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law_stackexchange

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Terms and condition for web scraping I intend to scrape (download all articles) from a newspaper website which has some terms and conditions listed in its footer. The part which seems to be in my interest is as follows: You shall not copy, reproduce, republish, disassemble, decompile, reverse engineer, download, post, broadcast, transmit, make available to the public, or otherwise use the content of this website in any way except for your own personal, non-commercial use. You shall not adapt, alter or create a derivative work from any content of this website except for your own personal, non-commercial use. Any other use of the content of this website requires the prior written permission of XYZ So does this also mean that I cannot scrape data from website and perform some analyses (machine learning and stuff) and use it to generate a report for Research purposes Commercial purposes	Yes, it does. Using the downloaded content, whether it was scraped or individually downloaded one file at a time, for research or for commercial purposes would violate that TOS provision (unless some other provision contradicts it, or you obtain specific permission). The site owner could sue you for such a violation, should the owner become aware of it. I do not think it would be likely to be a criminal offense, depending on the jurisdiction.	Twitter's terms says the following: Except as permitted through the Twitter Services, these Terms, or the terms provided on dev.twitter.com, you have to use the Twitter API if you want to reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the Twitter Services or Content on the Twitter Services. [...] You may not do any of the following while accessing or using the Services: (i) access, tamper with, or use non-public areas of the Services, Twitter’s computer systems, or the technical delivery systems of Twitter’s providers; (ii) probe, scan, or test the vulnerability of any system or network or breach or circumvent any security or authentication measures; (iii) access or search or attempt to access or search the Services by any means (automated or otherwise) other than through our currently available, published interfaces that are provided by Twitter (and only pursuant to the applicable terms and conditions), unless you have been specifically allowed to do so in a separate agreement with Twitter (NOTE: crawling the Services is permissible if done in accordance with the provisions of the robots.txt file, however, scraping the Services without the prior consent of Twitter is expressly prohibited); (iv) forge any TCP/IP packet header or any part of the header information in any email or posting, or in any way use the Services to send altered, deceptive or false source-identifying information; or (v) interfere with, or disrupt, (or attempt to do so), the access of any user, host or network, including, without limitation, sending a virus, overloading, flooding, spamming, mail-bombing the Services, or by scripting the creation of Content in such a manner as to interfere with or create an undue burden on the Services. facebook is a bit harsher: You will not engage in Automated Data Collection without Facebook's express written permission. So just go and use the APIs meant for the explicit purpose of automatic data collection.	It depends on what information you are sharing, how you got it, and what rights the business asserts over the information. For example, if it is content created by the business and they claim copyright protection you can only use it without their permission in accordance with Fair use exceptions. If you obtain the information through some limited/conditional access agreement you would be subject to the terms of that agreement. As always: If you want a legal opinion specific to your use case you need to consult a lawyer in your jurisdiction.	It doesn't make a difference if the product is free or commercial use, if it's initiated by a company or an individual. What you are considering would be a "derivative work" and without explicit permission from the copyright holder, it is considered a violation.	The second inferred question is "How does Twitter conform to GDPR?" See the Twitter GDPR FAQ for details on if Twitter is a data controller or a data processor, how Twitter complies with the legal requirements for transferring data, etc. Re: the original question regarding scraping and distributing Twitter data: Read Twitter's Twitter Terms of Service, which is a legally binding contract for use of their service. By using Twitter (or accessing Twitter without an account), you agree to that contract. Twitter very clearly states what they allow as legal uses of their service; pertaining to scraping and selling and/or sharing data: You also agree not to misuse our Services, for example, by... (iii) access or search or attempt to access or search the Services by any means (automated or otherwise) other than through our currently available, published interfaces that are provided by Twitter (and only pursuant to the applicable terms and conditions), unless you have been specifically allowed to do so in a separate agreement with Twitter (NOTE: crawling the Services is permissible if done in accordance with the provisions of the robots.txt file, however, scraping the Services without the prior consent of Twitter is expressly prohibited); ... If you want to reproduce, modify, create derivative works, distribute, sell, transfer, publicly display, publicly perform, transmit, or otherwise use the Services or Content on the Services, you must use the interfaces and instructions we provide, except as permitted through the Twitter Services, these Terms, or the terms provided for (developers) So you can scrape Twitter with prior consent, or scrape according to the robots.txt file, which shows Twitter's limits on what you can scrape. If you don't follow the TOS, you risk Twitter taking legal (civil, possibly criminal, according to jurisdiction) action against you.	You've really got two questions here: 1) "Is it an invasion of privacy to know that I'm using an ad blocker?", and 2) "Is it discrimination to refuse service based on what software I'm running?". Taking them in order: Because of how HTTP/HTML works, there are essentially two ways for a server operator to know what software you are running. Your browser announces that it's running something. This usually takes the form of a modified User-Agent header. I'm not aware of any privacy laws that consider "Person A told me something" to be an invasion of Person A's privacy. They guess it based on the actions your browser takes. For example, if the website gets a request for a page, and the site's ad network does not get a matching request for an ad, the server deduces that the user is running an ad blocker. Since this is based on things that the server operator could reasonably be expected to be informed of, it isn't an invasion of privacy under any law I'm aware of. Is it discrimination? Yes. But not all discrimination is illegal. In general, only discrimination based on protected categories (race, sex, etc.) is prohibited, and I can't imagine a jurisdiction making "choice of browser add-ons" to be one of those categories, not least because it's something the person being discriminated against can easily change.	In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.	You automatically have copyright protection for what you create. A collection of numeric answers to math equations probably would not qualify (lack of requisite creativity), but certainly anything that counts as a "paper" is protected.
Landlord billing me for previous tenant's charges I have subleased a studio in Illinois, and did paperwork officially with the leasing office. The original lease was until July 31, 2019, so I signed the lease to take responsibility of the lease (and charges) starting from Dec 1, 2018. As I moved in, in all surprises, the landlord give me bills for October and November, asking me to pay. I only moved in on Dec 1. The previous tenant is not responsive, and says they moved out and handed keys on Nov 1. Only thing I know is I should not pay for utility bills, and I'm planning to raise it to BBB. The bills, just like how electricity and internet billing works, should be billed to the right person who used them. What should I do? And what are my options? I feel very stupid and scammed right now.	You are responsible vis-a-vis the landlord. If the obligations are not current, then the landlord has a right to terminate the primary lease, and your sublease is derivative of the primary lease, so you would be evicted. You, in turn, would have a right to sue the tenant of the original lease from whom you subleased, for any funds you had to expend to bring the lease current due to charged preceding your lease term.	Bizarrely, it depends on where you live in Kentucky. There is a law, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383.705) which states limits on residential leases (otherwise, the matter would be governed by the terms of the contract and common law). The state didn't enact those laws as enforceable in the state, it "made them available" for cities, counties and urban-county governments to adopt unmodified (or not). So it depends in part on whether your locale adopted the law. Assuming it did, in the definitions, (13)"Security deposit" means an escrow payment made to the landlord under the rental agreement for the purpose of securing the landlord against financial loss due to damage to the premises occasioned by the tenant's occupancy other than ordinary wear and tear. (emphasis added) That would mean that they can't take the cost of carpet cleaning, painting etc. out of your security deposit. §383.595 (again, if applicable) states the obligations of the landlord, so he must Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him So it depends on whether the URLTA was enacted in your jurisdiction. This page indicates where that is the law, and also urges you to read the lease.	You have acknowledged that the house was in "new" condition, which establishes a baseline for determining if the present state is normal wear and tear. The lease and California law agree that normal wear and tear is not the responsibility of the tenant. You may then need to sue the landlord in small claims court to get the remainder of the deposit (the above guide will be useful). The thing that is not clear is exactly what constitutes "normal wear and tear". The state guide tends to emphasize extreme forms of damage such as dogs chewing the woodwork, or cigarette burns. If you do ordinary cleaning on the walls, windows, carpets etc. then it is more likely that the judge will find in your favor.	Sure, you can sue; but who are you going to sue? You have to prove someone knew about the fact that one condo resident was going to be paying for the other condo's hot water. Mixed up plumbing and electrical systems are fairly common in apartment and condo complexes, especially ones that have been converted. Chances are high it's a mistake and was not done on purpose. If you can find the original general contractor, he's going to say it wasn't him, talk to the plumbing contractor. Who will say I didn't do it, and my work is only guaranteed for five years, so talk to the plumbing inspector. He'll say he didn't see it, and besides, all those inspection records were thrown out ten years ago. The condo association may or may not have had oversight of the construction. Can you prove the neighbor knew about it and didn't tell the condo association? Can you prove the realtor who your dad bought through knew about it? Was there a home/condo inspection done - paid for by your dad or the seller - before the sale that might have spotted it? The police aren't going to care; technically, it is a crime, in a way, but it's not like someone tapped into someone's cable TV or electrical power meter last week. This is a problem from years ago, more than likely from the original construction; so who is really responsible? The police aren't going to run that down. And, what are the damages? A few months of part of a power bill? Is it really worth a lawsuit and a lawyer? Against who? I can't see a lawyer jumping into it. If you want to do something for whatever comes next, yes, collect evidence. Tell the neighbor he/she's on your hot water. Take photos and get a licensed plumber to take a look at it and give you an estimate for separating the water systems. That will document that the two systems are not separate. (Either call your own plumber or ask the condo association for the name of someone). Then, start with the condo association. They may be responsible for the inspections before the sale. At very least, the condo association may have to check off on the repairs. And, they may know more about it (oh, yes, we've heard about that in a few other condos...) You could bring it to everyone's attention at a meeting; it may be a common issue in the complex, and other residents may not know about it. If, in fact, the neighbor doesn't have their own water heater, they may be more on the hook for expensive repairs than your dad. They may have more of a case against the condo association than your dad.	Can a landlord (UK, English law) make a claim from a potential tenant who wants to back out of signing a Tenancy Agreement? No. Your description reflects that in this particular scenario there is no tenancy contract. The only actual contract relates to the holding deposit, and your description suggests that both parties fully complied with their obligations pursuant to that contract. Accordingly, neither party has a viable claim against the other. Regardless of whether verbal agreements are cognizable under UK tenancy law, the meeting of the minds you portray is that this tenancy ought to be formalized only by signing a contract. That supersedes customer's prior verbal expressions of intent about moving in. The landlord incurred expenses that either were covered by the customer's holding deposit or were unreasonable. An example of the latter is the fees "landlord has paid for the dates on the contract to be changed (repeatedly)", a task that any person can perform with a text editor at a negligible cost. Likewise, "turn[ing] down other potential tenants" is covered by the holding deposit the customer paid. As for taking "a detailed inventory", that is a task the landlord would perform with any potential tenant and which would render the same outcome regardless of who the tenant would be. The holding deposit must be associated to a deadline or holding period. Beyond that deadline, it is up to the landlord to grant customer's requests for postponement. But the landlord is not entitled to compensation for a risk he deliberately took without even requiring a [renewed] holding deposit. what's the situation if the tenant still claims they want to move in, but the landlord wants to withdraw because they no longer trusts the tenant's promises? That depends on the deadline associated to the holding deposit. Once the holding period has elapsed, the landlord is entitled to do with his property whatever he wants. The customer would have a claim only if (1) landlord withdraws prior to the deadline and (2) customer provably intended to move in.	The relevant law in California is here. In your situation, it is presumed (as you both agree) that you have a month to month agreement. §1946 states that A hiring of real property, for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of that party’s intention to terminate the same, at least as long before the expiration thereof as the term of the hiring itself, not exceeding 30 days; In other words, the landlord has to give you 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease, and you have to give 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease (and it must be written notice). The section continues: provided, however, that as to tenancies from month to month either of the parties may terminate the same by giving at least 30 days’ written notice thereof at any time and the rent shall be due and payable to and including the date of termination. which effectively says the same thing, specifically appliedd to month to month leases. There is some leeway on terminating a lease: It shall be competent for the parties to provide by an agreement at the time the tenancy is created that a notice of the intention to terminate the same may be given at any time not less than seven days before the expiration of the term thereof. The notice herein required shall be given in the manner prescribed in Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by sending a copy by certified or registered mail addressed to the other party. But you would have to establish that there was such an agreement (I assume there was not). §1946.1 asserts that a hiring of residential real property for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of his or her intention to terminate the tenancy, as provided in this section. That is, a lease is automatically renewed in your situation unless notice has been given. Moreover, A tenant giving notice pursuant to this section shall give notice for a period at least as long as the term of the periodic tenancy prior to the proposed date of termination. What you are proposing contravenes this provision of the law – from your description of the facts, you did not give notice 30 days before now. So your obligation to the landlord exists to the end of May. Bear in mind that the law imposes obligations on both landlord and tenant: just as the landlord cannot throw you out without proper notification, you cannot walk away from your obligation without proper notification. §1951.2 addresses breach of lease and abandonment by lessee (you) if a lessee of real property breaches the lease and abandons the property before the end of the term or if his right to possession is terminated by the lessor because of a breach of the lease, the lease terminates. Upon such termination, the lessor may recover from the lessee: (1) The worth at the time of award of the unpaid rent which had been earned at the time of termination; (2) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination until the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could have been reasonably avoided; (3) Subject to subdivision (c), the worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could be reasonably avoided; and (4) Any other amount necessary to compensate the lessor for all the detriment proximately caused by the lessee’s failure to perform his obligations under the lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result therefrom. There are, also, no special exceptions about landlords selling their property that allow instant termination. That is, you still owe the month's rent, even though the lease is ending at the end of the month. You could of course ask the landlord to forgive you that last month's obligation. I am assuming that the lease was terminated properly by the landlord. If it was not, the landlord has not legally terminated the lease and it will continue until someone does properly terminate the lease. That might provide incentive for the other party to just forget the last month's rent, but it also might not.	If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money.	You agreed to pay these fees when you applied for the apartment, so unless they explicitly say that one or both of these fees is waived in case you don't take the apartment (virtually no chance that they said such a thing), you owe that money. Your obligation is not contingent on them convincing you that the fee is just, so it doesn't matter that they won't explain the difference. However, if they said you can pay electronically, then you can pay electronically, since that too is part of the agreement.
Under what circumstances is the writ of mandamus normally used? Currently the State of Maryland and the District of Columbia are pursuing a case against the President of the United States regarding alleged violations of the emoluments clause. As described by Justice Department: The Solicitor General of the United States has authorized the filing in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit of a petition for writ of mandamus against this Court’s orders declining to dismiss the case and to certify an interlocutory appeal, as well as an application for a stay of District Court proceedings pending resolution of the mandamus petition. Is there precedent for this type of use of the writ of mandamus? Under what circumstances is this normally used?	Writs of Mandamus Are A Recognized Procedural Tool In the Federal Courts Is there precedent for this type of use of the writ of mandamus? Yes. It needs to be understood against the background rule of civil procedure that a party can only appeal a final judgment of a trial court, and cannot appeal an order entered by a trial court prior to entry of a final judgment. For example, the denial of a party's request that a motion to dismiss a case, or a motion for summary judgment be entered, which forces the claim at issue in the motion to be resolved following an evidentiary hearing or trial, rather than summarily earlier on in the case, is not an appealable order (subject like almost everything in the law to a few narrow exceptions, e.g., for a denial of a law enforcement officer's claim of qualified immunity in a civil rights case, and for preliminary injunctions). At the federal level, writs of mandamus have not been abolished as a means of securing an interlocutory appeal of a lower court ruling, but some alternative means of obtaining interlocutory appeals have been authorized by statute, and a writ of mandamus is only available where alternative remedies are not available. The route of last resort is a writ of mandamus. But, there are also other exceptions, a couple of more common of which including the following ones. Sometimes it isn't clear if a judgment is final or not, or a judgment is final against one party or on one issue, and not against other parties in the case or on other issues, and there is no good reason to delay an appeal against the one party against whom a final judgment has been entered. In those cases, a trial court, may, but is not required to certify the partial judgment as final, allowing an immediate appeal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). There is also another kind of discretionary appeal by statute in federal court and this is what the government is claiming that the lower courts abused their discretion in not providing. This statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1291(b), which provides that: When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order. Writs of mandamus in the federal courts are another means by which interlocutory relief can be granted (in addition to compelling public officials to take non-discretionary actions) which are authorized by the All Writs Act which is "28 U.S.C. § 1651, which authorizes the United States federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Many states have replaced the writ of mandamus with statutory rights to interlocutory appeals or with specific civil rules that replace the previous common law writs. For example, in Colorado, writs of mandamus directed at public officials other than judges and at judges in trial courts of limited jurisdiction have been superseded by Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 106 and writs of mandamus directed at general jurisdiction trial courts have be superseded by Colorado Appellate Rule 21. Writs of mandamus in the U.S. Supreme Court are also governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, but the federal rule retains the historic "writ of mandamus" terminology (in part to make it easier to search old precedents that used the old common law writ terminology and in part to keep the rule clearly within the authority granted by the All Writs Act). The use in question has been around pretty much as long as the federal court system, although it isn't terribly common, and writs of mandamus, when filed, are frequently denied. Historically, a writ of mandamus was treated as a lawsuit in the higher court by the aggrieved party seeking to appeal the lower court judge's decision prior to a final order against the judge in the judge's official capacity. Most jurisdictions no longer structure interlocutory appeals in this way because it is an irritation for a judge who is applying for a loan to have lots of lawsuits against him or her in the public record that aren't really lawsuits against the judge personally, even though they superficially look like it when one does a simple party search of court records. Writs Of Mandamus Are Used When Other Options Provide Inadequate Relief Under what circumstances is this normally used? At common law, before there was statutory authorization for interlocutory appeals (i.e. appeals before a final judgment on the merits is entered in a case, usually following a trial or ruling on a summary judgment motion that resolved all pending claims), a writ of mandamus was the only means by which appellate relief could be obtained before trial. Typically, a writ of mandamus was sought in circumstances where a failure to address the order appealed would make it an uncorrectable fait accompli once a trial was conducted (e.g. an appeal of an order requiring someone to disclose allegedly attorney-client privileged information), the negative consequences of the order are material, and there is no statutory alternative means by which to obtain interlocutory relief. More precisely: interlocutory appeals are permissible in a small category of cases where the decision being sought for appellate review: – (1) Conclusively determined the disputed question; – (2) Resolved an important questions separate from the merits of the action; and – (3) The decision is effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action. See, e.g., Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2004). The decision to grant this relief is discretionary and the court receiving a writ of mandamus is not required to resolve the issue presented to it on the merits. Application To The Case Identified In The Question In the case of "a petition for writ of mandamus against this Court’s orders declining to dismiss the case and to certify an interlocutory appeal," the main procedural issue is whether the statutory remedy provided in cases where an interlocutory appeal can be certified to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals was intended to abolish the common law writ of mandamus (which is not something that is constitutional in nature even though it is so ancient), in this situation by providing an alternative remedy. The government is probably arguing in this writ application that emoluments clause litigation is prohibited by Presidential immunity, and that even though they don't fall within the letter of the law authorizing an interlocutory appeal as a matter of right, that the litigation itself over the emoluments clause litigation against the President poses such a distraction to the conduct of the Presidency, that the purpose of Presidential immunity would be undermined by allowing the trial court lawsuit to go forward, even though a ruling against the President in this case could be appealed when and if a judgment is entered against the President on the claims presented in the case (logical quite similar to the reason that interlocutory appeals of denials of claims of qualified immunity in civil rights lawsuits are allowed). The government is probably also arguing that enforcement of the emoluments clause should be considered a "political question" that can only be enforced by Congress, for example, via impeachment, in which case the trial court would not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the case. And, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a matter which is often a grounds for granting a writ of mandamus. The argument against granting a writ of mandamus is that the appellate courts shouldn't micromanage the pre-trial process in trial courts, that most of the distraction can be handled by lawyers for the President without interfering much with the President's day to day conduct of his office, and that the distractions caused by a civil lawsuit arising out of the business interests of someone who is the President are a risk that the President assumed when he took office without selling his business assets or putting them in a blind trust. Previous cases in the Nixon and Clinton administrations established that Presidential immunity does not provide a blanket prohibition upon lawsuits against a President while the President is in office. The case involving Clinton, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), established that a subpoena for a deposition in a private lawsuit unrelated to the President's duties or conduct in office in any way could go forward while the President was is in office, and his testimony in that deposition would later become the lynch pin of an unsuccessful effort to remove him from office via impeachment. The case involving Nixon, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), which upheld the enforceability of a Watergate related subpoena is more clearly on point as it held that a President could be compelled to comply with a subpoena in a case that arguably had some relationship to his Presidential role and duties, although it was not cut and dried and Nixon's resignation made this largely a moot point. Both of these cases are controversial in conservative legal circles, and Brett Kavanaugh, recently confirmed as a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, has gone on record stating that Presidential immunity has been too narrowly construed by the courts and that these U.S. Supreme Court precedents should be overturned or modified by the U.S. Supreme Court. The lawyers bringing the writ of mandamus in this action know that President Trump is unlikely to prevail in his arguments to dismiss or stay emoluments clause litigation (which is why he lost on that argument in the trial court and why the 4th Circuit refused to consider his interlocutory appeal) under the existing U.S. Supreme Court precedents described above, but might prevail and secure a narrowing of these precedents in the U.S. Supreme Court with its new solidly conservative majority. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court did deny the writ of mandamus, this wouldn't preclude the U.S. Supreme Court from later holding on a better developed trial court record, if and when the trial court ruled on the merits in the case, that Presidential immunity barred the lawsuit, contrary to the ruling of the trial court on this legal issue, if the 4th Circuit upheld a trial court's judgment against President Trump. Doing so would allow the U.S. Supreme Court to postpone having to resolve a politically sensitive issue of constitutional law that might never end up reaching them at all depending upon how the case plays out. And, this is what the U.S. Supreme Court usually does when it can. So, the U.S. Supreme Court needs to really feel strongly that interlocutory relief is the only adequate remedy in order to rule in the President's favor on this writ of mandamus petition.	While I am not a lawyer, this is fairly well settled in US constitutional theory. The framers thought of impeachment is something very much like a legal process, which is shown, among other things by the procedure in the Senate being referred to in the Constitution as a "trial" and a vote to remove being described as a "conviction". The use of the term "High Crimes and Misdemeanors" also suggests a legal process. In The Federalist, Hamilton took the view that the trial was to determine "guilt or innocence", but would be inherently political.