law, which I am most familiar with) is for very small businesses. Another exception, from C.R.S. § 8-4-101(5), is if you are considered a "contractor" rather than an employee, per the government's determination. It is possibly worth your time to let you employer know of this conflict before termination if possible, so that they can adjust their policies, rather than in an adversarial position after termination, if only to avoid the headache.	No-ish, it is not. The relevant sticking point would be in their DMCA takedown notice, where they have to follow 17 USC 512(c)(3)(A) and include in their notice (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. The key here is having a "good faith belief". There is a credible scenario where a company A could file multiple notices for the actually same material B posted by the exact same person C, where the person has the right to post that material, and do so in good faith. If A was not able to locate evidence of the permission to C, then they would shift the burden of proof to C – "good faith belief" doesn't mean that they have to be right, just that they have to actually think they are. If C also uses the name D, A would not be able to determine that the work was licensed to D based on the fact (once they know that) that it is licensed to C. DMCA abuse is not an permanently open escape hatch. 17 USC 512(4) states Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section— (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it. See Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011. The ruling judge found that "Defendant could not have reasonably believed that the Press Release he sent to Hotham was protected under copyright". The appeal court drew on precedent and dictionary to fill in gaps w.r.t. "good faith belief", that the person should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it was making misrepresentations In this case, the abuser was flagrantly abusing the takedown system, and there is some reason to believe that in the instant case, the abuser had actual knowledge of non-infringement. Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America provides an alternative outcome. In this case, Rossi operated a website that appeared (note the word appear) to offer free downloads of movies, and the rights-holder MCAA filed a takedown notice. In fact, it did not offer any such downloads, but MCAA's investigation stopped prematurely. This court held that "good faith belief" is subjective, so Rossi did not prevail. It is no doubt crucial that Rossi actually counted on his customers thinking that you could get actual downloads of protected material. Whether or not a DMCA abuse suit would succeed would depend very much on the factual details of why the material is not infringing, and how easily the rights-holder could know that there was no infringement.
Is it illegal to make an account on 'DarkNet' marketplaces (which provide illegal goods for purchase), but not actually make any trades? i know this might be a goofy question, but i wanted to ask here, i am thinking about making tutorial videos on tor because it fascinates me, and i wanted to find out if it's illegal to create accounts and access websites on tor that provide illegal goods, but however not purchase any of those goods. i have read some articles online about darkweb markets and some of these markets you simply can't see unless you made an account, and so if it's illegal to make an account on these websites on the darkweb then some journalists might have broken the law. but before any of that, i wanted to ask you guys and find out, to make sure i wouldn't be recording myself committing a crime or something, thank you. 1st EDIT: someone has said that my question is a duplicate of this post Why is Silk Road criminal but not LocalBitcoins? my question asks a completely different question then that post, that post asks why the makers and providers of a darknet website are criminal, i am asking if a private 3rd party, who is not the maker of the platform, the pusher of drugs, or the law enforcement hunting these parties, is at fault simply by making an account and passively observing the illegal darkweb market place, am i committing a crime if i do? would i be guilty by association? would i be a accessory to a crime? thanks 2nd EDIT: so this guy named "gorkin" has commented that i need to "reword" my title, but i have no idea what he means and i have no idea how to get in contact with him, or speak to him directly, he said that the "that" in my title can refer to the market places or the accounts themselves, and my question is not about the marketplaces, it's about just passively setting up the accounts on the darkweb marketplaces, i checked the question that someone claims my question is a duplicate of, and it's a completely different question then the question i am trying to ask, so if someone were to just contact me directly and explain to my why they think my question is a duplicate that would be great and i can explain what i mean by my question, thanks.	Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details.	It would be illegal because only you are allowed to view the comic you purchased. Creating a copy of your comic (e.g photcopying, scanning etc) is not allowed, and showing others a copy of your comic is also not allowed	That GDPR Disclaimer is no protection in some jurisdictions: the applicable laws to that situation in germany for example don't care about the GDPR: Cold calling, mailing, or e-mailing private people to advertise services all is handled by the same law: Without the consent it is expressly illegal under §7 of the law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG) and such cases are rather Slam-Dunk if the origin can be made out. The punishment can be a 300.000 € fine. The fact that to email someone you need their e-mail address and that e-mail addresses and private addresses are by default considered personally identifiable information is making it worse for the advertizer: Without either an exception (there is none available to cold-emailing) or special allowance of the person the data belongs to, you violate §4 of the federal data protection law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes BDSG) just by handling their e-mail address. That's a separate crime from the UWG one, adding up to another 300.000 € fine under §43 BDSG - or even up to 2 years in prison under §44 BDSG! Oh, and if the email does not contain a proper sender's address, that's another chance for a huge fine under the UWG... So, GDPR is your least trouble, if you violate the marketing laws of a country, or their own data privacy laws. A disclaimer means nothing as the act of sending the mail, even to an unintended addressee, is what is illegal and the law as written does not give a damn about 'I didn't want to advertise to that person' when in fact you sent them unwanted advertisements. Oh, and the very repository you suggest? It would violate the very same §4 BDSG and be illegal for processing private data if it was not actively asked to do that by the end user. As a result, that database is useless: It does kick back all people not in its database. Its database is incomplete because only few people give their address to that database as people not aware of the database never add their data on their own. So it regularly violates §4 BDSG with every German citizen's e-mail address it gets and kicks back, and claiming those addresses would be OK, it throws the company trying to check the database under the bus because they rely on data that is impossible to be reliable. tl;dr Don't do cold-(e)-mail marketing. You throw yourself into boiling oil with a lit torch in hand. further reading Other laws banning such behavior I had listed here, and I quote myself: The US has the CAN-SPAM-Act, which illegalizes sending unsocialised advertisements. You may NOT send a mail if any of the following is true: it has no opt-out the email was gained by 'harvesting' contains a header not matching the text contains less than one sentence the adressee does not have any relation to you In fact, you are liable for a 5-digit fine per infringing e-mail in the US. The FTC itself suggests to never buy e-mail lists - as E-mail harvesting or generating any possible e-mail adress itself is illegal.	Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data	Wikipedia explains this well enough: Particular numbers can be trade secrets, and their reproduction and dissemination may be particularly proscribed, e.g., by the U.S. DCMA. As a coarse analogy: Your social security number is not "illegal." But if somebody entrusted with it shared it in violation of law or contract then their communication of the number in a context that allowed potential identity thieves to associate it with you would be illegal. To answer follow-up questions in the comments: Sure, "mere possession" of a number can land one in jail for all sorts of crimes, just like "mere possession" of stolen property can. For example, if you possess a bank account number, credit card number, or PIN, and you "conspire, confederate, or combine with another" person who actually commits fraud or theft using that number, then you can be convicted of the same crime. This is so common that a search for "conspiracy to commit wire fraud" or "credit card fraud" provides ample reading.	Of course it is illegal. You are attempting to access somebody's data without their knowledge and certainly without their consent. In the U.K. it is a crime under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Police and Justice Act 2006 and the Serious Crimes Act 2015. The clue here should be in the term Serious Crimes. The Human Rights Act, and indeed the ECHR, should never come into it unless it was state sponsored or corporate spying. And even then certain states have given themselves Orwellian totalitarian authority to do as they please.	There is no law against a person creating and distributing such a poster, to the best of my knowledge. However such a poster pretty clearly implies that the person shown is guilty of a crime, or at least strongly suspected. If the store somehow made an error, pulling the image of a person who did not use the stolen card or there is some other error, the person pictured might well suffer a significant loss of reputation, and might sue for defamation. Damages could possibly be significant. Such suits have, I believe, happened when surveillance photos were posted but there later proved to have been an error. Mary might wish to double check how sure the store is that the photos are of the person who actually used the stolen card.	Hypothetically speaking, if a program doesn't come with a EULA, does that mean someone in possession of it (who isn't the owner) would be breaking the law if they used it? If the copy on the stick was lawfully made with permission of the copyright holder, then you can lawfully use the software. Someone who lawfully comes into possession of a lawfully made copy of the software (that was not a backup) has the right to use that software in the ordinary way. For example if someone found a USB stick lying on the ground and it had software on it but no EULA, could they use the software? Maybe, but it would be hard for them to know whether they could or not. It might be a backup. It might be an unlawful copy. There was a case where a person found a CD in the trash that was clearly an original. The package had a shrink wrap agreement, but he found the CD without the package. The court held that he had every right to use the software on the CD (since it was a lawfully-made copy and not a backup) and was not bound by the EULA (since he hadn't opened the package). But he was very fortunate in being able to demonstrate these facts.
Vehicle Registration and Tickets I reside in California, USA. I drive a small pick-up truck that is insured and owned by someone else. If it's not registered (doesn't get tags), but remains insured who is responsible to for any ticket or moving violation I may receive? The operator (me) or the owner? Thanks.	The driver of a vehicle is responsible for moving violations, the owner is responsible for other tickets such as parking and vehicle correction notices. California Vehicle Code section 4000 states: A person shall not drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly, or logging dolly, unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code or registered under the permanent trailer identification program, except that an off-highway motor vehicle which displays an identification plate or device issued by the department pursuant to Section 38010 may be driven, moved, or left standing in an offstreet public parking facility without being registered or paying registration fees. A ticket for a moving violation, including driving an unregistered vehicle, is issued to the driver; the driver is responsible. Section 40610 of the California Vehicle Code describes what occurs with an unregistered vehicle. If there is no evidence of fraud or persistent neglect then a "Notice to Correct Violation" will be issued and will be the responsibility of the vehicle owner. The correction notice to have the vehicle registered is different than the violation of driving an unregistered vehicle. Non-moving violations, such as parking tickets are the responsibility of the vehicle's owner if the vehicle is being operated with the owner's permission. Section 40200 describes this as it relates to parking tickets: (a) Any violation of any regulation that is not a misdemeanor governing the standing or parking of a vehicle under this code, under any federal statute or regulation, or under any ordinance enacted by local authorities is subject to a civil penalty. The enforcement of those civil penalties shall be governed by the civil administrative procedures set forth in this article. (b) Except as provided in Section 40209, the registered owner and driver, rentee, or lessee of a vehicle cited for any violation of any regulation governing the parking of a vehicle under this code, under any federal statute or regulation, or under any ordinance enacted by a local authority shall be jointly liable for parking penalties imposed under this article, unless the owner can show that the vehicle was used without consent of that person, express or implied. An owner who pays any parking penalty, civil judgment, costs, or administrative fees pursuant to this article shall have the right to recover the same from the driver, rentee, or lessee. (c) The driver of a vehicle who is not the owner thereof but who uses or operates the vehicle with the express or implied permission of the owner shall be considered the agent of the owner to receive notices of parking violations served in accordance with this article and may contest the notice of violation. While the owner of the vehicle is legally responsible for non-moving violations of the vehicle code, a reasonable argument can be made that the person who committed the infraction, such as parking illegally, is morally responsible and may incur a civil liability to the owner of the vehicle as highlighted by bold in section (b) above.	Unlikely, but specific facts may change this. The fact a vehicle gets the approval of the NHTSA and/or other safety regulatory bodies will probably mean that it already passed a certain level of safety testing, and any reasons for a recall will only surface after orders of magnitude greater sample and/or testing time. Therefore, the probability of causing endangering participants in traffic and others are negligible. The duty of notice will most likely be on the manufacturer under a product liability theory. Driving continuously and/or repeatedly after notice may be a different matter if it actually results in harming one — theoretically even oneself.	It might be illegal, depending on where you are. If it is known to the person who owns the vehicle occupying your space prior to doing so that wheelclamping may be the result, then the common law doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to a willing party, harm is not done") would lead to a conclusion that one who knowingly places themselves in a situation where harm may befall them is not entitled to bring a claim of tort against the other party (in the United States assumption of risk is a similar doctrine, but doesn't apply here because wheelclamping is an intentional act). In your situation, this means that the owner occupying your space cannot bring a case in tort against you. While it is generally applied to harm to people, there is precedent (albeit in British case law) for the doctrine to be applied to vehicles, and specifically, to the situation you describe - see Arthur v Anker and Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest. While cases from other jurisdictions are not binding, I have not been able to find any similar cases in the United States, and so it is possible that such cases will be persuasive. Note that this is highly jurisdiction-specific, and there may be laws in your state that make it unlawful - at least one high-profile case involving a McDonalds and its parking lot operator cites California law authorising only law enforcement to impound vehicles, and considering wheelclamping such an act. However, I have not been able to find the record of a judgement on this matter. It is also likely that if the payment you request is excessive, the owner would be able to seek relief, in the form of reducing the payment owed to a reasonable amount. However, if the parking space was not marked in some way to signal that it was reserved for use, then the owner of the vehicle may be entitled to seek injunctive relief and damages from a court. This would be on the basis of, if you only wheelclamped the car and declined to remove the wheelclamp upon the owner's request, the tort of detinue. But, if you attempted to request payment from them, then as Dale mentioned in his answer, you have committed extortion (wheelclamping is actually listed as a crime of extortion).	Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough).	Probably moot considering how much time has passed but here goes. California 22349(a) states that no person may drive upon a highway at speeds of greater than 65 mph. So if you're going to be convicted under 22349(a), it doesn't matter if you're going 80 or 90. The charge is that you were doing greater than 65. The judge found you were going 90. 90 > 65. Conviction secured. The only sticky part is if the judge charged you the extra $150 because he alleges you went 90 instead of 80. You could appeal that, since even the officer argues you went 80, but since the officer testified that his radar clocked you at 90, you'd probably lose, especially since the officer's rationale for writing 80 was, by his testimony, your alleged admission at the scene, and you at the scene would have reason to downplay your speed. TL;DR: Yes, the judge, as the trier of fact, can do that. Something came out during the trial (radar at 90) that contradicted the ticket (80) so the trier of fact (the judge) resolved this by going with the radar. You might have been able to get out of it, if you asked the officer why he didn't write 90 when that's what the radar read. There was a reason the officer didn't trust that radar, and if he articulated it, then the judge would likely have stuck with 80.	2201.4 Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated at all or such times as shall be indicated by official traffic control devices. I'm failing to see the "... except when pulling over for the police" subclause. Equally there is no "... unless you think you should" subclause. If you choose to have a hearing the evidence will show unambiguously that you drove the wrong way in a one way street and you will testify as to your reasons for doing so. For you to avoid the violation you would need to convince the examiner that a) you are telling the truth and b) that your mindset is in any way relevant. Unless the officer clearly directed you to pull into that spot, the decision to do so appears to be yours. I'd pay the fine if it was me.	Each of the 50 states plus non-states has their own laws, but there is nothing general about contract or other law in the US that forces a rental facility to accept customers who don't have / won't get the insurance that they require. It is a reasonable requirement, because it protects their interest insofar as angry customers might sue the facility because their car was broken into, and many of them would mistakenly believe that their car insurance covers theft or destruction of contents (thus leading to a desire to sue, to cover the property loss). It may be just too much hassle and too risky for them to assume the correctness of a customer's claim that they already have adequate coverage and will maintain said coverage, with no practical means to verify the claim.	You always run some legal risk when you drive. As long as you are insured (you have a card in your hand) and you have permission to drive the car, it does not matter who owns the car. There is a difference between the legal minimum insurance coverage and actually adequate coverage, and since you are not getting separate insurance where control the insurance levels, you theoretically run some liability risk if you have an accident and the coverage is less than the damages (insurance doesn't mean that the other guy can't take you to court for the rest of the amount). There is also a risk that the housemate will do something crazy like cancel the insurance coverage for you, or report the car stolen, so you have to decide how worried you are about that possibility.
Is there a “repeated annoyance” defense? Let’s say my friend had a little boy repeatedly ride his bike on his lawn. He kept telling the kid to stay off. Then he even had dinner with the boy’s father and brought up the issue. Now the next day the boy does it again so my friend shoots him execution style in front of his two sisters (who are little girls). I understand the reaction may have been extreme but keeping in mind the the repeated annoyance, can the sentence be reduced or the charges dismissed? Would the races of the parties matter?	There is a defense of provocation This doesn’t apply in this instance because the provocation must be such that it would case a reasonable person to lose control. No reasonable person shoots a six year old.	There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.	When it is a mistake of memory, and not intentional (as this question is asking), there are no clear standards, and it is largely up to prosecutorial discretion. This means that whatever factors affect prosecutorial discretion (such as the prosecutor knowing who they have to work with on other days) can become significant in the determination. A prosecutor who announced this decision also specifically noted that it's up to the prosecutor to decide each case separately, with no guidance on fact patterns that could influence the decision either way. The Washington Post Magazine covered this question somewhat in depth several years ago, arriving at that conclusion. This was a surprise to me, but the article seems like a good resource on this - the question turns out to be more interesting and less resolved than it first appeared to be.	I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983.	Probably murder. Because "victim 2 was then shot by this man in self defense" hasn't been determined by a neutral third party investigation or jury - it is just his own rationale for shooting. He may not be charged, or he may be tried and acquitted on the basis of self defense, but he isn't in a position of authority to simply make a "rightful death" call on his own, (is there such a thing?) and dispose of all the evidence. Obstruction of justice would probably be the minimum charge for covering up evidence of the murder of Victim #1. There is really no valid reason for covering up a double homicide, and his actions could easily result in a double murder charge.	I can at least look at the federal sentencing guidelines. From the description of the offense I'm guessing he's charged under 18 USC §922(g)(3). In the guidelines, this offense would appear to fall under "§2K2.1. Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions Involving Firearms or Ammunition". The notes here say: For purposes of subsections (a)(4)(B) and (a)(6), "prohibited person" means any person described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or § 922(n). I therefore believe he meets the criteria of §2K2.1(a)(6) ("if the defendant was a prohibited person at the time the defendant committed the instant offense"), which would mean the base offense level was 14. Then the big question is whether he falls under §2K2.1(b)(2): If the defendant, other than a defendant subject to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), or (a)(5), possessed all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection, and did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition, decrease the offense level determined above to level 6. I doubt the handgun was for sporting purposes or for collection; it was likely for self-defense. But I also don't think he is accused of unlawfully discharging or using it. I'm not sure exactly how this would be interpreted. If the offense level is 6, a sentence of probation would normally fall within the guidelines. If it was 14 (or even 12 after a possible 2-level decrease for taking responsibility), a sentence of probation would not be within the guidelines. This is, however, a pretrial diversion, not a conviction. I'm not sure how much the ordinary guidelines apply to that, or whether that's normally done for this sort of thing. It's also possible that I'm missing some factor which would change the offense level more.	We're missing a lot of facts that would help drive the analysis. The first question I'd ask was whether this was part of an actual or attempted sex offense. If that's the case, the suspect could be facing particularly serious charges. Other information is also missing, such as the drug involved, whether it's on the list of controlled substances, her knowledge of the drug, her relationship to the suspect, and so on. Still, based on the information we've got and the inferences we can make from them, I could reasonably see the following charges being filed: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery. (g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she does any of the following: (1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another and any user experiences great bodily harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled substance. (2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another person any food containing any substance or object intended to cause physical injury if eaten. Sec. 12-4.5. Tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. (a) A person who knowingly puts any substance capable of causing death or great bodily harm to a human being into any food, drug or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption commits tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. (a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: (1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or (2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person. Sec. 21-1. Criminal damage to property. (a) A person commits criminal damage to property when he or she: (1) knowingly damages any property of another Sec. 11-1.20. Criminal sexual assault. (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent; Sec. 11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10); (3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim's consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes; Sec. 11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person: (2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent. Sec. 11-1.60. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim; (5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim's consent or by threat or deception. Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide. (a) A person commits drug-induced homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance. Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means. Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death. (b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means.	The means and motivation by which you intentionally harass people are no defense. There is no material difference whether you harass someone yourself, ask someone else to harass, use a drone or trained/tamed animals. Whether you harass because the target may subjectively deserve so also makes no difference. The legal repercussions stay the same: charge, trial, conviction, sentence.
Nashville Protest Felony Legislation Can't Possibly be Legal, Right? Tennessee passed some legislation yesterday in what appears to be a thinly veiled attempt to come down hard on protestors in the capitol. The most notable is that it is now a felony (with severe penalties) to erect a tent on state property between the hours of 10PM and 7AM. Is there any mechanism to prevent the legislation of arbitrarily severe punishments for crimes like this or is there precedent for overturning something like this in the court system?	The law is part of a larger bill modifying punishments for various crimes. For example it increases the penalty for vandalizing government property, creates offenses for assault on a first responder carrying out their duties (depending on the severity of the assault), increases the penalty for aggravated rioting, obstruction of highways and so on. It also clarifies that being assembling or being present at the scene of a riot is not an offense. The only new crime created is assault on a first responder. Unauthorized camping on state property was already a crime: this is an increase in the penalty for committing that crime. It does have a requirement for notice and continued violation for 24 hours, unlike vandalism where if you do the deed, you can be arrested. The courts have not held that the First Amendment protects the right to trespass, assault or commit vandalism. The only viable avenue for a legal challenge is that the punishment is cruel and unusual (too severe). A change from Class A misdemeanor to Class E felony is the smallest increment in penalty. The state will argue that the increase in penalty is necessary to maintain public order, and that it is not arbitrary or capricious, because there have been many recent violations of the law. In general, when laws are frequently disobeyed, it is legal for the government to increase the penalty for breaking the law in order to achieve compliance.	Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant).	The only real answer is that Congress hasn't (to the best of my knowledge) chosen to pass such a law. But the kinds of forgery that Congress might plausibly and constitutionally prohibit, such as forgery of checks, forgery of legal documents, and forgery as part of a fraudulent scheme are already crimes under state law, and the states handle such prosecutions perfectly well. There is really no need for a separate federal law on such issues. The kinds of forgery covered in the answer b grovkin would probably not be covered by a federal forgery statute, if one were to be passed. But that is speculation.	The victims of these unconstitutional laws would likely not be able to recover any damages or refunds of their fees. Generally speaking, the only avenue to challenge fees imposed as a result of a criminal conviction for sodomy (or any other criminal law) is through a direct appeal of your conviction or sentence. The amount of time to raise that appeal is 30 days from the entry of the final judgment in most states, though it can be as low as 10 days in Virginia or as high as 90 days in Wisconsin. So by the time the court struck those laws down in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the only people who could still raise an appeal would probably be those who had been convicted in the month or so before the court's decision. Even then, many of those people would likely still be unable to appeal. If they paid their fine, they generally forfeit the right to seek to vacate it. If they pleaded guilty, they probably would have waived their right to appeal on constitutional grounds. If they failed to raise the constitutional defense, they probably waived their right to raise it on appeal as well. So now the only people who can seek to vacate their fines are those you're dealing solely with the people who raised a constitutional defense, were convicted anyway, and had not yet paid their fines. Probably a very small universe. The other possibility would be through a civil suit under Section 1983, alleging that the government infringed on their rights by bringing that lawsuit. There are several possible ways to get hung up here, as well. First, under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the courts can't allow a 1983 action based on a criminal conviction unless the conviction "has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Again, it would be too late to reverse the conviction, and habeas corpus would be unavailable for someone who had merely paid a fine. Perhaps one could obtain an expungement under a statutory procedure and characterize that as an executive order, but I don't know that that would be persuasive. Even if the plaintiff were able to address his conviction in one of those ways, the ongoing litigation over compulsory union fees makes me think he would probably remain unable to collect damages. In the union cases, the Supreme Court had previously explicitly allowed public-sector unions to impose mandatory union dues, and it then reversed course, finding those dues unconstitutional. Although the unions could no longer collect the dues, a question arose as to whether they had to refund the dues they had collected in the past. As far as I know, every court to consider the question has found that a "good faith" defense essentially immunized those unions from liability for damages based on the previous collection of dues. Analogizing here, the Supreme Court has previously explicitly permitted state anti-sodomy statutes in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), then reversed in Lawrence. In the meantime, many states collected fines from defendants convicted of sodomy in reliance on Bowers. So I suspect the courts would find that any municipal defendants in those cases would be eligible for the good-faith defense, and any individual defendants would be eligible for qualified immunity, as the illegality of their conduct was obviously not clearly established, given Bowers. So in short, I think any attempt to recoup those fees would fail.	Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.	Can Congress essentially pardon a violation of law through legislation? Yes. Congress has the power to retroactivity reduce the sentence for a crime for which someone has been sentenced. This was done most recently in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 that reduced excessive penalties for crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine. In the same way, when the death penalty is legislatively repealed in a state, the death sentences of the handful of people on death row at the time is often commuted legislatively. While Congress cannot impose criminal penalties on someone legislatively, which is a Bill of Attainder and constitutionally prohibited, it can single out people for special treatment in a private bill, which is a constitutional exercise of legislative power at the federal level (not every state allows private bills to be enacted due to Progressive era reforms to state constitutions). For example, private bills often eliminate the collateral effects of a criminal conviction upon a person, there is even a standard procedure for doing so, which is functionally equivalent to a Presidential pardon of the crime for that purposes (the vast majority of Presidential pardons are issued after the person convicted has served the sentence for the crime). A private bill cannot impair contract or property rights, which would be a prohibited ex post facto law. But no one other than the federal government has a legally protected interest in keeping someone incarcerated or otherwise punishing them for a crime. Crimes are prosecuted in the name of the People and victims of crimes do not have legal rights in those proceedings except as created by statute. So, this would not be an ex post facto bill or a taking governed by the Fifth Amendment for takings of property interests. And, Congress may, by legislation, determine what the federal government will do in essentially all cases where it is not expressly prohibited from doing so (some argue that there is a minimum of federal authority vested exclusively in the President in the area of foreign affairs and military affairs, but that exclusivity of power does not extend to domestic criminal justice). Basically, anything that Congress could do for everyone via a public bill, it can do for someone in particular via a private bill, unless a specific constitutional prohibition applies, and there is no such prohibition when it comes to relieving someone from a sentence or the collateral effects of a criminal conviction prospectively via a private bill. This isn't exactly equivalent to a Presidential pardon or commutation, but it is very close to one in practical effect. For a fuller, but somewhat outdated treatment of the issue, you can read this 1939 article in the California Law Review which acknowledged that legislative pardons were possible under existing law. This said, government prosecutors routinely fervently oppose any retroactive criminal legislation that reduces punishment, particularly via private laws (although some countries, such as France, have constitutional requirements to retroactively reduce the sentences of anyone currently serving time for a crime whose punishment is legislatively reduced prospectively). Private bills that constitute legislative pardons are very rare. A 2011 law review article recounts how the tool of the legislative pardon (in parallel with the executive pardon which is also used much less frequency) has fallen into disuse. Part of the decline is due to the adoption of the right to appeal from a trial court criminal convictions which did not exist in the federal system until the 1890s. Until then, the only judicial relief available from a federal criminal conviction was via a writ of habeas corpus, and that was available only on very limited grounds such as a lack of jurisdiction to conduct the trial, or the non-existence of the crime of conviction. Conviction by a jury in a court with jurisdiction of a constitutionally permissible crime was an absolute defense to the extent of the sentence imposed to a habeas corpus petition at that time. (As a footnote, the term "private bill" can be confusing. In many governments with a parliamentary system, a "private bill" means one sponsored by an individual legislator rather than the prime minister and his or her cabinet. But, in U.S. terminology, a "private bill" refers to a bill with an effect limited to one person or a small number of persons who are either identified by name or by a very narrowly defined situation.)	Was This An Egregiously Lenient Sentence? Yes. Did he get lighter punishment than he "should have" (in some sense)? Yes. A six month sentence for a non-negligent homicide was virtually unprecedented then and remains extremely low. Even a six month sentence for the rape of an adult woman (which is generally a comparable or less serious offense than manslaughter) by a privileged white offender generates immense controversy today as it did in the case of the sentencing of Brock Turner for that offense in 2016 (something that ultimately cost the judge imposing that sentence his job). There is no way that intentionally hitting someone is negligent homicide. It is at a minimum reckless, and honestly, is hard to see as anything other than intentional conduct. While it wasn't premeditated and hence wouldn't qualify as first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, this would be a fairly straightforward case for a second degree murder charge and a sentence of a decade or more. The intentional part apples to the act of hitting someone, not the result of causing their death. This intent was present here. Where Did The System Fail? in what way did the legal process fail? Or do you think that there was any failure at all in the legal process? Was the substantive law at fault? No. The substantive criminal law in 1963 was very similar to what it is now and would have authorized a much more severe sentence on the crime of conviction and would have made a more serious charge of murder viable. Arguably the substantive law should have had a mandatory minimum sentence for homicide, but since judges very rarely impose such lenient charges for homicide in cases like this one where there was no good reason for leniency, many states don't do that now and it isn't a problem that legislators would reasonably have believed that they had to worry about. Allowing leniency in some extraordinary cases that capture considerations that the law does not expressly mention is often a good thing, rather than a bad one. Did The Appellate Process Fail? No. The defendant's conviction was not wrongfully reversed on appeal, and it is generally not possible for a defendant's sentence to be increased on appeal in these circumstances. Arguably, this is not an ideal rule of law (and it is not the law in most countries in these circumstances). But this was not a major problem with the legal system that was a primary reason causing the outcome in this case to be an exceptional miscarriage of justice. The Judge's Sentence Was An Abuse Of Discretion. The judge imposed a very light sentence within the statutorily allowed range of discretion. While we can't literally read the mind of the judge and the judge doesn't acknowledge this as a basis for the sentence, given a larger pattern of similarly lenient sentences of similarly situated people given light sentences by judges, we can make a very reasonable guess about the most likely and plausible reason for the lenient sentence. The most likely and plausible reason for the sentence is the one identified by Bob Dylan. A high status white man killed a low status black woman, and the judge felt that, as a result, it didn't justify as serious of a sentence. The actual chain of reasoning in the judge's mind consciously may have involved considerations like the view that the victim was an "eggshell" victim, and the likelihood that the defendant was capable of reforming his conduct after a short sentence and thus didn't present a threat to the public. But the courts very rarely grant leniency to someone on the grounds that the victim was "fragile" - usually this justifies a more severe sentence. And the documented fact that the perpetrator routinely assaulted others with his cane casts grave doubt on the extent to which he could be rehabilitated more easily than a typical defendant. Also, even if the charge of conviction was manslaughter, this case would have been considered at the high end of the range in terms of the culpability of the offender who went around assaulting many people at a public gathering seriously enough to cause harm, and to in one case cause a death of a more fragile victim. The sentence should have been at least at the midpoint of what is allowed (currently about five years out of ten possible) in a case like this one. Further, while Maryland is not in the "Deep South" it is a Southern state with a history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, and the judge in this case would have lived under and seen enforced to his benefit, Jim Crow laws in Maryland during his lifetime. The Civil Rights movement had not succeeded to the point that racism was a completely disavowed and unacceptable form of motivation in 1963, particularly in even parts of the South outside of the "Deep South" at that time. As a reference point, President Biden, in nearby Delaware, was starting to make a name for himself in politics at the time as a defender of segregation in the school system and an opponent of busing to desegregate schools. This issue got him elected and re-elected. Biden reformed his views later, but racism was alive and well in Chesapeake Bay area at the time. Was Prosecutorial Discretion An Issue? Possibly To Some Extent. The prosecution's decision to press charges for manslaughter rather than murder was also questionable, but less obviously so. Today, common practice would be to bring both murder and manslaughter charges in a case like this one. The facts would have supported a second degree murder charge. The fact that the prosecution originally brought a murder charge suggests that it knew that the facts supported that charge, and was influenced by some political or tactical consideration, or by judicial pressure, to drop the more serious charge before trial. But without insight into what that reason was (which is much less obvious than the judge's motivations) it is hard to judge whether the prosecutor should have acted differently under the circumstances. The fact that the prosecution pressed charges, took the case to trial, and got a conviction at all also suggests that the prosecutor's conduct was not at the bottom of the barrel compared to more racist prosecutor exercises of discretion in 1963 elsewhere in the U.S. The prosecutor had the full legal ability to decline to press charges at all without facing any legal consequences for failing to do so. Further, while it is certainly plausible that prosecutor's racism figured into this decision, it is also important to note that the prosecutor has to consider the attitudes of a likely jury pool when bringing charges. Even if the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty of murder under the law, the prosecutor has to consider whether the odds of getting a conviction from a local jury that is likely to have considerable racial bias influences what charges are right to bring in order to get a maximum conviction, as opposed to what charges the prosecutor believes are legally justified. Likewise, if the judge indicated the he would be likely to dismiss the murder charge before trial in a preliminary hearing, that would also make a prosecutor's decision to comply with an implicit judicial suggestion to stay in the judge's good graces for the remainder of this case, and for future cases before the same judge, understandable. However, if electoral public pressure, or the defense counsel's pressure or influence, caused the prosecutor to give up on a murder charge that a conviction would probably have been secured upon, this is much more problematic and would suggest racial and status bias on the part of the prosecuting attorney's office. Was Jury Conduct An Issue? No. The conduct of the jury in this case was not an issue, even though the potential of jury nullification that didn't happen was a factor that may have influenced the charge brought by the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant on the most serious charge presented to it.	This is from an opinion piece (albeit by Law profs.) so you'll have to bear/excuse the tone and check the details... but seemingly there some similar laws introduced earlier this year, on different topics though: But the subversion of private enforcement laws to restrict individual rights goes far beyond abortion. Since the beginning of this year, Tennessee has authorized students and teachers to sue schools that allow transgender students to use the restrooms that match their gender identity; Florida has followed suit, with a law that allows students to sue schools that permit transgender girls to play on girls’ sports teams. My opinion is that the comparison falls short on (2), as the [plaintiff] students seem to have to be from the same school, so it's not as broad as SB.8., in terms of who can sue. (N.B. found a more in-depth news article on the Florida sports law. Some of the writeups on this aren't totally clear on that though, just saying "another student" can sue. I couldn't find the exact text of the law insofar.) The promoter of SB.8, actually gave some inspirational examples in an interview, and they are somewhat older: And this is ground that's been ploughed before - under current Texas law under Medicaid fraud, for example. Any person who discovers Medicaid fraud can bring a civil case to bring that forward. The Chick-fil-A law, Senate Bill 1978 from last session about your religious freedom, that also allowed any person to bring a civil action. So it's not a new concept in Texas law, and if elected officials won't follow the law, we'll empower the people of Texas to do it, and we think it makes sense. (Hat tip to a Politics.SE answer for this latter quote.) Again, I didn't check the details... I suspect there may be some divergence from the strict letter of the (1) requirement. I bet (Medicaid) fraud is criminal as well. It seems the Chick-fil-A law failed to do its (immediately) intended job because it was attempted to be used against a city municipality, but the suit was dismissed (on appeal) due to governmental immunity... The private enforcement of the Medicaid fraud issue was apparently passed because of the huge backlog that existed at one point in the state/agency enforcement in Texas: The Office of Inspector General was lambasted in a state review last year [2015--seemingly] for, among other things, a massive backlog of cases and a failure to recover significant tax dollars from providers it accused of fraud, sometimes incorrectly. N.B., these are referred to as qui tam cases, but they don't quite entirely substitute the plaintiff, at least not in the insurance cases that were won: So-called qui tam cases allow whistleblowers to file lawsuits alleging fraud on behalf of the government. If the claims turn out to be legitimate, state and federal laws award a finder’s fee of between 15 and 25 percent of the total settlement or judgment. Interestingly higher awards are possible if the government declines to intervene, but they are still not 100% going to the private initiator (under the False Claims Act)--from Wikipedia: If the government does not decide to participate in a qui tam action, the relator may proceed alone without the Department of Justice, though such cases historically have a much lower success rate. Relators who do prevail in such cases may potentially receive a higher relator's share, to a maximum of 30%. As Wikipedia also notes, some such laws that entirely left the prosecution to a private entity were found unconstitutional, at the federal level e.g. In 2011, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the False Marking Statute was unconstitutional. Judge Dan Aaron Polster determined that it violated the Take Care Clause of Article II of the Constitution, because it represented "a wholesale delegation of criminal law enforcement power to private entities with no control exercised by the Department of Justice". Of some note, the FCA requires that the complaint actually be served on the government and not the actual defendant. This basically ensures that the gov't is notified of all such actions. The Texas-specific legislation on qui tam fraud cases actually seems to mirror the federal one pretty closely: A whistleblower under the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act [TMFPA] may be entitled to an award between 15% -25% if the state intervenes in the case. If the state chooses not to participate in the litigation, then a whistleblower may be entitled to an award between 25% – 30% of the amount recovered. Nonetheless, a court may reduce the award if the court finds that the action is based primarily on information disclosed by someone other than the person bringing the action. [...] Note: Changes to the Texas laws were enacted by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 1 (S.B. 219).
How Do States [Arizona] Amend the Federal Constitution? How do states (specifically Arizona) amend the United States federal constitution? How do states amend the federal constitution without permission/cooperation from the US federal congress? What is the process in Arizona for amending the federal constitution (with and without federal congress approval)? Are there any statutes or mentions in the Arizona state constitution that details the process that Arizona has for amending the federal constitution? Bypassing federal congress could be really useful in areas of politics like congressional term limits, reducing federal taxes (allowing states to tax more), states having more land (Arizona/Nevada/New Mexico/Western United States barely have state land), reducing federal government control and getting state legislature representation back in the federal senate. EDIT: I know that Arizona cannot amend the federal constitution by itself, but how does Arizona become the first, or one of the states? What is the process to become one of the states to try to amend the constitution, without federal congress?	No state can amend the US Constitution by itself. Technically, an amendment to the Constitution can be proposed a constitutional convention that is called for by two-thirds of the State legislatures (though this is has never happened; all 27 amendments have been proposed by the Federal Congress, which is the alternative path). This can be done without any kind of Federal approval what so ever. After proposal, an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures. EDIT: Regarding how to "get a convention started": This hasn't been tested, since a non-Congressional amendment has not, to my knowledge, been attempted, but I would imagine a Convention would be called if 2/3rds of the states submitted requests to Congress (which would probably either be a law or a joint-resolution, which is like a law without executive approval, but the form would probably be governed by each state's respective Constitution). Alternatively, it may be sufficient for state legislatures to designate delegates who meet up somewhere (as that is essentially what happened with the Constitutional Congress, i.e. the delegates who met and drafted the US Federal Constitution). A point has been raised in another answer that there may be an issue; however, I'm not convinced of this being a bar to a Convention. The delegates at the Constitutional Congress were original chosen to discuss changes to the Articles of Confederation, but wound up throwing the whole thing out and starting from scratch instead. Therefore, I do not see calls for a convention with differing but related objectives to be a problem; the whole point of a Convention in the Constitutional Amendment process is to discuss and compromise; otherwise, why require it before skipping to the 3/4ths of states ratifying, if the 2/3rds of states already have to agree on exactly what is being proposed before sending delegates.	Dale M's answer is not supported at all by history, or any mode of constitutional interpretation. I also don't find it likely. I'd say that if a duly ratified amendment said as much, that would be the law. It is certainly correct that the court could try to narrow the meaning. It's also possible to simply not follow the Constitution (as we do with state immunity and the 11th amendment). But to assume that would be done here is just speculating blindly. Of course, this question doesn't warrant much more attention than blind speculation, so my comment is not a very offensive accusation. As a few counter points, we have radically change the form of our government many times within the current constitution. Reconstruction, The New Deal and so on, all represented huge changes. Most importantly, the 17th amendment can easily be viewed as more radical than the question's proposed amendment. It completely flipped the political system upside down, orienting power in the people and the federal government, and treating the states as some weird intermediary: but we now see it as a relatively boring enactment. Certainly we could come to see the formal abolishment of the amendment process similarly, especially if it were (which it would need to be) accompanied with a new found comfort with non-textual interpretation to effectively "amend" through interpretation, i.e. If the textualists lost badly this amendment would seem like a relatively natural way of announcing their demise. Remember that Scalia's whole point, is that strict originalism (not saying he was actually so strict himself) would democratize by forcing change through the amendment process. If we rejected that notion (as deceptive, for example) we could (as in its not completely ridiculous to imagine) announce that rejection with the proposed amendment.	None. The federal government is allowed to prohibit coffee drinking under its power to regulate interstate commerce. Prohibition would not have required a constitutional amendment under modern constitutional jurisprudence either. By analogy, this would be no different (constitutionally) than a law prohibiting putting lithium in sodas (something that used to be done in 7 Up) or putting cocaine in sodas (something that used to be done in Coca-Cola). Conceivably, the law might have to allow a religious exemption in certain circumstances under the 1st Amendment's free exercise clause, but while many faiths prohibit drinking coffee (most notably, offshoots of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints), none of which I am aware require it as a matter of religious doctrine sincerely espoused.	Regarding the second part of your question: The 7th Amendment does not apply in state court, so any right to a jury trial there would depend upon the constitution of the State of Texas (specifically Article I, Section 15 of the Texas Constitution). This is the case because the Bill of Rights applies by its terms only to the federal government. Under the Selective Incorporation doctrine, the 14th Amendment causes some of the Bill of Rights to apply in state court but not all of it. In particular, the 7th Amendment is one of the parts that does not apply in state court as determined in the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) and Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877). The 11th Amendment would probably bar a federal lawsuit over this matter, since the proper defendant would probably be the State of Texas which is immune from suit in federal court except by another state or the United States. You would still have a right to assert your substantive federal constitutional rights in any state court litigation, however.	Since the US Federal government didn't try to pass any such law (nor would it have been politically possible in the period shortly before the US Civil War), there is no way to know with assurance how such a hypothetical law would have been addressed by the Supreme Court of the day, nor by the various states. Congress legally could have prohibited the importation of slaves after 1808, the constitution specifically grants this power. Congress legally could have prohibited interstate commerce in slaves. Congress could have repealed the Fugitive Slave Act. Congress legally could have imposed heavy taxes on the ownership of slaves. If heavy enough these could have been a de facto abolition. A series of Presidents could have appointed Justices inclined to overturn the Dred Scott decision (denying the possibility of citizen ship for most Negros, and denying that a "free" state could free slaves temporarily resident there). Congress could have passed laws requiring negro votes to be counted in federal elections. Various of the above hypothetical measures might have made slavery less economic, and thus less common, in time. Note that it is not likely that any actual Congress would have passed most of them. But I do not see how, absent a constitutional amendment, and absent a war, a simple Federal statute could have constitutionally abolished slavery de jure throughout the US. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was legally justified as a war measure, a confiscation from those in rebellion. It did not affect loyal slave states, such as Maryland. And it was never seriously tested in court anyway.	Does a treaty have to be compatible with the US constitution to be implemented? Yes. A treaty that is incompatible with the U.S. Constitution is void to the extent it is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) ("The treaty is . . . a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States."); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1870) ("It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument."); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ("It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the constitution forbids."); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ("The treaty-making power of the United States . . . does not extend ‘so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids.’") (quoting De Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) ("This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty.").	As much as they like Most pieces of legislation have a “dictionary” detailing, for the purposes of that legislation (or generally) what specific words and phrases mean. This can broaden (or narrow) the definition compared to how they are used in normal English. The purpose of this is not to set a trap for the unwary, although this may happen, but to introduce precision and to allow a short defined term to be used in the drafting rather than having to explain what is meant verbosely every time it’s used. Of course, they can’t redefine terms so that they give themselves jurisdiction when they otherwise wouldn’t have it. For example, in australia, the Constitution gives the Federal Parliament the power to make laws about, among other things, “external affairs”. A law that tried to define “external affairs” more broadly than the Constitution does (which it doesn’t, so we fall back on what it means in English) would be invalid.	No. Whatever clauses and terms existed in this contract, a second contract between the parties could modify it to remove such a clause, or to directly make such an amendment, or to annul the contract entirely. You can make it a requirement that amendments be unanimous among the parties (as opposed to e.g. unilateral, allowing one party to make certain changes, variously without approval or without notice). Such a clause may also be unenforceable for another reason, but this doesn't fit any of the general points for unenforceability, except perhaps being against public policy if a jurisdiction happened to regulate contracts to that degree.
Trying to find definitions for "bodily harm" and "Great bodily harm" in Florida law I'm researching Chapter 784 in the Florida State laws. The problem I'm having is there's no general "terms and definitions" at the top like there are in other chapters. I searched to see if there was a "terms and definitions" from another chapter that was written to cover multiple chapters, no dice. Specifically, I'm trying to find the Florida state definitions for "bodily harm" and "great bodily harm". Using google, I found plenty of law firms giving examples of "great bodily harm", but I still don't know what "bodily harm is". The context is 784.03 1(a) which states : (1)(a) The offense of battery occurs when a person: 1. Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or 2. Intentionally causes bodily harm to another person. Since there's that dreaded "or" there, I'm trying to figure out what is technically still a crime even with consent.	The question is not firmly settled under Florida law. Wheeler v. State, 203 So. 3d 1007 addresses the issue w.r.t. Fla. Stat. §827.01(2), now §827.03(1)(a)3 and the crime of aggravated child abuse, which depends on causing "great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement". The court notes that the chapter does not define "great bodily harm", but they also note that the same term is used in §784 – where as you observed it is likewise undefined. The courts take the term to mean the same thing in both cases. Calling on previous case law, they observe that GBH is "distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises as are likely to be inflicted in simple assault and battery." T.W. v. State, 98 So.3d 238, 243 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); see also Brown v. State, 86 So.3d 569, 571-72 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Gordon v. State, 126 So.3d 292, 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Smith v. State, 969 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) Thus [t]he state "must prove more than that the victim suffered some harm" Smith v. State, 175 So.3d 906 Consequently, the jury instruction for §775.087(2), related to discharging a firearm in the commission of a crime, states “Great bodily harm” means great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises. does not include a case where The victim suffered no injury and testified that it only stung when she was struck with the broomsticks nor does it include scratches, swelling, and puncture mark, but it does include a beating where a victim's lips were "the size of a banana ... [and] his head was the size of a basketball." D.C.'s face was so swollen that his mother did not recognize him the next morning. It is not hard to imagine unclear cases between puncture marks and ... swellings? It's interested to note that in one case, minor swelling is dismissed but massive swelling is taken to be great bodily harm. Courts might appeal to a dictionary, such as Merriam-Webster's legal dictionary physical injury suffered by the victim of a violent crime that causes a substantial risk of death, extended loss or impairment of a body part or function, or permanent disfigurement : physical injury that is more serious than that ordinarily suffered in a battery which is a bit problematic since the crime you are interested in is a battery. Minnesota defines these terms, but makes a three-way distinction in types of bodily harm: "Bodily harm" means physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. "Substantial bodily harm" means bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily member. "Great bodily harm" means bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm. Washington also has a 3-way classification for child abuse, repeated for general crimes: (2)(a) "Bodily injury" means physical pain or injury, illness, or an impairment of physical condition; (b) "Substantial bodily harm" means bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily part; (c) "Great bodily harm" means bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ. Ohio has a two-way distinction where "Physical harm to persons" means any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration. but "Serious physical harm to persons" means any of the following: (a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as would normally require hospitalization or prolonged psychiatric treatment; (b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death; (c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity, whether partial or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial incapacity; (d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or that involves some temporary, serious disfigurement; (e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to result in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or intractable pain. Texas has a rather different classification in terms of harm vs. serious bodily injury, the latter being bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. but harm is anything reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage, or injury, including harm to another person in whose welfare the person affected is interested thus can include financial losses and no physical contact. The line in Florida is not bright.	Deliberately causing an accident is illegal. However, in some (probably many) jurisdictions there is a "necessity" defense against criminal charges. In Washington it goes like this: Necessity is a defense to a charge of (fill in crime) if (1) the defendant reasonably believed the commission of the crime was necessary to avoid or minimize a harm; (2) harm sought to be avoided was greater than the harm resulting from a violation of the law; (3) the threatened harm was not brought about by the defendant; and (4) no reasonable legal alternative existed. The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence means that you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that it is more probably true than not true. If you find that the defendant has established this defense, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty [as to this charge]. It is possible, if B is attempting to kill the pedestrian, that you have defense of others available as well.	Most people would refer to this as "defense of others." In North Carolina, though, the relevant statute, G.S. 14-51.3, formally refers to this as "Use of force in defense of person." The statute allows a defense against criminal and civil liability for non-deadly force used "against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other's imminent use of unlawful force." Note, however, that the statute does not allow you to invoke the defense when the victim "is a law enforcement officer ... was lawfully acting in the performance of his or her official duties and ... identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law." This raises the question of whether the officer in this case was "lawfully acting in the performance of his official duties" when the relative intervened. If he was, the defense would likely be unavailable.	This is manslaughter of the vehicular variety Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:... (c) Vehicular— (1) ... driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. This is what they call a wobbler, and could be charged as a felony or a misdemeanor. In the latter case, the maximum penalty is a year in county jail and in the former it is six years in state prison. If the cause was ordinary negligence, it is just a misdemeanor. The details of gross negligence are set forth in the jury instruction CALCRIM 592 A person acts with gross negligence when: He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury; AND A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act. The "absent-mindedness" defense seems a bit far fetched, but still not everybody who drives inattentively is prosecuted for a felony, or even a misdemeanor. However, it is really hard to imagine not being acutely aware of the fact that people drive on the right side of the road here. Without a more-detailed story, I don't see a basis for deciding what level of negligence a prosecutor is likely to argue for, and what the prosecutor's agenda is: somewhere between no prosecution, and (most likely) misdemeanor manslaughter.	I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.	I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty").	Claim is irrelevant. Specific to Maryland Law, Assault occurs when one makes or attempts to make physical contact with another OR intentionally frightens another. Alice saying she helped to steal the car and your definition of the theft as "accosted Carol" implies one of the three forms of Assault took place. Alice just admitted to commiting the crime she thought was wrongly charged to her. The crime she was trying to get out of is called "Assault and Battery" which is where Assault leads to actual injury or physical harm to the victim OR attempts to actually injure or harm another OR puts them in fear of such action. In Maryland Law, the Battery portion almost always is paired with assault while in other states, it might be possible to commit Battery without Assault (though in these states, normally a separate assault charge to Battery is usually added.). As a helpful tip, the two words general break down as follows: Assault: The act of threatening harm or making unwanted non-injurious contact with another person. Battery: Causing Injurious Harm to another person. In Maryland, Alice was rightly charged with assault. Upon capture, Bob will recieve an "Assault and Battery" charge for hitting Carol with the stolen card and may get an addition simple Assault charge for the threats before he drove away.	In the US, it depends on the jurisdiction because each state has its own homicide statutes: but, the defining elements don't differ a lot. Drawing on Washington state law, the first question is whether you intended to kill a person (it doesn't have to be a specific person). If you did, you have committed first-degree murder. It is first-degree murder, because it requires a certain amount of advance planning to kill with a drone. It does not matter that the drone houses the gun that killed the person and a program determines when the gun fires (the "it was the drone, not me" defense gets you nowhere: otherwise, you could always claim "It wasn't me, it was my gun / knife / fist".) If instead this is a badly-designed pig-slaughtering drone, then it could be manslaughter in the first degree, if the act was reckless, or manslaughter in the second degree, if the act was with criminal negligence. To determine which it is, you look at the definitions: A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. versus A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. So it would depend on whether you decided that safeguards which would prevent shooting people were too much bother (you know there is a risk and set aside that concern), or it didn't occur to you that a flying gun might hurt a person.
Am I allowed to use other peoples instruments in my music? I'm new to creating music and trying to understand how everything works. I have been trying to look for instruments I like and I just can not find any good download packs. I have even bought a couple expensive ones but it's just not what I want. I have recently found out about "stems" and some songs I really like have some stems available to download. I would like to download these stems and take the instrument they use in it. For example If they use a trumpet I will take the trumpet track, cut out 1 trumpet note and re-pitch and edit it to however I like and put that in my song. No, I do not want to make a remix. I am not taking the WHOLE track. I am ONLY interested in the instrument they use. If this is not possible then could I go onto youtube, download a video where someone plays their guitar, take one note they play on that guitar and edit it and put that in my song? Is this legal? Do other people do this?	Your question is whether you can copy instrumental portions of recorded music, and modify it to create a new work, without permission. The answer is that this is illegal. This would be creating a "derivative work", and under copyright law, only the copyright holder has the right to authorize creation of a derivative work. Whether or not you have paid for a copy of a recording, you would still need a separate license to legally extract and use part of a recording. This includes taking just one instrument, and includes taking just a part of one instrument. Material on Youtube is subject to different licenses: in some cases items are free of restrictions, in some cases, you can't legally copy them at all. The standard Youtube license does not allow any copying. Copyright infringement of music is rather common. Enforcement of copyright must be pursued by the copyright holder, and you would need to discuss your specific plans with a copyright attorney to determine your probability of getting sued. Ultimately, you might get away with minimal copying, relying on a fair use defense (you still get sued, but you might prevail and not have to pay). There are street rumors that there is an N-note threshold for copyright infringement, where people often pick numbers from 3 to 7, but in fact there is no clear rule. This resource assembles relevant case law. Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, in the 6th District, establishes the rule that any amount of copying is infringement, whereas VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone in the 9th District rejects that finding and allowed a case of .23 seconds (230 milliseconds) of copying. The "de minimis" doctrine is independent of "fair use" which has a statutory basis, but seems to have arisen from similarity doctrines which are involved in proving that copying took place.	As the copyright holder you are free to license your work however you want. The fact that you have licensed your work under a CC license to one group does not prevent you from licensing it to someone else under a different license with different terms. This is true even if the CC license could apply to this other person. The CC license doesn't restrict what you can do with your own work. It only restricts what other people can do when they choose to use your work under the terms of the CC license.	Whenever there is a license to share things, the license creator wants the license to be widely used, but absolutely does not want slightly different licenses that could be used to trick people, or that just cause legal problems when used. Normal copyright law applies. And for the reasons above, the GPL license as an example allows you to copy the license verbatim but absolutely doesn’t allow you to make any modifications other than changing who is the person licensing a work. I would be curious what happens legally if someone licenses something with a sneakily modified copy of the GPL and then makes claims against a licensee who assumed it was the original GPL.	I see that channel offers playlists and "videos" of popular music by several artists. The one video I tried had the music with no accompanying video or images. The channel's about page says that then operator does not own the copyrights to the music and cannot grant others permission to play it. It is possible that the channel operator has obtained permission from the artists and is thus operating under a valid license. It is possible that the channel is committing copyright infringement, but the various copyright owners have not noticed the channel, or have noticed it but decided not to take action. There is no easy way for an outsider to tell which of these is correct. If the operator has not obtained proper permission, then it seems that this would be copyright infringement. If so, any copyright owner could send a takedown notice, use YouTube's own copyright complaint mechanism, or could file a copyright infringement suit. But nothing compels the owner to act if the owner chooses not to, it is entirely the owner's choice. I do not see that the US fair use or any other exception to copyright would be likely to apply here. If the owner brought suit and won (and a win seems likely to me, from what I can see), the operator would be liable for damages, which might be sizable, or mild. In the US at least the owner could also obtain a court order (injunction) requiring the operator to stop using the owner's copyrighted music. If the owner complained to YouTube, the site could add a "copyright strike" against the operator's account. After a few strikes (I think three) YouTube will cancel the account, according to its posted policies. Similar outcomes could face anyone else who posted or made available for streaming copyrighted content (such as music) without permission from the copyright owner. But again, everything depends on action by the copyright owner. If the owner chooses, for whatever reason, not to act, then nothing is likely to be done about the infringement.	First: the real answer to your questions is "consult your academic library staff." If this is for a thesis project, then you're presumably affiliated with a college or university, and the librarians at such institutions are used to helping sort out copyright claims and helping researchers obtain the necessary clearances. There are two questions you're asking, really. Are these works in the public domain? Possibly, but not for the reasons you think. In the US, copyright in unpublished works lasts for the life of the creator + 70 years. After that, they pass into the public domain. This means that if the composer/arranger died before 1919, then the works passed into the public domain before the formal publication in 1989, and they are still in the public domain now. However, if the creator died after 1919, then their 1989 publication effectively "resets the clock" on the copyright, and they will not come into the public domain until (according to the above link) 70 years after the death of the creator or 2048, whichever comes later. What doesn't matter is that the original symphonic works were in the public domain. Even if the 1812 Overture is in the public domain, I could write an arrangement of it for accordion quintet and I would have the exclusive right to publish it and profit from that arrangement for the standard term. In your case, if the work really is a straight transcription, it might not have a copyright; but if the work required some amount of creativity and artistic decision-making (which a piano transcription of a symphony certainly would) then the arrangement gets its own copyright when it's published. Can I make transcriptions of them if I don't publish them? Probably, but you should really consult your librarians. It's entirely possible that your proposed copying would fall under "fair use"; it would be for scholarship & research and you're not planning to include the transcriptions in your final published work. On the other hand, you're talking about effectively copying a substantial portion of a creative work that is still in print, which argues against fair use. Fair use rules are notoriously flexible/vague, and so it would be worthwhile to consult with an expert on the subject (i.e., your school's library staff.)	How do you know if the copyright claimant or owner of them material you are using is allowing their content on Youtube? You don't. ... does fair use automatically cover you for anything related to this? No Is it illegal to share the music experience of a legally purchased MP3 ... or to provide services that play songs ... but are not hosted by your website (in which case you just act as a pointer to other sites which are participating in illegal activities)? Yes What rights/privileges can cover you if you wish to participate in this? None I've heard (rumours probably with no legal standing), that as long as you are not monetizing their material, you will not have any legal action taken against you. You probably won't have action taken against you. That said, you probably won't get busted for smoking weed in your basement. Lack of enforcement makes it no less illegal. What copyright means Copyright is a legal right created by the law of a country that grants the creator of an original work exclusive rights to its use and distribution, usually for a limited time. The exclusive rights are not absolute; they are limited by limitations and exceptions to copyright law, including fair use. The copyright holder decides how, when and by whom their work can be used and copied. At some point this right expires and the work passes into the public domain. It is not trivial to determine what works are public domain and what are not as it depends on the copyright law in the country they were created in at the time of creation and how that law has changed subsequently. In most of the world, the default length of copyright is currently the life of the author plus either 50 or 70 years. Many jurisdictions also grant workers for hire moral copyright in their creative work even when the proprietorial copyright vests with their employer. Copyright comes into existence automatically; it doesn't need to be registered or denoted in any way. For example, I have copyright in this answer and you have copyright in your question. A few countries (the USA among them) have a copyright register but that only limits the remedies an unregistered copyright holder has; failing to register does not negate copyright. Further, a single work can have multiple copyright holders: a music video for example has (barring contractual arrangements): the composer(s) holds copyright in the music the lyricist(s) holds copyright in the lyrics the performer(s) hold copyright in the music performance the actor(s) (if any) holds copyright in the acting the producer(s)/director(s) holds copyright in the finished product. In practice, most of these people have contracts which give their copyright to someone else. Almost certainly, every MP3 of every song is covered by copyright; that is, someone, somewhere owns the copyright; that is at least one someone. How can you tell who that is? Often, in the absence of a claim of copyright, you can't. Obviously, if it is a song published by a record label than its pretty obvious that they hold copyright on it and you don't need to worry about the deals they have with the artist/composer etc. Remember, copyright violations are a civil matter; the state does not get involved. It is up to each individual copyright holder to take whatever action they wish under the law to protect their rights.	Very similar to how MySpace done it all those years back.... MySpace did it differently back then because they got sued for copyright violations for the music their users were uploading and streaming. https://www.google.com/search?q=myspace+lawsuit+music These days, you can upload music to MySpace, but they have licenses and agreements with music publishers, and are clear to their users what can be legally uploaded: https://help.myspace.com/hc/en-us/articles/202591770-Music-Upload-Requirements And remember.... By uploading any content to Myspace, you hereby certify that you own the copyright in or have all the necessary rights related to such content to upload it. Don't step on someone else's hard work. And Myspace is are clear on how they handle copyright violations: https://help.myspace.com/hc/en-us/articles/202055394-Copyright-FAQs Myspace will respond to allegations of copyright violations in accordance with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). The DMCA provides a process for a copyright owner to give notification to an online service provider concerning alleged copyright infringement. Now, with your question: you are allowing users to both upload music and stream it. Streaming is legal in the UK; see an older question here on LSE Is Streaming Copyrighted Content Illegal in the UK But the hosting - storing the actual files - of copyrighted material is not legal. But my app knows no detail of the song uploaded. Could be anything.... This doesn't matter; the files are on your server. You run the risk of legal action being taken against you for the actual .mp3 file of copyrighted music on your server. You are the owner of the webserver, and thus control the files on it, along with your knowledge of building an App that allows users to upload the files. Even if you claim to know nothing about what users upload with the App you built, the music files are on your server. What happens also depends on where the server with the music files is located, i.e. in the UK (action against you legally possible), or elsewhere (legal action against depends on the country and their laws and agreements with other countries). If your server is in a third-party country and can't be taken down, but you are a UK resident, the music companies can still go after you in other respects, as the paying owner of the server, the owner of the domain registration, even possibly as the creator of the App itself.	Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement.
Derivatives of Unauthorized Derivatives & Copyright Imagine 3 parties: A, B & C. Party A owns all rights to image X. Image X is not in the public domain, and no explicit licenses for use to the other parties have been granted. Party B adds some minor annotations to image X, and calls it image Y (whether or not the annotations are original enough to constitute a derivative work is unclear). Party C then removes the annotations from image Y (so it is again visually similar to image X) and uses it (let's call it Image Z) Party B now takes offence and claims copyright infringement against party C for image X/Y. Does party B have a reasonable case for Cease & Desist against Party C in the following scenarios: Image Y does not contain annotations original enough to constitute a derivative work Image Y does contain annotations original enough to constitute a derivative work (bearing in mind that image Z contains none of the additional material in image Y) Party A obviously have grounds to issue a C&D to both parties - but whether or not Party B have any such rights is unclear to me. Edit - Follow Up Question If instead Party B's work (Image Y) was an authorized derivative of A's work (Image X) - would Party B have the right to legally issue a C&D to Party C (still assuming C removed B's changes), or would it still have to come from Party A?	No B holds no right to a copyright, if his work infringes on A's right to X. So he can't win against A and neither C or lawfully demand a C&D from C. See Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 especially IV A 4: Since Anderson's Work Is An Unauthorized Derivative Work, No Part Of The Treatment Can Be Granted Copyright Protection Stallone owns the copyrights for the first three Rocky movies. Under 17 U.S.C. section 106(2), he has the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on these copyrighted works. This Court has determined that Anderson's treatment is an unauthorized derivative work. Thus, Anderson has infringed upon Stallone's copyright. See 17 U.S.C. section 501(a). [...] Plaintiff has written a treatment which is an unauthorized derivative work. This treatment infringes upon Stallone's [31] copyrights and his exclusive right to prepare derivative works which are based upon these movies. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). Section 103(a) was not intended to arm an infringer and limit the applicability of section 106(2) on unified derivative works. As the House Report and Professor Nimmer's treatise explain, 103(a) was not intended to apply to derivative works and most certainly was not an attempt to modify section 106(2). Section 103(a) allows an author whose authorship essentially is the arrangement or ordering of several independent works to keep the copyright for his arrangement even if one of the underlying works he arranged is found to be used unlawfully. The infringing portion would be easily severable and the scope of the compilation author's own work would be easily ascertainable. Even if this Court were to interpret section 103(a) as allowing an author of an infringing derivative work to sue third parties based on the non-infringing portions of his work, section 106(2) most certainly precludes the author of an unauthorized infringing derivative work from suing the author of the work which he has already infringed. Thus, the Court HOLDS that the defendants are entitled to summary [32] judgment on plaintiff's copyright claims as the plaintiff cannot gain copyright protection for any portion of his work under section 103(a). In addition, Anderson is precluded by section 106(2) from bringing an action for copyright infringement against Stallone and the other defendants. Note that any change to a work - even a single stroke or word, or cutting out a single frame - makes something out of necessity a derivative work. No alteration whatsoever makes it a pure copy. And using figures from a work in a different setting makes them, by necessity, a derivate, as in Anderson v Stallone. However, even if B's work was licensed or fair use (which can be done by critically recutting a work as in the h3h3 case or in Akila Hughs v Carl Benjamin aka Sargon of Akkad) and thus doesn't infringe on A's right, C still doesn't infringe on B's work: C's work is a (recreated) copy of A's original work, making it an infringement of A's work, but not B's altered work. Fair Use is explicitly not infringing under 17 USC § 107	Yes, a licensee of Sketchfab is only required to cooperate with this audit process because it was agreed to in a contract. Copyright law does not (in the US, or anywhere else that I know of) give a content creator such a right to demand proof that something is being used in accord with a license. If a content creator or copyright holder thinks that some content is being used without permission, or is an unauthorized derivative work, the holder has only a few possible courses of action. The holder can send a cease and desist letter. This has no legal force, but puts the alleged infringer on notice, makes further infringement clearly "knowing", and may well cause an infringer to stop infringing for fear of an expensive suit. The holder can send a takedown notice if the content is online in a venue that accepts such notices. But there is not a legal obligation to honor such a notice, and a counter-notice may lead to the content being put back up. Finally the holder may sue for copyright infringement. This has significant upfront costs, and requires significant time from the holder or the holder's business. The holder may therefore be unwilling to bring suit unless significant recovery seems likely. Once suit is brought, the holder will have discovery rights to demand answers to relevant questions from the alleged infringer, including the source of the content in question.	Both Bob and Charles are liable for infringement in the US. The fact that Charles had no idea that Bob was an infringer is not a defense, but it mitigates the statutory damages consequences for him. Either party can negotiate with Alice after the fact for a license, and Alice can grant either party but not the other permission to copy. The terms of the license that Alice gives Bob could either allow CCo reposting, or some more restrictive redistribution right. If the license requires a notice prohibiting further redistribution and Bob omits that notification, Bob will have breached the terms of the license in omitting the notification, so we're back to square 1. If Alice fails to specify a no-redistribution notification condition on Bob's reposting, Alice may have granted an implied license to the world, a matter which has to be determined by the courts.	If the photos are exact or "slavish" reproductions of flat (2D) art, then under Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) the photos are not original, and have no copyrights of their own. If the art was not under copyright (for example published before 1924) then neither are the photos. If the art is still under copyright, the photos are "copies" and the permission of the copyright holder (of the original art) is required unless they fall under the fair use exception, which photos taken for and used in classroom instruction, and for no other purpose, might well fall under. However, if the photos are so taken that angle, lighting, filters, and other aspects under the control of the photographer make a difference to the photo, then they will generally constitute new works, and if the art is under copyright protection, will be derivative works of the originals, and both the copyright holder on the original art, and the photographer will hold rights. One rule of thumb is if the photo shows the frame of the painting, it probably has original elements of lighting and viewing angle. The more the photo approximates a scan of a flat work of art, the less original it is. Photos of sculpture, architecture, and other non-flat (3D) art works (and objects) inherently involve artistic decisions about viewing angle, lighting, etc, and will pretty much automatically be original enough for copyright protection. If the original art is out of copyright but the photo is an original work the photographer will hold rights, but no one else will (unless the photographer sells or transfers the rights). In that case it does not make much sense to call the photos "derivative works" as that term is intended to indicate that the works are subject to another's copyright, which these are not, because there is no copyright on the original. Or one could call them derivatives of a public domain work -- the effect is the same. Under the case of Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), a work must have a certian minimum degree of originality to be protected by copyright under US law. Both Bridgeman and Feist are US cases, but many other countries have followed their logic and apply similar rules to copyright issues. It is not uncommon for those who have taken photos of art to assert copyright protection which a court would not uphold, but this will not be judged unless someone copies these photos, and the photographer (or someone claiming through the photographer) sues, and then defense challenges the validity of the asserted copyright. The statements in the text quoted by the OP may be based (in part) on such untested assertions of copyright.	You cannot claim copyright protection of the underlying work, but you can claim protection for your contribution. Under 17 USC 101, the resulting work is a derivative work: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. As an "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression", the work is protected by copyright law: but that only applies to the modifications that you added.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.	In Germany, there is no concept that corresponds directly to public domain. You automatically hold the Urheberrecht (~ copyright) for all creative works that you make, and it can't be given up or transferred (§29 UrhG). The work only enters the Gemeinfreiheit (~public domain) 70 years after your death. You can however license Verwertungsrechte (economic usage rights). When you make creative works in the course of employment (see §43 UrhG), your employer automatically gets the Verwertungsrechte necessary in the context for the work, which is typically an exclusive right (no one else, not even you, can use the work). Your are not in an employment relationship with your school, so it has no rights to your works and cannot prevent you from publishing them on copyright grounds. When you see advice on the internet to check with your school first, that is U.S.-specific advice. Since you're still a minor (7–17), you only have limited capacity to enter contracts or legal transactions (bedingte Geschäftsfähigkeit). While you are able to make transactions involving your own means (e.g. buying something with your pocket money) or make transactions that are only to your benefit (such as accepting a gift), other transactions are schwebend unwirksam (~ pending ratification), until your parents agree. The relevant law is in §107 and §108 BGB. This is a problem with open source licenses. If you publish software under a license, this license is schwebend unwirksam. Someone might start using the software under the license. But then if your parents refuse ratification, the license would be invalid, and everyone would have to stop using your software and destroy any derivative works they made. This is a bit of a problem, especially since open source licenses are otherwise assumed to be irrevocable. So if you want to offer a license (including open source licenses), please give legal certainty to the recipients of the license and ask your parents for their consent first, possibly even in writing. Per §107 BGB, the license you offer with their consent will be valid.	But while some libraries allow unrestricted use of their Public Domain content, others do not and limit the use of their copies to Non-Commercial use. It is my understanding that NC only applies to the digital copy, not the work itself. Your understanding is correct. An ancient text, or one long out of copyright, does not get new protection by creating an image of the text. At most the image itself is protected, not the underlying text. In the US, and other jurisdictiosn that follow the rule of the 1999 Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp case there is no copyright protection on the image because it has no original content. Some EU courts have indicated that they will be following the logic of bridgeman. To the best of my knowledge no EU decision grants copyright protection to an otherwise out-of-copyright work because of its presence in a digital library or collection. However, if a person gained access to a digital library or collection subject to a TOS agreement which includes "no commercial use" terms and then published a text from it commercially, that person might be subject to a breech of contract or similar suit by the library. Such a suit would need to include proof of damages.
How legally enforceable are documents giving up paternity? I have recently been witness to an argument between two acquaintances and since neither of them were lawyers, I offered to post to Law.SE to try and resolve it. For context: since same-sex marriage became legal in USA, many newly married lesbian couples who cannot afford sperm bank/fertility services, use sperm donors, usually found either through interpersonal networks or various personals sites. From what I've been told, there's a significant amount of people who pursue this approach. Obviously, since you get what you pay for, unlike "official" fertility services, these come with certain medical as well as legal risks. There is apparently a typical protocol involved in this to mitigate the legal risks, one part of which is that both parties sign some sort of "legal" release forms - in case of the donor, the document being signed states that they will not seek paternal rights in the future. The argument I was witness to revolved around whether this sort of a document is legally enforceable, or is just a feel-good paper with notary seal on it. My main contribution to the argument was that (1) neither one of them was a lawyer so the should really seek professional advice if this was a practical concern, and (2) I'm pretty sure state laws differ on the topic so the answer might be "it depends". So, the exact question is: A male sperm donor, who is not donating via a fertility clinic/sperm bank, signs a document stating that they relinquish future paternal/parental rights to the child conceived from their sperm. Later on, the donor changes their mind and seeks legal paternal/parental rights, such as visitation with the child. How legally enforceable is the document the donor signed in the eyes of the legal system? You can assume that the document was written as well as it can be from the viewpoint of a lawyer familiar with that state's family law, and was notarized. If the answer depends on jurisdiction, an example of a state where the answer is "yes" and one where the answer is "no" would suffice, although an explanation of how to tell the answer for any other arbitrary state would be desirable as well.	This is indeed an area of law where the answer does depend on the jurisdiction. As a 2015 article on the subject noted (and I am loathe to refer to less current sources as this is a rapidly changing area): The United States has no national laws or regulations governing assisted reproduction. However, many states have piecemeal legislation. Some aspects are regulated, while others are not; some states have strict laws or regulations whereas others are looser. As a 2017 American Bar Association article with citations notes, this isn't entirely true. There are some national laws that apply, but they aren't comprehensive and probably don't control the situation described in the OP. It also notes that: Certain states, like California, have created a legislative environment supportive of surrogacy by providing for the validity and enforcement of commercial surrogacy agreements and enacting legislation to define the resulting nontraditional parental relationships.10 Others, like New York, explicitly prohibit commercial surrogate parenting contracts,11 requiring most residents and potential surrogates in the state to seek desirable surrogacy arrangements in other states. However, so many aspects of ART are simply not addressed by the states:12 there is no state regulation of the number of children that may be conceived by an individual donor, no rules regarding the types of medical information and updates that must be supplied by young donors as they age, no standards regarding genetic testing on embryos, no limits on the age of donors, and virtually no regulation of the gametic13 material market. (Gametic material means sperm and eggs.) The American Bar Association has more resources on related issues here. A 2014 article surveyed the issue broadly. Colorado has a law that permits arrangements like these and makes them enforceable if the formalities of the statute are followed. It is not easy to figure out exactly which states do and do not allow this because: (1) there is a model act to authorize this but many states that allow it crafted their own legislation rather than following the model act (Article 6 of the Model Act is the part relevant to the OP), and (2) some states have allowed this kind of arrangement via case law rather than statutory law. There are also states with no statutes on the subject and no clear case law one way or the other. As of 2010 all but a handful of states had some kind of legislation, but as noted above, some of that legislation disallowed rather than authorized certain practices or only address some issues and not others. This article reviews in detail the facts and rulings in several cases that are on point to this issue, for example, from California, Minnesota and Montana.	A child is not property, therefore a (deceased) parent cannot transfer ownership. In case the sole custodial parent dies, the court will appoint a guardian for a minor child, and will take into consideration the wishes of the deceased parent, however their primary duty is to protect the interest of the child. It follows from this that objections to nomination of Smith as guardian are more easily sustained, since the requirements for being a guardian (e.g. in Washington) are stricter than the requirements for receiving $100,000. RCW 11.130.090 excludes any guardian who has been "convicted of a crime involving dishonesty, neglect, or use of physical force or other crime relevant to the functions the individual would assume as guardian", but such a person is not barred from inheriting property. There are limited formal grounds for contesting a will: testator mentally incompetence, formal failure of the document, (the laws surrounding signatures and witnesses), no clear indication that the document is intended to be a will, forgery or fraud, undue influence (such as a gun to the head), or mistake (for example, mistakenly believing that their child was dead therefore leaving it all to a neighbor). So it is possible, but not so easy, to contest a will. Organ donation takes place under separate laws: you can't wait for the probate process to get finished in three months before donating organs.	The only one I can find so far relates to a Brazilian citizen getting married abroad, called a: Consular Declaration of Civil Status These are issued by the Consular Authority to: Brazilian citizens who intend to marry before a foreign authority within their jurisdiction. The document is issued in English. Source: gov.br (I have yet to find if a comparable certificate is available in-country, for marriage or otherwise, but none of the official guidance sites I have trawled though mention it)	This is from an opinion piece (albeit by Law profs.) so you'll have to bear/excuse the tone and check the details... but seemingly there some similar laws introduced earlier this year, on different topics though: But the subversion of private enforcement laws to restrict individual rights goes far beyond abortion. Since the beginning of this year, Tennessee has authorized students and teachers to sue schools that allow transgender students to use the restrooms that match their gender identity; Florida has followed suit, with a law that allows students to sue schools that permit transgender girls to play on girls’ sports teams. My opinion is that the comparison falls short on (2), as the [plaintiff] students seem to have to be from the same school, so it's not as broad as SB.8., in terms of who can sue. (N.B. found a more in-depth news article on the Florida sports law. Some of the writeups on this aren't totally clear on that though, just saying "another student" can sue. I couldn't find the exact text of the law insofar.) The promoter of SB.8, actually gave some inspirational examples in an interview, and they are somewhat older: And this is ground that's been ploughed before - under current Texas law under Medicaid fraud, for example. Any person who discovers Medicaid fraud can bring a civil case to bring that forward. The Chick-fil-A law, Senate Bill 1978 from last session about your religious freedom, that also allowed any person to bring a civil action. So it's not a new concept in Texas law, and if elected officials won't follow the law, we'll empower the people of Texas to do it, and we think it makes sense. (Hat tip to a Politics.SE answer for this latter quote.) Again, I didn't check the details... I suspect there may be some divergence from the strict letter of the (1) requirement. I bet (Medicaid) fraud is criminal as well. It seems the Chick-fil-A law failed to do its (immediately) intended job because it was attempted to be used against a city municipality, but the suit was dismissed (on appeal) due to governmental immunity... The private enforcement of the Medicaid fraud issue was apparently passed because of the huge backlog that existed at one point in the state/agency enforcement in Texas: The Office of Inspector General was lambasted in a state review last year [2015--seemingly] for, among other things, a massive backlog of cases and a failure to recover significant tax dollars from providers it accused of fraud, sometimes incorrectly. N.B., these are referred to as qui tam cases, but they don't quite entirely substitute the plaintiff, at least not in the insurance cases that were won: So-called qui tam cases allow whistleblowers to file lawsuits alleging fraud on behalf of the government. If the claims turn out to be legitimate, state and federal laws award a finder’s fee of between 15 and 25 percent of the total settlement or judgment. Interestingly higher awards are possible if the government declines to intervene, but they are still not 100% going to the private initiator (under the False Claims Act)--from Wikipedia: If the government does not decide to participate in a qui tam action, the relator may proceed alone without the Department of Justice, though such cases historically have a much lower success rate. Relators who do prevail in such cases may potentially receive a higher relator's share, to a maximum of 30%. As Wikipedia also notes, some such laws that entirely left the prosecution to a private entity were found unconstitutional, at the federal level e.g. In 2011, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the False Marking Statute was unconstitutional. Judge Dan Aaron Polster determined that it violated the Take Care Clause of Article II of the Constitution, because it represented "a wholesale delegation of criminal law enforcement power to private entities with no control exercised by the Department of Justice". Of some note, the FCA requires that the complaint actually be served on the government and not the actual defendant. This basically ensures that the gov't is notified of all such actions. The Texas-specific legislation on qui tam fraud cases actually seems to mirror the federal one pretty closely: A whistleblower under the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act [TMFPA] may be entitled to an award between 15% -25% if the state intervenes in the case. If the state chooses not to participate in the litigation, then a whistleblower may be entitled to an award between 25% – 30% of the amount recovered. Nonetheless, a court may reduce the award if the court finds that the action is based primarily on information disclosed by someone other than the person bringing the action. [...] Note: Changes to the Texas laws were enacted by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 1 (S.B. 219).	Does signing a contract after explaining it was not legally binding count as contract fraud? No. However, depending on the details of the contract, the circumstances, and the parties' subsequent conduct, the donor's ability to prove he actually disclosed it to the couple would strengthen his position. The prima facie elements of fraud are listed in Key Finance, Inc. v. Koon, 371 P.3d 1133, 1137 (2015): (1) a material misrepresentation; (2) known to be false at the time made; (3) made with specific intent that a party would rely on it; and (4) reliance and resulting damage. The donor's disclaimer to the couple "telling them [the contract] was not legally binding" strikes elements (1) and (2). That preempts the relevance of (3). No matter how bizarre it is that the donor eventually bowed to the couple's pressure, that does not change the fact that elements (1) and (2) are stricken. Your description does not reflect whether or how the couple incurred any losses, but the requirement of the couple's reliance is preempted by virtue of the donor's disclaimer. Furthermore, the donor's "history of questionable truthhoods" can only weaken the couple's position of "reasonable" reliance on any representation the donor makes (in case the couple shared back then your concept of donor's reliability). The donor's questionable assertions "[to] further his personal agenda" seems to be irrelevant in this matter because, as you say, "he gained no benefit from the contract". Also, it is unclear from your description whether or not the donor has been sued/charged at all. The donor's mere allegation that he was sued has no legal effect --such as defamation or malicious prosecution-- unless one adds intricate assumptions into this matter. As for "he says the judge chose to 'charge' him", it is possible that he was charged for something else and he is (whether unintentionally or on purpose) mischaracterizing whatever proceedings in which he was involved. The sole act of signing that contract upon proper disclaimer does not render the donor liable for fraud.	There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.	In jurisdictions that recognize common law marriage, it is generally necessary to show that the spouses agreed to marry each other, that they held themselves out to the public as married, and that they cohabited or consummated the marriage. Once this happens, a common law marriage comes into being. In Colorado and most jurisdictions that recognize common law marriage, once a common law marriage is entered into it is binding for all purposes, and cannot be dissolved except by divorce. In all jurisdictions that recognize common law marriage, any subsequent relationship which would otherwise constitute a common law marriage does not give rise to a common law marriage of someone who is already in a common law marriage, because the law does not recognize that you can be married to more than one person at once (and indeed, criminalizes marrying more than one person at once). Many jurisdictions that do not themselves have common law marriage will recognize a common law marriage which was effective where it was entered into between the parties. Colorado and some other states and some programs in the federal government (including the Social Security Administration) also recognize the rights of someone who is a "putative spouse" which is someone who believes in good faith that they are married to their spouse and that their spouse was not married to anyone else at the time that they believed that they were married to their spouse. For example, someone who married in a state that requires a marriage license to do so, who thought that a marriage license was obtained when it wasn't, might be a putative spouse. Similarly, someone who obtained a marriage license or met the requirements of a common law marriage at a time that their supposed spouse was divorced when in fact a decree of divorce was never obtained, might be a putative spouse. One spouse can be a putative spouse, even if the other one knows that the marriage isn't valid. But, anyone who knew that their supposed spouse was already married at the time that they purportedly got married would not qualify as a putative spouse, because the person could not believe in good faith that they were married under a legal regime mandating monogamy. Note that I am using the term "common law marriage" in the somewhat narrow sense of a marriage not formally licensed by the government based upon the principles of the English common law as received by the jurisdiction in question. There are countries, in which, by statute or legal custom that does not derive from the English common law, marriages are recognized without being registered with the government. For example, a country might recognize Islamic law as effective for family law matters between Muslims, and might hold that a marriage not licensed by a government marriage license was still valid if the marriage was effected in a manner recognized by Islamic law. In that case, the first four unregistered marriages of a man made without a death or divorce of a spouse would be valid, and any further purported marriages would be invalid. But, a purported marriage of a married woman to another man would be void and probably punishable by some very severe Islamic law sanction.	Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms.
