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Can a vendor cancel an order due to a pricing error? I purchased some goods from a supplier which has now cancelled my order giving the reason as being a pricing error. However I had paid for the item and in their online portal it stated that my order was accepted. Do I have any legal rights in this case, as the terms and conditions don't state terms for acceptance of an order? Also the t's and c's don't address cancellations.	Yes they can (by their contract) - Clause 3.1: The Seller reserves the right to amend prices at any time without prior notice. Errors and omissions are excepted. However, it is possible that there are consumer protection laws in your jurisdiction that prohibit this. I think this is unlikely, however.	Option 1: The contract is not formed By writing a non-confirmation and explicitly denying the contract, the contract does not fulfil the meeting of the minds. There is no renegotiation, as the agent of the company is not allowed to negotiate. In a strange fashion, UPS would not be entitled to $50, but the customer is not entitled to any delivery, storage of the parcel or even to leave it at the company - and can't sue for the loss of more than the $50 because that is the total extent of their damages: the unjustly paid fees. Option 2: The contract is still formed as offered by UPS In the alternative, the contract has to be followed as written originally. In that case, the customer is obligated to arbitrate. In fact, the signing (or marking) of the terms of service might be simply acknowledgment of the standard contract, which was formed moments prior to the moment the customer handed over the package and paid. The customer did not get any verification of the altered terms of service from the clerk - who couldn't negotiate those deals to begin with - and instead accepted the terms by not taking back the parcel. Would the customer truly want to deny the offered terms, he'd have canceled the transaction and taken the parcel. Instead, he left it with the clerk and paid the transaction, which in itself makes a contract formation by action, very much akin to how you form a contract under the standard terms of the store by paying at the cashier for a bottle of soda. Non-Option: altered deal The clerk is not tasked with negotiating or accepting different terms from those that UPS declares. If the clerk just failed to notice the attempted altered deal, we are back to the two options above: either there is no deal, or the deal is as originally offered. Would the clerk has actively agreed to a deal that fall outside of his tasks, the whole situation collapses to a variation of Option 1, where there is no valid contract between UPS and the customer. However, in this case, the clerk is liable for the damage to the parcel and the damage to UPS.	The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem.	If they really ordered it, they entered into a contract, and you have a claim against them for damages suffered because the contract was breached. This would be a civil claim, not a criminal claim, in the Netherlands. However, if you're delivering an order that was sent anonymously, you have no way to prove that the person at the door is the one who ordered the food - and the onus would be on your to prove that it was. It could become a criminal act under a number of laws ("oplichting", "fraude", etc.) if intent can be proven but that's not easy - and you first have to get the police/public prosecutor interested in the case. It's quite comparable to someone ordering in a restaurant and not paying the bill, which is notoriously hard to prosecute criminally in the Netherlands. (Search for "eetpiraat" - dinner pirates) As a restaurant, you usually can only try to enforce a civil claim through the civil courts.	If they actually mean $0, then that is not "taking advantage". If they do not mean $0, it is most likely that they will tell you "Sorry, we made a mistake, we're not gonna send you that Rolex for $0 plus shipping". If this came with free shipping, then you would not actually have a contract, because there s no consideration on your part (no payola). Fortunately, there is shipping, so there is a contract. You could then attempt to force them to send you the goods, which they might do rather than irritate you, but not if it is a Rolex. One of the defenses against enforcing a contract is "mistake", and a $0 Rolex would be a great example of that. Things get a bit more tricky if you relied on their free Rolex. You would look up the doctrine of promissory estoppel, to see if the seller could be estopped from making the mistake argument. Let's say that you also bought a Rolex Display Case from someone else at a cost of $100 plus shipping. By relying on their promise to sent you a Rolex, you have suffered a loss. The most likely outcome is that they'd have to reimburse your Display Case expense. (Finding) mistake airfares is an industry: a common response for the airline is to say "Oops, sorry", though sometimes they honor the mistake fare. Rumor has it that rather than get trashed on Twitter, the airlines honor mistake fares. You may find disclaimer language pertaining to verification of prices and availability, which also gets them off the hook. At any rate, you certainly won't be sued or prosecuted for assuming that they mean it and buying the thing; you might be disappointed.	we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early & unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself.	Yes, but ... It doesn’t protect you. Let’s imagine you put such a clause in and a person in Europe used your service notwithstanding: they’ve broken the contract but you’ve broken the law. You get the fine and they get ... nothing. Because you can’t contract outside the law you never had a valid contract with them so you have no basis to sue. Further, because you are purporting to something you can’t legally do, you are probably on the wrong side of misleading and deceptive consumer protection law: which is another fine. If you can ensure that you don’t breach local law - like by not operating over the internet - then you can choose not to deal with e.g. Europeans. If you can’t guarantee that, then you’re stuffed.	You are not bound by any contract. You bought a physical good that the seller was barred from selling outside of the listed countries by his supplier. You did not enter a contract with the seller's supplier. Let's look the stream of commerce: Supplier of the item (Printing press) offers it. Sale with a sales limiting contract to resellers. Sale by reseller to customer without limiting contract. The first sale doctrine says, that without a form of contract, the rights of the supplier are exhausted in step 2. Even with a contract limiting the reseller's rights, step 3 exhausts any right the supplier has in the item, unless he too explicitly signs a contract. Selling an item in normal commerce is not satisfying this requirement. There already were no rights in the physical copy of the book when whoever bought the book first sold it to the second-hand seller you bought it from, and there can't be any more rights in the selling of this book gained by the original supplier unless he bought the book back from you.
Is it possible to have a "future" settlement in case of divorce? This is a shame question. But my spouse and I usually have conflict and the spouse wants to ensure we have an agreement in place for future potential divorce (e.g. money, kid..). It is the way the spouse wants to hold it against me so I don't violate a certain terms in the marriage and try to hold the marriage together. Is there such as as "legal document on future settlement in case of divorce"? For example, the spouse wants to write in there a big bite out of my assets (not 50/50) IF I cause the divorce to happen. If there is such thing, do I get notarized then?	Yes, it's called a post-nuptial agreement.	The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well.	It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.	Legalese is not required You can and should write a will in plain English. However, you need to ensure that your simple wishes can: Actually be understood, Actually be implemented, Don't have unintended consequences, Cover all bases. Use a lawyer I suggest that you write your simple wishes out as you have done and take them to a lawyer. A good lawyer will be able to: Draft a will and have it executed so that it complies with the law, Keep a copy of the will so that your executor can find the damn thing without having to tear your house apart, Consider the contingencies that you haven't. My lawyer charged me and my wife $150 each - 20 years latter the estate has twice as many children and would be worth several million dollars; I consider it one of the cheapest pieces of insurance I have ever bought. Contingencies Who is the executor of the will? This is the person who administers the estate until it is finalised. As written, you haven't named one: in most jurisdictions this makes the government's Public Trustee the executor. How and how much will the executor get paid? Executor's are entitled to be paid for their services. What happens if you and your wife are separated or divorced at the time of your death? Wills are not automatically terminated by these events. What if Bob is dead before you die? Or has emigrated? Or is insane? What if Bob dies in the same car crash that kills you and your wife? What if Bob dies after he becomes the trustee of the trust? Who will be your child's guardian? As written, Bob is responsible for the finances but he is not the guardian. The child would be reliant on kinship guardianship or become a ward of the state. For what purposes can Bob use the trust money? Education of the child? Vacations for the child? His own gambling problem? Can the trust borrow money? What types of investments can the trust make? Bolivian palm tree futures anyone? Does Bob need to get professional financial advice about this? Who will audit the trust to ensure Bob is behaving appropriately? Your wife falls pregnant tomorrow. Do you want to write a new will or have one that works no matter how many children you have? What if all 3 of you die in the same car crash? Who gets the estate then? Only people with no assets or dependants have a simple estate	Do I have any recourse for invalidating all or part of the contract? No. There is a presumption in contract law that when a contract is reduced to writing then what that writing says is what the parties agreed. Also, if you signed it, then you are legally stating: I read it, I understand it and I agree to it - don't sign things you don't understand. If your lawyer has produced something you don't understand then have them redraft it until you do. Would a successful suit against the lawyer for malpractice or negligence make any difference? No. A suit against you lawyer may get you damages from your lawyer but it will not affect the rights of third-parties. What is best practice for avoiding flawed contracts like this in the first place? Read and understand the contract. Educate yourself enough in the law so that you can do this. Your lawyer is there to give you professional advice; you are there to make your own decisions.	Most Likely Yes to both. It really depends on the nature of your agreement, oral agreements are as legally binding as written ones, but as a matter of evidence in court written contracts are of course better. So looking at your agreement: did you agree to pay the full amount, in return for a place to study? Or did you specifically agree to pay on a rolling basis, where you pay for however long you actually study? I would believe that you had agreed to the first type of agreement, since that is what most study contracts are. And if that's the case: You pay to be allowed to attend, whether you actually attend or not isn't important. And even if you pay on a rolling basis, I would think in a lawsuit the court would find that - judging on previous payments - you'd have agreed to pay on a per semester basis, meaning that the incomplete semester would round up and you would still have to pay for it. I would lean yes to the 2nd question (but im not sure so anyone with more info please chime in). This answer can be more useful if you be specific about the terms and conditions of your study	When it says "any e-filed document submitted in support of, in opposition to, or in connection with any motion or application must be delivered to the courtroom clerk assigned to the Department in which the motion or application will be heard" this appears to apply to motions and other requests and not to complaints. This said, the easiest way to determine the answer would be to call the clerk of the court's office and ask. An answer from a clerk of the court would be definitive and easy to secure.	Courts have inherent jurisdiction to reconsider/recall their own decisions. This rarely happens (especially if the decision has already been "sealed" i.e. issued in writing) but still possible. The principle of finality only applies to parties asking courts to reconsider; it does not constrain courts themselves. So, in this example, "the judge agrees to vacate them" but that decision hasn't been sealed yet. The judge can easily just change their mind (although, again, it rarely happens). No double jeopardy applies because it is still the same trial.
If there's no majority candidate, does the incumbent or newly elected Congress choose the President and Vice President? If no candidates get a majority in the U.S. electoral college, are the President and Vice President chosen by the incumbent Congress or the ones just elected?	The newly elected Congress does all of the work in electing a new President. Under the 20th Amendment, the newly elected Congress takes office on January 3. Then three days later, on January 6, 3 USC § 15: Counting electoral votes in Congress, requires the new Congress to meet in Joint Session to count the electoral votes. If this session does not produce a President or Vice President, there is what is called a contingent election. In a contingent election the House begins immediately to choose a President from among the top three electoral college vote getters, while the Senate chooses a Vice President from among the top two electoral college vote getters. Both Houses use majority rule. The House votes by state, so a majority is 26, while the Senators vote individually, so a majority is 51. If the House does not pick a President by Inauguration Day, January 20th, the Vice President serves until a President is picked. If neither a President nor a VP has been picked by the 20th, the Presidential Succession Act applies, and the Speaker of the House, President pro tempore or a cabinet officer serves as Acting President. It wasn't always done this way: The 20th Amendment was passed in 1933 to take control over elections away from the lame duck Congress. Before the 20th A was adopted, the terms for P, VP and Congress all ended on Inauguration day, March 4. That meant the lame duck Congress had to deal with electoral matters. By giving Congress and the P/VP different expiration dates, the Amendment meant new Congress could deal with the election. Setting the election counting date after the new Congress was seated (on January 6), meant only the new Congress could.	There is no definitive answer, which can only be determined by SCOTUS if faced with a case. DOJ has opined twice that "the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions". The Impeachment Clause (art.I, §3, cl.7) says Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law The exegesis of this clause is that this means a sitting president cannot first be prosecuted for a crime, but must first be removed from office. The counter-argument is that "nevertheless" indicates that this clause only states that a president can be removed and then prosecuted, and that removal does not preclude further action. In other words, the law has yet to be determined on this matter.	Yes. US Constitution, at Article two, Section two, provides that the President has the power to nominate the justices and appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate. There is nothing restricting the President from doing this on any particular day from beginning to end of his term, and also no restriction on when the Senate may give their advice and consent.	Not less than a full house of Congress, and perhaps Congress as a whole, might have standing. It is hard to see anyone else who would. The law of Congressional standing (the link is to a report of the Congressional Research Service, a policy research arm of the Library of Congress that does research for Congress) is quite involved and is not perfectly consistent and clear. Congress would argue that it has suffered an institutional injury as an institution and perhaps authorize someone to bring suit on its behalf via a joint resolution. As the Court explained in Arizona State Legislature, an “institutional injury” is an injury that “scarcely zeroe[s] in on any individual member,” but rather “impact[s] all Members of Congress and both Houses . . . equally.” There is considerable uncertainty regarding how this would be applied which is not really at issue in this case at the present time since Democrats control both houses of Congress and support the President in this policy. Individuals legislators lack standing to sue in a case like this one. See also Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, "Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court", 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571 (2014); Matthew L. Hall, "Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation", 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1539 (2012). A blog entry from a law professor considers the question and comes up with the Congressional standing analysis above, the notion that a loan serving company paid on the dollar value of the loans serviced might have standing (which isn't inconceivable but is a stretch), and finally considers "competitor standing", a minority view that I do not think is sound in these circumstances (because the forgiveness is retroactive only and does not change competitive positions going forward).	Article II of the Constitution does say that "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors". So it is true that a president or a federal judge could be impeached and removed from office, and it has happened to some extent 19 times – in 8 cases it went all the way to removal (as opposed to acquittal or resignation). However, this would not be a very effective way to avert a "crisis". Any judicial ruling is subject to appeal by a higher court, until you get to the Supreme Court. Moreover, impeaching a lower judge does not erase his or her rulings. So ultimately, a matter will be decided by SCOTUS. In anticipation of such a ruling, Congress might decide to get rid of some Supreme Court justice who they think might stand in the way. That was attempted with Samuel Chase, who was acquitted. Such a decision is not subject to judicial review (Nixon v. United States 506 U.S. 224). However, SCOTUS can also overturn that decision though that would be very unusual. It would also be very unusual for Congress to impeach a Supreme Court justice for having a position that they disagree with. At any rate, there is no such thing as a "deadlock" between branches of government. When the court rules, that is the end of the matter from a legal perspective. It is, in fact, entirely possible that a general will rule that the court or the president (or both) are wrong and will declare what the law now is, but that takes us out of the realm of legal discussions.	Not all by itself. It requires the consent of the legislature of the existing state, as well as of the US Congress. But if they all agree, then yes, it is possible. US Constitution, Article IV, Section 3: New states may be admitted by the Congress into this union; but no new states shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of the Congress. You might like to read about how West Virginia was created out of Virginia in 1863. Of course the State of Virginia had already seceded, and the Confederate legislature obviously didn't consent, but the federal government recognized a separate "Restored" government of Virginia which did consent.	The electors being "appointed" simply means that they are chosen for that office. They may be chosen by election, they may be chosen directly by a state legislature, some other mechanism might be used. The Constitution leaves that entirely to the states. 3 U.S. Code § 1 says: The electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year succeeding every election of a President and Vice President. When it says "every election of a President and Vice President" it means the vote of the electors. Thus it says that the electors are formally appointed four years after the previous set has done so. 3 USC § 7 goes on to say: The electors of President and Vice President of each State shall meet and give their votes on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December next following their appointment at such place in each State as the legislature of such State shall direct. So they are appointed in November, and then vote in December. 3 USC Chapter 1 does not refer to "election day" in any sense meaning a popular election Note that these code sections dates from 1948. The Federalist #68 says, in relevant part: It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture. ... A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations. ... Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice. All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office. (emphasis added) The above makes it clear that popular election was expected to be used to choose the electors, although it was not used by all states at first, and was not invariable until after 1860.	The Constitution states the only possible restrictions on presidential power, thus a president can exercise the powers of the office except if dies, is impeached, or the 25th Amendment becomes relevant. If the VP decides to can can get a majority of the relevant principal officers to agree, POTUS can be deemed unable to discharge his duties. Congress has not designated any body other than the executive departments for satisfying that requirement. After the disability is communicated to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, the Vice President immediately assumes the powers of the president. However, the declaration of disability is revoked when the president informs the Senate Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House in writing that no inability exists, and he resumes his powers. Then, if within 4 days the VP and a majority of the cabinet again vote that the President is incapacitated and communicate that decision as above, then POTUS does not resume his powers. If and when this comes up, there will be some discussion about the timing of the re-vote. The amendment says, specifically Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Assuming that the inability is not instantly re-certified, then there are at least two ways to interpret this. One is that the president temporarily re-assumes power until 4 days pass or the disability is re-affirmed. The other is that the president must wait 4 days before re-assuming power (and the VP remains in power). Then SCOTUS will have to decide what the amendment "means". Assuming that the inability is re-certified within 4 days, then by a vote of 2/3 of both houses of Congress, Congress decides if POTUS is disabled. Specifically: If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office. In this case, the language of the amendment makes it clear that the VP becomes acting president. The unclarity is limited to whether, between declarations of disability, actions of POTUS are legal.
Student wearing political shirts in school? Let's say a student wore a shirt in a New York school that said "I✡️JQ", and the school principal ordered him to stop wearing it because it was offensive and he complied. But later came back with a shirt that said "Made in the USA With technology engineered in Europe" and refused to stop wearing it and was suspended, can get an injunction against the school to protect his freedom of expression?	Option 1 is that this is a private school. The school can establish whatever rules they want. There might be a cause of action for breach of contract, but more likely there is some clause saying "You have to do what the principal tells you". Private organizations are allowed to completely suppress you freedom of expression. Option 2 is that this is a public school, in which case they are bound by the First Amendment (which is a limit on government action). Such a prohibition is legally untenable, but you may have to go to court to get an official ruling on the matter. If speech is objectively disruptive, it can be limited, but your examples are not objectively offensive or disruptive, they are simply somewhat provocative. Here is a summary from the ACLU of what public schools can't do w.r.t. student appearance.	In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another.	There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law.	Can he name a particalur one, like Linkin Park? Or that would be considered non-allowed type of advertising? Generally speaking, that does not constitute unlawful advertising. Public figures are allowed to broadcast their preferences on issues that are more sensitive than topics of music. There might be few, rare exceptions where something like this would be outlawed, but most likely that has to do with a regime's censorship of specific bands or music styles rather than with a general prohibition.	The state has wide discretion on what to require that a school teach to children, particularly in the K-12 grade range. There is little case law where a parent or private school has challenged such requirements. However, for a state to forbid that certain things be taught would probably run into a first amendment problem, because the school has free speech rights. In addition, if the school is a religious one, forbidding teaching its dogmas and views might also impact the free exercise clause. Note that a state need not permit homeschooling at all, and some states do not. When a state requires that a school teach something that it disagrees with, it can often follow a line such as "Many people think X {Standard state supported concept} but we believe Y instead. Then it has taught X, but not endorsed it. Some religious schools have handles the teaching of evolution in this sort of way. If a state mandated teaching matters of opinion as fact, such as "CARTER WAS THE MOST HANDSOME president EVER" there might well be a challenge, and I am not at all sure how it would be resolved.	How is banning such events constitutional with the freedom of assembly? The rights created by the First Amendment are not absolute. They are subject to reasonable restrictions as to time, place and manner, especially if those restrictions are content neutral. Restrictions narrowly tailored to protect against genuine threats public health and safety fall within the exception of the First Amendment even if they are not strictly content neutral, that is commonly described by the rubric that you don't have a right to falsely cry "fire" in a crowded theater (causing a riot that could harm people). For example, suppose that a rope bridge over a deep gorge can only support the weight of ten people, and three dozen people want to hold a protest there. A regulation that prohibited more than ten people from engaging in the protest would be constitutional. Even then, however, a lack of content neutrality (e.g., restricting punishment to false statements likely to incite a riot) can't also be a lack of ideological neutrality (e.g. restricting punishment to anti-Catholic but not anti-Jewish statements likely to incite a riot). If it were a political protest/gathering would this change? Generally speaking political protest/gatherings are still subject to content neutral regulations of time, place or manner, and those narrowly tailored to protect genuine threats public health and safety. So, for example, if there is a genuine COVID-19 risk that public health officials are trying to address, and the regulation of gatherings is not viewpoint or content based, it would be upheld as constitutional in the face of a First Amendment freedom of assembly limitation. But, if the regulation applied, for example, only to Republican and not Democratic party protests or gatherings, which is a viewpoint or content based restriction, it would not survive a First Amendment freedom of assembly challenge.	Yes, such as this limitation on free speech. Initially, the limitation was "Clear and Present Danger" test (Schenk v. United States, 1919) which held that speech inciting lawless action was not protected speech and thus could be crimilized speech (i.e. Schenk publishing anti-draft fliers during World War I, which advocated draft dodging which at the time was a crime under the Espionage act of 1917). This was later over ruled to the "Bad Tendency" test which allowed for advocacy of criminal actions to be criminilized (Whitney v. United States, 1927. Whitney was accused of helping establish the American Communist Labor Party (ACLP), which held as a party platform the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government in favor of one advocated by the ACLP. This is standard to most Communist Parties at the time around the world. The difference between Schenk and Whitney was that Schenk actively called for a criminal action, where as Schenk was speaking of a future action following other party successes). This was overturned again by Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969) which introduced the "Imminent Lawless Action" test. This explicitly overturned Whitney in addition to other cases not mentioned such as Abrams v. United States (1915), Giltrow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951). It does not overrule Schenk, but it did cast doubt upon the decision made. In the case, KKK leader Brandenburg made a speech advocating for revenge against African Americans and Jews as well as expressing the belief that the United States government actively surpressed White Americans and needed to be opposed. He was charged as advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Imminent Lawless Action added the important componant that the violation must be advocacy of lawless action (revenge against racial minorities) must have a definite future date (like "tonight", "tomorrow", or specific time and date) and a vague future time will not count. And must show intent to break the law (Brandenburg did not specifically intend to break the law... he wanted it changed so it would not be legal before he took action). Additionaly, they found that the mere advocacy of resisting the government did not have any language componant that suggested violent resistance. Brandenburg, as discussed, overturned the reaffirmed B and put Schenk on some shaky ground as parts of Shenk were still relevant (Schenk first introduced that Free Speech was not without restrictions, but some of the case law was not relevent anymore, as Whitney used it as a basis in that decision, as did to a limited extent Dennis, which didn't work well with Whitney for other reasons. It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court does not typically take cases that wholly reaffirm past cases. Typically, their rulings are to clarify situations in a previous case that are not stated by the current extant rulings. For example, if the Supreme Court took a case that called Roe v. Wade into question, the case would more likely test whether Roe allows for a particular practice that isn't all that clear in Roe. It may affirm that Roe is still law, but the new case is not consistent with Roe, which will place a restriction on Roe, but not, figuratively, (pardon the pun) throw the baby out with the bath water.	You don’t have to swear Witnesses are given the option to swear (technically take an oath) or to affirm, which has no religious connotations. You also don’t actually swear on a Bible if you do swear. For example california. The US is a very religious state france is a secular state - it prohibits religious clothing (hijabs, crucifixes etc.) in schools. The united-kingdom (specifically England) has an official state religion (Anglican) but religion is far less prevalent in politics or society than it is in the US. For example, outside of a place of worship, who your mother is sleeping with is a far more acceptable topic of conversation than what her religious beliefs are. Which is not to say it actually is an acceptable topic of conversation, just that it’s more acceptable than religion. australia elected its first openly atheist Prime Minister in 1983. The US was not founded on the idea that there shouldn’t be established religion, just that there shouldn’t be a state religion - that is, a church backed by the power of the government. Many of the early settlers were fleeing religious prosecution from state religions. Nevertheless, it was never the intention to exclude religion from politics. Indeed, religion in the US influences politics to a much greater degree than it does in most European or Anglophone countries.
Can the law of a country be applied over a resident of another country? Let's say for example that I am the resident of country X. I'm a hacker and I decided to hack into bank accounts of people from Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi Arabia has a law which prohibits hacking bank accounts and gives a penalty of cutting the hands of the criminal if he is caught doing that practice. My own country also has a law forbidding hacking bank accounts, but instead gives a penalty of 5 years of prison if I ever get caught. I'm a citizen of country X, and I decided to hack the bank accounts of people from Saudi Arabia. However, due to failure protecting my identity, the government of Saudi Arabia was able to get hold of my name and my home address. Can Saudi Arabia track me down and have me subjected to their law and proceed to cut off my hands, or am I going to be subjected to the punishment of my own country's law?	The victim's country might seek the suspect's extradition from the country of residence. Extradition is a formal law enforcement process whereby the authorities in each country cooperate to hand over the suspect to the victim's country. Whether extradition can take place depends on factors such as: whether it's permitted by the constitution of the country of residence - some constitutions do not permit the extradition of their citizens whether there is an extradition treaty between the two countries (e.g. the US-Canada extradition treaty) or as part of the laws within a supranational body of which the countries are members (e.g. the EU) the outcome of an extradition hearing, if there is one - the suspect might be allowed to appeal against the extradition (and against an adverse decision) whether the government of the country of residence approves or blocks the extradition A case pertinent to your hypothetical is that of Gary McKinnon, a Briton resident in the UK who was accused by the US government of hacking into many military and NASA computers. He was indicted by a federal grand jury and the US sought his extradition from the UK. After a few years of litigation, including appeals to the-then superior court of the UK the House of Lords and the European Court of Human Rights, which on the whole went against him, his extradition was blocked by the-then Home Secretary Theresa May on human rights grounds. A process outside the legal system of the victim's country is extraordinary rendition - although sometimes the government of the suspect's country secretly cooperates. This is state-sponsored kidnapping or abduction - agents of the 'victim' country grab the suspect and move him to that country or some other place. So far as I'm aware, however, it has not been used on hackers - only people suspected of terrorism. There is at least one known case where the person was abducted by mistake. Alternatively the two countries might come to an agreement whereby the person is tried in the country of residence and punished there if convicted.	I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server.	the statute only applies to EU residents Wrong. GDPR applies to everyone in the EU (Art. 3). This means tourists are also covered. Residence status is completely irrelevant (Recital 14(1)): The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence There is no provision for data processors/controllers to demand proof from data subjects of them being located in the EU. You can challenge them, but if they refuse to provide proof you will still be liable to fulfill their GDPR request should they indeed be present in the EU.	It depends Law in international airspace over international waters is the law of the country the plane is registered in - just like a ship is considered land of the registered/owner's country while in international waters. This is, according to the Britannica, also called the quasi-territorial Jurisdiction. So if this were a Lufthansa Flight, technically everything there happens in Germany under the Tokyo Convention and German Law (StGB §4) and the case can be held in Germany. For United Airlines it means, that the act happened in the US and if it was an Air Japan flight, it would be Japan, no matter in which airspace it happens. However, other laws might also make the law of other countries apply and put the people into the jurisdiction by virtue of law applying globally: if the perpetrator or victim were US citizens, any felony that happens between the two on that flight can also be prosecuted in the US, as they claim jurisdiction in those cases. Similarly, the UK and Germany have similar laws, in the latter case for only a subset of crimes (StGB §5, 6-11a). This is the principle of personal jurisdiction. But technically, the quasi-territorial jurisdiction can override that. And that again is overridden once the plane lands and enters the territorial jurisdiction of the harboring country. All involved countries can elect to prosecute or not, and there is no double jeopardy problem as we have separate sovereigns. Who is most likely to prosecute? Depends on the case, but in the least, the country of registration has Jurisdiction and will usually get the first crack at the case. However, extradition treaties and other treaties between two countries can give preference to the country of the nationals. BTW: we had pretty much the same question for murder on a plane.	Residency under Texas law is determined by various individual laws for different purposes: probate (in case you die), divorce, in-state tuition, voting, fishing licenses. Your question is in the realm of landlord-tenant law, which does apply to one or more rooms uses as a permanent residence, but there is no requirement that the tenant be a "resident" in any legal sense. So that law is applicable no matter when you arrived in Texas.	I have never heard of anything like this. I guess when you say "registered in that place" you are referring to Russian resident registration. The US doesn't have such a system, so this sort of certificate wouldn't even make sense.	To answer the last part of the question: Jurisdiction would be where the copied media is being producted and where it is being consumed/sold. Moving media from one jurisdiction with ineffectual protections to another jurisdiction is part of product piracy. The scheme you suggest might shield the company producing the counterfeit goods, leaving the importers holding the bag. If the importers and manufacturers are controlled by the same person, courts in jurisdictions with strong protection might hold that person liable for the whole criminal enterprise. There is a widespread assumption that the internet is 'beyond national laws.' That is wrong. Enforcement may be difficult in some cases, but the laws apply. If you try to make profits by skirting the edges of law, you need really good, really professional legal advice.	I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down.
Do I have to pay taxes if I register the domain but the website income belongs to someone else? If I am the registrar of the website domain name, meanwhile the website/business is running and registered in another country, who is obliged to pay taxes for the income of business, me as registrar of domain or the owner who runs the website/business in their country? I tried to do a research but I didn't found any answer to this specific question. Would be happy if I have your help here. Thanks in advance	Do I have to pay taxes if I register the domain but the website income belongs to someone else? No. The person or company who runs, and/or profits from, the business is the entity under obligation to pay all the applicable taxes: Value Added Tax, income tax, corporate tax, and so forth. Unless you charge a significant amount therefor (see the comments), the mere registration of just one domain is unlikely to trigger tax obligations.	It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations.	I am unfamiliar with specifically US laws on this but under common law (which US law is derived from) there is the crime of "Theft by Finding", however, because you turned it over to the authorities who, after the required time period were unable to find the rightful owner, the money becomes yours. However, you still have to pay your taxes on it: http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/07/03/found-money-is-awesomebut-must-pay-uncle-sam/ As far as I can see, income is income whether it comes as cash, diamonds or long lost antiques. As far as the money laundering aspect, that is something the authorities would need to prove - as opposed to you just being lucky.	If GDPR applies, then no one can opt out. If it doesn't apply, then an IP block is superfluous. Whether GDPR applies is determined by Art 3 GDPR. For this, we must distinguish where the data controller is operating from. It is irrelevant where the site is hosted, but primarily relevant where the data controller (your colleague) has an “establishment”, e.g. where he resides or typically works from. Per Art 3(1), GDPR applies to all processing activities in the context of an European establishment, regardless of where the users are. So if your colleague were running this site from Europe, they wouldn't be able to circumvent GDPR by blocking European users. However, if your colleague is running this site from outside of Europe, then Art 3(1) doesn't trigger. Per Art 3(2), GDPR can apply to processing activities where there is no European establishment. There is the Art 3(2)(a) “targeting criterion”: if your colleague “offers” goods or services to people who are in Europe, regardless whether paid or gratis, then GDPR applies to all processing activities related to this offer. I'll discuss this more below. There is also the Art 3(2)(b) criterion: if your colleague monitors the behaviour of people that occurs in Europe, then GDPR applies. For example, an app collecting geolocation information or a website creating interest profiles for ad targeting might trigger this criterion. An IP block can help to establish that no offering/monitoring related to people who are in Europe is happening, but it might not be necessary. It may be worth talking a bit more about the targeting criterion. The GDPR explicitly says that mere availability of a website in Europe doesn't imply that GDPR would apply. Instead, it is necessary to establish the data controller's intention – are they soliciting users from Europe, or otherwise expecting that people from Europe might use those services? Recital 23 gives a couple of non-exhaustive factors that can be considered here, for example: the site uses a language or currency used in the EU but not used in the controller's own country the site mentions users or customers from Europe, e.g. in testimonials This means that a lot of US websites, written in English or Spanish, only mentioning payment in USD (if any), not mentioning any European countries, will not be subject to GDPR. Then, occasional European visitors are irrelevant. It wouldn't be necessary to IP-block potential European users. However, such an IP-based block would help establish that the data controller really doesn't intend for those services to be offered to people who are in Europe. My personal opinion is that it's wasted effort to block users from foreign countries in case their foreign laws claim to apply, but if such a block brings peace of mind that might be worth it. While geoblocking might not be necessary, is it sufficient? There is no clear guidance on this subject, but it seems to be generally accepted that IP-based geoblocking is fine, even though it is trivially circumvented using VPN services. Of course, if a website were to block European IP addresses but were to also advertise that people in Europe can use their services via VPNs, that would probably still be an “offer” and might defeat the point of doing any geoblocking. The Art 3(1)(a) targeting criterion is most easily applied to things like ecommerce where physical goods are shipped to the customer in return for payment – so essentially whenever the data controller participates in the EU Single Market. This is roughly similar to the concept of a Nexus in US tax law. But in principle the targeting criterion can also apply to other kinds of websites or apps such as blogs, even if they are gratis. GDPR does not just apply to for-profit commercial activity, and doesn't distinguish between controllers that are entities/LLCs and controllers who are natural persons. Things are slightly more complicated due to the Art 3(2)(b) monitoring criterion and the pervasive use of online trackers on websites, but this aspect of the GDPR is difficult to enforce and frequently ignored. In this answer, “Europe” means the European Union (EU), the European Economic Area (EEA), and the United Kingdom (UK). Note that countries like Norway are covered by GDPR, whereas Switzerland is not. Of course, the GDPR is not the only privacy law relevant internationally.	Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite.	We don't know the circumstances. It could be that his business didn't owe any taxes, or that he did clever things to avoid having to pay taxes (legal tax avoidance), or that he did illegal things to avoid having to pay taxes (illegal tax evasion). In the UK, it is possible to run a company completely legal without having to pay taxes: You must make no profits to avoid paying corporation tax. You must keep your revenue below £83,000 a year to avoid paying VAT, alternatively only sell things that have 0% VAT tax (I think children's clothing fit that category), You must pay employees less than £11,500 a year each to avoid having to pay income tax on their behalf, and you must pay yourself less than about £8,000 a year to avoid paying tax and national insurance. (The company could pay you dividends to increase the money up to £16,500 tax free, but it can't really pay dividends to yourself without making profits).	You premise is correct. The processor is someone that processes data on your behalf, and since the GDPR definition of processing is extremely broad, that is about every third party subcontractor that you use for data processing, including various cloud providers. I'm afraid it will soon become a huge mess with a gazillion contracts to sign. I disagree. Yes, the GDPR says that a contract between the controller and processor must exist, but Article 28 of the GDPR does not say anything about how the controller shall document these instructions. Basically, in cases like the one you describe where John Doe relies on a web agency for having a contact form on the web, there will be a standardized (by the web agency) service agreement between the John Doe (controller) and the web agency (processor). There is nothing stopping the parties from agreeing that this service agreement that John Doe accepted as part of the onboarding procedure is also the DPA as required by the GDPR. Putting something like the following in the service agreement would do it: The parties agree that this Service Agreement between You (controller) and Us (processor) set out Your complete and final instructions to Us in relation to the processing of Personal Data and that processing outside the scope of these instructions (if any) shall require prior written agreement between You and Us. You also agree that We may engage Sub-processors to process Personal Data on Your behalf. The Sub-processors currently engaged by Us and authorized by You are listed in Annex A. I think we will se a lot of amendments in service contracts as the GDPR gets better understood, but I don't really see a flood of DPAs in addition to these amended service contracts.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.
Dual U.S./canadian citizen living in Canada who has never resided in the U.S. can vote or not? I am a Dual U.S./canadian citizen living in Canada who has never resided in the U.S. but my deceased mother lived and was born in Michigan and i was told i could register to vote but all Michigan voting sites states i must provide proof i lived in Michigan in order to vote? true?	This document from the Michigan Sec'y of State says that "A US citizen who has never resided in the US and has a parent, legal guardian or spouse that was last domiciled in Michigan is eligible to vote in Michigan as long as he or she has not registered or voted in another State". You then use the Federal Post Card Application or the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot, which you can get here.	People often use "passport" as a metonym of "citizenship," but that should not lead one to mistake the two. Notably, many US citizens live their entire lives without having a passport. A fairly brief search didn't turn up an explicit statement from an official government source that passport revocation does not affect US citizenship, but that is quite clearly the case if one reads between the lines of the fairly sizeable statutory and regulatory provisions governing both. Nationality law is codified at 8 USC 1401 and following, with the sections governing loss of nationality beginning at 8 USC 1481. The regulations concerning nationality generally are found at 8 CFR 301 and following, but there are not many regulations concerning loss of nationality. Passport law is found in an entirely different title of the US Code, and titles are the highest level of division in the code. It is in 22 USC 411 and following. There are provisions that restrict eligibility for a passport scattered around in there without any section applying specifically to passport revocation. That is found in the related regulations. Passport regulations are codified at 22 CFR Part 51, with revocation being the subject of Subpart E, which is 51.60 and following. There may be an explicit statement in the regulations that passport revocation does not affect citizenship. I did not look very thoroughly. But a bit of logical reasoning shows why it must be so: The conditions for loss of US nationality are very well defined. They are also fairly tightly circumscribed by several decisions of the US supreme court in the decades following the second world war. The conditions for revocation of a passport are much less strict; as an example, a passport may be revoked under 22 CFR 51.62 and 51.60 if the bearer "is the subject of an outstanding Federal warrant of arrest for a felony, including a warrant issued under the Federal Fugitive Felon Act (18 U.S.C. 1073)." US nationality is required to hold a US passport, but US nationals do not need to have a US passport. Therefore, a US passport may be revoked for a reason that cannot lead to loss of US nationality, and, when that happens, US nationality is retained. The condition mentioned in point 2 is clearly insufficient for depriving someone of US nationality, not least because the subject of an arrest warrant is only suspected of having committed a crime. Depriving a suspect of their liberty is acceptable to the extent necessary to bring that person to trial, but further deprivations beyond that end would violate the constitution's guarantee of due process. A word on "nationality" and "citizenship" in US law is in order, lest the use of the two terms seem inconsistent or arbitrary. US nationality is broader than US citizenship. All US citizens are US nationals, so loss of US nationality implies loss of US citizenship. However, there are some people who are US nationals without being US citizens, so it is more precise to speak of "loss of nationality" than "loss of citizenship," and indeed that is the term used in US nationality law.	Skyborn are a known phenomenon. Country Citizenship? Generally, the kid automatically gets citizenship from his mom (and father) through bloodline, so our skyborn on that plane is likely that citizenship(s). There are cases that can't grant a citizenship that way (among them: Vatican is only granted ex officio) The sky is also treated as an extension of the land below. If the country you fly over has Jus Soli, it grants citizenship to the baby born above it. The USA has Jus Soli in its 14th amendment, our skyborn baby has dual citizenship to whatever country the mom is from. And in case the plane is over unclaimed water - think a nonstop flight Vancouver-Tokyo by Lufthansa - maritime law applies: The airplane is registered somewhere and treated as territory of that land while over international water. Lufthansa is in Germany, so the kid is, on paper, born in Berlin Germany (as that is what Germany prescribes for air- or seaborn). Germany does not use the unrestricted jus soli but the first test is the bloodline to determine what's the kid's citizenship is, unless the kid would have no citizenship through bloodline. So, if any one parent is German, the child is German. jus soli applies mostly to children of someone who has a permanent residence permit for at least 3 years and has been in Germany for the last 8 years: then the kid is (also) German, even if that grants dual citizenship - till the child is 23 and has to choose one of its citizenships. However, if all known parents are stateless or can't grant the kid citizenship through their bloodline (Yes, that happens!), then the kid born on this international flight has the right to become a German citizen - but some rules still apply. Which City/District/State is responsible? Now, which state's office is responsible? That is even more tricky. Technically, OP's kid that is born in Nebraskan Airspace is a Nebraskan, so it should be a Nebraskan birth-certificate. But the general rule in maritime practice would be to file the papers in the next port the ship lands, that would be Maryland if applied to planes. For a german registered ship or plane (my Lufthansa example), the responsible municipality would be Berlin, unless another municipality is responsible. US State citizenship? And then, I thank hszmv for this US Addendum: It should be pointed out that in the U.S. state citizenship is based on primary residency and can be changed over time. I've personally been a Maryland citizen, a Florida Citizen, and a Maryland citizen for a second time in my life. Usually state citizenship denotes exclusively where your vote is cast. No state can restrict a U.S. citizen from taking up residence in that state per constitution. So the Nebraska vs. MD distinction is academic only... the kid could move to California for the rest of his life without much fanfare. So, as a result, let's assume the parents of the Skyborn actually live in New York. Then te kid gets registered as a New York Citizen, his place of birth is "Above Nebraska" (or the state's equivalent rule) on OP's hypothetical. The couple on the Lufthansa flight could ask to have Berlin (Germany) written into the record, as that is where the interior of all Lufthansa planes is to be considered under the law over international waters.	Any country is free to decide what actions are considered to be crimes, and what crimes are prosecuted depending on whether you perform the action in the country, outside the country, and depending on whether you are a citizen, a resident, both, or neither. They can also decide what are accepted defences in court and which are not. Any other country is free to decide under which circumstances they will ever extradite someone to that first country. Now you have to check the laws of the individual countries.	I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down.	Documents from countries which did not sign (or to be received by non-signatory countries) must be certified by the foreign ministry of the source country (or its equivalent) and then further certified by the foreign ministry of the receiving country, before such documents can be used in legal proceedings. The Wikipedia article says: A state that has not signed the Convention must specify how foreign legal documents can be certified for its use. Two countries may have a special convention on the recognition of each other's public documents, but in practice this is infrequent. Otherwise, the document must be certified by the foreign ministry of the country in which the document originated, and then by the foreign ministry of the government of the state in which the document will be used; one of the certifications will often be performed at an embassy or consulate. In practice this means the document must be certified twice before it can have legal effect in the receiving country. For example, as Canada is not a signatory, Canadian documents for use abroad must be certified by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa or by a Canadian consular official abroad, and subsequently by the relevant government office or consulate of the receiving state. This seems to answer the question rather completely.	As the link in your OP says, in the USA you do not have a legal signature. So the question for you is what signature do you want to change? That will give the answer to how you can change your signature, Your signature is used as a evidence that you signed a given document. If you said "no I di not" then potentially it could go to court, and the side claiming that you did sign might produce other evidence, or have a handwriting expert examine what you say is your signature, etc. Implications: For really important documents, often the parties will want a notarized signature. This means that someone who has a commission attests 'Yes, I saw her sign this." For something somewhat important, they might have a witness, but not a notary. In some cases, they might have a signature on file that is then compared. So the bank has a signature card (or now electronic on a pad). They can then compare a check to that signature. So to change your "legal signature: for checks, go to the bank and sign a new signature card. For something like mail-in voting, they check against the signature you used when you registered. Maybe that is the signature on your driver's license. Honestly, I think you would have to go and get a new driver's license. If it is not time critical (like you want it changed for this election), you can just use your new signature next time you come up for renewal. Speaking of driver's license, that is used to check your signature, is in a way it is the closest we have to a de facto "legal signature," in the same way that the card (or a non-driver ID card from the same place) is our de facto "official ID." So again, go get a new driver's license or just use your new signature next time you need a renewal. Summary: Go to the bank (all of the banks you have an account with) and sign a new signature card. Go to the DMV and get a new license, or just change your signature when you need a renewal.	If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase.
What is the exact meaning of this Article about loss of liability limitation? The Article below comes from a Convention. I am confused about the exact meaning of its last part: A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result. I divide this Article into three parts for easy understanding: if it's proved that the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, (which is) committed with the intent to cause such loss, or (committed) recklessly. Thus my question is: Should the last part -- “and with knowledge that...” -- come after “recklessly,” after “committed with the intent”, or should it modify both? Please let me know how you understand (and divide) this Article. Any suggestions are welcome. Thank you.	Maritime law has a lot of weird rules, but the normal rule of statutory construction is that scienter requirements -- intent, knowledge, recklessness, etc. -- apply to everything that comes after them, until a new scienter requirement is stated. That would leave you with a statute looking like this: A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that the loss resulted from: his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss; or his personal act or omission, committed recklessly; and committed with knowledge that such loss would probably result.	All torts have to be proved. In 99.99% of cases the proof is by admission of the tortfeaser. That is, they agree to pay damages with or without admission of liability. Where liability is contested, there are never any “slam dunks”. There are strong cases, even very strong cases, but when someone else is deciding the case, there are no certainties. Remember, if your opponent thought they were going to lose, they’d settle. Looking at your examples, it seems that the tort you are thinking of is negligence. In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of torts, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. Where the issue is not one of evidence, that is, the facts are as you say and are not in dispute, the question is not “what happened”, but “is what happened negligence”. For all the examples, 1, 3, and 4 are probably not in dispute: there was a duty, the conduct caused damage at law and the plaintiff actually suffered harm. The question to be decided is whether the driver failed to conform to the required standard of care. For examples 2 and 3, most courts would conclude they didn’t. For example 1, some courts might decide that the way the driver drove did conform to the required standard and others that they didn’t. The legal argument would not be about “proof”, it would be about the standard the law requires.	Your personal liability depends on your state law regarding the family car doctrine, so the answer there is "maybe" (Texas is not a state with that doctrine, so simple ownership of the car does not confer liability). You would be liable if your supervision of the child was negligent, which means approximately that you knew or should have known that she was a bad driver and would cause damage. Still, the insurance company is suppose to indemnify you (plural) against such loses, as long as they are legally required to do so. That would include many considerations, such as whether the driver was covered under the policy, whether the car was being used contrary to the terms of the policy (being used commercially), and so on. The insurance company is entitled to make a reasonable determination of whether they are responsible for the loss (and if so, to what extent). If they actually decline to cover the loss, you would need to sue them to make them comply with the terms of the policy (and your lawyer would give you a detailed explanation of why they are not liable, in case they aren't). The plaintiff works with his insurance company to recover his insured losses, and with his lawyer to recover any uninsured losses. His insurance company works with your insurance company, up to a point, and then the lawyers get involved. Your daughter does not work with his insurance company, and your insurance company probably has said something along the line "only talk to us". The insurance that a driver typically has may cover some of their own medical costs, but does not provide a payment for "pain and suffering": that is an uninsured loss. It is not generally required that drivers carry insurance to cover their own medical expenses – it is required that they insure against damages, in general, suffered by other parties (if the defendant is at fault). So there is probably nothing for the plaintiff to work out with his insurance company. In Texas, if the defendant is entirely at fault, defendant will be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 90% at fault, defendant will be liable for 90% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 49% at fault, defendant is not liable. Defendant can, in any event, also sue for damages, so if defendant is 49% at fault, defendant can recover 49% of her damages. The insurance companies might be able to talk it out and reach a clear resolution of the matter, but it could be more in their interest to throw the dice and work it out in court. One can always sue at the very start, and drop the suit if it becomes advantageous.	By definition this is not an intentional crime or tort (i.e. civil wrong for which one can sue). There are several standards of intent (also called mens rea) other than knowledge that one is committing a crime or intent to commit a crime, that are commonly applied to criminal offenses and torts: Strict liability Negligence Gross negligence Willful and wanton conduct Recklessness Extreme indifference Strict liability would be highly unlikely to apply to unintentional encouragement of violence. Usually, in the criminal context, it applies to traffic offenses, like speeding or drunk driving defined by blood alcohol content. Negligence is often a basis for liability in a lawsuit or for other civil remedies (e.g. cause to fire someone from their employment), but is usually only a basis for criminal liability when a death or very severe injury results (e.g. vehicular homicide) or when the circumstances are such that there is a heightened risk involved in an activity (e.g. discharging a firearm, or treatment of a small child in one's custody). Even then, for criminal law purposes, liability is usually only imposed in cases of truly "gross negligence." One could imagine highly stylized fact patterns where gross negligence encouraging violence could give rise to criminal liability (e.g. gross negligence by the commander of a military unit under military justice) but this would be a rare and exceptional situation. Willful and wanton conduct, and recklessness, don't require actual knowledge or specific intent, but do presume disregard for objectively obvious risks. Under the Model Penal Code, this is the default standard of intent that applies when no specific standard is articulated in a statute. Unintentional but reckless conduct encouraging people to be violent might very well give rise to criminal liability. Extreme indifference (also sometimes called deliberate indifference) is an extreme form of recklessness in which one acts with total disregard for the consequences when one clearly knows or should know that serious consequences are almost certain, even if the precise consequences to whom or what are not known. This level of intent is often treated as equivalent to intentional conduct and would often give rise to criminal liability. There are many potentially relevant federal and state statutes that could apply, but this is the general lay of the land regarding unintentional conduct.	Criminal negligence pertains to criminal acts, which are prosecuted by the government and where a defendant can be convicted and punished. There will be a statute explaining where "criminal negligence" is relevant and when it is applicable. Here is the section in Washington law about criminal negligence: A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. There are a number of criminal offenses where being "criminally negligent" in doing the thing is sufficient, for example mistreatment of a child or manslaughter. First degree murder requires "premeditated intent to cause the death of another person" which does not does not include "criminal negligence" (there is a separate clause about "under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life" which is different from criminal negligence). "Gross negligence" can arise in a number of other non-criminal circumstances, and is defined (and discussed) here. Gross negligence is the failure to exercise slight care. It is negligence that is substantially greater than ordinary negligence. Failure to exercise slight care does not mean the total absence of care but care substantially less than ordinary care. This concept arises under numerous laws such as the gross negligence of government officers in fish and wildlife matters, where the game wardn can be sued and found civilly liable for gross negligence in performance of duties. He can't be imprisoned (it's not a crime), but he can be fired or forced to compensate the damaged party. There is no clear difference in what level of negligence we are talking about, instead the difference has to do what what kind of law we are concerned with. Usually (?), crimes are intentional acts where the prosecution has to prove that the defendant intended to do so-and-so. But laws are also written so that certain levels of bad behavior also punishable, such as tricking a person into falling to their death as part of a jackass stunt. One use of "gross negligence" in a civil case is that certain act may be immunized against liability arising from simple negligence (Good Samaritan law for example), but not gross negligence.	Severability My understand [sic] of contract law in general, is that an illegal or unenforceable clause does not render the whole contract void, but rather that specific clause is essentially stricken out, as if it did not exist. This is not true. Or, at least, not necessarily true. The courts, when interpreting a contract, try to give effect to the parties intentions. Or, more precisely, what an impartial, reasonable person would conclude their intentions at the time were based on the evidence. A contract is a set of mutual promises - if one of those promises is unenforceable, was it the parties intention that: the remainder be enforced, or absent that promise, they would not have made a deal, or they would have made a different deal, say, at a different price? It’s hard to make general statements about severability because they turn on the particular facts of each case. However, the common law doctrine is that severance means severance - you can take words out, but you can’t add words in or change the meaning of words you left behind. If doing that leaves nonsense, then the clause can’t be severed, and the whole contract is void. Further, what’s left must still be a contract. If the severed portion leaves a remainder that does not meet the requirements of a contract (e.g. because the severance totally removed one party’s consideration), then the whole contract is void. Similarly, if the severed item is central to the purpose of the contract, then the whole contract is void. Finally, at least in Common Law countries, there is a difference between provisions that are unenforcable (e.g. unfair restraint of trade clauses) and those that are illegal (e.g. your murder before resignation clause). In most jurisdictions, if a provision is unenforcable at common law or through statute, severability is an option. However, if the provision is illegal, then responses differ. In England and Wales, a provision that requires criminality or the commission of a tort cannot be severed - the illegality 'infects' the entire contract and makes the whole thing void. However, in Australia, the degree of illegality matters - heinous illegality infects the entire contract, but incidental illegality may not. For example, see REW08 Projects Pty Ltd v PNC Lifestyle Investments PTY LTD [2017] NSWCA 269 [23 October 2017] - the NSW Court of Appeal ruled that a property sale that contained clauses designed (by both parties) to defraud the state of Stamp Duty was nevertheless enforceable against the vendor - this would likely have been decided the other way in England and Wales. Of course, many contracts make express provision for unenforcable terms in what are known as severability clauses. These can go further than mere severance and allow the court to add words or even redraft entire sections to preserve the contract. However, this is not a panacea because what you agreed to in your severability clause may not be what you thought you agreed to when the rubber hits the road. For example, when you are forced to sell your Picasso for the 1,000USD deposit only, and you can't get the 100,000,000,000 Iranian Rial balance due to US sanctions. Therefore, deliberately leaving unenforcable provisions in a contract is dangerous because you don't know what you are going to get. However, is it unlawful? Well, that depends. There is nothing wrong with making legally unenforceable agreements. You and I can agree to go to the movies this Thursday. That's an unenforcable social arrangement, not a contract. If you stand me up, I can't sue you even if I bought popcorn for you. Similarly, there is no prohibition on having unenforcable terms in an otherwise legally binding contract, particularly if everyone knows they are unenforcable. Indeed, many large contracts are accompanied by Memorandums of Understanding that are unenforcable statements about how various organisations intend to work together to give effect to the contract. However, if the term is included to be deceptive or misleading by one party against the other (intentionally or otherwise), there may be legal consequences. A person who was misled into entering a contract may be able to have that contract declared void. Also, many jurisdictions make misleading and deceptive conduct in trade or commerce an offence.	It depends... It could be an offence under section 5 Public Order Act 1986: (1) A person is guilty of an offence if he— (a) uses [...] disorderly behaviour ... [...] within the hearing or sight of a person1 likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby. Then there's Causation to consider, which is: whether the defendant's conduct (or omission) caused ... harm or damage. And also recklessness, which can be described as: unjustified risk-taking. In R v G [2004] 1 A.C. 1034 two boys set a fire which caused significant damage. They were charged, and convicted, for reckless arson contrary to section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971: (1) A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence. ... (3) An offence committed under this section by destroying or damaging property by fire shall be charged as arson. This conviction was quashed by the House of Lords who determined that test of recklessness for criminal damage is subjective and should take account of, for example the defendant's age (in R v G they were 11 and 12). The court determination was: A person acts recklessly within the meaning of section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 with respect to - (i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; (ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk. But compare this with DPP v Newbury and Jones [1976] AC 500 if someone were to die as a result of being hit by a brick: The defendants, both teenage boys, had thrown a piece of paving stone from a railway bridge onto a train which had been passing beneath them. The object struck and killed the guard who had been sitting in the driver’s compartment. The defendants were convicted of manslaughter, and unsuccessfully appealed, on the ground that they had not foreseen that their actions might cause harm to any other person. Lord Salmon explained that a defendant was guilty of manslaughter if it was proved that he intentionally did an act which was unlawful and dangerous and that act caused death, and that it was unnecessary that the defendant had known that the act in question was unlawful or dangerous. 1Note that there has to be such a person, not a hypothetical one, to be guilty of this offence.	does the individual have a legal case against the company? Unfortunately, no. Some details and terms you use are unclear (e.g., "phantom" equity, "manifest" core technology, and so forth), but your overall description reflects that the individual sabotaged himself by signing a contract that does not mention the promise of equity through which he was persuaded to engage. A written contract usually supersedes any prior agreement --regarding the subject matter of that contract-- between the parties. That superseding effect means that the contract formalizes or overrides, accordingly, said agreements or promises. Since the initial promises of equity are not reflected in the "interim" contract, the investor's subsequent silence upon individual's reproach/reminders is from a legal standpoint irrelevant. At that point only the terms of the contract matter. The individual might consider alleging mistake in the sense of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 151-154 such that would make the contract voidable and perhaps "make room" for other theories of law. However, that seems futile unless the interim contract contains language that (1) provides specific conditions for its expiration, or (2) reflects the company's [mis-]representations that induced the individual to sign it. Neither seems to have occurred in the situation you describe. There is always a possibility that the contract might favor the individual's position and he just has not noticed it. But the only way to ascertain that is by reading the contract itself.
How can it be legal to prohibit marriages based on religion and nationality? As far as I know marriages between jews and non jews are prohibited in Israel. Even Israel citizens have to go to Cyprus to marry. How did this law come into existence? Is there an enforceable international law that regulates such laws?	Westphalian Sovereignty Israel has decided that this is the law in Israel and they are the only one who gets a say in this. The concept of the modern nation-state can trace its origins to the Treaty of Westphalia (possibly - there is disagreement among historians and political scientists but for our purposes we'll just let them get on with it) which ended the 30-years war. This was a complex and dynamic conflict of which one of the contentious issues was who had the right to determine the laws in a particular territory, particularly religious laws - the local prince/king/duke etc. or the Emporer. Long story short - it wasn't the Emporer. This is embodied in Article 2(1) of the UN charter: The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. That is, Israel and only Israel gets to decide what the law is in Israel. Which is to say, that what the law is in Israel is down to internal Israeli politics. Israel is a democracy so this is down to democratic politics. International law only allows involvement when the actions of a sovereign state (UN member or otherwise) infringe on the peace and stability of other sovereign states. I realise that there is a whole area of discussion here but suffice it to say that the internal operations of the UN are political rather than legal. However, laws on marriage in Israel seem unlikely to have international peace and security implications.	What is the status of songs that glorify illegal activity in different countries? germany Depends on the crime and the lyrics. For historical reasons, glorifying genocide is banned. Calling for crimes to be committed against individuals is banned. More generic 'gangster rap' pretending to a criminal lifestyle is allowed. The exact dividing line between the two comes out in court precedents, which weigh the freedom of expression against the freedom from insults and criminal threats. Are there any countries where my question would be illegal to write? Sure. Consider North Korea, where those lyrics would be evidence of decadent Western speech patterns and get punished by two years to life (or more, if the police has a quota to fill).	switzerland A mariage that is only made to get citizenship or a residence permit is illegal. The german legal term for it is "Scheinehe". This is defined as Eine [Scheinehe] liegt dann vor, wenn das heiratswillige Paar offensichtlich keine Lebensgemeinschaft führt, sondern die Bestimmungen über Zulassung und Aufenthalt von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern umgehen will. A sham marriage (see below for terminology) is on hand when the couple that requests the marriage obviously doesn't live in a partnership but wants to circumvent the laws about immigration and residence of foreigners. The marriage registrar may deny the marriage, or it may even later be voided. This source says that you can get a fine or a prison sentence of up to three years for this. If one even takes money to enter a fake marriage with someone, the sentence can be up to five years. So, better wait for the right one ;-) Terminology remark: It needs to be distinguished between the terms "Scheinehe" (english "sham marriage") and "Konvenienzehe" ("marriage of convenience"). The later is a marriage mostly to keep one's social status and is typically arranged by the parents. This is legal and was very common in former times. In some countries, e.g. in India, it is still common. It differs from the sham marriage by the fact that the social status of both spouses is the same.	Immigration and naturalization is pretty far out of my comfort zone, but I'm confident that the answer is yes. Although people often believe that a foreign embassy is considered the territory of that country, I don't know of any law that supports that belief. Instead, through the Vienna Convention, the embassy grounds remain the territory of the host state but are provided a variety of protections and immunities because of their diplomatic status. With the embassy on U.S. soil, the child would therefore satisfy the "born ... in the United States" prong of the 14th Amendment's Citizenship Clause.* But that would not be the end of the analysis, as birthright citizenship also requires not just that the child is born in the United States, but also that the child be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." So if the child were born to an American citizen who had entered the Indian embassy to get a travel visa, the child would be both born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, making it eligible for birthright citizenship. But if the child were born to Indian ambassador or to diplomatic staff, who would generally be able to claim diplomatic immunity, that child would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and would not be able to claim birthright citizenship. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73, (1872) ("The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States."). * I haven't been able to find any cases saying this explicitly, but all the cases involving children born in foreign embassies sort of skip over the question as though they just assume that the child was born in the United States. See, e.g., Raya v. Clinton, 703 F. Supp. 2d 569 (W.D. Va. 2010); Nikoi v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 939 F.2d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1991) These cases also go on to conclude that those children are not citizens of the United States, because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."	An anti-BDS law may be invalid in some circumstances, but this has nothing to do with the establishment clause of the First Amendment. Boycotting or not boycotting Israel is not an inherently religious question and isn't justified as such. More often the issues will be pre-emption by a higher level of government's laws, lack of legal authority to enact such a law under an authorizing statute, or possible the "dormant commerce clause." The linked material in the OP refers to the First Amendment freedom of association and possible the First Amendment freedom to petition, not to the establishment clause.	Everything is allowed unless the law says it isn’t Common law systems like the USA are ‘exceptions based’ - the law permits everything except what it prohibits. So, your question is backwards - rather than looking for laws that allow it, you need to look for laws that prohibit, restrict or regulate it. There are laws that regulate this but none that prohibit it.	Legally speaking, very many nations grant asylum, and religious persecution is one of the most basic grounds for granting asylum, following the 1951 Refugee Convention. This newspaper article compares asylum statistics in Ireland versus other parts of Europe. The Irish immigration authorities spell out the details for an asylum application. Note that you must already be in Ireland, to apply for asylum in Ireland (you should apply when you enter the country). One could also apply to Norway (almost an English-speaking country), but again you have to be in Norway to do so. There is a generic solution to the "what if I'm not in country" problem via the UNHCR, which can propose resettlement into various countries. I need to add that getting a visitor's visa from certain countries can be extremely difficult. To take an example, Norway (which is fairly open to refugees) is pretty up-front on the chances of getting a visa, based on country. To take a random example, they are not very optimistic about visitor's visas from Iran, and they say "we consider how probable it is that you will return to your home country or the country you live in when the visit is over. We consider the situation in your country and your own situation", "If we believe that it is unlikely that you will return, your application will normally be rejected" and "If you plan to visit Norway as a tourist, you will normally not be granted a visa". This is the fundamental problem that refugees face, the problem of getting there. One country that allows visa-free admission from Iran is Turkey. This guide (which is in Farsi so I can't comment on) provides practical information on the UNHCR asylum process "the political asylum process for Iranians in Turkey": that may indicate that apostasy is a different matter. Other evidence suggests that this option is worse than staying put. Only for the sake of discussion, Svalbard is a theoretical possibility. Svalbard (next to the North Pole) is part of Norway, but Norway treats it as being somewhat outside of Norway. It is outside the Schengen visa area, and it is a visa-free zone, meaning that nobody requires a visa to visit or live there. This is due to the Svalbard Treaty whereby Norwegians and treaty nationals have equal rights to the islands, and while most nations are not treaty signatories, it has been policy to extend those rights to everybody. The Governor does have the power to expel anyone who is a burden on local society (e.g. unemployable). Normally one would have to get a Schengen area visa to get there, which would be an obstacle, but it is apparently possible to get a same-day visa-free transit at Oslo Airport, if travelling non-stop to Svalbard (I cannot find a definitive policy statement on this matter, but I also am not sure where exactly to look). There are some air routes from outside Schengen where the first Schengen stop is Oslo. The Governor's office gives appropriate warnings about local problems (ridiculous prices, housing shortage, work shortage, more polar bears than people, really cold).	There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.
Why is a company allowed to change the number of shares it’s divided into after its IPO? I read that even after an IPO, a company can change the number of shares that it’s divided into based on a board vote. What’s to prevent them from arbitrarily increasing the number of shares to raise capital, thereby diluting the value of the outstanding shares? I understand that a company might refrain from releasing all of their stock into the market initially so they can sell it later to raise capital, but it seems strange that they would be allowed to raise money by decreasing the value of an asset that shareholders have already bought. In other words, what’s to prevent a company from saying every quarter: “Instead of being divided into n shares, we’re now divided into n+100 shares. We’re keeping 50, and the other 50 will be offered in a PO (which will decrease the value of the outstanding shares)”?	There are two different kinds of transactions that are implicated by your question. The first is a stock stock split. This simply turns 1 share into X shares and trades out existing shares for new shares. This has no economic effect and is simply done for the convenience of trading shares for prices that are easy to work work on a practical basis, for example, in software listing stock prices. The second is an initial public offering, which, confusingly, means not just the first time that newly issued stock is sold to the public by the issuer, but any time that newly issued stock is sold to the public by the issuer. The possibility of dilution is real in this situation. Abuse of that possibility is primarily managed through the fact that the Board of Directors whose approval is required to issue new stock and sell it to the public, have a fiduciary duty to the company to sell the new stock at a price commensurate with the fair market value of the currently outstanding stock. If the Board of Directors breaches that fiduciary duty to the company, then shareholders may bring what is called a derivative action to enforce the duty that the Board of Directors breached to the company. Lawsuits of this kind make up a significant share of the total volume of cases in the Delaware Chancery Court, a state court in the U.S. state of Delaware where most large publicly held companies are organized. These cases are also often litigated in the state courts of New York State and of California, both of which are also popular states for publicly held companies to be incorporated in. Also, keep in mind that the Board of Directors is elected by the existing shareholders, and while most publicly held companies have "Soviet style ballots" in director elections from a pre-set slate of candidates, a proxy fight to run a competing slate of candidates is allowed is existing shareholders are unhappy with their performance. Normally, as a matter of practical reality, the Board of Directors is quite responsive to coalitions of shareholders with substantial holdings who care about the value of their shares as opposed to political issues only tangentially related to the company. A Board of Directors is usually aligned with the interests of the existing shareholders and doesn't have an incentive to screw them over by diluting the value of their shares. People who don't like how a Board is running a publicly held company usually sell their shares and invest in some other company instead, rather than risk being diluted. SEC approval and approval from state securities regulators is also required for an initial public offering (including a subsequent offering of new shares by a public company) but that approval requires only full disclosure of the transaction and the company's financial situation, and cannot be denied on the basis that the transaction is unfair to existing or to new shareholders on account of the price of the offer. It is allowed because the whole purpose of a publicly held company is to raise capital to engage in business activities. When a publicly held company needs more money to do something it has several choices: An initial public offering of corporate bonds. An initial public offering of new stock. A private loan from a bank or affluent individual. Options 1 and 3 increase the debt to equity ratio of the company and increase the company's risk of default on existing loans, while imposing a minimum cashflow requirement that it may not be able to fulfill in the event of a short term economic disruption (like the current pandemic). In the case of a very big investment, there may simply be no lender who has the capacity to lend enough money privately. Option 2 makes the company more creditworthy and can be economically desirable to existing shareholders is the shares are sold at a price that makes it a cheaper source of capital than borrowing money at the interest rates currently available to the company. If the capital raised makes possible an investment that increases profits for the company by a greater percentage than the existing shareholder's interests are diluted, it is a good deal for existing shareholders.	"Backlogged" has no legal status. Under usual contract terms, all intellectual property you generate as part of your employment belongs to your employer. But "intellectual property" is a category of rights, such as patents, trademarks and copyrights. An idea by itself is not intellectual property. "Wouldn't it be great if ..." cannot be owned by a company. However, specific ideas can be trade secrets, and trade secrets are protected. It's likely that your idea is a trade secret, if the idea applies to the sort of business that your ex-employer is involved in. The fact that it's called promising by the company reiterates that.	Maybe You linked to the publication of a patent application, not to a patent. Based solely on looking at the format of the number the answer would be, Yes, unless it eventually became an issued patent. As it happens, it did become issued patent US9066511B2. That would make the answer no. Since the application was filed before you started selling them, the fact that you were selling them in 2017 could not be used to challenge the patent. I say the answer is maybe because the patent has been disputed in court and I do not know if the outcome has left the patent valid. You can look this up at the USPTO Public PAIR. Then you need to search with either the patent number or the publication number. When you get to the record of the history of that application look at the Image File Wrapper tab.	When you license your IP (like a song) you can specify the terms and conditions of its use by the licensee, including revenue shares from any derived work. However, if, as your comment suggests, you grant an "informal" license, and later decide that you want to "firm things up" with a license having different terms, that's a matter you would have to either negotiate or litigate with your counterparty. If you want a common reference point for negotiation of this sort of license, you might have a look at compulsory license terms.	Can bankruptcy be used as strategy to avoid paying back investors? Are there examples of such behavior? In the United States, a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is frequently used as a way to cancel equity investments and to reduce or eliminate long term bond debt (especially subordinated bond investments) by senior management, in an effort to keep the business operating as a going concern and keep their elite senior executive jobs, and the jobs of many subordinate employees and contractors of the business. Pretty much every single business bankruptcy reduces the amount of return that investors in the company can receive from it (although there are rare cases when investors can be compensated in full in an orderly disposition of a company's assets but bankruptcy is filed to prevent a fire sale of assets in a disorderly fashion that would hurt investors, or hurt them more than the alternative outcome). A key factor here is the segregation of ownership and management in most big businesses. A large equity owner in a company is in a poor position to defraud other equity owners in bankruptcy, however, and equity owners are behind debt investors in priority in bankruptcy, so it is also hard for the equity owner to use bankruptcy to defraud debt investors without hurting the large equity owner. In some ways, this is a variant on a leveraged buy-out by management, because usually, in a big business bankruptcy, a key step is for management to secure a third-party lender to the bankruptcy debtor (G.E. Capital was the dominant lender in this market for many years), to finance the continued operations of the business until a plan could be put in the place to reorganize the company with less debt and none of its old equity investors. This is almost never a strategy of the company at the outset. It is one that is chosen once it becomes clear that its business model has ceased to be viable with the amount of leverage that the business has. Often, in such a plan, some long term debt that is not subordinated is converted to equity, although that equity is usually worth less than the original equity investment of the investors in the firm. Typically, this strategy is used when a company with a large initial capital investment is in a market where it can still make a profit relative to its variable operating costs from the revenues it can secure in current market conditions, but can no longer afford to service its long term debt that was used to make that large initial capital investment (e.g. in a building or factory) that has decreased in value because the products made with that investment are no longer as valuable as they used to be, or because, for example, patents expired but the long term debt wasn't paid off during the terms of the patents. For example, many U.S. coal mining companies in the U.S. have recently had Chapter 11 bankruptcies. These companies made large investments in coal mining operations that were economically sensible when coal was worth more and alternatives to coal were not economically viable. But, when renewable energy became cheaper with changes in technology, and environmental requirements made coal fired power plants more expensive, the market price for coal collapsed and those companies could no longer support the debt that made it possible to conduct the mining operations that these companies had incurred. In a reorganized fashion, some of these companies could continue to be viable with lower sales volume and lower coal prices since they now only had to pay current operating costs and not obligations to investors in those companies. What are the mechanisms in place in US law to prevent people from creating a company to attract investors with the intent of filing for bankruptcy as a strategy to not repay their debt? This strategy doesn't really make sense as a plan from the issuing company's point of view, it only makes sense if the person promoting the scheme has some way to extract value from the investment made by the investors. The company itself that issued the securities (typically stock or corporate bonds) in which the investor invested also isn't a suitable target of litigation because the company that issued the securities simply doesn't have the assets to pay damages to the investors. If one can show that the company incurred debt with an intent not to repay it, and is followed by transfers out of the company without receiving substantially equivalent value in exchange to some third party behind the scheme, this can be regulated by fraudulent transfer laws. See Section 4(a)(2) in the Uniform Act numbering although individual states adopting the act as state law invariably number the sections differently). This conduct can also be used to seek securities fraud liability or common law fraud liability from the persons other than the company itself (such as its officers or brokers or promoters of some other kind) involved in promoting the company. Footnote Re Importance Of A Formal Bankruptcy The bankruptcy code component of this analysis isn't a particularly important part of the strategy. A limited liability entity can dissolve itself, or make an assignment for the benefit of its creditors of all of its assets, or be placed in a receivership, outside of bankruptcy, with similar effect, since the discharge of debts is not relief associated with a Chapter 7 liquidation of a limited liability entity (although debts can be reduced or eliminated as part of a Chapter 11 plan so long as the creditors are at least as well off as they would be in a Chapter 7 liquidation or otherwise consent to the plan).	In business dealings, you would have a contract with a company, not with its owner. The new owner inherits both the assets and liabilities of the company. It's up to the buyer of the business to do due diligence before buying the company. The old owner may escape obligations to clients and suppliers once the sale of the business is complete, but the new owner could sue the old owner for fraud. (It may be possible to escape some liabilities by declaring bankruptcy, but that's not the situation you described. One unethical accounting trick that a company can use is to split the company into two corporations such that one branch inherits the liabilities, and it go defunct.)	There is certainly precedent. This list of the 10 biggest class action lawsuits in the world indicates that 8 of the 10 were by investors against their own company. In any event your analysis is flawed. The people who initiate the class action may (probably are) no longer be investors because they sold their shares and realised their losses. Further a legacy investor who didn't buy on the basis of the company's wrongdoing would not be entitled to damages. Finally, an investor who bought at say $100 on the basis of false information (like the cars were legal when the company knew they weren't) and now hold shares worth $40 will wait many years (if ever) to make good their losses: a lawsuit will be quicker and more certain.	Just think of the subtenant cum owner as two separate people with two separate roles. Tenant = T Subtenant = ST Old owner = OO New Owner = NO The rights of the tenant vis-avis the new owner will be informed by the lease and the local laws. Generally, if the sale happens in the middle of the existing lease, the NO is obligated by the terms, as is the T. NO cannot just kick T out, and T cannot just break the lease. The lease may say what could happen and local laws will apply. Likewise, ST has whatever contract with T that previously existed. Pretend NO and ST are different people. If T owes NO $1000 per month, and ST owes T $400 a month, that continues even though ST and NO are the same person. Depends on what kind of dispute. See above. All contracts continue, subject to whatever the lease with the original owner and the subtenancy agreement say abut modifying or breaking the lease and sublease. Local laws apply. Note, if the subtenancy was "off the books" or was done when not allowed by the original owner, and if it was not in a place that the local law says owners cannot deny subleasing, then tenant might not have any protection. ST, now that he is owner could just move out and stop paying. On the other hand, even if he is the owner, he cannot just say "I am the owner now, so I am moving back in for free" because the original lease gave the tenant use of the whole property. But ST could just drop out because T always owed OO, and now NO, the full rent. Do you mean if rather than sublease, they were both on the original lease? Interesting, but just imagine it as the obligations before the sale = the obligations after the sale. I don't know though. There are some tax implications for an owner occupied rental.
What if someone accuses another person of killing him in his last statement before death Suppose, Person X has some minor feud with person A. If X sets himself on fire and accuses A of killing him (last statement before legal authorities) and later dies. Will last statement of deceased work as criteria to punish accused A? How does last statement weigh against evidences? Don't go in the matter whether it was a suicide or murder. Point of question is about last statement of deceased. Please mention respective law prevalent in India.	To "punish" A there must be evidence that would convince the court beyond reasonable doubt. The last statement will be just a piece of admissible evidence. Just by itself it will certainly not be enough to prove A's guilt, but it may add weight if there are other corroborating pieces of evidence e.g. witnesses saying that X indeed killed themselves because A made them do so etc.	The answer provided by Dale M is half right, but there are a few things that I think are wrong. Firstly, the actual reality of the situation doesn't matter. What matters is that you act in a reasonable manner, performing assessments of the situation as a reasonable person would do. If you misread the situation, and end up killing a police officer that was acting in a lawful manner, it doesn't necessarily mean you were acting unlawfully yourself. Because police officers are generally exposed to situations where they would be forced to use their firearm, that obviously would impact how a reasonable person would see the situation, but the test for reasonableness would not go out the window. In addition, even if you were found to not be acting in a reasonable manner, there is certainly a question if you would be found guilty of a lesser charge of manslaughter rather than murder. It's possible the self-defence claim would be upheld as an imperfect defence.	Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing".	Being misunderstood is not a crime. You could concoct scenarios where any number of statements could be a crime if interpreted unfairly. "I went to Georgia last weekend." "I choose to believe you mean the country instead of the state, and you don't have a passport, therefore you admitted that you went to a foreign country illegally!" The police would be free to investigate, but they wouldn't be able to get a warrant or arrest him based just on an ambiguous statement, let alone obtain a conviction. Of course, if the younger sister decided to accuse him, and the older sister decided to lie about having a relationship with him, that puts the statement in a whole other context - but if someone is falsely accusing you and someone else corroborates their story, you're probably in trouble no matter how exactly that came about.	There are instances when the testimony may still be admitted. For example, a deposition may be admitted at trial either for impeaching or when a witness cannot attend, which involves the circumstance of death (FRCP 32(a)(4)(a)). Additionally, regarding hearsay, there are numerous exceptions. My Evidence professor said in class "If you cannot find a way to get evidence around a hearsay objection, you are not trying hard enough." One such hearsay exception states in the committee notes: Accordingly, the committee has amended rule 803(8) to refer to the provision of [proposed] rule 804(b)(5) [deleted], which allows the admission of such reports, records or other statements where the police officer or other law enforcement officer is unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process.	Note: The answer to the question is not the same in every U.S. state and territory. I have provided definitive answers only when there is unanimity or near unanimity. Did the deceased's family obligate themselves by not returning the the first service, that of the Notice of Appeal? No. Unless they expressly agree to do so in writing to be responsible for a decedent's debts (which almost never happens in the U.S.) next of kin of have liability regarding the debts of a decedent (at least by virtue of being next of kin, obviously, if they were, example co-defendant in a case who participated in the wrongful conduct, that could be another matter), except that it may result in a claim against the probate estate which reduces the size of their inheritances (potentially to zero), if timely asserted in the probate estate. As the next of kin are they obligated to receive the mail addressed to the deceased? No. Also, counsel for a decedent are terminated as counsel as a matter of law upon the death of a client. It is customary for a lawyer in the case (often, although not necessarily, the lawyer for the decedent if the decedent was represented by counsel at the time of death) to file a document usually entitled "suggestion of death" in the pending case when someone dies. But, no one is obligated to do so, and if the party is self-represented in the case (a.k.a. pro se), or that party's lawyers have withdrawn from the case, neither the decedent's former lawyers, nor anyone else in the case, may even be aware of that fact that the party to the case has died. What would be a possible remedy to keeping the claim active against this defendant albeit deceased defendant? File a claim in the estate of the decedent if the deadline for filing claims has not lapsed (which two years later, it may very well have). Normally, either a claims deadline that functions by operation of law (e.g. a state law non-claim deadline one year after the date of death), or a claim deadline arising from publication of a notice to creditors in the legal section of a newspaper in the area where the decedent died in a manner prescribed by state statute, would bar the claims, especially if the status quo was that they had been dismissed at the time of the decedent's death, even if there were still undistributed assets left in the probate estate after the deadline for filing claims has expired. It may also be possible to do a substitution of parties of the decedent's probate estate for the decedent in the pending case, if a probate estate has been opened and the deadline for filing claims has not yet lapsed. If a probate estate has not been opened, usually, after a certain amount of time, a creditor may open up the estate without the consent of the next of kin, or a public administrator will be appointed if there are no next of kin who have done so, and there are assets left to be managed in the probate estate. The law governing exactly when a probate estate has liability for the debts of a decedent incurred during life is a matter of state law that varies in significant detail between different states within the United States and is quite technical. I've written a couple of Colorado Bar Association journal articles on that subject applying Colorado law (Andrew Oh-Willeke, "Creditor's Rights In Probate - Part I and II", The Colorado Lawyer, May 2015 and June 2015). Note that the general rules may not apply in all cases to lawsuit brought "in rem" (i.e. adjudicating rights in a particular piece of property) although those kinds of cases aren't very common in federal court and would rarely involve the fact pattern set forth in the original post. Footnote Re Federal Civil Procedure For many years there was a lack of clarity, and/or a split of authority between U.S. Court of Appeals Circuits, over the proper time to appeal a ruling dismissing a party entirely from a case as a matter of federal civil procedure in various circumstances. It was resolved a few years ago, but I don't recall the outcome of that case. The general rule, expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) is that the dismissal of a party in a case cannot be appealed unless the trial court certifies that decision as final for purposes of appeal which is a discretionary decision for the trial court judge.	It depends on the law For example, the NSW Crimes Act 1900 s18 defines murder and manslaughter: (1) (a) Murder shall be taken to have been committed where the act of the accused, or thing by him or her omitted to be done, causing the death charged, was done or omitted with reckless indifference to human life, or with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person, or done in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission, by the accused, or some accomplice with him or her, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for life or for 25 years. (b) Every other punishable homicide shall be taken to be manslaughter. (2) (a) No act or omission which was not malicious, or for which the accused had lawful cause or excuse, shall be within this section. (b) No punishment or forfeiture shall be incurred by any person who kills another by misfortune only. It is possible that the acts you describe could be prosecuted as either murder or manslaughter. For murder the prosecutor would need to prove that they are an "act by the accused ... causing the death charged, was done ... with reckless indifference to human life" - the hard part is the causal link. For manslaughter it is clear that the act "was ... malicious" and that there was no "lawful excuse" - some cause and effect would need to be demonstrated still. However, the prosecutor has a more certain option under s31C: 31C Aiding etc suicide ... (2) Where: (a) a person incites or counsels another person to commit suicide, and (b) that other person commits, or attempts to commit, suicide as a consequence of that incitement or counsel, the firstmentioned person shall be liable to imprisonment for 5 years. It is important to look at the legal definition of a crime to determine if a given set of circumstances meets all the required elements.	"If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining.
Could US mayors/governors order their state police to arrest unmarked federal agents? Could the local US governors/mayors, who reject federal agents on their streets, legally order their local police force to arrest all people, who are violence and don't wear any insignia? Or would it be illegal for them to arrest the federal agents, even when they don't wear any insignia showing their role as federal agents?	Revised for clarity in light of comments State and local police can arrest anyone who they have probable cause to believe is breaking state or local law. Like all LEOs, Federal LEOs can break some state and local laws while enforcing Federal law. When they grab someone off the street and hold them in a cell, they are detaining them, not kidnapping them, and so on. However, to avoid arrest, the Feds have to identify themselves. That's because state and local LEO who know they are dealing with Feds on federal business no longer have probable cause to believe a crime is being committed. State and local police can arrest Federal LEOs who they: a) have probable cause to believe are breaking state or local; and, b) have no reason to believe are Feds enforcing Federal law. In other words: Any Fed who refuses to identify herself to a local LEO can be arrested if there is probable cause. State and local police cannot, however, arrest Federal LEOs just because they are not wearing insignias. That is because: a) there are no federal statutes requiring federal LEOs to identify themselves; b) the Supremacy Clause says federal law takes precedence over state and local law that conflict with it; c) at least in Portland, the feds were not operating under any sort of formal agreement with Portland or Oregon officials that required them to have identification. While it is hard to prove a negative, the question of whether Federal LEOs are required to identify themselves has been looked at recently by reputable sources. They all agree there is no such law. For example, the answer from Lawfare: Broadly speaking, law enforcement officers do not have a legal duty to disclose either their identities or their agencies of affiliation, even if asked directly. Certain municipalities require police officers to identify themselves if asked, but there is currently no federal statute requiring officer disclosure of such information. The article points out that the two main types of cases involving police identifying themselves really don't apply: police who are working undercover, notably in sting operations, and police searching and seizing property. They go on to point out: Separate from the question of federal law, several states have adopted laws and regulations requiring law enforcement to identify themselves. For example, under New York City’s Right to Know Act, a broad set of police reforms that went into effect in October 2018, officers must tell civilians at the start of some interactions “their name, rank, command, and shield number.” (Also, many departments have policies that generally require officers to identify themselves, although with exceptions. You can see examples of the policies here.) Again, these local laws do not apply to Feds because of the Supremacy Clause. NOTE: As several of the news stories note, the lack of identification will make it very hard to hold Federal LEOs accountable for their actions. Accountability requires identity.	In general, yes, police could do this. I am not aware of any US state or locality which requires an officer to execute a stop as soon as a traffic violation is observed. Whether the police would act in such a way is another question, but in some areas maximizing citation revenue is a high priority, so police in such areas might act in such a way. If police think a person's actions are "suspicious" and think that the person might be involved in some crime more serious than a traffic violation, it would be common procedure to follow without making a stop or arrest to get a better idea of what the person was doing. Many police I have encountered seem seriously concerned to stop someone driving in what they consider an unsafe way as quickly as possible, and so stop violators promptly, but I don't say that motivates all police all the time.	It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot.	So my answer depends heavily on a clarification. Are the Police Suspicious or do they have a warrant? This is a big difference in the two behaviors as the former is not a thing, from a strictly legal perspective, and the police should not be harrassing Bob, who doesn't want to talk to them, when they should be making calls to get a warrant (If the police think Bob is being disorderly, they will arrest him and Bob should zip it, get an attorney down to the station, and let the Lawyer yell at the cops... and the judge... and the prosecutor and whoever else... If it's the latter case, they don't need to ask Bob to have Bob come outside... they can kick in the door and arrest Bob or remove him as part of executing the warrant. That's why you have them. In the situation as described, it reads like there was some crime in the area and the police think Bob may have some knowledge about it (he need not have done it, they could be looking for a witness). Bob does not have to say anything to the cops as per his rights against self-incrimination, so Bob tells them he does not wish to speak to them, possibly in an irksome manner and the Police won't take no for an answer. Perhaps they really think Bob might be the criminal... this doesn't necessary mean they have evidence to arrest Bob on. Perhaps Bob was identified by a guy off of security camera footage... maybe it was Bob, or maybe it was Bob's evil twin he never knew about and Bob's been home all night Keeping Up With The Kardassians (anyone knows Bob knows he can't stand going a week without knowing what Kim and Kanye are doing). Either way, it could be enough for a search warrant but just wanting to talk without a warrant, Bob can refuse and they need to respect that. Again, it's probably a bad faith arrest, but the street is not the place to have that fight... save it for the courts.	Following you around with the intent of harassing you is stalking. I don't know whether there's going to be a law actually requiring social distancing in Florida. In other states, I've seen laws set up to make it a crime to violate an order of the Director of Public Health or something like that. I don't know whether Florida actually has an order requiring social distancing by the general public.	I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely.	Are you required to comply with a police officer's order to put your baby down in an uncertain situation and allow yourself to be handcuffed? Of course. If holding a baby could immunize people against arrest, every criminal would have a baby around whenever possible. Similarly, suppose an officer legitimately fears for his or her life or safety, or the lives or safety of others, on the basis of a suspicion that someone carrying a baby is about to produce a weapon and use it against someone. Courts, at least in the US, give wide and explicit deference to police officers in stressful situations like that, and they recognize that even if, in hindsight, it is perfectly clear that there was no danger, the officer must be allowed the leeway to act on his or her suspicions in case they are correct. The officer will of course have some obligations to ensure the welfare of the child after separation from the adult, but the only immediate recourse the adult has is to appeal to the officer directly, or perhaps the officer's supervisor if he or she is available. Any other enforcement of the officer's obligation will have to take place in the courts after the fact.	The fire department is entirely within its rights, which are the same as any other property owner. The fact that property is owned by a governmental body does not mean that members of the public can't be excluded that property. Some governmental property is public, but lots of it is private, and this would usually include most parts of fire department property. As long as you have not been denied any access to a public road by this fence, there is nothing improper about it. Anyone can walk through their parking lot, park their car there, meet friends, whatever, This is almost surely inaccurate. The fire department does not have to allow members of the public to have any access to their property and probably would demand that most of the uses you describe stop if they interfered in any way with the performance of its duties.
Use of the words "losses" and "damages" in an indemnity clause in a medical education course participation form I'm a pharmaceutical translator, and I'm proofreading a Russian-to-English translation of a form to be signed by a participant of a medical education course. The text includes the following sentence: Accordingly, I undertake to indemnify the Company, the local distributor , other companies of the Group, their consultants, agents and representatives for their damages, as well as to prevent occurrence of the latter due to any losses, liabilities, claims, injuries, lawsuits, costs and expenses (including sanctions) resulting from any violations of the Protocol, the norms of best medical and professional practice, as well as of any applicable laws and regulations in accordance with the foregoing. I looked up the legal meaning of damages: At common law, damages are a remedy in the form of a monetary award to be paid to a claimant as compensation for loss or injury. In my original Russian text, it's clearly not this kind of "damages". It is убытки - plural of убыток. Isn't it better to use lossess instead of damages, since in legal texts "damages" seems to differ in meaning from "losses"? Or maybe in this context the meaning is the same for both words? Original paragraph in Russian: Соответственно, я обязуюсь возместить компании, местной дистрибьюторской компании , иным компаниям Группы, их консультантам, агентам и представителям убытки, а также не допустить возникновения последних в результате любых потерь, ответственности, претензий, ущерба, исков, затрат и расходов (включая санкции), возникающих вследствие любых нарушений Протокола, положений передовой медицинской и профессиональной практики, а также любого применимого законодательства и норм регулирования согласно вышеизложенному.	I love Wikipedia to bits, but it's sometimes worth reading the "talk" pages as well as the article, and trying a few other sources. I think this one comes closer : Damages attempt to measure in financial terms the extent of harm a plaintiff has suffered because of a defendant's actions. In the paragraph you're translating, "damages" is used as a broad term : the text then goes on to mention "losses, liabilities, claims, injuries, lawsuits, costs and expenses" as specific forms of damages. "Damages" as highlighted in the translation is the word I would use, as it covers many different things with a financial effect on the plaintiff. "Losses" is more specific, and is already covered in the list that follows. Losses may be considered damages, but not all damages are losses.	Possibly I am Australian so I am not familiar with Albertan labour law but I have done a little research and the underlying common law principles are similar. I will assume that you are covered by Albertan law and not the Canada Labour Code. The next part of the answer is based on A Guide to Rights and Responsibilities in Alberta Workplaces. First, if you lost it they would need to ask you to pay for it, they could not deduct it from your pay without a garnishee order (p. 10). Second, if the device is safety equipment, and it is certainly arguable that it is, then it is the employee's responsibility to use it and the employer's responsibility to keep it in safe working order; this would include replacing it if it were lost (p. 12). The common law position depends on a) the contract and b) if any negligence were involved. Contract What does your current employment contract say about your use of the employer's equipment generally and this item in particular? If it says something then, unless it is an illegal term, that is what happens. If it is silent, then it turns on the particular circumstances. Also, a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, if they are trying to introduce a new term then you have to agree to it; remembering that there may be consequences to taking a stand against your employer, you should say that you do not agree - this removes the risk that the employer could argue that there was tacit agreement. Negligence In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of torts, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, as an employee this is virtually a given; breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), this would depend on the circumstances of the loss or damage. You have to take reasonable care of the equipment - this is not a subjective standard, you need to do everything that a person in your position can do to protect the equipment from loss or damage; the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff. This has to do with the "proximity" of the harm, if for example the device needed a battery change and you took it to a technician who damaged the item in changing the battery then your actions are not proximate to the loss; and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. Well, if it is lost or damaged this is pretty unarguable. So, if you take reasonable care of the device and, notwithstanding, it is lost or damaged then you would not be liable for negligence ... probably. Talk to your union rep; this is exactly the sort of stuff that they are there to sort out.	It has to be 'liquidated damages', since a penalty clause is unenforceable. It has to have a reasonable relation to the party's legitimate interest. The point is that it has to represent a good faith estimate of the actual damage.	You have read it: legally It doesn’t matter if you haven’t read it in fact. At law, you have. Therefore you cannot avoid obligations or consequences by saying “ I didn’t read it”. It’s an extension of the common law principle that if you affix your ‘mark’ to a document you were acknowledging that you understood it and would abide by it: even if your mark was an X because you were illiterate. There are protections. At common law an unconscionable term is unenforceable and may void the contract entirely. Additionally, many jurisdictions have passed legislation to make unfair contract terms unenforceable, particularly in contracts of adhesion. Further, consumer protection laws often have non-excludable warranties that operate in spite of the contract.	If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money.	What you are talking about here is the tort of negligent misstatement, a subset of the tort of negligence. First, there is no presumption in any jurisdiction that I am aware of that anyone is or is not a lawyer (or doctor, or engineer etc.). If people knew that you were, however, then it is reasonable that they would give your statements more weight then if they did not know. It may also be reasonable if they suspected you were. The practical purpose of such a disclaimer is to ensure that they know you aren't. For the specific facts you give, you would certainly be in a better position if you said: "But I'm not a lawyer, so you should seek professional advice"; not so much because you told them you weren't a lawyer but rather because this changes your advice to "seek professional advice". It's impossible to be wrong with that advice! The standard form in Australia is: "this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice". If the statement is limited to "I'm not a lawyer" or if your neighbour knew you were, for instance, a dog catcher with no professional qualifications, then you could still potentially be liable. Your neighbour would need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; by giving advice you potentially do, however, a for negligent misstatement there must be a 'special relationship' [Hawkins V Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539, MLC Assurance V Evatt]. You breached that duty; the advice given was "unreasonable". There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your advice there would have been no loss. There was a legal (proximate) cause; damage to the neighbour as a result of the advice must be foreseeable. Harm; the neighbour must suffer real loss. The main point of the disclaimers is on the 2nd point: what is "unreasonable" for a professional is different than for a "lay person". Oh, and by the way: this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice.	Written Contract If there was a written contract, the fact that it wasn't signed is not relevant. While a signature is evidence of agreement with the terms there are other ways that acceptance can be indicated: like you paying them $600. Wrong Information Where the error is fundamental to the performance - e.g. you needed shipment to Alaska and they were offering shipment to Alabama, the contract would be void ab initio. That is, it never happened and everyone needs to be returned to their original positions as far as possible. However, in general, an error by one or the other party in their understanding of what was agreed does not invalidate the contract. For example, if you told them it was a "small" dog because it was small for a Great Dane but under an objective classification, it is, in fact, a "large" dog the contract must be completed and either you or they wear the additional cost of doing so. Whether they are entitled to ask for additional payment "due to some wrong information" depends on who took the risk under the contract for its correctness? Barring a specific term, the risk usually lies with the party that provided the "wrong information" but some contract will assign the risk for one party's errors to the other party - subject to a requirement to act in good faith. If they are not entitled to additional payment, they have to perform the contract for the original fee. If they are entitled, then you have to pay a reasonable price increase - you are not generally entitled to cancel. All of this turns on the specific terms of the contract and the exact nature of the "wrong information". Consumer Protection Law CPL in your state or their state or both will almost certainly have something to say about this beyond common law rules of contract.	Different courts have different practices, but I believe the general practice is for plaintiffs to use exhibit numbers, and for defendants to use exhibit letters. As with most procedural questions, the final decision belongs to the judge. The repetition in letters comes in when you get to the end of the alphabet. After you've used A-Z, you go to AA, BB, CC ... ZZ, then AAA, BBB, CCC, and so on.
Barrister in the UK I have had an interest in taxation throughout my adult life, and I recently stumbled upon a position at a Chambers to do exactly that, and they also pay for me to become a Barrister. If I eventually get bored of taxation and I wish to go into Criminal, despite the extremely low salaries, what would be the process to make the change? It would be depressing to think I would have to go through some long bureaucratic process to make the change, unless it simply requires some work experience in the criminal side.	There wouldn't be any formal process - you would just start practicing criminal law, but obviously you would be reading up on criminal law prior to doing so since you would hold relevant professional obligations under the Bar Standards Board Handbook to, well, actually know the law you're practicing—namely Core Duty 7: You must provide a competent standard of work and service to each client In other words, you simply need to acquire sufficient knowledge of the criminal law (whether through work experience (most realistically) or through reading up on the law) and to practice it competently and professionally to avoid attracting any sanctions or potential debarrment.	I would say all the similarities and differences between approaching a barrister directly and going through a solicitor are set out in the PDF. The historical division of barristers and solicitors is discussed in the document. Traditionally, solicitors took on cases and did the 'behind the scenes' preparation before a case went to trial, and barristers represented that client in the courtroom using the prepared materials. You needed to go through a solicitor in order to be represented by a barrister; there was no way of approaching a barrister directly yourself as a lay person. While this has changed with the Public Access Barrister scheme, this way of instructing a barrister is still seen as the 'default' method. In the usual scheme of things, you, as a client, would deal with a solicitor, and they would then instruct a barrister to represent you in court. In the Public Access Barristers scheme, you, the client, effectively miss out the solicitor stage and you approach the barrister directly. But this leaves something of a gap. In the typical client-solicitor-barrister model, the solicitor's role is to prepare the case for the barrister: collating documents for court, for example. The barrister then takes the papers, reads them, prepares an argument based on those documents and puts the client's case in a courtroom. (This isn't always the case, as the document makes clear: some barristers are not qualified to conduct litigation, for example, whereas some solicitors are qualified to represent clients in court. It's more the typical and historical model.) In the Public Access Barrister scheme, there is no solicitor to prepare the case. From the PDF provided, this means that: this is cheaper, as you're not paying for two lawyers; but conversely: you will have to undertake some of the preparation yourself, e.g. collating the papers, and there are some cases which are too complex for a client to take directly to a barrister, because a solicitor would be required to prepare all of the documents necessary for the trial. In terms of similarities, you will still end up receiving the advice and/or the representation of a barrister; you simply won't be going through a third party, but will be dealing directly with that barrister.	I know in general freelance work is not taxed Your “knowledge” is wrong. In general, all income is taxed. Some jurisdictions may exempt certain income derived from hobbies that are not businesses but this is by no means universal.	Yes, but ... You can bring a suit in an Australian court of competent jurisdiction. You would then need to find and serve the defendant in compliance with both Australian law and the law of the jurisdiction they are in. They can then raise a jurisdictional challenge that the Australian court is not the appropriate forum - they might be right depending on where the substance of the contract happened, whether the contract has a nomination of venue clause and if the contract is subject to an arbitration agreement. If the Australian court decides it does have jurisdiction it would have to decide which law applies - this is likely to be a mix of law because some laws in both jurisdictions are likely not excludable by contract. If you win, you would then have to get the judgement enforced somewhere the defendant has assets. Not paying a judgement is not a crime so the defendant will be of no interest to law enforcement - getting money from them is your problem. tl;dr Cross-national litigation is way more expensive in time and money and way less certain in outcome beyond the inherent uncertainty in any lawsuit. This is not something you can expect to succeed at without lawyers in both countries so you will be spending tens of thousands for an uncertain outcome. If you are chasing millions this may be worth it but if you are - don’t do million dollar deals by email in the future.	The judiciary is an arm of the state There is no “power grab” by the judiciary: they are simply exercising the Constitutional power they have to act as a court of record (given to them in the Supreme Court Act) and resolve disputes. In the UK (among many others), judges get paid to interpret the law - both statute and customary law - weigh the evidence and make decisions. You seem to think this isn’t their job but it is precisely their job. In general, judges try to leave their personal and political opinions outside the court, however, they are human and mistakes are sometimes made, from bias or otherwise. That’s why there is an appeals system - one judge has made a decision, 3 or more others review it. The Grainger test is as much a part of the law of the UK as the Equality Act is. It can be changed by an act of Parliament or it can be changed by a future appellate court at the same level or higher in the hierarchy. Parliament’s role is to write laws of general applicability, the administrations role is to administer those laws, including making decisions about individuals, the judiciaries role is to decide specific controversies by interpreting the law and providing guidelines for consistent decision making by future judges and officials.	when is it a good idea to get a lawyer? Only when you are not confident that you can put enough dedication to the matter & learning curve, or when you are not confident of your ability to cope with the emotional/frustrating toll of judicial proceedings. I do not mean this in an ironic way or to challenge you. It is just important to avoid a false sense of confidence. However, if you decide to represent yourself in court, you will have much more control of your case than if you delegate it to some lawyer whose attention is split with many other unrelated cases. Also, never get intimidated by pedantic or wasted phrases such as "he who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client". In the XXI century, most urban people can read and write, Canadian laws are written in your own language, and the Internet provides many informative resources for free. Furthermore, even knowledgeable attorneys happen to be clearly wrong about the law, as I pointed out here. I feel like the bulk of the work is carefully detailing what happened which feels more like the job of a news paper editor. It involves more than that. A newspaper editor does not get entangled with subtleties of a story or of the law, and subtleties are often decisive in judicial proceedings. Litigation also involves intensive legal research so as to find case law (that is, binding court decisions) and statutes that support your position. The application of these laws to a particular case are often premised on subtleties. Hence my remark in the previous paragraph. A newspaper editor hardly ever knows what questions or evidence are required or would suffice for proving a case. This knowledge only comes through (self-)education and experience. What options exist if I don't want to pay a lawyer a bunch of money and am willing to do most of the work myself, for example would pro bono be a good option? Start by searching for "pro se" and "Canada" on the Internet. Some of the results might actually provide guidance on what procedural law(s) apply in your jurisdiction, the legislation, and so forth. As for searching case law, there should be a Canadian equivalent of http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch (sorry I am not knowledgeable of the specifics of Canadian litigation/resources). Based on your other post, I presume you are or will be getting acquainted with the Tenancy Act. I recently addressed here a question about the Act, showcasing the combination of that legislation and contract law (interestingly, many tenants presume their issue with the landlord is strictly about landlord-tenant legislation when in fact it has to do with contract law). I am sure in a library will find plenty of useful books covering the basics of the legal system as well as the rules of civil procedure. Find out whether the public has access to case files in Canadian courts. If so, go to a courthouse and study those files. Get acquainted with the drafting and format of pleadings, motions, responses, briefs, and so forth (although in Small Claims court much of this would be unnecessary, for small claims proceedings are much more simple). This will show you the practice aspect of what you learn from books. When using a term that you consider essential to your case, be sure to consult its meaning in a legal dictionary (I do not know whether Black's Law Dictionary is applicable in Canadian litigation). The meaning of many words are much more specific in litigation compared to their common usage. Or would getting a real lawyer and spending only one hour of his time be better? I highly doubt it, especially if you have not gained any background in law. A lawyer will not explain things from scratch, let alone the intricacies you need to know. The most you could get from speaking with a lawyer for an hour would be notions which are too generic to be of any use at all. Moreover, I doubt that a lawyer in a phone interview will give you any legal references for you to verify on your own. In the very beginning of my litigation, I spoke with a law firm as assigned by a lawyer referral company. By then I already had some background in law and therefore I had specific questions. The guy from that law firm just kept babbling ambiguities very quickly. At the end of the phone call, I thought "nah, I will do this by myself". You might end up making that decision in your current or future matters.	Private prosecution is allowed in New Zealand, so one possibility would be to conduct the prosecution yourself. You could either do that as a case of destruction of property, or under the Animal Welfare Act. It is not guaranteed that your charging document will be accepted (for example, if your document lacks the required content). An alternative would be to apply political pressure to the Crown Law Office, to persuade them to pursue the matter.	I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down.