[A] But there is no supervising authority, and the Congress (and each house of it) is a very political body. Procedures for drafting and passing Articles of impeachment in the House are whatever the House chooses them to be on each particular occasion. Procedures and rules of evidence in a Senate trail are whatever the Senate chooses them to be on each occasion. There is no standard format which is binding, or even customary. Thus in practice an impeachment will be a political issue whenever the Congress treats it as one. Early in the history of the US there was an opinion among some legislators and politicians that an impeachment was simply a statement that "we want your offices to give them to better men"[B], suggesting that it be treated much like a vote of no-confidence in the UK parliament. In the impeachment of Justice Chase the Senate did not vote to convict, and this was held to establish the principle that actual wrong-doing, not mere political dispute, must be the basis of any impeachment. In the impeachments of Federal Judges, the procedure has been essentially legal, with accusations of actual crime, such as bribery or malfeasance in office, being the basis of impeachments, and Senate trials being quite similar to criminal trials. This was perhaps particularly apparent in the impeachment and trial of Justice Chase. The articles of impeachment drafted in the case of president Nixon also looked very much like an indictment for ordinary crime. The trial never took place, but discussions of its format at the tiem suggested that it would have also been somewhat like a criminal trial. But the impeachments and trials of Presidents Clinton and Trump had a much more political aspect to them. While accusations were made of actions alleged to be not just politically unacceptable but unlawful, the Senate essentially inquired not into the truth of the accusations, but into whether they were improprieties deserving of removal at all. This was essentially a political, not a legal decision, and was made in a quite partisan way in each case. The US Supreme Court has held that it has no authority to approve or disapprove the outcome of any impeachment proceeding (not does any other federal court). An "impeachable offense" is whatever the House choose to list in an Article of Impeachment, and a "removable offense" is whatever the Senate chooses to vote for removal on the basis of. Thus those preparing proposed articles or advocating them in a Senate trial will be as legalistic or political as they think the occasion demands. Notes and sources The Federalist on Impeachment [A] Essay number 65 of The Federalist (by Alexander Hamilton) begins: THE remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will, therefore, conclude this head with a view of the judicial character of the Senate. A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt. ... What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution itself? Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation as the representatives of the nation themselves? It seems that Hamilton's ideal was that of a legal proceeding, a court, which was to determine "guilt or innocence". But he was well aware of th importance that political factors (and factions) might assume in any impeachment trial, and regarded this as inherent in the nature of such a proceeding. Most constitutional scholars seem to have followed this line of thought. Giles [B] Senator William Branch Giles, leader of the Senate forces favorable to the Administration of President Jefferson, is reported by John Quincy Adams to have said: Impeachment was not a criminal prosecution ... and a removal by impeachment was nothing more than a declaration by Congress to this effect: "You hold dangerous opinions, and if you are suffered to carry them into effect, you will work the destruction of the Union. We want your offices for the purposes of giving them to men who will fill them better." quoted from Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (J.P.Ipperncot & Co; 1874) Volume 1, page 322; quoted in Grand Inquests By Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist (William Morrow & Co; 1993) page 27 (Chapter 1) The Wikipedia article on Giles (linked above) says: Giles strongly advocated the removal of Justice Samuel Chase after his impeachment, urging the Senate to consider it as a political decision (as to whether the people of the United States should have confidence in Chase) rather than as a trial.	I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case.	There is a legal doctrine of executive privilege, where the executive branch can resist subpoenas, but that privilege is limited (US v. Nixon). Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. SCOTUS pointed to the kinds of cases where such privilege would be valid Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the confidentiality of Presidential communications is not significantly diminished by producing material for a criminal trial under the protected conditions of in camera inspection, and any absolute executive privilege under Art. II of the Constitution would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under the Constitution. But otherwise, when a claim of Presidential privilege as to materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here, not on the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality, the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice Decades later, Harriet Miers claimed executive immunity (as White House counsel) to a subpoena to testify before the Committee on the Judiciary, and the district court ruled rebuffed that claim There are powerful reasons supporting the rejection of absolute immunity as asserted by the Executive here. If the Court held otherwise, the presumptive presidential privilege could be transformed into an absolute privilege and Congress's legitimate interest in inquiry could be easily thwarted. if the Executive's absolute immunity argument were to prevail, Congress could be left with no recourse to obtain information that is plainly not subject to any colorable claim of executive privilege. However, executive privilege has been invoked dozens of times since Nixon – there are no other SCOTUS decisions. We should set aside current political posturing. POTUS might claim executive privilege, and then the question is whether the courts would order Banon to testify. We don't know the basis for such privilege, but we can assume that it would involve national security issues (thus might be within the penumbra of the Nixon ruling). Traditionally, executive privilege has involved the person who is president, not the person who ended up becoming president, so it would be extremely surprising if the courts upheld immunity in a pre-election matter.	In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment "standing"1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term "standing" in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis.	Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? No. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their actions in the course of their duties in connection with the court process. Prosecutors have effectively absolute discretion in their charging decisions and in their decisions to reduce the charges sought against a defendant (prior to jeopardy attaching when a jury is sworn in). Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights Yes. or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges? No. Incidentally, there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in a case where six months or less of incarceration is sought as a penalty, and there is no federal constitutional right to counsel unless incarceration is a possible penalty. The Utah State Constitution distinguishes between criminal matters and non-criminal matters in several respects mostly found in the state's bill of Rights (Article I of the State Constitution) in Sections 8, 10, 12, 13, and 19. But, it is fundamentally the right of the state through its prosecutors to decide what charges to press against someone, and they are well within their rights to change their minds. Often, this will be in your favor because reducing an offense to a civil infraction rather than a misdemeanor will have far fewer collateral consequences related to having a criminal record.	I am assuming you are not the councilor. Civil matter you have no standing. The councilor does. Maybe the hotel bar does. I can’t think of anyone else who does. Criminal matter If a crime was committed in DC, the DC prosecutor is under no obligation to prosecute it. As a political matter, if you were a citizen of DC you could complain and try to get the prosecutor voted out next election. Political matter As a citizen of your city, it is a political matter: You call your councilman* or any city councilman really and ask them to begin impeachment or whatever similar action you have there. Then next election to try to get the mayor voted out. If you are unsatisfied with the council, try to get them voted out also. The cost of investigation is a cost of running a government. Someone could have chosen not to spend seven grand investigating a hundred bucks, but they did it. *Note this is called petitioning for redress which is the right that the current SCOTUS nominee could not recall off the top of her head.	"Seditious libel" has happened before, but not in the US. This comes up in NY Times v. Sullivan, which notes that For good reason, "no court of last resort in this country has ever held, or even suggested, that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American system of jurisprudence." City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 601, 139 N.E. This Volokh article gives various citations showing that a government entity cannot sue for libel.
I live in Bulgaria. Should I worry about a patent that has been granted in the USA? I want to implement, in my app, a technique that has been patented in the USA. I live in Bulgaria. Do I need permission from the patent owner?	Bulgaria is one of many countries in which intellectual property can be protected with a single international patent filing, in lieu of a Bulgarian specific filing. In generally, you should assume that any patented idea likely to have international application, such as Internet based software, which is patented in the U.S. is also the subject of international patent protection, unless you specifically know that this is not the case. Virtually all patent lawyers know how to make this filing and most would recommend doing so in this case. So, yes, it is something you should worry about, and the better practice, by far, would be to obtain permission from the patent owner if the app is likely to have any meaningful commercial value. Now, if you were sued, there is a good chance that it would be in Bulgarian courts under Bulgarian patent law, which may be somewhat less harsh in some respects like damages awards than U.S. patent law. But, the basis for patent liability for an infringement in Bulgaria would be very similar.	If you want to implement this or a similar feature, you'd look up the patents, and either get a license (unlikely that Microsoft would give you a license), or figure out how to implement the feature without violating the patent. An example how a company I worked for worked around a patent: In order to compress data. in the best possible way, the idea was to try eight different methods to compress the data and pick the best compressed data. There was a patent for that (even though to me, this was quite obvious). Workaround: The software tried eight different methods and reported a number from 1 to 8 indicating which method gave the best result (unlike the patent, which actually gave the best result). Then the data was compressed once using the best method. No patent violation. You'd probably want a patent lawyer to check if your idea how to implement the feature violates the patent or not, and how to get around it. It takes a specific mindset that you and I don't have. And even good lawyers who are not patent lawyers might not be able to help you there. Commercial vs. open source/free software makes no difference, except that Microsoft might not bother suing you if there is no money to be made. Unless the intent is to prevent you from implementing the feature, in which case the would sue companies without money as well.	You will want to speak with a patent attorney, not a labor attorney. Some of the facts you are presenting are entirely wrong. Patents have inventors, copyrights have authors. Inventorship has strict rules. Inventorship cannot be denied without consequence in almost any jurisdiction, but you'll need to get local legal advice. In the US, "A patent is invalid unless it lists the first and true inventor or inventors of the claimed invention." (See Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, 119 F.3d 1551, 1553, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented). See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115-16, 256.) Assignment--the "ownership" of the patent--is different. It's very common to have you sign an agreement as a condition of your employment that you grant full assignment to your company for any patentable material created under their employ. If you did not, it is possible that the company would need to give you consideration for the right to assignment, e.g., they would have to pay you something to own the patent. If you are no longer there, that "something" can be substantial, because the patent is invalid without it, and they have little leverage over you. Bring all written records, emails, etc. to a licensed attorney who specializes in patent litigation.	Unfortunately, no. Apple does not have any legal obligation to make the program available in Moldavia. The reason why Apple opened the battery replacement service was to limit the bad press after the BatteryGate had hit the press. So, to answer your question, you cannot sue on these grounds. However, you could theoretically sue Apple on the grounds of planned obsolescence, if such behavior is incriminated in Moldavia. I wouldn't advise on it, however -- it would be extremely expensive and quite a long procedure, for minimal result. A solution I could have to your problem, would be to get your phone sent & repaired by a store in a country were the program was made available by Apple -- even if you'll have to pay for the shipping costs... Hope it helps!	Prompted by this recent similar question, I've revisited this question and deleted my original answer as it was completely off the mark. This is its replacement. It is illegal, and it turns out to be an international standard in the Berne Convention. Article 16 in full: (1) Infringing copies of a work shall be liable to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to reproductions coming from a country where the work is not protected, or has ceased to be protected. (3) The seizure shall take place in accordance with the legislation of each country. Your scenario falls squarely within point (2) and the imported George Orwell book is to be treated as an infringing copy within the UK. The implementing UK legislation for (2) can be found in Section 27(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.	The United States Patent and Trademark Office has a relevant document. As mentioned in the referenced document, the inventor must set forth the best variant of the invention, which would explain using the words "preferably" and "advantageously". But the inventor doesn't want to let someone evade the patent by building a version that isn't the best, but is still better than what was known before the patent was published. So some features are described as "optional", meaning both the invention with the optional feature, and the invention without the optional feature, are covered by the patent.	The Berne Convention is the treaty that creates international copyright. The existence and duration of copyright is determined by the law in the country of first publication. If you publish these things first in Finland they have no copyright anywhere; if you publish first in say USA, they have copyright everywhere including Finland. However, the law for determining if there is a breach is the jurisdiction where the breach occurs. So even though these snippets may have copyright protection in Finland by virtue of first publication elsewhere; their use may be allowed under Finnish copyright law.	Yes, this violates the GDPR if the user is in Europe. Data which is tied to a personal device can be tied to the person who owns it. From "What Is Personal Data" by the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (emphasis added): Personal data is information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual. What identifies an individual could be as simple as a name or a number or could include other identifiers such as an IP address or a cookie identifier, or other factors. If it is possible to identify an individual directly from the information you are processing, then that information may be personal data. If you cannot directly identify an individual from that information, then you need to consider whether the individual is still identifiable. You should take into account the information you are processing together with all the means reasonably likely to be used by either you or any other person to identify that individual. The bit about "all means reasonably likely" in the last bullet includes the kind of de-anonymisation tactics described in the NYT article. There are 6 lawful bases for data processing in the GDPR, and all processing must fall under at least one of them. (a) Consent: the individual has given clear consent for you to process their personal data for a specific purpose. (b) Contract: the processing is necessary for a contract you have with the individual, or because they have asked you to take specific steps before entering into a contract. (c) Legal obligation: the processing is necessary for you to comply with the law (not including contractual obligations). (d) Vital interests: the processing is necessary to protect someone’s life. (e) Public task: the processing is necessary for you to perform a task in the public interest or for your official functions, and the task or function has a clear basis in law. (f) Legitimate interests: the processing is necessary for your legitimate interests or the legitimate interests of a third party, unless there is a good reason to protect the individual’s personal data which overrides those legitimate interests. (This cannot apply if you are a public authority processing data to perform your official tasks.) Selling data isn't covered by any of the others, so consent must be obtained. Permission must be clear and positive, and you cannot predicate delivery of a service on the processing of data that isn't necessary for that service. So for instance you cannot say "You can use this service as long as we are allowed to collect and sell your data" because selling the data isn't necessary to the provision of the service. From "Consent" by the ICO: Consent requires a positive opt-in. Don’t use pre-ticked boxes or any other method of default consent. Explicit consent requires a very clear and specific statement of consent. Keep your consent requests separate from other terms and conditions. Be specific and ‘granular’ so that you get separate consent for separate things. Vague or blanket consent is not enough. [...] Avoid making consent to processing a precondition of a service. This applies to any processing of data about individuals within the EU, so just being an American company doesn't get you a free pass to ignore the GDPR if your app gets used by Europeans. The "Legitimate interests" basis is more problematic, in that the company collecting the data has to conduct a vague "balancing test" to determine if this basis applies. For direct marketing the ICO has written this, which says that direct marketing may be a legitimate interest, especially if you can show that the user has expressed interest in such adverts. For instance a location service which promises to tell you about nearby special offers would fall into this category. Against this, the impact on the user's privacy has to be considered, and location data is "special category data" because it can reveal medical information (e.g. hospital attendance) or religious affiliation (e.g. which church you go to). So unless the relationship between the recorded location data and the service is very direct its not going to pass the balancing test. The company would also need to distinguish between knowing the current location and keeping a record of historical locations; the two need separate justification. And of course nothing about this covers the sale of the data; this is considering a company which sells advertising space in it's app, not one that sells the data itself.
Can an extra-terrestrial be legally adopted? Background: My client has disclosed to me that he is an extra-terrestrial entity who arrived from another planet some time after 1900. He was sent to Earth in a rocket by his (now dead) parents, then placed up for adoption and legally adopted by two US citizens from the state of Kansas. We are trying to determine whether this adoption was legally valid, specifically whether there is anything in US Citizenship law, US Adoption law (or US law in general) that states that a "person" or "citizen" specifically needs to be human.	There is longstanding and well-established legal non-uniformity in defining ‘person’, and in stating laws in terms of ‘persons’. The RICO statutes (18 USC 1961 (3)) states that a person ‘includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property’. A corporation is a person for the purposes of access to the federal courts, for purposes of forming contracts, and enjoyment of First and Fourth Amendment rights, but not for purposes of voting or 5th Amendment immunity. 1 USC 8(a) states that the words “person”, “human being”, “child”, and “individual”, shall include every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development which states a sufficient condition, but not a necessary one. In Washington state, RCW 1.16.080 says that The term “person” may be construed to include the United States, this state, or any state or territory, or any public or private corporation or limited liability company, as well as an individual. Washington does not define ‘individual’, but we can call on Black’s Law Dictionary to learn that this term denotes a single person as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association; but it is said that this restrictive signification is not necessarily inherent in the word, and that it may, in proper cases, include artificial persons. And finally, Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 157 holds that an unborn instance of homo sapiens is not a person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. In short, there is no clear and settled answer to the question. Courts do not always refuse to hear ground-breaking cases, and in case this issue is ever realized, I am confident that cert. will be granted. The point of law is, after all, to state general principles regarding what is forbidden or allowed in a society, thus it must be capable of addressing novel situations. We will have to await that case, but the prospects for your client are good. It is obvious that “persons” have a special position under the law, it is recognised that they have both rights and responsibilities that other things do not have. Summarizing over millenia of jurisprudential thinking, we can see that the special status of persons (when not reduced to divine gift: not applicable under current US law) derives from the fact that persons have a capacity to reason, and to choose actions based on their reasoning. In the context of our current knowledge, this is mostly coextensive with being an instance of homo sapiens, though in case of severe or complete limitation of those faculties, an instance of homo sapiens may not be legally accorded the full set of rights and responsibilities of homo sapiens. In fact, the law does not have a definition of homo sapiens. Before objecting that science teaches us that only earthlings can be homo sapiens, we should be remember that courts do not always hold that terms as defined in a scientific discipline are to be interpreted that way under the law, which is how SCOTUS in Nix v. Hedden 149 U.S. 304 was able to hold that a tomato is not a legal fruit. The plain meaning of homo sapiens is completely consistent with extending legal coverage to Kryptonians. Thus it will be the finding of the court that petitioner, not a member of the species homo sapiens but endowed with the faculty of reason and free will, has all of the rights and responsibilities of a ‘person’ under Kansas law, and has the right to be adopted.	Against Bob: yes; Against Cindy: no I'm going to borrow @Trish's example because it's a good one although the conclusions they reach are wrong. Alice made a green box. Bob signs an NDA never to tell anyone that Alice made a green box, and there is a clause in it that if the NDA is breached, the box is red. Bob tells Cindy that Alice made a green box. Cindy has a patent on making green boxes. Cindy sues Alice and in the lawsuit puts Bob on the stand. Situation 1 So, the box is objectively green and objectively a breach of Cindy's patent on green boxes. Bob is on the stand and is required to answer questions honestly and no contract can prevent him from doing so. He testifies that the box is green. This would be a breach of contract except that a clause that requires a breach of the law (perjury in this case) is void for public policy reasons so Bob cannot be sued for this. However, he can be sued for the initial breach - he may have a public policy defense here because Alice was breaking the law, however, it’s easy enough to construct a scenario where Alice was innocent but suffered loss from Bob’s disclosure. Cindy can say what she likes because she is not bound by the NDA. Cindy wins, Alice loses. Situation 2 Cindy dies - after a long and happy life so we won't grieve too much. To Bob's surprise, he inherits Cindy's green box patent of which he was previously in complete ignorance of. Bob sues Alice for breaching Cindy's now his, patent. So, the box is objectively green and objectively a breach of Cindy's patent on green boxes. However, Bob agreed with Alice in the contract that the box is red and so, legally for matters between Alice and Bob the box is legally red (notwithstanding that everyone knows it's green) and is not in breach of Bob's patent. This sort of stuff has a name - a legal fiction. Adoption is a legal fiction - adoptive parents are (legally) parents; biological parents of adopted children are (legally) strangers. Alice wins, Bob loses.	As long as they have diplomatic immunity, they don't have a residency status. If either parent didn't have diplomatic immunity, then the child is a subject to the jurisdiction and they become a citizen at birth. The short explanation with the reasoning can be found on the uscis website. Namely Children born in the United States to accredited foreign diplomatic officers do not acquire citizenship under the 14th Amendment since they are not “born . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” and If one parent was an accredited diplomat, but the other was a U.S. citizen or non-citizen U.S. national, then the child was “born . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and is a citizen.	Only the currently unmarried may lawfully marry in the US US laws generally prohibit a marriage if either person is currently in a valid marriage to a third person, whether in the US or anywhere else. If a current marriage is valid it must be ended by divorce or in some other lawful way before a valid US marriage can occur. Marrying in the US while already married to another person is the crime of bigamy, and will also render the later marriage invalid and void. All this is true regardless of immigration status, it would be true for citizens, green-card holders, holders of any visa type, and undocumented people. No one may contract a marriage while currently married to someone else. I believe this is true in all US states and territories. Committing the crime of bigamy could possibly have negative impact on the immigration status of a non-citizen, in addition to potential criminal penalties. I am not sure why you would think it might be OK to proceed with such a marriage without first obtaining a divorce, annulment, or other lawful termination of any existing marriage, inside or outside the US, but it is not.	It is probably illegal under Indonesian law for you to launch a cyber-attack on a website that you believe violates Indonesian law, just as it is illegal for you to shoot a person for fraud. The Indonesian government reserves the right to judge guilt or innocence, and to mete out punishment, within Indonesia. It is definitely illegal under US law, also UK law and so on, to launch a cyber-attack on a website for some reason, so you can be prosecuted under the laws of that nation. You should then be concerned with the Law on Extradition (1979), noting that there might be a treaty but also Indonesian law allows extradition on the basis of the interest of Indonesia (as judged by government officials). Indonesian nationals do not enjoy immunity from extradition (as is the case in some countries). There is no extradition treaty between Indonesia and the US; there was one between the UK and Indonesia but I cannot determine whether it is still in force.	This is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1401 which details who qualifies for "birthright citizenship". Including of course the condition mandated by the 14th ammendment, Congress is otherwise free to bestow such citizenship essentially as it pleases by duly enacted legislation. One of the cases that receives birthright citizenship is a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States. So the presumption for young children found in the US is that they are citizens by birth. The law in particular requires positive proof that the individual in question was definitely not born in the United States. Lacking this, or it failing to be found prior to reaching the age of 21 years, they are citizens. For other cases, this will likely end up falling to the courts, who will decide the matter on the preponderance of the evidence. In this case it becomes the burden of the individual claiming citizenship to establish that they are a citizen. Birth certificates can be filed after birth, and can be submitted as evidence. The laws controlling the validity of birth certificates is locally determined. If there are other birth certificates from other countries, or conflicting witness testimony, then it will fall to the court to decide which case is more likely based on the evidence available. More accurately the burden generally falls on the entity making the claim about someone's citizenship (their own or someone else's). In a deportation hearing, for example, it falls to the government to establish the individual is not a US citizen. Deporation only applies to aliens, so the defendant must be established as such.	A US passport does not list height or make claims about ethnicity: what you have is a birth date and state, and photograph. A passport is taken to be strong proof of identity. You may apply for a new passport (turning in the old one), with a new photo. It may be necessary to provide "documentary evidence of identity" by appearing with an identifying witness (citizen or permanent resident) who has known you for 2 years and fills in an affidavit (both of you would need to bring some ID as well, so let's assume you also have a valid driver's license). It would be at the discretion of the accepting agent whether to believe that you and the "old" you are the same person. In the fictitious scenario, the person could videotape themselves undergoing the transformation, but ultimately, if one is sufficiently off the grid, then proving identity could be very difficult.	An individual obtains due process rights upon entering into the United States. For a recent write-up on this question, see this piece at Reason. The people Trump is talking about generally aren't being denied admission at an established, legal border crossing; they're coming across wherever they can get through, and only being discovered by federal agents thereafter. Because they're already in the United States, they have due process rights. As for cross-border interactions with ICE or CBP, the extent of due process protections is still an open question. SCOTUS took it up last year, but it kicked the case back to a lower court rather than deciding it.