Is male circumcision without consent and without medical reason legal in France? A lot of circumcision are realized on children in France without medical reasons. Are those operations legal or illegal ?	Male circumcision is by default legal In France it requires the consent of both parents for children and the subject themselves if an adult. If performed for religious or cultural reasons the risks must be explained. If performed for medical reasons, all alternate therapies must be explained as well.	Any country is their own sovereign There is no international law that demands any state to allow anyone free speech of all kinds. Remember that your rights end where the rights of others [incl. society] begin. And in Germany, the right of the society is defined as being not subjected to the symbols of illegal organizations, especially ones that try to violate the liberal democratic basic order Also, Germany is not alone in banning the sentence or the accompanying gesture. They are also illegal to various degrees in Austria, Switzerland, Slovakia, The Czech Republic, and Sweden. It also can be illegal in the US, if disturbing the peace. The sentence is an identifier for a banned organization The sentence is certainly illegal if spoken to express certain things. However, it is legal to be used for example in art (films) and is commonly found in lecture material, as one example of how the nazi party identified. But how? People are often confused, but the rule is actually somewhat easy: If you display any symbol of a banned, unconstitutional organisation (under § 86a StGB) like any of the logos of the Nazi Party and spiritual successors (those with a red bar: banned!) or even the PKK, then you are acting in an illegal manner. And unless you have an exception to claim, the determination can be done entirely on a factual basis by looking at the circumstances. Indeed, the mens rea requirement is so minimal (because the law is written in a way that there is none needed!), that posting photos of a swastika tattoo can get you convicted for jailtime Exceptions However, I mentioned exceptions. Those are in § 86a StGB(3), pointing to $ 86(3)&(4) [eng]: (3) Die Absätze 1 und 2 gelten nicht, wenn die Handlung der staatsbürgerlichen Aufklärung, der Abwehr verfassungswidriger Bestrebungen, der Kunst oder der Wissenschaft, der Forschung oder der Lehre, der Berichterstattung über Vorgänge des Zeitgeschehens oder der Geschichte oder ähnlichen Zwecken dient. (4) Ist die Schuld gering, so kann das Gericht von einer Bestrafung nach dieser Vorschrift absehen. (3) Subsection (1) [and (2)] does not apply if the propaganda material or the act serves civic information, to prevent unconstitutional activities, to promote the arts or science, research or teaching, reporting about current or historical events, or similar purposes. (4) If the degree of guilt is minor, the court may dispense with imposing a penalty under this provision. That is why we have swastikas in German school books, as those tell about the horrors of nazi germany. That is why the logos can be found in research material and history books analyzing the use of the symbols in different countries. That's why the news outlet filming the demo where people yell Heil Hitler show that footage without precautions (unlike those that fly the banned symbol!) That is why you can have the film Inglorious Bastards with all its Swastikas and people yelling Heil Hitler, but its advertisement material was specifically altered to not show those. However, until August 2018, computer games were not accepted as arts. This is why the German versions of Wolfenstein that did get a german release before had been altered to remove Swastikas and voice lines. But the "Sozialadäquanzklausel" had been applied to computer games in August 2018, and the games got (after some other hoops) re-released in their international version on 22nd November 2019. How come some ideologies are banned?! Germany's equivalent of a constitution is the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). Its first 20 articles (not paragraphs or sections!) prescribe the rights of any person. The very first and most important one is, and the very first sentence of it makes clear what the very guiding principle of all other laws has to be (emphasis mine) before any of the other basic rights are enumerated. Art. 1: Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt. Art. 1: (1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. This is the most absolute right anyone can have. There is no provision in any way that would allow (or make it possible!) to strip or reduce the human dignity and every human being, living and dead, has it. Violations of human dignity have been used quite often to repeal laws, such as several incarceration methods or when cuts to the social security system would prevent someone to live a life that would be without dignity. Human Dignity is the measure that can be used to cut all other rights. In fact, it is explicitly the foundational principle of all german laws, that rights are not granted beyond where other rights start and that nobody has any rights when it comes to harming the constitutional order derived from the Grundgesetz (emphasis mine): Art. 2: (1) Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Rechte anderer verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetz verstößt. (1) Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law. Now, where comes freedom of speech? Only in Article 5, and it is absolutely not absolute but has defined limits (emphasis mine): Art 5:(1) Jeder hat das Recht, seine Meinung in Wort, Schrift und Bild frei zu äußern und zu verbreiten und sich aus allgemein zugänglichen Quellen ungehindert zu unterrichten. Die Pressefreiheit und die Freiheit der Berichterstattung durch Rundfunk und Film werden gewährleistet. Eine Zensur findet nicht start. (2) Diese Rechte finden ihre Schranken in den Vorschriften der allgemeinen Gesetze, den gesetzlichen Bestimmungen zum Schutze der Jugend und in dem Recht der persönlichen Ehre. (3) Kunst und Wissenschaft, Forschung und Lehre sind frei. Die Freiheit der Lehre entbindet nicht von der Treue zur Verfassung. Art 5: (1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. (2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honour. (3) Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution. Parties and organisations that can't abide by the other rules of law because of their ideology will get banned based on that. In the case of the nazi ideology, it's quite simple: The core idea of Rassenlehre and its believe in Untermenschen is so deeply dehumanizing that there can't ever be a way to get that in line with the very first (as well as 2nd and 3rd) Article of the Grundgesetz. Or to quote the words of Amon: Nazi ideology denies dignity to some humans, goes against the liberal-democratic order, and therefore cannot enjoy the usual protections. Rule of law is still maintained because restrictions to the freedom of expression are codified in law, and violators will get a fair trial. You see, you simply don't even have an absolute right to disseminate your ramblings, because the Basic law itself points to the general laws that ban the dissemination of certain materials. This is how § 86 StGB can ban any propaganda material for organizations and § 86a StGB subsequently bans their symbols, including gestures and slogans.	It is legal. What would be illegal is for a public school to promote or inhibit a religion. You can teach all sorts of facts that touch on religion (millennia of Western history) and you can e.g. survey the major religions of the worlds as a cultural phenomenon. You can use circumlocutions or proper names. It's not illegal to confess to having personal beliefs. This is about public schools, which is an arm of the government. A person who is in a school, for example a student, is not prohibited from promoting or demoting a religion, therefore a student who clearly and openly advocates the Pastafarian faith is not to be sanctioned, except insofar as the conduct is objectively disruptive. This is because the student is clearly not acting as an agent of a government institution. Things are a little murky when it comes to teachers and guest speakers. Teachers do not lose their First Amendment rights when they enter the classroom. Here is a summary of pertinent court rulings. The main principle that comes from such cases is that school districts can direct teachers to refrain from certain actions when there is a reasonable belief that the actions would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Individual teachers have been ordered to not engage in silent reading of prayers in school (Roberts v. Madigan). Case law on guest lecturers is probably close to zero, since guest lecturers don't have the same kind of property right to be at the school expressing themselves as teachers do.	That would be when he does so willfully and lewdly. Simple nudity is not illegal. See for instance in re Dallas W., where the court found that sexual intent is necessary: "'something more than mere nudity' must be shown", citing In re Smith (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 36. A propos this incident, the reported partial erection is not irrelevant.	There are several misunderstandings here. First of all, the US exclusionary rule applies only to evidence gained by the police, or by people acting as agents of the government, and not always to them. Secondly it applies only in criminal cases. The question does not say which state this would be in, and these are largely matters of state law, so it makes a difference. But I don't know of any state where taking a video without explicit consent, in a place where the person has a right to be, is a crime. In some states it would not even be a tort. If a video is taken without the subject's consent, that may be an invasion of privacy, and the subject might be able to sue (not "file charges). In such a case the video itself would absolutely be put in evidence, and if it recorded verbal permission to take the video, the case would be promptly dismissed, quite possibly with sanctions for a frivolous lawsuit. Even if the video were taken by a police officer, and was presented as evidence in a criminal case, the office could testify to the verbal permission. That would be enough for the judge to view the video as part of a suppression hearing (which is not before a jury). If the judge saw and heard verbal permission to take the video, that would be an end to the motion to suppress, unless it was claimed that the permission was somehow coerced or faked, and evidence supported such a claim.	No. In most civil-law countries, including France, a testament must follow very specific forms. It must be either handwritten (holographic will) or confirmed by a notary (authentic will, mystic will). Both possibilities preclude wills as video.	Copyright The photographer, not the subject(s) own the copyright in the picture. So, unless this was a selfie, you have no rights in the picture. Privacy If the photo was taken in circumstances where a reasonable person would expect privacy, then revealing it to others might be a tort of privacy breach. In most common law jurisdictions this area of the law is undeveloped. However, if the photo was taken from a public place (even if you were in a private place), or with your permission, this doesn’t apply. Intimate images In some jurisdictions, the distribution of intimate images without the permission of the subject is a crime. Intimate does not include a photo that is merely embarrassing. Bullying This is probably bullying behaviour but bullying per se is generally not illegal. It might be illegal if the bullying is motivated by a protected characteristic (race, age, gender, sexuality etc.) but that usually requires a context - employment, public accommodation etc. it might also be illegal hate speech even outside such an institutional framework. Similarly, within an institutional context like a workplace or school there might be policies around bullying; these might have the force of law but are probably quasi-contractural matters. However, a private person doing it because they don’t like you and want to humiliate or embarrass you is probably not doing anything illegal.	The law does not say. It is up to the judgment of the judge to determine what constitutes "Le fait de provoquer directement à des actes de terrorisme ou de faire publiquement l'apologie de ces actes". I would not have predicted that the act constituted "faire publiquement l'apologie", but if that expression can reasonably construed as meaning "indicating approval of", then I understand the conclusion. The law does not mention SSIDs, that simply falls under the penumbra of "publicly approving of terrorism", and there isn't a specific list of forbidden acts. Analogously, Holocaust denial is against the law in France, and there is not a specific list of things that you can't say, there is a general rule from which specifics can be inferred. Publicly saying "Free Kurdistan!" could be construed as supporting PKK and thus approving of terrorism, but that would be quite a stretch. Using the SSID Pkk21, on the other hand, could be a problem.
Copyright of derived works without permission Say Alice produces a copyrighted work. Bob then creates a remix of Alice's work without license or permission to do so, thus violating Alice's copyright. Does Bob still hold the copyright over the modification? If Alice now copies and redistributes Bob's remix without license or permission, is she violating Bob's copyright?	This topic came up as a sub-point to another question a few weeks ago, I ended up doing a fair bit of research with not much in terms of concrete results. I'll start with the USA since they're basically the only major copyright jurisdiction for which I could find a straightforward answer, then discuss internationally. USA In the USA, Bob would generally not hold copyright in modifications thus there is no copyright for Alice to violate, assuming no copyright exceptions like fair use apply. This is due to 17 U.S.C 103(a) (see also Anderson v. Stallone): The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully. While I couldn't find any commentary on this point, the wording does seem to imply that portions of a derivative with additions far enough removed from the original work might qualify for copyright protection. International copyright law The main provisions governing derivative works in international copyright law come from Berne Convention Article 2(3): Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. and Article 12 (with a similar provision specifically for translation in Article 8): Authors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing adaptations, arrangements and other alterations of their works. There's the argument that since unauthorized derivatives aren't explicitly excluded from protection that they should be protected, however, there's also the argument that granting unauthorized derivatives their own copyright is in itself prejudicial to the original copyright holder. Note I don't think it's debated that non-infringing derivatives gain their own copyright, including unauthorized derivatives that nevertheless fall into a copyright exception such as fair use. Dr. Daniel Gervais points out in The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes Better than Hedgehogs section III.B that there's a bit of history here. The original Berne Convention 1886 text stated that "Lawful translations shall be protected as original works." However, the word "lawful" was struck out in the 1908 Berlin Convention coming up with wording similar to today's Article 2(3). Gervais's article cites Étude sur la Convention de Berlin de 1908 pour la Protection des Œuvres Littéraires et artistiques by André Petit implying disagreement between the countries about whether or not to protect unlawful derivatives, thus leaving it unsaid. Unfortunately, I'm unable to locate any copies of this source. Additionally, thanks to a fortunate snippet Google Books displayed, I know that La conférence de Berlin (14 octobre-13 novembre 1908) by Georges-François-Joseph Martin also discusses this exact point on page 187, quoting someone who thought unlawful derivatives would be protected now, though I couldn't get enough context to really determine anything. While I could find available copies of this book, for now it's a little on the expensive side for me. Overview of various jurisdictions In the EU, the derivative right is not harmonized and so the question is punted to the Member States. There is no implementation of either Berne Convention Article 2(3) or Article 12 in the Information Society (Copyright) Directive, Article 12 being specifically acknowledged by the Court of Justice in the Allposters case. In the UK, infringing derivatives are probably protected, see Redwood Music Ltd. v. Chappell & Co. Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 109 (Q.B. Div.) at 120. I can't find the judgement text outside a paywall, but an article by William J. Braithwaite (PDF) quotes the relevant part on page 209 (the square brackets are his): [T]he idea that [the owner of the underlying copyright] should be entitled to reap the benefit of another's original work, by exploiting it, however extensive such work might be, however innocently it might have been made, offends against justice and common sense. Additionally, the justice noted the argument that unlawful derivatives are not explicitly excluded from copyright protection and that parliament has declined to make this explicit. If I understand the English court system correctly, this decision was two appeals away from the Supreme Court (House of Lords back then), but there doesn't appear to have been any appeal. For what it's worth though, the justice who issued the decision ultimately became Senior Law Lord. In Italy, the Supreme Court has determined that derivative works can be simultaneously infringing and protected.	This can't be right. If I modify open source code as part of the work done, by nature of the open source license that code can not become intellectual property of the client. Certainly it can. That which is "developed or produced" would be the modifications to the pre-existing code, i.e the copyright on the derivative work so created. If the base code was under a share-alike or copy-left license, then the client can only distribute it under the same license (or a compatible one, perhaps). But nothing compels the client to distribute it, and for the client's use, the client owns the copyright, without fear of any future claims by the contractor. If I have my own code/scripts/settings/templates/etc that I use as a contractor, and I modify those in the interest of coding efficiency in the interest of serving the client, it hardly seems correct that these assets become property of the Client. Those are your work, and you can choose whether to sell the copyrights to the client or not. Again, only the work done for that client would be covered under the wording quoted above, unless there is another provision that grants the client a license to use the pre-existing work which you modified for the job, which there probably ought to be. Or I suppose the agreement could assign copyrights in pre-existing work to the client, but that seems an odd choice, and the language in the question would not do that. You and the client could agree on a different provision such as: The contractor grants to the client a fully-paid, non-exclusive permanent license to use all intellectual property developed under this agreement, and any pre-existing works that may be incorporated therein. The contractor warrants that s/he is entitled to grant such license, without infringing on the intellectual property of any other person or entity. That wording would have the contractor retain all copyrights and other IP, but provide a license to the client to use it without further payment or expiration. Many other ways to structure such a provision are possible, dividing the rights up however the contractor and client can agree. The price for the work might vary depending on what rights the client obtains. Both forms, and many others, are perfectly legal, it is just a question of what the contractor chooses to sell, and what th4e client chooses to buy.	In the US, the original author still owns the copyright, unless the original work was out of copyright (in which case no one owns the copyright): copyright is not granted for just pressing a "scan" button, and mechanical reproductions are not eligible for copyright (copyright protects creativity, and a scan involves zero creativity). To quote 313.4(A) ("Mere Copies") of the Compendium of US Copyright Office Practices, Third Edition: A work that is a mere copy of another work of authorship is not copyrightable. The Office cannot register a work that has been merely copied from another work of authorship without any additional authorship. [...] Examples: [...] Photocopying, scanning, or digitizing a literary work. That doesn't necessarily mean the repository can't put any restriction on your use of the copy; the repository may have a terms of service. Terms of service are rooted in contract law, not copyright; just because the work is in the public domain, doesn't force the repository to show it to anyone who asks, and they can force you to agree to a contract first. The enforceability of that contract is fact-dependent.	This sounds completely incorrect to me. First, subsequent research is not normally a "derivative work" for the purpose of copyright, since copyright doesn't protect your ideas but only the particular form in which you have expressed those ideas. Second, as the owner of the copyright, you can permit anyone to make any sort of copy or derivative work, or sell, assign, or license the ability to do so to other parties, without regard to whether the work has been published. The real reason that nonpublication of your work would stifle further research is that researchers will not have access to it.	The fact that a developer is showing off work that he/she has done for other another company doesn't imply that that developer owns any copyright to the work. In Canada, see the Copyright Act, § 13 (3): Where the author of a work was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service or apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person, the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright and § 13 (4): The owner of the copyright in any work may assign the right... In the US, see 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b): In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. and § 201 (d): The ownership of a copyright may be transferred... "What rights should and should not be attributed to the developer?" That is a business decision to be made on a case-by-case basis. Advice about the prudent balance of copyright between an employer/client and employee/contractor is legal advice. "Is it okay to use this projects as part of the developer's portfolio?" If the developer can link to public use of a product that he/she developed for a company, then the developer is not violating copyright by simply advertising that they worked on the product and linking to, without reproducing, the work. If the developer for whatever reason maintained copyright ownership in the code and other assets, it would not be copyright infringement to reproduce those as part of the portfolio. If the developer did not maintain copyright ownership in the code or assets, reproducing those may be copyright infringement, dependent on whether the copyright owner allowed the developer to reproduce those elements, or if the reproduction is fair use. There may be other laws or contracts implicated, though: non-disclosure agreements, trademark law, among others.	You can't, in general, know whether a distributor of a work has permission to distribute, or is a pirate site. I verified that they have posted an illegal copy of a work that I created, and I know that I did not grant permission to them (or anyone) to infringe my copyright. Both hosting and downloading works without permission is a violation of copyright law, so both parties are liable. Downloaders may erroneously rely on the "I didn't know!" defense, which in the US carries no legal weight. Even so, if you download my book, it will probably cost me vastly more to sue you for infringement than the damages that I might be awarded over your infringement. Usually, copyright holders go after the pirate sites, and only rarely go after particularly egregious serial downloaders.	Yes, a work with no license is All Rights Reserved, reserved meaning the creator of the work. Who is the creator of the work ? Everyone who contributed it, unanimously. Yes. If people contributed any copyrightable part of your work, in theory you cannot add any license or grant any right to use/reproduce/whatever the work without their unanimous agreement. That's very cumbersome, and almost nobody really does that, but it's what the law is. Big serious companies and repos require contributors to waive their rights on the code they contribute, by agreeing to a contributor's agreement. For example, python/cpython requires you to give your contribs a license allowing the python org to do essentially what they want with it, even though you retain copyright over them. If your project is not so serious, I suggest it should be enough to make the license clear, and that by contributing people are agreeing to place their contribution's code under the license. If it's a free license, that's all you need.	Broadly speaking, the difference is the "sharealike" clause of CC-BY-SA. Any derivative of a CC-BY-SA work must itself be licensed CC-BY-SA, whereas a derivative of an "MIT with attribution" work can be under any license the author wants. There are a number of other differences in the fine print (eg. CC forbids DRM, where MIT doesn't), but that's the big one.
Secretly recorded audio to meeting with landlord and now starting a dispute against him. Can I submit it as evidence? My ex-landlord preferred to communicate by in person meetings. I began covertly recording our meetings with the microphone on my phone. Only the audio was recorded, not the video. My ex-landlord was unaware he was being recorded. I am applying to the residential tenancy branch (RTB) with multiple concerns to get money from my ex-landlord. Can I submit the audio recording as evidence? I asked the RTB directly and they said they accept any type of evidence, however to check with the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner. I contacted them but was given such a bureaucratic answer I couldn't make sense of it (I think it amounted to "we don't give legal advice"). Can I get in trouble for submitting an audio recording of meetings I had with my landlord even if he wasn't aware he was being recorded? On a couple instances other tenants momentarily joined in the meeting but walked away before it was done. Does this make a difference?	Yes, you can use it as evidence Canada clearly requires what is called a one-party consent for recordings. Section 184(1) of the criminal code makes it a crime to "knowingly intercept a private communication." However, Section 184(2)(a), the "Saving Provision," says the prohibition "does not apply to": (a) a person who has the consent to intercept...of the originator of the private communication or of the person intended by the originator thereof to receive it." Because you: a) either originated the conversation or were the person your landlord intended to talk to; and b) gave your consent by making the recording; therefore, c) you are covered by this clause. For more details, you can read nice summaries by lawyers here and here.	What the landlord is doing is forcing you to abide by the terms of your lease agreement. You most likely agreed to a 1 year lease on a signed document, which means you're pretty much screwed because if he wanted to, he could force you to fulfill the lease and pay him anyway. However, his remarks about when you can notify to terminate are wrong. See end of answer. About Terminating Your Lease Early However, there are a few loopholes you can exploit. The easiest one is to get him to increase your rent. Ask about it, tell him that you're considering staying but tell him you want to know if he's going to increase the rent by much. If he declares that he is going to increase the rent, perfect. Get him to send it to you in writing (which he is legally required to do). Just in case though, have him on speaker phone and record every conversation you have from now on without telling him. This is legal (see this answer) and is a powerful form of evidence, so exploit the hell out of it. If you can get him to tell you that he's going to increase your rent, then you can legally submit a notice to terminate tenancy on the grounds that you do not wish to pay the increase. In this case, the amount of notice that you have to give is capped to the day that the rent increase is to take place. If you try this, do everything you can to get it in writing. Don't feel proud of snaring him and immediately announce that you're leaving because of this as soon as he says it on the phone, because you're screwing yourself out of going through the proper channels to make sure you not only win, but you've made your case air tight. Also, feel free to let you landlord know that he owes you money. Landlords in Ontario have to repay you a capped interest rate on your last months' deposit every 12 months. This rate is decided annually and for 2015 is capped at 1.6%. If your landlord wants to be anal about the rules and stick the letter of the law to you, do it back. Becoming a pain your landlords ass is a great way to get them to either become more flexible, or make a mistake that will give you an out. Notice that if he does increase the rent, he can demand that you increase your last months deposit and force you to pay it. You could "accidently" make him aware of this right in a conversation where you are concerned about a rent increase immediately after letting him know that he owes you money for the interest. "I'm concerned about the rent increase because I have to increase my deposit by law too." This way, he'll hopefully have the thought "I can avoid having to give him any money by increasing his rent by the same interest rate, so he'll owe me what I owe him, therefore I owe nothing. I'm so smart!" Then he cheerfully gives you a notice to increase rent, at which time you invoke your right to terminate tenancy on short notice due to an increase in rent. Your Landlord Is Wrong All that aside, your landlord committed an illegal act when they refused your notice to terminate, because he's denying you your rights under the RTA. From the Residential Tenancies Act: A tenant may terminate a tenancy at the end of a period of the tenancy or at the end of the term of a tenancy for a fixed term by giving notice of termination to the landlord in accordance with section 44. 2006, c. 17, s. 47 The details adjust a little bit depending on your circumstances, but the conditions in section 44 are basically to ensure the following: You are giving 60 days notice. You are not giving 60 days notice where the termination date you provide is less than the previously agreed term, except in special cases like the one I mention about increased rent. There is nothing in section 44 that can be confused to mean that you must wait until you have passed the end of your term before you can decide to leave. I suspect your landlord is deliberately interpreting the use of wording like "may terminate at the end of" to imply you have to wait to give your notice. A notice of termination is not a termination. It is a notice that in the future, you are going to terminate. Let's remove the confusion by replacing the word "terminate" with "vacating the premises and not paying another cent". That should remove any ambiguity that could be abused. So frankly you can simply go straight to the board, file the appropriate form with them and just pack up and leave when you've reached the date specified in the notice to terminate. Your final month is covered by your deposit. File the form immediately, let them know about the conversation you had with your landlord, then go to your bank and cancel the cheques you've already written (except for your deposit cheque) and simply ignore the landlord, carrying on with your moving plans. You should ask the Board if this illegal act has any ramifications. Perhaps because he has done this, this gives you an immediate out or something else. Call the Board and tell them what happened and ask them. They have an obligation to inform you correctly. Sources: Landlord Tenant Board of Ontario FAQ Final Note The Board is there to serve you, free of charge. They have a duty, as it is their explicit directive, to assist you in all matters regarding being a tenant. Phone them, talk to them at length, demand assistance. They are to inform you of your rights and guide you on the appropriate action, forms and procedure to assist you in resolving any issues you have. Note that I wrote the whole bit about getting out of your lease early legally before I refreshed my memory on the fact that you can/should give your 60 days notice before the end of your lease period. That makes the case much simpler as a I note in my answer. I left the information I already wrote however because it could be applicable or at least be of some help to others. Also note that if you're saying that the landlord came to get more cheques on the basis of his lie that he used to refuse your attempt to legally leave, then you'll need to cancel those cheques. That costs money. That alone is enough of a case to take him before the Tribunal and force him to repay the cost of those cancelled cheques. You may even successfully claim further damages or the Tribunal may voluntarily award you money for the actions your landlord is deliberately taking to deprive you of your rights. Talk to the Board.	While I don't like agreeing with a landlord, you are in the right here. Your tenants do not have the right to access the property now they have moved out. If they were still living there things would be different and it would be reasonable for them to fix minor damage (to preserve their deposit). They did not do so. Get the damage fixed professionally, keep all reciepts, and take it out of the deposit.	Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity.	You would need to know the landlord's reasons for refusal in order to determine their reasonableness or otherwise. If there is a dispute about this (i.e. They think they are reasonable and you don't) you can seek a court order requiring the landlord to accept the sublease or alternatively, that since the landlord has breached the contract, you are entitled to terminate it. Hire a lawyer before you do this.	The recording is not illegal because you've been told it would happen, and by not hanging up, you've agreed to have a conversation that can be recorded. This was determined in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. applying the exception of Penal Code 632 that communications are not considered confidential if there is a reasonable expectation that the call will be overheard or recorded - being explicitly told that the call will be recorded makes this true. It would not be illegal for them to only record their own statements during the call, nor for you to record only your statements, either. In particular, the company is allowed to record the part of the call where they make this statement, as they are not recording a conversation, only their own (likely pre-recorded) statement (again?). Indeed, including their statement about the recording in the recording is common practise partly for protection against claims that the other party was not informed of the recording occurring.	In general, the express terms of the lease signed supersede all prior negotiations of the parties, except to the extent that the particular language in question in the lease is ambiguous. This is called the parol evidence rule (which is the law in all U.S. jurisdictions although it has been expressly rejected in Israel). The parol evidence rule expressly makes a written agreement supersede a verbal agreement, rather than making them equally valid. Also, even if both agreements had been written, generally speaking, the last and final version of the agreement will supersede earlier versions of the agreement. The best defense would be along the lines of fraud-in-factum or fraudulent inducement, i.e. that this term was slipped into the final draft in a manner expressly intended to mislead the signing party about what was being signed. I've won one case where this happened (where there was extensive email correspondence between business lawyers regarding the changes that would be made in each draft and there the version signed did not correspond to the last version signed electronically in a very long document on paper and there were other indicia of fraud), but by far the more common outcome is to bind the party signing the document (especially in a commercial context) and to consider failing to carefully read all terms of the final draft to be negligent on the part of the party signing the contract. Arguably, there might also be a malpractice claim against the lawyer for the tenant for missing this change in a material term before the contract was signed.	the landlord has been living there for a week. Is this allowed? Am I still expected to pay rent if he is living there? Generally speaking, no. But you need to verify that your lease contains no language that overrides certain basic assumption about leases. My understanding is that (1) you delivered the property, and (2) the landlord was not entitled to live there during your tenancy. Usually one basic assumption in a lease is that only the tenants and their beneficiaries/guests ("tenants", for brevity) are entitled to use the property. It appears that the landlord is neither. Your delivery of the property enabled the landlord to reassign the tenant's exclusive right whenever the landlord deems it fit. The scenario of you finding someone to replace you in the lease is merely one alternative from which the landlord can make the informed decision to reassign that right. The event of reassignment automatically releases you from subsequent payments related to your early move-out. Accordingly, the landlord's informed and willful reassignment (in this case, to himself) of the aforementioned exclusive right forfeits his entitlement to subsequent payments from you. This renders the [rest of the] lease voidable by you. In this regard, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 151 and 153(a). There is also an issue of fraud and quantum meruit (see also unjust enrichment) insofar as the landlord benefited at your expense (in the form of your father's work on behalf of you) without informing you that reassignment had taken place already. The landlord knowingly and intentionally deprived you of the opportunity to decide whether to keep taking care of property about which you no longer had any obligation. I presume you already are mindful of this but I should still mention it: Make sure you can prove the landlord was actually using the property rather than inspecting/enhancing/managing it.
How complex can a will or testament be? How many resources will be expended to execute it? Is this process self-funding? Say, if it prescribes that assets should be disseminated only upon a condition, possibly many years in the future, can I be sure it will happen exactly as described? For example, can I award my legacy to someone who solves a certain equation (where the verification of this might be complex, and costly in time and money)?	A Last Will and Testament can be very complex. The longest and most complex one that I have drafted runs to about eighty pages. I've seen some in probate proceedings that run to about 120 pages, with additional exhibits of numerous pages containing legal descriptions for real property and serial numbers and account numbers for other assests. How many resources will be expended to execute it? Is this process self-funding? The fiduciaries appointed to carry out with implementing a Last Will and Testament in a probate proceeding spend whatever they need to spend to carry it out, to the extent that funds are available in the estate. The assets of the estate pay for these costs of estate administration. Say, if it prescribes that assets should be disseminated only upon a condition, possibly many years in the future, can I be sure it will happen exactly as described? You can't. You're dead. You nominate fiduciaries such as executives, personal representatives, administrators, guardians, conservators, trustees, custodians, and trust protectors to carry it out. They have fiduciary duties to faithfully carry out your instructions which interested persons, such as creditors and beneficiaries of the estate and trust protectors, can sue to enforce. In the case of charitable trusts, there is also a government official (in the United States, usually the state attorney general of the state in which the estate is administered) that has standing to enforce will and trust provisions for the benefit of a charity. There are certain legal doctrines that exist to discourage you from exercising "dead hand" control for too long. One of this is a very complicated rule known as the "Rule Against Perpetuities" which differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Another (in the U.S.) is a tax known as the Generation Skipping Transfer Tax. There are also legal doctrines that allow interested persons to apply to a court to modify or reform the terms of a probated will or trust, doctrines such as the cy pres doctrine to deal with cases where transfers to entities or persons that no longer exist are present, doctrines that invalidate certain dead hand directions (e.g. related to race or to marriage) as a matter of public policy, statutes that invalidate certain kinds of real estate ownership with remote possibilities of reversion to a remote relative (e.g. fee tail), and doctrines that allow will and trust provisions to be reformed because it is impracticable to carry the out the terms even if it isn't strictly speaking impossible to do so. For example, can I award my legacy to someone who solves a certain equation (where the verification of this might be complex, and costly in time and money)? Subject to the doctrines set forth above, yes, this is possible. The typical way to do this would be to establish a foundation to oversee this part of the legacy and to name someone such as the current holder of an endowed professorship, or the chair of a university department or scientific institute, as an arbitrator of the question of whether the condition was met (typically with instructions to pay for that service as an administrative cost or instructions that it be self-funded by the recipient of an endowment gift to an institution as a condition of receiving an endowment gift). If an arbitrator was not appointed, a court would typically appoint an expert known as a "special master" to investigate the question (as the expense of the parties seeking to be paid and the estate) to determine if the condition was met in the event that this was disputed, or to ratify that the condition was met, in the event that this was not disputed. The "special master" would then investigate the matter and issue a report after receiving input from all parties and any independent investigation that was authorized by the order appointing the special master, and the report to the court would recommend a resolution. The parties could tell the court whether they disputed the special master's finding, and if so why, and the court would almost always adopt the special master's recommendation on the basis of that report. I have seen this process used in cases involving complex tax questions in probate court. Another common way to do this would be to establish a donor advised fund in a "community foundation" which is a foundation shared by many donors with a common administrative staff and investment pool that administers foundation-like funds from particular donors according to the substantive terms of the fund. There are examples of things similar to this (such as the Nobel Prize) being done. When I was in law school, there was a popular urban legend, I don't know if it was true or not, but it could have been true, that the dining hall in the law school (at the University of Michigan where I took my meals for my first year in law school) was endowed on the condition that steak be served every Friday. True or not, the steak was always there on Fridays.	As of present moment, under no circumstances. That said, the law may and probably will change around that. But the time has not come just yet. Trying to predict what the law will be is out of scope of this site.	IMHO, your questions reflect several misunderstandings of how the process works. So, with your permission, I will avoid directly answering your questions and instead focus on suggestions how to best help you plot a path forward. Your counterparty has the burden of proof. If your counterparty forged your signature on a contract, then they must prove you signed it or they can not enforce it. In order to enforce the contract, they will need to sue you civilly. Then you can introduce evidence of their forgery at that time. Inform your counterparty you did not sign the contract. Then act accordingly. If your counterparty forged your signature on an extension contract then you should inform them immediately after it has come to your attention. Advise them you have no intention of complying with a contract you never signed. And that if they try to enforce the forged agreement, you will defend yourself "vigorously." Never threaten criminal charges to advance your position in a civil case. This behavior is a crime in itself. It's called extortion. If you want to pursue criminal charges at some point then do it without relating it to the civil case. The police are not your only means of pursuing criminal charges. You can also schedule a meeting with your District Attorney, State's Attorney (whatever that position is called in your state) or your state's Attorney General. In other words, you might want to approach the government's attorney responsible for prosecuting crimes in your jurisdiction. Forget about involving the police. They have given you their position on the matter. Approach the DA or AG office instead. If the DA/AG decides to use the police, she we will make that decision then inform the police how she needs to use their services. Police are wary of being used as leverage in civil disputes. That's probably the reason for their policy decision regardless of whether it's technically justified by the law or not. Your counterparty can't "fix" anything. If they claim you signed a document you did not, they will have to produce that document with your signature on it. This will presumably be your Exhibit A evidence they forged it. Disclaimer: I am a lay person and not an attorney. This writing is no substitute for proper legal advice. If you need help with a specific legal situation please hire an attorney and do not rely on anything I have written here.	Often one chooses your accountant, your financial advisor, or your lawyer. Another option is to appoint the trust department of a bank. I personally, as a lawyer, have a policy of not consenting to do that except in rare cases like the one in this question, of a client who just doesn't have anyone and has an estate sufficiently small that a bank trust department would not be cost effective or well suited to handling some aspect of the executorship. But, I have done it a few times in those cases. Most lawyers I know of take a similar position. If no executor is designated, your estate will usually be administered either by a large unpaid creditor, or by the public administrator (whose job is primarily to administer estates in cases where there are no next of kin, no executor has been designated, and there are no unpaid creditors who have stepped up to do the job).	A deed executed during life trumps a will. The other siblings would have to argue: Your mom did not have the capacity to execute the deed (which is a very low standard in terms of her capacity). The deed was procured from undue influence from you (which requires them to meet a high bar of proof). The deed was really the implementation of an agreement for you to hold the property in trust for everyone (which requires some affirmative evidence of this intent).	First, agree w/Dale M re: it would be an egregious and likely career-ending move for an attorney to fake his representation. That said, there is likely no reason why you would be unable to request such proof of representation. Your job consists of protecting the assets of the trust, carrying out any other duties outlined in the trust document, being honest and in communication with the trust's beneficiary, managing the assets, and ending the trust as determined by the trust document. Several of those points (particularly the "protecting the assets" part) argue heavily in favor of your confirming the veracity of any claims involving the trust and/or the identity or true intent of those seeking any information, etc., with respect to the trust. Also, demand letters are letters stating a legal claim and usually asks for restitution or performance of an obligation. It's not entirely clear what constitutes a "demand letter requesting information" unless you have a legal duty to provide that information (and this would - or should - be stated in the demand letter itself). Finally, should you be unable to obtain the confirmation you're seeking, you should consider consulting a trust administration attorney. In most cases, you may use trust assets to pay for expert help (including tax preparers and accountants).	Do the exchanges need to check with each government to make sure the information is valid? Or is submitting documents enough? They need to understand the (usually very complicated) laws governing financial services and data protection in every jurisdiction where they operate. The specific requirements will vary from one jurisdiction to the next. The usual way of acquiring this understanding is to hire a lawyer (or several).	If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected.
How to create a long-lived organization that executes a certain program? I'd like to start an organization that, similar to the website Patreon, enables people to set financial rewards on mathematical proofs of their choice and holds their money in escrow. Since some proofs take decades to be written (and some might be impossible to write), this would have to be a pretty long-lived organization, protected against the failings of individual humans (theft, death). If this were about a single person awarding price money for a single proof, a will might do. But this organization should enable many people to contribute money and objectives. Ignoring issues like inflation and the complex and possibly costly process of proof verification for now, what kind of organizational form would be best suited for this undertaking? A Charitable trust? A Nonprofit organization?	You can do it using a US non-profit, but you need a lawyer We know it can be done in the US using a non-profit because it has been done. For example, the Clay Institute’s Millennium Prize does exactly what you propose: it pays people who solve unsolved math problems. Similarly, the the Everglades Foundation used a prize to get people to come up with new ways to get phosphates out of the water sources. To do what they did, you need to follow their lead, and set up and run a non-profit (aka, 501(c)(3), named after the relevant provision of the tax code). Because non-profits are tax exempt under US tax law, you have to apply to the IRS to become a non-profit. Speaking broadly, the IRS imposes two requirements on non-profits: 1) It must serve a charitable purpose; 2) It must spend a certain percentage of its money every year doing charitable work. To set up a foundation you have to specify the charitable purpose you will serve (“encourage research in mathematics”), and have a plan to do so (“we will award a cash prize to people who solve important unsolved problems”). If the IRS decides your plan is genuine, then they give you a pass on paying taxes. To make sure you are carrying out your charitable plan, the IRS requires you to spend a certain percentage of your money each year on charitable work. (This is called the "distribution requirement.") Meeting the distribution requirement may be a problem, since you may not award prizes every year. You may be able to get a general idea about how the IRS deals with such situations by searching on line. At some point, however, you will probably need to talk to a lawyer with experience setting up non-profits. (FWIW, it looks to me as if the Clay Institute meets its yearly spending requirement by supporting lots of other activities that count towards the spending requirement.) One other problem that it seems you won’t have involves giving prizes directly to individuals. For obvious reasons, the IRS is generally suspicious of prizes given to individuals, so they impose restrictions. For example, for the winner to avoid taxes, the prizes have to be for previous work. Where to go for more information: USA.gov has a nice overview of the application process here. The IRS has several publications and websites that you might find helpful: here, here, here, and here. These cover everything from the general rules to nuts-and-bolts details about which forms to use. You can read more about the IRS treatment of prizes here and here. Depending on how comfortable you are with financial statements, you may learn about how these non-profits work by reading their 990 forms. The Clay Institute's forms are here.	Usually, the only reason to set up an "ownerless" corporation is to set up a non-profit. Non-profit corporations can have self-perpetuating boards and are very similar to charitable trusts. If it ends up without any board members and has a self-perpetuating board, any person affected by the corporation or a suitable government representative (in the U.S., usually a state attorney general in the place of incorporation) can apply to a court to have new board members appointed. In a "for profit" context, this generally doesn't happen because the people investing in the company want to be able to profit from it and/or obtain a return of their investment. So, the question is largely hypothetical in that case.	In general the primary purpose of creating a single-owner business entity is to shield the owner from liability. For example, if it turns out that (unbeknownst to you) your necklaces were manufactured with toxic metals then "you" as a seller could face ruinous liability. If "you" is a company, then you as a person might lose whatever value is left in the company, but at least you wouldn't lose your personal assets. There are many other potential reasons to conduct business through a business entity, and many types of business entities constructed and recognized for those purposes; but they are highly dependent on the jurisdiction, entity type, and particulars of the business.	If you own the copyright (because you wrote the book), you can do whatever you want with it. If someone else has the copyright, you have to get their permission to do what you propose. That could be the author, the author's estate, or some other party. It then depends on what the interest of the rights-holder is: they could say "No way!", "Sure, for a payment of $100,000", "At $1 per copy, here is how you must keep track of copies", "Okay, as long as you include this notice that prevents further re-distribution" or "Huh, I never thought of that. Sure, I grant you complete license to do whatever you want". A publisher is relevant only when the publisher requires a transfer of copyright to the publishing company, or if the rights-holder has granted them a certain type of license (e.g. an exclusive license). If the author has granted someone else an exclusive perpetual right to distribute, then they cannot also grant you a license to distribute for free. That is really the author's problem, though, since the publisher doesn't hold the copyright so can't sue you, instead the publisher would sue the author for breach of contract.	Good news: it behaves like a legal entity. An estate is a collection of assets and liabilities that belonged to the deceased. The collection behaves a great deal like an LLC or other legal entity, although states don't call it that. The collection is isolated from anyone else's collection of assets and liabilities. For instance, it's not part of the executor's personal assets, nor liabilities. That's very important because... If the collection is sued e.g. by a creditor, the suit can only make claims against assets in the "collection". That is to say, the executor's own assets are not at risk. That's very important if you're thinking about volunteering to become an executor or manager of a trust. You can do so without fear of personal liability. Asterisk here , but don't panic, it's a harmless asterisk. The collection can buy and sell goods and services (more the latter generally). A typical service purchased by an estate is storage unit rental. The collection can hire, fire and generally do business. Consider an estate which owns an apartment building. Life goes on: rent must be collected, utilities paid, leaky toilets fixed, contractors and managers hired and fired. In this case, the estate is a going-concern business behaving a lot like an LLC. The collection/estate could potentially do business indefinitely, if the will of the heirs is to continue doing so. This might happen if splitting the assets equitably amongst the heirs wasn't possible (e.g. the estate of Leonard Cohen collects a lot of royalties)... or too complex to easily back out of (say: the deceased owned 5 McDonalds franchises and had bet the farm on opening two more; backing out now would bankrupt the estate, so the estate might oddly open two McDonalds.) The collection can also sue, and proceeds from the suit or settlement go into the collection. Asterisk again. The collection has its own Taxpayer Identification Number (aka SSN or EIN). The collection files its own 1040 tax form, and may do so for years or even decades. The point of all these practical examples is that an estate looks, walks and quacks like a "legal entity". To the point where the IRS even calls it one. And to a boots-on-ground executor, manager or trustee, the reality is it handles like a legal entity, and the experience you have managing legal entities will largely apply, almost in full. Almost. * Now, that asterisk. Due to state court rules in many states, if you attempt to sue an estate, you have to use the right name. And that's what this question is all about. It's a naming convention, and that is all. And courts treat it as such. Take Roe v. Wade. "Roe" is an adaption of "Doe" as in "John Doe". Wade, however, was the district attorney of Dallas County at the time of filing. Wade wasn't being sued personally. It's just the quirky naming convention the court uses. What you have identified is a similar quirk in court rules, where instead of suing Estate of John Q. Example, the syntactically correct thing is to sue Jane Doe, in the capacity of, Executor of John Q Example's estate. And the italic parts are optional, because the court knows that. Why is this important? It's not important, and that's what the Florida Court of Appeals said in florida Spradley v Spradley 213 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017. The plaintiff had made exactly the above error: suing "the estate of" instead of suing "Derreck Spradley et.al. (implied: in their capacity as executor)". The judge threw out the case, saying in essence "You forgot to "dot an i". The appeals court said no, the distinction is trivial and the court should have simply let the brother "dot their i" and continue with an entirely valid case. In other words, it was a distinction without a difference. So if sued, the executor should not panic about being "named personally" in the suit - you're not personally liable. And it is a waste of time to pick nits over how the name of the defendant is spelled, so says the Florida court at least... and in my humble opinion that precedent would be well received in other state courts, as it avoids wasting docket time and citizen filing fees on an action that will simply be re-filed correctly the next day. Not a license to cheat, however. One way an executor can manage to create personal liability is to abuse or mishandle the role with extreme negligence. In that case, yes, the executor's personal assets could come under fire, basically as punishment for misdeeds. An executor who is careful, honest and gets help when needed won't have any trouble at all.	If the author died in 1946 then copyright in his works expired at the end of 2016. The work is in the public domain. The relevant section of the Copyright Designs & Patents Act 1988 extends to the whole of the United Kingdom, but not Crown Dependencies or colonies. You need to be sure that the work is the author's own work. If someone else has contributed then the copyright endures until it expires 70 years after the death of the last of the authors. The same applies to art. If you want to reproduce artwork, say for a cover/sleeve design, that would also have the artist's copyright, which lasts for 70 years after that person's death. The typography of a book has copyright which lasts for 25 years from publication.	I run CourtListener.com and RECAP and I hear this question from time to time. It depends a little on what kinds of data you're after. Some folks need court data in real time as it's published by the courts, other folks just want to follow particular cases, etc. I think your options are A commercial provider. Maybe Lexis or Bloomberg? I admit I don't know these options particularly well, but it's probably an option. You could use our services, depending on your needs. In the RECAP Archive, we have millions of documents. We get a lot of these from journalists that use our RECAP Extensions, so if it's stuff that's in the news, it can work particularly well. We also do bulk downloads of court data for researchers, but I'm guessing that's probably not your use case. I think the final option is to use a gift card from Visa or another provider. I think if you have a friend in the US, you could buy one, send it there, and they could send you photos of the card to help you out. If this is to gain PACER access and if you need an American address, we could probably lend you our address (we're a non-profit, this is part of our mission, and not a big deal).	This is a close call, in the example that you suggest, because it won't have been executed with the proper formalities and it isn't clear that the content at a url would be fixed in its language at the time that the Will is executed. Subject to an exception for personal property memorandums (and a more subtle one for powers of appointment in trusts) you can't change the terms of a Will once it is signed except by a Codicil executed with the same formalities. Certainly, the best practice would be to assume that the answer is no. There are times when a reference to an external document in a will is allowed (e.g. a reference to real property by address rather than a full legal description found in a recorded deed), but a list of beneficiaries would ordinarily not be allowed unless it was effectively a reference to vital statistics records (e.g. "all children born to or adopted by me.") In general, references to external documents are not allowed when used to establish the nature of the testator's donative intent (a "testator" is someone who writes a will), unless it "describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification" and can't be modified after the Will is signed, but can be used to establish general facts about reality. One exception in Colorado is that a "personal property memorandum" designating who will receive specific items of tangible personal property can be incorporated by reference and does not have to be executed with the same formalities as a will. It isn't clear to me if a url could be a valid personal property memorandum and that issue has never been tested in Colorado. Colorado's probate laws are based on the Uniform Probate Code and would be substantially identical to any other jurisdiction that adopted the Uniform Probate Code's substantive provisions. The primary statutes governing this (which aren't necessarily easy to understand without context) are: Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-502. Execution--witnessed or notarized wills--holographic wills (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section and in sections 15-11-503, 15-11-506, and 15-11-513, a will shall be: (a) In writing; (b) Signed by the testator, or in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator's direction; and (c) Either: (I) Signed by at least two individuals, either prior to or after the testator's death, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he or she witnessed either the testator's signing of the will as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will; or (II) Acknowledged by the testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments. (2) A will that does not comply with subsection (1) of this section is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting. (3) Intent that the document constitute the testator's will can be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of the document that are not in the testator's handwriting. (4) For purposes of this section, “conscious presence” requires physical proximity to the testator but not necessarily within testator's line of sight. (5) For purposes of this part 5, “will” does not include a designated beneficiary agreement that is executed pursuant to article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-503. Writings intended as wills (1) Although a document, or writing added upon a document, was not executed in compliance with section 15-11-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: (a) The decedent's will; (b) A partial or complete revocation of the will; (c) An addition to or an alteration of the will; or (d) A partial or complete revival of the decedent's formerly revoked will or a formerly revoked portion of the will. (2) Subsection (1) of this section shall apply only if the document is signed or acknowledged by the decedent as his or her will or if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent erroneously signed a document intended to be the will of the decedent's spouse. (3) Whether a document or writing is treated under this section as if it had been executed in compliance with section 15-11-502 is a question of law to be decided by the court, in formal proceedings, and is not a question of fact for a jury to decide. (4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a designated beneficiary agreement under article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-510. Incorporation by reference A writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-511. Testamentary additions to trusts (1) A will may validly devise property to the trustee of a trust established or to be established (i) during the testator's lifetime by the testator, by the testator and some other person, or by some other person, including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance contracts, or (ii) at the testator's death by the testator's devise to the trustee, if the trust is identified in the testator's will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will, executed before, concurrently with, or after the execution of the testator's will or in another individual's will if that other individual has predeceased the testator, regardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust. The devise is not invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or because the trust was amended after the execution of the will or the testator's death. (2) Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, property devised to a trust described in subsection (1) of this section is not held under a testamentary trust of the testator, but it becomes a part of the trust to which it is devised, and is administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the governing instrument setting forth the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before or after the testator's death. (3) A revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator causes the devise to lapse, but exhaustion of trust corpus between the time of execution of the testator's will and the testator's death shall not constitute a lapse; a revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator shall not cause the devise to lapse, if the testator provides that, in such event, the devise shall constitute a devise to the trustee of the trust identified in the testator's will, and on the terms thereof, as they existed at the time of the execution of testator's will, or as they existed at the time of the revocation or termination of the trust, as the testator's will provides. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-512. Events of independent significance A will may dispose of property by reference to acts and events that have significance apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by the will, whether they occur before or after the execution of the will or before or after the testator's death. The execution or revocation of another individual's will is such an event. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-513. Separate writing or memorandum identifying devise of certain types of tangible personal property Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing shall be either in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by the testator and shall describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will. There is not a statutory definition of a "document" or a "writing" in the Colorado Probate Code.
Should I inform the copyright holder that I plan to invoke the fair use doctrine if they decide to pursue legal action against me? Context/Background: I'm currently trying to navigate the legal intricacies of using content from a company whose platform revolves around athletic/sports data. For anyone who might be familiar, this company is a large social network (based in the United States) with millions of users who post their workouts and athletic activities online for others to see. It is essentially a social network for runners/cyclists/athletes, and the posted content consists of activities uploaded and shared by these users. I am an academic researcher with an interest in sports statistics. While reviewing the content on this social media platform, I discovered some interesting results that I'd like to turn into an academic/journal publication. Essentially, I performed some statistical analysis on some of the platform's data (which is visible and accessible by anyone with an account on the platform) and came to some meaningful conclusions, which I'd now like to publish as a paper. Obviously, there are legal considerations to be made before trying to publish these results. Above all, the company has a Terms of Service that I agreed to in order to use the platform. The Terms of Service explicitly state that I may not "create derivative works from the content of the service". This is a significant obstacle that would prevent me from achieving my goal of publishing my results. I reached out to the legal team at this company asking for an exemption to this clause for the purpose of my academic research. In return, I received a fairly generic response that all users of the platform are bound to the Terms of Service and must abide by them (which is fair, but already known). I have since followed up with the company to explain my objectives in more detail; I am currently awaiting a response to my e-mail. In the meanwhile, I was considering other approaches to publishing this work and did some research into how fair use doctrine might support my case here. I think there are a few points that I have in my favor here: The purpose and nature of the use is for noncommercial, nonprofit educational purposes. Specifically, the nature of the use is for research and scholarship. The nature of the use is fairly transformative, as I would be publishing the analyzed/summarized statistical data and not any of the raw content from the platform. To some extent, I guess that you could say the raw data represents facts, which are not protected by copyright laws. The appropriate attribution and acknowledgment would be provided to the company regarding the use of their data in the publication. Finally, I would not be harming the copyright owner's market or limiting their ability to exploit the original data for their own purposes. These are all points that I could pitch to support my argument. I'm not sure if the fair use doctrine would, in this case, supersede the relevance of the company's Terms of Service. For the purpose of this question, let's assume that the argument I've posed above is reasonable (although please feel free to leave a comment if there are notable flaws in my reasoning). Question: Should I inform the copyright holder (i.e. the company and its legal team) that I would intend to invoke the fair use doctrine if they were to pursue legal action against me? If so, to what extent should I detail my argument—should I simply let them know that I would invoke fair use in my defense, or should I go even further and explain my arguments for each of the four factors for fair use consideration? If not, what is the reason for withholding my intentions from the company? On one hand, I believe that expressing my intent to invoke fair use might make them concede to my request (both because it may be perceived as grounded in legal doctrine and because they'll realize that I am not willing to back down without a fight). On the other hand, I worry that giving them too much information upfront might end up working against me if I end up in a legal battle against the company (which is not something I want to do unless there's a very strong chance that I'd win). How should I play my cards here? What are the advantages/disadvantages of each option?	We cannot dispense personalized legal advice: that is what your attorney is for. However, I agree with your analysis that this is most likely covered by fair use, and indeed it is not obvious that you have taken anything that is protected. There is no creativity behind a number such as entries in the "I did N pushups" column. The arrangement of data into a web page passes the smidgen of creativity test, but "210" is not a creative number. The terms of service of a website cannot negate your right to use the website however you want in a non-infringing way. If your use is "fair use", then they can't tell you that you can't use it. In case it turns out that "fair use" fails, the matter would hinge on what exactly the TOS says. They may have granted you permission to make use of their "information". So there are three positive avenues for you to consider: not protected, fair use, and permitted. A practical difficulty is that a university lawyer is only interested in the interests of the university, and they are as likely to say "don't do that" or "get permission" as they are to say "that is fair use". You can hire a lawyer who is paid to care about your interest, though there is never a guarantee that the lawyer's advice is correct. I think it is likely that the lawyer will tell you to not say anything until legally forced to, given the apparent rebuff of your request for special permission.	Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement.	I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must.	In Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 593 U.S. ___ (2021), the US Supreme Court addressed the reproduction of a subset of the Java API. The majority assumed for the sake of argument that the Java API was protected by copyright, but went on to hold that the reproduction was a fair use. We shall assume, but purely for argument’s sake, that the entire Sun Java API falls within the definition of that which can be copyrighted. We shall ask instead whether Google’s use of part of that API was a “fair use.” Unlike the Federal Circuit, we conclude that it was. So, it is an open question whether an API is protected by copyright, but the precedent from the Federal Circuit will be persuasive authority. The Federal Circuit held that the API is protected by copyright and the Supreme Court did not upset that conclusion. Second, the factors that led the court to conclude the reproduction of part of the Java API was fair use could turn out another way in another fact scenario. Some of the reasoning seems to generalize, but some seems specific to the Java development ecosystem. Briefly, the court recognized: API authorship is a creative process, but is "functional in nature" The reproduction was intended to assist interoperability; it was commercial; there was no evidence of bad faith The amount of code taken was a small amount of the entire Java work, an amount consistent with its goals The market harms to Oracle were dubious My prediction is that there will continue to be significant case-by-case uncertainty as to the applicability of the fair-use defence in this context.	In the abstract, two businesses that cooperate in violating a third party's copyright could both face liability. Applying that information to the facts you gave would amount to legal counsel. If you don't want to tell the client 'no,' you should speak to a lawyer about your potential liability. Beyond the legalities, do you really want your portfolio to advertise that you design sites by ripping other sites off?	The following answer is based on US-law. I am not a lawyer; this is not legal advice. If the book you read is in the public domain* you should be fine. Otherwise what you are doing is copyright infringement and probably not protected by fair use*. One of the rights granted to copyright holders is to control derivative works, and transference to different mediums, which is what your recordings would be. Under US law, whether an instance of copyright infringement is fair use is evaluated on a case-by-case basis, weighing four points: the purpose and character of one's use the nature of the copyrighted work what amount and proportion of the whole work was taken the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of the copyrighted work In my non-lawyer evaluation, point 1 depends on what you do in your video (unless you monetize your Youtube video, in which case it is likely to be decided against you), but if you are merely reading the book out aloud, it is unlikely to be in your favor (although it may not be against you as an "educational tool"). Point 2 depends on what is being read, with a informative work (e.g. a textbook) being more likely to be fair use than a creative work (e.g. a novel). Point 3 depends on how much and what proportion of a work you use; since you are presumably reading a whole book, this would most likely be ruled against you. Point 4 would almost certainly be decided against you, as you are essentially creating an unauthorized audiobook. In summary, you can read a book aloud. You can record your reading of it for your personal use. You should NOT upload it to Youtube, or other sharing sites. Note that different countries have differing rules on when a book enters the public domain, and since the internet crosses borders, multiple rule sets may apply.	It is not clear from your question whether you intend to make use of the Yelp API to display Yelp ratings on your own website. You ask: So is my idea fair use of these websites data or is not because of the TOS? The ToS is not for Yelp data, it is for the Yelp API. The ToS will only apply to you if you agree to it. However, if you agree to the ToS for the API, fair use is irrelevant. The ToS is a legally binding contract that trumps fair use. You also brings up Google's display of Yelp stars. This display is not based on the Google using the Yelp API, but on Yelp opting in on a mechansim created by Google called Rich Snippets. Returning to Yelp ToS, it is clear that its purpose is permit re-use of their "ratings, reviews, photos" etc. by to promote your own Yelp-rated business. Also what they clearly do not allow you do do, is to build a competitor to Yelp. Since your planned restaurant rating site would compete with Yelp, you will not be able to use the Yelp API to get the data. What if you didn't use the Yelp API, but simply scraped their site - would fair use apply? What constitutes fair use in borderline cases such as yours is mainly decided by case law. Case law differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. My general impression is that it is not fair use if the use is commercial in nature (i.e. you create something intended to directly compete with the site you scrape the data from) and your product or service does not communicate something new and different from the original or expands its utility. As always: If you want specific advice, hire a lawyer.	The GPL does not explicitly specify a time within which the source code must be provided, which probably means a "reasonable time" is allowed. What is "reasonable" would eventually be evaluated by a court, if the matter ever got that far. But please note that only the copyright holder (or the holder's authorized agent) can sue for infringement. The license does not give other people a right to sue for infringement, and I doubt that any license could grant such a right. One could inform the copyright holder who could sue, but the holder need not sue, and undertaking such a suit would involve expense, time, and effort. Whether the offer to provide the source constitutes a binding agreement is not clear, and may well vary in different jurisdictions. The question does not state any particular jurisdiction.
What is the status of a baby born abroad to an American parent, but fails to qualify for U.S. citizenship? Looking at the "Acquisition of U.S. Citizenship by a Child Born Abroad" page, it seems that there are some combinations where the targeted baby may not be an American citizen by default. So, what happens when the American parent tries taking the baby with them to the U.S.? Does the baby get deported as an illegal immigrant? Possibly to an orphanage/foster-care if the other parent isn't there and/or the U.S. parent doesn't want to travel? Is there a way for the American parent have the baby converted to a (naturalized) citizen? Oh, and that page doesn't seem to cover what happens if both parents are U.S. citizens, but not in wedlock. Does anyone know the policy in that case?	So, what happens when the American parent tries taking the baby with them to the U.S.? If the child has proper documents, the specifics of which depend on the child's citizenship and the purpose of entering the US, nothing will happen. If the visit is temporary, the child needs the same documents as any temporary visitor with the same citizenship. If the parent intends to remain in the US indefinitely, the child should have an immigrant visa, in which case the child will become a US citizen on arrival.	First off: if someone in DHS is telling you this, your first, best, and really only option is to get advice from an attorney specializing in family law. Regardless of what we tell you here, without representation you will have a hard time with officials who believe otherwise. That said: I don't find anything exactly matching what you describe. The Uniform Adoption Code (AR Code § 9-9-200 (2014)) does not specifically address sibling groups at all. Adoptive parents do have rights to streamlined adoption of a sibling of a child they already adopted, under the Streamlined Adoption act (AR Code § 9-9-701 (2014)). In the section related to Placement of Minors (AR Code § 9-28-108 (2014)), however, is likely what the case worker was describing. Subsection (b) (2) reads, in part: (2) When it is in the best interest of each of the juveniles, the department shall attempt to place: (A) A sibling group together while they are in foster care and adoptive placement This is discussing foster care and adoptive placement, of course. I think the key wording is When it is in the best interest of each of the juveniles; that would be your argument (that it is not in their best interest). I see a 2011 case, for example, discussing a sibling group of four children not entirely different from yours; while there are not children with special needs, there is a child with major behavioral issues, and one of the (three) foster parents is considering adopting one of the children and "would be open" to considering others, but clearly isn't expecting to be required to do so. Note: I am not a lawyer, and particularly not one specialized in family law This is based on my reading of the 2014 Arkansas code. That is almost 2 years old. That said, I don't see any news articles or similar discussing limitations in sibling group placement in Arkansas recently, which is the sort of thing that usually would get attention. That said, this has also been something that HHS has been trying to encourage states to push for – more sibling group placement and awareness of sibling group issues – so it's entirely possible something could have changed.	I'm not sure if the information is accurate, but according to the above text, when a wife cheats, it is marriage not biology that decides the paternity of the child. I got some questions: If my wife cheats on me, I would still be the legal parent of the child. If I don't want this paternity, is there a legal process to disavow it? In most states, yes (I can't think of any exceptions, but there are 50 states and more self-governing territories and this is a matter of state law). Typically there is a statute of limitations of one to five years from the date of birth for a husband or person listed as a father on a birth certificate to bring a legal action to disavow paternity. See, e.g., California Family Code §§ 7540-7541 (setting a two year statute of limitations from a child's birth for a person with standing to dispute that a cuckolded husband is the legal father with genetic evidence). Note also that the process and statute of limitations are usually not the same, if, for example, a child wishes to prove that the child's biological father is someone other than the legally presumed father of that child. If I fall in love with a married woman and we give birth to a child, I am the biological but not legal parent of the child. Is there a legal process for me to claim paternity of the child from the woman's husband? Sometimes yes, and sometimes no. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), held that a state is not constitutionally required to make such a process available, but some states do anyway. The details of how this plays out under New York State law are described in this Law.SE question and answer. An analysis of the relevant portions of Minnesota law can be found here. For example, in California, Family Code Section 7541 limits standing to dispute paternity to spouses, people "presumed to be a parent" under Family Code Section 7611, or representatives of children seeking to establish or disestablish the paternity of someone "presumed to be a parent" under Family Code Section 7611. So, the only people eligible to be found to be parents are (excluding spent provisions of only historical interest): A husband who was married to the mother at the time of the birth or within 300 days before the birth. § 7611(a). A putative husband who would have been a spouse under § 7611(a), who marriage is annulled (e.g. because a marriage license expired or a husband was too closely related to the mother or either spouse is already married). § 7611(b). A putative husband who cohabited with the mother within 300 days before the birth whose attempt to married was too obviously defective to require an annulment (e.g. two fifteen year olds who have a church wedding without a marriage license). § 7611(b). A husband of the mother who marries the mother after the birth and is also named as a father on the birth certificate, in a voluntary written promise, or in a court order. § 7611(c). A putative husband who attempt to marry the mother after the birth and is named as a father on the birth certificate, in a voluntary written promise, or in a court order. § 7611(c). A person "who receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child." § 7611(d). A parent who dies while the "child is in utero" if this is established in a probate court proceeding. § 7511(f). Thus, in California, a father of the child of a woman married to someone else, who is still alive, (or someone of behalf of the child seeking to establish that he is the father) can only dispute the paternity of the husband of the child's mother (if the husband himself or the mother does not challenge the husband's paternity) if he "receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child." Simply claiming paternity without "receiving the child into his home" isn't sufficient to overcome the presumption that the mother's husband is the father in California unless the mother of the child or her husband disputes this presumption. The document says "The reverse is not true". Why the decision about paternity is different between a wife cheats on a husband and a husband cheats on a wife? Because maternity (absent a surrogacy arrangement) is almost never in doubt, while paternity is often in doubt. Furthermore, it wasn't possible when these doctrines were formulated (centuries ago) to determine paternity reliably in all cases anyway, at least at an affordable price. Cheap and reliable paternity tests, that can be used in pretty much any circumstances{1}, have only been possible for less than forty years, which is why a case like Michael H. v. Gerald D. didn't come up until then. {1} There have been particular cases, for example, when mother and father are both white and a child is at least partially black, where it has always been possible to do so (although even that scenario isn't 100% accurate, as illustrated by a famous historical case in which both parents had a modest amount of African ancestry that wasn't visible phenotypically). Similarly, there was the scenario of @MartinBonner where husband "was away at sea/war at the time conception would have had to occurred". Later on, blood types could disprove paternity in some cases, but not prove it with any certainty. There is a quasi-magical process described in the Old Testament for resolving such disputes involving the wife drinking a semi-poisonous liquid. In the Roman Empire, those cases were resolved by the husband who had a right to commit infanticide if he wished. In modern times, something close to the existing legal process has usually been available, complicated in certain eras by criminalized adultery, "heart balm" civil actions, and fault based divorce.	The legal responsibility to support a child arises from "parentage" and not "genetic relatedness", therefore one of two identical twins will not be assigned such responsibility simply because of genetic relatedness. However, genetic facts can enter into a legal proceeding for support, and can be evidence to establish parentage. In the US, the rules for determining parentage are generally established by the Uniform Parentage Act, instantiated for instance in Washington state RCW Chapter 26.26A. RCW 26.26A.100 spells out the full set of rules: A parent-child relationship is established between an individual and a child if: (1) The individual gives birth to the child, except as otherwise provided in RCW 26.26A.700 through 26.26A.785; (2) There is a presumption under RCW 26.26A.115 of the individual's parentage of the child, unless the presumption is overcome in a judicial proceeding or a valid denial of parentage is made under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265; (3) The individual is adjudicated a parent of the child under RCW 26.26A.400 through 26.26A.515; (4) The individual adopts the child; (5) The individual acknowledges parentage of the child under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265, unless the acknowledgment is rescinded under RCW 26.26A.235 or successfully challenged under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265 or 26.26A.400 through 26.26A.515; (6) The individual's parentage of the child is established under RCW 26.26A.600 through 26.26A.635; or (7) The individual's parentage of the child is established under RCW 26.26A.705 through 26.26A.730. §§300-355 govern the use of genetic tests in determining parentage, according to which genetic test results can be evidence of parentage, but §§600 ff specifically address assisted reproduction and surrogacy agreements – RCW 26.26A.610 for example specifically assigns "parentage" to a person who consents to assisted reproduction by a woman with the intent to be a parent of a child, and under §605, a donor is not a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction.	You've asked a two part question. [Is this a violation of] the international policy that a country should never refuse entry to verified citizens of their own? In considering that question, the US example may be illuminative. The US requires US citizens to have a "passport book" when flying into the US, even though the US issues "passport cards" that serve as proof of nationality. If you can get to the border and prove your US nationality (by passport card or otherwise), they'll let you in, but airlines won't board you unless you have a passport book. If you don't have a passport book, you're supposed to get to the nearest consulate and apply for a passport before flying to the US. But note that the US obligation to admit its own citizens is principally a feature of US law. CBP does not waive 8 USC 1185 because of some international body; there is no body that enforces international "policies" of this nature. Rather, they do so because they know that the federal courts would require them to admit US citizens based on the right of free movement implicit in US law. If someone were unable to get into their country of citizenship and unable to gain legal residence elsewhere then unless they could remain on the run for the rest of their life they would eventually end up as the subject of negotiation between whatever country is trying to deport them and their country of citizenship. In other words, in the worst case, such people become a bilateral diplomatic matter between two countries. Therefore, any challenge to the restriction would have to go through the Italian or EU legal system. Is this a violation of the EU freedom of movement directive, whereby a verified EU/EFTA national cannot normally be refused entry to any EU/EFTA state? It certainly seems to be, but without a decision from an EU court, we can't be certain. From Article 5 of the freedom of movement directive (2004/38/EC): Article 5 Right of entry 1. Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border controls, Member States shall grant Union citizens leave to enter their territory with a valid identity card or passport and shall grant family members who are not nationals of a Member State leave to enter their territory with a valid passport. No entry visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on Union citizens. This doesn't say anything about allowing EU citizens to board aircraft from non-EU destinations without their EU passports. So if Italy makes a rule that EU citizens need a passport to board a flight to Italy from outside the EU and Schengen area, that doesn't seem to violate Article 5 except by implication. It would be for a court to decide whether that implication is in fact present. Because Article 5 doesn't say anything about where the passenger has flown from, we can also consider the case of a dual citizen of an EU member state and a "third country," who might fly to Italy using the third-country passport, and then present a national ID card at the immigration counter. If such a traveler were denied entry, that would appear to violate Article 5. If that traveler's other nationality were one that required a visa in the non-EU passport, the traveler might have a stronger case that Italy's rule infringes on the right of free movement. EU or EFTA citizens could also challenge the restriction more generally as an infringement on the right of free movement that is established in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), even if the directive itself does not prohibit the restriction. For example, one might argue that free movement is restricted because there are countries to which EU citizens can travel with only an ID card, but from which they cannot return to Italy with only that card. In addition, non-Italian EU or EFTA citizens could challenge the more restrictive regime applied to them on the argument that it violates the principle of non-discrimination articulated in Article 9 of the TEU: Article 9 In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.... Furthermore, non-Italians residing in Italy could challenge the more restrictive regime on the basis of Article 24 of the directive: Article 24 Equal treatment 1. Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty. The benefit of this right shall be extended to family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who have the right of residence or permanent residence.	American citizens can have dual citizenship , but if an american citizen who has his/her citizenship renounced (even though the person was originally an american citizen) , then what is a way of obtaining the citizenship back? Possibly, by the same means that a non-citizen could be naturalized. But, immigration and nationality officials have broad discretion and would probably refuse to grant citizenship to someone who had previously renounced it. And can an american citizen without dual citizenship (Meaning that he is only an american citizen), renounce his/her citizenship? Yes. For example, Prince Harry's financee plans to renounce her U.S. citizenship and contemporaneously be granted U.K. citizenship (the paperwork goes through really easily when the Queen is your grandmother in law). Renunciation of citizenship is not necessarily tied to gaining a new citizenship, but leaving yourself stateless would be a foolish thing to do.	The US doesn't do exit immigration checks, so if your hypothetical Israeli overstayer can board a flight out of the US, they'll most likely be allowed to go without detention or other punishment. The US sees no value in spending government money to detain someone who is ready to leave of their own accord. I'm not sure why such a person should have "no valid documentation". Maybe you're confused by the common term "undocumented" for people without legal immigration status, but it usually doesn't literally mean they have no documentation at all. Most such people would still have their passport and other identification from their home country, and the passport is enough to board a flight back home. You say your hypothetical Israeli overstayer had a visa; so they must have had an Israeli passport when they entered the US. Under normal circumstances, they've still got it. If it expired, they could have renewed it at an Israeli consulate within the US; the consulate will issue passports to all Israeli citizens without regard to their immigration status in the US. Even if somehow they lost their Israeli passport and all other identity documents, the consulate would have the ability to verify their identity from Israeli government records (e.g. the photo and biometrics from their previous passport, which would still be in the Israeli government's database), and process their application for a replacement passport.	Constitutionally, a person is only required to be granted U.S. citizenship if they are born in the United States. Any other form of citizenship is as provided by statute. So, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 makes some people citizens who would not otherwise be citizens in its absence. In that sense, it grants citizenship. Meanwhile, 8 U.S.C. § 1409(g) supports the proposition, which is a legal fiction in some cases, that someone is a "natural born citizen" of the United States, and hence eligible to run for President someday, and is retroactively considered to have been a citizen in the meantime for myriad other purposes, despite the fact that in the case of an unmarried non-citizen mother and a citizen father, this right is not vested and could never come into being if the required actions aren't taken after the fact. Incidentally, this statute has been upheld against constitutional challenges. Miller v. Albright, 520 U.S. 420 (1997). So, while you would like to clearly distinguish between someone having citizenship granted and having citizenship revoked, Congress, in its wisdom, has not been so accommodating and has declined to clearly distinguish between the two interpretations. This statute is a bit like the question of Schrödinger's cat, who is indeterminately alive and dead at the same time until there is a measurement of its state, in quantum physics. A person with an unmarried non-citizen mother and a citizen father is both a U.S. citizen from birth and always has been, and has never been a citizen of the U.S., until the situation is resolved with an actual determination of the question in accordance with the requirements of the statute.
Citizenship revocation leading to statelessness possible while there's a gateway to one's ethnic country's citizenship through descent? Can citizenship be revoked if a person would be rendered stateless, provided that they could anyway eventually become a citizen of their native country by descent? Countries like India even allow people who have never set foot on Indian soil and just have one Indian parent apply for "Overseas citizen of India" card (India's pseudo/dummy citizenship, virtually equal to citizenship with some exceptions). They can even apply for citizenship after living in India for a period with that card. One thing that immediately comes to mind is the Shamima Begum case. She fled her London home to join the Islamic state but now she wants to come back to the UK (after realizing), but UK's Home Office revoked her citizenship, claiming that she could claim Bangladesh citizenship by descent even though she isn't a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. A British court recently allowed her to come to the UK, but that was challenged by the Home Office. Anyway. We do not know yet what will happen next, but can countries claim a citizen's former country's citizenship by descent pathway, to revoke their current citizenship? Is that allowed under international law? It is very difficult to revoke citizenship if there's no other pathway for the person to get another citizenship, but what if there's a straightforward pathway by means of descent? PS: There is obviously an assumption that the citizen we are talking about here would be a big big threat to the public.	The case that you mentioned isn't an example of what you're talking about. One thing that immediately comes to mind is the Shamima Begum case. She fled her London home to join the Islamic state but now she wants to come back to the UK (after realizing), but UK's Home Office revoked her citizenship, claiming that she could claim Bangladesh citizenship by descent even though she isn't a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. No, they are claiming that Shamima Begum is a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. According to section 5 of Bangladesh's Citizenship Act 1951, a child born abroad to a Bangladeshi citizen father is automatically ("shall be") a Bangladeshi citizen by descent at birth. (Mothers were allowed to pass on citizenship after 2009, but that was after Begum was born.) Note that registration at a Bangladeshi consulate within 1 year of birth is only necessary in the case where the father is a Bangladeshi citizen by descent. I believe Begum's father was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise by descent, in which case no registration or other action is necessary for her to be a Bangladeshi citizen at birth. It doesn't matter that she has never been to Bangladesh nor does it matter that she never claimed to be a Bangladeshi citizen. There were two men of Bangladeshi descent in a separate case who successfully fought their revocation of British citizenship, but the difference between their cases and Begum's case was that they were over 21, which she was under 21 at the time of revocation. Section 14 of Bangladeshi's Citizenship Act provides that someone with dual citizenship automatically loses Bangladeshi citizenship if they don't renounce their other citizenship, but this provision doesn't apply to those under 21. So these two men had Bangladeshi citizenship too, while they were under 21, but they lost it when they turned 21, before their supposed revocation of British citizenship, whereas for Begum, she hadn't lost Bangladeshi citizenship at the time of the revocation of her British citizenship, because she hadn't turned 21. (Perhaps you got the idea of "claiming" of citizenship from some report that one can "claim" Bangladeshi citizenship by descent while under 21, and these men failed to claim it, but Begum can still "claim" it. But if you read the text of the law, that is clearly not the case. For a child born to a father who was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise than by descent, there is no "claim" of citizenship -- it is automatic and involuntary at birth.) As to your question, there are no universal restrictions to how a country can grant or take away citizenship. There is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which countries may voluntarily join, but only a minority of countries of the world are party to the convention. Article 8 of the Convention does prohibit countries that are party to the Convention from depriving someone's citizenship if it would "render him stateless", though there are several exceptions including if the citizenship was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The language seems to require that the person already have another citizenship, not just have the ability to acquire one, though I am not sure how much leeway countries have to interpret this. In the case of the UK, it is a party to the Convention, and it has largely implemented the provisions of the Convention in its domestic law. With respect to deprivation of citizenship, section 40 subsection (4) of the British Nationality Act 1981 prohibits a deprivation order if the Secretary "is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless." (Subsection (4A) has a looser restriction where British citizens by naturalization can be deprived of citizenship if the Secretary believes that the person is able to become the national of another country. I am not sure whether this is compatible with the Convention. In any case, this is not relevant to Begum's case as she was not a British citizen by naturalization.) So if the UK were to try to deprive citizenship of a British citizen otherwise than by naturalization like Begum, not on the basis that the person already has another citizenship but on the basis that they are "eligible" to "claim" one (which as I described above I do not believe is the case for Begum; I am talking hypothetically if such a case were to arise), that can already be challenged as a violation of British law, in British courts, without considering the UK's obligations under the Convention. If it's another country that's a party to the Convention, but their law expressly allows deprivation of citizenship for being "eligible" to acquire another citizenship even though the person doesn't have one (including, perhaps, British citizens by naturalization deprived citizenship under section 40(4A)), and a person in that situation is deprived of citizenship, they don't really have any recourse. A private party cannot "sue" a country over any violations of the Convention in an international court.	Technically you could stake such a claim in accordance with general principles of public international law, but every country has discretion about whether to recognize you as a sovereign state. Established states would likely have no interest in dealing with you until you have a certain amount of influence and resources. You might have to defend your claimed land and property by force at times from pirates, imperialists, states claiming authority by international agreement, etc. There are a number of microstates and micronations with varying degrees of recognition.	Assuming, for purposes of argument, that such a change could be made by executive order, or indeed by legislation, rather than by amendment, yes, the change could and would have to have an effective date, and apply only to persons born after that date. Indeed that would still be true if such a change were made by constitutional amendment. Consider, people whose parents (or one of whose parents) are US citizens, but who are born outside of the US, are or may become citizens (by statute), but only if the citizen parent complies with certain rules specifying a minimum period of residence in the US, and other conditions. Those periods and conditions have changed over the years, and each such change had an effective date. If such a change could be made but could not be made with an effective date, then it would apply retroactively, and deprive people who are already citizens of their citizenship. There is no valid equal protection claim, because the same rules apply to both individuals, they merely give different results for the different birth dates. (See my answer to this question for why I do not think such a change would be valid except by Constitutional Amendment.) EDIT: I suppose such a changed interpretation, if made at all, might take the position that such births never did validly convey citizen ship, and all people whose parents were not validly in the country had never been citizens. That strikes me as even less likely to pass judicial review, but one cannot know what the Supreme Court will do when faced with a truly novel situation.	It’s legal under Ukrainian law for foreign nationals to join their defense forces Indeed, this is so common it may be considered the default position internationally: the US, UK, France, and Australia just to name a few all allow this. Generally, it’s usually legal for a citizen to join the army of a foreign state. It is usually not legal to fight for a non-state actor this is where fighters for ISIS are in trouble. Where issues arise is if they take up arms against the country of their citizenship. That’s called treason and it usually attracts the most severe punishment available: death or life imprisonment typically. So, as long as you aren’t Russian and are not from one of the few countries that prohibits foreign military service, there are no legal issues.	There is a report about a male-to-female transgender woman here: http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lawreport/2017-06-27/8651398#transcript She managed to do the following: 1. While legally being a male, she got a preliminary passport as a woman so she could travel to Thailand, have an operation, and not run into trouble returning with a male passport and a female body. 2. While legally still being male, but with a female body, she married a woman in Australia. That was fine because legally she was male. 3. She has received a passport as a female. 4. She was refused a change of her birth certificate as long as she is married. So the current state is: She is (in fact, biologically) a woman. She is married to a woman in Australia. That marriage is perfectly legal, however, it is officially a marriage between a man and a woman. She has a woman's passport. The Australian government cannot and doesn't want to do anything to make her marriage illegal. BUT she cannot change her birth certificate without getting divorced first, and if she got divorced and changed her birth certificate, she couldn't remarry the same woman, or any other woman.	Yes, the Fourteenth Amendment makes a person born on U.S. soil a U.S. citizen at the moment of birth. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. This is not a "loophole," because it is exactly what the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment were trying to achieve. There are narrow exceptions because of the "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" clause: The children of an ambassador are held to be subjects of the prince whom he represents, although born under the actual protection and in the dominions of a foreign prince. ... Thus the children of enemies, born in a place within the dominions of another sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens. Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. 99, 155-56 (1830).	This is weird. Within the EU, a passport is proof of identity, and it is also proof that you are allowed to take a job in the EU. There is nothing that a birth certificate would add to this. Either the bar manager is badly misinformed, or he doesn't want to give your brother a job, and will come up with something even more ridiculous if he gets the birth certificate.	They can't take his citizenship... Since he claims to be a born citizen, he has citizenship by birthright and nothing CBP can do can possibly revoke it. He can voluntarily renounce his citizenship, but he has to do that through the State Dept. (which CBP is not part of). And that is an elaborate and expensive process that can't even be done inside the United States. If someone could do it merely by entering without papers and asking for a self-deport, lots of expats would save a lot of money - and that's not gonna happen :) ...but they could put him to serious inconvenience In this particular case, CBP found his documents suspect. Probably because (if it's the case we've seen documented elsewhere) he was with two other people whose entry was illegal, and they had forged documents. So most likely, if he agreed to self-deport, CBP would use that as prima-facie evidence that he is not a bona-fide citizen, and therefore, that his papers are faked. They certainly will not give fake papers back to someone who has tried to pass them. So the victim would be obliged to go back to SSA, the state, etc. and re-acquire his identity documents. From outside the country. It's a pretty big chore.
Can I sue from California, in small claim court, someone in England who is British? Can I sue from California, in small claim court, someone in England who is British? I live in California and this guy sometimes comes to CA for business. He stole money from me in the U.S.	In California, the small claims court has jurisdiction over claims up to $10,000. In order to have personal jurisdiction over him: He must have a summons and complaint hand delivered to him (or to certain other people such as an adult who lives in his household, or to his secretary if he has one). This is called "service of process" and there are professionals called "process servers" who can do this for you in most cities. The service of process can take place anywhere in the world and still be valid. The summons and complaint must be hand delivered by a person over the age of eighteen who is not a party to the lawsuit and is not your attorney. The events that form the basis of the lawsuit must have happened in California, not merely the United States (long arm personal jurisdiction), or he must have the summons and complaint personally hand delivered to him in the State of California (tag jurisdiction). If you win, either by default if he fails to respond by the deadline, or following a trial, you will get a piece of paper called a judgment that legally determines that he owes you $X, which you must then enforce. A judgment can be enforced, for example, by garnishing his bank accounts, garnishing monies due to him from an employer or from a sole proprietorship he operates, seizing tangible personal property that he owns with the assistance of a sheriff, or putting a lien on real estate he owns. A judgment from a California small claims court can only be enforced against assets in California. There is a relatively simple process for having a judgment from California turned into a judgment from any other U.S. state. There is a relatively difficult and expensive process for having a judgment from California turned into a judgment from England that only sometimes works because some aspects of the U.S. civil court system (like punitive damages) are considered to be against public policy in England and are thus not enforceable there. You cannot have someone arrested for failure to pay a civil judgment. Enforcing the judgment is likely to be much more difficult than getting the judgment in your case. It is also possible to make a criminal complaint if the acts genuinely constitute theft. If a prosecutor finds that there is probable cause to back up your claim, the prosecutor could obtain an arrest warrant from the court in the place where the theft took place and that could be served within California when the individual is present in California (i.e., he could be arrested in California, after which the criminal justice process would proceed). Generally, to constitute theft, it must be intentional and must not be a mere breach of an agreement, in which case it is a breach of contract rather than theft. Any theft small enough to be addressed in small claims court would probably not be considered serious enough for the government to request extradition from the U.K. for, a step usually reserved for serious felonies, but if extradiction was sought from the U.K., the process on the U.K. side is described here. Any extradiction request would be handled by the prosecutor's office and law enforcement, in cooperation with federal law enforcement agencies.	Jurisdiction is generally a matter for courts to decide. For example, in Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F. 3d 1294 (2012), the plaintiff, having had their work published in Sweden, had filed a claim there, and lost. They then took the claim to the United States. Copyright infringement is generally actionable per se - no damage needs to actually be proven or sustained. Typically, the rule is that the proper law will apply. This is the state that seems to have the closest and most real connection to the facts of the case. Now, where there is more than one jurisdiction in which a claim may be brought - as in your example - a plaintiff may research the relevant statutes to determine which jurisdiction is most likely to afford them the most favourable outcome. It's called forum shopping. It is likely that the proper law will be that of A or C. This depends on a number of factors: Whether the infringing party profited from the infringement. If the infringing party profited from the act, then you are likely to want to bring the matter in A, so that you can recover damages. Whether the infringing party has any presence in B. If the party has a presence in B, then a claim in B is likely to be more cost-effective. Again, depending on the laws of the country, it may not be possible for the artist to bring a claim against the infringing party if they have no local presence. Some countries have laws that explicitly allow extraterritorial service. Whether the hosting service was aware of the copyright infringement. If the hosting service was aware of the infringement and failed to prevent it, then you may be able to claim for contributory infringement - they could then, depending on their contract/agreement with the infringing party, be able to claim for damages. The Napster case may be somewhat relevant to this, but it's hard to say anything concrete when working with hypothetical countries. At the very least, a claim against the hosting service - which may just be an injunction ordering the removal of the content - could be fruitful. The actual laws of the countries involved. If the artist has sufficient money, they can just choose the forum that is most favourable to them. In short, private international law is a tricky subject and there are so many factors that need to be accounted for.	Jurisdiction: england-and-wales Preliminary issues Firstly, as some of the comments have highlighted, this could be a scam. I have personally come across such a scam on two occassions. The scammer rents a property short term (e.g. 2-3 weeks) on AirBnB. They then pose as a landlord or letting agent and advertise the same property as a long term let. They collect a deposit and rent from any person who wants to be a tenant. They may even copy the keys and give each "tenant" a set. On move in day, you arrive at the property to find that you are not the only person trying to move boxes in. It has always struck me that landlords are generally very careful to vet their tenants by checking ID, proof of address, obtaining references, and running credit checks. Yet tenants rarely do any vetting at all of their landlords. A very basic and easy check you can do is to purchase the title register (not title plan) for the property from the Land Registry. This costs £3 and will give you the name of the person who owns the property. If the property is an apartment then you will generally want the leasehold title register (not the freehold). Once you have the name, you can then ask your landlord to provide proof that they are that person. Secondly, you've tagged the question united-kingdom, but the UK is actually comprised of multiple legal jurisdictions and housing law varies among them (particularly in Scotland). I'm answering this on the basis of england-and-wales. Third, questions asking for legal advice on real situations are off-topic here. My answer will just address the general issues and shouldn't be taken as advice for your situation. Contract and due dates There is nothing in contract law which prevents obligations from arising before the date that the contract is agreed. It is not unusual for parties to draft contracts which govern past behaviour. In that sense, it is perfectly acceptable to agree a contract on 12 August which requires rent to have been paid on 8 August (albeit it would be inadvisable to agree such a contract as you would immediately be in breach if you had not already paid). On the other hand, a contract which purports to have been agreed on a date which is earlier than when it was actually agreed, can amount to fraud. I would be wary of a subsequent email which purports to allow a later due date which contradicts the contract. Unless there is a clause in the contract allowing for the landlord to postpone due dates, the email is unenforceable and your real due date is still 8 August. The attempt to change the due date is effectively a variation of the contract, and a variation which is not permitted in the contract itself needs to be executed as a second contract. That means you need all the elements of a contract: offer/acceptance, intention to be bound, and consideration. The problem here is the latter. The landlord is providing consideration (a later due date) but you are offering nothing in return. Holding the room "The agent told me they cannot hold my room too long due to the high volume of interest in booking the rooms." "Once you have signed this agreement you will be liable for the full rent set out in the agreement unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company." These two positions are contradictory. If you agreed a tenancy (as implied by the second quote), then you have a contract which is legally binding on both parties. The first quote is incorrect - there is nothing to "hold" because the room is already yours. On the other hand, it may be that what you agreed was a holding deposit agreement (rather than a tenancy agreement) which is merely a commitment on the part of the tenant to forfeit a sum of money (which by law cannot exceed 1 week's rent) in the event that the tenant (as opposed to the landlord) decides not to proceed with the tenancy. The wording from the second quote (liability for full rent) implies that it is a tenancy agreement rather than a holding deposit agreement. Or, in the alternative, that it is an illegal holding deposit agreement which asks for more money to be forfeited than is lawful. You'll need to read your full contract to understand what it is. If it's a tenancy agreement, it will be obvious from the wording that you have actually rented the property. Obligation to pay rent "My question is do I have any legal responsibility to pay for the entire rent by the new due date (25 August) for APT1?" Unfortunately, if you have signed a tenancy agreement, then you are legally bound to fulfill your obligations under it (provided such obligations do not break the law). If it contains a clause stating that you must pay 51 weeks's rent, then that is what you must do. "If they told me they cannot hold my booking any longer, do I need them to confirm in writing that I'm released from the agreement?" As a general rule of contract law, nothing needs to be in writing unless (a) the law requires it to be in writing or (b) the contract requires it to be in writing. You agree non-written contracts all the time when you go shopping, use the bus, etc. The same applies to taking actions which are governed by a pre-existing contract e.g. giving your taxi driver verbal directions once you are en-route. The phrase "unless released from your tenancy by the Landlord or Management Company" says nothing about the release needing to be in writing; therefore it can be verbal (provided that there isn't another clause somewhere else in the contract which requires it to be in writing). Be aware however that verbal statements can be difficult to prove.	There is no particular mention in the OSCOLA guidelines for how to refer to laws of England and Wales. In academic papers it is common to see both "English Law" and "English and Welsh Law", usually depending on whether the particular point relates directly to England, Wales or both. However, in the case of Welsh Measures and Statutory Instruments of Wales then it would be correct to only describe the laws as "Welsh Law".	If it’s your pizza, yes The civil equivalent of theft is the tort of conversion, “consisting of "taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession". In England & Wales, it is a tort of strict liability.”	This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't	It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.	What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes
Why should one never threaten to sue? I've often seen it in answers and comments on this site, that if you want to sue someone, then just go ahead and sue, don't tell it them beforehand. It's often repeated as some kind of dogma, I've never seen explanations for it. So, what are the exact advantages of suing someone without warning? I doubt it's the effect of surprise, and they will have plenty of time to consult their own lawyers before anything crucial happens. That the following example: Alice wants to sue Bob, because he caused her some damages. The damages are high enough that she wants to be made whole, but not as high that a lawsuit would be surely expected. Let's also assume that both know that Alice will have very good chances of winning if it comes to a trial. At first Alice asks him nicely to be repaid (without mentioning a lawsuit), and Bob refuses because he thinks that Alice won't bother suing over such a thing. At this moment Alice could say that if he doesn't repay the damages she will sue. Bob would then have an incentive to pay, as he now knows that Alice is likely to sue and if it comes to that, he will likely lose much more (legal fees, time, etc.) So it would be optimal for both of them if Alice tells Bob that she will sue, as both of them would be saving time and money if he just paid her without going to court. So, in the above situation, why should Alice just sue Bob without first threatening/warning/telling him? What would she lose by trying? (and is there a difference if the jurisdiction does or doesn't have a "loser pays both parties legal fees" policy?)	Because threatening a lawsuit is a nuclear option If you are thinking about a lawsuit then you have a dispute. The best, most efficient, most effective and cheapest way to resolve a dispute is to negotiate a settlement. The best, most efficient and quickest way to derail a negotiation is to make threats. People don't like being threatened. It makes them upset and angry. People who are upset and angry like to make the person who made them upset and angry upset and angry in return. This rapidly leads to an escalation of tensions often to the point that the thing (a lawsuit) that was previously only one option out of many is now the only option. So instead of resolving the dispute cheaply, quickly and under the control of the parties to the dispute, it gets resolved expensively, slowly and by someone who doesn't give a rat's arse about the parties. Lawyers can't make empty threats Lawers have an ethical duty not to make threats they don't intend to follow through on. A lawyer who makes empty threats of lawsuits can be censured.	There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order.	Suing relatives or friends to trigger an insurance policy is sometimes necessary, particularly if the insurer is being recalcitrant. Apart from that it is pointless to sue someone who has no money! In common law jurisdictions you can of course sue anyone for negligence. One of the things that you have to prove to be successful is that the defendant owed a duty of care. It may be difficult to prove that a child had such a duty.	Small claims court was created for such matters. There is the possibility of a fee waiver, and if you prevail, you could get some of your costs covered (though there are other hoops to jump through if you need enforcement). A formal letter (written by you) stating that you intend to seek a legal judgment against him/her in the amount owed might be sufficient motivation for the person to pay what is owed.	They can still be sued - they just can’t be found liable For example, as an adjudicator, I have immunity for acts and omissions done in good faith as an adjudicator. A suit could be brought alleging lack of good faith and/or acting as other than an adjudicator. If these were proved (and barring corruption it’s a very high bar) the adjudicator would be liable. However, adjudicators are often joined with the claimant (usually the Respondent is the plaintiff) and the ANA (Authorised Nominating Authority - the organisation that appointed the adjudicator, who also have immunity) not so they can be held liable but so that they can be subpoenaed and forced to give evidence - if they aren’t parties to the suit they can refuse to do this. My standard response when this happens is to write to the court saying “I submit to the decision of the court save as to costs” meaning I am not going to contest anything unless you try to make me pay costs - which I don’t have immunity from.	An individual has no authority or legal basis to demand a personal "fine" for a perceived offense. The actions in the two scenarios would both be blackmail. although whether they would be prosecuted is quite another question. It would be reasonable for the shopkeeper to demand compensation for the lost merchandise. The offender (or the offender's parents) might offer to pay, either because they thought it the right thing, or in hopes to induce the shopkeeper not to call in the police. But if they specifically made "no police" a condition of payment, that would be bribery or attempted bribery. The resident in scenario 2 could demand compensation for an alleged civil wrong of excessive noise, whether or not the passer-by was speeding. ote that the amount of noise made would not be directly related to the speed of any driver (although no doubt there would be some relation) and no one driver would be responsible for keeping the resident up. I doubt that a civil suit, if pressed that far, would prevail, although it would depend on the factual details. The specific law of the local jurisdiction would also matter. But the moment there is a threat to bring evidence of a possible crime to the police, and a request for money instead, that is blackmail.	We cannot and will not try to answer "what should i do?" questions here. Nothing in the linked page makes me think that the views expressed in the previous question here are any less correct. They certainly have not changed the law on copyright. The linked page is an open forum. Many of the posts o9n that thread express ill-informed and incorrect views of how copyright works, and what it protects. Several google searchs find no trace of the suit described in the thread. Note that in US law no copyright claim may be heard in a small claims court, except for the federal copyright office's small claims tribunal. I am not sure if the same is true in Canada, but it might be that the suit was simply dismissed on such a basis. In any case small claims cases do not establish legal precedents in Canada or the US. Of course it is true that anyone can sue over almost anything, even when there is no valid legal basis for the suit. If the suit had been won by the claimant, or even settled that would be larger grounds for worry. A person seriously worried over publishing a book such as that described in the question might do well to consult a lawyer with relevant expertise. A single consultation plus an opinion letter might not cost very much. But 17 USC 102 (b) is very clear that copyright never protects facts, as are the copyright laws of other countries. Note that reports of the events of sports matches are not protected by copyright, although expressive language and analysis may be. 17 USC 102 (b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Article 2 paragraph (8) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (8) The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. There seems little room for copyright protection of the moves of chess games.	The legal term for what you're talking about is "prejudice." When a lawsuit (or a claim, or a party) is dismissed by a court "with prejudice," that means that the same cause of action cannot be brought again by the same plaintiff against the same defendant. It is also possible to dismiss a claim "without prejudice," meaning the same claim can be brought at a later date. When, exactly, a civil case can be dismissed with or without prejudice will depend on the jurisdiction where you're litigating. However, the general rule is that once the suit is underway, most dismissals are with prejudice. For example, in U.S. federal court, the plaintiff has the right to dismiss the suit without prejudice only up until the defendant responds to the complaint (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)), unless all of the defendants agree to be sued again later (this does happen, sometimes, but normally only as part of a broader settlement). So, yes; you can lose your substantive legal rights if you refuse to follow the court's procedural rules. Most courts, especially in federal court, where there is a fairly permissive standard of pleading, will give plenty of leeway to pro se litigants, but in the end they have to follow the rules. In my own experience, when pro se claims are dismissed, it's generally on the merits. If cases are dismissed for procedural reasons, it's almost always a case of a pro se litigant refusing to listen to the judge's clear instructions for what they need to do (or, more often, not do).