Is there precedent of secret subpoena that compels government access? Under what guise of law, would state actors (UK, US, etc.) be able to issue secret (unpublished) subpoenas that require industry / utilities to provide government access to their systems? Examples of access include phone companies, which were forced during the Clinton administration to build digital networks that government agents could tap. The modern day version of "tapping" is dismantling end to end encryption of messaging systems such as Facebook or WhatsApp	In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it.	1-3: This would be prohibited under Article VI, paragraph 2 of the US Constitution, which provides that federal law, and the ability to enforce that law, has supremacy over state law. As summarized by Cornell Law, the Supremacy Clause: establishes that the federal constitution, and federal law generally, take precedence over state laws, and even state constitutions. It prohibits states from interfering with the federal government's exercise of its constitutional powers... 4: Not legally; see above. 5: Yes, probably a lot of laws. Those charges could range anywhere from interfering with a federal investigation, wrongful imprisonment, assault, or kidnapping. I think it's important to point out that it is highly unlikely the situation would ever escalate to 4, let alone 5. The federal government is incredibly well resourced with regards to being able to move its law enforcement officers throughout the country. And that's not withstanding that the FBI and other agencies (CBP, TSA) are already stationed in any particular state. A non-zero number of those agents are also residents of the state they're stationed in, which would complicate things further.	Note that what is being bought or sold here is actually information about the exploit. Attempting to criminally penalize the transmission of information in the US often runs into First Amendment issues. If a person has good reason to know that information is going to be used to commit a crime, or is likely to be so used, and there is no plausible legitimate use for the information, that person might be charged with complicity or conspiracy for distributing the information. But where there are legitimate uses, that is much less likely. Here the information could be used to defend against the exploit, or to identify and remove software subject to the exploit, or for research into such exploits generally. There may be other legit uses as well. Some years ago the Federal government attempted to prosecute a person for exporting a book describing how to create an encryption program. The courts eventually ruled that this was protected speech. I suspect a similar ruling would be made in the sort of case described in the question, but the details would matter.	The clause you highlighted has an "or" in front of it: "..., or in such pretended character...". It's only one alternative. Demanding or obtaining money, etc, is sufficient to violate the statute but not necessary. Looking at the previous clause, it is still a violation if the pretender merely "acts as such", which I suppose is what people allege this person is doing. She can be guilty without having demanded or obtained anything, so the question about whether it's a "thing of value" is moot. As to the "nonexistent agency" issue: a useful source for information about how federal criminal laws are interpreted and enforced is the Justice Department's Criminal Resource Manual. (The link may be a past version; they seem to have reorganized their documents and I can't find a version not marked as "archived", but I think the information is still valuable.) 18 USC 912 is discussed in sections 1469-1477 of that version. Section 1474 examines the meaning of the "acts as such" element, and includes this note: It is not necessary that the act be one which the pretended officer would have authority to perform if he were in fact the officer he represents himself to be. Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916); United States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d at 98. Nor is it necessary that there be in fact such an officer as the defendant pretends to be. Caruso v. United States, 414 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1969). Caruso in particular was a case in which the defendant, as part of a scam, claimed to be the Administrator of a Veterans Hospital. He was convicted, and appealed on the basis that the government had not proved that the office of administrator existed. (Just as in this case, the government certainly could not prove that the Freedom to Breathe Agency existed, since it does not.) The Fifth Circuit found that his point had "no merit" and, citing Brafford v. United States (6 Cir. 1919, 259 F. 511, 513), that it was "immaterial whether or not there was any government officer or employee with the precise title [the defendant] assumed". I realize that claiming to be a nonexistent officer is not exactly the same thing as claiming to represent a nonexistent agency, but I would expect that courts would treat it the same.	In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge.	The president is not permitted to blackmail the Supreme Court, but what you've described isn't blackmail. Blackmail is a threat to expose someone's crimes. You're probably thinking of something more like extortion, which is outlawed under 18 U.S. Code § 875: Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. There are three problems with your theory I see right away: With the facts: As you noted, the President's statements were "seemingly unrelated," which is essentially an admission that there's no indication one has anything to do with the other. Under those circumstances, you can't establish that he's making any kind of threat. With the statute: "Extortion" is generally understood to refer not merely to a threat to do something unpleasant. Instead, extortion is inducing another person to turn over property by the wrongful use of force, violence, or fear. There's no property at play here, and it's not unlawful to study changes to the court (nor would it be unlawful to actually make changes to the Court, which the president doesn't even have power to do anyway). With the First Amendment: The President has a First Amendment right to advocate for changes to gun laws, and for changes to the composition of the Supreme Court. That right does not evaporate when it is informed by the court's conduct. So the Biden situation is not really a good fit with the hypothetical you've described, which presents a much stronger factual basis from which to find a threat. Because it also appears you're using wrongfully inducing fear of economic injury to obtain another person's property, and because you have no right to do so, you would be liable for extortion, while the President would not. EDIT: Although the top-line questions has been reframed, I'll just note that the answer remains basically the same. Bearing in mind that the president has no power to force any Supreme Court justice into retirement, one might rephrase the question this way: "If the Court rules that a constitutional amendment has Meaning X, can the president threaten to support a constitutional amendment?" The answer should be obvious: The president is free to support policies to change the constitution, at any time, for any reason.	The situation in Texas is unclear. It is worth mentioning Texas as a state where the law may require statutory authorization in order to copyright state documents. Although the statute does not explicitly state such as a requirement, it can be inferred from an attorney general opinion. At a bare minimum, the Department of Health, the State Preservation Board, the Water Development Board, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and county governments all have statutory authority to hold copyrights. In your specific case, there's an additional complication. Something is only a work of the State of Texas if one of the following is true: 1) it was created by a government employee as part of their job duties, or 2) it was a work for hire. It's quite likely that neither of the above is true for a student newspaper, rendering the question of Texas-owned copyrights irrelevant.	You are likely thinking of United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) and the related injunction against a letter by Charles R. Hansen. However, these were not prosecutions; they were applications by the United States for injunctions to prevent the publication of the material. The allegation relating to The Progressive was that an article due to be published would be in violation of the "born secret" clause of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2011 and following). The author was journalist Howard Morland. That act declares as restricted (see 42 U.S.C. 2014): all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 2162 of this title. The U.S. argued: that its national security interest also permits it to impress classification and censorship upon information originating in the public domain, if when drawn together, synthesized and collated, such information acquires the character of presenting immediate, direct and irreparable harm to the interests of the United States. It is not universally accepted that the information was actually gleaned wholly from public knowledge, but that would not have made a difference to the government's position on the injunction. There was a related letter by Charles R. Hansen, containing instructions for a hydrogen bomb, that was also enjoined by the United States against being published in the Daily Californian. This was eventually the one actually first published, and is known colloquially as "the Hansen Letter." Ultimately, after the Hansen letter was published in The Press Connection and the Chicago Tribune (two publications not enjoined by court order), the government withdrew its request to prevent the publication, and the other publications went forward.
Is it legal to organize a female-only event, assuming the topic isn't gender-specific? I've recently seen a few "female-only" lectures about technical topics, organized by companies that try to promote the presence of women in engineering. While I don't feel like I'm discriminated (there are tons of "inclusive" events out there), I still feel like they're breaking the law. To be more specific, here's a description of a similar event in the US: Is it legal to organize such events, under the anti-discrimination laws in the EU?	In the case of the US, the only anti-discrimination laws that would cover an event is the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under the rubric "public accommodation", in Title II. But that law does not prohibit sex discrimination. The extent of "public accommodation" is not clearly defined, but generally is held to be about "a place", and would include "entrance into this facility". It might be illegal in California, though, since the Unruh Civil Rights Act is more generic, not excluding sex on this point. The main issue would be whether this organization is a "business".	In the USA communication between an attorney and their client is "privileged". This makes it illegal for, amongst other things, the police to listen in to conferences between a suspect and their attorney. However in practice there is often little to prevent the police actually doing so.	Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it.	There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.	"Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights" on the website you linked to is very clear that the Charter of Fundamental Rights only means the EU institutions can't discriminate based on age, and that EU law is not allowed to be age discriminatory. It doesn't mean that individual acts of age discrimination are illegal: In contrast, the provision in Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The practice of youth and senior discounts is older than the charter of fundamental rights. The charter will be interpreted in the light of continuity, it definitely wasn't the intention to outlaw price discrimination. There are specific laws that make price discrimination based on certain principles legal, e.g. UK equality act: Age discrimination - when discrimination is allowed in the provision of goods or services	You are correct that the federal law does not prohibit sex discrimination in "public accommodations", the category that includes your examples. State laws tend to be more restrictive, see for example Washington's RCW 49.60.215 which declares that It shall be an unfair practice for any person ... to commit an act which ... results in any distinction ... except for conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to all persons, regardless of race, creed... sexual orientation, sex... PROVIDED, That behavior or actions constituting a risk to property or other persons can be grounds for refusal and shall not constitute an unfair practice. The definitions allow for a few exceptions as to what kind of place is so restricted, most notably a facility "which is by its nature distinctly private", nor "any educational facility, columbarium, crematory, mausoleum, or cemetery operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution". Here is a paper that summarizes the situation with women'-only clubs. For example, New Jersey law has the exception that nothing herein contained shall be construed to bar any place of public accommodation which is in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex, and which shall include but not be limited to any summer camp, day camp or resort camp, bathhouse, dressing room, swimming pool, gymnasium, comfort station, dispensary, clinic or hospital, or school or educational institution which is restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex... So it depends on the state, but most states prohibit any sex discrimination in public accommodations.	It is illegal in Scotland. There is currently no law specifically against it in the rest of the UK. If you find this is unbelievable, yes it is. There are attempts now to change the laws. PS. There are no photos taken "of the act". Taking the photo is the act. The pervs use a selfy stick or just get down on the floor to take photos, or take photos on stairs. PPS. News on Jan 16th 2019: "A new law will now be introduced in the next couple of months. It could mean that perpetrators might face up to two years in prison and are added to the sex offenders register."	I believe in this case, your company (OrgX) is a data processor and your customer's organization (OrgY) is the data controller. OrgY is responsible for establishing a lawful basis for sending you (OrgX) the personal data for their employees. Note that consent is just one of six lawful bases outlined in article 6(1). I'm no expert, but I believe OrgY's admin can claim they have a legitimate interest in sending their employee's personal data for training sake. In either case, the data processor is not responsible for establishing the lawful basis for processing. Of course, data processors aren't completely off the hook. GDPR outlines specific requirements for data processors (see chapter 4, particularly article 28).
If a lease provision says that a tenant has to accept revisions, how extensive can the revisions be? This is in the state of Washington. The lease states that after the expiration, the lease will automatically renew for successive terms of one month each the resident agrees to execute all revised rental agreements upon request Prior to the lease expiring (but more than 20 days in advance), the landlords requests that the tenant sign a month-to-month lease with a substantially different wording. What happens if the resident refuses and insists that the old wording allows them to stay on the old lease, but for month-to-month terms instead of the new terms. Assuming that there is no change in the amount of the rent (so no advanced notice of change of rent is necessary), which of the two provisions wins out? Does the tenant break the lease by not executing the new (substantially differently worded) lease or does the lease renew unless the landlord gives a notice to terminate? BTW, I am not asking for a legal advise. I am asking if there is any state law that limits how extensive a lease revision may be. Edit: to further narrow down the question, there is currently a moratorium on landlord-initiated termination of leases, or serving of notices of unlawful detainer, issued by the governor of the state under the emergency powers. The landlord recognizes this, and stipulates this, when making their request.	The old terms apply ... ... until the landlord gives notice and ends the lease - then the tenant has to get out. This is not inconsistent with the requirement to “execute all revised rental agreements upon request” - unless and until new terms have been agreed, there are no “revised rental agreements”, once there are, the tenant can be requested to (and must) execute them. There seems to be a misapprehension that this term gives the landlord a unilateral right to change the terms - it doesn’t. However, if the landlord wanted to formalize the month-to-month arrangement that is created under the old lease with new documents (or any other mutually agreed arrangement), then the tenant is obliged to sign it.	The landlord is obligated to let the existing tenant stay in that they cannot legally physically remove them or change the locks without a court order. The business between the landlord and holdover tenant doesn't involve you. All that matters is that the landlord told you that the unit would not be ready for you. Your lease should have a section describing what happens should the unit not be ready in time.	Section 11(6) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 says In a lease in which the lessor’s repairing covenant is implied there is also implied a covenant by the lessee that the lessor, or any person authorised by him in writing, may at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24 hours’ notice in writing to the occupier, enter the premises comprised in the lease for the purpose of viewing their condition and state of repair. There is also an absolute right to enter in an emergency (such as fire). Note that the law does not require tenant permission (a landlord may obviously enter for any reason with permission): the law says when he may do so without permission. If the "viewing" is related to repairs, then you just have to accept it. However, "viewing" usually means "showing prospective new tenants". In that case, there is the 28 day end-of-tenancy entry right which, if you didn't omit anything, is not relevant. In light of the common law right to quiet enjoyment, you have the right to exclude the landlord (or anyone else) absent a statutorily expressed override. Permission can be inferred by word or action under common law, for example if a person appears at the door and you open it wide and step aside, you have implicitly granted permission even if you didn't say "I hereby permit". Explicitly denying permission (even once) eliminates any reasonable possibility of inferring permission. If you had gotten an email saying "we'll come by at 4:30" and you reply "Alrighteo, see you then", that can reasonably be interpreted as permission. If you do not reply, they cannot infer permission (obviously: X sending a message to Y does not entail that Y received or read the message). If a person does not have a right to enter property, then doing so by force constitutes trespass, which is plainly against the law.	Is this something for small claims court Yes. The explicitness of your prior leases overrides the statutory variations that might exist among jurisdictions in this regard. And the total of 50$/month for six or seven years indicates that you would have to pursue recovery in small claims court (at least if the landlord refuses to reimburse you). In Wisconsin, the statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years. See 893.43. Statute of limitations means the lapse of time upon which claims of certain type are no longer actionable. Thus, you would only be able to recover the fees of the latest 6 years except for this year's lease, since your current lease no longer specifies that the landlord will cover that cost. For more information on small claims courts, see chapter 799 of the Wisconsin statutory law.	Often, evictions are bifurcated. An initial hearing determines all evidence necessary to determine if there is a default existing sufficient to justify an eviction, and if so, the eviction goes forward immediately despite the fact that not all issues in the case have been resolved. A later hearing resolved the precise dollar amount of any damages claim. If the grounds for eviction is non-payment of rent, and the amount of payments or the amount of obligations of the landlord that can be setoff against the rent due exceeds the amount of rent found to have not be paid, then it is a defense to an eviction in the initial possession phase. If the counterclaim is smaller than the amount of rent owed (or cannot for some reason be set off against the amount owed) then it is only at most, a setoff against a damages award in favor of the landlord. I'm have not researched, in particular, how this is handled in New Jersey, but I am providing this answer on the theory that some insight is better than nothing. For the purpose of this question assume the landlord does not dispute the tenants underlying claim. His only argument is that the tenant should counter sue and that it should not be raised as a defense for non payment / stop the eviction. If this is true, it is both an affirmative defense to the eviction claim and a basis for a counterclaim in most cases. The better practice would be to raise it both ways in the same lawsuit. But, if the counterclaim is not sufficient to overcome the claim that rent is owed and not paid in full, or triggers some other different alternative ground for an eviction (e.g., maybe the lease provides that application of a security deposit against rent owed is itself an event of default), then that wouldn't prevent an eviction.	The official website of the french administration gives details under which conditions a landlord can end a lease in France. As a general rule, the landlord cannot end a lease unless meeting certain conditions. The landlord has to send a letter to all of the tenant (all of them if multiple) named on the lease, and the spouse of the tenant even if not named on the lease. The letter has to be sent at least 6 month before the end of the lease if the residence isn't furnished, or 3 months if the residence is furnished. The letter must contain the reason for the ending of the lease. There are 3 causes the landlord may use to end the lease: The landlord plans to make the residence the primary residence of them, their spouse / partner (of at least 1 year) / PACS partner, or an ascendant or descendant of the landlord or their spouse. The landlord plans to sell the residence. In this case, the tenant has the priority to buy the residence if they wish. If the tenant take the offer, the landlord is obliged to accept the offer. The landlord can also sell the residence with the lease, in which case the lease is transfered to the buyer. Under legitimate and serious cause, including but not limited to not paying rent / regularly paying the rent late, causing trouble to the neighborhood, subleasing the residence... If the tenant contests the cause, the landlord will have to justify to a judge the reason the cause of termination. In this case, the landlord can have ground to end the lease before its end date. Otherwise, the landlord cannot end the lease, and the lease is automatically renewed at the end date without the need of explicit communication. A tenant can be protected if they fall under certain conditions. I don't find anything protecting people with a child, but if the tenant is older than 65yo / taking care of someone older than 65yo and the tenant earns an income lower than a certain limit a given year Then the tenant can be protected from these causes, unless the landlord is also older than 65 or earns an income lower than the same limit as the tenant or offers to help relocate the tenant to another residence close to the first residence which also accomodates to the need of the tenant. Note that, if the ex-tenant found that the cause given by the landlord was fraudulent (for example saying they'll use it as a primary residence but lease it to another tenant), then the tenant can bring the case to court and get indemnized as indicated here.	You can't give your landlord a "notice to quit" A "notice to quit" is something a landlord gives to the tenant under s8 or s21. Assuming you want to end the tenancy, you would give them whatever notice is required in accordance with the lease. Why the paranoia? Ending a residential tenancy is routine and would not normally land you anywhere near a court. You give your notice, pay your rent, move out and get your deposit back. Is there something going on that you're not telling us? If so, ask about that thing in a different question. The video would be fine as evidence However, it would only be used if there was a dispute over the service of the notice. While this can happen, its pretty rare and your precautions seem ... elaborate. Your landlord's name and address (and yours) will be a public record forever Courts are public, the names and addresses of the parties are a matter of public record (unless you are children, or sex offenders, or have some other reason the court accepts as to why this shouldn't happen). These records are kept indefinitely.	The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement).
Do you have to unlock your devices for TV licence inspections? In this answer Matthew mentions that Section 366 of the Communications Act 2003 grants the person executing the warrant the power to examine your equipment. Specifically it says give the person carrying out the examination or test all such assistance as that person may reasonably require for carrying it out. and A person is guilty of an offence if he— (a)intentionally obstructs a person in the exercise of any power conferred on that person by virtue of a warrant under this section; or (b)without reasonable excuse, fails to give any assistance that he is under a duty to give by virtue of subsection (7). So say you have a locked mobile phone on you that requires a passcode to unlock. Such devices can receive broadcasts that require a TV licence, e.g. via iPlayer. Do you have to unlock it? Would, for example, the argument that your phone or computer contains sensitive or personal data be a "reasonable excuse"? Such data could include embarrassing photos, other people's personal data and the like. In particular I can imagine they may want to view your browser history to see if you have visited iplayer.com.	It will be fact-specific, but potentially not unlocking your phone for such a reason could be a "reasonable excuse". However, you will need to provide evidence for such an excuse. The prosecution will still have to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the excuse is not "reasonable". It is entirely possible that the court would determine any such excuse based on privacy to not be reasonable, partly because it grants a very broad shield to defendants which would frustrate the purpose of the law, but partly because they can point to precedent that privacy is not an absolute right and that privacy infringement can be justified in the circumstances (the same way the police can search your phone). I have not been able to find any relevant case law on the matter, but I will keep investigating and update my answer if I find any. As an aside, it does appear possible for any warrant obtained by TV Licensing officials to include a Section 49 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 notice which would compel you to unlock the phone regardless of any "reasonable excuse". Failure to do so would result in a conviction under Section 53 of the Act.	If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.	How far can one go to defend him/herself from an unreasonable search and seizures, in the same sense of one defending him/herself from an unlawful arrest? Not very far. Basically all you can do is try to talk the officer out of it. He thinks he sees evidence in sight... If the police officer reasonably believes that there is evidence of a crime in plain view, then the officer can proceed to seize the evidence. If the property owner tries to use force to prevent the seizure, then the officer can arrest the property owner. ... the property owner ... highly believes there is no possible way he could have seen the evidence from outside his property. It doesn't matter what the owner believes (unless the owner can somehow convince the officer before the search). What matters is what the court believes. But the owner cannot bring the matter to court before the officer enters the shed. If the officer insists on entering the shed and the owner can establish in court that the officer couldn't see the evidence and that there was no other lawful basis for a warrantless search or seizure, then the evidence will be inadmissible. The owner might also be able to prevail in a civil suit for the violation of civil rights, but the bar for such a suit is very high, so the likelihood is very small.	You call their employer and impersonate them The onus is on the employer to keep your personal data secure. If they do not take reasonable steps to verify that the caller is indeed you, they fail that duty and can be held to account. So, not a loophole.	Section 11(6) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 says In a lease in which the lessor’s repairing covenant is implied there is also implied a covenant by the lessee that the lessor, or any person authorised by him in writing, may at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24 hours’ notice in writing to the occupier, enter the premises comprised in the lease for the purpose of viewing their condition and state of repair. There is also an absolute right to enter in an emergency (such as fire). Note that the law does not require tenant permission (a landlord may obviously enter for any reason with permission): the law says when he may do so without permission. If the "viewing" is related to repairs, then you just have to accept it. However, "viewing" usually means "showing prospective new tenants". In that case, there is the 28 day end-of-tenancy entry right which, if you didn't omit anything, is not relevant. In light of the common law right to quiet enjoyment, you have the right to exclude the landlord (or anyone else) absent a statutorily expressed override. Permission can be inferred by word or action under common law, for example if a person appears at the door and you open it wide and step aside, you have implicitly granted permission even if you didn't say "I hereby permit". Explicitly denying permission (even once) eliminates any reasonable possibility of inferring permission. If you had gotten an email saying "we'll come by at 4:30" and you reply "Alrighteo, see you then", that can reasonably be interpreted as permission. If you do not reply, they cannot infer permission (obviously: X sending a message to Y does not entail that Y received or read the message). If a person does not have a right to enter property, then doing so by force constitutes trespass, which is plainly against the law.	The police officers themselves are covered by Qualified Immunity - to put it briefly, a government official acting in their official capacity in a discretionary act (as in, they have some discretion in whether/how they carry out the act) is immune from suit so long as they pay reasonable deference to relevant law. In the case of the police, so long as the search or seizure itself is reasonable (either because there is a warrant, or because they had probable cause), they can take appropriately destructive measures to carry out their duty. Even if the search or seizure is later found to have been unreasonable, an officer may still have Qualified Immunity unless their action violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would have known" (Harlow v. Fitzgerald). However, a search/seizure doesn't give the police license for arbitrary destruction, whatever they do has to be reasonably pursuant to the legal search/seizure. For example, if a suspect is barricaded in a house with a gun, they can knock down doors, windows and walls to apprehend them. On the other hand, that does not mean the officers can then break open safes to try and find evidence - once their probable cause for the entry is fulfilled (apprehending the suspect), they need to get a warrant to do more than a plain sight search of the house. Warrants will specify what items are being searched for, so even with a warrant the police have to take reasonable measures to carry it out - an example of an unreasonable measure would be to tear into walls in order to try and find a stolen bicycle. On the other hand, tearing into walls could be justified if their warrant included searching for drugs from a dealer, where it is not uncommon to hide them in the walls. States and the Federal Government enjoy Sovereign Immunity from suits in most cases. There are some exceptions, but none would apply in this case so long as the general policy of the police department was not illegal or unconstitutional. However, county and city governments do not enjoy Sovereign Immunity and state governments and the Federal Government often allow suits against them for negligence from their actors, so someone injured by unreasonable police action can usually try to recover damages from the officer's department.	The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal.	The chief legal problem might be (depending on how you build and operate the thing) the amount of Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) that you're causing. You are not exempt from FCC regulations, but § 15.23 Home-built devices. (a) Equipment authorization is not required for devices that are not marketed, are not constructed from a kit, and are built in quantities of five or less for personal use. (b) It is recognized that the individual builder of home-built equipment may not possess the means to perform the measurements for determining compliance with the regulations. In this case, the builder is expected to employ good engineering practices to meet the specified technical standards to the greatest extent practicable. The provisions of §15.5 apply to this equipment. Since the question assumes "the builder knows what he's doing", we may assume the FCC demand "the builder is expected to employ good engineering practices" is met. But that also would assume that the builder knew about EMI in the first place.
Ownership of Work Copyright by Multiple Authors If a work is "Copyright © year Author One and Author Two" (with no written or verbal agreement between Author One and Author Two regarding regarding ownership), what rights does each individual author have? Can Author One republish the work or create derivative works without the permission of Author Two, or does Author One require permission from Author Two to do this? Any other legal ramifications?	A copyright notice like that could mean the authors are claiming copyright in different portions of the work, or claiming a joint copyright. With the former, standard copyright law applies with respect to each part, so I'm going to examine the joint copyright aspect. Broadly speaking, joint works tend to be an unclear and internationally inconsistent area of copyright law and you haven't specified jurisdiction. Since this is an English language site and the US and UK are polar opposites on most of these issues, those will be the jurisdictions I examine. US Definition: To qualify as a joint work, each author's individual contribution must be inseparable or interdependent, and the authors must intend to be joint authors (17 U.S.C. s 101, Childress v. Taylor, Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc.). Rights of use: Joint authors can independently exploit and license a work without consent of other co-authors, but have a duty to account profits to co-authors (House Report No. 94-1476 (1976), Goodman v. Lee, Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, etc.). UK Definition: To qualify as a joint work, each author's individual contribution must not be distinct, they must work towards a common design, but no specific intention of joint authorship is required (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Art. 10(1), an 11-factor test was articulated in Martin v. Kogan para. 53 by the E&W Court of Appeal). Rights of use: Joint authors must seek consent of the co-authors in order to exploit and licence a work (Cescinsky v. George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., Hodgens v. Beckingham). For further information, see this excellent paper by Elena Cooper comparing how US and UK law diverged on this point.	The fact that a developer is showing off work that he/she has done for other another company doesn't imply that that developer owns any copyright to the work. In Canada, see the Copyright Act, § 13 (3): Where the author of a work was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service or apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person, the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright and § 13 (4): The owner of the copyright in any work may assign the right... In the US, see 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b): In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. and § 201 (d): The ownership of a copyright may be transferred... "What rights should and should not be attributed to the developer?" That is a business decision to be made on a case-by-case basis. Advice about the prudent balance of copyright between an employer/client and employee/contractor is legal advice. "Is it okay to use this projects as part of the developer's portfolio?" If the developer can link to public use of a product that he/she developed for a company, then the developer is not violating copyright by simply advertising that they worked on the product and linking to, without reproducing, the work. If the developer for whatever reason maintained copyright ownership in the code and other assets, it would not be copyright infringement to reproduce those as part of the portfolio. If the developer did not maintain copyright ownership in the code or assets, reproducing those may be copyright infringement, dependent on whether the copyright owner allowed the developer to reproduce those elements, or if the reproduction is fair use. There may be other laws or contracts implicated, though: non-disclosure agreements, trademark law, among others.	If the author died in 1946 then copyright in his works expired at the end of 2016. The work is in the public domain. The relevant section of the Copyright Designs & Patents Act 1988 extends to the whole of the United Kingdom, but not Crown Dependencies or colonies. You need to be sure that the work is the author's own work. If someone else has contributed then the copyright endures until it expires 70 years after the death of the last of the authors. The same applies to art. If you want to reproduce artwork, say for a cover/sleeve design, that would also have the artist's copyright, which lasts for 70 years after that person's death. The typography of a book has copyright which lasts for 25 years from publication.	One cannot use the works of others unless one of the following applies: The copyright holder has given permission, usually in the form of a license, often explicit, but sometimes implied. The work is not protected by copyright. This can happen in several ways, but the most common is that the work is old enough that copyright has expired. In the US, works older than 1927 are currently out of copyright. So are some others, the rules are a bit complex. In many countries, if the author or creator died more than 70 years ago, the work is out of copyright. In some countries this is a different number, between 50 and 100 years. This is not likely to apply to a file distributed with current software. If an exception to copyright applies. In the US this would most likely be fair use. In the UK it would probably be fair dealing. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions that might apply, including personal use in some. AS a comment by Jen points out "use" here refers only to those rights protected by copyright, such as making and distributing copied, making nd distributing derivative works, and the like. (Displaying and publicly performing seem unlikely to apply.) Now lets consider the specific situation, and which if any of the reasons for lawful use might apply. License or other permission. There is no explicit license. Since the program is distributed to be run, there is an implicit license to make the sort of use of the file needed to run the program. If the documentation describes how to employ the file as part of running the program, there is almost surely an implied license to employ it in that way. There is not, however, permission to make copies unless that is needed to run the program. There is surely not permission to make derivative works of the file or distribute copies to others, even if you do not charge anything. Expired copyright This pretty clearly will not apply. Fair use This might apply, or might not. There isn't enough info in the question to tell, not even to make a good guess. If any use would be non commercial, that helps fair use a bit. If the use would be for a different purpose than the one the developers used it for, that helps fair use a lot. If the use of the file harmed the market for the program, or served as a substitute, that lean against fair use. without knowing what the file is, what it does, and how it might be used, one really cannot weven guess.	I don't see how. Remember that a license is a contract where the author gives permission to copy (modify, redistribute, remix, etc) a copyrighted work, provided that the licensee fulfills the stated conditions. If the license is not in effect, then we revert to the default situation under copyright law, which is that the potential licensee has no rights to copy the work. (Not counting particular instances of copying which are permitted under fair use and similar exceptions - I presume that's not what you have in mind, or the whole question is moot.) In this case, the conditions include that the licensee must credit the author under their chosen pseudonym. The licensee can't get out of that obligation simply because they find it distasteful or objectionable for whatever reason. If they don't want to do it, then they should not accept the license in the first place, and so refrain from copying the work. (Of course, if the author is offering the CC license in hopes of encouraging reuse of the work, then this may not be a desirable outcome for the author, so they might want to think twice about their choice of pseudonym.) Even if the author's pseudonym were something that would actually be illegal to quote (say, because it is obscene), I don't think it lets the licensee off the hook. A contract with illegal terms is void, so legally it is as if there is no license at all, and we revert to the default in which there is no right to copy. A question was raised in comments about the word "reasonable". I don't know of case law where this has been tested, so I can only speculate: The context suggests that "reasonable" is intended to refer to the means of attribution (for instance, where the attribution should appear in a piece of source code or documentation), not to the pseudonym. There's a legal principle that the specific governs over the general, and the requirement to credit the author by a particular pseudonym is clearly more specific than the general requirement of "reasonableness". It seems clear that the author, who is the one offering these terms, didn't intend for the general term "reasonable" to render meaningless their request for the use of a specific pseudonym; if they had, why would they have bothered to put it in? On the flip side, there's the principle of contra proferentem, that ambiguities in a contract should be resolved in the favor of the party that didn't draft it - here, the licensee. But it's hard to argue that this is really ambiguous; it seems quite clear what the author wants. Of course, the author can circumvent the whole issue, if they're worried, by licensing the work instead under a modified version of the CC license in which the word "reasonable" is removed. After all, there is nothing particular magical about CC's language: the contract is whatever the author and the licensee agree to, and they're just using the pre-written CC license as a convenience to streamline their negotiations.	There is no general prohibition against taking down material, even non-infringing material, which is posted by some person, but there is a risk to the service provider. Abstracting away from the specifics of github, a Provider has some agreement with the User whereby User rightfully makes Stuff available on Provider's site. Arbitrarily removing Stuff (in violation of the usage agreement) may cause damage to User, who may sue Provider, and Provider will avoid that if possible. DMCA protects Provider from copyright infringement suits by Victim, providing the proper DMCA procedure is followed, and it allows Provider to remove Stuff without fear of getting sued by User (17 USC 512(g)). This protection is not available if the takedown notice is not proper. (As a case in point, the entire series of Harry Potter books is still out there freely on the internet, because only the rights holder can demand a takedown, and the rights holder seems to not be concerned).	That is definitely a derivative work You can’t do that without permission One of the rights that copyright gives is the exclusive right to decide who can make derivative works.	It is legsl to include references showing readers where facts you include in your article were derived, or where they can be supported. Indeed academic ethics generally require doing so, although there is (in most cases) no legal requirement to do so. Listing the title, author, and publication information of a source is not an infringement of copyright. That J. Jones published an article on "How to Find the Purple Moth" [imaginary example] in volume 28 of the Journal of Moth Science is a fact.Facts are never protected by copyright. Indeed in US law 17 USC 102(b) provides that: b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. The laws of other countries are similar on this point. Indeed I do not know of any country in which facts are protected by copyright. So, including such references is fully legal, and no permission from the sources being cited is required. This is true whatever form the reference takes. In particular, if an online address for the content is included, this is still true. I do not know whether Medium, or any other specific publishing platform, will pat fees to authors based on clik-thru from such citations. That depends on their particular policies, which might be found in their Terms of Service or other policy document.
Is it libel if I reasonably believed it to be true? Suppose I'm a major newspaper journalist. A rape occurs, and the police arrest the suspect. Bucking all journalistic trends, I run a story with the headline, "Rapist CAUGHT," not "Alleged Rapist Caught." As time goes on, it is eventually proven that the "rapist" did not actually commit the act, and I or a fellow journalist promptly retract my previous statement. In the first article, did I commit libel? Does it matter whether or not I had reason to believe what I published was accurate?	What you reasonably believed to be true about the guilt of the rapist is moot; you could argue that you reasonably believed he was guilty, but you'll probably have to admit you didn't have the facts of the case to make a final judgement about guilt. That's what libel is: the stating of provably false facts. But mostly the problem will be that you didn't know the difference between an arrest and a conviction. People are arrested under suspicion of a crime when there is reason to believe valid evidence exists that they committed the crime, or that the evidence already exists. If it turns out that the evidence doesn't exist, the prosecutor won't prosecute, and the arrested person is released, and their arrest record expunged in some cases. And, yes, chances are very good the paper will have to print a retraction, due to a lawsuit or insistence of their own legal department. But any news or copy editor is going to add "alleged" to any such "the criminal is caught" headline, because that's one of the jobs of an editor or copy editor: to try and keep the paper from being sued for defamation by the named person who turns out to be innocent. So that libelous headline wording is rarely going to appear in print, anyway. And if you're only a journalist, you're not going to be writing the headlines; editors and copy editors do that. The separation of the writing of the article and the headline is traditional in journalism, and one of the reasons is above. If you in fact run your own paper or website and are the reporter and editor, good luck: that you didn't know the difference between an arrest and a conviction is probably the plea you're going to make to the jury or judge when you get sued for defamation and you're really hoping the civil court judgement doesn't financially destroy you.	It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial.	Being misunderstood is not a crime. You could concoct scenarios where any number of statements could be a crime if interpreted unfairly. "I went to Georgia last weekend." "I choose to believe you mean the country instead of the state, and you don't have a passport, therefore you admitted that you went to a foreign country illegally!" The police would be free to investigate, but they wouldn't be able to get a warrant or arrest him based just on an ambiguous statement, let alone obtain a conviction. Of course, if the younger sister decided to accuse him, and the older sister decided to lie about having a relationship with him, that puts the statement in a whole other context - but if someone is falsely accusing you and someone else corroborates their story, you're probably in trouble no matter how exactly that came about.	We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.	Sure Obama can sue Trump for defamation. Libel is a civil offense and committing libel is not a part of Trump's role as president. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. But not for personal acts. See Is the US President immune from civil lawsuits? But a libel action would be difficult to win; they're both public figures, which makes the defamation threshold higher: Public officials and figures have a harder time proving defamation. The public has a right to criticize the people who govern them, so the least protection from defamation is given to public officials. When officials are accused of something that involves their behavior in office, they have to prove all of the above elements of defamation and they must also prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice." Defamation Law Made Simple \| Nolo.com The "actual malice" part is interesting: In the landmark 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court .... acknowledged that in public discussions -- especially about public figures like politicians -- mistakes can be made. If those mistakes are "honestly made," the Court said, they should be protected from defamation actions. The court made a rule that public officials could sue for statements made about their public conduct only if the statements were made with "actual malice." "Actual malice" means that the person who made the statement knew it wasn't true, or didn't care whether it was true or not and was reckless with the truth -- for example, when someone has doubts about the truth of a statement but does not bother to check further before publishing it. (same link above) Could malice be proved? Was Trump reckless with the truth? Could be. But would Obama sue? What's the cost/benefit analysis to him and his legacy, politically and personally? Trump was taking a political or personal risk - or he's being stupid - with such accusations, since he may feel invulnerable. He has sued and been sued and settled many times: see Legal affairs of Donald Trump I think both would not want to be in court; because once in court, they (and their lawyers) both have subpoena power and both would have to answer nearly any question put to them about their public (and possibly private; but not official) lives. Trump has interestingly enough talked about "opening up the libel laws" so he can more easily sue people. But if he did that, it cuts both ways: he would be easier to take to court. See Can Libel Laws Be Changed Under Trump? In my opinion, Obama is much better off ignoring Trump and letting the FBI, DOJ, Congress and the Intel Community do their jobs - have the facts fall where they may - and and not become a right-wing talk radio subject for the rest of his life, as well as risk being deposed himself in court. Edit 3/21/17: From a timely piece in The New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-first-amendment-applies-to-trumps-presidency While it is unlikely that former President Barack Obama would sue Trump for libel, he very likely has a strong case. The First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/opinion-trump-could-lose-lawsuit-for-libeling-obama/ that “there seems no doubt that Trump’s statement was false, defamatory, and at the very least made with reckless disregard for the truth.” That is the test for damaging the reputation of a public figure or official: Trump either made his assertions with knowledge of their falsity or with disregard of a high degree of probability that they were false. Obama, Stone is confident, could prove that Trump made his false charge, as the Supreme Court defined the standard, with “actual malice.”	Can I sue someone for publicly calling me a sex offender if I'm not one? Yes. However, in this particular case you need to take a preliminary step regardless of your jurisdiction, which I assume is somewhere in the U.S. Prior to filing any complaint (and I will repeat this below), it is in your best interest that you demand a retraction and removal of the defamatory falsehood. Be sure to show the prospective defendant(s) some proof that supports your pre-suit demand. You need to secure your ability to prove in court that you made that demand. For that reason, your requests should be in writing (email, and certified mail if practicable). If it is not by email, you should have the addressee at least sign a receipt copy of your demand letter. A demand of retraction is prerequisite in jurisdictions such as Texas and Florida. If you [or your lawyer] omit that step, the court will easily dismiss your complaint altogether. In other jurisdictions, such as Michigan, the request of retraction is a requirement only if you intend to pursue exemplary and punitive damages. See MCL 600.2911(2)(b). Regardless of the jurisdiction, your request or demand to each prospective defendant needs to be made prior to filing the corresponding complaint/pleadings in court. Even if your jurisdiction does not have that prerequisite, failing to request a retraction and removal of the defamatory falsehoods would allow the defendant to justify itself and/or obtain leniency on the basis that it was not aware that the registry information turned out to be disproved/inaccurate. In your complaint(s), you will pursue injunctive relief that consists of ordering the removal [from each website or post] of the defamatory falsehoods. It is also reasonable for you to also ask for monetary relief. You certainly have a claim of defamation per se, but a ruling granting you an award of substantive damages is doubtful unless the defendant refuses --or neglects-- to remove the inaccurate records. If the website owners/authors promptly remove the false records, it is going to be difficult or impossible to prove actual malice: that is, that they published the falsehoods (1) despite knowing them to be false, or (2) with reckless disregard of their truth. Without the ability to prove actual malice or that you suffered special damages (whether it is a loss of employment or other economic damages), the court would only grant you nominal damages, which is the negligible amount of one dollar. Lastly, beware that even the granting of injunctive relief might be ineffective. I [vaguely] recall a case where federal court ordered a removal from sex offender registry, but apparently the defendant ignored the order. I have no idea how much the plaintiff's lawyer charged him for the futile representation, but the last time I checked neither the problem was fixed nor did it appear that the attorney pushed any further to ensure compliance with the order. I will not disclose the name of the lawyer, since that would facilitate the unintended consequence of identifying the defamed plaintiff.	The defense lawyer has the duty to do the best for his client. The client will be convicted if he or she is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If the lawyer can create a reasonable doubt and manages to free his client then he has done a good job. So yes, if the lawyer knows that some other person might have committed the crime, to the degree that it creates reasonable doubt, then the lawyer must raise this. Of course if it turns out that there is just some phantasist making wild accusations, that might not be helpful.	Not all illegal things are crimes. Lack of evidence. They are asked to testify, and they say "what I said in my book was a lie". There is no general law against lying, except when under oath. Statute of limitations. Saying "10 years ago I did smoke drugs" means that any offence is no longer prosecutable. Lack of details. Which jurisdiction were they in? When did they commit the act, how many acts? You cannot be arrested for being a "bank robber" or a "murderer". You are charged with "robbing Bank X on 123 Fake Street the Thursday 25 April 2018" or "murdering Jim Thio in January 2017". Otherwise the defendant would have a hard time defending himself (how to prove that you have not killed anyone at any time?) All of the above combined with prosecutorial discretion in the form that any possible prosecutor will most likely determine that bringing charges would be just a waste of time and resources. UPDATE February 2018: Just for the sake of completeness, a reference to the situation of Jacques Cassandri, who did boast about a serious crime(a robbery in a Societe Generale vault in 1976) in a book. Unfortunately for him, he made some kind of mistake/miscalculation and the crime had not yet expired, so he has become an example of someone being prosecuted by confessing a crime in a book.
How much control can US landlords have over a tenant's personal behavior in and outside of a dwelling? I understand why it would be imoportant for Landlords to request certain information about employment and also to be allowed to establish rules like no smoking or no pets allwed in a dwelling. But I've noticed that some leasing advertisements have stipulations that seem to imply that they will not lease to certain people based on specific activities, even if they take place outside of the rental. And many lease applications, will ask for this kind information in advance without specifying how or if it will be used in tenant selection. For example, tobacco and e-cigarette use is often specifically mentioned in leases. I get that this could be justified as tobacco smoke lingers on a user etc. I'm just using it as an example because it's so common in lease agreements. I'm just curious how much control landlords can legally exert over a tenant's personal behaviors, in and out of a rental unit. I know there is a small subset of protected classes that can't be used for tenant screening, like religion, age, race, family status, and maybe now sexual orientation. But are there any requirements for landlords to justify other exclusionary stipulations or requests for personal information? Or can a landlord legally refuse a tenant for any non-protected reason, including for activities that take place outside the rental property? Like, could they craft a lease in such a way that tenants could be unilaterally evicted if they were seen using a Juul in a public space, or having a beer at the pub? Could they theoretically make a hard and fast rule against all knitting and crochet in rental unit? Just trying to understand the theoretical limits of landlord control over tenants.	A limitation has to be expressed in lease and must not violate laws related to housing discrimination that apply to the place where the leased property is located. There are also other terms of a lease that are statutorily prohibited or prohibited at common law (e.g. imposition of a penalty interest rate in excess of the rate allowed by usury laws). But, the general rule is that anything not prohibited by law is allowed. A secondary analysis is that one of the common law prohibitions in contracts is a "penalty" which means a fixed monetary sanction not easily calculable based upon the measurable economic harm to a party to the contract after the fact. In those cases, the clause, called a "liquidated damages" clause must be a reasonable attempt within reason ex ante to quantify the harm caused by a breach of the contract triggering the liquidated damages clause. If the termination of a lease for a violation of a lease term involving a tangential personal life activity unrelated directly to the premises, and has the effect of making a tenant subject to liability for the balance the lease payments, it might be disqualified as a penalty which is void as contrary to public policy. On the other hand, if it simply operated to terminate the lease as the next convenient juncture (perhaps the next of the next month more than 30 days from the violation) with no financial penalty involved, it would probably be valid.	You can't give your landlord a "notice to quit" A "notice to quit" is something a landlord gives to the tenant under s8 or s21. Assuming you want to end the tenancy, you would give them whatever notice is required in accordance with the lease. Why the paranoia? Ending a residential tenancy is routine and would not normally land you anywhere near a court. You give your notice, pay your rent, move out and get your deposit back. Is there something going on that you're not telling us? If so, ask about that thing in a different question. The video would be fine as evidence However, it would only be used if there was a dispute over the service of the notice. While this can happen, its pretty rare and your precautions seem ... elaborate. Your landlord's name and address (and yours) will be a public record forever Courts are public, the names and addresses of the parties are a matter of public record (unless you are children, or sex offenders, or have some other reason the court accepts as to why this shouldn't happen). These records are kept indefinitely.	Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant).	Yes, they still have to go through the normal eviction process and must still provide the minimum number of days required by their local jurisdiction in order to vacate the property. By moving in and establishing residency, the tenant and landlord form an implied lease - the tenant does not need anything in writing in order to establish their legal rights to tenancy. More information: No written lease--Am I in trouble?	First, to be clear, this is almost never a state level limitation. To the extent that the link in the question implies otherwise, it is incorrect. Instead, local governments, typically a municipality or in an area that is not part of any municipality, a county, enacts land use regulations, the most common of which is usually called a "zoning code." There are also usually locally adopted building codes that supplement the zoning code. A zoning code typically establishes rules regarding how different kinds of real estate can be used in different enumerated zones. Usually, there are several different zones in which residential uses are allowed and different rules apply in each one. One of the typical limitations in a residential zone is to establish the number of unrelated people who don't own the home who may live there. The purpose of such limitations is to discourage the establishment of boarding houses, group homes, women's shelters, homeless shelters, flop houses, and halfway houses in relatively low density residential zones, on the theory that these uses are undesirable in terms of neighborhood character and cause undesirable people to move into a neighborhood that lowers property values for other people who live there. More crassly, people in affluent neighborhoods want to ban property uses that make it possible for poorer people to live near them. Often the actual scope of the limitations, however, is far broader than is necessary to prohibit these particularly unpopular "NIMBY" (not in my backyard) uses. The drafters of zoning codes are frequently more concerned about preventing loopholes in their restrictions from being identified than about limiting property rights in a respect that most current property owners in the zone don't avail themselves of anyway. For example, in Denver, where I live, the City Council recently passed a Group Living Amendment to its zoning code easing restrictions on uses of residences by unrelated people. This measure was sufficiently controversial that members of the public used their referral powers to petition to have the repeal of the recently enacted legislation places on the November 2021 general election ballot for voters to consider repealing it. As the link in the question notes, homeowner's associations, frequently also impose limitations on this kind of use of a residence, which are often even more strict, and are frequently adopted for the same reason. HOAs have more authority to do so than local governments because as private entities, they aren't required to meet constitutional law limitations on their authority. The question is, if both parties agree to forgo any safety measures that it might be there to protect, who exactly is it hurting if one person pays the other to stay over? In simple terms: why is it illegal? Why does the government care who stays in who's house, while paying money? Is there some 3rd party that is negatively affected if the guidelines aren't followed? The third-party is the neighboring property owners who fear that the quality of their neighborhood will be reduced by this kind of agreement. I am sympathetic to these criticisms. But, they aren't barriers to enacting laws if people with the power to enact legislation disagree. The simple rule is that in the real world, legislation is not required to adhere to a liberal/libertarian ideal in which laws are enacted only to regulate matters in which someone else may arguably be harmed. Subject to light constitutional regulation, the authority of local government's to enact legislation regulating the use of property is frequently plenary (i.e. unlimited) or close to it. The government can do anything it wants that it isn't forbidden from doing by the constitution or a higher level government's statutes. Courts aren't permitted to second guess the accuracy or desirability of these legislative determinations in most cases. Many states, furthermore, have "home rule cities" that are expressly protected from having their legislative authority limited in many respects by state legislation. A regulatory taking, the prevents property from having any beneficial use, must be compensated by the government enacting the regulation of its use. But regulatory laws may reduce the value of property by limiting the uses to which it can be put so long as there is still some beneficial use of the property that remains available. A very light and disputed impact that is perceived to be negative, such as the one in this case, is a sufficient rational basis for a municipal or local government to enact such legislation, and many local government zoning codes do, in fact, regulate this kind of activity. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the authority of local governments to enact this kind of legislation in the United States in the face of a constitutional challenge to it, in the case of Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co. in 1926, although some more extreme versions of limitations on non-related people sharing a home have subsequently been held to be invalid, mostly as a result of later enacted federal fair housing laws.	The wording of the original lease and the renewal form are vital here. The Texas Property code, Title 8, chapter 92 is the relevant state law for residential tenancies. It neither forbids nor guarantees a right of renewal. That is left up to the lease agreement. However, it does require a landlord to provide a tenant with a copy of any signed lease promptly. Specifically Sec. 92.024. LANDLORD'S DUTY TO PROVIDE COPY OF LEASE provides that: (a) Not later than the third business day after the date the lease is signed by each party to the lease, a landlord shall provide at least one complete copy of the lease to at least one tenant who is a party to the lease. ... c) A landlord's failure to provide a complete copy of the lease as described by Subsection (a) or (b) does not invalidate the lease or, subject to Subsection (d), prevent the landlord from prosecuting or defending a legal action or proceeding to enforce the lease. (d) A landlord may not continue to prosecute and a court shall abate an action to enforce the lease, other than an action for nonpayment of rent, only until the landlord provides to a tenant a complete copy of the lease if the tenant submits to the court evidence in a plea in abatement or otherwise that the landlord failed to comply with Subsection (a) or (b). (e) A landlord may comply with this section by providing to a tenant a complete copy of the lease: (1) in a paper format; (2) in an electronic format if requested by the tenant; or (3) by e-mail if the parties have communicated by e-mail regarding the lease. Sec. 92.003 provides that: (a) In a lawsuit by a tenant under either a written or oral lease for a dwelling or in a suit to enforce a legal obligation of the owner as landlord of the dwelling, the owner's agent for service of process is determined according to this section. (b) If written notice of the name and business street address of the company that manages the dwelling has been given to the tenant, the management company is the owner's sole agent for service of process. (c) If Subsection (b) does not apply, the owner's management company, on-premise manager, or rent collector serving the dwelling is the owner's authorized agent for service of process unless the owner's name and business street address have been furnished in writing to the tenant. Dallas municipal law prohibits retaliating against a tenant who complains about improper conditions or requests maintenance, but says nothing about lease renewals. Under ordinary contract law, an offer and acceptance makes a contract, unless the parties have previously agreed otherwise. Moreover, demonstrable practice can make or confirm a contract. If the tenant has paid rent for either March or April in reliance on the renewal agreement, and at the specified renewal rate, and that rent has been accepted, that may well constitute ratification (and thus execution) of the renewed lease. This is if the new lease would hav started before the April rent was due. So the tenant may well have the right to enforce the terms specified in the February renewal form. However, this will depend on what those terms are, and also what renewal provisions, if any, were in the original lease. It might be a good idea to send a letter to the landlord and manager, saying that the renewal form that you signed constitutes an acceptance of their offer, and thus a binding contract, and asking for a signed copy as per section 92.024, mentioning the section number. If it were me, I would send such a letter by both email and USPS certified mail, to both the manager and the landlord, if I had both addresses. I would keep a copy of any communications, and make them all in writing from now on (email is writing, legally). In any case the tenant would be wise to continue to pay rent on time in the amount specified on the renewal form, by some traceable means such as a check, money order, or credit card. I would be sure to use a method the original lease listed as acceptable, or that had been used in the past, except for cash. If I used a check, I would write "payment in full for rent of {address} for {month}" on the back The tenant would be wise to consult a local lawyer who specializes in tenant's cases, there seem to be quite a few. There is a local housing crisis center. It offers regular (twice a month) legal clinics with volunteer lawyers, and can be reached at 214-828-4244 or [email protected]. Such a center might be able to recommend local lawyers. Often an initial consultation with a lawyer on such a matter is free or at a low charge. It would probably be a good idea for the tenant to take some action fairly promptly. 15 U.S. Code Chapter 96 (the federal e-sign act) (section 7001) provides that: (a) In general -- Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law (other than this subchapter and subchapter II), with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce— (1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and (2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation. Also the UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999), which has been adopted by Texas, allows but does not require the use of electronic signatures. Thus the tenant;s email response ought to be a vald means of forming a contract.	No All parties must agree to change a contract. On the face of it, the New Tenant has to be “acceptable to both the Landlord and the remaining individual or individuals comprising the Tenant (the Remaining Tenant)”. It goes on to describe what the landlord may consider in making this assessment; there is no such imposition on the Remaining Tenant. However, there is implicit in a contract a requirement that the parties must act reasonably when using discretion. If Remaining Tenant repeatedly rejects every proposed New Tenant then this raises the question of if they are acting reasonably. Have you clearly articulated why the proposed replacements are unacceptable and are those reasonable reasons?	According to this press release, Toronto is "stepping up enforcement" of its leash by-law. You should call 311 to report violations: http://www.toronto.ca/311/knowledgebase/29/101000050429.html You can find more information here: http://www.toronto.ca/311/knowledgebase/47/101000050447.html http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=b6c9dada600f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD You can find a list of areas where dogs are permitted to be unleashed here: http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=5a81dada600f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD&vgnextchannel=b6c9dada600f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD I note, however, that the press release says that "A dog is considered running at large if it is unleashed, off its owner's property and not under its owner's control." Reading this strictly, where all three conditions must be met, a dog owner is permitted to unleash a dog if it is still possible for the owner to control the dog. I don't know how the courts have interpreted this, but it could certainly be interpreted very widely.
Developed initial version of website in belief contract would get signed. They backed out. Is the site mine? The title is probably my best summary. It is similar to this other unfortunate scenario, but I ask here because of a few differences. So here are the mains: Two months ago I sent an email to a guy on upwork who was looking to hire out a programming job I was uniquely qualified for. In my email I linked him to my proof of qualifications. I received a phone call from him where the first words he said were "Where the fuck have you bean!? I've been looking for you for months." He went on to tell me how he was loosing faith in his project because he'd already interviewed over 30 developers who didn't fit the bill. Then said he got "goose bumps" when reading through my blog posts because I showed that I'd basically already done in a prior project what he was trying to do (albeit for a different application in a different industry). At some point I said "If I were to be the one to do this job for yo.." when he abruptly cut me off to say "No no. There is no if. This job is yours." I was feeling pretty good. Over the next two months him and I discussed the project with his partner - the sole financier of the project. Communication wise: They shared with me: very general block diagrams of how the system would work, examples of websites they wanted to emulate (which were gross), and a CSV of people they wanted to advertise to obtained from public government records. They never provided code of any form to me. I shared: outlines of a better system, better 3rd party providers to integrate with, and educated them on machine learning. I learned that the financier, who is involved in a hedge fund, is litigious - he would gloat about various ways he'd made money including a story about making $50k by buying pre-foreclosed real estate who's mortgage he knew was improperly recorded so he could sue the city/bank to nullify it. These communications spanned about 30 hours. We negotiated through several revisions of a written contract that ultimately was not signed. The last revision I requested was that I would retain rights to all works until receipt of final payment, at which point I would transfer over all rights. Both partners told me multiple times that they wanted to hurry up and get this contract signed so that I could get paid/start. Communication from them slowed last month... I was told that the financier fell ill. Two weeks ago I told them that I would immediately begin working on the project "full time" in anticipation of finalizing the contract. It was clear they received my message because the financier responded saying he would call me the following day. He didn't call me, but I did develop a working version of the software. It is live on a domain name I own. All the visuals, design elements, and code were created by me. I figured branding could easily be swapped. I updated the financier that I'd created a first version and was going to have beta testers using it this week. Then he sent me this: So my questions are: If this guy sues me, what could he win? The initial idea for this site was theirs but I am the one to manifest that idea into a usable thing using hard won know-how and assets. Is it completely mine to monetize? His abrupt change of heart has left me with about 80 hours of non-compensated work as well as server and 3rd party service costs. So about $7k in currently wasted effort. If it is okay for me to sell this, should I first offer it to him? Or should I not speak to them anymore?	All your work is yours. They've made it very clear it wasn't a work for hire, so it's yours. They can't copyright any of their ideas. You can't copyright an idea. Only specific creative elements authored by them and present in your work could be covered by copyright. You didn't use their block diagrams. I don't see how references to other sites to look at would constitute a creative element they authored. That said, you probably want to talk to a lawyer and get a written legal opinion that you can rely on.	As far as I can see this means that I sign away any rights I currently have to any IP and also that I sign all rights to any IP I create whilst working for the company. The hiring manager says that I have this wrong and that it only means anything related to work that I would undertake during my employment with the company. Based on the quoted language, the hiring manager is correct. The key phrase is "all rights to all material created in the course of your employment with the Company" This means things created as part of your new job. It does not mean copyrights or other IP you now own, nor does it mean rights to things you create outside of work hours, unrelated to your job, not as part of any work assignment, and not created on work premises or using work equipment. You might want to confirm this by talking with a local lawyer with some IP experience and some employment law experience. A one-time consult should be available at a fairly small cost. The section about "whether now existing or created in the future" refers not to existing IP, but to existing kinds of IP and existing laws. If the UK should pass a new "algorithm rights " law next year, this language attempts to make sure that such rights are covered without needing you to sign a revised contract. Note that this phrase occurs as part of the definition of the term "Intellectual Property Right", and it is limited by the phrase "in respect of the material created by you in the course of your employment." A contract that attempted to claim all existing IP you may hold that is unrelated to your employment, or one which tried to claim IP having no relation to your future employment might be held void as against public policy. In any case, if it was ambiguous, any such ambiguity should be resolved against the drafter of the contract (here the company) and in favor of the other party. A separate email might be taken into account as showing what your "meeting of the minds" was with the company insofar as the contract language is ambiguous. It will not, however, be effective in changing the plain meaning of the contract.	By "unlicensed" you mean that it doesn't state a license for use (MIT, GPL, etc.)? Those licenses are just a codified bundle of terms of use that cover many many edge cases. You have in place a much simpler agreement that covers the primary situation: you using/modifying the code for your own use. It's just like borrowing a car. You will ask a friend "hey, could I borrow your car for a bit?" "sure!". You know there's a possibility that you'll get in an accident or something weird will happen, but you think the chances of that are minimal and you would be able to work it out. If you ask a car rental company, they'll give you a full contract covering every situation that may happen. Similarly, a large company would be hesitant to borrow a car for corporate use without a legal framework surrounding it. So you will likely be in the clear if you are just using it for a small project with minimal legal/financial implications. If you plan on turning your project into a multi-billion dollar empire, you should revisit your agreement.	Do you have a contract? It depends on the website’s terms but almost certainly not. It is standard practice in e-commerce terms and conditions that your selecting “buy” and giving the vendor money does not create a contract; you are merely making an offer that the vendor can accept or reject. For example, Amazon’s terms are clear that the contract only comes into existence when they dispatch the goods, until then they are free to cancel your order and return your money. Here the vendor rejected the offer. Is this false advertising? Maybe. It would depend on the specifics of the ad and whether, overall, a reasonable person would be mislead or deceived. It’s possible you misunderstood but that doesn’t necessarily make it misleading or deceptive. I misunderstand a lot of things; that doesn’t mean they were objectively misleading or deceptive. Notwithstanding, a business does not have to make good on false advertising. An incorrect advertised price does not force the business to anccept offers of that price. It may force a correction and may require the item to not be sold until the price is corrected and it may expose the business to fines, but it does not give anyone the right to buy at that price.	Counter notices are described in 17 USC 512(g)(3). It starts with the requirement for "A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber" (and a statement under penalty of perjury...). Supposing that you can't get anywhere with finding the contributor even via a subpoena, then you're stopped there: you can't swear on behalf of someone else. Paragraph (f) also says that if a person files a false infringement claim, they become liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it but it's not immediately obvious that you would suffer damage by taking the material down (not immediately obvious doesn't mean obviously not true). A case could be made, but it's risky. In Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Diebold was hit with substantial damages basically for having made up a theory that certain email discussion was infringing when it was clearly fair use. If a person actually lies about being the copyright owner, that would probably be viewed even more dimly by the courts. Your 4th argument gives you no traction: if an infringer posts infringing material and transfers copyright on the web page, but they don't hold copyright, then that transfer mean nothing. As for the other arguments, your attorney will have to suggest an advisable course of action. S/he might advise that your evidence is so strong that you should just ignore the takedown; or that you should take the content down and then sue for damages; or take the content down and lobby your congressman for a change in the law. [Addendum] I will reiterate my recommendation to get a lawyer. I believe that under the law, the risk to you would be the situation where the person prevails in an infringement suit against you. Outside of the "mere conduit" safe harbor, you have to participate in the notice and takedown scheme in order to "stay safe" (also you have to do so quickly). You have identified a potentially huge flaw in the system. Theoretically, criminal charges of perjury and paragraph (f) damages would be enough to deter ordinary wrong-doers, provided that you can really prove that someone else is the copyright holder. But the cost of litigation is not zero and the chances of winning are not 100%. The law does assume that all parties tell the truth, indeed the law requires a "penalty of perjury" statement. Since counter-notice is also part of the legal dance, I would conclude that you do have to write yourself a counter-notice. Then if there is a suit, you have satisfied the requirements of the law.	Since you are 17 years old, any contract that you sign is according to US law voidable by you or your guardian until some time after you are 18. So if he tries to sue you, you can just void the contract and he has no leg to stand on. The money he paid you is just bad luck for him. He won’t have any copyright or license to use your code in that case. BTW. You have a verbal contract which is quite valid. With no other evidence, any court would assume that the contract was that you delivered what you delivered, that he has a license to use the code, and he paid the money that he paid. If you void the contract, he has nothing.	The CEO wants to "fool" users You are essentially admitting that the company you are working for is about to deceit its customers and asking whether that is legal. The relevant set of laws is rather sparse and does not give direct answers in regards to oAuth tokens or other details of that level (which is probably making your CEO think he can "handle" the arising questions). Probably the most relevant bit of legislation that applies here is The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§41-58) which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices and has been applied to online privacy and data security policies. I am pretty sure that, in practice, if the users take your company to court, it will be held liable because: users are allowing us to read their CRM data and once we get the data, the data become ours, and we can do whatever we want with it. Is this true? While the users are still allowing you to read their data it is completely up to the Terms/EULA what you can do with it. However, once you have made the users think that they have withdrawn your access (e.g. they "deleted" oAuth tokens), you are no longer authorized to read the current data (although the Terms may still allow you to use the old data you obtained when you had access). Silently continuing to access their data without their knowledge/approval is definitely a deceit. The CEO wants us to download all of their emails and store them in our database There would be nothing wrong with that if it was in the Terms. But if it is not, that would be a blatant (and easily punishable) breach of privacy. Note that you may also be held personally liable for this wrongdoing (if/when proved so). "Just doing your job" claim will not work.	IMHO, your questions reflect several misunderstandings of how the process works. So, with your permission, I will avoid directly answering your questions and instead focus on suggestions how to best help you plot a path forward. Your counterparty has the burden of proof. If your counterparty forged your signature on a contract, then they must prove you signed it or they can not enforce it. In order to enforce the contract, they will need to sue you civilly. Then you can introduce evidence of their forgery at that time. Inform your counterparty you did not sign the contract. Then act accordingly. If your counterparty forged your signature on an extension contract then you should inform them immediately after it has come to your attention. Advise them you have no intention of complying with a contract you never signed. And that if they try to enforce the forged agreement, you will defend yourself "vigorously." Never threaten criminal charges to advance your position in a civil case. This behavior is a crime in itself. It's called extortion. If you want to pursue criminal charges at some point then do it without relating it to the civil case. The police are not your only means of pursuing criminal charges. You can also schedule a meeting with your District Attorney, State's Attorney (whatever that position is called in your state) or your state's Attorney General. In other words, you might want to approach the government's attorney responsible for prosecuting crimes in your jurisdiction. Forget about involving the police. They have given you their position on the matter. Approach the DA or AG office instead. If the DA/AG decides to use the police, she we will make that decision then inform the police how she needs to use their services. Police are wary of being used as leverage in civil disputes. That's probably the reason for their policy decision regardless of whether it's technically justified by the law or not. Your counterparty can't "fix" anything. If they claim you signed a document you did not, they will have to produce that document with your signature on it. This will presumably be your Exhibit A evidence they forged it. Disclaimer: I am a lay person and not an attorney. This writing is no substitute for proper legal advice. If you need help with a specific legal situation please hire an attorney and do not rely on anything I have written here.
Protection of a person from the laws of the country (marriage in Israel) If a person is a citizen of the country that prohibits or limits his right to marry, what are the legal ways for this person to protect his/her rights to marry? An example is Israel that prohibits marriage of a non-jew to a jewish person. Is there an international law to protect his/her rights to marry to a person of his/her choice?	The whole institution of marriage is subject to arbitrary interpretation/twisting within/by any sovereign jurisdiction. Countries are normally within their rights to recognise marriages subject to any conditions they like, or even completely repudiate the institution of marriage altogether. Is there an international law to protect his/her rights to marry to a person of his/her choice? No. what are the legal ways for this person to protect his/her rights to marry? A few options: Elect a politician/party that will change the law; or If you do not care whether the government recognises your marriage if done the way you want, just marry where/how you want and live with it; or If you need the government to recognise your marriage (e.g. for relationship property protection etc.), move to a country where your "rights to marry" will be protected the way you want.	The answer is "it depends on the protection." Even illegal aliens are afforded certain rights by the US Constitution. For example, that fact is one of the reasons for the prison in Guantanamo Bay. Another consideration, for protections or rights that are available to citizens but not to aliens, is that the determination of citizenship or alienage must be subject to the right of due process. Without that, the executive branch of government would be able to, for example, remove or exclude anyone from the United States, or commit anyone to indefinite immigration detention, simply by asserting that the person is an alien, without review by the judicial branch. There is a discussion, with references, here: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alien. This mentions the fifth and fourteenth amendments, as well asthe fourth, as applicable to aliens. Pertinent quotations (emphasis added): Aliens also receive treatment very similar to the treatment that U.S. citizens receive in the context of the judicial system. For instance, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution apply to aliens residing within the United States. As such, the courts guarantee aliens the right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. Courts have generally construed the Fourth Amendment as applicable to aliens as well. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures. Congress has the preeminent power in terms of passing statutes that regulate immigration and alienage. Consequently, the United States Constitution enables Congress to delineate the rights, duties, and liabilities that accompany legal immigrant status. Congressional power in this realm, however, must comply with the qualification that any law resulting in disparate treatment between aliens and citizens must bear some relation to a legitimate goal impacting immigration law. When a law treats an alien differently from a U.S. citizen, courts treat the law as inherently suspect and apply strict scrutiny when considering the law's constitutionality. States possess the power to confer additional rights on aliens within their respective jurisdictions. While states may not pass regulations affecting aliens that directly conflict with federal laws or the U.S. Constitution, states may pass other regulations if they bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. State law controls the right of an alien to hold real property in the particular state. Under common law, the alien had property rights similar to those of citizens. Currently, most states have enacted statutes following the common law, but a few have forbid aliens, ineligible for U.S. citizenship, from holding or acquiring real property. These laws have resulted in some successful challenges by aliens who claimed the laws were unconstitutional. ... When invoking federal question jurisdiction, federal statutes provide aliens with access to the federal court system in the following three scenarios: allegations of civil rights violations by the federal government, allegations of Equal Protection Clause violations by the federal government, and allegations of violations of the Refugee Act of 1980. A strict reading of the text sheds some light on the matter. For example, many constitutional rights are specified by limiting the power of congress; such a limitation applies to all people under the jurisdiction of federal law. For example, the First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Similarly, some rights explicitly granted by the constitution are typically granted to "the People," without reference to nationality. The Fourth Amendment: The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (The question of whether "the People" implies "of the United States" may explain the qualifier "generally" in the sentence above discussing applicability of the Fourth Amendment.) Some rights are granted specifically to "persons"; the courts appear to have concluded that this applies to everyone regardless of nationality. The Fifth Amendment: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Finally, some rights are expressed as procedural rules applying to the courts. As with limitations on congress, these apply to anyone who is party to a relevant action. For example, the Sixth Amendment applies to "all criminal prosecutions": In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. The Seventh Amendment applies to all "suits at common law": In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by Jury shall be preserved, and no fact, tried by a Jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.	Probably not. There is an unenumerated constitutional "right to travel" (which has been recognized in case law, and has not yet been judicially overruled) and there is also a concept called the "dormant commerce clause" which prohibits legislation by a state that interferes with the ability of people to engage in interstate commerce even if Congress has passed no relevant legislation. There could also be a privileges and immunities clause argument arising under the original 1789 constitution and not the 14th Amendment to that document privileges and immunities clause, which affords people from outside a state the same rights as people in a state. Also, citizens of a state are defined as its residents, so a state only has jurisdiction over someone as a citizen for so long as they reside there. I was born in Georgia, for example, but haven't lived there since I was six years old, so I am not a citizen of Georgia. The proposed Texas law bears some similarity to the Mann Act of 1910 which prohibits transporting people across state lines for the purposes of prostitution (to slightly oversimplify). But the Mann Act is a federal law, not a state law. The proposed Texas law also bears some similarity to the infamous Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 which required free states to respect the slave status of people treated as slaves in a slave state under the slave state's law by returning fugitive slaves to their out of state masters, when the slave escaped across state lines. But, this was also a federal law and reflect the greater extraterritorial force of contracts and property rights created under state law compared to the extraterritorial force of the police powers of a state government. There are constitutional provisions requiring states to honor each other's rulings as well, most notably the requirement to extradite felons, and the full faith and credit clause that requires states to honor the court judgments and government determinations of status (e.g. marriage certificates) of other states in most circumstances. But, I don't think that you get there in a case regulating the conduct of a state resident outside the state, or in a case where you want to criminalize assisting someone in the state to leave the state for a particular purpose. Neither of these examples, however, involve state laws. Generally, penalties for doing something across state lines need to be established by federal, rather than state, laws. This said, the issue has not been litigated in this particular context yet, and the legal theories implicated and structure of those lines in fine particulars could matter. States have only rarely tried to regulate the conduct of their residents outside their own states and have even less frequently been successful in doing so.	The legal solution is very simple. Under Philippine law (Title 1, Marriage, Article 2) No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. If you do not consent to the marriage during the ceremony, that is the end of the matter, you are not married. You can also refuse to apply for a license under article 11 (which requires your sworn application – refuse to swear). If your are threatened with violence, you can report this threat to the police, since not even your father is allowed to threaten to assault or kill you.	You are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction that you are in. However, some of the laws of the jurisdiction you reside in or are a citizen of have extra-territorial applicability, so you have to comply with those laws too.	The most important aspects in India which are governed by specific religious laws are: Marriage Inheritance Marriage It is easier and faster to get married using the religious laws (Hindu Marriage Act or Shariat Act), as compared to the secular marriage law (Special Marriage Act, 1954). That is why many young couples convert to a single religion to get married quickly. Inheritance If one's ancestors identified with a specific religion, and one identifies with another religion, then that could affect one's inheritance. The inheritance of a person, especially a woman, could also be affected by them marrying outside their religion or state. So, if one decides to become the first generation atheist in a family (against the wishes of the family or the larger religious community), their inheritance and their rights (especially if they are engaged in agriculture) could be severely affected. This becomes all the more difficult, if the business of their family is not incorporated as a company under the Companies Act. If you are professional or a first generation business owner, then you shouldn't have legal challenges but primary and secondary social challenges. Primary social challenges could be people not ready to deal with you or engage with you if you declare publicly that you are an atheist. Secondary social challenges, would be to be able to find a lawyer (in your town and whose services are affordable) who can address these challenges. And in case you go to court, the judge may not have a lot of experience or education about how to deal with atheist cases. Also, most lawyers will advise you to identify yourself as a member of a religion to avoid unnecessary legal hassle.	Natural persons are not and cannot become juridical persons. Juridical persons are entities that are not natural persons, but which it's necessary or convenient to treat in many respects as though they were natural persons. The categories are mutually exclusive. There is no "contract" involved in citizenship from a legal standpoint (there's a concept of a "social contract," but that's a philosophical justification for government and not an actual legally binding agreement with specific terms); citizenship is not subject to commercial law in any way. Incorporation has nothing whatsoever to do with citizenship; a natural person is not incorporated, and is a citizen as a natural person. That citizenship is the ordinary notion of citizenship.	There is no such thing as "EU" law. Each member state has their own laws. In germany it is not forbidden to live together. The marriage certainly would not be legal here and I highly doubt the marriage would be recognized here if legalized somewhere else. But let's for the sake of the argument assume it would be. As soon as it gets into territory that marriage is made for, it would be highly illegal. Moving to a different country from Asia, the minor is highly dependent on their adult spouse for basically everything. Starting with mandatory health insurance, where you literally have to check the box "a dependent of the adult" in the adults insurance, to basic needs such as food, shelter, clothes, paying for school materials. Even in theory, with school being mandatory and laws against child labor, there is no way the child would not be depending on that adult. § 174 Abs. 1 StGB Sex mit Schutzbefohlenen (Personen unter 16 Jahren, die jemandem zur Erziehung, Ausbildung oder zur Betreuung in der Lebensführung anvertraut sind bzw. leibliche oder angenommene Kinder unter 18 Jahren) und Sex unter Missbrauch eines Abhängigkeitsverhältnisses ist verboten und wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu 5 Jahren bestraft. Translation: Sex with a protected person (a person under the age of 16 who is entrusted to someone for upbringing, education or persons under the age of 16 who are entrusted to the care of someone for upbringing, education, or life care, or natural or adopted children under the age of 18) and sex in abuse of a relationship of dependence in general is prohibited and is punishable by imprisonment for up to 5 years. That is if they agreed. If they don't, it's rape, plain and simple, regardless of marital status or other relationship and will, depending on circumstances, net you something between the 5 years above up to 15 years in prison. The difference between raping a spouse and raping someone outside of marriage has been abolished in 1997.
Income tax bracket threshold for zero tax in the US and regarding no income at all (1) I am trying to find out whether one has to file any income tax if they are an American citizen permanently living abroad but having literally no income? (2) While trying to search about this on the internet, I wondered why is there no tax bracket with 0% or nil income tax (the UK doesn't tax income upto £12,500 for example). This means that people earning below that threshold are exempt from paying tax. Is there no such Nil or 0% tax thing in the US? So many countries have this minimum threshold income where no filing of income tax is required. Even countries like India have such policy. But I can only see that in the US you have to pay 10% tax minimum no matter how less you earn. I would really appreciate if you could help me regarding those 2 questions. Thank you:)	Q2: US tax brackets are based on your taxable income, which is computed by applying various adjustments and deductions to your "actual" gross income. In particular, most taxpayers are entitled to apply a standard deduction which is currently about $12,000 for a single taxpayer. So if you are a single taxpayer with a gross income of, say, $10,000, then after taking the standard deduction you have a taxable income of $0 (it cannot go negative) and therefore you owe $0 in taxes. The overall effect is somewhat similar to having a 0% tax bracket.	Don't even think of going there. If you refuse to pay taxes with this argument, the IRS will take this as a "frivolous tax return", and give you a fine of up to $5,000. If you are trying to argue that this is illegal, you only make things worse. The IRS gets about 20,000 to 30,000 frivolous tax returns every year, so every argument you could come up with they have heard a dozen times.	On the first page of https://www.gov.uk/duty-free-goods/overview you find: "You can bring some goods from abroad without having to pay UK tax or ‘duty’ (customs charges), as long as they’re for your own use." And on the next page "... will use them yourself or give them away as a gift". This clearly doesn't cover anything that you bring into the UK to sell it. And a bit further on the site it says "You must tell customs (known as ‘declaring’) on arrival in the UK if you have goods: ... that you plan to sell". Since you are asking here, it is quite obvious that you intend to sell :-) You said "e.g. say this guys comes every month from Russia to France for unrelated business, each time he fills up his luggage with the maximum allowed amount of goods that comply with custom laws". If this guy sells the stuff to you, then the maximum allowed amount of goods to import without paying taxes is zero. Once he is willing to pay taxes, there is no limit. Obviously regularly importing things from Russia or France and selling in the UK at a profit means that he is running a business in the UK, which means he would have to register a business, pay corporation taxes etc. It's all a matter of degree; for small amounts nobody cares (up to some limit you don't need to register a business or pay taxes; I don't know the details).	Yes, you can borrow tax-free Bitcoin (or really, any currency not your home currency) is a security like a stock or bond. Whenever you take a loan using a security as collateral, that is not a taxable event, and so you do not owe taxes on the money you borrowed. Perfect world, you pay it back and this is not taxable either: the loan/repayment is a non-event to the tax authorities. (Although interest might be tax deductible). When this goes wrong: you default If you default and keep your collateral, at some point, the lender decides you'll never pay, and forgives aka "writes off" the loan. This forgiveness is considered ordinary income and it is taxable in the year forgiven. In the US this is waived if you can show that you were insolvent at the time of default. When this goes wrong: forced sale of collateral The collateral is still your property. The bank just has a lien on it or other form of control, like it's in your brokerage account in their bank such that they can flag it, force sale, and intercept funds. When the bank forces sale of your collateral to pay your debt, that is a sale of the security for tax purposes. The proceeds go to you (as far as the tax person is concerned), even though the bank certainly will intercept the proceeds. So the tax liability goes to you. Note that standard capital gains rules apply, so if you owned it less than 1 year when you signed up for the loan, yet the bank forced the sale after 1 year of ownership, then it counts as holding the security longer than 1 year for tax purposes. (e.g. qualifying for the lower "long term capital gains" rate in the US).	The IRS requires taxpayers to swear under "penalties of perjury" to their statements and figures given concerning their income. Since obviously this constitutes a potential incrimination The privilege against self-incrimination applies to giving testimony that reveals that you have committed a crime, not to doing something prospectively in a way that does not violate criminal laws. The solution is that you may truthfully report the amount of income that you have on your tax return. Ordinarily, the information that you had a certain amount of income, without a specific description of its source, would not in and of itself be incriminating. So, it is not "obvious that this constitutes potential incrimination[.]", at least in the general case. There might be some circumstance in which merely filling out the information on a tax return required by law and signing it under penalty of perjury would be incriminating, although this is far more narrow that your question suggests. In those circumstances, the solution would be to file an unsigned tax return accompanied by a disclaimer stating that you are not signing it under penalty of perjury as it would be potentially incriminating for you to do so would on a signed and attached explanation that explicitly claims the 5th Amendment privilege. There is actually an IRS form for doing that or similar things on: IRS Form 8275. This would result in serious civil tax penalties, but would probably protect you from a criminal tax law violation (at least for the failure to file offense, not necessarily from the failure to pay offense).	In the U.S.: To my knowledge all states and jurisdictions that with a "sales tax" technically have a "use" tax, which means the tax liability falls on the purchaser. However, they require "businesses" (whose exact definition varies by jurisdiction) to collect and remit that tax on behalf of "consumers" (which can also vary, e.g., to exclude businesses that resell). Historically consumers have avoided paying use taxes by purchasing from out-of-state businesses that are not subject to their home states' laws on withholding the use tax: while technically a violation of the tax law neither consumers nor states have had an interest in calculating or auditing use taxes owed, except in the case of very large and unusual transactions. There is a large effort underway by states and "brick-and-mortar" stores that lose business to this virtual "mail order tax exemption" to subject out-of-state businesses to the requirement of collecting use taxes on behalf of the state. A few online businesses (notably Amazon) have acquiesced to this demand. To answer your question: In the U.S., an individual who is not making a "business" of selling items or services is generally exempt from the requirement to collect sales tax. It is the purchaser who has the legal obligation to declare and pay tax on such transactions. But purchasers rarely do.	You ask them explicitly, maybe adding that you need that info specifically to calculate tax. IP address is not reliable because your customers could be using VPN, Tor, or be on vacation overseas. (By the way, "IP" on a website about law would more likely be understood as "Intellectual Property", not "Internet Protocol address".)	The difficulty is that tips are, by statute, considered a form of wages rather than a form of self-employment income for the tipped employee for income tax purposes (in contrast, employers don't have to keep track of tips for minimum wage purposes, tipped employees just have an extremely low minimum wage+). (If it was self-employment income, withholding and paying self-employment tax which is paid in lieu of FICA taxes, would be solely the employee's problem and none of the employer's business.) A comment notes, probably correctly, that: If wages plus tips do not add up to the full regular (non-tipped) minimum wage, the employer must pay the difference. This is not well-enforced, however. So, employers have a duty to report to the IRS and withhold taxes from their best estimate of combined wages and tips in a manner authorized by IRS regulations. If they don't, the employers face stiff penalties from the IRS for failing to withhold taxes. There are tax regulations and other forms of official guidance governing when it is permissible to infer tips on cash payments in this fashion. It isn't truly "wage theft". The employee still gets whatever the actual tip is, and the employer still doesn't get the tip itself. Instead, what the employer does is withhold taxes for the benefit of the employee (and with respect to FICA an equal share of employer obligations withholding) based upon estimated wages and tips combined. The income tax withholding is annually reconciled (in theory anyway) against actual taxes owed on the annual tax return. If you maintain good records, you might get audited, but you'd probably win. If you maintain sloppy records or don't keep track at all, you'd probably lose in an audit. To reconcile the error in income tax reporting in federal tax law, the waiter files a 1040 with the W-2 from the employer. The waiter reports the amount withheld in one box. The waiter reports the correct amount of wages and salary and tips rather than the incorrect amount in the wage and salary box. The waiter files a supplement to the tax return page explaining the that W-2 is inaccurate. The waiter calculates tax and shows entitlement to a refund, and the IRS either writes a check or audits after which the IRS or if there is no agreement the tax court decides who is right. Cash tips should be logged daily by the waiter and regularly deposited. (I've done this before personally, with success in the audit process, in cases of erroneous 1099s for my personal taxes.) Reconciling errors in FICA withholdings is rather more difficult, but erroneous overwithholding still provides a benefit to the employee, and the employee's survivors, in the long run in that case. This is done in the form of larger Social Security benefit checks that are based on the inflated wage and tip estimate and the actual FICA taxes paid. If the employee actually receives more cash tips than reported by the employer and doesn't correctly increase the amount in a tax return, the tipped employee is actually engaged in petty tax evasion (and, in practice, excess cash tips are rarely reported). The circumstances under which a fixed percentage may be properly set and what it should be are too technical for an answer here. Systemically, the problem with the applicable regulations is that the inferred tip percentage is benchmarked against the tips paid on credit card payments, per IRS guidance and permission, but actually, customers tip at lower percentages of the bill when paying in cash than when paying via credit card. This is a flaw in the law, but it doesn't represent impropriety on the part of the employer.
Is there a legal difference between using pharmageddon or the implied meaning of the word pharmageddon? In one documentary's trailer, one doctor says, "Let's be honest, a number of medical schools are run by pharmageddon." Pharmageddon doesn't literally mean anything, but it implies something. Is there any legal difference between a person using pharmageddon in the sentence above and a person using the exact implied meaning of the word pharmageddon in the sentence above?	Is there a legal difference between using pharmageddon or the implied meaning of the word pharmageddon? It depends on the context, wording, and substance of the "implied meaning". If these are in the sense of the comments to your question, then there is no difference from a legal standpoint. The lawfulness of both alternatives is premised on the First Amendment, which protects free speech. Many other countries have in their legislation or Constitution equivalent provisions to protect the freedom of speech. Here, the invented term pharmageddon constitutes rhetorical hyperbole. A reasonable person would understand it not as a concrete entity controlling the medical schools, but as an adaptation from the Book of Revelation to give a connotation of doom or catastrophe in the context of medicine academics. The statement of fact "[A] numer of medical schools are run by pharmageddon" would not be actionable as defamatory because it does not sufficiently identify entities (such as specific pharmaceutical companies and/or medical schools) of which reputation is or could be harmed by that statement. Even if the publication singled out specific entities, actionability would depend on the veracity of the notion that the denounced dynamics hinder the schools' priority (i.e., academics & research in medicine) and/or the righteousness the allegedly controlling entity is expected or required to maintain.	Informed consent is required for a surgical procedure. "Informed" includes having knowledge of the risks. The relevant legal question would be whether the doctor in question did adequately apprise the patient of the risks. On an individual basis, patient A could sue doctor X for the resulting harm. It is possible that 5 patients might sue the same doctor on this basis, which gets expensive and inefficient. If there is a well-defined and large-enough class, it may be possible for the action to be certified as a class action. 20 people might be a large-enough class. The defendant would be "whoever is responsible for the wrong". That might be a single practitioner, or a hospital that the practitioner(s) work for. The hospital is an obvious plaintiff, if they failed in their duty to assure that their employees adequately informed patients of the risk.	They never legally existed According to True West magazine, no government ever issued a wanted poster containing the phrase “dead or alive”. The iconic posters were promulgated by private organisations railroads, Wells Fargo, Pinkerton etc. No doubt, if challenged, those organisations would argue that they were simply stating the terms under which the reward would be paid, not encouraging or condoning unlawful killing. Pre-modern societies had the legal concept of the “outlaw” which meant someone who was outside the protection of the law - they had no rights and anyone could do literally anything to them without legal consequence. It was effectively a death sentence. The legal use of outlaw is different from the colloquial use meaning a criminal. However, it had disappeared from use under English law (even if it was still theoretically possible) before the split with America and the due process clause would likely prevent its return. It was reintroduced in the Australian colonies to deal with frontier bushrangers where a magistrate could issue a warrant requiring a person to present themselves by a stated date or be declared outlaw. Even so, in practice most outlaws were apprehended and tried rather than shot on sight.	It doesn't matter. When a contract is left ambiguous the interpretation that is used is the one that is the most favorable to the party that did not draft the contract, under the logic that if the party that did draft the contract chose all the wording and thus, they could have stated their interpretation in the contract just avoided this whole mess in the first place. A similar rule exists in criminal law, where if the law is ambiguous, the interpretation used is the one most favorable to the defendant, since the state could have drafted it in a way that made their interpretation clear.	Numbering is for the sake of clarity, and is not intrinsically required. If you refer to a section, you need a way to say which section you mean, and a vague description like "up there where I talked about copying" is insufficient. You can refer to a section by a title, if you need to refer to sections within the contract, as long as your titles match what you refer to them as (and you don't have two sections called "Your Rights").	In the example given, both elements must be established. This is the most common meaning of the word "and" in a statute or rule or contract or other writing, but there are times when "and" does not have that meaning. One must always determine the meaning from context on a case by case basis. Words do not have a single universal meaning in all contexts for legal purposes. This variation by context in the meaning of words for legal purposes is especially frequent in countries with common law legal systems based upon the English legal system such as the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and India to have situations where a word often means one thing in one legal context and another thing in different legal contexts. This is because the governing statutes and case law are written on a piecemeal basis by many different people with no one in charge of maintaining stylistic uniformity, over a very long period of time (often centuries). In countries like those of Continental Europe, Latin America and much of Asia and Africa, which have what are called "civil law" systems, that are based on European civil codes, there are comprehensive codifications of the basic laws of the land that are drafted by experts all at the same time, and amended only with great deliberation and care, and these codes tend to use a word more consistently in most contexts than common law legislatures and judges do, although even then, this principle is not absolute.	The question of a patient's legal responsibility would arise under a negligence lawsuit, where the patient "should have known". The standard for determining what things a person "should have known" is fluid, but obviously you can start with "could have known". If a patient's can't know a fact, they cannot be said to have negligently contributed to the damage. Doctors are given these warnings, but patients are not, uniformly. It is therefore possible that a patient was never warned of the effects of an opioid prescription (I can personally attest to that lacuna in the system). Your assumption about the bottle being so labeled is only valid for the original supply bottles from which the pharmacist dispenses. However, there is also a rather compelling argument to the effect that no person in the US can in fact be unaware of the addiction risk of opioids. It is a defeasible argument, possibly applicable to a hypothetical person who has lived in complete isolation for decades. A patient is not required to undertake independent research in order to validate the science that underlies statutorily-mandated FDA approval or drugs, instead, the burden is assigned to the manufacturers and distributors (primarily doctors and pharmacists) to convey the relevant information. Thus HR 1026 would, if enacted, mandate a different warning. But the bill does not assert a lack of liability on either side, therefore the question reduces to the "simple" matter of determining if a person knew or should have known.	Yes, it’s legal Homeopathic “medicines” contain no active ingredients so they are effectively placebos. Placebo work for some patients some of the time but they don’t work if the patient knows what they are. For them to be effective they have to be kept secret. Most doctors from time-to-time and for various reasons prescribe placebos. The ethics of this practice is debatable but the legality isn’t - it’s totally legal.
GDPR & EPR regards maintaining email blacklist Note a user call YIVI had previously stated that you could store a hash of the users email address to avoid the requirements of General Data Protection Regulation (GDRP) and ePrivacy Directive (EPD). This is false as hashed email addresses are still considered personal information under the regulations as it is still may be possible for the data controller to identify the actual email address associated with the hashed value i.e. the data controller still has personal information stored of the user. Pseudonymized data is still unequivocally considered personal data under the GDPR, as noted in Recital 26. GDPR Recital 26 states "Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. " Under GDPR & EPD a persons hashed or un-hashed email address can be considered personal information. GDPR & EPD require user consent before storing a users personal information. Websites need a way of blacklisting malicious users i.e. add the users email address to a blacklist to prevent them logging into the website. Similarly when a user deletes their account on a website their email address may be added to a blacklist to prevent another account being opened with the same email address for various security and management reasons. Under GDPR a user has the right to be forgotten and can request that their personal information be deleted. Are we allowed to keep the users email address in a blacklist if they request that their personal information be deleted ?	GDPR & EPD require user consent before storing a users personal information. Wrong. User consent is one of the ways that justify storing personal information, but there are others. You may check art.6 to see the several reasons that allow to store personal information. In this case, it seems reasonable to justify it under the paragraph f (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of course, that means that the data has to be used for this purpose. Avoiding spammers and other banned users would be such a purpose, but you should ensure that you do not send those e-mail address commercial information or even a Christmas greeting. In any case, be careful with anything you store. If along with the e-mail you stored more info, this could be interpreted as excessive and beyond the scope of paragraph f. For example, imagine storing "User wrote nazi statements" explaining why the e-mail is banned; EU laws are very restrictive about storing information about political or religious beliefs.	IP addresses are personal data. That means you need a legal basis to process them, but not necessarily consent from the user. That IP addresses should be treated as personal data in most contexts is clear, regardless of whether you can associate the IP address with a user ID. That you make such an association affirms that both the IP address and user ID are personal data in your context though. As the answers in the questions you linked indicate, there are alternative legal bases to consent. The GDPR offers a choice of six legal bases (Art 6(1) lit a–f). In most cases, you would instead rely on a “legitimate interest” for logging. But it's not enough to claim that you have a legitimate interest. You must have a clear purpose for which such logs would be necessary, and you would then have to weigh this legitimate interest against the interests, rights, and freedoms of the affected data subjects. If such logs are necessary for security and anti-abuse purposes, your legitimate interest test is likely to prevail. However, you must limit retention of the logged data and the included information to what is actually necessary. For example, keeping user IDs in there might not be necessary. If the association of IP addresses and user IDs is not necessary for a legitimate interest, then you would indeed need consent. Discussion on why IP addresses are personal data. You see many answers and opinions that IP addresses might not be personal data. Some of these are technically correct, but most are misinformed or outdated. I know only a single well-informed person that still disagrees. For everyone else such as the EU Commission, IP addresses are clearly personal data. Under the GDPR, personal data is any information that relates to an (indirectly) identifiable natural person. In the context of log files we can assume that the entries usually “relate” to a person, namely the person making the request. The exception would be requests triggered by automated systems. The more interesting question is whether the person to which the log entry relates is identifiable. While the GDPR does provide further guidance on the concept of identification in Recital 26, it does not provide clear unambiguous criteria. Thus, there is lots of debate about what that precisely means. One approach is to sidestep that debate and and notice that the GDPR's definition of personal data explicitly notes that a person might be identified “in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier” (Art 4(1)). Another but otherwise unrelated part of the GDPR mentions “internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags” as examples of online identifiers (Recital 30). We can also look more deeply into Recital 26 and see that “singling out” already counts as identification. We can use the IP address to single out one person's log entries from the set of log entries, so this could be interpreted as meaning that any stable user ID renders the data personal data – and an IP address is sufficiently stable in this context. Another part of Recital 26 says that we must consider “all the means reasonably likely to be used” for identification, even if this involves additional information from third parties. This phrasing is virtually identical to the GDPR's predecessor, the EU Data Protection Directive. On the basis of that DPD, the EU's top court (ECJ/CJEU) was asked to rule on the question whether dynamic IP addresses are personal data (the Breyer case, C‑582/14, judgement from 2016-10-19). It said yes. “It did not say yes”, some people will object. And they are technically correct. When someone rents an internet connection from an ISP, the ISP will have logs that connect the user's real-world identity to the IP address they were assigned at a time. You don't have access to the ISP's logs. But, if that user violated your rights (e.g. a cyberattack or copyright infringement), then you could (depending on civil vs criminal matters) report this to the appropriate authorities or to petition the court and they would have the right to order the ISP to disclose this information. The CJEU said that if this chain (you → authorities → ISP → user identity) is grounded in law, then the IP address would be identifiable. But whether there are suitable laws to compel the ISP to disclose this data would be up to national laws, and the CJEU doesn't concern itself with that. Spoiler: such laws are pretty common. To summarize typical objections: The IP address doesn't relate to a person: Can be a valid objection, but is not typically the case for user-facing web services. The Recital 30 argument is not valid because it's about profiling, not identification, and it only says that IP addresses may be used for profiling, not that they are always identifying: Technically correct, but I think that Recital 30 merely expresses the implied understanding that of course an IP address is an online identifier and permits identification by itself. “Singling out” does not apply because SOME_REASON: Indeed, this is an ill-defined term with no case law to guide us. However, regulators such as the EDPB and their predecessor WP29 routinely use “singling out” to mean being able to distinguish one person's data from other people's data. An IP address lets us do that. The Breyer judgement is not applicable because the defendant in that case was the German state, and the state has other legal means than ordinary website operators: Nothing in that case was specific to the website operator being a state or other authority. If the website operator can contact the appropriate authority and if they have the right to order the ISP to disclose the relevant data, then the IP address is identifiable. The CJEU didn't say “yes” in Breyer, it said “if”. So I'll take that as a “no”: The CJEU concerns itself with the interpretation of EU law, not with national laws. Specifically in the Breyer case, lower courts confirmed that German law has the necessary means. In other EU member states, further checks would be necessary but it would surprise me if there wouldn't be equivalent subpoena powers. If the ISP doesn't have the data, then the IP addresses are anonymous: Indeed, the CJEU scenario collapses if there is no additional data to be linked with the IP address. However: The CJEU used this scenario as an example to show that IP addresses can be identifiable. If that particular scenario fails, there could be other scenarios that still allow identification. The question of whether IP addresses are identifiable had of course been the subject of wider debate at the time. That the GDPR explicitly mentions IP addresses can be seen as a reaction to this debate. Thus, in a sense, the Breyer case is moot. It is still useful as an explanation of how broad “reasonably likely means” must be interpreted.	TL;DR In theory there's nothing wrong with your method, it's just a way to authenticate the user, and without authentication a user has no right to request anything anyway. But in practice it looks like your method doesn't have a way to deal with situations where users lose or forget their authentication data and want to be able to recover their account. Failing to deal with that in a modern system might be considered an unacceptable bad practice and so be against the GDPR principles of security and privacy by design. EXTENDED VERSION I might be wrong or not understand the question correctly, but I don't see how this is different from many other common cases where encryption is not involved. Think about it, you aren't able to give the user their own personal data unless they provide the ID and encryption keys. How is this significantly different from the fact you aren't able to (or rather you should not) show a user their own data unless they provide their own username and password, or they convincingly authenticate themselves in any way? Just like you can't ask Facebook to show you all the data collected about Donald Trump only by claiming you are Donald Trump, you can't be required to give a user their own data unless they provide the encryption key. It can be seen as your way to authenticate users (among other things). Edited: multiple IDs/keys I didn't understand your method involved multiple IDs and keys. In theory, the situation is still the same, only with multiple pieces of data for authentication, like the user had to remember multiple usernames and passwords. Failing to provide all IDs and all keys will result in a partial authentication. But with such an approach a potential problem becomes more evident: your authentication scheme might be against the GDPR principles of "security and privacy by design and by default". Basically, your methods might be considered bad practice because they fail to deal with the common issue of lost or forgotten passwords. If a user tells you they have lost a USB drive containing all their IDs and keys and they don't have them anymore, what do you do? You can't delete their data because you aren't able to know what their data is, without another way of authenticating. And their data is now at risk, because somebody else might have their IDs and keys. If you had an email address associated with all the user's IDs and data, then you might be able to confirm their identity (for example sending an email with a link) and delete all their data. As you see, things can get pretty complicated, it all depends on the details of your implementation, and just adding or removing one detail might change the whole scenario.	I'm not entirely sure why you have to store the data of the invited user? You can simply hash the email address. Hashes are meaningless without the original input so that would allow you to store the data. Sending email means that you're processing personal data. In your use case it would fall under Art 6 (f): Legitimate Interest. (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. I do advice you to also follow these guidelines in the submission of the email: https://sendgrid.com/docs/Classroom/Deliver/Address_Lists/peer_initiated_email_invitation_requirements.html	Yes. Article 4 GDPR Definitions (1) ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; Recital 26 Not applicable to anonymous data The principles of data protection should apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable natural person. Personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes.	If the GDPR applies, then the e-privacy directive (EPD) (formally Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002) almost surely also applies. However, this being a directive rather than a regulation, the implement6ing laws may vary in different countries. The relevant provision is Article 5 paragraph (3) which reads: Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia [among others] about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such processing by the data controller. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user. This governs cookies and any other local data, that is, data stored on or read from the user's equipment. What this means is: A site operator must disclose, in detail, what cookies or other local data the site stores on or reads from the user's device. Even strictly required data (cookies) must be disclosed. A site may not store or read any local data until after consent has been obtained. The user must have the option to consent to or refuse consent to individual data items separately. Giving consent may not be a condition of permission to use the site. Consent must be opt-in, not opt-out, that is the default must be "No consent". Local data (including cookies) that is "strictly necessary" for the operation of the site is exempt from the requirement of consent, but not from the requirement of disclosure, and that means specific disclosure. It must be at least as easy to cancel consent later as it was to give consent initially. Do my Stripe cookies count as essential cookies? If the Stripe cookies count as essential, is it legal to provide no option to turn them off? Have I met my legal requirements in terms of disclosure? The terms and conditions and privacy policy were generated by Termly. I don't know stripe well enough to be sure, but they might. What do they do that is essential for operating the site? Yes. No, not if the disclosures in the question are the only ones you make. As I understand it, you must provide at least a link to a page that shows each specific cookie that you read or set, and what data is stored in that cookie, even for strictly required cookies. Update: I should mention t6hat although the above describes my understanding of the current legal requirements, I have read that enforcement of those requirements does not seem to be a priority for the relevant authorities at this time. Other aspects of data protection, such as proper security to avoid data breaches, and having a proper legal basis for processing, and other GDPR requirements, as opposed to e-Privacy requirements, seem to get more attention and resources from the relevant authorities. Having read the comment by the OP, it does seem that at least some of the stripe cookies are strictly required and need not have consent. The stripe cookie policy linked to is better than many sites currently offer. It does not go into fully specific detail, but it may be that the dashboard does, and that together the two are fully compliant. Linking to this policy (and if possible directly to the stripe cookie dashboard) would seem to me to cover most of the issues here.	There are a few different grounds under which PII can be handled. Perhaps the most discussed at the moment of GDRP introduction is consent, because of the wave of consent-seeking. But there are a number of other grounds. "Necessary for contract execution" is a trivial one, to deliver a pizza you'll need an address. The relevant ground for sanctions lists is also pretty obvious in hindsight, you may process PII in order to comply with legal obligations. Note that this is still an integral part of the GDPR, not an exception to the GDPR. That means you need to apply all the basic GDPR rules. You need to explicitly store where you got the PII from, for which purpose, and you need to document how you're using it. Note that this might be hard - why do you need to store this data? Why can't you just check the list as the moment it's relevant? The GDPR for a large part depends on you justifying your actions, not just in hindsight but already up front.	The GDPR has an exemption for purely personal or household activity. Creating a family tree seems purely personal as long as you don't publish it. You're also allowed to freely share the tree as long as it stays within that purely personal scope. Your proposed restriction of only showing data of blood relatives seems excessively strict. But assuming that this exemption wouldn't apply, there'd probably still be no problem. The GDPR does not require you to always obtain consent. It requires that the purposes for which you process personal data are covered by some legal basis. Consent is one such legal basis, but legitimate interest is another. You can likely argue that you have a legitimate interest to create a tree of your (extended) family. The legitimate interest must be weighed against the rights and freedoms of the affected persons. For example, contact information could be used for stalking. The balance of the legitimate interest check can be changed if you adopt suitable safeguards. Your idea of only sharing data with close relatives would be such a safeguard, but it might not be necessary. When you rely on legitimate interest, the affected person can object to further processing, furthermore they can request to be erased from your records. A request for erasure can be denied if there are overriding grounds to keep the data. E.g maybe only contact information has to be deleted but names, dates, and relations might be kept. You should notify persons when they are included into your records. It is your obligation as the data controller to make these decisions. If someone disagrees they can sue you or lodge a complaint with a supervision authority. Note that dead persons are not natural persons in the sense of the GDPR, and have no privacy. However, national laws may provide such protections.