Can I object to a flight attendant praising TV characters for 5 minutes? During a domestic flight, one of the flight attendants started making rather annoying praises of them being a fan of Disney and Mickey Mouse, Mickey Mouse' birthday, and asking whether anyone was going to visit Disney Land after arriving at LAX, which not a single person seemingly was. This continued for at least 5 minutes (or what seemed like eternity), over the PA system. He also mentioned his success of converting the other flight attendant to become a fan, and of his quest to convert the third one as well. I was distressed of being subjected to this instance of an unexpected commercialism out of nowhere. If I knew I'd be subjected to 5 minutes of various praises for one of the most commercial objects to have ever been created, and the most hated character in the context of public domain sabotage (Disney heavily lobbied for copyright term extensions), I might as well have not have taken this very flight. From where I come from, one of my friends refused taking his girlfriend to Disney World, because of the negative connotations of Disney within the copyright world, so, it was very disappointing of having to endure the praises. Is there any recourse? I was thinking about chanting, "SAY NO TO COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION LOBBYING FROM DISNEY", but I wasn't sure if that would have been allowed to do within an airplane or not. What would be the best course of action? Do flight attendants have an unlimited leeway of forcing the passengers to listen to their gibberish that are completely unrelated to their duties?	Do flight attendants have an unlimited leeway of forcing the passengers to listen to their gibberish that are completely unrelated to their duties? Pretty much, I'd say. It may not be a good customer experience, but the flight attendant certainly isn't doing anything illegal. You don't have a legal right not to hear speeches that offend your IP sensibilities. I don't think it's legally any different than if they were showing an in-flight movie that you didn't like. If you try to forcibly stop him, you are likely to be found in violation of 49 USC 46504, which prohibits "assaulting or intimidating a flight crew member or flight attendant of the aircraft, interferes with the performance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessens the ability of the member or attendant to perform those duties". Even if making speeches about Mickey Mouse is not part of his duties, anything physical you did to try to stop him would likely tend to also lessen his ability to perform his actual duties. Violation of 49 USC 46504 is a felony and carries a prison term of up to 20 years. If you try to shout him down, you might be charged with disorderly conduct under state or local law, like this guy. You could probably push your call button to summon another flight attendant, and politely state that you object to the loquacious crew member's behavior, and could they please ask him to stop. Alternatively, you can put on your noise-cancelling headphones and turn up the volume on your music. Anything beyond that and you're in a bad legal position. Of course, you can certainly file a complaint with the airline after the fact. There's a fair chance you'll get an apology, maybe some extra air miles, and the flight attendant might be disciplined or fired. But that's an internal customer service or personnel matter; nothing to do with law.	It would seem that your song is a derived work. You took the original work and found words that sound the same. If the original work had used different words, your work would have ended up differently. So you have a derived work. Same as making a translation; if the original was different, then the translation would be different, so the translation is a derived work. I was asked "How is this not straight up infringement". But it is. Not only copying is an exclusive right of the copyright holder, but also the creation of derivative works.	In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split"	It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on.	If we cut through all the entertaining colour commentary around Bob's experience then all that happened is TfL refused him permission to carry a specific item and according to the TfL Conditions of Carriage: 9.2 Staff can refuse permission for you to take any item onto our services. For example, you may be prevented from taking a bicycle on DLR services during the London Marathon. So the rules around the times when non-folding bikes are permitted on the Overground not withstanding there's a catch-all rule which allows them to refuse specific items on specific occasions for whatever reason they want. What remedies does Bob have available for his wasted time, his refusal of carriage, the supervisor's concealment of his identity, general rude treatment, Realistically - none. The refusal may be harsh - but there's plenty of room in the conditions of carriage to allow it. A supervisor concealing his identity may be annoying but it's not illegal, nor is being rude. the BTP's shockingly insulting accusation of his "wasting police time" by simply trying to explain the situation to reason with them upon their arrival, either against TfL, or against BTP? Probably nothing doing here either - the BTP aren't for what Bob's trying to use them for. I doubt they'd actually pursue Bob for wasting police time unless he makes a habit of doing it, but they've got a point. They're not the complaints department for TfL! It's like calling the police because McDonalds won't serve you at the drive through.	A matter of terminology, what you want is not the copyright, but a license to use the copyright, presumably a non-exclusive license. You would probably need to approach a licensing department at Disney. They will ask lots of questions, and if they are open to the possibility, will quote a fee, which will, i would think, be sizable. Anyone should be able to ask, but I suspect that most requests are refused. It would probably be well to have a business plan laid out, and exactly how the images would be used in your plan. Disney can refuse any license, or offer one on whatever terms it pleases.	Daniel Fleetwood, and his wife who watched the movie with him, were bound by a confidentiality agreement: She can't say much more because she had to sign a confidentiality agreement. Basically, both he and his wife signed a contract, if they had said anything they would have been in breach of that contract and could have been sued. Such agreements are standard, even for actors, so presumably, the lawyers at Disney know what they are doing when they write such a contract. NDAs such as this often specify hefty fines. I am doubtful that his illness would have meant they would have lost a case against him in that situation - it would have meant a whole lot of negative publicity, but if the contract was legally binding, the health condition does not matter. Daniel himself died five days after watching the movie.	There are no laws requiring that any company must publish all opinions from its customers. I'll admit it's fundamentally dishonest to only publish the positives, but there's no prohibition against it either. Look at movie advertisements, for example. They'll paraphrase or selectively quote a review, citing only what seems to be positive, yet if you read the review and quote in context, you'll understand the review quite differently. How exactly would you police it if you were to require companies to publish all reviews? Would you have some kind of litmus test to determine whether the critique is justified and fair? How often do people post false reviews (good or bad), and how would you account for them? Company web sites offering reviews form their own customers are doing nothing more than using the web as an extension of their marketing, so one has to expect some manipulation of the information in order to present products and services in their best possible lights. Why, for example, would I tell you how much someone hates my product when my goal is to sell it to you? This is why it would be better to use independent third-party review sites that have no dog in the hunt when it comes to honest feedback about the companies they cover.
Invoice from work done years ago I bought a house in 2013 in Ireland, all well and good. Before everything went ahead, I got a structural survey (recommended, not mandatory). Conversation with the surveyor went as follows: Me: I want a survey on my house please Him: No problem, it costs x. I will do it, then send you the invoice, and release results once payment received So it was delayed by 2 weeks or so before he actually got back to me and said he was doing it in the next few days. So I thought grand. Another week elapsed and I followed up and he said sorry there was a delay, I will send over the survey asap. Another week followed, and I eventually got the survey. Even though he didn't mention any payment, he sent me the survey. So I emailed him and said can I have your bank details please and I will transfer the money for the work done. I never heard back. 5 years later, he has now emailed me and said he was going through his accounts and noticed I never paid him for it (which is true). So he resent me the invoice, and his bank details. To be honest, at this stage I had forgotten all about it, and I know it's not a huge amount of money, but I'm not currently in a position to pay it. Is it still legal to send invoices this long from the past?	I know it's not a huge amount of money, but I'm not currently in a position to pay it. Is it still legal to send invoices this long from the past? Yes, it is legal. And the surveyor is still within the statute of limitations to sue you for breach of contract. Beyond the purely legislative aspect, personally I would encourage you to pay the surveyor once you are in a position to do so, even if the statute of limitations had expired. From your description, it seems that the surveyor acted with nobility in that Even though he didn't mention any payment, he sent me the survey. and there is no indication that the survey was faulty. Thus, it would be opportunistic not to honor your part in the contract under pretext of the statute of limitations. Consider this: You would not wish to be deprived of compensation today (or once the debtor becomes able to pay you) simply because years earlier you were too overwhelmed to send an invoice for work you actually performed.	No A debt is created by a contract (among other ways not relevant here). A contract for a restaurant does not contemplate the creation of a debt, payment is to be contemporaneous with the service. Presuming that the customer was made aware that cash payment was not acceptable and that they chose to enter the contract, by ordering, then they accepted that term. Not abiding by it is a breach of the contract. Now, if the customer did not pay and the restaurant sued for the amount (plus damages) and won, that would be a debt for which cash must be accepted.	We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. The debt collector is probably either the owner of the claim against you, if it is an assignee of the claim, or an agent of the landlord for purposes of collection. Thus, payment to the debt collector is equivalent to payment of the landlord. The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction regarding whether payment constitutes of waiver of a right to sue over the debt. Sometimes it is necessary to designate the payment "under protests" or "reserving all rights", but that is not a uniform rule of law that applies in all jurisdictions, and I do not have the time and familiarity with that state's law to research Massachusetts case law on that point accurately.	In short, because the government is not required to honor your characterization of the transaction. A gift is something given without receiving anything in exchange. In almost all taxable contexts this is not a plausible argument. A judge would almost surely rule for the government that your money transfer was rent and not a gift, for example. And, if you didn't report the income that was found to be rent and not a gift, on an income tax form, you would be assessed serious penalties and might even be charged with criminal tax evasion, since the sincerity of your gift would be in doubt. Also, while in the bare example of an informal roommate arrangement, proof of the existence of a lease in the event of a dispute between the parties might not be necessary, usually contractual documents are in place to protect the rights of both parties to a transaction and those would be inconsistent with a gift characterization. For example, if you sell lumber on credit and it was treated as a gift, you couldn't sue someone who failed to pay for their lumber, and if you sold lumber for cash, it would be a clear quid-pro-quo.	Yes, this is a valid concern As written, every piece of IP you produce while employed belongs to the employer. This includes your hypothetical game. It also includes your weekly shopping lists, your Christmas card to your Great-Aunt Nellie, the … a-hm … private video you make of you and your significant other. As written this is overly broad and probably unenforceable. However, it’s always better to have clear and legally enforceable clauses in your agreements because unclear, arguably unenforceable ones lead to disputes. To be fair, the employer has probably lifted some (bad) boilerplate and hasn’t actually thought through what it means. Get it redrafted.	The retailer You can try making a subject access request under Articles 15(1) and 15(3) of the UK GDPR. Provide as much information as you can (your name, date of purchase, store you purchased it from, copy of the receipt, etc.) and ask for the serial number. If they still have it, and it is stored in a way which is linked to you in an identifiable way, then they are obliged to provide it without undue delay (and in any event within 30 days). You may want to provide a copy of your passport in the request to pre-empt them coming back with an ID check request under Article 12(6), which then allows them to delay processing the request until you have replied. As stated above, if they no longer have the data or you are not identifiable from the data then they do not have to provide it. If they do have to provide it but refuse then you can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office or ask the County Court for a compliance order under section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The insurer Regulation 3(1) of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 prohibits "unfair commercial practices". Regulation 3(4) provides that a commerical practice is unfair if, inter alia, it is listed in Schedule 1. Paragraph 27 of Schedule 1 contains the following item: Requiring a consumer who wishes to claim on an insurance policy to produce documents which could not reasonably be considered relevant as to whether the claim was valid, or failing systematically to respond to pertinent correspondence, in order to dissuade a consumer from exercising his contractual rights. As you've provided proof that you purchased the item, you can try to argue that having the serial number of the lost item can not "reasonably be considered relevant". Yes, the contract says that you must provide it, but consumer rights legislation overrides contractual provisions. You may also want to consider dealing with the insurer by email/post instead of by phone, (a) to avoid continuing to waste time on hold, and (b) because if they systematically fail to respond then this may also cause them to be in breach of the above provision, (c) to acquire evidence which you can use later. Escalating If you get no results from the insurer, make a formal complaint to them through their complaints process. Under the FCA Handbook rule DISP 1.3.1R, the insurer is required to provide a complaints procedure. Under rule DISP 1.6.2R they are required to provide a final response to a complaint within 8 weeks. If you are not happy with the response, you can escalate the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service which has the power to make financial awards pursuant to section 229 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("FSMA"). Doing so is free of charge and is therefore a good alternative to going to court. The ombudsman can also make awards that are not strictly based on law (i.e. they can go further than the courts can) because of section 228 of FSMA which provides that: "A complaint is to be determined by reference to what is, in the opinion of the ombudsman, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case." You must generally escalate a complaint to the Ombudsman within 6 months of receiving your final response from the insurer (rule DISP 2.8.2R).	There are two "cancellations" here. There is a contract between the customer and the company. This contract was ended. Also, as part of GDPR obligations, the data of the former customer was removed. Now the "credit" part suggests a pre-paid phone, which are often described as "no contract". Legally this is incorrect. There is a contractual obligation for the phone company to deliver phone services (typically expressed in minutes of call time, # of text messages and/or MB of data). Now the pre-paid contract with high likelihood had a clause which dealt with inactive accounts. For instance, the minutes of call time may expire after 5 years. A "credit" that has not been converted to minutes, messages, or megabytes may also expire. When this happened, the company might need to keep the customer data on their records for two more years (for legal reasons), so the 7 year period does not sound weird at all. As soon as the legal reason to retain the data has ended, the GDPR indeed states that the data should be removed. That act is not connected to the credit expiring years before.	This has very little legal effect. It means that someone forgot to update their annual registration and pay the fee and could be resolved in half an hour with a small late fee payment. It is a sign of slight sloppiness, but is only sometimes evidence of something more serious. For example, if a company moves to a new location without remembering to inform the Secretary of State, it might not get the annual report notice and thus fail to file. And, a company rarely has an occasion to double check that it is in good standing. Usually, the only legal consequence is that the company can't commence a lawsuit without bringing itself into good standing and that another company can steal its business name (if it can do so without violating a common law trademark arising from use of the name). It does not significantly change the rights of parties dealing with the company in terms of property ownership, contract rights, etc. This said, closer scrutiny than a company without that issue might be in order and the fact that you are checking at all means that there might have been other reasons apart from this fact to be concerned.