Is it legal in Chicago to shoot looters? I was stuck in the riot, in Chicago, a few days ago, and felt rather threatened by the degree of organized lawlessness. I walked out of my home to purchase a soda, and saw an organized raid of 7/11 involving multiple cars, and coordination between five to ten people. (they sent a guy to the back door to catch anyone running out) A lot of these individuals looked like gang bangers in style and dress. I felt intimidated and threatened, and ran to another store to find it broken into too. I eventually found a non-looted 7/11, and heard loud bangs and pops of another store being broken into or gun fire. I felt threatened by every stranger on the street as I walked the mile back home. If I had pulled out a legally owned gun, and shot the organized raid dead would the Illinois legal system protect me, considering this is a stand your ground state, in practice?	Illinois has a "Castle Doctrine" which includes dwellings and other qualified buildings, but not a general "Stand your Ground" doctrine. Normally, to claim self-defense one has to show that they were not able to retreat and had to use force, but in Illinois you do not have a duty to retreat if you are preventing criminal interference with a dwelling or with real property that you or a family member owns, or you have a legal duty to protect (see Ill Code 720-2 and Ill Code 720-3). In order to use deadly force in any case, it must be to prevent a forcible felony, which is defined as (720 ILCS 5/2-8): "Forcible felony" means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. So, assuming you have no legal duty to protect the 7-11, you would not be justified in using deadly force against rioters merely on the basis that they were committing a forcible felony against the building. On the other hand, if you were in the store or could see someone in the store being attacked, you may be able to successfully defend deadly force used to protect yourself or that person.	Firstly, there is no jurisdiction in the US where rape is a potentially capital crime, and murder is not - so you are discussing a hypothetical (and rather implausible) jurisdiction. Given your jurisdiction is hypothetical, you can make the law be what you would like. Secondly, duress is accepted in almost all jurisdictions as a defence to a charge of anything except homicide (and some jurisdictions allow it to reduce the severity of a homicide charge). Courts can be reluctant to accept a charge of duress, but a bullet wound would probably be persuasive. I don't know if someone who had just been shot would be physically able to perform though. The precise crimes the perpetrator is guilty of would depend on your specific jurisdiction, but I would expect at least: rape (because they organized it) kidnap shooting the brother	You aren't liable unless you do something stupid with them. Possessing keys doesn't make you the owner, it makes you someone with keys. That said, we could probably come up with negligent things you could do that would be a problem. Like have a huge heroin party (let's assume this is a thing) filled with minors in the back yard. The family of an overdosed kid would have a good action against you personally for being so negligent, and also probably against the homeowner and their insurance as the property owner. If the party turned wild and the house burned down, the owner would likely have good action against you as well. I doubt this is really a problem for you, so there's no need to worry.	I think you would have difficulty distorting the situation - Pokemon Go is not magic that defies existing laws, and this would be no different to a mall issuing a trespass notice (which is effectively how they would kick you out) for any other reason. I would question the ability of a store to "Arrest" you - that is a job for the police - After they trespass you (ie by giving you notice to leave), if you come back again then they can call the police to arrest you - but its not as clear-cut as someone seeing you playing a game and arresting you. I don't think Pokemon players are a "protected class" of people, so finding a valid cause of action might be tricky. About the best you could do would be to talk with your wallet (ie shop elsewhere with your friends), but for my money that would make me more likely to go to that mall !	There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense.	The law was first promulgated on June 8, 1940 By the 76th Congress. The original text is here. It doesn’t seem to be a particularly important piece of legislation and I can find commentary on it and I’m not going to read the debates - if you do, please get back to us. Two points to note, it was passed at a time when most of the rest of the world was at war and the US was quietly preparing to be at war and it seems to be intended to fill a gap in state law since conviction under state law is a defence under Federal.	Not even real roaches are an emergency. The event was foreseeable and scheduleable. According to the terms of your lease, you are entitled to a 2 day warning. From your description, the landlord did not violate the lease, but he came close to it, perhaps to the point that the courts would consider it as good as a breach. In Chicago, §5-12-050 of the municipal code mandates 2-day notice, and the following section says that If the landlord makes an unlawful entry or a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner or makes repeated unreasonable demands for entry otherwise lawful, but which have the effect of harassing the tenant, the tenant may obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, or terminate the rental agreement pursuant to the notice provisions of Section 5-12-110(a). In each case, the tenant may recover an amount equal to not more than one month's rent or twice the damage sustained by him, whichever is greater.	In California, you may use reasonable force to protect property from imminent harm. The jury instruction on that point is here. The instruction regarding justifiable homicide and defense of property is more restricted, because it only applies to protection of property when the deceased enters a home. If a stranger attacks your dog on a walk, you can use force to defend your dog, but you cannot shoot to kill. If the attack is against a person and not property, then the attack does not have to be in a home in order to be justifiable.
How can I get back my dead mother's ring, which I gave to a family friend? My mother has been dead for a couple of years now and upon her death I received her butterfly ring and her ashes. I had given her ring to a family friend who was like a mother to mine, but unfortunately I may have to cut contact with her. Is there a way for me to get my mothers ring back? I was unaware she had several things from my mom and I had foolishly given it too her, while all I have to remember my mom is three photos and a name tag from her last job.	Sarah, thanks for your question. You have asked this on the Legal forum; and whilst there might be many moral or ethical considerations surrounding your situation - I'll try to deal with the legal principles here - which are distinct from what people consider 'fair' in the common sense of the word - simply discussing the legal basis of what you are asking. The relevant law here is 'Gifting' under the Law of Property - here A gift, in the law of property, is the voluntary transfer of property from one person (the donor or grantor) to another (the donee or grantee) without full valuable consideration. In order for a gift to be legally effective, three requirements must be met: Intention of donor to give the gift to the donee (donative intent) Delivery of gift to donee. Acceptance of gift by donee. Gifts are generally considered by the court to be either 'outright, remunerative or onerous' - so there can be conditions placed on the acceptance/receipt of a gift. However, it doesn't sound like these apply and that you have given this gift, free of conditions to the donee. There are special legal considerations with respect to engagement rings between would-be spouses where the donee actually typically keeps an engagement ring even if they fail to get married. This is under revocation. Unfortunately, from a strict legal point of view - a gift, is a gift - which broadly speaking means that if the person is not willing to return the gift, they are under no strict duty to do so. One can sue for return of the gift if undue influence was exerted over the donor by the donee: There are two main forms of conduct that are unacceptable: Acts of improper pressure or coercion such as unlawful threats. In the case of Etridge the judge made it clear that the court will intervene to set aside a transaction which is the product of “excessive pressure, emotional blackmail or bullying”. Failure to perform an equitable duty; g. where A trusts B and B takes unfair advantage of A. see here It would ultimately be for first, your solicitor and secondarily a court (or similar) to decide whether you had a legal case based on any undue influence you may have been under, based on the situation which you did not know that she had other items of your mother, leading you to gift her the ring. This is very context dependent. This legal process would be under a civil action against the donee. Of interest, the supreme court have limited the scope of 'undue influence'; the technical details can be seen here. I hope this is helpful.	In some states there is a law know as Caylee's Law, for example Connecticut General Statutes 53-21a(d) which requires reporting a child's disappearance: Any parent, guardian or person having custody or control, or providing supervision, of any child under the age of twelve years who knowingly fails to report the disappearance of such child to an appropriate law enforcement agency shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. For the purposes of this subsection, “disappearance of such child” means that the parent, guardian or person does not know the location of the child and has not had contact with the child for a twenty-four-hour period. Assume that they have done as the law requires, i.e. reporting the disappearance. It could be a crime for the parents to fake the kid's death, depending on what you did to "fake" the death. They might legally do things that could lead a person to think the child died; but telling the police, in the course of an investigation, that the child died in an accident, would be a crime. The parents would not have to convince the school district of anything, though someone at the school might alert the authorities that the child was gone (but they would know that anyway). They might well have to convince the police of something (i.e. that they didn't kill the child). It would certainly be a felony to lie to the IRS (i.e. claim the child as a dependent). It would also be a crime to continue to receive welfare payments or other benefits based on the fact of having a child.	It's highly unlikely that A would even recognise this as similar. It's really bog standard. A coloured patterned background (in a different colour and with a different pattern). Two buttons. A picture and a testimonial. All things that have been done thousands of times. In the end, it is _copy_right. What exactly is B supposed to have copied?	She never said that She said: When I joined that family, that was the last time, until we came here, that I saw my passport, my driver's licence, my keys. All that gets turned over With respect to my adult children and their passports, the same is true in my house. I ask them for their passports when they aren’t needed, they give them to me, I store them in a safe place and I give them back to them when they need them. That’s just a sensible precaution against them being lost and in no way illegal. Now if I took their passports without permission and withheld them when they wanted them, that would be illegal as it would for anyone else including the Queen (who, I’m sure, had absolutely nothing to do with it - that’s the job of the Keeper of the Royal Passports or some such). Similarly, if you came to my house and I offered to take your coat and you gave it to me and I gave it back when you left, that would be perfectly legal. When I pull up in my car, I put my keys in a bowl in the laundry (unless I forget and then I can’t find them and it’s really annoying). I would prefer instead to have an employee jump into the car, park it and put the keys in their bowl so that when I want the car latter, it’s their job to remember where they left the keys. But I can’t afford that.	The owner has the best claim The finder of lost property must: Hand it to the venue owner who will make reasonable efforts to find the owner. Hand it to police if it is a type of lost property police will accept - cash is such a type who will make reasonable efforts to find the owner Make reasonable efforts to find the owner. If, after a reasonable time the owner can’t be found, the person with custody may treat it as their own.	If the passport that was stolen is a U.S. one, you should report it by any of the channels outlined on the State Department's page Lost or Stolen Passports. The paper-reporting option is via form DS-64, which asks, among other things, whether you filed a police report; so it might be good to do that first. Form N-565 is a similar form for requesting the reissue of a naturalization certificate, and it, likewise, asks about any police report. Withholding someone's ID documents, knowing that they are necessary for travel, would be "false imprisonment" under both state and federal statutes. Also, 18 USC §§1426 and 1427 cover the crimes of "Reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers" and "Sale of naturalization or citizenship papers"; a 10-year felony for a first offence. "Whosoever unlawfully ... disposes of a ... certificate of naturalization, ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ... 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime)," If the police take your report but don't scare the possessor of your documentation into immediately returning it, you could sue him or her for the actual expenses of obtaining replacements in Small Claims court. If the mispossessed passport causes big enough damages, I guess you could sue in any court that has jurisdiction.	I am sorry for your loss, and that you have to deal with bills on top of everything else. The quick answer is yes, you might have to sell the house to pay your mother's bills. As you probably know, the estate includes both your mother's assets (cash, house, car, and so on) and her debts. In general, to "settle the estate," the executor must pay all debts before she gives away any of the assets. Legal Aid of West Virginia has a helpful website about West Virginia probate law. Here is what it says about this issue: If you can’t pay all of your family member’s creditors from the person’s available money, you must sell off the family member’s property and pay the creditors in the order listed in W. Va. Code § 44-2-21; W. Va. Code §§ 44-1-18 to -20. You may have to sell the family member’s land or home in order to pay creditors. W. Va. Code § 44-8-7. Added after comments Under WV law, it does not matter that you were bequeathed your mother’s house. The law gives debtors priority over heirs. This means debtors are paid before any heir. Heirs are “paid” from whatever is left in the estate after the debts are paid. So if the estate is underwater, if it owes more than it is worth, there will be nothing left in the estate to give to the heirs. As executor, your job is to carry out West Virginia law. The nuts and bolts of what happens if you refuse to the sell the house depends on WV law. You might be able to find the details by searching on line, but your best bet is to probably to talk to an attorney who specializes in WV probate law. An attorney will know both the law on the books, and how that law is implemented. They will be able to advise you on what options you really have, and the costs and benefits of those options. If the estate is underwater, you could buy the house from the estate. If you do that, you will not be liable for any of your mother’s debts; those are owed by the estate. Depending on how the sale is handled, this may be your (financially) best option. (Depending on whether the price covers the debt, and on what other heirs are bequeathed, the court might worry about you selling yourself the house at a discount price, and thus look at the sale very carefully.)	I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well.
Stateless in Australia — how to obtain legal residency, education and citizenship without being detained? Let us say that we have a person who is undocumented, born to parents who were also undocumented, and whose ancestors were all also undocumented. For all intents and purposes they were all born in Australia, yet they are not members of a group who are recognized as indigenous Australians. The person in question is about 16 years old as of now, and cannot produce any evidence of their birth or former place of residence, nor can this person produce relatives or other witnesses to their presence in Australia prior to the last month. Effectively, this person's family may be considered to have been living in an isolated area of Australian bushland with no visible evidence of human occupation, remaining unnoticed by the wider population, since around the time of Australia's discovery by Europeans. Finally, this group has an unique genetic profile that includes a common inheritable X-linked genetic mutation that has not previously been documented by science or medicine, and was previously thought to be completely mythical, though they are also provably human. This mutation does not constitute a disability, though it does provide certain minor difficulties in using certain aspects of modern housing and transport, as they are significantly taller than normal humans. This mutation cannot readily be concealed save by surgery that would leave the person in a wheelchair for the remainder of their life, and would leave visible scars, without also wearing a garment such as a burka... so it can be demonstrated that they could not have been recent arrivals to Australia, as no mention has ever been made of people with such a remarkable mutation ever entering the country before the appearance of this individual. My question is: How would it be possible for this individual to obtain legal residency, further education and Australian citizenship, in that order of priority. Obviously, this individual would not want to be placed in detention, so avoiding that is also a priority. What obstacles would have to be overcome, and how long might this process be expected to take? Citizenship is a secondary goal, and may potentially be obtained through marriage to an Australian citizen. This question is purely theoretical, and should not be considered to apply to any real person, being research for a work of fiction.	First, let's be clear. Under the relevant Australian law, this person is an Australian citizen, This is for two reasons. First, because he or she is descended from someone who was born in Australia in the time period from January 26, 1949 to August 19, 1986 (or who was a British subject born in Australia prior to January 26, 1949), and second, because a child born in Australia after 19 August 1986 (and who is not otherwise an Australian citizen) and who lives in Australia, automatically acquires Australian citizenship on his or her 10th birthday, if the child has not been granted or otherwise acquired Australian citizenship in the meantime. This occurs automatically (by operation of law), and applies irrespective of the immigration status of the child or his/her parents. So, the question is not one of status as an Australian citizen, but of proof of status as an Australian citizen. This individual is not truly stateless. Also, even if the parents (contrafactually) were stateless rather than being Australian citizens, which they were, children born in Australia whose parents are stateless and not entitled to any other country's citizenship may in some circumstances apply for and be granted Australian citizenship. One of the reasons that Australia allows this rule is that in order to deport someone you have to know that the person deported is a citizen of the country to which the person is deported. If you are a stateless person in Australia (as this person is not, but someone might suspect them of being), you can be denied rights the flow from citizenship, rather than merely from being a person or being a resident. But, you can't deport a stateless person because you have no place to deport them to. Related to this fact is that Australia is a party to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961), a multilateral international treaty. In respect of contracting states: "Stateless birth" on their territory attracts the grant of their nationality (article 1). Otherwise stateless persons may take the nationality of the place of their birth or of the place where they were found (in the case of a foundling), otherwise they may take the nationality of one of their parents (in each case possibly subject to a qualifying period of residence in that State) (article 2). A stateless person has some time beyond attaining adulthood to seek to claim the benefit of the Convention. That time is always at least three years from the age of eighteen (article 1(5)). Transfer of territory between states must occur in a manner that avoids the occurrence of statelessness for persons residing in the territory transferred. When a State acquires territory, the inhabitants of that territory presumptively acquire the nationality of that State (article 10). Persons otherwise stateless shall be able to take the nationality of one of their parents (possibly subject to a period of prior residence not more than three years) (article 4). Absent circumstances of fraudulent application or disloyalty toward the contracting state, deprivations and renunciations of citizenship shall only take effect where a person has or subsequently obtains another nationality in replacement (article 8). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will issue travel documents evidencing nationality to persons, otherwise stateless, having a claim of nationality under the convention. Birth on a sea vessel or aircraft may attract the nationality of the flag of that vessel or craft (article 3). Disloyal or certain criminal conduct may limit an individual's ability to avail the benefit of the Convention (article 8). The benefit of the Convention may be claimed by guardians on behalf of children (article 1(1)). States may impose a period of residence qualification for granting nationality to persons who may be otherwise stateless. That period is a maximum five years immediately prior to application and maximum of ten years overall (article 1(2)). There is also the question of proof. What suffices as proof sufficient for an immigration and nationality official varies, and there are probably presumptions that would be relevant. The fact that you are currently resident in Australia, that you have no recollection of living anywhere else or being told that you live anywhere else, your own testimony under oath regarding your place of birth and ancestry, any documentation that exists of you being in Australia in the past, and the fact that you speak English in an Australian accent fluently and speak no other language, would also be evidence of your citizenship or might trigger a presumption in favor of assuming that you are a citizen unless proven otherwise. The government can also change its processes to fit special circumstances. For example, during the Vietnam War in which the United States was involved, a significant number of children were born to U.S. soldier fathers and Vietnamese mothers in Vietnam. Ordinarily, under U.S. law, it is necessary to establish that a particular person who is a U.S. citizen was your father. But, in the aftermaths of these births, there was a period of time at least, when anyone born in Vietnam to a Vietnamese mother, who was racially part-Vietnamese and part either European or African in ancestry, was presumed based upon appearance alone to be a child of a U.S. citizen present in Vietnam in connection with the war effort and granted citizenship by birth, with their place of birth and mixed race alone sufficing to establish their citizenship. It wouldn't be hard to imagine Australia adopting such a rule in the case that you describe. Also, even if such a per se rule were not adopted, usually the ultimate test in a proceeding to establish citizenship is proof by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not that this person is an Australian citizen, and that standard could probably be met by any official who was not intentionally inclined to bear ill will to this person or their group. Competent legal representation and expert testimony would likely help the person to establish their citizenship.	This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.	Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all "completely illegal" regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a "criminal conviction"). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been "decriminalised" - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority.	When the person has been naturalised, that is, when the US government officially recognises them as a US citizen. There are many pathways to citizenship and the ones on the linked page are pretty typical across the world although the details vary: residence for a period with or without marriage to a citizen service descent.	Claiming to be independent is probably not a crime: the family that say they have set up the Principality of Sealand have never been prosecuted (though that may have something to do with the difficulty of arresting them). It does not, however, excuse a British subject from the ordinary duties of paying taxes and the like; anyone in a more accessible (and more clearly British) part of the country would be subject to the normal forms of law enforcement, including imprisonment for contempt of court if they refused to obey court orders. Despite the more eccentric theories of the 'sovereign citizen' movement (who do exist in the UK), the fact that somebody living in Britain is subject to British laws is not open to negotiation. Resisting this law enforcement by force would not be a good idea: as well as the fact that the Government has access to bigger and better armed forces than you do, it would probably render you guilty of treason. The Treason Act 1351 (as amended and translated) makes it illegal to "levy war against our lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere"; the good news is that the death penalty for treason was abolished in 1998 (some time after that for murder).	Anyone can claim asylum Whether that person qualifies as a refugee depends on the law in the country where they make the claim which usually involves an administrative decision making process. If a country is a signatory to the UN convention on refugees then local law will reflect that in some way. This outlines the process in australia. Under the convention a refugee is a person who: ... owing to well‐founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it ... Being a citizen or a resident of a state with an authoritarian government does not, of itself, make one a refugee. The individual must have a “well‐founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Most citizens of most authoritarian countries are not persecuted or at risk of persecution. They also must be outside their home country. You can always emigrate The UK has no general restrictions on people leaving the country in search of more freedom. However, you need to choose carefully. At last count the UK is less authoritarian than 151 of the 167 countries in the world. If you are going to emigrate there are 15 places you could go that are better. Fortunately, 4 of them have English as a primary language and, not coincidentally, a system of government in the UK model.	You can search for study programs via Hochschulkompass. There’s essentially just the Bachelor of Laws attainable at the Fernuniversität in Hagen. You can also do the First Legal Examination there, but if you really wanna become a Volljurist, i.e. a judge or an attorney, you will inevitably have to come to Germany, because the Referendariat can only be done here. Note, AFAIK it is not necessary to be an EU citizen to study, but you have to be a German to do any of the typical legal professions here, e.g. being appointed as a judge → § 9 no. 1 DRiG. Naturalization is an entirely different issue, but I’ll rather mention that right away.	There are certain requirements of Statehood according to the Montevideo Convention on Statehood of 1933, which is just a codification of international customary law: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Is it "legal" to buy a piece of land and claim it to be another country than before(either inventing a new one or migrating it to an already existing one)? According to international law, it is. Sure. But just because you say something is the case, doesn't mean it is. Always. Sometimes it is. But for present purposes, let's say that if you found an uninhabited island and said that you were a country, that wouldn't be the case - nor if you bought it from a man living on it. If you found some land that belonged to another country and decided to claim it as that of an existing country, then it would depend on the specific circumstances. That's exactly what happened to the Krim island in the Ukraine(now Russia maybe?), right? I don't think so. As far as I know, the annexation of territory isn't considered sale. In any case, the ownership of this land is still under dispute. So, if it's possible without the influence of these international institutions, trying this in an area with their influence would be easier, right? If trying this means declaring some land you have purchased to be a new sovereign state Nope. You probably still don't meet the requirements for statehood. If trying this means the acquisition of some land by an existing sovereign state Maybe. Probably not. The Montevideo Convention requires that statehood not be gained through force; while member states' interests may be greater where they are more invested, the requirements for acquisition of territory are the same no matter where you are. What would prevent me from creating my own nation? Money, defensibility, recognition, the fact that you probably don't own any land that you "buy" (depending on the jurisdiction and real estate system), the fact that you generally can't unilaterally declare yourself a sovereign state.
Under what rule do bills etc. die (US Congress)? It is generally accepted that when a bill (for example) is introduced in one house of Congress, it must be approved by both houses before that Congress adjourns. A bill approved by one house cannot be carried over for approval by the other house across congressional terms. The Constitution does not overtly mandate this (unless the mandate is very subtle). Is there an "official" mechanism encoding this result? For example a statute passed into law at some point; rules of the House and Senate that declare this; or some SCOTUS ruling that mandates this as a result of the common law? Or is this just one of those "it's how we've always done it" things?	The rule that all bills die when a Congress ends is an unwritten rule, based on precedent. It is part of a more general rule: All unfinished business dies when a Congress ends. The logic of this rule is simple: Because every member of the House is elected every term, every new Congress is considered a separate Congress. To require a new Congress to take up the unfinished business of the previous Congress would violate yet another, more general rule: “No Congress can bind its successors.” This rule came from England, where it was thought to be a direct implication of parliamentary supremacy. In the US, it is justified either as implied by the constitution, or by practical political realities. What the Congressional manuals say The rule “all business dies” is mentioned in several of the standard compilations of Congressional practice and precedent. These compilations, (available online from the GPO,) include House Practice: However, because past proceedings of one Congress do not bind its successor, business remaining at the end of one Congress does not carry over to the beginning of a new Congress (with the exception of impeachment). Precedents of the House, § 8. Legislative Business of a Prior Session: Each Congress is a separate parliamentary body that comes into being at assembly and terminates upon sine die adjournment. Thus, it is generally the case that business of one Congress does not continue as business of the next Congress. For example, bills and resolutions introduced in one Congress cannot be taken up in a subsequent Congress but must be formally reintroduced. Unfinished business pending at the close of one Congress does not remain unfinished business of a subsequent Congress. Decschler’s Precdents, Ch. 1 § 11, The vast majority of business remaining at the end of one Congress does not, however, carry over to the beginning of a new Congress, since Congress does not allow the past proceedings of one Congress to bind its successor. Few categories have carried over from one Congress to the next; impeachment proceedings pending on the last day of one Congress have been continued at the beginning of the succeeding one, and a Presidential veto message to the House was on one occasion read and received at the beginning of the next Congress. Legislative Entrenchment: Why Congress Can't Bind The idea that one legislature cannot bind a later legislature is known as the rule against ”legislative entrenchment.” This rule traces back to England, where it was first stated by Edward Coke, in his Institutes of the Laws of England, published in 1644. Acts against the power of the Parliament subsequent bind not. In England, the rule was seen as a direct implication of parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone argued that to allow one parliament to bind another would be logically inconsistent with the idea of parliamentary supremacy: Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal…absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if its ordinances could bind a subsequent parliament. Interestingly, during the Revolution, an American colonist, writing as Cassandra, used the rule against entrenchment to argue for independence. He quoted Coke to claim that because no Parliament could bind future Parliaments, any British promise to respect the rights of colonists was not, as the game theorists would say, credible. It is out of the power of the British Legislature to give us security for the future enjoyment of our rights and liberties…Is there safety in entering upon terms of accommodation with a power which cannot stipulate for the performance of its engagements? In reaction to such criticisms of the British system of Parliamentary supremacy, Americans decided to adopt a written constitution. The Americans argued that while a legislature might not be able to bind itself, the people, acting through the Constitution, could bind the legislature. Instead of invoking Parliamentary supremacy, Americans justified the “no Congress can bind” rule by appealing to the Constitution (ie, the electoral cycle + the vesting clause = every Congress is a new Congress, which alone is vested with the legislative power under Art. I, § 1), or to practical considerations (it is impossible for today’s Congress to enforce a binding clause on a later Congress, which could simply pass a new statute). (For fuller discussion of these arguments, see here.) Unwritten Rules in the House Here is what House Practice, Ch. 50. Rules and Precedents of the House, says about Rules Based on Precedent or Custom: Much of what is known as parliamentary law is not part of the formal written rules of the House but springs from precedent or long-standing custom. Such precedent may be invoked to resolve a procedural question in the absence of an express written rule on the subject. More frequently, the precedents of the House are used to show the scope and application of one of its formal rules… On the theory that a government of laws is preferable to a government of men, the House has repeatedly recognized the importance of following its precedents and obeying its well-established procedural rules. The House adheres to settled rulings, and will not lightly disturb procedures that have been established by prior decision of the Chair. However, the Speaker or Chairman may refuse to follow a precedent even though it is relevant to a pending question, where it is the only precedent on the point and was not carefully reasoned.	Only with the approval of Congress. An agreement between states is called an "interstate compact" (a variety of existing compacts are listed in the link). The federal government can also unilaterally create an independent agency with authority in some states, but not others such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Appalachian Regional Commission. The relevant parts of the Constitution are Article I, Section 10, which states: 1: No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 2: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. 3: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. Also relevant are Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1: New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. and Article V: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.	No A state may not do that. The US Constitution Art. I section 8 says: The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; Art I section 10: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. The power to regulate interstate commerce and foreign commerce is exclusive to Congress, no state may exercise it. The power to tax imports and exports is only given in vary limited degree to states, and only by specific permission of Congress. The Interstate Commerce Clause has been interpreted to mean that a state may not favor its own citizens over citizens of other states in taxation or in commercial privileges, although it may restrict state services to state residents, or charge non-residents higher fees, as for tuition at public colleges. Even with the consent of Congress, or if passed by Congress, such a law might well be precluded by the Equal Protection clause. Congress may prohibit specific items from being moved in interstate commerce, or it may limit, license, or tax them. But all such regulations must be uniform across the United states, and may not apply only to a specific state. Regulation of interstate commerce can include regulation of purely intra-state transactions, if they are held to "affect" interstate commerce. This power is very wide-ranging.	There are a number of areas in which the US states can pass laws only to the extend that they do not conflict with Federal laws passed by Congress. When a federal law clearly says that states may not pass laws on a given subject, the issue is clear. When it specifically invites state laws, the issue is also clear. But when a Federal law imposes certain regulations in a given area, it may not be clear if a state may go beyond the Federal requirements. Sometimes it can. For example, there is a Federal Minimum Wage. But states are free to impose higher minimum wage levels, and some have done so. So when a court decision or legal article says "Congress having occupied the field" it means that a set of Federal laws is intended to be a compelte regulation of a given area, and states may not add additional regulations of their own in that area. I am not sure what rules apply to disclosure of information by the Capitol police.	See Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186 (2003) and Golan v. Holder 565 U.S. ___ (2012), especially the first four pages of Eldred (the syllabus). How does extending the term for existing works "promote the progress"? This is a judgement that the courts have left in the hands of the legislature. The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature's domain. (Eldred) if it is generally expected that the copyright term will be extended continually, then, effectively, the perception is that the copyright term is unlimited First, this isn't generally expected. Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress might evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together "an unlimited number of 'limited Times,'" the Court of Appeals stated that such legislative misbehavior "clearly is not the situation before us." (Eldred) Second, in the situation that has actually been happening, Eldred says: Although conceding that the CTEA's baseline term of life plus 70 years qualifies as a "limited Tim[e]" as applied to future copyrights, petitioners contend that existing copyrights extended to endure for that same term are not "limited." In petitioners' view, a time prescription, once set, becomes forever "fixed" or "inalterable." The word "limited," however, does not convey a meaning so constricted. At the time of the Framing, "limited" meant what it means today: confined within certain bounds, restrained, or circumscribed. Thus understood, a timespan appropriately "limited" as applied to future copyrights does not automatically cease to be "limited" when applied to existing copyrights. This is Constitutional because the Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to make these extensions, and its legislative actions until now have not strayed beyond the scope of what the Constitution permits. Briefly, the court took a textualist approach to interpreting the "limited times" restriction. They found that "at the time of the Framing, limited meant what it means today: confined within certain bounds, restrained, or circumscribed," and that Congress has a long established practice of providing extensions to both patent and copyright holders. "Congress’ unbroken practice since the founding generation of applying new definitions or adjustments of the copyright term to both future works and existing works overwhelms petitioners’ argument." This weighs in favor of the view that "limited times" did not mean to the founders that extensions are unconstitutional.	Under the present constitution . . . Are there any consequences of the fact that the Constitution of Massachusetts and the Constitution of the United States use two different names for that state? No. Lots of the language in the United States Constitution is no longer in place or in common usage or is invalid due to subsequent amendments, and that language is still effective as originally intended. The U.S. Constitution has never been "amended and restated" and can't be understood properly without annotations to its raw text. Might a federal statute be needed for some states (e.g. Vermont, because of what is noted above) but not for others, because of differences in the federal statutes that admitted the state, or because of the lack of any need for admission by Congress in the case of the original thirteen states? Not really. Every state's name is embedded in myriad federal laws and regulations in addition to the statute that admitted the state to the United States, e.g. laws assigning names to post offices, laws allocating judgeships, laws purchasing property, laws appropriating funds, laws assigning states to various districts for purposes of executive branch departments and the judiciary, tax laws (e.g. the Obamacare tax credit), etc. Would a state statute suffice? Would a state constitutional amendment suffice? Would a federal statute suffice without a state statute or a state referendum? Would a federal constitutional amendment be needed? A federal constitutional amendment would not be needed. The Constitution vests Congress with the authority to admit states and to change their boundaries with the permission of the affected states. This would be within the power over states that could be inferred from those powers. A state and the federal government could each pass a statute to call itself something different for various purposes. For example, the official name of the state of Rhode Island is "State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations" but various state and federal statutes authorize the use of the short form of the "State of Rhode Island" for most purposes. As a practical matter a state constitutional amendment would probably be desirable on general principles to officially change the name of a state, whether or not it was strictly required, in part, because a state constitution usually sets forth an official name of a state in its body text. It would be possible for a state to change its constitution and statutes and change its name in a move that the federal government did not accept, and if that happened, the federal government and its officials would probably continue to use the old name and the state government and its officials would probably use the new name. I think it is as a practical matter, unlikely that a standoff like this would persist, but I think that this is the most likely outcome. A federal government move to change a state's name without its consent proactively, however, would probably be struck down as violating federalism concerns. Of course, all of this is speculative, because there are really no precedents for disputes over the changing of a state's name. Context would influence the outcome of any such case.	Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 says The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. Therefore, the House cannot try an impeachment. The wording of the Constitution does not say "The Senate must try any impeachment delivered by the House". The option to reject an impeachment by simple majority runs completely counter to Senate tradition. But analogous to deployment of the "nuclear option" to change Senate rules, it is a conceivable outcome. The first impeachment presented to the Senate was against a Senator, William Blount in 1797, and in that instance the Senate appears to have voted that Blount was not an impeachable officer (so they did not vote on impeachment, but they did vote to expel him). In Nixon v. US, SCOTUS ruled that Senate impeachment actions are not justiciable. While current Senate rules require a trial, the rules can be changed by the Senate by a majority vote, and SCOTUS will not review such actions. The Senate can also adjourn and not take up one or more articles, as happened in Andrew Johnson's case.	Lower courts are only bound by US Supreme Court precedent on questions of federal law once the US Supreme Court releases an opinion on an issue. Until that point in time, the US Supreme Court is officially undecided on an issue. You ask: if the U.S Supreme Court says it hasn't decided as to what the law is in this regard, can a lower court issue a ruling that might eventually be in conflict with the Supreme Court? This is commonplace. For many matters, the US Supreme Court is undecided (new statutes, novel circumstances, etc.). In order for a matter to even get to the Supreme Court in the first place, it is often the case that a lower court ruled on a question for which the Supreme Court had not previously announced its opinion. I know you are asking about the circumstance where the US Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal but has not yet issued judgment. However, with respect to precedential value, it is the same until the time of judgment.
Contradictory laws and bench nullification? If during a trial two laws are found to be contradictory in whole or in part, what is the proper conduct of the court? Some of the possibilities would be: Strike down both laws Strike down one of the laws Ignore one of the laws and only apply the other Dismiss the case as untriable Attempt to reconcile the laws by ignoring the contradictory elements It would seem that option #3 is the one mostly commonly chosen (got to put the guy in jail somehow, right?) but least legally defensible. I would guess that such a decision could be appealed.	None of the above! What you describe almost never happens. That's not because statutes never contradict each other. Statutes contradict (or appear to contradict) each other all the time – lawyers take advantage of this, arguing the statute that seem to favor their client is the relevant one. What almost never happens is that a court finds that two statutes (or even two parts of the same statute!) really do contradict each other. Courts can do this because almost every statute can be interpreted in different ways. When statutes appear to conflict, courts interpret those conflicts away. The logic that courts use to justify interpreting statutes this way is simple. They start by assuming that it would be insane for a legislature to pass laws that conflict. Imagine what would happen in Massachusetts if the legislature said, "In Massachusetts, divorce is legal and illegal." To prevent such chaos, courts presume that legislatures are not insane, so they "presume" the laws only appear to contradict each other because they are being misinterpreted. Court use this presumption to correct those misinterpretations by showing that, when interpreted correctly, the statutes are consistent, not contradictory. To do this, the courts make use of what are known as canons of statutory interpretation. As one law professor put it, "Canons are simply interpretive guidelines which, by dint of judicial repetition, take on the appearance, if not the reality, of a legal rule." There are canons explaining how to deal with everything from the words in a list to conflicts between statutes. Some canons are so commonly used that they are known by their nicknames, such as the “canon against superfluity" or the "last-antecedent rule." (Many are in Latin: "expressio unius," "noscitur a sociis" or "ejusdem generis". As Amon and Trish point out in the comments to the OP, there are two canons that are often used when statutes appear to conflict: Generalia specialibus non derogant: If there is a conflict between a general law and specific rule, the specific rule prevails. Newer laws amend older laws. What if two laws really are contradictory? In that case, the court should refuse to enforce either law. If the court picked one of the laws, it would effectively by making law. Under our system of separated powers, legislatures, not courts, legislate. How to find out more about canons The canons are a hot topic in law right now, largely because of Justice Scalia's insistence on the primacy of the text. His last book, "Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts," discusses the canons at length. (You can see a list of the canons he discusses here.) Unfortunately, reading a list of canons, or articles about them, without seeing how they are used, is about as helpful as reading the rules of baseball without ever watching a game. The best way to learn how canons are actually used is to read a law school casebook. For canons, the best choice is Williams Eskridge's "Legislation" casebook. It devotes an entire chapter to the canons, including many (edited) examples of real decisions using them. And, since the canons change only slowly, you don't need the latest edition -- earlier editions are available for almost nothing ($3.51) online!	Some of the documents are here. As document 61 of the trial, the government motion for bench trial, argues, There is no constitutional right to a jury trial for criminal contempt charges resulting in a sentence of imprisonment of six months or less. Arpaio responds in document 62 that Defendant Arpaio acknowledges that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for defendants charged with “petty” offenses where the maximum sentence does not exceed six months imprisonment, but continues the argument (the point being that there is no question that there is no absolute right to a jury trial, esp. in the instant case). He argues Many of the actions of the referring judge will become an issue in the case, calling into question the objectives and motives of Judge Snow. A public official’s actions and motives should and must be decided by an impartial jury of the elected official’s peers. The court order is document 83. There, The Court finds that this case is appropriate for a bench trial. This case focuses on the application of facts to the law to determine if Defendant intentionally violated a court order. Essentially, since there is no right to a jury trial and no compelling reason to grant a jury trial (e.g. the court found no merit to his argument that there would be the appearance of impropriety), the motion for a bench trial was granted. The order cites case law regarding the "not longer that 6 months" rule from Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454; United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488; United States v. Aldridge, 995 F.2d 233; United States v. Berry, 232 F.3d 897.	The jury ultimately decides if a person is guilty or not. Jury nullification is when the person is clearly guilty or innocent, but for some odd reason the jury (who knows the person is guilty/innocent) gives the "wrong verdict" An example of this in the UK was when a guy was being charged with a spy crime years after his crime happened (I cant remember the case), the jury essentially thought that so much time has passed that it was silly to convict him, so gave a non guilty verdict. There are cases for and against jury nullification. In my personal belief I think in certain cases, such as if edward snowden would be charged, I would find him non guilty as a matter of what is right to ky conscience, regardless of the fact that he clearly did something illegal	The concept of "jury nullification" is not really applicable to civil litigation, whether it's a bench or a jury trial. The short answer is: generally in the United States, civil judges, and civil juries, have to follow the law. If the jury doesn't follow the law, the judge can entertain and grant a JNOV motion on the basis that no reasonable jury could have reached the verdict in question. If the judge doesn't follow the law, the aggrieved party can appeal the judgment as an abuse of discretion or on similar grounds. Jury nullification occurs when a criminal jury returns a verdict of "not guilty" although they feel the defendant was in fact guilty under the law. That is the only circumstance where no legal review can reverse the verdict. Civil "jury nullification" is not a particularly meaningful concept.	Yes, there is indeed a conflict, often described as a balancing act. Similarly, the principle of free speech protected by the First Amendment requires that the public tolerate lies in political rhetoric, and hateful public speech and insults, but can be balanced against an individual's interest in reputation in a libel case. See Near vs Minnesota and NY Times vs Sullivan for leading cases on this issue. There is also tension between the right of a newspaper to report on a current criminal case again under the First Amendment, and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial before an unbiased jury, which might be influenced by newspaper publicity. In these and similar situations, there is no way to fully serve both protected interests, and courts must strike a balance and prefer one right over another, or find some compromise. In the 5th vs 6th situation, courts have mostly favored the 5th. That is, the court will not require a witness to give up the right not to self-incriminate, and usually will not grant a defendant an acquittal because desired testimony is unavailable. It might be that a defendant expected to rely on the testimony of a witness who has since died, or has fled the country and cannot be brought before the court. The sixth does not and cannot assure perfect justice, and the courts do not attempt to make it do so. In the situation described, the defendant may compel the witness to appear and be asked the relevant questions. The jury will hear the answer, and may assume what it would have been without the invocation of the Fifth. The defendant's lawyer can try to find a question that the witness will answer, and can argue that the refusal to answer is consistent with a not-guilty verdict. That is all that the courts provide. When the prosecution calls a witness, knowing or having good reason to know that the witness will invoke the 5th on more or less every relevant question, the US Supreme Court in Namet v. United States 373 U.S. 179 (1963) has held that this may be error requiring overturning the conviction. This was confirmed and expanded in Douglas v. Alabama 380 U.S. 415 (1965). But neither of these are relevant when the defense calls the witness.	Not the same way as there's protection against double jeopardy in the criminal system. If Person A and Person B both have claims against Person C, even if it's for the same act or omission, each of them can independently pursue those claims. Imagine what would happen if that weren't the rule: Whoever filed first would functionally be preventing the other one from recovering their claim. What's worse, Person A and Person C could collude (say, by presenting a bad case on Person A's side) and prevent person B from accessing relief that they're entitled to. The way that the courts prevent abuse of the system by people who want to keep re-litigating the same issue is a principle called res judicata. But that's a principle that only applies when it's the same parties – say, Person A sued Person C and lost, and so sued Person C again for the same claim. This limitation protects Person B against any collusion or just bad lawyering on the part of Person A.	If a case is dismissed, then it means the charge was thrown out of court. They were not even tried, much less convicted.	When it is a mistake of memory, and not intentional (as this question is asking), there are no clear standards, and it is largely up to prosecutorial discretion. This means that whatever factors affect prosecutorial discretion (such as the prosecutor knowing who they have to work with on other days) can become significant in the determination. A prosecutor who announced this decision also specifically noted that it's up to the prosecutor to decide each case separately, with no guidance on fact patterns that could influence the decision either way. The Washington Post Magazine covered this question somewhat in depth several years ago, arriving at that conclusion. This was a surprise to me, but the article seems like a good resource on this - the question turns out to be more interesting and less resolved than it first appeared to be.
Is there duty to report crime that may be committed soon? Rob approaches Bob and offers him a job: to commit a certain specific crime. Bob rejects. Question 1: At this point, does Bob have any legal duty/obligation to report Rob to law enforcement authorities? Some time later Bob finds out that the crime he was offered to commit has been committed by someone. Apparently, someone has accepted Rob's offer, or Rob has committed it himself. Question 2: Now, does Bob have any legal duty to report Rob? Question 3: If the answer to Question 1 is "yes" and Bob did not report back then, does the fact that the crime has been committed make Bob's inaction a more serious offence? Would Bob get any discounts for that offence if he reports Rob after the crime? (Any jurisdiction).	In the UK, generally there is no duty to report crime. There are circumstances where there is a duty to report suspicious activity or 'knowledge' or 'suspicion' of a crime. These include: financing of terrorism money laundering or dealing in other proceeds of crime (criminal property) or fraud in a regulated sector (e.g. solicitors, accountants, insolvency practitioners, finance, gambling) (unless the information comes to the person in 'privileged circumstances') In respect of such circumstances, as soon as Bob 'knows' or 'suspects' Rob is engaged in such behaviour Bob must report this to the authorities and must not tell Rob about it (the offence of 'tipping off'). Bob commits an offence if he doesn't report it. In terms of failure to report money laundering that could lead to a maximum of five years in prison and/or a fine. Depending on the circumstances an additional risk of failure to report is being perceived to have participated in the commission of the crime.	The basic reason to avoid speaking to police is the concern that something that you say will provide the police with a basis for arresting you or someone you care about, or charging you or someone you care about with a crime. Often, the reason that the police are talking with someone is specifically for the purpose of developing probable cause or a case to convict someone of a crime, when without your information they wouldn't have that information. Statements far short of a confession to committing a crime can be critical lynch pins in establishing a case against you. For example, a statement that confirms that you were in a particular place at a particular time could link you to a crime that happened at or near that location at that time, when otherwise the police might have no idea where you were at that time and might never link you to the crime. Also, it isn't uncommon for a request for police assistance to end badly, with the police assistance being deployed against you, or the means used by the police to resolve a situation having a deadly or undesired outcome. On the other hand, often you will need to communicate with police. You may need to report a crime for insurance purposes. You may need help when you or someone around you is currently being victimized by someone committing a crime. Cooperating with police to provide information may help to remove someone who is a potential threat to you or someone you care about from the streets. A better rule than "never talk to the police" is really more along the lines of "think twice before talking to the police". You should thoughtfully evaluate if what you hope to gain from doing so is greater than the risk that a case against you as a suspect could be established and is also greater than the risk that if the police do respond when you communicate with them that the situation could end badly. As you do this, try to see yourself from a police officer's perspective. How will you look? Also, are you capable of saying what needs to be said and then stopping, rather than blabbering on out of nervousness. A related notion is that you should be much more wary about talking to the police when the police initiate the conversation than you are when you are the one initiating the conversation. This is because ulterior motives on the part of police that could harm you or people you care about are much more likely when the police initiate the conversation than when you do. Yet another consideration is how much you understand about the situation you are in, how sophisticated you are in dealing with the police, and how glib you are compared to the average person. For example, there are people who a guilty of a crime and are in a situation that they understand well where they are at high risk of being implicated in a crime, where smooth talking can deflect police attention away from you and onto another person or a non-existent suspect. But, not many people are smooth enough and understand their circumstances well enough to pull that off. In general, the more that you fit "the profile" of someone the police are likely to suspect of a crime (e.g. if you are a young adult African American man in a "high crime neighborhood"), the more you should assume that responding to a police inquiry directed to you is a bad idea.	I have not read the news report so cannot comment on the alleged offences and police conduct, but what I can say is that the information to given on arrest may be found at section 28 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): (1) Subject to subsection (5) below, where a person is arrested, otherwise than by being informed that he is under arrest, the arrest is not lawful unless the person arrested is informed that he is under arrest as soon as is practicable after his arrest. (2) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (1) above applies regardless of whether the fact of the arrest is obvious. (3) Subject to subsection (5) below, no arrest is lawful unless the person arrested is informed of the ground for the arrest at the time of, or as soon as is practicable after, the arrest. (4) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (3) above applies regardless of whether the ground for the arrest is obvious. (5) Nothing in this section is to be taken to require a person to be informed— (a) that he is under arrest; or (b) of the ground for the arrest,if it was not reasonably practicable for him to be so informed by reason of his having escaped from arrest before the information could be given. Note the provisions at subsection (3) do not require anyone else to be told the grounds (reasons) at the time of arrest - including members of the public, protesters, bloggers or the press. Kerb-side debates can seriously or significantly distract the officer from ensuring e.g. public safety or preventing e.g. an escape from custody. Also, depending on what else is going on e.g. say in a dynamic and volatile crowd control or public order situation, the person under arrest does not need to told immediately if it would be impractical to do so. The operative phrase being as soon as is practicable, which is not defined by statute as each case needs to be considered individually according to its own set of circumstances. The relevant case law is DPP v Hawkins [1988] 1 WLR 1166, but the only detailed commentary I can find online is behind the PNLD paywall1. Succinctly, the magistrates initially dismissed the case against Hawkins for assaulting four police officers who kept him under arrest without giving the grounds as required by s.28(3) PACE. The DPP appealed, and the Court of Appeal sent the case back to the magistrates saying, inter alia, although there is an obligation under s.28(3) to tell a prisoner of the reason for his arrest as soon as possible (sic) after his arrest, a constable was also under an obligation to maintain that arrest until it was practicable to do so. 1Or free to law enforcement officers	Probably not. Overview You haven't specified a jurisdiction. I will talk about Australia because that's what I'm familiar with. In Australia the most relevant area of law would be tort, specifically negligence. The university would be liable to pay damages if a court found that it owed a duty of care to your friend, that it breached that duty, and that your friend suffered injury ('injury' including loss of property as well as mental suffering) as a result of that breach. Also potentially relevant would be contract law, if your friend and the university had entered into some kind of agreement relating to his security, or equity, if the university had somehow acted to lead your friend to rely, to his detriment, on the university protecting him (promissory estoppel: Walton Stores v Maher). However, I think this is unlikely unless, for some reason, the university had put up signs saying 'Please come onto our land and we will be responsible for your security'. Negligence You have stated that 'it is their responsibility to make sure all students are safe on campus.' It is not clear whether you mean to state that as a fact or whether you are suggesting it as a possible hypothetical basis of liability. I am not aware of a case that establishes the proposition that universities do have such a duty. The judgments in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 discuss the liability of the occupier of land (such as the university in your example) for injuries inflicted by criminals upon people present on land (such as your friend in your example). In that case, the defendant ran a shopping centre. The plaintiff worked at a shop in the shopping centre. At the end of the plaintiff's shift at 10.30pm, it was dark outside because the shopping centre switched the lights in the car park off at 10pm. The plaintiff was mugged in the shopping centre car park on his way out to his car. The key question there was whether the defendant shopping centre was under a duty to keep the lights on for workers leaving work (along with the question of how the failure to illuminate the area led to the attack i.e. whether the plaintiff still have been mugged if the lights were on). Therefore the question that we are presently interested in, about an occupier's responsibility to protect visitors, is only dealt with as a side issue in that case. But the principle is pretty well-established that, generally, you are not responsible to protect another person from the criminal acts of a third person. The common law has a strong presumption against imposing liability for 'omissions' as distinct from acts, which is another way of saying that the courts don't want people being liable to run out into the street and help people. See paragraphs 27 and 28 and thereabouts in Modbury Triangle. Particular relationships may exist which create such a duty. One is in relation to school children; the school is responsible for taking such care of the child as a parent would. The relevant features of this the school-child relationship include the child's vulnerability as a child and the way the school controls their movements and enviroment during the school day. I presume that your friend is not a child and the university does not control his or her movements. Therefore a court is likely to be looking at the general principle that the university is not responsible for protecting people from the criminal acts of strangers, and then looking (and probably not finding) any special feature of the relationship between your friend and the university that creates an aspect of vulnerability, reliance or control that makes it reasonable to impose a duty of care. Some people think that there is a general principle that if something bad happens to them, some identifiable person with cash must be responsible for paying compensation, whether that is an insurer, the government or a nearby corporation. The common law has not picked up that principle. The common law would slate the responsibility home primarily to the mugger. Sue them. What does the university have to do with it? Conceivably the university might also be liable along with the mugger, but the fact that an injury occurred and nobody else can in practice be held responsible does not in itself make the university liable. As mentioned by Pat W., there may be some other feature that creates a duty, such as if the university had made some change to the environment that allowed made the attack to occur when it wouldn't otherwise have e.g. moving your friend's dormitory so that the only entrance was through a dark alley, or if the attack occurred inside a university building where the university controlled entry (even then not sure that would get your friend over the line).	In Connecticut, this is covered by the firefighter's rule. Police and fire personnel entering a property as part of their official duties are considered licensees, which limits the duties of the landowner. The rules are as follows: You can't intentionally hurt or lay a trap for the licensee. If you know or should know the licensee is there, you need to exercise due care with them. You don't have to worry about obvious hazards (but keep in mind that it's harder to see stuff at night). If you're doing something dangerous, you need to watch out for them. If you know about a hidden hazard, you must warn them. I'm not sure how in-depth you need to go with the warnings; various things I find suggest the duty to warn might only be there when you know or should know the licensee is present, but signs are a good idea regardless. On the other hand, if you do need to warn them, you might need to mention the specific locations of the pits you actually know about. However, there's no duty at all to proactively look for possible hazards. This rule originated as a rule for professional firefighters responding to a negligently-started fire: the idea is that professional firefighters sign up to do a dangerous job, and letting them sue for hazards inherent in their job (they aren't called without a fire) is a bad idea. Also, since they cannot be denied entry, go in places not open to the public, and can arrive at any hour, needing to keep the property safe for them is an unreasonable burden. Of course, there's an exception if a law is passed to protect their safety, because statutes override common law. The rule has since been extended in some states to police, and to situations besides the very problem they were called for. Other states have abolished it. In any event, this is for civil liability only: this is when cops can sue for injuries caused to them.	By definition this is not an intentional crime or tort (i.e. civil wrong for which one can sue). There are several standards of intent (also called mens rea) other than knowledge that one is committing a crime or intent to commit a crime, that are commonly applied to criminal offenses and torts: Strict liability Negligence Gross negligence Willful and wanton conduct Recklessness Extreme indifference Strict liability would be highly unlikely to apply to unintentional encouragement of violence. Usually, in the criminal context, it applies to traffic offenses, like speeding or drunk driving defined by blood alcohol content. Negligence is often a basis for liability in a lawsuit or for other civil remedies (e.g. cause to fire someone from their employment), but is usually only a basis for criminal liability when a death or very severe injury results (e.g. vehicular homicide) or when the circumstances are such that there is a heightened risk involved in an activity (e.g. discharging a firearm, or treatment of a small child in one's custody). Even then, for criminal law purposes, liability is usually only imposed in cases of truly "gross negligence." One could imagine highly stylized fact patterns where gross negligence encouraging violence could give rise to criminal liability (e.g. gross negligence by the commander of a military unit under military justice) but this would be a rare and exceptional situation. Willful and wanton conduct, and recklessness, don't require actual knowledge or specific intent, but do presume disregard for objectively obvious risks. Under the Model Penal Code, this is the default standard of intent that applies when no specific standard is articulated in a statute. Unintentional but reckless conduct encouraging people to be violent might very well give rise to criminal liability. Extreme indifference (also sometimes called deliberate indifference) is an extreme form of recklessness in which one acts with total disregard for the consequences when one clearly knows or should know that serious consequences are almost certain, even if the precise consequences to whom or what are not known. This level of intent is often treated as equivalent to intentional conduct and would often give rise to criminal liability. There are many potentially relevant federal and state statutes that could apply, but this is the general lay of the land regarding unintentional conduct.	To be determined. Warren Decision [t]he duty to provide public services is owed to the public at large, and, absent a special relationship between the police and an individual, no specific legal duty exists [emphasis added] Castle Rock and Warren denied the existence of a legal duty to specific individuals of performance of law enforcement activity given the specific fact pattern in those cases. These rulings have been generalized into what's been called the No Duty to Rescue Doctrine (NDRD). It's possible a future court could uphold those principles and apply the NDRD to the Parkland case. Or not. Depends on the arguments of fact and law made in court to that effect. The primary argument against applying the NDRD might be as you described, i.e., the specific nature of Peterson's duty assignment to Parkland. One interesting angle on this question is if Peterson owed a duty to act, then who rightfully owned the debt of his obligation? One could argue the Sherrif's department that employed Peterson was the sole lawful holder of his duty to perform and not the school or the victims. In short, it's all very complex and the specific facts at play (which are still surfacing) will be determinative as no applicable statutes or case law yet exist that extend beyond the cited references.	In short, no, that cant be a pardon for those police officers who would be now influenced to take more violent actions towards those they detain. Pardons are only applicable to past actions. You may be pardoned before charges are filed, but the actions must have already occured. Though I less certain about this, simply because Ive never heard such a thing proposed, I would also note that it is highly improbable that the actual statement he made - generic and during a speech - could everbe interpreted as an affirmative act intending to grant pardons to anyone who may act in that manner in the future.
Can a question of law be taken to a civil court, while not naming a specific defendant? There exist known methods of surveilling people within their homes and elsewhere and even harassing them there that provide complete anonymity for the surveillor/harasser. If those means afford such a degree of insulation for the surveillor/harasser that no defendant can ever be identified or proven, can a harassee take the matter of those harassments to a civil court so as to seek a judgement of that surveillance/harassment being illegal and doing harm as a simple matter of law?	Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.	A case for negligence or some other tort would likely never reach the stage where we could answer this question, as lawyers are generally immune from suit for their litigation conduct. I don't know of any case with facts likey you've described, but my understanding is that the litigation privilege precludes virtually any tort action based on a lawyer's statements in the course of the proceedings. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, for instance, has specifically acknowledged that claims for defamation, extortion, fraud, perjury, forgery, slander of title, injurious falsehood are unavailable: The policy reasons for the privilege have often been repeated: In fulfilling their obligations to their client[s] and to the court, it is essential that lawyers, subject only to control by the trial court and the bar, should be free to act on their own best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of later having to defend a civil action for defamation for something said or written during the litigation. Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).	If I understand your question, you're asking the difference between something like this: "You shouldn't do business with Bob; he's a child molester. Raped a whole bunch of kids. Everyone knows about it." and this: "You're thinking of doing business with Bob? Huh. That's your call, of course. I won't say anything against Bob. But Bill is in the same business, and I happen to know that Bill has never molested any kids." or this: "There are three people you could do business with. There's me. I've never molested any kids. There's Bill; he's a little expensive, but he's never molested any kids either. Then there's Bob. I don't have anything to say about Bob." I don't know the answer under German law, but under U.S. law, it's surprisingly complicated, and varies by jurisdiction. Here is a thorough but somewhat dated article on the subject. New York has recently established an explicit test for defamation by implication: To survive a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation by implication where the factual statements at issue are substantially true, the plaintiff must make a rigorous showing that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference. Stepanov v Dow Jones & Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 03940 (App. Div. May 29, 2014). That opinion also discusses the other approaches used in other U.S. states. Under that standard, it seems clear that my example statements would be defamatory; any juror would immediately understand both the factual implication and that it was 100% intentional. In practical terms, I doubt any court in the United States would not consider them defamatory. In general, defamation is harder to prove in the United States than in other jurisdictions, because of the strong protections afforded to speech under the First Amendment--but I don't know enough about German law to speak to that issue.	This Question Is Tricker Than It Seems One of the things about being a non-expert in a field is that it is very difficult to know in advance what is a hard question and what is an easy question. Some questions that seem like they should have simple, straight forward answers are actually very hard to answer. Some questions that seem like they should be very difficult and have involved tricky answers are actually very easy. Without an in depth understanding of the field, you just can't know in advance. It turns out that this particular question is a quite hard question to answer. So, rather than really providing a clear answer, I will explain what about this question makes it hard to answer in this answer. Even this incomplete and ultimately inconclusive answer will require far, far more words (2,078 to be exact), than were necessary to pose the question (94 words). Essentially, the core difficulty is that there are several different principles of law that apply to this fact pattern, each of which, individually have specific things that have to be proved to establish that some legal consequence will follow (which in turn are often themselves intrinsically indefinite), and each of which has exceptions that could also be proved if specific things happen. In part, this is because, while the fact pattern set forth is not freakishly unforeseeable, it is also not a fact pattern that was contemplated when any of the individual legal principles that are implicated were conceived. Likewise, the interaction of these different legal principles in one fact pattern wasn't contemplated and there is probably no one clear controlling case precedent on point that involved this fact pattern. What the law does in cases like these (which come up all the time in real life) is to break down each legal theory individually and analyze it, possibly spread over multiple distinct court cases in different courts in front of different judges. I'll try to unpack the issues (dispensing with U.K. legal terminology in some cases, since I'm only trying to provide a sense of why this is complicated and not to provide a definitive answer to how it is resolved under U.K. law). Possible Claims, Charges, and Defenses; Traffic, Civil, and Criminal It is a crime to threaten someone with weapon or in another way that puts someone at risk of imminent harm. Depending upon the weapon and other circumstances, mere possession of the weapon might be a crime in the U.K. Someone who has been threatened with weapon or in another way that puts them at risk of imminent harm can be a civil lawsuit for money damages against the person making the threat which was called "assault" in historical common law. Someone who has been threatened by another can seek a restraining order/protective order directing that person to stay away from them in the courts in a civil action. Hitting someone else's car is a traffic violation, unless a defense to the traffic violation is present and proven. Hitting someone else's car with a statutorily mandated level of intent is a crime, unless a justification for the crime is present and proven. The person whose car was hit could credibly argue that hitting the door was a mistake, not because the door was hit, but because the driver intended to kill them and missed, so an attempted homicide charge could raised in a criminal proceeding. The person whose car was hit could argue that there was an intend to put them in imminent risk of harm providing a basis for a civil lawsuit for money damages for common law assault. Someone whose car is hit by another car through negligence or recklessly or intentionally can bring one or more claims in a civil lawsuit against the person who car hit their car for money damages. The standard of care for negligence is established by how a reasonable person would act under the circumstances. Self-defense is a possible defense to traffic offenses, criminal charges and civil liability related to harming another's property if the conditions for self-defense apply, which include a risk of imminent harm to oneself, another, or one's property, and if the action taken in self-defense is reasonably proportional under the circumstances as evaluated by a reasonable person in response to the threat. But, if the response of the person making the threat with the weapon was as a result of actions in which the person threatened with the weapon was the true aggressor, then the privilege of self-defense would be forfeited. In real life, good attorneys for the parties could almost certainly solicit and call attention to additional facts not mentioned in the question that would further muddy the waters and raise additional claims, charges, and defenses to claims beyond the ten listed above. I could analyze each of these issues on the facts in depth as best I could with references to statutes and case law (under a body of law other than U.K. law anyway), which would take a few lengthy and heavily researched paragraphs each that would take a fair amount of time each to prepare, but I won't. A full analysis would help you weigh the odds a little better, and if I was a lawyer of a party in this situation, I would do that since every little edge counts in litigation and negotiations of settlements. But even if I did that, it would still leave a lot of uncertainty regarding the final resolution of these questions on the merits. Decision-Making Regarding Bringing Claims The traffic and criminal charges would be brought or not brought largely in the discretion of the Crown attorney or some other government official. It is most likely that a government official making that decision is doing so because the offense was referred to them by the police officer who responded to the scene, or a police officer who received an informal complaint (as opposed to a civil court filing) from one of the parties, or through a complaint delivered directly to the prosecuting authority by an alleged victim. A prosecutor doesn't have to bring claims just because someone asks them to, and doesn't have to bring all possible claims even if some are pursued. The parties themselves would decide whether or not to bring civil claims against each other. Whoever is sued first would make the decision in the context of knowing that they will be a party to a civil lawsuit whether or not they bring civil claims of their own. Possible Forums The traffic offense would probably be resolved in one court. The criminal charges against the person making the threats would be resolved in another court. The criminal charges against the person who hit the car door would be resolved probably in the same court but in a different case, possibly with a different judge. The civil claims would be resolved in yet another court, probably with a different judge, although probably in a single case with the first person to make it to court as the Plaintiff and the other party as a Defendant bringing counterclaims against the Plaintiff. The civil claims might also involve other parties (e.g. the owner of the vehicles in question if not identical to the persons driving the cars at the time of the incidents). Issue Preclusion Some final decisions on the merits in some cases would resolve the outcome of other cases as a matter of law, other final determinations in some cases would not be binding on the other cases as a matter of law because burdens of proof are different, or the legal issue evaluated is not identical, or because other rules (like a rule against a traffic court decision resulting in a binding determination on civil liability for negligence) would apply. The exact rules are rather arcane and there are quite a few permutations of how it come up, but it is important to be aware that these kinds of rules are out there, exist, and would have to be analyzed by the parties as a matter of litigation tactics. Even The "Legal Issues" Are Fact Intensive Inquiries Almost all of the legal theories implicated above involve broad legal standards in which a lot of the substantive question of what is or is not legal is delegated to the finder of fact in a manner that cannot be reviewed on appeal. For example, in a negligence case related to damage to an automobile, even if there is a videotape and there is 100% agreement on precisely what happened, whether that conduct constitutes "negligence" that breaches the duty of care owed by a reasonable person to the general public to protect them from harm, is legally considered a "question of fact" to be determined by a judge on a case by case basis, rather than a "question of law" which will always have the same outcome and is subject to review by an appellate court if the judge gets it wrong. A similar "reasonable person" standard which must be resolved with a highly fact intensive inquiry that could be resolved more than one way by two different judges or juries hearing precisely the same facts and finding the same witnesses and evidence to be credible in exactly the same way, with both upheld on appeal, applies to the self-defense legal theory. This self-defense issue could also conceivably, based upon the order in which cases were tried and their resolution, be resolved one way in a criminal case and a different way in a civil case between the parties. In the same vein, when a threat is imminent is a highly subjective determination that could be resolved in a "legally correct" way that is not subject to being overturned on appeal on precisely the same facts, with precisely the same determinations as to credibility and weight of the evidence, by two different judges or juries. Again, the substantive question of whether particular conduct is or is not illegal is a "question of fact" that can't be resolved in the absence of a trial on the merits in a particular case before a particular finder of fact. Bottom Line The facts provided in the question aren't sufficiently detailed to provide a definitely correct answer to this question. Indeed, the nature of the facts is such that even an perfectly detailed factual statement regarding what happened might not be enough to definitively determine who has civil liability to whom, and to determine what charges each defendant is guilty of. Different judges and jurors could reasonably come to different legally correct conclusions in a case like this one when faced with precisely the same facts and resolving all issues of credibility and the weight of the evidence in precisely the same way. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the same facts would be analyzed with respect to different legal theory analysis in different forums by different people, when there is not, as a general rule (although there is in some cases) any mechanism for compelling those decisions to be made consistently on outcome determinative evaluations of the same facts regarding what was reasonable for the parties to do under the circumstances. The notion that a judge is just an umpire, and that every competent judge acting in good faith will always resolve a case presenting the same facts in the same way is a myth. This simply isn't true, even in the U.K. where the judiciary is (as a consequence of how the system for appointment and retention of judges is designed) not nearly as partisan and politicized as it is in the United States. The outcomes of even fairly simple cases in many cases, like the one in this question, are intrinsically and irreducibly uncertain in common law legal systems. The range of possible outcomes from a best case scenario to a worst case scenario, for each party in this fact pattern, is very wide. A desire to tame the myriad uncertainties involved for all parties, and the desire to avoid multiple time consuming and uncertain court proceedings arising out of the same incident, is one of the reasons that it is very common for civil lawsuits to settle out of court without a trial, and for criminal cases to be resolved by an agreement of the prosecution and the defense (sometimes reached even before charges are filed).	Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side.	If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.	There are various tangential ways in which this could be illegal, for example if your subjects are celebrities, you take a picture of them and commercially exploit it without permission in a product endorsement. Leaving aside such fringe cases, in the US, the legal right to privacy comes about, at the first cut, by premise trespass law. If the proprietor tells you to go away, you have to go away; if the proprietor tells you that you cannot take pictures, you cannot take pictures (your right to enter is conditional). Neither of those circumstances holds in your case. There are other tort-law bases for a right to privacy: numerous privacy laws regarding privacy and financial transactions (not relevant here), the aforementioned right of publicity (commercial exploitation of likeness), false light (like defamation, about creating a false impression – I don't see what false information is conveyed by a photo). There is also public disclosure of private fact, but that cat is out of the bag because the subject has self-disclosed the supposedly offensive fact revealed by the picture by eating in public. Intrusion of solitude and seclusion does not exist in the circumstance, since the subject is eating in public where everybody can see: there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. This page sums us Virginia law. The main take-away from that is that there is no common law action for privacy in Virginia, and only an action for unauthorized used of likeness or name.	No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal.
How does insider trading law affect bitcoin exchanges? The Bitcoin network is predicated on the premise that it is difficult to find 'low' hash values for a given input. This is an incredibly safe bet because of the way the algorithm is implemented - if you change one byte in the input then the output changes to an (apparently) random number without any way to predict what it could be in advance. People can 'mine' for new bitcoin by taking existing blocks and trying to 'solve' them by looking for a particularly low hash value. Currently this is done by simply trying lots of input values until a low enough output is hit by chance. Huge 'farms' and pools of computing power and specialised hardware exist to mine the new bitcoin and by all accounts only just manage to turn a profit after the cost of powering them. So suppose someone somewhere discovers the hashing algorithm the Bitcoin network uses is not as random as the world thinks and comes up with a new unlocking algorithm that can reliably produce low hash values and 'solve a block' in seconds on his beat up pentium III computer at home (I realise that this is almost certainly impossible but it's a hypothetical). He, and only he, then knows the secret and has the power to create new bitcoin quickly. Would there be legal implications for him to use this new knowledge to his advantage and to the detriment of others by, for example, Generating new bitcoin and accumulating it just slowly enough to avoid arousing suspicion After a period suddenly dumping and short-selling as much as he can before going public with the news of his algorithm (which would surely suddenly devalue the currency to the point of collapse) Obviously he would be on safe ground if he just started using his new algorithm to generate bitcoin - nothing in the rules about how blocks are solved. My suspicion is that as soon as he uses that algorithm to deliberately influence the exchange for the currency for his own profit (which he arguably does by 'going slow' in stage 1 but certainly does by timing the dumping/short selling just before the announcement in stage 2) then he must be violating some law, such as some kind of ban on insider trading?	Your question assumes that there is a method to find a block of bitcoins with a faster computation than the brute force method used so far. If such a faster calculation method exists, it is proprietary to the mathematics and our superhero has not invented it, he just discovered it and used it. It is not an insider trading case since everybody has the possibility to acquire the same math knowledge for free and use the same super algorithm (and maybe is using it already). Insider trading covers only situations when an insider has an information earlier than the market due his proximity to the information, being e.g. employee of the relevant company whose shares are traded, etc. Insider trading presumes that the insider is an "insider", i.e. has the information earlier only due to his position. On the other hand, having an information earlier due to his math skills which are available to everybody does not constitute insider trading. Using the new discovered super algorithm for shorting the bitcoin price is not illegal since the super algorithm is not illegal either, but proprietary to the mathematics. The assumption that the price will drop may be not true, it is only a valid speculation.	The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed.	The ultimate question is whether an obviously joke enterprise constitutes a real offering of securities or just performance art (a Ponzi scheme is one of many types of securities fraud). An unregistered offering of securities that does not fall within an exception is per se unlawful under federal law, but a security is generally defined as something offered with at least a prospect of making a potential profit for the investor which is not something that is true of this offering. (And if less than $1,000,000 are sold it might even be within an exemption to securities laws). State securities laws are divided into two categories. Most allow any offering of securities so long as proper disclosures are made and the offer is restricted to the right kind of investors. A minority impose substantive quality standards on offerings and this offering might violate the law in those states (although this still would present the question of whether a known money losing opportunity is really a security since there is no evidence of an intent to potentially make a profit from the investment). I do not believe that California imposes substantive quality of investment standards on public or private offerings of securities. Any deal whether or not it is a security is actionable if it is fraudulent. Normally an element of any claim for fraud is justified reliance upon a representation or upon a failure to disclose information. But, in this case, it is hard to see how anyone could say that they were justified in relying on any representation in making a purchase because they were told that they were being cheated. So, it is hard to see how a fraud claim would be sustained here either. I'm not sure that this cleanly falls into the category of gambling either, even though there is money at stake and the outcome isn't entirely certain. This doesn't really seem like a game of chance to me. Indeed, viewed as performance art, this scheme might even be entitled to First Amendment protection. Ultimately, I would not prioritize a civil or criminal action against this enterprise either from the perspective of a private lawyer representing an investor, or from the perspective of a government enforcement authority. And, while I would be a little nervous about running this enterprise, I wouldn't be quaking in my boots. In a civil lawsuit, any award would probably be minimal, and in a criminal case there would probably be an extremely generous plea offered.	You quoted the definition of personal data from Art 4(1) GDPR. This definition of identifiability is further explained in Recital 26: […] To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. […] If the user ID is unique, then the hashed user ID will be unique as well. Thus, the hashed ID will enable “singling out”, and would still count as identifying in the sense of the GDPR. You also claim that there's no way to reverse the hash. This is not quite correct. Assuming that the hash function itself is secure, then the only way to crack the hash is to brute-force the input. The difficulty of brute-forcing depends only on the entropy of the input data, not on the size of the output hash. It is thus comparatively easy to crack hashes of short low-entropy strings like sequential integer user IDs, IPv4 addresses, or weak passwords. In contrast, it would be difficult to crack long random user IDs, such as UUID version 4 identifiers created from a cryptographically secure RNG (CSPRNG). Even if the hashes can't be cracked, they are not anonymous – you can link them to the original user ID, after all. The GDPR only considers data anonymized if there are no “reasonably likely” means to re-identify the data subject. If this de-identification is reversible, it's called pseudonymization instead. If storage allows, a better technique to generate pseudonymous IDs is to create a table that maps the true ID to a CSPRNG-random ID. Unlike a hash, the random ID cannot leak extra information about the original ID. This pseudonymization technique could perhaps also be turned into irreversible anonymization by deleting the ID mapping, assuming that no “singling out” can happen. Pseudonymization is a very good security measure. It is explicitly mandated whenever appropriate in Art 32 GDPR. So you should probably use it. It's just that GDPR continues to fully apply to processing of the pseudonymized data. Since the pseudonymized data is the data subject's personal data, you may be required to delete it when receiving an Art 17 request for erasure. You may also be required to forward the request to others with whom you shared the data. However, the right to erasure has many conditions and exceptions. If you actually need to keep the data for a particular purpose, chances are good that you can keep it.	The basic principle about copyright protection is that the expression of an idea is protected, but the idea itself is not. So wholesale copying without permission is infringing. But the abstract algorithm is not protected by copyright (and let us assume that it also isn't patented). By way of analog, an insertion sort is a pretty easy concept to grasp, and once you understand it, you can re-create it, independent of how the original example (where from you learned about the sort) is expressed. So the question is whether it is necessary for you to copy that code (copyright protects against copying), or can you independently re-express the algorithmic idea (ideas are not protected)?	Political risk insurance exists, but not in the format hypothesized. What the question is contemplating is more like a gambling bet, or a futures contract (which is a type of "derivative" contract), than insurance. What constitutes an insurable risk of harm to an insurable interest is mostly a matter of common law although there are some state statutes on point in the U.S. which is the level of federalism at which insurance is regulated. Basically, you can only insure against a loss to an "insurable interest" caused by an insurable risk. In practice, this means that insurance has to be linked to an individualized loss of an individual or business that is clearly and directly caused by a covered occurrence. A change in governing political party itself, doesn't give rise to such a loss. The mere fact that a party is elected or that the people elected take an oath of office, doesn't itself change any laws or regulations. It just puts in place people who might do such things in the future. Political risk insurance, when it exists, insures against the nationalization of one's business at a loss, or against the industry that one is engaged in becoming illegal, at a loss. It is the specific action taken by the newly elected regime towards the particular insured firm or individual, and not the actual new regime itself, that gives rise to a loss to an insurable interest in the case of political risk insurance. For example, you might be able to buy political risk insurance against the possibility that your marijuana business which is legal under state law but not federal law, will be seized in a civil forfeiture or shut down by a change in the practical effect of the relevant state law. If you are worried that your company's stock will decline in value due to an election result, the available financial instrument would be to short sell your company's stock, hedging against losses arising from a drop in stock price below a certain dollar value by a certain date for any reason. If your company is not publicly held, the risk of a decline in business due to an election result is not something that can be insured against.	Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice.	What Big Tech is doing is spending a lot of money on lawyers and appeals – doesn't matter if it costs millions if you can make money in the meanwhile. Facebook stores a lot of user data in the US. Initially, this was allowed because the US was recognized as offering an adequate level of data protection under the Safe Harbor and later the Privacy Shield Framework. Then Schrems I and Schrems II happened and the adequacy recognition was ruled to be invalid. Does Facebook pull back their user data? No. The GDPR offers alternative reasons why you might process data in foreign countries, such as “standard contractual clauses” (SCCs) or “binding corporate rules” (BCRs). Now, Facebook claims that they are using SCCs. Is this valid? Almost certainly not due to the issues of US law analyzed in the Schrems II case, but it can take years for the next round of court cases to work its way through the system. And when Facebook's use of SCCs is ruled invalid they will probably try BCRs next, and once that is over a decade will have passed and the US might actually have achieved an adequate privacy level by then. You do not have Facebook-style money to spend on lawyers and endless rounds of appeals, so you should avoid legally risky things such as outsourcing data processing activities to companies in the US (this doesn't mean you can't be compliant if you are a US entity). I mentioned adequacy decision previously. There is a list of countries that the EU considers to be sufficiently safe. Currently, the more notable countries involve Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, in addition to EU/EEA countries of course. If you want to process data in a location that is OK for both the UK and the US, then looking at companies in one of these countries is a good idea. For example, if most of your users are in the US but you would like your servers to be in a country with an EU adequacy decision, then looking at Canada could make sense. Even outside of this list, you can process data if you implement additional safeguards via SCCs. However, this requires a case by case analysis of the legal environment in that country. One problem with the US is that it has national security laws that impose requirements on companies in a manner that is incompatible with SCCs. A company bound by these US laws cannot enter into such a contract where it guarantees the privacy of your user's data. Countries other than the EU have much more tedious data residency laws. The GDPR does not impose any data residency requirements in the sense that data must not leave a particular country – you just have to ensure that the data is properly protected. In contrast, Russia and China have real data residency requirements that are fundamentally incompatible with the GDPR.