Found at fault in non-left turn collision I was involved in an accident and am being found at fault by their insurance company, but I do not understand why. We were both stopped at a red light. I was in the left turn lane. They were in the straight only lane adjacent to mine. When the light turned green we both turned left and they drove ahead of me into the lane I was turning into and I collided with the side of their vehicle before I could react. Why am I being found at fault when they weren't suppose to turn left?	An insurer can’t find anyone at fault An insurance company cannot find you or anyone else at fault - they don't have the power. They are alleging that you are at fault and, presumably, demanding damages. Whether you are at fault or not is a matter for you to concede (by paying them) or a court to determine based on the evidence when they sue you (or you sue them for your damages). The other driver’s insurer only knows what they have been told and it’s likely the other driver genuinely believes they were not at fault and, based on what you say happened, they may very well be right, or at the very least, that both drivers were at fault. For example, it’s not clear if you turned from the left most lane into the left most lane as you are required to do or if you changed lanes during the turn. Notwithstanding, it sounds like you drove into them (that is, the front of your car was behind the front of their car) and the fundamental rule of driving is don’t drive into things - failing to avoid a collision is a go to offense in all driving rules.	I've contested many of my own traffic tickets in a state where traffic tickets are also considered misdemeanor criminal violations. I would appear in court before the time limit on your ticket. I'd plead not guilty, and I would not waive any rights- which means I would request a trial by jury. Under Georgia law you do have the right to a jury trial IF your ticket is not considered a petty offense. Otherwise you can have a bench trial. If your case starts in a Municipal Court and you request a jury trial, the case will be sent to the State or Superior Court of that county. Jury trials on traffic citations are rare, but it is probably a good tactic because you might be able to work out a better solution than you can in Municipal court. Once the court accepts your plea, then I would make sure the court set a pre-trial hearing. At this hearing make a motion to the judge that you would like the dash-cam video of the officer and the vehicle he stopped you in. If the prosecutor argues that it's not relevant (and they might) explain to the judge why they are relevant (the officer didn't realize exactly what intersection you were at). IMPORTANT: Introduction of your own evidence requires that you 'lay the foundation' of the evidence. This usually means that you must declare officially in court, in front of the prosecution, that your evidence (pictures you take, etc.) are taken by you, and that they are 'true and correct' representations of the location where the alleged offense took place, and that the date and time was (whatever it was). You usually must state this while under oath. OTHERWISE, the prosecution will object to your evidence most likely on the grounds of no foundation. Please read up on how to lay the foundation in either a trial or in a pre-trial setting. For something like this you might need to just present the evidence and lay your foundation at trial. So you'll need to read up on how to lay foundation and present your evidence at trial. You could get lucky and the officer won't show up at trial. So in that case I would make a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution (you can't cross examine a witness that didn't show up) You'll get to choose jurors, etc. in a process called Voire Dire. So read up on that too. You will not be forced to testify if you don't want to (because of the constitutional right to not incriminate yourself) but if you do choose to testify, the prosecution can ask you questions).	This varies greatly by state, but the pedestrians "right of way" is quite a common misconception. Pedestrians do not always have the right of way, but you're also not allowed to just run them over if they're in the middle of the street. That's why states have jaywalking laws, and a lot of people don't realize that they can be ticketed for it - because it's a huge safety concern for a pedestrian to walk in the street outside the designated areas. The NCSL provides a Pedestrian Crossing 50 State Summary that outlines the laws regarding pedestrian crossing. Particularly, there are two lines that frequently repeat throughout all the states: Pedestrians may not suddenly leave the curb and enter a crosswalk into the path of a moving vehicle that is so close to constitute an immediate hazard. Pedestrians must yield the right-of-way to vehicles when crossing outside of a marked crosswalk or an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection. Bottom line: if there is a pedestrian randomly in the middle of the street somewhere, you are fully obligated to attempt to not hit them with your vehicle. Feel free to curse them out (if that's your thing) because in most states they are themselves breaking a law. If an accident can't be prevented due to a pedestrian's actions, then the pedestrian is fully at fault and you will not be held responsible in any way.	The vehicle occupying the lane has right of way i.e. if you merge and cause a collision, you are liable. The fact that the other driver was in breach of the road rules as well as you is immaterial. If you rephrased the question to be "A vehicle behind you in that lane is exceeding the speed limit - can I exceed the speed limit too?" you would see why. "Because they were breaking the law I should be allowed to" is not a defence that has any prospect of being successful. The law says you must give way when merging, so give way when merging.	The statute in question is section 26708 (13)(B): A vehicle equipped with a video event recorder shall have a notice posted in a visible location which states that a passenger's conversation may be recorded. It doesn't require it be visible to all passengers and doesn't make any provision for visually impaired passengers. I am not licenced to practice in California but know of no cases clarifying how "visible" the notice needs to be. I wouldn't suggest trying to hide the notice, though.	As a former rental car employee I can explain why this is. Cars that are rented to customers for insurance reasons (accidents, etc) are supposed to match the size of the car that was damaged as close as possible. I'm speaking for one rental car company in particular here but I'm assuming others have a similar policy but every 2 years old the car is it goes down a size in rental. So your 2014 would and could be considered a "standard" size or even "compact depending" on what is available on that rental lot or how that agent is feeling. With that being said, I've seen customers complain to insurance companies to get bigger cars sizes or even pay out of pocket for larger vehicles. In most insurance rental situations, the company provides "X" amount of dollars per day, generally between $20-25. These insurance companies have deals with rental agencies to secure rates that align with these low daily costs - the same car they get for $20 a day would cost a walk in customer double or triple that. You could use that $20-25 a day towards the cost of your rental and then just pay the difference on the larger car if you'd like. So to answer your question, yes you can push back all you want. Direct your concerns to their insurance company. In my experience, I've seen more often than not they agree to the larger vehicle. You can also petition the rental agent to let you get the larger car for the cheaper rate - however bear in mind these rental agents hear this 100 times a day and this can be your quick ride into that dusty PT Cruiser that nobody wants in the corner of the lot.	The most likely reason the other driver doesn't want to go through insurance is to avoid a raise in his premiums. However, there could be more serious consequences, up to and including having his insurance cancelled, for example, if the son was not supposed to be driving the car, or based on the criminal nature of the offense. However, there can be serious consequences to not dealing with insurance. Some (if not all) insurance policies require him to report the accident; by failing to do so, he may risk losing his insurance. More importantly to you, if he does not report a claim to his insurance, his insurance will not pay it. This is important to you, because insurance companies, as a general rule, pay claims. Random people don't always; they ignore you, they move out of state, they go bankrupt. If this is a serious amount of money, you need to talk to a lawyer before you enter into a contract with this person, to make sure that it's enforceable, and that if you don't get paid, you have some recourse.	Yes, the police can give you a ticket for not having insurance/registration in the vehicle, even if they know it is registered/insured. The requirement is not just that you must have it, but you must carry proof of it in the vehicle. California Law (CVC §16058) requires that insurance companies electronically report insurance information to the DMV, which the officer has access to and can verify insurance. From the California DMV Page: Financial responsibility (commonly known as insurance) is required on all vehicles operated or parked on California roadways. You must carry evidence of financial responsibility in your vehicle at all times and it must be provided as specified below when: Requested by law enforcement. Renewing vehicle registration. The vehicle is involved in a traffic collision. The reason it must be in your vehicle is that when you are involved in a collision, you have to be able to provide that to the other party. And yes, you can receive the citation even if the vehicle is not yours. It is your responsibility as a driver to abide by the laws and verify that the vehicle is legal to drive. California Vehicle Code (CVC) §4000(a)(1) requires registration: A person shall not drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly, or logging dolly, unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code or registered under the permanent trailer identification program, except that an off-highway motor vehicle which displays an identification plate or device issued by the department pursuant to Section 38010 may be driven, moved, or left standing in an offstreet public parking facility without being registered or paying registration fees. I'm not advocating that you should just "suck it up and pay" this ticket. I would certainly bring proof of registration/insurance at the time of the ticket to your court date and provide that you are not the registered owner of the vehicle (you don't say, but I assume you were borrowing a friends vehicle). The court should look at that evidence and issue a warning or dismiss the ticket.
The "self defense" defense but for pets If you were to be walking with your family down the street, and a kerfuffle with a stranger were to break out, risking the safety of yourself or your family, in both federal and state courts for just about any state in the Union a "self defense" defense would apply for any legal action resulting from the resulting mayhem, so long as a reasonable person could reasonably fear for your safety or that of your family as a result. But what if the stranger threatened your dog? To be specific on jurisdiction, I'll mention the United States, as well as the states of New York and California. Let's assume this stranger very specifically did nothing to suggest physical harm to any humans present, but actively threatened harm to the fluffiest member of the family. Does the "self defense" defense apply?	In California, you may use reasonable force to protect property from imminent harm. The jury instruction on that point is here. The instruction regarding justifiable homicide and defense of property is more restricted, because it only applies to protection of property when the deceased enters a home. If a stranger attacks your dog on a walk, you can use force to defend your dog, but you cannot shoot to kill. If the attack is against a person and not property, then the attack does not have to be in a home in order to be justifiable.	The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing	The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions "based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'", which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute.	You can start here, with the attractive nuisance doctrine, which is aimed at children and the fact that they don't have adult common sense. The extent to which you are at risk depends on your jurisdiction. However, a fence does not necessarily protect you, because children can find a way to get around a fence, instead you need to eliminate the risk (so you also have to identify the risk). This article reviews some of the outcomes in attractive nuisance cases: there is no simple rule like "put up a fence and you're safe". Insurance is more predictable, as long as you read the fine print.	Self-Defense Law In A Nutshell Self-defense (or defense of others) with deadly force is generally authorized when a reasonable person would believe that the use of death force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person (i.e. there aren't non-deadly options that can accomplish this end) and a reasonable person would believe that the use of force will prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person, subject to exceptions that would not apply to a private individual using deadly force in a stampede situation. Incidentally, every state and every country absolves someone of liability for homicide when deadly force is used in self-defense, or in the defense of others (not necessarily family), although the exact details of when this is justified varies slightly. For example, in D.C. v. Heller, the right to self-defense is considered a natural or universal right. The analysis would be somewhat different if the shooter were in law enforcement, and would be different again in the case of a shooter who was in the military with more or less clear orders. But, that legal standard doesn't get you to an answer. The Complex Phenomena Called Stampedes The analysis would be extremely fact rich, in the sense of exactly who one would attempt to shoot, what that would be likely to accomplish, and what other alternatives would be available. And, to do that, you also need to understand the phenomena of deadly stampedes which are complex and often somewhat counter-intuitive phenomena. While there are circumstances where it could be legal self-defense or defense of others to shoot a stampeding individual to save someone's life, there are also many stampede circumstances where a use of force would not be justified. In practice, most stampedes, as a matter of physics, can only be stopped by removing a crush of bodies from the rear, where they do not know that they are causing a deadly stampede, while those at the front who end up directly harming others are frequently physically incapable of stopping. Essentially, in a typical stampede that causes death, the problem is an inability of the people at the front to communicate to the people at the back to slow down. And, when a stampede is caused by a genuine threat to the people at the back like a fire or a terrorist, there is nothing that would persuade the people at the back to slow down anyway. So, usually, shooting to kill someone at the front of a stampede would not achieve the intended result of protecting someone in its path. The person shot would either continue to surge forward while dead under the crush of bodies behind them, or would have their dead body trampled over by the next person in line who also has no physical ability to do anything other than to surge forward. So, usually, using deadly force to shoot someone at the front of a stampede will be futile and only cause an unnecessary death. Given that using deadly force in a stampede, if directly at people in the front, is almost always futile, the question for the judge or jury deciding the case becomes whether a reasonable person would know that at the time, which would have to be decided a case by case basis. Sometimes it is obvious from someone in a vantage point to shoot at the front of a stampede that this would be futile and sometimes it isn't. This question would be highly fact specific and depend a lot upon exactly what information about the situation was available to the person shooting a person in the stampede. The situation where deadly force might not be futile would be one in which there is no actual life threatening harm that people are fleeing in which the deadly force is directed at the people in the back who are driving the stampede (even though they don't know it), to shock them into ceasing to do so. But, in that situation, if the shooting is done by someone who understands the situation well enough to know that this is what is actually necessary, that person also may be capable of firing warning shots or shooting to injure with the same effect, so justification might also be in doubt. Protecting Targets of Mobs v. Protecting Targets of Stampedes A similar situation where the use of deadly force might be justified is something visually similar to a stampede, but quite different in what would work factually. This is a mob that is about to attack someone, possibly armed with pitchforks or knives or clubs or broken bottles or a noose. In the case of a mob, the use of deadly force to protect someone threatened by the mob would almost always be a justified use of force in self-defense or the defense of others, because shooting someone in the front is likely to be both necessary and effective.	You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on.	I'd take the city council's advice and realize that you could be charged with a crime. Their job is to know the local laws and put them into place, as well as know how those laws relate to state law. As for state law, the Revised Statutes of Missouri, RSMo Section 574.115 Making a terrorist threat says: 574.115. Making a terrorist threat, first degree — penalty. — 1. A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree if such person, with the purpose of frightening ten or more people or causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation, knowingly: (1) Communicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (2) Communicates a false report of an incident or condition involving danger to life; or (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. 2. The offense of making a terrorist threat in the first degree is a class D felony. 3. No offense is committed under this section by a person acting in good faith with the purpose to prevent harm. A fake gun turret on a porch in the public view that tracks people who walk by could be interpreted as making a terrorist threat because it (3) Causes a false belief or fear that an incident has occurred or that a condition exists involving danger to life. And, it's probably safe to assume your turret has the "the purpose of frightening ten or more people." The fact that the gun turret is on private property doesn't mean much; it is in view of the public and your intent is for it to be seen by the public and you want to invoke fear in the public members who walk by. And it's not going to be seen by the council as some sort of security; threats are not security. If you did put up such a turret, and the state didn't take action under 574.115, and there is no local law on the books that applies, the council can easy put one in place at their regular council meeting with a simple motion and vote. Since you already asked the council, they may already be considering such a law. And, depending on the county, the council could invoke a law addressing threats to the public that has more severe penalties that the state law, because Missouri is a home rule (Wikipedia) state.	Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo!
Daughter dies at party My 19 year old step daughter attended a party in Illinois. One kid slipped a pill in her drink which caused her to have a heart attack and die. After watching this play out, this boy didn't even bother to seek any medical aid for her, such as calling 911 or alerting that she would need help. He just left her all alone to die. What charges could he face in the event the police find him and file charges?	We're missing a lot of facts that would help drive the analysis. The first question I'd ask was whether this was part of an actual or attempted sex offense. If that's the case, the suspect could be facing particularly serious charges. Other information is also missing, such as the drug involved, whether it's on the list of controlled substances, her knowledge of the drug, her relationship to the suspect, and so on. Still, based on the information we've got and the inferences we can make from them, I could reasonably see the following charges being filed: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery. (g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she does any of the following: (1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another and any user experiences great bodily harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled substance. (2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another person any food containing any substance or object intended to cause physical injury if eaten. Sec. 12-4.5. Tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. (a) A person who knowingly puts any substance capable of causing death or great bodily harm to a human being into any food, drug or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption commits tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. (a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: (1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or (2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person. Sec. 21-1. Criminal damage to property. (a) A person commits criminal damage to property when he or she: (1) knowingly damages any property of another Sec. 11-1.20. Criminal sexual assault. (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent; Sec. 11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10); (3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim's consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes; Sec. 11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person: (2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent. Sec. 11-1.60. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim; (5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim's consent or by threat or deception. Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide. (a) A person commits drug-induced homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance. Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means. Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death. (b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means.	The best course would be to contact the public defenders office and explain the situation to their intake or consultation services. Remember, you don't have to be going to trial to avail yourself of their services and sometimes, helping cops makes the cops suspicious about you (it would not be the first killer who cozies up to the police to learn what they know about his crime). If the Public Defender thinks you're rich enough not to need their services, you should call criminal defense attorney practices. Most law offices will offer consultation free of charge as part of client intake, so they will be willing to hear your case and offer advice. In either case, check with the lawyer that attorney client privilege is in effect. If they say yes, explain in detail to them, everything you know and want to discuss, even if some of it could criminally implicate you in this or another crime. Treat it as your deathbed confession and you know full well which circle of hell you're going to if the priest doesn't absolve you of sins (okay, too Catholic... but the Lawyer is not going to turn you in if the privilege is in effect... he could lose his license to practice law over it... we can make all the evil lawyer jokes we want, but this is one of the few sacred tenants of their profession.). Listen to his advise. Also see if you can find a second opinion. It's not that the first guy gave bad advice, but the next guy might give you something different. If you still do not feel comfortable, then keep your mouth shut. If they arrest you for the murder, do not talk until you have an attorney present and prepare to tell him exactly what you did. Especially if you did do it. Always answer your attorney truthfully.	Based on some quick searching, this would likely be a wrongful death action. I have to pick a state, so I'll pick Nevada. The first question is what damages could be. I don't know offhand what is typical in wrongful death suits, but this appears to be beyond mere negligence: there was a hit and run involved. I have no trouble believing the claim would reach at least six figures. This is important, because federal diversity jurisdiction only includes lawsuits with over $75,000 at stake. Now, Santa Claus's citizenship matters; if he were stateless it'd be an issue, but he is a citizen of Canada. That means that federal court has diversity jurisdiction: because the lawsuit is between a citizen of one state on one side and a foreign citizen on the other (no state has citizens on both sides of the lawsuit), and meets Congress's extra requirements (enough money at stake), it can be in federal court. The way diversity jurisdiction works is that the plaintiff can file in federal court, but if they choose to file in Nevada court then the defendant can remove the case to federal court. Either party can get it into federal court. Conventional wisdom is that federal court is more defendant-friendly than state court on state law claims. It is likely that if Grandpa files the case in any court in Nevada, the case will end up in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. But suppose it is in state court? Most states don't have separate "county court" and "state court" systems; county courts are a thing, but they're a specialized thing and the serious stuff is not in those. A six-figure wrongful death claim won't go in Nevada's equivalent of small claims court. It'd go in Nevada district court, if it's in state courts. But what about other courts? Grandma was walking home, so it can be assumed she was a Nevada resident. Assuming Grandpa lived with her (which is rather likely), so is he. They then can't sue in any US state other than Nevada without being laughed out of court -- a lawsuit needs to have something to do with where you're suing. The other option is Canada, but such a suit is unlikely.	Unless the Youtube Video shows them committing a crime, then no, they couldn't be arrested and tried for a crime. Them saying it, not under oath, is just hearsay that has no evidentiary value unless there is already other evidence they have committed a crime. In that case, its an admission. But there must be other, either circumstantial, or actual physical evidence of a crime. Past intoxication is not a crime, either. Possession of drugs, if caught with them is. But saying you got high is not. People have walked into police stations and confessed to murders. But with no evidence, no body, no name of a missing person, they can't even be held after the holding period for investigatory purposes expires. If the video shows them committing assault, or breaking and entering (there actually are idiots who post this stuff), the video is actual evidence of a crime and it is often used against them. The statements can be used to begin an investigation, but people don't usually confess to anything worth pursuing even an investigation. The fact that someone says they used to do something criminal is not enough. For all you ( meaning anyone ) knows, the statute of limitations has expired because they "pirated games" 10 years ago. Your comment is right on.	Does any American state have a statute under which Joanne would be liable for her son's death? Probably not. None of the mother's conduct seems like a basis for a homicide prosecution. Suicide is only prosecuted, in states that allow it to be prosecuted at all, for conduct with a calculated purpose to cause a suicide, or encouragement of someone to commit suicide. These facts don't show that. There is no intent to cause suicide and there is no encouragement of the son to commit suicide by on the mother. A survey of selected laws on point by the Connecticut Legislative Research Service can be found here. The case law and related legal theory is reviewed and analyzed in this law review article with the following abstract: In 2017, a Massachusetts court convicted Michelle Carter of manslaughter for encouraging the suicide of Conrad Roy by text message, but imposed a sentence of only fifteen months. The conviction was unprecedented in imposing homicide liability for verbal encouragement of apparently voluntary suicide. Yet if Carter killed, her purpose that Roy die arguably merited liability for murder and a much longer sentence. This Article argues that our ambivalence about whether and how much to punish Carter reflects suicide’s dual character as both a harm to be prevented and a choice to be respected. As such, the Carter case requires us to choose between competing conceptions of criminal law, one utilitarian and one libertarian. A utilitarian criminal law seeks to punish inciting suicide to reduce harm. A libertarian criminal law, on the other hand, justifies voluntary suicide as an exercise of liberty, and incitement of suicide as valuable speech. Utilitarian values are implicit in the foreseeability standards prevailing in the law of causation, but libertarian values are implicit in the reluctance of prosecutors to seek, and legislatures to define, homicide liability for assisting suicide. The prevalence of statutes punishing assisting—but not encouraging—suicide as a nonhomicide offense reflects a compromise between these values. These statutes are best interpreted as imposing accomplice liability for conduct left unpunished for two antithetical reasons: it is justified in so far as the suicide is autonomous and excused in so far as the suicide is involuntary. This explains why aiding suicide is punished, but less severely than homicide. Yet even these statutes would not punish Carter’s conduct of encouragement alone. Her conviction although seemingly required by prevailing causation doctrine, is unprecedented. Guyora Binder and Luis Chiesa, "The Puzzle of Inciting Suicide" 56 American Criminal Law Review 65 (2019). In any jurisdiction, could anyone but Joanne, in light of the aforementioned circumstances, face liability for Jordan's death? Maybe the bullies could be prosecuted for homicide or some lesser charge like harassment intended to provoke a suicide or something like that. More facts would have to be developed on that point. Maybe teachers have civil liability for negligence, but not criminal liability for not intervening since they didn't intend to cause or encourage the suicide.	Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.	It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay? And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case (Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal.	Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing".
Is It Legal to Marry a Jew? Let's say an Eastern European woman is in Israel on a work visa and a Jewish man, for whatever reason, wants to marry her. Since it is practically speaking illegal to mix in Israel, could they secretly run off to America, and get married? And if so, would that marriage be recognized in Israel, even though they could not get legally married in Israel itself?	First, there is no prohibition against a Jewish man marrying an Eastern European woman in Israel. If they are both Jewish, the marriage can be performed in Israel. If they are not the same religion, then if they get married in Israel, the government will not recognize the marriage. However, Israel recognizes inter-faith marriages performed outside Israel. The marriage does not have to be secret, and it can be performed in Cyprus as well as America.	The recognition of other country’s passports is a courtesy Each nation is sovereign over its own borders. So who they allow in (and out) is a matter for them. For example, many Arab countries will ban your entry if you have an Israeli stamp in your passport no matter what nationality it is. So, yes, any country can decide not to record sex in a passport and, yes, there may be consequences in other nations.	What discrimination? As explained in Conflict between a religious belief that accounts for the existence of transgender people vs. one that doesn't the Constitutional protection of the Free Exercise Clause applies to the exercise of a deeply held belief (religious or not). So, let's accept that a person believes that certain sexual practices or gender identity is morally repugnant for whatever reason and that belief triggers the Constitutional protections. That means, that the person cannot be forced to engage in those sexual practices or adopt a different gender identity. It does not mean that they have a licence to discriminate against people who do in a work or public environment - they can, of course, choose to avoid such people in their private life. Alternatively, if the person believes that they are required by their faith to discriminate on the basis of those characteristics then such a belief does not get Constitutional protection as it is now affecting the rights of others. In the same way that someone who believed in human sacrifice would not get Constitutional protection.	Yes, but only under very limited circumstances that would not be applicable to most people. Under directive 2004/38/EC, your wife can be deported only if she is a threat to public safety, health, or policy. This is particularly a consequence of Articles 3 (section 1) and 7 (sections 1 and 2). Provisions concerning expulsion are found in Chapter VI. Another possibility that could lead to her expulsion is a finding by the French government that your marriage is not genuine, or was undertaken as a marriage of convenience (Article 35).	As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there.	The question is definitely specific to a jurisdiction. I think this is legal in the jurisdiction you specify. Wikipedia shows incest in New York defined as: Persons known to be related to him or her, whether through marriage or not, as an ancestor, descendant, brother or sister of either the whole or the half blood, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece. I don't think "our children have married" means the couple is related "as brother and sister through marriage". In England and Wales, this would definitely be legal. Wikipedia lists the relationships that cannot marry, and co-parents-in-law are not on the list. (The table is probably out of date, in that the "for men" and "for women" column should almost certainly be merged.)	It's not possible to marry the US citizen until the first marriage is terminated, and the F-2 status ends when the marriage is terminated. It's not the F-2 status that prevents the marriage to the US citizen; it's the continued existence of the previous marriage. It might be possible to file for change of status (to B-2 perhaps) in anticipation of the termination of the marriage, but it seems unlikely to be accepted by USCIS. It would certainly be unwise to attempt anything like that without the advice of an immigration lawyer.	In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?
Is it illegal to send mail through the US Postal Service with a missing or fake return address? Is this illegal: Let's say someone wants to send a letter to a recipient. But if the sender were to put the correct return address and name on the letter that it likely will be thrown away by the recipient unopened. So they put the name of a fictitious or incorrect name and return address on the letter, or they put the name and address of a legitimate business (but not theirs) on the letter in hopes that the recipient will open it and at least read the first page of the letter (which would then get them to read the rest of it). What laws does this break? I'm thinking 18 U.S. Code § 1342 - Fictitious name or address, but not sure if it breaks this or others. There is nothing in the letter except information. There is no attempt to obtain money, make any trade, nor anything else except the content of the letter, which is simply factual information only.	First, return addresses are intended simply to provide a mechanism by which an undeliverable or returned letter can be returned to the sender. If you have a practical concern then consider the following: I worked for the postal service and never experienced an instance where anyone cared whether there was an accurate return address except in the following cases: As mentioned above, a letter was refused or otherwise undeliverable, and an attempt will be made to return the letter to the return address. In cases of a false, unreadable, or non-existent return address, the letter will be marked undeliverable and likely destroyed or recycled. Someone is trying to scam the system by putting an identical address on each the delivery and return address of a mail piece, especially on mail pieces that have insufficient postage. If caught, this mail piece will go to the delivery address the same as any other case of insufficient postage, with a postage due requirement for the recipient. However, in this case this piece will be held and eventually destroyed rather than returning to sender, since it does not have a non-identical return address. The content of the mail piece is illegal (e.g. anthrax, drugs, etc. made apparent by forensic equipment or by a piece of mail being inadvertently opened/destroyed by a machine and discovered by a postal employee). In these cases the mail piece will be sent to the postal inspection service (most plants have one in-house). These postal inspectors might have use for a return address in the event that the sender was dumb enough to include an accurate return address on an illegal mail piece. 18 U.S. Code § 1342 penalizes those who commit crimes under false names, and uses broad language to include people who use pseudonyms to avoid detection, since these actions make the job of postal inspectors much more difficult. The final language also makes opening mail address to people other than one's self illegal, though this is likely described elsewhere, too. It does not pertain to false return addresses, unless someone were to open the letter upon return, despite that person not being the return addressee, or committing some other crime using the postal service. The only situations where I can see your hypothetical situation becoming a concern for postal inspectors or postal regulators would be: The mail piece masquerades as a certified, registered, or other special class of mail. There are many junk mailings out there that look surprisingly similar to the protected classes of mail, but are distinct enough to not raise any serious concerns (e.g. "CONFIDENTIAL", "URGENT", or various green or red markings). The penalty would probably be a fine in the amount of each identified letter times the price for the corresponding postal product. The return address is for a governmental entity, or possibly an annoyed person or company, but not actually sent from these locations. I suspect this is the possibility most relevant to your question. However, this is unlikely to raise any concern, unless a recipient or other affected party raises a fraud concern (18 USC 1341, 1342 & 1345; 39 USC 3005 & 3007) with the postal service. This would be taken on by the postal inspection service, which would investigate the content of the mailings for any signs of the actual sender, and they may attempt a variety of other methods (e.g. tracing letter meters, surveillance) to locate the source of the mail. However, the legal penalties would probably be fraud-related and might fall outside postal regulations per se, but could include federal laws about committing crimes that leverage the mail service, and various other laws if this is done across state lines (also this might invite FBI attention).	In the Netherlands, this qualifies as a deceptive trade practice (misleidende handelspraktijk) and is therefore directly illegal. It's likely also an unfair trade practice, (oneerlijke handelspraktijk) as the claim appears intended for end consumers. This means that the seller cannot count on the consumer knowing anythong about stuffase. It is a dutch implementation of EU directive 2005/29/EG, so similar laws apply in other EU countries. But the illegal per se part might vary.	In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say.	The lawyer referred to in that article is suing in his capacity as the recipient of spam emails under California's anti-spam law. Not every jurisdiction has a law like this. I'm from Australia. In Australia, when we make laws prohibiting something, the law usually appoints a government agency to administer the law and bring prosecutions under it, and fines are paid to the government. In contrast, America has a lot of these laws where affected individuals can sue and collect the fines personally. So under the Californian law, you can get $1,000 per email for particular kinds of spam even if you haven't actually suffered any real damage: California Business and Professions Code s 17529.5(b)(1)(B)(ii). How? You need to work out who sent the spam, get evidence to prove it, and file a claim in a Californian court. Apparently you can sue in small claims court, which saves you on filing fees. It helps if you have many email accounts, because then you will receive many emails and therefore can collect many fines. One of that lawyer's wins was in Balsam v Trancos (2012) in the Californian Court of Appeal. Another example of a judgment discussing the Californian anti-spam law is Bontrager v Showmark Media.	In the US, your experiment is problematic in several respects according to the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 - Wikipedia. You can legally send unsolicited email, as long as you have an unsubscribe link in the message, and you have obtained those email addresses in a legal manner. Your project is problematic because 1) you using emails from an online dump, which more than likely came from a spam harvester, and those emails were probably not legally obtained. 2) the subject lines (and content) of the emails you send will be deceptive, because you are trying to get people to click on the link to give you data on the people who respond while not telling them the true nature of the email. 3) you will be displaying your collected data in a public manner related to those personal email addresses, after deceiving those people to the nature of your emails, and this could possibly be illegal in terms of privacy outside of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003. Beyond the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, in order to send all of those emails in the US, you will need to use internet service provider, which will either be a commercial business, a government entity, or and an NGO. All of those will have terms of service which probably restrict sending mass unsolicited emails using their services. This will be a worldwide project and poses no threat other than being classed as a spam email.... Wrong. You will more than likely be violating many email and privacy laws and those of many interest service providers in all of those jurisdictions, and will open yourself up to both civil and criminal liability.	If a friend uses my home address for his tax return, and he owes the IRS tons of money, will I be liable in any way? Assuming that this is an income tax or sale tax return, rather than a property tax return, generally not. The only case where you could be liable is where you were conspiring to help him evade tax collection somehow, or conspiring to evade state sales or income taxes. For example, suppose that your friend had no connection to your home in your state (Nevada) with no income taxes and has never even set foot in your state, and actually lives in a state with high income taxes (California). But your friend is using your address to falsely claim residency in Nevada with your knowledge and cooperation to avoid paying California income taxes. To make it spicy, let's assume that your friend's state income tax liability would be $400,000 in California, but $0 in Nevada. In that case, you might have felony criminal liability under California's tax evasion statutes (for which you could be extradited to California) for conspiring with your friend to evade his California income tax liability. But if you had no idea of what your friend was up to, and simply agreed to forward mail to him at your address (the way a typical mail drop company does), you would typically have no criminal or civil liability (subject to the "willful blindness" exception to lack of knowledge where you strongly suspect that your friend is up to no good but take a don't ask, don't tell approach). Also normally would it be a problem if he filed a tax return with my address, and I filed a tax return with the same address in the same tax year? No.	The key language to be taken notice of in that code is 'by fraud or deception'. If the property manager has provided reasonable notice of a clear-out, then the code doesn't apply due to lack of fraud or deception. But at the end of the day, just go and check the mail room on a Thursday afternoon and you shouldn't have any problems.	Given that this is a UK based company, the most applicable Act would be the Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971 A person who, not having reasonable cause to believe there is a right to payment, in the course of any trade or business makes a demand for payment, or asserts a present or prospective right to payment, for what he knows are unsolicited goods sent (after the commencement of this Act) to another person with a view to his acquiring them [for the purposes of his trade or business], shall be guilty of an offence and on summary conviction shall be liable to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale. This law specifically refers to [unsolicited] charges for entries in directories. You also mentioned that they're misrepresenting that a company is already a customer and sending out invoices on that basis. That would be a breach of the Fraud Act 2006 A person is in breach of this section if he dishonestly makes a false representation As to their enforceability, that answer is no. If this came before an actual judge, the judge would throw it out in a heartbeat. No agreement was made to provide a service in return for a payment and these companies rely on sending threatening letters via (seeming) third-parties precisely because they wish to avoid that level of scrutiny.
What happens if a law enforcement agency refuses to obey a court order? So, let's say that a judge issues an order to a law enforcement agency - for instance, ordering them to behave in a certain way when interacting with protestors. The law enforcement agency then proceeds to disregard this order. What would happen next? Normally, when someone refuses to obey a court order, they're held in contempt of court and arrested, but if the police responsible for arresting someone for contempt of court are the people being held in contempt of court, couldn't they just refuse to arrest themselves for contempt of court on the reasoning that they're already being held in contempt of court, and all that would happen to them for ignoring the order is being held in contempt of court for failing to arrest themselves for being held in contempt of court?	Contempt of court is still a remedy, because fines can be issued. The mayor or chief of police can still be arrested and held (enforcement would be via the county court bailiff or sheriff, for example), and the city can be fined. It is possible but not normal to arrest government personnel for disobeying a court order.	Does the party have any legal leverage to engage the police (or other competent authorities apart from private investigators) to help locate the witness and serve the summons on them? Not really. Legal process is not infrequently served by a sheriff's deputy. But the deputy will not generally take any initiative to locate a person to be served beyond what it provided by the litigant. The main reasons to have a sheriff's deputy serve someone with process is the fear that the person served might react violently. Or is it just the party's bad luck that the witness cannot be located and served on? Pretty much.	In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.	I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983.	In all common law countries, this would be the tort of battery (thus, illegal). The police might lawfully lay hands on the person, under certain conditions. First, the police would have to be legally arresting the person; second, the person would have to be (unlawfully) resisting that arrest. If the person acts in a way that a police officer "has reason to believe to be so mentally ill as to be incapable of taking care of himself", he may arrest the person (Mental Health Act 1987 art. 23). Part III (art. 20 ff) provides the legal background for the second path for arrest, via involuntary commitment. Under the circumstances you describe, a court would have to first order the person taken into custody (leading to an arrest, and possibly being subdued). The police would not be authorized to administer a sedative, so they would have to use physical restraint (handcuffs, hammer-lock and so on). The process is either initiated by a psychiatric professional, or by a relative (art. 20), then the court determines whether the person is to be so detained.	There are three kinds of restraining orders in Minnesota, but what they have in common is that a person petitions the court to order a person to e.g. stop the harassment and have no further contact. This order if granted by the court will be served on the respondent, and all actual restraining orders are valid. A forgery which was not actually ordered by the court is not a restraining order, and of course it is not legally valid. But you don't seem to be claiming that this is a forgery. In principle, a person can obtain a copy of a restraining order under The Minnesota Data Practices Act. However, there are limits on access to certain records. Minnesota Court Rule 4 restricts access to domestic abuse and harassment records, blocking disclosure until the respondent has been served with the order. If someone fails to obtain a record in such a case, it could be because the request was made before the order was served. Even if the request was improperly denied, that does not invalidate the court order. Subsequent comments by OP indicate the possibility that he was not given the restraining order, as required by law, which would substantially impact the validity of the arrest. This handbook from the courts spells out the rules for handling these orders. If it is impossible to personally serve the notice on respondent (he can't be found), then it is possible for the court to order notice by publication, where an item is placed in the newspaper (legal notices, which nobody reads). In other words, you can be "served" in the legal sense, but not know it (however, the police will know it, so if BCA is saying "we can't find any restraining order", this would be a plainly improper arrest).	It depends on the jurisdiction. Some states don't require a signature. In California refusing to sign is grounds for arrest: CA Codes (veh:40300-40313) 40302) Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this code, not declared to be a felony, the arrested person shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of the offense and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where the arrest is made in any of the following cases: (a) When the person arrested fails to present his driver's license or other satisfactory evidence of his identity for examination. (b) When the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to appear in court. (c) When the person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate. (d) When the person arrested is charged with violating Section 23152.	Normally, statutes don't crawl out of law books and enforce themselves. And, government officials have broad sovereign immunity for most of their activities, so in most cases the only remedy available if someone in the government doesn't enforce a law according to its terms is to seek an injunction ordering the government to carry out the law. Impossibility is a defense to an injunction request. Also, enforcement of many laws is vested entirely in the discretion of the executive branch and can't be compelled judicially at all. When compliance can be judicially compelled because someone has standing to do so and the language makes the action required by statute truly mandatory, short of demanding full compliance with the law, a judge can set deadlines for compliance (a recent example of that involved a judge ordering the federal government to reunite migrant parents and children who had been separated). In the absence of a court order, the attorney-general for the jurisdiction (or an assistant AG tasked with the job) and the chain of command managers responsible for the function and often aides on the chief executive's staff will come up with a compliance plan that is within the realm of the possible. If none of those approaches is workable, the chief executive or top aides to the chief executive will typically approach friendly members of the legislature to seek a legislative work around. A substantial share of the bills in Congress or a state legislature at any given time that almost never make headlines are bills addressing situations like these that come up from time to time, for example, when a statutory requirement that used to become workable, ceases to be due to unavailability of resources or some technical barrier. Most of these bills pass on a bipartisan basis as a matter of course without the general public even noticing it. Most large omnibus laws are followed a few months later by a technical corrections bill address problems discovered in trying to implement the law.
Faked Discovery Evidence If a victim submits fake photographs as evidence and said photographs are proven to be edited pictures, would that qualify for dismissing a case?	Not necessarily. Let's say the victim delivered photos of a harm that were alleged to be done by the defendant. That's a crime in itself. But based on this item the DA orders investigation and finds evidence of a real crime. Discovering that the photo was faked can lead to dismissal (with prejudice), but even without the fake photo, there might be a strong case against defendant. Also, the photo could not even be used as evidence in the actual trial stage. A good defense attorney might manage to convince the judge, that the doctored photo should have been discovered such early in the investigation, but I doubt, that one could manage to make everything else in a proper investigation fruit of the poisoned tree unless police screwed up.	A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.	She would want a litigation attorney that specializes in this kind of case. For instance if the underlying issue is an OSHA violation, there may be questions that imply a degree of culpability by the witness, and an attorney who knows that area of law (as opposed to copyright or drug-trafficking) would be in the best position to protect the interests of the witness.	Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this.	The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal.	The standard for stopping someone and requesting their ID under the limitations in the U.S. Constitution is "reasonable suspicion." For example, if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that you are taking pictures for the purpose of a secure location for purposes of espionage, or to case the location for a future crime, reasonable suspicion is probably present and you can probably legitimately be asked for you ID. A creative and intelligent officer can almost always conjure up some reasonable suspicion in the situation that you identify to question you and demand ID. For example, she could state that no one else has taken a picture of that location in weeks and that is is very unusual behavior, that your demeanor or the time of day you were present doesn't seem to be that of someone taking a picture for artistic or journalistic purposes, that you seemed nervous, that a previous criminal engaged in similar behavior before committing a crime fourteen years ago, that a confidential informant (e.g. a nosy neighbor) advised him that there was someone engaged in suspicious behavior at that location, that she read in a police anti-terrorism bulletin that terrorist favor that model of camera, etc. The nature of the suspicion doesn't have to be shared with you until you challenge it in court. A dumb cop won't come up with any colorable reason, demands ID for a stated reason ("before you have to do whatever I say") that is inaccurate, admits he has no reason to stop you in a conversation captured by a body camera, and doesn't come up with pretext after the fact before going to the court. In that case, the stop is a de minimis violation of your civil rights justifying a nominal damages award of $1 to you and your attorneys' fees and costs and maybe a consent decree ordering the agency not to do that in the future.	Submit emails in their totality Your testimonial affidavit can quote or cite them as applicable. There is no protection of anyone’s privacy in court. By the way, the email where admissions were made is probably inadmissible if it was sent were in the course of bona fide negotiation to resolve the dispute. If the other party objects they will be thrown out - I wouldn’t hang my case on them.	A motion to dismiss sets no precedent Whether it succeeds or not, it does not result in a judgement on the merits, it is simply an analysis on whether the case as pleaded shows the defendant has a case to answer. The case would have to go to trial, have a judgement issued (i.e. not settle), and await the result of final appeals (if any) before it would be considered precedent. As to your final question Is it considered intellectual property theft to capitalize on synthetic datasets produced by OpenAI's LLMs? No one knows. Hence the lawsuit.
USA: Do 911/PD phone operators have a 'duty to rescue'? As I understand it: 'duty to rescue' does not generally exist for regular citizens in the USA. (Some exceptions apply!) Let's say I'm in Europe and I call the general inquiry phone number of a local (city) police department in the United States to report a suicidal individual local to them. Do any of the following entities have a 'duty to rescue' in the following situations?: Police officers answering the phone. Non-police officer employees answering phones at a (local?) PD. The dispatch operators that #1 and #2 connect me to. The dispatch operators I get when I dial 911 while being in the USA myself. The legal entities of either the police department or the emergency services dispatch (or other involved party?) Note: I have tried to keep this question as narrow/focused as possible. Let me know if there's any issues with the question. I'm not familiar with law all that much.	No More generally, government agencies have no duty to protect. In the cases DeShaney vs. Winnebago and Town of Castle Rock vs. Gonzales, the supreme court has ruled that police agencies are not obligated to provide protection of citizens. In other words, police are well within their rights to pick and choose when to intervene to protect the lives and property of others — even when a threat is apparent. In the united-kingdom , the situation is the same with the relevant case being Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, a precedent followed in australia. However, the police, fire fighters, ambulance officers etc. do owe the same common law duty of care as everyone else where such a duty exists if and when they do choose to act, unless specifically exempted by law. For example, they owe a duty to people in custody or innocent bystanders.	Given there was no answer here, I will state what I know about child abuse response, but note I am not a lawyer nor am I in Illinois, so my statements are likely generalized for most US states (individual laws vary by state, and I reside in Pennsylvania). In most US states, the police and child/youth services (that's what it's called in Pennsylvania but all states have similar services) work side by side and a complaint by the child to a police officer will have an emergency action taken to protect the child. The child is identified as a victim and the police and child/youth services have the obligation to protect the child and to keep them from harm. This is the main goal of police and children/youth services - to keep the child safe and act in the best interest of the child. Usually, a complaint to a child abuse center can take time to process. When a police complaint comes in it is more immediate, with police having more 'influence' with CYS (child/youth services). Especially when the child is in deadly danger (they were just stabbed, after all), the police may arrest the mother or abusive sibling or intervene therein to remove the child from the parents care with CYS-equivalent services working to find suitable alternative living situations for the child as a result of a order of removal/protection authorized by a judge. (PA at least had emergency situation response plans for these situations where a judge is just a phone call away). As well, the child will likely be made a ward of the state if the courts determine the mother cannot care for the child or is a threat as such (not caring enough to stop the brother may count), insomuch that the child may be removed from the dangerous situation and placed in the care of a willing relative or if none can be found will be placed in temporary foster care in a safer environment. Note that nothing happens rapidly without the initial complaint to the police. At age 16 the child is likely going to be taken more seriously (compared to a 12 year old, for example), and has the right to be allowed to reach out to hospital staff to ask to speak to a police officer - otherwise it takes a child abuse complaint from someone who knows the child and situation and that can sometimes take longer to process (though, the distance factor in the original question may make a complaint from overseas given a lower priority due to not knowing the person on a more personal in-person level)	In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense.	The problem with Solution 2 is that government officials in the United States enjoy qualified immunity with respect to actions that they did while acting under color of law. It's not total immunity, but if they do things by the book, they cannot be prosecuted even if something goes wrong (even when doing things by the book, Police deal in very volatile situations and things can still go wrong because of an X factor to specific for the training manual to cover.). In other cases, it may be because multiple officers are working the scene and Office A lied to Officer B about the situation. Consider Officer A pulls over a suspect and realizes it was someone who was suspected of a crime, but couldn't prove it. He calls for back up and Officer B arrives. Upon arriving on scene, Officer A tells B to search the trunk of the car despite the fact that A had not received consent from the suspect nor has a warrant, nor cause to make a search of a trunk of a vehicle. B makes the search and finds [the bloody knife/the stash of drugs/the smoking gun/the match to a child's shoe that was missing from the kidnapping scene/ insert other incriminating evidence]. Under system (2), since it was Officer B who made the illegal search, B would be liable for it, even though Officer A lied about having legal reason for a search of the trunk space. But what's more... if the evidence is gonna be used anyway, what's to stop the cops doing it again? After all, there is very little recourse for those who are illegally searched to contest this in court (If I'm illegally searched and don't have anything on me, I have to take this to civil court, which is a different animal than Criminal Court and exposes me to broader Discovery... aka gives the cops free reign to search my property for a hell of a lot more illegal things.) or just sit back and count my 4th amendment rights (the section of the constitution protecting against unwarranted search and seizures) as worth less than the paper they're printed on. Oh, and by the way... that second word seizure... that means that they will be taking my property (or myself if they arrest me) and will not be giving it back for some time while they process it... if it's a legal to hold item (like my laptop that I do work on) that's going to make it harder for me to do my job which injures me further in lost business and income. In other cases, it could be they have a warrant for a large item (a stolen big screen tv) and while searching for it, open my sugar bowel and find evidence of a crime unrelated to theft of the television (i.e. opening a baggie of weed). This is actually an illegal search because, unless I am a wizard, a Time Lord, or Mary Poppins, there is no reason why a container smaller than a big screen TV should ever be searched when looking for a Big Screen TV and the cops should logically see this as out of bounds of the search warrant. The nature of this is damaging before the legality of the search can be determined, and because the search may have been out of scope of the warrant that was otherwise justified, the rule of making the evidence of a crime inadmissible was held in order to prevent LEOs from doing this because they could. This rule also started to take formation prior to the Revolutionary War. British Law had ruled against compelled confessions being inadmissible as evidence in 1769, a full six years before the Revolutionary war started (1775) and seven years before the publication of the Declaration of Independence (1776). Now there are some exceptions that can get the evidence brought back in, such as plain view ("The suspect's vehicle is a pick up truck with an open bed, the murder weapon was lying in the bed covered in blood"), inevitable discovery ("We have developed evidence by other means that would have lead us to this evidence legally") and Exigent Circumstances ("We believed someone inside the property was in grave danger if we did not enter the property immediately and that's when we found a cache of stolen Big Screen TVs!) and Good Faith (the Warrant was authorized for the wrong street address of the target but we found the evidence of an unrelated crime in a place the warrant authorized us to search. Everything but the goofed up address was done by the book.).	You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on.	The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed.	You have no legal duty to inform callers they have the wrong number. Official business is not carried out by telephone, despite the fact that some collection agencies commonly use the tactic that there is service of process forthcoming, or some other legal jargon, to entice a callback. From a non-legal perspective, you may want to call and tell them to take you off their call list and that they have the wrong number; otherwise, they are likely to continue to bother you day and night. It appears to be either a scam or a collections attempt.	The police will order you to stop and then you have to obey. The moment you annoy the police in a way that is hindering their work (such as blinding them with a flashlight), they can demand you to stop. if you don't comply, then you are committing a misdemeanor. For example, Virginia calls this "refusal to aid [an] officer in execution of his office" and it is worded so widely, that the officer asking you to shut up and you don't, then you are guilty. If the order is in any way justifiable, then you not following the order is... well, criminal. Plus, if you did not comply and they pulled out their handcuffs and you still don't comply with their demand, you are now resisting arrest, which at least in Virginia is again, a misdemeanor.
DMCA counter notice and court action Suppose there are two parties A and B. A files DMCA against B and the material is taken down. Then B files counter notice against A. Then google sends notice to A that unless A submits notice that they have filed a court order on the infringing material, then the material will be restored. So then A files a court order and shows proof to google. So as a result, is the material taken down or restored? Or is it dependent upon the outcome of the court action?	If a legal action is filed, the take down order generally remains in force until a court orders otherwise. If a legal action is not filed with the required time frame, the Internet Service Provider (ISP) such as Google is no longer required to honor the take down order. See generally here and here. Also, an ISP is not required to honor even a valid takedown order. Doing so sacrifices the ISP's statutory immunity from copyright law liability, but that is all.	What happened is that you created a legal mess. You are obviously on the hook for copyright infringement. The maintainers of the project will scramble to replace your code with newly written code. They will likely ask your company which code they are complaining about - that puts your company into the problematic situation that they shouldn't identify code that isn't theirs, that it will be hard to sue for infringing code when they didn't give the project maintainers a chance to fix it, and that everything they identify will be replaced. Since it is your actions that caused the trouble, anyone suffering damages from your actions can sue you.	The DMCA prohibits circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to a copyrighted work. So you can't legally "crack" the software, period -- even if you own a disc containing the software and have a valid license to use it, a license to use the work is not authorization to circumvent access controls. So if the disc is copy-protected, by my understanding of the DMCA, you're kinda screwed. (The company might be willing to provide you a replacement copy, even if only to maintain the illusion that the software is "licensed, not sold". But you can't make one yourself.) Likewise, if you have a copy of the disc but have lost the license key, you're screwed. Even if you could prove beyond any doubt that you are the licensee, there's not any law i'm aware of that would compel the copyright owner to provide you another license key. And courts have held that distribution of license keys without authorization is a violation of the DMCA. So whoever might provide you another key, if they're not the copyright holder, has broken the law. If you managed to copy the disc from a friend (without circumventing any kind of copy protection), and had your own license key, you might be in a better position. Many EULAs allow you to make a backup copy. Even if they didn't, copyright law does, so there's a possible case for fair use.	I've found Google's filtering based on licence to not be very reliable, at least not reliable enough to trust from a practical legal perspective. Using a photo that you don't own the copyright to is a risk. You may be infringing copyright by doing so. The owner may eventually ask you to stop, or they may sue you for damages. Further, some copyright infringement is criminal 17 USC 506. In my opinion, it would be unwise to use a work commercially that you don't affirmatively know you have permission to use.	The judgment (Google Spain and Google (Judgment of the Court) [2014] EUECJ C-131/12) is definitive on this point at paragraph 41: ...the activity of a search engine consisting in finding information published or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and, finally, making it available to internet users according to a particular order of preference... In your example, the blogger would be unaffected by the decision as his links are presumably collected and sorted by hand. However, the blog itself may be removed from Google et al at the request of John Doe.	If your app is published under US law, then the DMCA would apply, just as if it was a web site. The DMCA doesn't say anything about what particular technology the distributor is using. TO be protected by by the DMCA's "safe harbor" provision, you will need to include a notice in your app that you accept takedowns, and provide an address or method by which they can be sent, and an agent who will receive them. (You can be your own agent if you choose.) When and if you recieve a take down notice, you must check if it is valid in form. According to this Wikipedia article, a takedown notice must include: (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site. (iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (See the actual text of the relevant section of the law.) If you receive (through your designated agent) a valid takedown notice, you must promptly remove the content and notify the poster (or you can instruct to poster to remove it, but you must do so yourself if the poster does not). If the poster then files a valid counter notice (see the linked sources above) with your agent, you must notify the sender of the original notice, and if the sender does not notify you of a copyright suit filed within 10-14 days, you must restore the content. Provided that these rules are complied with, the host gets a 'safe harbor" and cannot be sued for copyright infringement, nor for the act of taking down the content. I believe that the agent must be registered with the US copyright office. The courts have not ruled on just how quickly an ISP or other host must react to the takedown notice. It must be "expeditious". Moreover, Under the DMCA (i) 1) (a) The host must have, post, and enforce a policy denying access to repeat infringers, or lose safe harbor protection. The text of the provision is: (i) Conditions for Eligibility. -(1)Accommodation of technology. —The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider— --(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers;	There is no case law as yet However, the most likely situation is that there is no copyright in the original works because they are computer-generated. There is certainly copyright in the code that created the art but the output of that code, the art itself, would probably not be subject to copyright. Copyright only exists in art created by humans. The US Ninth Circuit has held that animals cannot create copyrighted works. Subsequently, the US Copyright office has rejected applications for registration (a prerequisite to a suit in the US) of computer-generated art because it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.” While this position has not been tested in the courts, I don't think they are any more likely to grant copyright to a program than they were to a monkey. What's going on? The OP states that there is litigation: there isn't. What there is, is a DCMA takedown request from Larva Labs. If this is complied with that will be the end of the matter; if it isn't then there may be litigation. However, before Larva Labs could sue CryptoPunks in the US they would first need to get a writ of mandamus to force the USCO to register it. If they try and fail then there will be a legally binding court decision that Larva Labs don't own the copyright in any of their computer-generated art. Which kills their business model and, presumably, them. This would be a very high-risk move. They may choose to sue in a jurisdiction where registration is not a prerequisite, however, that court would still need to be satisfied that there was a copyright that could be breached. So that's just a different take on the same problem. I have ignored the issue of NFTs as these are legally problematic in their own right and irrelevant to the main question. However, the NFT and the artwork are not the same thing.	There's existing copyright infringement and future copyright infringement. Let's say you sold a million records with infringing contents. That's copyright infringement. It has happened, you can't undo it. Now you get sued. If you think you will lose, it would be a good idea to change the music to be not infringing, so the next million records are not infringing and add to the damages. It doesn't fix the infringement that has already been done, but makes sure there is no further infringement. And infringement after you were told about it and asked to stop might be punished more harshly.
Does the German GDPR require storing the data in a German datacenter for a tele-health company? I co-founded a tele-health startup, we are expanding to Germany, we have gone through the GDPR, and implemented most of it, however, we didn't quite understand the data residency part and found conflicting information online. Should the data be stored in a German data center? is it a requirement? Would it be ok to have it stored outside Germany? How about outside the EU? Thanks	The goal of the GDPR is to ensure a single market for personal data processing throughout the EU. Since all EU/EEA member states now have equivalent levels of data protection, it doesn't matter in which member state data is stored or processed. Member states cannot generally limit this single market via national laws. Furthermore, secure processing may be possible outside of the EU/EEA as discussed in Chapter 5 of the GDPR. Some countries such as Japan have been asserted an adequate level of data protection so that no special safety measures are necessary. For other countries, a transfer of personal data may be possible under so-called Standard Contractual Clauses which detail the responsibilities of the data exporter/importer. However, the recent Schrems II ruling has invalidated the (partial) adequacy decision for the United States, and has strongly hinted that SCCs only work if the parties are actually able to honor their responsibilities under the SCC (which is not the case with some surveillance laws). Data protection is likely not ensured for processing in the US or by US-controlled companies (even if the processing usually takes place within the EU). Given the sensitivity of health data, this means you should likely avoid using the typical public cloud providers (regardless of availability region). Depending on where your company is based, you might also be disqualified as a data processor by EU data controllers. So the GDPR has no data residency requirements that limit the processing/storage to Germany, but some data residency requirements to keep the data in the EU. However, there may be non-GDPR obligations that mandate how the data can be processed, but I'm not familiar with those (the German regulatory landscape for tele-health is very uneven, differs between German states, but is also improving a lot recently). Since you're processing health data, you should pay special attention to Art 9(3) GDPR which is expanded in German law by §22 BDSG to list a catalogue of possible safety measures you should consider, but none of them are related to data residency. §78 BDSG has further details on transfers into non-EU countries, such as emphasizing that human rights must be guaranteed in the target country.	In my opinion, this should be enough. The GDPR regulation is general - it does not attempt to address these issues directly, precisely for the reasons we see here: You can never predict how the technology will develop. When interpreting the GDPR, we must keep the intended goal in mind. What is the purpose of the "right to erasure"? To prevent anyone from further processing the personal data. If you "crypto-shred" it, it can't be processed anymore, not even theoretically. The encryptec file cannot be used to identify the subject, therefore it is not even personal data anymore. In case it can be decrypted in the future... Well, that is just a speculation. The courts can go to great lengths in interpreting what personal data is (dynamic IP address is considered personal data, since it can be linked to a person by the police with a court order), but i am pretty sure that "it can be theoretically possible in some distant future" is beyond the limit. As for the second question, I am not aware of any applicable case-law, but I guess that current security and technological standards will be used to assess the delay. You have a right to protect your data, the subject has a right to erase them. Those rights must be balanced, neither fully overrules the other. The delay should be short enough so the right to erasure is effective, and it should not extremely long compared to other (economically viable) backup solutions available, in line with current industrial standards.	In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.	If GDPR applies, then no one can opt out. If it doesn't apply, then an IP block is superfluous. Whether GDPR applies is determined by Art 3 GDPR. For this, we must distinguish where the data controller is operating from. It is irrelevant where the site is hosted, but primarily relevant where the data controller (your colleague) has an “establishment”, e.g. where he resides or typically works from. Per Art 3(1), GDPR applies to all processing activities in the context of an European establishment, regardless of where the users are. So if your colleague were running this site from Europe, they wouldn't be able to circumvent GDPR by blocking European users. However, if your colleague is running this site from outside of Europe, then Art 3(1) doesn't trigger. Per Art 3(2), GDPR can apply to processing activities where there is no European establishment. There is the Art 3(2)(a) “targeting criterion”: if your colleague “offers” goods or services to people who are in Europe, regardless whether paid or gratis, then GDPR applies to all processing activities related to this offer. I'll discuss this more below. There is also the Art 3(2)(b) criterion: if your colleague monitors the behaviour of people that occurs in Europe, then GDPR applies. For example, an app collecting geolocation information or a website creating interest profiles for ad targeting might trigger this criterion. An IP block can help to establish that no offering/monitoring related to people who are in Europe is happening, but it might not be necessary. It may be worth talking a bit more about the targeting criterion. The GDPR explicitly says that mere availability of a website in Europe doesn't imply that GDPR would apply. Instead, it is necessary to establish the data controller's intention – are they soliciting users from Europe, or otherwise expecting that people from Europe might use those services? Recital 23 gives a couple of non-exhaustive factors that can be considered here, for example: the site uses a language or currency used in the EU but not used in the controller's own country the site mentions users or customers from Europe, e.g. in testimonials This means that a lot of US websites, written in English or Spanish, only mentioning payment in USD (if any), not mentioning any European countries, will not be subject to GDPR. Then, occasional European visitors are irrelevant. It wouldn't be necessary to IP-block potential European users. However, such an IP-based block would help establish that the data controller really doesn't intend for those services to be offered to people who are in Europe. My personal opinion is that it's wasted effort to block users from foreign countries in case their foreign laws claim to apply, but if such a block brings peace of mind that might be worth it. While geoblocking might not be necessary, is it sufficient? There is no clear guidance on this subject, but it seems to be generally accepted that IP-based geoblocking is fine, even though it is trivially circumvented using VPN services. Of course, if a website were to block European IP addresses but were to also advertise that people in Europe can use their services via VPNs, that would probably still be an “offer” and might defeat the point of doing any geoblocking. The Art 3(1)(a) targeting criterion is most easily applied to things like ecommerce where physical goods are shipped to the customer in return for payment – so essentially whenever the data controller participates in the EU Single Market. This is roughly similar to the concept of a Nexus in US tax law. But in principle the targeting criterion can also apply to other kinds of websites or apps such as blogs, even if they are gratis. GDPR does not just apply to for-profit commercial activity, and doesn't distinguish between controllers that are entities/LLCs and controllers who are natural persons. Things are slightly more complicated due to the Art 3(2)(b) monitoring criterion and the pervasive use of online trackers on websites, but this aspect of the GDPR is difficult to enforce and frequently ignored. In this answer, “Europe” means the European Union (EU), the European Economic Area (EEA), and the United Kingdom (UK). Note that countries like Norway are covered by GDPR, whereas Switzerland is not. Of course, the GDPR is not the only privacy law relevant internationally.	Among other things, GDPR regulates what you may do with the data within your systems. You can use it for the contracted purpose, or in accordance to law, or with informed and revokable consent, or for some other enumerated purposes. Even with consent, you have to take security measures to avoid the misuse of the data. Remember the software shrink-wrap licenses? "By opening the package, you agree to the terms inside." GDPR makes the equivalent in the cloud world impossible. You have to document exactly what you do with the data, and for any use that is not necessary to perform the service the customer can opt out. In the scenario you describe, it is possible that you are not the data controller under GDPR but the data processor, and that you have a duty to keep the data from separate controllers apart. And delete any batch at the end of contract. If you want to do this professionally, you need to consult a lawyer for your specific plans.	GDPR rights and obligations cover different things: A duty of the data processor towards the government of the country where they operate to present certain documentation, and to implement technical and organizational measures to protect data. These would be audited by government agencies, not the individual customer. A single data subject cannot waive them. A duty of the data processor to process and store personal data only with a legal justification. User consent is one possible justification, if it is informed, revokable, etc. So a single data subject can waive a "ban" on storing his or her data in a database along with all the other users who waived that "ban," but the duties towards the government regarding that data would still apply. A duty of the data processor to respond to an Article 15 request by the data subject in a certain way and timeframe. If a data subject writes a letter to the data processor and explicitly states that the letter is not an Article 15 request, then Article 15 does not apply. The data subject would of course have the right to make an Article 15 request at a later time.	Possibly, but probably not. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person. The statement “Alice is sick” is information, and relates to Alice who is identifiable. Processing personal data is not inherently illegal, but does require a legal basis per Art 6 GDPR, such as a legitimate interest. Here, the information is data concerning health, processing of which is prohibited unless one of the explicit exceptions applies (such as explicit consent, or legal obligations). So it is legitimate to have concerns on whether disclosure of this information would be legal. If these rules were breached, that would be on the data controller. Here, the company would be the data controller, not Bob (unless Bob acted against training and instructions and processed the personal data for his own purposes). However, GDPR probably doesn't apply to this specific interaction. In Art 2(1), the GDPR says that This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. A conversation itself would not be subject to GDPR rules – there is no filing system or similar structured data involved. What GDPR would prevent is to keep records on Alice's health status, but doesn't necessarily prevent talking about it informally. For example, the EUR 35.3M fine against H&M in Germany was imposed not because managers talked with employees about personal matters, but because they then maintained detailed files about those personal matters. Data controllers are responsible though for ensuring security and compliance through appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs). TOMs can include things such as non-disclosure agreements and training for staff. If Bob acts against such training, there could be repercussions along the Bob–Company employment relationship. But that would mostly be an employment law thing, not so much a GDPR thing.	You wrote: As far as I believe, it is permitted under GDPR to record and store non-anonymized web server access logs, as these can be useful for security reasons. True, Recital 49 GDPR: The processing of personal data to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring network and information security, i.e. the ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or unlawful or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted personal data, and the security of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those networks and systems, by public authorities, by computer emergency response teams (CERTs), computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), by providers of electronic communications networks and services and by providers of security technologies and services, constitutes a legitimate interest of the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications networks and malicious code distribution and stopping ‘denial of service’ attacks and damage to computer and electronic communication systems. You asked: My question is whether this anonymization process counts as processing personally identifiable data under GDPR? IP addresses are personal data in some cases, so yes, you're processing personal data. Then, these anonymized logs will be fed into an analytics tool to provide stats on unique visitors, page hits, etc. These are purposes considered compatible with initial purposes according to Article 5.1.(b): Personal data shall be (...) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for (...) statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose limitation’); As a matter of fact, you might be required to anonymize the data for those purposes, see Article 89.1: Processing for (...) statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that technical and organisational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of data minimisation. Those measures may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner. If I were to anonymize the logs and continue to use them exclusively for security reasons, would that change anything? No, you would be processing data in a manner compatible with initial purposes (ensuring network and information security). Or does it not matter what I do with them once they are anonymized? Yes, it does. If you're not using them for "archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes" then you're using them for purposes incompatible with initial purposes. You would need to find new legal basis for processing. does this extra anonymization process on top then take it over the line meaning that consent and a privacy notice would be required? It depends on what you want to do with anonymized data. In your case, for security purposes or security and statistical purposes, you don't need the consent and there is no requirement for the privacy notice (but sure, it would be nice to publish one). For other purposes it might be different.
Could marriage of two people who share a half sibling but do not share parents constitute incest? Suppose that two parents have a child named Sam before divorcing. Sam's father then marries another woman and has a daughter, Daisy, while Sam's mother marries another man and has a son, Matthew. Because Sam shares a parent with each of them, Matthew and Daisy are both his half siblings. However, Matthew and Daisy are not siblings in any way, for they do not share any parents nor do they share stepparents. Could Matthew and Daisy legally get married and have children if they are living in a state where incest is illegal? Would this count as incest at all? I would also like to know if there is a term for Matthew and Daisy's relation to each other. (Quarter siblings? Some type of cousin?)	Assuming that neither one of Matthew's parents are blood relatives of either of Daisy's parents, then they do not share a blood relation that would forbid their marriage under any law or standard of incest of which I have heard. (As for describing the relationship of Matthew and Daisy: The best English term is step-siblings, even though the order of parental relationships that produced them may not be the most common sequence that produces step-siblings.)	Can you always ask for an independent genetic testing when you are asked by the court to support your wife's or your partners children? No. Only sometimes. (Literally, you can always ask, but sometimes the answer will be clearly "no", as a matter of law.) Some presumptions of paternity are conclusive (either immediately or after a statute of limitations to contest paternity expires) and can't be overcome by contrary genetic evidence. Other presumptions of paternity are rebuttable. The specifics vary in important details from state to state. The theory behind the conclusive presumption is primarily that the presumed parent in those circumstances becomes the psychological parent, and it is not in the best interests of the child to dislodge a psychological parent, even if that parent is not a biological parents. Put another way, a conclusive presumption is really part of the definition of what a father is under the law. Several other answers at Law.SE have addressed this in the context of specific U.S. states. An answer here considers California law and another answers the question under New York law.	Yes The only accurate thing in the linked article is: "I am not a Constitutional lawyer." That could be taken further into "I have no real idea how our legal and political systems work." One of the tasks of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is to interpret the laws of Massachusetts including the Massachusetts Constitution. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health the court decided that the Constitution provided for equal protection and due process and that if the state wished to discriminate against people on the basis of sex they needed a good reason. The reasons the state put forward were: providing a 'favorable setting for procreation'; ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the department defines as 'a two-parent family with one parent of each sex'; and preserving scarce State and private financial resources. On 1. the court said marriage is irrelevant for procreation and vice-versa. On 2. they said Massachusetts law on child welfare dealt with the "best interests of the child" and that it is not in those interests for the state to deprive the child of benefits because it doesn't like the sexual orientation of the parents. On 3. they said equal protection means equal protection. In a common law legal system like Massachusetts where courts have the power to strike down legislation then that takes effect as soon as the decision is published. The law ceases to exist without the legislature or the executive doing anything. Now, the people of Massachusetts are free to amend their constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage or remove equal protection rights if they want. However, at the time and subsequently, the majority don't want.	There are a couple of flaws in your hypothetical. Nobody, certainly not the state, represents the birth records as inerrant or complete. Birth records frequently have to be corrected. In fact the point of many paternity suits is to correct the official birth record. Sometimes the father, or even the mother will be listed as "unknown" on the birth record, so the absence of a birth record naming a person as a father is not dispositive. No government official would ever issue a legal document declaring that the man is not any child's legal father because the records don't establish that. At best they could issue a document stating that the man was not the father of record for any child in the state. Anyway, the exercise would be pointless. The only birth record the court would be interested in would be that for the child before them. None of the other birth records would be relevant to the case at hand. The court in a paternity case would ask for evidence, such as birth certificates, or statements acknowledging paternity. If the two parties continued to dispute paternity, the court would order a paternity test. Older blood typing tests sometimes left paternity ambiguous, but modern DNA paternity testing is can achieve 99.99% certainty, baring fraud or laboratory error.	Yes ... ... apart from the impracticality of it. Basically, the bureaucratic process of marriage and divorce doesn't fit within a 24-hour cycle. For example, in australia it is a requirement to notify the state one month before you intend to marry and divorce is a legal process that takes as long as it takes - typically years. But, assuming those obstacles did not exist, your scheme would not fall foul of the law. In general, you can remarry a person you previously divorced. kentucky [apparently]1 says enough is enough after the third time. Unless adultery is illegal (as it is in much of the Muslim world) there is no law against polyamory so long as no one person in the relationship is married to more than one other person. Your headline of "Concurrent Polygamy" is wrong - what you describe is "Consecutive Monogamy".	england-and-wales Is this illegal? YES, NO, MAYBE Context is everything, and it depends on whether this was just playful (for want of a much better word) or sexual touching. Assuming that the "grandma" is actually her grandmother, the likely offence - if there is one at all - would be sexual activity with a child family member contrary to s.25 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003: A person (A) [i.e. grandma] commits an offence if — (a) [s]he intentionally touches another person (B) [i.e. the child], (b) the touching is sexual, (c) the relation of A to B is within section 27 [which includes grandparents], ... (e) — ... (ii) B is under 13. Touching is defined at s.79(8): (8) Touching includes touching — (a) with any part of the body, ... (c) through anything [e.g. panties] ... Sexual is defined at s.78 as: penetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that — (a) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature sexual, or (b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual. A key point to prove is whether s.25(1)(b) is met or not, so again: context is everything. Is it legal only for women to do? NO - Both males and females (over the age of criminal responsibility of 10) can commit any sexual offence apart from rape which is purely male-specific for anatomical reasons.	Nowhere is this legal. Polygamy is legal in 58 countries, polyandry is possibly legal in Sri Lanka and Bhutan. Neither country recognizes same-sex marriage, ruling out a marriage between three women. The law of Bhutan is clear on the requirement of male-female mixing, only allowing marriage between 1 man and 1 woman at a time. In Sri Lanka, the Kandyan Marriage and Divorce Act also allows multiple husbands for a woman, but only for Kandyans (Buddhist from the former provinces of the Kandyan Kingdom).	A conviction isn't ever impossible, but it could well be highly unjust. Indeed, there is a current case where a man alleged that he was the murder, though his identical twin brother was convicted. This article indicates that identical twins are not necessarily genetically indistinguishable. Assuming there is a lack of positive evidence such as fingerprints or an alibi which clearly identifies one versus the other, then one would predict no conviction because there would be a highly reasonable doubt. See the case of Orlando Nemnhard, where one of two twins did it but the DA concluded that they couldn't prove which one, so the charges were dropped.
Can the police examine the digital contents of your smartphone beyond the IMEI if you are searched or arrested? If you are arrested, can your messages be read and your contacts be retrieved by demand of the police? If so, under what circumstances and caveats?	Yes. The police have the power to seize your phone as evidence under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and the Terrorism Act 2000. There are no caveats or defined circumstances other than having a reasonable belief that the data on the phone forms evidence against you. They do not require a warrant to access your phone, and many police forces in the UK are using commercially available software to bypass password/PIN protection on your phone 1. In the event you do not provide your password/thumbprint/facial scan/PIN to officers to unlock your phone, you can be served with a Section 49 Notice under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) which compels you to provide that information. Failure to do so can lead to a conviction under Section 53 RIPA, in addition to any other offences you may be charged with.	Yes. At international borders and international airports (because those are the equivalent of a border), US customs officers may do searches of people and belongings without a warrant and without any particular reason to think they'll find contraband. This includes the authority to do some level of disassembly of the car, if they then reassemble it. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149. This is known as the "border search exception." Moreover, police normally don't need warrants to search your car if it was mobile when they found it and if they have probable cause to believe they'll find contraband. This is known as the "automobile exception" or the "motor vehicle exception." It was established in Carroll v. US, 267 U.S. 132. Individual states may have stricter requirements on police searches, but the Fourth Amendment doesn't require police to get a warrant to search your car if, say, you drove it up to a checkpoint and they have probable cause. The difference at a border is that they don't need probable cause and the car never had to be mobile: they can search you on a hunch.	What a statute means can be difficult to determine. There are several approaches to statutory interpretation that could be helpful: Textual: The plain meaning doesn't confine "use" to a few particular types of uses. The plain text provides an expansive prohibition on any use of an electronic communication device. Legislative history/legislative intent: The previous version of the subsection did limit prohibited uses to only composing, sending, or reading electronic messages. Given the amendment, it seems that the legislature no longer desired that limitation. When the bill was introduced, Rep. D'Amico stated the purpose of the bill was to "[expand] the prohibition on driving while using an electronic communication device to include uses beyond composing, sending, or reading an electronic message." During debate, when asked what a person should do that doesn't have Bluetooth, Rep. D'Amico suggested "You put it on speaker phone". When asked, "Where would you place the phone?", Rep D'Amico replied, "Wherever you feel like; just not next to your ear." During the same debate, D'Amico described the bill: "What House Bill 1247 does is ban handheld cell phones while driving a vehicle." In my opinion, the declaration of the bill's sponsor, and the debate surrounding the bill treated it as expanding the prohibition from including only texting and email to also include voice conversations. As far as I can tell, the full scope of "using" under this statute hasn't been tested in court, but I could see this going either way. The plain text provides an expansive prohibition on any use of an electronic communication device. However, a court might also be convinced by the legislative intent that only aims to add handheld voice communications to the previous list of prohibited activities (or it least it could be argued that this is the case). Further, under a purposive construction, a court could even look beyond the explicit legislative intent and find that the core purpose was to prevent distraction, in which case "using" could include any activity on your electronic device that distracts you as if you were texting, or making a phone call (eg. selecting the next song to play in your music app).	Is mere accusation without evidence other than testimony of the accuser, grounds for arrest in the UK? It depends on the circumstances, especially when dealing with non-recent allegations where independent and corroborative evidence may be difficult to locate and/or recover, but in my experience it is very rarely an option to arrest soley on the say-so of one complainant unless there is a compelling reason to do so. It's also fraught with potential risks - Operation Midland being a prime example of when it can go horribly wrong. Also, no-one can "call the police and have someone arrested" in the united-kingdom - the police are under a duty to carry out a "proportionate investigation" in to allegations of crime and then make their own minds up on how to proceed based on the available intelligence and evidence. Focussing on england-and-wales, the most commonly used power of arrest* is at s.24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which, along with PACE Code G, requires an officer to: Reasonably suspect that an offence is being, has been or will be committed. On a scale of 0 to 10 - with 10 being total knowledge and 0 being no opinion at all - suspicion may be as low as 2 or 3 whereas belief starts at 7 or 8. And reasonably believe an arrest is necessary. One commonly used mnemonic for the Necessity Test under s.24 is: ID COP PLAN: Investigation - prompt and effective investigation of offence or conduct Disappearance - prevent prosecution being hindered by disappearance of a person Child / Vulnerable person - protection of Obstruction of highway Physical injury to themselves or someone else Public (in)decency Loss or damage to property Address not know Name not known I cannot say why the officer did not make an arrest in the OP's case. I surmise that he did not deem it necessary based on the above mandatory criteria but rather considered that a voluntary attendance interview would be the most appropriate course of action given the circumstances and information available to him at the time. *There are other statutory and common-law powers of arrest, but they all follow the same procedures as above	The law 'doesn't care' how the call is recorded. What matters is whether or not you should inform / should have informed the participant(s) in the circumstances. In circumstances where you are acting as an ordinary member of the public, in the course of a purely personal or household activity, not in a journalistic capacity, regulated business or other circumstances where the rules may differ: In the UK it is not unlawful for a private person to record a phone call without the permission or foreknowledge of the other participant(s) - provided the recording is for 'personal use'. If you intend to share the content of the call with a third-party or make it public, then you must inform the person ahead of recording it. If you try to use a covertly recorded call as evidence in court, the court may or may not exclude it depending on the circumstances.	It is possible that there is such a booklet in some jurisdiction, and that local police are required to carry that booklet and show it to persons on demand. This link (apparently) publicly provides the police manual for the city of Seattle, except it is 5 years and a major lawsuit out of date. No provision seems to exist that requires showing authority to detain, when requested. There is no general requirement for all police and all laws, in the US, and the full set of state, county and city codes would be impractical to lug around. If required by law to carry and display some such document, then by law a person can demand to see a police officer's authority to detain. Even without such a law, you have a First Amendment right to challenge the detention, but that does not also enable you to resist arrest. A detention is not invalidated by the fact that the detainee is unsatisfied that the detention is legal.	That the cop claims to be your friend is not more illegal than a salesman claiming that he has "the best offer" for you because he likes you (in fact didn't you see any film about the good cop/bad cop routine?) The term you are looking for is Entrapment. The (very simplified) basic idea is that police officers can promote the comission of a crime to catch criminals but cannot "trap" innocent people into it; the difference being that their persuassion should not turn otherwise innocent people into criminals. An extreme example would be if the cop threatens the target into commiting a crime. For the more usual situation when a cop promotes a crime to catch the criminal, I saw it explained (just for illustration purposes, it is not that you are safe when the cop insists a third time) as it follows: Legal: Cop) Oh boy! The place where I work is full of cash and they don't even have alarms or store it in a safe box. If someone helps me, we could go this night and take all of it. Are you interested? Target) I don't know. Cop) Trust me, it will be easy, nobody is there at night and it will be just a couple of hours. Target) Ok, count me in. Illegal Cop) Oh boy! The place where I work is full of cash and they don't even have alarms or store it in a safe box. If someone helps me, we could go this night and take all of it. Are you interested? Target) I am not a thief. Cop) Come on, it will be easy, the place is insured and nobody will be hurt. Target) Not interested. Cop) We can get 5000 US$ each one, just for a night of work. Didn't you told me that you had troubles with your bank? You could solve those overnight! Target) Maybe you are right, but I have no experience with these things... Cop) Do not worry, I will tell you what you need to do. Target) Ok, count me in. Note that it is not only "the cop insisted a lot". For the drug dealer example, if the cop insisted a lot but, when agreed, the boy produced the drug from his pocket, already packaged for sale, it would not be entrapment. OTOH, if the guy had told "I do not know where to buy drugs" and the cop had told him "go talk with X so he sells you the drug", then it could be considered entrampment. In any case, this is generic information only, entrapment is difficult to prove and will depend on the views of the judge/jury so, no matter how enticing that criminal offer is, just don't do it.	It can go either way. If detectives have been working to build a big conspiracy case against you, they might get charges filed before they roll up to arrest you. If a cop catches you mugging someone, they'll arrest you on the spot and charge you later.
Original work or derivative work if published posthumously and never previously registered? I'm trying to determine how a literary work should be registered -- as a derivative work with two authors, or as a derivative work with me as claimant and author? Or neither? Details: My mother wrote a manuscript for a children's book years ago and shared it with me a few years back. She died last year. I have since taken her original text-only word document manuscript and 1) edited a lot of the text > 50%, and 2) created illustrations with an external freelancer (work made for hire) for every letter. The original text she wrote was neither registered nor published under US Copyright. Effectively, my mother and I will have both contributed to the final published children's alphabet book. She wrote some of the original text, and I rewrote/adapted and edited it, and had illustrations created for everything, and have had the book put together. How should I register this?	As Polygnome points out in the comments, the first step is to determine who owns the original copyright on your mother's work now. This will be her heirs. If you are the sole heir then no problem. If the copyright was explicitly left to you in her will, also no problem. If there are multiple heirs and no explicit assignment of the copyright, then problem. The copyright will probably be considered part of the chattels of the estate (i.e. everything except real estate). If those are allocated fractionally (e.g. half each to two siblings) then the copyright probably followed that principle, unless you have already come to some agreement about it. If you are on good terms with the siblings then the best bet is to just make a deal for their part of the copyright. You could just ask them to sign it over to you, or you could cut them in for a percentage of future royalties. That makes the situation 100% clear, and any publisher is going to require 100% clarity before they consider offering a contract. Once you have the whole copyright you can go ahead and register. I've looked through the registration process and it doesn't actually ask about derivative works. What it wants to know is whether you own the copyright, and who were the authors (including works for hire). So just fill it in on that basis.	This is a heavily fact-dependent question. Exactly how and how much your work "evokes" the original will matter. That said, your belief that "My understanding is that as this doesn't contain any mechanical part of the original movie it is fine." is not at all correct. If your new work is clearly based on the original work, it would be a derivative work. For example, if Shakespear's Romeo and Juliet were still in copyright, West Side story would have been a derivative work, and would have required permission. You would do well to consult a lawyer knowledgeable in this specific area, in your specific jurisdiction, as the detailed rules vary by country, although the general principles are pretty much world-wide.	Under Copyright? The first question is: Is this novel still under copyright. This depends on the place and date of publication. In many countries copyright now lasts for 70 years after the death of the author. Some countries use different rules. In the US, a work published before 1978 is in most cases copyrighted for 95 years. Works published after that are protected for 70 years after the death of the author. More complex cases are detailed in this well-known chart. Who holds the Copyright? For most novels, copyright is initially held by the author(s). The author may sell or give away the copyright at any time. If the author does not transfer the copyright during life, it will pass with other property st the author's death. It may pass by will or by default (intestate) inheritance in the absence of a will. The author's surviving spouse children, if any, are often the heirs to any copyrights, but not always. Authors with many works still in print may have s "literary estate" set up to handle their copyrights. Works with multiple co-authors usually have the copyright shared between all authors; in equal shares unless they agree otherwise. Any one copyright holder may license a derivative work such as a translation. A would-be translator of a work still under copyright must find the copyright holder(s) and obtain permission. If the holders cannot be found, no permission can be obtained, and any translation would be an infringement of copyright. The copyright holder could sue for damages after publication. Damages may be quite substantial in some cases. This varies by country and by the facts of the case. In the US The Federal Copyright Office will search its records to try to determine who holds a copyright. They charge a fee for doing so, and success is not guaranteed. Other countries may have similar services. Addition: There is no automatic or guaranteed way to find who now owns a copyright. In some cases the owner does not even know that s/he owns the copyright. If the holder died without heirs the copyright may belong to the government (state government in the US). Research into the author's life may reveal probable heirs. An obituary may list the author's children, if any. Finding them and asking is a reasonable place to start.	Using the setting and characters of an existing and current book would probably, indeed almost surely, make it a derivative work. Creating a derivative work from a work protected by copyright requires permission from the copyright holder, unless an exception to copyright applies. In US law 17 USC 101 defines a derivative work as: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. and 17 USC 106 provides in pertinent part that: Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: ... to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; This means that creating such a fanfic without permission would be copyright infringement, and Rowling could sue for damages. Fair use In the US the primary exception to copyright available is fair use. Whether a work is a fair use of another is always a case-by-case decision, and often a complex one. There have not been many published US cases on whether fanfiction is or may be fair use. This depends on the details, but from the description I do not think such a fanfic as the question describes would be likely to be held to be a case of fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? In general fanfiction has not fared very well under US copyright law. See this Wikipedia article. A recent Law Review article on this topic, one of the few available, is The Better Angels of Our Fanfiction: The Need for True and Logical Precedent, 33 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 159](https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol33/iss2/1) by Stacey M. Lantagne. [Footnotes in the original shown here in {braces}.] On pages 168-9 Lantagne wrote: Although fanfiction is a flourishing medium, there has been no true case evaluating it under a fair use analysis. For instance, Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books 575 F.Supp.2d 513 (SDNY 2008) involved a work created by a fan, but the work in question was an encyclopedic reference book about the original copyrighted material, not a piece of fiction spun off from the original copyrighted work in some way. The fan work's inconsistently transformative character swayed the court's fair use analysis{The court noted that at times the fan work lapsed into mere verbatim copying of the original copyrighted material, which detracted from its transformative nature}, and the fact that it used more of the original copyrighted work than was necessary.{The court found it telling that the fan work contained a great deal of verbatim copying of "highly aesthetic expression," which tipped this factor away from a finding of fair use} These two factors would necessarily dictate a different analysis when a work of fiction is involved as opposed to a reference work.{Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 544. The court found troubling the excessive copying of "distinctive original language from the Harry Potter works," using "Rowling's original expression," in the work's entries. Id. Presumably, much less direct copying of original language would happen in a work of fiction. A similar implication occurs when considering the "verbatim copying" of whole sentences from the Harry Potter books. Id. at 547. Works of fanfiction seldom copy verbatim language, focusing on characters, settings, and plots.} Lantagne next discussed mthe case of Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 70. That case dealt with a novel called 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye, whose protagonist, "Mr. C", is a 76-year-old Holden Caulfield, (the protagonist of the J.D. Salinger novel The Catcher in the Rye. Lantagne wrote: The defendant's novel embodies typical fanfiction activity: taking a recognizable character and re-imagining them at a different stage of life." The court determined that the work was not permissible fair use and enjoined its publication.{This case [on appeal] recently settled, with Colting agreeing not to publish the book in the United States or Canada until the copyright on The Catcher in the Rye expires, but being able to publish it in other international territories, as long as it was not marketed using reference to Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye, or the litigation between the parties.} First, the court concluded that 60 Years Later was not a parody because it "contain[ed] no reasonably discernible rejoinder or specific criticism of any character or theme of Catcher. Rather than commenting on Holden Caulfield as a character, the purpose of 60 Years Later was to "satisfy Holden's fans' passion" for his character. The insertion of J.D. Salinger as a character in 60 Years Later was possibly, the court conceded, a criticism and commentary of Salinger, but not of The Catcher in the Rye. While the court admitted that there was some transformative element in the Salinger character in 60 Years Later, it was limited by the character's minor role in a work that was largely not transformative. The court concluded that merely aging the main character of a novel and altering the novel's setting was not sufficient to make the use transformative. Finally, because 60 Years Later was to be sold for profit, the court found that the first factor weighed against a finding of fair use. After finding The Catcher in the Rye to be an expressive work, which weighed the second factor against a finding of fair use, the court then concluded that 60 Years Later took much more from The Catcher in the Rye than was necessary for whatever transformative commentary it was trying to make. The court disapproved mainly of the use of the main character of The Catcher in the Rye. 60 Years Later also was similar to The Catcher in the Rye in structure, in a way that was not necessary to offer a commentary on Salinger (the only transformative purpose the court had found the work to have). Finally, the court found that 60 Years Later harmed the potential market for any permissible The Catcher in the Rye sequels. The court found that fair use should not protect the ability to publish unauthorized sequels: [B]ecause some artists may be further incentivized to create original works due to the availability of the right not to produce any sequels. This might be the case if, for instance, an author's artistic vision includes leaving certain portions or aspects of his character's story to the varied imaginations of his readers, or if he hopes that his readers will engage in discussion and speculation as to what happened subsequently." Although 60 Years Later may be classified as fanfiction, the overtly commercial purpose of the work makes it an imperfect representation of the genre because most fanfiction is not-for-profit.{See Tushnet, supra note 16, at 664. A recent development in fanfiction that has led to clashes is the rise of the use of fanfiction for charitable purposes. "Fanfic auctions" in which readers bid for the services of fanfiction authors to write a story based on their specifications, with the proceeds to benefit charity, are becoming more common. See Gabaldon, supra note 7 ("Recently, a couple of people have drawn my attention to a person who's been posting on various boards about fund-raising for an uninsured friend named Stacie who has breast cancer. Her (the poster's) idea for fund-raising is to auction off a customer-written piece of fan-fic. . . ."). Fanfiction written for such a commercial purpose may change the analysis. But see Tushnet, supra note 16, at 672-73 (quoting Gene Rodenberry).} Because the court weighed the novel's commercial nature against a finding of fair use, Salinger is not an ideal fanfiction precedent Lantagne goes on to discuss the case of Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001). In that case a novel The Wind Done Gone, retelling Gone With the Wind from the PoV of the black characters, was held to be a parody as well as a sequel, to be "highly transformative", and allowable as fair use. Sequels as Derivative Works A sequel uses the characters and/or setting of an existing work of fiction. It often constitutes a derivative work. The more distinctive and original the setting and characters are, and the more of those distinctive characteristics that are used in the sequel, the more likely the sequel is to be treated as a derivative work. On the matter of sequels, see the case of Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989). In that case, a Mr. Timothy Anderson prepared a sequel to the film Rocky III which he hoped would become Rocky IV. He presented it to MGM and Stallone. They eventually declined to buy it, and Anderson sued, claiming that the film Rocky IV that was made infringed his script. The district court held that Anderson's script was an infringing work not entitled to copyright protection. The court, citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), ruled that the characters in a copyrighted work are protected when they are "developed with enough specificity to constitute protect able expression." Holding that the Rocky III characters met this standard, the court ruled that the Anderson script was a derivative work created without permission, and thus was not entailed to any copyright protection at all. Anderson appealed, and the case was settled out of court while this appeal was in progress. Details of the settlement were not disclosed. An unauthorized sequel to Harry Potter would probably face the same rule and reach the same result as in the Anderson case.It would depend on how much of the "distinctive" nature of JKR's characters and settings were used in the fanfic sequel. The Ethical and Emotional Arguments against Fan Fiction In This comment on the question user "RedSonja" writes: I know this is Law and you are looking for legal answers. But what you are proposing is plagiarism by the back door. JKR went to a lot of trouble inventing her universe. Why should you be able to just plug in and milk someone else's cow? If you are that highly original, write your own universe. Leaving aside the point that if the source is acknowledged it cannot be plagiarism, although it may be copyright infringement, this is essentially an ethical argument that the law should be different than it currently is. Some authors make an essentially emotional argument, saying that their works or their characters are in effect "children of the mind" and that others should not touch them without permission, whatever the law may say. Some find such arguments persuasive or powerful.. I disagree with these arguments. Lantagne on pages 172-179 of the law review article linked above, responds to such arguments, writing [Some footnotes omitted, others in {braces}]: Fanfiction is frequently devalued as not being "real" writing. This is closely related to the aesthetic argument. Copyright only protects creative expression.{See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2002)} If the fanfiction is not creative expression, then it is not copyrightable. That, however, is a different question from whether it is infringing.{See Tushnet, supra note 16, at 681 ("Fan fiction may not be copyrightable, but that does not make it an infringing use....").} It could be that the "not real writing" argument, translated into legalese, really expresses the idea that the work of fanfiction is not transformative enough.{See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) ("If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another's work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger."). Importantly, however, a work does not have to be transformative to be protected under fair use. See id. at 579. The fair use test is not forgiving of shortcuts.} However, this alone does not automatically make the work a copyright infringement because other fair use factors remain. Many authors frequently describe fanfiction as being the equivalent of an affront against their relatives.{See Gabaldon, supra note 7 ("[L]et us just say that there's a difference between someone dating red-haired men, and the same someone trying to seduce my husband.... I wouldn't like people writing sex fantasies for public consumption about me or members of my family-why would I be all right with them doing it to the intimate creations of my imagination and personality?"); Someone Is Angry on the Internet, supra note 11 ("My characters are my children, I have been heard to say. I don't want people making off with them, thank you."); Hobb, supra note 7 (comparing fanfiction to PhotoShopping a family photo).} While the artistic protectiveness for one's creation is understandable, it is not a valid argument in U.S. copyright law. Artists have the right to control derivative works of their creations. If the fair use factors come out the wrong way [for the reuser], artists can prevent that use of their work. However, the purpose of copyright is not to prevent all use by others of an artistic work.{See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574-77 ("From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose ...)} It never has been. The very character of the fair use test illustrates this, as it protects most strongly those uses of an artist's creation that the artist would never permit.{See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282-83 (11th Cir.2001) (Marcus, J., concurring) ("To the extent the Suntrust [sought to impose editorial restrictions] to preserve Gone With the Wind's reputation, or protect its story from 'taint,' however, it may not now invoke copyright to further that goal. Of course, Suntrust can choose to license its derivative however it wishes and insist that those derivatives remain free of content it deems disreputable. Suntrust may be vigilant of Gone With the Wind's public image-but it may not use copyright to shield Gone With the Wind from unwelcome comment, a policy that would extend intellectual property protection 'into the precincts of censorship,' in Pat Conroy's words.")} Arguably, the more that a fanfiction work criticizes or parodies the original work, the more that fanfiction is a fair use. Thus, the argument that fanfiction should not be permitted because it transforms the original authors' characters mirrors the argument for exactly why fanfiction should be permitted under copyright law. ... The arguments that authors advance when they argue against copyright belong in a regime without fair use-a regime that would ignore the central purpose of U.S. copyright."' Such a conclusion is not only potentially untenable under the Constitution, but is also undesirable."' "The public's interest in free expression . . . is significant."" There is no question that courts have, throughout the history of copyright law, sought to protect that public interest. However, there is also no question that courts are inevitably swayed by value arguments. This should not be the case, but such influence is inevitable. ' Furthermore, value is a chicken-and-egg argument: Campbell did not base its decision on the popularity of music sampling, but surely the popularity informed Campbell's understanding of the critical commentary value of "Pretty Woman." ... [T]he use of the word "fair" in "fair use" does not mean that it is fair to the author's wishes. Rather, it means that it is fair to the purposes of copyright. None of the emotional arguments frequently raised against fanfiction support a blanket proclamation that none of it is fair use. Truthfully, much of fanfiction may very well not be fair use. However, a true test case of fanfiction, logically evaluating each factor, would be invaluable in moving the fanfiction debate past the emotions of the participants. The argument should focus not on the emotions of the author or the quality of the writing, but on the fair use factors: on the purpose, character, and possible transformative nature of the work, on the amount of the original copyrighted work used, on the nature of the original copyrighted work, and on the effect on the market of the original copyrighted work. These are the factors that best protect the advancement of the twin goals of U.S. copyright. I agree with Lantagne here, it is often exactly those uses that a copyright owner will not want to approve that should be permitted as an exception to copyright. The limited statutory monopoly is granted in return for a contribution to the clutural fabric, and such work should therefore be available for use in further developing that fabric where it does not deprive the copyright holder of financial rewards, and where such uses in general are of public benefit. I take it thatr current US copyright law follows that goal, more or less. Non-US Law The rule on derivative works is also contained in the Berne Copyright Convention and the WTO's TRIPPS Agreement, and so applies in almost every country. Exceptions to copyright, however, vary widely. The concept of Fair Use is originally a purely US concept, although it has been adopted by Israel, and in part by a few other countries. Other countries generally have more specific and narrower exceptions, but often have several different exceptions. India has some 28 different exceptions in its copyright law. Few of these seem likely to be any more favorable to a fanfiction sequel than the US concept of fair use.	A translation is a devivative work - the copyright owner has the exclusive right to these So, yes, translation is prima facie copyright infringement. Strictly speaking, if you translate it, it's a derivative work because you exercised creativity in making the translation; what Google translate does is not a derivative work, it's a copy because there is no creativity. Either way, only the copyright owner can do (or authorise) this. Whether it's legal or not depends on if what you are doing falls within one of the exceptions to the applicable copyright law such as fair use or fair dealing. Attributing the original author does not, of itself, allow translation. Additionally, I'm not able to find the copyright documentation for the site link I provided above. What is "copyright documentation"? Copyright exists the moment a work is created and no further documentation is required. Essentially, I could translate the whole documentation by myself to avoid this problem. No, you can't - see above. If copy-pasting the google translate is illegal, then exactly how much must I edit, move around sentences, change words, and such until the text is no longer plagiarized? All of it. If you were, based on your own knowledge of the software, to write a manual without any copying o the existing manual, that would not be copyright infringement. Is this plagiarism or copyright infringement? It's copyright infringement - plagiarism is an academic misconduct issue not a legal one. where can I check the copyright for the above link? The site you linked has "Copyright © 2020 Acquia, Inc. All Rights Reserved" in the bottom left corner which identifies the copyright holder, the date and prohibits all copying ("all rights reserved"). This isn't necessary but it is helpful. If you really want to do this, contact Acquia, Inc and ask for permission.	First off, the work is almost certainly not in the public domain in the US. Works are generally copyrighted upon creation or publication, but in this case the work was probably explicitly copyrighted. The fact that a work is out of print generally has no bearing on its copyright status. US copyright law changed several times in the last century. The 1985 copyright year means the board game was probably published then, and it's since it's a Disney copyright it's a corporate work, which would give it a copyright term of 95 years, meaning that it should be covered under copyright until 2080. See this factsheet on copyright from the US Copyright office. Works Created on or after January 1, 1978 For works made for hire and anonymous and pseudonymous works, the duration of copyright is 95 years from first publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter International laws will vary, but many countries adhere to the Berne Convention, which means that international laws will probably be at least similar. Either way, the work isn't very old from an intellectual property perspective. Fair use is an exception to copyright law that allows portions of copyrighted works to be used without permission or compensation in certain circumstances; academic or scholarly use is one of them. Generally, your use of the work has to be the minimum necessary amount to serve your purposes, and cannot harm the commercial value of the work. (The fact that the work is out of print may help with the latter.) The problem with fair use is that it's always determined on a case by case basis. The only way to know for sure if a particular use is fair use is to wait for the copyright holder to sue you and then make a fair use defense in court. I was going to suggest that you discuss this with the editor of your journal, but re-reading your question it looks like you're planning to publish to a personal blog rather than an academic journal. In the end, it's up to you (or your attorney, if you choose to hire one) to analyze the relevant legal concepts and rules and decide if and how much of the work to use.	Presumably you are referring to works commonly called "fan fiction." Under copyright law these might be considered "derivative works" and therefore subject to the rights of the copyright owner. However, they might also qualify for exemption from copyright enforcement under "fair use." It appears that the legality of fan fiction is not settled law, and the outcome of legal challenges have turned on facts specific to each case. Decent background on the question is summarized on wikipedia.	First, copyright means that permission from the author is generally required. The courts find three sorts of such permission: direct author-to-recipient explicit licensing (typical in the case of a book author to publisher relation), indirect licensing arising from platform usage (in using Stackexchange, you probably unknowingly click-agreed to allow me and everybody else to copy and redistribute your creations), and implicit licensing – where permission to use is reasonably inferrable, though not explicitly stated. Since the latter doesn't involve written-out statements of the conditions under which you are licensed to copy text, the courts don't rely heavily on implicit licensing. But implicit licensing is what makes it possible to legally read a web page without first signing an agreement. If we assume in your scenario that the author is fully aware that their responses are automatically distributed to various servers, then even in lieu of a platform license, an implicit license can be found. Second, irrespective of the desideratum of having permission, one is in the US allowed to copy without permission, for certain purposes known as "fair use". This is a complicated area of legal analysis, where one has to weigh factors such as whether the content is artistic vs. factual, whether your use simply re-propagates vs. makes a comment, whether the use is for profit vs. free and educational, and whether the use has a negative effect on the market for the original work.