What does "Preferably", "Optionally" and "Advantageously" mean when used in patents? I am currently reading through a standard Australian patent and in the "Summary" section, I have seen the use of "Preferably", "Advantageously" and "Optionally" used numerous times when beginning almost every paragraph. Preferably, the web server is controlled by the computer program code to send, via the interface, the property identification data to a property verification server, receive, via the interface, verification of the property identification data. Advantageously, the application server is adapted to automate the identity verification process of the bidder, the vendor and property so as to substantially reduce manual intervention in the verification process. ... Preferably, if acceptance data is not received during the extended auction period, via the interface, representing acceptance of the bid amount by a vendor, then the web server is controlled by the computer program code to close the auction. Preferably, the configuration data comprises reserve price data representing a reserve price for the property and wherein if the bid amount is greater than the reserve price, then the web server is controlled by the computer program code to record the property as having been sold. How do these adverbs differ when used in a patent and when should they be used? To a naive person reading those terms loosely (like myself), they all seem to mean "optionally".	The United States Patent and Trademark Office has a relevant document. As mentioned in the referenced document, the inventor must set forth the best variant of the invention, which would explain using the words "preferably" and "advantageously". But the inventor doesn't want to let someone evade the patent by building a version that isn't the best, but is still better than what was known before the patent was published. So some features are described as "optional", meaning both the invention with the optional feature, and the invention without the optional feature, are covered by the patent.	There are basically two kinds of things one could do. One could assign or transfer intellectual property rights and contracts related to the app to the entity, or one could license the intellectual property rights to the entity. Generally speaking, in a related party transaction, everything should be in a signed writing, and a notice of the transfer of an intellectual property right that has been registered or filed with a government agency should be provided to the government agency in question. Since there are potentially copyright, patent, trademark, publicity, and contractual rights that might be associated with the app, each aspect which exists should be transferred or licensed, as the case may be. While the forms to do this aren't particular long, the concepts involved and correct terminology are subtle, so this would not be a wise undertaking to attempt on a do it yourself basis.	It seems clear that this is personal information under the GDPR. If you are subject to the GDPR, you need to have a "lawful basis" to store or process such information. (You are subject to the GDPR if you are locates in the EU, or if your users are. My understanding is that it is location at the time the app is accessed that matters, not a user's citizenship. I am not totally sure about that, however. Unless your app is limited to non-EU access, it it probably safest to comply with the GDPR) The degree of precision of your location data will not matter -- a specific city is quite enough to make it personal data if it can be tied to a specific person. There are various lawful bases that may be relied on for processing and storage, but explicit consent is probably the one with the widest applicability. To use consent as the lawful basis, you must present an OPT-IN decision to the user, and record the results. If the user does nothing, the result must record lack of consent. You may not use a pre-checked consent box or another mechanism that has the effect of an opt-out choice. You should be clear about what information will be stored, and how it will or might be used. You will also need to consider how your app will function for those who do not consent, and how to handle requests to withdraw consent. So if an app obtains user consent to store location data in a manner that complies with the GDPR, it may store user location data. The consent should make the possible uses of the data clear. If the data is to be shared, the consent should make the possible extent of sharing clear. Some previous questions and answers here on law.se dealing with GDPR consent that seem possibly relevant: User consent required under GDPR What provisions should I make regarding GDPR consent when users do not sign themselves up? GDPR - Withdrawn user consent Opt Out Consent under GDPR	Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A.	To use an API over a network connection (as opposed to, e.g., the Windows API), a user communicates a request to the API host, or server, and awaits a response. The host of the remote API can refuse to serve requests from users for probably any reason. Such services often require users to accept a license as a condition of using the service, and they may charge a fee as a condition of the license. A license to use a service is obviously not necessarily bound to a license for the use of its source code, just as the ability to reach the service is not dependent on the ability to see (let alone use) the code in any format, whether it be the source code or some compiled form of the code. In essence, source licenses and service licenses have different primary goals, at least inasmuch as the source license seeks to restrict someone who has actual physical access to compiled code, and possibly source code. Service licenses do not have that concern, though I have seen service licenses that also prohibit decompiling. This is probably the result of a CYA attitude among lawyers: the language is already in the standard software license text, and it doesn't hurt anything to leave it in, and it could help if a service user somehow managed to download the program code.	The question says that the OP "asked" company A for confidentially. It does not say that the agreed to it. If they did not, the asker has no case, and they could publicly admit having used his idea and s/he still would have no case. If Company A agreed to confidentiality, and did so in writing (or if the agreement can be otherwise proved) then there might be a case. Proving communication of the idea to Company B would indeed be a hard part of bringing the case. Company B could also defend by showing independent invention of the concept. History has many examples of the same idea being independently arrived at by multiple people at about the same time. Ideas are more common, and therefore of less value standing alone, than many inventors think. To seriously pursue such a case, it would be a very good idea to consult a lawyer experienced in IP law in your jurisdiction. NDAs (and this agreement, if it existed, would be a form of NDA, even if it wasn't called that) are often governed by state law, but trade secret law is partly Federal (see 18 U.S.C. § 1832). A lawyer could advise more specifically and accurately on the chances of success, the probable costs, and the possible amount of recovery, based on the specific facts. But as described, the case is far from a sure thing. More specifically, most US states have enacted some version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The USTA sec 1.2 prohibits using or sharing a trade secret gained through "improper means". Section 1.1 defines this: "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means. Promising to observe confidentiality and then breaking that promise would seem to fit. Section 1.4 defines a "trade secret" as: "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy The idea described in the question might fit this definition. The UTSA provides successful plaintiffs with several possible forms of relief, including injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees. The details will be decided by the court in each case.	TL;DR: You have to do something to accept a document; a signature is often used because it is simple and permanent; signature alone is often not enough (e.g. wills); claiming a false signature annuls the contract for both parties and you cannot keep the accrued benefits. Signing something means you accept it and it becomes legally binding. Many things can become binding without signature (including your usage of this website) and signatures alone are not considered trustworthy in many circumstances. Important documents (e.g. wills, marriages, real estate transactions) in many jurisdictions require a public official (notaries, marriage commissioners etc.) or a trustworthy person (lawyers, doctors, professional engineers, etc.), who will often require rigourous identification documents, and/or witnesses to be involved for the documents to be legally effective. Some high-value commercial transactions will also involve witnesses for signature, or require witnesses for executions of certain articles. Otherwise I can always claim that I didn't really sign that document when it becomes convenient for me. You can and people do. Then the parties go to court or other dispute resolution mechanism, and the judge will consider all relevant evidences to decide (often on a balance of probabilities, i.e. more likely than not) if you consented to a document. Particularly, "when it becomes convenient for me" is often after some elements of the contract having been executed, which is evidence in favour of the existence of the contract and nonexistence of a contract removes obligations and rights for both supposed parties, as such the executed part could be undone. If for a sales contract the other party has sent you a computer, you cannot claim that you did not sign that contract and keep the computer they sent. Without the contract, the computer is not rightfully yours. Also, claiming false statements for benefit or under oath is fraud/perjury and can be criminally prosecuted. So, why are they used everywhere? You have to do something to affirm your consent to a document. It is symbolic but symbolic does not mean meaningless and a symbol of your consent is often desirable. A signature is simple and: affirmative of your intention, unlike a simple visual inspection of document (perhaps eventually someone will argue your eye movement can be used, e.g. for VR) permanent, unlike oral declarations (which can still be legally valid, even if hard to prove)1 which is enough for most purposes. As a bonus, it is also somewhat unique and can be compared to certain extent. For purposes demanding higher level of confidence, ID documents can be demanded and more complex procedures (e.g. with notaries and witnesses) can be undertaken. Of course, you could make an audio recording for oral declarations, but audio recorders were not commonly available and it would be too complicated if the entire contract is not read aloud in that recording.	These kinds of cookie banners are typically noncompliant and useless since they are not clear and provide too little information to users. Careful: blocking a user who declines consent is usually a GDPR violation! Instead, only those aspects of the site that rely on this consent should be disabled. When cookie consent is needed Per the EU ePrivacy directive (PECR in the UK), information society services (websites, apps, …) are only allowed to store or access information on the end user's device if one of the following holds: the access or storage is strictly necessary for performing a service that was explicitly requested by the user; or the user has given consent Note: there is no “legitimate interest” exception for cookies. When is access/storage strictly necessary? For example, it is strictly necessary for a photography app to store photos on a device. It is strictly necessary for a website to store session cookies so that you can log in to the site. It is strictly necessary for an ecommerce site to store the contents of your shopping cart. It is strictly necessary to remember cookie consent status. And so on. It is not strictly necessary from the perspective of the user to have analytics cookies, ad personalization cookies, or cookies for features that the user doesn't actually use. Many websites that just provide the service the user expects will therefore not have to ask for cookie consent, even if they use cookies. It is worth noting that the ePrivacy definition is entirely technology-neutral. It doesn't relate specifically to cookies, but to any kinds of storage, including LocalStorage. Regulatory guidance considers any access or storage of information on the device to be in scope, even JavaScript APIs in a browser (for example to read the screen dimensions), and considers techniques like fingerprinting to be functionally equivalent and therefore subject to the same rules. It is also worth noting that these rules apply regardless of whether the information being accessed/stored qualifies as “personal data”. What consent is Consent is defined in Art 4(11) and Art 7 GDPR, and further explained in EDPB guidelines 05/2020. A defining feature of consent is that it must be freely given. The user must not suffer “detriment” for revoking or declining consent. And per Art 7(4): When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. This disallows making access to a service conditional on unrelated consent. For example, it would not be permissible for a website to exclude users who decline consent for advertising cookies. But: The EDPB guidelines discuss that there can be “permissible incentive” for consent. For example, courts and some DPAs seem to be of the opinion that a subscription website can offer free access to users that consented to personalized ads: consent-or-pay-walls can be compliant, whereas consent-walls alone would not. Sometimes consent is really needed for a processing activity, in which case it is OK to block that service until consent is given. For example, websites should not load third party content like YouTube videos or embedded maps until consent is given to share personal data with the third party. The rest of the website should still work, though. If consent was not freely given, if the user didn't have an actual choice, then the consent is invalid. What should the data controller in your scenario do? The data controller should reassess the role of the cookies for which they are trying to ask for consent. If these cookies are strictly necessary from the user's perspective, then it is proper to inform the user about them – but this should not be confused with consent. It is my personal opinion that purely informational cookie banners are confusing/misleading and should be avoided, but this could also be argued differently. If these cookies are not strictly necessary, then the phrasing “We need to use cookies to provide you with our service” is quite misleading. It should be made clearer to the user that they can opt-in to additional services/improvements if they want to. The user should be able to configure this on a per-purpose basis. Thus, more compliant cookie consent flows will typically give the user three options: continue with only strictly necessary cookies/purposes (must be default behaviour if none is selected) consent to all purposes configure purposes For example, I'm fairly happy with the current Reddit cookie notice: Why this is a good notice: it explains the data controllers (Reddit and partners) it summarizes the purposes for which consent is sought it links to more detailed information the presented options “accept all” an “reject non-essential” are less ambiguous that “accept/decline” Comparing this with the list of minimum required information for informed consent in section 3.3.1 of the EDPB guidelines linked above, the following information is missing though: the identity of the “partners” what (type of) data will be collected and used the existence of the right to withdraw consent
do we have to register our trademark to be valid.... can we take a legal action if someone is using similar trademark but our is not registered? My question is about do we have to register our trademark to be valid. 1. can we take a legal action if someone is using similar trademark but our is not registered?	In the US, trademarks do not need to be registered. The owner of the mark can sue in state court for infringement of the trademark without ever registering. However, there is increased protection and specific benefits to registration. The US Patent and Trademark office (USPTP) PDF publication Basic facts About Trademarks says (on pages 10-11): In the United States, parties are not required to register their marks to obtain protectable rights. You can establish “common law” rights in a mark based solely on use of the mark in Principal Register provides a number of significant advantages over common law rights alone, including: • A legal presumption of your ownership of the mark and your exclusive right to use the mark nationwide on or in connection with the goods/services listed in the registration (whereas a state registration only provides rights within the borders of that one state, and common law rights exist only for the specific area where the mark is used); • Public notice of your claim of ownership of the mark; • Listing in the USPTO’s online databases; • The ability to record the U.S. registration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to prevent importation of infringing foreign goods; • The right to use the federal registration symbol “®”; • The ability to bring an action concerning the mark in federal court; and *The use of the U.S. registration as a basis to obtain registration in foreign countries. The USPTO is supported in part by fees from trademark applications, and obviously wants to promote registration. Registration involves fees, and time and expense in preparing the application. It often involves the services of a trademark lawyer. Many businesses find nit worthwhile. Whether it is a good idea for a particular business is an individual, fact-based, business decision, and I cannot advise on it.	In US law, a trademark application only requires that you are now selling, or intend to sell in the reasonably near future, a product (or service) using the specified name. You don't have to provide an example, or a design, and it does not have to be patented. The applicant might be planning to license someone else's patent, or to market off-the-shelf tech not protected by patent. The applicant might be planning to market tech still under development and not yet ready to be submitted for a patent. I do not know Chinese trademark law, but I suspect it is similar in this regard. I have not heard of any country that requires a patent, a design, or an example of a working product along with a trademark registration. However, there is, in many countries, a requirement that actual sales occur within a limited period after the trademark is granted, and if this does not happen, the trademark registration may be canceled. The time allowed varies.	The register of trademarks can indeed be searched before an application is filed, and any prudent applicant will make, or pay an expert to make, such a search. Note that each country has its own trademark register (although some EU countries are working on a shared EU register, I understand). Marks registered in one country will not be protected under the laws of another, unless they separately qualify for protection under the laws of the second country. Note that in the US, marks that have never been registered but are in active use receive some trade mark protection, although not as much as those that have been registered. Searching for unregistered marks in current use is significantly harder than searching for registered marks. Application may be refused for conflict with an active, unregistered mark. Also in the US, registered marks may have their registrations canceled if they are not in use for a significant time, I believe at least 5 years. Many advise hiring a firm that specializes in trademark applications to do the entire application, including searches. This involves significant added cost. US trademark searches may be done via the Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) Some information about doing such searches is provided at Search trademark database (an official USPTO page). That page states: Private trademark attorneys If you are an applicant, registrant, or party to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board proceedings domiciled in the United States or its territories, you are not required to have a U.S.-licensed attorney represent you at the USPTO. However, deciding what to search for and interpreting your results can be complicated. There are many factors to consider in determining likelihood of confusion. We can’t advise you on how to do a clearance search for your mark, do one for you, or interpret your search results. Therefore, we strongly encourage you to hire a U.S.-licensed attorney who specializes in trademark law to guide you throughout the application process. If you are a foreign-domiciled applicant, registrant, or party to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board proceedings, you must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is licensed to practice law in the United States. See the why hire a private trademark attorney webpage to learn more about what an attorney can do for you and how to find one. For more information about conducting a clearance search, please watch the news broadcast-style video titled “Searching” (video #3 in the Trademark Information Network (TMIN) series). I am sure that similar searches of the register in other countries are available.	I take it that you intend using the logos of the various companies to show that you do business with them? That would be "nominative use" and would be legal even without permission, but it would be better practice to ask for permission. You would need to make it clear that these companies do not endorse or recommend you (unless they do and say so in writing). If you get permission, ask about any color variations they are OK with. Would it be possible to put a black or dark color undercard below any logos that are white on transparent? this would make them visible and be a minimal change to the standard form of the logo. Again, the key thing is to make it clear that you are not claiming to be any of those companies, nor to be endorsed by them. And yes, a short consultation with a lawyer knowledgeable in trademark law would be a very good idea, and might not be very expensive.	Generally speaking, trademark law does not allow to reserve a trademark for future use for an extended period of time (like five years), without using it. A trademark arises from use in commerce or imminent intended future use in commerce.	Hypothetically speaking, if a program doesn't come with a EULA, does that mean someone in possession of it (who isn't the owner) would be breaking the law if they used it? If the copy on the stick was lawfully made with permission of the copyright holder, then you can lawfully use the software. Someone who lawfully comes into possession of a lawfully made copy of the software (that was not a backup) has the right to use that software in the ordinary way. For example if someone found a USB stick lying on the ground and it had software on it but no EULA, could they use the software? Maybe, but it would be hard for them to know whether they could or not. It might be a backup. It might be an unlawful copy. There was a case where a person found a CD in the trash that was clearly an original. The package had a shrink wrap agreement, but he found the CD without the package. The court held that he had every right to use the software on the CD (since it was a lawfully-made copy and not a backup) and was not bound by the EULA (since he hadn't opened the package). But he was very fortunate in being able to demonstrate these facts.	Attribution is not a legal requirement If company A owns IP (copyright and trademarks in this case), they can licence it to company N on whatever terms are mutually acceptable. They may require company N to attribute their IP or they may not.	The relevant law is trademark law. The basic question is whether the mark is identical or creates an unreasonable risk of confusion with the protected mark. There is no per se 30%-40% rule. I can imagine cases where changing a single letter in a long phrase turns a trademark violation into a parody or clearly different mark (see the Electric Company TV show). I can also imagine cases where changing a large part of the mark could still be infringing and confusingly similar. A parody is protected on fair use grounds in copyright law (which could conceivably come into play since this is a derivative work but would be protected since it is a parody), but in trademark law the issue is that a parody is unlikely to be confused for the original. Of course, at a fine grained level when one is looking at particular cases rather than general ideas, you would have to know which country's laws were involved, for example, where the goods would be sold.
Can copying simple general code cause copyright infringement? And is it even possible to avoid that? Imagine that during writing software for the employer, I created simple helper function IsPositiveNumber(x) which returns true if x > 0 and false otherwise. Or function TrimBlanks(text) which returns text without leading and trailing spaces and tabs. Let's say that those functions are very simple inside and can be re-created by an average developer in a few minutes. Now, if I will create an open-source software or change the employer, how serious ownership violation would I commit when I will simply copy those two functions into new code? Maybe shall I open-source such functions and then ask for permission to include that open-source library? And even if I will write them anew, it is very likely that they will be 90% identical with original ones (including their names), because there are not many ways (in my mind) how to create their body or how to name them. So does it matter if I copy those functions over or if I write them anew? Even if I write them anew, how can I prove that I did not copy them? Or is this a thing on which no sane person will build an IP lawsuit?	As you've presented them, I doubt the functions are protected by copyright in the first place. Originality is one of the threshold requirements for copyright protection, and it demands that the work in question be independently created by the author, and that it possess some minimal degree of creativity. If you're talking about programming at a level so basic that the function truly must be created in a particular way, there is no originality in simply following the instructions. And even if there's some wiggle room, but the language you used has likely been independently replicated by many programmers, that's still not original enough to be copyrightable. What you want to watch out for, though, is the possibility that they've been combined into an original arrangement that is protected. I don't know enough about how copyright law is applied to code to say where or how that line is drawn, but my instinct would be that it could be a fairly low threshold.	I don't see how. Remember that a license is a contract where the author gives permission to copy (modify, redistribute, remix, etc) a copyrighted work, provided that the licensee fulfills the stated conditions. If the license is not in effect, then we revert to the default situation under copyright law, which is that the potential licensee has no rights to copy the work. (Not counting particular instances of copying which are permitted under fair use and similar exceptions - I presume that's not what you have in mind, or the whole question is moot.) In this case, the conditions include that the licensee must credit the author under their chosen pseudonym. The licensee can't get out of that obligation simply because they find it distasteful or objectionable for whatever reason. If they don't want to do it, then they should not accept the license in the first place, and so refrain from copying the work. (Of course, if the author is offering the CC license in hopes of encouraging reuse of the work, then this may not be a desirable outcome for the author, so they might want to think twice about their choice of pseudonym.) Even if the author's pseudonym were something that would actually be illegal to quote (say, because it is obscene), I don't think it lets the licensee off the hook. A contract with illegal terms is void, so legally it is as if there is no license at all, and we revert to the default in which there is no right to copy. A question was raised in comments about the word "reasonable". I don't know of case law where this has been tested, so I can only speculate: The context suggests that "reasonable" is intended to refer to the means of attribution (for instance, where the attribution should appear in a piece of source code or documentation), not to the pseudonym. There's a legal principle that the specific governs over the general, and the requirement to credit the author by a particular pseudonym is clearly more specific than the general requirement of "reasonableness". It seems clear that the author, who is the one offering these terms, didn't intend for the general term "reasonable" to render meaningless their request for the use of a specific pseudonym; if they had, why would they have bothered to put it in? On the flip side, there's the principle of contra proferentem, that ambiguities in a contract should be resolved in the favor of the party that didn't draft it - here, the licensee. But it's hard to argue that this is really ambiguous; it seems quite clear what the author wants. Of course, the author can circumvent the whole issue, if they're worried, by licensing the work instead under a modified version of the CC license in which the word "reasonable" is removed. After all, there is nothing particular magical about CC's language: the contract is whatever the author and the licensee agree to, and they're just using the pre-written CC license as a convenience to streamline their negotiations.	The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage.	No, it does not fall under fair use: It is commercial use in nature It is a copyrighted work It is hard to say what portion of the copyrighted work you'd be using based on your description, so test three is inconclusive It could be argued in your favor that the infringement would not have an impact on their potential market, but it could potentially impact the value If discovered the owner of the copyright could pursue action against the company you work for.	how would this differ between say ArXiv which is open access, and a publication that is pay-only, like Elsevier or Nature? It wouldn't. But if the equation is the creation of the author of some publication, as in the author is expressing some unique mathematical expression, obviously the publication should be referenced. But is referencing enough? Are there additional rights one must obtain from the publication and/or author in order to show this content? Laws of nature, including purported laws of nature, are not protected by copyright. So, usually, key equations in an academic paper aren't protected by copyright law. Referencing the work is important as a matter of academic ethics, but is legally irrelevant. Copying of exposition by the author beyond laws of nature is permitted as fair use if it is limited to quotations necessary for academic discussion and criticism, but copying of an entire work would not be permissible fair use in most cases and would constitute copyright infringement. Of course, there is a large gray area between those extremes.	First of all being the "founder" of a startup in no way implies that one wrote all the code of the startup's primary or signature app. The founder could have hires coders, or had partners, or used open source code. But let's make some assumptions. Suppose Alice has created a startup, and wrote the code for an application. Suppose Bob invested in the startup, and got 30% of the stock, What rights does Bob have to the copyright on the code? It depends entirely on what agreements Alice has made. Alice might have sold or assigned the copyright to her startup firm, call that F1, If so, F1 owns the copyright, and Alice can't reuse it without F1's permission. If Alice has retained the other 70% of F1, she controls it and can have it grant her whatever permissions she likes. But if she has sold or assigned a majority shore to investors, she will need to persuade the management of F1, or a majority of the shareholders, to grant her permission. Alice might have merely licensed the code to F1. In this case she retains the copyright. If the license was not exclusive, she can use the code as she pleases, but so can F1, in accord with the license. In neither case does Bob directly own the copyright, or a share in it, unless a separate agreement granted or sold that to him. But he has a right to a share of the profits, if any that F1 makes, and a right to vote on decisions that 1 makes, long with other owners of F1 If Alice never formally transferred or licensed the software to F1, she still owns the copyright and can do as she pleases, even if shew sold most or al of F1 Note that to transfer a copyright there must (under US law) be a written and signed document, one signed by the owner or the owner's agent. It must specifically indicate what copyright(S) it transfers. A purchase of an interest in a business does not suffice without such a document.	This answer is limited to United States law. The situation in other countries is definitely different. Under United States law, the owner of a lawfully made copy of a copyrighted work has, as a right of the physical possession of that work, the right to the work's ordinary use. Licenses grant you additional rights such as the right to make derivative works, the right to make copies beyond what's needed for ordinary use, and so on. A pure license doesn't ask for anything in return, it just gives you new rights. Those rights may be conditional, but the conditions are just things you have to do to get new rights. They're not conditions imposed on any existing rights you had. A contract is an agreement between two parties. Both parties must agree to a contract for the contract to be enforceable. Contracts can take away rights you otherwise have. You don't need a license or contract to use a copyrighted work if you lawfully possess a copy of that work. Say you download a copy of a work covered by the GPL. You can refuse to accept the GPL license and you can still use that work. Why? Because no law prohibits you from doing so and there is no civil cause of action for using a lawful copy of a work under US law. But now say you want to give a copy of that work to your friend. This is illegal under US law because 17 USC 106 restrict that right to the copyright holder and there's no applicable exception since that's not part of the ordinary use. For a work covered by the GPL, the license offers to give you that right, a right you wouldn't otherwise have. It imposes conditions on you that are specifically in exchange for the grant of the new right. If you do accept the GPL, it functions as a contract. You got in exchange a right you didn't have before and if you don't comply with the GPL's terms, you don't have the copyright holder's permission to exercise those rights which is required under the law. By contrast, a click-through or EULA takes effect when you agree to it and such agreement is a condition for using the software. That's a pure contract and usually doesn't give you any rights you wouldn't have in the absence of such an agreement other than the use of the software.	It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations.