Can an estate be forced to sell real estate to cover debt if the home was bequeathed to an adult child? My mother died in West Virginia. I am her son and the executor of her will, in which the home was bequeathed to me. The estate has insufficient funds to pay medical and other debts. Can WV probate court force me to sell the home to pay the medical and other debts? Can liens be placed on the home prior to, or after probate closes (and the home, I presume, will become mine)?	I am sorry for your loss, and that you have to deal with bills on top of everything else. The quick answer is yes, you might have to sell the house to pay your mother's bills. As you probably know, the estate includes both your mother's assets (cash, house, car, and so on) and her debts. In general, to "settle the estate," the executor must pay all debts before she gives away any of the assets. Legal Aid of West Virginia has a helpful website about West Virginia probate law. Here is what it says about this issue: If you can’t pay all of your family member’s creditors from the person’s available money, you must sell off the family member’s property and pay the creditors in the order listed in W. Va. Code § 44-2-21; W. Va. Code §§ 44-1-18 to -20. You may have to sell the family member’s land or home in order to pay creditors. W. Va. Code § 44-8-7. Added after comments Under WV law, it does not matter that you were bequeathed your mother’s house. The law gives debtors priority over heirs. This means debtors are paid before any heir. Heirs are “paid” from whatever is left in the estate after the debts are paid. So if the estate is underwater, if it owes more than it is worth, there will be nothing left in the estate to give to the heirs. As executor, your job is to carry out West Virginia law. The nuts and bolts of what happens if you refuse to the sell the house depends on WV law. You might be able to find the details by searching on line, but your best bet is to probably to talk to an attorney who specializes in WV probate law. An attorney will know both the law on the books, and how that law is implemented. They will be able to advise you on what options you really have, and the costs and benefits of those options. If the estate is underwater, you could buy the house from the estate. If you do that, you will not be liable for any of your mother’s debts; those are owed by the estate. Depending on how the sale is handled, this may be your (financially) best option. (Depending on whether the price covers the debt, and on what other heirs are bequeathed, the court might worry about you selling yourself the house at a discount price, and thus look at the sale very carefully.)	Is there a way for us to prevent the sale of the house until they have moved the fence? For example, it seems that filing suit against the current owners doesn't necessarily prevent the sale, and that the suit would be pointless after the sale is complete. You can't prevent the sale, but if you file suit to adjudicate the boundary dispute and file what is called a "lis pendens" giving notice that the suit is filed in the real estate records, the buyer will taken subject to the lawsuit and realistically, won't close in the first place. The prospect of an impending sale is unlikely to be something that would cause the court to take expedited action or issue a temporary restraining order, because you can preserve your rights with a "lis pendens" which doesn't take a court order. The absolute minimum amount of time in which you could get a court order on the merits without a temporary restraining order is perhaps three to four months, which is almost surely too long to prevent a sale of a house. The suit isn't pointless after the sale is complete. You can still enforce the boundary against the new owner. And, often, a new owner, having no ego in the placement of the fence, might settle the case sooner than the old owner would have. But, better practice in terms of neighbor relations would be to file suit first, so that the new buyer, if the buyer goes forwards with the sale, is aware of the defect. The old owner is also more likely to have evidence useful in the lawsuit you bring. Short of filing suit, send a letter to the realtor and the neighboring property owner with a copy of the survey advising them of the problem. If you could somehow figure out who was handling the closing, you could tell them too. This will impose upon them a legal duty to advise the new buyer before closing, and if they fail to do so, they expose themselves to the risk of a fraud lawsuit from the new owner. But, while this is cheaper, it also presents a risk that they won't warn the buyer who will then not have notice and the risk of being sued for fraud may cause the seller and the seller's realtor to resist your suit more aggressively and to be less prone to settle it. If you wanted to be really aggressive, you could give the neighbor notice that the fence is over the line and that you will destroy it if the neighbor doesn't act, and then tear down the fence, which is strictly speaking within your rights if you can do so without a breach of the peace, because it is on your property. I wouldn't recommend this approach, however, as it could lead to violence or police involvement that depending on the policeman who isn't trained in real estate law, might get you arrested which is not good even if the charges are later dismissed.	Normal ways of owning a house don't allow this In common law jurisdictions (so, be careful if you set this in Louisiana which has mixed civil/common law) the normal ways that residential property is owned would either require the agreement of all parties to sell or one party could sell their share but they could not force the other party to do so. However, there are lots of ways that property can be abnormally owned. First, there is the transitional period where the property is legally owned by the Estate of the deceased for the benefit of the beneficiaries and administered by the executor of the will or the administrator if there is no will. If the house was bequeathed specifically to the beneficiaries then the executor must arrange for the legal transfer. However, if there is no will or the will just bequeaths assets without identifying them then the executor/administrator has discretion on whether to transfer the house or to sell it and distribute the proceeds. If this is shortly after the death and the sister was the administrator, she could decide to sell. The house could be owned by a company. If so, the director(s) would be able to dispose of it. The director(s) are appointed by the shareholders and if the sister had more than 50% of the shares, well. This is not a particularly common way of owning residential property because it has tax disadvantages but it is a common ownership method for industrial or commercial property: many companies own the land where they do business. Perhaps the house is a small part of a large factory complex? The property could be inside a trust with the brother and sister as beneficiaries but the sister as trustee. Trusts can be discretionary (i.e. the trustee decides who gets what) or unit trusts (like having shares in a company - you get it in proportion to your holding). The latter is the way publicly traded property trusts work. While the trustee has to operate in line with the trust deed and for the benefit of all the beneficiaries, the sister may, reasonably or unreasonably, decide that selling the house is in those interests.	A Last Will and Testament can be very complex. The longest and most complex one that I have drafted runs to about eighty pages. I've seen some in probate proceedings that run to about 120 pages, with additional exhibits of numerous pages containing legal descriptions for real property and serial numbers and account numbers for other assests. How many resources will be expended to execute it? Is this process self-funding? The fiduciaries appointed to carry out with implementing a Last Will and Testament in a probate proceeding spend whatever they need to spend to carry it out, to the extent that funds are available in the estate. The assets of the estate pay for these costs of estate administration. Say, if it prescribes that assets should be disseminated only upon a condition, possibly many years in the future, can I be sure it will happen exactly as described? You can't. You're dead. You nominate fiduciaries such as executives, personal representatives, administrators, guardians, conservators, trustees, custodians, and trust protectors to carry it out. They have fiduciary duties to faithfully carry out your instructions which interested persons, such as creditors and beneficiaries of the estate and trust protectors, can sue to enforce. In the case of charitable trusts, there is also a government official (in the United States, usually the state attorney general of the state in which the estate is administered) that has standing to enforce will and trust provisions for the benefit of a charity. There are certain legal doctrines that exist to discourage you from exercising "dead hand" control for too long. One of this is a very complicated rule known as the "Rule Against Perpetuities" which differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Another (in the U.S.) is a tax known as the Generation Skipping Transfer Tax. There are also legal doctrines that allow interested persons to apply to a court to modify or reform the terms of a probated will or trust, doctrines such as the cy pres doctrine to deal with cases where transfers to entities or persons that no longer exist are present, doctrines that invalidate certain dead hand directions (e.g. related to race or to marriage) as a matter of public policy, statutes that invalidate certain kinds of real estate ownership with remote possibilities of reversion to a remote relative (e.g. fee tail), and doctrines that allow will and trust provisions to be reformed because it is impracticable to carry the out the terms even if it isn't strictly speaking impossible to do so. For example, can I award my legacy to someone who solves a certain equation (where the verification of this might be complex, and costly in time and money)? Subject to the doctrines set forth above, yes, this is possible. The typical way to do this would be to establish a foundation to oversee this part of the legacy and to name someone such as the current holder of an endowed professorship, or the chair of a university department or scientific institute, as an arbitrator of the question of whether the condition was met (typically with instructions to pay for that service as an administrative cost or instructions that it be self-funded by the recipient of an endowment gift to an institution as a condition of receiving an endowment gift). If an arbitrator was not appointed, a court would typically appoint an expert known as a "special master" to investigate the question (as the expense of the parties seeking to be paid and the estate) to determine if the condition was met in the event that this was disputed, or to ratify that the condition was met, in the event that this was not disputed. The "special master" would then investigate the matter and issue a report after receiving input from all parties and any independent investigation that was authorized by the order appointing the special master, and the report to the court would recommend a resolution. The parties could tell the court whether they disputed the special master's finding, and if so why, and the court would almost always adopt the special master's recommendation on the basis of that report. I have seen this process used in cases involving complex tax questions in probate court. Another common way to do this would be to establish a donor advised fund in a "community foundation" which is a foundation shared by many donors with a common administrative staff and investment pool that administers foundation-like funds from particular donors according to the substantive terms of the fund. There are examples of things similar to this (such as the Nobel Prize) being done. When I was in law school, there was a popular urban legend, I don't know if it was true or not, but it could have been true, that the dining hall in the law school (at the University of Michigan where I took my meals for my first year in law school) was endowed on the condition that steak be served every Friday. True or not, the steak was always there on Fridays.	Under normal common-law principles, she has provided you a gift and you have accepted it, which transfers the property to you unconditionally. You also made a gratuitous promise that you might attempt to repay her. That promise has no legal effect as a contract, both because the promise is so uncertain as to be unenforceable, and because it is not supported by mutual consideration (i.e., she has not promised to do in anything in exchange for your promise to pay you back). If the case is presented with these facts, a court should therefore deny her request to force your repayment.	Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.	As Polygnome points out in the comments, the first step is to determine who owns the original copyright on your mother's work now. This will be her heirs. If you are the sole heir then no problem. If the copyright was explicitly left to you in her will, also no problem. If there are multiple heirs and no explicit assignment of the copyright, then problem. The copyright will probably be considered part of the chattels of the estate (i.e. everything except real estate). If those are allocated fractionally (e.g. half each to two siblings) then the copyright probably followed that principle, unless you have already come to some agreement about it. If you are on good terms with the siblings then the best bet is to just make a deal for their part of the copyright. You could just ask them to sign it over to you, or you could cut them in for a percentage of future royalties. That makes the situation 100% clear, and any publisher is going to require 100% clarity before they consider offering a contract. Once you have the whole copyright you can go ahead and register. I've looked through the registration process and it doesn't actually ask about derivative works. What it wants to know is whether you own the copyright, and who were the authors (including works for hire). So just fill it in on that basis.	We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. The debt collector is probably either the owner of the claim against you, if it is an assignee of the claim, or an agent of the landlord for purposes of collection. Thus, payment to the debt collector is equivalent to payment of the landlord. The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction regarding whether payment constitutes of waiver of a right to sue over the debt. Sometimes it is necessary to designate the payment "under protests" or "reserving all rights", but that is not a uniform rule of law that applies in all jurisdictions, and I do not have the time and familiarity with that state's law to research Massachusetts case law on that point accurately.
Selling a college house Let's say a father buys a moderately decent house for his daughter to live in for college. 4 years later he sells for a profit. Would capital gains taxes come into play given that the house is his daughters primary residence, but not his?	Would capital gains taxes come into play given that the house is his daughters primary residence, but not his? Yes. He sold something that was his property, i.e., his [long term] asset. The fact that it was not his primary residence is irrelevant in this regard. The issue of primary vs. non-primary residence might be relevant only for purposes of computing the applicable credits and/or deductions, but that is very jurisdiction-specific.	As Polygnome points out in the comments, the first step is to determine who owns the original copyright on your mother's work now. This will be her heirs. If you are the sole heir then no problem. If the copyright was explicitly left to you in her will, also no problem. If there are multiple heirs and no explicit assignment of the copyright, then problem. The copyright will probably be considered part of the chattels of the estate (i.e. everything except real estate). If those are allocated fractionally (e.g. half each to two siblings) then the copyright probably followed that principle, unless you have already come to some agreement about it. If you are on good terms with the siblings then the best bet is to just make a deal for their part of the copyright. You could just ask them to sign it over to you, or you could cut them in for a percentage of future royalties. That makes the situation 100% clear, and any publisher is going to require 100% clarity before they consider offering a contract. Once you have the whole copyright you can go ahead and register. I've looked through the registration process and it doesn't actually ask about derivative works. What it wants to know is whether you own the copyright, and who were the authors (including works for hire). So just fill it in on that basis.	I am unfamiliar with specifically US laws on this but under common law (which US law is derived from) there is the crime of "Theft by Finding", however, because you turned it over to the authorities who, after the required time period were unable to find the rightful owner, the money becomes yours. However, you still have to pay your taxes on it: http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/07/03/found-money-is-awesomebut-must-pay-uncle-sam/ As far as I can see, income is income whether it comes as cash, diamonds or long lost antiques. As far as the money laundering aspect, that is something the authorities would need to prove - as opposed to you just being lucky.	Yes The child owns what they own - it would be illegal for the parent to take the item and dispose of it or otherwise permanently keep if from the child (once they became an adult). However, parents are their children’s legal guardians and are responsible for the raising of their children including matters of discipline. It is both legal and appropriate for a parent to limit access of a child to their possessions.	It is certainly possible to give gifts to your relatives (or to anyone really). But, the harder question is whether or not it is really a gift. A characterization of a transaction as a gift is less likely to be questioned if it is between related parties, and it is less likely to be questioned if it isn't obviously a quid pro quo. If you told your brother that you would make a gift to him of all of the appreciation in the house, if he made the guarantee in advance, it would be a guarantee fee (or an equitable or nominee ownership) rather than a gift. But, with the timing and motives described in this post, it is certainly a closer call. The fact that the "gift" amount exactly matches the appreciation casts doubt on the theory that this is really a gift, but doesn't absolutely clearly require the conclusion that it is not. This could end up being resolved either way, and ultimately, could be very dependent upon the detailed facts and how they are presented to the person determining if tax is owed.	The Probate Estate v. Non-Probate Transfers First off, keep in mind that only the "probate estate" is probated at all. Assets held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, assets held in trust, and assets with a death beneficiary, for example, pass by non-probate transfer. Some states also have a rebuttable presumption that all tangible personal property which is not part of a business owned by someone in a married couple that is not subject to a certificate of title is owned in joint tenancy by right of survivorship in favor of a surviving spouse. The probate estate consists only of property held in the name of the decedent with no beneficiary designation and no joint tenants (although there could be tenant-in-common co-owners or co-owners as part of a general partnership). The Primary Domicile Probate The primary probate is generally conducted in the state and county in which the decedent was domiciled at death. Intangible property, including interests in entities, and the legal rights of the decedent are generally deemed to be located at that domicile for probate purposes. The common law choice of law rule is to have moveable property also governed by the law of the state of domicile. While it doesn't have constitutional standing, it is widely adopted. The unsecured claims (i.e. claims not secured by collateral) of third-parties against the decedent are deemed located at the decedent's domicile at death. A will contest is almost always conducted solely in the primary domicile state, and that resolution has collateral estoppel and arguably full faith and credit clause binding effect in other ancillary probate cases. Almost every state, however, recognizes the validity of a will that was valid where executed at the time it was executed. Estate plans of individuals with property in many states that would be subject to many ancillary probate proceedings are routinely devised so that the property subject to ancillary probate is either not subject to probate at all, because it is in a revocable trust or joint tenancy with right of survivorship or has transfer on death beneficiary, or it at least in an entity whose shares are handled in the primary probate rather than in an ancillary probate, when the decedent was represented by counsel (and it verges on malpractice not to recommend that this be done if estate planning counsel is aware of the facts). Of course, not everyone hires a lawyer to do their estate plan before they die (even if they meant to do so), so ancillary probates still happen. Ancillary Probate Proceedings When there is real property in the estate owned outright by the decedent, and not subject to a joint tenancy or other non-probate transfer (such as a transfer on death deed) and not owned via a trust or entity, then an ancillary probate must be opened up in that state to probate that parcel of real property. One if left in an ancillary probate dealing with real property and debts for which that property is collateral in the ancillary probate. But the ancillary probate is largely a formality and mostly defers to the rulings of the court in the primary probate case. Sometimes closely held business which is a sole proprietorship or general partnership (as opposed to an entity), with a state or local specific license, must be the subject of an ancillary probate. But more often, the closely held business is an entity with a license and tangible personal property held in the entity. In those cases, the stock or membership interest is intangible property that can be probated at the domicile of the decedent, rather than in an ancillary probate where the business is located. In other words, let's say a person lives in Maine, but has property in 20 different states. Various houses, boats, bank accounts, brokerage accounts, you name it. Does the will have to then be probated in every one of the states in which the various property resides? The bank accounts, brokerage accounts, and most of the etc. that are part of the probate estate would be probated in Maine. The houses outside of Maine and possible the cars and boats and sole proprietorship inventory, equipment and license transfers outside of Maine would be resolved in ancillary probate proceedings. Conflicts Of Law Between Primary And Ancillary Probate Laws What happens if the probate laws of the states conflict? The procedural rules of the forum state govern the ancillary probate, rather than those of the primary probate case. Every state adopted the general rule that the directions of a will are valid and enforceable subject to only a handful of exceptions, and in most cases, intestacy rules when there is no surviving spouse are likewise identical. Almost all states would honor a will admitted to probate in the primary probate state (and are arguably required to do so under the full faith and credit clause), even if it would not have been admitted to probate in the ancillary probate state. While it is theoretically possible to have a conflict of law regarding general partnership property, inheritance of general partnership property is largely governed by the Uniform Partnership Act and this model state law is, in fact, a law that has been adopted in every U.S. state and is uniform on this point in every U.S. state. The main circumstances in which there could be conflicts between the state probate laws are: quirky intestate situations (differences between per stirpes and per capita at each generation, or differences between treatment of half-blood or multiple line of descent heirs), exemptions from creditors (e.g. homestead rights, tenancy-by-entirety rights, special legacy property rules in some Southern states), details of slayer statutes (e.g. does negligent homicide count?), divorce revocation laws (not every state revokes will provisions in favor a divorced spouse), community property rights in property, mandatory inheritance rights of disinherited spouses (dower, curtsy and force share laws, some states treat this as a creditor's claim, others don't), and provisions for what happens when a specific devise fails because an asset no longer exists if the will doesn't specifically state what happens. It is fairly rare for this to come up in practice, however, since normally the ancillary probate forum state court defers to the primary state appointed executor's requests, and it is quite rare for that to be disputed by other parties to the estate in the ancillary proceeding. It happens, I've been there, but it is very uncommon. In those cases, there is little formal guidance. The forum state's law is presumed to apply, but that presumption can be overcome by showing that some other state has the most significant connection to the legal issue over which there is a conflict. The analysis is handled by the forum state court on a case by case basis in the rare cases where it comes up. The primary probate court can also sometimes make an end run around ancillary probate court rulings applying substantive ancillary probate forum probate laws to property in the ancillary probate state by ordering a compensatory adjustment in how property in its jurisdiction is distributed to conform to the laws of its state. A recent case from New Hampshire discussed how choice of law works in probate cases: We first address whether the New Hampshire probate division erred in applying Massachusetts’ pretermitted heir statute, rather than New Hampshire's RSA 551:10, to the testator's will. On appeal, the petitioner argues that, despite the language of Article Ninth in his mother's will, RSA 551:10 applies because his mother was domiciled in New Hampshire at the time of her death and her estate consists of only personal property. The respondent argues that “[t]he intent of Marie G. Dow is clear,” (bolding and capitalization omitted), pursuant to Article Ninth of her will, that Massachusetts law should apply and asserts that New Hampshire “give[s] effect” to choice-of-law provisions in wills. We agree with the petitioner. The probate division's findings that the testator's estate consists of only personal property and that she was domiciled in New Hampshire at the time of her death are not challenged on appeal and need not be disturbed. We review the probate division's application of law to undisputed facts de novo. Under New Hampshire law, personal property of a testator generally passes according to the law of the state of domicile. Compare Eyre, 37 N.H. at 120 (“The general principle of the common law is, that the right and disposition of movables is to be governed by the law of the domicil of the owner.”), with Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 199, § 1 (West 2012) (stating that Massachusetts, when administering the will of a non-inhabitant of the Commonwealth, will dispose of the estate “according to his last will, if any; otherwise ... his personal property shall be distributed and disposed of according to the laws of the state or country of which he was an inhabitant”). Our law comports with Section 263(1) of the Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws, which provides: Whether a will transfers an interest in movables and the nature of the interest transferred are determined by the law that would be applied by the courts of the state where the testator was domiciled at the time of his death. Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws § 263(1), at 121 (1971). Compare id. (pertaining to transfers of personal property by will), with id. § 239(1), at 48 (“Whether a will transfers an interest in land and the nature of the interest transferred are determined by the law that would be applied by the courts of the situs.”). Because the testator's will disposes of only personal property, i.e., “movables,” the nature of the interests in this property will be determined by the laws of New Hampshire — where she was domiciled at death. Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws, supra § 263(1), at 121. The law in New Hampshire is clear, and we are not persuaded that there is a reason to deviate from it in the instant case. The respondent relies upon our decisions in In re Farnsworth's Estate, 109 N.H. 15, 241 A.2d 204 (1968), and Royce v. Estate of Denby's, 117 N.H. 893, 379 A.2d 1256 (1977), in support of her position that Massachusetts’ pretermitted heir statute applies to the will because New Hampshire law honors the testator's intent, as expressed in Article Ninth of Marie G. Dow's will, to have her estate “administered and enforced according to the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” This reliance is misplaced. The respondent emphasizes that the court, in In re Farnsworth Estate, “gave effect to the choice of law provision in [the testator's] will.” However, our review in that case was limited to the testator's designation of New York law as the law to apply to her testamentary trusts. In In re Farnsworth's Estate, the testator was a domiciliary of New Hampshire at the time of her death though her will was “drawn and executed in New York City.” The testator's will stated that it shall be administered in the State of New York and shall be construed and regulated by the laws of the State of New York.” We noted that the administration and validity of a “ ‘trust of movables ... created by will’ ” is generally governed by the law of the state of the testator's domicile at death, but explained that there are “ ‘two situations in which the law of another state may be applied to the administration of the trust. The first is where the testator has designated the law of another state as the governing law. The second is where the testator has fixed the administration of the trust in a state other than that of his domicile at death. We determined that the will “created both of these situations” and, thus, held that “these trusts were intended to be and should be administered in the State of New York.” Here, the testator did not establish a testamentary trust. The fact that the will at issue in In re Farnsworth's Estate disposed of the testator's property via testamentary trusts was essential to our reasoning and our decision in that case. see also In re Lykes' Estate, 113 N.H. 282, 284, 305 A.2d 684 (1973) (holding provision of will that testamentary trust be construed according to laws of Texas was “a valid provision which must be respected by this court” (citing Scott, supra §§ 574-75; Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws, supra § 268(1), at 143). The pertinent rules to apply to dispositions of property via will are dependent upon the form of the disposition and the form of the property. See, e.g., Haynes v. Carr, 70 N.H. 463, 463, 480, 49 A. 638 (1900) (“There is a wide distinction between a gift to charity and a gift to a trustee to be by him applied to charity.” (quotation and emphasis omitted)); Eyre, 37 N.H. at 120 (a decedent's personal property passes according to the law of the state of domicile, while real property passes according to the law of the state where it lies). Therefore, in the instant case, In re Farnsworth Estate does not support deviating from New Hampshire law as the law governing the disposition of personal property in Marie G. Dow's will. cf. Robbins v. Johnson, 147 N.H. 44, 45, 780 A.2d 1282 (2001) (“The pretermitted heir statute, on its face, applies to ‘wills,’ not to trusts.”). Similarly, the fact that the testator in Royce became a domiciliary of New Hampshire after she had become incapacitated and never regained capacity before her death was essential to our reasoning and our decision in that case. “The Royce holding was limited to the facts of that case, which are distinguishable from those before us.” In Royce, we recognized that, because the testator had no opportunity due to her incapacity to change her will after her move to New Hampshire, it was inequitable to apply the New Hampshire rule that the law of the domicile controls the succession to personal property when the testator had no opportunity to respond to New Hampshire law. Here, the testator had an opportunity to change her will after relocating to New Hampshire approximately a year before her death.3 Therefore, Royce does not support deviating from New Hampshire law as the law governing the disposition of personal property in Marie G. Dow's will. We note that our prior case law, contemplating the applicability of New Hampshire's pretermitted heir statute where the facts implicated more than one jurisdiction, has not expressly dealt with a provision like that of Article Ninth in Marie G. Dow's will, expressing her intent to have her estate “administered and enforced according to the laws” of another state — the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See, e.g., In re Estate of Rubert, 139 N.H. at 276, 651 A.2d 937 (applying Virginia law to determine whether the plaintiff was a pretermitted heir entitled to an intestate share of the testator's personal property where the testator was domiciled in Virginia). While it is true that we attempt to give maximum effect to a testator's intent, our law does not support the application here of another state's pretermitted heir statute independent of the governing law of the testator's domicile at death with respect to dispositions of personal property. Section 264 of the Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws supports a testator's ability, in bequeathing interests in personal property, to select the rules of construction of another state for use in construing the language of her will. See Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws, supra § 264(1), at 125 (“A will insofar as it bequeaths an interest in movables is construed in accordance with the local law of the state designated for this purpose in the will.”); id. § 264 cmt. e at 126-27 (“The forum will give effect to a provision in the will that it should be construed in accordance with the rules of construction of a particular state.”). We have not expressly adopted this section of the Restatement, and we need not consider doing so here because even assuming without deciding that Article Ninth designated Massachusetts’ rules of construction for application to the will, neither Massachusetts’ nor New Hampshire's pretermitted heir statute constitutes a rule of construction. As will be discussed in section III, not only is RSA 551:10 not a rule of construction, it is a conclusive rule of law. We, therefore, hold that New Hampshire's pretermitted heir statute applies to Marie G. Dow's will because she was a domiciliary of New Hampshire at the time of her death and her will disposes of only personal property. Accordingly, the probate division erred in applying Massachusetts law to determine that the petitioner is not a pretermitted heir. In re Est. of Dow, 2019-0752, 2021 WL 199619, at *2–5 (N.H. Jan. 20, 2021) (caselaw citations omitted). The Role Of Federal Courts Notwithstanding the fact that parties to probate cases are frequently diverse in citizenship, there is an obscure court created doctrine that provides that probate cases are a matter of state rather than federal court jurisdiction. (The "well pleaded complaint rule" largely prevents federal question jurisdiction from applying.) Part of the legal justification for this is that probate cases are in rem proceedings that primarily adjudicate rights in a particular collection of property (everything owned by the decedent) rather than primarily providing in personam relief between citizens of different states or countries, the way that a lawsuit for breach of contract or a tort or an injunction might. So, unless title to the real property arises under the conflicting claims of two different states (which almost never happens for obvious reasons in the modern era of accurate surveying of state boundaries), diversity jurisdiction is not implicated.	If the space were owned by a charitable organization, the money left by each individual would be a charitable gift reduced by the fair market value of the food taken, and the proceeds would not be taxable income for the organization because it is tax exempt. As an individual, treating it as income subject to a deduction for cost of production (not including your labor), but with the loss not being deductible as there isn't an intention to profit, would probably be the correct treatment as that treatment is what is usually what is applied to a "pay what you can" arrangement that apart from the price, resembles a business transaction. If no money were collected, it would probably be characterized as a gift by you to the persons taking it, which if less than $16,000 per person per year for all gifts made to that person, would be exempt from gift taxation. You could argue for bargain sale treatment, with the value of the produce taken net of the money left as a gift, and that would be a potentially arguable position if the money left is less than the value of the produce taken. But this characterization would probably not hold up if the amount of money left exceeded the out of pocket cost of growing the produce, in which case treating it as a low value sole proprietorship would be much more defensible than treating the money left by people as a gift to you. Generally speaking, when one person makes a gift and another person makes a counter-gift in a related action, treating each donation in isolation as gifts is not an appropriate tax treatment. I'll see if I can find authority, but, of course, cases with such tiny amounts in controversy almost never result in formal appellate decisions or regulatory action, so any binding authority wouldn't be four square on point factually, which matters in the law where reasoning by analogy and logic often doesn't produce the legally correct result.	I can't help with the relationship issues: here are the legal issues. She legally owns 5% of the house and you own 95% I presume that the loan agreement is a contract between you, her and the lender so removing her name from the loan is at the discretion of the lender, not you or her. I would be very surprised if the lender would allow this without totally refinancing the loan. Whatever arrangements you had with your sister are probably not enforceable because the presumption is that arrangements between family members are not legally enforceable contracts. Unless you can provide evidence that both of you intended to create legally binding obligations for what you assert (like a signed document) then what you say is just hot air. Legally, neither of you have the power to get her name off the loan. As a co-owner she is entitled to live in the property rent free. Each of you is jointly (i.e. together) and severally (i.e. individually) liable for making the loan repayments - in what proportion that should be done is a matter for you two to sort out - the lender doesn't care who pays so long as they get paid. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tenancy_in_common
How to show an officer your insurance card? When a police officer pulls you over, they always ask for the standard trifecta of documents; license registration, and proof of insurance. In ye olden days of yore, insurance companies used to mail you insurance cards you’d keep in your glove box, but they don’t do that anymore. Nowadays, everything is in an app on your phone. My personal policy for any interaction with a police officer (even ones I initiate) is to keep my phone passcode locked (not merely fingerprint/face locked) at all times when an officer is present. However, my insurance app requires me to unlock my phone to show my “virtual” insurance card to the officer, which is not a thing that’s going to happen. I have not been pulled over in many years, but if I ever am, how can I show this information without compromising my own device security?	If they can compel you to show your insurance paper and you don’t want to unlock your phone to do that, then you need to bring it in paper form or suffer whatever consequences there are for not showing them. “Unlocking your phone” doesn’t mean you have to hand it over. Practice how to lock your phone quickly (iPhone: Press a specific button for four second), or just one press if you set up the phone for that. Unlock the phone away from the officer, locate the insurance paper, show it without leaving the phone out of your hand.	Law enforcement activities are out of scope of the GDPR, though there is a similar right to access in section 45 of the Data Protection Act 2018. Access to police bodycam footage can be denied or restricted on various grounds, including to protect the rights and freedoms of others. A separate right to access information held by public authorities is part of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, but it exempts the applicant's own personal data and refers to the DPA 2018 for further restrictions of this right – FOIA is just a fallback in case access is not regulated otherwise. If necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of party A, the footage released to B could be redacted in order to protect A. However, since A and B were both present the footage would not disclose information that B didn't already have. Therefore, redaction might not be appropriate. Given that there is no clear legal guidance and that all of this is context-dependent, I'd expect this to come down to the internal policies of the police department handling the access request. I see no grounds that would require A to be alerted when footage is released to B. A could also make a request to access their data, and should receive information about “the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the personal data has been disclosed”, but this might be limited to protect B.	You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.	Reporting that an SS card is lost or stolen could be useful for two reasons: obtaining a replacement, and finding and prosecuting the perpetrator. You can obtain a replacement card from SSA at any time, and they do not require a justification for a card (they do not investigate thefts). The local police can investigate, but will only investigate a theft (not a simple loss). Their interest would be in prosecuting the perpetrator (and possibly retrieving the stolen property). In the course of investigating, the police will ask (in some form) if you have a clue where it is, and if you do not admit that you know where it is, they can prosecute you, because that would violate your state's version of the false statement law (Washington example here). The physical card is not so important: loan applications etc. don't require producing a physical SS card: what they need is the number on the card.	According to the Crown Prosecution Service's legal guidance Disclosure – Guidelines on Communications Evidence (26 January 2018), the law is that: Investigating officers are required to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether to exonerate or implicate suspects … This will often include the obtaining and analysis of communication evidence whether it originates from devices or social media accounts belonging to the complainant or the suspect or, in some cases, to third parties. See also Disclosure – A guide to "reasonable lines of enquiry" and communications evidence (24 July 2018): The examination of mobile devices belonging to the complainant is not a requirement as a matter of course in every case. There will be cases where there is no requirement for the police to take the media devices of a complainant or others at all … Examples of this would include sexual offences committed opportunistically against strangers, or historic allegations where there is considered to be no prospect that the complainant’s phone will retain any material relevant to the period in which the conduct is said to have occurred and/or the complainant through age or other circumstances did not have access to a phone at that time. There is an extensive discussion of the "issues of principle … that frequently arise in present-day police investigations … linked to the privacy concerns of complainants and other witnesses who are asked by the police to share the contents of their mobile telephones" in Bater-James v The Queen [2020] EWCA Crim 790 (23 June 2020), from paragraph 65 onwards. The end-to-end rape review report on findings and actions (June 2021), at paragraphs 93 – 101, cites this decision and commits the Government to ensuring that: No victim is left without a phone for more than 24 hours … and victims are not asked for information unless it is necessary and proportionate in pursuit of a reasonable line of inquiry. The most recent Rape Review progress update (June 2022), at pages 11 – 12, summarises recent reform in this area, including changes to police practice and passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Chapter 3 of Part 2 of that Act introduces new powers to extract information from electronic devices with the user's informed consent. However, as noted at paragraph 22 of the new Code of practice: Extraction of information from electronic devices (17 October 2022), these powers are distinct from existing "coercive or compulsory powers, such as a search warrant, production order or statutory notice."	The basic reason to avoid speaking to police is the concern that something that you say will provide the police with a basis for arresting you or someone you care about, or charging you or someone you care about with a crime. Often, the reason that the police are talking with someone is specifically for the purpose of developing probable cause or a case to convict someone of a crime, when without your information they wouldn't have that information. Statements far short of a confession to committing a crime can be critical lynch pins in establishing a case against you. For example, a statement that confirms that you were in a particular place at a particular time could link you to a crime that happened at or near that location at that time, when otherwise the police might have no idea where you were at that time and might never link you to the crime. Also, it isn't uncommon for a request for police assistance to end badly, with the police assistance being deployed against you, or the means used by the police to resolve a situation having a deadly or undesired outcome. On the other hand, often you will need to communicate with police. You may need to report a crime for insurance purposes. You may need help when you or someone around you is currently being victimized by someone committing a crime. Cooperating with police to provide information may help to remove someone who is a potential threat to you or someone you care about from the streets. A better rule than "never talk to the police" is really more along the lines of "think twice before talking to the police". You should thoughtfully evaluate if what you hope to gain from doing so is greater than the risk that a case against you as a suspect could be established and is also greater than the risk that if the police do respond when you communicate with them that the situation could end badly. As you do this, try to see yourself from a police officer's perspective. How will you look? Also, are you capable of saying what needs to be said and then stopping, rather than blabbering on out of nervousness. A related notion is that you should be much more wary about talking to the police when the police initiate the conversation than you are when you are the one initiating the conversation. This is because ulterior motives on the part of police that could harm you or people you care about are much more likely when the police initiate the conversation than when you do. Yet another consideration is how much you understand about the situation you are in, how sophisticated you are in dealing with the police, and how glib you are compared to the average person. For example, there are people who a guilty of a crime and are in a situation that they understand well where they are at high risk of being implicated in a crime, where smooth talking can deflect police attention away from you and onto another person or a non-existent suspect. But, not many people are smooth enough and understand their circumstances well enough to pull that off. In general, the more that you fit "the profile" of someone the police are likely to suspect of a crime (e.g. if you are a young adult African American man in a "high crime neighborhood"), the more you should assume that responding to a police inquiry directed to you is a bad idea.	A law enforcement officer not telling you they are a law enforcement officer is not entrapment; it's just undercover police work. Entrapment involves the law enforcement officer inducing the perpetrator to commit a crime that they otherwise would not. Will you be able to avoid future charges initiated with this contact because they were not honest? Of course not, there is no obligation on a law enforcement officer to be honest if being dishonest is in accordance with their job requirements at the time. For example, it is perfectly legal for a male 45-year-old police officer to pretend to be a 14-year-old female on the web in an attempt to catch pedophiles. If the officer induced the perpetrator to request a meeting for the purposes of sex or to request child abuse material then that would be entrapment; if they simply play the role and respond without crossing that line that is OK.	In Connecticut, this is covered by the firefighter's rule. Police and fire personnel entering a property as part of their official duties are considered licensees, which limits the duties of the landowner. The rules are as follows: You can't intentionally hurt or lay a trap for the licensee. If you know or should know the licensee is there, you need to exercise due care with them. You don't have to worry about obvious hazards (but keep in mind that it's harder to see stuff at night). If you're doing something dangerous, you need to watch out for them. If you know about a hidden hazard, you must warn them. I'm not sure how in-depth you need to go with the warnings; various things I find suggest the duty to warn might only be there when you know or should know the licensee is present, but signs are a good idea regardless. On the other hand, if you do need to warn them, you might need to mention the specific locations of the pits you actually know about. However, there's no duty at all to proactively look for possible hazards. This rule originated as a rule for professional firefighters responding to a negligently-started fire: the idea is that professional firefighters sign up to do a dangerous job, and letting them sue for hazards inherent in their job (they aren't called without a fire) is a bad idea. Also, since they cannot be denied entry, go in places not open to the public, and can arrive at any hour, needing to keep the property safe for them is an unreasonable burden. Of course, there's an exception if a law is passed to protect their safety, because statutes override common law. The rule has since been extended in some states to police, and to situations besides the very problem they were called for. Other states have abolished it. In any event, this is for civil liability only: this is when cops can sue for injuries caused to them.
Is it legal to make a contract intentionally confusing? Suppose a company drafts a user agreement that is intentionally hard to understand in order to confuse its customers. Maybe it's needlessly long and wordy, maybe it unnecessarily cross-references various other documents, maybe it has a section in Swahili, who knows. Is there any point where this could make the contract unenforceable? Many people will just click "Accept" on literally anything, and some customers would inevitably accept the agreement in spite of its problems. Assume for the sake of argument that, although the contract is confusing, it is unambiguous, and its terms (though unfavorable) would be legal and enforceable if it were written in plain English. Would a contract like that be valid?	Simply being confusing is not enough to make a contract unenforceable. The law generally operates on the premise that people can understand statutes, regulations and contracts, and that if they don't understand a contract, they won't agree to it. Therefore, if they agreed, they understood: this is a fundamental premise of contract law. However, there are a couple of loopholes, "unconscionability" and "public policy", which could provide an escape. In the proposed scenario, we would assume that there is a huge difference in bargaining power between the customer and company, that some term is unfair (a highly subjective matter reduced to expressions like "shocks the conscience"), and the language of the contract is clearly confusing. "Public policy" generally involves a requirement in a contract that is statutorily prohibited: either the required action is itself illegal, or the law has banned any such clauses in a contract (very commonly, residential leases are statutorily prohibited from including clauses waiving statutory protections of rights). I think that if a contract for some internet thing (e.g. an ISP) had a clause that "unahitaji kukulipa $1 kwa kila siku unayotumia huduma zetu" (you must pay $1 for every day you use the service) that this is not a shocking price, so the contract would be enforceable, even if it ought to be a bit confusing.	Contracts are subordinate to the law Any clause in a contract that is unlawful is void. So, if the law compels you to disclose information then even if a contract prohibits it, disclosure is not a breach. However, in most circumstances, law enforcement officers have no power to compel disclosure - you have a right to remain silent. As such disclosure when it was requested but not required would be an actionable breach of contract. On the other hand, a judge can most certainly compel disclosure.	If the agreement is the result of a binding determinative process like the decision of a court, arbitrator or administrative tribunal, the aggrieved party can go to the court for enforcement. If it isn’t, then the agreement may be enforceable as a contract (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?). Breach of the contract allows the aggrieved party all the normal remedies. In either case, breach by one party does not excuse breach by the other. Of course, the agreement can be worded “you do this then I do that” so if you don’t do this, you are in breach but I’m not. If it isn’t either of the above, it can’t be enforced.	One of the key fundamentals for the formation of a contract is that the parties demonstrate their intention to be legally bound. There are two ways that websites usually use to show that intent by their users: click wrap and browse wrap. With click wrap terms the user explicitly agrees to the terms and creates a binding contract by ticking a box or pressing a button. As far as I am aware there has never been a case where a user has been successful in claiming there was not a contract. With browse wrap terms: For assent to occur the browse-wrap agreement should be conspicuous, state that there is an agreement, and provide where it can be located. it is certainly arguable (IMO with a good chance of success) that the stack exchange browse wrap, with its tiny link embedded among many others at the bottom of the page, is unenforceable. For the circumstances you describe the site tried for a click wrap but due to technical difficulties got a browse wrap. If it can be demonstrated that the user saw the terms or a prominent link to them and continued this would probably be enforceable. Licenses: if the terms contain the grant of a copyright licence then that can be enforced because copyright exists even if a contract doesn't.	As a buyer, you can write anything you want (aside from anything illegal) into a contract, i.e. to withhold the last payment on a item until you check off the final product specs, but that won't make a difference unless the manufacturer agrees to the contract. A contract that is agreed to (written and agreed to (typically signed), or verbal and verbally agreed to) is legally binding; a contract not agreed to is little more than a wishlist. If this involves, as you say, online purchases or when the customer is remote and working through an agent, a contract can still legally binding, but the contract may be more complex. You may need to draft more stipulations into the contract with all involved, (agent and manufacturer); but again, those mean nothing if the contract is not agreed to. See Contracts - Legal Information Institute for an outline of the steps of making a contract: An agreement between private parties creating mutual obligations enforceable by law. The basic elements required for the agreement to be a legally enforceable contract are: mutual assent, expressed by a valid offer and acceptance; adequate consideration; capacity; and legality. The enforcement of breaking a contract is a completely different situation. You may draft arbitration arbitration (Legal Information Institute) into the contract; or may go to civil court.	Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc.	You can have agreements that are not contracts As such, there are not legally enforceable as contracts but may be enforceable under non-contract law. Examples of such non-contractual agreements include social agreements, statutory duties, memorandums of understanding, agreements to distribute cocaine etc. However, that’s not what you have here “No contract” agreements for things like internet or phone services are contracts - the “no contract” terminology is advertising fluff to indicate that the contracts are one-off or short term and don’t lock the customer into a long-term contract. The term “contract” is being used in a generally understood way as meaning a long-term binding commitment not in a strict legal way where virtually every commercial transaction is a contract	In general, "making a reservation" does not create a contract, except when it is obvious that you have a contractual agreement. That would be the case with an airline reservation, and one clear sign is that you have to pay for the ticket when you make the reservation; or, it you don't, then there is no contract, and they can cancel or change the price. You would look for clear signs of an agreement, such as a "agree to terms" button that you have to click. Paying a deposit is another clear sign. Then you would simply look at the terms of the contract to see what their obligation is, and what yours is. They may have strongly committed to providing service in which case you might have a cause for legal action if they break that commitment, or they might have made no specific promises about service in case of intervening events (such as if the chef has a heart attack, or the power goes out). If we do think of this as a contractual matter, you breached your duty as a customer, to be there by 7:30, so even if there is a contract, they didn't break it. The note that you added renegotiating the arrival time was insufficient – it is outside of the contract, and possibly something that they didn't see (they only look at the names and official time blocks reported by the web page). In lieu of a contract, there could be some statutory obligation, i.e. a specific regulation in Sweden saying "if a restaurant accepts a reservation, they absolutely must hold the space available for the entire reserved time", which is an unreasonably onerous business practice that no nation requires.
What if I use a false signature on a contract? Suppose I sign a contract with a company to buy some amount of good in bulk but while signing I faked it, they wouldn't have a way to know if it's my actual signature and if I breach my contract I could just say I never signed it, they won't have any proof as the signature is not mine. How can you protect yourself from this?	In what way is the mark you made not your acceptance of the contract? It doesn’t matter if it’s your name, or someone else’s name, or an X or the Bluetooth logo or a caricature of Donald Trump. You made it - it’s your signature.	Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer.	Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word.	Every state except New York, Illinois, and Washington has adopted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, and those three states have adopted their own electronic signature laws. At the federal level, a law known as ESIGN provides that electronic signatures are valid, and preempts state laws unless the state has adopted UETA or has its own electronic signature law compatible with ESIGN. One requirement of UETA is that both parties have to agree to use electronic signatures. It can't be forced on a party. If you send me a contract electronically and I electronically sign it, the question is whether I meant "I agree to be bound" or something else (like "I read it, this looks fine, send over a paper copy to sign"). By putting in the agreement "I agree to use an e-signature," it's hard to argue that you didn't mean to accept the contract. If you didn't mean to use your e-signature to accept, you shouldn't have put it on a contract saying "an e-signature is accepting the contract." However, you don't necessarily need to put that in the contract for the e-signature to be valid. The question is the intent of the parties, and the court can look at all relevant evidence to decide whether both sides really meant to use e-signatures to accept the contract.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.	You call their employer and impersonate them The onus is on the employer to keep your personal data secure. If they do not take reasonable steps to verify that the caller is indeed you, they fail that duty and can be held to account. So, not a loophole.	You can obviously write anything into a contract that you like. However, the laws of your country always apply, and the laws can tell you that some things are not valid, even if they are in a contract. Such things cannot be enforced. Things in a contract that are valid according to the laws can be enforced. An extrem example would be a contract saying "user6726 pays gnasher $20,000, and gnasher kills user6726's spouse". Since killing your spouse is a very serious crime, even if we both signed it, and even if you paid the $20,000, you couldn't enforce me doing my side of the contract. What does it mean if we say a contract can be enforced? It means if we both sign a contract, and you do your side of the bargain, and I don't do mine, then you can take me to court. If the court agrees, the court can order me to do what the contract says, and/or to pay you damages. If I refuse, the court has ways to "convince" me to do my side of the bargain. For example, they could send bailiffs to my home, who take my property and sell it in an auction to pay for what I should have paid. They can not in most countries send me to jail. Sometimes one side cannot fulfil their side of the contract. If there is a contract that you build a brand new home for me, and I pay you a million dollar, but I not only don't have the money but am hugely in debt, then I can't pay you. Some people will say that you can't enforce your contract which is legally imprecise. You can take me to court etc., but you can't take money from my empty pockets. I might be in trouble though if I signed the contract knowing that I can't pay you; that could be criminal fraud and I might go to jail if a judge and jury believe that I committed fraud.	The document may, but probably doesn't say what it is you are witnessing. For example, a person witnessing a statutory declaration in NSW attests: their qualification to be a witness (JP, solicitor etc.) that they actually saw the declarant sign it that they asked the declarant if they believed their declaration was true that they have known the declarant for more than 12 months OR the declarant provided a photo ID and either their face matched the photo or they had a valid reason for not showing their face. If it doesn't say then what you are witnessing is that the signature was made by a person whom you could identify if necessary (e.g. if the person denied the signature).
Ethnic discrimination in education by the State I found a petition on the potential ethnic discrimination/division of children by the national Ministry of Education. The case describes a possible ethnic discrimination by the Ministry of Education in Moldova, where all the Moldovan children are "forced" by the Ministry to study the History of "Romanians", regardless the ethnicity of children (moldovan, jews, russian, ukranian, romanian, gagauz, etc): all should learn the history of the "romanians". Wondering if there are such analogical legal cases in the Europe or in the World where the State was attacked based on the discrimination in the school object name.	There are many analogous cases throughout the world, but like the petition you cite, they are not legal, they are political, e.g. the Kautokeino rebellion, the Basque conflict, Turkish-only laws in Turkey, Bantu minorities in Somalia, Jim Crow laws in the US. A legal case would be when parties file a lawsuit in some higher court, to force a government to cease a policy of ethnically-based discrimination. There were a number of cases arising in the US, which centered around the policy of "separate but equal" which was found unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education. On the political front, there has been a long standing debate over curricular matters, where not everybody's culture is given equal treatment in public school curricula. In order to successfully sue over the practice, there has to be an underlying legal basis, for example a law mandating that such-and-such be taught in the schools. Washington state law mandates teaching US history, and does not mandate teaching Chinese history, so a lawsuit over not teaching US history would succeed and one over not teaching Chinese history would fail. The courts would find that it is up to the legislature, or the local school board, to establish the rules regarding what is to be taught. It may be that there are cases where a school district is sued because they aren't following the rules set by higher authorities. It is an absolute fact that schools do not teach the history and culture of all of the students in their classes.	Yes, such as this limitation on free speech. Initially, the limitation was "Clear and Present Danger" test (Schenk v. United States, 1919) which held that speech inciting lawless action was not protected speech and thus could be crimilized speech (i.e. Schenk publishing anti-draft fliers during World War I, which advocated draft dodging which at the time was a crime under the Espionage act of 1917). This was later over ruled to the "Bad Tendency" test which allowed for advocacy of criminal actions to be criminilized (Whitney v. United States, 1927. Whitney was accused of helping establish the American Communist Labor Party (ACLP), which held as a party platform the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government in favor of one advocated by the ACLP. This is standard to most Communist Parties at the time around the world. The difference between Schenk and Whitney was that Schenk actively called for a criminal action, where as Schenk was speaking of a future action following other party successes). This was overturned again by Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969) which introduced the "Imminent Lawless Action" test. This explicitly overturned Whitney in addition to other cases not mentioned such as Abrams v. United States (1915), Giltrow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951). It does not overrule Schenk, but it did cast doubt upon the decision made. In the case, KKK leader Brandenburg made a speech advocating for revenge against African Americans and Jews as well as expressing the belief that the United States government actively surpressed White Americans and needed to be opposed. He was charged as advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Imminent Lawless Action added the important componant that the violation must be advocacy of lawless action (revenge against racial minorities) must have a definite future date (like "tonight", "tomorrow", or specific time and date) and a vague future time will not count. And must show intent to break the law (Brandenburg did not specifically intend to break the law... he wanted it changed so it would not be legal before he took action). Additionaly, they found that the mere advocacy of resisting the government did not have any language componant that suggested violent resistance. Brandenburg, as discussed, overturned the reaffirmed B and put Schenk on some shaky ground as parts of Shenk were still relevant (Schenk first introduced that Free Speech was not without restrictions, but some of the case law was not relevent anymore, as Whitney used it as a basis in that decision, as did to a limited extent Dennis, which didn't work well with Whitney for other reasons. It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court does not typically take cases that wholly reaffirm past cases. Typically, their rulings are to clarify situations in a previous case that are not stated by the current extant rulings. For example, if the Supreme Court took a case that called Roe v. Wade into question, the case would more likely test whether Roe allows for a particular practice that isn't all that clear in Roe. It may affirm that Roe is still law, but the new case is not consistent with Roe, which will place a restriction on Roe, but not, figuratively, (pardon the pun) throw the baby out with the bath water.	At the time of annexation of country X someone would have to decide the status of the countries citizens: If all citizens of X are now citizens of the USA, and whether they are legally citizens from the date of annexation or since they were citizens of X, and if they are considered residents in the USA since the day they became residents of X, and if they are retrospectively "born in the USA" if they were born in X. And other things, like whether non-citizen legal residents of X are now non-citizen legal residents of the USA. That has to be decided for many reasons, and the answer to your question follows naturally from this. Maybe you could check on a history site if anyone knows how this worked with Hawaii.	You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey.	Yes. This is infringement. This infringement might be excused by a "fair use" defense but it probably isn't. At a very small scale tailor to a very specific educational program, for example, for just members of a thirty person English class that they are currently taking, it might qualify as educational fair use. But I get the impression that the contemplated translation project is far more ambitious than that. The underlying content of the events reported in the news are not protected by copyright, but the language used to report those events and any translations of that language, is protected. The only reliable way to solve it is to get permission to do so from the holder of the copyright of the source of the new reports you are translating.	tl;dr My assumption: the U.S. government is considering whether to accept refugees and immigrants (given your Syria comment). The background section talks about State attempts to restrict entry. The answer is nuanced since there are different standards for an entrance decision than there are for someone who is already in the U.S. This is because foreign nationals in their home nations aren't "persons within the jurisdiction of the United States," and so laws like the Civil Rights Act only apply in spirit. What does that mean? We wouldn't expect to see the federal government discriminate based on religion, but we might expect to see decisions made about groups that incidentally share an common religion. This is because the federal government has wide latitude when it comes to alienage---which is just a formal name for policies related to non-citizens. While religion is afforded a high degree of protection, the federal government's alienage policies are governed by the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. This implies a practical challenge: things like religion and national origin can be very difficult to disentangle from questions that pertain to the alienage category. For example, a policy might restrict some group's entry "because of" a particular alienage reason and "in spite of" the fact that most of the affected people happen to share a common religion. Background The Equal Protection Clause U.S. Const. Am. XIV § 1 prohibits States from denying any person within its jurisdiction "equal protection of the laws." The Clause is often applied to the federal government as well, via the Due Process Clause U.S. Const. Am. V. See, e.g. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In relation to the clause, laws are reviewed for their constitutionality using either strict, intermediate, or rational basis scrutiny. Strict scrutiny would mean that in order to distinguish based on a particular trait, the government has to have a compelling, narrowly tailored interest, and no less restrictive alternative available. Rational basis just means the government's interest is subject to a lower level of scrutiny (e.g. benefits exceed costs, or don't let in felons). Things like, race, religion, national origin, and some forms of alienage are suspect classes that merit strict scrutiny. This bit about alienage is important. As we'd expect from the above, when States enact alienage statutes, they're subject to strict scrutiny, and when those statues cross the line, the courts have found that State attempts to restrict resident or non-resident aliens encroach upon the federal government's exclusive control over entrance of aliens. Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). In other words, the federal government, not the States, decides whether various "aliens" are admitted. Note: State scrutiny levels when dealing with undocumented immigrants may be context specific. See, e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (children and education). The federal government's authority over immigration is further solidified by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Const. Article VI. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1967). As such, the courts have applied rational basis scrutiny to the federal government's immigration policy. One reason alienage is interesting is that it tends to encompass things like national origin and religion. This doesn't imply the federal government makes its decisions on the basis of religion. In fact, it'd be hard to make an argument that they do. However, since the categories can be so closely entwined, many scholars have argued for a change in standard. Edit In hindsight, this topic seems quite forward looking. A couple weeks after the OP's question a U.S. presidential candidate (Donald Trump) came out in favor of a ban on entry into the U.S. by Muslims. That led to a flurry of activity, and to this insightful blog post by Professor E. Posner.	What a country claims to be the case certainly doesn't guarantee what is the case. The constitution (at least as of 2012) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (aka North Korea) says: Article 67. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and social organizations. Needless to say, North Korea is not generally considered a bastion of free speech. The People's Republic of China has a similar provision in its constitution. When we get to countries where those outside the country consider there to be some level of freedom of speech, there are still restrictions. In the UK, the Official Secrets Act makes it a crime for any person to republish leaked classified information. Germany makes it illegal to deny that the Holocaust happened. Until 2013, Canada made it illegal for a person to use telecommunications to say something that would expose people to hatred for some reason covered by antidiscrimination law. Many, many countries criminalize child pornography. Many, many countries have copyright laws. "Free speech" does not mean "you can say whatever you want and the government can't stop you." It means "as a general rule, the government can't restrict what you're saying because they don't like it." I am unaware of any country with a functional government with unfettered freedom of speech.	If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment.
Stealing my pet back? I was dating this guy for about a month. Within that,He convinced me to let my bird stay with him and he, my dad, and I all agreed that I would get her back if we broke up. Texted him last night and he’s refusing to give her to me and says I can come see her. If I take her without using physical force(unless needed) would I get in any sort of trouble with the law?	You don't state a jurisdiction, but the following will apply in most common-law jurisdictions. If you entered with permission, picked up the bird and walked out with it without any objections then a charge of theft would not stick; you were simply reclaiming your own property with the permission of the householder. However from your post that doesn't sound likely. If your ex objects to you taking the bird then they can call the police. The police will refuse to get involved in arguments about ownership and will just act to preserve the status quo ante. As long as you haven't broken in or acted deceitfully then you haven't committed a crime, but they are unlikely to let you take the bird as long as the person with possession claims legal title. If you try to "steal it back" then you will be guilty of theft, and possibly burglary, criminal damage and maybe other crimes depending on how you did it. Don't go there. You probably need to file some kind of civil case for the return of your property. Details will depend on the jurisdiction, but if you can get a court order for possession then the police should accept that as evidence that you are acting legally when you turn up to reclaim your property. However (again, depending on jurisdiction) you might need to hire a specialist to do the actual repossession; the laws about gaining entry, searching property etc tend to be complicated and you don't want to get on the wrong side of them. This is all on the assumption that the value of the bird is lower than the likely cost of hiring a lawyer. If this is an expensive bird then you need legal advice.	Two people can have an equal interest in real property without being married, and being incarcerated doesn't affect a person's property rights. What matters is that now your ex-wife has a legal interest in the property. As a separate issue, she presumably also has a legal obligation w.r.t. the mortgage (otherwise the quitclaim deed makes no sense). The easiest solution is for the other party to voluntarily transfer their interest in the property to you via a quitclaim deed. A difficult solution is to use the judicial process to remove a person from the title. This could be done if there was fraud involved in the property transfer process, for example if the quitclaim deed was forged (presumably not the case here). You might sue to correct an error which doesn't reflect the terms of the transaction, via a reformation action, but that doesn't seem to be the case (a party not understanding the consequences of transferring an interest isn't an error in the relevant sense). You need to hire an attorney to solve the problem (he will look at all of the documentation relevant for your case for a possible solution).	You are 500km away and you neither intend to do her harm, nor are you personally doing her harm. You are not an accomplice by any means. You may, appropriately, feel a moral obligation to do as much as you can to help, but not doing everything that you wish you could does not make you an accomplice.	This is a fun one. I don't have any particular domain knowledge about this question. So this one is just a guess. My answer is strictly from a practical standpoint. If I were faced with this situation in real life, what would I do? (Technical point: I feel the vagueness of the language, "Is he allowed to" allows me to answer this way.) My assumptions: My assumptions are that: The cost of consulting an attorney on the matter or filing a law suit would likely exceed the combined total cost of the bike and the lock. Usually, the law follows what "feels right" and what makes common sense to the average person. Usually. Not always. But usually. (Legal principles: "Equity follows the law." and "Equity does not aid a party at fault." See this reference.) What I would do: So, I would do the following... (if I were in the U.S.) I would simply cut the bike lock and repossess my bike (unilaterally) if and only if all the following conditions were true in the situation: I could confirm without any doubt that the bike in question is actually my bike and not just another one that looks just like it. I could not find anyone around who looks like they might be the owner of the lock or the other bike. If I could find the owner of either the lock or the bike it is highly likely there was some mistake and the situation could be resolved directly with them. There are no law officers nearby. If so, I would engage them in helping me rectify the matter. If they said it was a "civil matter" and refused to get involved, I would proceed to the next item on this list. I had the tools handy and available to cut or break the lock. If any of the above conditions were false, I would flag down the nearest law officer or call one to the scene to help resolve the issue. Any other approach would seem impractical to me on the basis of my above assumption numbered 1. If I were anywhere outside the U.S., I would involve the local authorities without considering the unilateral repossession option.	Of course The prosecution just needs to prove that the crime happened (or the defendant believed it to have happened) and you helped (in brief, there will be specific elements of the crime that each need to be proved). This would be easier if the primary crime had a convicted perpetrator but it’s not impossible without. Allow me to illustrate with an example. I will set out facts which are somewhat contrived and would not be so clear cut in a real case but for the purposes of the example please take them as undisputed and fully supported by evidence. John and Jill are in a relationship. This relationship is well known to be argumentative with frequent shouting matches and one or the other storming out. This does not amount to domestic violence by either party. John's friend Alan believes (wrongly) that there is domestic violence. During an argument Jill drops dead of a heart attack. John rings Alan distraught and says "I've killed her." Alan assumes (wrongly) that John has murdered Jill. Alan says "i'll take care of it. You go to your dad's". Alan (alone) disposes of the body. John is not guilty of murder (or indeed, anything). Alan is guilty of accessory to murder even though the actual crime never happened. The fact that Alan believed it happened is enough.	Before you go changing locks, you might want to hire an attorney. There is law in Ohio that governs "such" relationship, which are typically landlord-tenant relationships, but might not be strictly construed the way you'd prefer. In a classic landlord-tenant relationship, it is illegal to change locks on a tenant, and if you want a tenant booted out, you have to go through the court process and get the court to order an eviction (carried out by the sheriff). A landlord-tenant relationship need not involve a written lease, all that matters is having an agreement. On the face of it, it looks to me as though you agreed to let your son live there, and his attorney would no doubt point to whatever benefit you received from allowing your son to live there as "consideration" in this verbal (vague) contract. The exact terms of that contract don't matter: what matters is that state law limits what you can do. You can read ORC here on the topic of evictions. Actually physically removing a person is a crime (battery), so definitely don't do that. Lockouts have been illegal since 1973. You no doubt can show the court that your son is now effectively a trespasser, but he clearly did not break in without permission, so the bottom line is probably a visit to the court (unless a letter from the attorney resolves the matter). Alternatively, it could be simpler and cheaper to just go directly for the court process. There are professionally-written manuals for about $20 that spell out the procedures, and an attorney is not actually required to evict someone. You can just treat the situation as a standard landlord-tenant process, give the required notices (using legalese in a notice may well be sufficient). If you do have to file in court, there are a couple hundred bucks of fees associated with filing. It takes time. There is a 3 day notice requirement on your notice, after that you can file the complaint and a hearing is scheduled after that (county dependent: I hear it's about 3 weeks in Franklin). Defendant can stretch that out for a week or so by asking for a continuance to seek legal counsel, but eventually you will prevail unless the judge is too warm-hearted and orders family counseling (you never know, these days). They you apply for the "red tag", the bailiff posts it within a few days, and that gives him 5 days to leave. If that doesn't work, you call the bailiff for the physical removal, and they probably respond within a couple of business days.	In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it.	If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.
Can I block an ADU that blocks my ocean view, invades my privacy, and casts a shadow on my solar panels? A neighbor intends to construct an ADU that will completely block my ocean view and invade my privacy by inviting residents to congregate directly in front of my living room windows. Also, at 16 feet in height it will cast a shadow on my existing solar panels. Can he do that?	It depends on the location and the nature of the structure. In Seattle, for example, it requires a permit. Usually, any such structure does require a building permit, which means that the government has to approve the plans w.r.t. offset requirement, height requirements and so on. There may be a view ordinance, or not; you may have a view easement, or not. Whatever the case may be, you should not assume that the government agency in charge will vigorously work to protect your interests over the neighbor's interest. You own attorney is the one who will vigorously and professionally defend exclusively your interests (likewise, the neighbor's attorney). Your description doesn't explain how this would "invite residents to congregate directly in front of my living room windows", which seems unlikely for a dwelling. If for instance this is really a bar and not a dwelling, then zoning issues about businesses arise.	There is no such law mandating this layout, nor is there any law permitting the defendant to demand a change to it. The arrangement seems most likely to have been driven by security concerns when courts began removing "the dock" and letting the defendant past the bar to sit with his attorneys. One court has also concluded that it was meant to assist the government "because it bears the burden of proof." It's of course impossible to prove a negative like this, but I'll note that Kenneth Lay's attorneys raised the issue in the Enron case, and they were unable to cite a single case saying that the defendant has the option to sit closer to the jury. If they couldn't find it, it probably doesn't exist. Meanwhile, the government was able to find several cases saying that the defendant does not have the right to demand a change, though it did not have any cases saying that the layout is mandatory. Instead, it described itself as "traditionally" having a right to the table. In that case, the judge ended up splitting the baby. Saying that there was "no law" to inform his decision, he sat the government next to the jury during its case, and it sat the defense next to the jury during its case. That was quite a bit more generous than the Seventh Circuit, which has rejected the jury-proximity argument as frivolous. So there are some cases addressing the issue, but I don't know of any case where a court has actually looked at the issue and given any real consideration to the due-process implications of the substantial empirical evidence suggesting that the party closest to the jury enjoys an advantage.	Sure, you can sue; but who are you going to sue? You have to prove someone knew about the fact that one condo resident was going to be paying for the other condo's hot water. Mixed up plumbing and electrical systems are fairly common in apartment and condo complexes, especially ones that have been converted. Chances are high it's a mistake and was not done on purpose. If you can find the original general contractor, he's going to say it wasn't him, talk to the plumbing contractor. Who will say I didn't do it, and my work is only guaranteed for five years, so talk to the plumbing inspector. He'll say he didn't see it, and besides, all those inspection records were thrown out ten years ago. The condo association may or may not have had oversight of the construction. Can you prove the neighbor knew about it and didn't tell the condo association? Can you prove the realtor who your dad bought through knew about it? Was there a home/condo inspection done - paid for by your dad or the seller - before the sale that might have spotted it? The police aren't going to care; technically, it is a crime, in a way, but it's not like someone tapped into someone's cable TV or electrical power meter last week. This is a problem from years ago, more than likely from the original construction; so who is really responsible? The police aren't going to run that down. And, what are the damages? A few months of part of a power bill? Is it really worth a lawsuit and a lawyer? Against who? I can't see a lawyer jumping into it. If you want to do something for whatever comes next, yes, collect evidence. Tell the neighbor he/she's on your hot water. Take photos and get a licensed plumber to take a look at it and give you an estimate for separating the water systems. That will document that the two systems are not separate. (Either call your own plumber or ask the condo association for the name of someone). Then, start with the condo association. They may be responsible for the inspections before the sale. At very least, the condo association may have to check off on the repairs. And, they may know more about it (oh, yes, we've heard about that in a few other condos...) You could bring it to everyone's attention at a meeting; it may be a common issue in the complex, and other residents may not know about it. If, in fact, the neighbor doesn't have their own water heater, they may be more on the hook for expensive repairs than your dad. They may have more of a case against the condo association than your dad.	Your problem is not just that you don't have a working stopcock, but that you now know that you don't have one. Of course it's not illegal by itself, the problem is what is going to happen if you have an insurance case. Your home insurance most likely has to pay for accidental damage. But any damage that would be caused by not being able to close the stopcock, when you knew it wasn't working, they could claim that this is due to gross negligence. Whether they would succeed with that claim or not, I don't know, but fixing the stopcock seems to be a much, much cheaper solution. PS. Seems I made a wrong assumption here - that it was your home, owned by you. The same reasons that would have made it a good idea for you to fix the stopcock obviously make it a good idea for the landlord as well. So I would make sure that you tell the landlord as soon as possible. If something goes wrong, and the insurance doesn't pay, your landlord would be responsible for the damage. Whether it's legal to not fix the stopcock - that's a different matter. I thought you were the owner. You would have endangered yourself and your property. Nothing illegal with that. But with the landlord it's different; he wouldn't be endangering himself but someone else's property.	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.	There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court.	My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here.	This hinges on what you mean by "spy". Generally, a landlord cannot enter a leased or rented property* without the tenant's consent, nor can their agents. (They can arrive and ask to enter, as can your neighbors whether or not you own your home, but you are not required to acquiesce in either case). A landlord can view the publicly viewable portions of the property at their leisure, as can their agents, or any member of the public for that matter. A landlord could possibly be notified of a tenant's actions in a number of ways: such as viewing the public portions of the property, being notified (or billed) by utilities or public agencies, or receiving complaints from the neighbors. A neighbor has no more, and no less, legal ability to spy on you if you owned your home vs if you rent your home. So, they would have no more right to, say, spy at your house with a telescope than if you owned the property yourself, but no less right to complain if you have a loud (or audible) party or a large number of guests; the only difference being they can complain to someone who could potentially do much more than they could if you owned the property yourself. Thus, the answer to your question depends on what is meant by "spying". *This assumes that this is a separate property; a landlord who rents out a room in their own home often has far greater rights.
US states and legal tender (money) I was of the understanding that all governmental bodies inside the US were required to accept all forms of legal tender. In other words, if you owed a $1,000 fine to the federal, state, or local government, you could pay in 100,000 pennies and that governmental body or agency has to accept the payment. On this page of US Treasury's website, it states only private entities do not have to accept US currency. This would not include any federal, state, or local governmental bodies or agencies. If this is the case, how can Michigan law 21.153 exist? Here is an example of a local government not accepting coins as payment in Michigan.	Your understanding of “legal tender” is flawed There is plenty of case law to show that governments can place reasonable restrictions on payment by legal tender up to and including excluding it entirely. Picano v Borough of Emerson explains this very succinctly: Finally, there is no basis for concluding that defendants violated 31 U.S.C. § 5103. Section 5103 provides that "United States coins and currency . . . are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues." None of the cases cited by plaintiff stands for the proposition that § 5103 requires a local government (or any other entity) to accept payment in cash, and no court has so held. The refusal by governments to accept pennies (or any other small denomination) has withstood challenge multiple times. 31 U.S.C. § 5103 does not create a requirement to accept cash.	I don't know of any cases where a court has done this, but the law would permit it in an appropriate circumstance. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) federal courts in the united-states may grant relief beyond what the complaint demands: Final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings. The same is true in new-york under N.Y. C.P.L.R. Law § 3017: The court may grant any type of relief within its jurisdiction appropriate to the proof whether or not demanded.	No. You have to pay taxes no matter what currency you are paid in, or for that matter, in most barter transaction as well. You would have to pay taxes even if you were paid in goats. Also, the counter-parties in transactions in which you are paid in Bitcoin and earn money often have an obligation to file information tax returns to the IRS. If you don't report the income, both you and any counter-party subject to reporting requirements could be liable for the tax as well as for penalties and interest and possible criminal charges as well for intentionally evading taxation and filing false tax returns.	None First, only cash transactions are reportable: electronic and cheque transactions aren't. The only ones that will be reported are your single withdrawal and deposit. As you say $10,000 is not a lot of money. What law enforcement is looking for a people who frequently have large cash transactions: they use data matching algorithms to identify these people. Your single transaction will not be noticed.	This is tied up in the concept of sovereignty - nation states have control over their territories and citizens and they recognise the right of other nation states to do likewise. The USA, China (Hong Kong) and Panama are all sovereign states, they each decide what the law is within their own territory and they can’t tell each other what to do; they can ask, however, that’s what diplomats do. If a HK domiciled company provides HK based servers then they have to comply with HK law irrespective of where their customers are located. The USA could pass a law requiring US companies (like ISPs) to keep logs of traffic to and from HK servers but they cannot force a HK company to do anything, unless and until it operates in a place where the US has jurisdiction which means both the right and the ability to enforce their law.	In general, you still need to pay for the drink. If you had purchased the drink (on credit, ie a tab or similar as you appear to have done), and you had offered the vendor CASH, and he had refused, [if you can prove you offered him cash] he would be unable to pursue you for the debt (technically you would still owe it to him, but as he had declined government issued tender the government won't act on his claim, so he has no remedy available to him to extract payment - although he can refuse to serve you in future etc). Paying through a debit card is not the same as paying cash - although the money goes out of your account and into his, its not "legal tender" in the same way cash is.	Every state except New York, Illinois, and Washington has adopted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, and those three states have adopted their own electronic signature laws. At the federal level, a law known as ESIGN provides that electronic signatures are valid, and preempts state laws unless the state has adopted UETA or has its own electronic signature law compatible with ESIGN. One requirement of UETA is that both parties have to agree to use electronic signatures. It can't be forced on a party. If you send me a contract electronically and I electronically sign it, the question is whether I meant "I agree to be bound" or something else (like "I read it, this looks fine, send over a paper copy to sign"). By putting in the agreement "I agree to use an e-signature," it's hard to argue that you didn't mean to accept the contract. If you didn't mean to use your e-signature to accept, you shouldn't have put it on a contract saying "an e-signature is accepting the contract." However, you don't necessarily need to put that in the contract for the e-signature to be valid. The question is the intent of the parties, and the court can look at all relevant evidence to decide whether both sides really meant to use e-signatures to accept the contract.	In Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021), the US Supreme Court addressed a case that sought one dollar in nominal damages. I'm assuming you mean only claims involving money damages as a remedy, because there are many claims every year involving no literal money damages and the remedy sought is some other kind of relief (although such relief would still have practical or economic value).
Could doctors who do circumcisions be prosecuted for sexual assault? Logically, its sexual assault regardless of parents consent. If I go around cutting people I will be charged with assault regardless of parents consent. Cant the doctors just be charged with sexual assault since there was never any loophole where circumcision became not sexual assault? Why is circumcision not prosecuted but other forms of sexual assault are? If surgery is ok, then what law authorizes surgery and are surgeons allowed to do literally anything to kids with parental consent? Can a surgeon eg chop your arm off for fun? Is there a specific law saying a medical reason is an acceptable defense to assault?	Surgery is not assault when consent is given. Surgery on an infant requires the consent of a parent, who generally are legally entrusted with the right to give consent on behalf of the child (assuming they haven't have that right taken away by the court). Circumcision on an infant without parental consent is assault, unless it is a medical necessity. Also, "sexual assault" is a legal term of art which depends on jurisdiction -- it isn't necessarily "sexual assault" since it involves no penetration or sexual gratification. We'd have to look at the laws of the jurisdiction that you had in mind to see if e.g. unconsented adult circumcision is deemed sexual assault.	Some people seem to believe that just because something happens 'in the internet' it is somehow outside normal jurisdictions. Wrong. In may be harder to investigate and prosecute crimes in the internet, but the laws apply all the same. There are some problems when it is unclear 'where in the world' something did happen -- in the jurisdiction of the perpetrator, the victim, or the service provider? But problems of jurisdiction apply e.g. to international fraud cases in the non-web-world as well. In many jurisdictions, the informed and voluntary consent makes some things legal which would otherwise be illegal. For instance, if two boxers get into the ring, it is understood that each of them did consent to be hit by the other. But usually two fighters could not legally agree to a fight to the death, because even if there are laws on assisted suicide, they do not apply to a fight. Insults, libel, and slander are not on the same level as homicide. There are jurisdictions where they are not prosecuted without the request of the victim. But an insult might also violate other laws, e.g. disturbing the peace. So don't bet on such an app unless you know for sure which jurisdictions are involved.	In the US, there are no (and can be no) laws against hate speech. You also cannot sue a person for using an ethnic or similar epithet. A false accusation, however, might be grounds for a defamation lawsuit. Word connotations do not matter, what matters is the denotation, for example calling someone a "rapist" denotes a specific criminal act. Even calling someone a rapist isn't necessarily defamatory, since hyperbole abounds especially on the internet, so in order to actually be defamation, the statement would have to be understood as a particular accusation (a form of unlawful sexual assault). A defamatory statement has to be made with reckless disregard for the truth of a statement, which is not the case in the situation you describe (perhaps the person correctly said that so-and-so is a therapist, but was ineffective in their use of English).	If I did punch him , would that be okay? No, that would be Assault and Battery. If you did him serious injury you could face a charge of Grievous Bodily Harm. If you killed him, that would be murder. If you are in the UK, Canada or Australia and you were charged with murder you could claim provocation in an attempt to have the charge reduced to Voluntary Manslaughter. If you were in the US you could attempt to argue "extreme emotional or mental distress" if you are in a state that has adopted the Model Penal Code for any of the charges; if successful your sentence would be reduced. I saw people punch one another over this in movies. And I saw aliens invading the Earth in the movies - what happens in the movies if not necessarily true. Kissing my wife is adultery right? No, extramarital sex is adultery. Notwithstanding, adultery is not illegal in common-law countries. I'm pissed and don't know what to do? I sympathise with you but this is not a legal question. Whatever is going on between you, your wife and your neighbour is a social situation; not a legal one.	It is definitely illegal in Russia as well, but the police will do nothing. Previous activity of this group included forcefully attacking people who tried to speak to a girl who disliked it and handling over such people to police to get fined "for hooliganism". Usual practice in Russia is to beat the people whom the random girls around dislike. This group stepped a bit further, involving police. They use illegal or questionable methods, definitely. But they use them in a manner that people would be unlikely to complain to police because they themselves either did something illegal or public opinion is not on their side. The police usually will do nothing even with much more serious violations, like beating somebody.	In the US, it depends on why you are doing this, and how you go about performing the operation. There are approved devices and procedures, and there is the other stuff. In an emergency that is life-threatening or threatens severe debilitation, it is permitted for a physician to try an extreme measure – if the state has a "Right to Try" law. Otherwise, a review and official approval by the relevant IRB is required. The devices are regulated by the FDA, but the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, so the feds don't have a say in whether a procedure is allowed. Nevertheless, use of unapproved devices can be taken to be evidence of failing to meet the required standard of care, in the case of a malpractice suit or punitive action by the state regulatory board. There is no specific law prohibiting removing lots of organs and replacing them with prostheses, though arguable what happened was that the brain was removed (it's not that a replacement shell was built around the person). Ordinarily, intentionally "killing" a person is illegal (except in case of sanctioned execution or self-defense). There is zero case law that would tell us whether removing a brain from a body "kills" the person. Most likely, there would be a prosecution for unlawfully causing a death, and either the legislature would tune up the law w.r.t. the definition of "causing death", or the courts would do so.	This is a mixed bag of so-called "laws", often interpreted in an unfavorable or satirical light. Because of this, you might say that none (save one) of these laws are literally laws, but they are the effects of laws that do exist. I'll do my best to sort this out. A fine of $25 can be levied for flirting. Almost certainly an anti-prostitution law taken to the extreme. I only found one example of a bill, but it failed, and was only tangentially related. It's not hard to imagine that at some point, flirting was technically illegal. A license must be purchased before hanging clothes on a clothesline. This is most likely a satire of the actual law, which probably states that you cannot hang anything out your window or in your yard without a permit. Many cities and states have rules about what you can, and can't, put on your property. These are usually related to health and/or aesthetics. Carmel: A man can't go outside while wearing a jacket and pants that do not match. It's too hard to track this one down right now, but that sounds like a satire of something like a specific situation where a person must be wearing specific clothing. For example, I would imagine a firefighter or school crossing guard having these requirements for safety reasons. Citizens may not greet each other by "putting one's thumb to the nose and wiggling the fingers". Edited for clarity While we do have the First Amendment right to Free Speech, it is sometimes recognized in jurisdictions that certain actions and phrases may pass the "imminent lawless action" exception. It is likely some kind of ordinance that prohibits being unnecessarily rude to the point where the offender may end up being assaulted or worse as a result of the gesture. This gesture was known as early as Shakespeare, with the "I thumb my nose at thee" line, also known as the "cock-a-snook" gesture in some regions. Of course, the actual law is probably much more nuanced than that, and this is just a funny way of reducing this law down to the most absurd example that someone could think of. Thanks to some comments, I just realized that this is very likely § 240.20 Disorderly conduct. A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: ... In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or ... Several states have some sort of statute like this that are technically First Amendment Free Speech violations, yet generally recognized by those jurisdictions as having legal force, since the purpose is to discourage violence that can be caused by "fighting words." Donkeys are not allowed to sleep in bathtubs in Brooklyn, N.Y. This is likely a structural integrity joke that doesn't hold up well (sorry, couldn't resist). Floors only have limited strength. If you look up the weight of a cast-iron bathtub and the maximum weight of a full-grown donkey, you'll find it weighs just less than a ton (about 1,800 pounds, assuming a heavy tub and large donkey). Someone probably saw a law about the maximum weight you can put on a floor, then looked up how much things weigh, and the joke practically writes itself. During a concert, it is illegal to eat peanuts and walk backwards on the sidewalks. Again, this is probably taken out of context, but I presume that someone was doing something stupid and got hurt or killed, so a law was written about not walking on the sidewalk without paying attention to where you were walking. For example, if a sidewalk had a open manhole cover or something, and a person fell in. This is just a hyperbole example of the actual law, whatever it may be. In New York, you can teach your pet parrot to speak, but not to squawk. Easy. Noise ordinance law somewhere. A parrot's squawk can exceed 105 dB, and is generally disruptive to living next door to you in a thin-walled apartment. This person just found something really loud, and translated this law to match that law's prohibition. It's unlikely you'll find a law this specific, but noise ordinance laws exist in many areas. My area is 75 dB during the day, 70 dB at night. In New York City it's illegal to shake a dust mop out a window. That's definitely still on the books. It's part of the littering law. Littering, sweeping, throwing, or casting any material such as ashes, garbage, paper, dust, or other garbage or rubbish into or upon any street or public place, vacant lot, air shaft, areaway, backyard, court, or alley is illegal. Throwing garbage out of windows (for example, from buildings or vehicles) is also a violation. In addition, no person may allow anyone under his/her control (agent or employee) to commit a littering, sweep- out, or throw-out violation. Merchants must put all sweepings into suitable garbage receptacles for pickup by a private carter. Residential units must put sweepings into suitable garbage receptacles for pick up by DSNY. Sanitation litter baskets may not be used for this purpose. It is against the law to throw a ball at someone's head for fun. As far as I can tell, this has a serious history. Carnival workers ("carnies") often had setups that involved heavy solid balls. The kind that could literally cause concussions if they were hit in the head. Dunk tanks, knock-stuff-over games, and so on. Presumably, people thought it would be funny to assault the carnies, so laws were written. Of course, assault is already illegal, but it was probably put there was a way to let people know it was a serious situation. Jaywalking is legal, as long as it's not diagonal. That is, you can cross the street out of the crosswalk, but you can't cross a street diagonally. This is really just saying that there's no law prohibiting jaywalking specifically, but there are laws about when you're allowed to cross an intersection diagonally. Again, making it sound weird or strange. It's just a loophole in the lawbooks. Presumably, if people started getting hit while crossing mid-street, they'd add a new law to address that. Slippers are not to be worn after 10:00 P.M. This is likely another oversimplification. It's probably something more like "you have to wear solid-soled shoes at night to protect your feet from broken debris and rats" or something like that. Staten Island: You may only water your lawn if the hose is held in your hand. This is likely a water conservation law. Automated sprinklers and lawn sprinklers waste water. In an effort to combat that problem, requiring hand-holding your hose makes you more likely to not overwater your lawn. While riding in an elevator, one must talk to no one, and fold his hands while looking toward the door. Of this list, this one is presumably a satire law that makes a statement about societal customs in some places of New York. It's highly unlikely this would be real law, but rather an expectation of how to behave in an elevator if you didn't want to have a bad experience. So, overall, I'd say that virtually none of the laws actually read like they do on this list, but some variant of the law in a more generalized form probably does exist.	It is not obvious that is it illegal in Washington state. Everett WA has local ordinances against "lewd conduct" (there are versions of this at the state level and in most municipalities). Having sex and masturbation are included in the class of "lewd acts", and are also included in "sexual conduct". An activity is "obscene" if three things are true. First, the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest and when considered as a whole, and in the context in which it is used, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. I think having sex or masturbating could pass these two tests. The third condition is that the act explicitly depicts or describes patently offensive representations or descriptions of... [sex, masturbation, or excretion] The prohibition is more narrow: A person is guilty of lewd conduct if he or she intentionally performs any lewd act in a public place or under circumstances where such act is likely to be observed by any member of the public. If lewd conduct were completely illegal, you could not excrete or have sex withing the city limits. Now we have to turn to the definition of "public place": an area generally visible to public view, and includes streets, sidewalks, bridges, alleys, plazas, parks, driveways, parking lots, automobiles (whether moving or not), buildings open to the general public, including those which serve food or drink or provide entertainment and the doorways and entrances to buildings or dwellings and the grounds enclosing them, and businesses contained in structures which can serve customers who remain in their vehicles, by means of a drive-up window Focusing not on the probable intent but on the words, it is primarily defined as "an area generally visible to public view". Your house qua building is probably generally visible to public view, as is a public toilet or hotel. The inside of your bedroom is probably not generally visible to public view, nor is the inside of a toilet stall. While the building is probably a public place, a closed stall within the building does not meet the definition (nor does a hotel room). It might however qualify under the clause "or under circumstances where such act is likely to be observed by any member of the public". The statute does not give a definition of "observe", but under ordinary language interpretation, observation may be seeing or hearing. Silent sex, masturbation or defecation might not qualify as being public. Obviously, excretion in a stall of a public bathroom cannot be a lewd act, presumably because the average person does not generally consider ordinary excretion as appealing to the prurient interest: but there could be contexts where it does. Another avenue for prosecution is the Indecent Exposure state law which is when one intentionally makes any open and obscene exposure of his or her person or the person of another knowing that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. It is totally non-obvious that sex or masturbation in a toilet stall is "open". There is a slippery slope regarding quiet sex or masturbation w.r.t. knowing that the conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. Because the contexts where sex and masturbation are not clearly spelled out by statutory law, the matter would depend on how courts had interpreted previous cases. There have been arrests in Washington of people having bathroom sex, but I don't know if anyone has ever or recently-enough been convicted for having quiet sex out of view in a toilet stall, or similar place. There is a potentially applicable case, Seattle v. Johnson, 58 Wn. App. 64, which seems to involve public sex, and the conviction was overturned because the complaint was defective, in not including the element "that the defendant must know 'that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm'". It is not clear from the appeal what the act actually was – it probably was for public nudity. There is also an decision by the state appeal court division 3 (not publicly available) in Spokane v. Ismail which, in connection with a charge of public urination declares that "A toilet stall is not a public place. The center of Riverfront Park during the lunch hour is a public place", in connection with an ordinance just like the Everett one against public lewd acts.