Can a company be held to an agreement it signed before it was incorporated? Company X, Inc. or an entity purporting to be Company X, Inc. signed an agreement, A, with Company Y on the tenth of the month. On the fifteenth of the month, Company X filed for, and received incorporation in New York. It became X Inc. at this time, but not before. On the 20th of the month, Company X, Inc. signs a second agreement B, with Company Y. Company X, Inc. is willing to honor agreement B. Company X, Inc. claims that it is not bound by Agreement A because it was signed five days before Company X was a properly constituted (corporate) entity. Company Y wants to enforce agreement A as well. Can Company Y do this? If not, what recourse does it have? (Y did not know about the lack of "incorporation" on the tenth, and found out about it on the fifteenth.)	Only if the company consents While some jurisdictions have by statute allowed corporations to be bound by pre-incorporation contracts, New York is not one of them and holds to the common law principle that a person cannot enter a contract before that person exists. In your circumstances the company is only bound by the second contract. So, who is bound by the first? Well, corporations can only act through agents and agency law tells us that an agent who purportedly acts for a non-existent principal is actually acting on their own behalf. So, the person(s) who signed for Company X on the first contract are personally bound to the contract. Unless they explicitly told Company Y that they wouldn’t be. It seems that they didn’t so Company Y can require performance of the first contract by them and of the second by Company X. Company Y must, of course, fulfil its obligations under both contracts - it needs to bear this in mind if it is actually impossible to do both, for example, transferring the same property to the signers of the first contract and Company X or becoming a full time employee of both. If so, it might be in Company Y’s best interests to let the first contract “die”.	Can he/lawyer try to use the payment to me as leverage, for example, offer to give me that payment only if I agree to sign a non-compete or other document? The employer ultimately ought to comply with the written agreements between you two. The employer is not allowed to belatedly impose conditions that alter (to your detriment) the contract(s), let alone when you are no longer his employee. The clause "You will be paid on X and Y when/if they close" does not reflect whatsoever that payment is contingent on your acceptance of a non-compete agreement. Your description does not reflect any legal merits that would justify your employer to further withhold the compensation to which you are entitled pursuant to the deal/sale that got closed. The employer and his lawyer are just being vexatious.	Let me start by saying that real estate contracts are some of the most heavily regulated contracts and details vary enormously by jurisdiction. That said ... To vary a contract, the contract must actually contain provisions that allow for it to be varied and variations must be in accordance with those. These sorts of clauses are common in long-term contracts (building, mining, logistics etc) but are less common (but not unknown) in transactional contracts like real estate sales. If the contract does not contain such provisions then it can only be varied by a collateral contract which has the same basic requirements of any contract - in this particular case, were you offered something in return for agreeing to delay settlement? If you weren't you do not have a collateral contract that varies the original contract. Notwithstanding, even though the other party delaying settlement from the 11th to the 18th is a breach of the contract by them, by agreeing to it you would be prevented from enforcing your rights under the contract by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This presumes that they actually settle by the 18th - if they don't all bets are off and you can enforce the rights you have from their breach by failing to settle on or before the 11th - just don't agree to any more extensions. What you remedies are will be detailed in the contract. These would normally include issuing a notice for them to settle by a given date - if they don't do that you can terminate the contract and keep the deposit. You could also sue for damages. Don't do any of this (or anything else) without getting legal advice first. Edit The OP has put in a comment a rather vital piece of information: there is a clause making settlement contingent on the buyer selling their condo. If the delay is in accordance with that clause then the vendor is stuck, even if settlement takes 10 years.	It isn't 100% clear from the question if a case has been filed in court, or someone was just planning on filing a lawsuit, which is an important fact. It seems like the ex filed a court case and you hired attorneys who responded. If there is a court case filed, that can't just be abandoned until all the i's are dotted and t's are crossed in the eyes of the court. The lawyers can't quit unless the court gives them permission to do so. Usually, lawyers are entitled to be paid for all of the work they do and out of pocket charges they incur in a case, until it is wrapped up, even if some wrap up work happens after the event that determines the final outcome of the case like your ex deciding to abandon his arguments. But, otherwise, if there isn't a pending court case, you normally have the power to tell your lawyers to stop everything and give you the moment left (if any) in your retainer. At first read, it almost sounded as if your lawyers are willing to do that, but are warning you that your ex might continue to be a problem after the lawyers quit and that if that happens, it will be more costly and time consuming to start all over dealing with the threatened lawsuit that your ex made, than it would be to get it over and done with now. But, upon closer inspection, it seems that there is a pending lawsuit and that this is the issue.	You cannot be compelled to sign a form indicating that you agree to something. However, your lack of agreement does not override a policy that they have authority to set. There is a contractual way that this could work out for them, depending on what exactly the document is. To be a contract, the parties must agree to the terms voluntarily, and if you do not agree to the terms, there is no contract. A 10 year old child cannot be bound to a contract, anyhow, so the child's consent is legally irrelevant, though strategically a good idea in the sense of alerting the child to their obligation. To be a contract, both sides must offer something that they are not already obligated to provide. What is the school offering? On the school's side, they might claim "We offer an education", but as a public school, they already have that obligation. Schools have broad authority to impose rules in order to operate, so in lieu of a successful lawsuit that the district overstepped their authority and violated someone's constitutional rights, the school could have a policy prohibiting use of a cell phone in school. Paired with such a policy, they can grant conditional permission, subject to the parent (and symbolically, the child) agreeing to certain terms. Since they are not obligated to allow cell phones at all, they are offering something of value to you, and you have a contract. The cell phone owner could try suing the school for keeping the phone, but the suit would fail because there was a breach of the contract. A strategy probably not worth pursuing is arguing that the confiscation clause is unconscionable (which would void the contract, which entitles the child to have a cell phone at school). Confiscating the phone is not theft, since the intent is not to permanently deprive the owner of their property (just as it is not theft when you have to leave guns or recording devices at the security desk). If a student were to take a forbidden thing without the owner's authorization (such as a gun, or a phone) and it was then confiscated, the rightful owner might be able to sue the school – as long as their hands are clear (if they had no knowledge that the thing was taken and used in an unauthorized manner). In this case, the parent clearly knows and authorizes.	If you had an agreement that amounts to a contract, it is binding even if it was informal. However, if your agreement was not in writing, it might be hard to prove. You can easily prove that you transferred money to the other party. But can you prove that it was a loan an not a gift? And even if it is agreed to be a loan, if no repayment time was specified, what says that the debt is due now? Was the agreement really for a loan repayable on demand? The court would have to determine what your real contract was, or what contract can be implied from the actions of the parties. Also, if you are in a common-law jurisdiction, there could be a question of what consideration there was for the loan. Without consideration, there is no valid contract in such a jurisdiction. Perhaps a promise to repay could be treated as sufficient consideration. Small-claims courts do deal with unclear verbal contracts on a regular basis, but the outcome will depend on the facts of the case, and on the details of local law. It might be wise to consult a local lawyer with small-claims experience. A single consultation should not be too expensive. In response to comment If the "written binding agreements" include a statement from the other person that this is a loan, and a promise to repay it, you are in a stronger position than I had thought from the original question. The question for the court would be, since there was no due date agreed, what is a reasonable date to impose. The court might treat it as a loan repayable on demand, or specify some particular date for repayment.	Possibly Your employment contract is only one part of your deal You are also bound by the company’s constitution and any shareholder agreement that may exist. Companies often have wide ranging powers to repurchase their own shares at fair market value or following a pre-specified formula. It’s not uncommon for private companies to get an option to purchase shares automatically from ex-employees.	As soon as you start working in your second job, you will be violating your first contract. If you refuse to start working in your second job, you will be violating the second contract. You were very careless. Not much of a legal question, but the question is how to get out of the mess you created at the lowest possible cost. I would suggest that you go as soon as possible to the second company (the one with the part time contract), tell them that you are very sorry but you didn't read your first contract properly, and that you cannot start working for them. If you seem suitably sorry there's a chance that they will tear up your contract and send you home, with no more damage than a big red "DO NOT HIRE" in you records. If things don't go nicely (and you don't have any legal right to expect them to be nice about it), you go and get a lawyer.
Can Walmart ban shoppers who wear Nazi face masks from entering in California? Description of incident The last paragraph is the one I'm interested in: Walmart says the trespass notices issued to the couple prevent them from visiting any Walmart facility for at least one year. I'm curious about this since it reads as though Walmart is banning the two people from entering the premises because of their political beliefs. A quick Google search indicates this is usually legal in the United States, but not always - in particular California, New York and the District of Columbia disallow such discrimination (this is admittedly not the exact same scenario since it deals with employment, but this source says the same thing about California). This seems to indicate that at least in these states, walmart cannot ban them from entering their stores. However the second source above also says that "In general, refusal of service is justified in cases where a customer’s presence interferes with the safety and well-being of other patrons and the establishment itself", and clearly Walmart's other patrons disapproved of these two people. This seems to indicate that Walmart can ban them from entering their stores. Question: if the two people in the incident go to California and attempt to enter a Walmart store, can Walmart legally prevent them from entering?	This is an open question. California's Unruh Act prohibits discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of political affiliation. This same issue has come up previously, in a case where four neo-Nazis showed up wearing swastika pins at a German restaurant. When they refused to remove the pins, the restaurant called the police to remove them. The Nazis sued the restaurant under the Unruh Act, which prohibits various forms of discrimination in public accommodations (restaurants, hotels, etc.) Although the Unruh Act does not specifically mention discrimination on the basis of political ideology, the California Supreme Court has interpreted its list of classes as describing, not limiting, the classes eligible for protection, which it has also explicitly said include political affiliation: Whether the exclusionary policy rests on the alleged undesirable propensities of those of a particular race, nationality, occupation, political affiliation, or age, in this context the Unruh Act protects individuals from such arbitrary discrimination. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 726 (1982). Based on these interpretations, the trial court refused to dismiss the Nazis' case against the restaurant, and the parties eventually settled without going to trial. Read commentary about the case here. So it seems clear that the Unruh Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of political affiliation. Because wearing a swastika indicates that you affiliate with the National Socialist German Workers' Party or one of its offshoots, the Unruh Act probably prohibits a business from discriminating against customers on the basis of wearing a swastika. But federal law may pre-empt the Unruh Act. But the problem doesn't end there, because intepreting the law that was creates potential conflicts with federal public-accommodations law, employment law, and the First Amendment. For instance, federal law prohibits the creation of a "hostile environment" in terms of both providing public accommodations on equal terms regardless of race, and in terms of equal employment opportunity regardless of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Proving a hostile environment can be pretty difficult, but if you could demonstrate that allowing swastikas on premises created a hostile environment for customers or employees, you'd then have a strong Supremacy Clause argument that the Unruh Act can't be enforced to require the admission of swastika-wearing customers. Beyond that, businesses have First Amendment rights on generally the same terms as natural humans. There's a reasonable argument to be made that those businesses, in banning swastikas, are communicating a First Amendment-protected anti-Nazi message, or that they are exercising their right to control who speaks in the forum that they control. If the court were to accept either of those arguments, it would again mean that the Unruh Act probably could not be enforced to benefit those wearing swastikas.	Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination.	Has Bob been treated less favourably than Alice by this establishment with respect to his committed philosophical worldview of opposing fascism and all its associations and forms? Has Bob thus been unlawfully discriminated against? No. There is no discrimination law engaged here by the retailer asking if its customer would like to donate to the Red Cross Crisis in Ukraine Appeal or such and not asking if the customer would like to donate to any other appeal.	There is no law against a person creating and distributing such a poster, to the best of my knowledge. However such a poster pretty clearly implies that the person shown is guilty of a crime, or at least strongly suspected. If the store somehow made an error, pulling the image of a person who did not use the stolen card or there is some other error, the person pictured might well suffer a significant loss of reputation, and might sue for defamation. Damages could possibly be significant. Such suits have, I believe, happened when surveillance photos were posted but there later proved to have been an error. Mary might wish to double check how sure the store is that the photos are of the person who actually used the stolen card.	It may be discrimination, but it is not discrimination based upon any reason that the company is prohibited from engaging in. This conduct is legal in pretty much all U.S. jurisdictions.	I assume that you committed the crime in nevada. Under NRS 205.240, this is a misdemeanor, petty larceny, the maximum penalty for which is not more than 6 months in prison and a fine of not more than $1,000, plus restitution. 8 USC 1227 makes certain crimes deportable offenses, but shoplifting isn't one of them. In France, under Art. 311-3 of the Code pénal the maximum penalty is 3 years and €45,000 fine. The "risk" is harder to calculate, if you mean "the most likely penalty". There is a substantial chance that the maximum penalty will be getting yelled at by the store manager, and even if you are arrested by the police there is a good chance that the matter (as a first offense, right? no aggravating circumstances) will not result in a trial because you will have the opportunity to "negotiate" the matter to probation, to avoid a trial. Rumor is that Walmart is aggressive in its anti-shoplifting policy.	If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment.	Yes Businesses (and consumers) can choose who to do business with and what information they ask for and disclose and when they do that. If you’re uncomfortable with how they do business, don’t deal with them. If they don’t like how you do business, they are free not to deal with you. This is called discrimination. However, it is not unlawful because only discrimination against a person due to membership of a protected classes is unlawful. This person “won’t answer my questions” is not discrimination based on a protected class (unless they are a monk who has taken a vow of silence).
How can German supermarkets get away with not following the EU regulations, which have been established long ago? Since 2011, EU regulations on food labeling states require most foods label's to contain nutritional facts of the food. However, as a person who has been living in Germany for a couple of months, it is quite clear to me that this regulation isn't followed in German supermarkets at all. Very few foods and drinks have their nutritional facts in their labels. Before Germany, I was living in UK, and there, everything had a label containing the nutritional facts of the food. How can Germany, or German supermarket, get away with not following the EU regulations, which have been established long ago?	You are referring to article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 which contains: Article 9 List of mandatory particulars In accordance with Articles 10 to 35 and subject to the exceptions contained in this Chapter, indication of the following particulars shall be mandatory: (...) (l) a nutrition declaration. In a comment you clarify that you are talking about wine. Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 contains: Article 16 Omission of certain mandatory particulars (...) Without prejudice to other Union provisions requiring a list of ingredients or a mandatory nutrition declaration, the particulars referred to in points (b) and (l) of Article 9(1) shall not be mandatory for beverages containing more than 1,2 % by volume of alcohol. As wine contains typically more than 1,2 % alcohol, a nutrition declaration is not required. See also Labelling of alcoholic beverages in the EU: some facts.	You will probably have been presented with a form mentioning "Texas Food Establishment Rules (TFER) Section: §228.35", which requires you to report symptoms and diagnoses which include Salmonella Typhi. That does not guarantee that you actually got such a form or that you remember signing it, but theoretically you did. The regulations are given here and here. The model form includes the information above the signature line "I understand that failure to comply with the terms of this agreement could lead to action by the food establishment or the food regulatory authority that may jeopardize my employment and may involve legal action against me".	A good question that arises from stupid lawmaking. As Wikipedia notes: United States Tyramine is not scheduled at the federal level in the United States and is therefore legal to buy, sell, or possess. Status in Florida Tyramine is a Schedule I controlled substance, categorized as a hallucinogen, making it illegal to buy, sell, or possess in the state of Florida without a license at any purity level or any form whatsoever. The language in the Florida statute says tyramine is illegal in "any material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any quantity of [tyramine] or that contains any of [its] salts, isomers, including optical, positional, or geometric isomers, and salts of isomers, if the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation." This ban is likely the product of lawmakers overly eager to ban substituted phenethylamines, which tyramine is, in the mistaken belief that ring-substituted phenethylamines are hallucinogenic drugs like the 2C series of psychedelic substituted phenethylamines. The further banning of tyramine's optical isomers, positional isomers, or geometric isomers, and salts of isomers where they exist, means that meta-tyramine and phenylethanolamine, a substance found in every living human body, and other common, non-hallucinogenic substances are also illegal to buy, sell, or possess in Florida. Given that tyramine occurs naturally in many foods and drinks (most commonly as a by-product of bacterial fermentation), e.g. wine, cheese, and chocolate, Florida's total ban on the substance may prove difficult to enforce. But lawmakers, in principle, are allowed to pass stupid laws, and an evil-meaning police officer confronting a German citizen with a technically correct interpretation of a duly enacted law, even if it makes no sense, is hardly a fanciful scenario. The mostly likely result would be that a judge would interpret the Controlled Substance designation to apply only to synthetic and meaningfully concentrated version of the chemical in order to avoid absurdity, even if this is not the most plain reading of the statute, in order to reflect legislative intent. Also, while the statute doesn't have an express de minimis exception, one can look by analogy to the fact that no one is prosecuted because the currency they receive as change from a restaurant has trace amounts of cocaine (which 80% of dollar bills in circulation do). Another potential challenge under the federal constitution would be based upon the dormant commerce clause (as in impediment to interstate and international commerce in ordinary trade goods), under a "rational basis test" argument under the Equal Protection Clause (to highlight the lack of any positive reason to enact the law read broadly), or under a "void for vagueness" analysis that assuming the law wasn't intended to have absurd consequences it isn't clear how far it was intended to go. Lack of knowledge that one is in possession of the substance due to lack of advanced chemical knowledge not shared by most members of the legislature would also be a defense in many cases, because many controlled substances offenses require you to have knowledge that you are in possession of a controlled substance.	Have you ever bought groceries? If you have, I’m pretty sure you never signed a contract nor asked the person on the till if they had the authority to enter a contract on behalf of the company. Notwithstanding, a contract is what you had with the grocery company; one that is legally binding on both you and that company. (Most) contracts don’t need to be signed Or, for that matter, be in writing There are exceptions, most notably around real estate or finance, but the overwhelming majority of contracts don’t need a signature or even to be in writing. Many contracts are in writing even when that isn’t legally necessary for all sorts of good reasons but most B2C and even many B2B contracts are verbal or even simply performed - like you buying groceries. Apparent or ostensible authority An agent of a company (including employees) that reasonably appears to have the authority to bind a company to a particular course of action, including agreeing to a contract, has that authority even if they don’t. For example, when you buy your groceries, you can reasonably assume that the cashier has the authority to sell them to you. Unless you know that someone is exceeding their actual authority or it is unreasonable for you to assume the agent is (for example if the cashier tried to sell you the grocery store), then the company cannot avoid their obligations to you. They can, of course, take action against an agent that exceeded authority but that doesn’t let them off the hook for what that agent did. What authority a company gives its agents is up to it A company can only act through its agents. At the top of the tree are the directors and other officers, they have authority only limited by the law and the company’s rules. However, since outsiders don’t know the company’s rules (unless they have been explicitly told), their apparent authority is only limited by law. The directors and officers can delegate authority to employees and other agents however and with whatever restrictions they wish. Such delegation may be explicit or implicit, for example, it’s implicit in a purchasing officer’s role that they can purchase things. However, an outsider is entitled to presume that an employee who acts like they have the company’s authority to do whatever they are doing, does have it.	On the first page of https://www.gov.uk/duty-free-goods/overview you find: "You can bring some goods from abroad without having to pay UK tax or ‘duty’ (customs charges), as long as they’re for your own use." And on the next page "... will use them yourself or give them away as a gift". This clearly doesn't cover anything that you bring into the UK to sell it. And a bit further on the site it says "You must tell customs (known as ‘declaring’) on arrival in the UK if you have goods: ... that you plan to sell". Since you are asking here, it is quite obvious that you intend to sell :-) You said "e.g. say this guys comes every month from Russia to France for unrelated business, each time he fills up his luggage with the maximum allowed amount of goods that comply with custom laws". If this guy sells the stuff to you, then the maximum allowed amount of goods to import without paying taxes is zero. Once he is willing to pay taxes, there is no limit. Obviously regularly importing things from Russia or France and selling in the UK at a profit means that he is running a business in the UK, which means he would have to register a business, pay corporation taxes etc. It's all a matter of degree; for small amounts nobody cares (up to some limit you don't need to register a business or pay taxes; I don't know the details).	Note: IANAL Does the placement of a sticker stating, "We accept XYZ credit cards," essentially obligate a business to accept that card? It depends on whether you mean whether they are obligated to provide goods/services to someone who presents the card, or whether, having provided goods/services, they are obligated to accept the card as payment. For the first question, the answer is "no". The credit card brand could theoretically go after them, however, as names of credit networks are trademarks, so claiming to accept a card but not doing so is trademark infringement. For the second, the answer is "pretty much". Since they misrepresented their establishment, there is no mutual assent and therefore no contract. If they try to use "defrauding the innkeeper statutes", those require fraudulent intent. If you fully intended to pay for you meal by a credit card, and it was their choice to refuse payment, then you have no fraudulent intent. The only avenue I can see for them is some sort of equity argument, but that would be problematic, especially if they ask for the retail, rather than wholesale, price, and not worth the hassle of collecting. So, legally, you can just walk out, but in practice if they have a bouncer they might make trouble for you.	Point three should include "to the best of my knowledge and belief", or be modified to state that none of those "house or the adjacent shop" have informed the affiant of any such delivery, or delivered any such package to the affiant. It might add that the affiant had questioned such persons and they denied receiving such a delivery. The point here, of course, is to prove that the package was never properly delivered, no doubt in support of a claim on the delivery service. The ordinary assumption is that if a person in the "house or the adjacent shop" had accepted a package, it would normally have been given to the addressee at an early opportunity.	Rather than deciding that a restaurant is a convenience store, the restaurant owner can, following the text that you quoted ("unless the consumer specifically requests the single-use plastic straw"), wait for the customer to request a straw, in which case they can give the customer a straw. If a restaurant owner decides to declare that it is a convenience store and not a restaurant, there could be unintended consquences, since (for examples) a convenience store can't serve a glass of beer.
United States citizen crosses Canadian border and murders someone. Who prosecutes the killer? Would like this question answered, as I have the scenario in the book I am currently writing. Would like to ensure I am providing my readers probable outcome for the killer. A United States citizen crosses the Canadian border and murders someone. Returns to the United States and law enforcement in Western Canada discovers who they are. Who arrests and prosecutes the killer?	I imagine, under the relevant extradition treaty, US law enforcement would arrest the killer upon request from Canada and extradite them to Canada, where they are then prosecuted by authorities there.	In the US, it depends on the jurisdiction because each state has its own homicide statutes: but, the defining elements don't differ a lot. Drawing on Washington state law, the first question is whether you intended to kill a person (it doesn't have to be a specific person). If you did, you have committed first-degree murder. It is first-degree murder, because it requires a certain amount of advance planning to kill with a drone. It does not matter that the drone houses the gun that killed the person and a program determines when the gun fires (the "it was the drone, not me" defense gets you nowhere: otherwise, you could always claim "It wasn't me, it was my gun / knife / fist".) If instead this is a badly-designed pig-slaughtering drone, then it could be manslaughter in the first degree, if the act was reckless, or manslaughter in the second degree, if the act was with criminal negligence. To determine which it is, you look at the definitions: A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. versus A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. So it would depend on whether you decided that safeguards which would prevent shooting people were too much bother (you know there is a risk and set aside that concern), or it didn't occur to you that a flying gun might hurt a person.	In the UK this is just called "an appeal for the suspect to come forward." The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe).	united-states Bob could do any number of things to try to convince someone to prosecute Alice: call the prosecutor's boss, or the district attorney (or their equivalents in DOJ if it's a federal crime), or his elected representatives; he could also go to the media, or post on social networks... But if none of that works, the article is right: Prosecutors can't be legally compelled to prosecute someone Crime victims don't have any rights to control whether a prosecution happens—the government is the plaintiff. A prosecutor can even file charges over a victim's objections. Federal law and some states have Crime Victims' Rights Acts, which do grant some rights. But note the particularly relevant exception in that law: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction. This is also a separation of powers issue: the executive branch has the exclusive right to determine how the laws are executed. Neither the legislature nor the judicial branches can compel the executive to prosecute someone. Note that none of this affects Bob's civil remedies: he can still sue Alice for damages. But that won't result in her ending up in prison.	From what I can gather, a US citizen could literally commit first-degree murder in another country, and not be held liable in US courts. Yes. From looking at the decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., it seems a corporation could go so far as to commit genocide in another country and not be held accountable in US courts. Yes. Why is US law set up in this way, and why has nothing been done to change it? Extraterritorality The modern nation-state is part of the Westphalian tradition of sovereignty which takes as a core value that the internal laws of each nation-state are a matter for it and it alone. This is baked into international law as part of the UN charter: "nothing ... shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." The basic assumption of criminal law is that it is, by default, territorial. If a US national commits a crime in the Ivory Coast, then that is primarily the Ivory Coast's problem to deal with. There are both practical and political reasons why this is a good idea. The practical matters are that law enforcement and the courts in the Ivory Coast have the on-the-ground resources and knowledge to investigate and prosecute the crime and the US doesn't. US police forces can't collect evidence and interview witnesses in the Ivory Coast unless the Ivory Coast allows it. US courts can't subpoena witnesses. On the flip side, foreign jurisdictions don't have to follow the US Constitution when conducting searches and beating up, I mean, interrogating, suspects. That may make a lot of the evidence collected in foreign jurisdictions inadmissible in US courts. The political reasons are the US (and anyone else) should stay the f&^% out of the internal operations of other countries. The treaty of Westphalia ended 30 years of the most brutal warfare in history, which killed an estimated one-third of Europe's population, which was largely fought because the ruler of country X wanted to tell the ruler of country Y what religion they should have. Extraterritorality in US law Constitutional restrictions can limit exterritoriality. First, the statute must be within Congress' power to enact. Second, neither the statute nor its application may violate due process or any other constitutional right (see above). The presumption is that Federal laws only apply within US territory. To be extraterritorial, Congress must make this clear, ideally explicitly, but the courts can find that some laws are implicitly extraterritorial based on their language. Other nation's approach is different. For example, a French citizen is subject to French as well as local law everywhere in the world.	Yes. This is legal, even though it is highly unlikely. There were very few, if any, instances of the federal pardon power being used this way historically, but it could happen, and President Trump, while he was in office, intimated that he might use the pardon power in this fashion. Realistically, it would be easier for the President to prevent someone from being prosecuted in the first place if the crime took place during his term, but he might pardon someone who committed the crime under a previous administration. The fact pattern in the question: “don’t be surprised if I pardon anyone that puts to death repeat heroin and fentanyl dealers dealing in amounts larger than 50 pounds” doesn't sound very morally palatable. But consider a slight variant of it which is much more plausible. Suppose that while running for office a Presidential candidate says: don't be surprised if I pardon someone who was convicted of homicide in a previous administration for killing someone who had been using them as a sex slave in a human trafficking network, or killing someone who was in the process of raping them shortly before their divorce became final but was not allowed to assert a self-defense argument at trial because marital rape was legal at the time. Now arguably that's different, because it doesn't induce someone to commit a future crime. But the President has broad discretion to make policy to de-emphasize certain kinds of criminal prosecutions in any case while in office even without the pardon power, and generally, this is not a basis for having a special prosecutor appointed at the federal level since there is no individualized conflict of interest. Of course, the U.S. President can only pardon someone from a federal crime and can't pardon state crimes or criminal convictions from other countries. So, even if the President pardoned someone of a federal crime in this situation, the state in which the murders took place could prosecute the individual for murder unimpeded (constitutional double jeopardy considerations would also not bar a state prosecution following the federal prosecution). Indeed, the vast majority of murder prosecutions are made under state law, and there are very few murders that take place which are beyond the jurisdiction of any U.S. state and any foreign country, that are in the jurisdiction of the U.S. government and covered by a federal homicide statute, in any year. As noted by @hszmv in a comment to another answer: Federal Murder charges are a thing and can be prosecuted, but are normally reserved for murders that either involve federal government employees (especially if they are murdered because of the duties the performed in the course of their duty or the status as a federal employee) OR murders that occur on Federally Owned Property OR the Murder involved crossing state lines OR is in U.S. Jurisdiction but not in a territory or state jurisdiction (usually applies to some uninhabited territorial islands or U.S./International Waters). Further, a pardon would not prohibit the victim's family for suing the murderer for wrongful death, and indeed, probably wouldn't prohibit them from using the murder conviction that was pardoned to conclusively establish liability in a civil case under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (I haven't researched that highly specific and technical civil procedure issue, however, but even if that wasn't possible, the murder trial transcript would be admissible in the civil case). A civil judgement for wrongful death was famously obtained against O.J. Simpson by the victim's family after O.J. Simpson was acquitted in a criminal murder trial. This tactic would really only be helpful to a prospective defendant with respect to cases where there is not a parallel criminal offense under state law.	Ah, but destroying the insulin is not "tantamount to to murdering the victim". Any pharmacy or hospital can supply more. Once the villain is secured, or the cop and victim are away from the villain, additional supplies can be obtained. That does not justify deadly force. (And since the T J Hooker series was set in a large US city, such supplies would have been readily available, 24/7. If the setting was far away from any such supplies, the case would be different.) However, if the cop has plausible reason to fear that the villain will attack him or the victim, and pose a serious threat of injury or death, the cop can use as much force as is reasonably required to defend himself or the victim, including deadly force if that is needed. He may not use more force than is reasonably required, but in practice once it is established that there was a valid threat, or reasonable grounds to believe that there was a threat, the cop's judgement on how much force was needed will only be overruled in a really egregious case. Under current law, the cop may not use deadly force simply to stop the suspect from escaping, unless there is some unusual factor involved. I think the law may have been interpreted differently on that point when the TV show was made, in the early 1980s.	In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless.
Can governors deploy state police vs federal police? (Non US national here) Can the governors of states that disagree with the deployment of federal troops deploy some kind of state force to stop these? Does state police loyalty lie with the governor or the nation?	There are multiple police forces in the US: city, county, state and national, and each is responsible to a relevant executive. Typical "police" are city police, who are responsible to a chief of police, who is appointed at the municipal level. Counties usually have an elected sheriff, and a set of deputies; at the state level, they are usually called state troopers. The typical protocol is that decisions are made at the lowest applicable level, so Seattle police enforce or refuse to enforce laws within Seattle, and King County police enforce or not in remaining unincorporated locations in the county. Individual city officers do not then decide to ignore the chief of police and instead follow orders from the county sheriff or the governor. However, each state grants vast powers to their governor, so it is possible that in the case of a state of emergency, the governor can take command of all law enforcement in the state. Governors "can't" deploy police to oppose federal law enforcement in a shoot-out, except that they might actually do so on some theory that federal law enforcement officers are violating the law. In general, you are not immune to arrest for illegal acts just because you are a law enforcement officer. The governor of Washington could easily (in the legal sense) declare an emergency and order state troopers to prevent federal officers from effecting arrests. Of course, resolving these disputes in court is another option.	england-and-wales Alice's defence will be that she had an honest belief, given the circumstances, that force was necessary and the force she used was reasonable in defence of John (and possibly Alice). John's consent is irrelevant unless it had some bearing on that. Why did John oppose the use of force? Did John tell Alice not to shoot because he would rather die than cause a death? Irrelevant. Did John tell Alice not to shoot because he believed Bob was not a real threat due to circumstances X, Y and/or Z that he wanted Alice to heed? Relevant.	Assuming that all of these locations are in the same state, this is not an issue of federal law and is not governed by the U.S. Constitution. The geographical jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement officers is exclusively a matter of state law and has no single correct resolution. Different states handle the issue differently. Even if state law or the state constitution prohibited the arrest, this violation of state law or the state constitution, would not give rise to a federal claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which may vindicate only federal rights, and could not form a basis for a collateral attack on a state court conviction in a federal court habeas corpus petition which is likewise limited to vindications of federal law rights. Any remedy would have to be secured in the state court system invoking state law rights (assuming for sake of argument that state law provides such a remedy), or in a diversity lawsuit in federal court applying state substantive law, if the defendant was from another state and the amount in controversy was in excess of $75,000.	In Connecticut, this is covered by the firefighter's rule. Police and fire personnel entering a property as part of their official duties are considered licensees, which limits the duties of the landowner. The rules are as follows: You can't intentionally hurt or lay a trap for the licensee. If you know or should know the licensee is there, you need to exercise due care with them. You don't have to worry about obvious hazards (but keep in mind that it's harder to see stuff at night). If you're doing something dangerous, you need to watch out for them. If you know about a hidden hazard, you must warn them. I'm not sure how in-depth you need to go with the warnings; various things I find suggest the duty to warn might only be there when you know or should know the licensee is present, but signs are a good idea regardless. On the other hand, if you do need to warn them, you might need to mention the specific locations of the pits you actually know about. However, there's no duty at all to proactively look for possible hazards. This rule originated as a rule for professional firefighters responding to a negligently-started fire: the idea is that professional firefighters sign up to do a dangerous job, and letting them sue for hazards inherent in their job (they aren't called without a fire) is a bad idea. Also, since they cannot be denied entry, go in places not open to the public, and can arrive at any hour, needing to keep the property safe for them is an unreasonable burden. Of course, there's an exception if a law is passed to protect their safety, because statutes override common law. The rule has since been extended in some states to police, and to situations besides the very problem they were called for. Other states have abolished it. In any event, this is for civil liability only: this is when cops can sue for injuries caused to them.	The question has no definitive resolution other than the authorities cited and some other related authorities such as the protocol rules of the Secretary of State for diplomatic purposes and the Presidential succession statute. It has never been litigated any reasonable interpretations of the the constitution and relevant law could be argued. There is also some case law under the appointments clause regarding which departments count as principal departments. There is a broad consensus regarding the existence of 15 principal departments of the United States government and which departments those 15 departments are in practice. I would say that the majority view is that the highest ranking person in each department is the principal officer of that department (which is provided for by statute in the event of vacancies) but there is also an argument that only the Congressional ratified and Presidentially nominated Secretary of a department (and the Attorney General in the Justice Department similarly appointed) count. In the event of a dispute, either Congress or a court could resolve the issue depending upon how the issues ended up being presented for a decision. If asked, the White House Counsel would render a formal opinion that would be binding upon all members of the Executive Branch. Triller novel writer Tom Clancy has explored some of the scenarios as have other writers in the same genre, but since the 25th Amendment has never been invoked in this manner, there is no definitive answer or even a non-judicial precedent to provide us with guidance on the question.	Answering the question title, a Texas law enforcement officer can certainly make arrests in Louisiana these days under the right circumstances (I'm not about to look up the laws as of 1934). For starters, Louisiana law grants any person the authority to make an arrest when the person being arrested has committed a felony, whether or not that felony was committed in the presence of the person making the arrest. This is normally a legally risky thing to do (the arrest is illegal unless the person actually committed a felony, while a cop's felony arrest is legal as long as the cop had probable cause), but in this case the pair had been involved in a kidnapping and a robbery in Louisiana. Any person could have made a lawful arrest, and could have used necessary force to effect that arrest. But suppose the gang turned out to be innocent of the Louisiana crimes. In that case, a citizen's arrest would be illegal. But the Texas lawmen weren't at the ambush alone. They were there with the parish sheriff and a deputy, who were Louisiana peace officers with the authority to make an arrest on probable cause. And under Article 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, A peace officer making a lawful arrest may call upon as many persons as he considers necessary to aid him in making the arrest. A person thus called upon shall be considered a peace officer for such purposes. Neither of these things depends on the Texas officers' status as Texas officers. There are some arrests which are legal based on that (e.g. hot pursuit), and a Texas officer has some extra powers in Louisiana based on federal law that make an arrest easier (e.g. cops in the US can carry concealed firearms nationwide without needing a CCW permit), but under normal circumstances a Texas police officer has no special authority to make an arrest in Louisiana. However, it's not at all uncommon for police agencies in different states (or at the state and federal level) to cooperate on something, and there are ways to make it work out. With more planning, there are normally formal ways to do it instead of needing to rely on "we'll ask you for assistance" (for instance, officers could formally be appointed as deputies in the appropriate agency; this happens a lot on federal task forces, where a deputized state or local cop gets nationwide jurisdiction). If Bonnie and Clyde existed these days but the feds wanted to involve state cops, they'd just set up a federal task force, make Hamer a special deputy US marshal, and go from there.	Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.	Claiming to be independent is probably not a crime: the family that say they have set up the Principality of Sealand have never been prosecuted (though that may have something to do with the difficulty of arresting them). It does not, however, excuse a British subject from the ordinary duties of paying taxes and the like; anyone in a more accessible (and more clearly British) part of the country would be subject to the normal forms of law enforcement, including imprisonment for contempt of court if they refused to obey court orders. Despite the more eccentric theories of the 'sovereign citizen' movement (who do exist in the UK), the fact that somebody living in Britain is subject to British laws is not open to negotiation. Resisting this law enforcement by force would not be a good idea: as well as the fact that the Government has access to bigger and better armed forces than you do, it would probably render you guilty of treason. The Treason Act 1351 (as amended and translated) makes it illegal to "levy war against our lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere"; the good news is that the death penalty for treason was abolished in 1998 (some time after that for murder).
Multiple perpetrators: who is guilty? Suppose Alice commits arson, setting fire to a store which is completely empty of people (and which she verifies at the time she sets the fire). Suppose Bob happens to be running past the store, which is visibly engulfed in flames. Suppose further that Charlie sees Bob, runs towards him from the side, and body-slams him into the burning store. At this point, Bob hits his head on something, knocking him unconscious. Nobody renders aid, and Bob dies in the fire. Clearly, Alice is guilty of arson. Clearly, Charlie is guilty of murder. By the doctrine of transferred intent, is Alice also guilty of murder?	Charlie may or may not be guilty of murder or of attempted murder. It depends upon his intent and knowledge, which the question doesn't flesh out sufficiently to evaluate. Why did Charlie bodyslam Bob? The reason matters a lot. Did Charlie know that the building was on fire? Was Charlie trying to kill Bob? Was the thing that Bob knocked his head upon an intended result of the bodyslam, or an intervening cause? Did Charlie's initially less culpable act and his knowledge combine to create a duty to rescue and what offense (probably not murder) would it be if a death resulted from a failure to rescue? Alice is likely to be guilty of murder, but on a felony-murder theory, rather than on a transferred intent theory. In most, but not all, states if you are in the process of committing one of an enumerated list of specific felonies that pose a high risk of serious injury or death, such as arson, you are guilty of murder in the event that anyone (even a co-conspirator) dies as a result of your felonious course of conduct, whether or not you intended that a death result. Alice might have been able to purge her felony-murder liability if she had tried to put out the fire and save Bob once she realized that he was in danger, under the exception to felony-murder for renunciation of a course of felonious conduct, but she didn't even try. The doctrine of transferred intent in a murder case usually applies when you intent to kill one person and instead end up killing someone else. But, Alice didn't intend to kill anyway, so this doctrine does not apply. Alice's best defense would be that the death was a result of the attack by Charlie, rather than by the fire, which she would merely have to establish a reasonable doubt regarding. But, ultimately that would be a weak defense for her.	The answer is going to depend on what jurisdiction you're talking about. But I can give you some general principles that apply, in most cases, in the U.S. at least. "Homicide" is a general term for the killing of one person by another. If someone died, and another person caused it, it's homicide. "Murder" and "manslaughter" are specific crimes, usually now defined by state criminal statutes. The specifics are going to differ from state to state, but in general, murder is the more serious crime and carries a more serious punishment. So if a person dies at another person's hand, it is a homicide, and it may also be murder or manslaughter. The way the law distinguishes between murder and manslaughter usually has to do with the killer's mental state. For example, a state with three homicide offenses might break them down like this: Murder: "I killed him because I wanted to steal his wallet." Voluntary manslaughter: "I killed him because I just found out he was sleeping with my wife." Involuntary manslaughter/negligent homicide: "I didn't mean to kill him, but I was drunk and didn't see the stop sign." These homicide offenses will then be further subdivided into degrees based on aggravating or mitigating factors. For instance, in some states there is a very limited definition for first degree murder, which may be the only offense that allows the death penalty (example: murder of a police officer, murder while serving a life sentence).	I do not know what actually happened to anyone in the aftermath of this incident, but it is unlikely that there is a basis for civil or criminal liability in this case. Criminal liability does not generally attach to negligent conduct except in cases of homicide or criminally negligent motor vehicle operation. But, this case appears to have involved mere negligence. It appears that somebody made an honest mistake rather than acting recklessly or intentionally to cause harm. Governmental entities and officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacity have immunity from liability for negligence except in some vary narrowly defined areas (e.g. failure to maintain government buildings, medical mistakes in government hospitals, and car accidents) which seem unlikely to be implicated here. But, it seems likely that the responsible parties were all governmental entities or officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacities. So, it is unlikely that there would be civil liability either. Needless to say, however, this does not look good on the job performance record of any civil servant below the Governor (who doesn't get evaluated in that way) when being considered for promotion, demotion, unfavorable transfers or even termination of employment. Obviously, if new facts were uncovered and this was actually more nefarious than it seems, and this hidden truth was discovered, there could be a basis for civil or criminal liability. But, if this was the case, it would have made headlines.	When you say "blanket immunity," I assume you're talking about transactional immunity -- the witness cannot ever be prosecuted for any crimes they testified about. This immunity is actually broader than that required by the US Constitution (although some states do require it). However, if it's provided, it absolutely covers crimes connected to what John is accused of. One very common use of immunity is to give a co-conspirator immunity to testify against another co-conspirator being charged with conspiracy. If transactional immunity wouldn't cover that conspiracy charge, it would pretty much defeat the purpose.	You're wrong in the first sentence So I agree, that a hung jury is in fact reasonable doubt by lack of concurrence, the defendant should be acquitted. No. A hung jury just means they can't decide on any item they should decide about, for whatever reason. Maybe they all want to see the defendant guilty but can't decide if it is murder 1st or 2nd degree, or one of them is just trying to stay out of work and just is contrarian to whatever the jury deliberates, wether guilty or not guilty. In either case they can not tell the judge what they can't agree about. They can only tell the judge that they can't agree on a verdict. Since the judge can't assume anything about the deliberations, he can only reset trial and swap the jury for one that actually might be able to decide. The whole Jury is tossed out, their deliberations don't matter anymore - their hung state does not influence the re-trial.	You misunderstand the significance of the phrase "innocent until proven guilty." This is in part because you are not considering the entire phrase. The full phrase is that an accused party is "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This does not mean that the accused is innocent, only that criminal procedure must take as its starting point that the accused did not commit the crime. The major implication of the presumption, and indeed its original purpose, is that it places the burden of proof on the prosecution. This means that if a prosecutor asserts that you stole something, you do not have to prove that you did not. Rather, the prosecutor must prove that you did. The only reason to present evidence of your own is to rebut the prosecutor's evidence. Another practical implication is that a decision to detain someone awaiting a criminal trial may not be based on the assumption that the accused committed the crime. On the other hand, that decision is not based on the assumption that the accused did not commit the crime. There is a presumption of innocence, but no assumption of innocence, and the government is not obliged before the person is convicted to treat the person as if there is no accusation or charge. Wikipedia has a decent discussion. If we modify your question accordingly, it becomes How can two people be presumed innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? Now the answer should be clear. The prosecutor must develop evidence that shows which one of the people has committed the crime. If the prosecutor cannot do that, neither person may be punished.	In the case you link, this was given as an opening statement by the defense. Opening statements do not contain evidence. The defendant may or may not testify on their own behalf during the trial - this testimony, if given, counts as evidence, even if it is somewhat self-serving. And anything which tends to casts doubt as to the defendant's guilt is evidence that they didn't do it, even if it isn't proof. If there is reasonable doubt, then "he didn't do it" is not illogical. And it would seem unfair to allow the prosecution to say "he did it" but not allow the defense to say "no he didn't".	It seems like callous behavior which leads to a foreseeable death deserves a bigger punishment than just firing of the administrator. The starting point of the analysis is that no one is legally responsible, civilly or criminally, for a suicide unless that person intended that the person who committed suicide do so, which is almost certainly not true in this case. As a matter of law, a suicide caused by merely callous behavior not intended to cause someone to commit suicide is not foreseeable. And if the only actions brought are civil, then the University would be the defendant and the actual individuals who were involved would not themselves even face any trial. This is not accurate. It would be routine to bring suit against anyone personal involved (probably both the administrator and the gay student who allegedly colluded), as well as the University, and indeed, the likelihood of a recovery against one or both of the individuals would be greater than the chance of recovery against the University. To recover against the University it would be necessary to show that the Title IX violation occurred pursuant to an officially approved policy or practice of the University, but this case seems to have at its heart, a failure to an administrator to follow a policy of the University. It might be possible to sue the University or someone involved in the process for a violation of his civil rights, but generally speaking, his death would not constitute recoverable damages in a such a suit. Also, generally speaking, a Title IX claim requires that any party held liable to have had an intent to violate someone's civil rights, rather than that the person was merely mere inept or negligent in implementation or non-implementation of a bureaucratic policy or dispute resolution procedure. This is alleged by the Plaintiff, probably in part because it has to be to prevent the case from being dismissed on the pleadings, but is quite implausible that this really happened that way, and this is difficult to prove unless there is some really hard evidence backing up the alleged collusion. Generally speaking, the fact that a hearing board comes up with a wrong conclusion after allegedly not following proper procedure, is not actionable for damages and certainly wouldn't constitute fraud. UPDATED RESPONSE TO EDIT 2: there maybe other victims, in similar situations, who are not protected by the criminal justice system if nothing of what is alleged to have transpired is deemed illegal It is a common fallacy that if something is not a crime, that it is not illegal or that there are no remedies. A civil lawsuit is a common and often appropriate remedy for all manner of wrongs, and the compensatory and injunctive remedies for civil wrongs such as a breach of contract and torts such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress are often significant. This said, as a government entity, the University of Texas and its employees are probably immune to many tort causes of action that would be available against a private party engaged in the same conduct. In this case, probably the only viable causes of action against the University of Texas itself, as opposed to the responsible individuals in a particular case, would be for breach of contract for not actually carrying out its policies as impliedly promised, and for injunctive relief under Title IX insisting on new policies that would prevent misconduct in disciplinary proceedings. Generally speaking, a criminal law remedy is less victim oriented than a civil remedy and is outside the control of the victim, which can be traumatic for a victim who would prefer not to be involuntarily dragged into the criminal justice process. The notion that settlement is not possible in the criminal justice system is likewise mostly incorrect. There is a reason why we don't handle rapes (for example) in civil courts. Criminal justice system exists to make sure that, at least in theory, those who commit heinous acts cannot buy their way out of consequences of those actions. In fact, one can bring a cause of action for a rape in a civil court. I've done it. And, the lower threshold of proof, the lack of a right to remain silent without legal consequences under the 5th Amendment, the greater focus on compensation for the victim, and the greater level of control of the victim are all good reasons to pursue this route. Many cases of rape by people able to afford to pay compensation are also cases of actionable sexual harassment. In general, criminal law is the solution that is usually resorted to not so much because the acts committed are heinous, but because the typical person who violates a law that is criminally prosecuted is judgment proof and unable to pay compensation that is even remotely proportionate to the harm done, so a civil remedy does not discourage that behavior. Your typical rapist who is prosecuted in the criminal justice system isn't capable of paying meaningful compensation to a victim, although there are always exceptions. Preventing people from buying their way out of their wrongdoing is almost never advanced by criminal justice scholars as a reason for a criminal justice remedy. And, when I have clients who have been harmed, for example, by fraud, most would far prefer to receive compensation from the wrongdoer, than to see the perpetrator punished without receiving any meaningful compensation for their own injuries, which is the usual result in the criminal justice process. Most people think of the criminal justice system as more of a last resort when all other options fail than as a good first choice which it rarely is even when it is the least bad option. So back to the main question, what, if any, criminal charges can be leveled against the administrator and the false accuser if the alleged facts of the case can be confirmed to be true? In the fact pattern presented, where a public official at the University of Texas conspires with a student with whom the official has a pre-existing personal relationship to produce an intentionally inaccurate result in a University disciplinary hearing harming a defendant in that process, there are several university statutes that might form a basis for criminal action against either the public administrator or the conspiring student on the offense identified or conspiracy to commit the offense identified. In no case are any criminal charges against the University of Texas a plausible option in this fact pattern. Each of the offenses is a misdemeanor under Texas law. The best fit is "improper influence". Texas Penal Code § 36.04. This involves reaching an outcome in an adjudication for a reason other than one legally allowed due to someone's application of influence other than a bribe or kickback. The section states: (a) A person commits an offense if he privately addresses a representation, entreaty, argument, or other communication to any public servant who exercises or will exercise official discretion in an adjudicatory proceeding with an intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding on the basis of considerations other than those authorized by law. (b) For purposes of this section, “adjudicatory proceeding” means any proceeding before a court or any other agency of government in which the legal rights, powers, duties, or privileges of specified parties are determined. (c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. Two other possibilities are "abuse of official capacity", Texas Penal Code §39.02, or "official oppression" Texas Penal Code § 39.03. These sections and a related one, read as follows in the pertinent or potentially pertinent parts: Sec. 39.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (1) "Law relating to a public servant's office or employment" means a law that specifically applies to a person acting in the capacity of a public servant and that directly or indirectly: (A) imposes a duty on the public servant; or (B) governs the conduct of the public servant. . . . Sec. 39.02. ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY. (a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly: (1) violates a law relating to the public servant's office or employment . . . (b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. . . . 39.03. OFFICIAL OPPRESSION. (a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he: . . . (2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or (3) intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment. (b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity. (c) In this section, "sexual harassment" means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a person's exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explicitly or implicitly. (d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor . . . Also, in all three of these cases, the fact that someone committed suicide afterwards is basically irrelevant legally.
Is it normal for the client to own all IP for work created by a software contractor? Usually when a contractor creates some new solution for their client it is understood that “tools of trade” used by the contractor are owned by the contractor, while any new IP created for the client is owned by the client. What happens when the client wants to own all the IP? Does this ever make sense? Wouldn’t that make it impossible for the contractor to build anything similar for other clients? How would the contractor grow their business if they stopped using tools of trade? Do these things even get enforced legally (how would one prove the solution was repeated elsewhere and thus infringing on IP rights?)	The customer will own exactly what is stated in the contract. As the contractor, who wants to be able to reuse code (which is in everybody’s best interest) you want to keep the copyright, with the client having the license to use the code any way they want. If the customer wants the copyright with the contractor losing all rights, that will be in the contract, and it will cost. If the contractor produced an application that use lots of domain knowledge supplied by the client, that will often not give the client copyright, if the contractor is the one producing the actual expression of that knowledge by translating knowledge into code. If the client provides knowledge that is actually a trade secret, then an NDA should be signed. And again, it’s contracts. The client can put into the contract that their domain knowledge must not be reused. That is quite reasonable. The client might add to the contract that the contractor will not write software for any competitor. That is legal if it is in the contract, but it will cost.	When a company stops existing for whatever reason, then its assets (physical, financial, intellectual or otherwise) don't stop existing. When the company dissolves voluntarily, those assets usually go to the owner(s) of the company. When the company got bought up and integrated into another company, the buying company will usually own them. When the company went bankrupt and got liquidated, then they will often get sold off to the highest bidder. And then there is the question of who actually owns the IP rights to a specific game asset. Often there is not just one legal person which worked on a game. In addition to the developer, there might also have been a separate publisher who might or might not own IP rights. There might have been investors in the background who financed the project and now own some copyrights. Sometimes there was more than one publisher. And sub-contractors might have been involved in the development who only licensed their assets but retained copyright. So unfortunately it is often not really clear what happened to IP assets of a defunct company. People who might have the rights will often not care much about them until something happens which gives new commercial value to those assets. So even if you are unable to determine who owns the assets to a game, as soon as you start using them, someone might show up with a plausible claim to the IP rights and demand money from you. Such lawsuits can get really messy and really expensive. For a good example for just how much of a goose chase you might be in for when you want to legally obtain the rights to a game from a defunct company, check out the story of the re-release of No One Lives Forever. tl;dr: multiple game companies said "Maybe we have the rights to the game according to some contract buried in some file cabinet, but we don't care enough to find out. But if you try to release it, we will find out and if we do we will sue you!"	A TOS is not intrinsically illegal, but an interpretation of a TOS may or may not be supported by a court, that remains to be seen. It probably does not constitute a "deceptive practice" under FTC standards. The TOS is your permission to use the software, and there can be no question that they have the right to impose conditions on customer use of the software. E.g. Amazon cannot freely use software that is only licensed for free educational use. They speak of "ownership" of IP so created and explicitly disclaim any claims about Current Law in Your Jurisdiction. At the crucial point in the agreement, they switch to talking about the license (BY-NC) that they grant when you are not a paid member. The exact details of this ownership are not part of the free tier TOS, but they do seem to add certain protections to "owned" content created under the Pro plan – they are under no legal obligation to make all content universally visible and usable.	Whether this is considered a trade secret (at least in the US) depends partly on whether you've taken reasonable action to keep it secret. If an employee thought it was OK to publish the algorithm, that's evidence that you didn't try very hard to keep it from getting out. Even if nobody's noticed it yet, getting the blog post taken down in't going to get it off the internet. You may as well try to do it anyway. If nobody has noticed the algorithm by now, you want to make it harder for them to find. You need an IP lawyer pronto. Depending on where you are, you might be able to get a patent on the algorithm still, but patents are hard to enforce, and it appears to be getting harder in the US to patent algorithms. (There's a Stack Exchange site so people can look at patent applications and see if they can invalidate the application with prior art.) You can't license out the algorithm without having some legal way of stopping other places from just using it. If you have more proprietary algorithms or things that aren't generally known that give you a competitive advantage, it would be a good idea to inform employees that they aren't supposed to reveal them. Check with your IP lawyer to see what you should do.	The MIT License (as distributed by OSI) does not include an attribution requirement beyond the requirement to include the copyright notice in any re-distributed copy including derivative works. The same is true of the description of the license as described in the Wikipedia article. If you sent back to the maintainer a modified version including your own contributions with an MIT license notice and your name in the copyright statement, that is a new work released under that license. The maintainer (or anyone else) may not lawfully use your work or incorporate it into a new derived work without complying with the license terms, which require retaining the copyright notice. By distributing the combined work using a copyright notice not including your name, it would seem that your license is being violated. You could contact the maintainer with a request that your name be included in the notice or your contributions be removed. If that is not accepted, you could use a take-down notice, or file suit. That last would involve significant costs, of course.	The software being free and open source has no impact on whether it infringes any patents or violates any copyrights. Copyrights attach to fixed representations of creative work in a tangible medium (e.g., the actual code and graphical elements of the software in question). As long as you aren't copying the copyrighted work of someone else, you should be in the clear. So, if you write your own code from scratch, or rely on code that you're allowed to use (e.g., "free" software with a permissive license that allows it to be used freely), you should be fine. On the other hand, if you copy a chunk of code that you aren't allowed to use, and then change the variable names so that it's superficially different, you're likely violating someone's copyright. Patents are a much more difficult question. To determine whether you would infringe any patents, you would have to read the independent claims of every patent that might be related. If you perform all the steps of any one of those claims, then you are infringing that claim (and therefore, the patent in which it is found). Unfortunately, this is much easier said than done. First, it may be difficult to search for all the potentially relevant patents, and once you've found them, there may be far too many to read. Second, claims are written in a type of language that is specific to patents, and someone without experience in patent law may not understand them correctly. Finally, the terms in the claims may not take on their plain English meaning, but rather may have been defined by the language in the rest of that patent, so it's possible that you might incorrectly think you were in the clear based on a misunderstanding arising from that. All that said, it may be best to go ahead with implementing an idea and then waiting to see what happens. Chances are that the implementation will arguably infringe some patent in some way, no matter what's done. But chances are also high that there will never be any worrisome enforcement action taken against it by a patent owner, simply due to the difficulty and expense associated with enforcing patent rights.	It's a contract violation if you're under the EULA. It may be a contract of adhesion, but such "clickwrap" contracts been found to be acceptable and enforceable in software EULAs out of necessity. However, there may be some limits. If you're not under the EULA, as you argue, then you lack a license to use the software at all and it's an outright copyright violation and/or a theft or misappropriation of the software. Whether or not you can be sued depends in part on what you do with it — if you don't release the material or otherwise cause damages then there's not much to sue for... Added for clarification: to answer the framing question, supposing neither contract or copyright applied, one could be sued in tort or in equity (i.e. for unjust enrichment).	You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license.
Can a White Person sue for Discrimination after being Fired for using the N-Word? After the landmark Bostock v. Clayton County ruling, I am asking for a friend if he has an action against an employer who fired him for using the N-word on 3 occasions as well as uttering "my melamine-enhanced homie over here". The employee was visibly white, and neither party disputes that black employees regularly use such language and face no disciplinary action as a result. From Bostock: “An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex,” Gorsuch wrote. “Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.” It is obvious that he was fired for actions it would not have questioned (and has not) in members of a different race. Is this not exactly what Title VII forbids?	Bostock is irrelevant. Your friend can sue under Burlington v. News Corp. Burlington answered this exact question ten years ago, using exactly the same, well-established logic used in Bostock. Burlington involved a news anchor (Burlington) who was fired after using the N-word descriptively in a staff meeting. He sued under Title VII. He argued he was being discriminated against on racial grounds, since several Black employees had used the word at work without consequence. The case was tried before a jury in Federal district court. Burlington lost after the jury decided the facts did not support his claim. However, the judge made clear that the actions he alleged would violate Title VII: Historically, African Americans' use of the word has been ironic, satirical, or even affectionate. Too often, however, the word has been used by whites as a tool to belittle, oppress, or dehumanize African Americans. When viewed in its historical context, one can see how people in general, and African Americans in particular, might react differently when a white person uses the word than if an African American uses it. Nevertheless, we are unable to conclude that this is a justifiable reason for permitting the Station to draw race-based distinctions between employees. It is no answer to say that we are interpreting Title VII in accord with prevailing social norms. Title VII was enacted to counter social norms that supported widespread discrimination against African Americans. To conclude that the Station may act in accordance with the social norm that it is permissible for African Americans to use the word but not whites would require a determination that this is a "good" race-based social norm that justifies a departure from the text of Title VII. Neither the text of Title VII, the legislative history, nor the caselaw permits such a departure from Title VII's command that employers refrain from "discriminat[ing] against any individual...because of such individual's race." Added: Why Bostock is Irrelevant for Your Friend’s Case: As you say, if we substitute the word “race” for “sex” in those sentences from Bostock, it seems obvious your friend would have a case under Title VII. This is true, but not because of Bostock. Bostock changed who could claim sex discrimination under Title VII, but nothing else. In particular, it did not change the test used to prove discrimination under Title VII. The sentences you quoted, use the well-established ”but for” test. Here's Gorsuch’s explanation of how the "but for" test works: In the language of law, Title VII’s “because of” test incorporates the “simple” and “traditional” standard of but-for causation. That form of causation is established whenever a particular outcome would not have happened “but for” the purported cause. In other words, a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause. The Bottom Line: Bostock is illustrative, but not dispositive, of your friend's claim.	I am not knowledgeable about UK law, but since almost everywhere in the U.S. employment is at-will by default, in all three scenarios Company B is entitled to terminate the employee very easily. The assumption that the employee was accurately found guilty of harassment elsewhere precludes more interesting analyses where matters such as defamation and public policy are involved. If the contract between the employee and Company B establishes that termination will be for good cause, the employee has only a mild chance of not being terminated for what he did in Company A. However, I say "mild chance" because in most cases Company B can reasonably argue that it seeks to protect its other employees and/or customers from the possibility that the employee's misconduct may occur in the current workplace. A very detailed analysis of the factual circumstances might be required for discerning whether Company B's decision to terminate the employee is merited. Additionally, in cases where The Employee is a publicly visible figure and a figure of authority having a management role there could be a concern that the employee's misconduct elsewhere may harm the image of Company B.	I virtually never see "without prejudice" used in anything but court documents, unless the writer does not know what he's saying. A typical example would be when a person sues someone, but brings the case in the wrong court. The judge would dismiss the case without prejudice, meaning that the plaintiff could refile somewhere else. In contrast, if the person filed in the correct court, but the judge ruled that the plaintiff had done nothing wrong, the judge would then dismiss the case with prejudice. I believe I have on some occasions seen the phrase used in legal correspondence, perhaps noting, for example, that a party was willing to settle his sexual harassment claim for X amount of money without prejudice to their claims for some unrelated issue. In either event, "without prejudice" is typically referring to the ongoing ability to litigate a claim. I'm not entirely clear on how you're envisioning it being used as e-mail boilerplate, but I can't see any reason to do so. If you did, that would not have any effect on the e-mail's admissibility. EDIT: One other note, because I hadn't looked at it before. The LinkedIn article to which you linked and the comments on it are basically nonsense. Legal advice from a graduate of the "School of Life" is about as valuable as life advice from a graduate of a school of law.	Not necessarily. It depends on the type of dismissal. The term prejudice helps better describe your question. You have described a dismissal with prejudice: the case can not be re-litigated. But it's just as likely the case could have been dismissed without prejudice. Meaning, the plaintiff could restart the case at any time. Or, alternatively, file a new case on the same facts. (You might be thinking about double jeopardy which is prohibited and applies to criminal cases involving an acquittal.) The with prejudice vs. without prejudice decision is often left to the discretion of the judge (or adjudicator) depending on the type of proceeding. And sometimes the decision is determined by procedural rule. You must read the notice or order of dismissal to determine what type of dismissal it was.	The EEOC states that national original discrimination in employment is illegal, which is supported by 28 CFR Part 44 (discriminate means "the act of intentionally treating an individual differently from other individuals because of national origin or citizenship status, regardless of the explanation for the differential treatment, and regardless of whether such treatment is because of animus or hostility"). See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. codified at 42 USC 2000e–2. The internet widely advises that asking such questions is illegal. The EEOC has a more nuanced view of the matter as articulated here: they say We recommend that you avoid asking applicants about personal characteristics that are protected by law, such as race, color, religion, sex, national origin or age. These types of questions may discourage some individuals from applying, may be viewed suspiciously by some applicants, and may be considered evidence of intent to discriminate by the EEOC. If you do not have this information when you decide who to hire, it may be easier for you to defend your business against a hiring discrimination complaint. Before reaching a conclusion, we should check what an employee is (42 USC § 2000e(f)), namely: an individual employed by an employer, except that the term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States. This just tells us that in writing the law, Congress left it somewhat open what an "employee" is. An Amazon seller is, on the face of it, not an employee of Amazon, instead, a seller is an independent contractor. Of course that is a legal question that can't just be decided superficially, see for example California's AB5 (but even under that law, a seller is not an employee). As articulated by SSA The common law control test is the basic test, using the common law rules, for determining whether a relationship exists between the worker and the person or firm that they work for. Under the common-law test, the employer has the right to tell the employee what to do, how, when, and where to do the job If the Dept. of Labor or the IRS determine that you are (would be) an employee, then this is illegal discrimination, otherwise it is not. Since you are not paid a wage, the prospects for being deemed an employee are extremely dim. The EEOC gives this guidance on the distinction, with a very long list of examples which in general support the position that a vendor is an independent contractor and not an employee.	This depends on how far along you're waiting for court rulings to set in, and if you count laws of Congress passed under the 13th amendment's enforcement clause. There were quite a lot of things that got ruled as violations of the 13th and 14th amendments (mostly the 14th), but many were not ruled or legislated that way for decades. Some were even ruled to have an essentially opposite effect of what the current (overturning) precedents do. "Separate but equal" was challenged on 13th amendment grounds, but was upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), and wasn't overturned, on 14th amendment grounds, until 58 years later in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Your particular situation sounds like peonage, which was outlawed by Congress in 1867 via the enforcement clause. This law specifically banned "the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise." However, peonage cases continued to make their way into the courts for more than 40 years thereafter, such as Clyatt v. United States (1905)— which ruled that peonage was involuntary servitude— and Bailey v. Alabama (1911). These cases affirmed that the 13th amendment abolished not just chattel slavery but essentially all forms of involuntary or indentured servitude (except as punishment for a crime). Though exactly what qualifies as "involuntary servitude" is still something courts decide on a case-by-case basis; the draft doesn't, nor does mandatory community service to graduate high school.	Almost certainly not. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendez v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 680 F.Supp.2d 357, 375 (D.P.R. 2010) "This incident, however, is not sufficient to constitute direct evidence of discriminatory animus...[Defendant's agent]'s anecdote could be interpreted as emphasizing the importance of a positive attitude, rather than plaintiff's interpretation that it expressed a preference for younger male employees...This benign interpretation seems more plausible...In light of these facts, there does not appear to be any evidence on the record that gives a 'high degree of assurance' that discriminatory animus was behind the decision to terminate plaintiff" (emphasis added). NOTE: OP's original question was simply whether listing 'positive attitude' on a job description was illegal. OP has now changed the question to whether making employment decisions based on a depressed individual's lack of a positive attitude is illegal. Although I have great sympathy for those with mental illness and personally wish the law were different, my answer is still that this is almost certainly legal. Another example of a court finding attitude to be a legitimate reason upon which to base employment decisions is: Martin v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 809 (M.D. Pa 2000). In this case, the court accepted as a legitimate reason for promoting one individual over another that the promoted individual "demonstrated good interpersonal skills." Id. at 817. A third example is Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, the Seventh Circuit explicitly noted that "[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and we will not second-guess that decision." Id. at 601. It then went on to affirm dismissal of the plaintiff's ADA claim because the employer "said that lead drivers must have knowledge of the mechanics of the trucks and be able to manage the other drivers on the truck through a positive attitude and ability to get along well with others. But the supervisors in charge of hiring lead drivers testified without contradiction that [the plaintiff] had a negative attitude that drew complaints from other drivers." Id. at 601-602 (emphasis added). After a relatively exhaustive search, I've found no case to counter these pretty clear statements that basing employment decisions on 'attitude' is legal. FURTHER NOTE: OP has now modified the question again to add the qualification that the lack of a positive attitude "doesn't prevent the employee from doing their job." IF this were actually true, then the answer likely becomes that illegal discrimination has occurred because then the employee would be 'otherwise qualified' (a key phrase in employment law litigation). BUT, there is an inherent contradiction in premises in OP's question now because if X is a requirement of a job, and Y employee cannot do X because of Z, then Z is preventing Y employee from doing that job. In other words, if a job requires a positive attitude, then one can't do that job without a positive attitude. Ultimately, what OP's question is really trying to get at is 'what if the employer makes 'positive attitude' a job requirement, but I don't think it should be a job requirement?' Unfortunately, there's almost certainly no legal recourse for this as long as it's a legal job requirement because, to reiterate the 7th Circuit, "[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and [a court] will not second-guess that decision." Id. at 601.	The First Amendment forbids the government from abridging your freedom of speech. There is no (federal) law against your private employer doing so. A good summary is https://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_andsociety/15/winter-2015/chill-around-the-water-cooler.html
If ignorance of the law is no excuse, then why is it so hard to get legal advice? The principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse (US) seems reasonable - but it also seems to rely on the presumption that all laws are readily available and understandable, because otherwise the government would be requiring you to comply with something you can’t know or can’t understand. I don’t believe this presumption is accurate. There are so many different sources of laws (federal, state, local, and others) that even just finding a relevant law is beyond the grasp of some people, and even if you can, many laws are written in “legalese” that can be difficult to interpret. You can hire a lawyer to answer your questions, but there are two problems with this: One is that it limits legal knowledge to very wealthy people, and the other is that lawyers can be wrong, and if your lawyer gives you bad advice (e.g. you commit a crime because the lawyer said it was not a crime), this is not a defense. The government doesn’t offer any official channels for legal advice, and in fact even general discussions (like StackExchange) often specifically bar legal advice because it is so difficult and risky to provide. Why doesn’t the government have any obligation to provide something like a hotline where you can just call and ask if something is legal? It already provides public defenders, which seems to be an admission that the law is beyond the grasp of ordinary people - but you only get a public defender when you have already been accused of a crime. If the government says, “You are responsible for knowing X, and you are responsible for complying with X,” why doesn’t the government have any obligation to tell you what X is in a way that the general public can actually use? Please note that this question is not asking for legal advice. It is asking why there aren’t better sources for legal advice.	The concept of "ignorance" of laws isn't about the individual. It's about administratibility of the system. The argument is that a system with a wide-ranging ignorance defense would struggle to produce results—just or otherwise. So the American system presumes knowledge of the law and then carves out narrower exceptions, such as mistake of law. For example, the law wasn't published, or it had been overruled. Alas, the question about why there isn't a hotline belongs on another site.	You've basically described two of the ends of the pole in theories of jurisprudence (there are dozens of ends). There is no theory of law that relies purely on "spirit" (also no theory that actually relies on the letters uses=d in writing law), instead, everybody interprets the text (the words enacted by the government) and some people supplement their interpretation with consideration of "other factors", such as assumed legislative purpose. Certain scholars and judges are inclined to put most weight on the actual wording of the law, while others are inclined to let purposive considerations dictate the interpretation of a law. Interpreting law by W.N. Eskridge is an informative guide to supplementing a reading of the statute with anciliary considerations. Antonin Scalia is the best-known proponent of the textualist approach.	Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.	The best course would be to contact the public defenders office and explain the situation to their intake or consultation services. Remember, you don't have to be going to trial to avail yourself of their services and sometimes, helping cops makes the cops suspicious about you (it would not be the first killer who cozies up to the police to learn what they know about his crime). If the Public Defender thinks you're rich enough not to need their services, you should call criminal defense attorney practices. Most law offices will offer consultation free of charge as part of client intake, so they will be willing to hear your case and offer advice. In either case, check with the lawyer that attorney client privilege is in effect. If they say yes, explain in detail to them, everything you know and want to discuss, even if some of it could criminally implicate you in this or another crime. Treat it as your deathbed confession and you know full well which circle of hell you're going to if the priest doesn't absolve you of sins (okay, too Catholic... but the Lawyer is not going to turn you in if the privilege is in effect... he could lose his license to practice law over it... we can make all the evil lawyer jokes we want, but this is one of the few sacred tenants of their profession.). Listen to his advise. Also see if you can find a second opinion. It's not that the first guy gave bad advice, but the next guy might give you something different. If you still do not feel comfortable, then keep your mouth shut. If they arrest you for the murder, do not talk until you have an attorney present and prepare to tell him exactly what you did. Especially if you did do it. Always answer your attorney truthfully.	Assuming that privilege applies, no Not all communications with your lawyer trigger privilege and if it doesn’t then the lawyer is not your lawyer and is under the same obligation to report as any other member of the public. If privilege does apply then they must keep your secrets. If they are defending you and you confess to the crime then they can: represent you if you plead guilty withdraw unless that would prejudice your defence continue to act providing that they do not: suggest someone else committed the offence set up a defence inconsistent with the confession they can: argue the prosecution has not made their case, that you are not guilty of the offence charged by reason of law, or argue for any other (non prohibited) reason that you should not be convicted.	Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.	united-states It is not required for a person to formally assert a fifth- or a first-amendment right when questioned by the police. One can simply be silent, refuse to answer any questions, without giving any reasons. But probably more effective and just as legal is to say "I won't answer any questions until I have talked with a lawyer. I want a lawyer, now." That is perhaps less likely than using the words "plead the fifth" to be assumed to be a confession of guilt, although some people and some police may take almost anything as a confession of guilt. By the way some of the points you distilled from the video (which I have not watched yet) are correct, some are half-truths, and some are quite incorrect. For example: The 5th amendment was not designed as a shelter for the guilty (despite it often being used as such). It was designed to help prevent you from unknowingly incriminating yourself. As a matter of history, this is quite incorrect. It arose historically out of a reaction to government procedures deemed oppressive. See https://law.stackexchange.com/a/63690/17500 for more detail. But helping people avoid unintentionally incriminating themselves is one of its major current functions. You can't talk your way out of getting arrested. Sometimes you can, but it is never safe to count on it. You can't know in advance if it will work, and more often than not it doesn't. Everything you tell the police can be used against you but not to help you. Not quite. If your statement is recorded, as is likely nowadays, the whole statement must be given to your lawyer and entered into evidence if you are eventually charged. (See Brady vs Maryland) Things said in your own favor may be discounted as self-serving, but the judge and jury will still hear them. But they can be very risky.	united-states You may be confusing the right to an attorney if you cannot afford one that is applicable only in CRIMINAL cases, not civil cases like you are discussing. You may be able to get an attorney to take your case on a contingency basis but there are two things to keep in mind: The attorney has to have some expectation that the case is winnable. The amount to be recovered must be worth the risk of taking on this case. In other words, for the attorney it's more of a business question that a legal one. Many attorneys will give you a free 30 minute, more or less, consultation. Perhaps you might give that a try.
Can a district rescind an offer of employment? I applied and interviewed for a school counselor position--I am highly qualified, have experience and fantastic references. The principal called me at 6 pm to offer me the position. I said I wanted to speak with HR to discuss the salary in the morning. The Board met that evening and an internal applicant who is NOT certified but wants the school counselor position came forward, and the board voted against hiring me--the principal called me in the morning to rescind the offer of employment. Can they hire someone who is not qualified and rescind my offer of employment? Are they not obligated to hire the most qualified applicant?	Can a district rescind an offer of employment? Yes. Any contractural offer can be withdrawn so long as it has not been accepted. You did not accept it, so the withdrawal is legal. Can they hire someone who is not qualified ... That depends on the particular law that mandates the qualification. As a general principle, anyone is allowed to work at anything unless there is a law that says “you cant do job X unless you have qualification/licence/accreditation/whatever Y.” So you need to actually read that law. Some allow a grace period for a person to do X while they get Y and some are outright prohibitions. And there are some things that people think require a specific qualification because everybody has one but there is actually no legal requirement. For example, I’m a qualified arbitrator, adjudicator and mediator. I need the qualification to work as the first one in australia and I it to work as the second in queensland but not new-south-wales but I don’t need it anywhere to work as the last one - most mediators have qualifications but they are not legally required. I am not a qualified lawyer because I don’t need to be to work as any of the above and, indeed, merely being a lawyer does not allow you to work as an arbitrator. … and rescind my offer of employment? The eligibility of the person they chose to hire has no bearing on their decision not to hire you. If they have hired an unqualified person then that is for the relevant regulator to deal with and has nothing to do with you. Are they not obligated to hire the most qualified applicant? No they are not. Employers have the discretion to choose the applicant they consider the “best”. And they can assess how your better qualifications weigh up against someone else’s past history with the organisation. Provided they do not consider things that they are not permitted to consider under discrimination law and that the process is not corrupt, they can weight the various factors how they wish. However, if an employer has stated that they will weight various applications is a specific way, then they have to do that.	The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.	Given that the purpose of the bonus is to incentivize you to stay, and you are willing to do that, I see no reason why you shouldn't keep the signing bonus if you are fired. While this is not totally without ambiguity, it is at least a fair reading of the statement that a pay back applies only to a voluntary departure, and ambiguities are generally interpreted against the drafter. Also, keeping the signing bonus compensates you for having to start up at a new job only to have it promptly dissipate.	I’m guessing you have seen a sign in a business that read - “Management reserves the right to refuse service to anyone”. At least in the US, they do not need a reason as long as the reason isn’t unlawful discrimination. They can decide not to serve you.	No. Absent some collective bargaining agreement to the contrary, you have no recourse because you have not been legally wronged. You have no right to privacy in this regard. You have no right to be free of humiliation based upon truthful statements. If the email is truthful and you were indeed suspended, then the manager is entirely appropriate in sharing that information, and indeed has a need to do so. You would have no recourse in Tennessee, even if your manager gave a national television interview on your suspension and truthfully stated all reasons for the suspension and threw in statements of opinion disparaging you. Humiliation is only actionable if it amounts to "outrageous conduct" beyond mere truthful speech (e.g. throwing your clothes in the toilet or secretly putting some self-disparaging statement on the back of your uniform) and was calculated with a specific intent to cause you extraordinary emotional harm that was not necessary for some legitimate purpose.	Issues of strategy rest with counsel, not the client. Thus, in the situation you posit, the lawyer is not required to follow the client's desires. One might observe, however, that a competent lawyer will avoid the conflict entirely by addressing the issue before accepting the client. If the client is firm in wanting to direct the lawyer's negotiation or litigation strategy, and the lawyer is unwilling to do so, the lawyer should decline to take on the case. When I practiced, prospective clients who wanted to run things were very politely declined and shown the door. I don't see anything unethical about accepting such conditions from a prospective client, but the attorney isn't required to do so, and can decline the employment.	Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract.	Asking as such is hardly ever illegal. Any stranger can ask you to pick up their kids from school, like you always can tell them where to go. What I guess you are actually asking is whether the PI can require you to do it. No they probably cannot: it would have nothing to do with the matter of your contract or nature of your professional relationship with them. However, if they are in the position of power, they will have discretion in making decisions that will affect you. Whereas you legally can tell them where to get off, it might be good idea to attempt some interpersonal workplace tactics first.
What is the difference between the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County? It is my understanding that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is the highest state court in the state of Massachusetts. However, I have also heard reference to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, which I gather is a different judicial body from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. I found this page on the state government website about the SJC Clerk for Suffolk County, but I'm not sure if that's the same thing either, and even if it is, the page does not describe the function of the SJC Clerk for Suffolk County, only the opening hours, COVID-19 restrictions, and contact information. So what is the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, and how is it affiliated (if at all) to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts?	The Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, also known as the Single Justice Session is part of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Their powers are much like those of US Supreme Court Justices when they are sitting as Circuit Justices. In Massachusetts: an associate justice essentially acts as a trial judge, or as an administrator of the court's supervisory power... These sessions are held each week, and the associate justices rotate through them. The issues they hear include: certain motions pertaining to cases on trial or on appeal, bail reviews, bar discipline proceedings, petitions for admission to the bar, and a variety of other statutory proceedings. There's a more complete, but fairly accessible, description of the Single Court of Justice's "Practice and Procedure" here. For example, here are details about some of the Court's jurisdiction: The single justice has jurisdiction over all interlocutory orders in criminal cases pending in the Superior Court, District Court, and in Juvenile Proceedings. In civil cases, with few exceptions, the single justice has jurisdiction over interlocutory orders of the District Court.	Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' & judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.	Historically, this was true in the Icelandic Commonwealth in the Middle Ages, and in some democratic Greek city-states in the classical era. Similarly, in non-democratic feudal regimes, the lord or monarch was both the law giver and sitting in court was also the arbiter of all disputes arising under the lord's own laws. In places like Saudi Arabia where the monarchy's power is more than symbolic, the system still works this way to a significant extent. The practical reality in most one party Communist states is similar. In the United Kingdom, historically, the Appellate committee of the House of Lords (staffed by a subset of aristocrats usually appointed for life by the Prime Minister to the post) was the highest court of appeal of other courts in the British Commonwealth (with the Judicial committee of the Privy Council handling final appeals from outside Britain), and it was also a court of original jurisdiction for certain criminal cases against other aristocrats to satisfy the Magna Carta's notion that one is entitled to a jury of one's peers. Top level general purpose legislatures rarely serve as courts at the highest level, except in very isolated political matters. A good example of narrow quasi-judicial legislative power is the power of the Congress in the U.S., to be the ultimate judge for Congressional election disputes and of some Presidential election disputes. Congress also has quasi-judicial jurisdiction over impeachments of government employees whether or not they are elected, and over expulsions for cause of its own members and over other ethical sanctions of its own members. Many other legislatures have some sort of quansi-judicial impeachment and/or explusion power exercised as a whole by by some committee within it. It is common in the United States for administrative agencies, within their narrow area of competence to exercise both quasi-legislative power to enact regulations with a broad mandate in a subject area, and also to have quasi-judicial power in that same subject area. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Internal Revenue Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Merit System Protection Board, for example, all operate in this fashion to some extent. Likewise, it is very common at the local government level for a city council and its planning board to carry out both legislative roles and quasi-judicial role when disputes come up regarding its land use regulations. Similarly, school boards routinely both establish employment regulations and other school rules, and serve in a quasi-judicial role with respect employee discipline or termination, and with respect to student discipline. This dual role is also common for the boards of other public institutions like hospitals and state colleges, and for private non-profit organizations. A recent example in that kind of situation is Colorado's State School Board which both exercises legislative power over when charter schools (i.e. public schools not under the direct supervision of any elected local school board) may be formed, and has the ultimate and final judicial review role over decisions by local school boards to grant or deny school charters.	It depends on the state. Unlike France, a unitary nation, American Federalism typically means States may define different legal concepts differently. In California for example, Municipal courts hear Misdemeanor criminal Cases, preliminary Felony Cases, and Small Claims civil cases and serve county wide jurisdictions. In other states, the court may only hear cases arising only from city ordinances, traffic, and small claims and serve a jurisdiction that may not be bound by county lines. It should be pointed out that all "X County Court Houses" in the U.S. are branches of the State Court System, as counties are not sovereign in the United States, and thus the county court house is a local branch of the State Courts and often built in the County Seat (the county's "Capital City" if you will.).	united-states In U.S. practice in almost all jurisdictions, court orders must be memorialized in a signed or electronically signed writing transmitted to the parties and/or counsel. But, this can be a bare recitation of the result. The extent to which it must be reasoned is discretionary, and the reasoning can be supplied by an oral statement of the judge in lieu of a writing. Oral statements of reasoning in lieu of written judgments are common in courts of limited jurisdiction comparable to English County Courts, but written opinions are issued now and then in more complex cases or where legal issues were argued in closing arguments. A ruling of a judge sitting without a jury may be vacated and remanded by an appellate court for further proceedings, if the factual and legal basis for the ruling is not articulated with sufficient clarity to allow an appellate court to determine if the trial court's decision was legally correct and supported by the trial court record. Juries, of course, are not requires to articulate their reasoning and enter a bare verdict of liability and damages, or guilty and not guilty as to each charge (and in rare instances also answer one or more "special verdict" questions) in the manner set forth on the jury verdict form provided to the jury. In limited jurisdiction courts where the sole appeal is a trial de novo in a higher court, called "courts not of record", a written statement of reasons is unnecessary as any appeal will not be based upon the trial court record.	The answer by Dale M is basically correct but has some details wrong. US Courts of Appeal Recall that in the US Federal system the circuit courts are the "Courts of Appeal", that is the middle level of the system, above the district courts, but below the Supreme Court. In the early days of the US, each Justice of the Supreme Court was assigned to one circuit, usually consisting of several adjacent states. The Justice spent roughly half of each year "riding circuit". The Justice would stop at two to four places in the circuit, where Federal district courts were located.The justice would sit together with one of the district court judges in those places, in the courthouse that would be otherwise used for the district court. That Two-judge panel would constitute the session of the Circuit Court. The places where the circuit court was held were usually state capitols or other large towns or cities. The Justice would not stop at every small town along the way. (I recently read The Marshall Court and Cultural Change: 1815-1835, Which describes the practice in detail. Travel was quite wearing on the Justices. During the actual Supreme Court term, they lived in a boardinghouse in Washington DC, usually the same house for all the Justices. Cases were often discussed after hours at these boardinghouses. The Chief Justice often made arrangements for the coming year's accommodation. The Justices' wives did not normally join them in Washington nor on circuit.) This practice persisted until 1912, but had ceased by the early twentieth century. It stopped in some Circuits sooner than others. There are now permanent judges assigned to the Courts of Appeal, which is now their proper formal name, but the areas over which they have jurisdiction are still known as circuits, and the courts are informally still called the Circuit courts. In fact the judges of the Courts of appeal are often where Presidents look when there is a vacancy on the Supreme Court. Each circuit still has a supervising Justice assigned to it. That Justice handles certain "emergency" appeals from the circuit court, either ruling on them at once, or relaying them to the full Supreme Court. English Assize Circuits In England, before the US existed, judges rode circuit. These assize circuits were defined by statute in 1293, and remained in use until they were replaced by the Crown Court in 1972 under the Courts Act 1971 Western US In the West and Mid-west of the US during the nineteenth century, some state courts (not federal courts) rode circuit in areas where the population was not dense enough to support a full time stationary court. The Judge was often accompanied by a group of lawyers, whom would take on the various cases that awaited the judge. However, these courts are not what is usually meant by "circuit courts" in US usage. These judges did often stop at a relatively large number of small towns, often county seats or comparable locations, where a county courthouse might exist. This practice stopped at different times in different areas, but it was obsolete by the early twentieth century.	The government has the choice They can prosecute the child for a crime in the adult system and the defendant then has the right to a jury, or they can refer the matter to the juvenile justice system (JJS) in which case any sentence is administrative and rehabilitative, not criminal and punitive. Some jurisdictions have removed certain classes of crime from the JJS and others allow the prosecutor or the JJS judge to refer the matter to the adult system. You may argue that this is a distinction without a difference, however, SCOTUS did not agree in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971). The fifth amendment says "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" and SCOTUS was satisfied that the JJS provided that. They were also satisfied that because the prosecution was not criminal, the sixth amendment's right to a jury trial was not engaged. The JJS was established around the turn of the 20th century out of a belief that juveniles were more amenable to rehabilitation and that juvenile crime was a product of lack of parental supervision and societal influences whereas adults made a conscious choice to be criminals. In theory, the idea was to create a more sympathetic and less adversarial system to allow orders that were aimed to promote rehabilitation rather than punishment. Its success in that regard has been, at best, mixed. With the rise in crime in the US (but also worldwide) from the 1970s to 1990s, it became more politically beneficial to be "tough on crime" and more children were diverted from the JJS to the adult system - especially if they were people of colour. Even though crime rates have crashed since the turn of the 21st century, this is still many politicians' go-to response.	The US Supreme Court only has jurisdiction in federal matters. So if someone is suing under federal law, or there is a constitutional question, the Supreme Court is the place to go for a definitive answer. However, states have their own laws. The Supreme Court cannot tell New York that it must apply the attractive nuisance doctrine, as it is neither a matter of federal law nor a constitutional matter. New York is free to make its own laws on the subject, and the New York courts are free to interpret those laws as they see fit. In fact, federal courts are required to defer to New York's interpretation if New York's laws apply to the case, even if the case is in federal court for some reason (like diversity of parties.) See the Erie doctrine (which, coincidentally, involves yet another case about railroad injuries.)
Posting Sex Offender Information Online Sex Offender Information is public to an extent. If I become aware of a sexual offender in an area and simply post a link to the registry with the intent to merely inform others and not harass nor hinder this person in any way. Is there any way my actions could be perceived as illegal? When I made the post I made it clear that my intent was to merely inform and nothing more, yet some users claim I could be sued for slander even though there is evidence to support my claims.	You can always be sued, but truth is an absolute defense to libel. Your actions could be perceived in any way imaginable. What usually matters for legal purposes is how a "reasonable person" would perceive them. As an example, Pennsylvania's Megan's Law Website warns: Any person who uses the information contained herein to threaten, intimidate, or harass the registrant or their family, or who otherwise misuses this information, may be subject to criminal prosecution or civil liability. It further clarifies: Public access to information about registered sexual offenders is intended solely as a means of public protection, any other use prohibited.	There is actually a rather recent law in Germany which would make nonconsensual distribution of images which could damage the reputation of a person illegal: §201a StGB [de\|en] "Violation of intimate privacy by taking photographs or other images". This law says that: whoever, without being authorised to do so, makes available to a third party a photograph or other image of another person which is of such a nature as to significantly damage the reputation of the person depicted incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine. But even if the person has not already done so, just threatening to commit this crime might also be a crime according to §253 StGB [de\|en] "Extortion": (1) Whoever unlawfully, by force or threat of serious harm, coerces a person to do, acquiesce to or refrain from an act, and thereby damages that person’s or another’s assets for the purpose of wrongful personal enrichment or enrichment of a third party, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) The act is unlawful if the use of force or the threat of harm is deemed reprehensible in respect of the desired objective. (3) The attempt is punishable. (4) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. An especially serious case typically occurs where the offender acts on a commercial basis or as a member of a gang whose purpose is the continued commission of extortion. Considering the repercussions in the Saudi-Arabian culture and legal system for promiscuity, especially for women, it is hard to deny that there is a threat of "serious harm" in this case. So it might be a good idea to file a police report with the police of the federal state where the perpetrator lives. The police of most federal states allow to do that through their respective websites (look for the keywords "Internetwache" or "Strafanzeige"), so there is no need to travel to Germany to do so. This does of course require that there is enough information available to obtain the real identity of the perpetrator, which can be difficult with people you only know through online services.	When a criminal act takes place, the state in which the act took place has jurisdiction. State of residence of perpetrator or victim is not at all relevant. It also would not matter where the minor was "staying", all that matters is where the act took place. If that was California, California Penal Code 261.5(c) says Any person who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. Additionally, (261.5(e)(1) states Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an adult who engages in an act of sexual intercourse with a minor in violation of this section may be liable for civil penalties in the following amounts:... (C) An adult who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor at least three years younger than the adult is liable for a civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000)	In the United States at least, the answer is clearly "Yes". Absent some restrictive agreement to which the would-be blogger is explicitly a party, a person has a protected right to comment or report on events and publish opinions of them. The question does not mention a location or jurisdiction, and I am not suren what the law on this point might be in non-US jurisdictions.	Unless the Youtube Video shows them committing a crime, then no, they couldn't be arrested and tried for a crime. Them saying it, not under oath, is just hearsay that has no evidentiary value unless there is already other evidence they have committed a crime. In that case, its an admission. But there must be other, either circumstantial, or actual physical evidence of a crime. Past intoxication is not a crime, either. Possession of drugs, if caught with them is. But saying you got high is not. People have walked into police stations and confessed to murders. But with no evidence, no body, no name of a missing person, they can't even be held after the holding period for investigatory purposes expires. If the video shows them committing assault, or breaking and entering (there actually are idiots who post this stuff), the video is actual evidence of a crime and it is often used against them. The statements can be used to begin an investigation, but people don't usually confess to anything worth pursuing even an investigation. The fact that someone says they used to do something criminal is not enough. For all you ( meaning anyone ) knows, the statute of limitations has expired because they "pirated games" 10 years ago. Your comment is right on.	If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent?	No Voluntary disclosure, even accidental, by the client ends privilege. The information may still be confidential (inadmissible) if it happened in the appropriate circumstances, for example, as part of a mediation. Edit A recent decision of the High Court of Australia has determined that a litigant can use material that comes into its possession that would have attracted privilege irrespective of how this happens. In that case, the law firm was hacked by an unknown party, the information was given to a journalist and published and the litigant wanted to use it in their case - they were allowed to do so. The court decided that privilege is not a legal right that could found a course of action. Basically, it only prevents the compulsory production of such information - it doesn't protect the information itself.	Defamatory and offensive are not the same “He is a child molester” is defamatory and illegal (unless he is, of course). “She is a two-faced f___ing b___h with the morals of an alley cat and the integrity of a politician” is offensive and legal. Neither is a crime.