Private companies asking for Social Security Number? I thought that the privacy act (HIPAA) forbade use of the Social Security Number, or even asking for it, except by banks and federal agencies. Nevertheless, I frequently get asked for my Social Security Number by private companies. For example, I just asked a company to rent me a propane tank and they sent me a form asking for my Social Security Number. Is that a violation of Federal law?	HIPAA only governs the disclosure of electronic medical records. It has nothing to do with Social Security numbers, except to the extent that they appear in your electronic medical records. Generally speaking, there is no law against asking someone for their Social Security number. It is a request for information, protected by the First Amendment. Reciprocally, there is generally no law requiring you to disclose your Social Security number. Your choice not to speak is similarly protected by the First Amendment. A business can ask for your Social Security number, and you can want to keep it private. In that case, one of you can compromise to make a deal, or you can both walk away having lost nothing. There are, however, certain types of transactions for which a Social Security number is required under 31 CFR 1020.220. This includes setting up a bank account and transactions that have to be reported to the IRS. If you want to engage in one of these transactions without providing your Social Security number, you're out of luck.	Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it.	The First Amendment forbids the government from abridging your freedom of speech. There is no (federal) law against your private employer doing so. A good summary is https://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_andsociety/15/winter-2015/chill-around-the-water-cooler.html	Health care providers in the US may send protected patient records to other health care providers for the purposes of treatment, either of the patient whose information it was or of a different patient (for instance, a doctor could send a chart of a different patient with a similar issue). This can be done without patient authorization, except for two cases: if the patient has requested more restrictions on use of their information and the provider agreed to those restrictions, and with psychotherapy notes. Source: HHS. WhatsApp specifically does not appear to be compliant with HIPAA, which is the US medical privacy law. However, there are many similar systems that are compliant. The body of your question asks about taking a smartphone screenshot; with many secure messaging systems, this is perfectly acceptable, and the principle of a doctor consulting with another doctor about a patient is actually encouraged. HIPAA violations do not by themselves result in any action against a medical license, nor can anyone besides the US government file suit based on a violation (everyone else is limited to complaining to the US government). Private lawsuits and (especially) license consequences are determined by state law, and are state- and situation-dependent. A doctor who calls a press conference to announce that this patient of his has HIV is more likely to face sanctions than a doctor whose violation was just not using a secure enough messaging client. HIPAA violations like this are not that uncommon, and generally result in at most a fine against the practice.	It's from a company called MarkMonitor that does trademark protection for clients - specifically around internet activities and that includes domain cybersquatting - which is illegal in the US under the ACPA, and of course that's what you were/are doing. So it could be a legitimate request as these things go. But that's not the whole story - the domain in the e-mail you posted is "walmartt.com" which is not only currently owned by Walmart Inc. but always has been, in fact the current Registrar of record is the aforementioned MarkMonitor. So either this isn't a legitimate request because you don't own "walmartt.com" and therefore this is spam or phishing (in which case feel free to delete it and move on with your life), granted that would be a pretty impressive bit of phishing since you are currently cybersquatting some Walmart-typo domains. Or you're just telling porkies all the way through your question for reasons of your own.	The employer may provide salary information, including a W-2, about an employee to an accountant, whether that accountant is also an employee of the employer, or an independent contractor hired by the employer. Normally a contract (or a company policy) will impose a duty of confidentiality on the accountant. If no such duty is explicitly imposed, there is quite likely an implied duty of confidentiality.	HIPAA does not legally protect physicians from disclosing PHI to another party, although there are a few exceptions: HHS provides an excellent resource on these, but the regulation most relevant to your question is Permitted Uses and Disclosures (5) Public Interest and Benefit Activities, which includes "Required by Law. Covered entities may use and disclose protected health information without individual authorization as required by law (including by statute, regulation, or court orders)." These statues, regulations, and court orders vary from state, but almost all of them refer to STDs and not genetic conditions (in some states, physicians are required to disclose positive STD test results to known sexual partners, but I can't find similar legislation for genetic tests). Here's an example of a voluntary patient information disclosure form – you'll notice that an individual has to specify the parties to whom they're willing to have PHI disclosed. The example you provided is still a violation of the Privacy Rule in the U.S., but this is a very curious grey area in bioethics and law. Disclosure of Genetic Information Within Families: How nurses can facilitate family communication. Gallo et al. Am J Nurs. 2009 Apr; 109(4): 65–69. (Emphasis mine.) HIPAA and Genetic Disclosure Does the law affect families? The privacy rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) went into effect on April 14, 2003. The rule created new requirements for health care providers, third-party payers, and health care clearinghouses to protect the privacy and security of health information, including genetic information, that could identify a person. A person's decision not to disclose her or his risk of developing a genetic condition to a family member may pose a dilemma for the health care professional, who has to choose between ethical obligations to inform the at-risk party and legal requirements to respect and protect the patient's privacy. The potential for harm to family members often plays a large role in the decision. For example, in rare cases, the use of a certain surgical anesthesia can cause death in people with the mutation that disposes them to malignant hyperthermia. Likewise, strenuous exercise can bring on sudden death in people with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. In such cases, clinicians should carefully explain the reasons for sharing information with family members, strongly encourage patients to notify at-risk relatives, and offer to help develop a plan for notifying them. When patients choose not to notify family members, clinicians typically respect the decision. There are situations, however, in which the clinician may consider overriding the patient's preferences because the family member is judged to be in danger of serious or immediate harm or there is a high likelihood that a dangerous condition will occur that can be either prevented or adequately treated with early recognition. Clinicians who believe it is necessary to override a patient's wish regarding the notification of family members, should consider consulting an ethics committee or legal council. In most situations, though, the risk of serious harm associated with nondisclosure is not clearly immediate. For instance, if a woman has tested positive for the BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation but doesn't want to upset her two sisters by sharing that information with them, the need for disclosure isn't clearly urgent. Each sister has a one in two chance of carrying the same mutation. It would be understandable for the patient to try to learn more about what the mutation means for her and her children and to give careful thought to whether and how she'll share her test results with her sisters. Clinicians can best help family members by clearly informing patients who test positive for genetic conditions or the mutations that cause them about the risks faced by their family members, discussing the value of disclosure and offering assistance with it. The "Duty to Warn" a Patient's Family Members About Hereditary Disease Risks. Offit et al. JAMA. 2004;292(12): 1469–1473. (I can send you the full-text of this if you want it; it contains an excellent overview of cases and their outcomes relating to disclosing genetic information in the U.S. under HIPAA.) In general, the special nature of genetic tests has been viewed as a barrier to physicians' breaching the confidentiality of personal genetic information. However, the failure to warn family members about hereditary disease risks has already resulted in 3 lawsuits against physicians in the United States. While the findings of case law and the state and federal statutes that bear on the issue of "duty to warn" of inherited health risk are still being defined, we believe that health care professionals have a responsibility to encourage but not to coerce the sharing of genetic information in families, while respecting the boundaries imposed by the law and by the ethical practice of medicine. ...in considering whether to breach patient confidentiality to warn of risks of a genetic disease, clinicians need to balance the actual risk of that disease, the efficacy of potential preventive interventions, as well as emerging legal considerations and potential liabilities. Overriding patient confidentiality and genetic privacy might very well mean violation of HIPAA and certain state regulations, with attendant civil or criminal liability. At the same time, in one state appellate court decision that has not been overturned, the estate of a physician was held liable for his failure to warn relatives of hereditary disease risk.	I think this shows a misunderstanding of the meaning of the GDPR. A data subject has the right to demand information, correction, deletion etc. about some of their data held by some institutions, depending on the legal basis for the data processing. One John Smith does not have the right to see the data of any other data subject named John Smith, and he cannot even demand to know if there are other John Smiths in the database. The data controller has to make reasonable steps to ensure that an individual who seeks account information is in fact the individual who is the data subject. In the case of an email, that's usually easy -- if John Smith can access the mail account [email protected], one can assume that he is the John Smith who opened the account. If not, then not. If the data controller has the birthplace and birthdate in their records, they can possibly match that against some government-issue identity document, too, but why would they have that data?
Google deleted my developer account without warning or much explanation. What can I do? I haven't received any prior warning in fact from Google and suddenly received the following message: This is a notification that your Google Play Publisher account has been terminated. REASON FOR TERMINATION: Prior violations of the Developer Program Policies and Developer Distribution Agreement by this or associated accounts as outlined in previous emails sent to the registered email address(es) of the Publisher account(s). Google Play Publisher suspensions are associated with developers, and may span multiple account registrations and related Google services. You can visit the Developer Policy Centre to better understand how we enforce Developer Program Policies. If you’ve reviewed the policy and feel this termination may have been in error, please reach out to our policy support team. Do not attempt to register a new developer account. We will not be restoring your account at this time. The Google Play Team This was my only developer account to my knowledge. There is a free mp3 app from a friend who asked me to publish it in my account, which I didn’t check properly. I am assuming that created this termination since it happened only after publishing that app. This sudden termination comes as a shock and Google's decision seem very rude to me Any idea what can I do?	"There is a free mp3 app from a friend who asked me to publish it in my account, which I didnt check properly." You violated Google's policies by uploading an App that you did not have full control over and/or was not developed by you. As well, the App possibly violated Google's policies in terms of violating licensing for code libraries that were included, had code included in the App that was malicious or violated privacy, or was otherwise not compliant with Google's terms. Google's policies are legal contracts which you agree to when you open an account. You reserve the right to end the contract by deleting your account. They reserve the right to end the contract when their policies are not followed. See https://play.google.com/about/developer-content-policy/ "This sudden termination comes as a shock and Google's decision seem very rude to me." You may think it is rude, but Google is fully within its rights to terminate your account because you violated their terms. It matters little that you did not get the previous warning emails from Google; you are responsible for monitoring the account email for policy updates. If you’ve reviewed the policy and feel this termination may have been in error, please reach out to our policy support team. Try that; you might attempt to explain that it was honest error on your side.	You agreed to this On Stackexchange, there are Terms of Service. These tell you to follow the Code of conduct and explicitly allow SO to throw you out if they don't want you to write here. Stack Overflow reserves the right to refuse, suspend or terminate your access to the public Network if it determines, in its sole discretion, that you have in any way violated these Public Network Terms or are otherwise ineligible to access or use the Network or Services. If your actions are determined by us to violate these Public Network Terms, Stack Overflow may, in its sole discretion, try to remediate that violation by working with you individually, but is under no obligation to do so, and if any such remediation efforts are unsuccessful (in Stack Overflow’s sole discretion), then Stack Overflow may revoke your rights to the Network. You agreed to follow the rules, and the code of conduct spells out that if you don't, then you face action.	Basically, statement 3 above is correct. The owner of the copyright in a work may release that work unmder different, even incompatible, licenses, as many times as s/he chooses to do. None of these releases cancels or invalidates any other. A person who obtains a work from a site where it is listed under a particular license, may rely on that license grant. The owner may (if the site allows) modify the license or remove the posted work, but this does not invalidate the license granted to those who obtained the work before any modification or removal. An incorrect or incomplete copyright notice does not, under current law. invalidate the copyright, and to the best of my understanding will not invalidate either of the license mentioen in the question.	First off: Legally, everything is copyrighted anyway. Licensing is not at all necessary. Hence, even if a court would disagree with # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0, that would just make it closed source. Having said that, the law generally doesn't bother with trivialities such as "file headers". Any commonly accepted way to state the copyright and license terms is OK. Your LICENSE is such a common convention. If you want to avoid all doubt what is covered under that license, put a reference to that LICENSE in each header. If you have just five files in one directory that are all licensed the same, I wouldn't even bother with that. Again, the default position is that everything is closed source.	Yes Best is to call them and let them guide you to the right department. https://www.microsoft.com/en-gb/contact.aspx In reality you can give up. They will never ever give you the permission to use the icon, even if you'd pay for it. Why? Because as soon they give the permission to someone others will try to use it too and their legal stand would be more difficult since they softenend the use rights of that icon/intellectual property, opening doors for people who copy without thinking of the legal implications and scammers. EDIT: To add; As far I know you're not allowed to take stuff from wikipedia without noticing them/linking to them. That your app is free also doesn't matters. Maybe you're even showing ads in your app giving it a commercial goal.	The Google terms of service do not prohibit using their translate programs to create something that you sell. TOS for using their API would be irrelevant, since that isn't what you're doing. There is no clear copyright issue: as far as I can tell, there is not yet any case law suggesting that the output of a program can be owned by the copyright-holder of the program. (Copyright must be held by a legal person, i.e. an actual person or a corporation, and a program cannot yet be a legal person). A human-performed translation is subject to copyright protection since what is protected is that which is created by the (translating) author, and a program lacks that creative element. A translation owes its existence to the program-user using a particular tool to create the work, be it a pen or a translation program. What is unclear at present is whether a person using machine translation in a permitted fashion to create a derivative work thereby gains copyright to that derived work.	They certainly can make that a license term and revoke the license if you do not comply. However, revoking the license is all they can do to "forbid". Or they could sue you for damages without revoking the license. That said, you are free to consult how to use their software so long as you do not hold a license so that you are not bound by the terms AND you do not break the law e.g. copyright. How to do it is up to you to figure. Maybe you could simply consult users that do have a license — on their premises and devices.	Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it.
Who owns the code when my employer wants something similar to my existing open source project? I have a similar situation to this question. My employer hired me knowing that I work on some open source projects, but for a long time, showed no interest in my open source projects. Now they want me to work on something similar to one of my projects. Before I started working there, I planned to expand that particular project into a small side business. I might close the open source project as I turn it into a business. My employer does not know of my plans to start a small side business. My side project is not identical to what I would do at work, but it is similar. My open source project has nothing to do with their products, so it would not compete against them. It would simply make some of their internal business and software development activities easier to do. There are 4 tests for what is considered acceptable as a personal project. I don't compete against company interests. I don't work on it during company time, but on my own time. I don't work on it with company resources, but with my own computer. I don't reveal any company secrets. My side project would certainly pass items 3 and 4. #2 is iffy because I can rewrite similar code at home as what I would at work. #1 is iffy because although the project is not even remotely related to the company's product, it does make the company a little more efficient. Yet, I signed an agreement when I started saying I would turn over any intellectual property to the company that is developed during the course of my work. Can I retain ownership of any open source code I write which is similar to what I would do at work?	How can you get in trouble? If they see any code you wrote for them show up in your open source project. They own the code you write on company time. Even if your code goes into an open source project owned by the company, you still don't own that code. The only way you can own it is if they directly tell you that you may put it into your open source project. If you make your open source project private so nobody else can see the source code, but they see your side business has the same features you wrote for them. You can try to get around problem #1 by hiding your open source project. But if they see the same features in it that they told you to write for them, they can become suspicious. They might force you to reveal the source to them in court. If you don't want them to see it, they may force you to share it with a third party who is bound by an NDA. The third party can compare your code to theirs and report if you copied any code. Even if your work is not directly related to the company products, your work for them can be a company secret. You reveal that, and you are in trouble. You say your work improves internal procedures, but is not directly related the company products. If a company can reduce its cost, it can lower its prices and still make more money than their competition. That gives them a competitive edge over other businesses. By revealing how your employer does its internal work, you give that competitive edge to their competition. Although you say your open source project does not violate rule #4 - "does not reveal company secrets" - all three explanations mentioned above say it does. What can you do? Quit and start your own company based on your open source project. If you quit, you should do it before you write any code related to your project for your employer. Ask your company to fund your project. Talk to your boss and anybody else there who might be a stakeholder. Tell them what you can do. Make a deal with them that you get to work on your project during work hours. Maybe they could turn it into an additional source of revenue for the company. That changes you from a potential loss into a valuable asset. Their competitors might end up buying products based on your code. Many companies would love for their competition to pay them. Ask your employer to allow you to turn your work into your open source project. Some companies require employees who work on open source projects to give their employers a royalty-free license to use and modify the work as they wish. Ask your employer if they would use a product based on your project. You can start a side business (with your employer's blessing), and turn them into your first customer. They get access to a beta product before their competitors do. Promise them they get it free or at a hefty discount for a year or two before the competition even knows what you have. The first option is win/lose. You win and your employer loses. The other three options are win/win. Good luck!	At least in theory an end user could be sued for infringing on a patent, especially a method claim. Given the cost of a patent lawsuit, this strikes me as extremely unlikely to happen though, unless the user in question were an extremely large company, or something on that order. Theoretically, the only difference between open-source software and proprietary software would be that availability of the source code makes it easier to prove use of a patent in open-source software. Releasing the software as open-source doesn't confer any immunity from patent law or anything like that though. Realistically, however, the chances of being sued for infringement if you're basically giving away the software in question are fairly remote. It rarely makes sense for a patent holder to spend millions of dollars on a lawsuit where they stand no chance of even recovering their cost (but no, that certainly should not be taken as legal advice that you're free to infringe on patents, or anything similar--in fact, none of this should be taken as legal advice at all). If you can actually prove that a technique was published or publicly known and used (e.g., in a product that was offered for sale) well before the patent was applied for, the patent is probably invalid (and if proven so in court, the case would normally be dismissed with prejudice, which basically means the patent holder wouldn't be able to sue anybody else for infringement of that patent). I'd note, however, that in my experience this is much less common than most people imagine--many look at (for example) the title of a patent, and assume it lacks originality because it refers to some well-known technique, and ignore the claims where it details the precise differences between the previously known technique and what the patent really covers. Just for example, the EFF used to have a web page talking about a (now long-since expired) patent on how to draw a cursor on screen. In an apparent attempt at scaring the unwary, they showed code they claimed infringed in the patent--despite the fact that the patent's "background of the invention" specifically cited the technique they showed as being previously known, and not covered by the patent.	The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage.	Of course you have to follow the license. You seem to have a license that doesn't allow distribution and want to know if giving copies to the Dutch or Chinese branch of your company is distribution. First, you should not make that decision. Your company's lawyers should do that. Second, such distribution is with some licenses perfectly legal if you distribute the software with source code. That's a business decision which you or your manager or his/her manager... can make. Such questions (whether giving a copy to your Dutch branch is distribution) often don't have an answer that is yes or no but maybe - if you went to court, would a judge say that it is distribution? The answer is quite clearly "maybe". So unless you can find a safe way, there is a risk. Again, your lawyers will assess the risk.	When a company is dissolved, someone takes over the company's asserts, often the creditors, or they may be sold for what they will bring. Failing anyone else, it may be the crown. Assuming that the copyright was in fact owned by the company (and not by someone else and merely licensed to the company), someone owns it, (just as someone owns the physical property that the company had) but it may be hard to find out who. It is even possible that the owner is not aware of the copyright. As for Person A, that depends on the details of A's contract or agreement with the company. A may be a co-owner (unlikely). A may have rights to use the code to some extent. Or A may have no more rights than I do (that is, none at all). According to "Ownership of copyright works " an official UK government web page: Where a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or a film, is made by an employee in the course of his employment, his employer is the first owner of any copyright in the work (subject to any agreement to the contrary). The expression “in the course of employment” is not defined by the Act but in settling disputes the courts have typically had to decide whether the employee was working under a ‘contract of service’ (eg as an employee) or a ‘contract for services’ (eg as a freelancer or independent contractor). Where a person works under a ‘contract for services’ he will usually retain copyright in any works he produces, unless there is a contractual agreement to the contrary. Thus if person A was acting as an employee of the company, the copyright would automatically be owned by the company, in the absence of any written agreement between A and the company. The page goes on to state: When you ask or commission another person or organisation to create a copyright work for you, the first legal owner of copyright is the person or organisation that created the work and not you the commissioner, unless you otherwise agree it in writing. However, in some circumstances, for example when copyright is not dealt with in the contract to commission the work, courts may be willing to find that there is an implied licence allowing the commissioner to use the work for the purpose for which it was commissioned. This does not necessarily result in a transfer of ownership. Instead, the commissioner of the work may only get a limited non-exclusive licence. ... Thus if A was acting as an employee in creating or co-creating the code, and there was no written agreement on the matter between A and the company, A would have no rights to the code, and the copyright would pass to whoever purchased or was awarded it after the company dissolved. Such a copyright might well have been included in a purchase of "all other assets" (or some such language) and no explicit or specific mention of it been made. The situation in the US would be basically similar. Work by an employee within he scope of employment is a "work-made-for-hire" (WFH) under US copyright law( See 107 USC 101), and the employer is legally the author (which is not true in UK law), unless there is a written agreement to the contrary. The natural person(s) who in fact created the wok have no rights unless an agreement grants such rights. On dissolution the copyright does not end, nor is it transferred to the creator, but passes to whoever bought it, or bought or was awarded the general assets of the company (such as in a bankruptcy proceeding).	Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.	The code is copyrighted. You are not given any permission to use or copy any part of it, nor to create a derivative work based on it. There is no way for you to "make the copyright null". The code was copyrighted in 2005, and the copyright will not expire until 70 years after the death of the author, under US law. The period would vary in some other countries, but in no country that I know of will it expire in the next few years. That the author is dead, or the publisher out of business, does not change this legally. Someone, probably the author's heir, or perhaps whoever bought the remains of the publisher's business, will own the copyright. However, the ideas and programming techniques shown and discussed in the book are not protected, and you may use them freely to write programs, commercial or non-commercial. You need not even acknowledge the book as a source of ideas, although to do so would be nice. Of course, since the author is dead and the publisher not active, if you were to infringe the copyright by copying code from thsi book, there is a reasonable chance that no one would notice, but if someone did notice, the current owner of the copyright could sue you for infringement, and could perhaps win sizable damages. It would be safer to write your own original code using only the general ideas from the book. In future, do not ever assume that you can just take someone else's code (or other creative work, such as a book) and reuse it without permission, unless it is in the public domain, for example because it was published before 1923.	By "unlicensed" you mean that it doesn't state a license for use (MIT, GPL, etc.)? Those licenses are just a codified bundle of terms of use that cover many many edge cases. You have in place a much simpler agreement that covers the primary situation: you using/modifying the code for your own use. It's just like borrowing a car. You will ask a friend "hey, could I borrow your car for a bit?" "sure!". You know there's a possibility that you'll get in an accident or something weird will happen, but you think the chances of that are minimal and you would be able to work it out. If you ask a car rental company, they'll give you a full contract covering every situation that may happen. Similarly, a large company would be hesitant to borrow a car for corporate use without a legal framework surrounding it. So you will likely be in the clear if you are just using it for a small project with minimal legal/financial implications. If you plan on turning your project into a multi-billion dollar empire, you should revisit your agreement.