Can POTUS make FDA approve a drug (such as hydroxychloroquine), or make it available over the counter? President Trump is known to have taken hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) as a prophylactic against COVID-19. Some prominent medical scientists also came out in support of HCQ for outpatients (as opposed to inpatients, where it's considered ineffective). Yale professor of epidemiology, Dr. Harvey A. Risch stated that he believes that ~100,000 American lives would be saved by HCQ. The FDA initially authorized HCQ for inpatients, but later revoked this authorization. It's currently prescription-only for certain diseases other than COVID-19 (malaria, rheumatoid arthritis, lupus) The issue has been politicized and beset by controversy and fraud. What I'd like to know is if POTUS has the power to compel the FDA to issue an emergency use authorization or to make HCQ available over the counter?	No. Congress, in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, gave the the power to regulate drugs to the FDA, not the President. In addition to giving the FDA jurisdiction, Congress also set up requirements and procedures that the FDA must use to classify and reclassify drugs. (The FDA, acting under the APA and other statutes, has engaged in further procedural rule-making as well.) These procedures require the FDA to hold hearings, etc. before making decisions. Since the President can only execute laws passed by Congress, he cannot bypass the FDA or these procedures. To do so would violate the separation of powers. For example, the FDA could grant its Emergency Use Authorization for HCQ because a statute -- 21 USC § 360bbb-3 Authorization for medical products for use in emergencies -- gives it the power to do so. FWIW, interbranch conflicts over FDA decisions are quite common.	According to an HHS guide entitled "Individuals’ Right under HIPAA to Access their Health Information", HIPAA does entitle you to access your medical records; however, the medical provider has 30 days to respond to your request. See the section on "Timeliness". So if the doctor wants to withhold the information until your appointment in 3 weeks, it looks to me like they are legally entitled to do so. Massachussets law has some similar provisions which are linked from the state court system's page on medical privacy. But as far as I could tell, they also only set a 30 day window, and it only applies to requests that are related to a claim for Social Security or a similar program. It doesn't appear that the law is on your side here. You might have more luck just trying to reschedule your appointment for an earlier date, or letting them know that you would take an appointment on short notice in case they have a cancellation.	The short answer is "yes". There is U.S. Supreme Court authority that supports this position, In particular, United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 599 (1965), and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), stand for the proposition that a defendant may not be punished for actions taken in good faith reliance upon authoritative assurances that he will not be punished for those actions. If the U.S. Department of Justice (or a U.S. Attorney with jurisdiction over the place the offense was committed) (hereinafter DOJ) says this, people who reasonably rely on that pronouncement can't be prosecuted until a different policy is announced and people who acted in reliance on the previous DOJ position are given a reasonable opportunity to change their conduct in response to the newly announced policy. The statement does have to be a publicly announced policy (or a policy personally communicated to the defendant or his counsel), and not just a de facto reality in terms of prosecutions not being brought in the past, or a secret, unannounced policy (or, for example, an unofficial and offhand statement of the U.S. Attorney General at a party that does not amount to a policy statement). Of course, the defense doesn't protect you if the DOJ says it won't prosecute if you do X, but you do X times Y which goes beyond the safe harbor created by the DOJ pronouncement. For example, the DOJ might say that they will not prosecute conduct involving marijuana offenses that is legal under state law, if it does not violate any other laws, and also meets certain conditions found in federal law (e.g. no offenses within 1000 feet of a school) that the DOJ chooses not to refrain from enforcing. But, if the DOJ then publicly says that it will start enforcing federal law without exceptions on July 1, 2021 and has rescinded its prior policy, a reasonable time in advance, then this defense ceases for conduct after that date. What constitutes reasonable notice would depend upon the facts and circumstances. The DOJ can also reach a binding agreement not to prosecute a particular instance of conduct by a particular person irrevocably in connection with plea bargaining type agreements, with respect to offenses of which the DOJ has jurisdiction (but not necessarily prosecutions by a different government such as a state government or the government of another country, for which the DOJ is not an authorized representative). For example, suppose that a mail carrier is killed by a resident of a home claiming to have acted in self-defense in Denver, Colorado. The DOJ could reach an irrevocable agreement with the resident to accept a plea bargain to a misdemeanor charge of not paying the tax due on the sale of the firearm from a non-compliant gun shop, dismissing forever the charge of murder of a federal post office employee. But that agreement would not bar the District Attorney in Denver from bringing murder charges twenty years later under state law prohibiting murder of human beings in the State of Colorado. For the defendant resident to prevent that from happening definitively, an agreement from the State of Colorado's District Attorney in Denver, or the Colorado Attorney General, would also be required.	All laws (federal, state and local) apply to everybody, unless you have diplomatic immunity. That is, unless e.g. the federal government decides as a matter of policy to ignore certain federal laws. California does not have a law generally prohibiting the use of marijuana, though public consumption is illegal, minor consumption is illegal, and possession over 28.5 grams is illegal. So that is one less law to be concerned with violating. The federal law still exists, and has not been repealed for anyone. However, the federal government by policy is not pursuing marijuana cases in legal contexts in those states that have legalized marijuana. The complication for foreign students is that there are also immigration laws whereby you may be deported for a drug offense (that link is full of technical details on immigration and drug laws, worth reading). The immigration laws basically make it easy to penalize a foreigner (for example you might be deemed "inadmissible" so you cannot be re-admitted to the US if you leave; it just depends on what their grounds are for action). For example, "a noncitizen is inadmissible as of the moment that immigration authorities gain substantial and probative 'reason to believe' the noncitizen has ever participated in drug trafficking," which does not mean a conviction. It is reported that in California, DHS officers have treated minor infractions as "convictions," which means to be safe you have to avoid even infractions. It appears (and hire an immigration attorney if you want to test this) that trouble only arises if there is reason to believe you are trafficking, if you are a drug addict or abuser, if you are "convicted" (not necessarily "tried and found guilty," it also includes certain legal maneuverings), or if you admit to drug use (even in the case of home use under doctor's orders, i.e. a California-legal context). This incidentally includes non-use but working for the marijuana industry. It is possible that you could get stopped on the street by a random immigration search, and if you are in possession, then... it is not guaranteed that possession of a small amount of marijuana, when caught by federal authorities, cannot lead to immigration problems.	Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it.	A partial answer (for a manufacturer) is "look it up" – that may tell you if a determination has been made by the FDA. If so, it is not new and may require a less extensive review the next time it is included in a new drug product. For example, if a particular inactive ingredient has been approved in a certain dosage form at a certain potency, a sponsor could consider it safe for use in a similar manner for a similar type of product (the FDA says). The legal part doesn't explain how it is scientifically determine that an inactive ingredient raises safety concerns but to take on example, wheat gluten is in the Inactive Ingredient Guide. This article gives a bit of analysis of the factors that sponsors have to consider in shouldering their burden of proof. If you want to manufacture a new vaccine, you have to show (the FDA) that it is safe. If you dilute the vaccine with water, that ingredient is not a "safety factor". Benzalkonium chloride could be (you would have to show that it isn't), and if it is, that regulation requires you to list it. What's not specified clearly is how many adverse reactions per million doses constitute being a safety factor.	The doctor is a professional Engineers don’t put extra wings on airplanes because the client asks. Lawyers don’t throw unsubstantiated allegations in their pleadings because the client asks. Accountants don’t change the balance sheet because the client asks. And doctors don’t prescribe unnecessary medications or vitamins because the client asks. For most people with normal health and a relatively balanced diet, nutritional supplements are medically unnecessary. They may make the user feel better through the placebo affect but doctors prescribe things that are necessary, not things the patient wants but doesn’t need. You can sue a doctor if they are negligent. One sure sign of negligence is if they adopt the treatment plan proposed by the patient without applying their professional judgement.	House Rule XI(m), p. 19, states the power of committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas. (1)…a committee or sub-committee is authorized (subject to subparagraph (3)(A)) …to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses… (3)(A)(i) Except as provided in sub-division (A)(ii), a subpoena may be authorized and issued by a committee or subcommittee under subparagraph (1)(B) in the conduct of an investigation or series of investigations or activities only when authorized by the committee or subcommittee, a majority being present. A subcommittee could therefore authorize the chair of the subcommittee to issue subpoenas with no vote at all. Otherwise, the (sub)committee must "authorize" a subpoena, which conventionally means "vote on the motion". There is no requirement that the entire house must vote on subpoenas. There is no question that POTUS did not obey the demand of the House subcommittee. The argument that will most likely be proffered is not that the House violated its rules, but that the House rules exceed constitutional authority in issuing the subpoena. As pointed out in this analysis, this is not a well-established and settled question of constitutional law. There is no rule that requires a full House vote on all subcommittee rules established by a subcommittee that forwards articles of impeachment to the full House. That is, a subcommittee does not have to get prior approval of the full House in order for a subcommittee to conduct business and recommend an action to the full house. Instead, the House simply votes yes or no on the particular articles, following the rules for House votes.
Do police officers in the USA have to carry the law/code book? I have seen several videos recently where police officers in the USA approach or detain someone, and then open a binder with laws/codes of the area and show the people what they violated. Question is, do police officers usually carry such binder? If so, what is it called? Also, can a person call into doubt the officers actions by demanding to review that binder?	It is possible that there is such a booklet in some jurisdiction, and that local police are required to carry that booklet and show it to persons on demand. This link (apparently) publicly provides the police manual for the city of Seattle, except it is 5 years and a major lawsuit out of date. No provision seems to exist that requires showing authority to detain, when requested. There is no general requirement for all police and all laws, in the US, and the full set of state, county and city codes would be impractical to lug around. If required by law to carry and display some such document, then by law a person can demand to see a police officer's authority to detain. Even without such a law, you have a First Amendment right to challenge the detention, but that does not also enable you to resist arrest. A detention is not invalidated by the fact that the detainee is unsatisfied that the detention is legal.	In Massachusetts where I live, here are the general guidelines: In re G.L. c. 268, § 32B(b). A person can be charged with resisting arrest only when the officer is acting under the color of his official position (meaning he is on duty and acting according to those duties). The Commonwealth must also prove that the defendant knew that the person seeking to make the arrest was a “police officer.” The Commonwealth may do so by proving that the officer was in uniform or, if not in uniform, identified himself (herself) by exhibiting his (her) credentials as a police officer while attempting to make the arrest. Such credentials would include such things as a badge, insignia, identification card, police radio, or other police equipment such as a clearly identified police vehicle. Thus, in Massachusetts according to usual legal interpretation: (1) The officer must be on duty and acting in an official capacity. (2) The officer must be provably known to be a police officer by some means to the person charged. Resisting arrest must be ancillary to some other charge. You cannot just be charged with "resisting arrest" unless you are actually being arrested on some other charge (or interfering with someone else being arrested). So, as far as a search is concerned, even if the resisting arrest charge were thrown out, the real question would be why was the person being arrested in the first place? That would determine the admitability of the evidence.	Although the USA don't like it, there's a department called INTERPOL which is composed by about 150 countries. When a crime is committed and you need to involve another country to solve it, the sovereignty of each County prevents a police officer from one country acting upon another country. That's when the INTERPOL comes in. They usually requests the police from that country to act up. A judge from that country will grant their local police access to the data to be delivered to the country that requested it. Can the police get a search warrant for data 'in the cloud'? Yes. If the servers are located within the boundaries of your own country, it's a normal procedure. But like the above answer states, it's easier to subpoena the records than to execute a search warrant. In a subpoena, the company itself is bound to provide everything the police asks. Can the police get a search warrant for such third party systems? Yes. If there's enough probable cause, the investigation can lead to allow the police to try and discover files that are held by servers that store the cloud data. But if the servers are located outside the country and the company does not have any office opened in the country, a search warrant won't have validity in another jurisdiction and the police can't act without breaking the sovereignty principle. That's where the INTERPOL services are handy. The department is built in the principle of polices from different countries helping each other. The downside is that it's too bureaucratic and it takes a lot of time. For instance if he has a virtual machine hosted by Amazon, would they serve the warrant on Amazon, or on the suspect? Like mentioned by @Viktor, if the company has an office within the bounds of your country, it's easier to subpoena the records because that way the company will filter and provide only the data linked to the suspect being investigated. That is, the subpoena will have both the name of the company (Amazon) and the name of the Suspect, so the company can provide only the necessary files. Update If the police lack sufficient evidence for a search warrant, but an interpol country was, for some reason, willing to work with the police to collect and provide that information would they be able to use it even if they wouldn't have been able to subpoena a US country? Hypothetically speaking, I see your follow-up as a company that do have a local office and the Federal Police was turned down by a judge on a warrant/subpoena. In that case, there's no reason for another's country police to act on their own country. The suspect is a foreign suspect, the crime is a foreign crime and the police has no reason to work on it. But for the sake of argument, let's say that the local police was turned down by a judge for lack of evidence or something and the suspect has been investigated by a foreign country or whatever. If the information that the local police desires to obtain is available through the INTERPOL, it's most likely to be accepted since it's a data stored by an international police department. In your scenario, the foreign police was granted a legal right to search and collected the data for legal purpose. Maybe they can't use it in their own country, but since they followed a safe chain of custody and provided the information to the INTERPOL, that information has legal validity and it is not fruit of the poisonous tree if the chain of custody was maintained.	The powers given to law enforcement professionals will be detailed in the relevant law that establishes them. I would suspect that the decision to cordon off an area would fall within the purview of the officer on the scene; the idea that a police officer would need to seek permission before cordoning off a motor vehicle accident or chemical spill is unworkable. I would also suspect that other emergency personnel (e.g. ambulance and fire-fighters) would have similar powers. However, such cordoning off would be a temporary measure and if it was maintained for an unreasonable period it would be open to challenge through an administrative or judicial process. If the police decided that a feature was a permanent hazard then they could seek a court order on the owner of the property to provide some measure to adequately protect the public, by either removing the hazard or providing some permanent barrier, under whatever laws seemed most appropriate.	There are multiple police forces in the US: city, county, state and national, and each is responsible to a relevant executive. Typical "police" are city police, who are responsible to a chief of police, who is appointed at the municipal level. Counties usually have an elected sheriff, and a set of deputies; at the state level, they are usually called state troopers. The typical protocol is that decisions are made at the lowest applicable level, so Seattle police enforce or refuse to enforce laws within Seattle, and King County police enforce or not in remaining unincorporated locations in the county. Individual city officers do not then decide to ignore the chief of police and instead follow orders from the county sheriff or the governor. However, each state grants vast powers to their governor, so it is possible that in the case of a state of emergency, the governor can take command of all law enforcement in the state. Governors "can't" deploy police to oppose federal law enforcement in a shoot-out, except that they might actually do so on some theory that federal law enforcement officers are violating the law. In general, you are not immune to arrest for illegal acts just because you are a law enforcement officer. The governor of Washington could easily (in the legal sense) declare an emergency and order state troopers to prevent federal officers from effecting arrests. Of course, resolving these disputes in court is another option.	Let's say you leave fake drugs in someone's yard. Eg, you expect the police to be dumb enough to believe it and arrest the other person Obstructing a public officer, specifically "deliberately hindering a public officer from carrying out official duties". Trespassing.	This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.	When you refer to customs, that necessarily denotes travel to a foreign county, such that each county will have their own laws, rules, and regulations that govern these issues. It is more than likely that if you refuse to answer the questions of customs officials in ANY country, you will be denied admittance. The same is true if you refuse or balk at being searched (personally or your possessions), and keep in mind that this is without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The best thing to do is to answer the questions honestly and accurately, but also as narrowly as possible to completely answer. Trying to argue with them will only send up red flags and you will be there longer. Remember it is a privilege, not a right, to enter a sovereign nation of which you are not a citizen. For example, in the U.S., customs reserves the right to detain for questioning, search you, your car, your children, your bags, packages, purse/wallet, or any other travel item with full legal authority to do sol they can even examine your electronics (content and hardware). You place your stuff on the exam station and open it. (After the exam is completed, you will be asked to repack and close the baggage.) If you are unhappy with the way you are being treated, you do have the right to ask to speak to a CBP supervisor, but I cannot see anything good coming of it, unless they were super rude without provocation or broke something of value. The authority to delay and speak with travelers derives from the United States Code (section citations below) enables CBP to prevent the entry of persons who are inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and to prevent the smuggling of merchandise, including narcotics and other contraband items, into the United States. Speaking with travelers and examining merchandise coming into or leaving the United States is just one of the mechanisms used to identify illegal or prohibited items, and to determine whether or not someone is trying to enter the U.S. for unlawful or fraudulent purposes. Unless exempt by diplomatic status, all travelers entering the United States, including U.S. citizens, are subjected to routine Customs examinations. At times, people make the mistake of thinking their civil rights are being violated by being asked questions about their trip, personal background and history, etc. That is not the case. Supreme Court decisions have upheld the doctrine that CBP's search authority is unique and does not violate the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Customs website has a detailed Q&A section. Most modern countries do as well.
What is the legal & tax position of a UK person working remotely for UK firm, in non-UK locations, in Europe and globally? This question is inspired by this question on travel.stackexchange.com. I am mainly asking about a UK viewpoint, but am interested others (Europe, USA, commonwealth, etc), because at its root, this is a cross-jurisdiction question. Person X has a UK limited company Y, and his/her work on consultancy based, often remote, sometimes visiting clients in person. The consultancy reports and software are all delivered via internet. Invoicing and payments and all financial affairs are done in GBP via UK banks, and all tax affairs are in order with the UK HMRC. The clients are based in various countries, UK, Europe and globally. What is the legal & tax position of conducting this work various remote non-UK locations in Europe and globally? And from a legal-philosophy viewpoint, is it any different from a UK author going travelling, taking lots and lots of notes, or even writing his/her next novel whilst in various locations, and publishing once returned to the UK? Finally, in practical terms, if a government does get snotty about it, what basis does a government have for deciding "where" work was done? How would that apply if a team of software developers had a virtual "pair programming" session, with one in USA, one in UK, and one in the Far East ? "Where" has that software been written?	This is a tricky question on the intersection of visa and tax laws. It is tricky because every country can make its own rules that apply when you are in that country or do business in that country. Even within the EU, there is no uniform approach because freedom of movement merely covers the right to work in a country, but not the rules which have to be followed when doing so. Thus, you have to fall back to reading each individual country's rules and legislation. In general: Whether you are even allowed to work or which work activities are permitted depends on your visa or visa-free status. If you are a permanent resident or citizen of the UK, you can come to and work in every EEA country, until the end of the Brexit transition period, subject to the same rules as residents in that country. Often, visa-free visits or business visa allow some business activities such as attending meetings with clients or collecting information, but not performing actual work. If you're interested in what business activities the UK allows visitors from other countries to do, take a look at the visitor rules. Income tax may be due at the place of tax residency or where the income is generated/earned, in particular where you actually perform the work. There is a widespread belief that you only gain tax residency after staying in one country for 6 months, but this is misleading in the general case: every country makes its own rules, and income tax may be due even without (permanent) tax residency. The relevant countries (the country where you work and the country where you normally reside) might have a tax agreement that specifies where tax is due. Within the EU, it is fairly common that a person works in a different country than the one they reside in, so there is a well-developed network of tax treaties. Often, certain activities are exempt from local taxes, such as compensation for visiting researchers or regular employment. There's also a good chance that profit from independent work / business profits are only taxable at the place(s) where that enterprise has a permanent establishment – but it depends on the details. This section is based on the OECD model tax treaty (https://doi.org/10.1787/mtc_cond-2017-en) which most treaties follow closely. If no tax treaty exists that exempts your income from local taxation, you must consult the local tax laws. VAT rules are entirely different, and for B2B services are generally taxed at the location of the client (place of supply rules). But every country makes its own rules. Exception: within the EEA, cross-border B2B supply is always taxed at and by the client via the reverse-charge mechanism. So things can get quite tricky, and a business visitor should inform themselves beforehand what activities they are allowed to perform abroad and whether there are tax implications. is it any different from a UK author going travelling, taking lots and lots of notes, or even writing his/her next novel whilst in various locations, and publishing once returned to the UK? Here no tax implications arise because the travelling author is not paid during their travels, but they have to consider visa rules when performing their work. Such rules often have exemptions for artists. However, it depends on the rules of the travelled country. what basis does a government have for deciding "where" work was done? Each country is sovereign and can make its own rules. How would that apply if a team of software developers had a virtual "pair programming" session, with one in USA, one in UK, and one in the Far East ? "Where" has that software been written? It is not generally relevant where software was written, aside from copyright or export regulation issues which might have their own rules. Since each of the three programmers is working in their own country, no particular visa or income tax issues arise. However, if they have a common employer, the employer does have to consider the local employment laws regardless of where the employer is established, which may include paying some taxes in every country.	There is nothing extraterritorial about these laws. If a company sells a good or provides a service to individuals based in the EU, then this good or service has to comply with EU laws. This concept is self-evident for physical goods that are produced anywhere in the world and then sold in the EU and the GDPR just applies this concept to services provided over the internet. The same legal concept also holds in all other major jurisdictions. The only thing that makes this more complicated for the GDPR is the actual enforcability of these laws but that is a technical issue not a legal one.	Sample answer: Be a US citizen - automatic US tax residency Own a UK property and live there for 91 days to gain UK tax residency Spend 60 days in India plus a total of 365 days over the previous 4 years Spend 62 days in Norway, having been tax resident there the previous year. If I understand correctly, this status can be maintained indefinitely by spending 62 days there per year once first gained. Spend 120 days in Paraguay On the last day of the tax year, start working in the Philippines on an indefinite contract Spend 183 days or more in Singapore during the prior tax year Spend a total of 270 days in Mauritius over the current tax year and the previous two years (our calendar is getting pretty constrained at this point but I think this is still all technically possible) Have access to a spare room that a friend informally keeps available for you in Germany Be a member of the crew of a vessel registered in Mozambique Have at least one essential connection to Sweden, having been tax resident there less than 5 years previously Have a spouse who lives as a permanent resident in Spain and is somehow a contributing member of the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (triggering Australian tax residency) Total tax residencies: 13 Total marginal income tax rate after double tax treaties and reliefs for the tie break: no idea	Greendrake's answer says that a country can declare any jurisdiction it likes. This is true, but in practice it is the convention that a country should claim jurisdiction only over its territory and its citizens. The point about "citizens" is normally not pushed, as when you go to a foreign country you are normally subject to its laws rather than those of your home, but for instance there are laws against child sex tourism where the perpetrators can be prosecuted at home for offences committed abroad. However this basic principle gets more murky with long-distance communication such as the Internet. Someone in country X can, for example, provide a service to someone in country Y which is illegal in country Y. At this point the laws of country Y have been broken by someone sitting in country X. Y is not claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction; the crime occurred inside its own territory, but the criminal is currently resident in X. From a legal point of view this is the same as if both had been inside Y when the crime was committed, but then the perpetrator fled to X before they could be arrested. So in the Kim Dotcom case, Dotcom is alleged to have committed criminal copyright violations by supplying movie files to people in the US. In the Meng Wanzhou case, Meng is alleged to have made fraudulent statements to American banks to the effect that Huawei was complying with US sanctions law (otherwise those banks would not have been able to do business with Huawei). The accounts I've read don't say whether Meng was in the US for those meetings, but the fact that they were made to American banks in order to do business in America makes the precise location of the meeting irrelevant.	What happens to someone who’s committed a murder in the UK? Considering the person will be caught. This is a basic and somewhat vague question so I will provide a basic and very general answer. The name of the court with proper jurisdiction, the relevant criminal procedural rules, and the substantive law that applies varies within the U.K. In particular in Scotland and the various dependencies of the U.K. differ significantly from England-Wales. There are some minor differences in Northern Ireland. England-and-Wales are treated as one for most purposes, but there are some slight differences at the very lowest levels but none materially impact a murder case. If they are caught in England and Wales they are arrested, interviewed, charged then brought before the next available Magistrates' Court who send the defendant to the Crown Court for trial. As a Magistrate has no power to grant bail for murder the defendant must be remanded in custody until he can make an application for bail before the Crown Court, but the default position is that bail should not be granted for murder unless in very exceptional circumstances. In other U.K. jurisdictions, the names of the courts will differ and there may be some other fine details that aren't the same in the pre-trial process but the same general outline applies. If they are outside of the U.K. they will be subject to either an International or European Arrest Warrant and extradited to the UK at the request of the U.K. Government under the terms of the relevant extradition treaties. On arrival in the UK they are arrested for murder and the process proceeds in the same manner. (If they are someplace that does not have an extradition treaty with the U.K., the trial may be deferred until U.K. officials have an opportunity to arrest him and are often dogged in attempting to accomplish, perhaps, for example, while the suspect is on holiday somewhere that there is an extradition treaty.) Prior to the trial, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the defence will prepare their cases and return to court at various times to settle any issues etc before going to the expense of a full trial. Also, at any time the CPS determine the case to be too weak for a realistic prospect of conviction or the suspect is innocent, they are supposed to dismiss or amend the indictment. The defendant is then tried for murder before a jury (almost always, but not in every single case, e.g., if the defendant admits guilt and the plea is accepted in appropriate proceedings before a judge). The CPS instruct a barrister to present their case with another barrister acting on behalf of the defendant. The process is for juvenile defendants is pretty much the same as for adults, apart from added safeguards to ensure the juvenile understands the proceedings and is not put at any disadvantage due to their age. All of the jurisdictions within the U.K., however, will have a trial that involves presentation of sworn evidence and exhibits and opening and closing arguments from both prosecution and defence counsels to a jury, procedural objections, cross-examination, and sometimes offering of additional evidence under the supervision of a single judge; normally with the defendant present. There will be some means of court reporting, and unless the judge orders otherwise (which is only done in relatively exceptional circumstances), the trial will be open to the public and the press to observe. If the defendant dies before the legal process to secure a conviction is not completed, the case is dismissed as moot. If the defendant is convicted of a homicide offense the trial/sentencing judge will impose a prison sentences, which is "fixed by law", with a life sentence in the case of the most serious homicide offense, murder (there are multiple homicide offenses that hinge largely on the intent of the defendant, often a murder prosecution will include less included homicide offenses as options for convictions). Only in exceptional cases this will be a whole-life term, in all others the judge will prescribe a minimum sentence according to the judicial sentencing guidelines after which the defendant may be released on licence, which is what an American would call parole. Any offences committed on licence will normally result in a recall to prison. The U.K. does not have a death penalty and does not authorise corporal punishment. The vast majority of people who are arrested and tried for murder are convicted, although there are sometimes acquittals or hung juries. This conviction may be appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeal (and again up to the Supreme Court) (the intermediate appellate court may not be the same in all U.K. jurisdictions) which reviews the proceedings to determine if the law was applied correctly and if there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. If the court finds that this was not the case, it can vacate the conviction and orders an appropriate revised disposition of the case depending upon the circumstances justifying the reversal of the trial court. If the appeal court affirm the trial verdict then the sentence continues to be carried out. Usually, but not always, the defendant will be in prison pursuant to the sentence imposed pending an outcome of any appeal. Eventually, if the sentence imposed upon a conviction is affirmed (and not a whole life term) the prisoner may be released on licence (which includes some post-release supervision) and is free and to about living their life again, subject to some collateral consequences based upon their criminal record (e.g. inability to work in certain occupations). If the defendant is acquitted, then they go free and cannot be tried again for the same offence, unless the exceptions under the double jeopardy provisions that apply in that jurisdiction apply. The main exception of double jeopardy is for newly discovered evidence of guilt in a case where there was an acquittal. If the person convicted is not a British citizen, they will usually be deported at the conclusion of their sentence if international law allows for it. There are a few exceptions to these rules that come up in a tiny percentage of all U.K. murders that apply (1) in the case of people subject to courts-martial such as active duty military service members, (2) in the case of foreign diplomats with diplomatic immunity, (3) when the murder is classified as an act of terrorism, and (4) in the case that the defendant has a title of nobility that calls for special treatment such as, e.g., Prince Charles (the current heir to the throne) or the Queen. These special cases are really too esoteric for the plain vanilla facts stated in the question and involve unique processes that are very different from the usual one described above. The fourth case is one that does not exist in my country (the U.S.) and in other countries that are republics rather than constitutional monarchies like the U.K., although most countries have some special rules for criminal trials of their very highest officials (like Presidents and Prime Ministers).	Per Art 3(2), GDPR only applies to non-European companies when their processing activities relate to the offering of goods or services to people in Europe, or when the processing activities relate to monitoring people in Europe. However, the word “offer” of this targeting criterion requires some level of intent. It is not enough for GDPR to apply that they're marketing to someone who happens to be in Europe, but GDPR would apply if they are intentionally marketing to people who are in Europe. I don't know what they are marketing, so I don't know if that would be the case here. Even if GDPR were to apply, it would not be the most appropriate law. Yes, there's the GDPR right to erasure, which applies under some conditions (though there's a pretty absolute right to opt-out from marketing). The EU's ePrivacy Directive provides more specific rules though, in particular that every such marketing email must offer a way to unsubscribe. Other countries have comparable anti-spam laws, potentially also the home country for this online service.	If you want some boilerplate text to just drop in and have done, you are going to be disappointed. But you don't need a lawyer either. Treat it as a coding job. First, list all the ways you are going to store and process identifiable user data. If someone is going to process it on your behalf, identify them too. Draw a chart showing the paths that user data is going to take. (Storage is a form of processing) Then look at the 6 bases for processing user data and figure out which ones apply to each step. E.g. if the user asks you to do something then that is one basis under which you can process their data. See how much coverage you can get without asking for consent. For each third party (e.g. Google) figure out what data is to be sent to them, and where they will be. Google has data centres in the EU specifically so you can get them to process user data without sending it outside the EU. Check the third party contracts for these services, including the confidentiality clauses. Link that to the processing they will do for you. Finally, pull all this together into a single summary of what you are going to do with the data and the bases under which you will do it.	The Immigration Act 2016 introduced the so-called 'right to rent' provisions under which a landlord can be prosecuted for renting accommodation to someone who is not legally in the UK. Everyone in the UK, Brits included, is subject to the Act. This gives the landlord the right to examine your work permit and to see if your visa is valid. The landlord will make a copy of the information. This makes the landlord a data controller which imposes restrictions on how the information can be used. Because this became controversial, the Information Commissioner published a brochure on the things a landlord can do with your data. All things considered and based upon what you wrote, if the landlord did not get your permission to use the data, then it's likely he is in breach. But this does not mean it's actionable or that it would be advisable to make a formal complaint to the Commissioner. If you want to pursue it, you can use the Commissioner's "Report a Concern" page as a starting point. Alternatively, you can lodge a formal complaint with your landlord and he will have to respond to it. What does the law say? The act giving the landlord the right to access your data is in the 2016 act linked above. Everything else is in the Data Protection Act 1998. The ILPA Information Sheet is at "Right to Rent". "The information sheet was updated on 01 November 2016 to take account of the second commencement order issued by the government, on 31 October 2016, bringing further provisions into force." The information sheet is recommended reading for anyone in the UK on a work permit. Disclaimer: I'm a member.
Why does assault sideline "imminent fear of harm in the future", and require merely "fear of imminent harm"? Concentrate Criminal Law (2020 7 edn) pp 52-53. The most common mistakes students make when explaining or applying the law on technical assault are: confusing fear with apprehension (see ‘The main issues’, above); confusing an immediate apprehension with an apprehension of immediate harm, so: – if V says ‘I now expect to be hit tomorrow’, there is no technical assault (even if V is very afraid of the future harm), but – if V says ‘I expect now to be hit now, but I am not afraid’, the actus reus of a technical assault is satisfied. Do not forget to consider if D satisfies the mens rea too; – if V says ‘I am not sure when I will be hit: it may be tomorrow or it might be now’ that can be an assault according to Constanza [1997] because the victim fears they might be hit in the immediate future. Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (8 edn, 2018). p. 75 What does ‘imminent’ mean? The victim’s apprehension must be of imminent harm. It is well established that a threat to be violent in the distant future (e.g. ‘I will beat you up next week’) is not an assault.13 But what about a threat to cause violence in the near future? Lord Steyn in Ireland indicated that a fear of violence ‘within a minute or two’ might be sufficient to constitute an assault.14 This leaves open the question of exactly where the line is to be drawn: is fear of violence in ten minutes enough, an hour, a day? We can know only when we have further guidance from the courts. ... ... 13 But there are some specific offences that relate to threats to harm in the future, e.g. there is an offence of threatening to kill in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s. 16. 14 See also Smith v Superintendent of Woking Police Station (1983) 76 Cr App R 234. I refer to red underlines in blue box. Why "not enough to show that as a result of the defendant's actions[,] the victim immediately feared that he or she might be harmed a long in the future"? "In other words", why "imminent fear of harm in the future" not assault? I can't distinguish between "fear of imminent harm" (green) v. "imminent fear of harm in the future" (red).	Assault is defined as "putting someone in fear of imminent harm". Imminent means "about to happen". "fear of imminent harm" means the harm is about to happen (very soon) "fear of harm in the future" means the harm might happen later "imminent fear of harm in the future" is probably a usage mistake, but might technically happen if you are about to feel the fear.	Engaging in unlawful conduct does not completely preclude a claim of self-defense under Wisconsin law ...but it does raise the bar in some circumstances: Criminal conduct by the defendant removes the presumption that "force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm" when defending against unlawful forced entry to one's own property. A much higher burden on use of force is imposed if engaging in unlawful conduct that is "of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack." Anyone intentionally provoking an attack by any means, lawful or unlawful, "with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant," is not entitled to self-defense at all. Section 939.48 of Wisconsin law governs the standards for self-defense. 939.48(1) sets out the general standard: A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. 939.48(1m)(ar) provides presumptions in favor of the defendant and no duty to retreat when defending against unlawful entry to one's own property (an implementation of the castle doctrine), but those presumptions are removed by 939.48(1m)(b)1. if (among other things), "[t]he actor was engaged in a criminal activity." More relevant to a case that occurred outside is 939.48(2), which lays out how provocation affects a claim of self-defense: (a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self-defense, but the person is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely to cause death to the person's assailant unless the person reasonably believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm at the hands of his or her assailant. (b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. (c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense.	First, the relevant term is "precedent". You have misstated the nature of "precedent". Precedent is simply the addition of further information about what the law is. A legislature may set forth a law that say "If A, then (if you B, you will suffer consequence C)". But it is not self-evident in a given instance whether A is true, or B is true, or what exactly C refers to. In addition, law is an integrated system, so Law #39 may seem to contradict Law #12: does that mean that Law #39 doesn't apply, or is it that Law #12 (if #12 is a Constitutional provision, #39 is just wrong – laws exist in a hierarchy). Therefore, laws must be interpreted. "Precedent" refers to the creation of a rule of interpretation, one which is logically consistent with existing rules of interpretation (which are arranged in some logical hierarchy). If the Supreme Court establishes a rule that laws penalizing "hate speech" contradict the First Amendment (R.A.V v. St Paul) and therefore cannot be a law in the US, then any similar law is, by rule, also not actually a law. Creation of precedent itself follows rules, though ones that are harder to discern – this is what "jurisprudence" is about. For example, some justices believe that they should appeal to an inherent feeling of justice; others believe that a law should be interpreted according to perceived legislative intent; still others focus on the wording of the legal text (statute, usually). This does not involve appeal to popular sentiment. It does mean (usually) that law is seen to be a system of rules, and not case-by-case feelings.	Only Parliament has the power to define crimes in law (well, also in the UK there are common law crimes, where ages ago the courts defined punishable wrongs). The police have the power to enforce existing law, but not the power to create new crimes. Part of police power is the power to use force to enforce laws. If a person is trying to kill another (which is a crime), the police can use force to stop the person from committing this crime. Police power can be statutorily encoded (Parliament passes a law saying what police can and cannot do), or it could be part of common law. As for laws regulating a suspect, there may be a specific statutory prohibition – "you may not reach into your pocket" – or there is a common law inference to be made, that if the police have the power to order you to not reach into your pocket you may be forced to comply. The subtle distinction here is that if it is a crime to reach into your pocket when told not to, you can be prosecuted and imprisoned. If there is no such crime, you just have the consequence that you can be roughed up to some extent for disobeying the police order. One act of Parliament is the Offences against the Person Act 1861 §38 which says Whosoever . . . shall assault any person with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of himself or of any other person for any offence, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, NB "assault" does not require physical contact: creating apprehension suffices. Another law is the Police Act 1996 §89 which says Any person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty, or a person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both These laws do not exhaustively list all of the things that are forbidden (e.g. they do not say "may not bite. nor scratch, nor kick..."), instead, the prohibitions fall under the general rubric of assault and resisting. Under the circumstances, it is possible that the person could be criminally prosecuted, but even in lieu of a prosecution, it is strongly probable that the police use of force in this instance was lawful. One would have to await the outcome of investigations and litigation to know for sure.	Legal Context This kind of argument is often called a "defense of others" defense which is available in every jurisdiction of which I am aware. Almost every state has a specific description of when this is permitted as part of their criminal code, usually in a general principles section at the beginning, or in the sections pertaining to crimes of violence. Some details vary from one state to another, but none of the facts presented in this hypothetical really push the envelope in terms of distinctions between one state's law and another. Most of the differences involve situations when the use of deadly force is allowed. For example, states differ regarding when deadly force allowed to prevent a burglary of your home or business which is in progress, particularly if it is possible to avoid a use of deadly force at all by retreating in a manner that puts you at no one at any significant risk of bodily injury. But, the scenario presented does not appear to involve the use of deadly force (although the definition of "deadly force" can be slippery and lead to some subtle variations in what is permitted from state to state). Another common nuance of variation between states involves the circumstances under which physical force or deadly physical force is authorized to make a citizens arrest, but this situation is also not implicated by your hypothetical. Once Thug is beat up, the scenario ends without any effort to detain Thug until the police arrive. Generally speaking, a defense of others defense that justifies a use of force under criminal law will also not give rise to civil liability in a lawsuit for assault and battery as opposed to a criminal prosecution for it. A Sample Defense Of Others Statute The pertinent section of the Colorado Revised Statutes (2016), strongly influenced by the language of the Model Penal Code (which never adopted in full by any state but highly influential stylistically in how U.S. criminal codes are drafted) is very typical of the majority rule regarding the defense of others and reads as follows (emphasizing the language relevant to the scenario in the question): § 18-1-704. Use of physical force in defense of a person (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204 ; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force if: (a) With intent to cause bodily injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that other person; or (b) He is the initial aggressor; except that his use of physical force upon another person under the circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so, but the latter nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force; or (c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law. (4) In a case in which the defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction regarding self-defense as an affirmative defense, the court shall allow the defendant to present evidence, when relevant, that he or she was acting in self-defense. If the defendant presents evidence of self-defense, the court shall instruct the jury with a self-defense law instruction. The court shall instruct the jury that it may consider the evidence of self-defense in determining whether the defendant acted recklessly, with extreme indifference, or in a criminally negligent manner. However, the self-defense law instruction shall not be an affirmative defense instruction and the prosecuting attorney shall not have the burden of disproving self-defense. This section shall not apply to strict liability crimes. Analysis of the Hypothetical Facts Is Paul guilty of assault and battery for attacking Thug, or would self-defense or some other standard defense apply? Paul is probably not guilty of assault and battery for attacking Thug because a defense of others defense justifies his actions. Paul is using physical force to defend a third person (and presumably himself as well once once he is involved in the fray) from what he reasonably believes to be the use of unlawful physical force by Thug, and generally, under those circumstances Paul may use a degree of force which Paul reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. Paul is most vulnerable in this scenario on the question of whether he reasonably believed that the degree of force he used was reasonably necessary for the purpose of defending Emily and himself from Thug's unlawful use of physical force, or whether he went further than what was reasonably necessary for a few minutes that left Thug "incapacitated and thoroughly bloodied". For example, suppose that Paul had already caused Thug to try to flee the scene after the first minute at which point Thug was slightly bruised and afraid of Paul, but was not at all incapacitated. But, suppose that despite this fact that Paul, awash with adrenaline from the fight, continued to pummel Thug for a couple more minutes as Thug repeatedly tried to flee the scene only to be dragged back by Paul. Suppose that Paul continued the fight after it was no longer necessary because Paul wanted to punish Thug for his mistreatment of Emily and to discourage other people from trying to attack Emily in the future, even after Paul knew that there was already no real risk that Thug himself would continue to use unlawful physical force against Emily no or in the near future. Under these circumstances, which aren't inconsistent with the hypothetical facts, if this extra couple of minutes caused Thug to be much more badly injured than he otherwise would have been if Thug had been allowed to flee after the first minute, then Paul could still be guilty of assault and battery, even though his actions were legally justified for the first minute of the fight. There is no indication that either Paul or Emily provoked the attack on Emily, or that either Paul or Emily was the initial aggressor, or that this was actually a pre-agreed dueling situation. So each of these circumstances which would be exceptions to the general rule that the defense of others is justified do not apply to this case. There is likewise no indication that Paul used "deadly force" as opposed to mere "physical force" in handling the situation. It is likely that Paul would have committed a crime if he had shot and killed Thug instead of beating him up, if Paul knew perfectly well at the time that he was capable of beating up Thug and making Thug go away for good as a result without resorting to a firearm, unless the attack on Emily was severe enough for Paul to reasonably believe that the attack was putting Emily at a real risk of serious bodily injury.	england-and-wales I think the main reason is that in specific prosecutions such behaviour may not be found to constitute any of those criminal offences. While on the face of it the behaviour is illegal, the court is also obliged to take into account the rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and association, in the Human Rights Act 1998. But a court's injunction sets out in black and white the restrictions on behaviour after considering the human rights aspects of the case, and breach of the order is a contempt of court (not a criminal offence as such, but punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine). Such injunctions are an additional tool for trying to mitigate or deter the behavior to which you refer and in a sense they are more convenient than criminal prosecutions. Some considerations and more detail in no particular order: Standard of proof differences You mention relevant criminal offences. These necessarily have the criminal 'standard of proof'. The trier of fact (the jury at jury trial; the magistrate or judge at non-jury trial), having considered all the relevant evidence, must be sure the defendant is guilty. However, the entity seeking an injunction (the claimant) does not need to meet that standard of proof to obtain an injunction that includes restrictions on behaviour. They need only persuade the court there is a real and imminent risk of a civil wrong for which they merit relief, or that there is a serious issue to be tried at a later date for which they merit relief until the conclusion of that trial. Criminal prosecution delays For the past two years to the time of writing this answer, circumstances have been such that if there were a criminal trial (which is by no means guaranteed), it may be scheduled months, perhaps even a year or two, in the future. But the claimant (and the wider public) may want relief 'now' and the defendant(s) might be free to continue their behaviour in the meanwhile, the defendant might not be held in custody pending trial. Due to delays, some defendants have been in custody for several months pending trial and this isn't satisfactory either, particularly if they are innocent: "everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time" (article 6 Human Rights Act 1998). The behaviour may not be found to constitute a criminal offence In this context, the law providing for the criminal offence must be read 'compatibly' with the human rights legislation - the qualified rights to freedom of expression, to assembly and association. Meaning, is this criminal justice system reponse to that behaviour provided for in law, necessary and proportionate, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, protecting the rights and freedoms of others, and were there no alternative and less restrictive responses? Now, some of those elements are a definite yes (e.g. trespass to or obstruction of the highway are provided for in law), others may be arguable. But in any case, the police, prosecution and the court (if it gets that far) must consider those things, must do that weighing up - it is not explicitly provided for in the legislation that creates those criminal offences. The courts have not found every protest on a highway to constitute a trespass to (Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jones and Another) or obstruction of a highway (Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) v Ziegler and others (Appellants)). On the other hand, when these claimants seek an injunction the court does that weighing up and may consider alternative, less restrictive approaches (the claimant submits a wishlist, the defendant or court may push back). The court will say "Yes, this is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of the claimant and the wider public, however X is disproportionate, Y is proportionate, the defendants may go in area A but not area B, this time period is disproportionate, that time period is proportionate," and so on. So the claimant and the police are now armed with that injunction, the claimant will publish it, defendants are aware of its contents and fellow protesters ought to be made aware of it. It's there in black-and-white what is restricted and anyone breaching the injunction could be found guilty of contempt of court (punishable by up to two years in prison and/or unlimited fine or asset seizure; must be proved to the criminal standard). Example judgments about injunctions including lists of restrictions Here are some examples from the context that include different kinds of restrictions by court order and the court's weighing up of the competing interests of the claimants, the defendants and the wider public. Shell UK Oil Products Ltd v Persons Unknown [2022] EWHC 1215 (QB) (20 May 2022) The claimant sought (and succeeded) to maintain an injunction that was granted on an emergency basis, its restrictions set out at para 20, conclusion at para 70. National Highways Ltd v Heyatawin [2021] EWHC 3078 (QB) - see para 7 for restrictions, the court found some protesters breached the so-called M25 Order and the court ordered their immediate imprisonment (para 66). National Highways Ltd v Persons unknown (blocking traffic) [2021] EWHC 3081 (QB) (17 November 2021) - the reasons for the decision to not set aside the ex parte interim injunction made by Linden J on 25 October 2021, some restrictions at para 4. High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd & Anor v Four Categories of Persons Unknown & Ors [2022] EWHC 2360 (KB) (20 September 2022) - restrictions at para 188.	To use Texas as an example: Sec. 22.01. ASSAULT. (a) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person's spouse; (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury, including the person's spouse; or (3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative. If no reasonable person would think the contact is offensive, and no injury is involved, no assault was committed. This is a fairly common definition of "assault."	This Question Is Tricker Than It Seems One of the things about being a non-expert in a field is that it is very difficult to know in advance what is a hard question and what is an easy question. Some questions that seem like they should have simple, straight forward answers are actually very hard to answer. Some questions that seem like they should be very difficult and have involved tricky answers are actually very easy. Without an in depth understanding of the field, you just can't know in advance. It turns out that this particular question is a quite hard question to answer. So, rather than really providing a clear answer, I will explain what about this question makes it hard to answer in this answer. Even this incomplete and ultimately inconclusive answer will require far, far more words (2,078 to be exact), than were necessary to pose the question (94 words). Essentially, the core difficulty is that there are several different principles of law that apply to this fact pattern, each of which, individually have specific things that have to be proved to establish that some legal consequence will follow (which in turn are often themselves intrinsically indefinite), and each of which has exceptions that could also be proved if specific things happen. In part, this is because, while the fact pattern set forth is not freakishly unforeseeable, it is also not a fact pattern that was contemplated when any of the individual legal principles that are implicated were conceived. Likewise, the interaction of these different legal principles in one fact pattern wasn't contemplated and there is probably no one clear controlling case precedent on point that involved this fact pattern. What the law does in cases like these (which come up all the time in real life) is to break down each legal theory individually and analyze it, possibly spread over multiple distinct court cases in different courts in front of different judges. I'll try to unpack the issues (dispensing with U.K. legal terminology in some cases, since I'm only trying to provide a sense of why this is complicated and not to provide a definitive answer to how it is resolved under U.K. law). Possible Claims, Charges, and Defenses; Traffic, Civil, and Criminal It is a crime to threaten someone with weapon or in another way that puts someone at risk of imminent harm. Depending upon the weapon and other circumstances, mere possession of the weapon might be a crime in the U.K. Someone who has been threatened with weapon or in another way that puts them at risk of imminent harm can be a civil lawsuit for money damages against the person making the threat which was called "assault" in historical common law. Someone who has been threatened by another can seek a restraining order/protective order directing that person to stay away from them in the courts in a civil action. Hitting someone else's car is a traffic violation, unless a defense to the traffic violation is present and proven. Hitting someone else's car with a statutorily mandated level of intent is a crime, unless a justification for the crime is present and proven. The person whose car was hit could credibly argue that hitting the door was a mistake, not because the door was hit, but because the driver intended to kill them and missed, so an attempted homicide charge could raised in a criminal proceeding. The person whose car was hit could argue that there was an intend to put them in imminent risk of harm providing a basis for a civil lawsuit for money damages for common law assault. Someone whose car is hit by another car through negligence or recklessly or intentionally can bring one or more claims in a civil lawsuit against the person who car hit their car for money damages. The standard of care for negligence is established by how a reasonable person would act under the circumstances. Self-defense is a possible defense to traffic offenses, criminal charges and civil liability related to harming another's property if the conditions for self-defense apply, which include a risk of imminent harm to oneself, another, or one's property, and if the action taken in self-defense is reasonably proportional under the circumstances as evaluated by a reasonable person in response to the threat. But, if the response of the person making the threat with the weapon was as a result of actions in which the person threatened with the weapon was the true aggressor, then the privilege of self-defense would be forfeited. In real life, good attorneys for the parties could almost certainly solicit and call attention to additional facts not mentioned in the question that would further muddy the waters and raise additional claims, charges, and defenses to claims beyond the ten listed above. I could analyze each of these issues on the facts in depth as best I could with references to statutes and case law (under a body of law other than U.K. law anyway), which would take a few lengthy and heavily researched paragraphs each that would take a fair amount of time each to prepare, but I won't. A full analysis would help you weigh the odds a little better, and if I was a lawyer of a party in this situation, I would do that since every little edge counts in litigation and negotiations of settlements. But even if I did that, it would still leave a lot of uncertainty regarding the final resolution of these questions on the merits. Decision-Making Regarding Bringing Claims The traffic and criminal charges would be brought or not brought largely in the discretion of the Crown attorney or some other government official. It is most likely that a government official making that decision is doing so because the offense was referred to them by the police officer who responded to the scene, or a police officer who received an informal complaint (as opposed to a civil court filing) from one of the parties, or through a complaint delivered directly to the prosecuting authority by an alleged victim. A prosecutor doesn't have to bring claims just because someone asks them to, and doesn't have to bring all possible claims even if some are pursued. The parties themselves would decide whether or not to bring civil claims against each other. Whoever is sued first would make the decision in the context of knowing that they will be a party to a civil lawsuit whether or not they bring civil claims of their own. Possible Forums The traffic offense would probably be resolved in one court. The criminal charges against the person making the threats would be resolved in another court. The criminal charges against the person who hit the car door would be resolved probably in the same court but in a different case, possibly with a different judge. The civil claims would be resolved in yet another court, probably with a different judge, although probably in a single case with the first person to make it to court as the Plaintiff and the other party as a Defendant bringing counterclaims against the Plaintiff. The civil claims might also involve other parties (e.g. the owner of the vehicles in question if not identical to the persons driving the cars at the time of the incidents). Issue Preclusion Some final decisions on the merits in some cases would resolve the outcome of other cases as a matter of law, other final determinations in some cases would not be binding on the other cases as a matter of law because burdens of proof are different, or the legal issue evaluated is not identical, or because other rules (like a rule against a traffic court decision resulting in a binding determination on civil liability for negligence) would apply. The exact rules are rather arcane and there are quite a few permutations of how it come up, but it is important to be aware that these kinds of rules are out there, exist, and would have to be analyzed by the parties as a matter of litigation tactics. Even The "Legal Issues" Are Fact Intensive Inquiries Almost all of the legal theories implicated above involve broad legal standards in which a lot of the substantive question of what is or is not legal is delegated to the finder of fact in a manner that cannot be reviewed on appeal. For example, in a negligence case related to damage to an automobile, even if there is a videotape and there is 100% agreement on precisely what happened, whether that conduct constitutes "negligence" that breaches the duty of care owed by a reasonable person to the general public to protect them from harm, is legally considered a "question of fact" to be determined by a judge on a case by case basis, rather than a "question of law" which will always have the same outcome and is subject to review by an appellate court if the judge gets it wrong. A similar "reasonable person" standard which must be resolved with a highly fact intensive inquiry that could be resolved more than one way by two different judges or juries hearing precisely the same facts and finding the same witnesses and evidence to be credible in exactly the same way, with both upheld on appeal, applies to the self-defense legal theory. This self-defense issue could also conceivably, based upon the order in which cases were tried and their resolution, be resolved one way in a criminal case and a different way in a civil case between the parties. In the same vein, when a threat is imminent is a highly subjective determination that could be resolved in a "legally correct" way that is not subject to being overturned on appeal on precisely the same facts, with precisely the same determinations as to credibility and weight of the evidence, by two different judges or juries. Again, the substantive question of whether particular conduct is or is not illegal is a "question of fact" that can't be resolved in the absence of a trial on the merits in a particular case before a particular finder of fact. Bottom Line The facts provided in the question aren't sufficiently detailed to provide a definitely correct answer to this question. Indeed, the nature of the facts is such that even an perfectly detailed factual statement regarding what happened might not be enough to definitively determine who has civil liability to whom, and to determine what charges each defendant is guilty of. Different judges and jurors could reasonably come to different legally correct conclusions in a case like this one when faced with precisely the same facts and resolving all issues of credibility and the weight of the evidence in precisely the same way. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the same facts would be analyzed with respect to different legal theory analysis in different forums by different people, when there is not, as a general rule (although there is in some cases) any mechanism for compelling those decisions to be made consistently on outcome determinative evaluations of the same facts regarding what was reasonable for the parties to do under the circumstances. The notion that a judge is just an umpire, and that every competent judge acting in good faith will always resolve a case presenting the same facts in the same way is a myth. This simply isn't true, even in the U.K. where the judiciary is (as a consequence of how the system for appointment and retention of judges is designed) not nearly as partisan and politicized as it is in the United States. The outcomes of even fairly simple cases in many cases, like the one in this question, are intrinsically and irreducibly uncertain in common law legal systems. The range of possible outcomes from a best case scenario to a worst case scenario, for each party in this fact pattern, is very wide. A desire to tame the myriad uncertainties involved for all parties, and the desire to avoid multiple time consuming and uncertain court proceedings arising out of the same incident, is one of the reasons that it is very common for civil lawsuits to settle out of court without a trial, and for criminal cases to be resolved by an agreement of the prosecution and the defense (sometimes reached even before charges are filed).
Is it legal to demand a user agree to an EULA after the product has already been purchased? First I'd like to note that I'm primarely interested in Canadian law, but answers about the law in other countries is fine as well. I've encountered this situation on multiple occasions, such as when purchasing an ereader, a phone, or getting software online. Typically, it is only after I have paid for and acquired the product that I am presented with the EULA, and informed that without agreeing to it I cannot proceed to use the thing in question. My question is as the title says: is this even legal? Shouldn't I be made aware of all the terms and conditions prior to making the purchase? How is it accepted for companies to tack additional terms on to the exchange after it has occurred?	is this even legal? It is legal, but at the same time the contract is voidable by you. This means that if the buyer rejects the EULA, he is entitled to return the unused product and be reimbursed. Obviously once the buyer has used the product, the conclusion will be that he accepted the EULA and therefore no longer can void the contract. The buyer's entitlement to rescind the contract compensates for the fact that he was not duly informed about the conditions prior to making the purchase.	In all such offers that I have seen, there is an agreement explicitly saying that if the service is not cancelled by the end date of the trial, a recurring charge for the price of the service will be made, and the customer authorizes this. If there was such an agreement, the charges would be authorized, not fraudulent. The question does not say what agreement accompanied the free trial. But any reasonable person would know that credit card info is only provided when a charge is at least possible. Addition: The question now says: Reviewing an example of the vendor's website, it says in big print "Monthly Plan $0.00/mo" and in fine gray print it says "Renews at $5.88/month." In that case it seems to me that the customer agreed to the recurring charge. What was purchased was access to the service, and whether the service was in fact used is not relevant. Unless there is a consumer protection law specifically requiring such terms to be "prominent" or otherwise making this deal unlawful, it seem to me that the customer has agreed, and the charge nis in no way a false claim. But it is possible that a court would rule otherwise. It is my experiences that in such cases the credit card company can and sometimes will act as an agent for the customer, and can often obtain refunds for multiple past charges. No doubt they have mush stronger negotiating power. But such refunds are not a matter of law, I think, rather of business practice and good will.	No If the price advertised is not honoured by the business and you are asked to pay a higher price, you do not have an automatic right to buy the item at the special offer or sale price. As long as the shop or business tells you before you pay that the higher price applies, you have the option to either buy it at the higher price or decide not to. However, the shop or business may be in breach of consumer law in relation to misleading advertising. The prosecution (or not) of the misleading advertising is the government’s task, not yours. This is a common formulation across Common Law jurisdictions as it a codification of the historic common law position. An advertised price is not an offer capable of acceptance, it is an invitation to treat. That is, it is an invitation for you to make them an offer and the price that is likely to be accepted. It is overlaid with later developments in consumer protection surrounding false advertising and misleading and deceptive conduct.	Both. The user made an infringing copy with the upload, the developer did with the download. Further the ToS between the app owner and the user will not protect them from being sued by the owner of the copyright. They don't have any ToS with them.	A settlement is fundamentally a contract where parties A and B promise to do certain things (one of them being "stop litigating"). A court order is an enforceable order to do something. A contract cannot be directly enforced (where force is used to make a person comply), it requires a court order for actual enforcement. The conditions of a contract might be enforceable, but you can't get the sheriff to come out based just on a contract. It appears that you got to the "facilitation" phase where the parties talk about the issue and the CRT case manager talks to the parties in neutral terms, aiming for an agreement. If you don't reach an agreement, the Tribunal Decision Process escalates the matter. Under the decision process, the CRT member makes a decision, and it can be enforced in court. They state that "For a $25 fee, the CRT can turn your agreement into an order, if both parties agree that an order should be issued. This is called a “consent resolution order”." I suppose that you did not go through that step, and you only have an agreement. So you would need a separate court process to get a court order. Because everything that you did in this negotiation phase is confidential, if you want CRT to give you something that is enforceable, you have to present the case from the beginning, since they don't have access to what has happened before. The problem in your account is that a settlement has to be reached by yourselves – possibly with the assistance of the CRT case manager. I assume you did actually get a settlement (agreement) with the landlord, but have not filed for a consent resolution order. It may be that the case is too old for you to just pay the $25, and it does require agreement by the other party. Read their FAQ about how cases end.	You can't grant or license that which is not yours. For example, the Slack terms of service say: We grant to Customer a non-sublicensable, non-transferable, non-exclusive, limited license for Customer and its Authorized Users to use the object code version of these components, but solely as necessary to use the Services and in accordance with the Contract and the User Terms. So Slack's agreement with Org A does not give A any right to let any other organization B use the software. It does not matter how A and B are related, nor whether B is nonprofit or for-profit, nor what A would be getting in exchange. If B wants to use it, they need to make their own agreement with Slack.	It is likely that the law applying will be both that of the USA and your country. If you went to court this would be one of the things you argued over. For example, Australian Consumer Law applies to any goods or services sold to a customer in Australia irrespective of where the vendor is located. Your jurisdiction may have similar laws. At first blush you must comply with the term of the contract preventing reverse engineering. They would be within their rights to terminate the licence if you don't. However, they probably have an obligation under your equivalent to the ACL to supply a product that: is merchantable is fit for purpose does what it says it will do If it doesn't then you have a right to terminate and get your money back, sue for damages and your country's government may prosecute.	No. You have to ask for specific permission to send marketing emails, and can't make it a condition of making a purchase since marketing emails are clearly not necessary for that. When accepting the terms you need a separate tick box for marketing emails, and it must be unticked by default (opt-in).
‘I will beat you up next week’ — Why aren't, threats to be violent in the distant future, assault? Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (8 edn, 2018). p. 75 What does ‘imminent’ mean? The victim’s apprehension must be of imminent harm. It is well established that a threat to be violent in the distant future (e.g. ‘I will beat you up next week’) is not an assault.13 But what about a threat to cause violence in the near future? Lord Steyn in Ireland indicated that a fear of violence ‘within a minute or two’ might be sufficient to constitute an assault.14 This leaves open the question of exactly where the line is to be drawn: is fear of violence in ten minutes enough, an hour, a day? We can know only when we have further guidance from the courts. ... ... 13 But there are some specific offences that relate to threats to harm in the future, e.g. there is an offence of threatening to kill in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s. 16. 14 See also Smith v Superintendent of Woking Police Station (1983) 76 Cr App R 234. Why isn't "a threat to be violent in the distant future (e.g. ‘I will beat you up next week’)" an assault? Please don't just answer "because courts have judged they're not, or UK Parliament hasn't criminalized this."	The quote doesn’t say they are lawful: just that they aren’t assault Indeed, it specifically says: But there are some specific offences that relate to threats to harm in the future, e.g. there is an offence of threatening to kill in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Assault is defined as putting someone in fear of imminent harm. Issuing threats of a more distant kind is a different crime.	Assuming these are common law crimes (Kenya is a common law country - sort of) or statutory crimes that have codified common law crimes without substantially changing them. It is not attempted murder - this requires an intent to kill. Pulling the trigger would have that intent, pointing it doesn't. It is assault if it puts the victim in fear of immediate harm (pretty sure it would). There are probably some statutory firearms offences too.	There is a Defense of "Necessity" which would apply in such cases, even if the law had no intent element.. This essentially allows as a defense to an accusation of crime that the actions were essential to prevent harm. Dee, for example Justia's page on The Criminal Defense of Necessity. There it is said: The defense of necessity may apply when an individual commits a criminal act during an emergency situation in order to prevent a greater harm from happening. In such circumstances, our legal system typically excuses the individual’s criminal act because it was justified, or finds that no criminal act has occurred. Although necessity may seem like a defense that would be commonly invoked by defendants seeking to avoid criminal charges, its application is limited by several important requirements: The defendant must reasonably have believed that there was an actual and specific threat that required immediate action The defendant must have had no realistic alternative to completing the criminal act The harm caused by the criminal act must not be greater than the harm avoided The defendant did not himself contribute to or cause the threat Only if all of these requirements are met, will the defense of necessity be applicable. It is also important to note that in some jurisdictions, necessity is never a defense to the killing of another individual, no matter what threat they may present. The Justia page goes on to describe the elements of the defense in detail. See also The Wikipedia artifcel which makes many of the same points. Necessity is a broader defense than the intent or willfulness requirements of particular laws, because it applied even when the law does nor contain such an element. However, it has its own strict limits, described above. The exact scope of this defense differs in different jurisdictions.	In the US, it depends on the jurisdiction because each state has its own homicide statutes: but, the defining elements don't differ a lot. Drawing on Washington state law, the first question is whether you intended to kill a person (it doesn't have to be a specific person). If you did, you have committed first-degree murder. It is first-degree murder, because it requires a certain amount of advance planning to kill with a drone. It does not matter that the drone houses the gun that killed the person and a program determines when the gun fires (the "it was the drone, not me" defense gets you nowhere: otherwise, you could always claim "It wasn't me, it was my gun / knife / fist".) If instead this is a badly-designed pig-slaughtering drone, then it could be manslaughter in the first degree, if the act was reckless, or manslaughter in the second degree, if the act was with criminal negligence. To determine which it is, you look at the definitions: A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. versus A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. So it would depend on whether you decided that safeguards which would prevent shooting people were too much bother (you know there is a risk and set aside that concern), or it didn't occur to you that a flying gun might hurt a person.	Because a "sting" does not trigger the prerequisites for the warning The Miranda Warning has triggering events: The circumstances triggering the Miranda safeguards, i.e. Miranda warnings, are "custody" and "interrogation". Custody means formal arrest or the deprivation of freedom to an extent associated with formal arrest. Interrogation means explicit questioning or actions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The Constitution does not require that a defendant be advised of the Miranda rights as part of the arrest procedure, or once an officer has probable cause to arrest, or if the defendant has become a suspect of the focus of an investigation. If you voluntarily speak to a police officer (uniformed or undercover, identified as such or not) while not being both in custody and subject to interrogation, that speech can be used in evidence.	Depending on the state, menacing may be a separate offense from assault. For example, here is New York State's law on menacing (New York Consolidated Laws, Penal Law - PEN §120.13–16): §120.13: A person is guilty of menacing in the first degree when he or she commits the crime of menacing in the second degree and has been previously convicted of the crime of menacing in the second degree or the crime of menacing a police officer or peace officer within the preceding ten years. Menacing in the first degree is a class E felony. §120.14: A person is guilty of menacing in the second degree when: 1. He or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death by displaying a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument or what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; or 2. He or she repeatedly follows a person or engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts over a period of time intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death; or 3. He or she commits the crime of menacing in the third degree in violation of that part of a duly served order of protection, or such order which the defendant has actual knowledge of because he or she was present in court when such order was issued, pursuant to article eight of the family court act, section 530.12 of the criminal procedure law , or an order of protection issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in another state, territorial or tribal jurisdiction, which directed the respondent or defendant to stay away from the person or persons on whose behalf the order was issued. Menacing in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor. §120.15: A person is guilty of menacing in the third degree when, by physical menace, he or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of death, imminent serious physical injury or physical injury. Menacing in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor. However, not all states define menacing separately from assault, and the exact definition varies by state.	If the pursuit is unlawful (which it almost always is except for police) and the pursued suffers harm in fleeing from the pursuer, then the pursuer is responsible both criminally and civilly. Being pursued would put a person in fear of harm: that’s the criteria for assault so the act of pursuing someone without lawful cause is a crime. Self-defence ceases to be a defence when the other person is running away - even if they are carrying your TV. You can use reasonable force to effect an arrest but a pursuit is not likely to be reasonable if it is of any significant distance or involves vehicles. Police pursuits are strictly limited and police have been successfully sued when they exceed those limits and harm comes to the pursued. If the pursed dies, pursuers can and have been convicted of murder or manslaughter.	None, if the intention is merely trespassing, unlike burglary which requires intent to steal, commit criminal damage, or inflict grevious bodily harm or if the building is a protected site - neither of which isn't evident from the question. Note, for both offences, the actus reus is entry - there is no requirement for any form of "breaking" Further to ohwilleke's comment, unless the lock is damaged or destroyed etc, then there is no offence of criminal damage
How can I tell what is meant by "assault", as opposed to "battery"? In English law, I'm struggling to find a consistent definition of "assault", or at least, a way to decide what definition to apply: Sometimes it appears to mean "to intentionally or recklessly cause another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence". With this definition, an actual act of unlawful physical contact is a battery, which is something different to an assault. Alice threatening to punch Charlie is an assault, Bob punching Charlie is a battery. Other times the word "assault" appears to be an umbrella term which self-referentially includes "assault" OR "battery". Using this definition, it doesn't matter whether there is physical contact: it can be referred to as an assault either way. Alice threatening to punch Charlie is an assault, Bob punching Charlie can be called an assault or a battery - both are correct terms. The terms "assault" and "common assault" also seem to be interchangeable in some texts, or in other texts used to differentiate between the two possible meanings of assault (so e.g. a text might claim that "common assault" is sub-divided into "assault" and "battery"). I have even seen this explained the other way around, whereby "assault" is sub-divided into "common assault" and "battery", so even this use of the terms is not consistent. The confusion is perpetuated by judges. For example, James J. in Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 said: An assault is any act which intentionally—or possibly recklessly—causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence. Although "assault" is an independent crime and is to be treated as such, for practical purposes today "assault" is generally synonymous with the term "battery" and is a term used to mean the actual intended use of unlawful force to another person without his consent. On the facts of the present case the "assault" alleged involved a "battery." I'm not sure what to make of this. We are to "treat as such" that "assault" is an independent crime, but then it goes on to contradict this by saying that in the present case we can include the "battery" as being part of the "assault", because the two are "generally synonymous". It's hard to see how he can justify both positions simultaneously. So, ignoring the every day English language meaning of the words, is there in fact a clear and precise definition of "assault" (in which case some sources are simply using it incorrectly), or do I just need to accept that there is confusion, even within the law itself, and rely on context to establish in any given instance which meaning is meant?	You have accurately summed up the conundrum. There is little else to say. You need to accept that there is confusion, even within the law itself, and rely on context to establish in any given instance which meaning is meant. You will come to find that there are many instances of such confusion in the law. The historic technical distinction in the law (especially in tort law) between assault and battery has been collapsed in the everyday vernacular and this had made its way even into the way that the words are used even by law enforcement officers and legislators, who grew up speaking the vernacular language like everyone else. Where I live, in Colorado, the word "menacing" has been used be legislators to replace the historic sense of the word "assault" and the words "assault" and "battery" have become synonymous. But, in England, they are struck with a situation in which the meaning of the word "assault" has become context specific.	Assault is defined as "putting someone in fear of imminent harm". Imminent means "about to happen". "fear of imminent harm" means the harm is about to happen (very soon) "fear of harm in the future" means the harm might happen later "imminent fear of harm in the future" is probably a usage mistake, but might technically happen if you are about to feel the fear.	This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.	new-south-wales No it's not harassment State and territory laws criminalise stalking. These offences often target behaviour amounting to harassment There are also state and territory offences that capture harassment at work, in family or domestic contexts, and in schools and other educational institutions. "Harassment" requires a pattern of behaviour which is missing from your example. It's probably the tort of battery A battery is a voluntary and positive act, done with the intention of causing contact with another, that directly causes that contact: Barker et al at p 36. See Carter v Walker (2010) 32 VR 1 at [215] for a summary of the definition of “battery”. The requisite intention for battery is simply this: the defendant must have intended the consequence of the contact with the plaintiff. The defendant need not know the contact is unlawful. He or she need not intend to cause harm or damage as a result of the contact. The modern position, however, is that hostile intent or angry state of mind are not necessary to establish battery: Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd, above, at [52]. It is for that reason that a medical procedure carried out without the patient’s consent may be a battery. On the other hand, it is not every contact that will be taken to be a battery. People come into physical contact on a daily basis. For example it is impossible to avoid contact with other persons in a crowded train or at a popular sporting or concert event. The inevitable “jostling” that occurs in these incidents in every day life is simply not actionable as a battery: Rixon at [53]–[54]; Colins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 per Robert Goff LJ.	Why would he not have been charged with "housebreaking"? In england-and-wales neither "house breaking" nor "breaking and entering" are legal terms: the offence is called burglary contrary to s.9 of the Theft Act 1968 which in 1983 was: (1) A person is guilty of burglary if— (a) he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser and with intent to commit any such offence as is mentioned in subsection (2) below; or (b) having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser he steals or attempts to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or attempts to inflict on any person therein any grievous bodily harm. (2) The offences referred to in subsection (1)(a) above are offences of stealing anything in the building or part of a building in question, of inflicting on any person therein any grievous bodily harm or raping any woman therein, and of doing unlawful damage to the building or anything therein. There is no difference between nightime and daytime entry, and there is no requirement for a forced entry. All that's needed is to go in without permission intending or attempting to do one of the relevant offences. I can only surmise that the reason(s) theft, rather than burglary, was charged was a (pre CPS) prosecutorial decision based on the admissible evidence, Fagan's mental state and what was in the public interest because the quoted text seems to meet the criteria for burglary. (ETA subject to the actual circumstances surrounding the alleged theft of the wine, which are not clear from the quoted text.)	It could depend on jurisdiction: in Georgia, attempted murder has a 10 year maximum term and aggravate assault has 20 years max. The essential difference is that attempted murder requires proving intent to kill, whereas "harm" is much broader and thus easier to prove.	In general, you do not have civil recourse against the government for (lawful) legal process that you are the victim of. "Counterclaim" would only be applicable when A sues B, and B makes a counterclaim against A – the police don't sue you, they arrest you, and the prosecutor prosecutes you (or decides not to). If the police beat you up, you could sue them for violating your rights, under what is known as Section 1983. Given the scenario you describe, this comes closest to involving false arrest, meaning that there was no probable cause for arrest. Otherwise, the police have immunity for their actions. But if there is a legal arrest warrant, there is probable cause (existence of probable cause is the standard for issuing an arrest warrant), so no claim against the police will succeed. I am leaving out the anomalous concept of an unlawful arrest warrant, where a judge issued an arrest warrant but there is in fact no probable cause. Such a case would be covered by Section 1983, where either the judge or the swearing officer (or both) violated your rights.	This is the Texas law pertaining to self defense, which says that "a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force". Relatively little of the law pertains to firearms, and none of it restricts the right to self-defense based on whether you are a resident, or you are using your own firearm vs. a borrowed one. The one provision, subsection (b)(5), that refers to firearms is an exception whereby force is not justified, namely if the actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's differences with the other person while the actor was: (A) carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02; or (B) possessing or transporting a weapon in violation of Section 46.05. (Sect. 46.02 is about conditions unlawful carrying of weapons, which covers such things as under-age carrying of certain knives, or not having control of your weapon, or being a felon in possession, etc. 46.05 is about machine guns, explosives, zip guns etc.) Deadly force is covered by a separate section, 9.32, adding the requirement that the actor "reasonably believe[] the deadly force [to be] immediately necessary". (A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or (B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Note that "deadly force" is defined as "force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury". Sec. 9.33 likewise allows deadly force to be used analogously in defense of a third person, and intreestingly, in 9.34(b), "A person is justified in using both force and deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force or deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an emergency". In addition, deadly force can be justified in defense of property, per sec. 9.41, if you "reasonably believe[] the force [to be] immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property", and you may also use force to recover or re-enter the property (as long as the force is used "immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession", and "the actor reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when he dispossessed the actor; or the other accomplished the dispossession by using force, threat, or fraud against the actor"). Sec. 9.42 then provides the possibility of justified use of deadly force in protection of property, if the force is immediately necessary (A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or (B) to prevent the other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the property; and (3) he reasonably believes that: (A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; or (B) the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The short version is, if deadly force is justified in the particular circumstances, then deadly force with a borrowed weapon is justified. However, there are federal laws regarding non-resident aliens possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(B) says that It shall be unlawful for any person...who, being an alien (A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or (B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)))...to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce Under subsection (y) there are exceptions for licensed hunters, government representatives etc. You can also petition the Attorney General for an exception. The point is that federal law would make possession of a firearm illegal for most visa types: here is the list.
Is it legal to retaliate against an employee who answered falsely when asked an illegal question? Oftentimes due to public policy considerations or for a multitude of other reasons employers can not ask particular questions during an interview or just in general in the workplace. Suppose that an employee or a perspective employee (in an interview) lies on one of these disallowed questions. Suppose the interviewed employee was hired. Can the employer fire for lying on such a question? Can an employee fire a current employee for falsely answering? Does this count as cause for firing? Can an employer retaliate by firing the employee for such a lie if they found out it was a lie later? Is lying in such circumstances illegal or otherwise fraudulent?	Is it legal to retaliate against an employee who answered falsely when asked an illegal question? It depends. It is important to ensure we understand the distinction between (1) questions which are illegal in and of themselves, and (2) the illegality of hiring, discharging, or failing to hire based on a candidate's/employee's answer(s) or attributes. You yourself might have been aware of the difference beforehand, but your question is a good occasion for clarifying a general misconception. In instances of the first category, it would certainly be illegal to retaliate against the employee insofar as the falsehood is traceable to the employer's violation of the law. Examples of this category are sections 432.3(b) ("An employer shall not [...] seek salary history information, including compensation and benefits, about an applicant for employment") and 432.7 ("An employer [...] shall not ask an applicant for employment to disclose, through any written form or verbally, information concerning an arrest or detention that did not result in conviction") of the California Labor code. Scenarios of the latter category are more intricate, since an employer might prove that his decision to discharge the employee falls outside of conduct sanctioned by statute. For instance, 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) does not outlaw --at least at a federal level-- questions about the individual's protected categories (such as sex, religion, or national origin). It only outlaws the decision making that is influenced by the protected categories which are the subject matter of the interview questions. The example you gave ("what would your husband do if you got this job?") serves to illustrate the difference, putting aside that questions of that sort might be intended to indirectly ascertain the candidate's marital status. Let's assume that the employer seeks to hire a waitress, and that the jurisdiction at issue outlaws discrimination on the basis of employee's marital status but not the questions about it. The employer has a cognizable interest to avoid employing any waitress whose husband is an overly jealous person with propensity to attack male clients. The waitress's lie when answering that question (for instance, by fraudulently representing that she is single or that her husband is ok with her employment as waitress there) contravenes the employer's legitimate interest to protect its clients. In that context, the employer's discovery that the employee lied during the interview gives reasonable grounds for discharging that employee. After all, the employee's intentional misrepresentation only strengthens the employer's suspicion of being at greater risk (of liability toward clients) than the employee is willing to admit. For the employer to prevail at law, it would need to be proved that the reason for discharging the female employee was not her marital status itself, but the employee's concealment of a risk that is a matter of employer's lawful concern.	You can ask nicely, but there is nothing you can do legally to prevent your former employer from making disclosures related to your former employment so long as they are true.	There are a very few government surveys which it is a crime to lie in responding to, most notably, census related surveys. Proving that a representation is false with respect to some questions (e.g. race or nationality) are challenging to prove and the subject of lots of hypothetical discussion. But proving misrepresentation with respect to other matters (e.g. how old you are) could be easy. This kind of survey is probably the only one where there could be criminal consequences. In the context of an employer-employee relationship, proving causation of damages from an inaccurate survey response would be almost impossible as a practical matter, but a proving an instance of lying on a survey could constitute generalized evidence of dishonesty that could constitute grounds (at least in part with other evidence) for denying an unemployment benefits claim or terminating an employee who has civil service protections or who can only be terminated pursuant to an employment contract for cause. A similar analysis could apply if the person lying on the firm sponsored survey was (or was an officer or manager of) an independent contractor or agent or business partner of the firm of some type in a case seeking to terminate that relationship for cause (and possibly triggering liquidated damages under a contract between the parties). In the context of a generalized public opinion survey, at most, the firm asking the survey questions might have a right to sue for any amount that the person was paid to participate in the survey (this would also be true for employer/firm sponsored surveys and while the amount might be small, this dollar amount could be important to showing that there were "some damages" caused by fraud and thus preventing a fraud claim from being dismissed on a motion for summary judgment). Conceivably, taking money to complete a general purpose survey with an intent not to answer truthfully could give rise to a criminal mail or wire fraud claim under federal law, but even then, showing that the matter misrepresented was material in a survey context beyond a reasonable doubt would be hard and the FBI has a non-binding policy of not prosecuting mail and wire fraud cases involving private parties in cases where less than $75,000 is at stake absent extraordinary reasons for doing so.	Is it possible for a witness to backtrack and claim that their previous statements were wrong because they misremembered? ... Is the witness now allowed to say something along the lines: "Huh. That's odd. I clearly remember it differently. But it's such a small detail and it was so long ago..."? Yes. Or is it now considered a deliberate lie? A judge's assessment of a witness's credibility and reliability is much more nuanced. See "How is a judge to evaluate a witness's credibility?"	There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced.	I do not believe that Idaho has such a law. This is not the end of the analysis, however. It isn't clear that saying you do not have a conviction, when in fact, you have a conviction that was dismissed, is a permissible ground for an Idaho employer to, for example, justify the termination of your employment for an improper reasons (e.g. national origin) when the employer, after the fact, discovers that you have a conviction that you did not disclose because it was dismissed. An Idaho court could easily rule that the non-disclosure of a conviction which was dismissed was not a material fact upon which an Idaho employer could justify terminating your employment when it was discovered after the fact. Likewise, fraud prosecutions generally require a misrepresentation to be made regarding a "material" fact, and not just any fact. In the same vein, while misstating your middle name might be a misrepresentation, it might not be an actionable misrepresentation of a material fact.	In law, there is a distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law. If the law prohibits X, and you think you're doing Y, that's a mistake of fact. If the law prohibits X, and you know you're doing X, but you think the law prohibits Y, that's a mistake of law. Mistake of fact is generally a defense (although that principle is being eroded), but mistake of law is not. In your hypothetical, you clearly had the intent to sell coffee, so you had mens rea. Mens rea refers to the intent to perform the act that is illegal, not the intent to break the law. If you intend to follow the law, but intentionally perform an act that is against the law, it is the latter that forms mens rea; mens rea refers to your intent regarding the act you are performing, not your intent regarding the law.	Is it unethical to file a claim against an attorney who lied? No. It is actually encouraged if the claimant can submit proof of attorney's misconduct. The grievance is to be filed in the claimant's jurisdiction rather than with the American Bar Association. An attorney's lies may be severe enough to constitute fraud on the court and possibly warrant disbarment. See Matter of LaRosee, 122 N.J. 298, 311 (1991). The real question from a practical standpoint is whether the Disciplinary Review Board and related entities will follow through or be unduly lenient about that attorney's misconduct. What if the Judge ultimately rejected the attorney's claim? That does not reduce the impropriety of the attorney's misconduct. The so-called "zealousness" with which lawyers advance their clients' position does not justify indulging in dishonesty devised to result in miscarriage of justice. Is it wrong to bring it to the attention of the judge or do judges frown on such things (since the attorney is representing the other party)? No. Judges generally are not up-to-date about attorneys' misconduct. Putting them on notice might frustrate a crook's further attempts to mislead the court in that and other cases the judge presides. By not reporting a crook, the public remains exposed to risks from that lawyer's pattern of misconduct.
Is it against any Texas wildlife regulations to keep a possum as a pet? Is there a law anywhere in black and white on paper that says it is against the law to keep a possum that was rescued as pet since if would only die if released into the wild?	There sort of is a law, this one. It does not absolutely forbid owning a possum, but it is required that you have a license to take or keep a wild fur-bearing animal including a possum. There is no existing "license to take and possess as a pet", but you could try under trapping licenses. However, they warn that the Fur-bearing Propagation Permit does not authorize individuals to possess live fur-bearing animals as pets.This IS NOT a “pet permit.” Ultimately, what would happen is you apply for a license, but they would deny the application because you don't plan to propagate the animal, or skin it. Although the statute does not specifically prohibit keeping a fur-bearing animal as a pet, it does authorize Parks and Wildlife to promulgate and enforce regulations. Another approach would be to seek a wild animal rehabilitation permit, pursuant to PWD regulations (here). This is also not a general pet permit, but in case your program of possum rehabilitation fails, you are not required to kill it or release it into the wild to die. There is a test required, to be sure you know how to rehabilitate wild animals, plus a requirement for letters of support from conservationists, veterinarians or rehabilitators.	Standing requirements are different in state and federal courts, and from one state to the next. A random individual would not have standing to object to a stranger's abortion in federal court, and likely not in any state court, under normal circumstances, as they are not injured in any meaningful way by the abortion. I don't know what the normal rules of standing are in Texas, but it is likely perfectly acceptable for the Legislature to wave its wand to grant standing to whomever it wants regarding any violation of the law it sees for. That seems to be what is happening here.	You may contact a towing company; they will ask who you are, and will politely inform you that since you aren't the property owner, they aren't authorized to take someone else's car that is trespassing on the property. [Addendum] The first step in unraveling the legalities of the situation is seeing that only the property owner can give permission to enter (park) on the property. That permission can be rescinded, but only by the owner. The owner seems to have given permission and has stated in advance some conditions under which permission might be rescinded. The towing company could be called (by the owner) to act as the agent for the owner and remove the offending vehicle; but the towing company cannot just up an do this on their own. If they were to spontaneously tow a vehicle without officially acting on behalf of the owner, they would be liable for damages, owing to their having torted some guy's chattels. So the company will want to know that they are protected, in acting as the agent of the property owner. One way to do that is to verify that the person calling the towing company is the owner. Another would be to get the caller to swear that they are the owner and indemnify them against damages, in case they get sued. That pound of cure is more costly and annoying than the ounce of prevention of making sure that you're towing a car with proper authorization, so it's unlikely that they would just tow the car on your say-so. You might try suing the complex owner for some kind of breach of contract, if you think you have a contractual right to a parking space and they are negligent in doing what's necessary to meet your contractual right. The lease says "we may...", not "we will", so they haven't promised to absolutely enforce this rule. Or, of course, you could call the manager and mention that there's still a problem.	Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.	You face two legal perils when you use a firearm against a wild animal: Most wild animals are protected or regulated as game by state and/or federal law. Unnecessarily discharging a firearm is forbidden in many jurisdictions. With respect to both charges, self defense is almost always a justification (assuming the possession of the weapon used was lawful). The specifics vary a little by jurisdiction, but this Utah rule is pretty typical: R657-63-3. Self Defense. (1) A person is legally justified in killing or seriously injuring a threatening wild animal when the person reasonably believes such action is necessary to protect them self, another person, or a domestic animal against an imminent attack by the wild animal that will likely result in severe bodily injury or death to the victim. (2) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors: (a) the nature of the danger; (b) the immediacy of the danger; (c) the probability that the threatening wild animal will attack; (d) the probability that the attack will result in death or serious bodily injury; (e) the ability to safely retreat; (f) the fault of the person in creating the encounter; and (g) any previous pattern of aggressive or threatening behavior by the individual wild animal which was known to the person claiming self defense. (3)(a) A person shall notify the division within 12 hours after killing or wounding a wild animal under Subsection (1). (b) No wild animal killed pursuant to Subsection (1) or the parts thereof may be removed from the site, repositioned, retained, sold, or transferred without written authorization from the division. (4)(a) A person is not legally justified in killing or seriously injuring a threatening wild animal under the circumstances specified in Subsection (1) if the person: (i) has the ability to safely retreat from the threatening animal and fails to do so, except when the animal enters a home, tent, camper, or other permanent or temporary living structure occupied at the time by the person or another person; or (ii) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly provokes or attracts the wild animal into a situation in which it is probable it will threaten the person, another person, or a domestic animal. Federal law is a little more terse: The Endangered Species Act includes the following: Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, no civil penalty shall be imposed if it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed an act based on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member of his or her family, or any other individual from bodily harm, from any endangered or threatened species. Defense of property One can be fined for killing threatened or endangered animals in defense of property or livestock (see, for example, Christy v. Hodel). These instructions from the Missouri Department of Conservation are typical: If wildlife is damaging your property, you ... may shoot or trap most damage-causing wildlife out of season and without a permit to prevent further damage. Note: Wildlife you may not shoot or trap under this provision are migratory birds, white-tailed deer, mule deer, elk, turkeys, black bears, mountain lions, and any endangered species. For conflicts with these species, contact your local county conservation agent or nearest Department office. Control action may be taken only on your property. Wildlife you take under this provision may not be used in any way, and you must report it to the Department within 24 hours, then dispose of it in accordance with Department instructions. Check with local city or county authorities regarding the use of traps and firearms in local jurisdictions.	As stated in the answer to What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?; if either of the participants is in Australia than unless all parties have given consent then the recording is illegal. Notwithstanding its legality, property in the recording vests in the person who made it. There is no law against him keeping it. There is no law against him publishing it unless the material contained is offensive, hate speech or defamatory (see Customer feedback gathering in Australia).	Since your consent is not required in Texas, revocation is irrelevant. Restrictions of use of recordings flow from the legal nature of the recording itself, so there is no provision saying, for example, that only one party needs to consent for just recording, but all parties must consent to make any use of the recording. Since these laws were devised to regulate the practice of wearing a wire and collecting evidence of crimes, requiring consent from all parties would be counterproductive to the purposes of the law. You could try drafting a contract where you pay people to not record you (anybody who doesn't sign, you shouldn't talk to them), but enforcement could be tricky, so I would not try a DIY contract: get a lawyer. You would have to show that you were harmed by them making an unconsented recording. It should be in the form of a contract where you give something of value in exchange for something of value, which is a thing typically enforced by the courts. Also bear in mind that even in an all-party state, if you know that you are being recorded, you cannot just say "I do not consent", you have to stop talking. Continuing to talk when notified that there is or may be a recording constitutes implied consent, which is why on the phone companies often announce via recording that the conversation may be monitored, and they do not ask "Do you consent". By not hanging up, you consented.	I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level.