How to divorce remotely? I am a UK citizen, who has been married to an American woman for about 18 months. We got married in the UK, lived together for about 3 months and later on she moved back to the US because of job opportunity. I stayed at home and later on we decided to break up. However we remained married on the paper and had an agreement when it comes to a divorce, none of us is going to have any property aquired since the moment of separation. So basicaly we have been separated for 10 months and now she assumed filing a divorce with an online company, and I hesitate whether it would be legit on the territory of the UK if we got divorced remotely like that, so I wonder how the process of a divorce could be accomplished, if she is not willing to come to the UK.	The divorce under Florida, USA, law, will be recognised in the UK and have legal effect. Under the Family Law Act 1986 an overseas divorce obtained by means of judicial or other proceedings is recognised in the UK only if: it is effective under the law of the country in which it was obtained; and at the relevant date (that is, the date on which proceedings were begun), either party was either habitually resident or domiciled in that country or was a national of that country. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-divorces-set13/overseas-divorces-set13 You may need to take additional steps in the UK as a Florida divorce certificate may not be familiar to organisations who need to be told of your divorce. Obtaining recognition of your foreign divorce in the UK can be extremely complex and we strongly advise anyone who is unsure to contact a legal professional in the UK to ensure their overseas divorce is valid and there could be no repercussions down the line. https://www.nelsonslaw.co.uk/foreign-divorce-valid-england/	1: What's the correct process to get a restraining order? The police aren't involved in the formal process, although sometimes people go to the police and are told that they have to go to a judge instead. The aggrieved plaintiff presents an ex parte affidavit or makes statement in person under oath to a duty judge (who often asks clarifying questions). If this statements states a basis for a protection order one issues with a prompt return date (a week or two). At the return date the order either becomes final if the defendant doesn't show up, is vacated if the plaintiff doesn't show up, or is tried in an evidentiary hearing if both show up. Of course, a court order is ultimately just a piece of paper and there is no legal recourse against the government if they don't successfully stop the person restrained from doing something. Also enforcement of restraining orders was a lot more lax in 1987 than it is today, and men asking for restraining orders were taken less seriously then, than they are now, by most judges. 2: Can Dan keep his adultery secret during that process? Not really. In the initial ex parte hearing, Dan can probably tell the story artfully in a way that hides the adultery, but in the adversarial hearing, if there is one, the other side (or their lawyer) can ask him under oath about the affair and he has to answer truthfully in a public court hearing setting. 3: Is it plausible that Dan's family and friends don't learn about that process? Yes. Unless he's famous enough to make the newspapers (which in a decent sized city is pretty famous), and if he initiates the process, the only person who gets formal notice before the order issues is the court, and if the court issues the initial order, the only person who gets notice is the defendant. If Dan doesn't call family or friends as witnesses and don't tell his workplace why he's at court, nobody is told. It isn't a secret. It's a matter of public record that could be subsequently discovered at any time. But there is no active means of notification of friends and family in the short term. Realistically, Dan might ask a cop or a lawyer what to do, get accurate or inaccurate information, and decide not to pursue it for fear of creating sworn proof of his affair at a hearing. Cops love to provide legal advice that they aren't qualified to dispense. Dan's concern is particularly relevant because this happened in New York State in 1987 when New York State didn't have no fault divorce at the time, and the outcome of divorce proceedings on the merits for property division and alimony and custody would have been heavily influenced by marital fault in the divorce case. Revealing an affair under oath as he might have been required to do at a hearing would have crushed him in a subsequent divorce outcome if his wife found out and decided to divorce him.	You are entitled to at least see, and probably get a copy of, any document you sign. If you insist, they will have to show you or give you a copy. It may well be that they are supposed to give you a copy even if you do not ask. But if you are going to insist, allow a bit of extra time at such appointments. If they describe the document, even in rather general terms, your signature is probably binding, unless they have significantly misrepresented the document. If they tell you it is consent to be treated and it is actually an agreement to purchase a timeshare, that would be fraud and the document would not be valid, but that would be very unlikely. There might be some provision that you do not like, but such agreements are usually fairly standard, and also usually not very negotiable if you want service at that office. Still, it is better practice to at least look over and get a copy of any document you agree to.	Even in a community property state like Washington, a person is not liable for the premarital debts of a spouse (but is responsible for postmarital debts). During the marriage, jointly-owned property is accessible to creditors, but after divorce, there is no risk to the non-debtor. Though, you would be responsible if you were a co-signer on the loan.	When you breach a contract, you can get sued in local court, and if you don't show up to defend yourself, default judgment will be entered against you. Then the aggrieved party will have to collect, but the court in Washington (to invent a jurisdiction) can't enforce an order against a person in Norway (to invent another jurisdiction). So the aggrieved party would need to take enforcement of the judgment to the Norwegian courts. In the actual case of Norway, this is fairly simple, you just call an attorney in Norway to do the paperwork. It might be harder if the other jurisdiction is Belarus. If you return to the US, even if there is a money judgment against you for the rent owed, you will not be arrested for that debt. Depending on the state (about half of the states), you might be arrested for failing to comply with a court order to pay the debt. The difference lies in refusing to comply with a court order, versus simply having a debt. The State Department conveniently lists the reasons for denying a visa. Owing money or having an uncollected judgment against you is not one of the possible reasons, in fact even having been ordered by a court to pay, ignoring the order, and the court issuing an arrest warrant does not make you inadmissible.	Are you in the United States? If so, you're an adult and therefore legally free to move out of your parents' home and to enter into contracts. As a legal matter, you don't really need to do much at all beyond turn 18 to be permitted to sign a lease. There are of course all manner of practical impediments to finding a place to live (perhaps you have inadequate income, credit, or references), but none that should be insurmountable. EDIT: You've indicated in the comments that you may be under a guardianship, but you seem to be indicating that you doubt whether this is true. If you are under a guardianship, your rights are likely to be quite different than under usual circumstances. It seems quite unlikely to me that an adult who has the mental capacity to come asking these questions could be under a guardianship without knowing about it. Given that your parents are the purported guardians, I don't know how you could have been placed under their guardianship without appearing in court sometime around your 18th birthday, which I assume you'd remember. You should determine whether you are under a guardianship. You can probably do this by searching the court records online for each county you've lived in. Alternatively, you could contact adult protective services or an equivalent agency.	This is a well established model in the UK. One route is the umbrella company. Y here would be the umbrella company. A would then either be providing services to Y or be employed by Y. You may be wondering what use it is if A is employed by Y. The answer here is that whilst A may not benefit from the tax treatment, X does not bear the burden of running PAYE etc. Further, because of regulations such as IR35, it may be that there is a doubt as to whether employment tax apply even if there is a contract for service. Essentially disguised employment means taxes are levied on the employer as if an employment existed; however, in this situation X has the comfort that if this arises they will (normally) fall on Y rather than X. Another route is the service company, where normally A himself will own it (or it is owned between A and A's spouse), take a combination of salary and dividends out (using two allowances if owned between spouses), and he will bill X or Y; companies exist which will perform all the necessary paperwork to do this (in which case Y is called a managed service company), as opposed to a personal service company (if A sets it up himself). It's not clear where you are based, but if you are based outside the UK (and possibly if you are inside the UK) there are accountancy companies that specialise in setting all this up.	It's not a matter of funding, it's a matter of eligibility for asylum in the UK which appears to be highly unlikely according to reports where 45 recent applications from US citizens were rejected.1 One option is to apply for a Skilled Worker Visa for one of the eligible occupations. The Skilled Worker route enables you to live and work in the UK for up to five years. You can apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain, a form of settled status, after you have lived in the UK for five years under the Skilled Worker Visa. Source As for "Can he legally work such a job with or without permission?", working in the UK without "leave to remain" (i.e. permission) is an offence contrary to section 24B of the Immigration Act 1971 1That said, if the UK and USA governments did come to an arrangement whereby "at least for the short run, they allow his claim to start in the UK" it is impossible to foretell the future and say with any degree of certainty what conditions, requirements, liabilities and demands each side would impose.
Can the government outlaw excessive spending on defense counsel? Suppose a jurisdiction in the United States wanted to pass a law limiting the amount of money that a defendant could spend on counsel, to try to prevent a very wealthy person from assembling a dream team of the best lawyers in the world and getting much better representation than the average person, or making a joke of the whole proceeding, as we've seen in some high profile cases. I suspect this would not be constitutional, but why not, specifically?	No. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a criminal defendant's right "to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." The U.S. Supreme Court interprets this to mean that the government cannot interfere with "the individual's right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of ... counsel.” Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989). For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(2) allowed the federal government to freeze assets of "equivalent value" to that which a person is accused of obtaining through health-care or bank fraud. When the government tried to use that law to stop a defendant from using the money to hire an attorney, the Supreme Court said it was unconstitutional, holding that "The constitutional right at issue here is fundamental: 'The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire.'" Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016).	The U.S. could pass a law directing Apple to create software for fair compensation. Similar statutes have been passed in wartime compelling companies to do all sorts of things and companies don't have all of the rights of individuals. If it can be done (not obvious in the case of existing products in the market place), it might be possible for the government to compel it to do so; if it can't be done, it can't be compelled and not all things are possible retroactively. There would also be a constitutional contracts clause issues with such a law impairing contracts between Apple and its customers when applied to existing phones retroactively. Whether it could require Apple to create a law enforcement back door depends upon whether 4th Amendment privacy rights trump the creation of a means to do so. There is an expectation of privacy in electronic records, but it is not absolute. But, there is no law on the books requiring this from Apple. It does not flow naturally from existing powers of law enforcement under existing statutes. It goes beyond what a subpoena would ordinarily require someone to do, and a subpoena is the main means by which governments compel people to provide information. In my opinion, a court faced with that question would rule that a statute requiring Apple to do this prospectively would be constitutional, but no such statute exists. However, this is currently an open legal question because there is no statute of the kind that have been litigated in a manner that produced a binding precedent.	The US Supreme Court only has jurisdiction in federal matters. So if someone is suing under federal law, or there is a constitutional question, the Supreme Court is the place to go for a definitive answer. However, states have their own laws. The Supreme Court cannot tell New York that it must apply the attractive nuisance doctrine, as it is neither a matter of federal law nor a constitutional matter. New York is free to make its own laws on the subject, and the New York courts are free to interpret those laws as they see fit. In fact, federal courts are required to defer to New York's interpretation if New York's laws apply to the case, even if the case is in federal court for some reason (like diversity of parties.) See the Erie doctrine (which, coincidentally, involves yet another case about railroad injuries.)	Mr. Comey answered this in his testimony. LANKFORD: Okay. Fair enough. If the president wanted to stop an investigation, how would he do that? Knowing it is an ongoing criminal investigation or counterintelligence investigation, would that be a matter of going to you, you perceive, and say, you make it stop because he doesn't have the authority to stop it? How would the president make an ongoing investigation stop? COMEY: I'm not a legal scholar, but as a legal matter, the president is the head of the executive branch and could direct, in theory, we have important norms against this, but could anyone be investigative or not. I think he has the legal authority. All of us ultimately report in the executive branch to the president. LANKFORD: Would that be to you, or the attorney general or who? COMEY: I suppose he could if he wanted to issue a direct order could do it anyway. Through the attorney general or issue it directly to me. This issue also came up in United States v Texas. The obligation to refrain from interference with the FBI is a norm, not a legal requirement. And, like many executive powers, an act that is sometimes legally permitted can become illegal given an improper motive. It is also possible for Congress to find legal acts to be untenably corrupt.	There are both statutes and customs aimed at preventing "Malicious Prosecution" and "Abuse of Process." (In Pennsylvania, for example, the 1980 Dragonetti Act allows the victim of a frivolous lawsuit to counter-sue for compensatory damages.) One can also buy insurance against this type of risk: Umbrella liability policies will generally provide a defense against civil lawsuits and any damages awarded, as will many business insurance policies. Of course, none of this is to say that a skilled legal team can't avoid all of these countermeasures and, in practice, take up a significant amount of your time and trouble. We do not have a perfect system of justice.	Many times. See pages 4 and onward here. The 11th circuit (which includes FL) recognizes sentencing manipulation but not sentencing entrapment. The one example from the 11th circuit in that document (US v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264) was an unsuccessful claim of sentence manipulation, but it shows the analysis that goes into deciding these types of claims. They say: While our Circuit does not recognize sentencing entrapment as a viable defense, we do recognize the outrageous government conduct defense, and we have considered sentencing manipulation as a viable defense. ... Ciszkowski, however, has not met his burden of establishing that the government's conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to constitute sentencing factor manipulation. Government-created reverse sting operations are recognized and useful methods of law enforcement investigation. Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1413. The fact that law enforcement may provide drugs or guns essential to a willing and predisposed offender does not necessarily constitute misconduct. We have previously declined to find that the government engaged in prohibited sentencing factor manipulation in other similar contexts.	The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.	Legally there is no problem. What you say is protected speech under the 1st Amendment as long as it is either true or a matter of opinion. However Ron Beyer's comment is a good one; while legal this sounds very inadvisable. You would be far better off hiring a lawyer. The Mr Dicks of this world make money from the widespread fear of legal action. He will probably fold as soon as he sees a letter from a lawyer threatening a lawsuit. Until then stalling doesn't cost him anything so he will carry on doing it. BTW, don't delay. I don't know about the US, but over here in the UK there are a number of ways that people like Mr Dick can make it hard to collect. Don't give him time to play shell games with his assets.
What legal authorities provide for DHS to police cities? I heard about 40 U.S. Code § 1315 on a podcast. It allows HHS officers to safeguard federal property and gives them arrest power under explicit conditions - (c) arrest people they witness committing federal crimes and (d) serve warrants. They also have (e) the power to investigate violation of federal laws. Blocking traffic and being rowdy in the streets and failure to disperse are not federal crimes. In media discussions about their activities in Portland in July 2020 I have heard much about the advisability, morality and optics of these activities but little about the legality. I see that law provides that they may enter into agreements with state and local authorities for other activities. This has clearly not happened in Portland. Therefore when they are blocks away from federal property detaining people there seems to be no legal leg to stand on, unless it is -- (f) carry out such other activities for the promotion of homeland security as the Secretary may prescribe. Is there any more specific legal authority, and if so, has the administration cited it?	You've omitted a critical part of paragraph (b)(2)(C): make arrests without a warrant for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of the officer or agent or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if the officer or agent has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony So if the crime in question is a felony, the agent does not have to have witnessed its commission; they only need "reasonable grounds to believe" that the person they're arresting did it. One possible felony that may come into play is 18 USC 1361: damage or attempted damage to federal property in excess of $1000 is punishable by up to ten years imprisonment. Anything greater than one year is a felony.	Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out.	Answering the question title, a Texas law enforcement officer can certainly make arrests in Louisiana these days under the right circumstances (I'm not about to look up the laws as of 1934). For starters, Louisiana law grants any person the authority to make an arrest when the person being arrested has committed a felony, whether or not that felony was committed in the presence of the person making the arrest. This is normally a legally risky thing to do (the arrest is illegal unless the person actually committed a felony, while a cop's felony arrest is legal as long as the cop had probable cause), but in this case the pair had been involved in a kidnapping and a robbery in Louisiana. Any person could have made a lawful arrest, and could have used necessary force to effect that arrest. But suppose the gang turned out to be innocent of the Louisiana crimes. In that case, a citizen's arrest would be illegal. But the Texas lawmen weren't at the ambush alone. They were there with the parish sheriff and a deputy, who were Louisiana peace officers with the authority to make an arrest on probable cause. And under Article 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, A peace officer making a lawful arrest may call upon as many persons as he considers necessary to aid him in making the arrest. A person thus called upon shall be considered a peace officer for such purposes. Neither of these things depends on the Texas officers' status as Texas officers. There are some arrests which are legal based on that (e.g. hot pursuit), and a Texas officer has some extra powers in Louisiana based on federal law that make an arrest easier (e.g. cops in the US can carry concealed firearms nationwide without needing a CCW permit), but under normal circumstances a Texas police officer has no special authority to make an arrest in Louisiana. However, it's not at all uncommon for police agencies in different states (or at the state and federal level) to cooperate on something, and there are ways to make it work out. With more planning, there are normally formal ways to do it instead of needing to rely on "we'll ask you for assistance" (for instance, officers could formally be appointed as deputies in the appropriate agency; this happens a lot on federal task forces, where a deputized state or local cop gets nationwide jurisdiction). If Bonnie and Clyde existed these days but the feds wanted to involve state cops, they'd just set up a federal task force, make Hamer a special deputy US marshal, and go from there.	When the LEO violently assaulted the citizen on the easement is he out of his jurisdiction? No. Federal law enforcement officers' jurisdiction generally* includes the entire US. Federal and state jurisdiction are said to be concurrent with one another. If the federal law enforcement officer has a lawful basis to effect an arrest, the arrest can be effected on a state† highway easement. Is there any immediate or long term consequence for an officer committing crimes or doing so egregiously (with or without qualified immunity) out of his jurisdiction as opposed to doing so in his jurisdiction? If the officer were outside his jurisdiction (which isn't the case here) then the officer is generally treated as any other private individual. In this case, "outside his jurisdiction" means "in another country," which brings up all sorts of additional complications that aren't really in scope here, largely because the laws and legal systems of other countries are different from those in the US. Are there any nuances to jurisdiction and law enforcement by LEOs that a first amendment auditor should be aware of? There are plenty, but perhaps the most prominent one, if the internet is any guide, is that an officer is not required to articulate the basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause at the time of a Terry stop or an arrest. The time for this is much later, after a judge is involved. Arguing with an officer on this score is just going to make things worse. Instead, one should cooperate while stating one's objections clearly and calmly, especially making it clear that cooperation does not imply consent. * Some categories of officers do have more limited jurisdiction: thanks to cpast for the example of park rangers, whose jurisdiction is essentially restricted to national parks. The officers in this case are CBP field officers. There is a wide misconception that CBP officers' jurisdiction is limited to within 100 miles of the border, but that 100-mile limit only applies to their power to board and search vessels and vehicles without a warrant in order to prevent illegal entry into the US. Their power to make warrantless arrests "for any offence against the United States" committed in their presence is not geographically restricted. † The original video was filmed in South Portland, Maine, and the roadway is a municipal street, Gannett Drive, to be precise. The point remains, however, that it is a public right-of-way, and federal officers are not "out of their jurisdiction" simply because they've left a federal facility and entered a public place.	The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal.	You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't.	A state or local law enforcement officer cannot enforce federal laws unless the officer has been deputized by the federal government to do so. State and local law enforcement officers are sometimes deputized to enforce federal law, but this would almost never be done in the case of FCC regulations.	1-3: This would be prohibited under Article VI, paragraph 2 of the US Constitution, which provides that federal law, and the ability to enforce that law, has supremacy over state law. As summarized by Cornell Law, the Supremacy Clause: establishes that the federal constitution, and federal law generally, take precedence over state laws, and even state constitutions. It prohibits states from interfering with the federal government's exercise of its constitutional powers... 4: Not legally; see above. 5: Yes, probably a lot of laws. Those charges could range anywhere from interfering with a federal investigation, wrongful imprisonment, assault, or kidnapping. I think it's important to point out that it is highly unlikely the situation would ever escalate to 4, let alone 5. The federal government is incredibly well resourced with regards to being able to move its law enforcement officers throughout the country. And that's not withstanding that the FBI and other agencies (CBP, TSA) are already stationed in any particular state. A non-zero number of those agents are also residents of the state they're stationed in, which would complicate things further.
Can a university in the U.S. legally force students to get regularly tested for COVID-19? I attend a university in the United States which has recently released its COVID-19 response plan, and part of that plan includes requiring that students get testing before coming to campus, and then get tested regularly while on campus. It should be noted that all contracts/agreements (school policies, dorm contracts, acceptable use policies, financial aid agreements, etc.) were signed months ago, and include no reference to COVID-19. Can the private university legally require that students get tested before returning? And if they can (say, due to some new state law or something), can they also require you to submit to regular testing while on campus? My first reaction is that this would be a simple violation of 4th. amendment rights, but because there may be exigent circumstances, are there exceptions, or have I simply misinterpreted everything? Say, for example, that a student returned without getting tested, and the administration then proceeded to expel the student, would the student have a strong legal case against the university? A case that they would be likely to win? A few things to note: I’m not providing an opinion as to whether or not mass testing of students is a good or a bad thing, and I’m not looking for moral arguments in return. I am simply looking for a healthy, factual debate as to whether or not it would be legal. I suppose that the university could impose micro-restrictions. For example, they may require you to get tested before participating in clubs or sports, as those contracts haven’t been signed yet and they could make it part of the agreement. However, in this case, I’m simply referring to just returning to and living at school.	As a private university, they have much broader discretion to require things of you. Questions of 4th amendment rights are beside the point, what would matter is whether it is already covered by some part of your contract with the university. As a starting point, they have the property right to control access to their property, and they grant you the right to use their property in certain ways, in exchange for things that you have to do. The contract does not have to say "We can require you to get covid tests". It is extremely unlikely that any clause says "You can do anything you want except for the following actions". Typically, your contract includes a generic agreement to "follow the rules". There are safety-related standards somewhere in the code of conduct. The requirement to be tested, or to not spread bubonic plague etc. will be subsumed under one of these rules. I understand that you don't want to name the institution.	I guess it depends on what courts decide is the "standard of care" in prisons against transmissible diseases. This has been litigated in various way recently, not just following deaths: From a legal standpoint, many the cases center upon: due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly related to pre-trial detainees; Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment; Americans with Disabilities Act violations; and discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs are often asking judges to intervene to force immediate changes at prisons and jails, while litigation is pending. The approach has yielded mixed results thus far. Some judges have moved aggressively, ordering institutions to improve conditions and to do more to adhere to CDC guides. Yet those decisions have met with continued appeals and resistance from corrections officials, and the U.S. Supreme Court has twice overturned efforts by federal judges to intervene forcefully in coronavirus-related matters. In May, the high court rejected on procedural grounds a request by inmates to increase cleaning and COVID-19-related education efforts at their Texas-based geriatric correctional facility. The court upheld the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, which had overturned a Houston-based federal judge’s ruling supporting the prisoners. A few days later, however, the court appeared to switched course, letting stand a federal judge’s order requiring that prison officials move hundreds of inmates from an Ohio institution where nine people had died from COVID-19. Then, on Aug. 3, justices, in a 5-4 decision, overturned a lower-court injunction requiring stricter health and safety measures at the jail in Orange County in Southern California. The Orange County case, Barnes v. Ahlman, is instructive in terms of the arguments being made on both sides and the response by the courts. The jail’s leadership was accused by prisoners of ignoring Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommendations by failing to enforce social distancing measures and declining to isolate inmates with COVID-19 symptoms. A federal judge in California had issued a preliminary injunction that required the jail to take stronger measures, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined a request by the jail to halt the injunction. Jail officials argued that, prior to the injunction, CDC guidelines had been “largely implemented” and said the injunction’s requirements far exceeded the scope of the CDC’s recommendations. They also cited their efforts to voluntarily release half of the jail’s inmates to help with social distancing and said they had all but eliminated “COVID within the jail population.” The Supreme Court majority voted to stay the injunction while litigation continues. As is custom, the justices did not explain their reasoning in the order. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, saying the stay was premature and that jail had placed inmates at significant risk. Earlier in the Texas case, Sotomayor encouraged lower courts to ensure “that prisons are not deliberately indifferent in the face of danger and death.” I guess some Supreme Justices might not say it but probably think it that it's not cruel and unusual to (catch and) die of transmissible diseases in prison since it happens all the time. E.g. according to one study 97% of infected inmates don't get Hep C treatment. At the other end of the spectrum: a former jail administrator in Oklahoma was sentenced to more than 4 years in prison following his decision not to take an inmate with diabetes to hospital, resulting in his death in 2013. The administrator "pleaded guilty to one count of deprivation of rights under color of law." The inmate in question died of ketoacidosis. So the standard of care in prisons is somewhere in between these extremes. Most litigation regarding Covid-19 seems to center on whether CDC guidelines have been followed or not. I see that the CDC does have some specific guidelines for correctional facilities in this regard. I'm not sure of negligence case law in prison, but regarding the 8th Amendment violations, Helling v. McKinney is probably relevant to preventative measures: In Helling v. McKinney, the Court considered the case of a Nevada prisoner, "the cellmate of a five-pack-a-day smoker," who sought to be housed in an environment free of second-hand smoke. McKinney suffered from no ailment and sought no medical treatment. Justice Byron White wrote for a 7-2 majority of the Court that McKinney's claim that prison officials "have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of ETS [second hand smoke] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health" raised a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment. He wrote that McKinney would have to prove both the scientific facts of the dangers of exposure to second-hand smoke and prove that community standards supported him, that "it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today's society chooses to tolerate." He would also have to prove that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference. Also following Ashcroft v. Iqbal government officials could not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates so each official would have to be proved liable individually for involvement in such a (faulty) decision.	If the school is a private school, then definitely yes: the school can also mandate clothing and grooming standards, and so forth – attending private school is optional, and they can even require the parents to provide the computer. (Mandatory) public schools have less power, but they still have the right to require students to do things that the parents do not like. For example, a parent might not like the particular history curriculum, or the might not like the fact that the child has to study music, but that is a power granted to public school districts. If the requirement were "unreasonable" in some sense, parental prerogative might win out over the school's rational of educational necessity. But it is no more unreasonable to require a student to learn how to use a computer that it is to require them to learn how to read a book. You might argue that reading is "more necessary" than developing computer skills, but the school district's curricular judgment is placed above that of a parent, so you would have to establish that giving a child access to a computer is objectively unreasonable.	Can the employer fire Bob if they refuse to provide saliva sample for a marijuana test? Maybe, if drug testing is an enforceable condition of Bob's contract of employment. An employer's drug testing policy has to be justified according to the nature of the work carried out and requires an employee's consent. If Bob is required to occasionally operate machinery, for example, then it may be proportionate to include mandatory testing in his contract of employment. Workers can’t be made to take a drugs test but if they refuse when the employer has good grounds for testing, they may face disciplinary action. Source ETA Employers have a legal duty of care under s.2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the health, safety, and welfare of their employees. Employees have a comparable duty under s.7 to take reasonable care of themselves and anyone who could be affected by their work. This duty of care may extend to requiring an employee to give their consent for drug testing / screening - as long as the process is fair to all, proportionate and justified, in all the given circumstances, to enable the employer to discharge this duty.	There are two scenarios to consider. One is that there is such a policy written down and duly communicated in some fashion. In that case, it is obviously "okay" in all senses to enforce that policy. (That does not preclude the possibility of suing the institution because they are abridging some right of yours in having this policy, but that's a separate matter). The alternative is that there is no such policy, and someone spoke incorrectly. If that is the case, then they "can't" enforce a non-existent policy. Actually, they can prevent you from using the facility, the question is, how could you correct their misunderstanding of their policy? The most protracted way to resolve this is to file a lawsuit against the university, for denying some right (constitutional or property). A more efficient way to do that is to bring the matter to the attention of a reasonably high-ranked official within the institution, perhaps the department chair, who may not be aware that subordinates are making up or misinterpreting rules. The fact that you were unable to locate a written statement of policy online really doesn't count for much. It is entirely reasonable to believe that the chair may have instituted such a policy, under his authority as chair, and communicated it verbally to subordinates: or, the subordinates simply do not know where to find the policies. An alternative approach is to raise the question with the Student Advocate's office, if discussion with the chair is unsatisfactory.	You were trespassing The community college is a public institution but they can decide what part of their land you can walk on and in what circumstances. Just like the military is a public institution but they don’t let you walk across their shooting ranges. To be clear, in the absence of clear “no dogs allowed” signage, you were not trespassing until you were told about the policy. At that point, you were legally obliged to remove yourself (or more precisely, your dog) from the campus as soon as possible. When you refused to do so, you became a trespasser. It’s trivially easy to find out who you are. One photograph, one reverse image search they’ll know everything about you right down to your shoe size. Even if you don’t use social media, I’m sure some of your family and friends do. In most US states, trespass is a misdemeanour and also in most states members of the public can arrest someone who is committing a misdemeanour in their presence. They can use reasonable force to do so and can hold the arrestee until they can transfer them to the custody of a law enforcement officer. Admittedly, this seems unlikely but it is possible. If you have caused damage, you can be sued. It seems that your discussion with the college staff was somewhat protected so the loss of productivity of those staff members is a loss that the college suffered and that they could sue you for. Again, not likely but possible. Alternatively, they could just report you to the police who may or may not bring charges. Note: this assumes the dog is a pet. If it’s a disability assistance animal, it can’t be excluded. See: Are sidewalks on a university public or private property? Can a local government charge a fee to enter a public downtown area during an event? Trespassing or Public Property? Is a mall considered a "public place" for copyright purposes?	California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.	I suspect that the statute in question may be Section 11-104(1)(F) of municipal ordinances of the Town of Bloomsburg, PA, a university town (home to Bloomberg University of Pennsylvania, a public college) that purports to have special need for regulation based upon the large number of student rentals in the town and apparently applies primarily to house rentals to students. (If not, the ordinance in question may be modeled on this one, or this one may be modeled on the ordinance in question.) This ordinance imposes the following duties on people who have been granted landlord licenses, which the town requires of most landlords renting to students (a landlord is called the "owner" in the ordinance): The owner shall maintain a current and accurate list of the occupants in each regulated rental unit or dormitory unit which shall include their name, permanent address and permanent telephone number which shall be available to the Town for inspection upon reasonable notice. The owner shall notify the Town of changes in the occupancy within 10 days of the change and shall provide the name of the person who is not longer residing in the premises in the event a person departs and the name, permanent address and permanent telephone number of new occupants in the event a new person is added. On its face, this is probably valid. There is not a constitutional right to keep your own contact information or address, or your tenant's identity. Indeed, very similar requirements are routinely imposed upon operators of hotels and motels. And, I strongly suspect that in Pennsylvania, that towns of any reasonable population have more or less plenary authority to adopt ordinances that aren't specifically prohibited by other state or federal laws or constitutions or the town charter. I do not believe that there are any federal statutes that prohibit a town from imposing such a requirement, barring extraordinary circumstances like a duty to cooperate with national security measures, witness protection programs, or a federal organized crime investigation that don't benefit the average tenant. The kind of privacy policy and privacy disclosure laws in place at the national level apply mostly to health and financial information (and far more in Europe), but not generally to legally mandated disclosures of landlords to local governments. The requirements of a privacy policy don't apply here. The main federal privacy laws and some of the most notable state privacy laws are: The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) which affects websites that knowingly collect information about or targeted at children under the age of 13. Any such websites must post a privacy policy and adhere to enumerated information-sharing restrictions COPPA includes a "safe harbor" provision to promote Industry self-regulation. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires institutions "significantly engaged" in financial activities give "clear, conspicuous, and accurate statements" of their information-sharing practices. The Act also restricts use and sharing of financial information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rules requires notice in writing of the privacy practices of health care services, and this requirement also applies if the health service is electronic. The California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 – Business and Professions Code sections 22575-22579 requires "any commercial websites or online services that collect personal information on California residents through a web site to conspicuously post a privacy policy on the site". Both Nebraska and Pennsylvania have laws treating misleading statements in privacy policies published on websites as deceptive or fraudulent business practices. But, most of these laws apply only to Internet sharing of information by private firms, and the Nebraska and Pennsylvania laws don't require anyone to actually have a privacy policy. Those laws certainly don't pre-empt local ordinances. There is at least one state law that should supply an exemption to this statute in Pennsylvania pertaining to confidentiality for domestic violence victims that should override contrary town ordinances. Address Confidentiality Program (ACP): Victims can get a legal substitute address (usually a post office box) to use in place of their physical address; this address can be used whenever an address is required by public agencies. First class mail sent to the substitute address is forwarded to the victim's actual address. Probably the most fruitful means by which an ordinance like this one could be challenged would be to argue that the true intent of the ordinances when adopted or as it has been subsequently applied, is to use it for a purpose that the town is not allowed to engage in, such as enforcing immigration laws, suppressing voting rights, imposing a de facto poll tax, or engaging in discrimination against a protected class in violation of state and federal fair housing laws. College students, however, the expressly stated and plausible target of the ordinance, are not generally a protected class under fair housing legislation. There are precedents upholding zoning regulations discriminating against households of "Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals" aimed at students and other kind of populations whom municipal busybodies often find to be undesirable against federal constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). California's courts have been more hostile to this kind of legislation. See, e.g. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 125 (Cal. 1980) (an op-ed arguing that this was wrongly decided in the L.A. Times in 1990 is here), but that isn't very helpful in Pennsylvania, and California rather than Pennsylvania is the outlier nationally on this kind of issue. The general issue over free association and privacy rights in connection with housing and unrelated individuals is discussed in an up to date manner in a 2016 Florida Law Review article. Proving an improper purpose in an as applied or legislative intent based challenge to a facially neutral statute is very, very difficult in all but the most blatant cases (e.g. when town council members openly proclaim their improper purpose is that true purpose of the law). No doubt recognizing the possibility of such a challenge to the ordinance, this particular ordinance has a particularly lengthy and detailed legislative declaration regarding its purpose that no doubt is an effort to take a position that it has a proper purpose in the event of future litigation. This states: It is the purpose of this Part and the policy of the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg, in order to protect and promote the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens, to establish rights and obligations of owners and occupants relating to the rental of certain dwelling units and dormitory units in the Town of Bloomsburg and to encourage owners and occupants to maintain and improve the quality of rental housing within the community. It is also the policy of the Town that owners, managers and occupants share responsibilities to obey the various codes adopted to protect and promote public health, safety and welfare. As means to those ends, this Part provides for a system of inspections, issuance and renewal of occupancy licenses and sets penalties for violations. This Part shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its purposes and policies. In considering the adoption of this Part, the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings: A. While the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg acknowledges the significant contribution that Bloomsburg University, its students, faculty and staff makes to the culture and economy of the Town of Bloomsburg, in recent years, adverse effects of student housing on residential neighborhoods have increased and there has been an increase in destructive student behavior that threatens the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg. B. Accordingly, the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings relating to student housing and its effect on the residential neighborhoods of the Town of Bloomsburg and the effect of student lifestyles on the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg: (1) When compared to other unrelated cohabitating individuals and traditional families, groups of students have different hours, work and social habits and frequently cause noise, disturbances and problems in residential neighborhoods. (2) There is a greater incidence of violations of various codes of the Town at residential properties where owners rent such property to students. (3) There is a greater incidence of problems with the maintenance and upkeep of residential properties where owners rent such property to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (4) There is a greater incidence of disturbances which adversely affect the peace and quiet of the neighborhood at residential properties where owners rent to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (5) A concentration of student homes changes the character of a neighborhood from one with traditional family values to one that cannot maintain those and approximately 90% of the Town's student homes are concentrated in two areas of the Town which displaces middle and lower income housing by absorbing housing units and rendering the remaining units less desirable for more traditional residential use. (6) Since 1994, nine students have died as a result of fires in houses occupied by students; two students have died of alcohol overdose; one student has died as a result of exposure when he fell from a porch at a student party. (7) Since 1997, 155 reports of disruptive conduct under the Town's Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance involving student behavior have been filed. (8) Since 1996, 73 prosecutions for unlawfully occupying premises while smoke or fire detectors were not operational have been filed against students. (9) Since 1998, 295 prosecutions for underage drinking have been filed against students and 11 prosecutions were filed against non-student residents of the Town of Bloomsburg. (10) Since 1998, 43 student parties have been raided where arrests were made for underage drinking and furnishing alcohol to minors. (11) There are sufficient differences between student housing and nonstudent housing and the behavior of students and non-student residents to justify different regulations for each class of resident. (12) Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals are being modified for occupancy by two students requiring the relocating of bearing walls and the modification of utilities, sanitation facilities, means of ingress and egress and smoke and fire detection systems. (13) Inspections of dwelling units occupied by two students have revealed little or no life protecting equipment in the dwelling units such as smoke and fire alarms and detectors and fire extinguishers, over-loaded electrical services, heating systems needing servicing and the use of supplemental heaters, all of which create a dangerous living environment. (14) There is a significant occurrence of disruptive behavior in dwelling units occupied by less than three unrelated students as compared to dwelling units that are occupied by owners, traditional families or unrelated persons who are not students. (15) Students who remain in the occupancy of the premises for periods of time after they are no longer students contribute to the above-described problems. (16) Because of the demand for student housing in the Town of Bloomsburg, developers have expressed interest in developing properties for use as dormitories where students live in rooms without fixed kitchen facilities. (17) Dormitory type uses are not covered by the Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance which applies only to dwelling units. (18) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of providing the same protection and standards for students who reside in dormitories or dwelling units. (19) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of imposing the same responsibilities upon owners of dormitory units and dwelling units where students reside. (20) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg finds that Bloomsburg University has sufficient resources and interest to properly manage dormitories owned by it and there is no need to regulate such dormitories. Even though it probably isn't inherently invalid, it is unusual, so it is likely to be challenged if someone can find an angle to do so. And, I suspect that its purposes are not as pure as those formally identified in the text of the ordinance. In conclusion, while I would totally hate to have an ordinance like that one in my town, it isn't obviously invalid and would probably survive a facial challenge in the absence of evidence that is was being applied in an illegally discriminatory manner.
Suppose someone kills more people than they intended. Did they murder the extra people? If a person sets a bomb in a music festival. Based on previous attendance numbers, they expected 60,000 people to show up. 120,000 people showed up and were killed by their bomb. Legally, did they murder 60,000 people, or all 120,000? Also, suppose they set up the bomb just to kill the production crew, and they end up killing the attendees. Did they still commit 120,000 murders?	Through the legal doctrine of "transferred intent", wherein if one intends to murder A, and undertake actions to kill A, but one's actions kill B, one has murdered B. Whatever crimes one would have committed, had one performed them on one's intended target, are considered committed against the individual one actually performed them on. Many crimes require one to have mens rea to be guilty; they do not require one to have mens rea towards a given individual. So, so long as one had the proper intent to murder someone, the actual victim of their actions is irrelevant.	Yes, although whether you get any response depends on a lot of factors. Specific, credible threats are much more likely to get a response than "I'm gonna kick your ass, amphibient, you (insert opposing viewpoint/sports team/etc)." The law broken in question would be: 18 U.S. Code § 875.c: Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. As you are in different states, this would need to be reported at a national level. This would be done at https://www.ic3.gov/complaint/default.aspx. Whether or not this is the best option depends on what you hope to accomplish and whether the other person is likely to act on those threats.	Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.	There will be single frames from let's say "The Exorcist" that are highly recognisable. You say it's not the heart of the work, but it may be representative for a substantial part. If I wrote a book about the movie, then say 25 frames out of the movie would illustrate the book very nicely, so this is substantial. And there is a market for selling pictures, t-shirts, posters etc. all using a single frame, or selling single frames to book authors wanting to use it for illustrative purposes. You deprive them of income for this activity. So what you said is something similar to what I would expect your lawyer to say in court, but I would expect the opposing lawyer to come up with some very different wording. All in all, I find the argument for "fair use" not convincing.	What is the correct way to handle this situation? Strictly speaking, each driver exceeding the speed limit is in violation of the traffic sign even if everybody else also infringes it. Thus it is completely valid for the police to pull & fine anyone from among those drivers. Statutes like the one you mention are intended for scenarios where a driver departs significantly --and for no apparent [lawful] reason-- from the speed limit, such as driving at 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. Typically a driver would not get pulled over in the scenario you mention (driving at 62 mph where everybody else drives at 65 mph). The exception would be some police department(s) requiring its cops to meet a quota of fines per week, but that would be quite a questionable practice having nothing to do with the legislative intent. Speed limits are supposed to represent normal and reasonable movement of traffic. If informed consensus is that a particular speed limit is inconsistent with that principle (for instance, where limit is artificially low and raising it would not compromise safety), then a request could be submitted to the Oregon Department of Transportation.	One might be enough, 10,000 might not be enough In some cases, no eyewitnesses may be enough. The trier of fact (the jury if there is one, the judge if there isn’t) decides what weight to give to the evidence or any part of it (including the testimony of any given eyewitness) and decide if that is enough to meet the prosecution’s burden of beyond reasonable doubt on each of the elements to be proven. From the outset, however, you should understand that you are the sole judges of the facts. In respect of all disputes about matters of fact in this case, it will be you and not I who will have to resolve them. In part, that means that it is entirely up to you to decide what evidence is to be accepted and what evidence is to be rejected. For that reason you need to pay careful attention to each witness as their evidence is given. You should not only listen to what the witnesses say but also watch them as they give their evidence. How a witness presents to you and how he or she responds to questioning, especially in cross-examination, may assist you in deciding whether or not you accept what that witness was saying as truthful and reliable. You are entitled to accept part of what a witness says and reject other parts of the evidence. Recommended instruction to the jury from the NSW Criminal Trial Bench Book	In England and Wales, under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by section 59 and Schedule 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) it's a criminal offence to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting someone to commit suicide. I think that applies to Scotland too, and there is similar law in Northern Ireland. Encouraging suicide is also a criminal offence in some other common law jurisdictions, e.g. in Australia. While in other common law jurisdictions, if there isn't such a law, the person might instead be prosecuted for manslaughter - or not at all. The minimum, maximum and recommended penalties may well differ between jurisdictions. I don't know what you mean by "vengeance rampage" but I'm not aware of any jurisdictions where it is lawful for a person to cause harm to someone for revenge. States tend to reserve for themselves a monopoly on the use of force.	Is this realistic? Yes. The dramatic performance plays out in the same way that it would in the U.S. Court system. The actual killing of the wife would be 'legal', so can he be charged for murder for something that has been done legally, only because they can prove is intent to kill her before that? Especially since he has already been acquitted of that fact. Mostly, this is an issue of causation and not double jeopardy. From a double jeopardy perspective, the crime of murder is not complete until the person dies, and they have not be tried for murder, so this is a different crime that had not occurred until after the attempted murder trial was over. Causation Issues Even if the immediate cause of the wife's death is withdrawal of life support, the shooting could still be a legally sufficient cause of the wife's death. For example, suppose that you shoot someone and the hospital can't give the victim a blood transfusion because the victim has blood type O- (universal donor) which can only receive blood from other people with blood type O-, and the hospital, due to negligence on the part of a hospital administrator, has run out out of type O- blood. The fact that the victim would not have died if the hospital has not negligently failed to have type O- blood on hand does not provide a defense to murder on the part of the person who shot her. While terminating life support is "legal" it also constitutes a non-judicial finding with legal effect on the part of the person authorizing it and the physicians signing off on the decision, the further medical care would have been futile and that the person whose life support was terminated was already dead in key material respects, even though they would not be dead for purposes of a murder charge until life support is terminated. When death is a natural and foreseeable result of action that causes physical harm, the death is caused by the act that causes the physical harm. Something else that causes death would have to be a "superseding cause" and not just an additional cause of death. Thus, the fact that life support was terminated legally does not mean that she cannot be a murder victim. Indeed, many murder victims are people who are on life support for some period of time and then have that life support terminated because it is futile to continue medical care and the person is already "brain dead" or something equivalent to that. Collateral Estoppel Issues Double jeopardy does carry with it a related concept of "collateral estoppel" which provides that facts necessarily decided in one criminal case cannot be decided differently in a subsequent, related criminal case in some circumstances. But, collateral estoppel applies only when the facts in the prior criminal case were necessarily decided on the merits in the prior criminal case. Acquittal of criminal charged does not necessarily include a determination that someone was innocent of the charges. The fact that he was acquitted of attempted murder does not mean that the jury found that he didn't attempt or intend to murder her. In particular, a dismissal of criminal charges as a result of a technicality that excluded evidence related to an element of the crime for which there was an acquittal, is not a determination on the merits that a particular element of a crime was actually absent, so it would not be binding in the subsequent criminal case for murder. An acquittal does not mean that every element of the prior criminal charges was found not to be present. Collateral estoppel arising from the double jeopardy right, in contrast, might be a ground for dismissal of the murder case, if the man's primary (and perhaps only) defense to the attempted murder case had been that he had established the affirmative defense that someone else committed the murder, or that he had an alibi that made it impossible for him to have committed the murder. Then, the jury would have found on the merits that this defense, equally applicable to the murder case, had already been established.
Is abortion of children with Down's syndrome legal in EU? In many countries of the European Union, abortions are performed on women after knowledge of down syndrome in the embryo. In some countries this disease has almost disappeared from the population. And according to MIT news in recent months, we are now on the verge of being able to detect other diseases such as some form of diabetes. We must not forget that we can also already suppress HIV in births, even if for this virus, the probability of seeing it disappear from the population is much lower. All this means that in a few years the countries of the European Union will be able to create populations almost disease-free at birth. The definition of eugenics is : the study of or belief in the possibility of improving the qualities of the human species or a human population, especially by such means as discouraging reproduction by persons having genetic defects or presumed to have inheritable undesirable traits (negative eugenics) or encouraging reproduction by persons presumed to have inheritable desirable traits (positive eugenics). And we already know that article 3 of EU charter of human rights prohibit "eugenics practices". My first question is : Why does practices are not considered as eugenics practices following EU charter of human rights ? And my second question is : If it is proven that the constitution of human rights does not prevent such abortions, does this mean that it does not prevent abortions based on the probabilities of the height or IQ of the future child either?	It would appear the answer is "it depends", based on where the abortion takes place. It's possible that France has a domestic law that prohibits aborting children with Down's syndrome — which would make such an act illegal if performed in France. I am not familiar with French law so do not know and cannot comment on that. More generally speaking, there is no EU-wide law that prohibits such abortions. For example, in the UK, such abortions are considered somewhat routine and there is no specific law prohibiting them. Indeed, they are explicitly permitted under the Abortion Act 1967. While there is a prohibition on eugenics in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), that would only seem to be engaged in the event some EU or domestic law was passed that mandated some form of eugenics. The European Convention on Human Rights has Article 2—the "Right to Life"—however, the rights established by this Article typically only apply to living beings and have not yet been held to firmly apply to foetuses (Vo v. France [2004] ECtHR, para 80.) and an unborn child can be held not to possess these rights until the moment of birth (Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1979]) although it varies from Member State to Member State. Some Member States (e.g. Ireland) constitutionally guarantee unborn children the right to live, in which case such abortions would presumably be illegal, but unless there's a specific law that prohibits such abortions, in almost all Member States of the European Union, such abortions would not be illegal. In conclusion, are such abortions prohibited in the EU? Not as far as my research suggests.	To answer the last question, the court cannot order a DNA test, see Kumar v. Gupta, on privacy grounds: "such tests impinge upon the right of privacy of an individual and could also have major societal repercussions". This is not a hard line, but it would be safe to conclude that in a case like the present, the Court’s decision should be rendered only after balancing the interests of the parties, i.e, the quest for truth, and the social and cultural implications involved therein See Puttaswamy v. India, the landmark case that established the constitutional right to privacy. DNA evidence is not absolutely barred, see Banarsi Dass V. Teeku Dutta and citations therein, finding most importantly that There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act. Various rulings have clarified that Section 112 establishes a defeasible presumption, and not a mindless bar to evidence: It is rebuttable presumption of law that a child born during the lawful wedlock is legitimate, and that access occurred between the parents. In other words, yes and no. As summarized in that ruling, tests cannot be ordered routinely or as a form of discovery, "There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act", the court must balance the consequences of ordering such a test ("branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman"), and a person cannot be compelled to give a blood sample.	Trash is public property, see here for example: "The abandonment of property is the relinquishing of all title, possession, or claim to or of it". I think the assumption that a DNA code "belongs to you" is legally questionable. If you don't abandon it, you can own specific molecules of DNA. The only way to legally control replication of that pattern (garnerd via trash picking) would be via copyright or patent. But natually occurring DNA cannot be patented (Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.). As a natural fact, it is also not subject to copyright.	There is not uniformity of law on this question, which is usually decided in the period after a death, but before a will is admitted to probate or an executor is appointed (typically in three to five days). As a result, the legal jurisdiction (usually a country or sub-national state or autonomous region) involved matters a great deal. For example, Italy used to presume that you did not want organ donation if you didn't execute a document during life saying that you did, and now has the opposite presumption. Similarly, many jurisdictions used to give a blood relative priority over a same sex partner, but now recognize a civil union or same sex marriage as having priority over a blood relative. Some jurisdictions give you some say over, for example, whether your body's organs will be donated or your body will be used for medical research. Some have formal documents that can be drafted and there are such things as "negative" provisions that are documents saying who cannot do something with your body. Other jurisdictions, as user6726 suggests, have a fixed priority system for determining who is next of kin and that applies strictly. Needless to say, a critical issue is how any such directive would be enforced. Obviously you, being dead, can't do that, and documents don't simply crawl out of desk drawers and walk themselves into court houses after your death either. Your wishes will never be enforced unless someone takes it upon themselves at the critical moment, to take action, and in that case, local law determines under what circumstances that person's statement regarding your wishes will be honored. Often, the person who might step up to take action doesn't learn of your death and of the location of your body until it is too late. If you die in circumstances where your identity is unknown, or where no relatives can be located and no directives can be located, some public official or whomever else ends up in possession of your body (often a corner) will have to decide for themselves what to do without your input.	Can Alice still get child support, or will she be denied because she can not definitively prove which man is the child's biological father? The legal standard is a preponderance of the evidence (i.e. more likely than not) and there is plenty of evidence that can be offered in addition to DNA evidence, such as testimony under oath from people in a position to know who was having sex with whom at the relevant times. Contrary to a common misconception, testimony under oath is still solid evidence that can support a verdict on appeal. Alice had neither a long standing romantic relationship with Bob nor anyone that was a witness to the sexual act, thus making the question of who she slept with difficult to prove. It isn't that hard to prove. Q to Alice's physician: Based upon an ultrasound, when did Alice conceive? A: April 5-8, 2021. Q to DNA expert: Based upon the DNA test, who could the father be? A: Billy or Bob. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Billy between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Bob between April 5-8, 2021? A: Yes. Q to Billy: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Billy: Why not? A: I was at the Shuffleboard World Cup in Tibet, I have time stamped pictures. Q to Bob: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: -- if Yes, judge says he believes Bob and Alice and the case is over. -- if No, the judge decides who among Bob, Billy, and Alice the judge believes based upon other evidence. Ultimately, the judge has to rule between the two based upon non-genetic evidence and resolve credibility disputes just as in any other case that doesn't involve DNA evidence (which is the vast majority of cases). Also, the edge cases are few are far between. Identical twins are rare to start with, and few women have sex with more than one identical twin in the several day period when she could have conceived or didn't know which twin she had sex with. It has happened at least once in history (post-DNA testing), but you can probably count the number of times that it has ever happened on one hand. For example, presumptions from cohabitation, marriage, and claims of paternity often resolve paternity disputes without DNA evidence. Further, to the extent that there is good faith uncertainty (perhaps everyone agrees that the mother has sex with both twins on the only possible day of conception and nobody really knows), the downsides to a mistake in the larger cosmic sense of the overall paternity law system are minimal, as identical twins very rarely become deeply alienated from each other and instead tend to be close and intensely cooperative once they discover each other, and tend to be similar to each other in almost every respect depriving the child of little if the court gets it wrong. Realistically, identical twins are particularly likely to settle out of court so the judge doesn't have to decide. In one of the only two actual cases I could locate that went to trial (in Brazil), both twins were ordered to pay child support because the evidence showed that they actively conspired with each other to confound the mother and the court regarding who the father was, and conspiracies can support joint and several liability. The other case reported in a news story had convincing circumstantial evidence supporting one identical twin over the other that probably establish a presumption of paternity for one twin and not the other. One of the twins, who cannot be named for legal reasons, went to court last summer in the hope of forcing the mother to grant him access to the child. Although his name is not on the birth certificate, he claims he is the only father the boy has known, cared for him every other weekend, provided financial support and was even known to him as 'papa'. But then the man's relationship with his girlfriend broke down and the visits halted. When he began legal proceedings to prove his paternity, the mother made her claim that she had been sleeping with his twin at around the same time. The twins have said they knew they were both having sex with the woman, but argue that only one had sex during the period of conception. Both refused to undergo a DNA test: the complainant refused to pay the £335 charge while his brother, who has since married and fathered children, does not consider himself involved in the dispute. Now, however, Judge Jolin has asked the complainant to take a DNA test by 1 December to ensure he can claim even possible paternity, while his brother may also be tested. (The second case is in Quebec and the cost of the test in pounds is apparently a currency conversion value.) (It is possible in principle to distinguish even identical twins from each other with high coverage whole genome tests that would reveal a few random mutations in each twin out of billions of possible mutations, but it is currently prohibitively expensive to do so.) Can she even get a paternity test given that it would not be definitive proof which man was the father? Yes. This rules out all 4 billion men in the world minus two of them. It has great probative value, narrowing the list of possible fathers down to two.	In the US, the most wide-spread proscription against a medical treatment (broadly construed) is that only 10 of 50 states allow physician-assisted suicide. In Washington v. Glucksberg (one of the states that subsequently made such suicides legal), SCOTUS affirms that such a law does not violate the Due Process Clause. Given a historical analysis, the court concludes that an "asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause". O'Connor in her concurring opinion further states that "There is no dispute that dying patients in Washington and New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths", but this falls short of a ruling that a person has a protected liberty interest in seeking medical care. Cruzan v. Director affirms that "[a] competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical treatment" (also noting that "informed consent" may derive from common law or specific state constitutions). Reciting prior reasoning on Due Process and medical treatment and referring to Jacobson v. Massachusetts (smallpox case), they note that "the Court balanced an individual's liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine against the State's interest in preventing disease". There seems to be a dearth of cases affirming a protected liberty interest in seeking a particular medical procedure. Were the court to announce a fundamental right to seek some medical treatment, that right could still be subordinated to the states compelling interest in preventing some harm associated with a medical procedure, with legal review being carried out under a strict scrutiny standard. It should be borne in mind that Congress does limit access to drugs and devices, hence there is no constitutionally-protected right to take LSD as a treatment for mental problems. To the extent that a procedure relies on a (not-yet approved) device, that device must be approved by the FDA.	According to a Politico article from July this year EU Parliament lets companies look for child abuse on their platforms, with reservations The European Parliament on Tuesday approved a controversial law that would allow digital companies to detect and report child sexual abuse on their platforms for the next three years. Tuesday's vote was the final hurdle for the bill, and will allow companies to scan their platforms for explicit material without fear of violating Europe's strict privacy laws. The bill pitted the European Commission, who proposed the bill, and children's rights activists against the Parliament and Europe's privacy regulators, who fear the bill could undermine the EU's privacy rules. The results showed 537 MEPs voted in favor of the bill, with 133 against and 24 abstaining. Despite the result, [some] European lawmakers warned that the rules are "legally flawed" and could crumble in front of a court. [...] MEPs also said that the blanket scanning of private messages of European citizens to look for evidence of child grooming could clash with another set of privacy rules protecting personal data, the GDPR. To allay the Parliament's concerns, EU countries agreed to modify the Commission’s law to add additional safeguards, including bringing in Europe's network of privacy watchdogs to advise on what technologies should be used to do the scanning, and how they should be used. They also left out audio messages from the bill. The changes prompted Sippel, who was negotiating on behalf of the Parliament, to sign off on the bill. So YMMV, but insofar it looks pretty legal unless a court decides otherwise. It seems Apple went public with their plan after this EU law was passed, so they probably took it into account. For what's that worth, there's an analysis from someone at Cambridge (in the Compliant and Accountable Systems Group, Department of Computer Science and Technology) that: EU law would require that Apple obtain the consent of individual iPhone users for on-device scanning. This consent would need to be opt-in, rather than opt-out; there would need to be a real possibility for users to refuse consent; users’ access to iCloud could not be made conditional on giving consent to CSAM Detection; and users must be able to withdraw consent without suffering loss of iCloud service. This may place a welcome brake on the deployment of on- device CSAM detection in the EU. However, these barriers may be removed by future EU or Member State legislation – just as similar potential barriers for automated CSAM detection by certain messaging services have already been removed by EU legislation. So it seems that there would be a way for Apple to do this "device scanning" even in the EU with user (clickwrap) agreement... The paper enumerates the things than can be made implicit (bundled) in a GDPR agreement, and then goes on to argue that probably none of these apply to Apple's CSAM on device, and so they'll probably need a separate checkbox for CSAM... which the paper's author is pretty sure the users would not check. Importantly, because consent must be specific, consent to one purpose (such as processing to detect CSAM) can’t be presumed from consent to another purpose (such as processing for cloud backup). Nor can consent to processing to detect CSAM be ‘bundled’ with consent to cloud backup. GDPR strongly indicates that ‘bundling’ – the practice of making access to a service conditional on giving consent to processing that is not necessary for that service – is not permitted. [...] It is unlikely in the extreme that even minimally informed holders of CSAM would give consent to Apple’s CSAM Detection system. The paper more tenuously (IMHO) argues then that Apple needs do the same for their server-side scanning in the EU, i.e. get explicit consent, because it's somehow tied to the on-device scanning via the iCloud account. (The author also makes their personal disapproval of CSAM in all forms more explicit towards the end of the paper.) But still that someone who disapproves of CSAM entertains that it might be deployed via clickwrap user consent (albeit with a separate checkbox) is noteworthy. In this context I'll note (even though the paper doesn't), that there is a 2019 CJEU decision that pre-checking certain kinds of checkboxes (like for "nonessential" cookies) is not legal. I suspect CSAM will fall in this kind of category... so they won't be able to have the checkbox for it pre-checked, unless Apple does something more devious and make it so that image hashes become "essential" to something else that the user would more readily like to agree to... Also, looking at a current (August 1) Apple description of their system, it seems they only plan to run the image hashing on the device (and upload a threshold-encrypted version of the result, so that only multiple, cumulative "hits" on several images would be detectable/decryptable on the server), which would basically make their system (as currently envisaged) inoperable without the local hash step. I've also looked at Commission's 70-page impact assessment for their most recent proposal (the one discussed at the beginning of this answer), but it only discusses things like PhotoDNA and server-side hashing. So I guess they were unware that someone might plan to do [only] client-side hashing as part of a CSAM design. If this goes to an EU court, I guess an issue will be when and why iOS would create those (threshold-encrypted) vouchers that contain the images hashes, e.g. if they'd be considered an essential part/step of an otherwise approved purpose...	Although abortion is legal in the US, not everyone is allowed to perform an abortion. In Washington, the law allows a physician to terminate a pregnancy, and recognizes a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. An abortion performed by anyone else is not legal, and performing an illegal abortion is a class C felony. There are "plan B" pills which are legal in the US and levonorgestrel is available without a prescription, but the mifepristone and misoprostol regime is not available without a doctor's orders. In this scenario, the partner will have performed an illegal abortion, and is guilty of a controlled substances crime. In some states, there is a separate crime of fetal homicide. In Washington, this is covered under 1st degree manslaughter, a class A felony, if one "intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child". "Any injury" does not require "great violence" or "striking". It is also the class B felony of poisoning which includes slipping in a harmful substance with intent to harm another person, as well as assault.
Are paramedic required to recognize stroke and deliver the stroke victim to ER? ER arrives for a somewhat confused patient. Her speech is slurred, she has no balance. Her husband has very limited English and calls his son to translate via Skype. The paramedics warn about the danger of contracting covid-19 in ER and asks the patient whether she wants them to drive her to ER. The patient doesn't quite understand what's going on and says "no". The son asks the paramedics via Skype to evaluate her and make the decision. The paramedics reply that they don't see anything wrong with her. The daughter-in-law, an RN, tells them via Skype that the patient may have a stroke and they should take her to ER. They reply that they have to go with what the person present tells them. They leave. The patient indeed had stroke and, due to 24-hour delay, her condition worsened significantly and irreversible. Is the paramedic company liable?	Maybe, but probably not, although this would be a question of fact to resolve on a case by case basis under broad legal standards by a jury, and would also depend upon the state where it took place, and upon the nature of the employer of the paramedic. The hypothetical facts in this case are rich enough and ambiguous enough that the case could go either way depending upon how it was presented and what could be proven at trial. This is a case it would be good to take to a medical malpractice/personal injury lawyer in the jurisdiction where it happened to be evaluated. Usually a PI lawyer would not charge you for doing so or would ask for only a nominal fee. Additional factual investigation would probably also be necessary regarding some of the key facts identified below. It's complicated and there are multiple issues presented in this case where the law is not uniform from state to state. The general rule is that a medical professional has to carry out the delivery of medical care to a patient with the reasonable care that would be taken by a medical professional of that type. If the medical professional fails to take reasonable care, and that negligence failure to do so causes injury, then there is civil liability for medical malpractice. A threshold issue would be whether a medical professional-patient relationship was established. This would be a question of fact for a jury and would be a question upon which various potentially applicable state and federal laws would often not be uniform. On these facts, it could easily go either way. In federal court and in a majority of state courts (although there is variation from state to state) you need to know the name of the paramedic you dealt with who provided the bad advice to bring a successful lawsuit before suing. In a minority of states, you could sue first and get the name of the paramedic in discovery through the court process from the hospital after the lawsuit was commenced. The standard of reasonable care liability in this case would be judged by the standard of a reasonable paramedic, not a reasonable doctor. But, often states would have statutes that would limit the liability of paramedics in these situations to liability for gross negligence (which the facts in the question would probably not suffice to show), but not for ordinary negligence (which a jury could come out either way upon and which would hinge heavily on expert testimony). These tort reform type laws differ considerably from state to state. Whether or not particular conduct was negligent or grossly negligent, is a question ultimately decided by a jury under very broad and general legal standards after the fact in a trial, based largely upon expert testimony, on a case by case basis, unless the facts are unequivocally clear one way or the other, which is rarely the case. With my layman's level of knowledge about what a reasonable paramedic should be able to diagnose, I could see this determination going either way. Two cases with identical facts in front of the same judge in separate trials, in which juries are presented with exactly the same evidence could come out differently. The resolution of one case of the question of whether a particular act constituted negligence giving rise to liability is not binding as precedent and is not admissible as evidence in another case (subject to a narrow exception called "collateral estoppel" which applies when the same individual is sued by multiple people for the same conduct in different lawsuits that have resulted in final orders resolving key questions of fact that the lawsuits have in common). Many states would require that someone suing the paramedic have a medical professional certify that the paramedic's actions constituted legal negligence before the suit could go forward in a court. If there is a medical professional-patient relationship, and if the medical professional was found to have negligently caused injury, the medical professional's employer would have vicarious liability in some (but not all) states under a respondiat superior doctrine. Usually, the paramedic at an ER would be an employee of a private EMS ambulance company or a municipal fire department, and not of the hospital that runs the ER. But, some hospitals have their own in house paramedics. Also, some hospitals are run by for profit or nonprofit private companies, some are state or local governmental agencies, and some a federal government agencies. Usually only a small minority of the medical professionals in a hospital are employed by that hospital, and most of them merely have "privileges" to provide medical services for which they bill patients separately while working for their own professional corporation through which they are self-employed. Legally, the hospital itself is more like a hotel or a WeWork office space than to being a firm that directly provides medical services, although it isn't quite that black and white. Holding the ER directly responsible for failing to have good triage policies, as opposed to holding the paramedic responsible and assigning vicarious liability to the employer of the paramedic, would be very difficult, although not necessarily impossible if the ER had official policies that fell far below the standard of care for emergency room triage. It would be very uncommon for an ER to have bad policies of this type. Typically, ERs are only held directly liable for bad triage policies when, for example, they have a policy of not evaluating at all someone who does not have health insurance, which is a practice expressly prohibited by federal law. If the paramedic's employer was a government entity such as a fire department or a government owned hospital, the paramedic would be entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless an exception applied. Usually there is an express exception to absolute immunity for medical malpractice liability by a medical doctor who has established a doctor-patient relationship with a patient, when the medical doctor is employed by a state or local government, usually there isn't when the doctor is employed by the federal government. But these laws differ from state to state in fine details that matter in a case like this one regarding whether the exception to immunity from liability is limited to medical doctors or applies also to paramedics. Causation would also be an important factual issue for trial. There is liability only to the extent that taking a non-negligent action could have prevented the harm. If you are infected with COVID, one common consequence is a stroke, and if someone had a stroke while infected with COVID, the case that taking them to the ER would have prevented the stroke from doing serious damage in the long run is weaker. On the other hand, guessing that a stroke was really something else, might or might not be reasonable. The injured person would also have to prove that the EMS response occurred at a time within the roughly 1-2 hours after the start of a stroke when it is possible to take medical action that could do something about a stroke. If the stroke had already happened an hour and a half later and it was rush hour and would have taken half an hour to get to the nearest hospital, causation might be absent and there would be no liability. There would be a legitimate question of fact over whether there was an actual diagnosis and treatment, or whether there was a refusal to get treatment. The reasonable care test is a balancing test. It takes into consideration not just the potential benefits of taking action, but also the cost that would be incurred if action was taken, and the downside risks of a proposed action. The paramedic's concerns about getting a COVID infection at the ER when the person responded to didn't appear to have it at the time would make the cost of a false positive diagnosis higher and would thus influence what would constitute reasonable care in this situation as the jury applies the relevant legal test. Liability would be evaluated based upon what the paramedic reasonable understood he was being told. This would be a question of fact for the jury. It is likely that different people who were present understood what was being said differently. Even if bystanders understood what was being said and meant, what matters is what the paramedic reasonably understood was being said and meant. Given the communication difficulties involved, that question could go either way.	Firstly: that depends on the jurisdiction. It might not even be possible at all for employers to attempt to sue their own employees for damages caused by negligence. Even terminating an employment contract for reasons of negligence is quite difficult in many jurisdictions. Second, if it is possible, the question is wether such legal proceedings could be expected to be successful. Employees making mistakes is part of the risk of doing business, and distinguishing a "mistake" from "negligence", "gross negligence" , or "intentional wrongdoing" by the employee ought to place quite a burden of proof on the employer. To be held negligent in the first place, the employer will have to to prove that the employee was aware of the fact that the password they used was common, well-known and extremely insecure. Knowledge of which passwords are common and well-known is, unless you are considered a skilled IT security professional, not something that a typical employee can reasonably be expected to know. Before there can be a case for negligence by the employee, the employer needs to make a strong case that: either the employee is that skilled IT security professional that really should have know better or the company can demonstrate that they provide all employees with adequate instruction and security training that includes how to select good passwords and which bad ones to avoid and that they seriously ensure both awareness of their password and security policies and compliance. even then, not enforcing a good password policy in your IT systems and assigning or allowing users to select weak passwords is in itself already negligent...	Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it.	She can ask, but she does not have a right to be excused New York law for jurors does not have an automatic right to be excused because of familial care needs. There is a right to be excused for medical or financial hardship - which you might be able to argue here if, for example, you were at risk of losing your job. There is also a right for automatic postponement of 2 to 6 months (to allow you to arrange care, for example) but you have to request this a week in advance. Unfortunately, as they say on their website: "Jury duty, like paying taxes, is mandatory." That said, judges have discretion to excuse jurors and normal practice is for the judge to state the estimated length of the trial and ask for reasons why a juror cannot serve. If they satisfy the judge the juror will be excused.	You can write anything you want (basic First Amendment protections): the question is whether one would be liable for damage that arises from what you're written, or whether you can distribute what you've written. Distribution may be restricted, thanks to the Commerce Clause (hence FDA regulations, which figure prominently in the analysis). Most software writers are not medical practitioners, and vice versa, and what the software writer does is implement something described by a competent medical practitioner. It is logically possible that a med. practitioner might also try to write software (no problem) and distribute it (possibly a problem); or, a software writer might read up on something on Wikipedia and try to implement it (again, no problem) or distribute it (possible problem). Damages can be sorted into two categories, implementation errors and scientific errors, and having ruled out deliberate sabotage, we are left with negligence. If the software writer failed to use suitable care in writing code that sums a set of numbers, the software writer has been negligent. If the person purporting to have the qualified scientific knowledge mis-states the formula, that person has been negligent. It is possible for many parties to be negligent (the programmer failed to be diligent in understanding the software requirements; the medical professional failed to adequately explain what was required of the program). The FDA does regulate medical devices, and "device" is construed pretty broadly (condoms are non-exempt class 2 medical devices). There is FDA guidance on medical software which makes it clear that the device manufacturer shoulders the regulatory burden. Anytime you manufacture a tangible thing (which is within the scope of FDA regulation for medical devices), you have to have the thing approved. Many (most?) medical devices implement software, and are thus within the scope of FDA scrutiny. It is not illegal to write software that ends up being implemented in an unapproved medical device, but the unapproved medical device itself is illegal. It is reasonably likely that purported medical software (not a gadget with software build in) would be held to be a non-exempt device. To know if something is exempt, you would look at the exemptions list, and determine that your program (or thing) is not on or implied by anything on that list. The visual acuity eye chart is a class 1 exempt item, as is the manual toothbrush. There is no way to specifically look for things that are only software, or that contain software, so the search through the list would have to be guided by knowledge of the subject area. Canada is helpful in explaining when software is a regulated medical device. This is non-probative w.r.t. US law but gives you an idea what is likely to be considered a "device". Under Canadian law, the software would be clearly a regulated medical device. The FDA has a power-point that attempts to say something about the matter which warns you that you are on your own and "You will need to go back to study and use the source regulatory documents" to make the determination. Eventually, slide 13, they hint that if you intend the software to be used in diagnosis, prevention, or treatment, then it is a device (so, yes, the aforementioned software would be a device, and probably not exempt from regulations). General purpose software (word processors, web browsers, communications software, etc.) are not indented to be used for a regulated purpose, although they can be so used, and thus they are probably not subject to FDA regulation. There is a murky relationship between regulatory approval and liability. Being approved by the government does not convey immunity to negligence suits (see Wyeth v. Levine), but being approved can have weight in determining whether a party was negligent, since regulatory scrutiny ostensibly filters out errors that could have been caught. Federal approval does not preempt state tort law, as the court ruled. Regulations pertaining to medical devices hold for anything that qualifies as a device, and is not defined (negatively) in terms of disclaimers. If you sell a medical device but label it saying "this is not a medical device, it is not created by a competent medical practitioner", that doesn't make it not a medical device. Unfortunately, what counts as a regulated device is based on intended use, and there is an obvious connection between disclaimers and intentions. Taking MS Word as an example, MS does not as far as I know say that "Word is not intended to be used as a medical device". It can certainly be used to diagnose, teat, and prevent medical conditions, but so too can a screw driver or pretty much anything else. The number of non-medical uses vastly outweigh the medical uses, so it would be deemed not to be a regulated device. A program which prescribed a set of prayers to be uttered in case of illness would be subject to First Amendment override of any FDA regulations. Quack medical devices are prohibited (that's why there is regulation of devices in the first place), but discerning the fine line between permitted actions based on nutty beliefs and forbidden actions is not easy. The FDA also has guidance on the distinction between "Complementary and Alternative Medicine", which does not clearly state that, for example, a software reading of your cakra-energies based on a computer program's questions is not a medical device. They do say of mind-body medicine (mentioning yoga, biofeedback and tai chi as examples) that "CAM practices in this domain would not be subject to our jurisdiction under the Act or the PHS Act", but then say "any equipment or other products used as part of the practice of mind-body medicine may be subject to FDA regulation, depending on the nature of the product and its intended use" (hence a yoga-enabling program may be subject to regulation).	This is "Topic #601" in various ForwardHealth interpretative statements about BadgerCare Plus and Medicaid. The last 3 paragraphs say: When commercial health insurance plans require members to use a designated network of providers, non-network (i.e., providers who do not have a contract with the member's commercial health insurance plan) will be reimbursed by the commercial health insurance plan only if they obtain a referral or provide an emergency service. Except for emergency services and covered services that are not covered under the commercial health insurance plan, members enrolled in both a commercial health insurance plan and BadgerCare Plus or Wisconsin Medicaid (i.e., state-contracted MCO (managed care organization), fee-for-service) are required to receive services from providers affiliated with the commercial health insurance plan. In this situation, providers are required to refer the members to the commercial health insurance plan's network providers. This is necessary because commercial health insurance is always primary to BadgerCare Plus. BadgerCare Plus and Wisconsin Medicaid will not reimburse the provider if the commercial health insurance plan denied or would deny payment because a service otherwise covered under the commercial health insurance plan was performed by a provider outside the plan. In addition, if a member receives a covered service outside their commercial health insurance plan, the provider cannot collect payment from the member. If we take these statements by the Dept. of Health Services as correct interpretations of the law, then it seems that their interpretation is correct: "providers are required to refer the members to the commercial health insurance plan's network providers" (you as a patient have no choice) and "the provider cannot collect payment from the member" (they are encouraged to refer you to a network provider, because they are prohibited by law from taking payment from you). If you had received the services from the provider and not mentioned any insurance, this would have been treated as a normal doctor-patient case, and they would not know that the state would prohibit them from receiving payment from you. By going through the motions with insurance, I regret to say that you exposed them to relevant knowledge which they cannot take back or deny. The fraud would be between the provider and the state, via the provider's relation with this program. That does not endorse the DHS legal interpretation, but since they are the ones who wrote the regulations, it is fairly likely that (by definition) they got it right.	In the US, the most wide-spread proscription against a medical treatment (broadly construed) is that only 10 of 50 states allow physician-assisted suicide. In Washington v. Glucksberg (one of the states that subsequently made such suicides legal), SCOTUS affirms that such a law does not violate the Due Process Clause. Given a historical analysis, the court concludes that an "asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause". O'Connor in her concurring opinion further states that "There is no dispute that dying patients in Washington and New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths", but this falls short of a ruling that a person has a protected liberty interest in seeking medical care. Cruzan v. Director affirms that "[a] competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical treatment" (also noting that "informed consent" may derive from common law or specific state constitutions). Reciting prior reasoning on Due Process and medical treatment and referring to Jacobson v. Massachusetts (smallpox case), they note that "the Court balanced an individual's liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine against the State's interest in preventing disease". There seems to be a dearth of cases affirming a protected liberty interest in seeking a particular medical procedure. Were the court to announce a fundamental right to seek some medical treatment, that right could still be subordinated to the states compelling interest in preventing some harm associated with a medical procedure, with legal review being carried out under a strict scrutiny standard. It should be borne in mind that Congress does limit access to drugs and devices, hence there is no constitutionally-protected right to take LSD as a treatment for mental problems. To the extent that a procedure relies on a (not-yet approved) device, that device must be approved by the FDA.	Charged? Of course, the police can charge you with anything at any time Could you be convicted? Maybe. Their best shot is charging you with “Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act” also called constructive manslaughter. The Crown must prove your act: was intentional, was unlawful, leads the reasonable person to realise that some other person is at risk of physical harm, and caused the death. The first two are uncontestable: the protesters are deliberately engaging in an illegal act. No 3 would be up to the jury. No 4 is also up to the jury and would turn on the evidence that the delay to the ambulance caused the death.
My dentist denies mistakenly cutting off the tag connecting the lip to gum while putting in an implant. What can I do? The implant was unrelated to the tag, officially called the "upper labial frenulum", and the implant was for one of the two front teeth (Upper Central Incisor).	You'd have to get technical advice from Dentistry SE or something like that, but it is unlikely that this constitutes malpractice, instead was found to be necessary in the course of the implant. You could hire a lawyer to research the question to see if there is a reasonable probability that you could recover damages from a lawsuit, but the main difficulty would be establishing that you've been harmed. You would need an expert dental witness to establish that there is no reasonable connection between the implant and the frenectomy, and it might be an impossible to find a credible witness to that effect given that there is ample evidence that it can be necessary. If you are really saying that he is denying having performed the procedure, then in addition you would have to prove that he did, maybe with before and after pictures.	With the additional information in the comment, the approach most likely to give you a good outcome would be to present this as a dispute between the retailler and the manufacturer. Make a note of who said what and when, and try to obtain written confirmation from the retailler. It sounds like the retailler is currently on your side, which makes your position stronger as your legal contract is with them and they will have obligations under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (I'm assuming you bought the item as a private individual and not as a business). Note that you may not have a right to replacement. Consumer protection legislation and warranty terms include several ways the supplier can provide redress (usually repair / refund / replace). Since the preference is replacement, you will not be able to argue an inherent design fault with the product. This may give the manufacturer the opportunity to assert that the retailler, or you, specified an incorrect fitting kit - or that it was incorrectly installed. If the fittings were supplied with the foil, you could argue that it was an issue with these that led to total loss of the rest of the foil. It looks like you currently have grounds to claim this against the retailler. If there's no satisfactory resolution, consulting the Citizens Advice bureau would be a good place to start.	That is not at all what USPTO is telling you. Courts do not simply "dismiss" patents - that isn't a terminology you'd ever see used for a patent that was found to be invalid. Timeline of events: United Industries Corporation brought a suit against the owner of the patent, claiming unpatentability. That case went to trial, and the court found the claim to be invalid and that UIC failed to show unpatentability. UIC appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case because both parties agreed to its dismissal (it's possible they reached some external agreement we don't know about). As far as I can tell, at this moment, the patent is active.	There is, as far as I can see, no Crown exemption from the sale of goods acts (including the International Sale of Goods Conventions), but unfortunately for this patient the NHS has no liability either in logic or in law. The doctor provided a written prescription, for which there is no charge, and which allows patients to buy certain drugs. The patient took the prescription to a chemist's, which (for money) provided the drug specified in it. Even if the patient had noticed that the prescription was for the wrong form of medicine, the pharmacist has no discretion to alter it; if the prescription specifies tablets, the patient can either buy the tablets or not buy them and take the prescription back to the doctor. In neither case has either the doctor or the chemist committed any conceivable offence regarding sale of goods. (There might theoretically be a case for negligence, but it would never be worth either suing a doctor for an £8 prescription fee or reporting him to the authorities for writing a prescription for the right drug in the wrong form).	I will note from the outset that journal editors might require things from you that go beyond what is legally necessary. A typical case is that they will require one to obtain permission before reusing a figure from another article/journal/author (even though in the vast majority of cases no such permission would be needed). The legal answer might allow you to push back on the editor’s demands, but they still have the last word. There are two kinds of intellectual property to consider. Unless otherwise noted, this answer is valid for france and united-states. Trademark is almost certainly not an issue Trademark is a right to branding. A trademark holder can prevent others from using certain elements to promote their own products. The elements need not be complex, they just need to be recognizable by the public as related to the brand in question. For instance, "Tesla" is the name of an 19th century Serbian-American inventor known among other things for discoveries related to radio transmission. You would probably be able to market a radio transmitter under a "Tesla" brand (assuming there are no existing trademarks, which I have not checked). If you try the same thing with electrical vehicles, you will get sued. For a research paper, as long as you do not imply that Visa or MasterCard support your research or its results in any way, that should not be an issue. I assume, but cannot guarantee, that the above applies to most Western jurisdictions. Copyright Copyright is a protection or creative elements. Whoever authors a creative work can forbid others from distributing it under certain conditions. Are the Visa and MasterCard logos copyrighted? The first question is whether the elements at hand are protected under copyright. In the case of the Visa and MasterCard logos, this might depend on the jurisdiction. The criterion for "creativity" varies a lot. Some jurisdiction have adopted (some version of) the sweat of the brow doctrine, according to which work suffices to produce a "creative element" with copyright protection. The typical example are databases of facts where each individual entry is unoriginal but the collection might take some time to collect, curate and maintain (such as a phone book). In the united-states, the Supreme Court rejected the sweat of the brow doctrine in 1991. Accordingly, a work needs to reach the threshold of originality. Determining whether the threshold is met for a given work is done on a case-by-case basis at trial. However, it seems very likely that both logos are not protected by copyright in the United States. The Visa logo is a simple font with no significant creative elements; the MasterCard logo contains two overlapping circles. I note that Wikimedia Commons hosts both logos on their website and claims they are public-domain under that rationale (Visa, MasterCard). Wikimedia Commons usually follows copyright fairly closely, and they are a high-profile website hence a prime target for takedown requests by IP lawyers at Visa or MasterCard, so that is weak evidence that their claim is correct. But there is always the possibility that Visa / MasterCard just have not decided to sue yet. In france, the statute makes no explicit reference any threshold of originality: (article L-112-1 of the code of intellectual property) Les dispositions du présent code protègent les droits des auteurs sur toutes les oeuvres de l'esprit, quels qu'en soient le genre, la forme d'expression, le mérite ou la destination. The present code [containing all copyright statutes] protect copyrights for any works of mind, whatever their style, form of expression, artistic worth, or intended use. However, various court cases have tended to require "works of mind" to exhibit some amount of intellectual originality. For instance, Civ. 1ère 22 janv. 2009, n°08-11404 held that a perfume cannot be copyrighted because la fragrance d'un parfum, qui procède de la simple mise en oeuvre d'un savoir-faire, ne constitue pas la création d'une forme d'expression pouvant bénéficier de la protection des oeuvres de l'esprit par le droit d'auteur the smell of a perfume comes from the simple application of a know-how and does not constitute the creation of a form of expression subject to the protection of works of mind by copyright After a fifteen-minute look at various cases, I still do not have any strong idea of whether the Visa or MasterCard logo would be copyrighted in France. Let’s assume for the sake of the argument that they are. "Fair use" Even copyrighted works can be used without the copyright holder’s agreement under certain exceptions. Here again, any precise answer is jurisdiction-specific. "Fair use" is a US-specific doctrine, resulting from a string of court cases eventually codified into law (Wikipedia has a decent history). It is a rather general doctrine (any use case can be analyzed under the four balancing factors) and results can be hard to predict. I believe research articles usually fall on the right side, but because the logos under discussion are not under copyright in the US (see above), I will not attempt to make any in-depth analysis. Pedantic note: it is sloppy wording to use the term "fair use" for similar clauses in other jurisdictions. "Fair use" is a US doctrine. In france, the corresponding doctrine is given by a rather strict but precise statute at article L122-5 of the code of intellectual property: Lorsque l'oeuvre a été divulguée, l'auteur ne peut interdire : (...) 3° Sous réserve que soient indiqués clairement le nom de l'auteur et la source : a) Les analyses et courtes citations justifiées par le caractère critique, polémique, pédagogique, scientifique ou d'information de l'oeuvre à laquelle elles sont incorporées ; When the work has been published, the author cannot forbid: (...) 3° As long as the name of the author and the source are clearly mentioned: a) Analysis and short citations justified by the inclusion in a work with an aim of criticism, debate, pedagogy, science or information A research article is the typical case of a "work of science" (science means here "scholarly research", not STEM). I have little doubt that it would be a covered use, especially if the paper discusses the reason behind the choice of those logos (easily recognizable by test subjects? simple shapes? etc.).	The parties can be required under oath to explain what they understand the plain meaning of the words to be. Where they disagree about the plain meaning of the words, they can use expert witnesses to give weight to their interpretation. Once the judge determines the plain meaning of the words (either by agreement between the parties or by reference to expert witnesses or other evidence), it is a matter of standard contract interpretation. Even in the case of an idioticon, where no expert witnesses are available, if the disagreement between the parties surrounds only a few words, the judge could find that there is no actual ambiguity because the context. Also, the judge could refer to parole evidence if needed. The purpose of the written contract is to provide evidence of your agreement. It is a bad idea to create evidence that you both may want to rely upon at some point if nobody else can understand it.	Breathalyzer tests are distinct from blood tests because the former does not "implicat[e] significant privacy concerns" (see Birchfeld v. ND). A cell phone is like a blood test, because it implicates significant privacy concerns, especially the level of electro-snooping that would be required to determine if someone had recently committed a phone-use offense. As the court held, Because the impact of breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for BAC testing is great, the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. A breath test might (but also might not) also satisfy the exigent-circumstances exception (waiting some number of hours for a warrant can easily result in the destruction of evidence), but a cell phone case could not give rise to such an exception. It should perhaps be noted that the "implied consent" laws are misnamed, because consent is not the issue. The 4th Amendment ban is on unreasonable searches, not unconsented searches. If you actually consent, it is reasonable for the police to search. I am not aware of any ruling to the effect that "because the defendant consented, the search is valid". In the context of breathalyzer law and case-law, an essential component of what makes the search reasonable is that it is incident to an arrest. With or without consent, or an implied consent law, Having assessed the effect of BAC tests on privacy interests and the need for such tests, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. Extending "implied consent" to cause-unrelated searches of cars, homes, or body cavities might not pass strict scrutiny. The state has a legitimate interest in public safety which justifies some minimal intrusion, but adding a provision that "when you drive, you give implied consent to searches of everything" is not narrowly tailored. But since driving is a privilege and not a right, the state has much more leeway to give you an ultimatum: if you don't cooperate with the search, you can lose your license. On the other hand, SCOTUS has not actually approved of this slogan about driving being a privilege. Something noteworthy from Birchfield is that the court also disapproves of blood tests because a less invasive method of achieving the result is available, and they grant that "Imposition of a warrant requirement for every BAC test would likely swamp courts, given the enormous number of drunk-driving arrests, with little corresponding benefit". There being no less-invasive alternative means of realizing the legitimate state interest in stopping distracted driving, I actually expect that when this comes to pass and the matter ends up at SCOTUS, there will be another important change in search law (but "implied consent" will still be irrelevant).	It means what it literally says, that safety and effectiveness have not been established in certain contexts. The rationale behind saying this is §201.57 of 21 CFR 201, a regulation that mandates giving warnings. It is permitted to use a device or prescribe a substance where it is not yet proven that it is effective or safe for that usage, but you must not imply that it is perfectly safe and effective in all contexts. This part of the federal regulations dictates language aimed at particular scientific uncertainties. Insofar as a patient is expected to give informed consent for a treatment, informing the patient that a treatment is to some extent unproven is an essential part of the information that must be given for informed consent. So you can interpret it as a flag to the patient (or the prescribing doctor) that there is greater risk.
What can I do if a builder ignores me while I try to have them fix something that is under warranty? I am a US citizen living in the US. I own a condo, which has a builder's warranty on it. I have been attempting to contact the builder to fix an issue with my roof/ceiling that is covered on the active (ie not expired) warranty, but have not received a response for a few weeks. If they simply continue to ignore me, what can I do? What happens if the problem gets worse and worse? Is suing the builder the only option? I'm not sure what to do.	You can politely request over the phone that he fix it. You can politely request by letter that he fix it. You can hire an attorney to firmly request by letter that he fix it. You can sue him to get the courts to order him to fix it. You can also decide to fix it and forget the warranty. One thing that you can't do is let the physical situation get worse to the point of disaster and hope to recover the even greater damages that would result. If he is ignoring your letters, then get a lawyer.	It depends on the location and the nature of the structure. In Seattle, for example, it requires a permit. Usually, any such structure does require a building permit, which means that the government has to approve the plans w.r.t. offset requirement, height requirements and so on. There may be a view ordinance, or not; you may have a view easement, or not. Whatever the case may be, you should not assume that the government agency in charge will vigorously work to protect your interests over the neighbor's interest. You own attorney is the one who will vigorously and professionally defend exclusively your interests (likewise, the neighbor's attorney). Your description doesn't explain how this would "invite residents to congregate directly in front of my living room windows", which seems unlikely for a dwelling. If for instance this is really a bar and not a dwelling, then zoning issues about businesses arise.	Usually, you cannot place a mechanic's lien on public property. But, construction projects on public property generally have to be bonded and the bonding company is usually stated either in the contract or in a public document authorizing the project. So, instead of placing a lien on the property, one makes a claim against the public works bond in a very similar manner. The first time you do this, you need a lawyer, because both the formalities of the bond claim document and the timing are often very particular with very short statutes of limitations (week or months, not years) although once you learn the process, you can probably make the initial bond claim yourself, although you would need a lawyer to bring suit to enforce it if the bonding company doesn't pay the claim without complaint.	The key language to be taken notice of in that code is 'by fraud or deception'. If the property manager has provided reasonable notice of a clear-out, then the code doesn't apply due to lack of fraud or deception. But at the end of the day, just go and check the mail room on a Thursday afternoon and you shouldn't have any problems.	It seems that you have a valid contract and he has breached it. You could sue for the value of a year's hosting in a small claims court. Whether this is worth the effort ...	Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough).	With the additional information in the comment, the approach most likely to give you a good outcome would be to present this as a dispute between the retailler and the manufacturer. Make a note of who said what and when, and try to obtain written confirmation from the retailler. It sounds like the retailler is currently on your side, which makes your position stronger as your legal contract is with them and they will have obligations under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (I'm assuming you bought the item as a private individual and not as a business). Note that you may not have a right to replacement. Consumer protection legislation and warranty terms include several ways the supplier can provide redress (usually repair / refund / replace). Since the preference is replacement, you will not be able to argue an inherent design fault with the product. This may give the manufacturer the opportunity to assert that the retailler, or you, specified an incorrect fitting kit - or that it was incorrectly installed. If the fittings were supplied with the foil, you could argue that it was an issue with these that led to total loss of the rest of the foil. It looks like you currently have grounds to claim this against the retailler. If there's no satisfactory resolution, consulting the Citizens Advice bureau would be a good place to start.	You sue BOTH the contractor AND his insurance company. Your interest is in being made whole. It doesn't matter who pays you — whether the contractor pays or the insurance company pays. As long as you are made whole. One scenario you want to avoid is holding a judgment against a contractor who doesn't have the money to pay you then turns around and claims bankruptcy or skips town. That's why you sue both. You want to have a judgment against the insurance company too in case the contractor can not or does not pay you. Also, check your jurisdiction but you might need to sue in Circuit Court because the limit of jurisdiction for small claims court might be set at $5,000 as it is in many jurisdictions. You should sue for the highest amount possible. Then negotiate downward if warranted. Your invoices for materials and labor from your recent renovations and any photographs you might have taken would be your evidence to support your claim exceeding the ACV. If you sue them, they will negotiate.
Does Air France Cancellation policy violate EU 261/2004 Related to https://travel.stackexchange.com/questions/155243/air-france-cancellation-policy-seems-to-violate-eu261 but this question is explicitly about legality as compared to "how to approach Expedia" Air France Cancellation Policy says for flights canceled by Air France: complete the online form below to obtain a travel voucher. This voucher is valid for 1 year on all Air France, KLM, Delta Air Lines and Virgin Atlantic flights. This voucher will be refundable after one year if it is not used EU 261/2004 Article 5: In case of cancellation of a flight, the passengers concerned shall: (a) be offered assistance by the operating air carrier in accordance with Article 8; and Article 8: Where reference is made to this Article, passengers shall be offered the choice between: (a) - reimbursement within seven days, by the means provided for in Article 7(3), of the full cost of the ticket at the price at which it was bought, for the part or parts of the journey not made, and for the part or parts already made if the flight is no longer serving any purpose in relation to the passenger's original travel plan, together with, when relevant, So it seems that EU261 requires refund within 7 days but Air France is offering only a travel voucher that may be refunded after one year. Questions: Does this Air France policy violate EU 261 ? If yes, what options does a passenger have to get a full refund as required bu EU 261 ?	Answering my own question after some more research (which I should have done in the first place). Yes, it's illegal both in the US and in the EU Many airlines do it anyway because they are desperate for cash and hoping that no government agency will enforce it. A trade group is actually lobbying to change the laws Airlines will do what they can to make you accept a voucher. Some create an incentive, some make it just extremely difficult to get refund or they will simply deny it. If you accept a voucher, you waive the right for a refund. Only realistic option is a charge back through the credit card but I haven't found any successful examples yet. Good overview articles: https://onemileatatime.com/flight-cancelled-refund/ https://viewfromthewing.com/airlines-are-breaking-the-law-by-refusing-refunds-for-cancelled-flights/	You asked about other jurisdictions. As you'll probably be aware (from cases like EU vs Microsoft and EU vs Google) European countries and culture tend to have much stronger protection laws for consumer and employee rights than the US does. In the UK you could make a strong case, although such cases are not often undertaken. The current legislation is Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, but the unfair contract terms clause goes back to at least the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Basically the law protects a person in a situation where disparity of size and bargaining power have led to unfair terms in a contract (typically a large company offering "take it or leave it" standard terms) - and specifically if they create a significant disparity in the parties rights and obligations. In such a situation the company which drafted the terms alleged to be unfair must show they are reasonable. A list of common terms likely to be seen as unfair is provided. (Employment terms are covered by other laws but also aim to prevent abuses due to inequality of contracting power) A company which sold a product like Windows 7/8/8.1 and then later said "we are changing our terms of support and forcing you to upgrade" (especially to a different product the user may not want, or a product that is maintained in a different way),would almost certainly be at substantial risk of falling foul of this. It wouldn't matter if it was done by not providing the support/patches as originally implied (by custom or normal expectation) or as agreed in an explicit statement of support life cycle, or by saying "we have the right under the contract to do this", or by forcing what is essentially a change of product to get the updates. It also wouldnt matter how big they are, nor whether or not the user had already agreed "because I felt I had no choice". The law is there specifically to protect against abuses like this, so it is drafted to catch companies who try to find "wriggle room".	The "right to be forgotten" is not absolute. It is subject (Art. 17) to certain conditions, in particular the absence of "overriding legitimate grounds for the processing" (1(c)). 3(b) explicitly exempts data controllers from the erasure where needed "for compliance with a legal obligation which requires processing by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject". I can even imagine a former employee first claiming his right to be forgotten, and then - a week after getting the confirmation - claiming his right to receive a resumee (a right in existense in Germany), which a company would not be able to fulfill as it hasnt got any data to base the resumee on. If the "right to receive a resumee" indeed exists in Germany and employers need to comply with it, that would be perfectly legitimate ground to only partially fulfil the request to be forgotten⁠ — forget everything but the resume. Is it against the law to document these cases? If you document "On 27 February 2020 John Smith requested to be forgotten so we deleted or anonymised all his records", you will effectively NOT forget him. If you actually had to forget him, it will therefore be against the law to document your forgetting that way.	This aspect (and many others) of contract law is applicable in the US and various countries of the EU. can they renege after the candidate has begun their journey, thus saddling the candidate with the travel cost? No. The company would incur breach of contract. There is no need for a formal contract. The candidate only needs to prove that the company agreed (in writing, orally or clearly through its conduct) to cover or reimburse those expenses and that this elicited a meeting of the minds. The agreement would be void if the candidate incurred the expenses despite knowing (via timely notice) that the company changed its mind. Likewise, if the candidate lied on his CV, the contract (here, the company's agreement to cover the expenses) would be voidable by the company, since the candidate's intentional misrepresentations preclude the aforementioned condition of meeting of the minds. --Edited on 1/18/2019 to add ...-- Per suggestion by @KRyan, the aspect of void or voidable contract is expanded. But first, two disclaimers are pertinent: We need to be mindful that many of the follow-up concerns are either premised on or inspired by the situation described in the underlying Workplace SE post. These are somewhat beyond the scope of this Law SE question but addressed nonetheless, given their relevance as well as the OP's & audience's interest. The follow-up hypotheticals [in this Law SE question] and clarifications thereto neither speculate nor pass judgment on the stranded candidate who asked on Workplace SE. The Workplace SE post reflects a company's breach of contract. The subsequent comments here about fraud hypotheticals are mostly derivative inquiries beyond what is described in Workplace SE. In particular, we do not assume whatsoever that the stranded candidate committed fraud. The_Sympathizer commented: can the contract be voided on the spot like that without first proving in court? As it seems like it grants a rather "vigilante" justice power that is open to abuse, since effectively the "punishment" (cancellation of the flight and thus inducing a rather serious physical situation) is administered before any due process has been afforded the one accused. Yes, it can be voided on the spot (aka sua sponte). "Vigilante" justice denotes a self-attribution of punitive powers that exclusively belong to the state/government/court, whereas a party's voiding of a contract is the act of foreclosing his losses/exposures with respect to a contract that de facto never existed (such as when that contract was induced by fraud). I agree that unfortunately that is open to abuse: As a pretext to actually incur breach of contract, a company might allege that the contract was void. That is why (if taken to court) it will be the company's burden to prove that (1) it reasonably relied upon a candidate's representations (2) which were significant and blatantly false (3) given the candidate's knowledge that his lies contravened the job's core requirements. That can be quite burdensome. For instance, is the company handing out airfares without first conducting some competent corroborations about the candidate's credentials/skills? If so, one can hardly concede the company's allegation of reasonable reliance. The resulting finding would be that the contract was not voidable by the company, and thus that it is liable for breach of contract. Also, belatedly "informing" the stranded candidate that the company "is going in a different direction" falls short of evidencing that the contract was voidable. That applies even if the candidate performed very poorly in the interview or screening process. Given the hardship imposed on a stranded candidate, a company has to be morally and legally very judicious about its method and timing for "going in a different direction". But absent any representations or [company's] bylaws to the contrary, a company generally does not have the obligation to afford due process to a candidate. The court is the entity with an obligation to enforce due process as provided by law (although many of us in the U.S. have repeatedly experienced the courts' disavowal of due process). --End of edit on 1/19/2019-- a binding agreement requires both sides to give something Here, the candidate's consideration is his time and effort to accommodate the company's interest in assessing the candidate's profile at a location that is convenient to the company.	The problem was that the arresting officer and the investigating officer were two different people. After American airlines misidentified Mr Lowe as the suspect a warrant was issued for an arrest, and it wasn't until about a year later when officers in New Mexico ran his name and found that he had a warrant that they detained him. So their actions were perfectly proper. The length of his detention was primarily because the USA functions as separate legal jurisdictions, so you can be held for some time on a warrant for another state. Possibly the investigating officer should not have relied on American Airlines identification of the suspect. However, Mr. Lowe would have to overcome the qualified immunity bar to sue the PD. The case against the airline is that of negligence: they had no duty to single out Mr. Lowe; they could just have turned over all the data, as requested. Having chosen effectively to carry out their own investigation, the claim is that they owed a common law duty of care to Mr. Lowe to do it competently. It's clear that misidentifying Mr. Lowe as the suspect was likely to do him harm, so it's a reasonable foundation for a claim. More than that, we will have to see.	The answer has two parts depending on how you get here. Airline answer: Any such question by a CBP officer is merely a last-chance option to supplement the response you gave on the declaration form. The form asks a series of specific questions which are difficult to misunderstand (if you speak English), you say yes or no, and fill in applicable details. If you remember that you put an apple in your luggage, you can verbally amend the declaration. It is not necessary or practical to recite the statutory, regulatory and case law authority to ask these questions. As I recall, the electronic version asks the same questions. All versions of the form that I have encountered over the decades have included the perjury warning. If you had an alternative experience for you did not fill in a customs declaration form, that would be unusual, and a significant failure by the CBP officer(s). Land-border answer: you are right. In this case (when no customs declaration form is filled out), they rely on every person's obligation to know and comply with the law. You are required to declare the $12,000 cash that you are bringing back, and you cannot plead "I didn't know I had to declare that cash". You can always make suggestions for service-improvement to the Dept. of Homeland Security.	How I understand your question You have asked about mechanisms to "ensure the return" or something that will "trigger a law-enforcement or legal action if the child does not leave the US on the end of the submitted trip schedule." So I take it as premises of your question that there is a parenting agreement regarding schedule and return, and this trip will happen. Dale M's answer provides advice about what he recommends to a person in such a situation. However, I recognize that many parenting orders include a term that allows international travel that can't be unreasonably refused by the other parent,1 or that allow international travel with no consent necessary.2 There is no mechanism There is no mechanism to pre-register a potential violation of a parenting agreement with a foreign state. I cannot cite to a source to prove a negative, but I am familiar with the operation of the Hague Convention and non-Hague Convention regimes and none that I have encountered have such a mechanism. I have also spent some time looking to see if I have missed something, and am still convinced there is no such mechanism. 1. 2020 BCPC 16: "He shall not unreasonably withhold his written consent to such a trip. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, Y.N. has liberty to apply for a court order. If the court, on such application, finds that W.G. has unreasonably withheld his consent to such a trip, he is hereby put on notice that he may be ordered to pay Y.N.’s expenses incurred in bringing the application." 2. 2018 ABQB 1031 ("Each party shall be entitled to travel internationally with the children without the consent of the other party upon providing 30 days notice of such travel along with a full itinerary including flight information, destination, where the parties are staying and contact information."); 2010 ABPC 410 ("I will allow T.C. to travel outside the country without the written consent of the father."); 2021 ONCJ 440 ("Either party may travel with the Child outside of Canada during his or her parenting time. The Father requires the consent of the Mother, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The Mother may travel internationally with the Child without the consent of the Father, but she must advise him accordingly."); 2020 ABQB 434 ("either party may travel during their respective vacation or ordinary parenting time in Canada or internationally to any Hague Convention Country, without the consent of the other party"); 2017 BCSC 1463 ("The claimant is at liberty to travel with the Children both in Canada and internationally without the consent of the respondent.")	You entered into two contracts, one with a Canadian travel agency and on with an airline (maybe multiple airlines). The travel agency acted as your agent, in securing the booking with the airline. In each case, the contract reduces to the promise "I will give you this in exchange for that". The other parties did what they were supposed to do, now you are legally required to pay up. It is highly unlikely that your agreements included a clause to the effect that if they don't get the money from you within a particular short time-frame, the ticket is free. There can be a statutory limit on how long a civil claim (unpaid debt) is valid, but that is measured in years, not months. You can certainly negotiate with the party seeking payment (I assume it is the travel agency). If the agency clearly, unambiguously and explicitly states that they will accept half payment to settle the debt, then if they try to sue you in court, you can produce that email plus proof of payment as evidence that there is no debt. Thanking you for an offer is not clear, unambiguous and explicit acceptance of half payment.