Does filing for guardianship require consent? A person turned 18 some time ago and his parents haven't started filing for guardianship until now. I've heard that by law if parents haven't filed for guardianship before the child turns 18, the child is technically his own guardian, although I'm not sure if this is accurate. However, my question is this. If someone's parents file for guardianship and go to court, will the parents need the child's consent to become the child's guardians?	In the United States, the answer is no. The entire point of guardianship is that the ward is not competent to make legal decisions himself; the court appoints the guardian to consent to things on the ward's behalf. So the parents wouldn't need the child's consent, but they would need to demonstrate to the court that the child is incompetent to make legal decisions and that they are the best people to serve as guardians. To the best of my knowledge, granting guardianship over an adult is almost always limited to cases of serious mental incapacity, such as a vegetative state, mental retardation, Alzheimer's, etc. Is someone is aware of guardianship and researching it online, that is probably a good sign that the person is not a candidate for guardianship.	What you have heard is not exactly correct (and also depends, in part, on the Chapter under which the bankruptcy is filed). I will address the simplest case, a Chapter 7 liquidation of an individual, which is simpler, because a Chapter 7 liquidation is determined as of a point of time, while Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 reorganizations are conceptually more complex and don't just transfer rights to a trustee at a single point in time. When you file a Chapter 7, all of your property, including you rights to sue people that had accrued as of that date, are transferred to the bankruptcy trustee as an asset of the bankruptcy estate, and the right of anyone to sue you is stayed automatically until the bankruptcy court either authorizes the lawsuit, or discharges the debt associated with the lawsuit (there are actually a few cases where the automatic stay expires on its own after a certain amount of time). Rights to bring lawsuits that arise after the bankruptcy is filed, or can be brought at any time, like a divorce/custody suit, are not barred, although property and enforcement of economic rights in those cases may be stayed until the bankruptcy court takes action. Custody issues other than child support, and termination of marital status are not affected. For example, if you file for bankruptcy on Monday and are hit by a bus on Friday, your personal injury suit claim is probably yours and not the bankruptcy estate's and can be brought by you. But, if you are hit by a bus on Monday and then file for bankruptcy on Friday, your personal injury suit claim is probably property of the bankruptcy estate. (It is a bit more complicated than this, because your right to sue for a personal injury might be exempt property, at least in part, but this example conveys the gist of the concept.) There is a further complication in the analysis which is that domestic relations actions and probate court actions are normally considered to be outside of the jurisdiction of the federal courts (bankruptcy court is a federal court), even when there is diversity of citizenship, which doesn't change the basic conclusions above.	No law in the US requires that parent and child have the same last name. It is usual that a child's name match that of at least one parent, but not required. A parent can change his or her name, without changing the names of any existing children. Also, when a child is adopted, the child's name need not be changed to match the name of the parents, or either of them. I have read of cases where a widow remarries, and takes the name of her new husband, but an adolescent child retains his or her birth surname. I suppose this would also be possible legally if it is the husband who changes name on remarriage, but i have not read of such a case. I think, but I am not sure, that a child's name could be changed to a different name than the name of either parent. It may be that this would only be done if the child is old enough to understand and agree to the change.	united-statestexas In the US, it depends on the consent-to-treat laws of the state. In Washington, under RCW 9.02.100, everybody has a right to reproductive privacy (be it contraceptives or abortions). Under the federal HIPAA privacy rule, the minor requesting contraceptives would therefore be "the individual", which means that disclosure to others requires consent from the patient. Given the supremacy clause, that's all she wrote for Washington. The majority of states similarly allow 16 year olds to request contraceptives. Texas Family Code §32.003 spells out the conditions where a minor can consent to their own medical treatment, which does not include the situation you describe, therefore parental consent would be required (which clearly implies parental notification). Furthermore, that law also says (d) A licensed physician, dentist, or psychologist may, with or without the consent of a child who is a patient, advise the parents, managing conservator, or guardian of the child of the treatment given to or needed by the child. Therefore in Texas there is no prohibition against informing the parent(s). (Note that in the Texas Family Code, "child" is a synonym for "minor", so this also applies to teenagers, not just small children.) Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 is an important ruling regarding the rights of minors to make their own decisions regarding contraception, but it does not go so far as to declare that minors have a constitutional right to give consent to the requisite medical examination.	I assume you are not legally emancipated. To evict anyone, there is a legal process – nobody can just kick a tenant out, without the appropriate court order. These guys describe the process for evicting an adult child (where the child does not have a lease and is a tenant at will). A custodial parent has a legal obligation to provide, among other things, a place for the child to live. Kicking a child out is contrary to that obligation, and could constitute child abandonment ("neglect" under CRS 19-3-102), and that is a crime. A court would not grant a parent's motion to evict a minor child. If a landlord takes the law into his own hands, as it were, he can be sued under CRS 38-12-510.	Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant).	This person is appointed by the court to look after the child's interests recognizing that the child's interests may be different from those of the parents. As @phoog notes in the comments: the attorney ad litem is not your lawyer. The question suggests that you might not understand this (you mention "our" attorney ad litem). The job of the attorney ad litem is to represent your daughter's interests, which might not align with yours. This is why you need your own lawyer. The attorney ad litem might be skeptical of you and your submissions to the court; that's her job. It doesn't necessarily mean that she is biased against you. If her skepticism is well founded, an attempt to have her replaced may work against you. (FYI, most jurisdictions call this person a "guardian ad litem" or GAL, but Arkansas uses atypical terminology.) Our attorney ad litem appointed for our 2 year old daughter is extremely biased against me. This is not a reason to remove the person appointed. It is their job to distrust parents and provide an independent opinion to the court. There could be grounds for removing a guardian ad litem (e.g. a personal relationship with one of the parties prior to the litigation), but nothing in this question suggests that any relevant facts are present. You would be much better served trying to figure out what causes the guardian ad litem to distrust you and to find a way to show that person that their distrust of you is ill-founded.	I am not a lawyer either, though I have been through Pennsylvania a few times. The relevant law is 18 Pa.C.S. 5703, which prohibits recording without consent of all parties (Penna is a "two-party consent" state, like Florida and Washington). Unfortunately, violation of that law is a third degree felony, which has a maximum of 7 year prison. A specific instance of someone getting in trouble for recording their boss is Commonwealth v. Smith (Smith used a cell phone to record his boss, then argued that a cell phone isn't a "device"; the court determined that it is, and that was Feb 16 2016 so who knows the final outcome). An attorney in Pennsylvania might be able to tell you how often people actually serve time for violating the law. You should call one.
Unauthorized tow Followed by vehicle, who was acting suspicous. Turned right on highway access road and the vehicle following me turned right across 3 lanes of traffic to follow me. Vehicle behind me hit their lights and with fake police today, like there are, I raced home (which was 3 blocks away.) I figured if it was not the police, I could get home before them and they would not know where I lived. If it truly was the police, they knew where I lived and would come to my house. I pulled into my driveway and waited in the car. The police did show up and approached me asking why I ran from them. I told them just what I said above. The sheriff then said, well you were following all traffic rules until you took off. The sheriffs then ordered me out of the car, asked if there were any drugs in the car, and then proceeded to search the car. When my roommate heard the sheriff yelling out front and saw the lights, she opened the front door and the sheriff told her to not come out of the house and to shut the door. I was arrested for "evading arrest" and after the police car that I had been put in left my house, the sheriffs had my car towed. CAN THEY DO THAT?	Assuming, pending information about the jurisdiction, that this happened in the US, the answer is it depends. As described in Justia's Vehicular Searches article and Wikipedia's Motor vehicle exception article, Under US law police can search a motor vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause. This doctrine was first stated by the US Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132 (1925) and later modified or repeated in Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). All of these cases involved contraband, but in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court broadened the rule to evidentiary searches. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458–64 (1971) In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) the Court ruled that the search must be reasonably contemporaneous with the stop, so that it was not permissible to remove the vehicle to the station house for a warrant-less search at the convenience of the police. Subsequent cases have widened the scope of the exception, although the probable cause requirement has remained, and stops must have at least "articulable and reasonable suspicion". In the case of an ordinary traffic stop, the police may conduct a Terry-type search, based on "articulable suspicion". However, if the police arrest the driver, that is grounds to search the car under Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) Under Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S.(and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 note 9 (1982).) police may remove the car for a search elsewhere if they have probable cause to believe that there is contraband (such as alcohol, drugs, or weapons) in the car. Thus the arrest justified a search, as described in the question. It might not have justified the tow if there was not probable cause to suspect contraband. But that depends on the detailed facts, and judging those is beyond the scope of this site. In Collins vs Virginia (2018) the Court ruled that a warrant-less search of a car parked on the owner's property and within the curtilage was not justified. (The "curtilage" is the area near the house which gets additional Fourth Amendment protection, almost as if it were inside the house). However, in that case no arrest was made at the time of the search, and the search was based on an officer recalling the car having been used to elude arrest some two months previously, not just a few minutes before, so that case may not apply in the situation described above. If there was no probable cause, any evidence found might be subject to suppression, and a suit for damages under sec 1983 might be brought against the officers and the police force, but that would depend on the specific facts, and would in practice require a lawyer skilled in such matters.	This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best.	Sending a letter to the red light camera company or police department may or may not get the charge dropped before trial. But whether the charge gets dropped before trial isn't the important question -- after all, people sometimes do get charged wrongly -- rather, the question is, if it goes to trial, whether you will win. Since this question is about California, all traffic tickets in California, including red light camera tickets, are criminal cases (that's why the case will be named "People of the State of California v. [your name]" in court documents). The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and the standard of evidence is "beyond a reasonable doubt". There is no provision in California law to fine or otherwise punish the owner of a vehicle for a moving violation, except through a conviction as the driver who committed the violation. If you plead not guilty and it goes to trial, the burden will be on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver was you. If the driver in the picture does not look like you, there is no way they can meet that burden, and the court must find you not guilty. (In most cases the prosecution will immediately drop the case when they discover that the picture does not look like you.) Note that you have an absolute right to not testify in your own criminal trial where you are the defendant, so there is no way they can force you to testify at the trial about who the driver was if it was not you (which would be irrelevant to the case against you anyhow). If you do not say who the driver was, and the police department fail to guess who it was (e.g. by searching for drivers whose licenses share the same address as you for someone who looks like the one in the picture), then nobody gets fined or punished for the violation. This is true even if you know full well who the driver was, or even if you were pictured sitting right next to them. You don't need to claim not to know who the driver was, because whether you know or not doesn't matter -- you have no legal obligation to tell the identity of the driver even if you know, and you cannot be fined or otherwise punished for the violation if you intentionally refuse to tell.	I have beaten all but one of my traffic tickets just by going to court. In one case, the judge threw out the charge because he couldn't read the officer's handwriting on the ticket. In another, the officer charged that I was parked in a "no parking" zone on a particular street (at night), but gave a cross street where parking was, in fact, allowed.	I am sympathetic to your problem but there is probably not a legal solution: at least not an easy or cheap one. To help you clarify a whole mish-mash of issues I will address each of your points. frequently calls false noise complaints on neighbors resulting in police action. If the person genuinely believes that these complaints are valid, even if they do not end up being substantiated, he is within his rights to make such complaints. If you can document an ongoing pattern of unproven complaints this might amount to harassment and you could then seek a court order that he stop the harassing behaviour. However, if even a few of these complaints are proven this would become much harder. stands in front of the building in a menacing way as people enter/exit. He is entitled to stand wherever he likes in whatever "way" he likes. This is only an issue if the person entering/exiting has a reasonable fear that he will he will visit actual harm upon them, o, of course, if he actually does visit physical harm upon them. If so, then this is assault and can be reported to the police or be the basis of a civil action. hates black people. So, he's a bigot - this is not actually illegal. Discriminating against someone on the basis that they are black is illegal, hating them on that basis isn't. hates Middle Eastern people and Muslims. Ditto. constantly pounds on the floor/walls/ceilings. It can't be "constantly" - it might be often or even frequently, if you intent to take legal action hyperbolic language is not going to aid your case. To make a real complaint about this you would need to diarise each occurrence. Notwithstanding, unless he is damaging someone else's property or is violating a noise ordinance this is not illegal. screams curses at children. Clearly reprehensible behaviour: not clearly illegal. Unless this is assault (see above) or qualifies as offensive behavior under the criminal code wherever you are (unlikely) then he can scream whatever he wants at whoever he likes. Again, a pattern of such behavior may constitute harassment. Continues to park in handicap parking despite not being handicap, and receiving very expensive parking tickets. This is illegal and he is being punished for it. Unfortunately the expression Don't do the crime, if you can't do the time. has a corollary: if you are willing and able to take the punishment then you do as much crime as you want. And to add to the list, I suspect he's been putting nails in my car tire, always on the same tire, on the inside wall of the tire; I just replaced my 5th tire in 3 months. This is a crime. If you can get evidence to prove it then you can report him to the police and/or sue him for the damage. You have stated in your comments that you will be asking another question specifically about filming him, so I won't address this here. Is there some sort of legal incentive I've not clearly communicated to management to evict him? That depends on if any of his actions are actually grounds for terminating his lease and, if they are, the landlord wants to do so. A remote landlord who is getting his rent on time and not having their property damaged has no incentive to evict a tenant: no matter how annoying they are to others. It is possible, that you have a case for breaking your lease and/or suing your landlord for damages as you are not getting "quiet enjoyment" of the property. A suit along those lines may resolve the matter because either you or he will be evicted. Consult a lawyer. If he actually is insane, what sort of liability for his actions does he have? The same as anybody else. Liability for civil wrongs is an objective test of what a reasonable person would be liable for: it is not based on the specific characteristics of the person.	There are two questions here: Is it really the police, or someone pretending to be the police in order to stage a home invasion? If it is the police they will be wearing uniforms and showing you their badges. I don't know how common it is for criminals to impersonate police officers. Do they have a valid search warrant? Once you have established that they really are police your best course is to stand back and let them in. Arguing about search warrants and "fruit of the poisoned tree" is a job for a lawyer later on. One option might be to quickly dial 911, put the phone down but still listening, and then open the door while saying "are you police, can I see your badge?". If they are police then no problem. If they turn out to be imposters then the 911 dispatcher should be able to figure it out and send the real police around.	The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal.	If I remember the case correctly, he didn't make his home look uninhabited (that is nobody is living there) but as if the inhabitants had left (gone shopping etc.) to make it look attractive to burglars. He then waited inside, armed with a gun, with the intent of shooting any burglars that might arrive. He shot the first burglar in the legs, and then proceeded to kill the unarmed and now defenseless burglar, who was lying injured on the ground and was in no position anymore to hurt him. He then did the same with a second burglar, shooting her in the legs, then shooting her multiple times, and when he found she was still alive, he shot her point blank in the face while she was lying on the ground. You are asking the wrong questions. You are asking "is it illegal to remove a truck". It's not. What is illegal is to intentionally create a situation where you shoot people and try to claim "self defence". It can very well be argued that by luring burglars into your home with the intent to kill them, they are not actually illegal in that home, because you wanted them to be there. You can do many things that are each completely innocent but add up to a crime. Actually, for everyone interested, I posted a question maybe last week or the week before whether you can be convicted for both first degree murder and second degree murder for killing a person, and it was exactly this case that inspired the question. What should he have done? If he hadn't lured the burglars in, I believe the case would have still been a double murder, since he killed both unarmed teenagers when they were absolutely no threat. It might not have been first degree murder since it would not have been premeditated. But he intentionally lured them in, making it premeditated (first degree) murder. If he had only injured them, the fact that he lured them in could very likely have made this an assault. You asked: "Now that the burglars are in his house, what should he have done? " Well, he got himself into a dangerous situation. Remember, he was convicted for premeditated murder. So just before he shot the girl in the head, he should have instead put the gun away and called police and an ambulance. It would have been one murder instead of two. Just before he shot the boy, he should have put the gun away and called police and an ambulance. It would have been just attempted murder. When he heard the first person entering, he should have called the police and waited. When the burglar came in sight, he should not have shot and injured him. It's a similar question to "if I try a bank robbery and there is an armed guard, what should I do". The only legal thing to do is to drop your weapon and wait to be arrested. If an armed burglar had appeared instead of two unarmed teens, well, he would have put himself into a dangerous situation. Just as the burglar would have no right to shoot even if a home owner points a weapon at him, he had no right to shoot, no right to self defense, since he had intentionally created the situation. Tough shit. That's what you may get if you plan a murder. Responding to some comments: @J.Chang Are you being serious? You are not allowed to make your house inviting to burglars, while waiting inside with the intent of killing them. Self defense only applies when a reasonable person would believe they are in danger. Reasonable persons don't think that a burglar comes in with the intent of blowing themselves up and taking the home owner with them. And no, you don't get to "assume the worst". Not when the worst is something no reasonable person would expect. Thanks to Dale for pointing out that even for soldiers in a war situation, where different rules apply, deliberately killing a helpless enemy combatant is murder.
Noncompete, nonsolicit, nondisclose agreement company that was sold. But wait, there's more This all happens in Minnesota. Employee E worked for company A and had standard noncompete agreement. Agreement has an assignment clause assigning rights to any successor. Company B buys most business units of company A and hires most employees. Seller of A starts new company N. E stays with seller of A and works for new company N. Assume it's clear that language of noncompete contract assigned to B all rights of all of A's employees who now work for B. A was in the business of providing medical billing services to hospitals. E worked in that industry when hired by A. During employment E developed a product to detect fraud within hospitals and stopped working on billing and started working on the product. When B buys A, it only buys the billing business. Seller of A starts new business explicitly to sell fraud product and invites E to come along. There is an implied option for E to stay on and work for B, but B does not express interest in E and has no contact with E before the sale. Seller has an explicit new agreement with B (it is specific to seller the person) that seller will not engage in medical billing business. E has no new agreement. Seller commences new business N. E has no new agreement or paperwork with N. Not even a tax form. N is a small company and does not provide health insurance but since E received benefits under his spouse's employer there was no change in status in that regard. The only change is that auto deposit pay checks were now from N. Hospital who previously worked with seller at company A contacts seller, asking for consulting work on a billing problem. Because of seller's agreement with B, the consulting contract is written between hospital and B, with N working under a separate agreement with B. Basically N does all the work while B prints invoices and sends 50% of money to N. Seller goes to hospital and brings E along for the consulting job. In the course of the work, hospital offers E a job. Not just a job, the job - the one that's being filled by the contract work. Counsel for hospital sees no problem with the offer as it relates to hospital's actions and let's assume that's a correct assessment. But what about E? Is there any legal doctrine whereby E's agreement with A continued to apply to E in his work for company N? What about B? Do they have any standing to block E's going to work for a B's customer? My thinking here is that E technically has a noncompete agreement with B but perhaps there is a generally accepted public policy theory whereby employers can't enforce agreements against former employees especially under these facts. Reasonable minds may suggest that neither B nor N have an interest in blocking the employment. But let's assume seller is pissed bc now E won't be available to develop product for N and B is pissed because the hiring stops the gravy train and cuts off future potential work.	Is there any legal doctrine whereby E's agreement with A continued to apply to E in his work for company N? No, because the parties to the non-compete agreement were Employee E and company A, not the human who owned and sold A. What about B? Do they have any standing to block E's going to work for a B's customer? No. My rationale is that the decisions you describe result in a waiver of the non-compete clause. An employment relation between B and E never existed. Thus, the only vestige of B's non-compete rights binding E that could have been preserved stem from E's former employment at A. However, that vestige disappeared at the instant B --apropos of the hospital project-- waived its non-compete clause with N. Given B's waiver with regard to N, N's failure to establish a non-compete clause with E enables the latter to conduct business with (or accept employment at) the hospital. If anything, B would have standing to sue N for negligence or related torts. But neither B nor N has any viable non-compete claims against E.	You had bought product A. That constitutes you offering the seller a contract for you to get product A for your money. They keep the money and send product B - and now are in breach of the contract, as that is materially different from the contract both agreed to. Legal recourse is, depending on the customer protection laws, a refund of the payments or getting the correct product A. If you have a right for the Product A depends on exactly how it was advertized and the exact ToS.	Yes. The formation of a contract requires (among other things) that the parties intend to be legally bound. Their sending the offer from a corporate email address shows this. You replying in the same way shows your intention. Signatures are optional. Consider, verbal contracts are binding; how do you sign those?	It is certainly possible to transfer a copyright or other IP without an explicit charge, indeed it can be a pure gift, and normally would be when it is left by will, as is common enough. From a paid consultant it might be clearer to include a statement that the transfer is part of the consulting assignment, rather than putting a price of zero in a blank. But one could instead convey a permanent non-exclusive license, granting permission to use or modify the work in any way desired, ans saying that this is provided as part of the consulting process. Then there would be no question of what rights the consultant retained, or that the same or a very similar solution could be provided to different clients. Indeed such a license would not be so very different from a CC-BY license, or any of several open source licenses, although I would not use one of those by name. But the legal effect would be much the same, and the wording could be similar. Otherwise there could be a later claim that the right transferred precluded the consultant from using the same solution for other clients. Even if such a claim was not legally sound, and was not upheld, it could be a distraction and costly of time and energy at least.	Only if the company consents While some jurisdictions have by statute allowed corporations to be bound by pre-incorporation contracts, New York is not one of them and holds to the common law principle that a person cannot enter a contract before that person exists. In your circumstances the company is only bound by the second contract. So, who is bound by the first? Well, corporations can only act through agents and agency law tells us that an agent who purportedly acts for a non-existent principal is actually acting on their own behalf. So, the person(s) who signed for Company X on the first contract are personally bound to the contract. Unless they explicitly told Company Y that they wouldn’t be. It seems that they didn’t so Company Y can require performance of the first contract by them and of the second by Company X. Company Y must, of course, fulfil its obligations under both contracts - it needs to bear this in mind if it is actually impossible to do both, for example, transferring the same property to the signers of the first contract and Company X or becoming a full time employee of both. If so, it might be in Company Y’s best interests to let the first contract “die”.	Possibly If the texts are sufficiently precise that they constitute offer and acceptance then they would create a contract notwithstanding that “some documents” were never provided. First, your offer must have been sufficiently clear that it was open to acceptance by a simple “yes” or “ok”. Given that you had a lease, a simple offer to have another one would be enough as “on the same terms” is implied. Second, she must have accepted your offer unconditionally. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign” is an unconditional acceptance even if the documents never appear. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign first” or “Yes, I’ll put together some documents with the terms” aren’t. The first is a conditional acceptance and the condition wasn’t met. The second is a rejection with an intention to make a counter-offer that never eventuated. Third, real estate is heavily regulated. There may be specific requirements (such as a particular form of contract, or that it be witnessed) that mean there is no binding lease even though there would be a contract at common law.	This is neither unusual nor illegal, assuming that the buyback price is specified in the agreement. If your friend does not wish to take advantage of the "nice discount" he can decline the deal, and decide for himself whether he wishes to buy shares without restriction, at the market rate. (It would be interesting to know what happens if he sells his shares and then leaves the company. I am fairly sure the agreement will cover this, but requiring an ex-employee to buy shares and then give them to the company could be considered unconscionable. That might be worth asking a lawyer about).	Washington State is an "At Will" employment state meaning that, with exception to some protected classes and bargaining, the employer may terminate the employee for any reason the employer can cite, or no reason at all. If the firm used it as a benefit of the job but it wasn't agreed upon on the contract, its not a deception as if you can hold the job to the down season, you have less work to do. If a promise was made for employment into the down season during the negotiating of the job, and this was documented, it could be. It could be that he did all the work required of him, but another higher went above and beyond and he got the ax because he was the newest and the lesser performer. Either way, the employer is well within their right to fire an employee for any reason they choose absent discrimination based on protected class status.