How does [arbitrary attorney] have standing? As I understand it, Judge Sullivan has a conflict with the executive branch and appointed an attorney to plead his case. But how can one delegate power one doesn’t have? Either the power is delegated and this is a member of the judicial branch challenging the executive branch’s use of its authority or it is not a delegation, in which case it is a random attorney with a general grievance. If a random attorney at the direction of a judge has standing to challenge actions within executive branch jurisdiction, why didn’t a judge prosecute the banks guilty of criminal fraud leading to the 2008 financial crisis when Obama ordered the DOJ to not prosecute? Edit: Just realized a third option, that there exists, as in Superman comics, an unelected bizarro executive branch that can be summoned by the judiciary to battle the elected executive branch for supremacy and the one who determines the winner is... the judicial branch. Edit 2: (In response to people claiming that this is just how things work) Frank v. Gaos affirmed that standing is required at all stages of a case. Courts do not give advisory opinions. Courts do not entertain oral argument between one side that has standing and some arbitrarily selected neutral observer. Maybe answerers are confused and think that a traditional appeal, where a judge sends it to a higher court has a case and controversy due to a judge wanting the opinion of the higher court rather than the parties themselves having real injury in fact. That is not the reasoning applied by the Supreme Court when it comes to determining standing. So, I would like someone to reconcile (if possible) the traditional requirements for standing with the facts in the Flynn case before I select an answer.	If a random attorney at the direction of a judge has standing to challenge actions within executive branch jurisdiction, why didn’t a judge prosecute the banks guilty of criminal fraud leading to the 2008 financial crisis when Obama ordered the DOJ to not prosecute? This is a misunderstanding of the issue. Judge Sullivan is not "prosecuting" Mr. Flynn. Judges do not have the power to prosecute people. Instead, Sullivan (argues that he) is trying to decide whether or not to grant the government's motion to dismiss. Normally, this is a very open and shut question: If the government doesn't want to prosecute someone, then it would make no sense to try and keep the case in court, so it's typical for these dismissals to be rubber stamped. The complication in this particular case is that Mr. Flynn has already pleaded guilty. Because he was in federal court, on a federal charge, pleading guilty is a rather involved process. His plea included very explicit statements under oath about the specific conduct he allegedly committed, and that conduct directly matches up with specific required elements of the alleged crime. After Mr. Flynn had already made those statements under oath, the government told Judge Sullivan that it did not believe it had enough evidence to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Sullivan now wants to hold a hearing to determine whether he can or should believe the government, and if not, what if anything he can or should do about it. Finally, the DC Circuit issued a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Sullivan to immediately grant the dismissal. Sullivan is now appealing that order. In this sense, then, the dispute is not directly about Mr. Flynn's case, but rather about the level of discretion to which Judge Sullivan is entitled in performing his official duties. By issuing the writ, the DC Circuit necessarily determined that Judge Sullivan was not legally entitled to hold the hearing which he wanted to hold. That is what the en banc re-hearing is about.	This probably isn't a ground for an appeal. While a party arguing to reverse a trial court's decision must show that the argument that they are making on appeal was "preserved" by that party at trial by making that argument in the trial court, the converse is not true. Indeed, one of the rules of appellate practice is that a trial court's ruling will be upheld for any reason supported by the evidence even if it wasn't made by any party at trial. Generally speaking, a trial court isn't supposed to try a pro se party's case for them, but once the evidence is in, the court is free to do original legal research and come to a conclusions contrary to the arguments made by either of the parties. A judge is supposed to correctly apply the actual law to the facts notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to lead it astray. This doesn't systemically happen in favor of one party or the other in my experience, but is more common when one or both parties is relatively inexperienced in the relevant legal field. Appellate courts also come to conclusions about the law not advanced by either party on a regular basis. If anything, this is even more common in the area of administrative law, where the judge is likely to be a subject area specialist, than in ordinary civil litigation. It is also more common in administrative law because a judge in that context is more focused on the institutional implications of a bad precedent than trial court judges in ordinary courts. (PS is there a technical term for the rules concerning the "role" of the judge in a court, what they supposed to do, and not supposed to do?) Probably, but there isn't any term that comes readily to mind. If I can think of one, I will update this answer.	"Seila Law" is a law firm, not a law. They were a party in a recent SCOTUS decision, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S ___, which involved the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created by Congress, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The court held that the structure of that law (regarding appoinntment and firing of the director) is unconstitutional: The CFPB’s leadership by a single individual removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers. More specifically, Article II vests the entire “executive Power” in the President alone, but the Constitution presumes that lesser executive officers will assist the President in discharging his duties. The President’s executive power generally includes the power to supervise — and, if necessary, remove — those who exercise the President’s authority on his behalf. The President’s removal power has long been confirmed by history and precedent. The law in question addresses a single position, director of CFPB, not all government agencies. "Agency" is defined in 18 USC 6 as includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense. "Department" is then defined as one of the executive departments enumerated in section 1 of Title 5, unless the context shows that such term was intended to describe the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the government. POTUS firing power is about the executive branch, not the judicial or legislative branches, so it depends on what you mean by "agency". You can infer possible outcomes based on this ruling, but what they literally said is that particular law is unconstitutional.	There is a special type of law enforcement officer, called a "bailiff" who is charged with maintaining order in a courtroom, and often, a bailiff is a direct subordinate of a judge who must follow the judge's orders. Judges can also issue special kinds of court orders, called "writs" which are a direction to a law enforcement agency generally to take certain action. But, in these cases, the law enforcement agency is effectively an "independent contractor" in relationship to the judge with considerable discretion regarding precisely how and when a writ is carried out. Somebody in the law enforcement agency to which a writ is directed is required to take action, but no individual law enforcement officer is personally compelled to comply with this order. The quote in question is not a statement about the legal authority of a judge, however. It is a statement of "realpolitik". The judge can't physically force or threaten law enforcement to do what they are told to do by a judge. The cops have the guns, not the judges. Instead, the judge relies upon law enforcement obeying the judge's orders because that is what law enforcement officers do. It's right in the job title. But, if law enforcement chose to ignore judges, in general, there is very little that judges could do about that (and in some countries, law enforcement does routinely ignore judicial directions). Some forms of executive branch authority to defy judicial orders is even legally codified, most starkly in the case of the pardon power.	Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect.	Maybe, probably not. The leading case would appear to be Raines v. Byrd, 521 US 811, where 6 congressmen sued over a line-item veto law (later held to be unconstitutional). The court notes the established legal fact that To meet the standing requirements of Article III, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief". where that court added the italics; and the alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizable. This requires, among other things, that the plaintiff have suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized" In this case, the court find that "appellees have not been singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members of their respective bodies", and they are claiming institutional injury, arising "solely because they are Members of Congress...If one of the Members were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his successor instead". The court did, however, uphold standing in one legislative case, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, where there was an issue over whether the legislature had ratified a constitutional amendment when the Lt. Governor of Kansas cast a tie-breaking vote on the question (the allegation was that this was improper). The court held that the legislators "have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes", finding that their votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for naught although if they are right in their contentions their votes would have been sufficient to de- feat ratification. We think that these senators have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes. The Raines court finds that legislators "have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified" – but that was not the case in Raines (the line-item veto act had clearly passed). Applied to the Oprah hypothetical, senatorial vote would arguably have been completely nullified by the proposed process: that is the argument made in the present complaint, para 33-34. The end of sect. III of the Raines opinion gives extensive historical analysis of the fact that branches of government do not generally have standing to sue each other, closing with the note that Our regime contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts, well expressed by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974): "The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall [in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),] lies in the protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action. It is this role, not some amorphous general supervision of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests. There is a very narrow window through which the Senate might have standing to sue POTUS and otherwise, the answer is "no". The Oprah case is distinguished from Raines in that there is no political recourse to simply ignoring the appointments clause, except impeachment, and the courts might see such an action as equivalent to vote-nullification.	You are correct. A judge may only issue a warrant when it is supported by an affidavit, in which the officer seeking the warrant swears under oath to the facts supporting the warrant. Lying on the affidavit would constitute perjury. But judges very frequently just rubber-stamp the warrants without meaningfully reviewing the affidavits, so the primary form of oversight would be the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge asserting that the warrant wasn't supported by probable cause. If a judge does review the warrant application and finds the officer's statements not to be credible, he can refuse to sign the warrant, and he is free to also carry that credibility determination to subsequent warrants sought by the same officer or other officers in his department.	Many laws control the conduct of the executive branch "Attempting to control the conduct of the executive branch" doesn't imply a violation of the constitutional separation of powers. Congress has many laws that control the executive. 35 USC 101 tells the Patent and Trademark Office what subject matter is patentable. 15 USC 1052 tells the Patent and Trademark Office that it must provide registration unless a trademark falls into one of several categories. There are many many more. This power comes from Article 1, Section 8 The power to enact laws that tell the executive branch what to do stems from Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which gives congress the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." Example of intrusion on Executive authority But, when a statute intrudes on the authority conferred on the Executive by the Constitution, it is not constitutional. An example where Congress intruded on Executive authority is Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). The court held that "the power to recognize foreign states resides in the President alone", and that "if Congress could alter the President’s statements on matters of recognition or force him to contradict them, Congress in effect would exercise the recognition power. An exclusive Presidential power disables the Congress from acting upon the subject." (Citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), an important separation of powers case that went the other way: the Executive issued an order that infringed on the law-making powers vested in Congress.) Executive acknowledges that Congress can control how vacancies are filled There is a case before the Supreme Court in October term 2016, where the Executive is defending its interpretation of a statute that concerns how particular executive employees are hired, fired, or directed: National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc.. The Executive is not challenging the constitutionality of the statute, though. The Executive even argues, basically, "If Congress wanted to control us, it has the ability to and knows how to control us.. it just didn't in this case." No bills of attainder United States v. Lovett 328 U.S. 303 (1946) is another case where Congress went too far. The background here was that Congress passed a law that said "no salary or other compensation shall be paid to certain employees of the Government (specified by name)". The court held that: "Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial, are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution." This principle was refined in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). The court upheld an act that directed "the Administrator of GSA to take custody of appellant's Presidential materials". Even given this specific direction to take a particular action, the court found that "the Act does not, on its face, violate the principle of separation of powers."
Are these unsolicited seed packages illegal? I recently came across an article with the headline "Some mystery seeds illegally sent from China identified." It struck me as odd because obviously sending unsolicited junk mail isn't illegal, and I didn't think there was anything illegal about sending seeds internationally. Is there anything illegal about this?	Reports I've seen are that these seed shipments have false customs declarations, claiming that they contain something else, e.g. this one which was declared as "ring". That would violate 18 USC 542: Whoever enters or introduces, or attempts to enter or introduce, into the commerce of the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance, or makes any false statement in any declaration without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, or procures the making of any such false statement as to any matter material thereto without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, whether or not the United States shall or may be deprived of any lawful duties; or Whoever is guilty of any willful act or omission whereby the United States shall or may be deprived of any lawful duties accruing upon merchandise embraced or referred to in such invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission— Shall be fined for each offense under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Indeed, if they had been properly labeled "seeds", the packages would probably have been intercepted by US Customs and never have been delivered in the first place. International shipment of seeds and other agricultural products tends to be tightly regulated due to the risk of spreading plant diseases. There is also the Federal Seeds Act, 7 USC 1581: The importation into the United States is prohibited of— (1) any agricultural or vegetable seeds if any such seed contains noxious-weed seeds or the labeling of which is false or misleading in any respect; Under 7 USC 1596 violation is punishable by a fine of up to $1000 for the first offense, and up to $2000 for each subsequent offense.	You will have to pay import toll and taxes. There is no way around that unless you get only tiny deliveries, and that would be tax evasion. Atop that, make sure your wares are declared properly and are not regarded as counterfeit or not importable. Fashion products might require to follow some special rules on ingredients that are allowable. You can get the information you need at your customs office or at the customs office website	After some more research, I found several german retailers like Frankonia and Brownells, which do ship firearm magazines to Austria. My reasoning is as follows: If they were regulated in any way, they would either be confiscated or sent back to the store. In either way, the customers would get in contact with the store, and the store would stop shipping magazines to Austria. Since I was unable to find a german store which specifically mentioned that they would not ship to Austria, I am going to assume that they are not regulated and can be purchased freely.	Intent would greatly factor into the case. As mentioned, possession of child pornography is illegal. There was a case, where a man had inadvertently downloaded such images. In the case, it was shown that there was sufficient evidence that it was accidental and without his knowledge. Presumably, if you by happenstance created an identical code through encryption/compiling, there would be a lack of evidence of intent or evidence of your intended use. For example, your stored password manager file happens to store data identical to an illegal image. The password manager output is provable and repeatable to show that it was simply circumstantial. If you have hundreds of such outputs that all "just happen to be illicit images" you would probably fall on the wrong side of reasonable doubt. As to whether you can keep the data, the programmers for the password manager would probably update their system to modify the output to avoid bad press. The general idea is that the "illegal number" is so incredibly specific that accidental cases are very unlikely to occur, and if it did, that there would be forensic evidence indicating intent and use.	...due to the international registration of multiple domains to generate ad revenue by recycling stories across sock puppet networks, giving the impression of multiple, independent companies. None of that is illegal on its face. Internet domains are freely registerable by anyone, anywhere (with the exception of some laws in some nations that restrict such Internet-related activity), and registered privately or publicly, and websites can be hosted anywhere. Writing articles and "spinning" and copying articles (even if that writing is sales gibberish in broken English) among the same copyright owner is legal, and using the same design and layout for a network of sites is legal. The formation of multiple, related companies and shell companies to give the impression that companies are separate and independent is legal (again, with the exception of some business and corporate laws in some nations that restrict such activity). These are all common business practices. Some business practices may appear to be unethical - trying to fool customers in order to make money and get clicks and sell ads. And what you may be feeling is that such activity is unethical. And that's OK. But feeling that they are unethical doesn't make the practices illegal. Many common activities that are considered to be unethical are illegal; but not all. Buyer beware. One way some of that activity may be illegal is if those articles are factually incorrect and promote quack medical treatments, are financial scams requiring payments, are gambling sites or promote other clearly illegal things. But then you get into the complexity of exactly how they are illegal, which jurisdictions are involved, and on and on.	Due to competition/antitrust laws it can be illegal, more so if the search engine is dominant in the market. This has actually been realized in the EU where they fined Google €2.42 billion for abusing their market dominance and favouring their own Google Shopping service in search results. For further information, that fine has been specifically addressed on this site. In the US, this has not yet come to such a dramatic penalty, but there have been investigations. The FTC has investigated similar search results manipulation among other antitrust issues, but ultimately decided not to file a lawsuit as the changes to the search algorithms "could be plausibly justified as innovations that improved Google’s product." Following this inaction, as of November 2017, the state of Missouri is also investigating Google on the same issue. I'm not certain if manipulating search results on its own is illegal, but with market dominance (like what Google has), it certainly is.	The relevant section of US patent law was already posted in an answer on one of the questions you linked, but I'll repeat it: 35 USC 271 (a): Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. Merely making a patented invention is infringement; it isn't relevant whether you sell it. It is also infringement if you use it yourself, regardless of who made it or whether you paid them, or whether you would have otherwise bought it from the patent holder. There are some special exceptions for things like certain kinds of pharmaceuticals, but I browsed the rest of 35 USC Chapter 28, and didn't see anything that would appear to be relevant in this case.	if they do admit to to such fraudulent behavior, either in writing or over the phone, what legal action can I take against them? First of all, the intermediary with whom you are dealing will not admit fraud in writing or over the phone. Most likely the intermediary knows where, when, and how to give a candidate or employee directions that are sought to advance the intermediary's fraudulent purposes. The intermediary's practices sound in violation of Georgia's Fair Business Practices Act (FBPA), OCGA 10-1-390 et seq. The Attorney General is in charge of receiving and processing/channeling all complaints pursuant to the FBPA. See 10-1-395(c). Apropos of your mention of scamming and "foreign nationals", you might want to report the intermediary with the USCIS if you reasonably suspect the intermediary's fraudulent practices extend to obtaining visas for its employees. 18 USC § 1546 sanctions the act of "procur[ing] by means of any false claim or statement" any document of authorized stay or employment in the US. You will have standing to sue the intermediary only if it does something unlawful to you. Even if you end up suing the intermediary, there is a chance that your case would be presided by some corrupt judge/narcofelon whose "philosophy" in court consists of favoring "employers and [...] anybody who's powerful". In line with one of the comments, you might also want to consider denouncing the intermediary publicly. When doing so, you need to ensure that you prove or are able to prove the statements of fact you make about the intermediary. In this publication, I made statements of fact that I can readily prove by showing evidence, such as excerpt(s) of a contract with the crooked intermediary as well as excerpts of his deposition. The only reason why I refrained from disclosing other fraudulent practices this intermediary incurred is that neither these were not recorded nor did he reflect them in writing (your evidence need not be in the form of sworn/notarized documents or court filings; records such as emails would be fine). It is comforting that you are not planning on dealing further with that kind of employer. On paper the intermediary might assure you that you retain full control of your resume, yet that will not prevent him from pressing you in ways you could hardly prove later on.
Do obviously spurious claims of trademark infringement help in cases of genuine infringement? Several times when discussing obviously spurious claims of trademark infringement I've seen an argument that companies, in order to keep their trademarks, must threaten to file suit over trademark infringement even when it's blatantly obvious that there is no infringement. The argument goes like this: If a company waits until their trademark is genuinely infringed to issue threats over trademark infringement, then they'll have no evidence that they put any effort into policing their trademark, and hence lose their trademark. However, if they issue infringement threats to anyone who ever gives a funny look to their trademark, then when their trademark is actually and genuinely infringed they'll be able to point to mountains of spurious threats they've sent as evidence that they do police their trademark. Is there any validity to this argument?	This overstates the case. A company must pursue infringements, arguably even when it isn't economically sensible in isolation to do so, to prevent its trademark from being diluted. But, that isn't the case "when it's blatantly obvious that there is no infringement." There is no benefit from pursuing cases that aren't even colorable infringements. The notion is similar to adverse possession. If you let someone openly use your real property without your permission, eventually, the squatter becomes its legal owner. Also, as in the case of adverse possession, an alternative to suing someone for infringing is to make their permission non-infringing by writing them a letter expressly authorizing them to use your mark. Permissive, licensed use does not dilute a trademark.	The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture.	No If they have prior usage then they have the trademark already and are the only ones who can register it. Trademarks arise through use - registration is not required.	The only way in which you could be "incorrectly listed as a defendant" is if somehow your name was typed in as a party (there would be a glaring gap, that no paragraph of the complaint says anything about you as a defendant). Assuming the situation is nothing so bizarre as a typo, you are a defendant. Whether or not you are liable in this case is a matter of fact and law, and the plaintiff's attorney has probably done due diligence in suing everybody imaginable. Perhaps the plaintiff lied to his attorney about material facts (read the complaint); or perhaps there is a credible legal theory under which you would be liable (read the complaint). Your attorney will take care of your problems, to the best of his ability. He may be able to persuade the plaintiff's attorney that they stand no realistic hope of winning and some chance of getting smacked for pointlessly involving you. If the plaintiff's attorney isn't persuaded by the argument, your attorney could submit the legal arguments as a motion to dismiss. If the judge is not persuaded (at this stage), you (your attorney) will have to counter the arguments presented at trial.	Yes, this could become an issue Trademark infringement occurs when you use another’s trademark in a way that could cause confusion to the consumer. Is it possible that people will be confused that your company produced a game of the same name? Yes. Is that trademark infringement? Possibly. Would a company like Bethesda take you to court to find out? Possibly. Can you avoid this risk by choosing a different name? Yes. Does this cost anything? No, as a new business your ‘brand’ has zero value right now. Should you choose a new name? Well, it’s your business - make a business decision.	Owing to the First Amendment, in the United States your recourse would be limited to civil action based on violations of terms of service (meaning that "the authorities" are not going to knock on their doors to tell them to behave). This is not "spam" (which could be regulated) as the term is generally understood. It is annoying, but probably does not constitute threatening or child porn. It might involve violation of an anti-impersonation law such as this one from Texas, if the offender uses the persona of a real person as opposed to a fictitious person). That law, moreover, does not criminalize simple annoying. Prosecution may be possible in the UK.	If the lawyer has legitimate concerns, his first port of call would be the ICO https://ico.org.uk/. Before the ICO will take his complaint further he'll have had write to you expressing his concerns and received a written response that presumably he is unhappy with, and wants to take the issue further. Most companies have a data compliance team who will have policies and procedures to log breaches like this and decide what course of action to take in response. Not every breach needs to be brought to the attention of the ICO, and they have a handy self assessment tool to see if you should report the breach. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/report-a-breach/ In your situation, I don't think this constitutes a serious breach which will require investigating. It's simply an admin error. If it is unlikely to pose a risk to any of the individuals they will say something like: You should keep an internal record of the breach as detailed in Article 33 (5) of the GDPR, including what happened, the effects of the breach and remedial actions taken. The definition of risk according to the ICO is: "This risk exists when the breach may lead to physical, material or non-material damage for the individuals whose data have been breached". So in this case I'd assume a simple apology (Bcc'd :) ) and a record of what happened, how it happened, and the action taken to prevent it happening again should suffice.	As to #1, the US Patent and Trademark Office has a patent practitioner search where you can verify if someone is a registered patent practitioner. If so, it means they passed a [registration process] that evaluates their "legal, scientific, and technical qualifications, as well as good moral character and reputation", as well as a multiple-choice exam. I looked up a few of the attorneys listed on the firm's About Us page and they show up as registered. So this seems like a good indication that they are a "real law firm". This does not address whether they are "credible" (I'm not sure what that means), or how to evaluate the firm's quality, and I will leave it to someone else to answer that.
Killing pregnant women vs murder Abortion is not considered double murder, but killing a pregnant woman is. How is this contradiction resolved?	Murder is, by definition, an unlawful killing of a human. Since abortion is legal, it cannot be murder, so it cannot be a double murder. Since killing a pregnant woman is illegal and ends two human lives, it can be a double murder. The details can, of course, depend on the jurisdiction. If abortion is illegal, then it could be considered murder. If the law didn't consider a fetus a human life, then killing a pregnant woman might not be a double murder.	Yes the woman is guilty of murder (under the law OP described) The issue of common law mens rea (the guilty conscience) is moot as it is no longer a component of the crime, see here. Almost all jurisdictions today have codified crimes so the common law mens rea is not relevant, for example, in Texas a person commits murder if they "intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual"; feeling guilty about it or knowing it was wrong is not an issue. In the facts you describe the person "intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual"; the fact that she did not consider the victim to be a person is immaterial. As described, she would have a hard time with an insanity plea in the same way that a white supremacist murderer would for classifying members of other races as "non-persons". You can see why the common law usage would no longer work.	The concept is known as lesser included offense. The prosecution believed that they have a chance to prove murder, so they charged murder, but they understood that the judge and jury might not convict on murder. So they said in effect, "and if you won't find him guilty of murder, at least convict for manslaughter."	As a result, Bob becomes ill and dies. Could Eve be tried for Murder, Manslaughter, or some other crime, as she chose not to be vaccinated against a disease that she (in-directly) passed on to Bob and killed him? There are basically two distinct issues here. What is the duty? And if a duty was breached, what intent is necessary to breach it? There is not a legal duty to be vaccinated. There is a duty to use reasonable care not to hurt others. The duty not to hurt others could be satisfied by not seeing Bob in person, by wearing a mask around Bob or by having other non-transmission means available, in addition to being vaccinated. But Eve didn't do any of these things. We don't know if Eve had any reason to think that she presented a risk of infection to Bob because she could have passed the virus to him while she was asymptomatic. We also know, by the assumption of the question, that Eve was the source of the infection. But, in real life, proving the source of an infection beyond a reasonable doubt is very challenging or impossible. This must be established for any homicide crime. There is no indication that Eve knew she was transmitting the virus to Bob, or that Eve intended to transmit the virus to Bob (if she intentionally spat in Bob's face intending to infect him that would be a different matter). At most, her conduct was reckless, but if she was asymptotic and has no idea that she was doing something that was actually putting Bob at risk, her intent could be as slight as negligent (for tort law purposes only) or criminally grossly negligent. Since she lacked the necessary intent to commit murder (i.e. either an intention to kill, or an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm), she could not be guilty of the offense of murder. There are three types of voluntary manslaughter in England, none of which apply here: "There are three types of voluntary manslaughter: that resulting from loss of self-control; that resulting from statutorily defined diminished responsibility; and killing in perseverance of a suicide pact." So, this leaves involuntary manslaughter as the most serious possible homicide offense. Involuntary manslaughter could encompass either reckless conduct (i.e. "the unlawful act must be such that all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise it as an act which must subject the other person to at least the risk of some harm resulting therefrom albeit not serious harm") and is usually in furtherance of some other criminal offense, or in the case of "gross negligence manslaughter", negligent conduct that is a far greater level of wrongdoing than the negligence that would suffice for civil tort liability. Gross negligence manslaughter is the most plausible charge and is itself a hard call that involves judgement and discretion on the part of the trier of fact (i.e. the judge in a bench trial, and the jury in a jury trial) that is exercised on a case by case basis considering all of the circumstances. Also, to be clear, the wrongful act in a gross negligence involuntary manslaughter case would be transmitting the virus (which could have been prevented multiple ways) and not failing to get vaccinated itself.	Yes or no, depending. The question is investigated in "The Status of Pregnant Women and Fetuses in US Criminal Law" (JAMA), which collects 23 opinion in US jurisdiction. In Reinesto v. Superior Court, 182 Ariz. 190 where the court ruled that the state cannot prosecute for child abuse a woman who uses heroin during pregnancy and thereafter gives birth to a heroin-addicted child. However, in Whitner v South Carolina, 492 SE 2d 777 the court did find the mother criminally liable for child abuse, based on prenatal drug use. The South Carolina case is the sole example of that type, in the study (published 2003). Charges range from child endangerment/abuse, illegal drug delivery to a minor, or fetal murder/manslaughter. The general finding is that since a fetus is not legally deemed to be a person (in those jurisdictions, at that time), where was no "child abuse". South Carolina, on the other hand, reasoned, here and in prior cases, that We have no difficulty in concluding that a fetus having reached that period of prenatal maturity where it is capable of independent life apart from its mother is a person. A different study ("Criminal Charges for Child Harm from Substance Use in Pregnancy", JAAPL) which included cases up to 2015, found a slightly different distribution but generally concludes that courts do not consider maternal drug use to be a legal question. That article also cites a web page which at the time is purported to say that 18 states allow civil child abuse proceedings. In Chenault v. Huie (Texas), the court found that Texas does not recognize a cause of action in tort for injuries to a child that result from the mother's negligent or grossly negligent conduct while she was pregnant with the child but according to the more current Guttmacher Institute study, about half of the states have such a civil cause of action.	It would appear the answer is "it depends", based on where the abortion takes place. It's possible that France has a domestic law that prohibits aborting children with Down's syndrome — which would make such an act illegal if performed in France. I am not familiar with French law so do not know and cannot comment on that. More generally speaking, there is no EU-wide law that prohibits such abortions. For example, in the UK, such abortions are considered somewhat routine and there is no specific law prohibiting them. Indeed, they are explicitly permitted under the Abortion Act 1967. While there is a prohibition on eugenics in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), that would only seem to be engaged in the event some EU or domestic law was passed that mandated some form of eugenics. The European Convention on Human Rights has Article 2—the "Right to Life"—however, the rights established by this Article typically only apply to living beings and have not yet been held to firmly apply to foetuses (Vo v. France [2004] ECtHR, para 80.) and an unborn child can be held not to possess these rights until the moment of birth (Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1979]) although it varies from Member State to Member State. Some Member States (e.g. Ireland) constitutionally guarantee unborn children the right to live, in which case such abortions would presumably be illegal, but unless there's a specific law that prohibits such abortions, in almost all Member States of the European Union, such abortions would not be illegal. In conclusion, are such abortions prohibited in the EU? Not as far as my research suggests.	An alibi in itself isn't necessarily a trump card. A legal declaration that you were dead despite being self-evidently alive doesn't seem a persuasive alibi.	He is probably guilty of negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter, at most (a minor felony), and is possibly not guilty of a crime at all. The primary distinction between classes of homicide is mens rea (i.e. intent). The only affirmative act he took was to move the pillow. He did so both without intending to or knowing that he would kill Jane (the intent necessary for murder), and also, without clear actual knowledge that he would be creating a risk that Jane would die (a reckless state of mind that would support a conviction for manslaughter). Also, note that Walter himself, at this time, is not engaged in a felony, so he is not guilty of felony murder. We can presume he is present with the consent previously given of the owner of the property and did not mean anyone any harm. Likewise, this is not what is meant by "extreme indifference" for purposes of a murder statute, the paradigm of which is shooting randomly into a crowd knowing that someone will almost certainly be killed without knowing or intending that any particular person will die. The mental state necessary for negligent homicide is the equivalent of "gross negligence" in a civil case and is called "criminal negligence" in a criminal case. To be criminally negligent a person must fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a certain result will occur, and the risk must be of such a nature that the defendant's failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from a reasonable person's standard of care. If a jury found that a reasonable person ought should clearly know that moving a pillow put Jane at risk of dying, then he might be guilty of criminal negligence. But, if a jury found that a reasonable person would not know that moving the pillow put Jane at grave risk of death, his action would not be criminally negligent. There are also at least three questions of causation which is not entirely independent of the question of negligence. First, generally an act is only considered a cause of a consequence if it is a foreseeable result of the action. If Jane's vomit caused death is not a foreseeable result of moving the pillow, then her death might not be legally caused by moving the pillow. Second, how likely is it that she would have died even if Walter had never entered the room. There are lots of ways that the pillow could have been jostled during the night leading to the same result. If it likely would have happened anyway, Walter's involvement might not be the legal cause of the death. Third, how much fault should be attributed to Jane? This is closely related to the second question. If her death was primarily caused by her getting dangerously high and placing herself in a vulnerable position, perhaps Walter's involvement is not a meaningful cause of the death. A New Mexico court has held that the defense that the victim was negligent has value only if it establishes that the victim's negligence was the sole cause of the accident. State v. Maddox, 99 N.M. 490, 660 P.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1983). But, what about Jesse's negligence? Under a relevant standard criminal jury instruction in New Mexico: The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's act was a significant cause of the death of __________________ (name of victim). Evidence has been presented that the negligence of a person other than the defendant may have contributed to the cause of death. Such contributing negligence does not relieve the defendant of responsibility for an act that significantly contributed to the cause of the death so long as the death was a foreseeable result of the defendant's actions. However, if you find the negligence of a person other than the defendant was the only significant cause of death, then the defendant is not guilty of the offense of __________________ (name of offense). Caveat: A number of states impose strict criminal liability on drug dealers, often for murder, if someone died from using a drug sold by them, but often it has to be a child, and often the drug has to be the proximate cause of death, e.g. due to an overdose or impurity in the drug. I would presume that Jesse and not Walter supplied the drugs to Jane, that Jane is an adult, and it is not obvious that the drug itself (as opposed to the vomiting due to the manner in which the drugs were used) was the proximate cause of death, so a statute like this might not apply in any case. This brings us to the hard part of the question: Without the pillow Jane rotates on her back and starts to vomit and cough, still sleeping. At first Walter tries to react, running to the other side of the bed to help her, but then he stops and decides to do nothing as she dies. Note that if Walter had moved the pillow without knowing that he was creating a risk, left the room ignorant, and then this happened, surely Walter would have no legal liability for Jane's death. If Walter develops the necessary intent for criminal liability, this probably doesn't happen until he observes that she is starting to choke on her vomit and might die. Even then, he does not intend for Jane to die and probably doesn't even know for certain that she will die from his inaction, so he is probably, at most reckless, if he has a duty to rescue for criminal law purposes. Generally, under both civil and criminal law, there is no duty to rescue, even if you can do so without any risk of harm to yourself. But, there is an exception, at least in civil liability, for a duty to rescue that arises from the fact that you put the person at risk of peril through your affirmative actions. Does this apply here, at all, or in a criminal case? The first question is the exact language of the homicide statute. Some homicide offenses require affirmative acts, while others can arise from acts or omissions where there is a legal duty to act. Every crime requires some voluntary act or omission, and the voluntary act itself was not a crime and perhaps was not even a tort, at the moment it was taken, because Walter did not realize that his act created a risk of harm. He create a peril, but he did so innocently. A pretty standard formulation is that an omission is only a crime when the law creates a legal duty to act, but this is, of course, a question begging standard as it doesn't clarify whether there is a legal duty to act, which is at issue here. As the previous link notes, creation of a peril can give rise to a legal duty to act, but only sometimes. (4) Duty arising from creation of peril. If a person acts culpably to imperil another, he or she has a legal duty to rescue the victim. The cases are split on whether a duty to rescue arises if someone innocently or accidentally imperils another. This case would fall in the category of someone who innocently or accidentally imperils another, in which the cases are split, which which the linked article cites the following authority: Compare Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 24-25, 141 N.E. 510, 511 (1923) (defendant under duty to try to extinguish a fire that he accidentally set to his house and thus was guilty of arson when he did not) with King v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 654, 659, 148 S.W.2d 1044, 1047 (1941) (defendant who, in lawful defense of a third person, shot and wounded an attacker was under no duty to seek medical attention for the wounded assailant). A commentary that is part of a California standard jury instruction (for involuntary manslaughter, not murder for which this kind of liability is presumably not available) makes the following observation: A legal duty to act may also exist where the defendant's behavior created or substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim, either by creating the dangerous situation or by preventing others from rendering aid. (People v. Oliver (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 147-148 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138] [defendant had duty to act where she drove victim to her home knowing he was drunk, knowingly allowed him to use her bathroom to ingest additional drugs, and watched him collapse on the floor]; Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681] [defendant had duty to prevent horses from running onto adjacent freeway creating risk].) These examples would suggest that an innocently or accidentally created risk is sufficient to create a duty sufficient to support involuntary manslaughter liability for an omission under California law, and would probably lead to involuntary manslaughter liability in the case in the question as well, under California law. New Mexico, unlike California, does not have a standard criminal jury instruction or really definitive section of its criminal code that clearly resolves this question, although the fact that California which uses a murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter distinction in the same way that New Mexico does, limits criminal liability for omissions to involuntary manslaughter suggests that New Mexico would as well. The New Mexico case State v. Greenwood, 2012 -NMCA- 017, 271 P.3d 753 (N.M. App. 2011), touches on the issue, suggesting that there may be liability only for involuntary manslaughter (or certain specialized crimes based upon a relationship such as that of a nursing home to a resident of a nursing home) based upon an omission, and that the liability for an omission can only arise when there is a legal duty, but almost implies that only contactual duties are sufficient. It does so at paragraph 35 which says: Importantly, even if the LINKS contract relating to Jared were to have been renewed and to have been in force at the time of Jared's death, we are not convinced that it would be the sole basis or even a controlling factor in determining Defendant's legal responsibility under the Act. Defendant's criminal liability must exist solely based on an omission— a failure to act when she had a legal responsibility to act. See Deborah A. Goodall, Penal Code Section 22.04: A Duty to Care for the Elderly, 35 Baylor L.Rev. 589, 594 (1983) (stating that " authorities have long agreed that before an omission can constitute an offense[,] there must first be a duty to act" ); see also People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1907) (" The law recognizes that under some circumstances the omission of a duty owed by one individual to another, where such omission results in the death of the one to whom the duty is owing, will make the other chargeable with manslaughter. This rule of law is always based upon the proposition that the duty neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral obligation. It must be a duty imposed by law or by contract, and the omission to perform the duty must be the immediate and direct cause of death." (citation omitted)). But, this could be dicta because it was a case where any legal duty would arise under contract rather than for another reason, and as is the case in many smaller states, there is simply no case that has ever been decided in New Mexico which is squarely on point. Under British criminal law, in similar circumstances, a homicide conviction was vacated: R v Khan & Khan (1998) CLR 830, confirmed that there is no separate category of manslaughter by omission unless the omission constitutes a breach of duty to act. The defendants supplied a 15-year-old prostitute with twice the amount of heroin likely to be taken by a regular user. The defendants left her unconscious in the flat, returning the next day to find that she had died of the overdose. Had medical assistance been called, the girl would probably not have died. The unlawful act was supplying the drug but the death was caused by the quantity injected by the victim. The trial judge invited jury to consider liability on the basis of the defendants' failure to summon medical assistance. On appeal, the conviction was quashed because the brothers had not accepted a duty to act before she took the heroin. A dissertation on when criminal liability is imposed for omissions in Scottish law can be found here. New Mexico, whose laws really should govern, has just two homicide statutes: § 30-2-1. Murder A. Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused: (1) by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; (2) in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony; or (3) by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life. Whoever commits murder in the first degree is guilty of a capital felony. B. Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, a person who kills another human being without lawful justification or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another. Murder in the second degree is a lesser included offense of the crime of murder in the first degree. Whoever commits murder in the second degree is guilty of a second degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. Walter doesn't qualify for any of these prongs of the statute. § 30-2-3. Manslaughter Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. A. Voluntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. Whoever commits voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. B. Involuntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection. Whoever commits involuntary manslaughter is guilty of a fourth degree felony. Clearly, Walter also does not qualify as guilty of voluntary manslaughter. There is no quarrel or heat of passion. So, either Walter is guilty in New Mexico of involuntary manslaughter, or he is not guilty of homicide at all. New Mexico also has an unusual, and rather merciful "excusable homicide" provision at New Mexico Statutes § 30-2-5, that should also be considered: Homicide is excusable in the following cases: A. when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act, by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent; or B. when committed by accident or misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, if no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used and the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner. Arguably, Walter falls under "excusable homicide" part A, as moving the pillow was a lawful act done without unlawful intent and that is what caused the death.
I plan on making an intentionally fake news site - can I copy headlines from other sources? First off: this is an experiment with AI - the content I create will state that it is fake and generated news - I'm not trying to mislead anyone! So for my 'fake news' site I plan on copying headlines from news sites all over the web (using RSS feeds if that matters). Is this considered fair use? I have no issue with attributing where I get each headline (eg. A line below the headline saying something like 'source:www.bbc.co.uk'). I could generate the headlines myself, but I feel using real headlines adds an air of realism to the project. If it matters, I don't expect to make any money from this, although there may be potential to make add revenue if it's a big success!	To examine this further and answer your question, we need to look at Copyright (and fair use) as well as Defamation. Alas, I am unsure as to how taking legitimate headlines from around the world and attributing their source is 'fake news' - but I'll accept that it's 'fake news' for the purposes of exploring this topic. A lot of the potential (or motive) for a person or company to litigate against you will be context specific and detailed to how you have used their work and portray their journalists and characters - misquotes etc. As an exception to British copyright law, fair dealing is governed by Sections 29 and 30 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, which outlines three instance where fair dealing is a legitimate defence: If the use is for the purposes of research or private study; If it is used for the purposes of criticism, review or quotation; Where it is utilised for the purposes of reporting current events (this does not apply to photographs) However, where you may come into problems is: A statutory definition for fair dealing does not exist; it will always be a matter of fact, degree and interpretation in every fair use case. Nor is there a percentage or quantitative measure to determine fair dealing. The Intellectual Property Office lists the key factors used to determine the validity of whether a particular dealing with a work is fair as follows: Has the use of the work impacted negatively on the market for the original work? If the creator or owner has lost potential revenue through the re-use of their work, it is not likely to be fair. Was it reasonable and necessary to use the amount of work that was taken? Also: Fair use for parody, caricature or pastiche The UK copyright law on fair use of works for the purposes of creating a parody or pastiche is also listed in Section 30A, Schedule 2 (2A) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. References to all here. Guidance from the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) states that fair use needs to be “fair and proportionate” and does not protect an individual from any other rights an author may have. Those other rights may involve claiming defamation if this material creates fake news and uses the names of real journalists or companies etc - and if they allege that your AI fake news has caused serious harm in any way to their reputation - they could sue you for breach of the Defamation Act 2013. All of this is entirely contextual however as to how your AI might display or make fake news and how Google caches it and displays it - and if it could be portrayed as 'real' or believable for example. You are also doing this at a time where 'anti fake news' law is evolving... and even though you say it's fake news for AI experiment purposes - it's a growing field of concern for many. (see here) Copyright law is a vast and evolving area - and nothing is clear cut. It really depends if a major news company didn't like what you were doing and took exception to it and issued challenges on many areas of law based on that.	I don't think the issue is that it is a violation of a law, but rather that it is a violation of the terms of service you agree to when you sign up for the site - which is a breach of contract. You can be sued for breach of contract, if the site can prove any damages based on your breach. So if you use a bot to make money on a site, in violation of the site's license agreement, then I believe the site could indeed sue you to get the money back. Also, the phrasing of your question ("creating a robot") raises a separate issue. It is not actually creating the bot that is illegal, but using it where not allowed can be a violation of contract. Suppose person A makes a poker bot, just as a programming exercise, and doesn't use it. But then suppose person B uses the robot created by person A on a site that forbids it. Although this could be a gray area, I do not believe the site would have any recourse against person A (even though they probably would against person B).	It depends on what information you are sharing, how you got it, and what rights the business asserts over the information. For example, if it is content created by the business and they claim copyright protection you can only use it without their permission in accordance with Fair use exceptions. If you obtain the information through some limited/conditional access agreement you would be subject to the terms of that agreement. As always: If you want a legal opinion specific to your use case you need to consult a lawyer in your jurisdiction.	You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part)	Facts cannot be copyrighted. Such a project does not violate copyright law, and if you're in the United States, it is protected by the First Amendment.	This is likely not fair use. At first blush it appeared similar to things one might see in The Onion (parody print and online newspaper) or other parody publications or shows (SNL, Key and Peele, etc.). In this case, the context would have likely been deemed transformative. However, since they are selling coffee called "Dumb Starbucks" while using their trademark, they would be be found liable if sued. You can parody a trademark brand, so long as the work is transformative such that the use of the brand goes from selling coffee to making a commentary in which the brand itself is relevant. Amendment I don't think this would pass the test as a parody/commentary. Originally, I failed to notice that they are actually selling coffee. This takes it out of fair use and they would almost certainly lose if sued. If they never sold the coffee, but just had it open as a performance art (like I had originally read this) giving the coffee away to complete the parody, I think they'd be fine. However, they are literally using the Starbucks logo, and selling the same product. This is clearly an infringement of their copyright and not fair use. Sorry for the confusion.	They have copyright in their additional text, and possibly in things like their visual design choices (fonts, layout etc). They may also have introduced a few deliberate typos to detect any literal copies from their version (rather as mapmakers add a few imaginary features to their maps). None of this creates any rights to the original text. You are still free to produce your own copies of the original text. Just get it from some other source so you can be sure not to include anything of theirs.	A document can be distributed under more than one license. Just because it has been made available under a CC license for free, doesn't mean that IEEE can't negotiate a different license with different terms that allow them to sell the content. (This is similar to the way that a software library can be available for free under a license that permits non-commercial use, but also be made available for a fee for commercial use.) If you want to know whether IEEE is legally selling Aaron Swartz's manuscript, you can contact Morgan & Claypool, the publisher that owns the copyright, and ask them whether this use by IEEE has been authorized by them. For the other documents you mention, contact MIT Press. Etc.
Is ilegal use the index of a book as a guideline for make a few of youtube videos? I want to know if is there any legal consequences if I use the contents of a book in order to make videos for youtube. For example, I want to make videos about Python Developer Language, and I use the index of a book in order to make a index of my videos. The book has the following index: Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Installation Chapter 3: What is python? And I use that index in order to make 3 videos, with different content of course, and without pick images or code from the book, only the index and the main ideas. Is this illegal? Thanks	With respect to the Table of Contents - in the US: https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf What Is Not Protected by Copyright? Copyright does not protect • Ideas, procedures, methods, systems, processes, concepts, principles, or discoveries • Works that are not fixed in a tangible form (such as a choreographic work that has not been notated or recorded or an improvisational speech that has not been written down) • Titles, names, short phrases, and slogans • Familiar symbols or designs • Mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring • Mere listings of ingredients or contents For more information, see Works Not Protected by Copyright (Circular 33). In the UK (here) : Copyright protects only the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. For example, two artists may paint the same scene but portray them in ways that are slightly different, without infringing each other’s copyright. At the same time, the fact that the series Lost is copyright protected does not prevent you from writing a story about a number of people who are forced to live on a remote island after a plane crash. Taking inspiration from someone else’s work is therefore acceptable, but in order to have copyright in your work and avoid infringement you need to create something original by using your own skill, labour, judgement and effort. Using another’s work is copyright infringement when ‘the work as a whole or any substantial part of it’ has been copied. Unfortunately, the precise meaning of these concepts is defined on a case-by-case basis. In deciding cases like this, courts will weigh the potential impact upon the originator’s ability to market their work with the concern that other people should be able to use it in order to draw inspiration for future work. Now - just to dive a bit further in and have a thought experiment. Using those titles in your question as your titles, would be fairly anodyne and would likely NOT constitute a breach of copyright as they are merely describing what most study guides have at the beginning of their contents page! Substantial material has not been copied. However - if we engage our law heads and accept that this may not be a criminal issue, but rather a civil tort/wrong that could lead to a law suit if the book owner were to discover your copying of their exact titular layout in order to structure your course. If you made a full course, with say 50 topics that are mapped exactly to the same topics, in the same order - it could be argued by a lawyer that you are stealing someone's creative structuring of a study guide. They would then have to persuade the court that this was the case. You might argue that these topic headings were common to most study programmes for Python and represent fair communal use - see [here][2]. It is also hard to argue 'creativity' and expression in a fairly standard TOC page. There are exceptions to copyright in some educational circumstances ([here][3]). I would have said that a simple remedy would be to rename and restructure the titles as much as possible to prevent such a link from being made - thus showing you have put your own effort into constructing your own course outline. However you have also included "and the main ideas" - this might take us down another road entirely if you mean the main ideas from within the chapters themselves.... see [here][4]. When creating new work, it is natural to be inspired by the work of others. However, there is an important distinction between simply being inspired and unlawfully copying. In order not to infringe someone else’s copyright – meaning that you trespass on or otherwise interfere with their rights – you need to make sure that your work is substantially different to the work that inspires you. According to UK copyright law, your work is considered original – and thus protected by copyright – if you use your skill, labour, judgement and effort to create it. Using another’s work is copyright infringement when ‘the work as a whole or any substantial part of it’ has been copied. The meaning of ‘substantial’ changes is defined on a case-by-case basis. Usually the court focuses on the quality of the parts taken, not necessarily the amount, and the circumstances of each case. [2]: https://www.bl.uk/business-and-ip-centre/articles/fair-use-copyright-explained#:~:text=The%20concept%20of%20fair%20usage,s)%20or%20infringing%20their%20interest. [3]: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/375951/Education_and_Teaching.pdf [4]: https://www.copyrightuser.org/understand/rights-permissions/using-reusing/	In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.	Someone similar say While it is quite true that no one can have a copyright that excludes all others from preparing their own unique copy of the Bible or other public domain works for copyright protection, our Bibles and other materials are not exactly like any others and are fully protected by copyright laws in all countries So for example, I could theoretically take an ancient public-domain texts and republish it in some modified form. Copyright does not protect the original, but it does protect my modifications. To the extent that Mechon Mamre does include protected material (of their own creation), and Snunit redistributed that material with permission, Mechon Mamre might sue you for copyright infringement. Since they don't say what their creative contribution is, it's hard to evaluate the merits of their claim.	I do not believe that there is any requirement to number clauses, paragraphs, or pages, and I have certainly seen contracts where none of these are numbered. It is a common practice to number provisions in some way, in particular to make reference from one to another easier. But not all contracts include such internal references. Contracts presented in electronic form, such as on a web page, may not have any clear concept of separate pages, and so page numbers would be pointless on such contracts. Page numbers on contracts printed out are common, but I do not know of any legal requirement for such numbers. For contracts presented in electronic form, one can ensure against unauthorized modification by including a checksum or hash of the contract text. If a one-way hash function is used, it will be quite hard to produce a text with a different content but an identical hash value. This technique could also be used on printed contracts. However, I do not recall seeing this technique used in practice.	Of course. Copyright law prevents you from making copies, and prevents others from making copies. It doesn’t oblige you to take extreme precautions against vague possibilities that others might break the law. And reading is not considered “copying”. So you don’t have to prevent others from reading your books at all.	I can't answer for the Indonesian law specifically. But in general, under most international copyright schemes, a translation is considered a copyrightable work. This means that even if the original work (in this case, the Quran and Hadith) is in the public domain, derivative works based on that public domain work can still be copyrighted by their creators. This includes, for example: A song with lyrics taken from the Quran A play or movie dramatizing stories from the Quran A novel retelling a story from the Quran In all of these cases, the author has built something new, based on the public domain framework. Because they contributed something original, they are entitled to a copyright on their original contribution. They can't stop someone from copying the Quran themselves, but they can stop someone from copying their original work based on the Quran. Most copyright courts--again, I don't know about Indonesia specifically--will treat a translation the same way. A translation is an original work that requires creativity and skill--otherwise Google Translate would work a lot better than it does. Just like a movie based on the Quran, a translation based on the Quran will probably be copyrightable under most, if not all, countries' copyright laws.	Wikipedia and you likely have no contract. If you don't have to click "I agree" to access the data, its likely there is no contract. Therefore this is a pure IP law question. The ONLY IP law issue that I see is copyright. The DATA is not subject to copyright. Only the expression of that data. So copying the html and selling that IS potential copyright infringement. Copying the data in some other format and using that is not. Finally, even if you do copy the full html (i.e. full expression), this MAY be licensed by their terms of use (as you suggested they have licensed some content). That is a more particularized legal question that I can't answer here.	Not necessarily, but also possibly. Google Books may (or may not) have a license to distribute images of the book covers in question. This license would be between Google and the owner of the copyright of the book cover. Just because Google has a license to distribute the image of the book cover to you does not mean that you have a license to distribute the image of the book cover to your customers. However, depending on jurisdiction, using the book cover to identify a book might also be legal under relevant fair use statutes. It is also possible that the particular book cover is not protected by copyright. For example, a particular book cover might have entered public domain. If this question is not a hypothetical, you should probably consult a lawyer.
Can someone else use your deceased brother’s green card? I just found out that my brother-in-law used my deceased brother’s green card. Is this legal?	You ask if your deceased brother's green card may be legally used by another person. The answer is: no.	You will probably not be allowed to enter the United States if your visa is expired. Sometimes foreign student advisors at a college or an immigration attorney will know how to expedite the process to get it renewed in time. Also, sometimes the offeror of a scholarship can move it back to accommodate your inability to get a timely visa renewal, assuming that it is possible to get a visa renewal at all. Applications from the Philippines are processed more slowly than applications from any other country as a matter of official policy. It also isn't obvious to me that you are really talking about a green card (lawful permanent residency) as opposed to a student visa. A tourist visa does not suffice in cases where you need either a student visa or a green card. You need professional help ASAP as this is a highly technical, non-intuitive area, even if that means paying an immigration lawyer hundreds of dollars.	There is a relevant rule, the "posting rule", according to which an acceptance is effective once posted (this is a quirk of acceptances). This would be as soon after 7 May 2016 as Bobby sent his letter, presumably well before the deadline. So yes, a professional lawyer would be needed. If Bobby is in Australia, it might be more complicated; if Bobby is in Norway, it's simpler because they don't have the posting rule.	We do not have a law requiring you to renounce citizenships that you might hold, like the Nationality Law. I am not sure what you mean saying that renouncement is processed only within the Japanese legal system -- that is how it is everywhere, and there is no international authority or clearing house that handles citizenship renunciations. The effect of renouncing Japanese citizenship would be that you are then no longer a citizen of Japan: I can't find an explicit law prohibiting an exclusively-Japanese citizen from renouncing his citizenship and becoming stateless. A dual citizen would then be exclusively a citizen if "the other country", thus you would become strictly an Iranian citizen. According to the Civil Code of Iran you would be an Iranian citizen under clause 2 of Article 976. Article 977 allows accept a different citizenship but that would not apply if you have an Iranian father (and I guess does not actually get rid of your Iranian citizenship). Article 988 sets conditions for Iranians to abandon their nationality: you must be 25 or older, have renounced all property rights in Iran by transfer to Iranian nationals, have done your military service, and, have approval of the Council of Ministers. So yeah, not possible. Article 14 of the Japanese Nationality Law requires you to "choose either of the nationalities" before reaching 22, and furthermore Choice of Japanese nationality shall be made either by depriving himself or herself of the foreign nationality or by the declaration provided for in the Family Registration Law in which he or she swears that he or she chooses to be a Japanese national and that he or she renounces the foreign nationality (hereinafter referred to as “declaration of choice ”) Article 16 says "A Japanese national who has made the declaration of choice shall endeavour to deprive himself or herself of the foreign nationality". The bold part above seems to resolve that paradox, although that is based on a US-style interpretation of law and working from a translation of the law. That is, the requirement is that you try, not that you succeed (which is impossible in the case of a person with an Iranian father). There would be an effect in the US. If you renounce Japanese citizenship, you're strictly an Iranian national, and that has one consequence. What is not clear is whether the US recognizes, in any way, a renunciation which Iran doesn't recognize. This case features a person with renounced Iranian citizenship (he is also a US citizen), who was approved for a security clearance based in part on his renounciation. This gives some indication that the US does not care that Iran makes renunciation next to impossible. This is of course just for informational purposes and calls for an immigration attorney if it really matters.	we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early & unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself.	Is this realistic? Yes. The dramatic performance plays out in the same way that it would in the U.S. Court system. The actual killing of the wife would be 'legal', so can he be charged for murder for something that has been done legally, only because they can prove is intent to kill her before that? Especially since he has already been acquitted of that fact. Mostly, this is an issue of causation and not double jeopardy. From a double jeopardy perspective, the crime of murder is not complete until the person dies, and they have not be tried for murder, so this is a different crime that had not occurred until after the attempted murder trial was over. Causation Issues Even if the immediate cause of the wife's death is withdrawal of life support, the shooting could still be a legally sufficient cause of the wife's death. For example, suppose that you shoot someone and the hospital can't give the victim a blood transfusion because the victim has blood type O- (universal donor) which can only receive blood from other people with blood type O-, and the hospital, due to negligence on the part of a hospital administrator, has run out out of type O- blood. The fact that the victim would not have died if the hospital has not negligently failed to have type O- blood on hand does not provide a defense to murder on the part of the person who shot her. While terminating life support is "legal" it also constitutes a non-judicial finding with legal effect on the part of the person authorizing it and the physicians signing off on the decision, the further medical care would have been futile and that the person whose life support was terminated was already dead in key material respects, even though they would not be dead for purposes of a murder charge until life support is terminated. When death is a natural and foreseeable result of action that causes physical harm, the death is caused by the act that causes the physical harm. Something else that causes death would have to be a "superseding cause" and not just an additional cause of death. Thus, the fact that life support was terminated legally does not mean that she cannot be a murder victim. Indeed, many murder victims are people who are on life support for some period of time and then have that life support terminated because it is futile to continue medical care and the person is already "brain dead" or something equivalent to that. Collateral Estoppel Issues Double jeopardy does carry with it a related concept of "collateral estoppel" which provides that facts necessarily decided in one criminal case cannot be decided differently in a subsequent, related criminal case in some circumstances. But, collateral estoppel applies only when the facts in the prior criminal case were necessarily decided on the merits in the prior criminal case. Acquittal of criminal charged does not necessarily include a determination that someone was innocent of the charges. The fact that he was acquitted of attempted murder does not mean that the jury found that he didn't attempt or intend to murder her. In particular, a dismissal of criminal charges as a result of a technicality that excluded evidence related to an element of the crime for which there was an acquittal, is not a determination on the merits that a particular element of a crime was actually absent, so it would not be binding in the subsequent criminal case for murder. An acquittal does not mean that every element of the prior criminal charges was found not to be present. Collateral estoppel arising from the double jeopardy right, in contrast, might be a ground for dismissal of the murder case, if the man's primary (and perhaps only) defense to the attempted murder case had been that he had established the affirmative defense that someone else committed the murder, or that he had an alibi that made it impossible for him to have committed the murder. Then, the jury would have found on the merits that this defense, equally applicable to the murder case, had already been established.	In the US, when a person has unpaid debts and dies, those debts are to be paid from any assets of the estate (as in, any assets). The executor has the responsibility to use those assets to pay the debts. Presumably the executor did that, and there are no co-signed accounts or anything like that, so your mother isn't responsible for these debts in some obscure way. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act has a provision that you can tell a collection agency to stop communicating with you, and they must then stop communicating with you except to say they are stopping attempts to collect, to indicate possible remedies (i.e. lawsuits), or notify of an actual remedy (they have actually filed suit). Since they are no longer allowed to discuss anything with you once you give them the go-away notice, one should probably hire an attorney to exercise the nuclear option. You can also request proof that you owe the money: they are suppose to notify you of the right to dispute the debt with 5 days of first contact, which gives you 30 days to dispute the debt. Persuading a debt collector that they are pursuing the wrong person is probably easier than persuading a jury in a lawsuit.	I have never heard of anything like this. I guess when you say "registered in that place" you are referring to Russian resident registration. The US doesn't have such a system, so this sort of certificate wouldn't even make sense.
is estate responsible for debt of car-loan co-signed by the decedant? My mother co-signed a car loan for her grandson ~3 years prior to her death . He defaulted on the loan and the car was repo'd AFTER her death. Can the loan company come after her WV estate for the debt? The car was sold prior to the estate receiving notification.	Yes, subject to the deadline for presenting claims to the estate of the decedent (within sixty days of publication of public notice). If a timely claim is filed against the estate, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code allows a defense in to deficiency claim debt such as this one that the method of the sale of the collateral was unreasonable, but this is rarely a complete defense and is rarely successful in practice. Lack of notice would not automatically invalidate the debt (and the instrument creating the debt probably waives the co-signers right to notice of a sale contractually).	You are talking about "joint tenancy." I am familiar with bank accounts having multiple owners characterized as "Joint tenants with rights of survivorship" (JTWROS). This keeps the account out of probate: a death certificate simply removes the name of any owner who dies. But a probate court afraid that a deceased may not have enough assets to satisfy debts can still freeze the account for the duration of probate. These really are not tools for estate planning. For example, you can't use them to avoid gift or estate taxes. Also a JTWROS account is fully exposed to the liability/creditors of every owner. So no, a JTWROS does not shield assets from creditors. Finally, encumbrance of or distribution from a JTWROS account requires the consent of every owner. Any unresolved disputes are probably headed to court.	No Pennsylvania law § 2104 requires: (10) Requirement that heir survive decedent for five days.--Any person who fails to survive the decedent by five days shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent for purposes of intestate succession and the decedent's heirs shall be determined accordingly. Now, a will can provide contingencies for if an heir predeceases the testator such as flowing to the heir's spouse or children but if it doesn't then the heir is treated as non-existent and what would have been their bequest is dealt with by the other provisions of the will. The life annuity is not a part of the grandfather's estate and the funds will be distributed in accordance with the terms of its own contract, not the will. Usually, this means at the discretion of the trustee and nominations of beneficiaries are usually non-binding on the trustee; that is, they can distribute the funds as they believe the decedent would want. Your aunt should seek proper legal advice quickly.	If you had an agreement that amounts to a contract, it is binding even if it was informal. However, if your agreement was not in writing, it might be hard to prove. You can easily prove that you transferred money to the other party. But can you prove that it was a loan an not a gift? And even if it is agreed to be a loan, if no repayment time was specified, what says that the debt is due now? Was the agreement really for a loan repayable on demand? The court would have to determine what your real contract was, or what contract can be implied from the actions of the parties. Also, if you are in a common-law jurisdiction, there could be a question of what consideration there was for the loan. Without consideration, there is no valid contract in such a jurisdiction. Perhaps a promise to repay could be treated as sufficient consideration. Small-claims courts do deal with unclear verbal contracts on a regular basis, but the outcome will depend on the facts of the case, and on the details of local law. It might be wise to consult a local lawyer with small-claims experience. A single consultation should not be too expensive. In response to comment If the "written binding agreements" include a statement from the other person that this is a loan, and a promise to repay it, you are in a stronger position than I had thought from the original question. The question for the court would be, since there was no due date agreed, what is a reasonable date to impose. The court might treat it as a loan repayable on demand, or specify some particular date for repayment.	Tell your parents Given the circumstances it is a near certainty that the least he will do if you do not pay for the damage is make contact with them. It will be far, far better for you if they learn it from you rather than him. What could he do? He (or his insurance company) can contact your parents - he will almost certainly do this. He (or his insurance company) can sue you for negligence. Children are responsible for their own torts providing they have the capacity to recognize and avoid risk and harm - based on your question I have (and a court would have) no doubt that that you are. If you lose the case, and don't pay, he can have the government seize whatever you own in order to sell it to pay the debt you owe. If this happened in British Columbia or Manitoba he can sue your parents. He could report you to the police - they may or may not choose to prosecute if what you did was criminal: it probably wasn't but the police may investigate to determine this. If he is insured he may be required to notify the police.	Can the renter declare the contract to be void because of the death of the only other party to the contract? No. The estate of the decedent steps into the shoes of the decedent and the executor of the decedent's estate can enforce the lease. What if one of the heirs comes to the renter and tries to add additional conditions? The heirs do not have the authority to modify the lease without the tenant's consent, although the tenant knows that the lease may be less likely to be renewed if the tenant does not consent. Also, the heirs, strictly speaking, don't have the authority to do anything. Only an executor duly appointed by a court does.	I know it's not a huge amount of money, but I'm not currently in a position to pay it. Is it still legal to send invoices this long from the past? Yes, it is legal. And the surveyor is still within the statute of limitations to sue you for breach of contract. Beyond the purely legislative aspect, personally I would encourage you to pay the surveyor once you are in a position to do so, even if the statute of limitations had expired. From your description, it seems that the surveyor acted with nobility in that Even though he didn't mention any payment, he sent me the survey. and there is no indication that the survey was faulty. Thus, it would be opportunistic not to honor your part in the contract under pretext of the statute of limitations. Consider this: You would not wish to be deprived of compensation today (or once the debtor becomes able to pay you) simply because years earlier you were too overwhelmed to send an invoice for work you actually performed.	If you buy a house and your wife signs a quitclaim deed to you, that transfers to you whatever rights she has in the house. Similarly, if you and your wife sign an agreement that anything deposited in a particular bank account in your name would be your separate property, that would override the pre-nup as far as that account was concerned. Such an agreement could include a dollar limit per month or per year, or an explicit purpose, such as savings for a down payment. (It could be thought of as a gift to you of her share of any funds deposited.) Giving property to your parents or others with the understanding that it will be returned on your request might be seen as an attempt to evade the pre-nup, and a court might hold that the property was actually shared, if you ever do divorce. There might also be gift tax issues if the value is high enough. Whether asking your wife to agree to a quitclaim or any sort of agreement to modify the pre-nup would help or harm your marriage I cannot know, nor did you ask that. But I would think that for most people being open would work better than going behind a spouse's back. None of this should be taken as legal advice. I am not a lawyer.
Can Michigan's attorney general take legal action against Trump for not wearing a mask? I read from a CNBC news article how Michigan’s attorney general said Trump has a “legal responsibility,” under state law, to wear a mask as a precaution when visiting factories. Trump refuses to wear a mask despite federal health guidance saying he should. I know it is a state law that says the president should wear a mask, but is there a way with the United States' legal framework that the Michigan's attorney general could bring some kind of legal action against the President for breaking Michigan's state law?	I don't know how that would end, but states' AGs have take action against Trump personally in other matters, and that's bubbling through the courts; latest news I found on something like that on quick search (May 15): A lawsuit accusing President Donald Trump of illegally profiting off the presidency through his luxury Washington hotel was revived Thursday by a divided federal appeals court. [...] Maryland Attorney General Brian Frosh and District Attorney General Karl Racine — both Democrats — said they hoped Thursday's ruling from the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond would jumpstart efforts by the two jurisdictions to obtain financial records showing how much state and foreign governments have paid the Trump Organization to stay at the hotel and hold events there. More than three dozen subpoenas issued to various government agencies were put on hold while Trump's appeal was pending. The lawsuit was filed almost three years ago. U.S. District Judge Peter Messitte refused to dismiss it, but his ruling was overturned in July by a three-judge panel of the 4th Circuit. The judges found that Maryland and the District of Columbia lacked standing to pursue their claims against the president. But on Thursday, the panel's ruling was overturned by the full court of 15 judges. In a 9-6 ruling, the court found that the three-judge panel overstepped its authority when it ordered Messitte to dismiss the lawsuit. "We recognize that the President is no ordinary petitioner, and we accord him great deference as the head of the Executive branch. But Congress and the Supreme Court have severely limited our ability to grant the extraordinary relief the President seeks," Judge Diana Gribbon Motz wrote for the majority in rejecting Trump's request to dismiss the lawsuit. All nine of the judges in the majority were nominated by Democratic presidents. The six judges who disagreed — all nominated by Republican presidents, including three by Trump — wrote a scathing dissenting opinion, saying the lawsuit should be thrown out. "The majority is using a wholly novel and nakedly political cause of action to pave the path for a litigative assault upon this and future Presidents and for an ascendant judicial supervisory role over Presidential action," Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III wrote. DOJ spokeswoman Brianna Herlihy said the department is disappointed in the ruling. Etc.	Try the phone or email contacts at Florida Department of Law Enforcement - Home. The state of Florida doesn't appear to maintain a statewide officer registry, but that department should be able to verify someone is or isn't a officer in conjunction with the police department closest to your location. If this neighbor is threatening or attempting to enforce the law while not showing ID that proves he/she is an officer, that's serious, and you should call the local police department. Talking about being a LEO while drinking beer at a BBQ is less serious, but still could be a third degree felony. See Statutes & Constitution - Florida State Statutes: 843.08 False personation.—A person who falsely assumes or pretends to be a firefighter, sheriff, officer of the Florida Highway Patrol, officer of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, fire or arson investigator of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Corrections, correctional probation officer, deputy sheriff, state attorney or assistant state attorney, statewide prosecutor or assistant statewide prosecutor, state attorney investigator, coroner, police officer, lottery special agent or lottery investigator, beverage enforcement agent, or watchman, or any member of the Florida Commission on Offender Review and any administrative aide or supervisor employed by the commission, or any personnel or representative of the Department of Law Enforcement, or a federal law enforcement officer as defined in s. 901.1505, and takes upon himself or herself to act as such, or to require any other person to aid or assist him or her in a matter pertaining to the duty of any such officer, commits a felony of the third degree,	Probably not. Overview You haven't specified a jurisdiction. I will talk about Australia because that's what I'm familiar with. In Australia the most relevant area of law would be tort, specifically negligence. The university would be liable to pay damages if a court found that it owed a duty of care to your friend, that it breached that duty, and that your friend suffered injury ('injury' including loss of property as well as mental suffering) as a result of that breach. Also potentially relevant would be contract law, if your friend and the university had entered into some kind of agreement relating to his security, or equity, if the university had somehow acted to lead your friend to rely, to his detriment, on the university protecting him (promissory estoppel: Walton Stores v Maher). However, I think this is unlikely unless, for some reason, the university had put up signs saying 'Please come onto our land and we will be responsible for your security'. Negligence You have stated that 'it is their responsibility to make sure all students are safe on campus.' It is not clear whether you mean to state that as a fact or whether you are suggesting it as a possible hypothetical basis of liability. I am not aware of a case that establishes the proposition that universities do have such a duty. The judgments in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 discuss the liability of the occupier of land (such as the university in your example) for injuries inflicted by criminals upon people present on land (such as your friend in your example). In that case, the defendant ran a shopping centre. The plaintiff worked at a shop in the shopping centre. At the end of the plaintiff's shift at 10.30pm, it was dark outside because the shopping centre switched the lights in the car park off at 10pm. The plaintiff was mugged in the shopping centre car park on his way out to his car. The key question there was whether the defendant shopping centre was under a duty to keep the lights on for workers leaving work (along with the question of how the failure to illuminate the area led to the attack i.e. whether the plaintiff still have been mugged if the lights were on). Therefore the question that we are presently interested in, about an occupier's responsibility to protect visitors, is only dealt with as a side issue in that case. But the principle is pretty well-established that, generally, you are not responsible to protect another person from the criminal acts of a third person. The common law has a strong presumption against imposing liability for 'omissions' as distinct from acts, which is another way of saying that the courts don't want people being liable to run out into the street and help people. See paragraphs 27 and 28 and thereabouts in Modbury Triangle. Particular relationships may exist which create such a duty. One is in relation to school children; the school is responsible for taking such care of the child as a parent would. The relevant features of this the school-child relationship include the child's vulnerability as a child and the way the school controls their movements and enviroment during the school day. I presume that your friend is not a child and the university does not control his or her movements. Therefore a court is likely to be looking at the general principle that the university is not responsible for protecting people from the criminal acts of strangers, and then looking (and probably not finding) any special feature of the relationship between your friend and the university that creates an aspect of vulnerability, reliance or control that makes it reasonable to impose a duty of care. Some people think that there is a general principle that if something bad happens to them, some identifiable person with cash must be responsible for paying compensation, whether that is an insurer, the government or a nearby corporation. The common law has not picked up that principle. The common law would slate the responsibility home primarily to the mugger. Sue them. What does the university have to do with it? Conceivably the university might also be liable along with the mugger, but the fact that an injury occurred and nobody else can in practice be held responsible does not in itself make the university liable. As mentioned by Pat W., there may be some other feature that creates a duty, such as if the university had made some change to the environment that allowed made the attack to occur when it wouldn't otherwise have e.g. moving your friend's dormitory so that the only entrance was through a dark alley, or if the attack occurred inside a university building where the university controlled entry (even then not sure that would get your friend over the line).	If President Trump refuses to execute the war, does that become an act of treason on his part? Probably not, but it depends on the definition of treason. Congress could decide that it is, impeach him, and remove him from office. They could also remove him from office without using the term treason. Is he required to act on such a resolution? Not really. As chief executive, he has discretion to prioritize the tasks assigned to him by congress. Furthermore, there is plenty of precedent in international affairs for countries being legally in a state of war without any actual combat or other hostilities. If he doesn't, is there any recourse other than impeachment to force US armed forces to attack RF interests at home and abroad? There's always political pressure. But there's no way to relieve the president of his command of the armed forces without relieving him of his office. Aside from impeachment by the congress, this can be temporarily achieved by the cabinet, as specified in the 25th amendment. POTUS is the commander-in-chief, but, at the same time, he is not allowed to unilaterally decide who may or may not cross the border into the United States. The president's ability to make immigration policy and the fact that such policy is subject to judicial review are unrelated to his powers as commander in chief. Immigration is a civil and criminal matter, not a military one. The president's powers in this regard are delegated to him by congress, not specified in the constitution. On the other hand, the president's role as commander in chief of the military is explicit in the constitution. Do the judges also have a power to compel armed forces to take actions which a sitting President is refusing to take? The judiciary does not have the power to order military operations.	Not necessarily. Let's say the victim delivered photos of a harm that were alleged to be done by the defendant. That's a crime in itself. But based on this item the DA orders investigation and finds evidence of a real crime. Discovering that the photo was faked can lead to dismissal (with prejudice), but even without the fake photo, there might be a strong case against defendant. Also, the photo could not even be used as evidence in the actual trial stage. A good defense attorney might manage to convince the judge, that the doctored photo should have been discovered such early in the investigation, but I doubt, that one could manage to make everything else in a proper investigation fruit of the poisoned tree unless police screwed up.	Probably not In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the tort of negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. What standard of conduct do you think your employer failed to conform with? Owning a tree or a parking lot is not, of itself, negligent. Further, the branch fell "during high winds" - the wind is not within your employer's control. Now, if you can prove that your employer knew that the particular tree was ill and likely to drop branches in high winds and failed to do anything about it, that might be considered negligent. I know of a case where a council who had refused permission for a tree to be removed because it was "healthy" was found negligent when that tree latter (in calm winds) dropped a branch on Jaguar.	In New Mexico, where Better Call Saul is set, N.M. R. Prof'l. Cond. 16-505 prohibits an attorney from employing a suspended or disbarred attorney as a law clerk or paralegal only if there is an order from the New Mexico Supreme Court or its disciplinary board prohibiting that appointment. I don't believe the show ever indicates there was such an order. Other states have different rules. Some prohibit this type of activity altogether, while others permit an attorney to continue as a paralegal while suspended, but not after being disbarred. I believe some states merely require that the attorney disclose that she is using the services of an attorney who is under discipline.	There are, as far as I know, no "FDA-approved" vaccines against covid in the US. The FDA has given Emergency Use Authorization to some vaccines. This does not currently include the Johnson & Johnson vaccine. It is impossible for a person to get the J&J vaccine in the US, because it is not authorized, and J&J does not distribute it. One could imagine an unauthorized foreign vaccine being smuggled into the US, but it would be illegal to distribute it. I assume that you specifically mean, can a person refuse to get a vaccination on the grounds that it only has an emergency authorization and is not actually approved: and can one sue an employer for firing you because you refused to get vaccinated? In general, the employer can fire for anything they want, unless you have an employment contract that limits the grounds for termination. There are discrimination-based grounds that they cannot use, such as race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, age (age 40 or older), or genetic information at the federal level. Mississippi has no specific employment discrimination laws. Other that that, an employer can fire an employee for any reason, or no reason (Mississippi is what's known as an "employment at will" state). There are some state restrictions where it is prohibited for an employer to fire an employee for engaging in a specific required activity such as being called for jury duty or being called to military duty. An employer could not require an employee to break the law, but that is not applicable here.
Are hospitals required to provide language interpreters to patients? California, USA. The hospital is on COVID lockdown, no visitors allowed. The patient had a stroke, lost her English, but seem to understand her native language; she slowly and barely coherently speaks a few words, but only in her native language. Is the hospital required to provide an interpreter to help communicating with the doctors and the therapists?	Hospitals in the US that receive federal funding (e.g., Medicare, Medicade, FCHIP, etc.) are required to provide language services under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 52 U.S.C. §2000d et seq to those persons of limited English proficiency who receive services. This US Government Department of Health & Human Services page notes: Persons with limited English proficiency must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate in programs that receive Federal funds. Policies and practices may not deny or have the effect of denying persons with limited English proficiency equal access to Federally-funded programs for which such persons qualify. Many HHS documents address this requirement. An overview can be found in the HHS Language Plan (2013), which contains sections requiring translation of oral communications as well as written documents when the patient has limited English proficiency. Given the pervasive presence of these federal programs in the provision of health care in the US, most (if not all) US hospitals will be required to comply and provide translation services.	Your interpretation seems to be correct. A furloughed employee is defined by Acas to be one who is "temporarily sent home because there's no work". This could in principle be through unpaid leave. The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme is a government scheme to compensate employers for the wage bills of their staff during the furlough, so that the furloughed staff can continue to receive some income. An employee would have no direct dealings with the scheme and would continue to be paid via their employer. Your company seems to be offering to match the terms offered to employees under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme of 80% of salary, presumably out of their own funds. A kind gesture, it seems!	http://www.healthinfoprivacybc.ca/confidentiality/when-can-and-cant-they-tell-others is a pretty good summary. Different rules apply to private practices than public clinics and hospitals. I will assume that the clinic on campus is private. This is a summary of the summary about who your information can be shared with: Health care professionals can share information within your "circle of care". Specifically, they are allowed to assume your consent to this but you can explicitly withdraw that consent. This would include doctors within the same practice. Admin staff can access your information for administrative purposes. Anyone you have authorised them to share it with e.g. relatives, friends etc. The Medical Services Plan for billing and admin If you are unable to drive If there is suspected of child abuse If you are wounded by a gun or a knife If you are a danger to others For your specific questions: I asked about it and they said it's confidential, but confidential to the clinic. Correct, unless you explicitly revoke this. the counselling department can share information with the doctors This is tricker, these people may be either within your "circle of care" or they may be part of the same organisation. Notwithstanding, councillors are not doctors and are governed by the everyday laws related to confidentiality i.e. information given in confidence is confidential and everything else isn't. If you are told the limits of the confidentiality i.e. they tell the doctor, then those are the limits unless you renegotiate them. he would know I only have one kidney? Well you said "the counselling department can share information with the doctors" and this would require the information going the other way i.e. the doctor sharing with the councillor. Even if this type of sharing was OK in general (and I'm not sure it is, see above); the information shared should only be what is required for the councillor to do their job - the number of kidneys you have is probably irrelevant to this. What laws apply to situations like this where confidential information in one entity (medical office) decides to share it without the consent of the patients to another entity (the counselling dept.)? Well, we are not sure there are 2 entities: legally there may only be 1 - the university. Anyway, the laws are the Personal Information Protection Act and common law (Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 SCR 455)	This is not a HIPAA violation. HIPAA requires that personal information not be revealed to people lacking a statutorily-defined interest, without the patient's consent. A password itself is not "personal information", though having it could lead to such information. An example of personal information would be the fact that you personally had a certain tooth filled (not that "somebody had a tooth filled"). Protected information can be revealed to certain people, such as the lab that they send samples to, or your insurance company. This is covered by what is known as "The Privacy Rule". There is a related rule, the Security Rule, which essentially says "you need to keep information safe". An example of a required security rule standard is that the provider must Implement policies and procedures to address the final disposition of electronic protected health information, and/or the hardware or electronic media on which it is stored HHS recommends degaussing, but other means of satisfying the rule exist (burning, dissolving in acid). Tossing in the trash would not satisfy the rule. Password management falls under the weaker category of "addressable", that is, a provider needs to think about how they will manage passwords, but there is no specific requirement regarding what you have to do (unlike the requirements of Data Backup, Written Contract. Incident Reporting or Media Disposal). Printing and distributing to customers your account and password would, on the other hand, be a reportable incident. Information about your name, the dental procedure done, and the cost of the procedure, is probably also on the paperwork that they give you, and that even more than your password is protected information. A provider is allowed, indeed required, to disclose protected information to the patient. The assumption is that once you have processed that information, you will destroy or protect the paperwork, as you see fit.	TL;DR: Most likely, for certain drugs. Self-prescribing was never illegal under Federal Law; it is regulated to varying degrees by the states, and discouraged by professional organizations like the American Medical Association. Pharmacists can refuse to fill prescriptions they are uncomfortable filling, and many will not fill self-prescriptions. It's not clear if, as originally written, this question is referring to the FDA's Expanded Access Program, which was created under FDA's regulatory authority (ergo it is not a law) and is colloquially called compassionate use; or the Right to Try Act, which was signed into law by President Trump in 2018. I am going to take a few moments to give an overview of both and then get to the question of self-prescribing. Expanded Access has been around for about 30 years, when it began as a way to make experimental HIV drugs available to patients during the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It has been used since them to make drugs available for a variety of diseases (like cancer), and most recently for COVID-19. The Right to Try Act is similar in that it makes experimental drugs available to patients before they have received full regulatory approval. The mechanism for that availability is a different, and it has since it is a law it has the explicit approval of Congress. Here are a journal article and a very good table breaking down the differences between Right to Try and Expanded Access. Neither of these modify the patient/doctor relationship, so they do not effect whether a prescriber can write their own prescriptions either way. A doctor could probably prescribe COVID-19-related treatments for themselves approved for widespread use under Expanded Access; they would likely be unable to self-prescribe other more medically-complex, higher-risk treatments like chemotherapy. See below. Self-prescribing is legal under federal law. As noted by the Emergency Care Research Institute: Under federal law, physicians in the United States are not prohibited from self-prescribing medications. State laws governing physicians, however, vary greatly, and some may prohibit physicians from prescribing, dispensing, or administering certain medications to themselves or family members. Restrictions vary by state. Most (perhaps all) states prohibit a prescriber from self-prescribing Schedule II controlled substances, with some providing an exception for an emergency. Many prohibit prescribing of Schedule II drugs to family members. I have found several sources that claim some states outright prohibit self-prescribing, but whenever I follow those back to the actual statute they only apply to Schedule II drugs. Professional organizations like the American Medical Association strongly discourage their members self-prescribing, stating in their Code of Ethics that "treating oneself or a member of one's own family poses several challenges for physicians, including concerns about professional objectivity, patient autonomy, and informed consent." The greatest barrier to self-prescribing lies at the pharmacy, where pharmacists are able to refuse prescriptions when they question the medical necessity or standard of care that lead to the prescription.	What should and shouldn't happen isn't going to do a damn thing about your passport situation. Your passport isn't being 'held', it's in processing at a place that is currently not operational due to an unprecedented virus outbreak. No one is acting like a criminal or treating you like one, you are just unlucky. If your situation is that dire, you have no choice but to get a temporary passport. I seriously doubt an Indian court is going to side with you on this one. Just because the passport office is legally allowed to operate, doesn't mean that they are actually able to. If, for example, COVID-19 hit enough of their workforce, they won't have enough people to operate properly and they'll have no choice but to close. And no, '2 or 3 people' is not enough to operate such a large scale, sensitive operation with high security requirements, even just to return passports .	Merely encouraging people not to vaccinate via educational and political communication without purporting to provide individualized medical advice is probably not the practice of medicine and protected by the First Amendment's protections for freedom of speech, rather than constituting medical malpractice. Also, many anti-vax individuals (I couldn't quote a percentage) do so out of religious conviction and are protected not just by the freedom of speech in the First Amendment, but also by the free exercise component of the freedom of religion under the First Amendment. Generally speaking, it is harder to find a legal grounds for disregarding the free exercise of religion than it is to find a legal basis to regulate otherwise free speech. For example, commercial speech is subject to more rigorous regulation than private political and educational speech, which is why there are no private businesses taking anti-vax positions in their advertising. The theory is that courts are not in a good position to make general determinations of the truth of policy positions or statements about general truths as opposed to what happened in a particular transaction or occurrence. This is in part because a ruling by the right court at the right time can preclude the correctness of its determination from being revisited indefinitely and from time to time, accepted conventional wisdom and scientific consensus at one time are revealed later on to have been wrong with more discussion and investigation. I think that this is unlikely to be the case in the vaccination area, but the whole point of the First Amendment's protection of these kinds of issues is that we can't know in advance what will continue to be widely accepted and what will turn out to be mistaken. But, if someone in a medical diagnosis and treatment profession (e.g. M.D., D.O., physician's assistant, or nurse), were to advise a patient in a capacity as a medical care provider not to vaccinate, and as a result that person's child got sick from a disease that vaccination could have prevented, there probably would be medical malpractice liability. A somewhat similar issue arises when health insurance companies or government agencies set rules on providing care. In those cases, it isn't uncommon to have a physician or other medical professional placed on a committee or in an office such as medical director, with that person making the call and exposed to liability although not in the same way as a treating medical professional. A case about a month ago found malpractice by an insurance company's medical director (the company was United Health) to be a huge liability for both the medical director and the insurance company.	I guess it depends on what courts decide is the "standard of care" in prisons against transmissible diseases. This has been litigated in various way recently, not just following deaths: From a legal standpoint, many the cases center upon: due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly related to pre-trial detainees; Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment; Americans with Disabilities Act violations; and discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs are often asking judges to intervene to force immediate changes at prisons and jails, while litigation is pending. The approach has yielded mixed results thus far. Some judges have moved aggressively, ordering institutions to improve conditions and to do more to adhere to CDC guides. Yet those decisions have met with continued appeals and resistance from corrections officials, and the U.S. Supreme Court has twice overturned efforts by federal judges to intervene forcefully in coronavirus-related matters. In May, the high court rejected on procedural grounds a request by inmates to increase cleaning and COVID-19-related education efforts at their Texas-based geriatric correctional facility. The court upheld the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, which had overturned a Houston-based federal judge’s ruling supporting the prisoners. A few days later, however, the court appeared to switched course, letting stand a federal judge’s order requiring that prison officials move hundreds of inmates from an Ohio institution where nine people had died from COVID-19. Then, on Aug. 3, justices, in a 5-4 decision, overturned a lower-court injunction requiring stricter health and safety measures at the jail in Orange County in Southern California. The Orange County case, Barnes v. Ahlman, is instructive in terms of the arguments being made on both sides and the response by the courts. The jail’s leadership was accused by prisoners of ignoring Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommendations by failing to enforce social distancing measures and declining to isolate inmates with COVID-19 symptoms. A federal judge in California had issued a preliminary injunction that required the jail to take stronger measures, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined a request by the jail to halt the injunction. Jail officials argued that, prior to the injunction, CDC guidelines had been “largely implemented” and said the injunction’s requirements far exceeded the scope of the CDC’s recommendations. They also cited their efforts to voluntarily release half of the jail’s inmates to help with social distancing and said they had all but eliminated “COVID within the jail population.” The Supreme Court majority voted to stay the injunction while litigation continues. As is custom, the justices did not explain their reasoning in the order. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, saying the stay was premature and that jail had placed inmates at significant risk. Earlier in the Texas case, Sotomayor encouraged lower courts to ensure “that prisons are not deliberately indifferent in the face of danger and death.” I guess some Supreme Justices might not say it but probably think it that it's not cruel and unusual to (catch and) die of transmissible diseases in prison since it happens all the time. E.g. according to one study 97% of infected inmates don't get Hep C treatment. At the other end of the spectrum: a former jail administrator in Oklahoma was sentenced to more than 4 years in prison following his decision not to take an inmate with diabetes to hospital, resulting in his death in 2013. The administrator "pleaded guilty to one count of deprivation of rights under color of law." The inmate in question died of ketoacidosis. So the standard of care in prisons is somewhere in between these extremes. Most litigation regarding Covid-19 seems to center on whether CDC guidelines have been followed or not. I see that the CDC does have some specific guidelines for correctional facilities in this regard. I'm not sure of negligence case law in prison, but regarding the 8th Amendment violations, Helling v. McKinney is probably relevant to preventative measures: In Helling v. McKinney, the Court considered the case of a Nevada prisoner, "the cellmate of a five-pack-a-day smoker," who sought to be housed in an environment free of second-hand smoke. McKinney suffered from no ailment and sought no medical treatment. Justice Byron White wrote for a 7-2 majority of the Court that McKinney's claim that prison officials "have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of ETS [second hand smoke] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health" raised a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment. He wrote that McKinney would have to prove both the scientific facts of the dangers of exposure to second-hand smoke and prove that community standards supported him, that "it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today's society chooses to tolerate." He would also have to prove that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference. Also following Ashcroft v. Iqbal government officials could not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates so each official would have to be proved liable individually for involvement in such a (faulty) decision.