European prohibitions on bullbars on public roads I am looking to drive my American SUV in Europe (mainly in the UK, but also probably France, Italy and Germany). I have a hefty bullbar on both the front and back of my 2002 Chevrolet Suburban, similar to this. Since these bullbars are so dangerous if you’re ever in a collision with a pedestrian, I am wondering if there are any laws in those countries which prohibit them on public roads. I am intending to go only for a short holiday, so I am not trying to register the SUV in Europe.	The answer to your question does not depend on what the laws of the UK, other countries or even the EU say about bull bars. The reason is simple: All of those countries signed the Geneva Convention on Road Traffic. According to Wikipedia, by signing the Convention, those countries agreed to respect each others technical requirements. As a result, any car registered in the US that meets US technical requirements can be legally driven on the roads of any country that signed the Convention. Thus, those countries are required by the Convention to allow you to drive with bull bars on their roads. The power of the Convention was illustrated a few years ago when Florida passed a law requiring all foreign drivers to have an International Driving Permit. Since the Convention requires signatory countries to respect the licenses of other countries, Florida had to back down from enforcing its law.	This will ultimately depend on the specific laws, but the scope of EU laws like Directive 2006/114/EC is generally restricted to the EU Single Market. Thus, we would have to consider whether the advertisement in question is directed at that market. In your scenario, you have two US-based companies that engage in comparative advertising via an US-based platform. But where these companies are headquartered is not directly relevant, as non-EU companies can participate in the EU Single Market as well. Instead, EU rules are applicable if either: the comparative advertising occurred in the context of the activities of an EU establishment such as an EU-based subsidiary; or the advertising was directed to a country in the EU Single Market, for example by fulfilling the criteria listed in the Pammer and Alpenhof cases. For example, lets assume that the companies do not have a direct EU presence, but that they offer goods or services to consumers in the EU and the comparative advertisement was in German and mentioned prices in Euros. If so, there would be a good argument that EU rules apply and that the comparative advertising was potentially illegal. But as another example, lets consider two restaurants/diners in Memphis, Tennessee, US, that made unfair comparative advertisements which were distributed via YouTube. It is possible to view the advertisement from the EU. But is there any reason for this ad to be illegal in the EU? No. This ad falls out of scope of EU law as the ad is not directed towards the EU Single Market, and it is unlikely to mislead consumers in the sense of fair competition laws as there won't be any potential customers for the Memphis restaurant in the EU. National laws could take a more narrow approach though. Does YouTube have any responsibility here? No, fair competition laws generally only address the competitors, not the platforms through which advertisements are distributed (e.g. newspapers or social media platforms). Online platforms with user-generated consent benefit from safe-harbor laws. However, there are some legal theories such as the German Störerhaftung under which it might be possible to hold an otherwise-privileged service provider responsible for acts committed by an unknown third party. Note that while comparative marketing is quite regulated in the EU and thus rare, it is not actually illegal when done fairly. For example in Germany, § 6 UWG defines criteria to determine whether comparative advertising is unfair.	UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence.	2201.4 Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated at all or such times as shall be indicated by official traffic control devices. I'm failing to see the "... except when pulling over for the police" subclause. Equally there is no "... unless you think you should" subclause. If you choose to have a hearing the evidence will show unambiguously that you drove the wrong way in a one way street and you will testify as to your reasons for doing so. For you to avoid the violation you would need to convince the examiner that a) you are telling the truth and b) that your mindset is in any way relevant. Unless the officer clearly directed you to pull into that spot, the decision to do so appears to be yours. I'd pay the fine if it was me.	The route described is probably in violation of Section 22100 of the vehicle code: Except as provided in Section 22100.5 or 22101, the driver of any vehicle intending to turn upon a highway shall do so as follows: (a) Right Turns. Both the approach for a right-hand turn and a right-hand turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb The approach for the second turn is being made from the middle of the road. Neither of the exceptions apply, as 22100.5 is about U-turns at traffic lights, while 22101 is about turns controlled by markings or signs. Additionally, since you describe the route as a "curve to the street and turn right out", it's probably in violation of Section 22105: No person shall make a U-turn upon any highway where the driver of such vehicle does not have an unobstructed view for 200 feet in both directions along the highway and of any traffic thereon. Since the driver didn't make a complete right turn, it's likely that the forward view of oncoming traffic was partially blocked by the car's A-pillar or even the passenger seat, while the backward view of traffic was limited because none of the car's mirrors was pointed in the correct direction. It's certainly in violation of Section 22108: Any signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. The side road's not a hundred feet wide. There's no way the driver could have given the required signal for the second right turn. There's a decent chance this is also in violation of Section 22102 of the vehicle code: No person in a business district shall make a U-turn, except at an intersection, or on a divided highway where an opening has been provided in accordance with Section 21651. The six lanes of the main highway make it likely that this intersection is in a business district. "Business district" is rather broad, including not only roads lined by businesses, but roads lined by apartment complexes and other multi-family housing developments. And finally, the catch-all offense of "reckless driving" (Section 23103) could probably be applied: A person who drives a vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.	The critical consideration is that the permitted left turn must be onto a one-way roadway in that direction. One is not permitted to perform a left turn which involves crossing traffic from the left, which would also imply that it is not a one-way roadway.	Google maps (Street View, Google Earth) are all legal, although perhaps they are illegal in North Korea (along with many other things). Permission would be required for them to enter your house and take pictures, but if it can be seen publically, it is legal unless there is a specific law forbidding taking pictures. It is possible that there are legal restrictions on the Street View method of driving around with a camera in some countries, but Earth view shots are obtained by satellite, which is out of the jurisdiction of the objecting country. The Street View gap for Belarus may be due to a legal restriction, or it could just be Google-strategic (there seems to be no public explanation). There have been numerous "legal encounters" involving Street View and the authorities, in the realm of privacy concerns: there is no general rule. Google has the right to make and distribute these photos because there is no (enforceable) law against doing so, unless there is.	The United States has a fairly strict definition of where you have an expectation of privacy, a public bus certainly isn't a private place. In public, anyone can take pictures and video of anyone or anything else. You may have some sort of case if the girl were to use those photos to knowingly help your father violate the restraining order, but it doesn't sound like you believe that was the case.
Does sharing a personal text conversation violate GDPR I engaged in a text conversation over WhatsApp with another person, both of us in the EU, specifically Spain. I would now like to show a section of the texts to a party that would be affected by content discussed in the text messages. This content discusses unethical acts, but nothing illegal. Does GDPR or another regulation forbid me from sharing the text conversation? If so, is there any action I can take that would allow me to share the conversation? Thanks for any help or pointers.	No, GDPR does not apply here — but other laws might . The General Data Protection Regulation only concerns itself with the following: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. per Article 2. Furthermore, there is a specific exemption (Art. 2 (2)(c)) which would seem to apply to you (emphasis mine): This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (a) in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law; (b) by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU; (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; (d) by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security. You are sharing the conversation in a purely personal capacity and are not processing it wholly or partly through automated means nor are you intending it to form part of a filing system. Additionally, depending on the contents of the conversation and what you share, there may not be any personal data involved at all. For example, if you only share the messages themselves (and they don't contain any personal data that could identify someone) and censor/black out any names or photographs/avatars from the senders. Either way, GDPR does not appear to apply to you in this context. However, it appears that Article 18.1 of the Spanish Constitution grants the right to "personal and family privacy", as does the Organic Act 1/982 on Civil Protection of the Right to Honour, Personal and Family Privacy, and Self-Image. It's possible that, depending on the contents of the conversation, the other party involved in the conversation may have a case for action against you in the civil or criminal courts (for example, if the information invades their privacy or is defamatory in some way) if you share the contents of the conversation with someone else. I am not familiar with Spanish law so cannot comment further on this matter.	"1) Can I use an pre checked tick box under GDPR?" Nope. "Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent." (Recital 32) "2) Since GDPR also requires the data collector to ensure that the user is not under the age of 13 so I am planning to ask the users age only for that region i.e. EU Region. Now will simply mentioning that "By continuing you acknowledge that you are above 13 years" will work or will I have to ask the users age?" You have to require some affirmative action. Implicit consent (just continuing) is not acceptable (ibid.) "3) The GDPR requires the data collector to have a proof of the users consent. Now what kind of proof will be required for my App? I am ensuring that the user cannot move forward without providing the consent (only once) is that sufficient as a proof or is any other proof required?" If you are collecting data about the user, you should record the time and date consent was given as part of the user profile. If you are not collecting data about the user (this is only done by third party services such as Google analytics etc.) and there are no user profile, then preventing the user from using the app will have to do. The GDPR also requires data-minimization, and creating a user profile to record consent when no user profile is otherwise required will violate data-minimization-principles.	Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc.	Per Art 3(2), GDPR only applies to non-European companies when their processing activities relate to the offering of goods or services to people in Europe, or when the processing activities relate to monitoring people in Europe. However, the word “offer” of this targeting criterion requires some level of intent. It is not enough for GDPR to apply that they're marketing to someone who happens to be in Europe, but GDPR would apply if they are intentionally marketing to people who are in Europe. I don't know what they are marketing, so I don't know if that would be the case here. Even if GDPR were to apply, it would not be the most appropriate law. Yes, there's the GDPR right to erasure, which applies under some conditions (though there's a pretty absolute right to opt-out from marketing). The EU's ePrivacy Directive provides more specific rules though, in particular that every such marketing email must offer a way to unsubscribe. Other countries have comparable anti-spam laws, potentially also the home country for this online service.	Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A.	You could certainly allow twitter to delete the exchange, unless it is part of some record that the law in the relevant country require to be retained, which would be quite unusual. That would depend on the nature of the exchange, and the particular law requiring that records be retained. However, if the request is to be able to demand that Twitter delete the exchange, that would be much harder. In general a person or business is entitled to retain copies of communications, such as emails, sent to that person or entity. There is the "right to be forgotten" which applies under EU law, but that would not apply to records which a business needed to retain for its own legitimate purposes, and was not posting publicly, as I understand it. In any case Twitter is not an EU business, so I am not sure if the right would apply at all. (Twitter has an office in Amsterdam, so teh GDPR and other EU law clearly applies to it.) There might be some other basis on which such a demand could be made, depending on the detailed circumstances and the specific jurisdiction, but I cannot think of one offhand.	Are my assumptions correct? Yes, this is precisely the sort of thing that would fall under the purview of "the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party", as it fundamentally enables you to deliver the service to the data subject, and its also difficult to argue that "such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject" given its a fundamental part of delivering the service before any consent can be given. Its not the intention of the GDPR to solely require a direct relationship between the data controller and data subject, its intention is to allow the data subject to control more of the relationship than they did previously - in some cases, that control remains with the data controller, which is why not all of the lawful basis for processing rest on consent. So long as you ensure that the CDN provider has a relevant privacy policy and is identified as a data processor in your privacy and data policy then you are good to go. In my mind, this is similar to the issue of how the data subjects packets get to you from their computer - we aren't including all of the network providers who carry the packets between the data subject and the processor (despite the fact that those providers will have access to much of the same information as the CDN, such as IP address, source, destination etc), even though in many cases we don't know that information (for example which route it will take over the internet). The only difference here is that as the data controller, you know about the CDN and can include it in your policies, so you should.	Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data
How common are import bans of what is freely traded on national markets? In this question I will give an example of a law that effectively bans the import of (and makes attempted import without prior approval a crime) certain goods that can be freely bought and sold on national market. The effect is that the goods are hard to find and cost 10 times more than in countries where such a ban does not exist. The actual question is: how common is this scenario in free/democratic countries? Is it common, or is the below example just a legal anecdote that ideally needs to be fixed by lobbying/pushing the law makers in the right direction? In New Zealand, people over 18 can freely buy and sell air pistols. No firearms license is required (unless you are younger than 18). However, if Bob wants to buy an air pistol from say Amazon, he needs to apply to the Police for a permit to import. The most amazing/amusing thing here is that, unlike real, non-air guns (e.g. a regular rifle, an application to import which can be considered just by any "member of the Police" who "must" grant it if certain criteria is met as per section 18(2,3)), an application to import an air pistol (which is "restricted airgun") has to be considered by the Commissioner (the head of the NZ Police themselves) who only "may" grant it, and only if there is a "special reason" to it (section 18(4,5)). The law does not elaborate on what "special reasons" are, but the Police still has its idea. In a nut shell, if Bob simply wants to practice target shooting with an air pistol at his rural backyard, or control the population of rats threatening his duck flock, he is out of luck: import is effectively banned for him. But he still can just buy the same thing locally — if he is lucky enough to find it. Now, there is more to it. Say Bob, who routinely buys stuff from Amazon, sees there an air pistol he wants for only $50, new, whereas locally he can find it only for no less than $500, used. He orders it without hesitation, thinking that if he can freely trade and use it locally, surely there will be no troubles buying it from overseas. He has no idea that there is section 16 which, in its previous version could send him to jail for 1 year (in the current version they've added "without reasonable excuse" which now could possibly save Bob from becoming a prisoner). Bob's Amazon order arrives at the customs which, upon not finding a matching import permit, forfeits it by way of transfer of title to the Crown. Bob loses the money — getting punished for not being clairvoyant enough to expect that such a law could exist. Moreover, he should be thankful that no charges get laid against him. Apparently, the legislative intent here was to limit the number of air pistols in the country: if they were as accessible as they are in the world, the number of crimes involving them would have gone up. However, managing the risk of unlawful use just by keeping the prices 10 times higher (as opposed to either completely banning trade/possession or applying the same "special reason" threshold as for import) does seem like a very odd, peculiar solution.	The import of slaves into the United States was banned in 1808, although slavery itself and the buying and selling of slaves remained legal on a Federal level until 1865. There were, of course, many many violations of the law against importing new slaves.	That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D & E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small.	In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.	When a country makes criminal laws, these laws usually apply to anyone present in the country, and acting in the country. But the country is free to declare that some law might apply to its own citizens in a foreign country, or even foreign citizens in a foreign country. Assuming the laws about using marijuana say nothing about the country, that most likely means it only applies to using marjuana in the country itself. But if the US government decided that taking marijuana in Canada is illegal for US citizens, then nobody can stop them. In this case, Canada would not extradite you (unless Canadian law says that it is criminal for Canadians to use marijuana in another country), and Canadian police would likely not collect evidence. So even if illegal, it would be hard to convict you. PS. The "polygamy" case would be interesting, I think you would have to read the exact wording of the laws in every country. Some countries will say that you can't get married twice, and the attempt to get married a second time while already married is bigamy. In that kind of country you wouldn't have committed a crime within that country. Also, you would only be married to the first wife.	It is not correct to say that "Gutenberg is banned in Germany". A German court ruled that Project Gutenberg (US) could not provide copies of 18 works to addresses in Germany. PGLF (the foundation that runs Project Gutenberg) decided to block all access from Germany, because similar claims might be made about other works, leading to added legal expense in Germany. PGLF is said to be appealing the German Court's decision. Many works in the PG collection are clearly out of copyright in Germany, under German law. Providing those works would not infringe German copyright. As long as the PG license is complied with (and it is quite permissive) I see no legal problem with such works, but anyone planning to start a business or service reproducing such works would be wise to consult a lawyer with knowledge of copyright law in that person's country. Note that there are PG affiliates in several countries, including Germany and Australia, that operate under their own local copyright rules, and are run separately, and have different collections of works.	As for a member of the Universal Postal Union, what repercussions will occur for country B? None. Are they allowed to keep stealing stuff at the sender insurer's expense? Well, country B isn't stealing stuff. Bad actors in the employe of country B are stealing stuff. This is a matter for law enforcement in country B. If country B is endemically corrupt as seems to be implied, then it is likely that the bad actors will continue to be bad actors. As for the insurer, they are in the business of selling insurance against theft (among other things) and they will take this into account in setting their premiums. Will they face any penalties (e.g. banned from the Union) that would encourage them to hold their customs to account? All member countries of the UN are entitled to be members of the UPU and it seems unlikely that such minor issues could lead to expulsion from the UN - nation-states that have committed genocide are still UN members after all. Since the UPU appears to produce more upsides than downsides, being one of, if not the single most successful and universally adopted international treaty in history this is just one of the minor annoyances.	Rhino horn cannot be sold across state lines: Rhino horn: Generally cannot be sold in interstate or international commerce. Consult the Service for limited exceptions. Import or export requires a permit. Sale of items within a State allowed unless restricted by “use after import” limitations associated with items imported after the listing of the species under CITES or unless prohibited under State law. Pennsylvania has a proposed bill banning the sale of rhino horn but it is not yet law.	18 USC 922(g) says that it is illegal for various persons to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. (5) refers to "being an alien", specifically one who has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26))) with an exception as provided in subsection (y)(2), The (y)(2) exceptions covers foreign officials and law enforcement (not a typical tourist), and one who is (A) admitted to the United States for lawful hunting or sporting purposes or is in possession of a hunting license or permit lawfully issued in the United States; which pretty much covers simple tourists, if not typical tourists.
Clear FTA (Failure to Appear in Court) from my record Went to the DMV to renew my driving license and I found it was canceled due to a Failure to Appear in court and Failure to Pay a fine that was imposed to me for scratching a car while parking three years ago. I wasn't even aware of it because I changed cities in the meantime, and I probably received these documents in my previous address. The ticket given to me in the DMV contains virtually zero information on how to proceed in this case. I am currently residing in San Francisco but the ticket is from Los Angeles. Is there any way I can solve the issue locally or should I fly back to talk with the clerk of the address written in the FTA ticket?	I don't know the situation in L.A., but most courthouses I've dealt with will allow you to just pay the fine online and be done with it. Try their website or call the clerk's office to get more information.	It is rather unclear what the facts are, and the legal answer would depend crucially on those facts. My understanding is that you bought a domain from a provider, and they allowed you to use a web server for some period. It also appears that you don't have a clear understanding of the contract, which may have been made online and you might not have retained a copy of the agreement (which would allow you to look at the terms). The assumption that failing to pay substitutes for explicitly cancelling a service is incorrect. If under the contract you agree to pay a certain amount per year, then you have been racking up charges for some time, and you would need to actually cancel. Ultimately, they could take you to court to force you to pay what you owe, although usually there are less drastic intermediate steps. In court, they would produce their documents to show that you owe money, and your attorney would somehow counter, perhaps by alleging that you had a good-faith belief that the contract had been terminated. It is possible that they simply messed up and failed to send you an invoice earlier, which could explain the lack of invoice. At any rate, the fact that you haven't gotten an invoice does not legally entitle you to avoid paying for the service, whether or not you use it. On the premise that they haven't taken back the domain (seems like they didn't), you can legally use it. However, if you do use it, then that would trash any claim that you believed the contract had been terminated (to argue "I thought it had been canceled" entails "and thus I didn't use the service").	What is the process for having the plea withdrawn? Is it even possible at this point? Maybe, but YOU are not going to be able to do this on a pro se basis. It is clear from the way you word the questions you are still extremely emotionally invested in the whole scenario and want to make sure you get your pound of flesh at every turn. That is not going to work in this case. The first thing you need to accept is that for the purposes of the plea withdrawl the judge does not care to hear about how the lawyer tricked you. If you go in on your own pleading that your lawyer did you dirty, the judge is just going to deny your request in the best case. You will need a lawyer to prepare and argue the motion to withdraw your plea. Get a good lawyer they are worth their costs. Focus on the main goal of resolving your issue of the Criminal Trespass. How the police treated you or your Tenant took advantage of you does not excuse criminal behavior. So if the plea does get withdrawn focus on winning the criminal case. After the criminal issues are resolved then you can deal with the other issues.	Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant).	Here is a link to the relevant Texas Statute: Title 7, Subtitle C, Chapter 545, Subchapter A: Sec. 545.351. MAXIMUM SPEED REQUIREMENT. (a) An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing. Combine that with: Sec. 545.352. PRIMA FACIE SPEED LIMITS. (a) A speed in excess of the limits established by Subsection (b) or under another provision of this subchapter is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable and prudent and that the speed is unlawful. This section mentions, as an example, among other points: (2) except as provided by Subdivision (4), 70 miles per hour on a highway numbered by this state or the United States outside an urban district, including a farm-to-market or ranch-to-market road; What this means is that if you are driving over 70 miles per hour on a type of highway mentioned in (2) above then you are, by legal definition, driving at a speed that is greater than is reasonable and prudent. When you are cited for speeding you are not charged for driving at a specific speed in an area posted at another speed. You are cited for violating a broader law, such as in Texas, driving in an unreasonable or imprudent manner. The mention of the speed is merely a recordation of the facts that support the state's case against you. Let's take the proposal to demonstrate the speed is too low to its logical conclusion. You plead not guilty and it comes out during testimony that you weren't driving 80 but really 85. The judge will still find you guilty of the underlying charge as the facts in the case still support that finding. I have personally witnessed mistakes in tickets result in dismissal. Those mistakes have, however, been related to other facts about the case though: time of day, date of offense, etc. I've also witnessed people attempt to claim a lower but still illegal speed. For example, "I wasn't going 85 I was only going 80." These resulted in findings of guilt.	It isn't worth litigating a $60 fine for a non-moving violation that isn't likely to recur. You have a less than 50-50 chance of prevailing (something that is almost always true when you are appealing the decision of a judicial officer in a context like this one), you have no real long term harms as you would in the case of "points" for a moving violation, and you are even less likely to get costs of litigation or attorneys' fees if you prevail, so not having to pay a $60 fine would be a pyrrhic victory from an economic perspective. Even if it is free (and it probably isn't) it would easily take many hours to litigate that isn't worth you time. Any lawyer who would take the case would be cheating you because they would only leave you worse off than you are to start with due to their fees.	One wouldn't be able to make a claim about a driving record without it being testimony. Testimony will be challenged during cross examination. The prosecutor won't be able to bring up prior bad acts (such as previous speeding tickets) but will most certainly be allowed to rebut any claim of no prior bad acts made by a defendant. When the defendant claims a spotless driving record the defendant is introducing character or a character trait into the trial. Once introduced by the defendant the prosecutor will be allowed to challenge the credibility of that statement and, therefore, the credibility of the witness. Imagine the following interaction: Defendant: I have a spotless driving record. Prosecutor: Are you saying you've never been issued a traffic ticket? Defendant: Um, Uh, well... When a defendant goes to court they are facing a specific charge. The prosecutor will present evidence that supports that charge and it is up to the defendant and his attorneys to sow reasonable doubt within the jury, or at least one juror. By presenting character, the defendant may appear to be saying either, "Hey, it was my first time let me off," or, "I've never done it before so I couldn't have done it this time." Either way, it probably won't create reasonable doubt in the juror's mind about the specific charge they're weighing and it has the potential to open a can of worms that would be unfavorable to the defendant.	In the United States, the U.S. Department of Transportation, by regulation sets uniform design and signage standards for federally funded highways, which most U.S. state and local governments incorporate, either by restating them or incorporating them by reference for non-federally funded roads. I imagine that most other countries have similar regulations. Nonetheless, this is extremely unlikely to prevail as a defense to the traffic violation of speeding which is usually a strict liability offense to which almost no affirmative defenses, excuses, or justifications may be considered.
Stolen code in a GPL repo Quite an odd thing has happened. A software author as released a repo under GPL 3.0 license But inside that repo is code that the author doesn't own in any way and has no license. Now when people fork this repo their project will be under GPL 3.0 and using the code they do not know is stolen. I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects?	I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must.	To answer the question in your title: Yes, software licenses are copyrighted. They are written works that involve (significant, expert) creative effort to create. The best solution would be for Grammarly to hire a lawyer and say "we want a new EULA. We think this one covers a number of points our current one doesn't". Most legal documents will be copyright for the same reason (there may be a few that are so stereotypical that there is essentially no creative effort in putting them together).	Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing.	The creator of the derivative work has copyright in the derivative work. The copyright would protect only the new elements of the derivative work. Wikipedia is a good place to start. In the case of a book with updated grammar, depending on the extent of the changes, it would probably be easier to copy the original directly than to eliminate the updates from a copy of the derivative work.	The only issue relevant to your age is the (ir)revocability of the license. GPLv3 purports to be an irrevocable license. To be really irrevocable, the license would need to grant certain rights in exchange for something of value, that is, you need a license that passes muster as a contract. Copyright licenses are typically treated as contracts, but it is not clearly established in law that licenses are contracts or are not contracts. Out of the goodness of your heart, you can grant permission to use your property, but you can also withdraw that permission. If you have a contract granting perpetual permission to use your property in exchange for something of value, then you can't later withdraw that permission. In the case of Jacobsen v. Kratzer, the sides advances opposing theories that the license was a "bare license" vs. was a contract. (The matter was ultimately settled out of court). This article puts together the legal factors surrounding the notion of license as contract, see p. 21 ff, and esp. §IV for arguments that licenses should be contracts, to be fully enforceable. A contract for non-essentials formed with a minor is not enforceable, until you are 18. You could therefore revoke the license, until you are 18. Anyone who uses the software does so at their peril. However, if the license is not a contract, no existing legal doctrine (in the US) whereby the permission is irrevocable. In other words, yes you can, at their peril. The whole license-as-contract issue is very complicated, and I'm only focusing on the revocability issue. There is a separate question whether one can sue a user for both copyright infringement and breach of contract. The case of Artifex v. Hancom, see also this analysis, found that (in the particular case), plaintiff can pursue the matter as both infringement and contract breach.	It infringes the copyright. It can easily be proved that both XOR1 and XOR2 derive from the source work by XOR-ing the streams with each other. It's just like any encrypted copy: it infringes the copyright, but only those who can decrypt it are in a position to know that it infringes the copyright. The posts on the forum are illegal because they infringe the copyright; it doesn't matter that they are derived works rather than the work itself, just as your drawing of a copyright-protected image infringes copyright because it is a derived work without being the work itself.	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.	Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement.
Is it legal for a business to store and use my payment information in a way that I can't edit, remove, or otherwise control? I recently moved from a townhouse where I used Waste Management for my trash and recycling pick up. The apartment I moved into takes care of trash so last month I canceled the service, got a phone confirmation, and even took the extra step of removing my payment information from the website. What I see in the online portal is: All services are not showing and section is greyed out, autopay shows enroll option showing I unenrolled, and is grayed out to reflect no services available for autopay. And further, probably more importantly here, in the manage payment methods section: Clearly no payment method saved. Both of these views on the website have shown me this for weeks. Now in this case I'm assuming it's a software bug. I've already cleared it up with Waste Management (customer service rep looked into it, said it showed me still in auto pay on their system, took it out and refunded the extra charge that let me find out this was happening. Another set of bugs in that even if I was enrolled in autopay, if there are no services scheduled, it shouldn't be billed anyway, but less relevant here). Hopefully not too much background... I assumed when I deleted my saved credit card numbers they were no longer available to Waste Management in anyway, yet clearly they were saved in another capacity to continually be used like this. Is it legal for a business to store and use my payment information in a way that I can't edit, remove, or otherwise control?	A company may retain information to comply with legal obligations, exercise legal claims or rights, or defend legal claims. Maintaining the ability to charge and refund on a credit card is within the scope of their right to retain information. I would not assume that "removing payment method" deletes the data from their database, it means that you can no longer use that method of payment. See this section of Cal. Civ. and this section. A company would need to retain the information somewhere in case there was a reasonable explanation of a charge-back.	Essentially, if there is no written agreement or receipt of payment, the only records that exist will be in the payment itself. If it was paid by cash, there's probably no recourse without additional facts. However, if it was paid electronically, then even if there's no narration (description) that claims that the payment was for rent, it is still possible that you would be able to file a summons requiring the recipient bank to produce the information relating to the entity that holds the account the money was sent to. The information they have may be limited, but generally this would include: Name Address Date of birth (for natural persons) Phone number The above information is typically required under anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist funding legislation. Additionally, if it was paid electronically, the regularity of the payments and the regular amounts may be persuasive. Finally, it's not proof, but you can swear an affidavit or a statutory declaration attesting to the truth of your assertions, but without additional evidence (the aforementioned transaction information), it doesn't really hold weight on its own.	An incomplete list: Getting the money. How did you plan to get paid? Credit card? Paypal? Integrating those into a website in compliance with their terms of service is not easy. (I wouldn't touch credit card numbers, in particular, even with a ten-foot pole. Too much liability risk for weak implementations. Too many highly skilled attackers to pounce on any mistake.) Distributing the App. Places like the Apple App Store have their own terms of service, especially regarding payment and in-app purchases. At a guess, Apple would reject your app, but if they allowed it, how does your withdrawal policy fit with the 30% cut they want from the initial transaction? Holding the money. So there are user accounts with a credit balance that can be withdrawn again. Would you be able to repay them if all users withdraw at the same time? Where do you keep the money? Currency risks. Say international customers pay in currency A, which the payment provider transforms into currency B. Then they want their money back, but exchange rates have changed. What do they get? Knowing your customer. There would be money laundering concerns. Do you have the infrastructure to identify your customers? Can customers change the (re)payment method from one account to another? Can you handle withdrawals if a user no longer has the same credit card, for instance? Scammers leaving you to hold the bag. Say a scammer tricks a victim into making a deposit, and then finds a way to redirect the withdrawal (see above). Would you be able to deal with the legal and administrative fallout?	Yes. This is legal. The only possible liability for a truthful and accurate disclosure of fact is a defamation action (in the absence of a privacy clause in the contract) and this is truthful so it would not violate anyone's legal rights. Credit reporting agencies routinely collect such information and court actions to collect unpaid debts are also a matter of public record. Credit reporting agencies in this business also have some additional obligations (such as the obligation to remove an entry after a period of time and an obligation to present rebuttal statements from the person affected). But, you should understand that merely publicly sharing truthful information about a factual matter is not really what a "blacklist" means. Normally, a blacklist includes an implied understanding that certain actions will be taken as a result of placement on the list rather than merely sharing information for what it is worth. An example of a law prohibiting a true blacklist from Colorado is the following: § 8-2-110. Unlawful to publish blacklist No corporation, company, or individual shall blacklist, or publish, or cause to be blacklisted or published any employee, mechanic, or laborer discharged by such corporation, company, or individual, with the intent and for the purpose of preventing such employee, mechanic, or laborer from engaging in or securing similar or other employment from any other corporation, company, or individual. Incidentally, I'm not convinced that the statute would be constitutional if enforced under modern First Amendment jurisprudence, although one U.S. District court case from 1971 did uphold its validity in the face of a somewhat different kind of challenge. Resident Participation, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971).	Is sales person required by law to give a copy of signed contract at the time you sign up for service? No. If I would ask for copy of all documents from that company are they required by law to send her these copies? No. Is there a law that mandates process on how contracts should be signed in California? There are many, however, they relate to specific classes of contract. In general, it is not a requirement that a contract be signed or even written; verbal contracts are totally legitimate. Given that every single transaction where money changes hands in return for goods and/or services is or is part of a contract it is not feasible that they all be signed. Have you bought a cup of coffee today? Did you sign a contract when you did? Here's the thing Your friend has learned several valuable business lessons: the first is some people in business will rip you off. If you are a consumer then you have (some) legal protection, however, if you are in business then the courts and the legislature expect you to look after yourself. Your friend has signed a contract. Pretty much, any court will consider that what they signed would be the entire contract unless there was compelling evidence to the contrary. Her word that the sales rep said there would be no break charges would not on its own be compelling evidence. Your friend has an obvious incentive to lie. Here is the second lesson: don't sign anything unless and until you have read and understood it; hire a lawyer if you need to in order to understand it. Now, either under the contract the company is legitimately allowed to charge these fees or it isn't. Without having a copy of the contract you have no way to tell. Thus the third lesson: always keep your own copy of everything you sign. What your friend can do is: nothing. Don't pay the bill, write to them saying that she disputes that she owes them any money at all. If you want to be provocative, suggest which court would be most convenient if they want to prove the debt. Odds are this will go no further. If they do proceed with a summons then they will need to state their case. At that point she can request through the court a copy of the contract they are relying on. If their claims are legit she can simply roll over.	There might be some relevant state law. Michigan has a Social Security Number Privacy Act, which limits use of SS numbers, such as publically displaying an amount of a number, use it as an account number, require it to be transmitted insecurely over the internet, mail it etc. However, it is allowed under 3(a) to mail a number in a document if the purpose is to identify an individual, especially 3(a)(iv), to Lawfully pursue or enforce a person's legal rights, including, but not limited to, an audit, collection, investigation, or transfer of a tax, employee benefit, debt, claim, receivable, or account or an interest in a receivable or account. It would depends on your state, but it is highly likely that debt collection is an allowed purpose (even if it not a real debt, just a good-faith mistake). This gives a brief overview of state laws.	Wave Broadband is a private company; they can probably decide to not provide service to an address that is in arrears or collections. I'm sure there is a clause in their service contract that states they can do that, and there would be local or state laws to support that. Whatever public service commission governs the state may also allow that. It's possible that Wave is breaking the law by denying service to a whole address, but doubtful. You can check with the state level public service commission.	At what point passed the original ETA is the contract still valid? There is no hard limit or deadline other than the one (if any) the contract itself provides. The contract remains valid regardless of a party's breach or non-performance. The remedies that would be available to you are in the form of rescinding the contract --without having to pay the cancellation fee--, or forcing the store to deliver the furniture soon. The longer the delay, the clearer your entitlement to either remedy. The manager's allegation about other customers is unavailing: Your description does not reflect that the contract or estimates are in terms of the delay that non-parties tolerated. Their contracts are totally unrelated to yours. The contracts might not even be comparable. The purpose of estimates is to give the counterparty some rough information that is known to likely influence his decision-making. Accordingly, a huge departure from the estimate supports the finding that the store deprived you of information that was material to your decision. The store's failure to timely inform you strikes the contract law tenet that you entered the contract knowingly. Furthermore, the store's deliberate act of specifying even the day of the month [mis-]led you to rule out that the delivery might actually take years. Typically furniture is purchased with the expectation of being able to start using it relatively soon, not years later. In addition to breach of contract, the store might also be in violation of statutes against unfair and misleading practices.
Can you revoke consent to record a conversation in Texas? A person who was conversing with me in my house, revealed after the fact that they recorded a personal conversation. I became concerned where this was being stored (for later use) and if it was shared with anyone other than the person recording it. I'm aware that in Texas, it is a one-party consent state. I have a couple of questions I could not find in the law. if you inform the person that you revoke consent or expicitly state you do not give permission to record, does that override the one-party rule? I understand they may have the right to record without my consent, but if they choose to share that recording with another person (and not just keep for their own record), does a new consent rule come into play? Can I have the person sign a document stating that they will not record any conversation shared in certain settings (e.g. anywhere on my property such as home or car)? Will that override the one-party consent? Is there any way to block consent to record legally, either in writing or verbally, in the State of Texas? Thank you, Chris	Since your consent is not required in Texas, revocation is irrelevant. Restrictions of use of recordings flow from the legal nature of the recording itself, so there is no provision saying, for example, that only one party needs to consent for just recording, but all parties must consent to make any use of the recording. Since these laws were devised to regulate the practice of wearing a wire and collecting evidence of crimes, requiring consent from all parties would be counterproductive to the purposes of the law. You could try drafting a contract where you pay people to not record you (anybody who doesn't sign, you shouldn't talk to them), but enforcement could be tricky, so I would not try a DIY contract: get a lawyer. You would have to show that you were harmed by them making an unconsented recording. It should be in the form of a contract where you give something of value in exchange for something of value, which is a thing typically enforced by the courts. Also bear in mind that even in an all-party state, if you know that you are being recorded, you cannot just say "I do not consent", you have to stop talking. Continuing to talk when notified that there is or may be a recording constitutes implied consent, which is why on the phone companies often announce via recording that the conversation may be monitored, and they do not ask "Do you consent". By not hanging up, you consented.	The Canadian law governing interception of communication (wiretapping and recording) is explained here. Canada is a one-party country, so as long as one party (you, for example) consent, this would not be a violation of that statute. That source also believes (not unreasonably) that is would not constitute the tort of invasion of privacy since under the act The nature and degree of privacy to which a person is entitled … is that which is reasonable in the circumstances, giving due regard to the lawful interests of others (bearing in mind that is it allowed w.r.t. Section 184(1) of the Criminal Code: that is, it is reasonable to do so).	Since there is no search or seizure involved in having a driver's license, requiring a person to update their address is not a violation of the 4th Amendment. It is also not "testifying against oneself in a criminal case", so it does not violate the 5th. As has been repeated many times, driving is a privilege and not a right, meaning that there is no fundamental constitutional right to drive. Strict scrutiny would not render the requirement to have a license unconstitutional, and it certainly would not invalidate the requirement to give a correct address and update that address as necessary. There may be issues regarding a requirement to produce identification, but there is no legal precedent for the idea that an ID law law and a federal "must show" statute would violate the 4th (that is not to say that the courts could not find there is such a basis if the question arises, but it has not yet been found). Since there is no national ID law, one can only conjecture what the outcome of judicial review would be, but if such a law survived strict scrutiny, it would be inconceivable that a portion of the law requiring you to keep your address current would fail such scrutiny. A curiosity search would still be barred.	Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability.	GDPR seems quite clear that if you are recording calls, video and/or audio, you must get consent. Wrong. The GDPR requires that your have a legal basis for processing personal data. Consent is a legal basis but there are others. With respect to note taking, the GDPR only applies to “personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.” So, if they notes are not about an individual (and many B2B phone calls will not be) or are neither automated nor filed, the GDPR does not apply. If they are captured by the GDPR, you need to have a legal basis for the notes. Again, consent is one but it is not the only one.	PIPA has a dispute resolution process. See page 39 of the guidance document. The judge in your current case may have the power to award you damages under PIPA, but most likely not. You are probably best served by using the information as evidence that the guy is a bad person, has little regard for the laws, openly defied PIPA, etc. However, if he's smart he will say that you consented. Look at pages 5 and 6 of that document that you linked to. Unless you protested when you handed him your license and watched him photograph it, it's hard for you to say that you did not provide implied or verbal consent. This is especially true when coupled with the PIPA dispute resolution which start with you attempting to resolve this issue before filing a complaint. In summary, it might help you demonstrate a pattern of bad behavior but your current legal dispute is not the place to resolve your privacy issue.	It does matter if you invoke your right to silence. First, if you do, that affects what police can do (they have to stop interrogating you). Second, it plays a role in "adoptive admissions". If the police are asking you questions (you are not under arrest) and they make some statement that implies that you committed a crime, your silence can be used against you: it can be taken to be a form of admitting that you committed the crime. The premise is that if they imply that you murdered X, such an accusation if false would be so outrageous to a reasonable, innocent person that they would protest, therefore your lack of protest (denial) is tantamount to a confession. However, you can protect yourself by preemptively invoking your right to silence. See Salinas v. Texas: a witness who “ ‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’ ” at the time he relies on it... the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one may be“compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” not an unqualified “right to remain silent.” Since any right can be waived, at any time, there is no magic expression that you can utter that nullifies a future waiver of a Constitutional right. The closest that you can come is asserting that you hereby exercise your right to an attorney and that you will not speak until you have consulted with your attorney (then you better shut up). Lawyering up only prevents them from further interrogating you. Don't hedge: say "I am asserting my right to silence and refuse to speak without a lawyer". "I think I should..." is not a definitive assertion of your rights. If you are (briefly) stopped, police may ask if they can search you or your property. If they have a warrant or probable cause, there's really no point in saying anything. In the case that consent is required, you just have to remember to not consent, and it would not be a bad idea to explicitly deny consent. Each and every time they ask. The same with their statement "It would really help us if you would come to the station to answer a few questions". If you are under arrest, then you have to go with them: ask "Am I free to go?". You can say "I do not consent to any search". Your proposed declaration of rights is pretty vague. Exactly what rights are you talking about? Your right to freedom of religion? Your right to bear arms? Your right to not have to quarter soldiers in your house? Your right to an education? Many detainee statements have been found by the courts to be ineffective because they were unclear. You could give it a shot and see if the Supreme Court accepts your "universal assertion of rights" as effectively invoking your specific 4th and 5th amendment rights. Unless you have something in mind (like, the 6th amendment), the most effective statement is a very specific one. Silence, lawyer, no search.	The United States has a fairly strict definition of where you have an expectation of privacy, a public bus certainly isn't a private place. In public, anyone can take pictures and video of anyone or anything else. You may have some sort of case if the girl were to use those photos to knowingly help your father violate the restraining order, but it doesn't sound like you believe that was the case.
Is there any principle of contract law regarding failure to take a step towards fulfilling a contract? For instance, an offer letter is sent to the successful bidder of a government contract, in which it is stipulated that that they desposit 50% of the premium/bid prior to XX/XX/2020. The successful bidder communicates its acceptance, but fails to follow through with the deposit. Subsequently, the government body "withdraws" its offer letter. My question is asked from the perspective of the government body. If the party to whom the offer letter is issued fails to take any step towards fulfilling its end, can it be argued that there was no meaningful acceptance as for all intents and purposes, no part of the offer that was 'accepted' has been performed? Therefore, can the government body 'rescind' the offer and argue that there was no contract to begin with because there was no 'acceptance'?	If the party to whom the offer letter is issued fails to take any step towards fulfilling its end, can it be argued that there was no meaningful acceptance as for all intents and purposes, no part of the offer that was 'accepted' has been performed? There was acceptance — the successful bidder communicated its acceptance to the government body and therefore made a promise to pay the deposit. All the elements of a legally binding contract are met: 1. Offer The offer letter from the government body. 2. Acceptance Self-evident in your question. The successful bidder communicated that it had accepted the offer from the government body. 3. Consideration Ordinarily, this would be the deposit. In this case, since the deposit was never sent, the consideration is both the promise (from the bidder) to submit the deposit and the counter promise (from the government party) to give whatever the contract stipulates the bidder will get from the government party. 4. Intent to create legal relations Not evidenced in the question, but we can generally assume this based on the evidence that both sides are commercial parties. Therefore, can the government body 'rescind' the offer and argue that there was no contract to begin with because there was no 'acceptance'? No. The offer was accepted by the bidder so there was 'acceptance', and all the other elements of the contract stand too (there was consideration, etc.). Conclusion The bidder likely breached the terms of the contract. This could potentially be a repudiatory breach allowing the government body to choose to end the contract if they wanted (by "withdrawing"). At the very least, the government body would be entitled to sue the bidder for breaching the terms, but there is no legal position of "the contract doesn't exist" from my perspective.	If the stranger was aware of the reward offer at the time of the return you have a legally binding contract - you made an offer to the world, money for return of the phone, and they accepted it by returning it. If they were ignorant of your offer and returned the phone then there is no contract and you do not have to pay: albeit at the cost of being a jerk. Of course, if they obtained your phone unlawfully (e.g. by stealing it) the contract is void.	The question does not say what reasons the other party gives for not paying, and so one cannot judge whether such reason is covered by the terms quoted in the question. In general a contract need not be highly specific if the intent is clear. However, any ambiguity will usually be resolved against the party who wrote the contract, so it is in that party's interest to be as clear and specific as possible. It is not clear from the quoted terms that they form a contract at all. No consideration is stated. Contractual provisions which deny all recourse are not always enforceable. They may be overruled by law or regulation, or by prior court decision or by an equitable decision. If there is a serious problem with the service provided, particularly in a consumer transaction, a court might reject a provision denying all refunds even if it is quite specific and clear. The question does not list the jurisdiction (country and, for federal countries, state or province). Laws on contracts and enforceable terms vary significantly in different jurisdictions. Without this a specific answer is not possible.	Your title doesn't quite match your question. "Reneging" would mean saying that a lease would be offered at the reduced rent, and then not offering the lease. Here, they offered the lease, and you accepted. So now the question is not whether they can refuse to offer you the reduced-fee lease, but whether they are owed the back rent. Verbal agreements are indeed binding, but they are rather sticky from an evidential point of view. Also, there are other possible complications. If your original lease stated that verbal agreements are not binding, or that only specific people are authorized to modify the terms and the person you talked to is not such a person, then this is not binding. If after they said you could keep the rent reduction, you signed a lease for the full amount or otherwise indicated acceptance of the full amount, then it may be considered not binding. Even if the agreement is not binding, you have further arguments. If you believed that it was binding, and did so out of good faith, then there was not a meeting of the minds, and they can't go after you for breach of contract. They may have other claims, such as damages if they can show that they could have gotten more money from another prospective client, but them accepting the rent makes that difficult to pursue. Now, again, verbal agreements do have evidentiary problems. If your case were nothing than your word claiming that they agreed, you would not have much of a case. But here, you have: -They were willing to take the lower rent for the initial period -You stated that you would leave unless given a continued discount, and you stayed -They didn't make any attempt to collect the full rent for three months -They are willing to give you the discount if you pay the back rent All of this points rather strongly towards your claim being true. You also say "this situation is not unique to me." It's not clear what they means, but if other tenants also got verbal assurances that the discount would continue, and they testify to that effect, then your case is even stronger.	This aspect (and many others) of contract law is applicable in the US and various countries of the EU. can they renege after the candidate has begun their journey, thus saddling the candidate with the travel cost? No. The company would incur breach of contract. There is no need for a formal contract. The candidate only needs to prove that the company agreed (in writing, orally or clearly through its conduct) to cover or reimburse those expenses and that this elicited a meeting of the minds. The agreement would be void if the candidate incurred the expenses despite knowing (via timely notice) that the company changed its mind. Likewise, if the candidate lied on his CV, the contract (here, the company's agreement to cover the expenses) would be voidable by the company, since the candidate's intentional misrepresentations preclude the aforementioned condition of meeting of the minds. --Edited on 1/18/2019 to add ...-- Per suggestion by @KRyan, the aspect of void or voidable contract is expanded. But first, two disclaimers are pertinent: We need to be mindful that many of the follow-up concerns are either premised on or inspired by the situation described in the underlying Workplace SE post. These are somewhat beyond the scope of this Law SE question but addressed nonetheless, given their relevance as well as the OP's & audience's interest. The follow-up hypotheticals [in this Law SE question] and clarifications thereto neither speculate nor pass judgment on the stranded candidate who asked on Workplace SE. The Workplace SE post reflects a company's breach of contract. The subsequent comments here about fraud hypotheticals are mostly derivative inquiries beyond what is described in Workplace SE. In particular, we do not assume whatsoever that the stranded candidate committed fraud. The_Sympathizer commented: can the contract be voided on the spot like that without first proving in court? As it seems like it grants a rather "vigilante" justice power that is open to abuse, since effectively the "punishment" (cancellation of the flight and thus inducing a rather serious physical situation) is administered before any due process has been afforded the one accused. Yes, it can be voided on the spot (aka sua sponte). "Vigilante" justice denotes a self-attribution of punitive powers that exclusively belong to the state/government/court, whereas a party's voiding of a contract is the act of foreclosing his losses/exposures with respect to a contract that de facto never existed (such as when that contract was induced by fraud). I agree that unfortunately that is open to abuse: As a pretext to actually incur breach of contract, a company might allege that the contract was void. That is why (if taken to court) it will be the company's burden to prove that (1) it reasonably relied upon a candidate's representations (2) which were significant and blatantly false (3) given the candidate's knowledge that his lies contravened the job's core requirements. That can be quite burdensome. For instance, is the company handing out airfares without first conducting some competent corroborations about the candidate's credentials/skills? If so, one can hardly concede the company's allegation of reasonable reliance. The resulting finding would be that the contract was not voidable by the company, and thus that it is liable for breach of contract. Also, belatedly "informing" the stranded candidate that the company "is going in a different direction" falls short of evidencing that the contract was voidable. That applies even if the candidate performed very poorly in the interview or screening process. Given the hardship imposed on a stranded candidate, a company has to be morally and legally very judicious about its method and timing for "going in a different direction". But absent any representations or [company's] bylaws to the contrary, a company generally does not have the obligation to afford due process to a candidate. The court is the entity with an obligation to enforce due process as provided by law (although many of us in the U.S. have repeatedly experienced the courts' disavowal of due process). --End of edit on 1/19/2019-- a binding agreement requires both sides to give something Here, the candidate's consideration is his time and effort to accommodate the company's interest in assessing the candidate's profile at a location that is convenient to the company.	People are laid off all the time when sales are down, the market is bad, etc: there is no legal "right to a job" except whatever is in your employment contract. There is a legal concept of promissory estoppel which boils down to promises being binding. However, there has to be a clear and definite promise, not for example a statement like "we hope to bring you back after this is over". Normally, the employer can argue that they have the right to fire you regardless of performance, and that would be the end of it. Let's say you have it in writing, and it is clear that they unconditionally promise to hire you back: you would want to (e)stop them from arguing that they have the right to fire you. The underlying idea of promissory estoppel is that such a promise keeps them from making that argument. But: it is not enough that they made the promise, you also had to rely on the promise and act / forbear from acting in some way because of that promise. It could be, for example, taking another job, or moving to another country, or simply looking for another job. The hard part, then, would be getting a clear and definite promise.	Offer and Acceptance For a contract to be a contract there must be an intention on both parties to create legal relations - this is usually considered in terms of an offer and acceptance. When Website Co makes an offer to the world, you accept it by clicking the ToS acknowledgement and using the service. This is explicit acceptance of the offer. The ToS contain provisions that Website Co may amended or replace the ToS by giving you notice, when this happens the contract is still in force as the contract contemplattes its own variation: it doesn't need to be varied by another contract. They do allow you to opt out of the contract by no longer using the service but they are not obliged to do so. The ToS do not contain provisions allowing you to modify them. Therefore when you write to them you are making an offer to vary the contract. They can accept it explicitly or by conduct. They won't accept it explicitly. They aren't engaging in any conduct that is not already subject to the existing contract so they aren't accepting it by conduct.	One of the principles of contract law is that the offer and acceptance are evaluated based on the objectively ascertainable intentions as judged by a reasonable person. On the facts that you have provided - even if your friend claims that they filled it out wrong, there is no reason for someone to objectively think so, particularly given the fact that they went to the trouble of writing the information in. However, this will depend on what kind of legally binding document this is. If it is, in fact, a contract, then the employer must accept it before it becomes legally binding, and they must actually communicate this acceptance to your friend (the offeror). If this is a policy document, then it is only legally binding if another contract has said that it is legally binding - generally, (smart) employers will include a clause in their employment contract stating that you are to adhere to policies but that those policies do not form part of the contract. If that is the case, then your friend is legally bound by the terms of the policy and will breach their employment contract if they do not adhere to this policy. This is unlikely to be an issue of contract law in and of itself - your friend cannot unilaterally bind their employer to terms as he sees fit. More information - including the nature of the document and other agreements that were made - would be required to provide more useful information (and that's what you would give to a lawyer).
Is this an implied easement? I'm looking to purchase some property in Ontario. The property in question is between two other properties. The owners of the properties on each side have created a path through the wooded area to access each other, but the path is not required to specifically gain access to their property (basically their kids use it to go play, it's easier than doing an entire loop around the forest to get to each others houses). The properties on both sides have their own respective private roads to access their properties, which end on each side of the one I'm looking to purchase. I'm not a scrooge and don't plan on blocking them from walking through my property if I purchase it, but I'm wondering if there is an implied right of way that could be fought in court if my building plans end up inhibiting their access to each others properties. Is this a thing? Or does an implied right of way only pertain when it's the only source of access to your property and not necessary a "luxury access" between two properties.	No, but their use might give them a prescriptive easement. Under Ontario law, to establish a prescriptive easement, the trespassers would have to prove to the court that they: Used the property without permission; Used it openly and peacefully; and, Used it continuously, uninterruptedly for 20 years. (You can interrupt their use by giving them permission to use it for 20 years!) (This article summarizes easements in Ontario; the discussion in a recent decision discusses the statutes in some detail.) Implied Easement: An easement is implied if it is necessary for the use of the property. For example, take your previous question. If your parents severed a portion of their property and sold it to you, there would be an implied easement across their land to give you access to the severed portion. The reasoning being that you would only buy the land if you had access to it, so you have the easement as an implication of buying it.	While the elements of criminal trespass vary from one U.S. state to another, the majority rule is that a good faith belief that you have a claim of a legal right to be present on property (even if you are ultimately found to be incorrect on the merits) prevents you from having the intent necessary to commit criminal trespass. The majority rule is that there is strict civil liability for trespass without regard to intent, but the minority rule that civil trespass is an intentional tort isn't terribly uncommon either, in which case criminal and civil liability for trespass would often be the same. Given the legitimate possibility on reasonable grounds that someone inside some given building is not actually supposed to be there, how might this apply to the law about it being mandatory to leave? What if you claimed you either did not think they were really in charge, or that you simply had no way of verifying? This is irrelevant. The burden is on you not to go into property where you are not allowed to be, and not on someone else to tell you to leave. If you know you have no right to be on the property, the fact that you believe someone else may also not have the authority to control who is on the property is not a defense to criminal trespass. You can be guilty of criminal trespass in most jurisdictions even if no one asks you to leave, if you know that you do not have permission to be on the property. Lack of permission is the default in the absence of someone with apparent authority to do so telling you otherwise.	I do not know the particular legal environment in France, but in general the shop is private property and the owner decides who may enter and who may not. You have no right as such to enter somebody else's property against their will. Doing so would at least be classified as trespassing, possibly more serious considering you mention using force to enter the premise.	I would like to give you a clear definitive answer, but there isn't one. This depends entirely on the scope of the easement which is determined on a case by case basis in light of the facts and circumstances. It is frequently ambiguous. These cases come up frequently and usually either get resolved fairly quickly via mediation or negotiation, or escalate into very ugly lawsuits that can last years. I have a case like this that has been pending eleven years, is on a final appeal to the state supreme court, has involved about $800,000+ of legal fees between all parties involved, has been to the court of appeals following about six times so far, and has led to five evidentiary hearings in addition to depositions, motion practice, etc. Obviously, this is an extreme example, but long, costly litigation if a negotiated resolution isn't reached is pretty common.	Charlie is not a party to the contract between Alice and Bob Alice and Charlie have no contractural relationship and Alice cannot require him to do anything nor is he liable to Alice in any way. Alice’s issue is with Bob who has clearly breached his contract. Alice can sue Bob for damages and may be able to end the lease. There is no trespass because Charlie is there with the permission of the leaseholder. From Charlie’s position there is no reason to believe that Bob does not have the authority to give this permission so Charlie is not in breach of the law. The police will see this as a civil matter and won’t intervene.	There is no general rule about ownership: one parking lot I know is owned by the city, another is owned by the company that operates the mall, and in a third case it is owned by a third party who doesn't operate the mall. Either way, the owner of the parking lot has the property right to limit how it is used, and their agents (security guards, for example) can request that you refrain from skateboarding. They can evict you; they may not have the legal authority to physically toss you off the property, but they can probably perform a citizen's arrest for trespassing. None of this depends on how many cars are in the parking lot. It is more likely that a governmentally-owned parking lot will have a corresponding law restricting its use (whereas in the case of a private parking lot, restrictions center around general property law and the law of trespass).	Yes. It is fairly common for there to be one owner at law, but another person who has a beneficial interest - such as a long-term cohabiting partner. This may arise because the parties set it up that way, or perhaps more often when courts find that there is a "constructive trust" or a "resulting trust". See for example the concurring opinion of Lord Hope of Craighead in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, Parties are, of course, free to enter into whatever bargain they wish and, so long as it is clearly expressed and can be proved, the court will give effect to it. But for the rest the state of the legal title will determine the right starting point. The onus is then on the party who contends that the beneficial interests are divided between them otherwise than as the title shows to demonstrate this on the facts. The resulting court process may find that the beneficial interest exists, or not, and what fraction of the property it represents. It's common to find situations where one party put up most or all of the whole purchase price of a house, which was then registered in both names, and they then disagree about whether it should be split 50-50 or otherwise - that's an example of the beneficial ownership differing in proportion from the (equal) legal ownership. (See Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 at paragraph 51 for an explanation of this particular pattern.) The same sort of case arises when a cohabiting partner does not own the house, but still contributes to the mortgage and other bills - then, depending on the facts at hand, there may be a "constructive trust", and the partner is entitled to a share of the sale price of the house even though they are not its legal owner. A "resulting trust" might arise when someone contributed money for the purchase of the property, even though they didn't end up as a registered owner, but the parties acted in other respects as if they were joint owners.	I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't.
Is selling products at different prices depending on gender possible? I noticed that a French nightclub in Nice (France) sold products at different prices according to the sex of the customers and according to their clothes, indeed women paid less for nightclub's ticket and those who wore short skirts paid less for drinks. Is it possible to do that ? It seems like be price discrimination to me.	You cannot sell the same goods or services at different price points based on gender in the EU Council directive 2004/113/EC required members to implement local laws to "prohibit discrimination based on sex in the access to and supply of goods and services" and it "should apply to both direct discrimination and indirect discrimination." The example you cite would appear to be both direct (tickets) and indirect (skirts) discrimination.	I think the law there is quite clear - you have 14 days to return the goods for a full refund, except for digital content, which you can't return once you started downloading it. That's what it says. The arguments that you try to give were quite obvious to the law makers. I think you can assume they were aware that "digital content does not have a physical form". Now if you purchased, but haven't downloaded or started downloading yet, then obviously you can get your money back. You came up with some theory that this is a "visual vanity item". You can't see it unless you download it. Once you download it, that's it. If you don't download it, you can return it. Let me repeat this: Your fancy analogies mean nothing. There are in the EU laws about being allowed to return goods for a refund. There's the general rule for buying in a store (no right other what the store offers voluntarily), online purchases (some days to return), and online purchases of digital goods (no return once you started downloading). That's the law. Your attempts at redefining the situation are totally pointless. The law says what it says. What you try to redefine doesn't mean one thing. The law clearly distinguishes several situations, and analogies don't count. What happens counts. You bought from a digital item from an online store that needs to be downloaded. And as soon as you start downloading, there is your right to return it gone. And your reasons for wanting to return the goods are completely irrelevant. You don't need any reasons, and having reasons doesn't help you.	Most games have a TOS to playing that include provisions such as sales of in game items through out of game currencies (i.e. real world money changes hands for digital product or account). I believe Pokemon does have this as part of the TOS which could get you and potential customers banned from competition and possibly the modern online trade features, but am unable to look at the current TOS to verify. It should not be hard to find such a document and read for yourself.	According to the information I was able to find, every zone, country, or even states, have their own taxation rules for sales made there. Correct. Well, in no way it's possible that small companies or individuals that sell products internationally deal with tax rules for each buyer, that would be a non-sense, and paying such taxes worldwide would be a nightmare not worth having a small business at all. You are required to comply with the law. If it is complicated, or difficult or expensive to do so then, it's complicated, difficult and expensive and you still have to do it. The answer is obvious: if it's not worth having a small business, don't have a small business. The main question, if someone buys a license from my web-site, is it considered a sale in the buyer's country/state which requires me to collect and pay some remote tax, or it's a purchase in my country/state which requires me to collect HST from that buyer? It depends on the law in both Canada and the destination country. In most cases, the sale will be an export sale from Canada (GST/HST exempt) and an import sale in the destination country - requiring you to comply with GST/HST obligations there. Another question is regarding invoices, I know that Canada requires certain information to be included into an invoice for sales in Canada. If my sales will be considered sales in a buyer's Country with some other rules, does it mean I have to manage tons of invoice templates? Yes. Let's say if my sales in UE exceed 30K EUR it looks like I need to register and pay VAT there. But what if I have less? Then you don't need to register and remit tax. Nor are you allowed to collect it from your customers. By the way, I have no idea what country in the Eurozone goes by the initials UE. In most jurisdictions, you need to register either when you reach the threshold in fact or reasonably expect to reach the threshold. Also in most, you can usually register even if you are below the threshold. For example, these are the rules for Australia. Anyone, please advice. Hire an accountant versed in international digital services. They will be able to give you the advice you need. They will also be able to recommend sales/payment platforms that can handle most of this for you (for a fee, of course).	It is entirely legal to discriminate on arbitrary grounds. What is not legal is to discriminate on the basis of a protected category, for example race. The law say that you cannot favor or disfavor a customer because of their race. Federal law specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, but not age or gender (disability is more complicated). Moreover, the grounds are not arbitrary. The establishment is at legal risk if a customer does not wear eye-protection, and you have no right to compel them to assume that risk: it's a perfectly normal business decision. The law states that "Customers are not allowed to use a tanning device unless the customer uses protective eyewear", and verifying that you have such eyewear is the minimal way of assuring compliance with the law.	The question is always, would a reasonable customer be confused into thinking that the two are the same, or that there is some relation or sponsorship or attribute to one product or firm the rightful reputation of another. That is always dependent on the specific facts and the specific market involved. So-called "famous" marks get extra protection. The exact markets involved will matter. Any stylizations such as colors and typefaces may matter. Logos may matter. I can't say if one of those specific names would be found to infringe on the other.	There is a good answer at the Skeptics StackExchange here. Its three most relevant references are: 42 U.S.C. Chapter 21, especially Subchapter VI (applies only to employers with fifteen or more employees every day in at least 20 calendar weeks in a year) An example case, Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) Katie Manley, The BFOQ Defense: Title VII’s Concession to Gender Discrimination, 16 Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 169-210 (2009) Wilson v Southwest held that being attractive and female is not a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) for being a flight attendant, even when the company marketed themselves using female sexuality: sex does not become a BFOQ merely because an employer chooses to exploit female sexuality as a marketing tool or to better ensure profitability Most scholars believe that the BFOQ exception would not apply to Hooters servers for the same reason. The job is serving food, and the sexualized nature of the service is just the manner in which they do the job, not a requirement of the primary job itself. Hooters has never had a discrimination suit go to trial, however has been sued and settled out of court multiple times. Employment discrimination based on gender has been allowed only in cases where the primary product being sold (not merely the manner of delivery of the primary product) requires a particular gender. One example would be sexual entertainment. This would include strip clubs, modelling agencies, Nevada brothels, etc. I'll say it one other way. Simply offering attractive female service as part of a business strategy is not enough to trigger a BFOQ exception. To allow a BFOQ defence based on an employer's desired manner or means of achieving its primary business purpose would render the statute inoperative, and the BFOQ exception would "swallow the rule" Phillips v. Martin Marietta 400 U.S. 542 (1971). (This paragraph taken from here.)	No If the price advertised is not honoured by the business and you are asked to pay a higher price, you do not have an automatic right to buy the item at the special offer or sale price. As long as the shop or business tells you before you pay that the higher price applies, you have the option to either buy it at the higher price or decide not to. However, the shop or business may be in breach of consumer law in relation to misleading advertising. The prosecution (or not) of the misleading advertising is the government’s task, not yours. This is a common formulation across Common Law jurisdictions as it a codification of the historic common law position. An advertised price is not an offer capable of acceptance, it is an invitation to treat. That is, it is an invitation for you to make them an offer and the price that is likely to be accepted. It is overlaid with later developments in consumer protection surrounding false advertising and misleading and deceptive conduct.
Who is responsible for packages wrongfully delivered to one's address? Re: a thread discussing legal obligations for a package wrongfully delivered to one's address: ...it comes down to whom it is addressed to. As long as the merchandise is addressed to you, you may keep it. If it is addressed to someone else, then you are obligated to make reasonable efforts to either return it or deliver it to the intended recipient. What constitutes 'reasonable efforts'? What if I feel I have made a reasonable effort, and the deliverer fails to make a reasonable effort to pick it up? What are my options? What about the 'obligations' of the deliverer? It sounds like I'm being obligated to care for something I did not initiate and have nothing to do with.	There is no clear legal answer, and in case the matter goes to court, the jury would compare actions of the parties. For example, shipper could say "mail it back to us" and recipient could refuse, saying "come pick it up in the next 10 minutes". Both parties are being unreasonable, imposing significant obligations on the other party (time and money, in the case of the shipper's demands). In the case where a shipper is responsible for the error, most of the burden is on the shipper, thus the shipper should arrange for someone to recover the package. The question is, what limitations can the recipient insist on – what is a reasonable level of inconvenience that the recipient should bear? For instance, it is not generally an unreasonable inconvenience to ask a person to leave the package in a corner on the porch, but it could be too much of an inconvenience to ask a person to interrupt their dinner in order to hand over the package, and it would clearly be an unreasonable inconvenience to require the recipient to wake up at 3am to hand it over. When jurors have to decide such matters, they think "what would I do in this situation, and people have different views of what constitutes a reasonable inconvenience.	Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible.	It could be the passenger's problem or the taxi's problem When these sorts of breakdowns in communications happen in specifying contract terms then either or both parties can be at fault. If the passenger specified the wrong address then it is clearly the passenger at fault. Similarly, if the driver drove to a different address from what the passenger said, it would clearly be the driver at fault. However, if the passenger was imprecise and the driver made an assumption then who bears responsibility depends on whether that assumption is reasonable or not. For example, the main street in the Sydney, Australia CBD is George Street. Even though George Street is an extremely common name with literally dozens in the Greater Sydney area, a taxi driver would reasonably assume that a passenger at the airport asking for "George Street" means the one in the city, not any of the others. In such a circumstance, the onus is on the passenger to specify exactly where they want to go. Whether the driver is an employee or a contractor is irrelevant - they are the representative of the organisation with whom the passenger has a contract.	The primary question is whether you actually committed a crime in signing a credit card receipt, when you are not the cardholder nor are you authorized to sign on behalf of the cardholder: did you commit fraud? It is not possible to accidentally commit fraud, you have to have intended to deceived the other party that you are authorized to sign. For the sake of discussion, I will assume that you had no such intention. Presumably, the person who ordered the stuff will wonder "where is my stuff?", will complain to the vendor, they may then find the signed receipt and some evidence regarding where the goods were delivered. Whether or not they contact you asking for an explanation / return of the goods, the police would have to investigate the situation in light of some allegation that you committed fraud. The police will not just come knocking on the door and nab you (in the US: North Korean law is different). In many jurisdictions, there is a requirement for a warrant supported by probable cause. If the investigation provides sufficient credible evidence proving that you did intentionally falsely sign the receipt, to the point that given those facts you would be convicted of the crime, then there is probable cause for a warrant for your arrest. The fact of signing a receipt is not probable cause to support such an arrest, but other facts could be added to reach that level of evidence.	This is an internet transaction Internet transactions can be reversed within 14 days after delivery of physical goods without the need to state reasons in germany. That is "Rücktritt vom Kaufvertrag". However, you are needed to send back the product and might be required to pay the shipping fees, depending on the original contract. This is a materially flawed product You ordered a book with text A. You got text B. That is a material flaw and you can demand the correction of such a material flaw (Mangel) at the expense of the seller, including any postage. However, if the text was provided by you or the original order form is indicating text B instead of A, the mistake is on you.	The key language to be taken notice of in that code is 'by fraud or deception'. If the property manager has provided reasonable notice of a clear-out, then the code doesn't apply due to lack of fraud or deception. But at the end of the day, just go and check the mail room on a Thursday afternoon and you shouldn't have any problems.	Because they are consumer protection laws The purpose of the laws is to protect the consumer and the consumer’s relationship is with the retailer. Therefore the laws make the retailer responsible for dealing with the consumer’s problem. The retailer profited from the deal so why shouldn’t they be held responsible for sourcing only from reputable manufacturers/importers?	Focusing on the legal question, the obstruction of correspondence statute would not be applicable to UPS package deliveries. To repeat 18 USC 1702, Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or any authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail carrier, or which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. Private package delivery services deliver to the porch (pr similar), not to an authorized depository (such as a mailbox). They are not "mail", and they have not been in the custody of the postal service (unless they have, where USPS actually makes the delivery). Such deliveries constitute unsolicited goods / unordered merchandise, since they were not things that you requested. There are state and federal rules to the effect that you may accept such goods as gifts, and you have no obligation to return the goods. Here is the Washington state law for example, and here is what the FTC says about it at the federal level. The intended recipient cannot impose an obligation on you to store and guard his possessions, nor can a delivery service impose an obligation to safeguard property that they are responsible for.
Why did the show 'Lucifer' need the rights to the DC character? For a little bit of background since I don't expect you to watch the show: The necessary feature of the show is that lucifer leaves hell and then runs a nightclub The personalities and features of the majority of the characters are different to the source material; they only share a name. So if the characters did not share their comic book name (besides Lucifer himself since that's not copyrighted), would the show avoid a copyright strike from DC?	The Lucifer TV show is an adaptation of the comic series of the same name, but with a lot of creative license applied to make the show more viewer friendly/dramatic. In that case, they need the copyright license from DC because, even though there are a lot of differences, there are also a lot of similarities in the story, making it at least a derivative work. Lucifer: Similarities and Differences describes how the show and the comic are similar and where they diverge. You can see that the underlying concept/story is at the very least the same as the comic.	It depends on the game and what you copy. Games are an utter nightmare when it comes to IP law as so many parts of them cannot be copyrighted. Game rules for example cannot be copyrighted, nor can the concept itself. Some things can be copyrighted or trademarked. You cannot use the following: Names Written elements- while the rules themselves can't be copyrighted, rulebooks can Artwork and other visual elements Miniatures designed for the game Original characters Try to avoid these and the Hasbro lawyers should leave you alone.	A simple EULA does not absolve you from legal responsibility. The law that you need to be acquainted with, if you are dealing with the US (i.e. might be sued in the US), is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in particular Title II, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act which states the "safe harbor" provisions. Aspects of DMCA safe harbor are covered in many Law SE questions. In essence, you have to provide a way for rights holders to complain that someone has infringed their copyright on there site, and you have to take down allegedly infringing material: and there are a number of legal formalities to attend to in doing this. The main point is that you can't just ignore the problem and hope it goes away, and you can't just say it is not your responsibility, which is what a simple EULA does. To be protected, you need a "designated agent" where complainers can contact you. You provide the information online (as well as stating the DMCA policy, which can be in the EULA), and also register that information with the Copyright office (online). The complaint has to be in writing, and most of the burden is on the author of the complaint, but you still have to be sure that the complaint is legally conforming. The complaint has to say what was infringed (e.g. the URL), the identity of the protected content (title of the book, for instance), and provide the complainer's signature and contact information. It also requires the complainer to say that they have a good faith belief that the material is illegally copied (no permission, and not otherwise allowed by law), and a perjury statement that the foregoing is accurate and authorized by the copyright holder. When you have a conforming notice, you must "expeditiously" remove / disable the infringing material (there is no definition of "expeditious"), notify the user, then wait for a proper counter-claim (same general form as the take-down claim but where the user denies the posting the material was illegal. If you get a counter-claim, you notify the alleged copyright owner and wait for them to file suit in 10 days. If they don't do that, you restore the material. Here is a sample complaint, and a sample counter notice. Also, this document (look for the download tab) reorganizes the legal language so that requirements are put in logical order and not randomly scattered throughout the US Code.	The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use.	No. These companies seem to be saying that they are entitled to sell music under some sort of mandatory licensing agreement authorized by the law of the Ukraine, or by a licensing agreement specific to the Ukraine. Even if this were true, it would only give them the right to distribute the files in the Ukraine. If an American, sitting in the U.S., makes a digital copy of a file on a Ukrainian server by copying it to his or her U.S. hard drive, they have to have a license to do so issued either by the U.S. copyright holder or authorized by U.S. law. A license to distribute in the Ukraine doesn't give the U.S. end user that license. A Ukrainian statute doesn't give the U.S. end user that license. If the end user doesn't have that license, he or she is violating the copyright holder's rights and may be civilly or criminally liable. There is no scienter requirement for copyright infringement. In fact, it's not at all clear that any Ukrainian site is operating even under this dubious legal cover. This report on Ukrainian licensing agencies by an industry group claims that many Ukrainian licensing authorities are actually scams that have no rights to distribute music under any license--one of the "rogue licensing agencies" discussed is Avtor, referenced in your first example. There is some legal confusion over what group does have permission to license music and collect royalties in the Ukraine, but it's clear that Avtor doesn't, and it certainly doesn't have permission to distribute them in the U.S. If a guy came up to you on the street and told you he had written permission from Disney to videotape their latest movies with a camcorder and sell them to you for a dollar, are you violating the law if you buy it? The answer is yes, and it's the same for these Ukrainian sites.	Your example powers are tropes and their basis in public domain The Queen of Pain's scream is modeled after the Banshee, which had a scream that would kill... and there are LOTS of variants of Banshee. In fact, "Our Banshees Are Louder" is a trope. Hiding in a shadow or walking through it is for example a typical feature of Ninja stories since the Edo Period, and a common Trope as "Shadow walker". That makes those two powers older than You can not have a copyright on concepts, facts, or ideas. Facts are not copyrightable, which was decided LONG ago over Feist v Rural. Neither can you copyright concepts or ideas. You won't get a claim on the concept of a damaging scream or turning into shadow. See also Copyright.gov (emphasis mine): How do I protect my idea? Copyright does not protect ideas, concepts, systems, or methods of doing something. You may express your ideas in writing or drawings and claim copyright in your description, but be aware that copyright will not protect the idea itself as revealed in your written or artistic work.	Your question lacks some details. So you registered a domain name, and later find someone else used that domain name (in the past) for a hobby website? Then no, you don't need to worry about it. If that person has a current trademark on the name used in the domain name, and your website provides/sells products or services in the same area, then you could have a problem. But that doesn't sound like it's the issue.	The DMCA prohibits circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to a copyrighted work. So you can't legally "crack" the software, period -- even if you own a disc containing the software and have a valid license to use it, a license to use the work is not authorization to circumvent access controls. So if the disc is copy-protected, by my understanding of the DMCA, you're kinda screwed. (The company might be willing to provide you a replacement copy, even if only to maintain the illusion that the software is "licensed, not sold". But you can't make one yourself.) Likewise, if you have a copy of the disc but have lost the license key, you're screwed. Even if you could prove beyond any doubt that you are the licensee, there's not any law i'm aware of that would compel the copyright owner to provide you another license key. And courts have held that distribution of license keys without authorization is a violation of the DMCA. So whoever might provide you another key, if they're not the copyright holder, has broken the law. If you managed to copy the disc from a friend (without circumventing any kind of copy protection), and had your own license key, you might be in a better position. Many EULAs allow you to make a backup copy. Even if they didn't, copyright law does, so there's a possible case for fair use.
Can a US citizen who moves from Puerto Rico to Canada vote in the presidential election? An American who moves abroad maintains the status he had when he lived in the homeland. So a New Yorker who moves to Canada still can vote for his congressman, senator and the nation's president. (Quite exceptionally, the former New Yorker is also responsible to continue filing his state and federal tax returns but that's a separate issue) Puerto Rican residents are usually US citizens but do not have the right to vote for representation in Washington, including not being able to vote for president. So the question arises, what happens when a Puerto Rican moves abroad? Does he acquire the right to vote? Can it be that the former New Yorker and former Puerto Rican find themselves as neighbors in Vancouver, but one is eligible to vote for US president and one isn't?	A US citizen who resides abroad can register to vote in federal elections in the last state or territory where they resided in the US. So in your example, the US citizen who was resident in Puerto Rico, and who moves to Canada without first residing in any other state or territory, would register to vote in Puerto Rico. Since he is registered to vote in Puerto Rico, he does not vote in an election for choosing presidential electors since Puerto Rico doesn't have any presidential electors. Only the 50 states and DC have presidential electors, and each of them chooses the electors based on elections by people registered to vote in that state (or DC), so he would have to be registered to vote in some particular state or in DC to participate in an election for choosing presidential electors, but he does not qualify to register to vote in any of the states or DC, because he was not resident there last. Yes, US citizens who are neighbors in Vancouver, Canada, one of whom is a former New Yorker and the other of whom is a former Puerto Rican, would be registered to vote in two places (one in New York and the other in Puerto Rico). They would get two different ballots, and may even have different dates for elections (for elections that are not held on the November election day). They would have different offices to vote for, and, in the case of the ballot for the November election in a presidential election year, the New York ballot would contain an election for a slate of presidential electors, while the Puerto Rico ballot would not.	You've asked a two part question. [Is this a violation of] the international policy that a country should never refuse entry to verified citizens of their own? In considering that question, the US example may be illuminative. The US requires US citizens to have a "passport book" when flying into the US, even though the US issues "passport cards" that serve as proof of nationality. If you can get to the border and prove your US nationality (by passport card or otherwise), they'll let you in, but airlines won't board you unless you have a passport book. If you don't have a passport book, you're supposed to get to the nearest consulate and apply for a passport before flying to the US. But note that the US obligation to admit its own citizens is principally a feature of US law. CBP does not waive 8 USC 1185 because of some international body; there is no body that enforces international "policies" of this nature. Rather, they do so because they know that the federal courts would require them to admit US citizens based on the right of free movement implicit in US law. If someone were unable to get into their country of citizenship and unable to gain legal residence elsewhere then unless they could remain on the run for the rest of their life they would eventually end up as the subject of negotiation between whatever country is trying to deport them and their country of citizenship. In other words, in the worst case, such people become a bilateral diplomatic matter between two countries. Therefore, any challenge to the restriction would have to go through the Italian or EU legal system. Is this a violation of the EU freedom of movement directive, whereby a verified EU/EFTA national cannot normally be refused entry to any EU/EFTA state? It certainly seems to be, but without a decision from an EU court, we can't be certain. From Article 5 of the freedom of movement directive (2004/38/EC): Article 5 Right of entry 1. Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border controls, Member States shall grant Union citizens leave to enter their territory with a valid identity card or passport and shall grant family members who are not nationals of a Member State leave to enter their territory with a valid passport. No entry visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on Union citizens. This doesn't say anything about allowing EU citizens to board aircraft from non-EU destinations without their EU passports. So if Italy makes a rule that EU citizens need a passport to board a flight to Italy from outside the EU and Schengen area, that doesn't seem to violate Article 5 except by implication. It would be for a court to decide whether that implication is in fact present. Because Article 5 doesn't say anything about where the passenger has flown from, we can also consider the case of a dual citizen of an EU member state and a "third country," who might fly to Italy using the third-country passport, and then present a national ID card at the immigration counter. If such a traveler were denied entry, that would appear to violate Article 5. If that traveler's other nationality were one that required a visa in the non-EU passport, the traveler might have a stronger case that Italy's rule infringes on the right of free movement. EU or EFTA citizens could also challenge the restriction more generally as an infringement on the right of free movement that is established in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), even if the directive itself does not prohibit the restriction. For example, one might argue that free movement is restricted because there are countries to which EU citizens can travel with only an ID card, but from which they cannot return to Italy with only that card. In addition, non-Italian EU or EFTA citizens could challenge the more restrictive regime applied to them on the argument that it violates the principle of non-discrimination articulated in Article 9 of the TEU: Article 9 In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.... Furthermore, non-Italians residing in Italy could challenge the more restrictive regime on the basis of Article 24 of the directive: Article 24 Equal treatment 1. Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty. The benefit of this right shall be extended to family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who have the right of residence or permanent residence.	You would check with the authorities in the state where your parents last lived. Actually, you can write to any congressperson, and they can pay attention to you or ignore you as they like. (This also applies to people who live in the US; if you think a representative other than your own will be more likely to follow your request, you can write to them instead.) The reason it's most common to write to your own representative is that they have a political motivation to consider your request (you are more likely to vote for them if they do what you ask). If you were to vote for a congressperson, that would be in the district where your parents lived (but that is governed by state law).	Yes From the American perspective: U.S. law does not mention dual nationality1 or require a person to choose one nationality or another. A U.S. citizen may naturalize in a foreign state without any risk to his or her U.S. citizenship. Source: U.S. Department of State — Bureau of Consular Affairs And from the British: Dual citizenship (also known as dual nationality) is allowed in the UK. This means you can be a British citizen and also a citizen of other countries. Source: Gov.Uk 1Section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states that “the term ‘national of the United States’ means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” Therefore, U.S. citizens are also U.S. nationals. Non-citizen nationality status refers only individuals who were born either in American Samoa or on Swains Island to parents who are not citizens of the United States [Source: Dept of State, as above]	The 24th Amendment states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. But, no one in incarcerated in prison (and hence loses the right to vote) merely for failing to pay taxes. Usually, one is incarcerated in prison on tax charges for fraud in connection with one's tax obligation which is different from failure to pay. (A misdemeanor conviction does not result in the loss of an ability to vote, even while in jail.) Refusal to pay, on grounds other than lacking the money (inability to pay isn't a criminal offense), when done without full compliance with other tax return filing obligations, is tantamount to tax litigation abuse and abuse of process, not mere failure to pay a debt.	American citizens can have dual citizenship , but if an american citizen who has his/her citizenship renounced (even though the person was originally an american citizen) , then what is a way of obtaining the citizenship back? Possibly, by the same means that a non-citizen could be naturalized. But, immigration and nationality officials have broad discretion and would probably refuse to grant citizenship to someone who had previously renounced it. And can an american citizen without dual citizenship (Meaning that he is only an american citizen), renounce his/her citizenship? Yes. For example, Prince Harry's financee plans to renounce her U.S. citizenship and contemporaneously be granted U.K. citizenship (the paperwork goes through really easily when the Queen is your grandmother in law). Renunciation of citizenship is not necessarily tied to gaining a new citizenship, but leaving yourself stateless would be a foolish thing to do.	The President has the power under Article II of the U.S. Constitution to faithfully execute the laws enacted by Congress. Any power that the President has to regulate international travel of non-U.S. citizens arises from statutes enacted by Congress that give the President (or the executive branch more generally) that authority. Immigration laws, in practice, give very substantial discretionary authority to the President, and public health laws probably also do so. I don't have chapter and verse to cite to you regarding which specific statutes provide that authority, without considerably more research, but that is the general idea. The primary statute regulating immigration is the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (and more generally, Title 8 of the United States Code). It is not uncommon in the United States for there to be disputes over how much discretion a President has under a particular statute in the United States, because unlike parliamentary systems of government, the execution of laws and the passage of law is split between different branches of the federal government in the Presidential system of the United States, rather than being fused with a Prime Minster who serves at the pleasure of the legislature.	The Twenty Second Amendment is quite clear on this: No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice In your question, the President has been elected twice - unless of course the President was actually the Vice President (or elsewhere in the line of succession) at the start of the first term, in which case theres other limits: and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. So, someone who has held the office of President after being elevated to it rather than elected to it, but served no more than 1 year 364 days of that first term, could possibly, by the wording of the Twenty Second Amendment, be eligible to resign within their second term and stand again but only once more.
If I use the Deposit Protection Service-provided Alternative Dispute Resolution, is there any danger of legal fees or legal consequences? The background of the dispute is below. To be clear, this is not really about the money, but about the principle. I believe the landlord is attempting to take advantage, and many tenants more timid than myself would simply knuckle under and pay. I want to make the landlord understand she won't get away with treating people this way. The DPS provides a dispute resolution service which the landlord is proposing to use, if I do not pay up the £150 she wants to replace the hob. The only circumstances I would pay up, rather than go to the dispute resolution, is if I were exposing myself to some significant risk by choosing the latter. IOW: is it plausible that the dispute resolution service would hand me a significantly bigger bill than this landlord is demanding? Is it likely that they could turn around and say 'she only asked for £150, but actually you have to pay her £2000', or something like that? (for reference, the deposit is £1200) Edit: A user asked why I would think that a bill of (say) £2000 is a possibility. As it happens, I don't think that such a big bill is a possible consequence of going through the DPS resolution process. I am asking because my partner wants to just pay up and be done with it, because she is afraid of unforeseen consequences. I want to be able to reassure my partner that those fears are unfounded. The point is, it commonplace for the DPS to look at the evidence and decide the landlord deserves more than the landlord asked for? The background I have recently moved out of rented accommodation. I am having a dispute with my landlord over the deposit, which is lodged with the DPS (I checked, it is). The dispute is over a gas hob. The hob is controlled by plastic nobs, one of which I broke while cleaning. My ex-landlord believes that this means the hob is now unsafe and unusable. She wants to replace the whole hob with a new one, and charge us for it. I think this is absurd, because: 1) The hob was not new when I moved in two years ago, let alone now. Buying a new hob is not mitigating her losses. edit: clarification regarding above -- I'm no lawyer. But it's my understanding that if the hob is indeed broken, I only have to pay what it was worth at the moment before it was broken. If it was only as good as a second hand hob going for e.g. £40, then £40 is what I have to pay. As I said I'm no lawyer, so please advise me if I am mistaken. I also believe, per number 2) below, that the hob can be economically repaired in any case 2) I do not accept that there is anything wrong with the hob apart from the absence of one plastic knob which could be easily replaced. The landlord is also contending that one of the taps is 'jammed down' and can't be turned. I don't know what she means by that, except that I was able to turn them. One of them was stiffer than the others, but I do not think that is as a result of me removing and replacing the knobs to clean the hob. I asked the landlady who says the hob is unsafe, and she said 'the gas inspector'. She gave me his mobile number, but not his name or credentials. I strongly suspect she is getting advice from people who stand to benefit from fitting a new gas hob instead of repairing it. She says that cooker companies have advised her that no-one fixes gas hobs because it's too dangerous, which again I believe is ridiculous. A google search in my local area reveals a dozen companies who do this. One other thing: the landlady has known for months that the knob was broken because this 'gas inspector' came round and looked at the hob. If it was indeed damaged by my act and unsafe, he would have known that then, and reported it to the landlady. In that case the landlady would have known that I was living with an unsafe appliance, and would have been breaking the law in a pretty serious way by not addressing that problem... right?	The landlady is trying it on. The purpose of a deposit is to protect the landlord from being left out of pocket by: damage to the property rent arrears Reasonable wear and tear does not constitute damage. It seems unlikely that the stiff tap is as a result of damage. The hob is not so clear cut: the landlady could argue that it was damaged, albeit by accident, and the cost of repair taken from your deposit. If she insists that the only remedy is to replace the hob, she should make an appropriate deduction to reflect the fact that it is several years old and will be replaced by one that is new (thereby gaining her some value). It would be reasonable for you to expect to see the written report from the gas inspector who has condemned the whole hob in that case. But I find it hard to believe that: the plastic knob cannot be replaced doing so would make the hob unsafe, if the knob can be removed for cleaning it's my understanding that if the hob is indeed broken, I only have to pay what it was worth at the moment before it was broken. Your liability is to return her to the position she would have been in had the damage not occurred. If that means replacing a removable plastic part instead of the whole hob, that would be a reasonable remedy.	Once your rental contract starts, your landlord must give you access to the rented flat. If he doesn't do so he is in breach of contract. You could sue him, but that would be a bad start for a longer term contractual agreement. It might be less time and effort to look for a new flat. And do you really want to be in a long term contract with someone who breaches contract right from the start based on arbitrary reasons? In any case, you can and you should cut the rent proportionally for every day without access to the flat. Your landlord has by no means a right to check your luggage. Even if there would be such a regulation in the contract, it would be void, because of invasion of privacy. It looks to me that you are in for some bad times with such a landlord. I can assure you that most landlords are not like this. Another reason to probably look for a new flat. Legally you are right, but what does that help you if your landlord is trouble?	As a matter of contract law it would not be possible to enforce a requirement to pay legal fees without agreement. You could easily see how this would be problematic: one could just draft letters to hundreds or thousands of people and require them to pay the costs of composing the letter. My understanding is that this is common practice in the United States (see speculative invoicing). However, people are generally free to pay whatever they want to anyone they want. The other side is free to pay the legal costs, they just probably won't. In some common law jurisdictions, the concept of a Calderbank offer may be another reason to write a letter such as this; the settlement offer can be relied upon in later proceedings as an indication as to the costs that would be appropriate to award to the winning party, should the offeree unnecessarily prolong legal proceedings	The landlord is not free of liability risks. In California, everybody is responsible for injury brought about by lack of ordinary care or skill in management of his or her property or person. This applies to landlords, falling under Business Proprietor’s Liability for the Criminal Conduct of Others. Therefore the landlord must use reasonable care to protect tenants and guests from another person's harmful conduct on the property if the conduct can be can reasonably anticipated. The duty is towards anyone on tenants and guests alike. To figure out whether the landlord has breached his duty of care, the courts will "balance" the probability of harm to the tenant with the burden of the duty imposed on the landlord to prevent or mitigate the risk of harm, see Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 4th 269. In that instance, the landlord failed to replace a missing pane of glass on the front door, contributing to the tenant's murder, for which the landlord was held liable (wrongful death). This ruling has extensive discussion of that balancing act. The crucial question is, how did the assault happen, and how do the landlords actions relate to the assault? The answer may be different in other jurisdictions. In the modified scenario, liability would hinge on scenario details (I'll continue to assume California). The factual question is whether in light of the background check, the assault was foreseeable, and to what extent it was preventable – what did the landlord do wrong? For instance, if the criminal history check revealed a number of arrests for assault in the state and the check was limited to CA (the new tenant moved to CA just a year ago), and if the assault was in old-tenant's room which had no lock due to landlord indifference, then the landlord is more likely to be held liable (he could have fixed the lock for a few dollars, or paid for a better criminal check). On the other hand, if a thorough criminal check reveals no arrests or complaints for anything, anywhere, and the assault happened in the common area while talking politics, there is no reasonable course of action that the landlord could have undertaken to prevent the assault (hiring 24 hour guards would not be reasonable, in this scenario). In Vasquez, the issue came down to the landlord's failure to implement a cheap fix on the front door. In a third version of your scenario, suppose that there was some evidence of past violent behavior, but the only fault that could be assigned to the landlord is the fact of renting to the new tenant. Does a landlord have a duty to deny housing to a person with a past record of violent behavior? It is legal in California to do background checks and deny a prospective tenant a lease based on existing criminal history, as long as the criteria are applied consistently (not discriminatorily), and not in a jurisdiction where criminal checks are illegal (Oakland). There is a non-fantasy scenario where that includes "the US", given a guidance from HUD, based on a disparate impact analysis. HUD says that a housing provider excluding applicants with arrest but no conviction "cannot satisfy its burden of showing that such policy or practice is necessary to achieve a substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest". If there are convictions and there is a blanket no-convict policy, the provider must still be able to prove that such policy or practice is necessary to achieve a substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest. A housing provider that imposes a blanket prohibition on any personw ith any conviction record –no matter when the conviction occurred, what the underlying conduct entailed, or what the convicted person has done since then – will be unable to meet this burden If it is illegal to discriminate on the basis of past convictions, a landlord cannot be held liable for obeying the law. In short, "it depends (on minute details and whether the plaintiff's lawyer makes the necessary arguments): ask your attorney".	No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement").	Can landlord backbill 4.5 years worth of utilities that were never billed to us bimonthly as directed in the lease? Yes, since the bimonthly billing issue appears to be within the LA statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract: 10 years (see here). But you might want to check the actual legislative language of the statute referred therein and the prior or consecutive ones --all pertaining to statutes of limitations-- so as to ascertain the accuracy of information in the first link (navigating through the bunch of LA two- or three-line statutes for this and that gets annoying). They are desperate to get me to move out since it is a rent-controlled unit and I feel like they have done this to cause issues and force me to default on rent. Is this a legal practice? I am not knowledgeable of state legislation particular to rent-controlled units, but I highly doubt it is lawful for them to proceed that way. Other details you describe reflect that the company has been --or is being-- malicious or grossly negligent. If so, strictly speaking, the company's conduct (1) ought to weaken its position or merits in trying to force you out, and (2) tends to contravene the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see below). If your lease mentions any statutes regarding rent-controlled units, you may want to search for case law at leagle.com to see how the statutes are applied. Without knowing the terms of your lease, I think your priority should at all times be the rent itself so as to avoid eviction. Does the "billing every two months" in the lease have any hold on this issue if they breached their own lease? Maybe not. The repeated, yet sole, failure to send you the bimonthly billings falls short of landlord's breach of contract. For your argument on breach of contract to prevail, you would have to prove that the landlord knowingly/deliberately let the water bills pile up prior to demanding you to pay everything at once. That would prove that the landlord is not meeting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is prerequisite in contract law.	The correct term for this insurance is personal liability insurance - it is neither compulsory nor common in common law jurisdictions. However, some aspects of it may be bundled with other insurances like homeowners, landlords and contents insurance. Liability for damage in common law flows either from a breach of contract or a tort. Of course, if you intentionally cause harm you have crossed the line from civil liability to criminality and no insurance will indemnify you. For your specific examples: [I]f, say, a candle falls over and I burn my flat? If your lease prohibited you from having open flames then this would be a clear breach of contract and you would have to pay for the damage to the flat (and your own property, of course). If your lease was silent on this, then you would be liable if you were negligent and each party would bear their own losses if you weren't (i.e. it was a pure "accident"). What if a flower pot falls from my windowsill and accidentally kills someone? The passerby has no action under contract as they don't have one. They can sue you, or the landlord, or the body corporate (or all three) for negligence - the landlord's and/or body corporate's insurance would respond and if it included a waiver of subrogation (most do), the insurer could not sue any of the other parties for their losses. What if my trolley bumps into an old lady at the supermarket and I break her hip? What if I walk on my friend's glasses and break them? You have no contract with either of these people so they cannot sue you under one. If they can prove negligence then you have to pay for the damage. If it is, instead a pure "accident" then they bear the cost. However, for the old lady, she is way more likely to sue the supermarket as they will have insurance. It is not as useful in the UK as it is in France due to the need for the plaintiff to prove a breach of contract or negligence. In the UK, you are not responsible for accidents you cause - only accidents you cause negligently.	If a contract does not say what one of the parties wishes it would say, before signing it they should renegotiate the lease. Once the parties have an agreement as witnessed by signatures, a party cannot change the terms of the contract by declaring that some provision of the lease is a "typo". If they want to renegotiate the terms of the contract after the fact, they can, if the other party is willing to give in on the particular point. So as it stands, it seems that the landlord is in breach of contract. This section of Maryland's landlord-tenant law is relevant to this situation. (b) In general. -- A tenant may deduct from rent due to a landlord the amount of payments made to a utility service provider for utility service if: (1) An oral or written lease for an affected dwelling unit requires the landlord to pay the utility bill; and (2) (i) The tenant pays all or part of the utility bill, including payments made on a new utility service account; or (ii) The tenant pays any security deposit required to obtain a new utility service account. (c) Waiver not permitted. -- A tenant's rights under this section may not be waived in any lease. There is no provision under the law whereby the landlord can be penalized for the inconvenience that you've suffered. This section of the public utilities law addresses the problem of the landlord's debt, in particular: (c) If utility service at an affected dwelling unit is subject to the threat of termination or actual termination, a tenant residing in the affected dwelling unit: (1) may apply for a new utility service account in the tenant's name; and (2) may not incur liability for charges due on the landlord's account. In particular, (d)(3) says A utility service provider may not refuse or otherwise condition a tenant's ability to establish a new utility service account in the tenant's name because of arrearages on the landlord's account. So the utility company is wrong, and so is the landlord.