Do I have to provide proof of citizenship - GDPR Recently, I've been going through some old accounts of mine (on online websites) and I started deleting them. Thanks to GDPR, this is now much easier. Most companies' customer services have no problems with this; but I have encountered one where they were rather less cooperative. First they said that I can only deactivate my account, but I want to delete it (and Article 17 of the GDPR gives me this right). Therefore, I further emphasised that my wish is for them to completely delete my account. To this they responded that I have to send them my passport and ID to prove that I am an EU citizen. I understand that they may have this right - but do they actually? I cannot find anywhere online that I have to do so - and actually, sending in photos of my documents seems a bit iffy to me, at the very least.	You do not have to prove that you are an EU citizen, because EU citizenship is entirely irrelevant to the GDPR. Have a look at Article 3, which basically says that GDPR applies if you are in the EU or if the company is in the EU. If the company is in the EU, therefore, you do not need to send them anything or prove anything about yourself to invoke GDPR. If the company is outside the EU, you can send proof of address or other evidence that you are in the EU, which might be something that they already have, like your IP address.	It doesn’t make you exempt from the GDPR if that’s what you’re asking The hash you produce is linked to one (or a small number) of computers and it therefore serves as an ID number. Because that ID number is linked to the owner of the computer it is personal information and if you are collecting it, you must comply with the requirements of the GDPR - valid legal reason, deletion when no longer required, deletion on request, data security etc.	This is less of a compliance question, and more of an infosec question. On one hand, you want to be able to restore access to an account to users who have lost their access. On the other hand, you must prevent unauthorized access e.g. from hackers. These factors must be balanced. Whether you'll fulfil a data subject access request will generally follow the same criteria as deciding whether you'll reset someone's access credentials, so I'll mostly discuss identity verification in general. Trying to validate names is generally pointless from a security perspective, since the name on the account might not be real, or because validation documents like scans from a passport can be easily forged. When a service has identity validation measures like requesting a copy of photo ID, or requesting a photo of you holding up a validation code written on paper, that doesn't actually help validating that the person requesting access is the account owner, but that the person requesting access appears to be a natural person, and now documents about their identity are on file. A lot of information like names, birthdates, or addresses is also not at all secret and could be easily guessed by a malicious actor. Most websites work by equating access with control over an email account. If you can receive a password reset code over email, you have access. In effect, this delegates the responsibility of account recovery to the email or OAuth provider. So the issue is what happens when someone loses their email account, which is not entirely uncommon for accounts that are multiple years old. One reasonable (and likely GDPR-compliant solution) is to deny access when someone loses their account. Quite a lot of services operate this way. A milder form of this is to email the old address that someone is trying to take over the account, and turn over the account only if you have other evidence of ownership and there has been no reply over multiple weeks. Since this is part of an identity verification measure, I don't think the GDPR's normal 1 month deadline would apply. However, this approach is very risky: an attack can succeed through the mere inaction of the true account holder, and it would arguably be a data breach if you give access to the wrong person – safer for erasure requests only. Also, emails like “click here or we'll delete your account” look a lot like spam (I get a lot of those about alleged problems with my Paypal account). A potentially more reasonable approach is to use questions about the account to verify ownership. When did they create the account? When did they last use it? Can they answer questions about non-public content of the account? (But don't let an attacker choose the questions!) You see some older sites that ask the user to select a “security question” for recovery purposes. But this isn't a best practice – they are frequently the weakest link in an authentication system. If the user answers truthfully, the answer may be easy to guess or discover for an attacker. E.g. the infamous “what is your mother's maiden name” question is horrendously insecure in the age of Facebook. If the user provides a more secure answer, that is essentially just another password that's even easier to lose than an email account. High-value accounts typically offer a secondary authentication method as a fallback. E.g. my bank can send me new access codes via physical mail. GitHub can optionally link a Facebook account for recovery purposes. But these measures would be overkill for most cases. Especially collecting a physical address for the sole purpose of offering account recovery would likely violate the GDPR's data minimization principle, though it may be fine when the user opts in with freely given consent. To summarize: what you're trying to do is extremely difficult, because you've need to balance different security aspects: keeping malicious actors out, and letting legitimate account owners in. Whereas I'd resolve that by denying any account recovery or subject access requests, other approaches exists with other risk profiles. The GDPR requires you to perform reasonable identity verification measures, but what is reasonable depends on the business context and is ultimately an infosec question.	[I'm not so well-versed on US and Russian law, thus I will limit my answer to EU law.] Your specific use of a user identifier, as I understood from your question, can be classified as personal data, so in your case, the GDPR seems to apply. This means that you need to have a) legitimate purposes to process that personal data (e.g. crash reporting) and b) a legal justification for each purpose of processing: it could be based on consent or another legitimate purpose (inc. your own legitimate interests). Consent might not be the best option for you, but it's up to you to decide. In any case, you need to assess the risks to the data subjects (your users) before you decide. How likely is it that you will get breached, and what potential harm will that cause to your users? These are some guidelines; my recommendation is that you read the law and the guidelines by the Article 29 Working Group and European Data Protection Board, or hire some good experts on this. There is no easy answer, or one size fits all solution. The GDPR isn't so hard to understand or implement, but it does require some change in mindset. With the new law, processing personal data carries a higher risk of penalties, so you should do it only when it's absolutely necessary, and with respect to the rights of your users.	It depends on the issuing country. The primary purpose of a passport is to enable the holder to travel internationally, not to prove citizenship. Most countries only issue passports to their citizens, which has made such passports widely recognised as proof of citizenship — both inside and outside of the issuing country. But at the end of the day it is up to the country to decide whether to follow this established pattern or not. For example, Estonia does not. And, of course, it is up to the country to decide which documents prove citizenship of their own citizens inside. Say in Russia a Russian passport for international travel is not a valid document for identification/proving citizenship. So-called "internal passport", similar to that of German citizenship card, serves for this role.	If you are purely a designer (and not contracted for the daily operation of the site), the answer is "no". GDPR Article 4 defines the "roles" responsible for complying with GDPR, and there are two: Controller and Processor. The Controller is the one who calls the shots. In particular: Decides what personal data to process. This is usually the owner of the web site. The Processor is the one that actually does the processing. This is usually some company providing some sort of data processing service (e.g. SaaS, PaaS, etc.). The relationship between the Processor and the Controller must be contractual. The contract is called a DPA (Data Protection Agreement or Data Processing Addendum). As a designer, you don't fit into any of these roles. If your contract with the client is silent on liability for GDPR compliance, then you have no liability. This goes for projects completed both before and after the May 25 deadline. Of course, if there are GDPR clauses in your contract, then you must fulfil them just as have to fulfil any other contractual obligation. But unlike the controller and the processor, there are no automatic legal liability for a designer or programmer.	This issue touches upon two distinct GDPR rights: Art 15 right to access: you have a right to receive a copy of all personal data concerning you that are undergoing processing (including storage). Access may only be denied where this would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.” Art 20 right to data portability: if processing is being carried out by automated means, and processing is based on certain legal bases (consent or contract, but not legitimate interest), then you have a right to receive a copy of your personal data in a machine-readable format, for personal data that you have provided to the data controller. Whereas the right to access is fairly straightforward, the right to data portability applies under much more narrow conditions. Basically, it's a right that you can download any data that you've uploaded so that you can move to a different service. Google Takeout is primarily concerned with your right to data portability, and provides your data in a machine-readable format. Any photos that you've uploaded to Google Photos, you'll be able to download. Thus, it could be technically compliant to exclude information that they've inferred about your personal data, such as image-recognition results. Such results would still be personal data under the GDPR definition of the consent, and would be covered by your right to access. Google might argue that you already have access to this data through the web interface. In my opinion the GDPR clearly requires the data controller to provide a “copy”, i.e. the data in some durable form – not merely access through a web interface. Whereas your question is specifically about Google, the same issue applies to other services as well. E.g. Ruben Verborgh has an interesting blog series on trying to get access to all their data from Facebook, though unsuccessful so far. Similar to your scenario, Facebook offers a download for personal data but does not include all personal data in this download. In one of the documents provided by Facebook in the course of the exchange, they note that they allow access to photo tags through the web interface, but do not include this in downloaded data – without providing further justification.	the statute only applies to EU residents Wrong. GDPR applies to everyone in the EU (Art. 3). This means tourists are also covered. Residence status is completely irrelevant (Recital 14(1)): The protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence There is no provision for data processors/controllers to demand proof from data subjects of them being located in the EU. You can challenge them, but if they refuse to provide proof you will still be liable to fulfill their GDPR request should they indeed be present in the EU.
Lie about US citizenship If I tell a lie about my US citzenship (I am actually not), but not to a governmental agencies, I get no benefits, and I don't have the purpose to get any benefits from it, what code will specify the consequence? Am I removable? To be more clear, is the sole action of lying illegal, or does lying must be accompanied with benefits in order to be deemed illegal. For example, in US I've heard that forging documents (such as ID) is not always illegal until you actually use them.	If you falsely claim to be a US citizen in order to obtain work, vote in a US election, or receive public benefits in the United States, you can be deported, lose a green card, or be banned from ever obtaining a green card or US Visa. See https://dyanwilliamslaw.com/2015/02/why-lying-about-being-a-u-s-citizen-can-stop-you-from-becoming-a-permanent-resident-and-what-you-can-do-to-overcome-this-obstacle/ and https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-falsely-claiming-us-citizen-can-deportable.html for more detail. This very much includes checking an incorrect box on an I-9 form when obtaining a job, although that is not usually considered a "benefit". In fact incorrect I-9 statements are a common source of such bans. However, if a person lies in response to a merely curious question, when no government or private benefit, and no job eligibility is involved, the ban should not, as far as I can see, come into effect, nor should that be grounds for deportation, or indeed any criminal or immigration action. If a person falsely claims to be a US Citizen merely to obtain social status or personal importance or reputation, that would seem not to be a crime under the doctrine of U.S. v. Alvarez, nor should it lead directly to any immigration consequences, althoguh I suppose it might draw attention to someone who is deportable on other grounds.	The consequences for the US are perhaps better addressed at Politics; if you're really interested in those consequences, you can re-post this question there. For the police officer shooting a diplomat, the officer may be charged under state law, whatever is normal for an incident of this type; it doesn't matter whether the person is a US citizen or a diplomat or any other kind of alien, regardless of immigration status or lack thereof. If the person is a diplomat, however, the officer is also liable to be prosecuted under federal law, namely 18 USC 1116, which makes it a crime to kill, among others, a "foreign official"; the definition of that term includes any person of a foreign nationality who is duly notified to the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign government or international organization, and who is in the United States on official business, and any member of his family whose presence in the United States is in connection with the presence of such officer or employee. The characterization of the response "just been revoked" as "clearly legal" is inaccurate; a police officer has no power to revoke diplomatic immunity. In fact, only the diplomat's own country can waive this immunity. The United States cannot do so; it can only expel the diplomat.	This is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1401 which details who qualifies for "birthright citizenship". Including of course the condition mandated by the 14th ammendment, Congress is otherwise free to bestow such citizenship essentially as it pleases by duly enacted legislation. One of the cases that receives birthright citizenship is a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States. So the presumption for young children found in the US is that they are citizens by birth. The law in particular requires positive proof that the individual in question was definitely not born in the United States. Lacking this, or it failing to be found prior to reaching the age of 21 years, they are citizens. For other cases, this will likely end up falling to the courts, who will decide the matter on the preponderance of the evidence. In this case it becomes the burden of the individual claiming citizenship to establish that they are a citizen. Birth certificates can be filed after birth, and can be submitted as evidence. The laws controlling the validity of birth certificates is locally determined. If there are other birth certificates from other countries, or conflicting witness testimony, then it will fall to the court to decide which case is more likely based on the evidence available. More accurately the burden generally falls on the entity making the claim about someone's citizenship (their own or someone else's). In a deportation hearing, for example, it falls to the government to establish the individual is not a US citizen. Deporation only applies to aliens, so the defendant must be established as such.	UK, Identity Documents Act 2010, false identity documents etc: Possession of false identity documents etc with improper intention (1) It is an offence for a person (“P”) with an improper intention to have in P's possession or under P's control— (a) an identity document that is false and that P knows or believes to be false, (b) an identity document that was improperly obtained and that P knows or believes to have been improperly obtained, or (c) an identity document that relates to someone else. Each of the following is an improper intention— (a) the intention of using the document for establishing personal information about P; (b) the intention of allowing or inducing another to use it for establishing, ascertaining or verifying personal information about P or anyone else. ... Possession of false identity documents etc without reasonable excuse (1) It is an offence for a person (“P”), without reasonable excuse, to have in P's possession or under P's control— (a) an identity document that is false, (b) an identity document that was improperly obtained, ... Such an identity document could be an "an immigration document", "a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation" or "a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport" (e.g. a European country's identity card).	A US passport does not list height or make claims about ethnicity: what you have is a birth date and state, and photograph. A passport is taken to be strong proof of identity. You may apply for a new passport (turning in the old one), with a new photo. It may be necessary to provide "documentary evidence of identity" by appearing with an identifying witness (citizen or permanent resident) who has known you for 2 years and fills in an affidavit (both of you would need to bring some ID as well, so let's assume you also have a valid driver's license). It would be at the discretion of the accepting agent whether to believe that you and the "old" you are the same person. In the fictitious scenario, the person could videotape themselves undergoing the transformation, but ultimately, if one is sufficiently off the grid, then proving identity could be very difficult.	In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense.	Being misunderstood is not a crime. You could concoct scenarios where any number of statements could be a crime if interpreted unfairly. "I went to Georgia last weekend." "I choose to believe you mean the country instead of the state, and you don't have a passport, therefore you admitted that you went to a foreign country illegally!" The police would be free to investigate, but they wouldn't be able to get a warrant or arrest him based just on an ambiguous statement, let alone obtain a conviction. Of course, if the younger sister decided to accuse him, and the older sister decided to lie about having a relationship with him, that puts the statement in a whole other context - but if someone is falsely accusing you and someone else corroborates their story, you're probably in trouble no matter how exactly that came about.	He has this phrased like it's the ability to decide which laws you follow, and that it's an ability being withheld from the general public (although I seriously doubt that at least the former is the case). This is yet another false claim made by "freemen" or those who claim "common law defences". Notice of Understanding has no legal meaning unless the context demands that it evidences a meeting of the minds for the purposes of contract formation. It is a well-settled principle of common law that in order to be bound by a contract, there must be an agreement. Put simply, I cannot bind someone simply by sending them a Notice unless it is a right conferred on me by some earlier statute or legislation, or legally binding agreement. I tried searching for a solid definition, but all I could find was people/organization's Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights. The reason you've found nothing official about the terms Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights is that there is nothing official or legal about those terms. They are ordinary terms with ordinary meaning being bastardised by deluded people who believe they can fine the government and refuse to be bound by the law of the land. Of course, none of this holds up. What is the purpose of declaring your Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights? It might make you feel better, even though it has no legal, practical or other effect.
Can a U.S. President pardon an accessory to murder if the murder occurred in a foreign country? If a U.S. citizen conspires to have another U.S. citizen murdered but the actual killing takes place in a foreign country, can the accessory to the murder be pardoned by the President?	He can, to the extent that there is a federal charge involved. There is no limit to the power to "grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States", but there is no power to grant reprieve or pardon against a US state or foreign country. In other words, a presidential pardon would prevent the person from being tried or punished by the US federal government. It would not prevent them from being tried or punished by a state or foreign government.	Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.	It's generally correct in the American system that everything not forbidden is permitted. But the law you're looking at isn't really an exception. You have the legal right to tamper with evidence if tampering is not illegal, but this statute makes it illegal. The language you've highlighted merely says that the law does not apply to those who have some other affirmative grant of authority to do so. So if you stab someone to death in your kitchen, you can't remove the body or other evidence, but the detectives investigating the case can, because they have the legal authority to process the scene and maintain the evidence for trial. So the law is similar to the "speaking in public" hypothetical, but that doesn't make it meaningless. Because of the First Amendment, that law doesn't actually outlaw anything, but the tampering law faces no such legal barriers. You had the right to tamper until the government said you didn't. Now that it says you don't, you can only do it on the government's terms, which require an affirmative grant of authority.	My understanding is that the syndicate would be committing an act of extortion. Under the RICO Act, IF the politician conspired with the syndicate OR IF the politician had something like an 'understanding' with the syndicate, then they (any, and all involved) could be charged with the crime (extortion), racketeering and conspiracy. Additional crimes/laws to consider: Campaign finance violations Money laundering Compelled speech (1st Amendment)	Diplomatic immunity means that diplomats are immune from prosecution in their host countries. It does not necessarily mean that they can be sued or prosecuted in their home country. Whether the diplomat is subject to the home country's laws and courts is up to the home country. In most cases, it seems, diplomats can escape prosecution altogether by reason of their immunity. If the home country wishes to dissociate itself from the diplomat's actions, it can waive diplomatic immunity to enable prosecution in the host country's courts. There are some interesting examples, some of which touch on your question, in the Wikipedia article on diplomatic immunity. With respect to your example of an apartment lease, it appears that a diplomat might not actually be immune, since the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 provides for some exceptions to immunity, including A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission Interestingly, the Wikipedia article lists two prosecutions under home-country legal systems that both involve Romania, and both involve fatal accidents in which the driver had been drinking alcohol. (In one case, Romania was the sending state, and in the other, it was the receiving state.) In one case, the driver was an American Marine assigned to guard the US embassy. He was tried in a court martial, presumably under the US military code, which no doubt penalizes drunk driving, but that's just a guess. The court may well have applied Romanian law. In the other case, Romania apparently prosecuted its chargé d'affaires in Singapore after a fatal automobile accident. It's not clear whether he was charged under the Romanian or Singaporean law.	There is a general defence to any crime called self defense. If you commit a crime, but the reason you commit it is because you are acting in self defense, or the defense of another, then you will not be found guilty of that crime. For example, if you kill someone, but the court believes you are acting in self defense, then you will not be found guilty of murder (or manslaughter). This defense extends to other crimes too, and trespassing would be included in this. Acting in the defense of another person has the same effect as acting in self defense. Just note that you would have to prove that it was reasonable for you to be acting in the way you did. Usually this means that the crime you committed was proportional or necessary to prevent the crime that would have occurred, and if self defense is involved, that it was necessary to do what you had to do to prevent harm to you or another.	No Section 2, Clause 1 says: ... and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Impeachment is explicitly carved out from the President's power to pardon.	Under U.S. law the prosecution must prove that the defendant committed a particular crime beyond a reasonable doubt. So, it is not sufficient to prove that someone committed one of three crimes without proving which one it was. an alternative that I thought of later: someone is found somewhere where they can legally be, but in a situation where the only way they could have gotten there would involve trespassing through one of several properties owned by different people. Since the crime of trespassing requires the prosecution merely to show that someone was on the property of another without legal authorization to do so, it might be possible to prove this crime beyond a reasonable doubt without showing precisely which property was crossed, although I wouldn't be surprised if there was a split of authority among U.S. states on this question.