Dominic Cummings Trip to Barnard Castle - Manslaughter? The UK government's cheif advisor took a trip to Barnard Castle in the middle of a nationwide lockdown. A clearly illegal act. As a result of this, many people are choosing to flout lockdown rules because "if he can do it, why can't they"? Thus, community transmission is on the rise and we're facing a second spike. Any reasonable person in power would know that by getting caught flouting the rules, they would weaken the application of those rules. Thus, by taking this trip, Dominic Cummings would have reasonably known that he would put people at risk of catching COVID-19. As such, could he potentially be found guilty of manslaughter for these excess deaths as a direct result of his actions?	No. It would not meet the criteria for "unlawful act manslaughter" per the CPS Guide for Crown Prosecutors: The offence is made out if it is proved that the accused intentionally did an unlawful and dangerous act from which death inadvertently resulted. This is because there's no unbroken chain of causation. Let's walk through each element. 1. An unlawful and dangerous act Unlawful Clearly, the act was unlawful — leaving his home without reasonable excuse contrary to the relevant regulations. Dangerous This is an objective test. The test is whether all sober and reasonable people recognised its danger, based solely on their observation of Cummings' conduct during the act. (DPP v Newbury (Neil) [1977] Crim. L.R. 359). It seems the objective test is met - as the risk of harm only has to be "some" risk of harm, and you could argue if he had coronavirus he was putting other members of the public at risk, even if that risk was slight. 2. Causation The prosecution must establish that the unlawful act was a cause of the death without an "intervening act" to break the chain of causation (R v Lewis [2010] EWCA Crim 151). It will be impossible to prove such a chain of causation in this case, therefore any attempted prosecution will likely prove unsuccessful. There is no direct, unbroken link between what he did and someone dying of coronavirus.	I don't think that simply failing to make a sufficient explanation of the risks would make a death manslaughter. Three would have to have been serious negligence in addition, rather beyond the level needed to find malpractice, as I understand the matter. Law.com says that: Voluntary manslaughter includes killing in heat of passion or while committing a felony. Involuntary manslaughter occurs when a death is caused by a violation of a non-felony [sic], such as reckless driving. The Wikipedia article on Manslaughter says that Involuntary manslaughter is the homicide of a human being without intent of doing so, either expressed or implied. It is distinguished from voluntary manslaughter by the absence of intention. It is normally divided into two categories, constructive manslaughter and criminally negligent manslaughter, both of which involve criminal liability. Constructive manslaughter is also referred to as "unlawful act" manslaughter. It is based on the doctrine of constructive malice, whereby the malicious intent inherent in the commission of a crime is considered to apply to the consequences of that crime. It occurs when someone kills, without intent, in the course of committing an unlawful act. ... Criminally negligent manslaughter is variously referred to as criminally negligent homicide in the United States, and gross negligence manslaughter in England and Wales. In Scotland and some Commonwealth of Nations jurisdictions the offence of culpable homicide might apply. It occurs where death results from serious negligence, or, in some jurisdictions, serious recklessness. A high degree of negligence is required to warrant criminal liability. ... An example is where a doctor fails to notice a patient's oxygen supply has disconnected and the patient dies (R v Adomako). Another example could be leaving a child locked in a car on a hot day	I'll preface this by saying I live in Australia where the lowest jurisdiction that can make an act a criminal offence is the state; local governments simply do not have that power here, Question 1: If I understand this right you have a law that you do not enforce that carries moderate sanctions and you are asking that a law that you do not enforce with greater sanctions will be a greater deterrent? Well ... no (see here). If you want to stop the behavior you have to enforce the sanctions that you have in a fair and impartial way. I would suggest that you make it very clear that starting in early September the laws will be enforced - that gives people fair warning. Then, each weekend in September you bring in enough police (State Troopers?) to enforce the law. Its not going to take many $250 fines to make people stop. Question 2: No comment. Question 3: No comment. Question 4: Sounds like a good way of getting the city sued for negligence; just because people are breaking the law does not make it legal to hurt them. If you are serious then fencing the entire area may be worthwhile but the area would still need to be policed.	Can a shopowner in Thailand ban someone from entering their shop on the grounds of their citizenship? The first tweet, explains the context properly: I’m at my local hospital this afternoon to get a medical certificate. My work permit expires soon and so I need to run around getting all the documents in order. At the hospital they wanted to check my passport before letting me in to see if I had been abroad recently. Thailand has been very popular with visitors for decades and if laws existed that discriminated against foreigners this would be commonly known. So in this case the 'discrimination' probably not because of citizenship, but more about a faulty assumption that the virus is spread by foreigners. This will have nothing to do with Thai law. The (tweet) OP quotes only another persons claim. The OP states in the first tweet that they checked his passport only to see if he was abroad recently. So he didn't share the same experience of the American. Based on that, this second hand source (that can't be verified) is probably unreliable. Due to the present (global) uncertainties, caused by the Coronavirus, one should look at the whole picture. 2020-02-04: Coronavirus: Chinese targeted as Italians panic - BBC News In Italy and elsewhere, panic is spreading much faster than the coronavirus itself. Chinese businesses are empty, shopkeepers are shutting down and Chinese nationals are being targeted. At a bar beside the Trevi fountain, a notice was put up banning customers from China. So the the situation described by the original (tweet) OP is understandable, but the quoted (but not varified) second hand source as well as the events in Italy are not. The incidents have prompted condemnation from the Italian authorities. Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte reprimanded the regional governors, telling them that they were not competent to make such a call and that nothing justified such fear. Discrimination, solely due to citizenship, would be against Human Rights prevention of discrimination. Special cases may exist for prices that are subsidized and thus only for residents. Dual pricing was common in the Czech Republic until 1999, when it was ruled illegal (but still persisted). Then a foreign resident had to supply proof of residency to avoid paying the higher price. 2007: Illegal practice of dual pricing persists in Czech Republic At the time we assumed that this was legal (it was certainly understandable), but it seems that was not the case. Are the "Human Rights prevention of discrimination" written down somewhere? Also, who enforce them? Universal Declaration of Human \| United Nations Human Rights Enforcement Mechanisms of the United Nations \| ESCR-Net European Convention on Human Rights - Wikipedia European Court of Human Rights How these international laws/conventions are implemented into national laws will differ from country to country. For Germany they are anchored into the constitution: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany Article 25 Primacy of international law The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory. and are enforced by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and can be passed on to the European Court of Justice (or European Court of Human Rights) should the need arise. Thailand: Part of Section 30 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2007: Unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of the difference in origin, race, language, sex, age, disability, physical or health condition, personal status, economic or social standing, religious belief, education or constitutionally political view, shall not be permitted.	The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home.	It is not possible for someone to forfeit their rights because the GDPR is compulsory law. In the EU, laws can be regulatory or compulsory. In case of an agreement, regulatory laws can be set aside, if both parties agree on that. But compulsory laws cannot be set aside. Of course laws can also be partly compulsory. For example provisions which cannot be changed in disadvantage of a consumer. So there is freedom of contract, but it's freedom is reduced by law for the common good or for example to avoid misuse of bargaining power. In particular consumer related laws are often compulsory because it has little power against the other parties. Companies can have their negotiations done by lawyers, so they can make a well informed an well negotiated decision. As an extreme example, you cannot kill someone, even if that person has given you written permission. See also "Peremptory norm" on wikipedia for international law examples.	It looks to me like this is authorized under New York State's Executive Law Section 24. The text is long, but I think it addresses most of the points in your question. The law allows the chief executive of a local government (e.g. mayor of a city) to declare a local state of emergency "in the event of a disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency". Under such a state of emergency, the executive can promulgate local emergency orders, that can include provisions like travel bans, curfews, mandatory evacuation, etc. Violating such an order is a Class B misdemeanor (see paragraph 5). I didn't see any explicit requirement for the executive to weigh safety benefits against restriction of personal liberties. The executive just has to "find" (i.e. decide) that a disaster exists and imperils public safety. However, there are some safeguards. The local state of emergency is limited to 30 days (some orders can be extended for an additional 30 days); see paragraph 1. And the state legislature has the authority to terminate the state of emergency by a concurrent resolution (paragraph 8). Further good reading is a primer (PDF) written by the legal counsel of New York's Office of Emergency Management, giving a guide in layman's language for local chief executives on how to handle state of emergency declarations. I'm slightly puzzled as to why, in this case, the order was given by the governor, when it looks from the law like it should be the mayor's role to do so. It could be that the mayor took the appropriate legal action and just let the governor make the public announcement. Also, Executive Law Article 2-B (Sections 20-29) have many other provisions regarding emergencies. Section 28 gives the governor the power to declare a "disaster emergency", though it's not clear from that section whether this includes the power to issue similar emergency orders.	(Lots of digging) https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/609.341 The above is a series of definitions for the purposes of criminal statues. Way down (noting that the page notes that this section was amended in 2021, so almost certainly in response to this case, given the amount of attention it has received), as subdivision 22, we have the definition: Subd. 22.Predatory crime. "Predatory crime" means a felony violation of section 609.185 (first-degree murder), 609.19 (second-degree murder), 609.195 (third-degree murder), 609.20 (first-degree manslaughter), 609.205 (second-degree manslaughter), 609.221 (first-degree assault), 609.222 (second-degree assault), 609.223 (third-degree assault), 609.24 (simple robbery), 609.245 (aggravated robbery), 609.25 (kidnapping), 609.255 (false imprisonment), 609.498 (tampering with a witness), 609.561 (first-degree arson), or 609.582, subdivision 1 (first-degree burglary). Thus, it looks like your Minnesota government website is not complete. However, the above seem like the most likely crimes to warrant inclusion on the register. The prominent reason in this instance is the registration will hamper Chauvin from regaining employment as a police officer in Minnesota or any other state. Where I live, there are reports of "problematic officers" being "shuffled" between departments; this would explicitly prevent that.
I am a dual Canadian/US citizen residing in Canada; can I vote in US/Canadian federal elections? I am a dual Canadian/US citizen currently residing in Canada. Can I vote in both the Canadian and American federal elections? Can I vote in the primaries for my party? Am I allowed to cast votes for congressional candidates in the US from the district that I lived in most recently?	For the US, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act provides that just about any US citizen living abroad who has previously resided within the US is entitled to vote in federal elections as though they still lived at their last US address, provided they'd be eligible to vote if they still lived at that address. If you're overseas on duty in a uniformed service of the United States or as a spouse or dependent of such a person, it's based on your legal residence instead. This is a right of US citizenship; dual citizenship doesn't affect it. This State Department website has details; there's a special process you can generally use instead of the state absentee process. UOCAVA applies to all federal elections (including primaries); state and local election eligibility is up to the state. For Canada, citizens of Canada living there seem to have the right to vote regardless of any possible loyalty issues with another country. Canadians living outside Canada for over five years can't vote, but if you live there it seems as though it is allowed. So, the answer is seemingly "yes." For a definitive answer, contact the US consulate and Canadian election officials.	It is possible in principle, in the US, under the Bureau of Prison Treaty Transfer program, so that one could serve your time in Australia for example -- but not New Zealand, which isn't part of a bilateral or multilateral treaty with the US: here is the list. Canada and Australia are on the list via the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. New Zealand is (by choice) not a participant.	It is legal, unless the laws of that state say otherwise. Governments are allowed to charge different tuitions to residents vs. non-residents. They can also require proof of residence (not just your say-so). Being physically present in a state for a couple of years is not proof of being a resident. That doesn't mean that the interrogation that you are getting is allowed by law, but it's at least consistent with the general pattern of out of state tuition laws in the US. If you have contradictory elements of "proof" (voter registration in another state), they can demand more evidence. It really depends on what the state laws are, so you could name the state. Also, the full financial disclosure may in fact not be related to tuition rates but to financial aid, where they can demand all sorts of things by way of proof.	They can't take his citizenship... Since he claims to be a born citizen, he has citizenship by birthright and nothing CBP can do can possibly revoke it. He can voluntarily renounce his citizenship, but he has to do that through the State Dept. (which CBP is not part of). And that is an elaborate and expensive process that can't even be done inside the United States. If someone could do it merely by entering without papers and asking for a self-deport, lots of expats would save a lot of money - and that's not gonna happen :) ...but they could put him to serious inconvenience In this particular case, CBP found his documents suspect. Probably because (if it's the case we've seen documented elsewhere) he was with two other people whose entry was illegal, and they had forged documents. So most likely, if he agreed to self-deport, CBP would use that as prima-facie evidence that he is not a bona-fide citizen, and therefore, that his papers are faked. They certainly will not give fake papers back to someone who has tried to pass them. So the victim would be obliged to go back to SSA, the state, etc. and re-acquire his identity documents. From outside the country. It's a pretty big chore.	I suspect that this person could get a green card under 8 USC 1259 or 1255a, since it seems that he entered in 1952 or so, which was long before the Reagan amnesty. These sections of the code concern those who entered the US before 1972 and 1982, respectively. You might try asking on Expatriates as there are many people there who are familiar with immigration law. A consultation with an immigration lawyer is probably advisable.	If a newly naturalized citizen immediately emigrates from the US back to their country of origin (although continues to file and pay relevant expat taxes). This used to be grounds for expatriation, but in 1964, in Schneider v. Rusk, the supreme court ruled that it was impermissible. The law was subsequently amended to remove the relevant provision.	There seems to be no current applicable prohibition state law in Iowa in Iowa Code 39A, the Election Misconduct and Penalties Act. It is also not at all clear that precinct caucuses count as "elections" as applicable to the sections with criminal prohibitions (the precinct caucus does not appear to constitute a "primary election" under Iowa law).	with the new movement by some states to require voters to have identification to vote, and the fact that no state I know of provides free government issued ID (unless you are an employee) it seems that unless a state provided its residents with free access to state-issued ID, that requiring people to go pay for ID's needed to vote would be contrary to the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. This specific issue (which is much easier to address than the general question) has been litigated, and in some cases, it has been a successful argument. It is pretty much acknowledged now that requiring a fee for all documents required in order to have ID necessary to vote violates the 24th Amendment. But, the states that enacted these requirements knew that and tried to get around it by making at least one form of voter ID free, which prevents the statutes from being facially invalid. This isn't the end of the question, however: Voter ID laws, enacted in 11 states over the past two years, require voters to show a government-issued photo ID that the state will provide for free. But while the ID is free, the documents residents need to prove their identity in order to get that ID, such as a birth certificate, are not. Now, lots of people already have documents like birth certificates that were purchased by their parents at their birth and are now available to them for free. But, that isn't always the case. This raises the question of whether there is an "as applied" violation of the 24th Amendment in the cases of someone who can't prove their entitlement to compliant voter ID without paying for it, and if so, what the proper remedy is for the violation. These issues are still being actively litigated and haven't been definitively resolved on a national basis in all circumstances.
How does Judge Sullivan have standing? As I understand it, Judge Sullivan is appealing a writ of mandamus in the Flynn case. As the Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Constitution as having a case or controversy requirement that embodies a requirement of injury in fact and party seeking review must have suffered an injury, what is the injury here? Either Judge Sullivan is standing in for the American people and acting on behalf (but in opposition to) the executive branch (which would create a precedent that the judicial branch can step in and perform the executive branch function), or he has some some other injury. But as the judicial branch is expected to just be impartially interpreting law, it does not seem as though he would have any real injury in fact here, even if he is unhappy with the outcome of a particular case.	The Court of Appeals made Judge Sullivan the respondent. Flynn petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to order the inferior court to dismiss the criminal proceedings against Flynn. Normally the adversary in the 'parent' proceedings would oppose such a petition but in this case the adversary, the Department of Justice, supported Flynn's petition. The Court of Appeals made Judge Sullivan the respondent and did not appoint an amicus curiae. That allowed Judge Sullivan to seek a review en banc of the Court of Appeals' 24 July 2020 decision. The Court of Appeals has since vacated the 24 July 2020 decision and will re-hear the petition for the writ of mandamus en banc. It has asked parties to consider whether there are "no other adequate means [than mandamus] to attain the relief" desired. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 21. Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition, and Other Extraordinary Writs: The court of appeals ordinarily will be adequately informed not only by the opinions or statements made by the trial court judge contemporaneously with the entry of the challenged order but also by the arguments made on behalf of the party opposing the relief. The latter does not create an attorney-client relationship between the party's attorney and the judge whose action is challenged, nor does it give rise to any right to compensation from the judge. If the court of appeals desires to hear from the trial court judge, however, the court may invite or order the judge to respond. In some instances, especially those involving court administration or the failure of a judge to act, it may be that no one other than the judge can provide a thorough explanation of the matters at issue. Because it is ordinarily undesirable to place the trial court judge, even temporarily, in an adversarial posture with a litigant, the rule permits a court of appeals to invite an amicus curiae to provide a response to the petition. In those instances in which the respondent does not oppose issuance of the writ or does not have sufficient perspective on the issue to provide an adequate response, participation of an amicus may avoid the need for the trial judge to participate. Interesting point made at 41:00 in episode 175 of The National Security Law Podcast by Bobby Chesney and Steve Vladeck: the Court of Appeals didn't address the question of 'standing' or whether Sullivan was a proper party to make a petition. The Court announced that "Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing en banc, the responses thereto, and the vote in favor of rehearing en banc by a majority of the judges eligible to participate" they ordered the re-hearing of Flynn's petition en banc.	I am assuming you are not the councilor. Civil matter you have no standing. The councilor does. Maybe the hotel bar does. I can’t think of anyone else who does. Criminal matter If a crime was committed in DC, the DC prosecutor is under no obligation to prosecute it. As a political matter, if you were a citizen of DC you could complain and try to get the prosecutor voted out next election. Political matter As a citizen of your city, it is a political matter: You call your councilman* or any city councilman really and ask them to begin impeachment or whatever similar action you have there. Then next election to try to get the mayor voted out. If you are unsatisfied with the council, try to get them voted out also. The cost of investigation is a cost of running a government. Someone could have chosen not to spend seven grand investigating a hundred bucks, but they did it. *Note this is called petitioning for redress which is the right that the current SCOTUS nominee could not recall off the top of her head.	That remains to be determined. This article (100 Tex. L. Rev. 56 (2021)) discusses the possibility. To start, the Constitution does not directly say that a sitting president cannot be prosecuted. The lack of an express presidential immunity and the fact that an attempt by Madison to create such an immunity is an indication of "original intent". The view that an incumbent president cannot be indicted, prosecuted, convicted or punished is a policy stance set forth by the Dept. of justice, but is not constitutional law. Alito in Trump v. Vance points to some apparently negative consequences of allowing indictment of a sitting president, but this was in a dissenting opinion. Practical considerations of policy might argue for not prosecuting a sitting president, but the Constitution itself does not expressly forbid it. As we know from numerous SCOTUS rulings, the court is also capable of finding implicit support for a rule in the Constitution. For example theimpeachment provisions do not demand or even hint that impeachment must precede trial and punishment. An argument that prosecution would "incapacitate" the president is met with the fact that there is a provision for replacing an incapacitated POTUS with VPOTUS as acting president. The idea that a trial interferes with a person's ability to do their job (or that they can't adequately participate in their defense if they are doing their job) has not actually prevented ordinary people with jobs from being prosecuted for their crimes.	The direct answer is "no" and the indirect answer is "yes", that is, your way of putting the matter diverges significantly from how the Bill of Complain puts the matter. The claim is that the defendant states violated the Electors Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Texas claims that there is an injury in fact, citing various SCOTUS rulings e.g. Wesberry v. Sanders which says that No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined See the argument in the brief for more legal rhetoric. There can be no question that one state can sue another; equally clearly, the plaintiff must show actual harm and not just annoyance. New Jersey v. New York is a case involving a question of equity, not the federal constitution, but there is no legal principle to the effect that one state cannot sue over a constitutional harm rather than an equitable harm. See the brief p. 65 ff. The court does not require that there be exact precedential analogs (otherwise, Roe v. Wade would have turned out differently), what's required is simply that there be reasonable logical steps: SCOTUS gets to decide what is reasonable (or it can decline to decide).	I conclude (contrary to an earlier expression) that there is no such list, nor can there be, because the term "officer" is not well enough defined. The inferior officers are those officers who are not principal officers (as specified in the Constitution, e.g. ambassadors, cabinet members, judges), since there are only two kinds of officers. There is no constitutional or statutory definition of "Officer of the United States", so we have to figure it out from case law. As noted in Morrison v. Olson 487 U.S. 654 The line between "inferior" and "principal" officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be drawn. Officers of the US cannot be appointed by Congress (Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976), so that narrows down the possibilities – if in fact an appointment can be made by Congress, that is not an inferior office (since Congress has no such authority). That court also said that We think that the term "Officers of the United States," as used in Art. II, defined to include "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government" in United States v. Germaine, supra, is a term intended to have substantive meaning. We think its fair import is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an "Officer of the United States," and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article. To take a specific example, "special trial judges", authorized in 26 USC 7443a are an example of an officer. We know they are officers, because Freytag v. Commissioner 501 U.S. 868 says so (since they read Buckley): A special trial judge is an "inferior Office[r]" whose appointment must conform to the Appointments Clause. Such a judge acts as an inferior officer who exercises independent authority in cases governed by subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3). The fact that in subsection (b)(4) cases he performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not transform his status. The Dept. of Justice offers an analysis of "Officer of the United States". The main elements in their opinion are that the position must possess delegated sovereign authority of the Federal government, and the position must be continuing. There are other criteria possibly applicable (things that were invokes at some time) including method of appointment, having been established by law, taking an oath of office, an emolument (not a volunteer), and receiving a commission. Still, Congress authorizes (by law) the hiring of federal employees, and not all employees are "officers". An earlier memorandum on the topic is here. Footnote 54 notes that It is at least arguable, however, that the authority exercised by second lieutenants and ensigns is so limited and subordinate that their analogues in the civil sphere clearly would be employees. Warrant officers and non-commisioned officers would likewise have quite limited authority. Since the definition of "Officer of the United States" is up for grabs, there can't be a complete list of inferior officers, especially if all military officers are included. There is a long list of civilian officers under the executive branch published in United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions, after each presidential election. The so-called Plum Book is on a government web page here in the 2012 version, and here for 2016. However, you will not find special trial judges of the tax court in the Plum Book, which were held in Freytag to be officers, and are civilians in the executive branch. The special trial judges are apparently listed here, as are the sitting judges (who are also not in the Plum book).	As an example, POTUS does not undertake the entire pardon process on his own, instead they are preliminarily processed by the Department of Justice, which makes a recommendation. Only POTUS can "grant" the pardon, and we lack substantive information on how deeply he gets involved (does he just sign documents based on staff recommendations? does he do his own research?). I don't know what physical form Clinton's 450 pardons on January 20, 2001 took, but a president might use an autopen (Obama did use such a device). Questions have been raised and definitive answers from SCOTUS are lacking as to whether hand-to-paper signatures are demanded by the Constitution. DoJ at one point thought it was okay. This article lists the Constitutional functions which cannot be delegated: reporting to the Congress on the state of the Union; convening either or both Houses of Congress and adjourning Congress; signing and vetoing bills; receiving ambassadors and public ministers (recognition); appointing and removing ambassadors, ministers, and certain other public officers; nominating federal judges; and making recess appointments However, the Constitutional function of negotiating treaties or numerous functions as commander in chief of the armed forces is generally delegated, within the executive branch. Numerous statutory functions can be delegated (and Congress may say explicitly that some function can be delegated, in passing the law). The matter of implied power to delegate statutory function is the topic of a couple of centuries of litigation, but as an example in Williams v. United States, 42 U.S. 290 SCOTUS held that a law prohibiting the advance of public money in any case whatsoever to the disbursing officers of government except under the special direction of the President does not require the personal and ministerial performance of this duty, to be exercised in every instance by the President under his own hand. SCOTUS has not established bright lines regarding the extent of permissible delegation.	It is binding precedent for lower federal courts in the Ninth Circuit. They are required to follow it. It is persuasive precedent for the other circuits and for state courts. They may be persuaded by the reasoning and will consider the fact that the Ninth Circuit held as it did to be one factor in their decision-making, but they can make a different decision if they want to. Some courts are also more persuasive than others, although this is usually not explicitly acknowledged in written opinions. For example, state courts in the Ninth Circuit are likely to give more weight to a Ninth Circuit opinion than they are to give weight to a decision from another circuit. Cases from the Second Circuit are more likely to be persuasive than cases from other circuits, because of its reputation. Cases from the Southern District of New York are more likely to be persuasive than cases from most other non-local District Courts. There is also a personal reputation function that comes into play when looking at persuasive decisions. Some judges have a better reputation or a better reputation with a particular other judge, and their decisions may be considered more carefully. This is not explicit, but it means a good lawyer will mention the judge's name when a case in support of his position was decided by a well-regarded judge. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's holding would be persuasive precedent for the Supreme Court. You could write law review articles about this, but to dip one toe in: they may be persuaded by the reasoning and it matters to their function of providing unifying law, so especially during the process of applying for a writ of certiorari, they will care what different circuits have held on an issue and which circuits are going which way. But they are not bound by the circuit courts, and will overturn all of the circuits if they think that's the right decision. They did that a while ago with a statute about what it meant to use a firearm while committing a crime, for example.	According to this CNBC story the case brought by members of Congress (Blumenthal v. Trump) was dismissed for lack of standing by a three-judge panel at the Circuit Court level. As reported earlier a federal district court judge had allowed the case to proceed. This 2017 Politico story reported on the dismissal of an earlier suit on the same issue, also for lack of standing. The AP story "Supreme Court ends Trump emoluments lawsuits" reports that in Jan 2021 the US Supreme Court dismissed remaining cases on the issue as moot, since Trump was no longer President. In the piece "Supreme Court Ducks an Opportunity on Trump Emoluments Cases" by Ciara Torres-Spelliscy of the Brennan Center, the author reviewed the history of the constitutional provisions, expressed the view that rump had violated them, and suggested that new legislation should be passed to deal with any future cases of a similar sort. So far as I know, no such legislation has been introduced to date.
Irish Passport through Great Grandparent Say the family tree looks like this: Great Grandfather <- Born in what is now Northern Ireland Grandmother <- Born in Britain Mother <- Born in Britain Son <- Born in Britain From a cursory glance of the relevant legislation, the grandmother and mother would be eligible for Irish citizenship as a foreign born citizen but the Son would not. However, if the Grandmother or mother were to choose to exercise their right and obtain their Irish citizenship, this would reduce the number of generations between the son and the last Irish citizen ancestor to less than two. Would the son then be able to claim Irish citizenship? Finally, does it make any difference if the Great Grandfather was born in what is now the North or the Republic?	There's an answer at Irish Citizens Information, complete with a chart. First, it doesn't matter if the Irish ancestor was living in the Republic or in Northern Ireland. However, the ancestral right only extends to grandchildren unless you were born after 2015. Otherwise, your parent must have claimed Irish citizenship before you were born.	Your scenario as written is impossible. If one is born in the US, then they cannot lose their citizenship before they turn 18 (and it is rather difficult to lose it accidentally; in order to lose jus soli citizenship in the US, one must "intentionally revoke it"; generally speaking, you have to go to a US consulate (in another country) and formally renounce your citizenship. Additionally, the US will not accept the resignation your citizenship if you do not have a different one (i.e. if accepting the resignation will render you stateless).	Yes, of course you still owe it. There's no logical reason why ceasing to be a citizen should relieve you of existing obligations. The State Department mentions this explicitly Persons who wish to renounce U.S. citizenship should be aware of the fact that renunciation of U.S. citizenship may have no effect on their U.S. tax or military service obligations (contact the Internal Revenue Service or U.S. Selective Service for more information). In addition, the act of renouncing U.S. citizenship does not allow persons to avoid possible prosecution for crimes which they may have committed or may commit in the future which violate United States law, or escape the repayment of financial obligations, including child support payments, previously incurred in the United States or incurred as United States citizens abroad. I think the "may" is just to cover their butts - I can't find any indication of any provision that would forgive tax debts when you renounce. Indeed, renouncing your citizenship may cause you to owe more tax, because of the expatriation tax. Basically, all your unrealized capital gains are treated as if they were realized and taxed on the day before your expatriation, and you owe capital gains tax on them.	Whether or not you are protected by GDPR depends on the location of both yourself and the party processing your data. Citizenship and residence statuses are completely irrelevant (Recital 14(1)): The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence If the party processing your data is established in the EU, then you are protected no matter who you are or where you are (Art. 3(1)): This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not. If the party processing your data is not established in the EU, then you are only protected if you are in the EU (Art. 3(2)): This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union	Based on some quick searching, this would likely be a wrongful death action. I have to pick a state, so I'll pick Nevada. The first question is what damages could be. I don't know offhand what is typical in wrongful death suits, but this appears to be beyond mere negligence: there was a hit and run involved. I have no trouble believing the claim would reach at least six figures. This is important, because federal diversity jurisdiction only includes lawsuits with over $75,000 at stake. Now, Santa Claus's citizenship matters; if he were stateless it'd be an issue, but he is a citizen of Canada. That means that federal court has diversity jurisdiction: because the lawsuit is between a citizen of one state on one side and a foreign citizen on the other (no state has citizens on both sides of the lawsuit), and meets Congress's extra requirements (enough money at stake), it can be in federal court. The way diversity jurisdiction works is that the plaintiff can file in federal court, but if they choose to file in Nevada court then the defendant can remove the case to federal court. Either party can get it into federal court. Conventional wisdom is that federal court is more defendant-friendly than state court on state law claims. It is likely that if Grandpa files the case in any court in Nevada, the case will end up in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. But suppose it is in state court? Most states don't have separate "county court" and "state court" systems; county courts are a thing, but they're a specialized thing and the serious stuff is not in those. A six-figure wrongful death claim won't go in Nevada's equivalent of small claims court. It'd go in Nevada district court, if it's in state courts. But what about other courts? Grandma was walking home, so it can be assumed she was a Nevada resident. Assuming Grandpa lived with her (which is rather likely), so is he. They then can't sue in any US state other than Nevada without being laughed out of court -- a lawsuit needs to have something to do with where you're suing. The other option is Canada, but such a suit is unlikely.	Only for certain parts of the constitution, and not for the parts you are asking about. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has squarely stated that neither the First Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment "acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens."13 For more than a century, the Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause is "universal in [its] application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to differences of ... nationality."14 The Court has repeatedly stated that "the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."15 When noncitizens, no matter what their status, are tried for crimes, they are entitled to all of the rights that attach to the criminal process, without any distinction based on their nationality.16 Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens? - David Cole, Georgetown University Law Center	I'm not aware of any court ruling about the meaning of the "14 years" clause, but the plain reading of it would be that someone merely needs to accumulate 14 years of residency in the United States in order to be eligible to run for President. There's precedent for this, in the form of Dwight D. Eisenhower: he spent large parts of the period 1942-1946 in Europe before being elected in 1952.	She never said that She said: When I joined that family, that was the last time, until we came here, that I saw my passport, my driver's licence, my keys. All that gets turned over With respect to my adult children and their passports, the same is true in my house. I ask them for their passports when they aren’t needed, they give them to me, I store them in a safe place and I give them back to them when they need them. That’s just a sensible precaution against them being lost and in no way illegal. Now if I took their passports without permission and withheld them when they wanted them, that would be illegal as it would for anyone else including the Queen (who, I’m sure, had absolutely nothing to do with it - that’s the job of the Keeper of the Royal Passports or some such). Similarly, if you came to my house and I offered to take your coat and you gave it to me and I gave it back when you left, that would be perfectly legal. When I pull up in my car, I put my keys in a bowl in the laundry (unless I forget and then I can’t find them and it’s really annoying). I would prefer instead to have an employee jump into the car, park it and put the keys in their bowl so that when I want the car latter, it’s their job to remember where they left the keys. But I can’t afford that.
Public display of swastika in the US The Nazi swastika evokes emotional (fear, anger); is there a “bright line” in which this symbol crosses that public display of said symbol would result in an arrest in the US? Or is the symbol’s display protected under the first amendment? Sample context: https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/28/us/minnesota-walmart-nazi-masks-antisemitism-trnd/?hpt=ob_blogfooterold	In US Law, banning speech based on its content is called "Content-based" speech regulation (shocking, I know), as opposed to "Content-neutral" speech regulation like requiring all protests to end before a specific time. Content-based speech regulation can be constitutional if it passes strict scrutiny, but in the case of banning swastikas, it would fall under an even narrower subset of content-based speech regulation called "viewpoint regulation." I haven't found a case where the swastika or Nazi flag was banned in particular, but we can find reasoning that appears to safely protect the peaceful display of the Nazi flag and ideology from government restriction in Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), a case in which Chicago banned picketing within 150 feet of a school except in the case of labor disputes related to the school. The Supreme Court found that this amounted to viewpoint-based discrimination, writing in the majority opinion: But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone. As with all rights restrictions, a particular restriction may be Constitutional if it passes "strict scrutiny," namely, it: is necessary to a "compelling state interest"; is "narrowly tailored" to achieving this compelling purpose; and uses the "least restrictive means" to achieve the purpose. In general, a ban on the peaceful display of Nazi imagery or promotion of Nazi ideas would fail the first test, as the government does not have a compelling interest to suppress ideas which might be distasteful to some or even the majority of people. I have seen an argument that because the Nazi regime's stated goal included genocide, that promoting that ideology amounts to advocating violence. Speech which advocates violence or criminality may be criminalized, but only under a specific "imminent lawless action" test expressed in Brandenburg v. Ohio: Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. This case was brought against a KKK member who advocated various violent acts at a rally. The main distinction is that his speech did not call for specific violence, but merely advocated for it in general. This almost exactly mirrors the rationale for banning the Nazi ideology based on its advocacy of violence, and shows that a ban on such grounds would be unconstitutional. "Imminent" was clarified in Hess v. Indiana to mean that the action must be intended to produce actual lawless action at a specific point in the future, not simply advocate for it in general. Hess was a protester who was being forced off a street by police, said "We'll take the fucking street later" and was convicted of disorderly conduct for it, which the court reversed as his statement "amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time" and was therefore protected by the First Amendment.	It is entirely legal to discriminate on arbitrary grounds. What is not legal is to discriminate on the basis of a protected category, for example race. The law say that you cannot favor or disfavor a customer because of their race. Federal law specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, but not age or gender (disability is more complicated). Moreover, the grounds are not arbitrary. The establishment is at legal risk if a customer does not wear eye-protection, and you have no right to compel them to assume that risk: it's a perfectly normal business decision. The law states that "Customers are not allowed to use a tanning device unless the customer uses protective eyewear", and verifying that you have such eyewear is the minimal way of assuring compliance with the law.	The main difference distinguish Martinez's conviction from other flag burning convictions is that it wasn't his flag. If you were to steal and burn my American flag, you too could be prosecuted. There is a little issue of protected class, because he was convicted under the hate crime statute, not just plain arson. In Iowa the protected classes are: race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, or disability, or the person’s association with a person of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, or disability If you burned my Tall People's Club flag, that is not a protected class. If you burned my American flag because I am expressing my Americanness, that's a hate crime.	One could make a First Amendment challenge to mask requirements through either the Free Exercise Clause or the Free Speech Clause. Neither approach is likely to succeed. Because going without a mask is not recognized as "expressive conduct," it is not protected by the Free Speech Clause A free-speech challenge would likely also fail for two reasons. As you correctly suggested, the First Amendment protects more than just speech, also protecting "expressive conduct," such as flag burning, dancing, and wearing armbands. Of course, literally any conduct could have some secret expressive meaning in the mind of the person carrying out -- "I shot him in the face to say I didn't like him" -- so we have a question of where to draw the line between what expressive conduct does and does not receive the strong protection the First Amendment affords to speech. The Supreme Court detailed that test in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and it's now generally formulated as asking two questions: Did the speaker actually intend to convey a particularized message through his conduct? Are the people who see the conduct likely to understand that message? At the Sturgis rally, or at the statehouse protests over COVID restrictions, or some similar event that is explicitly opposed to masks, refusing to wear a mask goes a long ways in communicating an opposition to the mask requirements. But in the vast majority of cases, no one you run into in the normal course of daily life is likely to recognize that you are not wearing a mask because you are trying to communicate a message, let alone decipher what that message is. Do you believe that mask mandates are tyranny? That COVID-19 is a hoax? That life is meaningless and we should all welcome the hastening of human extinction? None of that is clear to the average viewer, which is who the courts are going to be concerned with. Because refusing to wear a mask is generally insufficient to convey a specific message, I'd argue that it is not expressive conduct. Because mask requirements are neutral as to religion and generally applicable, they do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. A religious challenge ("My religion prohibits wearing masks") is likely to fail because "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'" Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). This means that if the mask ban generally applies to everyone and you just happen to belong to a religion that forbids mask-wearing, you can't use that affiliation to escape the law's requirements. (The outcome may be different when you run the problem through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or state-level analogues, which impose more stringent tests for infringements on religious liberty.)	The First Amendment is absolutely relevant to the question (in a public school which is subject to the First Amendment, because it is a governmental entity), although it isn't the end of the story. Generally speaking, a school can establish reasonable rules and regulations for its students and punish those violations with punishments such as detentions, suspensions, expulsions, changes in grades on assignments or in classes, denial of eligibility to participate in extra-curricular activities or to receive school honors, and similar sanctions. Generally speaking, violations of school rules cannot result in criminal punishments or civil liability not authorized by other laws, and profanity is something that cannot be prohibited – at least in cases involving adults. Minors have First Amendment rights to express opinions, although they are diminished in a school setting, and while literally speaking profanity is part of the content of speech, it is often analyzed as a permissible "time, place or manner" restriction instead, especially when minors are present. Profanity also covers a range of conduct. Schools have the greatest authority to regulate speech when it is disruptive to the orderly operations of the school, or threatening. Profanity used to provoke or threaten someone, such as the use of a racial slur or an offensive statement about someone's family, could potentially be punished severely based not simply on what was said but because it is part of a larger context of aggression. In contrast, schools might potentially exceed their legal authority to prohibit profanity defined in such a way as to prevent students from a particularly ethnicity from speaking in ordinary non-provocative terms to each other. The N-word directed at an African-American student in a predominantly Hispanic school by someone reputed to be a gang leader with an intent to provoke or threaten the African-American students would be well within the school's right to prohibit and punish severely. But punishing two African-American students who are friends for using the same word in a friendly context like "Hey, N- how you doing?" "I'm doing better than fine, N-" might even be construed as discriminatory if punished, and deemed to be beyond the authority of the school to prohibit at all, or with anything more than the most minimal sanction. Limitations on profanity are also more suspect from a First Amendment perspective when used in connection with conduct that is intended to be expressive, such as an art project, or a monologue chosen for a drama class from published stage plays, novels and poems, or when used in connection with protests and political activity. Often the standard by which school officials are judged in court when a school punishment for some conduct or another is challenged, is whether the school officials abused their discretion and part of that analysis is proportionality. A school official can be comfortable that issuing a detention to a student, or assigning the student to some undesirable task like picking up litter from a school yard during recess for saying something like "shit" or "fuck" will not be judged to be an abuse of discretion. But, a court might very well overturn a school's exercise of its discretion to punish a student if a student were expelled for saying something like that in a manner that was not part of a more pervasive pattern of disregard for authority and disruptive behavior. Another factor that influences whether a rule like a ban on profanity is an abuse of discretion to punish in a particular manner is the extent to which there was advanced notice that this was prohibited. If the school has a clear rule that is familiar to everyone in the student body stating in advance what is prohibited and what punishments are authorized under particular circumstances, that rule is more likely to be held not to constitute an abuse of discretion, than a severe punishment of a student who has no real advanced warning that the conduct is not allowed. Similarly, the intent of the student is relevant. If a student uses profanity or an offensive term (e.g. "fag") not knowing that it is considered profane or offensive, either out of ignorance perhaps because other students misled him or her about what a word meant, anything more than a minimal punishment would be an abuse of discretion, while even relatively minor use of profanity, calculated and intended to have great negative effects in the context in which it was used, resulting in a severe punishment, might not be an abuse of discretion. In between, and perhaps justifying only an intermediate punishment, at most, without constituting an abuse of discretion, would be a use of profanity that isn't naive or innocent, but isn't calculated for maximum negative effect either, and just "pops out" based upon what is normal in a student's home life or previous experience even though it is contrary to the norms of this particular school and the student would have realized that upon further reflection. Is there detailed case law or a statute that spells this out, in great detail? No. Some of this is embedded in custom and social norms that are familiar to judges (usually in the context of what was historically known as a "certiorari petition" arising from a local government quasi-judicial decision). But, I do think that this answer relatively accurately captures how a seemingly vague "abuse of discretion" review standard for school disciplinary actions for students would be likely to play out in real life, and those expectations absolutely do influence how school administrators and teachers impose discipline, in practice.	I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision.	Note that the original Stolen Valor Act of 2005, which made it an offense to falsely claim to have been awarded any US military medal or decoration, or to wear such without authorization, was ruled unconstitutional in United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). The Stolen Valor Act of 2013 makes this an offense only if done for profit. As described in this Law.se Q&A, United States vs Hamilton (2012) limited the law against wearing military uniform without authorization to cases where it is done with intent to deceive (at least in the Fourth Circuit, but I suspect that the same rule would be applied throughout the country).	It depends. Symbols which are not entitled to trademark protection in a market, usually because they are merely descriptive or generic or functional, are in the public domain and may be used by anyone, but a person using a descriptive or generic symbol can't prevent someone else from using the same symbol to promote their own business. For example, I can use the scales of justice symbol to promote my law practice on my law firm website. But, since that symbol is a generic one in the law firm market, I can't sue a competing law firm from using the same symbol on their website. The essence of a protectable trademark that an owner of can legally exclude competing firms in the same market from using, is that your firm manages to infuse into the distinctive affectation for which trademark protection is claimed with what is called "secondary meaning" to the words or image or other manifestation of the trademark when it is used in the market where the owner of the mark wants to obtain trademark protection. For example, descriptive trademarks are not eligible for trademark protection and are instead in the public domain and can be used by anyone in a market where the mark is descriptive. You can't gain a legally protected right to use the word "liquor" to describe a business that is engaged in selling liquor, and you can't gain a legally protected right to use the words "doughnut shop" for a business that sells doughnuts. But, if you use the words "doughnut shop" to describe a business that sells liquor or bras, rather than doughnuts, and those words come to be associated in the mind of the public with your particular chain of liquor stores or lingerie stores, then the words "doughnut shop" have acquired a "secondary meaning" which can be legally protected by trademark law allowing you to deny other businesses the right to use that trademark in the economic market where it has acquired a secondary meaning. (The scope of an economic market can be both geographic and conceptual related to the nature of the products sold. The manner in which an economic market is determined for a mark is beyond the scope of this answer or the original question.) The analysis with respect to symbols is analogous. You can't gain legal protections for using a common symbol in a manner that merely conveys its pre-existing common meaning. For example, if you use the hashtag sign # to mean "number" or "pound", that probably cannot be legally protected by trademark law. But, suppose that one particular firm (e.g. Twitter) uses the hashtag sign in a novel sense associated exclusively with a service that this particular firm provides, in a manner that is not semantically derived from its pre-existing meanings. In that situation, the firm might very well be permitted to claim trademark protection for the use of that common symbol in this new sense that has a "secondary meaning", which associates that symbol in a certain context exclusively with that firm, in the market where that firm does business. Similarly, you could probably not gain trademark protection for the common highway "yield sign" design to mean "yield" or be careful or some other similar semantic meaning. But, if you used the common highway yield sign to sell spaceships, and people came to associate that symbol with the spaceships sold by your particular firm, rather than with spaceships in general, you might be able to secure trademark protection for the yield sign symbol in that marketplace. It is easier to develop a "secondary meaning" for a distinctive and particular stylized presentation of either words in a particular script, or a variation on what would otherwise be a common symbol, than it is to develop a "secondary meaning" for generic words or a generic symbol that is has an existing meaning in other contexts. For example, while Apple could probably not have claimed trademark protection for an image of a clock spinning clockwise while the user has to wait while the computer is thinking about something, Apple's distinctive variant of this image (which some people call the "pinwheel of death") might very well be eligible for trademark protection.' The AppleOS pinwheel of death
If an appeals court orders a lower court to throw out a case, can this be appealed by the lower court? Background On June 24th, 2020 in a 2 - 1 vote, a Washington appeals court ordered Judge Emmet Sullivan to throw out the case against Michael Flynn because both the prosecution and the defense wanted the case dismissed: By a vote of 2-1, the three-judge panel on the appeals court ruled Wednesday that the lower-court judge, Sullivan, had intruded on the Justice Department's "charging authority" by seeking further investigation after the department moved to dismiss Flynn's case. An attorney appointed by Sullivan to counsel him about the government's decision in the case called the move to dismiss an abuse of power by the Justice Department because it was interceding in the case of a friend of President Trump. Question Since the Judge now has an attorney, can this Judge appeal to the Supreme Court (or appeal again starting from a different court jurisdiction) to potentially allow him to continue his decision to review if the Michael Flynn case should be dismissed?	The Main Answer: The Judge Can't Appeal; But Other People Can Since the Judge now has an attorney, can this Judge appeal to the Supreme Court (or appeal again starting from a different court jurisdiction) to potentially allow him to continue his decision to review if the Michael Flynn case should be dismissed? Not exactly. It is potentially subject to appeal, but not by the judge. But the question contains an understandable and natural false premise that confuses the issue. The attorney appointed by the Court to present the position abandoned by the Justice Department is not a lawyer for the judge (who has absolute immunity from liability). Instead, the attorney is someone appointed to provide additional representation to "the People" on the theory that the Justice Department in unable to fully represent the interests of "the People" due to an alleged conflict of interest. The attorney appointed by the judge to present a position that the Justice Department abandoned, might have standing to do so, but the judge himself or herself, while listed as the Respondent in the case, is only a nominal party and not a true real party in interest. Also en banc review of a panel decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals can be raised sua sponte by any judge in the Circuit, without prompting from any part for further review (which is what happened in this case). The Archaic Federal Writ of Mandamus Practice Explained There is a general rule that says that only final decisions of trial courts can be appealed to an appellate court.<1> Thus, usually, a criminal defendant can only appeal from a criminal case after the criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime and sentenced for that crime. But, this general rule has exceptions. A request for a writ of mandamus is one way to get around this general rule. A writ is a court order directed at a government official by a court having jurisdiction over the official, usually, but not always, in a matter in which the government official is not alleged to have done anything making the government official eligible for punishment personally. For example, a writ of execution, is a court order directing the sheriff or some other government official, to take action to enforce a court order awarding someone a money judgment that the prevailing part seeks to have the sheriff involuntarily seize. A request for writ of mandamus (i.e. for an order directing a government official subordinate to the court to take a non-discretionary action in a court case) is structured in the old fashioned approach used in federal court as a lawsuit against a judge brought in a court with supervising authority over the judge. But, in substance, this is a legal fiction and formality used (in this context, writs of mandamus are used in more than one way) to provide review of trial court decisions prior to the entry of a final decision on the merits in a case (something also called an "interlocutory appeal"). This process was established in the All Writs Act of 1789 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651) that applied to the federal courts the process in place immediately prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution in 1789 in the courts of the American Colonies. The procedure used in the pre-constitution courts of the American colonies was borrowed from English common law procedural practices then in place. The English practice was in turn originally established during or not long before the reign of King Edward II (reigned 1307 to 1327 CE). Those procedures have then evolved over time. This procedure was formally established in the U.S. in the federal courts by case law interpreting the All Writs Act (the All Writs Act itself is only a sentence or two long). Put another way, the All Writs Act gave the federal courts the authority to order other government officials (including but not limited to judges) to do things to carry out federal court orders, in the same broad circumstances where English common law courts has the power to do so, and using the same procedures. Originally, a writ of mandamus really was a lawsuit against a judge, and there are contexts where a writ of mandamus is sought against a government official other than a judge that continue to be a lawsuit against a government official. But, now that is just a formality and not a real lawsuit in this context, and that has been the case in cases involving writs of mandamus filed against judges for hundreds of years. <1> A direct appeal of right from a final criminal conviction is a relatively new innovation in the federal courts in the U.S.. The right to bring a direct appeal of right of a criminal conviction secured in federal court did not exist until 1890. And, the right to bring a direct appeal of right of a criminal conviction is not constitutionally guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution or the Bill of Rights, it exists solely by virtue of a federal statute. Prior to 1890, most judicial review of federal criminal convictions was conducted via writs of habeas corpus (which has much narrower grounds upon which relief can be granted) or via Presidential pardons. The Modern Approach Used In Many Jurisdictions Contrasted The modern approach designed to avoid the confusion associated with nominally suing the judge, is to create a court rule replacing the old fashioned legal fiction of writ of mandamus practice, in which someone files an interlocutory appeal captioned (in a criminal case) as People v. Defendant, or as Defendant v. People (depending upon who files first) which is handled essentially like an ordinary appeal but with shorter deadlines and the requirement that grounds for considering the appeal at all prior to a final order in the case be established. For example, in Colorado, where I practice, the equivalent procedure to a writ of mandamus with the judge named as Respondent in a federal court, is called a "Colorado Appellate Rule 21 motion". Further Appellate Options Appeals from interlocutory writ of mandamus rulings made by a panel of a U.S. Court of Appeals are a fairly esoteric corner of federal appellate procedure, and I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of it, but there is a process by which someone with standing could seek further appellate review of the U.S. Court of Appeals panel's ruling. The interlocutory appeal in this case was handled by a three judge panel of one of the United States Courts of Appeal. There are two main ways that a ruling of a panel of one of the United States Courts of Appeal may be further appealed. One is to seek en banc review of the decision by all of the judges of the circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals whose panel heard the case. The other is to appeal either from an en banc decision or directly from the panel decision, to the U.S. Supreme Court. In both circumstances, further appellate review of discretionary, the en banc panel or the U.S. Supreme Court, as the case may be, first decides the preliminary question of whether to consider the further appeal at all, and then, if that is answered in the affirmative, considers the merits of the issue or the issues raised in a further appeal. In a case of national interest involving separation of powers in which the panel issued a divided ruling, it isn't unthinkable that there would be further discretionary review of the ruling if it was sought by someone with standing to do so. The most controversial aspect of the panel ruling in this case, highlighted by the dissenting opinion, is that the Justice Department and criminal defense attorney filed the writ of mandamus before the trial court judge had a chance to consider and rule upon the motions filed in the trial court. Normally, a writ of mandamus is not considered "ripe" to file until a judge actually rules on a motion with a court order which the person seeking the writ alleges was mistaken, rather than before the judge gets to consider whether or not to grant that motion in the first instance as was done in this case. To paraphrase the dissenting opinion, the dissenting judge felt that the appellate court panel jumped the gun in an unprecedented and irregular manner that deprived it of jurisdiction to decide the issue because it was not yet ripe for decision. Other Ways This Could Have Been Litigated As an aside, it is also worth observing that there were multiple procedural options available in this case to prevent his client from being sentenced and to force the case to be dismissed. The writ of mandamus was brought by the Justice Department seeking to enforce its own institutional privileges. But, the more conventional approach in a case with a similar fact pattern in federal court, would be for the criminal defense attorney to file a separate lawsuit against the warden of the jail where his client is being held (who is also a nominal defendant under a different legal fiction, and who also has absolute immunity, but would be defended in the lawsuit by the Justice Department absent an alleged conflict of interest like the one present in this case) seeking a writ of habeas corpus ordering the warden to release his client, possibly before a different judge, and subject to direct appeal once resolved, rather than an interlocutory appeal via a writ of mandamus. But, it isn't often that the Justice Department seeks to withdraw its prosecution against a criminal defendant who has already pleaded guilty in a proceeding in which the factual basis of the plea has already been established on the record in open court and the case is ripe for sentencing to a serious felony sentence. Update As Of August 3, 2020 This case was selected for en banc review by the entire DC Circuit based upon the petition of the dissenting judge in the three judge panel that decided the case. The Order states: ORDER Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing en banc, the responses thereto, and the vote in favor of rehearing en banc by a majority of the judges eligible to participate, it is ORDERED that this case be reheard by the court sitting en banc. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the court’s order filed June 24, 2020, be vacated. It is FURTHER ORDERED that oral argument before the en banc court be heard at 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, August 11, 2020. The parties should be prepared to address whether there are “no other adequate means to attain the relief” desired. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). A separate order will issue regarding the allocation of oral argument time. Per Curiam	A lawsuit would be unsuccessful. Prosecutors have discretion to prioritize whichever offenses they think are most important, and they are generally immune from civil liability. This is a political grievance, and it comes with a political remedy; voters can recall the DA or vote for a new one when his term ends.	I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993).	The Supreme Court does not handle hypotheticals. The court has interpreted Article III Section 2 Clause 1 of the Constitution, the Case or Controversy Clause as a limit on the powers of the judicial branch. The courts have jurisdiction over various types of cases and controversies but only those listed in the Constitution. This limits courts to hearing actual cases and prevents them from issuing advisory opinions. Additionally, in order to bring a case, the plaintiff must have standing to bring the suit. You can't sue the government just because you don't like a law (well, you can, your suit will just be dismissed because it lacks standing). You have to show That you have been, or will imminently be, injured (injury-in-fact) That there is a direct correlation between that injury and the law (causation) And that a favorable court decision will redress the injury (redressability) As a practical matter, the courts are already overwhelmed by the number of actual cases that come up and the Supreme Court can only hear a tiny fraction of the cases they are asked to hear. If they added the ability to hear hypothetical cases as well, the court could easily be overwhelmed by Senators and Representatives asking them to weigh in on every remotely controversial bill or amendment before Congress or interest groups bringing cases for speculative grievances.	Generally speaking, ex parte communications with a judge (i.e. communications to which all parties to a case are not notified) are prohibited, both by law and as a matter of judicial and attorney ethics, subject to some narrow exceptions (e.g. applications for arrest warrants prior to the arrest warrant being carried out). Generally speaking, communications with the court (which is to say with judges or their subordinates) are made a matter of public record, and if the communication is about a particular case, all attorneys in the case must be given notice of it (if someone is not represented by an attorney, the notice goes to the defendant rather than their non-existent attorney). The attorney may then communicate the communication to their client, and generally speaking should communicate it to the client. I don't see anything in the question that suggests that this proposed communication would fall outside the general rule. But, the question isn't very specific and I wouldn't rule out the possibility that an exception might apply in a case with very unusual facts. Also, usually, a request to reconsider a sentence has to be made by a formal motion filed by the prosecutor or the defendant. Generally speaking, a third-party cannot file that motion unilaterally. A third-party or victim would usually only have input into the decision through the prosecutor's office. Third parties and victims are not generally permitted to file motions to reconsider sentences that have been imposed even in states with "victim's rights" statutes, but can publicly provide input to the court before a sentence is imposed, usually at the behest of either the prosecutor or the defendant. Furthermore, generally a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to not have a sentence made more severe after being sentenced the first time around. Reconsideration of a sentence once it is imposed may only be in the direction of leniency. Once a sentence is imposed, it can't be reconsidered to be made more harsh.	You are quoting standards that are applicable during an appeal. So in this case, the defendant was brought to trial, was found guilty by a jury, and is now appealing that conviction. During that initial trial, the evidence was supposed to have been weighed neutrally. In an appeal, the appellate court is not attempting to re-litigate the entirety of the case. That would be costly and slow in addition to burdensome on witnesses that might have to be called again to testify. Instead, it defers to the trial court for things like the determination of facts. The standards you quote show that an appellate court is only going to overturn a lower court's verdict as insufficient if the lower court's ruling is manifestly unjust. The prosecution and the defense presented evidence on a particular element of the crime at trial. The jury determined that the prosecution met its burden, and proved the element beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeals court is not going to substitute its judgement for that of the jury particularly when the jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of different witnesses that may not be possible from a simple text-based transcript. If the trial court convicted and the appeals court determines that the conviction was reasonable if the evidence was viewed from the standpoint most favorable to the prosecution, then the sufficiency standard would be met and the appeal would be denied. The appeals court would only overturn the verdict as insufficient if no reasonable juror could possibly have concluded that the state met its burden of proof given the evidence presented.	There's also the matter of admitting its over is not admitting he lost. Trump could be saying privately that he thinks all possible attempts to contest were blocked, but that since almost all were blocked for non-evidentiary reasons, he can still hold that had the cases progressed to the evidentiary portion the outcomes would have been different. From an apolitical example, just because someone cannot be tried because of statute of limitations, doesn't mean they didn't do the crime... just that the prosecution didn't charge them in a timely manner. The prosecutor, upon getting the decision from the judge that the trial won't even happen, could say to himself or a client "It's all over" while still believing they had the guy they accused dead to rights for the crime. There is further issues with the Politico report that could negate this as evidence of Mens Rea (the first matter is for some reason the link to the report is not working for me, so pardon my ignorance of the details in the article). I'm supposing that Donald Trump did not tell the reporter this story himself, but rather a likely unnamed source that is close to Trump. Here the problem in court would be a matter of evidence (Trump would say he never said this... Politico can't refute that claim by saying we know a guy who says you did... the guy who said Trump said it could testify, but as of yet, we don't have any identity at this stage in the game... the burden of proof is on those who say Donald Trump said something that He himself says he never said or doesn't recall saying. The net result is that the statement attributed to Donald Trump would not be evidence to Mens Rea in any prosectuion right now because there is no specific person attributing the hearsay statement to Trump when Trump denies saying it (it is not hearsay to introduce statements agains opposition's intrest at trial, but the testimony to such evidence needs to be made by a person who was privy to the statement when it happened (they don't need to be the party that the comment was made to... just had to have a valid way of hearing it first hand). With all verbal statements, the larger context also applies, so access to the larger conversation as well as Trump's state of mind in the moment he said it to help infer ultimate meaning. Did Trump think he actually lost because he accepted the results OR did he think lost because he was cheated and denied a chance to be heard in court or have his evidence considered beyond pretrial determinations? The quote could be said in either context and mean totally different things as evidence to the two specific crimes you accuse him of. It's not something to dismiss off hand, but at this stage it is also not a smoking gun. Remember the classic Twilight Zone episode "To Serve Man" and that a single lone statement can have multiple meanings... assuming the most appealing meaning can have disasterous results when the statement is put into a broader context.	Can a corrupt sheriff cause all cases from his department to be dismissed while he was in charge? There have been cases of mass dismissals when the corruption by the law enforcement officer involves a pattern and practice of falsification of evidence provided to courts in those cases. One of the most notable such cases was this one: More than 24,000 convictions in 16,449 cases tainted by former state chemist Sonja Farak have been dismissed in a court case brought by the ACLU of Massachusetts, the Committee of Public Counsel Services (CPCS), and law firm Fick & Marx LLP. The new numbers appear in a report issued by a court-designated “Special Master.” . . . For nearly nine years, former state chemist Sonja Farak used drugs that she stole from or manufactured in the Amherst Lab, causing thousands of people to be wrongfully convicted of drug crimes based on unreliable evidence. Since her arrest in 2013, Farak’s lab misconduct has been compounded by prosecutorial misconduct, including by former prosecutors with the Attorney General’s Office who – according to a judge’s findings – intentionally deceived a court and defense lawyers about the massive scope of Farak’s misconduct. In 2017, the ACLU of Massachusetts and CPCS, together with Fick & Marx LLP, called for dismissal of every case tainted by Farak and subsequent years of prosecutorial misconduct. In April 2018, the Supreme Judicial Court ordered that thousands of convictions be dismissed. But, misconduct in how detainees are treated in jail does not go to the guilt or innocence of those defendants and therefore would not usually lead to mass dismissals. A prosecutor could decide on a non-legal basis that a defendant has suffered enough from mistreatment in jail and dismiss the charges, and sometimes this is done on an isolated basis. But, mistreatment of detainees would rarely if ever be a basis for a mass dismissal of charges and would be in the sole discretion of the prosecutor as an exercise of discretion not compelled or suggested by any legal requirement.
Is onetoughnerd.me protected by the 1st Amendment? I saw a website that appears to be making fun of Rick Snyder, and specifically his handling of the Flint Water Crisis and his Twitter handle. As the following log shows, it redirects to a URL shortener link with the word Flint Water, and takes the reader to an image of a glass getting filled with water. I don't know who did it, but it showed up on a blog post as a newly registered site. Is this a satire website that is protected under the 1st Amendment?	Of course it is protected by the first amendment. Everyone in the US is protected by the first amendment. It's possible that some statements published on the site might fall afoul of any of the well established exceptions to first amendment protection, but in general the site is protected.	There's an interesting philosophical debate you can have. By the plain text of the First Amendment, it protects libel. Aside: Yes, the First Amendment does apply to libel cases. A libel case, like all lawsuits, involves the government's judicial branch using its coercive power to make you pay money as a result of your speech, based on a law requiring you to pay money for certain kinds of speech. Tort law is not optional; a libel case isn't "you promised not to say bad things and then said bad things," it's the government saying "what you did is bad, now pay the person you hurt because of your speech." The idea that "you can say it, you just have to face the consequences" isn't enough and hasn't been for quite a while now. Traditionally, the main point of freedom of speech was that a court couldn't stop you from saying something, but could only seek to punish you after the fact (and for that you get a jury, a public hearing, etc.) But more recently, courts realized that subsequent punishment had similar effects to prior restraint. If you're going to be punished for some kind of speech, you're going to steer clear of saying anything a jury might think is that kind of speech. Libel law is heavily influenced by the First Amendment, and has been for over 40 years. The First Amendment looks like it protects libel, but it also looks like it should protect your right to reprint any book you want. It also looks like it should protect your right to tell someone "go and murder this person." It also looks like it should protect your right to say whatever you want in court, whether or not it's true. It also looks like it should protect your right to falsely shout "fire" in a crowded hall, with the intent to cause a stampede (this isn't just a turn of phrase, there was an actual incident in which 73 people were killed which is believed to have started when someone falsely shouted that there was a fire). It also looks like it should protect your right to post a sign saying "There is a bomb at this elementary school." Yet the Constitution explicitly sanctions copyright, and no one would seriously conclude that Congress may not protect the integrity of the judicial process by punishing perjury. Ordering a hit, making bomb threats, intentionally causing panics -- the fact that speech is a key part of these can't mean that the government isn't allowed to criminalize them. You cannot run a civilized society in which death threats are legal. So, the courts interpret. Language in the Constitution that appears absolute is understood to have implied exceptions. The people writing the document were well aware that perjury was generally a crime. The same Congress that proposed the First Amendment passed a law criminalizing perjury. Sure, you're punishing someone based on their speech, but it's clearly not meant to be protected. You can't run a court system without perjury laws, and its absence from the First Amendment doesn't mean that the First Amendment thereby upended this basic principle. The courts have identified a number of kinds of speech that, by longstanding practice, are not protected. Intellectual property violations are one. Obscenity is another. So are threats. So is "speech integral to criminal conduct" (e.g. "what'll it be, your money or your life?") And so is defamation. The text of the First Amendment may not exclude it, but courts have uniformly held that it's not something the amendment was ever meant to protect. The First Amendment does still pose constraints, which are some of the most defendant-friendly in the world (interestingly enough, US law is descended from English law, and English libel law used to be among the most plaintiff-friendly in the world). It's not libel if it's true. It's not libel if it's an opinion (unless it's a statement of fact dressed up as opinion). It's not libel unless you were at least negligent; if it was about a public figure, you have to have known it was false or seriously doubted its truth. But these restrictions leave a core of speech that is and always has been punishable.	Both Bob and Charles are liable for infringement in the US. The fact that Charles had no idea that Bob was an infringer is not a defense, but it mitigates the statutory damages consequences for him. Either party can negotiate with Alice after the fact for a license, and Alice can grant either party but not the other permission to copy. The terms of the license that Alice gives Bob could either allow CCo reposting, or some more restrictive redistribution right. If the license requires a notice prohibiting further redistribution and Bob omits that notification, Bob will have breached the terms of the license in omitting the notification, so we're back to square 1. If Alice fails to specify a no-redistribution notification condition on Bob's reposting, Alice may have granted an implied license to the world, a matter which has to be determined by the courts.	Firstly, because there isn't an explicit Constitutional "right to privacy", per se, and even if there was (and there are arguments that several constitutional provisions amount, in aggregate, to a right to privacy), that it wouldn't be absolute, in the same way that freedom of speech and of the press are not absolutes. Indeed, the closest thing to a right to privacy, the 4th Amendment, has explicit caveats: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (emphasis mine). Thus reasonable searches and seizures, especially those authorized by a warrant, are constitutional. Furthermore, even in light of a constitutional right of privacy derived from this statue, depending on how the "search history" is compiled, the 4th Amendment might not even apply, due to the Katz doctrine, also known as the "open fields" doctrine. Basically, the 4th amendment (as far as searches goes) does not apply to things that are publicly observable; while this would protect a literal "search history" compilation (baring a reasonable search), the searches themselves are public queries, broadcasted over the internet. Anyone watching could compile them into a "search history" themselves.	You can't own a database; you might, however, own (have) the copyright to a database if you created it or the creator transferred that right to you. You can also possess a copy of a database: the question is whether it is legal. "Leaked" implies that it is taken without permission, so you might be in violation of copyright law by possessing a copy. The only databases that would escape copyright protection would be those US government works, things put in the public domain, and things publically licensed to allow copying. Plus, any database whose content fails to exhibit a modicum of creativity (Feist). A database might be inherently illegal (at least in your hands), so it would depend on what the content is. The first thing that comes to mind is a database from a child-porn website, which contains numerous illegal images: see section 110 of Title 18. "Leaked" information might involve violation of 18 USC 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act), which prohibits unauthorized hacking. It does not directly prohibit being in possession of a hacked database: but you might still be prosecuted as an accessory after the fact. (That is one of those ad libitum areas of the law where there's no way to know for sure what is and is not "okay"). If they do prosecute you, you might rely on Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, where because it was a matter of "public interest", propagation of illegally obtained material was held to be protected by the First Amendment. Also there is the case of the Pentagon Papers. At the federal level, there are no controls over storing credit card information so if you get a copy of the Target or Home Depot hacked database, there's no federal law against that (if we discount "accessory after the fact"), but there are circumstances in Minnesota where retaining such information could be illegal.	Maybe, but probably not The geographic location of the organisation is immaterial: under Article 3.2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: ... (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. Posts anyone (not just EU citizens) make to Reddit (or anywhere else) while they are physically located in the EU or UK engage the GDPR. Pushift.io is therefore captured by the GDPR and any denial of that is just plain wrong. Given the denial, it is likely right out of the gate that they are non-complient. For example, they are unlikely to provided the required information under Article 14. More importantly, it seems that they have not determined the lawful basis for processing the data under Article 6 - they can possibly rely on the public interest basis (preserving deleted publication is arguably a public interest) or a legitimate interest but that requires a balancing of their interest against the data subject's. That said, the right to be forgotten is not absolute, the reasons that might be applicable here are: The data is being used to exercise the right of freedom of expression and information. The data is being used to perform a task that is being carried out in the public interest or when exercising an organization’s official authority. The data represents important information that serves the public interest, scientific research, historical research, or statistical purposes and where erasure of the data would likely to impair or halt progress towards the achievement that was the goal of the processing.	I don’t believe there is an aggravated violation due to his disability, but it is quite likely that a court will find that to be a violation of his rights. Florida’s stop and frisk law 901.151(2) would indicate the original stop and temporary detention was valid, but once the item in his back pocket had been identified, 901.151(3) requires that the detention be immediately terminated. After the identification, he was no longer being legally detained, it was thus either an illegal detention and a violation of his 4th amendment rights or a consensual encounter under Florida law, and if consensual no requirement to Id. But just because it was a violation of his rights doesn’t mean that he will automatically win a lawsuit if he brings one. Jones v. State, 584 So.2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) holds that you can’t be charged with resisting arrest without violence (aka 843.01), when the arrest itself is unlawful. I suppose Hodges could be charged with “obstructing” which is covered by the same statue, but more ambiguous than “arrest”.	Yes The case you want to know about is Cohen v. California: A young man was arrested for wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" and SCOTUS decided, that that was First Amendment-protected speech and the arrest illegal. The phrase מנא מנא תקל ופרסין is in Akkadian or Aramaic language but Hebrew script (as opposed to the Akkadian Cuneiform) and can be transcribed as Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin. It is also known in German as "Menetekel" or in English as the "Writing on the wall". It stems from the biblical episode of Belshazzar's feast. Literally, the text would be read as "counted, counted, weighed, distributed". Its meaning elaborated in Daniel 5 is generally understood as "Your days are numbered; Your days are numbered; You have been measured and found wanting; Your kingdom will fall and be divided". While stemming from religious texts, in the depicted situation it is more likely meant as political speech, and in that fashion indistinguishable from a flag. It also does not call for imminent lawless action - the so-called Brandenburg Test after Brandenburg v Ohio - and thus remains in the protected speech area. Remember, that even preaching genocide can be First amendment protected, as long as that line of imminent lawless action is not overstepped. As this phrase does neither, it is protected speech.
Dropservicing business in the US - is this legal for industries like law, accounting/bookkeeping and other regulated industries? I am looking to get into the business of dropservicing - finding a white label provider of certain services and then re-selling those services to retail customers. For myself, I'm sticking to traditional IT services and digital marketing. However, I was talking to a friend and he's not at all into technology (that's why I'm asking this question for him here, aside from my own curiosity). After I told him what I was doing, he was thinking of doing a similar business with bookkeeping and general legal services. We found some white label providers of these services (US-based), but he was concerned about legal issues since those are regulated industries. My question is: is this sort of arbitrage legal for those kinds of industries? Thank you.	Both law and accounting are subject to state regulation, so, at a minimum, work done remotely by non-licensed persons must be reviewed substantively and blessed by a local admitted professional before being shared with a client, and there are limits on what contacts with the client the back office can have. In a legal context, the back office is limited to what a paralegal can do, and that varies considerably from one U.S. state to another, especially with respect to real property matters. Mere "book keeping" as opposed to accounting is rarely a regulated profession under state law, but as in the case of legal services, the distinction between accounting that requires a license and activities that do not require a license varies from state to state (although less dramatically). The notion of selling "forms" is well recognized, but what crosses over the line from selling a "form" to selling legal or accounting advice varies and can be treacherous. I don't know off hand if this is true for accountants in most states, but in most U.S. states non-lawyers are prohibited from having an equity or profits based interest in a law firm, and referral fee compensation is also subject to significant professional ethics regulation. Non-competition clauses involving lawyers are also subject to heavy professional ethics regulations not common to non-legal professional activities. Without a more concrete example of what the dropservicing business model would entail, it is impossible to do a very definitive analysis. Your model seems to be based upon obtaining services from a third-party and re-selling those services. For the most part, that isn't a workable business model from a regulatory perspective in the U.S. Instead, you need licensed "white label" providers as the face of the business and you may potentially provide services behind them in the back office. There are some services along this line currently in existence with varied business models involving somewhat similar concepts: Legal forms companies like the recently succeeded Bradford Publishing. Hyatt Legal Services Plans Private legal services insurance such as Legal Shield. H&R Block and also tax services. The legal services provided by the JAG Corps to military service members. Nolo.com Union sponsored legal services plans such as Union Plus. Title insurance companies such as First American Title and related transaction execution companies. The legal defense provided incident to a liability insurance policy by companies such as Allstate. Governmental shared risk pools such as CIRSA. Donation driven non-profits such as the ACLU. The Ann Arbor Tenants Union. Temp agencies providing paralegals to companies such as this one. A few also make contract attorneys' available for a firm's one time big project. Tax software companies like TurboTax (a division of Inuit). Westlaw LexisNexis Wolters Kluwer (f.k.a. CCH).	Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice.	I've been wondering if it is possible to hire / create a company with someone who would open a restaurant in my place and manage it according to my guidelines. Yes, of course. You can do it just like you described: Create a company, hire employees, (let them) open the restaurant. You, as the owner of the company, could set up whatever guidelines you have in mind, and your employees would be bound by them (limited only by general laws, such as on health and safety). Some caveats, however: You will need money to set this up - for buying / renting space for the restaurant, for paying your employees, obtaining supplies, initial marketing etc. It may take a while until the restaurant earns money (if ever), and you'll need money in the mean time. Someone will need to manage, that is make decisions. You can do that yourself, but then you will work for the restaurant (which you write you do not want to do). Or you can hire someone to do it for you, but that will cost more (in salary), plus you will have to find someone you can trust. That's a tradeoff for you to make. I guess it'd be like an intellectual property. That depends, but usually there will be little in terms of intellectual property. If you have a unique idea for the restaurant, you could patent it, but there are many restrictions on what you can protect, and ways around it, plus this also costs money (a lot if you need a lawyer's advice). Apart from that, you can register a trademark for the restaurant, but that only protects the name / logo, not any ideas. Finally, some of your ideas might be considered trade secrets, but again the protection is limited. In general, there is no blanket "idea protection". If you have a good idea for a restaurant, in most cases other restaurants will be able to copy them, possibly with slight changes - take that into account.	The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X.	Is it legal? Yes. You can make just about any payment arrangements you like. You wouldn't be able to verify compliance, though, without some connection to the student's employer. The IRS won't tell you how much money a third party earned, or how much tax they paid, in a given year. Pretty sure they can't provide that info, which is why companies wanting to verify your income ask for copies of your tax returns rather than permission to get those returns.	Yes Businesses (and consumers) can choose who to do business with and what information they ask for and disclose and when they do that. If you’re uncomfortable with how they do business, don’t deal with them. If they don’t like how you do business, they are free not to deal with you. This is called discrimination. However, it is not unlawful because only discrimination against a person due to membership of a protected classes is unlawful. This person “won’t answer my questions” is not discrimination based on a protected class (unless they are a monk who has taken a vow of silence).	Licencing agreements The company producing these has successfully negotiated a licencing agreement with the IP holder to use the IP. These are extremely common. Subcontracting They have actually been commissioned by the IP holder to make these things for the IP holder e.g. for the IP holder to sell in their own outlets. As part of that agreement, they are also allowed to sell on their own behalf. Piracy They are breaking the law and hope they will be undetected, not worth prosecuting or operate out of pirate jurisdictions which will not enforce foreign judgements.	The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture.
How long do a man and a woman live together before they are considered common law married? How long do a man and a woman live together before they are considered common law married in Dallas, Texas?	The elements of common law marriage in Texas are substantially similar to those of all common law jurisdictions that recognize the concept. There is no specific time limit. You could be common law married in a day, or cohabit for a decade and having children together, and not be common law married. You must: Agree to be married. Reside in the state of Texas. Represent themselves to others as husband and wife in Texas. A common law marriage that comes into being in Texas will generally be recognized in every state, including those that do not recognize common law marriage. Texas does have one twist in the doctrine which is called "informal marriage" in Texas: You can also take steps to make your informal marriage “official” by filing a declaration and registration of informal marriage at your Texas county clerk’s office. If you have questions on how to make it “official” in Texas, reach out to a top family lawyer in Dallas or the county where you reside for advice. The relevant Texas statue (mostly enacted in 1997 and last amended in 2009, but b based upon prior Texas law) states: SUBCHAPTER E. MARRIAGE WITHOUT FORMALITIES Sec. 2.401. PROOF OF INFORMAL MARRIAGE. (a) In a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding, the marriage of a man and woman may be proved by evidence that: (1) a declaration of their marriage has been signed as provided by this subchapter; or (2) the man and woman agreed to be married and after the agreement they lived together in this state as husband and wife and there represented to others that they were married. (b) If a proceeding in which a marriage is to be proved as provided by Subsection (a)(2) is not commenced before the second anniversary of the date on which the parties separated and ceased living together, it is rebuttably presumed that the parties did not enter into an agreement to be married. (c) A person under 18 years of age may not: (1) be a party to an informal marriage; or (2) execute a declaration of informal marriage under Section 2.402. (d) A person may not be a party to an informal marriage or execute a declaration of an informal marriage if the person is presently married to a person who is not the other party to the informal marriage or declaration of an informal marriage, as applicable. Sec. 2.402. DECLARATION AND REGISTRATION OF INFORMAL MARRIAGE. (a) A declaration of informal marriage must be signed on a form prescribed by the bureau of vital statistics and provided by the county clerk. Each party to the declaration shall provide the information required in the form. (b) The declaration form must contain: (1) a heading entitled "Declaration and Registration of Informal Marriage, ___________ County, Texas"; (2) spaces for each party's full name, including the woman's maiden surname, address, date of birth, place of birth, including city, county, and state, and social security number, if any; (3) a space for indicating the type of document tendered by each party as proof of age and identity; (4) printed boxes for each party to check "true" or "false" in response to the following statement: "The other party is not related to me as: (A) an ancestor or descendant, by blood or adoption; (B) a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; (C) a parent's brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; (D) a son or daughter of a brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption; (E) a current or former stepchild or stepparent; or (F) a son or daughter of a parent's brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption."; (5) a printed declaration and oath reading: "I SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, ARE MARRIED TO EACH OTHER BY VIRTUE OF THE FOLLOWING FACTS: ON OR ABOUT (DATE) WE AGREED TO BE MARRIED, AND AFTER THAT DATE WE LIVED TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AND IN THIS STATE WE REPRESENTED TO OTHERS THAT WE WERE MARRIED. SINCE THE DATE OF MARRIAGE TO THE OTHER PARTY I HAVE NOT BEEN MARRIED TO ANY OTHER PERSON. THIS DECLARATION IS TRUE AND THE INFORMATION IN IT WHICH I HAVE GIVEN IS CORRECT."; (6) spaces immediately below the printed declaration and oath for the parties' signatures; and (7) a certificate of the county clerk that the parties made the declaration and oath and the place and date it was made. Sec. 2.403. PROOF OF IDENTITY AND AGE; OFFENSE. (a) The county clerk shall require proof of the identity and age of each party to the declaration of informal marriage to be established by a document listed in Section 2.005(b). (b) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly provides false, fraudulent, or otherwise inaccurate proof of the person's identity or age under this section. An offense under this subsection is a Class A misdemeanor. Sec. 2.404. RECORDING OF CERTIFICATE OR DECLARATION OF INFORMAL MARRIAGE. (a) The county clerk shall: (1) determine that all necessary information is recorded on the declaration of informal marriage form and that all necessary documents are submitted to the clerk; (2) administer the oath to each party to the declaration; (3) have each party sign the declaration in the clerk's presence; and (4) execute the clerk's certificate to the declaration. (a-1) On the proper execution of the declaration, the clerk may: (1) prepare a certificate of informal marriage; (2) enter on the certificate the names of the persons declaring their informal marriage and the date the certificate or declaration is issued; and (3) record the time at which the certificate or declaration is issued. (b) The county clerk may not certify the declaration or issue or record the certificate of informal marriage or declaration if: (1) either party fails to supply any information or provide any document required by this subchapter; (2) either party is under 18 years of age; or (3) either party checks "false" in response to the statement of relationship to the other party. (c) On execution of the declaration, the county clerk shall record the declaration or certificate of informal marriage, deliver the original of the declaration to the parties, deliver the original of the certificate of informal marriage to the parties, if a certificate was prepared, and send a copy of the declaration of informal marriage to the bureau of vital statistics. (d) An executed declaration or a certificate of informal marriage recorded as provided in this section is prima facie evidence of the marriage of the parties. (e) At the time the parties sign the declaration, the clerk shall distribute to each party printed materials about acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The clerk shall note on the declaration that the distribution was made. The materials shall be prepared and provided to the clerk by the Texas Department of Health and shall be designed to inform the parties about: (1) the incidence and mode of transmission of AIDS and HIV; (2) the local availability of medical procedures, including voluntary testing, designed to show or help show whether a person has AIDS or HIV infection, antibodies to HIV, or infection with any other probable causative agent of AIDS; and (3) available and appropriate counseling services regarding AIDS and HIV infection. Sec. 2.405. VIOLATION BY COUNTY CLERK; PENALTY. A county clerk or deputy county clerk who violates this subchapter commits an offense. An offense under this section is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than $200 and not more than $500.	The law does not criminalize "having more than 1 legal spouse", it criminalizes specific behavior. The polygamy statute is here. It says Every one who (a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter into (i) any form of polygamy, or (ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage, or (b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony, contract or consent that purports to sanction a relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. That is, if you behave like you're married to multiple women, you've committed a crime.	"Law" is actually a very broad term, which encompasses statutes, rules, regulations, precedent and I'm sure some other things that I'm forgetting. The popular understanding of "law" is the statute, which involves Congress (at the federal level) or the legislature (and the state level). That is the kind of law that we say is "passed". At the federal level, some number of representatives or senators will introduce a bill into the House or Senate, and it is discussed in a relevant committee; if it is approved, it moves to debate by the whole House / Senate and if it passes it moves to the other house. Once it has passed both the House and Senate, it goes to the President where it may be signed, rejected, or ignored. If signed, it becomes "a law", if rejected (vetoed) it can become law anyhow if it gains a 2/3 majority vote in both houses. If the President ignores it ("pocket veto"), it becomes law in 10 days (Sunday is not a day), unless Congress is not in session. Oh, and, that's just the tip of the iceberg. At the state level, there is a similar process, with the further option of referenda and initiatives. In the former case, a particular law will have been passed by the legislature and then it is put to a popular vote for affirmation / overturning, and in the latter case a new law is proposed by the people (generally through a petitioning process) and then voted on by the populace. There is a fair amount of variation on how this works and what can be done, by state. A law can be repealed (withdrawn) by passing a law that repeals a given part of the existing law, and it can be re-written. The Supreme Court of the jurisdiction can also withdraw a (part of a) law if it is found to be unconstitutional. No foreign body can override US law, although if the US is bound by treaty (which necessarily involves another country) then we might have to do whatever that treaty says, because we approved the treaty. One limit on what we can be forced into by treaties is that a treaty cannot violate the constitution. The largest source of law in the US is actually not statutory, it is regulatory law, where a regulatory agency writes rules with the force of law (so really, it is law). In that case, there has to be a statutory basis, where at the federal level a law is passed empowering an agency to write rules, where the scope of the regulation is supposed to be related to the empowering statute in some manner. In that case, there is a vetting process, but basically no voting, just an announcement, some discussion, and eventually the rules are set. Analogous processes exist at the state level. We also have various county and city governmental bodies, where e.g. the city council can vote to create a law; or, they can empower an agency to write regulations. Yet another source of law is the Executive Order, where the president can decree that such and such will be the case (as long as it has something to do with what the executive branch does). These are somewhat limited in scope, but every president seems to like to test what that limit is. Governors get to do it too! And lastly, courts have an indirect power to make law, by ruling on how an existing law is to be interpreted (as well as ruling that a law or part of a law is unconstitutional).	In my experience, varying jurisdictions can and do differ as to the myriad ways these disputes are resolved. Contract law is one area where the judge has a lot of discretion. This is definitely true in state courts, even from judge to judge, and can even be true in the federal level-The 9th Circuit has some wildly different appellate decisions when compared to the 1st Circuit, and so on. I say this not to be argumentative, but to highlight the importance of careful and concise drafting that fully explicates the bargained for exchange, as there can be a vast amount of judicial subjectivity that goes into determining which rules pertain to certain situations. "Conflicting or competing clause" cases are now some of the most commonly litigated contract disputes. This is largely because the last 20 years has seen a huge influx of people "drafting" (more like piecing together) contracts without benefit of qualified counsel. This is particularly true because lay people do not generally create a specific insturment like an attorney would - from scratch, with definitions and terms specific to the transaction. Rather, they go online and find "form" or model contracts that they feel are close enough (which are almost always missing key components), and then they type in their own terms, or even write them in. Because this is so common, most jurisdictions follow the rule that hand written terms supersede pre-printed terms; likewise, type written terms will take precedence over pre-printed terms. Specific terms also carry more weight than general terms. Specific terms will usually be given precedence over general terms, as these are seen as creating a specific exception to the general terms. For example, if Clause A in your scenario said: Written notice must be provided at least five days in advance of (any) change... (leaving out "to price"), then clause B would prevail because it would be more specific than the more general term (A), which in my scene would pertain to any change whatsoever (this is assuming the whole of the agreement did not shed light on the issues more fully). In your hypothetical, these are both specific terms. In that case, the court would first examine the entire contract and all addendum, specs, plans, etc. when interpreting competing or conflicting clauses applying the fundamental principal that a contract should always be interpreted as a whole - not clause-by-clause - and not section-by-section. Contracts will often have numerous parts with portions incorporated specifically by reference, or numerous documents that may be integral to the transaction, If the parties agree to what constitutes the various parts of the contract (even if not incorporated) the entirety of the transactional documents may be considered by the trier of fact (and law). Once examined, if a proposed interpretation makes other portions of the global agreement meaningless, illogical or unenforceable, and another party's interpretation is in keeping with the document as a whole, that is the interpretation that will typically be adopted. Assuming this analysis doesn't work to resolve the issue, then the court would look to see if there is an order-of-precedence clause, which is a clause that lays out what parts of the contract / types of clauses take precedence over others (ex. written requirements take precendee over performance requirements, addendum hold less import than the signed agreement, schematics hold less import than addendum, and so on). Assuming this there is no order of precedence, the court will look first to see if the contract was negotiated back and forth, with terms being modified with each draft. If Yes, then the court will except extrinsic evidence (parole evidence) that goes to the intent of the parties bargained for exchange. If not, the contract term(s) will be construed against the drafter and in favor of the one who signed the others' instrument. So, as you can see, there is no clear answer to what seems to be a simple issue. This just goes to show: Lawyers seem expensive when you decide to hire them - Lawyers are expensive when you have to hire them, because you decided not to in the first place!	You don't need to "report" it to anyone in the US or do anything else. The US doesn't have any national registry of marriage. Any marriage or divorce conducted anywhere in the world is automatically recognized anywhere in the US (with some exceptions like polygamous marriages); the same is true in many other countries. How does the U.S. find out, for tax or insurance purposes? Obviously there's a little box that says [] Married but how would they know if I lied if I'm not registered in the United States? They don't, and don't need to. (The same is true for marriages in the US -- they don't directly "know".) You are required to use an appropriate filing status for your marriage status at the end of the year for each year's tax returns. If you don't, you are committing fraud. There are lots of things that you can intentionally lie about on tax returns, and they may not immediately "find out"; but when they do, you are in big trouble. Am I legally required to report it when I return? No. Would the Canadian/provincial government inform the U.S./state government? No.	What you have heard is not exactly correct (and also depends, in part, on the Chapter under which the bankruptcy is filed). I will address the simplest case, a Chapter 7 liquidation of an individual, which is simpler, because a Chapter 7 liquidation is determined as of a point of time, while Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 reorganizations are conceptually more complex and don't just transfer rights to a trustee at a single point in time. When you file a Chapter 7, all of your property, including you rights to sue people that had accrued as of that date, are transferred to the bankruptcy trustee as an asset of the bankruptcy estate, and the right of anyone to sue you is stayed automatically until the bankruptcy court either authorizes the lawsuit, or discharges the debt associated with the lawsuit (there are actually a few cases where the automatic stay expires on its own after a certain amount of time). Rights to bring lawsuits that arise after the bankruptcy is filed, or can be brought at any time, like a divorce/custody suit, are not barred, although property and enforcement of economic rights in those cases may be stayed until the bankruptcy court takes action. Custody issues other than child support, and termination of marital status are not affected. For example, if you file for bankruptcy on Monday and are hit by a bus on Friday, your personal injury suit claim is probably yours and not the bankruptcy estate's and can be brought by you. But, if you are hit by a bus on Monday and then file for bankruptcy on Friday, your personal injury suit claim is probably property of the bankruptcy estate. (It is a bit more complicated than this, because your right to sue for a personal injury might be exempt property, at least in part, but this example conveys the gist of the concept.) There is a further complication in the analysis which is that domestic relations actions and probate court actions are normally considered to be outside of the jurisdiction of the federal courts (bankruptcy court is a federal court), even when there is diversity of citizenship, which doesn't change the basic conclusions above.	In California, all parties to a conversation (people being recorded) have to agree to a recording. There are no special rules pertaining to husbands and wives. It is sufficient that the parties are aware that the recording is being made and they continue to talk, knowing that fact. There are exceptions, under Cal. Penal 633.5, in that surreptitious recordings are allowed in order to gather evidence of "extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving violence against the person, or a violation of Section 653m". To be used as evidence, there are also "predicate rules" to the effect that you have to prove who the voices are from, that the recording hasn't been altered, and that the recording is reliable (e.g., there isn't a mysterious 18 minute gap).	None. Who you live with & how you live with them are (generally) your business. All laws against polygamy do is impose sanctions if you legally register more than one marriage; legally the first registered is a marriage, all the others are a nullity. This may influence the legal resolution of criminal and civil disputes about the cohabitants as the law treats married people differently from unmarried. If you want to have a relationship between 3+ consenting adults you can call it whatever you like. All the law does is restrict legal marriage to non-overlapping pairs. Polygamy is illegal, polyamory isn’t.