IP address details Usually how long does it take for the police to acquire IP details from the ISP now they no longer need a warrant to serve them under the snoopers charter. Would they usually then come and search your house for devices if it was cyber related?	Usually how long does it take for the police to acquire IP details from the ISP now they no longer need a warrant to serve them under the snoopers charter. The Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data Code of Practice published by the UK Home Office in March 2015 encourages service providers to furnish a disclosure notice within a fortnight: 3.50. Ordinarily the CSP should disclose, in writing or electronically, the communications data to which a notice relates not later than the end of the period of ten working days from the date the notice is served upon the CSP. In practice, it is impossible to tell what "usually" looks like because historical data is not available. Would they usually then come and search your house for devices if it was cyber related? It depends on what grounds an offence is believed to have taken place. In any case, unless you are arrested a search warrant would be required, and a constable (authorised by an inspector) must apply to a court. Lord Widgery CJ in Williams v. Summerfield [1972] 2 QB 512 described a search warrant as: ... a very serious interference with the liberty of the subject, and a step which would only be taken after the most mature careful consideration of all the facts of the case. Warrants that are governed by legislation for specific offences (The Theft Act 1968, section 26; The Firearms Act 1968, section 46; The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, section 23(3); Obscene Publications Act 1959, section 3; and Protection of Children Act 1978, section 4) require specific information as to the suspected offence. For example: If it is made to appear by information on oath before a justice of the peace that there is reasonable cause to believe that any person has in his custody or possession or on his premises any stolen goods, the justice may grant a warrant to search for and seize the same… (Theft Act 1968) More general search warrants are issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and the would first need to persuade a justice that there are reasonable grounds for believing: that an indictable offence has been committed there is material on the specified premises which is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation of the offence it is likely to be relevant evidence and it does not consist of or include items subject to "legal privilege", "excluded material" or "special procedure The justice would normally want to ensure there are reasonable grounds to believe that you would prevent access to that evidence (e.g. by refusing entry or by destroying it first), which make a warrant necessary. If you are arrested because a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that you have committed an offence, and the offence is indictable, PACE also grants a power to search premises following arrest: 32(2)(b) if the offence for which he has been arrested is an indictable offence, to enter and search any premises in which he was when arrested or immediately before he was arrested for evidence relating to the offence	I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!	If you mean the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (aka RIPA), it doesn't provide for mandatory retention of communications data. Broadly speaking, RIPA is about interception as opposed to mass surveillance or retention just in case. The Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 obliged "public communications providers" to retain what is commonly known as 'metadata', i.e. information about the communication - the originating phone number, the receiving phone number, the date, time and duration (if relevant), the type of call or message - not the content of the communication. See Schedule 1. In April 2014, in the case known as Digital Rights Ireland the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the EC Directive invalid. In response, the UK made the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) - sunsetted on 31 December 2016. This provided for the Secretary of State to issue a data retention notice to a communications services provider (CSP), requiring it to retain the data types set out in the Schedule to the 2009 Regulations. DRIPA's Explanatory Notes support my claims above with a summary of the history. This was replaced by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA), Part 4 of which deals with the retention of communications data. Here too the retention is of the metadata not the content (see s11(87) and the Explanatory Notes).	Let's break it apart: The police has an union or charity. That's legal in most jurisdictions. The union or charity accepts donations from non-police. Also legal in most jurisdictions. The union communicates who the donors are. Generally legal in most jurisdictions. Keeping it secret would be just as problematic. Police officers have some discretion if and how they charge incidents. That's just common sense. Otherwise you get cases like 8-year-olds being arrested. (You get those anyway when the police don't use their discretion, or if the laws are too rigid.) Police officers let themselves be influenced by the donor card in how they apply their discretion. That's usually illegal on the part of the police officer. The Brits use the catchphrase 'without fear or favour.' But it is difficult to prove, even if it is systematic. The union issues donor cards to facilitate the effects of the previous bullet point. That sounds at the very least unethical. Some might argue that it is organized corruption. On the other hand, you can assume that the police unions have some decent lawyers on staff, and that they made sure that the words on their cards are not blatantly illegal in the jurisdiction in question. It might take something like a whistleblower, a sting operation, or an internal affairs investigation to prove corruption.	This question is framed such that it could include myriad different scenarios that could lead to a search of one's personal computer. You seem to gear the bulk of your inquiry toward when the government can search, but then move to when a corporate entity has the right to do so, which is a very different thing. These are different issues with different concepts and rules that dictate when this can occur lawfully. You might want to narrow your question a bit. By way of generalization: the citizens of the U.S. have an implied right to privacy as construed through the Bill of Rights, even though there is no explicit right written into the constitution. The most common way to conduct a search in the U.S. is with probable cause through a search warrant. There are questions and answers both on here, as well as resources all over the internet, pertaining to constitutionally accepted forms of search and seizure such that you could get that information fairly easily. However, as with the U.K., and despite any rights (explicit or implicit), there are many ways your computer could be searched by the government - both known to the owner and unknown - and even remotely, that use means less common to the standard search warrant. As you've probably heard from the revelations of Edward Snowden (Wikileaks), the governments of the world have been shown to search metadata and other electronic records without a warrant under laws aimed toward protecting national security. In the U.S. the Patriot Act gave wide reaching powers to invade the privacy of individuals that required no oversight or basis for doing so. Corporations that deal with the transmission of data work with government entities to to accomplish this end. As one individual has already noted, you subject yourself to search (which includes your computer) upon entry to the country through customs. There are many ways that the government can and does engender to search computers, computer files, emails, metadata, etc. A corporation may search your personal computer under a contractual relationship you create with it (for instance if you work from home and elect to use your home computer, and to do so you elect to agree to allow the entity to inspect your computer for their intellectual property in certain circumstances). They can also do this pursuant to a civil lawsuit, which can allow for the inspection of your computer through the process of discovery. These are just some of the ways your information can become subject to inspection (search) by government or corporate entities. Again, your question would need to be limited more to address any one situation more fully.	Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.	If the police become aware of the domestic violence through you reporting it or otherwise the matter is entirely in their hands. They will decide if they want to prosecute or not.	A warrant is required: you cannot just bust into a home because the owner died. Nothing that you describe resembles the kind of emergency situation that allows a warrantless search. In order to get a warrant, you have to have a good enough reason. Suppose that campus police found a suspicious object at the scene which was evidence of a crime and which had an identifiable connection to his home. Campus police might get a warrant to search the home, to find evidence related to the possiblity that this was a murder. That evidence could be evidence that he had uncovered a terrorist plot to bomb Needles CA, and he was killed because of that. His home computer might contain records of contact between him and the terrorists: so the judge might grant a warrant. The FBI might also go to a federal court for a warrant for a different suspected crime, for example a planned bombing of Needles. Since this involves national security, this could be a FISA court, which is a secret court for surveilling foreign spies in the US. The daughter has the (apparent) authority to consent to a search – police are not required to inquire very deeply into a person's authority to consent to a search. If she doesn't consent, the police of the FBI might have probable cause for a warrant – it has to be an articulable reason, not just a mystical intuition (TV cop shows notwithstanding) that there must have been a crime and the house has evidence of the crime.
Does a work reference have liability? Similar to What is the liability of a person who signs as a witness? does a reference for a candidate employee have liability for what they say about the candidate? I've seen some companies ask references to fill out a form where at the bottom they sign agreeing the information they are providing is correct and true. To my understanding lying isn't illegal. So does the fact that a reference sign something claiming they aren't lying have an affect? For the purpose of this question assume the person acting as a reference isn't under obligation not to be a reference (e.g. from their current company's policy) .	does a reference for a candidate employee have liability for what they say about the candidate? To my understanding lying isn't illegal. Lying is unlawful to the extent that the liar's deliberate intent to mislead other(s) causes or is likely to cause unwarranted harm. This is regardless of whether "the person acting as a reference isn't under obligation not to be a reference". Lies can directly harm the candidate and/or the company, and others indirectly. The harm to the candidate is known as, or comes in the form of, defamation. Depending on the jurisdiction, an intent to mislead might not even be a prerrequisite for liability. For instance, Michigan statute MCL 600.2911(7) allows suits for libel or slander if "the defamatory falsehood concerns the private individual and was published negligently" (emphasis added). The liar's intent to mislead and his knowledge of the falsehood of his statements can only worsen the harm inflicted and his liability therefor. Likewise, the liar can be liable to the company for inducing it to hire a candidate the company would not have hired had it known the truth. Liability ensues when the hired candidate makes the company incur losses which would be prevented by relying on a truthful reference. If the reference is truthful, the chances for liability are significantly narrower. These scenarios typically involve matters of privacy or disclosures that are protected/sanctioned by law.	I do not believe that Idaho has such a law. This is not the end of the analysis, however. It isn't clear that saying you do not have a conviction, when in fact, you have a conviction that was dismissed, is a permissible ground for an Idaho employer to, for example, justify the termination of your employment for an improper reasons (e.g. national origin) when the employer, after the fact, discovers that you have a conviction that you did not disclose because it was dismissed. An Idaho court could easily rule that the non-disclosure of a conviction which was dismissed was not a material fact upon which an Idaho employer could justify terminating your employment when it was discovered after the fact. Likewise, fraud prosecutions generally require a misrepresentation to be made regarding a "material" fact, and not just any fact. In the same vein, while misstating your middle name might be a misrepresentation, it might not be an actionable misrepresentation of a material fact.	In an adversarial legal system, the parties are responsible for framing the issues in dispute and adducing relevant evidence. The parties, and perhaps more importantly their lawyers, also have an obligation of candour to the court. Courts routinely accept unchallenged assertions because there are serious consequences for misleading the court, and the opponent (rather than the court which should remain neutral) is in the best position to investigate and prove any suspected dishonesty. It is a matter for the party commencing proceedings (plaintiff or prosecutor) to decide how the parties will be named. People often change their names, and may use multiple spellings. It is not uncommon for typographical or other errors to appear. Generally, it is in the interest of at least one party to name the parties "correctly," ie. consistently with other government records that will be used to enforce any judgment, but a person's name is ultimately a formal matter that can be corrected if necessary. In cases of uncertainty, aliases can be specified, as occurred in Microsoft v McDonald (aka Gary Webb) [2006] EWHC 3410 (Ch). A person who is genuinely known by an alias (ie. the use of the alias is not part of an attempt to mislead the court) should use their "real" name in court, but could potentially conduct litigation using the alias without anybody noticing. However, court proceedings are public and this would not necessarily protect the person's identity. To achieve this, an anonymity order under CPR 39.2 is required, as explained in XXX v Camden London Borough Council [2020] EWCA Civ 1468 [13]–[22].	I think that the question you are really asking is whether a contract not to disclose certain information (e.g. to authorities) might be void as contrary to public policy, or illegal. Sometimes it is illegal to do so. For example, often concealing personal information in connection to the transfer of funds constitutes money laundering, which is a crime, or securities fraud. The key question is whether there is a legal duty to disclose in a particular context and whether the concealment facilitates some sort of fraud.	In general, you cannot neither change contracts nor restrict/nullify other people's rights by your acts alone. The people who hired you personally have a contract with you, not with your LLC. So, if someone has a claim against you, then their claim should not be contingent of your LLC going bankrupt or not; they have a right to have their damages restored by you (who was the entity they hired). Otherwise, fraud/liability delinquency would be trivial: get debts on your name and, when the things get difficult, create a shell LLC and let it go bankrupt.	The written document is given very high priority, so parties will be held to what is in the document. Both parties sign at the bottom, as a way of signalling their agreement with the terms specified in the document. If conditions are added or subtracted (by crossing out), especially with pre-printed forms, the "customer" (person who didn't write the contract) can initial such modifications, as a way of clearly signalling that they indeed agree to the deletion of such-and-such clause. Since both parties have a copy of the signed agreement, this is not strictly necessary. The potential issue would be that an unscrupulous person could cross out a clause after the contract was signed, and claimed that they aren't bound by that clause. A comparison of the two copies would then reveal that the unscrupulous person was attempting fraud. There is nothing special about handwriting in or crossing out conditions, except that it poses a potential evidentiary problem as to what exactly was agreed to, if for example one party threw away their copy and then maintained that the crossed-out clause had not been crossed out. (So, keep your copy). In case you are proposing a scenario where one party is unaware of a change, i.e. at the very last minute Smith crosses something out and signs it, and Jones did not see that happen, then both copies would be the same and Jones would be legally bound to what's in the paper. Smith should announce to Jones that a clause was being deleted. We might suppose that there are innocent reasons why Smith made changes without making an announcement to Jones, in which case the parties do not have an agreement. There may be amicable ways to deal with that situation, but push could come to shove, in which case the written form of the document is generally taken to be the most important piece of evidence (though not always the only admissible evidence, unless you're in Colorado, Florida or Wisconsin).	There is no requirement to name the parties to a contract I just bought a cup of coffee. I did not give my name to the other party to that contract and while I know the name of the shop, I do not actually know the legal entity I contracted with. Nevertheless, we have a binding contract and, for example, if that coffee gave me food poisoning, I would have legal recourse under that contract. Similarly, there is no difficulty signing a contract under a pseudonym - it still creates a legally binding relationship. The practical difficulties While there is no legal problem, there is an evidentiary one - if someone enters a contract and later disclaims doing so, how do you prove that they did? Or vice-versa, if someone alleges that it was you that entered the contract, how do you prove that you didn’t. What you need is some way of definitively but anonymously tying the person to the contract. I can think of lots - a fingerprint, DNA, public key cryptography, a trusted third-party intermediary to name just a few. This is essentially a technical problem rather than a legal one.	There are basically two kinds of conduct that you identify. One is backing away from what you believe were oral promises made by the employer and lawyer regarding payment. Whatever the status of the promises made by the employer, the oral statements made by the lawyer would probably be viewed by a court or ethics board as settlement offers or proposals rather than actual binding agreements, and this is unlikely to be considered an ethical lapse. For purposes of ethics questions and fraud lawsuits, lies about what kind of deal you are willing to make with an adversary don't count as lies. This isn't a terribly logical rule, but is is a well established one. Given that: I was told (by employer), verbally and in text/email messages that I "would be paid when the deals closed." It is going to be very hard for the employer to take back those written statements and text and email messages are usually given the effect of signed writings in a court of law. This is going to be taken as a confession of the employer regarding the probably unwritten agreement of the parties regarding your right to be paid on these deals, so you would be well advised to stick to your guns on this issue. The percentages will be another point that is hard for the employer to fight if there is a course of dealings between the parties in which you receive a consistent percentage or there was a written agreement concerning your commission percentage. Also, even if the lawyer did make a promise and breached it, this would still only be a breach by the employer of a contract made on the employer's behalf by his lawyer. It is not an ethical lapse to breach a contract about future conduct, and a lawyer is not personally responsible for contracts he makes as a disclosed agent of your former employer. The second is making a false statement of fact about whom the lawyer has discussed the matter with. Lawyers do have an ethical duty to be truthful and failing to do so is an ethical lapse. But, this duty is generally interpreted to apply only to statements of fact which are material. If a lawyer lies to you about how old he is, or whether he's ever had an affair, in the context of a pre-litigation negotiation like this one, the ethical officials won't care. If a lawyer lies to you about something material to the transaction (e.g. claiming that the employer has money in the bank to pay a settlement when in fact it is overdrawn on all of its accounts and has no money coming in and the lawyer knows those facts), this is a serious ethical breach. It is hard to see how this information would be material, even though it casts doubt on his credibility. Ethically, he owes any duty of confidentiality to his client and not to you, so it isn't your complaint to make from a confidentiality point of view. Also, unless he discusses confidential advice that he provided to his client when no one else was present to you, he has not waived the attorney-client privilege, contrary to the answer by @IñakiViggers on that issue. Of course, proving that the lawyer said anything in an oral conversation at which no one else was present comes down to a credibility fight between your sworn statement and his if the lawyer testifies inaccurately about the discussion. A sworn statement from you is proof and would meet the "burden of production" to provide proof in support of your case at a trial, but wouldn't necessarily prevail easily at trial since the judge might not be convinced regarding who is accurate in their account of the discussion (I have avoided the word "lying" because there are a variety of reasons that people inaccurately recall discussions). What would be the sensible way to use this information to my advantage while trying to resolve these matters with having to bring suit and go to court? Is there anything that this lawyer should fear, if his unethical behavior was brought to light, either in court or to a bar association? The conduct you describe on the part of the lawyer will provide you with little or no leverage in your negotiations and is likely to not even be considered admissible evidence in court since it may be considered a form of settlement negotiations. Your strongest leverage will be the written statements from the employer. But, depending upon the amount in dispute, it may still make sense to compromise given the time and expense and uncertainty of going to court. Even in the clearest case, you probably only have a 90% chance of winning a contested case, and you wouldn't cross the street if you knew you had a 10% chance of being hit by a car as you crossed, even if you knew that the collision wouldn't be fatal. Unless your state has a wage claims act that covers you, you may have little or not prospect of an attorneys' fee award if you prevail, and representing yourself when the employer has a lawyer will always put you at a disadvantage in a court setting. If the amount in dispute is great (e.g. $50,000+), hiring a lawyer is probably worth it. If the amount in dispute is small (e.g. $5,000) you may want to file a suit in small claims court and only hire a lawyer for a couple hours of pre-hearing coaching.
Is it illegal in the EU / in Germany to download a scientific e-book? Suppose there's a scientific monograph I really want to read but don't want to buy. I find an e-book on some website (where it is accessible to the public without restrictions) and download it. I don't intend to resell it and am only using it on a personal level. Am I breaking the law? My understanding is "yes": The scientific monograph is protected by copyright. Downloading copyrighted material without the permission of the copyright owner has been known to be illegal for a long time. Streaming copyrighted material (in the sense of looking at stuff that other people have uploaded without downloading it) without the permission of the copyright owner became illegal in April 2017. Motivation for pirating was not mentioned and so should not matter. However some people claim this may be legal (and claim that it is certainly legal for single papers rather than a full book; see discussions here and here). Their argument hinges on: Scientific research isn't the same as other copyrighted material. Section 60c of the German law says one can do this for personal scientific research. I can't sell the book, but if it's for my own personal reading I'm not breaking any laws. I would like to resolve: is it legal to download the book or not? The setting is the EU, and if the country within the EU matters, the country is Germany.	Summary Downloading from the internet constitutes an act of reproduction according to EU law, however The EU allows Member States to implement an exception permitting personal-use copies from lawful sources, and Germany implements such an exception, but Germany's personal-use exception is narrower than the base EU exception and doesn't generally apply in this case. Note: My answer concerns whether or not the private copying exception applies to the download specified in the question. There could be other avenues to explore, such as Section 60c mentioned in the question and phoog's answer. Downloading as an act of reproduction As a literary work, a scientific monograph is given protection against unauthorized acts of reproduction by the EU's Copyright Directive in Article 2. This includes an end user downloading from the internet. While it was surprisingly difficult to find an authoritative direct statement to that effect (most sources just assume this to be true), the Filmspeler ruling contains such language in paragraph 22 and paragraphs 69-72. The EU's private copy exception Despite the protection given by Article 2, Article 5(2)(b), henceforth the private copy exception, is one way to legally create copies without authorization. It allows Member States to enact exceptions: (b) in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, [...1] While this provides a baseline for private copy, in order to fully understand its scope, we must examine the landmark ACI Adam ruling. In it, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the private copy exception cannot apply when the source of the reproduction is unlawful (paragraphs 56-58). Additionally, according to analysis by Eleonora Rosati on the the IPKat blog, ACI Adam clarified that Member States cannot expand on the allowed copyright exceptions, they can only make them more narrow. Following just the baseline EU private copy exception, the download specified in the question is legal provided that the source is lawful2. Germany's private copy exception Germany transposes the baseline EU private copy exception into section 53(1) of its copyright act (German link, footnotes are mine): (1) It shall be permissible for a natural person to make single copies of a work for private use on any medium, insofar as they neither directly nor indirectly serve commercial purposes, as long as no obviously unlawfully-produced model3 or a model which has been unlawfully made available to the public4 is used for copying. [...] While private copying is therefore generally allowed in Germany, it implements a limiting exception to the private copy exception in section 53(4) as allowed by ACI Adam. The clause prevents unauthorized non-manual copies in the case of sheet music, periodicals, and books, unless they've been out of print for 2 years. Therefore in Germany, the download in question is only legal under the private copying exception if the source is not obviously unlawful and the book has been out of print for at least 2 years. Footnotes Two other restrictions on private copy not particularly relevant to this question. One is not circumventing technological locks, the other is that the rightholder must receive "fair compensation." In practice, this isn't handled by the private copier, but by collection societies which get funds from levies on storage media then redistributes them to rightholders. However, while I've not found a reference for it, I highly suspect the downloading of an entire in-commerce book would be found to violate the Berne three-step test, implemented in the EU in Article 5(5), which requires that copyright exceptions only apply in "certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder." The edges of "obviously unlawful" are a little fuzzy. In ACI Adam, it was determined at the EU level that the private copying exception must only apply to lawful sources, and so the German law might be inconsistent with EU law. Reading through the decision, however, the logic could also apply to sources which appear to be lawful so there's still hope for the German law. This is (debatably) the approach that was taken in Filmspeler. However, that ruling didn't address Article 5(2)(b), but Article 5(1), the temporary reproduction exception. If you're interested, I have a lengthy answer discussing the Filmspeler ruling. The translation here is poor and perhaps that's because it's not 100% clear in German either (I'm not fluent, I'd rate myself weak intermediate). Online sources conflict as to the exact meaning of this clause. Some say this clause prevents download from any public source, others only if it was made publicly available in an obviously illegal manner. I would lean towards the latter because that's closer to what the Justice Ministry thinks (German link). Editing note: This answer has changed significantly since its original posting. This is partly because I failed to notice section 53(4) the first time around, but mostly because of the incredible amount of intelligent comments and chat the original posting generated.	First, copyright means that permission from the author is generally required. The courts find three sorts of such permission: direct author-to-recipient explicit licensing (typical in the case of a book author to publisher relation), indirect licensing arising from platform usage (in using Stackexchange, you probably unknowingly click-agreed to allow me and everybody else to copy and redistribute your creations), and implicit licensing – where permission to use is reasonably inferrable, though not explicitly stated. Since the latter doesn't involve written-out statements of the conditions under which you are licensed to copy text, the courts don't rely heavily on implicit licensing. But implicit licensing is what makes it possible to legally read a web page without first signing an agreement. If we assume in your scenario that the author is fully aware that their responses are automatically distributed to various servers, then even in lieu of a platform license, an implicit license can be found. Second, irrespective of the desideratum of having permission, one is in the US allowed to copy without permission, for certain purposes known as "fair use". This is a complicated area of legal analysis, where one has to weigh factors such as whether the content is artistic vs. factual, whether your use simply re-propagates vs. makes a comment, whether the use is for profit vs. free and educational, and whether the use has a negative effect on the market for the original work.	The current version of copyright law in the PRC is here. Art. 10 states what is protected, which includes the standard rights of distribution, copying, modification and so on (which makes software cracking illegal). Article 22 gives the equivalent of the Fair Use limitation on copyright protection: a work may be exploited without the permission from, and without payment of remuneration to, the copyright owner, provided that the name of the author and the title of the work are mentioned and the other rights enjoyed by the copyright owner by virtue of this Law are not infringed upon for 12 specific reasons (translation into Braille or a minority national language, free public performances, quotation to make a point end so on), which includes some potentially applicable reasons (1) use of a published work for the purposes of the user's own private study, research or self-entertainment (6) translation or reproduction, in a small quality of copies, of a published work for use by teachers or scientific researchers in classroom teaching or scientific research, provided that the translation or reproduction is not published or distributed (7) use of a published work by a State organ within the reasonable scope for the purpose of fulfilling its official duties It is unclear what "State organ" refers to and it is unlikely that a university is a "State organ". It is unlikely that (1) and (6) are interpreted as an across-the-board "education exception" to copyright, but that could be an avenue for legality. The standard misconception of copyright law is that anything done for educational purposes is allowed, and the PRC law seems to have at least the seeds of such a misunderstanding. However... software protection is subject to separate regulation in Decree No.339 of the State Council, an English version being here. The regulations recapitulate the basics of copyright protection; software cracking is regulated under Art. 23, which says that anyone who commits any of the following acts of infringement shall, in light of the circumstances, bear civil liability by means of ceasing infringements, eliminating ill effects, making an apology, or compensating for losses:... (5)to alter or translate a piece of software without the authorization Art. 24 continues, saying that it is forbidden (3) to knowingly circumvent or sabotage technological measures used by the copyright owner for protecting the software copyright; (4) to knowingly remove or alter any electronic rights management information attached to a copy of a piece of software That covers cracking. Article 30 covers the situation of someone using pre-cracked software: A holder of copies of a piece of software that neither knows nor has reasonable grounds to know that such copies are infringing ones does not bear liability of compensation but shall cease the use of, and destroy, the infringing copies. Nevertheless, if the cease of use or the destruction of such copies is likely to cause heavy losses to him, the holder of such copies may, after paying reasonable remuneration to the software copyright owner, continue to use such copies. A mere user who is discovered simply has to stop, unless they should have known that the copy was illegal in which case they would be responsible for compensating the rights holder – I have no idea what the standards are for having reasonable grounds to know.	You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction.	"Educational use" does not get a free pass on the law against circumventing copy-protection. First, "educational use" is extremely broad and could include "to post on Stackexchange", or "so that I can learn something". The cited clause specifically limits this exception to "A nonprofit library, archives, or educational institution" – the library must be nonprofit, and the archive or educational institution may also need to be nonprofit (until the courts fix the ambiguity in the scope of "nonprofit"). Second, the circumvention has to be very limited: the purpose must be only to evaluate the work, to see if you want to legally acquire it. So a nonprofit library can peek into a work to see if they want to buy a copy, but you may not. The only thing the library can do is evaluate the work for legal acquisition, and they have to get rid of the pirated copy once they've made the decision. Additionally (other parts of the subsection say), they can't do this is there is an equivalent legal copy available (e.g. if there's a print book available, they can't hack into the e-book to "determine" whether they want the book), and w.r.t. libraries and archives they must be open to the public.	You can report it to the publisher(s) Protection of copyright is a matter for the individual rights holder: some (I’m looking at you Disney) are vigilant, thorough and draconian in protecting their rights, others don’t care at all. Unless you are the rights holder it’s none of your business. In much the same way that the guy charging your neighbour for 4 hours gardening but being long gone in 2 isn’t. If you like your neighbour or feel duty bound to do something, you tell them and then leave it to them what they do with it. This is not a matter for the authorities as it doesn’t rise to the level of criminal copyright infringement. Just like the gardener above, this isn’t a crime.	It would be illegal because only you are allowed to view the comic you purchased. Creating a copy of your comic (e.g photcopying, scanning etc) is not allowed, and showing others a copy of your comic is also not allowed	I'm assuming that you are in the UK, as you are talking about the British Standards Institue. In general the truth cannot be copyrighted but an expression of that truth can be, provided that it is creative or original to at least some extent. In this case the equations and constants you want to use are descriptions of scientific truths. If you translate them into another form (e.g. a computer program) then you are not copying the creative bit (the layout and arrangement of those equations and explanatory text), so you are not violating the copyright. Edit: I should also have said for (3) that their descriptions of the constants and variables will be copyright. You would have to avoid copying their words. However given that these are going to be terse descriptions of facts your words can still be pretty similar without infringing on copyright, because there are only so many ways of describing the acceleration due to gravity, or whatever. Take a look at some alternative references to see what words they use.
Landlord wants access to CCTV footage after we leave and possibly in realtime while we live there Not sure if this question belongs here, so apologies in advance if I have made a mistake. My landlord has asked me to purchase a CCTV camera to be placed above the front door. We have had a few disturbances in our area recently and they said that they would like to install it to ensure that we are safe and to give them peace of mind. We have chosen one of these new cameras that save the footage to an SD card and can also be accessed in real-time via a phone app. My landlord will be the one paying for it. My landlord has asked that we do not delete the footage when we leave the property, as they want to "re-run it". I don't feel comfortable about this as I feel as though it is an invasion of my privacy. I am a young woman and don't feel comfortable about my landlord going through the footage with no real reason. What is the law surrounding this? Can I delete the footage from the camera after we leave, but save a copy for myself, so if they request the footage from a certain date (for whatever reason), then I can provide it? Finally, what is the law surrounding providing my landlord with real-time access to the camera via the phone app? I feel even more uncomfortable providing this for obvious reasons, and I worry that this will be next on the list... EDIT Sorry for the lack of clarity, I am UK based. The camera will be placed above the front door. Our front door is facing a garden entrance, and so to get to the front door, you must enter via a garden gate which is directly in front (maybe two or three metres) of the front door. The gate is an iron gate and so you can see a very small portion of the street outside if you look from the front door. So in short, the camera will see people coming in through the garden gate as they approach the front door, and may see people passing by the garden gate on the street.	This article basically says "it depends": If it is genuinely used to improve tenant safety then that is OK, but if it is used to track your private life then that is not acceptable. Cameras that cover communal areas used by several properties are generally acceptable, but cameras covering individual properties are much less so. It sounds like this falls into the latter category. Assuming you haven't got the camera yet, I suggest you write to the Landlord asking for a written justification of the cameras, and a policy for the use of the camera. E.g. it will only be viewed if an incident is reported. Once you have the justification you can then look for inconsistencies (e.g. if they aren't planning to snoop at random times, how are they going to notice someone up to no good? And how would they tell?) You could also just say "no". The installation of this camera probably counts as a material variation of the rental agreement. You could also propose a compromise: you will install the camera, but only provide footage as you see fit rather than allowing your landlord to view the camera at any time. CCTV installations are covered by the GDPR, so you should ask your landlord for the associated paperwork. Amongst other things they will need to state how long they want to keep the footage and provide a justification for that. "We might want to re-run it" is not a justification. Having all this stuff written down will help if you ever suspect he is abusing the footage. Edit Another thought: does the landlord own other properties? Are they having cameras installed too? If not, why not? They should have a policy about this.	Law enforcement activities are out of scope of the GDPR, though there is a similar right to access in section 45 of the Data Protection Act 2018. Access to police bodycam footage can be denied or restricted on various grounds, including to protect the rights and freedoms of others. A separate right to access information held by public authorities is part of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, but it exempts the applicant's own personal data and refers to the DPA 2018 for further restrictions of this right – FOIA is just a fallback in case access is not regulated otherwise. If necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of party A, the footage released to B could be redacted in order to protect A. However, since A and B were both present the footage would not disclose information that B didn't already have. Therefore, redaction might not be appropriate. Given that there is no clear legal guidance and that all of this is context-dependent, I'd expect this to come down to the internal policies of the police department handling the access request. I see no grounds that would require A to be alerted when footage is released to B. A could also make a request to access their data, and should receive information about “the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the personal data has been disclosed”, but this might be limited to protect B.	Under an AST agreement the landlord is not permitted to evict you on a whim - if you refuse to leave, in order to 'take possession' the landlord must persuade a court to give him a court order. http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/applying_for_possession_assured_tenancies In the fixed term the landlord must first serve the tenant a 'section 8 notice' with a 'ground for possession' (there are 20). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/50/schedule/2 http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_assured_tenancies Were you to refuse or fight it a court would determine whether the landlord may take possession on the ground in the section 8 notice. That particular clause you are concerned about is common to the AST agreements I've seen. See for example the government's model agreement: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/695944/Model_Agreement_for_an_Assured_Shorthold_Tenancy_and_Accompanying_Guidance.docx The guidance isn't specific about "illegal, immoral, disorderly or anti-social purposes" but examples elsewhere include prostitution in the property (doing it yourself or allowing it to be done) or it being used to store stolen goods. http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_assured_tenancies/discretionary_grounds_assured_tenancies#7 I'm just curious to know if there are any laws protecting me as a tenant from the landlord abusing that i.e immoral is certainly subjective and realistically he could find anything he doesn't like immoral? It is unrealistic to assume the landlord can take possession based on saying anything he doesn't like is immoral. Do any laws exist to ensure there is a limit on what can be considered reasonable? Statute isn't specific about what's "reasonable". Ultimately what's reasonable is what the court says is reasonable. You can look at case law. http://england.shelter.org.uk/legal/security_of_tenure/assured_tenancies/ending_an_assured_tenancy/grounds_for_possession_assured_tenancies/discretionary_grounds_assured_tenancies#1 If not, am I within my rights to ask the landlord to expand on that clause to ensure there is no doubt between the two parties? You are free to ask the landlord what that clause means and to define it specifically - the landlord is free to do so or walk away from the deal. Consider that landlords tend to want tenants who will pay on time, keep the property clean and warn them about maintenance problems - I doubt the majority have any interest in their tenants' private lives that the landlord comes to know about unless the landlord anticipates an economic impact.	The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to.	Video surveillance is not necessarily illegal, but you do need a very solid legal basis. You should not install a camera in your lab without going through your department's usual processes, likely involving the data protection officer and the Betriebsrat/Personalrat which MUST sign off on such workplace surveillance measures. I don't quite see how a vote among colleagues could authorize this surveillance. Your organization's data protection officer should be able to help you to place the video surveillance on safer footing, or to find better alternatives. Implementing video surveillance could first require a written data protection impact assessment (Datenschutz-Folgeabschätzung). Some pointers below. GDPR/DSGVO compliance starts with three questions: What is the purpose for which personal data is being processed? What is the legal basis for this processing? What means can be used to achieve the purpose, collecting the minimal amount of data necessary? You need to think further about the purpose for which surveillance is necessary. In particular, a camera does not prevent accidents and there might be less invasive ways to prevent intrusion (such as locking the door). Cameras are a fairly extreme measure, and are typically only used as a deterrent to crime, e.g. to deter robbers at a bank counter. The legal basis (GDPR Art 6) you choose is quite relevant because consent (opt-in, Einwilligung) is not generally possible in an employment context, and legitimate interest(berechtigtes Interesse) is not available to public authorities. While companies could use a legitimate interest, this interest must be compelling enough to outweigh the rights and freedoms of the affected data subjects even if they object (try to opt-out). In its guidelines to video devices, the EDPB (EDSA) has also mentioned that the legitimate interest must be non-speculative. The mere concern that equipment could be damaged by an anonymous co-worker is not enough, but past incidents could make this interest legitimate – the amount of surveillance must be proportionate to the actual risks. The disgruntled co-worker could escalate by contacting the data protection officer, lodging a complaint with your state's supervisory authority, or by suing your employer. It is not guaranteed that they would succeed, but it doesn't seem like this instance of surveillance is entirely proper. I would deactivate the cameras until you are sure that the camera surveillance is being performed legally.	This likely comes down to contract law (note: I'm not a lawyer; this isn't legal advice). If his rental contract is not with you, you'll need to refer this to the property owner's representative. I don't see why just sharing the house would give tenants any eviction rights over other tenants. Even if you are the owner (cf “my house”), it would be unusual for independent tenants to be party to each other’s rental contracts. The other tenants are irrelevant to any eviction attempt, except perhaps as witnesses in court.	The Immigration Act 2016 introduced the so-called 'right to rent' provisions under which a landlord can be prosecuted for renting accommodation to someone who is not legally in the UK. Everyone in the UK, Brits included, is subject to the Act. This gives the landlord the right to examine your work permit and to see if your visa is valid. The landlord will make a copy of the information. This makes the landlord a data controller which imposes restrictions on how the information can be used. Because this became controversial, the Information Commissioner published a brochure on the things a landlord can do with your data. All things considered and based upon what you wrote, if the landlord did not get your permission to use the data, then it's likely he is in breach. But this does not mean it's actionable or that it would be advisable to make a formal complaint to the Commissioner. If you want to pursue it, you can use the Commissioner's "Report a Concern" page as a starting point. Alternatively, you can lodge a formal complaint with your landlord and he will have to respond to it. What does the law say? The act giving the landlord the right to access your data is in the 2016 act linked above. Everything else is in the Data Protection Act 1998. The ILPA Information Sheet is at "Right to Rent". "The information sheet was updated on 01 November 2016 to take account of the second commencement order issued by the government, on 31 October 2016, bringing further provisions into force." The information sheet is recommended reading for anyone in the UK on a work permit. Disclaimer: I'm a member.	If you are prevented from entering the property on the day the contract says the tenancy begins that is a breach of the contract. If you suffer a loss as a result of the breach, you are entitled to be restored to the position you'd be in had the loss not occurred. For example, if you had additional removal fees and a hotel bill resulting from this breach, you'd be entitled to claim those costs. Generally the landlord would be liable for this. It is no defence that the agent is unavailable to give you the keys - they should have accounted for the day being a Sunday or started the term on a day when someone would be available. I suggest getting in touch with the landlord in the first instance, civilly explain the situation and ask if they can arrange for you to enter the property on the given date - they might not know what is going on. Keep a log/diary of your communications with the agent and the landlord. Make sure you have a plan B for somewhere to stay. Call Shelter too, for free advice.
Adaptations of partially expired copyright in some countries Let's say that there are 2 (hypothetical) countries with different copyright durations: Country A has a copyright duration of Life + 70 years. Country B has a copyright duration of Life + 50 years. Country A does not apply the rule of the shorter term. A work was published in Country B by an author who died 65 years ago. Let's call this the "original work." An adaptation (known as "derivative work" in the United States) of the original work was later published in Country B since the work is in the public domain. The author of this adaptation chose to license their work with a public-domain equivalent license (perhaps CC0). My understanding of copyright is that it grants the author an exclusive right to distribute their work in whatever manner they'd like for some amount of time (determined by the copyright duration in a country). Can a person in Country A legally use the adapted work? I'm assuming no, but then does that mean that the author of the work created in Country B does not technically have all the rights to the work they created, since they have no control over whether their work can be distributed in Country A? If that is the case, then would these rights be "granted" to the author of the adaptation when the copyright finally expires in Country A? I am a bit confused. Am I misunderstanding something about international copyright law as enacted by treaties such as Berne or the UCC?	You're largely correct, though there's some vocabulary you're using that could go either way in terms of proper understanding. My comments on your understanding, presuming we're dealing with two Berne countries (UCC is largely irrelevant these days): My understanding of copyright is that it grants the author an exclusive right to distribute their work in whatever manner they'd like for some amount of time (determined by the copyright duration in a country). Generally correct though there can be many exceptions here (fair use, technical/temporary copying, first-sale doctrine, etc.). Can a person in Country A legally use the adapted work? I'm assuming no [...], Basically correct, whoever holds rights to the original work could theoretically still assert their rights in Country A on any portion of the derivative work that was part of the original. [...] does that mean that the author of the work created in Country B does not technically have all the rights to the work they created, since they have no control over whether their work can be distributed in Country A? This is splitting hairs, but while the derivative author has the rights given to them by copyright law, they aren't absolute. In particular in this case, regardless of which country, they still don't have any inherent exclusive rights over the original work. With respect to country B, those exclusive rights have expired so they don't bind the derivative author, but they haven't expired in country A. If that is the case, then would these rights be "granted" to the author of the adaptation when the copyright finally expires in Country A? Again splitting hairs, but its more helpful to express that no rights are actively granted by the expiration of copyright in Country A, it's just that no one holds those rights anymore (here there might be a language issue too, generally in copyright law "rights" refers to those exclusive actions that may be taken by the copyright holder, and not always to the "right" i.e. "freedom" for someone to do something).	The author of the book may have a copyright, because he created a new piece of work from the/a original work. For example, by translating it in another language or in a modernized language, by rearranging the content, by adding images or commentaries etc. You will therefore have to find a book or other source that is not or not anymore copyrighted.	No, it means you can't copy it. By default, the copyright to a work is owned by its creator, and nobody else is allowed to copy it, or create derived works, without their permission. That permission can be granted by a license. "License unknown" doesn't really tell us anything, but it certainly isn't clearly granting you permission. So you don't have permission to copy, and thus you cannot. You would have to seek permission from the copyright holder. See also If no licence is distributed with an application/source code, what license applies by default if any? (Some jurisdictions do allow for "fair use" exceptions, which allow you to copy a work without permission. You haven't said what jurisdiction you are in.)	Yes, patents expire. The term is generally 20 years, but a patent can expire earlier if the owner fails to pay the scheduled maintenance fees. 35 U.S.C. § 154, 35 U.S.C. § 41 The patent owner could grant you permission to make, use, or sell the invention. This isn't the same as getting permission to call it your own, and it is completely separate from copyright.	general things on copyright Copyright law is very similar globally, due to the Berne convention on copyright. Ány country's copyright law grants the copyright to an author. Copyright is the exclusive right of an author to authorize ("license") copies, performance, and derivative works. In case multiple authors jointly create a work, they own the right in their respective parts, or jointly. The copyright holder can deny making derivatives. If a derivative is made without authorization, it is copyright infringement. If the author was asked, denied the authorization and it is made anyway, it is wilful copyright infringement. Relinquishing your rights in the altered work does not make it not copyright infringement. The only way to not commit copyright infringement is to get a license. Naming the original author of a work you adapted is not just politeness, it is mandatory in all copyrights that follow the Berne convention on copyright. Licensing Fees The Verve's agreement to get the license was specifically to pay all the proceeds to the Rolling Stones, but that was an extraordinary case. License fees for recording a cover version (with the unaltered lyrics!) are usually mandatory to be available. for example in the united-states, it is mandatory to grant a mechanical license to create cover recordings for a licensing fee, for which for example the Harry Fox Agency is collecting and distributing the required payments and royalties. Those Royalties are about 9.1 cents per copy for a sub-5-minute song's recording. This license does not allow to alter lyrics. However, synchronization (tone and video) is not mandatory to be granted, and those start at a flat 4-digit and are rather open-ended. Without a sync license, you may not make video recordings of a work being performed. A public performance of a work requires a different license. A performance license is required for any public performance, and those are not regulated either, but typically not too expensive - yet alteration again is not within the scope of such a license. Granting a performance license is typically handled by Performing Rights Organisations such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, taking the required fees and distributing the royalties. Making an adaptation or alteration is a derivative work. Making a derivative work requires a license that is different again. Those can only be granted by the copyright holders, and if they say no... Close the folder. The price of copyright infringement Wilful copyright infringement, especially after you were told no, can be super expensive: In the US, the rightsholder can get 150 000 USD and the lawyer fees for willful infringement. The rightsholder can sue in the US if they are there. Recoverable costs plus damages are also available in the UK, capped at 60 000 GBP for costs and 500 000 GBP in damages.	First off, the work is almost certainly not in the public domain in the US. Works are generally copyrighted upon creation or publication, but in this case the work was probably explicitly copyrighted. The fact that a work is out of print generally has no bearing on its copyright status. US copyright law changed several times in the last century. The 1985 copyright year means the board game was probably published then, and it's since it's a Disney copyright it's a corporate work, which would give it a copyright term of 95 years, meaning that it should be covered under copyright until 2080. See this factsheet on copyright from the US Copyright office. Works Created on or after January 1, 1978 For works made for hire and anonymous and pseudonymous works, the duration of copyright is 95 years from first publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter International laws will vary, but many countries adhere to the Berne Convention, which means that international laws will probably be at least similar. Either way, the work isn't very old from an intellectual property perspective. Fair use is an exception to copyright law that allows portions of copyrighted works to be used without permission or compensation in certain circumstances; academic or scholarly use is one of them. Generally, your use of the work has to be the minimum necessary amount to serve your purposes, and cannot harm the commercial value of the work. (The fact that the work is out of print may help with the latter.) The problem with fair use is that it's always determined on a case by case basis. The only way to know for sure if a particular use is fair use is to wait for the copyright holder to sue you and then make a fair use defense in court. I was going to suggest that you discuss this with the editor of your journal, but re-reading your question it looks like you're planning to publish to a personal blog rather than an academic journal. In the end, it's up to you (or your attorney, if you choose to hire one) to analyze the relevant legal concepts and rules and decide if and how much of the work to use.	Copyright in the US has changed Prior to 1978 copyright lasted 28 years and could be renewed for another 28 (hence 1936 and 1964). Anything that was still under copyright then now has copyright for 70 years after the authors death so this will enter the public domain on 1/1/2026. The 1981 work is a derivative work with its own copyright by the new author(s). The original parts will enter the public domain on 1/1/2026 but the new parts will be copyright for 70 years after the new author(s) death.	YES, if you can get an image of it, you can use it A work that old is not under copyright protection in any country in the world. Under US law any work published in 1924 or before (as of 2019) is in the public domain. Unpublished works may be protected for up to 120 years after creation under US law. But no work that is over 600 years old has any copyright protection. In any case, merely owning the physical work does not mean owning the copyright. In the case of a work sufficiently recent that it is under copyright, say from the 1970s, the copyright initially belongs to the artist. If the artist sells or gives the painting to a museum (or anyone else), the artist retains the copyright unless that is explicitly included in the deal, in a written agreement. If the artist dies, the copyright is inherited, just as any other property that the artist leaves, as directed by will or law. If a museum owns a painting that is out of copyright, it can restrict access to it and prevent people from photographing or copying it, because it can restrict what people do on its property. But if an exact copy (known as a "slavish copy") gets out, the museum has no copyright in it, because making a slavish copy does not create an original, copyrightable work under US law. See the case of Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) and Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) The law may be different in non-US countries, but the reasoning of the Bridgeman case has bene followed elsewhere. A "slavish" copy is one that attempts to reproduce the original as exactly as possible, without adding or removing or changing anything. A photo of a painting in a frame on a stand with people standing beside it is not a slavish copy. The images of art one sees in books on art are usually slavish copies. So are the images one sees on museum web sites, as a rule. The term implies that the copyist had no more freedom than a slave in making the copy. At least that is the metaphor. Slavish copies do not get separate copyrights because they are not original works. Photos of 3D works such as sculptures require choice of angle, lighting, etc, sufficient t make them original works -- no two photographers will produce quite the same image of a sculpture. But some courts have ruled that wire-frame models of 3D works of art are slavish copies and not protected by copyright.
Found 200$, neighbor claims it's his but sounds suspicious I recently found two 100$ bills on the grass in the space between my house and the neighbor's house. I asked my neighbor (who isn't a very trustworthy person) if it was his, and his response makes me very suspicious he's lying. The conversation went something like this: Me: Hey, did you lose anything recently? Him: No, why? Me: I found some cash in my front yard. Him: Oh right! I just remembered! It must have fallen out of my pocket when I was mowing the grass this morning. Me: Didn't you mow the grass just two days ago? Him: I missed a spot. Me: How much did you lose, and in bills of which size? Him: Why the ** are you asking me that? Just give me my money. Me: Because I want to make sure it's yours. Him: Just give back my *** money before I call the police. Me: I'll give it to you if you just answer my question. Him: You don't trust your own **** neighbor?! If I don't get it back by tomorrow I'm calling the police. [He slams the door in my face.] What does the law say about money found like this?	As a legal matter, you need to call or visit your local police station, report that you found some lost money, answer their questions honestly and dispassionately (they don't care about your hate etc. unless it's causing an active situation they have to deal with, and even then they don't much want to hear you go on about it), and then let them deal with it. You can tell your neighbor, if he inquires, that you have handed the matter to the local police and he can inquire with them about claiming it; feel free to ask the police to affirm that's the suitable course of action. You can expect to be given legal possession of it if they are unable to determine the true owner in accordance with local law. You can ask the police for details on that, though they'll probably just tell you as a matter of procedure without prompting.	What misrepresentation? Alice said she buried the money there. That the money is not there now is not evidence that she didn’t. it’s evidence that something happened to it between then and now. However, let’s not let the flawed example obscure the question. Let’s pretend instead that Alice said the money was there now. Misrepresentation Pre-contractural false statements of fact by one party that induce the other to enter the contract give a cause of action in contract law; they are not a tort. There are torts that are similar like deceit and negligent misstatement. The link provided is talking about fraud - the criminal equivalent of deceit (and the word fraud is often used when technically it’s talking about the tort of deceit). The out-of-pocket rule applies to torts so Bob can recover his losses. Personal time invested is not an out-of-pocket loss as it represents an opportunity cost, so, Bob cannot recover what he or his excavator might have earned instead. He can recover his fuel costs and depreciation on the excavator as those are “real” out of pocket expenses. If Bob had been an employee of a plaintiff company, they could recover his wages but not what they might have sold his time for. That’s just how it is with torts. Misrepresentation is a different beast. It’s a contractural claim so the damages are the “benefit of the bargain”, in this case $500. However, this is only available if the misrepresentation was fraudulent (Alice knew the money wasn’t there), Alice had no reasonable grounds for believing the statement to be true, or at the court’s discretion. Further Bob must prove that it was this statement that caused him to enter the contract and that he would not have entered it otherwise. Alice’s statement may give Bob more than one cause of action and it’s up to him which he chooses to pursue. If he spent less than $500 on fuel he stands to get more with a misrepresentation claim but if his out of pockets are more than $500 he’s better off with a negligent misstatement claim. In either case, these are tough causes to prove.	It depends on the jurisdiction (naturally). The answer for Washington is "No, not exactly". RCW 9a.83.030 states that "The attorney general or county prosecuting attorney may file a civil action for the forfeiture of proceeds". The police can seize real property, but must file a lis pendens regarding the property. The bar that has to be cleared for forfeiture is "probable cause". The Institute for Justice has an extensive analysis of civil forfeiture, especially with a state by state summary (they aren't positionally neutral on forfeiture, but they are legally respectable). Then after a inevitable judgment (90 days if the judgment is sooner), the property is transferred. Notice is to be "served within fifteen days after the seizure on the owner of the property seized and the person in charge thereof and any person who has a known right or interest therein, including a community property interest", so they would notify Bob (assuming they know Bob is the real owner). Or, if Bob learns of the seizure that "If a person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession of property within forty-five days of the seizure in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, the person or persons shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to the claim or right". It is possible that Bob's property could be taken (nothing prevents it), especially if Bob's hands are unclean.	You did not commit any crime, but that does not mean you cannot be charged with a crime. Up to the point where you take the item back out of your pocket, a police officer would have probable cause to believe you were attempting to steal the merchandise, and probable cause is all he would need to charge you. At trial, the government would have the burden of proving that you intended to actually steal the item, but it can satisfy that burden merely by showing that your actions were consistent with such an intention. You would have the option of testifying that you planned to pay for the item. From there, it would be up to a jury to decide whether it believes you. If so, you should be acquitted. If not, you would likely be convicted, and your conviction would likely be affirmed on appeal.	Small claims court was created for such matters. There is the possibility of a fee waiver, and if you prevail, you could get some of your costs covered (though there are other hoops to jump through if you need enforcement). A formal letter (written by you) stating that you intend to seek a legal judgment against him/her in the amount owed might be sufficient motivation for the person to pay what is owed.	Probably not, although it is impossible to say without reading the lease. Usually leases are monthly. That means you pay for the entire month or lease term regardless of how much or how little you use the property. It seems weird that the lease ends on the 21st, but if that is the case, then you are legally obligated to pay for that time interval. That said, if you want to drive a hard bargain, you could threaten to reoccupy the apartment and stay in it until the 21st which are legally entitled to do, unless he refunds you some money. You would have to be a pretty serious hard-ass to pull this off, or be prepared to go to court. One possible course of action is that you demand return of the key and say you changed your mind and will be staying in the apartment until the 21st. Make sure the conversation is recorded and that he knows the conversation is recorded, or have a witness. He will refuse. You can then sue him for denying you the use of your property.	Regarding concern one: I don't know much of anything about historical landmarks and how they get exempted from certain laws. However, I can tell you that the law generally prefers safety over preserving historical value. It is highly unlikely that a court would ever consider a plant that has existed for any number of years to be of more value than a pedestrian's or driver's safety, and thus requiring that the hedge be trimmed or removed to allow for that safety would be far more important. As well, your argument that cutting or removing the hedges would decrease the value of the property isn't the strongest argument. Currently, you have hedges that violate a local law. That immediately decreases the value of your property because a part of your property is in violation of ordinances that would have to be corrected in order for the sale of the property to go through, because most homeowners do not want to buy a property with a burden attached to it. Thus, a potential buyer would likely stipulate that the hedges be removed before they consider buying, or they might also stipulate a lower price so they can use the difference between buying and list price to remove the hedges themselves after the sale. Sure, if you only include the part of "this property has beautiful hedges" then the property value goes up, but once you tack on "which are also in violation of law" that value you just gained is immediately negated. Now in your specific case you mentioned that it hangs a foot over an eight-foot wide sidewalk. That is an abnormally wide sidewalk (a standard sidewalk in most places is only around three feet wide, with some extending up to five feet). I've only personally seen eight-foot or more wide sidewalks in very heavily trafficked areas, which from your "small town" description doesn't sound like the case there. You might be able to argue that in your particular case, due to the size of the sidewalk, that the hedges do not actually inhibit the safety of pedestrians and thus the ordinance shouldn't apply, but there's no guarantee that would work (it sounds like the city council already decided that they want it enforced there). However, if it is hanging over into the street in any capacity, you are pretty much out of luck. It's unlikely you would ever get an exception for that kind of violation. Regarding concern two: You're widely conflating "daily" and "excessive" to mean the same thing. Daily fines are not automatically excessive fines, and it is not in any way unconstitutional for a fine to be assessed on a daily basis. The laws you cite about excessive fines refer to the cumulative total of the fine. At a certain point of assessing a fine on a daily basis, the amount reaches a point where it is an excessive amount to pay. In a situation like that, it makes far more sense to stop increasing the fine and instead jail the person as they have shown a clear disregard for the law and a willingness not to comply with the law. Continuing to fine them has proven not to deter them any further from breaking the law, and that a massive fine does not justly punish them for the actions they have taken. A different punishment is warranted. This is the premise of the case you cite in your question. Brunk argued that a cumulative fine of over $100,000 for his violations was quite excessive and appealed on that argument. I don't know what the final outcome of his appeal was, because that particular court did not make a decision (rather they vacated the amount and sent it back to a lower court for reconsideration to determine if that amount was fair). It's entirely possible he still ended up with the same fine in the end. Regarding concern three: There is nothing remotely illegal about this. So long as there is a city ordinance that allows the officer to write such a citation, the officer is perfectly within his authority to write such fine and threaten such fine for noncompliance. A law in its natural form is a threat. The government body that created that law is issuing a threat to all of its citizens that if they do this thing, then this fine or amount of jail time will be applied to them. We just don't think of laws as threats in that regard when we talk about them. An officer reiterating that to you does not constitute anything other than them telling you what the law is and what can happen if you disobey it. Now if the officer threatened something against you that is not mandated by law, that would be a more serious concern that potentially could have some legal consequences for them. But there's no evidence that occurred here. Your situation in general: If you're hoping for some constitutional argument that you can throw in the officer's face to get him to back off, you're not going to find one. Generally that part of the constitution is only reviewed after fines have been handed down. You would first need to be fined and have a judge review the case to determine a total amount of how much you will be fined for all the cumulative violations. At that point if you believe it is excessive and in violation of the constitution, you would challenge the decision in court or appeal the decision if the case has already been closed. But even then, the fine would not be dropped. It would just be reduced to a value that some other judge reviewing the appeal thinks is a fair, non-excessive amount for a fine given the specific details of your case. Your case details do matter. For example, if you just argue with the officer the entire time and do nothing to resolve the problem identified, a judge might consider a much higher value vs if you actively worked to resolve the problem but just weren't capable of doing it fast enough. "Excessive" here is a completely subjective term that is different for every single case. No one can tell you whether something is excessive until the final number has been totaled and given out. Consider the two alternatives I just mentioned above. If both of those cases were in trial at the same time, they would both likely end up with different amounts for fines and, on appeal, one might succeed in convincing a judge that the fine was excessive and one might not. Better options: You could talk to the officer and explain to him that you are not capable of doing the work that quickly without hiring additional help, which you cannot afford. But that may only work once. If the issue arises again in the future (say next year), the officer likely won't be as forgiving since you've been warned about the hedges hanging over the sidewalks and streets before. If anything at all, it will show a court that you attempted to work out an arrangement of some sort to fix the problem, and were trying to cooperate. If it ended up in court for some reason, that interaction would be immensely helpful to you. As well, you'll want to consult an attorney for exact interpretations of the city's ordinances to make sure that this is actually against the law and how the law punishes its violation. Many cities have ordinances forbidding trees and other plants from obstructing sidewalks and roadways for safety concerns, but not all. As well, I've found it is much more common for a city to impose a single fine for a violation like that if the warning is ignored. The city would then send out its own crew to rectify the problem and then charge the resident for labor, materials, and removal costs. However, if the city does not have their own Public Works department, that may not be an option for them. If you do find more specifics about how the law is to be enforced, politely tell the officer that. It won't get you out of trouble, and he may still have the legal authority to fine you in some way according to the actual law, but knowing the exact details of your township may give you more peace of mind in knowing the actual limitations of how much you can be fined.	There is a good chance that you have some kind of remedy. But, in all likelihood, there is no cost effective remedy to vindicate your rights in a $400 dispute. If it was a $400,000 dispute, the federal courts would provide a good venue to resolve the dispute. In a $400 dispute, your best shot is probably to seek to have the credit card company reverse the charges, if you paid by credit card, or resort to consumer arbitration, if the contract of sale provided for it. I don't know if the remedies available for a credit card purchase in these circumstances are also available in the case of a debit card, but the agreement by the bank on that issue would be worth investigating.
Revoking my right to defend my Intellectual Property by using Let's Encrypt Agreement: https://letsencrypt.org/documents/LE-SA-v1.1.1-August-1-2016.pdf Section of interest: BY WAY OF FURTHER EXPLANATION REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THE DISCLAIMER, AND WITHOUT WAIVING OR LIMITING THE FOREGOING IN ANY WAY, ISRG DOES NOT MAKE, AND ISRG EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS, ANY WARRANTY REGARDING ITS RIGHT TO USE ANY TECHNOLOGY, INVENTION, TECHNICAL DESIGN, PROCESS, OR BUSINESS METHOD USED IN EITHER ISSUING LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES OR PROVIDING ANY OF ISRG’S SERVICES. YOU AFFIRMATIVELY AND EXPRESSLY WAIVE THE RIGHT TO HOLD ISRG RESPONSIBLE IN ANY WAY, OR SEEK INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST ISRG, FOR ANY INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INCLUDING PATENT, TRADEMARK, TRADE SECRET, OR COPYRIGHT. It sounds like if I use a Let's Encrypt certificate, then they can steal my Intellectual Property on the site and I have no recourse. Certainly that cannot be true. Can you help me understand how to properly read this section?	First, lets look at the entire section: 4.4 IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN ISRG’S CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATE PRACTICE STATEMENT, LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES AND SERVICES ARE PROVIDED “AS-IS” AND ISRG DISCLAIMS ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY TYPE, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING AND WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF TITLE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, IN CONNECTION WITH ANY ISRG SERVICE OR LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATE. BECAUSE LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES ARE ISSUED FREE-OF-CHARGE AS A PUBLIC SERVICE, ISRG CANNOT ACCEPT ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY LOSS, HARM, CLAIM, OR ATTORNEY’S FEES IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH CERTIFICATES. ACCORDINGLY, YOU AGREE THAT ISRG WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES, OR RECOVERY, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SUCH DAMAGES ARE DIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, PUNITIVE, OR COMPENSATORY, EVEN IF ISRG HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. THIS LIMITATION ON LIABILITY APPLIES IRRESPECTIVE OF THE THEORY OF LIABILITY, I.E., WHETHER THE THEORY OF LIABILITY IS BASED UPON CONTRACT, WARRANTY, INDEMNIFICATION, CONTRIBUTION, TORT, EQUITY, STATUTE OR REGULATION, COMMON LAW, OR ANY OTHER SOURCE OF LAW, STANDARD OF CARE, CATEGORY OF CLAIM, NOTION OF FAULT OR RESPONSIBILITY, OR THEORY OF RECOVERY. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THIS DISCLAIMER IS INTENDED TO BE CONSTRUED TO THE FULLEST EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW. BY WAY OF FURTHER EXPLANATION REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THE DISCLAIMER, AND WITHOUT WAIVING OR LIMITING THE FOREGOING IN ANY WAY, ISRG DOES NOT MAKE, AND ISRG EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS, ANY WARRANTY REGARDING ITS RIGHT TO USE ANY TECHNOLOGY, INVENTION, TECHNICAL DESIGN, PROCESS, OR BUSINESS METHOD USED IN EITHER ISSUING LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES OR PROVIDING ANY OF ISRG’S SERVICES. YOU AFFIRMATIVELY AND EXPRESSLY WAIVE THE RIGHT TO HOLD ISRG RESPONSIBLE IN ANY WAY, OR SEEK INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST ISRG, FOR ANY INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INCLUDING PATENT, TRADEMARK, TRADE SECRET, OR COPYRIGHT. The first part that you notice is that in the first section is this sentence: LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES AND SERVICES ARE PROVIDED “AS-IS” AND ISRG DISCLAIMS ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY TYPE, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING AND WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF TITLE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, Which basically says that "we won't provide any statement to guarantee that our services/certificates don't infringe on another work, or that they are fit for your particular use". The real point of this indemnification section is in the second paragraph: BECAUSE LET’S ENCRYPT CERTIFICATES ARE ISSUED FREE-OF-CHARGE AS A PUBLIC SERVICE, ISRG CANNOT ACCEPT ANY [...] They are too poor to afford lawyers, so they are saying that you must agree not to sue them if you suffer any damages as a result of using the service/certificates. This is not a license granted by you to steal anything you don't expressly give them license to do so. Let's take an example: Let's Encrypt (LE) gives you (Customer) a certificate. That certificate, knowingly or unknowingly, infringes upon a patent owned by XYZ. XYZ sues LE and the judge orders LE to revoke all certificates using XYZ technology. Your site is now shown as unsafe and your payment process doesn't work. You lose $100k in revenue getting your site back up with another certificate company. According to this agreement, you cannot sue LE for that. XYZ could go even further and sue you, even though you unknowingly had been using that patent. Again you can't turn around and sue LE to recover anything XYZ recovers from you (or even the fees you spend to win). What you are not granting to LE is a right to "steal" any technology on any site/system that the certificate or service is used on. This agreement, in its entirety, is between LE and you for the use of LE services/certificates. Even if LE somehow steals from you, this would not indemnify them for that.	Short preface: You might want to consult with a lawyer if what that website does really constitutes trademark infringement. But the question did not ask for that. It asked what to do if you want to send a C&D to a website without contact information. That's the question I will answer here. Whether or not the C&D letter itself has merit in this particular situation is another question, and probably one which would violate our "specific legal advise" rule. You can use a whois-database to find the public information on who operates a domain. Doing so for the domain in question yields that the contact information of the actual domain owner was "Withheld for Privacy Purposes". That means the domain was registered through a domain-by-proxy service. The postal address in Iceland you see in the record is the address of that service, not of the domain owner. But you can see the registrar which hosts the domain: "Name Cheap Inc.". So that's somewhere you can address complaints to. If you cause them enough problems, then you might be able to get them to take the website down. Those discount webhosters don't make nearly enough money per customer to fight their legal battles for them. Just reading a C&D letter already costs them more than hosting a website for a year. So they might just fire the customer to avoid the trouble of dealing with you. But then the website might just reappear hosted by some other company a day later and you are back at square one. The registrar should also be able to tell you the real identity of the person who operates the website. However, they will likely not tell you without putting up a fight, as revealing private information without being legally obligated to might make them liable for violating a bunch of privacy laws. Ask your lawyer if there is any hope to get a subpoena forcing them to give you the identity.	The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.	A more general version of the question, as far as I can see, is "Is Google Drive legal?". I can create an account and upload files to Google Drive, and I can open them from the cloud using various interfaces. I can directly open only certain files types, others I have to download to the device that I'm using in order to open the file. There are various file storage systems that allow this, most or all of which seem to use some sort of system of password access, file-access permissions and encryption to block access by unauthorized individuals. All systems seems to allow "sharing" of a specified file. Google and colleague escape liability by complying with 17 USC 512 aka the DMCA safe harbor provisions. Basically, they don't know, they don't select uploads, they have a removal procedure, they don't know that the material is infringing, and they "are not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent". There is a chance that you would be sued for inducing copyright infringement, see MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, specifically We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties You describe a situation that is unlikely to be found to constitute inducement to infringing, instead it is "enabling possible infringing", and mere possibilty of doing something bad with a tool does not make you liable for selling a tool, under current US law. An eyebrow would be raised, though, as to why this service only allows ebooks to be deposited.	Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A.	You are correct that facts in general are not protected by copyright, and most raw data are facts. However, a collection of data may be protected by copyright as to its selection and organization. A use which copies such selection might possibly be copyright infringement. If data constitutes a trade secret it may be protected as such, and "improper" access might be unlawful. This would not apply to publicly available data or collections of data. If, to access a data set, one must sign or agree to a contract, that contract may limit the use of such data. Again, this would not apply to most publicly available data.	You are responsible for what data is being processed by your website. When you embed third party components on your website (e.g. iframes, scripts), you are at least jointly responsible with the third party providing these components. You are only responsible for what happens on the website (i.e. what processing is under your control), not for what the third party provider does with collected data on their services. However, note that information will be transferred to Google's servers regardless of whether the visitor has a Google account! The Fashion ID case is relevant case law establishing and explaining these points. Since you are (jointly) responsible, you need a legal basis for collecting personal data through the tracking snippet and sharing it with the third party (here Google). For example, the legal basis could be a legitimate interest, or could be consent. A legitimate interest requires that you balance this interests against the interests, rights, and freedoms of the data subject (the site visitor). If the data subject wouldn't reasonably expect this tracking, you cannot rely on a legitimate interest. Consent can always work, except that it is a freely given, informed opt-in – likely unsuitable for conversion tracking. Which legal basis to use is primarily your responsibility. You argue that the tracking snippet does not collect personal data. However, this argument is not well supported. Under the GDPR, personal data does not only include directly identifying information such as an email address, but also any information “relating” to an identifiable person. Identification includes the ability to single out someone, e.g. by a browser fingerprint. For purposes of conversion tracking, Google will clearly try to collect data that allows the visitor to be singled out, thus collecting personal data. Furthermore, specific kinds of information are regulated by the ePrivacy directive. This includes “traffic data” and “information stored on a terminal device”, regardless of whether this information is personal data under the GDPR. Under ePrivacy, such information can only be used as strictly necessary to provide the service requested by the user (and conversion tracking is not strictly necessary), or when the user gives their consent. Depending on what information is collected by the tracking snippet and on whether you are subject to ePrivacy, you would have to collect consent anyway. There is also the issue that Google Ads is an US-based service, and transferring data to the US is largely illegal since the 2020 Schrems II ruling. The US do not provide an adequate level of data protection, so that transfers would require additional safeguards. Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) for Controller to Controller transfers are not sufficient by itself. Of course those extra safeguards are effectively impossible to implement and no one is doing this correctly, but it's worth considering that there is additional legal risk. Explicit consent can provide a legal basis for transfers even to a country with inadequate protections, but that mechanism is intended for occasional transfers. In conclusion: you have wrongly concluded that no personal data would be involved you are jointly responsible with Google for whatever data is processed by the conversion tracking snippet you need a legal basis for sharing this data with Google legitimate interest may be sufficient, depending on what data is involved (consider ePrivacy) and depending on the result of your legitimate interest balancing test alternatively, you may require every visitors consent to track their conversions – unlikely to result in good data additionally, such use of Google Ads may run into issues around international transfers due to the Schrems II ruling this kind of stuff is difficult, and no one is really doing this correctly :/	I haven't used the extension, but here are the concerns I would have: Does RECAP detect and handle documents filed under seal? Under some circumstances, IIRC, Pacer gives certain attorneys access to documents sealed from the general public. If you access these sealed documents through PACER and thereby submit them to the RECAP public repository, you have violated the Court order sealing the documents and might well be found in contempt. It is not unheard of for a Court to order a document replaced by a corrected version; this is most common when a document was inadvertently filed with information not redacted that should have been. As long as nobody but the parties and their lawyers have accessed it, this can prevent that information from being public. If you log on to PACER and see your client's personal information...you can no longer keep it private by asking the Court for that remedy, because you just submitted it to a public repository. Enjoy your malpractice suit. Does the use of RECAP constitute a waiver of work product protection? Under some (admittedly limited) circumstances, your use of PACER might constitute attorney work product, which would ordinarily be protected from disclosure in a manner similar to a privilege. Revealing your research pattern to a third party could waive that protection.
Legality of not-so-obvious rental discrimination I'm a non-German working in north-west Germany since a couple of years. I was searching for housing for about a month or so, but never got replies from landlords regarding appointments. The only replies I got were 'not available anymore' emails. So I got curious and decided to an experiment, so to say. I asked my girlfriend (a German) if she could also send showing appointment requests to the landlords. We both send requests, same written emails, with names changed. Lo and behold, she always got calls or email replies giving away appointments, whereas I would not receive any replies, only a 'not available anymore' message sometimes. The posts from apartments we applied to were operated by agencies, not private owners. I found this document(III, Clause 6) online, which briefly talks about rental discrimination: However, there are also forms of discrimination on the housing market that are less obvious. One such form is when the landlord only pretends that the apartment has already been rented out to someone else. What's the legality of this situation? Am I being discriminated against by these landlords(companies)?	What's the legality of this situation? It's unlawful and you should seek support for it. That document you linked to appears to have resources that could help you, such as support lines and counselling centres, etc. Am I being discriminated against by these landlords(companies)? I would say so. It sounds like you're being discriminated against on grounds of race and ethnic origin. It appears to violate the General Equal Treatment Act. However, I do want to stress that there may be completely reasonable factors as to why landlords are rejecting your appointment requests. For example, it would not be discriminatory to refuse housing on the basis that you don't have the appropriate income, or you have a poor credit rating, or you don't have any previous rental references. It can be very difficult to prove discrimination if any of the above factors apply, since the landlord could simply cite one of those reasons instead.	The other answers don't quite spell it out, so I will. There is no law in the UK requiring landlords or their agents to show a property to all parties interested - refusal to show a property may however in some cases fall under discrimination laws, so that might be something you can pursue if you feel the refusal is due to your gender, race or sexual orientation. While they may have to justify their data collection under the GDPR, that is entirely separate to their refusal to show the property to you.	I am assuming in this answer that the lease or rental agreement provides the landlord with a right of access for required maintenance. The question is not clear on that point. If there is a specific and reasonable ground for refusing a particular representative or agent of the landlord, you might be able to do so. If, for example, that particular worker had previously insulted you in your apartment, or had attempted to steal from you there, you could probably refuse entrance and request the landlord to send a different worker to do the job. But in general the landlord may choose his or her agents, and if it is a reasonable for an agent to be admitted, you must admit whatever agent the landlord sends. You can probably demand reasonable notice, depending on the terms of the lease. You may be able to demand to be present when the agent is to be in the premises, again depending on the lease. But I fo not think that the tenant can arbitrarily choose which agent the landlord will use.	Two factors are relevant. First, the language of the lease sometimes contains an abandonment clause that makes vacancy a default under the lease. This is common in a commercial lease, as vacancies can undermine the apparent viability of a strip mall or mall, but these provisions are less common in residential leases where the rent is current. Second, since this in New York City, there is an issue of rent-control. Rent-control benefits are available only for residential leases, and if you do not live there for long enough, it could be reclassified as a pied-a-terre and cease to qualify as a rent-controlled apartment. If your apartment is not a rent-controlled apartment, this isn't a concern, but if it is, further research related to continued qualification as a rent-controlled apartment in New York City is necessary.	It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst.	The law regarding landlords and tenants is Iowa Code Ch. 562A. Part 2 (§562A.27 et seq.) states the legal remedies available to a landlord. §562A.27 specifically spells out the remedies for material non-compliance with lease terms. The gist of that and related sections is that if a person is in violation of a lease, there is a legal process that has to be followed, and if successful, the sheriff will forcibly evict the tenant (though §562A.27A, the clear and present danger section, shortens the process – still, it's not immediate and it does require legal notice etc.). Under the law, you (apparently) have become a landlord and have an unwritten tenancy agreement with the tenant. I assume based on your description of the facts you have a long-term written agreement with the property owner. By allowing this person to live with you, you have entered into a landlord-tenant relationship, which limits your rights. The police will not respond to this situation – a legal squabble – whereas if someone broke into your residence and was trespassing (and you complain in a timely manner, not allowing the person to trespass), the police would respond and not require a court order. §562A.9(5) states that in lieu of a specific term of tenancy, in the case of a roomer paying weekly rent the tenanct period is a week, otherwise it is a month. §562A.6 defines "roomer": basically, if you are a "roomer", so is your sub-lessor. By agreeing to let the person stay with you, you have become a landlord and sub-lessor, thereby subject to the restrictions on landlord actions. That means you have to take the person to court to get rid of them. Failure to pay agreed-on rent is certainly sufficient legal cause, and any monthly lease can be terminated by the landlord after giving legal notice (30 days advance notice).	A "limited license housing agreement" may be an interesting attempt to get around landlord-tenant laws, typically associated with official student housing (e.g. this from Queens College CUNY). This facility near WMU is not overtly related to the university, but might be subcontracting for the university. At any rate, there is no special provision under Michigan law that exempts landlords from the provisions of the law in case they declare the contract to be an agreement as opposed to a lease. It is possible that this is copy-and-paste law that erroneously relies on provisions in landlord-tenant laws that exempt university housing agreements from provisions of a state's landlord-tenancy law. You do not need to be informed that you should / could consult an attorney before signing a legal document: this knowledge is presupposed. It is also assumed that when you sign a document, you read the document. It is reasonably likely that the lease contained language like the following (from the above contract): I have carefully read, fully understand and voluntarily sign this Housing Agreement. Once fully signed, this is a binding contract and is intended to be enforceable under its terms. I have had the opportunity to seek independent legal advice The disclaimer "This Housing Agreement is not a lease and no tenancy, leasehold, possessory or other property interest in any specific apartment or bedroom is created" has dubious legal status. The rights given by the landlord-tenant act cannot be waived, under the Truth in Renting Act, so saying "this is not a lease" does not make the lease not a lease. In Michigan there is a duty on landlords to mitigate loses when a premise is abandoned. The case Fox v. Roethlisberger, 85 N.W.2d 73 mentions such a possible duty in the context of tenancy is often cited on the web as establishing such a duty, but I disagree. Froling v. Bischoff, 252 N.W.2d 832 however establishes that there is such a general duty for any breach of contract (and even applies it to breach of a rental agreement). So whether or not you call it a lease, there is still a duty to mitigate losses. In the scenario where you abandoned the unit and the landlord waited until the end of the year to file an action for breach of contract, they could have failed in their duty to mitigate their losses (but see Fox v. Roethlisberger, where landlord did make an effort to re-rent, and simply was not able to for 9 months).	It is usual for a lease to specify for what purposes and on what notice the landlord is entitled to access. Often there is a provision allowing the landlord access on no notice in an "emergency" which is often not specifically defined. Access for purposes of repair, and for purposes of inspection may be on 24 hours notice, or 48 hours, or some other period, or on "reasonable notice" with no specific period specified. Access for a reasonable purpose (such as inspection) on reasonable notice that does not actually inconvenience the tenant, and that is not demanded with unreasonable frequency will probably not constitute such a breach as to justify ending the tenancy, and may well not justify sizable damages in the absence of other breaches. Much will depend on the wording of the lease or rental agreement, and on the practice of the local courts. One might well ask oneself "what actual harm will an inspection with insufficient notice do me" because a court might ask a similar question if an action is brought. If the inspection does cause a problem, then that should be addressed.
skateboard riding at mall parking lot Who owns the parking lot near the shopping mall and is it possible to skate there and near shopping mall where is very few cars and people? Do the guards have the right to ask you to leave the place? I wonder what is the approach in the legislation of different countries	There is no general rule about ownership: one parking lot I know is owned by the city, another is owned by the company that operates the mall, and in a third case it is owned by a third party who doesn't operate the mall. Either way, the owner of the parking lot has the property right to limit how it is used, and their agents (security guards, for example) can request that you refrain from skateboarding. They can evict you; they may not have the legal authority to physically toss you off the property, but they can probably perform a citizen's arrest for trespassing. None of this depends on how many cars are in the parking lot. It is more likely that a governmentally-owned parking lot will have a corresponding law restricting its use (whereas in the case of a private parking lot, restrictions center around general property law and the law of trespass).	The acts in question don't distinguish between online and in person sales. Both are retail sales. A retail sale is a sale for use rather than a wholesale sale for resale. Wholesale sales are exempt from sales tax and so are easy to distinguish. Online sales are still retail sales. It is a distinction without a difference. Sales and Use Tax Law § 6007(a)(1) and common law case law would suffice. There is also case law under the UCC, and the relevant federal statutes. But, I doubt that the argument of the vendor would be that it didn't make a retail sale (at least once their lawyers got involved). More importantly, there is nothing that says that online sales aren't retail sales. Bob should contact the online sales department to seek a remedy since he was advised by the company to contact that department. But the part of the company handling his complaint doesn't change his rights. Warranty rights don't depend upon the intent of the parties. If a warranty arises and it good isn't as warranted, there is a legal right to a remedy. If a store doesn't honor one's legal warranty rights, then you sue the store for damages, typically, in a court of limited jurisdiction, or if there is an arbitration clause, in a consumer arbitration forum (some of which are not actively doing business due to controversies in recent years, leaving a judicial forum open).	This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied.	In most states or localities "loitering " has a specific statutory meaning. For example in Prince Georges County. MD Section 14-139.03 provides: (a) In this Section, "loiter" means for a person to: (1) Remain on a public street, sidewalk, or pathway, including one privately-owned but used by the public in general, so as to obstruct the free passage of a pedestrian or vehicle after a regular or special police officer has notified the person that the action is unlawful and has requested the person to move; (2) Remain in or on a vehicle on a public street, sidewalk, or pathway, including one privately-owned but used by the public in general, so as to obstruct the free passage of a pedestrian or vehicle after a regular or special police officer has notified the person that the action is unlawful and has requested the person to move; (3) Refuse or fail to leave a private business, commercial establishment, or parking lot that is posted with conspicuous "No Loitering" signs if the business or establishment is not open for business, and the person has been requested to leave by the owner, the owner's agent, or a regular or special police officer, unless the person: (A) Has written permission from the owner, lessee, or operator to be present; or (B) Is window-shopping under conditions and at a time of the day or night that would be considered conducive to that activity; (4) Refuse or fail to leave a private business or commercial establishment that is open for business, or a parking lot of the business or establishment, after having been requested to do so by the owner or the owner's agent; (5) Refuse or fail to leave a public building, public grounds, or a public recreational area, or a parking lot of a public building, public grounds, or a public recreational area, after being requested to do so by a regular or special police officer or by a regularly employed guard, watchman, or other authorized employee of the agency or institution responsible for the public building, public grounds, recreational area, or parking lot if the circumstances indicate that the person has no apparent lawful business or purpose to pursue at that place; (and so on) I do find that at one time New York state (and some other states) had an "anti-loafing law" which required all men between the ages of 18 and 50 to be “habitually and regularly engaged in some lawful, useful, and recognized business, profession, occupation, trade, or employment until the termination of the war.” This was passed during World War I (1918) and the then NY Governor said: The purpose … is to force every able-bodied male person within the State to do his share toward remedying the conditions due to the present shortage of labor. This is confirmed at https://andrewchernoff.wordpress.com/tag/anti-loafing-laws/ I don't know if it was ever challenged on constitutional grounds. Other than that, I cannot find any published law defining loafing.	You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.	Texas and California are actually what are called Presumed Speeding states, unlike most others which are Absolute Speeding states. (There is a little known third category called Basic, but this is uncommon). In a presumed speeding state, a speed-limit violation offers someone in your shoes far more flexibility in building your defense than the more common absolute state. In states that use this presumed system, such as California and Texas, it is not illegal to drive over the posted limit as long as you are driving safely and this can be established. For example, if you are driving 50 mph in a 40-mph zone, you are "presumed" to be speeding, yes. However, despite this prima facie evidence (meaning "on its face") of speed in excess of the posted limit, if you can show you were driving safely you may be able to mount a pretty decent defense. Just because you got a ticket is not prima facie evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that you were speeding. You are presumed innocent. If they prove you were speeding this is all they need to make their case, unless you rebut it. But there is a lot of room to rebut this presumption – and that is if they prove it. They must (as with all criminal cases) prove you did what you are accused of beyond a reasonable doubt – the highest standard of proof in the U.S. So, if everyone was going 80 MPH in a 70MPH zone, you would argue that the road was (I'm assuming) dry, unmarred, you were traveling in heavy enough traffic that to slow your speed to the posted limit would actually be less safe than traveling with the flow of traffic. You can talk about the state of your vehicle (repair, handling, etc.), how you stayed in one lane, and you can describe your skill at driving – especially if you have no other tickets and you have been driving for a long time. If you were weaving in and out of traffic, riding someone's bumper, if it was pouring rain, the road was bumpy or under construction, or if you admitted speeding (if you did this you can still rebut with a showing of safe driving, but ignore all info regarding challenging radar or other means of determining speed), or if any other evidence exists that the officer would testify to that shows you were not driving safely, this will not be successful. A successful example of a speeding defense in Texas: on a clear, dry morning with no other cars on a wide, straight road, a man is pulled over for being clocked going 50 mph in a 40 MPH zone. He had a perfect record and had been driving 22 years. He was driving a 2-year-old car. He convinced a judge that this was driving safely given those conditions and was acquitted. That's because facts presented were sufficient to "rebut the presumption" that by going over the posted limit he was driving at an unsafe speed. NOTE: Never bring up your driving record unless it is spotless. Unless you are a habitual offender it cannot be used against you or be brought into evidence at all, unless you open the door. You can also mount a defense based on the radar detection device, if one was used. You can seek records as to when the calibration fork was last checked, when the last time it was professionally calibrated (rather than self calibrated). You can ask, in a leading way (only if you know) how close the car behind and in front of you were (you don't want to be too close to the car in front of you, however if the cars were tightly grouped it is more likely the radar detector could have read another vehicle): e.g., "Isn't it true that the car behind me was only 1.5 car lengths behind me?" Only do this if you know, but if you can get the officer to admit that the car behind you was close, that can be used to rebut the radar detection and goes to the argument that driving slower would have been dangerous and you were driving safely with the flow of traffic. You should be prepared to put on an entire trial if you fight the ticket. In Texas, I believe speeding is considered a Class C criminal offense (rather than a civil offense as in most absolute states); hence, they have to build the prima facie case against you and prove it beyond reasonable doubt. If you can afford one, get a good traffic violation attorney. Always choose a jury in this type of case. Everyone speeds a little and you are far more likely to be acquitted by a jury than a judge. You should also ask to have the case assigned to the county seat; request this in writing ASAP. If you are trying the case, be prepared to go after the officer. Note any distinguishing marks on your car (if any), recall what you wore, what time of day, the lighting, all that. Even go back to the scene at the same day and time and take video showing the flow of traffic, (hopefully) the straightness of the road, etc. Cross-examine him on all facts with confidence and in a leading manner. Always ask for the calibration reports and you will get all evidence against you in discovery. This thing about 10mph being the minimum they can give a ticket for: ignore that, it's rubbish! It's meant to get you to admit to him that "you were only going 8 or 9 over." Also, that whole percentile argument is not relevant and will not work at all. You must show that you were driving safely given all the facts and circumstances to rebut the presumption that you were driving unsafely by speeding. It is worth fighting as you will also incur surcharges, increased insurance rates, and points on your license that are cumulative and stay for 3 years – a certain amount of which gets you suspended if you get (or have) more violations.	According to reports, one potential forum is the International Court of Arbitration. All reports I see say that the agreement specifies that the forum will be an arbitration forum. Whether it can be any arbitration forum or if it must be the ICC, or can be selected from a list, depends on the specific wording of the Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement of 2009, which I have not been able to find.	This an instance of the general rule ignorantia legis neminem excusat: ignorance of the law is no excuse. If the municipal ordinances state that a particular place does not allow parking at certain times, then if you park there you have violated the law and will get ticketed. There is no requirement that there be signs prominently posted saying that you must obey the law in this particular location. A law might itself require there to be postings, for example speed limit law pertaining to school zones typically are stated in terms of "posted" boundaries. Assuming that the ordinance doesn't have such a "as posted" requirement, you have no legal leg to stand on, and the burden must be shifted to your political leg. If, for example, you were in Pennsylvania, 75 PaCSA 3353(d) permits local parking ordinances: The department on State-designated highways and local authorities on any highway within their boundaries may by erection of official traffic-control devices prohibit, limit or restrict stopping, standing or parking of vehicles on any highway where engineering and traffic studies indicate that stopping, standing or parking would constitute a safety hazard or where the stopping, standing or parking of vehicles would unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic. Signs are kinds of traffic control devices. Since PA does not statutorily prohibit overnight parking, any local restrictions on overnight parking would require signage. Thus restriction such as this one that "The following vehicles shall not be parked between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on the streets...", applying to commercial vehicles among others, would require a sign. That borough has an interesting ordinance stating that In the event of a conflict between the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale and the provisions set forth in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3351 through 3354, as amended from time to time, the provisions of the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale shall control. Generally speaking, local ordinances are subordinate to state law, so this provision is legally questionable (although: the borough does not actually deny the signage requirement, so technically this is not a conflict, it is just ignoring state law – if there is no signage). The borough could of course argue that they were unaware of the state requirement to post no-parking signs, but ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
How can I use a trademark name in my app title? I am a student software developer in NY, USA. As a learning project, I created a mobile application for calculating scores of my favorite crossword board game and posted it on the famous online markets. I am making no money on it. The name of the application is the following "[CROSSWORD GAME NAME] Score Calculator". 6 months after I published my app, I received a copyright infringement letter from the [CROSSWORD GAME NAME] company. The reason for complain is following: This developer uses [CROSSWORD GAME NAME] trademark as the dominant portion of the name of their apps, which is not distinguished by any other mark that would identify an alternative source for the goods/apps. I suggested the new name for my app "Calculator for [CROSSWORD GAME NAME] Score" to the company's trademark lawyers. In my understanding, the newly proposed game name would be considered nominative fair use of the trademark. But the lawyers opposed to my suggestion: It is not acceptable, nor is it nominative fair use of the [CROSSWORD GAME NAME] trademark. Nominative fair generally applies to comparative advertising, parody and noncommercial use of trademarks. Including someone else's trademark in your own trademark (which is what an app title is) does not fall within the nominative fair use exception because you use [CROSSWORD GAME NAME] trademark as a trademark for your product – an app – and the statutory language in 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)4) specifically states that the defense applies only where “the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark" (emphasis added). An app name functions as a trademark for the goods. If I remove the game's name from my app title, I'm afraid people won't be able to find my app anymore. I see that many other apps on the markets whose app title includes the game name. Do you think it is possible to use "Calculator for [CROSSWORD GAME NAME] Score" despite what their lawyers say? If not, how can I keep the game's name in the app title? How is it different from a book entitled like "Become an expert in [GAME NAME]" ?	If not, how can I keep the game's name in the app title? Pay them a licence fee. Of course, they may not be willing to licence their trademark to you or you may not be willing to pay what they ask - that’s their prerogative; you can’t force people to sell you their stuff. Hasbro’s, sorry, I mean [CROSSWORD GAME NAME] owner’s lawyers, have explained the trademark law very well and while nothing is impossible, your chance of winning a lawsuit is as close to 0 as makes no difference. Here’s another point of view about similar circumstances. If you lose you will have to change the name anyway and pay damages (everything the game has earned is typical) and, probably, [CROSSWORD GAME NAME] owner’s costs. They are offering you a really good deal in allowing you to change the name and not suing you. If I remove the game's name from my app title, I'm afraid people won't be able to find my app anymore. Tough. The fact that people are finding your app because of [CROSSWORD GAME NAME] only strengthens the case against you. How is it different from a book entitled like "Become an expert in [GAME NAME]" ? It isn’t because the publisher almost certainly paid them a licence fee.	The use may constitute trademark infringement if it implies sponsorship or endorsement I'm going to assume US jurisdiction for this question, because you've not provided one, and you haven't provided enough car manufacturer names to suggest that this wouldn't apply to the US. I'll also only cover Federal law (the cases were tried in state courts), so be aware that there may be additional responsibilities under state law that I don't examine here. 15 U.S. Code § 1114: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 15 U.S. Code § 1125: (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. These actions - the use of the trademarked manufacturer logo within the app - is likely to constitute trademark infringement, if the trademark owner's permission is not sought prior to publication, and the use of the trademark is likely to cause confusion as to the source, sponsorship or approval of the goods. What this means, is that if the trademarks are used in such a way that a reasonable person is likely to think that: The product is an official product from the owner/brand associated with the trademark; The product is sponsored by the owner/brand associated with the trademark; or The product is approved or endorsed by the owner/brand associated with the trademark. Then an action in trademark infringement may be brought by the trademark owner. Consider the following two cases: Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) In this case, judgement was made for the defendant, as the defendant's field was not considered close enough to the plaintiff's for there to be a likely chance of confusion. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) In this case the trial judge decided that the trademarks Slickcraft and Sleekcraft were unlikely to cause confusion. This ruling was overturned on appeal and an injunction was ordered by the court. Possible defenses Nominative use of a mark When a mark is used solely to identify a product, this use is privileged. A descriptive mark used for its primary purpose Descriptive marks are a subtype of trademarks, which are descriptive in nature but have acquired a secondary meaning. Here, using a descriptive mark for its primary purpose has been found not to constitute infringement. General First Amendment protection Satire and parody are generally recognized as defenses if the primary purpose of the use is not directly commercial. If the products are not similar enough to be likely to cause confusion; and The use does not imply endorsement, sponsorship or approval of the product by the trademark owner then it should be fine. It seems that the situation in the question above would not give rise to confusion (unless the car manufacturer also develops an app, for instance), the second issue - endorsement - should be avoided. Many programs will have a legal section that includes ownership information and disclaims any association with the trademark owner(s). I have not been able to locate any cases where the effect of these sections have been tested. Further reading Overview of Trademark Law	Copyrights protect the mark as is, and derivatives of it, but does not protect the brand from look a likes or from new trademarks that would be confusing. Consider the Pepsi logo: I could easily draw a circle half red and half blue with a white line straight across, vertically, or diagonally. In fact: © 2018 A. K. all rights reserved. There it is my new logo for my cola company called Hep-C (I'm raising awareness). Under copyright law Pepsi could not come after me because the logo is my own creation. I could even call it Pepsi and it would not be a copyright violation as you cannot copyright words. However, Pepsi has better lawyers than that and with my trademark so similar to theirs and the name sounding so similar (and my new name being potentially disparaging to Pepsi) it would likely confuse consumers between what was Pepsi and what was Hep-C thus under trademark law it would be disallowed for commerce. Now you would have common law trademark protection by virtue of using your mark in commerce, but it would only be for the states in which you used it. Additionally a lack of a registered trademark would disallow you from seeking statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117.	The answer to the question "can so-and-so sue me?" is almost always "yes", regardless of context. Such a suit might be baseless, and it might get settled in your favor, but you still have to spend the time and money to defend yourself. This can be disastrous for a start-up that's trying to get off the ground, and it's how patent trolls make their money. (I'm not accusing SnapChat of engaging in such tactics as a rule, of course; I'm just pointing out that the legal system does allow for them.) Whether or not you are likely to be sued is a separate question, and one that can really only be effectively addressed by a trademark attorney with full knowledge of the particularities of your situation.	There is a general belief that a term being trademarked means that it's illegal to use the term without permission from the trademark holder, but that is false. It is illegal only if it is done in a manner that suggests endorsement by the trademark holder. For instance, selling a football as a "Super Bowl football" would be trademark infringement, as it implies NFL involvement in the production of the football. Simply talking about the Super Bowl, such as saying "Our construction company built the stadium the Super Bowl is being played in" is not trademark infringement. Simply using a trademarked term to discuss the thing it refers to, without implying endorsement, is known as "nominative use". However, even if one would be on solid legal footings and could win a lawsuit on the basis of nominative use, one might avoid using a trademark to avoid the hassle of being sued.	united-states You are protected by copyright as a matter of law, even if you don't post a copyright notice, although you have slightly more procedural rights if you do post a copyright notice and there would need to be a filing with the copyright registrar (a division of the Library of Congress) before you brought suit. You can't really get any other intellectual property protections for it except possibly a trademark if you have a distinctive mark or name or logo for the app.	Yes, the SFC doesn't allow the usage of the term "git" for third-party products unless they have their permisison. From the Git Trademark Policy, 2.3 Prohibited usages of the Marks: In addition, you may not use any of the Marks as a syllable in a new word or as part of a portmanteau (e.g., "Gitalicious", "Gitpedia") used as a mark for a third-party product or service without Conservancy's written permission. For the avoidance of doubt, this provision applies even to third-party marks that use the Marks as a syllable or as part of a portmanteau to refer to a product or service's use of Git code.	The relevant law is trademark law. The basic question is whether the mark is identical or creates an unreasonable risk of confusion with the protected mark. There is no per se 30%-40% rule. I can imagine cases where changing a single letter in a long phrase turns a trademark violation into a parody or clearly different mark (see the Electric Company TV show). I can also imagine cases where changing a large part of the mark could still be infringing and confusingly similar. A parody is protected on fair use grounds in copyright law (which could conceivably come into play since this is a derivative work but would be protected since it is a parody), but in trademark law the issue is that a parody is unlikely to be confused for the original. Of course, at a fine grained level when one is looking at particular cases rather than general ideas, you would have to know which country's laws were involved, for example, where the goods would be sold.
Temporarily Stopping a Lawsuit for Medical Reasons If the entity prosecuting a lawsuit or the entity defending a lawsuit becomes unable to do the necessary work in that lawsuit due to medical reasons: What is the proper way to let the court know? Send the judge a letter explaining the medical reason? Notify the court the party is physically incapable? Ask the court to halt proceedings until the party has resumed their health? Or, what? Exactly how much of one's medical history must be shared to halt a case for medical reasons? ---So, does one do a continuance for each thing pending and is there a limit on how long a continuance can be?	You may file a motion for a continuance (here is a sample help page). You have to provide as much information as is required to persuade the judge to grant the continuance. Nobody knows exactly how much information that is, and probably only your lawyer (I assume you are doing this yourself) would have a reasonable idea. Simply saying "I can't cope" is insufficient, and something that implies an open-ended delay ("Can we put this on hold until they discover a cure?") will not suffice.	What remedies are therein the United States? I would imagine that the witness could be prosecuted for perjury. My guess is that the plaintiff could prosecute the witness for the lost damages. Are there any other remedies like reopening the original trial or declaring a mistrial so that the plaintiff could sue the (deep-pocketed) defendant, or would this be double jeopardy? Perjury prosecutions are like unicorns. They are rumored to exist but are almost never seen. A prosecutor would be exceedingly unlikely to bring charges in such a case, but it might not hurt to ask. Even if the criminal prosecution prevailed, however, the defeated plaintiff would be no better off, or might get out of pocket court costs as restitution at most. You could request that the witness be sanctioned for contempt. But, this leaves the loser in the original case no better off unless the judge made the highly unusual decision to award compensatory damages as a contempt sanction. Similarly, if you have reason to believe that the attorney knew that the testimony offered was false, that would be grounds to grieve the lawyer which could result in the lawyer's suspension or disbarment, but that is very difficult to prove and again would not advance the unjustly defeated plaintiff's cause. Assuming that the time to move for a retrial (usually two weeks) expired when the new evidence was discovered, you could move to set aside the verdict (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 or the equivalent state rule). The deadline for such motions based upon fraud by an adverse party is usually six months. Sometimes an independent action to set aside the verdict for fraud on the court could also be brought (sometimes within two or three years), which is an uphill battle, but probably the best option if all other deadlines have expired. The witness probably has absolute immunity from civil liability outside that court case for the testimony offered, so a civil action suing the witness for lost damages would be dismissed. The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply, but a similar doctrine called "res judicata" (a.k.a. "claim preclusion") prohibits retrying a case that was tried on the merits between the same parties, if it has become a final order. So, filing a new case is ruled out assuming that no appeals were filed within the deadline for doing so. And, even if the deadline for filing an appeal has not lapsed, it probably wouldn't prevail because the key new evidence wouldn't be in the record. It would be better to file to set aside the judgment in a motion and to appeal if that motion was denied.	A case can be "dismissed" at (most) any time (however, the further along in the process a case is, the less likely a judge will allow a case to be dismissed without very good reason). A case can be dismissed with or without "prejudice", which in this legal context means essentially "finality". A case dismissed with prejudice cannot be brought again, while a case dismissed without prejudice can be refiled. (Compare the criminal law concept of "double jeopardy", though as phoog correctly notes, "double jeopardy" only applies in criminal trials, while prejudice can be applied in both civil and criminal courts). Many cases are dismissed without looking at the evidence (or even having the evidence admitted to the record); this is called "summary judgement" or "judgement as a matter of law". There are generally three cases when this happens: First, if the prosecution or plaintiff (i.e. the party bringing accusations) has "failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted", i.e. asked for something the court cannot grant. Second, is if the defendant can show, that even if everything alledged by the plaintiff is true, that the necessarily elements of the crime or offense have not been proven. Third, is if there are no facts in dispute, and only a disagreement on interpreting the law.	It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.	You're going to an administrative hearing overseen by an "Impartial Hearing Officer" (IHO). Your goal should be to present your case in as clear, concise, and compelling a manner as possible. If there are guidelines for the hearing then abide by those. Ideally, the IHO will be a real lawyer or judge, in which case they will likely be concerned with giving everyone a chance to advance their position and then efficiently achieving a resolution of the issue that appears most impartial and is least upsetting to everyone involved. Often, however, you will find the IHO is a bureaucrat who enjoys making up and enforcing procedural rules. In which case all you can do is ask, "What are the rules?" and do your best to follow them (or just start working on your appeal now). For example, if the IHO wants to make the hearing "court-like," then you could read your state's Code of Civil Procedure. But if you bring a copy and when the IHO says X point out the CCP says Y, then all you will have accomplished is to irritate the IHO: He'll either grudgingly allow Y, or declare that in his hearing it's X. That will not help you achieve your goal. Re-reading your question: It sounds like you're trying to make up rules for yourself. Remember that you are not a lawyer, and the hearing is not a court of law. If you assert evidence it should be accepted based on what a "reasonable person" would believe. You don't have to establish a forensic chain of custody. So tell your story, and if there's an email that documents it more compellingly – e.g., because you're recounting events from two years ago – then note that you're reading what you wrote two years ago as opposed to stating what you remember now, because that bolsters the credibility of your testimony. If there's evidence in an Email from B, and A knows something about those matters, you should be allowed to ask A about the substance informed by the Email, even if A can't address the writing or sending of that particular message. (But remember: Never ask a hostile party a question if you don't already know what their answer should be!) If you really want to prepare, find someone to play devil's advocate, and present your case to them. That's a good way to find and correct things that hurt or distract from your case.	"become yours" - Which court are you in? The court of the schoolyard? If you're in real court, then You would need to sue, to quiet title When a bona-fide dispute as to ownership exists, a case can be brought before a judge to resolve ownership definitively. The axiom of a quiet title action is that you must notify all parties who could possibly have an interest. Really, notification is 7/8 of it, because by the time you arrive at a "quiet title" action, most likely they either lost interest or are gone. And the crux of "Notify" is that your efforts to notify the party are to the standards of the court. You are a hostile party, noting your interests are in conflict with theirs. (we must fairly assume they want their iPad back; you want to take the iPad). Thus, it is obvious you will prefer to fail in your efforts at contact, and you will do a bad job of it, possibly on purpose. Since parties in a lawsuit are responsible to serve all documents on each other, courts have very high standards for that. And these standards are tested and gamed all the time. I even had a clever plaintiff do it to me! (we were expecting both the appeal and the dis-service). The crux of document service is you hire a licensed, third-party independent process server. A process server is naturally good at skip-tracing (think "Dog: the Process Server") and is accustomed to finding people who are actively hiding. (because some people think they can avoid consequences by evading service. That's a loser's game generally.) So, when you show up in court and they aren't there, the judge will ask "did you serve them?" And then you say "yes", name the company, and if needed call the process server to the stand, and the server reads out of their notebook all the things they did to search for the counterparty.	The Sixth Amendment is very specific: "[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy[...] trial." There is no such constitutional right given to the prosecution, and such a right would not serve the public interest. Defendants very often waive their right to a speedy trial in order to have more time to prepare a defense. Conversely, however, the defendant does not have the right to draw out the proceedings indefinitely. When the right to a speedy trial is waived, it falls to the court (that is, the judge) to schedule the proceedings at its discretion. It may choose to take into account the wishes of the prosecution or the defense or both, but is not required to do so.	It isn't explicitly prohibited so long as the amount claimed is in the aggregate less than $20,000. But, it would probably be better to file separately. First, very simple single party, single transaction cases are what small claims court is designed to do, and going against the flow often creates unforeseen confusion for the judge in the Justice Court who isn't a sophisticated civil litigation expert. The Justices of the Peace who preside over Justice Courts that handle small claims cases in Texas often aren't and don't have to be lawyers or even high school graduates. Second, if you sue as a group, and one of your group is the lead person handling the case (and that person isn't a lawyer), the lead person is at grave risk of being found to be practicing law without a license by taking actions in a lawsuit on behalf of your fellow plaintiffs.
Photos taken inside private home by guest without permission Alice meets Bob on a dating app and invites him to her place to have good time with him. Bob takes photos of the place's interior (walls, furniture etc.) without Alice's knowledge (and so without her explicit permission). Bob keeps the photos for himself and does not share/upload anywhere. Some time later Bob chats with Alice and shows her the photos. Alice becomes perturbed and accuses Bob of breaching her privacy. If Alice takes this to the court, could she possibly be awarded any damages at all in any jurisdiction? If not, is this sort of thing that Bobs can do without facing any consequences, even though technically it may be called breach of privacy?	The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is governed by Shari`ah law. See this work for an overview of Shari`ah as it relates to compensatory damages in personal injury cases. It is a principle under Ijma (a second-order source of Islamic law) that if one is insulted or emotionally injured by another party, you are entitled to be monetarily compensated. Sharia law in Saudi Arabia is not codified, so there exist differences among the four schools of Shari`ah regarding compensating a victim monetarily for emotional distress, which may alternatively be answered with physical punishment. Under Shari`ah, it is highly likely that moral harm would be found, since privacy is a fundamental right in Islam (see this source, with numerous citations). The standards for "intrusion into seclusion" under Shari`ah are stricter that they are under common law. However, other premises of the hypothetical are a problem under Shari`ah law (e.g. the whole dating thing).	It turns out that there is no difference between the ethical answer and the legal answer, in this case. The law recognizes the property right which a person has when they create a thing, such as a font, and that right is encoded in the law of copyright. The relevant US federal code is contained in Title 17, which you can read (essentially identical laws exist in virtually or perhaps actually all countries). The important thing to understand is that there is not a distinction between "privately" trespassing on a person's property and "publicly" trespassing on a person's property. The violation of the owner's property rights comes from taking the material without consent. There is a legally-recognized exception to the owner's rights, in the form of "fair use", which is widely misunderstood to mean "if it's not for profit, the property owner has no legal protection". Simply taking and using someone else's IP non-commercially is not "fair use".	For the offense of receiving stolen goods, "tracing" does not usually apply. It must be the actual good stolen and not proceeds of illegal activity. Tracing could come up in an effort to impose a "constructive trust" (usually by a private party) or "civil forfeiture" (usually by law enforcement) on the proceeds of embezzlement or fraud, for example. Tracing in this circumstance is governed by broad considerations of equity law and are highly fact specific. The methods are fairly ad hoc and mostly come down to rules of reason. For example, a court might find that anything clearly purchased with clean assets that were not comingled with dirty assets are not subject to forfeiture or a constructive trust, but that the entire amount of comingled assets might be subject to forfeiture or a constructive trust up to the total amount less the amount of clean assets which were comingled. This issue came up in the U.S. Supreme Court of Luis v. United States in 2014 over whether clean funds of someone subject to fraud liability could be frozen to protect the solvency of someone who may have already squandered the dirty funds when the defendant wants to use the clean funds for an expensive legal defense of the case (SCOTUS said that assets purely traceable to clean sources can't be tied up so as to prevent them from being used in a legal defense of the case.) Tracing generally does not extend to a bona fide purchaser for value (i.e. someone with no knowledge of wrongdoing is paid fair market value for something or pays fair market value for an asset) of something from the person engaged in misconduct because there was no economic benefit from the transaction to either party's net worth. What if Bob offers a smaller sum of money to many people, small enough that Bob could easily afford to give such a gift to one person, but the combined cost of so many small gifts adds up to an amount bob couldn't/wouldn't have been able to afford without his supplementary income? Could someone argue that the gift they received from Bob came from his legal income, but the other gifts Bob made to others was due to Bob's illegal activities, by claiming Bob was likely to give a gift to them without the extra illegal income but not to the others etc? In this situation, the gifts would be a "fraudulent transfer" because absent his illegal assets, Bob would probably be insolvent (i.e. have debts in excess of his assets), and transfers made without receiving substantially equivalent value in exchange can be unwound by his creditors if he is insolvent himself within a certain number of years. His solvency at the time of the gift rather than tracing from legal or illegal income respectively, would be the relevant legal issue. Of course, if the amounts of the gifts were small, it might not be economic to sue for their return.	Bob personally has no duty to honor Attorney's demands of non-contact. Bob is permitted to serve Manufacturer directly, or he may request that Attorney waive service on Manufacturer's behalf.	A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.	You acted illegally in assaulting your fellow student. When you are in public, a person can legally take your picture, and you are not allowed to assault a person because you do not like their legal actions. Any degree of force is excessive except in certain responses to illegal fource, and even the threat of force is excessive. You also have no right to demand that a person prove that they didn't take your picture, and certainly no right to enforce that demand with physical violence.	In England and Wales, in general it is legal to make a recording in one's own home without the knowledge or consent of the other participants. In general the law with regard to recordings is more strict in non-domestic contexts than it is in domestic contexts. For example, a business must "make all reasonable efforts" to inform a caller that their telephone call may be recorded. A business has obligations under data protection law that the householder does not have. Depending on the circumstances the homeowner might commit a civil tort (breach of confidence) or criminal offence if he discloses or publishes the recording made without the consent of the other participants. E.g. submitting it as evidence to court is OK, sharing it with friends or publishing it on the internet is likely not OK. In the specific context of the homeowner making a recording of a sexual act with another person and the other person has not consented to the making of the recording: if the homeowner shares the recording they might be investigated/prosecuted for the criminal offence of voyeurism (s67(3) Sexual Offences Act 2003) in R. v Richards the Court of Appeal ruled that the making of the recording for one's own sexual gratification amounts to the criminal offence of voyeurism (s67(3) Sexual Offences Act 2003)	Earlier this year, the Internet lawyer Arnoud Engelfriet wrote a blog post about exactly this topic. As it is written in Dutch, I will summarize it here: As you also said, deleting posts breaks the flow of the archived conversation and it makes your archive incomplete. This is a problem for the freedom of expression and information. But Art. 17(3) GDPR includes an exception to the right of erasure for this situation. So posts do not need to be deleted. However, profiles are not included in this exception. So they must be removed, but they can be pseudonymized. For example replace the username with user89432, and remove all details from the profile. If other posts contain the nick of the author of an anonymized post, that is considered an journalistic, academic artistic or literary expression, so Art. 85 GDPR would apply, so the right of erasure does not apply to that. Bottom line: you only have to pseudonymize the account, if that person wants to be removed from the forum.
How quickly will they obtain a warrant? If the police are investigating a cyber-crime, and all they have is the IP address and they obtain the details from the ISP, how quickly will they usually obtain a search warrant in order to preserve evidence?	It depends on the nature of the crime, among other things. Under Section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) the police must provide evidence to a court that a search warrant is necessary to secure and obtain evidence relevant to an ongoing investigation into a crime. If there is evidence that time is of the essence with regards to the evidence at stake (e.g. there is a high probability that the evidence will be destroyed unless it is secured immediately) then the search warrant will be expedited. Once the search warrant has been secured, it will be an operational matter for the police to decide when and how to act on it. They could choose to do a dawn raid, for example, or they could monitor the suspect for a week and then search the property when the suspect is out. Be aware that under Section 18 of PACE, a search warrant is not necessarily required. The police may, in the course of arresting someone for an indictable offence, search the premises without a warrant provided certain criteria are met. Of course, this is predicated on the police having grounds for arrest, and in the vast majority of cases, a search warrant will be obtained.	I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws.	Hacking into a computer owned by someone else and accessing the data stored on it without permission is a misdemeanor according to StGB 202a (de\|en). But only if it's successful. So a failed attempt isn't a misdemeanor yet. When you notice that someone might have committed a criminal offence (regardless of whether you are a victim or just a witness), then the usual procedure is to report it to the police. If they consider the crime serious enough to investigate, then they will request the identity from the ISP. But the copyright lawsuits which are filed in bulk by law firms working with media companies are not crime reports. They are civil lawsuits. A civil lawsuit is when someone had a tangible damage because of something someone else did, and now they want money in compensation. When there is no damage, then there is nothing to sue for. So when you want a judge to file an injunction to force an ISP to give them the identity of one of their users, then you would first have to explain to them how much financial damage you had because of that person and that this is enough damage to make it worth everyone's time. That might be quite challenging for nothing but a failed SSH login attempt. But it might be possible if a single person made so many login attempts that it incurred you non-negligible bandwidth cost or even caused a denial-of-service.	Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant).	Generally speaking, courts take whatever time they need to write their decision and then release it close to immediately. In cases where a judge believes she has the information she needs, she may rule "from the bench," announcing a decision and entering an order for the parties to comply, and then follow up with a written order later. The research process is fairly open-ended, but legal research databases are pretty advanced, and a good researcher can generally get his hands on the vast majority of what he'll need in very short order. But practically speaking, there are few limits on how long that process takes. A litigant who was growing impatient could seek a writ of procedendo to force a court to move faster, but my experience indicates that most attorneys wouldn't attempt that move unless a decision had been pending for at least a year with no action, which would be unusual.	The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony.	An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all?	To be very straightforward, yes, a police department would very likely have records of their past interactions with you in the form of police reports. They cannot just throw them away because it's been scrubbed from your public record. They detail the interactions the police officer had with you. That being said, those records would not show up in a general inquiry into your record, because those records are meant to protect the officer and the department as a reference point they can go back to in case some dispute arose in the future. If a police officer really wanted to find them, they'd have to do a bit of digging for them. The difficulty in finding them would depend on what system the particular police department uses to store those records. Smaller departments may just file them in a cabinet somewhere, whereas larger ones may actually have their own searchable database. But a traffic cop out on the street is only gonna see what you're seeing at the DMV - nothing. There is also a formal NCIC database, but traffic violations would never end up in there. That is a national database that basically stores red flag persons of interest (think stolen vehicles, sex offenders, and gang members). Sometimes multiple departments within a state will share their information with each other, but a department's database is usually kept to that department only. Also keep in mind court records. The court case that had a violation removed under such and such conditions is still gonna be a public record. Those records would generally be available to a judge overseeing your case so if you repeatedly end up in court for the same thing, they're gonna know and they're gonna stop scrubbing it from your record or offerring certain options because you're clearly not learning your lesson. Many laws allow you to have one offense stricken per year and similar stuff like that, but that kind of stuff doesn't just permanently disappear. They have to keep record of it in order to know you've already had your once per year etc. Also a note about parking violations: not all of those are actually issued by police. If it was issued by a private firm then that is not something that would ever show up on your record. It would just be in a database somewhere with whatever private firm issued the fine. Those kind of tickets get sent to collections and hurt your credit score if you don't pay them, rather than affecting your driving record.
Can a question be considered as a oral contract? Let's say that you are asking someone: "Let's meet at 5pm at place X?" and the person replies: lets meet at 5pm but at Y. Then if you are stuck on an emergency and cannot reply until 5pm. If you contact the person again at 5pm and they say "we agreed to meet at 5pm, why did you change plans?" Where you bind to that oral contract if you didn't agree to Y?	The four key elements of a contract, which are all required to make it valid, are: agreement, capacity, consideration, and intention. Agreement Agreement is achieved by offer and acceptance. And that is where it already falls flat. Even if you count "Lets meet at 5pm at place X" is an offer, the reply "Lets meet, but not at X but at Y" is not an acceptance, its a counter-offer. If both parties just offered to meet and there was no other communication, then there has been no agreement at all. So you are already in trouble on the first point. Capacity I am sure both you and the other person were capable of entering into a contract. If you are 18 years or older and you both understood the terms of the contract, that is. Consideration Parties must exchange some value for a contract to be binding. That is why you see sale contracts for a symbolic € (or $). And that is the second point where this situation fails to meet the standard of a contract. Nothing of value was ever exchanged, thus there is no contract. Intention Not all agreements between parties are contracts. It must be clear that the parties intended to enter into a legally binding contract. [...] In social situations, there is generally no intention for agreements to become legally binding contracts (eg friends deciding to meet at a specific time would not constitute a valid contract). Thus, the agreement to meet fails this test as well. In short, no, there is no valid contract. The promise to meet fails to meet three of the four properties a contract needs to have. References: How to form a valid contract?	You can’t die “during” a sale The formation of a contract is instantaneous, if the buyer dies they have to die before there was a contract in which case the seller keeps the car or after there was one in which case the buyer’s executor and the seller must do everything necessary to complete the sale (or breach the contract and get sued). This has nothing to do with any administrative obligations that either party owes to a third party like the DMV. Failing to properly transfer title may lead to complications and disputes latter on but it doesn’t directly affect the contract.	Contracts contain an implicit term that obligations will be carried out in a reasonable time While the situation is unusual and we obviously don't have the specific terms of the agreement, it would appear that the vendor agreed to contribute to half the cost of the roof repair and your sister was obliged to contribute the other half and arrange for the roof to be repaired. Implicit in this is that she would do this within a reasonable time. Your sister does not have the right to keep the money in limbo indefinitely. It's open to argument whether a year is a reasonable time or not. Similarly, if your sister is in breach of the agreement, the vendor would probably only be entitled to damages for what they have lost; they would not normally be entitled to terminate the contract. Their damages might be assessed as the difference between what their share costs now compared to what it would have cost a year ago - this may be nothing or a lot depending on how prices have changed - and interest lost on the balance that should have been returned to them.	First of all, a contract is valid without a signature and even without being in writing; all that is needed is consent by the parties. Therefore, the signature is merely evidence of that consent and is only relevant if a dispute arises over the general consent or the particular terms that were consented to. A digital signature would make it harder for Bob to argue that those were not the terms he signed but if I have Bob's signature on them then the onus of proving he didn't sign rests with Bob, I don't have to prove he did. All of the methods you suggest are valid as would an email saying "Got the contract. I agree. Bob."	TOS are a contract. If you have a contract through the App, you have incorporated the TOS as a term of your contract. Contracts mean what they say they do, what you are thinking of as "basic contract law" is actual just an ordinary and customary term that people in your industry usually make a part of the contract, not contract law itself.	Can job interview questions be confidential? Is this legally enforceable? It is lawful, unless the nature of questions is outlawed or hinting at illegal activity. For practical purposes, though, confidentiality would be hard to enforce because Google cannot realistically prevent you from disclosing those questions. Whether or not Google can remedy any breach of that clause, that is a separate and uncertain aspect. Google's clause is binding only if you consent to it. Signing an NDA is not the only way to render confidentiality binding. Consent can be evidenced by anything that reflects your agreement to abide by that condition. It could be an email reply, or by subsequent conduct such as attending the interview with knowledge that constraint and without objecting to it. The fact that you attended the interview after reading that email makes their clause binding unless you objected and they nonetheless conducted the interview.	No Contracts are not bound by due process. Due process is a rule of how a lawsuit has to be handled, not how a contract is to be handled. All the Due Process clauses in the US constitution simply don't apply. The only things that apply are the contract language, and the underlying/overwriting laws. If your contract stipulates that it is terminated by winning a coin flip against the other party, that's fine. If it stipulates, that you have to find 15 people supporting you in terminating the contract, that's fine. If it states that the other party can terminate for any and all reasons, including no reason, that's what the contract says, and fine. The contract would have to establish that you actually have a process, and how it is handled. My hypothesis is that these common practices combined with the plain language of the TOS of these social media platforms that grant complete autonomous impunity to the platform[...] This part is correct. They have the complete impunity because of how the contract is written. However, that does not make the contract illusory: you can decide not to agree to it and not go to the place, so it is mutual acceptance. Both sides are bound to perform something until the contract is terminated. An illusory contract would be that Alice gets 2000 USD for nothing (only one side performs). But both sides perform. The contract is to follow the TOS in exchange for site access. Both sides offer something: access in exchange for adherence to rules. The claim of non-mutuality is frivolous: If you claim "I don't agree to the TOS and contract", you can't at the same time get the benefits of the contract either: you signed the contract to follow the TOS in exchange to access the site, and if you don't want to follow the TOS, you have to terminate the contract and can't access the site. You can't eat your cake and have it too. Also, there is a severability clause, which is valid: even if a clause would be illegal, it would be replaced by the closest legal clause, overwritten by the legal minimum, or removed, whichever is the least impact. The rest of the TOS is untouched and fully valid. Your conclusion is wrong and meritless.	The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.
Why is it legal for public funded researchers to transfer their paper ownership to private publishers? Maybe it belongs to the academia forum, but I have never understood why public funded researchers can transfer their paper ownership to private publishers. We, the taxpayers, fully pay for the researchers salaries, laboratories material, infrastructure etc. so why can they just give all of their results to someone else? Why do we have to pay again for something we have already paid for? Despite having myself worked in public research, I genuinely can't tell what is the difference between allowing this, or allowing a bakery to tell their clients "Remember this cake you already pay for? We gave it to someone else, but I'm sure he will be willing to sell it back to you!". Similarly, a private company would never let its R&D employees decide on their own whether to publish something in a scientific journal. To simplify, maybe this question can be restricted to US or whatever European country for which someone has an answer. EDIT: I'm also specifically asking about scientific publications, not patents. Maybe I can restrict it even further with two specific cases: You work for a private company You work for CNRS (French research organism) In situation 2, You can spend your working time (paid by CNRS): Reviewing papers for a private publisher, who will not pay me nor the CNRS. Writings books and scientific articles, then freely transfer the rights to a private publisher. Of course you can't do that in situation 1. Yet, from what I remember from the contracts, there was not much difference between 1 and 2 (besides maybe patents).	This is a US-law answer. The Constitution protects various rights of individuals, and in general, there is no abrogation of your rights if you receive a benefit from government. Your presumption that taxpayers fully fund researchers and materials is incorrect, in the US, although there are some researchers whose salaries are entirely paid by taxes. So as a matter of basic law, a person is entitled to intellectual property that they create, regardless of how they interact with the taxing structure. US law has a concept of "work for hire", whereby if I am hired by Podunk U to write a book, the book may be the property of Podunk U and not me the author. Usually, publicly supported institutions have policies that reign in the tendency of universities to lay claim to the research output of their faculty (but not staff) in terms of copyright, but not patents. In principle, a publicly supported university could hold that faculty are hired to write books and therefore any book that they write is a work for hire. This is not done for mostly political reasons. There are various employer-mandated obligations on university employees to make works "open access", but it would take an act of Congress to make this a uniform legal requirement for, e.g., "anyone working for a company who in some manner receives funding from the federal government". There is no such law in the US. Incidentally, this liberty extends to other domains, such as food, because all food is in some way touched by federal money. The explanation for why the law is what it is is entirely political, that in the US, the concept of private property is recognized and protected by law, and there is no law allowing the arbitrary taking of private property. The law can be changed (it may take some constitutional amendments). You could follow this up on Politics SE to ask, what would be the most-acceptable abrogation of property rights in the US which had the effect that "if you receive direct or indirect tax support, you lose your property rights" (probably too broad for SE, but that's the underlying political issue). If you want a model of what such a law might look like, you can start with the US law regarding patents and federal assistance. There are many specifics which would have to be re-written to get the situation where a person benefitting from government funding must turn over their copyright to government. First you would have to pin down what it means to benefit from taxpayer support. The usual way this is done is in terms of being a party to a funding contract between a government agency and an employer. This has no direct effect on authors (who 99.99% of the time do not contract with the government), so the law would also have to require parties to government funding contracts to impose contractual restrictions on any individuals vaguely receiving a benefit from such funding, so that those who benefit from a funding contract must assign copyright to the government. The set of people who benefit indirectly from grants is vastly larger than the set of people who receive dollar amounts from grants, so the law needs to be specific (do students who learn from teachers supported by a grant therefore themselves benefit from tax dollars). This is a major infringement on the property rights of individuals, so such a law would be challenged in court and subject to strict scrutiny. It is unlikely that the case can be made that turning over copyright to the government is a compelling government interest; however the interest is stated, it would have to be the least restrictive and most narrowly tailored means of accomplishing that end.	You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license.	Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...).	It is reasonable to interpret the statement in their Github repository README.md as a "public domain" license for anything contained there. However, their "usage guidelines" backpedals a bit ("generally are not copyrighted", the misleading implication that content used commercially is subject to restrictions that educational and personal uses are not subject to). Although it is true that works "created by the US government" are not protected by copyright, not everything associated with a government agency is created by the US government. An agency might have a policy that they will not post material that is not copyright-free, there is no practical means of knowing if an item is an actual government work, versus a government-supported or government-hosted work (where copyright is held by someone else). If you trust their implication that all of those items in the repository are indeed government works, then they are free of copyright. I don't know any reason to not believe them, although sometimes the government is wrong and they end up liable big-time for infringement. However... NASA Open Source Agreement Version 1.3 (another copy on a NASA web page) on first glance seems to contradict the "government work" theory. Here, they claim to grant certain rights to users and also impose impose restrictions (including obligatory registration). This does not make any sense for a work that is in the public domain. The license is legally defective in that it fails to fill in relevant blanks (agency name, title of work, URL for obligatory registration). Also notice that the license is only for software. The scope of that license therefore has to be something narrower – it applies only to software, and presumably software that is not "a government work". I have no idea what software NASA could legally give away and is not a government work which is therefore not protected by copyright.	Stack Exchange questions are not public domain, they are protected by copyright. Authors have granted a license under Subscriber Content, specifically content is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC BY-SA 4.0) As long as you comply with the terms of the CC BY-SA 4.0 license, you may copy user content.	Yes The US constitution is in the public domain. Anyone may publish a version of it, including an altered version. No US law forbidding publication of an altered version would itself be constitutional -- the First Amendment would prevent such a law. However, if an altered version were sold under such conditions that a customer might reasonably believe it to be an unaltered version, that might be false advertising, or perhaps fraud, because the seller would be deceiving the customer as to what the product is.	A person can only patent their own original invention. If the technology which is the subject of the patent existed before it was filed, then the patent is not enforceable. This is called prior art. Note that the rights to a patent can always be placed in the public domain. Patent just means "make obvious" in Latin. So, if you obtain a patent, that does not necessarily mean you are blocking other people from using the technology. There are also various established ways for publishing your technology to guarantee that it is in the public domain.	A book (or any other creative work) published in the 1800s is now in the public domain everywhere in the world (excepting odd cases like Peter Pan where a special rule applies in some jurisdictions.) Anyone may legally quote from such a work at any length with no legal requirement for permission. In fact there is no legal requirement to attribute the quote to the author (although there is an ethical requirement). In fact one may publish a new edition of such a work, unchanged or modified in any way one chooses, with no legal need to obtain permission from anyone or to pay any royalties or fees. If the work were recent enough to still be protected by copyright, a limited quote could be used under fair use, fair dealing or another exception to copyright under the laws of most countries. The exact rules vary by country, and are often highly fact-dependent, so the exact details will matter. If one wanted to quote enough from a recent work that permission is required, the copyright holder, who is often not the publisher, would need to grant permission. That is often the author or the author's heir, but it can be a person or firm to which the author transferred the rights. Sometimes the rights-holder can be hard to identify. Update: it would be possible for a work published in, say, 1890 by an author then young who lived to a fairly old age, dying in, say 1960, to still be protected in some countries, although not in the US. (Anything published before 1925 is now PD in the US.) But Charlotte Bronte died in 1855, and all of her work has long been in the public domain
Is it common for plaintiffs to present their case at court hearings with an actual presentation? At court hearings, where the plaintiff (or their lawyer) is given time to present their case, is it common for them to do it with an actual on-screen slide show presentation (like at a conference)? Are there any rules or nuances about that? (Any jurisdiction).	Yes, what you're describing is very common. There is an entire industry built around helping lawyers prepare and assemble presentations for opening and closing arguments. I've seen people use PowerPoint, timeline software, and all sorts of things. Google "trial presentation vendors" for examples.	This paper studies the question, in a restricted context of federal cases (the main problem is getting data, but turns out that some federal court clerks have been obliging). From that database, between 1998-2011 1,156,460 felony cases were resolved. 0.2% of those cases were pro se representations with virtually all cases having professional representation ("data missing" is 10 times more frequent than pro se, and the only thing rarer was pro bono attorney at 0.03%). As for outcomes, it is possible that pro se defendants had the charges dismissed at a higher rate (16.9% pro se vs. 6.1% represented -- "possible" is a way of simplifying the statistical problems in interpreting these numbers); with acquittals it's a wash, and with convictions pro se defendants may have done worse (14.8% pro se, 4.9% represented). There also seems to be a trend that juries convict pro se defendants more often than they do represented defendants (90% vs. 77.9%). Ah, and this paper follows up and contradicts the findings of the Hashimoto study, linked in the comments.	Generally speaking, witnesses are not legally represented at trial, unless they are also parties. While a witness may choose to seek legal advice about a request or order they have received to give evidence, they would generally be expected to take this opportunity before they actually show up at trial. A witness examination would not normally be adjourned because a witness said something damaging to their own credibility or to one party’s case, and would like to pause and obtain legal advice. One goal of cross-examination is to expose unreliable evidence by obtaining this kind of tactical advantage over a witness. It is up to the party whose case was damaged to try to fix the problem in re-examination or reply evidence. That party may not be particularly interested in protecting the witness’s personal interests. There may be exceptions in specific factual situations, when it becomes clear that a witness does not understand their right to object to giving evidence on the grounds of self-incrimination or some other privilege. A judge may choose to halt further questioning of the witness if there is a real risk of a mistrial or some other procedural unfairness, which can be addressed without unfairly depriving the cross-examiner of their opportunity to challenge the evidence.	When it comes to the obligation to tell the truth, there isn't all that much difference between a lawyer's obligations and those of a pro se litigant -- at least as far objective truth. But not every question has a single truthful answer. Professionalism rules impose some higher standards on lawyers in cases that are a bit murkier than just asking, "Were you at the Capitol on January 6?" In the United States, the analogous rule lays out some bright-line rules. Rule 3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunal (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. (b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. (c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. (d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse. Subsection (a)(1) gives a good example of where the duties of honesty diverge for lawyers and pro se parties. If a plaintiff tells the court honestly -- but mistakenly -- that he lost $1 million in profits, but later discovers that he only lost $100,000, his lawyer has a clear obligation to correct that statement for the court; the pro se plaintiff's obligation is not clear. Similarly, if a plaintiff tells the court that he is entitled to those lost profits if he can prove elements A, B, C, and D, but later learns that the Supreme Court has also imposed a requirement that he prove E, the lawyer has an obligation to notify the court of this development; the pro se plaintiff does not. On the "overriding" language: I don't read it as generally having any effect on a lawyer's duty to be honest to his client. Instead, it means that the lawyer's duty to the court overrides the lawyer's duty to the client. In either of the above hypotheticals, for example, the lawyer acted honestly and ethically in presenting his evidence and argument, even though his statements turned out to be false. Correcting the record on either point would reduce or possibly eliminate his client's likely recovery and be against his client's best interests. Once the lawyer discovers the error, he is therefore faced with a conflict of interest: he has a duty to act in his client's best interest, but he also has a duty of honesty to the court. Chapter 13 says that his duty to the court overrides his duty to his client.	Calling someone an "asshole" is, at least in the US, an expression of opinion and so is not defamation. Saying that someone has committed a crime may be defamation, but not if that person has in fact already been convicted of that crime. In general if a statement is provably true, it is not defamation. If all that this hypothetical firm does is to post facts as found in court decisions, along with their unfavorable opinions of losing parties who they did not represent, it is hard to see any defamation case being valid. And I don't see any other obvious legal problem with doing this. It would probably anger other lawyers, and might make it harder to negotiate settlements or do other deals. If this firm announce that they refuse to accept as clients "cheats, crooks and similar people" and then make it public that they refused to represent some specific person, A, then A might claim that this portrayed him or her as a "cheat or crook" and was defamatory. The exact wording of their publicly announced policy, and of any announcements that they decline to represent A, would matter a good deal, as would the jurisdiction's exact law of defamation. In some places, codes of ethics promulgated by a Bar Association might be violated by such a policy, but such codes are usually not enforceable in the general case. I don't see any obvious grounds for disbarment proceedings.	Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked & answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false & misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness.	Generally you can't, since a basic Personality rights exist for eveyone that must be balanced with public interest. Allthough court proceedings are generally public, even the publication of when court sessions take place are very restrictive in the amount of information given out about what the session is about. How a court publishes this information seems to differ from court to court: public notice inside the court, press releases and sometimes an internet list. Indictments, generally, may not be published before the proceedings begin (§ 353d StGB). Proceedings before an Indictment Since an Indictment will only be accepted by a court if the chances are that it more likely succeed than fail, you may assume that the police or state attorneys will be even more restrictive about publicizing any information about any criminal complaint (or investigation). So the answer to your question, based on the reasons above is: no, there is no way to check this on google (from official sources) Sources: Öffentlichkeitsgrundsatz - Wikipedia (German) Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights - Wikipedia § 169 - Courts Constitution Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz – GVG) Publicity Justiz-Ticker - Berlin.de § 353d StGB - Unlawful disclosure concerning judicial hearings	Information about a defendant’s character or past misdeeds are not generally admissible during a court proceeding. It can be brought in to rebut testimony. If the defendant takes the stand and asserts that they never discriminated against anyone due to their nation of origin, then evidence they they have done so becomes relevant.
Why are residents of particular states barred from being Amazon affiliates? Amazon's affiliate operating agreement contains the following clause: In addition, if at any time following your enrollment in the Program you become a resident of Arkansas, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Rhode Island, or Vermont, you will become ineligible to participate in the Program, and this Operating Agreement will automatically terminate, on the date you establish residency in that state. Why would they be excluding these particular states from participation?	These states have relevant (offending) sales tax laws. Amazon has no physical presence in Louisiana, but Louisiana recently passed HB30 which requires businesses with in-state affiliates (p3 line 25) to remit sales tax, by redefining "physical presence" which is a requirement for collecting sales tax (Quill Corporation v. North Dakota 504 US 298). Similar laws exist in these states. It does collect sales tax in Kansas, Kentucky, New York, North Dakota and Washington since it has a real physical presence in these states.	The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed.	Although the USA don't like it, there's a department called INTERPOL which is composed by about 150 countries. When a crime is committed and you need to involve another country to solve it, the sovereignty of each County prevents a police officer from one country acting upon another country. That's when the INTERPOL comes in. They usually requests the police from that country to act up. A judge from that country will grant their local police access to the data to be delivered to the country that requested it. Can the police get a search warrant for data 'in the cloud'? Yes. If the servers are located within the boundaries of your own country, it's a normal procedure. But like the above answer states, it's easier to subpoena the records than to execute a search warrant. In a subpoena, the company itself is bound to provide everything the police asks. Can the police get a search warrant for such third party systems? Yes. If there's enough probable cause, the investigation can lead to allow the police to try and discover files that are held by servers that store the cloud data. But if the servers are located outside the country and the company does not have any office opened in the country, a search warrant won't have validity in another jurisdiction and the police can't act without breaking the sovereignty principle. That's where the INTERPOL services are handy. The department is built in the principle of polices from different countries helping each other. The downside is that it's too bureaucratic and it takes a lot of time. For instance if he has a virtual machine hosted by Amazon, would they serve the warrant on Amazon, or on the suspect? Like mentioned by @Viktor, if the company has an office within the bounds of your country, it's easier to subpoena the records because that way the company will filter and provide only the data linked to the suspect being investigated. That is, the subpoena will have both the name of the company (Amazon) and the name of the Suspect, so the company can provide only the necessary files. Update If the police lack sufficient evidence for a search warrant, but an interpol country was, for some reason, willing to work with the police to collect and provide that information would they be able to use it even if they wouldn't have been able to subpoena a US country? Hypothetically speaking, I see your follow-up as a company that do have a local office and the Federal Police was turned down by a judge on a warrant/subpoena. In that case, there's no reason for another's country police to act on their own country. The suspect is a foreign suspect, the crime is a foreign crime and the police has no reason to work on it. But for the sake of argument, let's say that the local police was turned down by a judge for lack of evidence or something and the suspect has been investigated by a foreign country or whatever. If the information that the local police desires to obtain is available through the INTERPOL, it's most likely to be accepted since it's a data stored by an international police department. In your scenario, the foreign police was granted a legal right to search and collected the data for legal purpose. Maybe they can't use it in their own country, but since they followed a safe chain of custody and provided the information to the INTERPOL, that information has legal validity and it is not fruit of the poisonous tree if the chain of custody was maintained.	why do they sometimes specify the federal law as well as the state/provincial law? Isn't it redundant? Not necessarily. The contract might be entered and/or performed in a different country, whence mentioning only the Canadian provincial law does not override the other country's federal law (or that country's "supra-provincial" equivalent). Mentioning Canadian federal law removes --at least on paper-- the ambiguity of which law applies for matters beyond the scope of Canadian provincial law. In such scenarios, portions or the entirety of the provision might be null and void. For instance, an employment contract might establish waivers which are void or perhaps even unlawful under the legislation of that other country. Please note that in general a copy/paste of sample clauses is strongly discouraged unless the parties fully understand their meaning and implications.	It depends on the state. In some states the Secretary of State holds the records for business entities and in others, such as Arizona, it's an organization known as the Arizona Corporation Commission. Regardless of the state's organization that keeps the information, one of the pieces of information you will find when you look at a company's records is the "registered agent", "resident agent" or "statutory agent." The agent, whether a person or a representative corporation, must be located within the state where business is conducted. That agent is who or what gets served with papers for a lawsuit. Here's a good explanation at legalzoom. A personal example that may help: I am an owner in a business that does business in Louisiana and Arizona. Our LLC is registered in Louisiana and is registered as a "foreign corporation" in Arizona. However, we are required to have a registered agent in each state. We pay a company to act as our registered agent in each state and the registered agent has a physical address in each state in which we are registered. If someone wants to sue my company then they can look up the name of my company in either state and will find my registered agent along with the registered agent's physical address. Service to the registered agent counts as service to my company. The agent will forward to me any service which is made to them. EDIT: if you don't known the name of the entity, i.e., the name on the door of the business does not represent the name of the company, then you need to find the "doing business as," or DBA record of the company. I don't know what state you're in but all the states in which I've done business maintain a "Doing Business As" system that can be searched. I guess it's possible that you're in a state that doesn't maintain DBA filings or require them. Typically, you can search either way - search by owner or search by the DBA name. Some states, such as Arizona, record DBA names at the county level. I've seen some states allow searching by address also.	You may want to select a state where you have some sort of presence. According to this article, personal jurisdiction can be waived, but subject matter jurisdiction can not, and "for pragmatic reasons some states deny subject-matter jurisdiction to specific claims, such as those arising in other states". In other words, if nothing about you, the other party, or the case has any relation to the state, the court doesn't necessarily have to listen to the case. And if that happens, the provision about them submitting to the jurisdiction is worthless. Beyond that, are you OK with going to court in the location you select? Do you know whether all your terms and conditions are valid in that location? Do you know whether one place or another has more favorable interpretations of the laws, or more favorable local rules, when it comes to the types of disputes you are likely to have? You probably want a lawyer to help you decide.	It sounds like you may be conflating ownership and control. It's very common for an affiliate to have a contract with the parent company. These terms can be very detailed - it may give the parent company the right to sell the affiliates widgets, but not sprockets (as those are sold by another parent company). As such, you can't really measure "control" as a simple percentage. So, when the parent is selling widgets, it can reasonably claim control over its affiliate. The buyer does not need to know the exact terms governing the relation between parent and affiliate.	First - do it all with an operating agreement in writing; always - no exceptions! Second - what you are describing in fairly simple for any competent lawyer to draft. The voting section of the operating agreement needs to include a provision stating something to the effect that until a Trigger Event occurs, Big Member will have 90% of the voting power of all membership interests; following the Trigger Event, Big Member and Little Member (assuming no other members join the LLC in the interim) will each own 50% of the voting power. The operating agreement (including this provision) is executed at the inception of the LLC, and will be self-executing, that is - when the trigger Event occurs, voting power should automatically shift without the need for any additional action. Have your lawyer make sure there's no hitch in the applicable state LLC law; that equity interests don't shift on the Trigger Event (that would cause tax problems) and, of course, don't forget to (very clearly) define the Trigger Event....
Can I carry a Miniature knife at school? I have a small necklace knife where the blade is less than 1 inch or 2 1/2 cm I live in Washington and go to high school would it be legal to carry such a small knife in a pocket in my backpack? it is under the requirement for "deadly" as it is way too small to really hurt someone.	RCW 9.41.280 prohibits firearms and "dangerous weapons", which does not extend to a tiny knife. Seattle Public Schools does not add anything relevant above state law, nor does Renton, nor Bellevue. Bellevue just says "knives" which is broader than state law, but they refer the question to state law, and such a "knife" would not be a dangerous weapon under state law. Seattle Prep doesn't say explicitly and doesn't refer the question to state law. There are hundreds of schools, so you'd have to check the specific school. Incidentally, if you concludes based on reading the school's policy that it is not prohibited, they may still punish you (confiscating the knife is more likely), and you may have to sue them to abide by their published policy. Their defense could simply be "we consider all knives to be dangerous weapons".	A follow-up story appears on the local ABC television station, indicating that the security guard pleaded no contest to simple assault. The fact that the security guard was convicted of a misdemeanor does not necessarily indicate that the deputy was allowed to have the gun in the IRS office, only that the security guard's response to the situation was not acceptable. I am not able to locate any firearm policy for the Lucas County, Ohio' sheriff's office. Many US law enforcement agencies have a policy that their officers carry their firearms essentially at all times, so that they can respond to unexpected incidents even when they are off duty. At the same time, owners of private property ordinarily can admit people, or not, for any reason at all. Unless the officer has an official reason for entering a property when the owner doesn't want the officer there, the officer isn't allowed to enter. It appears that in this case the officer had no official law-enforcement reason to enter. But this case doesn't involve private property, it involves federal property. A digest from the FBI states "Federal laws or regulations are not superseded by LEOSA. Qualified officers may not carry concealed weapons onto aircraft under the act. They also cannot carry firearms into federal buildings or onto federal property."	Self-Defense Law In A Nutshell Self-defense (or defense of others) with deadly force is generally authorized when a reasonable person would believe that the use of death force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person (i.e. there aren't non-deadly options that can accomplish this end) and a reasonable person would believe that the use of force will prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person, subject to exceptions that would not apply to a private individual using deadly force in a stampede situation. Incidentally, every state and every country absolves someone of liability for homicide when deadly force is used in self-defense, or in the defense of others (not necessarily family), although the exact details of when this is justified varies slightly. For example, in D.C. v. Heller, the right to self-defense is considered a natural or universal right. The analysis would be somewhat different if the shooter were in law enforcement, and would be different again in the case of a shooter who was in the military with more or less clear orders. But, that legal standard doesn't get you to an answer. The Complex Phenomena Called Stampedes The analysis would be extremely fact rich, in the sense of exactly who one would attempt to shoot, what that would be likely to accomplish, and what other alternatives would be available. And, to do that, you also need to understand the phenomena of deadly stampedes which are complex and often somewhat counter-intuitive phenomena. While there are circumstances where it could be legal self-defense or defense of others to shoot a stampeding individual to save someone's life, there are also many stampede circumstances where a use of force would not be justified. In practice, most stampedes, as a matter of physics, can only be stopped by removing a crush of bodies from the rear, where they do not know that they are causing a deadly stampede, while those at the front who end up directly harming others are frequently physically incapable of stopping. Essentially, in a typical stampede that causes death, the problem is an inability of the people at the front to communicate to the people at the back to slow down. And, when a stampede is caused by a genuine threat to the people at the back like a fire or a terrorist, there is nothing that would persuade the people at the back to slow down anyway. So, usually, shooting to kill someone at the front of a stampede would not achieve the intended result of protecting someone in its path. The person shot would either continue to surge forward while dead under the crush of bodies behind them, or would have their dead body trampled over by the next person in line who also has no physical ability to do anything other than to surge forward. So, usually, using deadly force to shoot someone at the front of a stampede will be futile and only cause an unnecessary death. Given that using deadly force in a stampede, if directly at people in the front, is almost always futile, the question for the judge or jury deciding the case becomes whether a reasonable person would know that at the time, which would have to be decided a case by case basis. Sometimes it is obvious from someone in a vantage point to shoot at the front of a stampede that this would be futile and sometimes it isn't. This question would be highly fact specific and depend a lot upon exactly what information about the situation was available to the person shooting a person in the stampede. The situation where deadly force might not be futile would be one in which there is no actual life threatening harm that people are fleeing in which the deadly force is directed at the people in the back who are driving the stampede (even though they don't know it), to shock them into ceasing to do so. But, in that situation, if the shooting is done by someone who understands the situation well enough to know that this is what is actually necessary, that person also may be capable of firing warning shots or shooting to injure with the same effect, so justification might also be in doubt. Protecting Targets of Mobs v. Protecting Targets of Stampedes A similar situation where the use of deadly force might be justified is something visually similar to a stampede, but quite different in what would work factually. This is a mob that is about to attack someone, possibly armed with pitchforks or knives or clubs or broken bottles or a noose. In the case of a mob, the use of deadly force to protect someone threatened by the mob would almost always be a justified use of force in self-defense or the defense of others, because shooting someone in the front is likely to be both necessary and effective.	You acted illegally in assaulting your fellow student. When you are in public, a person can legally take your picture, and you are not allowed to assault a person because you do not like their legal actions. Any degree of force is excessive except in certain responses to illegal fource, and even the threat of force is excessive. You also have no right to demand that a person prove that they didn't take your picture, and certainly no right to enforce that demand with physical violence.	Note that "pedophilia" is a psycological or social term, and not a legal term. What laws prohibit is the creation, distribution, and possession of child pronography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. This means that there is no offense if no real child is involved, and this is also true of the various other US laws on child porn. Since the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) erotica which appear to depict a minor engaging in sexual activity, but which are not depictions of any actual child are protected speech under the US First Amendment and are therefor not criminal. So called "furry cub porn" might include modified images of actual minors, in which case it would seem to be covered under US laws against child porn. But if the character is totally invented, or is based on an adult rather than a minor, then it would seem to come under the rule of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Note, the law in other countries is significantly different. In particular in the UK a realistic drawing may be considered to be a "pesudo-photograph" even if not based on an actual person, and may be punishable in the same way as an actual photo of an actual minor. Note also, the making, distribution, or posse ion of 'child porn' is a very serious criminal offense. I am not a lawyer, and one should not rely on this post to determine what acts are and are not legally safe. If there is any question, consult a lawyer. Note also that under the above statute (18 U.S.C. § 2251), something may be "child pornography" if the person involved is a minor, even if that person is old enough under local law to consent to sexual activity, and even if the person did in fact so consent, and even if there was no intent to distribute the image or video. So a person taking, say, a cell-phone video of him- or herself having sex with a 17-year-old, intended for personal watching only, in a state where the age of consent to sex is 16, can still be found guilty under this law, and such cases have occurred.	There is a relevant law, Title 18 section 907 which states that "A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally". So possession of lock picks is not a crime per se. In Com. v. Gendrachi 389 A.2d 604 we are reminded that "intent need not be directly proved, but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the incident out of which the charges arise". The accused was busted in mildly suspicious circumstances at 5:20 am in the dead of winter, urinating. The court notes that "There is no evidence that appellant's hands were on the door or that he made an attempt to extract the tools from his pocket and apply them to the door. In fact, there is no act or statement by appellant that would lead one to infer that he intended to use the tools at that time", and that "appellant is a certified locksmith and it is not unreasonable to find the tools of his trade in his pocket, especially when he is wearing his work attire". Note that this is on appeal: he was convicted initially. The point is that there is a lot of slop in cashing out the legal concept of "intent". Pennsylvania does not, apparently, have any specific laws that refer to lock picks. It does have a statute that addresses having criminal tools, which are defined as (including) "Anything used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have". Mr. Gendrachi had those very tools, and the appeals court did not say anything to suggest that the tools were not "criminal tools" (and in FN 5 they actually point out that the Commonwealth cannot say that the tools were weapons, a ludicrous proposition never raised by anyone – so by failing to deny that lock picks are criminal tools, they are adoptively admitting that they are criminal tools). Thus I conclude that there is a law in PA, that lock picks are burglary tools, and that the government would have to prove intent to use criminally.	Does CCPA impact whether or not this is allowed? Probably not. Public schools are divisions of state government and there are limits to how much the federal government can dictate the operations of state and local governments. Limitations on whether public schools can monetize data collected from students (13+) would arise under state law. The state law could certainly expressly authorize the practice (and to some extent does already with profit generating sports teams and yearbooks). State law could likewise prohibit the practice. For the most part, state law is silent and it doesn't happen that much because it isn't very profitable. Is there different guidance for public (government-managed and nonprofit) vs private schools? The legal analysis is very different. I'm not as familiar with this area of law, however, and will leave that question to someone else. As a practical matter, private schools are in a very good position to obtain express consent to do so from parents and students, so that is usually how the issue is resolved, I suspect.	The First Amendment generally prohibits the government from taking any actions to limit your speech, the same as adults. There are certain exceptions, particularly if you are enrolled in a public school, which has some latitude to impose speech restrictions to “avoid substantial interference with school discipline or the rights of others” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, (1969). While you are a minor, though, your parents have virtually unlimited freedom to limit your freedom of speech. If they want to punish you for buying a hat or saying things they disagree with, they can generally do that. EDIT: The hat you've linked to probably would not fall within the Tinker exception. A similar case arose in Schoenecker v. Koopman, 349 F. Supp. 3d 745 (E.D. Wis. 2018), where a student was removed from class for wearing similar apparel supporting Second Amendment rights. The school made a vague allegation that his shirts were disruptive, but the court found that its concerns about disruptions were largely unreasonable and unsubstantiated. See also N.J. ex rel. Jacob v. Sonnabend, No. 20-C-227, (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2020).
If elected, could Jo Jorgensen practically/theoretically pardon everybody convicted of victimless crime? Jo Jorgensen, the Libertarian Party candidate for US president in 2020, has said that if elected, she would pardon anyone convicted of a victimless crime. Ignoring the fact that Congress would impeach her, that she might be lying, and that her chances of getting elected are less than 0.1%, Could Jo Jorgensen theoretically/practically pardon hundreds of thousands of people? Is there some kind of theoretical/practical limit on how many people president can pardon at once or per day?	She does not assume a power to pardon for state crimes. The main impediment is the practical one, since a vague order regarding victimless crimes may not be enforceable. POTUS has historically granted general amnesties, such as Lincoln's Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction which did not specify particular laws that were violated or individuals who violated the laws. Some degree of resistance to such an order (by prison officials and the judiciary) is to be expected, to the extent that the scope of an amnesty is ambiguous. The Lincoln proclamation is clear enough in its scope (it was triggered by taking an oath of allegiance and the persons to whom this remedy was not available are clearly-enough described). There are on the order of 70,000 federal criminal convictions with sentencing every year, so probably over a million cases would be subject to review. She would need to sharpen the criteria, presumably by enumerating the applicable statutes. This may include or exclude convictions for perjury or lying to a federal officer. In an individual case, it could be argued that in this case, lying did not violate the rights of another person, but in that case it did – case by case review could be required. Violation of 18 USC 228 (Failure to pay legal child support obligations) might be considered to have a victim, or not, so just saying "non-violent victimless crimes" leaves open the question whether interstate refusal to pay child support is in the pardoned set. Targeted amnesties such as violation of the Controlled Substances Act could be specific enough that they could be enforced.	There is no law in the US that says you must tell the truth on the internet. Some places where one must tell the truth are: When speaking to police, the FBI, and most government agencies When filing your taxes with the IRS In certain business contracts When testifying before Congress But on the internet, you can claim to be the first man on the moon with impunity. If someone is gullible enough to believe you and send you money, that is their fault and responsibility. As far as eating a Pangolin, why should she "admit" it, when it was documented on Instagram? There is no duty to officially apologize for it. You can try to report her to the US Fish and Wildlife Service, which enforces the Endangered Species Act, but as it occurred outside the USA, they will be powerless. Her claims are dubious, and possibly incorrect. Her treatment of an endangered animal is reprehensible. However, you posted this to a law site, asking about "reporting it" (to some sort of authority), and tagged it "criminal law". Her behavior is troubling, but I don't see anything that is remotely illegal or criminal.	The police (and any other involved public agencies) do not work for Steve. They make their own decisions. You didn't specify a location, and requirements to consent to a search vary by location. It wouldn't be surprising, though, if Steve can't legally consent to a search of someone else's room (but possibly could consent to search of common areas). One possibility you don't seem to have considered is that the police or prosecutor would, if Steve is willing to testify, use Steve's testimony as probable cause to get a warrant. Then they could obtain text messages from Mike's service provider (even if he's deleted them from his phone), search his room without his consent, etc. Details again vary by location. Finally, any jail/prison term is typically up to a judge or jury, not the police. Pre-trial detention is typically up to a judge or magistrate. (Also, outside the scope of your question, but if there is any chance Steve has allowed himself to become involved in the misdeeds, even slightly, Steve would be wise to talk to a lawyer. Or if he suspects the police could believe that.)	You’re overthinking this The President can pardon Federal crimes, the state Governor can pardon state crimes. A convicted person will have been convicted under a Federal law, a State law or, possibly, both. The President can pardon the Federal convictions but not the State ones and vice-versa for the Governor.	One can argue both ways. On one side, yes, zero representation in the Senate for all states is equal suffrage in the Senate. On the other side, no, depriving all states of all representation in the Senate deprives them of their suffrage in the Senate (without needing to consider the question of whether the suffrage is equal). Since this question has never been considered by a court, we can't do much more than speculate how one might rule. There has never been an amendment proposed to modify the composition of the Senate -- at least not one that was seriously considered. The spirit of the law works in favor of the second interpretation. Furthermore, a strict application of abstract logical reasoning was probably not the intention of the framers. A strategy that might seem more likely to succeed would be to introduce amendments reducing the Senate's power in the legislative process, similar to the evolution of the House of Lords in the UK. If the goal were to sideline one state, this might work, but if the goal is to address the complaint that the Senate is undemocratic because people in smaller states have proportionally more influence there, there's no way the amendment would pass 3/4 of the states' legislatures. The number of states with one or two representatives is 13, by itself a sufficient number to block the adoption of an amendment.	Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.	Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.	Treason is basically the only crime explicitly defined by the Constitution. According to Article III, Section 3: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. So, no. What this hypothetical president is calling for is unconstitutional, is almost certainly grounds for impeachment, and may even be criminal, but treason it ain't. And that's assuming he actually does it. Simply calling for it, without acting (or directing others to act) to bring it about, may well be protected by the First Amendment.
Should I let someone overtake my car if there is not enough space to do it? This question came up in my driver license test (in Japan). I found this question hard to answer because not allowing someone to overtake you may cause an accident (after all, you may be mistaken about the available space). However, if indeed there is no enough space, it may cause an accident. I was unable to find the answer available in English here, so I'm guessing other countries may have similar rules. The correct answer for this question will be a quote (and a link) to an official (or credible) source about this issue here in Japan or alternatively in any other country.	I doubt that you will find an official answer to that question. No law allows you to block passing (even if passing is illegal). Therefore, you must allow passing. There are laws against obstructing traffic. Japanese law addresses this, defining obstructing progress as starting to move or continuing to move in circumstances that would likely cause another vehicle or streetcar to have to suddenly change speed or direction in order to avoid danger You'd have to specify how you intend to "not let" a person pass you, but I can't imagine what you could do that would not be "obstructing progress". A recent anti-road rage law allows license revocation for violation.	You (probably) did not commit a crime in Colorado. The answer to your question though is probably Driving an unsafe vehicle Colorado Revised Statutes Title 42. Vehicles and Traffic § 42-4-202 (1) It is unlawful for any person to drive...on any highway any vehicle...which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such lamps and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this section and sections... The above is not a crime , it is (5) Any person who violates any provision of this section commits a class A traffic infraction. A class A traffic infraction is a civil violation. Note that some driving offenses are crimes: In Colorado, driving more than 25 mph over the posted limit is a class 2 misdemeanor, and doing so in a constriction zone is a class 1 misdemeanor. Also note that I say probably because it is possible that they charged you with something more extreme- reckless driving? violation of noise or pollution ordinances?- but for a fine small enough that you don't say, 2 points, and you did not have to go to court (you could have if you wanted for the ticket, but not required) it is very unlikely.	Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? No, at least, not on the theory articulated in the question. I can imagine some circumstances where it is conceivable that there might be a duty arising from some other source, like an OSHA regulation applied to a firing range business, or an express contract with the employee (some employers provide an escort as a matter of right in the evenings or at other high risk times, as an employee benefit, especially college and university employers, in part, because they have worker's compensation liability while an employee is still on a large campus, in part because it helps attract employees who may feel vulnerable, and in part because of an attitude that the employer wants its employees to be safe at dangerous times of day and this shows that the employer cares about them), or a court injunction related to a labor-management dispute where the employee is a scab. There is no such employer duty, but an employer does have strict liability in almost every case (there are some minor exceptions for very small employers and criminal conduct by an employee who is injured when the criminal conduct is clearly outside the scope of duty of the employee) for injuries and death in the course of employment from any cause whatsoever pretty much (including criminal actions of third-parties) which is generally fully insured by worker's compensation insurance. The exact details of when someone ceases to be at work for worker's compensation/employer liability is buried in case law and regulations (for overtime and minimum wage purposes, the standard is "portal to portal" but workers compensation/employer liability need not be identical, although once you are clearly no longer on the employer's premises and commuting after a day's work is done or before a day's work starts, you are clearly not covered). But, any place where there is employer liability at all, it would be worker's compensation covered. Usually, if the employer is required to have worker's compensation but doesn't, the employer likewise has strict liability for the same harms, but the damages that may be awarded are not limited to those that worker's compensation policies would cover. This leaves the employee with at risk travel between the office and the vehicle. It seems reasonable as well that as the employer prohibits the employees self defence, they would be responsible for the employees defence between office and some safe location (i.e. vehicle). This theory pretty much always loses. An employee walking in an ordinary, non-wartime environment without a firearm is not "at risk" in a meaningful sense, any more than someone who didn't choose to carry a firearm who goes about their daily life (or is prohibited from carrying one due to past conduct such as a felony or a domestic violence protection order or a domestic violence misdemeanor or a condition of parole, probation or bond pending criminal charges). Also, the employee is not being prohibited from engaging in any kind of self-defense or protective action whatsoever (or from asserting self-defense rights if a firearm is carried contrary to an employer rule) just from carrying a firearm at that particular moment (on pain of losing a job, not forfeiting a legal affirmative defense under criminal statutes), which is one of many means by which a person can protect themselves from crimes.	Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer.	The most likely reason the other driver doesn't want to go through insurance is to avoid a raise in his premiums. However, there could be more serious consequences, up to and including having his insurance cancelled, for example, if the son was not supposed to be driving the car, or based on the criminal nature of the offense. However, there can be serious consequences to not dealing with insurance. Some (if not all) insurance policies require him to report the accident; by failing to do so, he may risk losing his insurance. More importantly to you, if he does not report a claim to his insurance, his insurance will not pay it. This is important to you, because insurance companies, as a general rule, pay claims. Random people don't always; they ignore you, they move out of state, they go bankrupt. If this is a serious amount of money, you need to talk to a lawyer before you enter into a contract with this person, to make sure that it's enforceable, and that if you don't get paid, you have some recourse.	Yes But not because they are mandated, just because your car has one. Because there is one factory fitted and it is a piece of safety equipment anyone you pay to maintain your car would be negligent if they didn’t make sure it’s working.	tl;dr Hitting the pedestrians is a separate crime, even if they shouldn't be there. Background On a highway, you might have a legal right of way and therefore a claim against the pedestrians for failing to yield. Since the states (and not the federal government) own and operate the interstate highway system, your specific answer depends on the state law. In North Carolina, for example, pedestrians walking along or upon a highway have a statutory duty to yield the right of way to all vehicles. So you could probably videotape and press misdemeanor charges against them individually. That said, contacting the police and waiting (or taking an alternate route) is the best recourse. Having the right of way (or feeling ethically justified) doesn't allow you to commit an offense like hitting a pedestrian. The fact that the pedestrians aren't supposed to be in your way is of little consolation in the charges you'll face if you injure or kill one. The court will see this as a legal/ethical problem, but one that won't go in your favor. In particular, you deliberately directed your vehicle into the crowd with the knowledge that the action might cause harm. One doesn't have to imagine the Austin Powers steamroller scenario to know that injuries are possible when cars go through crowds. That will pull all of the "involuntary"-flavored mitigations off the table. In particular, driving a car into a crowd might be considered "an inherently dangerous act or omission, done in such a reckless and wanton manner as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty." In the worst case scenario, where someone died as a result, a North Carolina prosecutor might push for second-degree murder (which operates on a "recklessness-plus" standard and might not be as crazy as it sounds since driving into the crowd is likely reckless, and driving in slowly with them yelling at you to stop could push a jury over the top). In that case, as a defendant, you'd hope your charge could be mitigated down to something like death by vehicle (which is similar to "vehicular manslaughter" in other states), and you'd shoot for the misdemeanor version of death by vehicle since you weren't driving under the influence. However, a key element of proving death by vehicle is that you unintentionally caused the death---and the fact that you deliberately drove into the crowd might ruin your defense. In the case where you just hurt someone, you'd likewise hope to mitigate intentional charges to unintentional ones. A claim for false imprisonment is unlikely to succeed. False imprisonment is called a variety of things---like felonious/misdemeanor restraint, unlawful detainment, etc.---depending on where you live. To prove it (and generalizing a bit since this varies by state), you typically have to show (1) detention or restraint against your will, and (2) unlawfulness of the detention or restraint. A big challenge here is that courts often interpret this to mean detention or restraint by exercise of force or threat of force, as in Harris v. Stanioch, 150 Wash. 380 (1928) for example. The protesters are just in the way, so it's unlikely this would hold up. Self defense almost surely won't be a viable excuse. The idea of driving the car slowly through the crowd relies on the notion that you should be able to escape the alleged detention. The escape you're considering in driving through the crowd likely comes at the expense of making contact with members of the crowd. Making unprivileged contacts might be allowable in self defense. However, self defense probably hold up either. Setting aside notions of proportional defense, you have to be defending yourself against something: force or threats of it by the protesters. So if they don't use force, or threaten it, against you, then your defense is going to be really shaky.	The Straßenverkehrsordnung(Translation) in Germany says this: § 34 Accidents (1) Any person involved in a traffic accident must: stop immediately; take the necessary steps to ensure traffic safety and, if there is only minor damage, move their vehicle to the edge of the carriageway; ascertain the consequences of the accident; assist injured persons (section 323c of the Penal Code); to other persons present at the scene of the accident who were involved and have suffered damage: a) state that they (i.e. the person referred to in the first clause) were involved in the accident; and b) if requested to do so, provide their own name and address, present their own driving licence and vehicle registration document and, to the best of their knowledge, provide details of their third-party insurance; a) remain at the scene of the accident until, by virtue of their own presence, it has been possible to identify their personal details, their vehicle and the nature of their involvement to the benefit of the other persons who were involved in and have suffered damage in the accident; or b) wait for a reasonable length of time and leave their own name and address at the scene of the accident if nobody was prepared to perform the identification; immediately facilitate subsequent identification if they have left the scene of the accident legitimately, after giving a plausible excuse or upon expiration of the waiting time (paragraph 6(b)). For this purpose, they must inform at least the persons referred to above (paragraph 6(a)) or a nearby police station that they were involved in the accident and must provide their own address, their present whereabouts as well as the registration number and location of the vehicle that was involved in the accident, which must be kept available for immediate investigation for a reasonable length of time. For minor accidents (no injuries, no suspected criminal offence, no major disagreements between involved parties, ...) you do not have to call and wait for police (you have a right to call them but they might try to discourage you from requesting that they come to the scene). For normal traffic accidents insurance doesn't come and collect evidence at the scene, instead an appraiser will document damage to your car and look at statements and witness reports and other documentation. You can just exchange all necessary information with the other party/ies and then leave with your car (possibly using a towing service). However, OP might refer to the specific case of an accident with a rented car. In that case, the contract with the rental service often mandates that you call police and request an official police documentation and report in case of an accident.
How can i compete legally with the large firms in the below mentioned scenario? I am from India and when i did some research i found out that there are some big and well established companies in the field of windmill installation for electricity generation like Vestas India, GE Wind Energy Ltd.etc. I have developed a product for renewable generation of electricity and want to start a startup, but it is not very complex (i.e easy to get copied) and i fear that those big companies could figure out the working of my product easily and can make a duplicate of it. Since i will be a small startup very few will recognize me and i will also be having less connections as compared to those big firms. Also i do have an option of getting a patent done but there can be a chance that i miss some aspect and then those big firms could find any loopholes and then make my patent invalid.(I guess you must be understanding what i want to say as there is lots of possibility for a product design and it is possible that i miss some of them in my patent) Is revealing of my product in press will be a good idea Please guide me what should one do for the above case in order to get recognized. (i guess after update my question is making some sense)	Patent it Hire a good patent attorney in the field and work with them to patent all patentable aspects.	Your issue is trademark, not copyright. If these other guys use their mark (product name) in commerce but did not register it, they have an unregistered trademark which you could be infringing. Between two users of the same trademark, the first to use in commerce wins. (There is a territorial component but with the Internet, meh.) If the trademark is registered that gives them a presumption of validity. Trademark infringement is concerned with consumer confusion. If someone uses someone else's trademark in a way that confuses consumers as to the origin of the goods, that's a problem. What this means is that if I make tires with the name Sportie and someone else makes soap also with that name Sportie there is not a high likelihood of confusion. Likewise a hotel in Washington called Runner's Cove probably doesn't infringe a shoe store in Florida with the same name. Fantasy games and fantasy books sold over the Internet? Sounds like a potential problem that you might want to clear up before the second book.	It depends upon how much money is at stake. You could have a patent search done and consult a patent lawyer help you to evaluate your risk based upon the results. This would cost several thousand dollars but probably less than $10,000 (these amounts are much less than the cost of trying to get a patent for your app). If you do this and there is anyone who has an arguable infringement claim, you would ultimately have to decide for yourself, informed by the search results and your patent lawyer's advice, what to do. Even in a low risk case, you might be sued. Even in a high risk case, the patent holder might decide not to sue you for some reason (patents of the kind you are worried about are weak and often don't hold up in court, about 50% of patent cases that go to trial end up finding that the patent is invalid and that would be higher with a patent of the type you are worried about, but of course, it costs money to go to trial so people often pay nuisance settlements to avoid litigation). You could, instead, launch your app without a patent search and see if anyone sends you a cease and desist letter and then decide what to do from there, possibly consulting a patent lawyer at that point if necessary. It only makes sense to search in advance if your investment and potentially profits from the app are significantly greater than the cost of the patent consultation. If you've invested $100,000 in making the app and expect to make $200,000 of profits from the app, you should definitely confer with a patent lawyer up front. If you've invested $1,000 in making the app and expect to make $2,000 of profits from the app, you should move forward until such time, if ever, as you receive a cease and desist letter from someone claiming to have a patent that covers your app. Somewhere in between those amounts, what to do is a business decision and a judgment call.	The reason why I could not find the patent is that there are several different kinds of patents. Mechanical patents, for example, are "utility" patents. The cut glass pattern referenced in the question is not a utility patent, it is a design patent. Each patent type has its own numbering system. To search for a design patent, typically a "D" is inserted before the patent number, like "D63795". This results in the correct patent being discovered:	First of all being the "founder" of a startup in no way implies that one wrote all the code of the startup's primary or signature app. The founder could have hires coders, or had partners, or used open source code. But let's make some assumptions. Suppose Alice has created a startup, and wrote the code for an application. Suppose Bob invested in the startup, and got 30% of the stock, What rights does Bob have to the copyright on the code? It depends entirely on what agreements Alice has made. Alice might have sold or assigned the copyright to her startup firm, call that F1, If so, F1 owns the copyright, and Alice can't reuse it without F1's permission. If Alice has retained the other 70% of F1, she controls it and can have it grant her whatever permissions she likes. But if she has sold or assigned a majority shore to investors, she will need to persuade the management of F1, or a majority of the shareholders, to grant her permission. Alice might have merely licensed the code to F1. In this case she retains the copyright. If the license was not exclusive, she can use the code as she pleases, but so can F1, in accord with the license. In neither case does Bob directly own the copyright, or a share in it, unless a separate agreement granted or sold that to him. But he has a right to a share of the profits, if any that F1 makes, and a right to vote on decisions that 1 makes, long with other owners of F1 If Alice never formally transferred or licensed the software to F1, she still owns the copyright and can do as she pleases, even if shew sold most or al of F1 Note that to transfer a copyright there must (under US law) be a written and signed document, one signed by the owner or the owner's agent. It must specifically indicate what copyright(S) it transfers. A purchase of an interest in a business does not suffice without such a document.	You would start by contacting a local lawyer. At some point you may want to take them to court, and an important question is, what court has jurisdiction? If you sue them in your country, there may be an issue in trying to collect on any judgment, but maybe it is manageable. Do your country's court have jurisdiction? That depends on your country's laws. Step one is to find out if it is even possible to sue them locally. Bear in mind that even though you set up an LLC in Singapore, you are not necessarily suing that LLC, you might be suing another corporation or set of people. So "Singapore" is not necessarily the only other choice. Start local, even if it turns out that you have to engage a multi-national law firm with lawyers everywhere.	This is not "unfair competition". You are allowed to ask people for their views and take them into account in designing software, even with the specific intent that it compete successfully with existing software. In the US you have a protected right to do that under the First Amendment. If the chat site where you asked is run by the developer or owners of the app, they can ask you to avoid such question there, and even ban you from the site if they choose, because it is their site. But if you went onto a public site (like Stack Exchange, say, or Quora) the app owners would have no right to insist that you not ask for such opinions. The degree to which the design or interface of an app or other software may be protected against imitation is a complex one, and depends on the country involved. But widely known and used features such as a 'like' button, message threading, or a comment section are almost surely not protectable. Listening to users of existing simile products and getting their ideas on what works well and what is lacking is generally a good idea, and is in no way "unfair".	I'm assuming it would NOT be a good idea to just accept the funding as a person (sole proprietorship). Correct. Would the time be right to form the LLC first, before starting the campaigns on the crowdfunding sites? Or would it be permissible for the entity to be formed IF and once the funding is available? For instance, if the campaign on Kickstarter raises 800 thousand dollars, can an LLC then be created, a bank account opened, and the funds deposited there? Or must the entity be created prior to the asking for startup funds? An entity should be (really must be) formed before funds are raised. This is not a hugely expensive thing to do. For a lawyer drafted one, you are talking on the order of $500-$2000, plus some state filing fees which are modest. I know it's kind of a chicken-and-egg situation, but there isn't a lot of funds available yet for hiring attorneys and drawing up papers before the money is raised. Or should this be something for just forming a very quick LLC and then worrying about the right entity after the funds come in? If you can't afford the money necessary to hire a lawyer to form an entity without crowdfunding, you aren't ready to open a manufacturing company. You really shouldn't consider trying to start a project of this magnitude unless you have at least several tens of thousands of dollars of personal funds on hand prior to the crowdfunding effort. You should also have a detailed business plan in place with fact checked budget lines and reality checked revenues estimates before stating your campaign. If you plan to have patents, you need to at least begin the process of applying to protect them legally, with pre-campaign funds too. Realistically, most people at your stage do a small round of friends and family and personal savings fundraising and often also find an angel investor or two, before going to the general public in a crowdfunding effort. If you can't convince those people that your project is worth investing in, you are probably not ready to run a manufacturing company which will require you to successfully make many similarly difficult pitches to a variety of people. What legal entity(s) would be best for startup funded by kickstarter or other investment? At the state law level a C-corporation and an S-corporation are the same. The distinction is made with a separate tax filing with the IRS in S-corporations. Crowd funding is a term that is often ambiguous and can be used in a multitude of contexts. If it is more than a gift (i.e. in exchange for stock or bonds) there are also securities regulations exceptions that the offering must be tailored to. If the funds are donations for a charitable project, a non-profit corporation would usually be the right choice and 501(c)(3) status needs to be obtained in advance. If funds are raised in exchange for equity interests or non-U.S. citizens/permanent residents own some of the interests, a C corporation would usually be the only permitted choice. If the funds are raised in exchange for interest paying loans/bonds, or the funds are non-tax deductible gifts rather than investments, then financing isn't a concern for choice of entity, and either an LLC or an S-corporation is usually preferred (or perhaps a limited liability limited partnership in lieu of an LLC which has a different control structure). If funds are raised for an operating business with assets that are leased or tend to depreciate in value and has less than 75 owners, and has owners who are also senior employees of the company, an S corporation will usually be the best choice. If funds are raised for a business that will hold assets expected to appreciate in value, or has a financing or control structure more complex than equal shares of common stock plus bonds, an LLC will usually be preferred. Assuming someone is going to start a business that is to design, build and manufacture a small electronic handheld device. A C-corporation or S-corporation rather than an LLC or LLLP is probably preferred for a venture like this one, with the tax classification dependent upon the means of financing and the nature of the owners. Usually, you would use an S-corporation if possible, and a C-corporation if not. A two entity structure, with an LLC owning the IP (if any, other than a trademark for the products), and then licensing it to an S-corporation operating company, would also often make sense in this scenario. I live in Texas, but I assume that the business entity would or could be formed in Nevada or Delaware or anywhere there are more favorable conditions. Not really. A Texas entity would be just fine in this context. A Delaware entity has higher registration fees and legal fees to prepare one, and the advantages it provides for big businesses will often be disadvantages in the kind of entity you are considering. The benefits of Nevada and Alaska trusts are much greater than the benefits of Nevada and Alaska corporations or LLCs. Also, the Texas entity may be more suited to addressing Texas community property issues.
If the President's power to grant pardons is absolute, could he face any consequences? Does the Presidential power to pardon include the power to avoid any consequences? Consider this hypothetical situation: An extremely rich individual (a US citizen) gets involved in a sordid love affair, and winds up charged and convicted of murdering his mistress on Federal property. The evidence is incontrovertible and totally convincing. All appeal options have been exhausted, and the individual is about to start his long prison sentence. The US President is nearing the end of his second term. He suddenly issues a complete pardon to the rich murderer with immediate effect. No explanation for the pardon is given. The pardon is within the Constitutional powers of the President, and clearly is in effect. A few weeks later, the pardoned rich individual explains to the press that he simply paid the President $25,000,000 to issue the pardon. He offers recordings of the negotiations, (which started at $15,000,000 but were bargained up by the President to $25,000,000), proof of payment, etc. The President happily confirms all this, referring to the payment as a Golden Parachute. Do these admissions in any way invalidate the pardon? (My guess, no) Are there any possible legal consequences for the President, either before or after the end of his term?	There are 2 separate issues here: what happens to such a President and what happens to the person who has been pardoned. What happens to the person who has been pardoned? While at least one attempt at reversing a pardon has been discussed in recent history (Clinton's pardon of Mark Rich), there is no case of a pardon that has been reversed without the wishes of the person who was to be pardoned. There were 2 SCOTUS cases which decided that a pardon is a form of clemency rather than an act of overturning a judgement. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833) established that if a person does not accept a conditional pardon, then it is not in effect. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915) decided that if a person does not accept an unconditional pardon, then the pardon is not in effect. Burdick specifically did not want to accept the pardon because his contention was that accepting it would be tantamount to admitting guilt and would strip him of his 5th amendment right to not incriminate himself. There is very little case law surrounding the understanding of the power to pardon, so it may help to simply list the relevant instances of considerations and available opinions. Both (fmr President) Nixon and (fmr Sec of Defense) Weinberger were pardoned without ever being tried for the crimes for which they were pardoned. Even after Burdick v US, the issue of whether a pardon does amount to a formal admission of guilt remains controversial (i.e., not fully settled legally). In Nixon v US (not to be confused with the more famous US v Nixon), the court referred to Black's Law dictionary, rather than to the previous 2 opinions, to state that a pardon does not overturn a "guilty" judgement but rather provides a clemency. It is established that all punishments (jail time or fines), that one would receive for the crime, would not be applied if the person is pardoned. However, it is not established, for example, if the the presumption of guilt that goes with the accepting of a pardon counts as a "strike" for the purposes of "3 strike" laws (because of no precedent); would result in a requirement to continue registering as a sex offender in case the crime was a sex crime (because of no precedent). The current DOJ FAQ states that a pardon removes "civil disabilities" such as restrictions on the right to vote hold state or local office sit on a jury It is widely claimed that a President cannot pardon anyone for state crimes. However, as far as I know, it's never been attempted. The current interpretation of the US Constitution's Supremacy Clause is that states cannot interfere with the proceedings of the Federal government. So should a President attempt to pardon anyone for a state crime, it would (almost certainly) result in a court challenge. Any claims, that the outcome of such a challenge would result one way or another, are (by definition) nothing but a speculation. Further, if a pardon does remove the civil disability of not being able to hold a state office, then it does remove punitive consequences of some states' laws. Which may potentially bolster the claim that a President may pardon a state crime. But again, this is a pure speculation and there are plenty of good arguments to be made against such a possibility. What happens to the President who has taken a bribe? That having been said, no official act performed by a President is automatically reversed if the act is found to have been done corruptly (in exchange for a bribe or any other personal consideration contravening his oath of office). However, the Congress has the enumerated power to impeach a President and remove him from the office if he is found to have taken a bribe. Removing him from the office does not, in itself, reverse any of his official actions (including the ones performed corruptly). The Congress, however, does not have the power to reverse pardons. Nor can it create such a power with a legislature. For Congress to gain such a power would require a constitutional amendment.	If the spouse of the US president filed for divorce, would a) the President have any claim of immunity from any litigation that followed (e.g. the division of assets in the matrimonial pot, child custody etc.), The President could claim it, but the President wouldn't win. Notably, a number of state governors and mayors have divorced while in office, and other foreign heads of state have been divorced while in office. For example, a U.K. court recently handled the divorce of a UAE monarch (over his objections to jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds), applying the same common law principles of head of state and sovereign immunities that exist in U.S. law and concluded that it had the authority to move forward with the case. Also, any Presidential divorce would take place in state court, not in federal court. Federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over divorce and custody cases (under the "domestic relations exception" to federal jurisdiction), so the civil action could not be removed to federal court, unlike federal criminal cases involving the official duties of the President and unlike civil cases over which the federal courts have jurisdiction. b) would all the proceedings be fully held in private, This would be in the reasonable discretion of the judge. It would not be a matter of right, but it is quite plausible that a judge might close the proceedings, especially if minor children were involved. c) could the President themselves be compelled to take the stand and Yes. A party to a lawsuit may always be compelled to take the stand, at least if no other person can provide a full substitute for the party's testimony. In ordinary civil lawsuits against the President, a President is usually compelled to testify only if an underling involved in the same matter cannot provide equivalent testimony. In many civil cases naming the President in his official capacity, the President has no personal knowledge of the facts and so can't be compelled to testify. But that would rarely be true in a divorce case, and would never be true in a divorce case where custody was an issue. This said, a state divorce court judge would almost certainly be very deferential to the scheduling concerns of the President for that testimony, and might allow that testimony to be provided remotely via videoconference so as to minimize the interruption this would pose to affairs of state and to address the security concerns of the Secret Service (i.e. the President's official bodyguards). d) what would happen if the President refused to do so? The judge could hold the President in contempt of court, which is punishable by fines and/or incarceration. But a more likely outcome, tailored to minimize interference with government business, is that the Court would sanction a President who defied an order to testify by assuming as a matter of law that any testimony from the President would have been unfavorable to the President and make a conclusive adverse inference on the evidentiary issues about which the President was asked to testify against the President.	Sort of The 25th Amendment is crystal clear that the VP and a majority of the cabinet can declare in writing to the president pro tem of the Senate and the speaker of the house a presidential inability, whereupon the VP becomes the acting president. The president can then immediately transmit in writing his declaration that there is no inability, and then he resumes his position as president until the VP and majority of cabinet (not necessarily the same members) again declare a disability, within 4 days. If that happens, then Congress decides the matter. There is a 28 day period for a super-majority of Congress to make that decision, plus 48 hours for assembling of Congress is not in session. The problem is that the amendment says that the president resumes his powers unless something happens within 4 days. It does not say that he must wait 4 days to see what the VP response is. If the VP does not counter-respond immediately, then it is possible, but not guaranteed, that the president regains power until the VP reaffirms the disability. This is a question that would have to be decided by SCOTUS. In the presumably short interim, there would be serious constitutional questions as to the legality of the actions of either POTUS or VPOTUS.	Sure Obama can sue Trump for defamation. Libel is a civil offense and committing libel is not a part of Trump's role as president. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. But not for personal acts. See Is the US President immune from civil lawsuits? But a libel action would be difficult to win; they're both public figures, which makes the defamation threshold higher: Public officials and figures have a harder time proving defamation. The public has a right to criticize the people who govern them, so the least protection from defamation is given to public officials. When officials are accused of something that involves their behavior in office, they have to prove all of the above elements of defamation and they must also prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice." Defamation Law Made Simple \| Nolo.com The "actual malice" part is interesting: In the landmark 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court .... acknowledged that in public discussions -- especially about public figures like politicians -- mistakes can be made. If those mistakes are "honestly made," the Court said, they should be protected from defamation actions. The court made a rule that public officials could sue for statements made about their public conduct only if the statements were made with "actual malice." "Actual malice" means that the person who made the statement knew it wasn't true, or didn't care whether it was true or not and was reckless with the truth -- for example, when someone has doubts about the truth of a statement but does not bother to check further before publishing it. (same link above) Could malice be proved? Was Trump reckless with the truth? Could be. But would Obama sue? What's the cost/benefit analysis to him and his legacy, politically and personally? Trump was taking a political or personal risk - or he's being stupid - with such accusations, since he may feel invulnerable. He has sued and been sued and settled many times: see Legal affairs of Donald Trump I think both would not want to be in court; because once in court, they (and their lawyers) both have subpoena power and both would have to answer nearly any question put to them about their public (and possibly private; but not official) lives. Trump has interestingly enough talked about "opening up the libel laws" so he can more easily sue people. But if he did that, it cuts both ways: he would be easier to take to court. See Can Libel Laws Be Changed Under Trump? In my opinion, Obama is much better off ignoring Trump and letting the FBI, DOJ, Congress and the Intel Community do their jobs - have the facts fall where they may - and and not become a right-wing talk radio subject for the rest of his life, as well as risk being deposed himself in court. Edit 3/21/17: From a timely piece in The New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-first-amendment-applies-to-trumps-presidency While it is unlikely that former President Barack Obama would sue Trump for libel, he very likely has a strong case. The First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/opinion-trump-could-lose-lawsuit-for-libeling-obama/ that “there seems no doubt that Trump’s statement was false, defamatory, and at the very least made with reckless disregard for the truth.” That is the test for damaging the reputation of a public figure or official: Trump either made his assertions with knowledge of their falsity or with disregard of a high degree of probability that they were false. Obama, Stone is confident, could prove that Trump made his false charge, as the Supreme Court defined the standard, with “actual malice.”	A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable.	There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.	Here is one of the three Trump appearance bonds. As you can see, it is a personal recognizance bond, and not a dollar amount bond. He promises to appear, as required, and there is no money involved. There is a direct indication that he was not required to "post bail", which is a stronger statement that "no indication that he was".	Yes. The absence of immunity for a U.S. President's unofficial acts was established both in the Nixon Administration and later in the Clinton Administration. In practice, a prosecutor would be loath to file such charges absent very, very solid probable cause, and a court would often be very deferential in accommodating the President's schedule and, for example, in allowing appearances by telephone when allowed by law, or by electing not to seize the President's passport as a bail condition to be free pending trial, as would be common for someone facing felony charges pending trial. But, ultimately, the President does not have the right to either defer the charges until the completion of his term, or to any immunity from charges for his or her unofficial acts.
GitHub - Can I legally commit proprietary source code in a private repository? I maintain an open-source application project, which I committed in a public GitHub repository. The source code I wrote is open-source (under MIT license) and owned by me, however it depends on a third-party library, for which the source code is proprietary of its providing company. Of course I bought a copy of this library, however for practical reasons I want to create a private GitHub repository, on which I think commit this proprietary source code and link it as a sub-module in my public application project. I performed a test to check if a thus created private sub-module may be accessed by anyone from my public application project, and it seems it's not the case, although the sub-module appears as a link, which is exactly what I wanted: an access to this sub-module for me exclusively, and no access for any person which just want to get my source code. However is a such practical legal? I.e can I commit the proprietary source code of another company in a private repository I own, if this repository cannot be accessed by other persons than me?	Per the comment, the applicable license term seems to be Licensee agrees to maintain in confidence the source code version of the Licensed Software by using at least the same physical and other security measures as Licensee uses for its own confidential technical information and documentation, but in no case less than reasonable measures. So if your own code is on a physically unconnected thumbprint-secured blah blah blah computer deep in a mountain, with files encrypted, so must theirs be. If yours is stored in "the cloud" with decent password protection, theirs must be as well. This seems to describe your Github use (I don't have any knowledge of the degree of hackability of private Github repositories). The legal judgment as to whether this is "reasonably secure" is based on whether a prudent person would know that it is practical to gain unauthorized access. Protecting a file with the password "password" would probably be found to be unreasonably insecure.	Whether this is considered a trade secret (at least in the US) depends partly on whether you've taken reasonable action to keep it secret. If an employee thought it was OK to publish the algorithm, that's evidence that you didn't try very hard to keep it from getting out. Even if nobody's noticed it yet, getting the blog post taken down in't going to get it off the internet. You may as well try to do it anyway. If nobody has noticed the algorithm by now, you want to make it harder for them to find. You need an IP lawyer pronto. Depending on where you are, you might be able to get a patent on the algorithm still, but patents are hard to enforce, and it appears to be getting harder in the US to patent algorithms. (There's a Stack Exchange site so people can look at patent applications and see if they can invalidate the application with prior art.) You can't license out the algorithm without having some legal way of stopping other places from just using it. If you have more proprietary algorithms or things that aren't generally known that give you a competitive advantage, it would be a good idea to inform employees that they aren't supposed to reveal them. Check with your IP lawyer to see what you should do.	You probably can. There are a few questions here. First, is the message protected by copyright? In general, it probably is, but there are many exceptions that might allow you to use it without permission. Unfortunately, these exceptions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The exceptions tend to allow the use of small excerpts of a work for various sorts of purposes that don't undermine the copyright holder's ability to profit. That leads to the second question, which is why you are using that message. If you're including it in your source code so you can test whether a message generated at run time is in fact that message, that's one thing, and it's probably okay. On the other hand, if the owner of the copyright sells a database of all its message strings, and you're compiling a similar database that you also intend to sell, that's probably not okay. A third question concerns the Firefox license terms. It's entirely possible that they allow you explicitly to do what you're considering, in which case it doesn't matter what copyright law says about it. On the other hand, Firefox is open source software, and under some open source licenses, if you incorporate any of the source code in your own product, you are required to release your product's source code under the same license. If you're not already planning to do that, you should consider carefully whether including that error message would trigger that provision (if there is one) of Firefox's open source license.	Impressum Requirement Wow, based on your citations, you've done a lot of research on this topic. I'm just going to add one more reference, which is from the same site as your first German citation and has incredibly detailed and judicially referenced information on almost everything related to the Impressum. All my non-GitHub links are to sections of that page. Based on your research, I'm going to take it for granted that you understand that according to the Telemediengesetz (TMG), an Impressum is required on a web page if it is "business-like" (geschäftsmäßig), or if it helps, I prefer to word it as "potentially commercial." I would have to argue that open source projects have to be seen as inherently "business-like" for the purposes of the TMG for two reasons: Some other legal person may have similar software as part of their business and might have the need to serve legal notifications to the owner of a GitHub project (TMG § 8 gives competitors the right to sue). Think potential copyright violations here. It is possible to build a more traditional commercial business around open source, for example what Canonical is doing around Ubuntu. Additionally, the common legal advice is to even include an Impressum on a personal blog, though I'm not aware of any court case having occurred at that level yet. In my opinion, a GitHub account can be seen as more "business-like" than a personal blog, and would follow that advice out of caution. I'll note that the XING situation you bring up is complicated. It centers over whether the content of XING pages is "business-like" according to the TMG. It may well turn out that some pages will need an Impressum and others won't. As for placing it in the project's readme.md, that might work but I have two concerns: The courts have essentially stated that the text of the link must imply that the required information under TMG § 5 is located there. For example, the words Impressum and Kontakt work, but the word Information does not. To me, "readme" is not sufficient, but this concern might be negated by the fact GitHub by default renders the readme.md directly on the project home page. While it has been ruled that the Impressum does not necessarily have to be directly on the home page (for GitHub, that would be the company's/users profile page), it must still be readily available in an intuitive location. I don't know if putting it in a project page satisfies the legal requirement. If it was sufficient, it's also likely that each project would have to have an Impressum so that it can't be missed. Examples The dominant pattern that I could find1 on GitHub is an off-site link to the Impressum contained in the profile page's byline right underneath the title. Examples: https://github.com/sedadigital, https://github.com/comsysto, https://github.com/znes, https://github.com/eSagu, https://github.com/TIBHannover. I'm almost certain this meets or exceeds the legal requirements. Example screenshot: Additionally, I found a few that had a repository specifically for an Impressum. Example: https://github.com/johsteffens. Since these repositories were clearly visible on the user's main page (either because there weren't enough repositories to make them span multiple pages, or because it was specifically pinned to the main page), I would argue these also meet the legal requirement for being readily available. While I didn't find any examples of it, another possibility would be to combine the above two approaches, having a link in the byline that links to an Impressum repository or some other page within GitHub. This would be useful if you didn't otherwise have an Impressum hosted elsewhere. There were also scattered examples of people placing an Impressum on a project wiki page or on an impressum.md file at the top level. However, none of the users I looked at were consistent in doing this across all their projects. Also as previously mentioned, it's questionable whether not having it on the main user profile page meets the legal requirement. The Wiki page in particular I don't think meets the requirement that it can easily be found. Found using the following Google search: site:github.com impressum -impressum.php -impressum.html -impressum.jsp -impressum-manager -github.io -issue. Exclusions meant to filter out a lot of false positives, mostly projects for websites that had their Impressum in code format meant for deploy and not for display on GitHub itself.	The GPL does not forbid you from charging money for software, nor does it require you to provide source code to the general public. What the GPL requires is that your software be free software, with "free" used in the sense of "free speech" rather than the sense of "free beer." According to the Free Software Foundation (authors of the GPL), the right of users to sell software is a requirement for it to be free software. If you receive a GPL license for software, you can give it to whoever you want provided you also ensure that person can get the source code. You don't need to make the source code available to the public, only to the people you actually distribute the binaries to. The GPL is structured along the lines of "if you distribute the software to someone, you must give them these rights;" it is not structured along the lines of "you must distribute the software." Of course, if users have the right to distribute copies for free, it's hard in practice to charge money (all it takes is one user distributing copies). But that doesn't mean you can't try. Some companies make substantial money selling free software through various models (e.g. Red Hat, which charges money for support). Others might bank on the fact that plenty of people are willing to pay to get it from the official site, and aren't interested in finding a free copy somewhere. It doesn't matter; as long as they license the software to you under the GPL and give purchasers access to the source code on the same terms, they're in the clear (if you want to redistribute binaries, it's your job to redistribute the source code as well).	It depends on what you are selling to the enterprises. You could be selling just a licence to use the program, and retain all the rights on the source code. You could be selling the rights to the source code. For #1, the source code is yours and you can do what it pleases with it1. In fact many programs offer both an open-source licence (which usually forces the user to make its changes to the code publicly available) and a commercial one (which allows the user to keep the modifications of the source code for themselves). For #2, the source code is no longer yours so it is not up to you to decide what to do with it. 1I am assuming no other agreements imposing limits on those; for example that none of your contracts to your customers have a clause forbidding you from making the code available to the public.	The words "proprietary format" are important. Are you sure the format is proprietary? If it is, then it's likely protected in which case they might have grounds to sue (but that does not mean they would definetly win). If the format is not proprietary, and so long as you don't share data which is proprietary then I believe you fine. I'm not a lawyer - but I cite GIF files as an example. They were still protected by the US and some other countries until at least the late 90s and there were various threats to open source linux companies who shared code that used the file format. I'm not aware of anything other than threats and never heard of any company being sued, let alone winning or losing. Another example that comes to mind is the RedHat ISO format. My understanding is RedHat could not stop anyone from sharing open source, but they could prevent folks from sharing the format they assembled and shared the open source. Again, I am not sure if it was ever tested in any court of law anywhere.	The code is copyrighted. You are not given any permission to use or copy any part of it, nor to create a derivative work based on it. There is no way for you to "make the copyright null". The code was copyrighted in 2005, and the copyright will not expire until 70 years after the death of the author, under US law. The period would vary in some other countries, but in no country that I know of will it expire in the next few years. That the author is dead, or the publisher out of business, does not change this legally. Someone, probably the author's heir, or perhaps whoever bought the remains of the publisher's business, will own the copyright. However, the ideas and programming techniques shown and discussed in the book are not protected, and you may use them freely to write programs, commercial or non-commercial. You need not even acknowledge the book as a source of ideas, although to do so would be nice. Of course, since the author is dead and the publisher not active, if you were to infringe the copyright by copying code from thsi book, there is a reasonable chance that no one would notice, but if someone did notice, the current owner of the copyright could sue you for infringement, and could perhaps win sizable damages. It would be safer to write your own original code using only the general ideas from the book. In future, do not ever assume that you can just take someone else's code (or other creative work, such as a book) and reuse it without permission, unless it is in the public domain, for example because it was published before 1923.
How can Nintendo cartoon Captain N use video game characters owned by different companies without those companies appearing in the show's copyright? Captain N was a late 80s cartoon which uses characters and settings from several games that are playable on the Nintendo Entertainment System console. Some of these are Nintendo owned, but there is a significant amount not owned by Nintendo like Mega Man, Castlevania, Tetris, Dragon Warrior and Final Fantasy that appear but the companies who own these games don't show up in the credits or even in the copyright section of the DVD i own. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8jxeetnZ9U As you can see from the link, the show claims that all of the elements in the show are owned by Nintendo/Nintendo of America despite that not being true.	Attribution is not a legal requirement If company A owns IP (copyright and trademarks in this case), they can licence it to company N on whatever terms are mutually acceptable. They may require company N to attribute their IP or they may not.	This is known as "film novelization"(For example, the novelizations of the Star Wars movies are film novelizations, created under license), and is copyright infringement unless made under a license from the copyright holder. Specifically, you would be making a derivative work of the original, by changing the medium. One of the rights provided by copyright is the right to control the transference from one medium into another. This, in my (non-lawyer) opinion, is unlikely to be found as fair use. There are four test factors for determining fair use(source), decided on a case by case basis: Transformative Character of the Derivative Work: Unlikely to be found in your favor, as nothing is transformed ("I don't change anything, the name are the same, everything is the same, it's just a conversion to textual form"). Nature of the Original Work: A narrative entertainment film, thus unlikely to be found in your favor. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Taken: You've taken all of it; not in your favor. Effect on the Potential Market: You are essentially providing a free version of what copyright holders can often charge for; negative effect on their potential market. Not in your favor.	License to use does not mean license to create derivative works These are different rights under copyright. If you want to make a derivative work, which your animations are, you must have a license to do so.	Most games have a TOS to playing that include provisions such as sales of in game items through out of game currencies (i.e. real world money changes hands for digital product or account). I believe Pokemon does have this as part of the TOS which could get you and potential customers banned from competition and possibly the modern online trade features, but am unable to look at the current TOS to verify. It should not be hard to find such a document and read for yourself.	A CC0 license granted by party A only waives their rights, and not those of unrelated party B (i.e. Marvel). And while Marvel might have granted the cosplayer a limited right to depict their persona's, that almost certainly does not constitute a sublicensable right. This is especially the case if the rights are implicitly granted (by Marvel not acting).	IP in Game Rules Game rules and other game "mechanics" are not protected by copyright. They are considered to be "ideas, methods or procedures". 17 USC 102(b) provides that: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. If the wording of the rules is not the same, and no art or visual design was copied or imitated, the fact that the gameplay is the same does not afford any copyright claim. Claims of Similarity A comment from the OP says: I seek clarification on whether claiming the game is similar to the original would infringe on the original game's intellectual property. If the maker or distributor of the new game states that it is similar to the old game, something like "This is a Flower version of Monopoly." would that be any sort of IP infringement? Such a statement would in no way infringe any copyright. Would it infringe the trademark rights on the mark "Monopoly". That is harder to say. The key question in a trademark case is whether the use of a mark, or of words or images that refer to or suggest a mark, would cause reasonable people to falsely think that the new product or service is endorsed, sponsored, or approved by the makers of the old, or to falsely believe that the new product or service comes from the same source as the old one, that is, is made by the same firm or the same people. Whether a particular statement of similarity would do that is a question of fact, and would depend on the details of the statement and the overall presentation of the new game. But a disclaimer can and often does avoid a potential trademark infringement issue. A statement something like: FlowerPoly is not endorsed, approved, or sponsored by Hasbro, the makers of Monopoly, and holders of the trademark on that name. FlowerPoly was created by a completely different group of people. One should not rely on the reputation of Monopoly when deciding to purchase or play FlowerPoly. It would be wise to have the exact details of any statement of similarity, of any disclaimer, and of the name itself, reviewed by a lawyer with experience specifically in trademark law. In general, merely suggesting a similarity is not trademark infringement. Specifically, comparative advertising is not infringement. For example, a new drink could advertise that "NewCola is better than Cokle." That would not be an infringement of the trademark "Coke", because it makes clear that the products are different, and come from different sources.	Unless the game is out of copyright, e.g. chess, snakes and ladders, Go, or checkers, your software would probably be considered a derivative work of the copyrighted game and an actionable infringement. The fact that you do not monetize it is not a defense. You would need written permission in the form of a license agreement from the copyright owner to do this legally. The penalties for violating copyright laws in this way could be punishingly serious.	No. Copyright does not have exemptions for obsolete works, use with credit, or non-commercial use. Depending on the purpose for the distribution, this could be fair use, but it is unlikely that a court will consider this fair use when the only reason is for other people to be able to play games. Perhaps you could try contacting Adobe; it's possible that they will give you a license to distribute the Flash Player. This isn't directly relevant to the legal aspect of copying Adobe's Flash Play, but to answer the underlying issue of legally playing Flash games, perhaps you/others could try Gnash, a libre reimplementation of Flash. I have not used it, but apparently Gnash can run some Flash software without using Adobe's player.
Can a person start new businesses to compete relentlessly with someone they hate? Let's take two people, Alice and Bob. Alice offends Bob in some way and Bob is determined to take revenge. He does this by starting new businesses to compete with Alice, e.g. if Alice owns a restaurant, he starts a new restaurant nearby, sells similar food, and sells it more cheaply (because he's willing to take a loss to get revenge, and he has the resources to sustain the loss). If Alice moves locations, he moves too. If Alice switches businesses, he switches too. Is it legal for Bob to do this kind of thing? If it violates a law, which one would it be? This kind of behavior sounds obnoxious enough that I'm guessing it is illegal, but I can't find a law that prohibits it. It doesn't seem like harassment, since Bob isn't humiliating or embarrassing Alice. It doesn't seem like unfair competition, because presumably once Bob achieves his aim of driving Alice out of business, he won't raise prices to unreasonable levels, in fact he'd probably shut up shop too. I'm tagging the question with "harassment" and "competition" anyway, since I can't think of anything else. If the jurisdiction matters, assume the EU. If the country matters, assume Germany.	Generally speaking, there's nothing wrong with setting up shop to compete with someone, even if you hate them, and even if you hope to bring them to financial ruin. But there are laws surrounding what is and is not fair competition, and the behavior you're describing -- relying on greater resources to cut prices until a competitor folds up shop -- is known as "predatory pricing." In the United States, it's illegal under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, assuming that Bob is cutting prices below cost, and that Alice's exit from the market could lead to a monopoly for Bob. I don't know the limits on predatory pricing anywhere else, but my understanding is that it's illegal throughout the E.U., including in Germany, where Wal-Mart has struggled mightily to adapt to local competition law.	The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.	If they really ordered it, they entered into a contract, and you have a claim against them for damages suffered because the contract was breached. This would be a civil claim, not a criminal claim, in the Netherlands. However, if you're delivering an order that was sent anonymously, you have no way to prove that the person at the door is the one who ordered the food - and the onus would be on your to prove that it was. It could become a criminal act under a number of laws ("oplichting", "fraude", etc.) if intent can be proven but that's not easy - and you first have to get the police/public prosecutor interested in the case. It's quite comparable to someone ordering in a restaurant and not paying the bill, which is notoriously hard to prosecute criminally in the Netherlands. (Search for "eetpiraat" - dinner pirates) As a restaurant, you usually can only try to enforce a civil claim through the civil courts.	It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.	Yes, that would be fraud. From the Fraud Act 2006: 2: Fraud by false representation 1) A person is in breach of this section if he— (a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and (b) intends, by making the representation— (i) to make a gain for himself [...] By saying that you had got a position with a competitor you would be dishonestly (i.e. you knew it was a lie) making a false representation. Your purpose was to obtain gardening leave, which is a gain for yourself.	A private venue normally has discretion over who may attend their premises, as long as it is not because of membership in a protected class under anti-discrimination law. Note that the communication, as quoted, did not say that the banned person was a threat, but only that one of the performers felt uncomfortable. I do not think that the banned person has any legal recourse, unless they can plausibly assert that this is a case of unlawful discrimination, which the question does not suggest.	There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer.	Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual.

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