Is the user agent string considered personal data? I have a website. I would like to store the user agent string, current time and opened url (not the IP address or something else) in a database for each page visit to be able to build some statistical measurements. The user agent string looks like: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Ubuntu Chromium/83.0.4103.61 Chrome/83.0.4103.61 Safari/537.36 Is this considered storing personal data? Do I need user's consent? Thank you!	Is X considered personal data? Can you use X to directly or indirectly identify a natural person? In the data to which you have access can X be related to an identifiable natural person? If you answer yes to either of those questions then X is personal data. Article 4(1): ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; Scenario 1: you want to count each user agent that comes to your site, that's the only data you have, then the user agent is not personal data (it cannot be used to identify someone - unless it has a name and address etc, which seems highly unlikely - and you cannot relate it to anyone). Scenario 2: you have customer records with names, addresses etc (clearly personal data) and want to record each customer's user agent then the user agent is personal data (it relates to the identifiable natural person). Scenario 3: in one dataset you record that a user agent was associated with order ID 123456 and in another dataset you record that order ID 123456 was for John Smith (plus address etc), then the user agent is personal data (it relates to the identifiable natural person). Is this considered storing personal data? If X is personal data. Do I need user's consent to record X? If you want to record X and X is personal data, then you must have an Article 6 lawful basis for recording X. Consent is one of the six lawful bases. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks.	The cookie consent requirement comes from the ePrivacy Directive, not from the GDPR. While the GDPR defines consent, cookie consent is required regardless of whether the cookie actually contains personal data. Instead, it says we can access information stored on an end users device under the following circumstances. Technical access to the information is used for the sole purpose of performing a transmission over a network, e.g. using a browser cache. Accessing the information is strictly necessary for providing a service explicitly requested by the user, e.g. session cookies or a consent-declined cookie. The user has given consent to the access, where consent is defined by the GDPR (freely given, informed, specific, …). The first scenario likely doesn't apply because your cookies aren't likely to be “technical storage or access” in the sense of ePrivacy, and because the tracking cookies wouldn't be used for the sole purpose of carrying out a transmission. The second scenario doesn't apply because tracking cookies are not strictly necessary to interact with the webshop, as evidenced by the possibility to opt out. The service explicitly requested by the user is the webshop or website, not the A/B testing. This only leaves consent as possible grounds for storing or accessing information on the user's device. It is already the storing or access that is covered by ePrivacy, not only later use as a persistent identifier. Your suggestion – to first set the cookie and then delete it if it shouldn't have been set – is more compliant than many set-ups I've seen, but is still technically non-compliant. It is also likely to fail in practice under non-ideal network conditions: if the request to see whether GDPR applies times out, or if the user closes the browser tab before the cookie will be deleted, the tracking cookie will remain without consent. I would instead suggest to consider the following points. It seems that by itself, Optimizely Web cannot be used in a compliant manner since it doesn't provide sufficient control over how cookies are managed. Thus, you should avoid loading such tracking scripts unless consent has been given, or unless this processing falls outside of EU/UK law. Currently, you defer loading of tracking scripts until you know if you have to ask for consent. This can be avoided if you always ask for consent :) This can also be avoided if you load the tracking scripts from a server that can independently determine whether the requests comes from the EU. For non-EU requests and for users with opt-in, the server can return the original tracking scripts. Otherwise, the server returns a dummy script. This server can be independent from your website's hosting. By combining the jurisdiction decision with the loading of the script, one roundtrip is saved and latency is reduced. Finally, no one is forcing you to use Shopify, and ePrivacy/GDPR is not required to accommodate their limitations. You do have different choices: use Shopify, at the cost of slow pages and limited A/B tests use a different A/B test provider that can be used without setting cookies use edge computing to do stuff in between of the browser and the original server use a different webshop platform ignore EU laws Well, one of them is clearly unethical. But you do have choices, and which choice you take is a business decision. Slow pageloads and consent banners are likely costing you conversions, but Shopify might be providing massive value that outweighs all that.	Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive.	By itself, a chess position is not personal data. Personal data is “any information relating to an … identifiable natural person”. Since the file in question includes the name of the opponent, it is clearly personal data about the opponent. If the files are used for “purely personal or household purposes”, the GDPR won't apply per Art 2(2)(c). If the files are shared more widely – especially if the files are published – then GDPR becomes relevant. The person/entity who is data controller has to consider GDPR compliance. Data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data (the “why” and “how”). The first question would be under which legal basis this personal data about another person can be shared. The GDPR offers multiple legal basis, notably “legitimate interests” and “consent”. Consent is always an option, but must be freely given (entirely voluntary). Legitimate interests can serve as a legal basis after a balancing test between your interests and the data subject's rights and interests. This balancing test also depends on the reasonable expectations of the data subject, which in turn depends on the more general context. For example, in a chess community where such sharing is completely normal there would likely be a legitimate interest for you to share games as well, if the games occurred in the context of this community. But if you play a game with a friend who is not part of this community, the friend cannot reasonably expect that their name and associated personal data would be shared. The second question would be how you would satisfy further GDPR compliance obligation, in particular the Art 13/Art 14 right to information. When collecting personal data, it is necessary to provide certain information such as your identity, what processing is being carried out, and how the data subject can invoke their GDPR rights (a privacy notice or privacy policy). This might be difficult or awkward to do. Practical solutions to these problems: If you want to share a game but aren't sure that the opponent is OK with this, remove identifying aspects such as names. For example, you could crop a screenshot, or describe the game in textual notation without listing the opponent's name. Play the game via a chess website that publishes the game. This way, the website is the data controller, and you and the opponent are the data subjects. This avoids having to act as the data controller yourself. This might work for private interactions, but not e.g. if you run a chess club and require members to play via that website – you might still be in a data controller role then and have full compliance obligations.	You can put anything you like in a ToS document, but not everything you might put there will be enforceable. By posting something on the web, you are inviting anyone to read it. In some jurisdictions that may include the right to make and store a personal copy, although not multiple copies or a copy for commercial use. You can taker technical measures to prevent automated access and automated downloads (scraping). There was a case (hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp, 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019)) in which access restrictions were held binding in a US court, but in that case the site owner had notified the would-be reuser (a competitor) directly. The laws on this sort of thing may differ from country to country, and are not as well-settled as older parts of the law tend to be. The question asks: can I list in my terms of service that all users acknowledge I own their posts ... The only way in which the host could "own" the posts would be if the users transferred copyright to the host, or granted the host an exclusive license. Under US law this would take a written and signed document. Clicking an "I agree" box or button might constitute a valid signature. A statement that "by using this site you agree ..." would pretty clearly not. You might prohibit bots copying from your site and posting duplicates, but to prohibit users re-posting their own messages elsewhere is harder, legally, and leas reasonable in my view. Under US law you could not actually file suit for copyright infringement until you had registered the copyright, but that is not true in many other countries.	I spent a few years working in and around the Energy industry - including a stint working at a supplier, I'm no longer there so unfortunately I no longer have access to the email chains I had discussing this with legal. The consensus at the time was that a "traditional" i.e. non-half-hourly (NHH), non-smart meter reading itself was not considered personal data - they are conceptually tied to a metering point (which may or may not be a physical meter), not to an individual and don't represent an individual's energy consumption (the granularity of the reading is insufficient to tell anything about the usage profile) But this information, while all around the implementation of GDPR it was a couple of years back and to be honest it was bugging me that I might be out-of-date on the current practices so I reached out to a former colleague who was the Data Protection Officer at the supplier I worked at to try and get a more up-to-date take. He's since moved on but was there until recently so has more experience with the topic since GDPR actually went into effect. I asked him whether a) estimated opening reads were considered "personal data" and b) what would happen with a request to change one under article 16 and he had this to say, I've translated industry-speak in square brackets: a) for NHH ["Non Half Hourly" - meters that are read ad-hoc, essentially all non-smart domestic meters will be this] an estimated reading wasn't personal data automatically until the billing flag was set in CRM and those would be the only ones we'd include on an SAR [Subject Access Request], any others are internal data not personal. HH ["Half Hourly" - meters for higher consumption users, typically larger business premises are billed on increments for each half hour so have readings for each] and remote [smart meter] readings are always personal for domestic and microb [micro-businesses are a certain class of non-domestic energy customer see condition 7A] b) erm no! we'd only change it if the value in CRM didn't match the value in the D10 [industry Data Flow used to transmit meter reads] for some reason. if they match it's an accurate representation of what we estimate the reading to be so it's just a vanilla billing dispute not a data protection issue so i'd have punted it to [name of person who was head of metering] From that it would sound as though the estimated read would count as personal data - so long as it's being used for billing purposes, but that doesn't mean they have to accept your read in it's stead. It all comes down to accuracy - GDPR requires that personal data be "accurate" but provides no definition as to what "accurate" means (which makes sense since you can't give a one-size-fits-all answer that isn't an encyclopedia) and while The Electricity Directive 2019 confirms the need for accuracy in billing again it doesn't tell us what that means. The implementation is left to member state regulators. In the UK this is OFGEM and all opening meter readings are validated through third parties (so you don't end up with the foxes guarding the hen house!) and are calculated using the following formula: Last validated reading for the meter point <= supplied reading <= (expected daily usage x number of days since last validated reading x 2.5) where "expected daily usage" is obtained from a database maintained by the regulator - it's calculated off meter type, property type, property use, previous validated reads etc. So if the customer provides a reading that falls outside the above the supplier can (and in practice invariably will) reject it as being inaccurate. Now this is why the when a meter reading is provided matters - reads you provide are always assumed to be the read on the day you give them. With opening reads there's some leeway, I can't remember the official rule on how much but usually they give you up to the next estimated read is generated but more on that later. Now if the reading you're trying to submit is a "now" reading and it's failed the validation criteria and you aren't happy with the rejection you can force the issue by demanding the supplier come read the meter. You don't say how long has passed since the opening read - more than the week from what you've said so presumably at least a month (guessing you've had at least your first bill). Now if they are saying the opening read was X (based on the estimated usage) and you're it should have been X + Y and the current reading is X + Y + Z you want to pay your actual usage Z not Y + Z. What you need to do is dispute the opening read, which you're entitled to do, arguably GDPR of Article 16 gives you this right, but on it's own it's a weak argument. There's established means by which an estimated read's "accuracy" is determined and assuming they followed that they're going to just tell you that as far as they are concerned it is accurate. Any challenge to that accuracy is going to have to be done within the legal/regulatory frameworks for assessing accuracy, that's what they're there for, if they won't accept your reading escalate that to the regulator - and as soon as you can. OFGEM for example allow disputing of opening reads for 12 months - it doesn't have to be resolved within that 12 months it just has to be lodged with them within that time. If you try and use the GDPR angle to pursue this IMHO it's going to muddy the waters and not help you get what you need - pursue this on billing accuracy.	The GDPR does not prescribe how exactly consent must be managed, as long as consent was obtained in line with the GDPR's principles. Similarly, the EDPB does not provide concrete recommendations in its guidelines on consent, mainly noting that Controllers are free to develop methods to comply with this provision in a way that is fitting in their daily operations. I would not be too concerned with edge cases like failing HTTP requests, at least not any more than for other HTTP endpoints. If the user indicated consent, and you act on that indication of consent in good faith, that's probably fine. However, remember that you must provide a equally easy way for the user to revoke consent later. If the user changes their mind, they can use the mechanism that you offer to inspect their consent status, and revoke it if they want. But again, how to do that is largely up to you.	It depends. Can the data controller or another person, with "means reasonably likely to be used," (see clause 26 of the preamble of the GDPR) use that data alone or in combination with other data to identify a natural person? If yes, it is personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. If no, it is not personal data within the meaning of the GDPR. Anonymous data is not subject to the GDPR. "The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes." Assigning an unique alphanumeric code to a thing does not necessarily make the code and/or the thing "personal data". But if you have a set of data that is or can be linked by the unique alphanumeric code (e.g. as a primary key in a set of tables) and you can use it to identify a person, then it is personal data. Either way, to be GDPR-compliant / to mitigate risk you should make some kind of record to reflect that process of thinking and what you decided. And if the answer is Yes, it is personal data, then you should record your "lawful basis" for processing the data and how you decided that.
Blackmail inside Germany I have a question about a common problem ... I have a female friend who lives in Saudi Arabia and her ex-boyfriend who lives in Germany blackmailed her with her own private pictures, that if she does not send him money , he is going to post her pictures all over the Internet .... She got to know him with PUBG and started to talk at Instagram with him so he blackmail her from a fake account 20 days ago I live in Germany too and I wonder what she can do so that she saves her from him and what can I do as someone who lives in Germany too. Please help she is dying right now. and thank you so much	There is actually a rather recent law in Germany which would make nonconsensual distribution of images which could damage the reputation of a person illegal: §201a StGB [de\|en] "Violation of intimate privacy by taking photographs or other images". This law says that: whoever, without being authorised to do so, makes available to a third party a photograph or other image of another person which is of such a nature as to significantly damage the reputation of the person depicted incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine. But even if the person has not already done so, just threatening to commit this crime might also be a crime according to §253 StGB [de\|en] "Extortion": (1) Whoever unlawfully, by force or threat of serious harm, coerces a person to do, acquiesce to or refrain from an act, and thereby damages that person’s or another’s assets for the purpose of wrongful personal enrichment or enrichment of a third party, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) The act is unlawful if the use of force or the threat of harm is deemed reprehensible in respect of the desired objective. (3) The attempt is punishable. (4) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. An especially serious case typically occurs where the offender acts on a commercial basis or as a member of a gang whose purpose is the continued commission of extortion. Considering the repercussions in the Saudi-Arabian culture and legal system for promiscuity, especially for women, it is hard to deny that there is a threat of "serious harm" in this case. So it might be a good idea to file a police report with the police of the federal state where the perpetrator lives. The police of most federal states allow to do that through their respective websites (look for the keywords "Internetwache" or "Strafanzeige"), so there is no need to travel to Germany to do so. This does of course require that there is enough information available to obtain the real identity of the perpetrator, which can be difficult with people you only know through online services.	Of course she is living with you. Clothes, toothbrush, cooking and eating, sleeping, I suppose breakfast as well, that's living with you. And it's not illegal, but it is apparently in breach of your leasing contract. I'd study your contract carefully to see what the consequences are if she is living for you for more than 14 days.	There is a relevant rule, the "posting rule", according to which an acceptance is effective once posted (this is a quirk of acceptances). This would be as soon after 7 May 2016 as Bobby sent his letter, presumably well before the deadline. So yes, a professional lawyer would be needed. If Bobby is in Australia, it might be more complicated; if Bobby is in Norway, it's simpler because they don't have the posting rule.	It is illegal in Morocco to possess or distribute pornographic material of any kind. This includes nudes of the hypothetical Vietnamese girl.	You can report your suspicions to any German police station or any prosecution service (Staatsanwaltschaft). Furthermore, in this case to any tax authority (Finanzamt). Your report may be made anonymous. You will not get a reward.	The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission.	"If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining.	This is wire fraud and punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. It is not relevant that the victims of this fraud are people who support a cause that the US government opposes. Nor is it relevant what your friend chooses to do with the ill-gotten money. It is still just as illegal. Whether your friend would be prosecuted would be at the discretion of federal prosecutors, and political motivations could come into play. That is beyond the scope of Law.SE to address. What is certain is that he could be prosecuted. Giving information to the FBI probably won't help, as from your description, the victims of this fraud aren't doing anything illegal. "Donating money to support Russia", while vague, does not sound like it violates any of the current sanctions.
Is it legal for a company to offer free coding courses to women only? A company is offering free coding courses to women and non-binary individuals only. Is this kind of sex-based discrimination legal?	Yes, it's legal. It would be lawful discrimination on objectively and reasonably justified grounds Here's why: On the face of it, this is a case of direct discrimination contrary to Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010: (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. however, the company may argue that they are taking positive action in line with Section 158 of the Act (emphasis mine): (1) This section applies if a person (P) reasonably thinks that— (a) persons who share a protected characteristic suffer a disadvantage connected to the characteristic, (b) persons who share a protected characteristic have needs that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it, or (c) participation in an activity by persons who share a protected characteristic is disproportionately low. (2) This Act does not prohibit P from taking any action which is a proportionate means of achieving the aim of— (a) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to overcome or minimise that disadvantage, (b) meeting those needs, or (c) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to participate in that activity. It is likely that they will be able to justify direct discrimination on the grounds of positive action. The Government's Explanatory Notes on the section express the intent of the legislation as such (emphasis mine): This clause provides that the Bill does not prohibit the use of positive action measures to alleviate disadvantage experienced by people who share a protected characteristic, reduce their under-representation in relation to particular activities, and meet their particular needs. It will, for example, allow measures to be targeted to particular groups, including training to enable them to gain employment, or health services to address their needs. Any such measures must be a proportionate way of achieving the relevant aim. A clear example is provided: Having identified that its white male pupils are underperforming at maths, a school could run supplementary maths classes exclusively for them. Furthermore, there is case law to establish that such positive action is entirely lawful: R (Adath Yisroel Burial Society and another) v Inner North London Senior Coroner [2018] EWHC 969 (Admin) (emphasis mine): Before leaving this topic we would stress that section 158 does not concern what is sometimes called “positive discrimination”; it is more limited and concerns only what the legislation calls “positive action”. In general “positive discrimination” is unlawful under the Equality Act. Therefore, as a matter of domestic law, prioritisation of some deaths for religious reasons would not be unlawful; to the contrary, it would be consistent with section 158. That position is mirrored in Convention jurisprudence. The point can be well illustrated by the decision in Jakóbski v Poland (2012) 55 EHRR 8. In that case the applicant was serving a prison sentence in Poland. He adhered strictly to the Mahayana Buddhist dietary rules and requested a vegetarian diet for that reason. This was not provided for him. The prison authorities stated that they were not obliged to prepare special meals for prisoners on the basis of religious belief as a matter of Polish law and that to do so would put excessive strain on them. The application before the court succeeded under Article 9. For that reason the Court did not consider it necessary to address separately the right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Convention rights in Article 14 (to which we return below). However, in our view, the case of Jakóbski is a good illustration of the principle of equality at work in cases of this kind. What on its face looks like a general policy which applies to everyone equally may in fact have an unequal impact on a minority. In other words, to treat everyone in the same way is not necessarily to treat them equally. Uniformity is not the same thing as equality. While this judgement concerns itself with positive action on religious grounds, it has broad application to positive action on grounds of sex too, and would be consistent with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights—namely that if the discrimination can be objectively and reasonably justified, it is lawful.	Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise.	Yes The relevant legal concepts are copyright, contract law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. You are liable to be sued by the people affected for damages and/or be prosecuted by the government for the felony under either or both laws. Let's start here: "I bought a game". No, you didn't; you bought a licence to use the software in accordance with the terms of service (licence) that you freely agreed to. All modern ToS will not allow you to reverse engineer the software. If you breach those terms of service then you have broken a contract - that is what allows them to sue you. They will no doubt argue that the prevalence of cheat routines developed by people like you reduce the number of people willing to play the game - say 100,000 users x $10/month * 12 months = $12,000,000. They will also ask the court to impose punitive damages to discourage this sort of thing. Which brings us to the copyright violation. You are allowed to copy their software provided you comply with the ToS. But you didn't. Therefore you are in breach of the Copyright Act and subject to additional civil and criminal sanctions. Finally, your "cheats" access their servers in a way that the ToS doesn't authorize. This puts you in breach of the CFFA - breaking this carries serious jail time penalties. Not to mention that in the US, a criminal conviction will preclude you from many jobs, including, naturally, any with access to company computer systems. Putting aside the illegalities, cheats are unethical and ruin the game experience for hundreds of thousands of people who don't use cheats. You are a criminal - stop being one!	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".	It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations.	Yes, it is illegal in North Carolina, which defines your sex as what's on your birth certificate. At any point in your transition, even when it's long complete, you'll still have to use the restroom for the gender on your birth certificate (hypothetically assuming the law is still in place). See e.g. this CNN coverage and this followup. Will you actually be arrested? Probably only if there's a complaint. The police haven't yet figured out how they're supposed to enforce this law.	You are correct that the federal law does not prohibit sex discrimination in "public accommodations", the category that includes your examples. State laws tend to be more restrictive, see for example Washington's RCW 49.60.215 which declares that It shall be an unfair practice for any person ... to commit an act which ... results in any distinction ... except for conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to all persons, regardless of race, creed... sexual orientation, sex... PROVIDED, That behavior or actions constituting a risk to property or other persons can be grounds for refusal and shall not constitute an unfair practice. The definitions allow for a few exceptions as to what kind of place is so restricted, most notably a facility "which is by its nature distinctly private", nor "any educational facility, columbarium, crematory, mausoleum, or cemetery operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution". Here is a paper that summarizes the situation with women'-only clubs. For example, New Jersey law has the exception that nothing herein contained shall be construed to bar any place of public accommodation which is in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex, and which shall include but not be limited to any summer camp, day camp or resort camp, bathhouse, dressing room, swimming pool, gymnasium, comfort station, dispensary, clinic or hospital, or school or educational institution which is restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex... So it depends on the state, but most states prohibit any sex discrimination in public accommodations.	This is not "unfair competition". You are allowed to ask people for their views and take them into account in designing software, even with the specific intent that it compete successfully with existing software. In the US you have a protected right to do that under the First Amendment. If the chat site where you asked is run by the developer or owners of the app, they can ask you to avoid such question there, and even ban you from the site if they choose, because it is their site. But if you went onto a public site (like Stack Exchange, say, or Quora) the app owners would have no right to insist that you not ask for such opinions. The degree to which the design or interface of an app or other software may be protected against imitation is a complex one, and depends on the country involved. But widely known and used features such as a 'like' button, message threading, or a comment section are almost surely not protectable. Listening to users of existing simile products and getting their ideas on what works well and what is lacking is generally a good idea, and is in no way "unfair".
Can a lawyer take a ridiculous case? The situation: A wants to sue B for some money. The reason why B should pay the money is totally ridiculous. Any judge seeing it would just laugh and send A home. But A goes to a lawyer, who tells A that taking this to court has zero chance winning, and A will only be throwing their money away. But A insists on taking the case to court. Can the lawyer get into any trouble for taking the case and bringing it to court? (Mostly interested in the UK and USA). PS. What caused me to ask was a story on another website: A company hires a public speaker. The contract says that if the company cancels with less than two days notice, they have to pay (quite reasonable). The public speaker cancels with less than two days notice and somehow imagines that he is owed money. No other motive, he wants his money and thinks he deserves it.	In the US, there are many possible sanctions A frivolous case, or pattern of cases, can result in a number of punishments: Paying the other side's legal fees -- Mind you, in the U.S, it is normal for each party to pay their own fees, and that will happen in "honest disagreement" type cases in which both parties have a valid perspective. "Loser pays" only happens when a) the loser has filed a ridiculous lawsuit, or greatly burdened the other side with frivolous filings; and b) the winner asks for fees. Transferring other costs to the plaintiff as the court sees fit. Again, winner must ask. Barring a plaintiff from filing future cases, without advance permission from the court. Again, winner must ask! Barring attorneys or firms from practicing in certain areas of law. Disbarment of the attorneys. That is decided by the state's Bar Association, typically a nonprofit trade association who in effect regulates lawyers in this manner. For instance, California is one of only four states allowing cash awards for ADA violations. A clever person named Mr. Molski went around to different restaurants and checked their bathrooms for ADA compliance. If a toilet paper roll was 1/2" out of position from where ADA required, Molski would take notes. Molski checked dozens of restaurants every day, and passed these notes onto a San Francisco law office. The law office filed hundreds if not thousands of these lawsuits against the various restaurants. The lawsuits all claimed that Molski was injured as a result of the ADA noncompliance. Mind you, this was in the age before easy merging of databases and MS-Word documents. Since these hundreds of cases were so similar, they simply made Xerox copies of the relevant paperwork, only leaving a few fields blank to be typed in by hand. To reduce secretarial workload, they didn't bother customizing the date of injury: so all cases claimed Molski was injured on the same day. Hundreds of defendants simply settled for amounts in the $5000 range (about half the cost of hiring a lawyer to grind through a trial). However, one defendant, a Chinese restaurant, fought. Their counsel discovered the hundreds of other same cases, and pointed out to the court that Molski was claiming to have suffered the same injury at dozens of restaurants on the same day. What an unlucky fellow! The defendant then claimed Molski and attorneys were Vexatious Litigants, and the court wholeheartedly agreed. Molski was barred for life from filing any lawsuit without advance court approval (in which Molski would need to show a body of evidence to the court that yeah, a real and valid case was there). The law firm was barred for life from filing any ADA related cases. The law firm folded up, and is no more. The lawyers involved in the case quit practicing law. Then we have Righthaven, who purchased from newspapers the "right to sue and collect damages" for copyright violations. Many bulletin boards, chatrooms, forums and Q&A sites allow/rely on "User Generated Content" (UGC), such as this here answer. They used search engines to find forums where users had copy-pasted newspaper articles. Generally, forums are protected from user behavior by the DMCA. Then, like Molski, they sued the forums, offering a settlement number below the cost of litigation itself. Again, hundreds paid; but a few fought on principle, with support from EFF. Again, Righthaven got destroyed in court - the right to sue cannot be sold. Courts ordered them to pay their victims' legal fees, bankrupting the operation. Prenda tried a similar thing against people who BitTorrent porn. I was in a case where we asked for fees. I got them, with such ease that I am kicking myself for not asking that the plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigant (which would have saved many others from this person). Further, the judge laid a heavy hint to the 3 other co-parties that if they asked for fees, they'd get them too. They did not ask. Amusingly, one of the lawyers who should have asked, was unable to collect from the client. Should have asked...	Admission of copying proves one of the elements that the plaintiffs would normally need to prove in an infringement suit, making a law suit less risky from their perspective. This may very well invite lawsuits that would otherwise not be filed. But, this is pure speculation. Your legal rights are the same, independent of how much you choose to reveal in advance of a lawsuit. If your copying doesn't amount to a substantial taking, then it isn't infringement, whether you admit to copying or not.	The real question is do they have to refund the rest of the summer camp fees if Bob is expelled due to his own intentional misbehavior? Not if the contract was written by a good lawyer, or even by a merely competent lawyer. In that case, the contract will provide that there is to be no refund in the event of expulsion.	Yes it is kind of possible what country would the legal action need to originate from? Would one file in the US and note the foreign defendant or would one file, as a foreigner, in the home country of the defendant? You can go either way. It is not obtaining the judgment that is the biggest trouble here, but enforcing it. You will need: A UK mailing address. Services like ScanMyPost will suffice. Some money to pay the court fees. Time, tenacity and patience to follow through the procedure and fill all necessary forms. Be lucky in that the defendant actually has something to pay the debt with. There are two stages: Obtain a court judgment in your favour. Unless the defendant pays you, enforce the judgment. Obtaining court judgment in the UK In the UK, the "small claims court" functions are executed by HM Courts & Tribunals Service. The specific service is called "Claim for money" which can be filed online via their old or new system. So, basically, you file the online form, pay the fee by credit card and wait for defendant's response. If they do not respond, you ask the court to make a judgment (in my case it took 10 weeks from filing claim to getting judgment). If the defendant responds and defends themselves, expect much longer wait and uncertain outcome. Enforcement So, you and the defendant have both received court judgment saying that they must pay you. But they are not paying. There is a range of options you can choose from: County Court Warrant of Control (claims from £50 to £5,000). Court bailiff will go to the defendant's address and try to seize goods that can be easily sold. High Court Writ of Control (claims from £600). Attachment of earnings order (you ask the court to order the defendant's employer to deduct his earnings in your favour). Third-party debt order (a.k.a. "Garnishee Order") — if you know the defendant's bank account details. Read about potential pitfalls here. Charging order: you will only get paid if the defendant sells their land. Bankrupt the defendant (big court fees!). Alternatively, you could always hire a UK lawyer but then you would probably not need this answer.	Civil cases are frequently decided by arbitration (a non-court process), so there's nothing particularly problematic here. Both parties have to agree to participate in the process, and one may (but need not) assume that there is a clause that the losing party has to live with the outcome. Odds are good that the parties are paid to participate, so there would be incentive to accept the verdict. One difference between this show (apparently) and a normal binding arbitration clause is that with the latter, this is part of the original contract which would state that all disputes must be resolved by such-and-such arbitration firm. Such verdicts are generally enforceable, unless there is some extreme impropriety (e.g. the defendant bribes the arbitration firm to flagrantly overlook the law). In the present case, torts as well as contracts can be the subject of a show, and the arbitration agreement would be separate from and after any underlying contract. A lot depends on the agreement that the show has participants sign. The Facebook-jury would, of course, not pass any form of scrutiny in a real court. So it is possible that afterwards, an unhappy party can press the case in real court, without prejudice.	If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible.	The amount requested has little or nothing to do with the amount, if any, eventually awarded. Once can sue "for 100 million dollars" and be awarded 100 dollars, and although it is rarer, one can be awarded more than the amount asked for when suit is field. That initial amount now serves as a peg to hang sensational news stores on, and nothing more. The plaintiff, and the plaintiff's lawyer, may consider that such publicity serves them well. Such inflated amounts are not grounds to dismiss the suit, so there is no downside to including them, except possibly negative publicity if people mock the demand.	Based solely on what you've described, what the lawyer did is inappropriate if, in fact, it occurred without any prior permissions. However, since you are not the actual client, it may be that you lack pertinent info, because this would be exceedingly rare behavior. Lawyers are allowed to make procedural and "expert"/professional decisions about your case without your consent, and do so all the time. As a general rule: we decide who to depose, what expert(s) are necessary to prove your claim, what questions to ask in discovery, what to say and when to say it when attempting to settle, and what witnesses to call vs. not to call at panel or trial. All of that is in the purview of the attorney's general discretion and work product. However, attorneys cannot diminish, amend, or settle your claim without your permission, unless you've signed a limited representation agreement and/or a prior authorization to do these things with a waiver of consultation on issues relating to settlement. (It is not uncommon for a client to say, "My bottom line is X; hence, you have my permission to settle the case for anything over that amount.") A client may also, subsequently, give verbal consent, saying things like "just do your best and get what you can". Contingency and Total Award Strategies Since you aren't the one having entered into the contract, you may not be privy to the existence of these types of contingencies. Agreements like this are very common when an attorney takes a weaker med mal claim. It may be that the lawyer will only take the case to the extent that they will try to settle, and may even file the case, with the understanding that they will never try the case. It is a way to try to get you as much as possible when all facts come to light, without agreeing to the expense of a trial. This happens a lot. In these situations, when you are trying to settle a claim that ends up being much less valuable than the attorney thought when he took the case, the insurance carrier will often say, "We will pay X on the claim if Doctor Doe is dismissed out," or something like that. Often lawyers intentionally over-file, in hopes there are two carriers (the more insurance the more money to make you go away) that they can try to settle with. When it turns out both docs are covered under one insurance carrier, then the weaker claim will often get dismissed out. It is a strategic decision to add them, and to dismiss them – and this is very common. Proving malpractice against one doctor is hard enough; trying to prove that you are the victim of double malpractice, back to back, is nearly impossible. All of that said, even if a client has entered into these types of limited or decisional authority-granting agreements, the lawyer still has a duty to keep the client apprised of what's going on. The client may decide later they don't like how little the attorney is stating the claim is worth (despite being forewarned this may happen, it happens all the time that when it actually occurs the client is not happy). In that case, they have the right to find a new lawyer, but that will be very difficult to do for a few reasons: (1) the original attorney is entitled to get paid for the work done under a theory known as “quantum meruit,” so other attorneys will be hesitant to get involved; (2) they will put a lien on any recovery for the amount of time and expenses, to be paid from any settlements or awards (and they get paid first, before the client or the new lawyer); (3) if a client gets angry and says they want to just drop the case rather than have the lawyer make more than the client, even after a year or more of work, all of the costs will still be owed by the client; (4) the potential new attorney will call the one who has the case and ask about whether the client has unreasonable expectations, if their case has any value, etc. Keep mind, if an attorney is doing the things you've described, they probably would suffer no love loss if the case went away. Malpractice in Context It very often happens, especially in medical malpractice cases, that a client will come in and describe the case one way, and then when the medical records arrive and the attorney and/or the paralegal/nurse-para review them, and all the facts get flushed out, it turns out things occurred a bit (or a lot) differently than the client described or recalled in the first place. This is typically not a matter, 99% of the time, of the client lying to the attorney, but rather it is merely the phenomenon of memories being based on their perception of the events/their care, rather than verifiable fact and established medical standards. (This is why eye-witness testimony is so notably unreliable: 10 people can witness the same event and there will inevitably be 10 different descriptions.) One thing all clients should be told by their lawyer (and you should only hire an experienced medical malpractice lawyer for these cases) is that bad outcomes do not equal negligence. Lay people often think that if something bad occurred while under the care of a doctor, this is the case, but it is not the measure of malpractice. Sometimes, even when the doctor does everything according to their specialty/industry standard, bad outcomes happen. Malpractice/negligence only occurs when they have deviated from this standard of care - outcome notwithstanding. The inverse is also true, when it comes to a bad outcome. The doctor may have breached the standard of care, but this cannot be determined by the patient - the law requires expert testimony to establish this. Sometimes bad outcomes are just the risk of the procedure. This is why patients sign (but rarely read) the informed consent forms, that describe in detail, and state the patient is aware, of all the potential bad outcomes that may occur during the procedure. Negligence, or a "breach of the standard of care" occurs when the typical physician (not the best expert in the world, just the normal, typical doctor in that field) would have found the actions to be unreasonable and never acceptable given the totality of the circumstances. Once you prove that, you then still need to prove that is what caused your damages (not the disease, or the ailment itself). Unfortunately, even with the best physicians, bad outcomes happen all the time. It is very common, to the point of being almost predictable, that a medical malpractice claim's value will depart from the original ballpark estimate of value that an attorney tries to "best guess" at the outset. When your attorney tries to value a case, they roughly estimate your "special damages", which consists of medical bills, lost income, lost earning capacity, and other quantifiable sums. Then, they must try to assess the market rate award for pain and suffering for the type injury you've sustained. This is only guesswork, based on jury verdict reports, reported settlements, and the jurisdictional leanings toward large or small verdicts (comparatively). As the case evolves, as facts come to lights, as experts are consulted - this is when these estimates can largely deviate from the original guesstimate based on very limited information. Risks of Contingency Representation At any rate, when a lawyer takes a case on contingency (when they agreed to get paid only if they recover, and not until they recover, aside from out of pocket expenses), they do this because they've relied on the client's account of what happened, as well as their initial assessment of the records, usually prior to hiring an expert (if they even intended to hire one because they agreed to take the case all the way through trial). You must understand that attorneys don't like when a case loses value any more than the client; in fact, probably less as they are the ones who've invested often hundreds of hours in the case at that point. This is how they make their money. Thirty-three percent of a small amount is not the same as that of a large amount. And many, many hours go into these cases. An attorney can make far more than their hourly rate on a great case, but this is balanced by making far, far less on cases whose values plummet as facts come to light. When a case appears to lost much of it's initially estimated value, the attorney will still try to maximize recovery; however, it may not seem that way to the client because after they take their third, and then recoup their expenses (which is on top of the third and is the responsibility of the client win-or-lose), clients can end up with almost nothing. This is because the expense of these cases is enormous and it is the problem with that area of law and the system in general. It is not uncommon for a medical malpractice case to cost, out of pocket, $200,000 or more! This is why so few people are able to get a lawyer to take these cases, and often when they do, it's on the very limited basis I described. Med Malpractice Primer Med Mal cases are some of the hardest cases to win and they are by far some of the most expensive cases to try. This in not accidental. Depending on the state you live in, tort reform (a legislative effort to limit the amount of medical malpractice claims filed and tried overall, as well as limiting their total recovery) can range from limits on damages, to very short windows for statute of limitations, to the requirements (like where I practice) where you must literally try the case twice – once before a med mal screening panel, who hears all your witnesses just as a jury does, and then decides whether the case should (and in some cases can) go forward. In some states (I happen to practice in one) the findings are admissible in court (not the evidence but the finding). So, if the MMPT screening panel finds the doctor was not negligent, or was, but the damages were within the standard disclosed potential outcomes, so there was no causation, or myriad other things, if you decide (or in some states, if you even still get to go to court) the defense gets to say to the jury that the legislatively enacted Med Mal Pre-trial screening panel found X (no negligence, causation, or damages – or all three). These panels are usually comprised of a lawyer (75% defense lawyers) or a judge, and two doctors who are biased against these types of cases in the first place). Also, if your expert gets torn apart on an issue during panel phase, anything they admit can be used against them in the trial. I say all this to help you understand that these cases are made, by the legislature, to be very hard to even find a lawyer to take, very hard to win, and exceedingly expensive to litigate. This is based on the (fallacious) theory that medical malpractice claims should be limited to the most serious claims because this litigation is so costly, and so impactful on the rates all citizens pay for insurance, that the legislature has seen fit to make them very difficult to prosecute, thereby weeding out weak claims. Bottom Line If the client truly feels their lawyer did something they did not have permission (either explicitly in writing, or verbally) to do, they need to talk to the attorney, explain their discomfort with the situation, and figure out why it occurred and if it was truly in the best interest of the case and the client. If the lawyer cannot adequately answer those questions, they should get a second opinion. The client can demand that anything the attorney did be undone, if it was the type of thing that is in the client's control. One would need to see the engagement letter and retention agreement, and also be privy to the conversations. It is, unfortunately, not uncommon for a client to say they understand what the lawyer is proposing when they don't. If you find that's the case, you may have them ask that all determinations be put in writing, with an explanation as to why.
Perma-Banned from game for offsite comment - is that legal? a friend and I play a pokemon-browsergame, which also offers monthly subscriptions for premium currency and benefits (=real money invested). We are also on a discord server with some friends, where we talk about the game. Note: this is a privatly run server and has no affilation with the game, the mods or anyone besides us. One of the Admins posted something along the lines of: "Don't generalise. "Only the sith deal in absolutes" may be from sci-fi, but there's a very real truth to it. Bad cops suck. Good cops who do things RIGHT, don't." On our sever (again, not the site) my friend just jokingly wrote "Bad Nazis suck. Good Nazis wo do things RIGHT, dont'." Because they disagreed with the above mentioned statement. So apparently we had someone take a screenshot, send that to a moderate on that site and my friend got now permantly banned and no refund of their monthly subscription. The reasons they gave were about toxic behaviour and rudeness. I also don't agree with my friends statement, but it was a hyperbole and was in no way meant to hurt someone. Alas, they refuse to talk to them or let them explain. The permalock is final. Sorry for the long explanation. The question here is just: is there anything they could legally do here? (for context: the website is based in the UK and in their rules they wrote the british laws apply). Thank you all very, very much in advance!	Your friend's relationship with the game company is one of contract. You don't say what the contract terms are, so it's impossible to say whether they were breached by your friend or the company. In any case, it is likely that the only remedy your friend could seek is damages, probably limited to whatever outstanding portion of the subscription they have not had the benefit of. It seems unlikely that it will be a large enough amount to be worth pursuing. As a private company the game provider can choose to contract with who they wish, or not as the case may be (unless they can be shown to be discriminating against protected characteristics).	A web site that is serious on protecting some content behind a paywall will put the protected content, or a version of the page with both protected and unprotected content, on separate page or pages, so arranged that a user will not be able to follow the link until that user has signed in and been accepted as an authorized user. A site that merely uses CSS to hide "protected" content is not really protecting it. CSS is designed to be modified by the ultimate user -- that is part of its function. If the site chooses to send you content, you are entitled to read it. Even if some of the content has a CSS tag attached which suppresses or obscures the display of that content, they know perfectly well that any user can supersede this with local CSS, and so I don't see how they have any legal claim, nor any way of knowing if you have accessed the "hidden" content or not. If you attempt to bypass or hack a login screen, that might be circumvention under the US DMCA, or "Unauthorized computer access" under any of several laws.	Depends on the purpose of the society and physical location of its members. A secret society aiming to coordinate bank robberies would be pretty much illegal anywhere. A secret society sharing photos of cats would be fine in most parts of the world. I'm not sure about the jurisdiction. All the places in which members live? Where the servers are located? The place of residence of the founder? All of that matters. Members, founder, servers are all subject to the laws of the land where they are. (That said, the fact that the members only interact online changes nothing.) For example, say there is a secret online society with some sort of political agenda and members all over the world. Whilst for members living in most of the English-centric world (UK/US/Canada/AU/NZ/Singapore etc.) such a membership would be perfectly legal, members living in Italy and Poland will be breaking the law.	My question is, because I am not making any income from the distribution of the game, would the use of the copyrighted music fall under Personal Use? There are some "private use" exemptions in Australian copyright law but they have some fairly narrow conditions. These exemptions are fairly narrow because the point of copyright law is not to prevent you from making money with someone else's intellectual property but to protect the other person's ability to make money with it. If Alice writes a song and Bob distributes it free of charge, Alice loses revenue. Similarly, it is Alice's right to decide whether that song should be included in a freely available open-source software product, and her right to decide whether to allow that use without charge or in exchange for a license fee.	The only real recourse you have is to contact the webhost and try to convince them your content is really yours and file a DMCA Takedown request. How you convince them might be an issue; do you have any old screenshots? Original photos? Any proof that the content and photos are yours? The webhost appears to be https://datacamp.co.uk/ , unless the DNS is being proxied, since DNS points to CloudDNS https://mxtoolbox.com/SuperTool.aspx?action=dns:marksmayo.com NZ and UK are members of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, so there don't appear to be any arguments about not applying copyright law. You willingly gave up the domain, so you have no recourse or valid reason to try and regain ownership of the domain. You could try and contact the new owner of the domain by filing a complaint via the abuse email listed by the domain registar at https://www.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx?&domain=marksmayo.com But they may not do anything, even if you can prove a copyright violation, since they only handle the domain registration and not the webhosting. How they got the content is another question: who was your webhost when you owned the site? Datacamp? Did they not delete it when you closed your account? How did the new owner come to get it?	I know that some of this may be covered by either the Creative Commons license or the OGL it was published under, but it's not clear to me how far those freedoms extend. It was all published as materials under copyright to the original authors, TSR, WotC, &c. and if things had been left like that hszmv's answer would've been completely correct: stay vague and allow users to enter those names and descriptions, talk to WotC's lawyers and sales department about license fees, or just keep it to yourself and your friends. You're right, though: WotC went whole-hog, dumped their partial OGL idea, and relicensed some things as Creative Commons. There are different Creative Commons licenses, though, some restricting commercial use that would still keep your app to yourself and friends without a specific licensing agreement. Go find out exactly what WotC put under CC. If it's only the Player's Handbook, then you can only use names and descriptions that are from the Player's Handbook and you're still facing a cease-&-desist if you start adding in Monster Manual info.If it's everything, it's everything they have but still won't include any older modules that they don't have the right to change the copyright status of. It'll still be under copyright, usually until 70 years after the death of the original creator. For Gary Gygax, that'll be 2078. Expect that length to extend during your lifetime though. US copyright usually extends every time Mickey & friends come close to entering the public domain. [Edit: The comments below suggest it might only have been the Systems Reference Document (I assume for 5e). It's 403 pages of not nothing but it's not much given the universe we're talking about. The spell and monster lists are generic. Bigby is nowhere to be found and the only mention of a beholder is a reminder not to use the name beholder without their written approval.] Go find out exactly which CC WotC used. The article above says "all use" but you need to find out the exact number of the Creative Commons license for each thing you're using and make sure all of your uses fall within its terms. Some are basically free use but still insist you mention the copyright holder prominently or in every use. Go ahead and do that if you have to. [Edit: The comments below say it is probably CC 4.0. The SRD download page says you can use CC 4.0 or their own OGL. In both cases, yes, you must acknowledge WotC by name in a way prominent enough to satisfy the license you choose.] And of course, Don't trust legal advice from internet randos or ChatGPT. If this is a serious thing you're going to be spending a good chunk of your life working on or expect to make significant money from, go talk to an actual lawyer. Bonus points for one specialized in IP with a knowledge of roleplaying and the way it's been (partially) opening up lately.If you start off just by talking to WotC's lawyers, just do that somewhere where you get their explanations and permissions in writing. Then keep that somewhere safe in electronic and hard copy. Then still take that with you when you go talk to your own lawyer.	I've found Commission Decision 2003/675/EC which sheds light on what exactly happened here (more digestable press release here). Basically, there was a dispute involving Nintendo and its various independent distributors who had exclusive distribution rights in their respective territories, Bergsala AB for Sweden. Note this wasn't simply a matter of Bergsala's rights being violated, but rather a scheme to reduce parallel imports/exports which the Commission found to be anti-competitive. For most parties, this was brought to an end in December 1997 (see section 2.2.11 on pgs. 54-55). So no, there was no change in the law, but the anti-competitive scheme stopped in late 1997. Weirdly this should have resulted in the possibility for more imports, but since those imports would no longer have artificially higher prices, perhaps the advertisements and/or imports were no longer worth economically worth it. Or perhaps Bergsala pivoted to greater enforcement the exclusive rights it did have, even if this didn't include the ability to block parallel imports according to EU competition law. In any case, trade of Nintendo products in Europe was greatly altered in late 1997. Please take my summary with a grain of salt, I'm not very well versed in the field of commerce and I've already misunderstood the decision at least once; check the cited decision for proper details.	Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.
Self defense damages Someone attacks me. I punch them in self defense. During the punch I dislocate my shoulder. Are there civil damages incurred when I injured myself in self defense and got a medical bill?	Yes Assuming you were assaulted (with or without battery) and you suffered injury (physical or otherwise) during that assault you are entitled to damages. The injury has to flow from the assault but not necessarily from the assaulter. For example, if you fled across the road and were struck by a car you could sue your attacker. Because assault is an intentional tort, it is not necessary for you to prove that actual financial loss was suffered - this is not negligence. The court can assess economic loss, non-economic loss and exemplary (punitive) damages.	“Never” is a very big word… If a burglar stabs someone in claimed self defense, then we have evidence that this was an armed burglary, so that won’t go down well for that burglar. And your rights to self defence are greatly diminished if you caused that situation illegally. So should you get into the situation, try to run away if at all possible. If you had any chance at all to escape your self defence argument will not be accepted. The only possible situation with self defence is if you are threatened with illegal violence that cannot be justified by the fact that you are a criminal. For example you enter a home, two people with guns inside catch you, bind you to a chair so you are no danger at all, and instead of calling the police they announce they will kill or maim you. This is of course very unlikely to happen.	Its worth actually reading through the law again - they're meant for different categories of drugs - and its worth looking up the relevant laws as a whole. You can't cherrypick which law you charge them under in this case. It depends on what the suspect has in posession, and if you have more serious charges, they're probably going to be preferred unless the prosecution decides to throw the entire library at the suspect and charge them with everything they can, or a larger subset. A quick search on the internet - which shouldn't be taken as legal advice, brings up this link. Category 1 drugs are addictive and seen as therapeutically useless - you shouldn't have any realistic reason to have quantities of it in your posession. Category 3 is drugs with therapeutic use - stuff like codine. You could get a prescription for that, but there's potential for abuse. They're aimed at different classes of drugs - and the confusion is over a misinterpretation of what the law is about. As an aside, this is why you need to usually read more than just a specific statute or law to get what its about.	When you have standing, a cause of action, and have suffered loss Standing means you have sufficient connection to the harm that the law will recognize your injury. A cause of action is the legal right you claim was transgressed. Broadly, there needs to be a remedy that lies within the jurisdiction of the court to grant. Monetary remedies are called damages and for most causes of action you need to prove your loss although some have statutory damages and others allow nominal damages.	Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.	Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo!	The general rule is that using force in self-defense is justified if the person using the force reasonably believes it immediately is necessary to prevent the unlawful use of force against themselves or a third party. Deadly force is not generally justified except in response to a reasonable fear of deadly force, or to prevent certain violent crimes (like rape, kidnapping, robbery, etc.) Force is not justified in retaliation. In some states, if you're not at home (or maybe even then), you also have a duty to retreat before you can use deadly force in self-defense. So, for your specific questions: If they hit you once but aren't continuing to hit you, it's illegal to hit them back. You can only use force to defend yourself, not to get even. If someone gets in your face without touching you, you might be allowed to use force, but it depends on the circumstances. You don't have to wait for someone to hit you, but you can't sucker-punch someone because you want more space in a mosh pit. Your use of force needs to be something you reasonably believe to be necessary to stop/prevent their unlawful use of force. It also needs to be proportional to the force you're defending against; you can meet deadly force with deadly force, but shooting someone to stop them from slapping you is murder. Likewise, no one's going to believe that you really thought you had to beat the crap out of someone in order to stop them from slapping you, or that it's in any way proportionate to what they did. Deadly force is not allowed in defense of a person unless you reasonably think deadly force is needed to prevent the unlawful use of deadly force, or to prevent one of a few crimes being committed against them. Depending on the state, it might be presumptively justified if the person is trying to forcibly break into your occupied house, car, or place of business, but that's state-dependent.	There are both statutes and customs aimed at preventing "Malicious Prosecution" and "Abuse of Process." (In Pennsylvania, for example, the 1980 Dragonetti Act allows the victim of a frivolous lawsuit to counter-sue for compensatory damages.) One can also buy insurance against this type of risk: Umbrella liability policies will generally provide a defense against civil lawsuits and any damages awarded, as will many business insurance policies. Of course, none of this is to say that a skilled legal team can't avoid all of these countermeasures and, in practice, take up a significant amount of your time and trouble. We do not have a perfect system of justice.
Is CNN Chris Cuomo right about Clinton's emails: "it's different for the media"? In 2016, CNN reporter Chris Cuomo, said about Hillary Clinton's hacked emails: Also interesting is remember...it's illegal to possess the stolen documents. It's different for the media. So everything you learn about this, you're learning from us...let's take a look at what is in there. That is, I could not download and read the emails from Wikileaks, but I could listen to Cuomo as he download and read them to me. Is it legal for citizens to possess hacked emails? Is it legal for CNN to possess hacked emails?	Chris Cuomo is wrong: the media are not different. For details, see this column by First Amendment specialist Eugene Volokh. My original answer was also wrong. Well, not wrong, but irrelevant. My answer was irrelevant because the hacked emails Cuomo was talking about do not involve national security. By focusing on the national security angle, I answered a question nobody asked. To make matters worse, in his comment on IKnowNothing's answer, A.fm. politely pointed out my mistake fourth months before I made it.	It could lead to investigation and wasting of government resources, but it is not a crime and not civilly actionable, under the circumstances described. The First Amendment right to say crazy things is pretty broad.	I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.	In the US at least, there is no mention of "mind reading" in the Constitution. But should such a technology be developed and actually used to read someone's mind and then that information was used against them in court, I can certainly see an appeal on at least 5th Amendment grounds. It's also possible that should such a technology become viable, that state legislatures and even the US Congress passing prohibitions on using it under certain circumstances.	I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.	In the united-states, those actions would be fully protected by the First Amendment. Andy has a constitutional right to speak freely about essentially whatever he wants -- including Mary's criminal conduct -- unless his speech falls into one of several narrowly defined categories, none of which would apply in this case. And because Mary has already put this information out on the Internet, it is likely not sufficiently private to support an invasion-of-privacy claim. However, the unfortunate reality is that complainants, police, prosecutors, and judges frequently ignore First Amendment protections. Indeed, many states have laws against "cyberstalking" and "telecommunications harassment" that are incredibly broad, and that clearly apply to conduct protected by the First Amendment. For instance, Ohio's telecommunications harassment statute makes it a crime to send an e-mail "with purpose to abuse, threaten, or harass another person." This means that many people who engage in First Amendment-protected speech end up getting prosecuted anyway. If they pay for a good lawyer who knows how to properly raise a First Amendment defense, they may escape any penalties. But because most defendants do not have those resources, and because many lawyers are unaware of the First Amendment implications of such prosecutions, most defendants in such situations likely end up being convicted despite behaving perfectly legally. In the united-kingdom, though, the situation is very different. Even if Mary is breaking the law, and even if Andy limits himself to strictly factual information about what's he's learned about her conduct, he may still be held civilly liable. Mary may also be able to pursue Andy criminally for harassment if his e-mail causes her substantial emotional distress, and civilly for "harassment by publication." The fact that this information is already public is likely not going to go very far in changing the analysis. Andy's best course of action is therefore to play it safe by keeping his mouth shut. Doing so has both legal and nonlegal benefits: He avoids exposure to the hassles of defending himself from criminal charges and he gets some time to examine the resentment, jealousy, paranoia that makes him want to humiliate his "friend."	You would need a court order to force them to take it down. There is virtually no chance a court will order them to take it down, because it would be almost impossible to do so without violating the First Amendment. You would have to prove that forcing a publisher to stop saying that you teach at the university would advance some compelling governmental interest, and that there isn't a better way to advance that interest. It's not clear what you mean by "cyberstalking," but if you're talking about someone sending you harassing messages, then the court would probably conclude that the better option would be to punish the harasser, rather than limit the publisher's speech. You could try paying them off or sending a threatening legal demand, but I doubt either would go far. I suspect that the best course would be a persistent campaign to escalate up their chain of command to find a sympathetic person willing to help. Even that, though, I would expect to be tough, because I'm sure you wouldn't be the first person trying this.	You'll note that Maryland governor Larry Hogan was sued and ended up settling over Facebook deleted comments and blocks. And a judge ruled that Trump can't block comments on Twitter. So it seems there's an evolving consensus that politicians can't simply block or delete social media comments for differing viewpoints.
If a contract always uses the wrong name, is it still valid? I was given a contract (NDA) that looks like it was from a template that was not retyped. My name is not stated anywhere on the contract, but rather someone else's name is on the contract. I do not know this other person. What am I liable for if I sign this? If the other person breaks the contract by disclosing company secrets, am I liable? If I disclose company secrets, am I liable, given that my name appears nowhere on the contract but the signatory line? This contract is between Joe and John. blah blah blah. Joe agrees to not disclose blah blah My name is not Joe or John and I know only John.	If a contract always uses the wrong name, is it still valid? A contract is not a piece of paper. It is an agreement between parties that meets certain criteria. The piece of paper is just evidence of that agreement that can be referred to should there be any misunderstandings or disputes. So in your case, you would be presumed to have discussed the terms with the party you sign the NDA. You would be presumed to have fully understood them. A wrong name on the paper is just an error. It may make it more difficult to establish that you indeed entered the contract (in case of a dispute) but it will by no means invalidate the contract.	Does this amount to the employer potentially paying the employee to lie to them, to no ultimate legal effect? Or will the employee have a problem if they end up with an obligation to sign a statement that is not in agreement with reality? Neither. Contract law contemplates a party's subsequent inability to comply with the terms that were established at the formation of the contract. In the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, this is referred to as supervening impracticability. See, for instance, the Restatement at § 261. In the hypothetical scenario you outline, the loss of a company laptop renders the employee's promise (namely, "to return any company-issued computers or devices") impracticable. Instead, the circumstances may entitle the employer to restitution (by the employee) for what the employee now is literally unable to return. That would be cognizable as compliance in substance.	The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today.	First of all, a contract is valid without a signature and even without being in writing; all that is needed is consent by the parties. Therefore, the signature is merely evidence of that consent and is only relevant if a dispute arises over the general consent or the particular terms that were consented to. A digital signature would make it harder for Bob to argue that those were not the terms he signed but if I have Bob's signature on them then the onus of proving he didn't sign rests with Bob, I don't have to prove he did. All of the methods you suggest are valid as would an email saying "Got the contract. I agree. Bob."	Because breaking the law is not breach of contract (Necessarily). Were you to use the model to 3D-print a gun and rob banks with it, without this clause, you have not broken the contract. That would mean that the provider could neither sue you for any damages the use of their model in your crime spree might have caused them, nor can they legally terminate the licence with you.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.	Am I right to assume that once the notice has been issued to the other party, me and the client still work on the project for 14 days until the notice period expires and that the client is required to pay for the work that has been done in those 14 days In the absence of any other wording to the contrary, a contract continues as normal up until the day of termination. The fact that a party has given notice to terminate merely establishes the termination date, unless the notice clause says something different. Note that there is nothing to stop you drafting a clause which explicitly states this. Indeed, it is often useful to explicitly state things which are already implied as it helps to avoid any dispute from arising in the first place.	NDA provisions in general are rather similar. In particular the ones covering the exceptions to the confidentiality obligations required to the receiving party. Such provisions normally have the following wording (more or less): Information shall not be treated as Confidential if: - at the time of disclosure is already in the public domain or becomes available to the public w/o breach by receiving party; - the receiving party receives it from a third party free to lawfully disclose such information; - was in the prior lawfull possession of the receiving party; - was independently developed by the receiving party; - is approved to be released by the disclosing party; or - the receiving party is required by law to disclose in response to a valid order of a court or by a government agency. Your particular case might not necessarily fall under any of this exceptions (i do not know the exact wording of the NDA you're referring to) but in any case, please note that simply telling a third party that you are discussing the development of "an app similar to x but with a better UX and simpler design", might already be considered as a breach of confidentiality. Surely the NDA is identified as being Confidential itself and it probably also contains a section saying something like: "This Agreement and its contents shall be treated as Confidential Information".
Can a traffic citation be issued solely off of witness account? In general, one driver reporting the plates of another is not likely to result in a citation being issued. Even if a citation were to be issued, I'd assume the initial caller would be required to testify in court, thus turning it into you word against theirs--an easily winning case. But what if multiple people call someone's plates in? I've read that officers are more likely to issue a citation in this case, but it seems there's an obvious exploitation. For example, a group of friends could conspire against a common enemy by all reporting their plates. Or let's say someone in a car with multiple people in it believes they have been cut off. Everyone in the car could then report the accused driver, getting him a ticket by default. Where is the line drawn and how possible are these scenarios to result in convictions? If taken to court, couldn't the accused driver simply say they weren't even on the road at the time? What's the point in witness based citations (without any proof but a testimony) even being issued?	The citation could be written but it should be easy to beat. In the circumstance that you describe the accused could just say the he was not driving his car at the time. If the prosecution is a sham with all your friends saying you all saw this thing, then the defendant can bring all of his friends to say that he was at some other place. The benefit to having a cop on the scene is that the cop will get ID and positive identification. The other thing the cop has is expert judgment. If a cop sees unsafe lane movement and writes a ticket, his testimony in court carries more weight than the "it was not unsafe!" testimony of the accused. Keep in mind, getting all of your witnesses to court on the same day, after continuances and other delays, and getting them all to tell the same story to overcome the presumption of innocence is no small feat. All that to say, it's easier with police as witness. There are two mechanisms which could get you where you want to go. Private prosecution and citizen's arrest. Private prosecutions are a part of history but not strictly unavailable at the state level. You could write up some charging documents to see if you can get your target indicted. Citizen's arrest is interesting because the rules are fairly unclear unless governed by a specific statute. There are two necessary parts of citizens arrest and the first part gets the attention. The first part is the detention (arrest). The crimes for which a citizen can legally detain a suspect are likely defined by state statute. The second part is giving testimony about the witnessed crime. Let's assume that you see a felony happen and watch the perp walk into a gas station bathroom. You are prepared to arrest, do part number one, and then call the cops, to do part number two. But while you wait for the guy to come out of the bathroom a cop walks up. You explain the felony and the cop goes into the bathroom and arrests the guy. It's purely witness testimony that led to the arrest and the indictment (physical evidence - let's say there is none) and even the trial. You successfully get the guy indicted and when you show up to testify you tell the story as you witnessed it. Now the accused gets to take the stand. When he takes the stand he says, "it was the other guy." When asked, "what other guy?" He says, "I was in the bathroom and a guy ran in and went into the stall. Then a cop came in and arrested me." Reasonable doubt right there. How much more if it's a bunch of friends ratting on some lone driver? Police need evidence. Prosecutors need evidence. Judges need evidence.	From a US perspective, in a word, "no". Firstly, "presumption of innocence" is in a trial, not in police interactions. Being arrested does not violate the presumption of innocence. Police do not need any reason to interact with you or ask you questions. Police can arrest you if they have probable cause to suspect you have committed a crime, but this is not always necessary. More on this later(in the fourth section). Secondly, I wouldn't describe requesting to see your ticket, or any document as a "violent communication", in general. It may be rude or insulting, but not violent. (Also "violent communication" is not a legal term. The closest legal terms, verbal assault and threatening communication, are also not this.) More over, there is no indication of am implication of lying in this request. Thirdly, there are many situations in which possessing a document or credential is not sufficient; one must legally display or present them upon request. For example, multiple occupational licenses such as liquor licenses and barber/cosmetology licenses require that the licenses be prominently displayed; whereas, in California at least, a vehicle driver on a public road must not only possess their driver's license and proof of insurance, they must produce them upon the request of any law enforcement officer (Source: https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/brochures/fast_facts/ffvr18). Fourthly, there are situations in which you can be legally searched and questioned without reasonable suspicion. Examples of this include boarder searches and sobriety checkpoints. Sources: (US Supreme Court rulings): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Martinez-Fuerte; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michigan_Department_of_State_Police_v._Sitz A note on sources: bdb484 and I have opposing court case sources. My sources have binding precedent over all courts in the US, save the US Supreme Court, whereas theirs don't have any binding precedent, but are more directly on-topic.	Since there is no search or seizure involved in having a driver's license, requiring a person to update their address is not a violation of the 4th Amendment. It is also not "testifying against oneself in a criminal case", so it does not violate the 5th. As has been repeated many times, driving is a privilege and not a right, meaning that there is no fundamental constitutional right to drive. Strict scrutiny would not render the requirement to have a license unconstitutional, and it certainly would not invalidate the requirement to give a correct address and update that address as necessary. There may be issues regarding a requirement to produce identification, but there is no legal precedent for the idea that an ID law law and a federal "must show" statute would violate the 4th (that is not to say that the courts could not find there is such a basis if the question arises, but it has not yet been found). Since there is no national ID law, one can only conjecture what the outcome of judicial review would be, but if such a law survived strict scrutiny, it would be inconceivable that a portion of the law requiring you to keep your address current would fail such scrutiny. A curiosity search would still be barred.	The driver of a vehicle is responsible for moving violations, the owner is responsible for other tickets such as parking and vehicle correction notices. California Vehicle Code section 4000 states: A person shall not drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly, or logging dolly, unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code or registered under the permanent trailer identification program, except that an off-highway motor vehicle which displays an identification plate or device issued by the department pursuant to Section 38010 may be driven, moved, or left standing in an offstreet public parking facility without being registered or paying registration fees. A ticket for a moving violation, including driving an unregistered vehicle, is issued to the driver; the driver is responsible. Section 40610 of the California Vehicle Code describes what occurs with an unregistered vehicle. If there is no evidence of fraud or persistent neglect then a "Notice to Correct Violation" will be issued and will be the responsibility of the vehicle owner. The correction notice to have the vehicle registered is different than the violation of driving an unregistered vehicle. Non-moving violations, such as parking tickets are the responsibility of the vehicle's owner if the vehicle is being operated with the owner's permission. Section 40200 describes this as it relates to parking tickets: (a) Any violation of any regulation that is not a misdemeanor governing the standing or parking of a vehicle under this code, under any federal statute or regulation, or under any ordinance enacted by local authorities is subject to a civil penalty. The enforcement of those civil penalties shall be governed by the civil administrative procedures set forth in this article. (b) Except as provided in Section 40209, the registered owner and driver, rentee, or lessee of a vehicle cited for any violation of any regulation governing the parking of a vehicle under this code, under any federal statute or regulation, or under any ordinance enacted by a local authority shall be jointly liable for parking penalties imposed under this article, unless the owner can show that the vehicle was used without consent of that person, express or implied. An owner who pays any parking penalty, civil judgment, costs, or administrative fees pursuant to this article shall have the right to recover the same from the driver, rentee, or lessee. (c) The driver of a vehicle who is not the owner thereof but who uses or operates the vehicle with the express or implied permission of the owner shall be considered the agent of the owner to receive notices of parking violations served in accordance with this article and may contest the notice of violation. While the owner of the vehicle is legally responsible for non-moving violations of the vehicle code, a reasonable argument can be made that the person who committed the infraction, such as parking illegally, is morally responsible and may incur a civil liability to the owner of the vehicle as highlighted by bold in section (b) above.	If you have a license and drive but forget your license and get pulled over what happens? You could receive a summons or citation (a.k.a. "ticket") for failing to carry a driver's license. Section § 46.2-104 of the Virginia Code states that it is a traffic infraction with a $10 fine to not have your license while driving. The operator of any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer being operated on the highways in the Commonwealth, shall have in his possession: (i) the registration card issued by the Department or the registration card issued by the state or country in which the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is registered, and (ii) his driver's license, learner's permit, or temporary driver's permit. Every person licensed by the Department as a driver . . . who fails to carry his license. . . for the vehicle which he operates, shall be guilty of a traffic infraction and upon conviction punished by a fine of ten dollars. (Emphasis added.) Do you get a penalty for forgetting it at your house? Yes, if you have a valid license that you left at home, you can get the case dismissed by showing the license to the the court (presumably a clerk), but you will still have to pay "court costs." However, if any person summoned to appear before a court for failure to display his license . . . presents, before the return date of the summons, to the court a license or permit issued to him prior to the time the summons was issued . . . or appears pursuant to the summons and produces before the court a license or permit issued to him prior to the time the summons was issued . . . , he shall, upon payment of all applicable court costs, have complied with the provisions of this section. Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-104 (2016).	Police reports are treated as "Business Records" and are therefore not excluded by the hearsay rule, regardless of the availability of the declarant. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803: Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay Business Records Exception The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. I suppose a valid defense in this case would be to bring into question the "trustworthiness of the preparation" (via 803(8)(B)), but it is still admissible. Admissibility of Police Reports A number of courts have held that a police report otherwise excluded by Rule 803(8) is admissible under the hearsay exception for recorded recollection in Rule 803(5). On the other hand... At least one court has held that the recorded recollection exception does not allow the admission of a police report that is excluded by Rule 803(8). Offering another reason for the exclusion, the court observed that such reports, particularly when they concern on-the-scene investigations, are considered less reliable than records prepared by other public officials because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases and the likelihood of the report’s use in litigation. See United States v. Pena-Gutierrez, 222 F.3d 1080, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2000); see also State v. Harper, 96 N.C. App. 36, 40–41(1989) (recognizing this rationale in finding police report inadmissible under Rule 803(8); court did not address admissibility under other rules). Recognizes the conflict of interest police have when recording evidence against a defendant, so it may be possible to argue admissibility in that way, but it seems most courts do not follow this line of thinking.	It seems that the Iowa authorities did attempt to notify the driver. If the letter of notification was returned because the driver changed his or her address, that is not the DOT's fault -- drivers are supposed to notify the authorities of changes of address -- indeed driving with a license with an out-of-date address is itself a violation in some US states. If the error was made by the postal service, that is still not the DOT's fault but they might be more willing to accept an appeal from the driver. In general, authorities must make a reasonable attempt to notify people of court or administrative actions, but if those notifications fail, the authorities can go ahead in many cases. Try explaining that one doesn't owe taxes because an IRS notice was misdelivered. It would be too easy to avoid unwanted governmental actions if nondelivery of mail were a valid excuse. It may well be that there is a procedure to get the suspension waived or ended early, perhaps involving taking the class that should have been taken, and perhaps paying an additional fine. Details of such procedures vary. A local lawyer who deals with traffic issues frequently would probably know what steps might be taken. It may well be that the original ticket mentioned a possible suspension, but it may not have. That also varies by state.	You are not reading a law book here and you should not interpret a driving test so literally. It's quite clear that the question implies you should follow all of their instructions regarding how to proceed through traffic. Sometimes those instructions do involve "breaking laws" such as driving on the wrong side of the road or proceeding through a traffic signal that was not turned off. The B option clearly does not mean they have the power to disobey all laws in existence, only those concerning traffic as evidenced by the examples given. You are not Sheldon Cooper and you should know how to interpret a vague question correctly. You are also not a gopher, and you can correctly deduce that crashing into another car or driving off the cliff into the water is not in your best interests, and that calling the police to report someone abusing their position is probably a good idea. If you're concerned by the wording, try contacting the California DMV to have them clarify the wording.
Is ignorance of the law a valid excuse for not following emergency laws with no warning period? Yesterday in Melbourne, Australia a State of Disaster was declared due to the COVID-19 pandemic. A new set of emergency laws came into effect, including an 8pm curfew, no travelling beyond a 5km radius of your house and various other restrictions. These are enforceable by police and large fines will be issued to those who don't comply. Let's say I don't own a TV, never go on the Internet, and don't listen to the radio. I also don't speak to anyone for a week. Next Sunday I go out for a walk at 9pm, completely unaware of this law. Can ignorance be a defence in this case?	No First, no new laws came into effect - new restrictions under existing law did. Specifically, the Premier declared a State of Disaster under s23(1) of the Emergency Management Act 1986 which requires it to be broadcast from a broadcasting station in Victoria (the televised press conference did that) and published in the government gazette (see first link). The government gazette is the communication channel for the promulgation of law - once it's in that then you are deemed to know it. The specific restrictions were communicated in the press conference and the power to impose them comes from s24(2)(d): (2) In addition to and without in any way limiting the generality of subsection (1), in a state of disaster the Minister may— (d) control and restrict entry into, movement within and departure from the disaster area or any part of it Note that this is a different Act than the previous restrictions which were under s200 of the public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008. Second, ignorance is only an excuse when the law says it is an excuse. Neither of the above laws do that. Most laws don't do that. An example of one that does (that I know from personal experience) is s58 of the new-south-wales Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) Regulation 2017 which says: For the purposes of section 68(2)(b) of the Act, the use of an unregistered registrable vehicle on a road or on a road related area is permitted if the person using the vehicle-- (a) was not the responsible person for the vehicle at the relevant time, and (b) did not know, and could not reasonably have known, that the vehicle was unregistered at the relevant time. However, even here, the ignorance plea is in relation to the facts of the situation, not the applicable law. My son drove my company car while unregistered and pled this defence. The regulator denied that he had a reasonable excuse because he should have checked the registration status using the NSW Government App before driving it. That is, my son had a duty to make all reasonable efforts to establish the registration status of the vehicle. However, they used their discretion and waived the fine. Which brings me to ... Third, officers, prosecutors and judges have discretion in how they apply the law. While ignorance is not an excuse, it is a factor that they can consider in deciding if you should be penalised and how much that penalty should be.	Since there are cases where it is legal to break into a car, is it legal to publish a guide on how to break into a car online? It is legal to publish this guide. Indeed, it is legal to do so even if there are no cases where it is legal to do so. Does it need to have a disclaimer saying to comply with all applicable laws? No. Could the author be held responsible if someone uses the instructions to illegally break into a car? Generally not. I could imagine that there might be some very specific and exceptional fact pattern where it might, but that would be the rare exception. But see man sentenced to twenty-years in prison after pledging support to ISIS and uploading a bomb making video related to that pledge.	In the US, many municipalities have ordinances outlawing loud noises during some night hours. It may start as early as 10pm or as late as 11pm, and end as early as 6am or as late as 7am. Unfortunately, you have to deal with it in the way which you indicated you would rather not. The people to call to deal with this are the police. You don't have to be present when the police arrives. Nor will they tell the neighbors who called them. But if the noise ordinance is violated, it is their job to deal with it. During the day-time hours, it is generally legal to make loud noises unless they exceed some very extreme levels. But those extreme levels are probably more than anything casual teenagers can do. If the walls of the house are not visibly shaking, that's probably not it.	This isn’t self defence Self defence involves reasonable steps to end an imminent threat. How does causing the assaulter to die in 2 weeks of Covid deal with the imminent threat?	Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal).	California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.	First off, you cannot booby trap your property, period. It is both illegal and tortious. But, as you noted, there are already questions/answers that deal with this issue. Sure enough, if the police get a no-knock search warrant, that in and of itself is the Court order allowing entry by any means necessary. When the officers, there by right of law, breach the outer perimeter and stop at the warnings, they will not be seeking any other court orders to have you allow them "safe entry". Their warrant gives them all the right they need, as probable cause of crime and violent intent or intent to destroy evidence was already presented to a judge. If, in real life, you actually put up signage or state explicitly that they're being forewarned that you intend to harm, trap, maim, or otherwise make it unsafe to enter; or that doing so will result in an attempt to destroy evidence, that is something they have already assumed (hence the seeking and granting of the no-knock vs. a regular search warrant). However, the signs in and of themselves are not protected speech, but rather overt threats, and that would put you in a very precarious position indeed. If the police get a "no knock" warrant (the most invasive, difficult to get warrants, whereby there is a grave risk of destruction of evidence or injury to persons), the police will ensure they have safe passage – they've come prepared for dangerous entry long before your signs, but once they see them, you could rest assured they will take them as they are intended: as a direct threat to their safety, and they will deploy a SWAT or other heavily armed entry team (who is usually there anyway for these dangerous entries). You could expect things like smoke/out canister and teargas, flash bangs, and heavily armed and well armored officers attempting to force you from your dwelling. Presumably, if you need to disarm traps to escape the situation, they can enter. Assuming you're home when they invade with chemical weapons, whether you come out or not, they will force you to disarm whatever booby trapping you may have in place that may destroy evidence, likely walking you in as their human shield in the event you're lying about any dangerous ones. That is probably your best case scenario. They may just decide to throw you through the perimeter once they get their hands on you, just to see what happens! If you don't exit and are home or if you are lucky enough to be out, the bomb squad, ATF, and SWAT will converge on your property in less than typical means. Because from your warning they can assume some incendiary or explosive device exists, bringing it into the jurisdiction of other agencies. If they cannot disarm the trap, they would send a robot in first to set it off, or cut through your roof, or knock down a wall – whatever it takes to get in without using a typical means of ingress/egress, so as not to chance your trap. Regardless, you can rest assured that they will get in, and you will pay for the trap you set for law enforcement. Further, to whatever charges you'd have been faced with from evidence flowing from the original warrant will now be added additional charges like attempted murder of a peace officer; if you have any roommates or known associates: conspiracy to do those things; attempted destruction of evidence, criminal interference with a police investigation ... all at a minimum. If anyone is actually harmed, your signage offers you no shield from criminal or tort liability, and you will be lucky to live through the experience once they get their hands on you. Police tend to not like being the targets of intentional maiming, dismemberment or death. You have to understand that, according to this hypothetical, you are intentionally trying to harm law enforcement, or destroy evidence of your dangerous criminal activity. These are not invaders, or intruders according to the law; they are the people whose job it is to enforce the laws, collect the evidence (if you weren't getting arrested pursuant to the fruits of the warrant, you certainly would be at that point). The signs themselves would make excellent exhibits in the coming case of State v. you. BTW: The only reason they have left John Joe Gray alone is that he knows the Henderson County Sheriff Ronny Brownlow, who has been told that the ATF, FBI, and State SWAT, would all be happy to enter and get or kill Mr. Gray if need be. Since the Sheriff never filed any federal charges, and has determined that he doesn't want to breach (and it's in his jurisdiction to determine this), the Sheriff, aware that Gray's entire family is holed up in the "compound", decided it's not worth going in. It's as well known as it is anomalous. When the police want in, and have the right to get in, they will get in. That Sheriff just decided it's not worthwhile.	Yes, they seem to have broken the law. In California, notice must be given for an eviction. This can be a 30/60/90 day notice with no reason needed (typically because the landlord wants the property for something else) or a 3 day notice with cause- the most typical being not paying the rent. Note that COVID exceptions exist, though I don't believe they apply to you. Even after that time, a landlord cannot physically remove a tenant or attempt to drive them out through the destruction/removal of property, locking them out, or cutting off utilities. They are liable for damages suffered as well as penalties. There are lawful procedures in place for this. The removal and destruction of your belongings could constitute either larceny or vandalism. Either way, by unlawfully removing your possessions, they are liable for the damages caused.
Technically, can the prosecutor have advocate? I understand, probably for many of you, lawyers, the article you’ve read is ultimately crazy, but I just thought: if everyone is equal before the court, can prosecutor use the services of a lawyer (advocate)? I think, I can name something wrong in English, also the Law of US, or other english-speaking countries, can be different from my country. By prosecutor I mean official person from the state who presents the accusing side in court. For each region of country, there is a prosecutor. In Ukraine or Russia it called like “The state accuser” (but translator translates it exactly as a prosecutor). It is very uncommon, but as alternative, the victim (if it alive, of course) can go to court by itself, and it will be called a “Private accuser”. Also I do not understand, do you understand the difference between the lawyer (юрист) and advocate/attorney (адвокат). In my country, one becomes a lawyer after finishing the University. After, you can pass special exam based on your lawyer grade to become an advocate/a judge (more complicated process)/a notary. If you do not want to pass this exams you stay just a lawyer, and You can go work to Police, for example, or to prosecutor office. Advocate (Attorney) is the person, who defends the side in the court. By the law, everyone have the right to the advocate(lawyer, Google translates it as a lawyer, I confused 😰). Theoretically, can the Prosecutor have an advocate?	The prosecutor always has an advocate The prosecutor in a criminal matter is the State. Since the State is an artificial entity it has to act through agent(s) who advocate for it. In Commonwealth countries the State is synonymous with the Crown - I suppose HRH Queen Elizabeth II could prosecute every case personally but she’s a very old lady with a lot of other things to do (this is a joke - the person is not the office).	As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury.	Yes, Defendant may compel Plaintiff to appear and may cross-examine Plaintiff personally. The right to counsel does not include the right to have an attorney testify for you at trial. At trial or deposition, Plaintiff's lawyer generally has no business testifyng at all, and his statements would not be evidence. If the attorney's testimony is necessary for trial, he would likely be disqualified from representing Plaintiff. Defendant is unlikely to persuade the judge to question Plaintiff for him. The judge might ask questions to clarify answers that Defendant elicits himself, but he might also just rule based on whatever information he receives, regardless of how clear it is.	Normally, the prosecution case will not rely upon the testimony of the defendant. Instead, the prosecution will call all of its witnesses until its evidentiary case is complete. Then, the defense case opens and it may call witnesses. The defense is not obligated to call all of the witnesses that it stated that it anticipated that it would call prior to trial and the jury doesn't know which witnesses the parties said that they anticipated that they were going to call and didn't call. Until the defense case is closed, the defendant can call himself or herself as a witness if he or she wishes to do so, but is not obligated to do so. Once a defendant starts testifying (generally in his or her own case) he or she has generally waived the Fifth Amendment right not to testify. So, the prosecution may cross-examine the defendant in this situation. But since the prosecution's case is usually already closed at this point, the prosecution's cross-examination is limited to the scope of the defendant's testimony under questions from his or her own lawyer (there are some nuances of how this is done when the defendant is self-represented and has no lawyer). The prosecution cannot expand the scope of questioning of the defendant to new topic areas. I can imagine deviations from this pattern in odd circumstances, but they would be very rare.	It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question.	In several civil law systems, including in Switzerland, the involvement of a defence lawyer can be mandatory, even against the will of the accused. If the accused does not appoint a lawyer, a duty lawyer must be appointed by the director of the proceeding (the prosecutor or the judge depending on the stage of the proceedings). The obligation to have a lawyer may extend to important civil cases in some countries before higher courts to avoid wasting judicial resources. In criminal cases, this is also to ensure the accused's rights to a competent, diligent and effective defence. The accused is responsible for the costs of the lawyer, within their financial circumstances and subject to government legal aids, if they are found responsible for procedural costs. All lawyers at bar in a canton are required to accept mandates assigned to them due to obligatory provisions of law, provided that they are competent to do so. This is regulated by art. 130 to 135 of the federal Criminal Procedure Code, in particular, A defence lawyer must be appointed to represent the accused if: a. the period on remand including the period when under arrest has continued for more than 10 days; b. the offence concerned carries a custodial sentence of more than a year or a custodial measure or may result in expulsion from Switzerland; c. the accused is unable to safeguard his or her interests in the proceedings adequately due to his or her physical or mental condition or for other reasons, and his or her statutory representative is unable to do so either; d. the prosecuting lawyer is appearing in person before the court of first instance or the court of appeal; e. accelerated proceedings (Art. 358–362) are being conducted. Essentially, all serious offences are subject to this obligation. Until now this is not a direct answer to the question posed, but it is a factor that shows the relationship between the lawyer and the client is not a simple one. Now going back to your question. In Switzerland, or indeed in most legal systems, the lawyer is to ensure that the accused receives a competent, diligent and effective defense. Indeed, if the public prosecutor or the judge believes or reasonably ought to have believed the defence is clearly incompetent or otherwise negligent in their professional duties, the proceedings must be suspended until a suitable defence is appointed by choice of the accused or by the proceeding director. so he asks his attorney to plead for innocence, saying that it's his wife, so he can do with her what he wants, and traffic laws, given he is a good driver, won't apply to him etc. The lawyer is a professional that must exercise their professional judgement. They are also a 'servant of the law' and a 'collaborator in the administration of justice' and bear responsibility for the correct functioning of the justice system (Federal Court rulings 106 IA 100, 130 II 270). In general, they are not allowed to induce the justice and the authorities in error. Thus, they cannot simply present baseless arguments before the judicial authorities. Dave is very certain that with this strategy, Alex will not only be convicted to a long prison sentence, but maybe even to a long-term preventive detention. What can Dave do to follow the wish of his client while still representing him as best as he can? If the lawyer is convinced that the strategy imposed by the client is clearly contrary to the client's interest, they may decide to withdraw from the mandate, if they can do so without seriously prejudicing the client's interest. This is the case when the accused had chosen their own lawyer, who under contractual law must follow the client's instructions and the recourse to avoid unprofessional conducts is withdrawal. For the duty defence lawyers, the accused cannot waive the right to a defence lawyer, indeed, it is an obligation on the accused, the lawyer and the judicial authority. While the law provides for replacement of the lawyer if the mutual trust between the lawyer and the client is seriously compromised, this is not simply so because the client says so. Loss of confidence on subjective grounds alone does not constitute a reason to change a duty lawyers unless the attitude of the lawyer is seriously prejudicial to the interests of the accused (Federal Court ruling 1B_307/2012). For lack of a better analogy, the duty defence lawyer would proceed to represent the interests of the accused as if the accused was mentally deficient or otherwise incompetent (not that the accused is recognized as so with respect to their criminal responsibility, but that the accused is unable, or in this case unwilling, to cooperate fully with the lawyer on their own defence). The duty lawyer can impose their own defence strategy and must do so if they sincerely believe it is in the best interests of their client (https://www.penalex.ch/faq-avocats/mon-avocat-doffice-peut-il-mimposer-sa-strategie/). Of course, the accused still has a right to be directly heard by the court, but such right is not unlimited. They can make their own representations and may note their disagreement with the defence counsel, but the accused does not have the right just ramble for two hours in the court. As it is not an adversarial system, the decision maker will take all circumstances into account and the disagreements between the client and their own counsel (despite being imposed by the law and the state) are not as much of an issue as in an adversarial common law trial. Note that an acquitted accused may still be found responsible for procedural costs (including for any obligatory defence fees) if they had deliberately caused the penal procedure to be opened unlawfully or wrongfully (even if "criminally" not guilty), or that they had deliberately made the proceeding more difficult (e.g. through multiple unjustified requests to change lawyers, or indeed possibly, presenting the arguments of Reichsbürger with insistence). Other consulted references: L'avocat dans la défense pénale : de l'obligation de dire la vérité à un droit de mentir, Flavien Morard https://sui-generis.ch/article/view/sg.53/661	No. The U.S. Attorney brings charges on behalf of the United States, which is the filing party, at least in criminal cases. That's why every criminal case is styled "United States v. [Whomever]."	The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.

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