How much does the President have to take the Senate's appointment "advice?" Article II, Section 2, of the US Constitution (emphasis added) states: [The President] by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law[.] Suppose the Senate were to pass a resolution advising the President to appoint a strict "originalist" who has been a long-time member and avid supporter of the Republican Party. To what extent must the President heed this advice? Taken further, does this mean the Senate can specifically identify who an appointee shall be?	The President can nominate whomever he wants; the "advice" is formally post-nomination advice (the motion to confirm appointments is a motion "to advise and consent to" the nomination). In any event, "advice" is by definition non-binding; that's why it's not a command. However, the Senate must consent to the appointment before the officer assumes the office, so pre-nomination advice is relevant. For some nominations (like district judges), the Senators from that state can effectively sink a nomination if they're from the same party as the President and don't like the nominee; that can result in the Senators picking a short list of candidates and the President just picking someone on the list (or asking for a new list, but if he just nominates someone not on the list there's a fair chance they don't get confirmed). The Senate could decide that they will only confirm one particular person for the post. The President can nominate someone different. That's a political fight to be solved by gamesmanship and negotiation, not something that has a legal resolution.	The ability to create such an office derives (according to Roosevelt, who invoked the power), from the constitutional authority of the president and the Trading with the Enemy Act amended by the War Powers Act, 1941. A president cannot repeal a part of The Constitution or an act of Congress, but he can undo an act by a president (as long as Congress hasn't come along and taken back a power for example by changing the "authorized" part to "required"). In a sense, that office is permanently gone, but until Congress or SCOTUS change the law, another president could effectively re-create that office and even give it the same name. The appendix to Title 50 which authorized the office is still there (not repealed). It is remotely possible that some other act or court ruling effectively nullifies this part of the law, but that would have to be determined by some president attempting to re-create the office and then someone else suing to prevent it (based on such an effectively nullification).	No, it means the following are eligible: Natural born citizens Citizens of the United States, at the time of the adoption of the constitution The second part was to allow people that were citizens of the US in 1788 (but were obviously not "natural born citizens", since the US didn't exist when they were born) to be eligible for the Presidency. Check out Alexander Hamilton's draft of this clause: No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United States.	The US Constitution doesn't say one way or the other how a state's representatives are to be chosen, so until this law was passed in 1841, a state could have all of their representatives elected at-large, without districts. It is only recently that SCOTUS has gotten involved in redistricting questions: here is a summary of leading redistricting rulings. A recurring theme in these rulings has been the Equal Protection Clause, where certain redistricting plans (or non-plans) were found to violate that clause (especially ordering a state to redistrict when it refused to do so with the result being that population changes diluted the vote of those living in certain districts). Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 held that The constitutional requirement in Art. I, § 2,that Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States" means that, as nearly as is practicable, one person's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's thus redistricting is a justiciable question, answerable with respect to the federal government's need to enforce the 14th Amendment. It is not necessary to amend the Constitution further to specify a means of enforcing that clause.	Under the Constitution, the president has to be a natural born citizen of the US, a resident for 14 years (relevant in the early years), and 35 years of age or older. Any action to preclude a candidate has to be based on these qualifications. Art. II of the constitution spells out the powers of the executive branch. His primary power is to carry out laws enacted by Congress, therefore executive orders have to be based on some statute, or specific Constitutional authority (e.g. as commander-in-chief). No law allows the president to nullify the fact that Biden is a natural born citizen of the US, a resident for many time 14 years, and 35 years old. Congress has not passed a law declaring that Biden has been previously impeached and removed from office (another way to stop a person from being elected). There being no such authority, an order to that effect would not be legal. In addition, executive orders give orders within the executive branch, and the executive branch isn't in charge of certifying the next president: POTUS cannot give orders to the House of Representatives, or to the Supreme Court.	Article IX, Section 5 of the constitution says: Removal by impeachment or address. Every person holding any civil office under this State, may be removed by impeachment, for misdemeanor in office; and every person holding any office, may be removed by the Governor on the address of both branches of the Legislature. But before such address shall pass either House, the causes of removal shall be stated and entered on the journal of the House in which it originated, and a copy thereof served on the person in office, that the person may be admitted to a hearing in that person's own defense. This provides at least some mechanism for removing an AG. A subcomittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Maine Legislature reports here on the broader question of tenure of office. p. 5 opines that "Many members of the executive branch of Maine government hold their offices at the pleasure of the Governor and may be removed from office by the Governor's direction to vacate". p. 6 then holds that "For civil officers whose tenure is set by the Constitution, removal from office may only occur through impeachment or address," and the Attorney General is enumerated as one of those Constitutional Officers (referencing Article IX Section 11). The State of Maine web page says that there are three branches of government plus three constitutional officers (state, treasurer, AG) and one statutory officer, thus the AG is not part of the executive branch (and thus the AG does not serve at the pleasure of the Governor).	This would require an amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. The process is specified in Article 5: Article. V. The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. The "mode of ratification" has until now always been by state legislatures rather than by conventions. That's unlikely to be different in this case.	The US President is Commander-in-chief of the US military. The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; (from Article II section 2) That does not make the president the direct boss of every federal employee. The Congressional Sergeants-at-arms, in particular (and their assistants) are employed by, and responsible to, Congress, not the President. The Secret Service is part of the Department of Homeland Security (formerly part of the Treasury Department, until 2002) which is part of the Executive branch, but I am sure the President cannot order them to arrest someone who has not committed any crime. If such a thing were pushed to a direct confrontation, I have no idea where it would go, I hope we do not find out. Article I Section 8 grants Congress the power (among a number of others): To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings That seems to say the ultimately Congress controls the District, and sets the rules there. There is also the provision in Article I section two that: The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers; which would include the Sargent-at-Arms, I think. Article I section five says: Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member. which again seems to grant control over the situation to the individual houses of Congress. Article I section 6 says: The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. which again puts Congress out of the direct control of the President.
Why the same-sex marriage Supreme Court decision applies also to Puerto Rico when the Fourteen Amendment does not apply to territories? This is in relation to a comment on this question that I also made. In one of the comments, one of the users made this statement: The Fourteenth Amendment talks about states (and Puerto Rico is not one), not about the federal government. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States While I agreed with him, this brought me to another question: if the Fourteen Amendment only applies to states, why the same-sex marriage decision from Supreme Court applies also to Puerto Rico, when this decision was based on the Fourteen Amendment? Please note: I am not trying to argue about the decision of same-sex marriage, what I am trying to figure it out is why a decision made based on the unconstitutionality of an amendment that does not cover Puerto Rico still applies to Puerto Rico.	The Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause apply to Puerto Rico. See Torres v. Puerto Rico 442 U.S. 465 (1979) (internal citations removed): [t]his Court has held or otherwise indicated that Puerto Rico is subject to the First Amendment Speech Clause, the Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment, and the equal protection guarantee of either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment.	Short Answer Yes, Supreme Court decisions apply everywhere right away. (Unless the decision says it doesn't.) No, we do not have to wait until new laws are passed. Explanation Judicial Review Marbury v. Madison (1803) established the principle of judicial review under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. This allows the court[s] to interpret laws passed by legislatures. And this is the basis for applying the ruling everywhere (in the U.S.) immediately. From Marbury at 178: if a law be in opposition to the Constitution [...] the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. [...] the Constitution of the United States confirms [...] that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. Judicial Restraint (Nominally) courts either interpret or invalidate existing law. In the former case, the law will persist (with the new clarity added by the decision). In the latter, the law will be struck as unconstitutional and, therefore, no longer exist.	All Four of them! Double Jeopardy is not in play if a jurisdiction can lay claim to your criminal action, so if you stand on the Four Corners and shoot a man in any of the four states, each state has a right to charge murder. In addition, the Federal Government can have a go at you because you crossed state lines while in comission of a crime. Plus the Navajo Nation, which controls the reservation land the border is on. So that six separate charges. That said, the state the dead body occupied at time of Murder would have the best case for action and the other three would likely let that state try you first. The Feds would only step in if each of the four states failed to convict, though they can step in whenever they want (they are just watching to see if you'll serve time first). Not sure at which point Tribal jurisdiction applies, but given that this is a fairly common Jurisdiction issue, I'm sure it's been worked out.	The United States enforces laws on its citizens. This is not true and never has been in the United States or pretty much any other country. Countries exercise authority over anyone in their territory, and over their citizens even if outside their territory. Sometimes countries agree to waive their authority over a tiny number of diplomats voluntarily while retaining the right to expel them from their country, but that is the rare exception and not the rule. So, which country comes closest to actually preserving people’s right to opt out of the state and have a natural right to at least some land? There really aren't any, and the claim that this is a "natural right" is, at a minimum controversial and not widely held. Many countries have areas that they control which are subject to different regulations than most of the country. For example, until recently, Hong Kong was subject to different laws by different authorities than the rest of China, and there continue to be some laws generally applicable in the rest of China which are not applicable in Hong Kong. Until recently, the Panama Canal Zone was a similar example of control of territory within one country being temporarily ceded to another sovereign authority. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is a third example. Similarly, and with some of the same conceptual framework behind it, the laws that apply in places such as the Channel Islands or the Cayman Islands or Scotland, which are subordinate in legal and political theory to the same King as England is, are permitted by the King and treaties and organic statutes established with the King's symbolic approval, to have laws that are different from those that apply in England. Ultimately, this is simply a form of federalism, although when the extent that the central government's otherwise generally applicable laws can be disregarded quite completely is high, it feels like something more than mere federalism, and is often called a dependency or colonial relationship. Similarly, many countries have "free ports" or "duty free zones" in which their usual taxes don't apply. For example, the U.S. taxation regime that applies in Puerto Rico is different from the U.S. taxation regime that applies within U.S. states. But, even in these cases, there is not an individual right to opt out of laws, there is permission granted by a higher level government for a subordinate level government to adopt laws different from the generally applicable laws of the higher level government. Sometimes the alternative government is democratic, sometimes it is not. Hong Kong, for example, was not self-governing in a meaningful sense until not long before China regained control of the territory at the end of a 99 year concession to the United Kingdom. Some jurisdictions give people subject to their jurisdiction more ability to reach their own legal arrangements contrary to the default rules of law than others. For example, Delaware affords people who create limited liability companies there more authority to deviate from Delaware's default rules of law for limited liability companies than any other U.S. jurisdiction. But this is a far cry from granting people subject to Delaware's jurisdiction generally, freedom to displace mandatory rules of Delaware law in other legal domains such as criminal law. Similarly, sometimes the government will tolerate deviation from binding national laws even when they technical still apply. This has been the story of marijuana legalization in the U.S. and of prostitution legalization in Perth, Australia. But, again, this is an isolated act of tacit toleration in a single subject area, and not a general disavowal of legislative authority.	There is no one answer, but here are some examples. India is famous for deriving general principles of more important constitutional law concepts that can be used to find constitutional amendments to be unconstitutional. The U.S. has not gone to that extreme but does derive constitutional protections for the overall scheme of the constitution and from the legal context of the nation when constitutional provisions were enacted that don't obvious flow from the text of the legislation (e.g. the 11th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) has been interpreted to establish state sovereign immunity that the text of that amendment does not expressly provide for). Another somewhat weird source of law in the U.S. (constitutional at the federal level and usually common law at the state level) is that the 21st century right to a jury trial in a civil case depends upon whether the claim would have been litigated in England in 1789 in the courts of law or the courts of chancery in England. Customary international law is a thing. It also often arises from international practices or diplomatic norms, rather than tribunal adjudications. In the jurisprudence of the legislative process and some aspects of federalism, historical practices that have not been litigated are frequently resorted to as a source of law. For example, the question of whether a legislature is in recess has been resolved based upon historical practice. Prior to the French Revolution, customary practice was an important source of law in France. Customary practice was an important source of the English common law. In many British colonies and former British colonies (e.g. South Africa and Kenya and Sudan), lower tribal or village courts were often expressly permitted to apply local custom in their decision making. In the U.S., a collection of secondary authority texts compiled by the American Law Institute, an affiliate of the American Bar Association, called the Restatements, which summarize in codified form, various subjects in common law, are often used by courts as a source of law where there is no case law on point in a jurisdiction. In civil law countries, the leading legal treatises of law professors are an important source of interpretive authority of the civil code and other major codification of the law. Most Islamic countries provide in their constitutions that Islamic law is the highest authority and supersedes any secular law including other provisions of the constitution to the contrary. In many parts of the United States, mostly in the west, but also in Florida and Louisiana, property rights arising under Spanish/Mexican law, or under Native American law continue in force even though they derived from legal systems other than U.S. statutes and common law. See, for example: Tribe: We have "aboriginal title" to these lands in New Mexico because we had exclusive occupation of them from around 1300 to 1650, and then still used them a lot since then. Further, the "sovereign" (the U.S.) has never properly taken them away, so they're still ours. District court: No. Tribe on motion to reconsider: How about just these bits of the lands? District court: Still no. Tenth Circuit: There's still a claim for one of the bits. Concurrence 1: No bits for you. Concurrence 2: Two bits. (Source)	TLDR: get a divorce. Basically, the US (as with most countries) recognizes valid marriages from other jurisdictions that would be valid if performed by the couple in the US. Which means that same sex marriages before Oberfell would not have been recognized but are now. Marriage with minors are not recognized. Multiple simultaneous marriages are not recognized (no second or third husbands or wives). Some common law marriages can have problems with this, as there is no record of the marriage.	Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.	We can only guess at what argument he has in mind, but one possible argument is that the standard is unconstitutionally vague, similar to the argument by McDonnell in the recent McDonnell v US (admittedly about a different statute). The vagueness argument was developed in several of the briefs: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/ The unconstitutional vagueness argument has also been made specifically about 18 USC 793 (e). US v Hitselberger 1:12-cr-00231-RC D.D.C. (2014). The defendant made a motion to dismiss based on constitutional vagueness, but this motion was denied. Private Manning raised the same defence, also unsuccessfully: http://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/051012-vague.pdf
Can I collect restitution for stolen goods if my insurance has replaced them? My residence was broken into and burglarized. My renter's insurance covered the cost of the stolen goods, though I did spend time reacquiring the goods and the claim affected my insurance plan was affected as a result. Is it possible to collect restitution for damages, including goods, time lost, and claims? This is in California.	Check your insurance policy. Any restitution would normally go to the insurance company.	If you innocently took the oven glove by mistake there is no possibility of criminal consequences. Now that you know it is not yours, you must return it as soon as possible. You may be liable for the losses caused by taking the glove, and that could extend as far as some fraction of the cost of a replacement glove if they have already replaced it. You cannot (legally) hold his glove hostage for the return of your desk. Deciding which glove is which is tricky. Given the cost of new oven gloves, I would go round with both and ask him which is his. Even if he takes the nicer one which isn't his, you are only down a few dollars. The messy hall should be a separate question (and risks being closed as asking for specific legal advice - I think you need your own paid-for lawyer for that).	No. Your evidence of registration of the car would suffice to show that you are not receiving stolen property, although you are correct that not informing the police that it has been recovered could get you pulled over if the car has been reported as stolen. Given the circumstances of the question, I don't address the means by which the car is repossessed. Not every use of force would be justified to secure the return of the stolen car. Reporting the theft and recover to the police would also make it easier for you to make an insurance claim. Repossession of a car stolen by fraud (tricking you into signing over the car title to them in exchange for Monopoly money in an envelope that you don't check until after they are gone, or for a forged check), which is then sold to a bona fide third party individual for value, however, might constitute car theft.	Actions in common law tort exist for both scenarios. Potential torts are negligence, trespass to chattel, and/or conversion. Putting the largely apparent tort of negligence aside, since that is nearly always available when something and/or someone is damaged by another (requiring only the [negligent] act, causation and damages) I'll focus on the other tort potentially applicable to scenario 1. The minority rule concerning trespass to chattel can be established even when the interference is negligent, whereas the majority rule requires intent to deprive. Interestingly, when the Restatement 2d of Torts talks about minority rule vs. majority rule, it really means "least often applied" vs. "most often applied", rather than merely "in some (fewer or greater) defined jurisdiction(s)". With these type of uncommonly pled torts, you could find a huge jurisdiction like California having lower courts (especially small claims or district courts) applying both the minority rule in some courts and the majority rule in others. This, all within one judicial jurisdiction if that state's law court has not weighed in on their interpretation of preference. The Restatement 2d (Second) of Torts § 217 and §218 define liability in trespass to chattel as "intentionally (negligently - minority rule ): (a) dispossess(ing) the other of the chattel, or; (b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or; (c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or; (d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest. Trespass to chattel can consist of mere "intermeddling with or the limited use of the possession" and no damage need occur to the property, as damage is per se; however in your scenario, actual liability would occur in the destruction of the possession. The 2nd scenario would lie in the more serious tort of conversion. The tort of conversion will always requires intent to deprive the owner of his property, and the majority view is that the deprivation is intended to be total or forever (whether by continued deprivation or by destruction). There are 3 elements required to establish conversion: plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the alleged conversion; defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff's property rights; damage(s). While anticipating the follow-up question to either scenario, being "what about the fact that you didn't take the ball, but rather it ended up on your land, and shouldn't that count for something"...the answer (to the unasked question :~) is no. The act of taking possession over property to satisfy the necessary prong in both torts may take any number of forms, but need not be wrongful to begin with. All that is required to establish possessory control over the chattel in a tortious manner is merely interfering with the plaintiff's right of possession, which is a wrongful deprivation of something the owner was entitled to possess (so in other words, even if you didn't go and take it, once you know it's there, it's not yours, and you seek to keep it, either temporarily, permanently – the act of wrongful possession has occurred. The way the property was acquired is not at issue. Conversion and Trespass in Chattel are often spoken of interchangeably despite the fact that they are different. The difference between a cause of action for conversion and one for trespass against chattel is measured only by the degree of interference with the plaintiff's rights in their chattel. While the distinction seems subtle in a vacuum, in the old English cases where these torts were typically decided, conversion was one small step from criminal activity, whereas today conversion may be the civil adjunct to a criminal suit. *for those not familiar: chattel is any possession that is not real estate.	Is something considered stolen if it possibly could have been lost? Something is considered stolen if it was stolen. You don't have your passport + Someone entered the room where it was ≠ They stole it Can this be brought to small claims court? What damage did you suffer that could be remedied by a monetary settlement? Sure, the landlord entering your room without your permission is probably unlawful but it's not clear that it did you any damage. No damage; no case. Should the police or some other government agency care? Here is a ranking of government cares: Getting reelected National security Economic Management ... 42,567. Murder ... 421,762. Passport Fraud ... 7,656,232. Passport theft ... 58,432,546. Passports that might have been stolen but probably weren't	I would think that this would be treated the same as lost property. In most places, if you notice lost property (for example because the postman hands it to you) you have the choice of ignoring it (don't touch it, don't accept it from the postman), or you have to make reasonable efforts to find the owner and return it. If you as the sender had no idea who received the package so you cannot contact them, and there was nothing in the package identifying the sender, the receiver would be able to keep the package when their efforts of finding the owner fail. But if you manage to contact them, then the receiver knows the owner, so there is no legal excuse to keep the package.	You certainly can claim whatever you want. Will you be granted it though? Time is money indeed, and replacing the damaged items requires some time not just items themselves. The question is how much time and at what rate? Your duty will be to mitigate the damages and so to minimise the time and its cost. Will your normal hourly rate be applicable? Only if you have to use your actual work time and miss out on earning for those hours. It will probably be unreasonable to use work time in the first place, let alone that you may not necessarily miss out any earnings in case it's a salaried job and your boss is fine to just let you go for a few hours to sort out personal issues. If the time you use for replacement is evenings/weekends then you would need to quantify how much you miss out on not doing what you would do otherwise.	Did I lose possession of my goods? That seems unlikely. But enforcing it sounds complicated, at least from the standpoint of substantive law (the Code civil). I am not knowledgeable of French procedural law. The difficulty begins with identifying whether your claim is cognizable as unjust enrichment, or --per your subsequent oral agreement-- breach of contract. You might want to read sections "The French Law of Unjust Enrichment" and "Enrichissement sans Cause" in this post. Please note that the French Civil Code recently underwent significant reforms, whence references of its articles are likely outdated. Here I pointed out one example of statutory renumbering in the Code. In the second link, you will read that originally [...] the action in enrichissement sans cause would not be available to the claimant if he or she had any other cause of action, even if that cause of action was blocked for some reason. [...] [B]ut it is perhaps here that the law has relaxed most in recent cases. Thus, the subtleties of your matter can be decisive for identifying the type of claim that is applicable to your situation. Lastly, according to this treatise (on p.54), "[t]he French legal system does not have the principle of [reasonable] reliance as it exists in the American legal system" (brackets added). That makes it easier for a plaintiff to prove his claims under French law.
Is it legal to use some sound effects that are identical or found on some famous TV shows or other games for your own game project? I found this sound effect resource for my mech game, but these sound effects are used in the Gundam series. I know there are some shows and games other than Gundam that use identical sounds. Is it legal to use them for making my own mobile game apps, if I alter the pitch and do some remixes? I'm making a 'fan-game' or 'mech-inspired' game, but in an original and legitimate way as possible.	No It says right on the page you linked: These downloads are not public domain, as they are parts of content that has already been licensed and distributed. Although using these downloads may be permissible as long as the project itself falls under the rule of "Fair Use," it is ill-advised to use these downloads for any project intended for profitable gain or commercial advertisement, unless otherwise stated by Kyutwo.com.	If an infringement suit is filed, the plaintiff(s) would have rights of discovery. They could subpoena the source code in such a case for comparison. They could take the depositions of EvilCorp's developers and ask them about the libraries that they used. There might well be other ways to achieve the same effect.	The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed.	Yes, this could become an issue Trademark infringement occurs when you use another’s trademark in a way that could cause confusion to the consumer. Is it possible that people will be confused that your company produced a game of the same name? Yes. Is that trademark infringement? Possibly. Would a company like Bethesda take you to court to find out? Possibly. Can you avoid this risk by choosing a different name? Yes. Does this cost anything? No, as a new business your ‘brand’ has zero value right now. Should you choose a new name? Well, it’s your business - make a business decision.	You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license.	Getting permission from the game owner would be a sensible approach. If you get it, great. Then you could do it with the owner's blessing. It's possible to do your write up without the owner's permission, but then you have to be much more careful. For instance, the names of games cannot be copyrighted. No one can prevent you from writing "A Guide to Bridge," or "A Guide to Chess," etc. On the other hand, some games are trademarked, in which case you will need to attach a TM (trademark) symbol when referring to them. In this case, see a lawyer. You are also allowed to discuss the game itself "in your own words," but you must be careful not to "plagiarize" anything from the rules, or the official game description. That is, while you can refer to specific aspects of a game, such as building houses and hotels, the leash on copying is fairly short, as little as five words. This does not refer to five words in a common sequence referring to a single thought like "The United States of America," but it could refer to five words in an original or unusual sequence such as "I think therefore I am," by Rene Descartes, or "X houses and Y hotels," where the numbers X and Y define the number of houses and hotels in a certain board game trademarked (I believe) by Parker Brothers.	No, this is not true. Copyright can be enforced selectively. You are confusing copyright with trademark. Company can lose its trademark if they aren't protecting it. All the meanwhile they can choose to ignore some copyright infringement while enforcing their rights on others with no legal problems what-so-ever. In order to illustrate the difference: for example, if someone would make a clone of Super Mario and would call their clone as well "Super Mario" and maybe even would call themselves "Nintendo", even if they have programmed the whole game by themselves from scratch and the art and music would be all different, they wouldn't be infringing the copyright but challenging protected trademarks. In your case, the naming was identical, the art and everything was too similar to the original and therefore the clone was challenging the trademark that needs constant protecting.	Copying is illegal, creating an identical work by coincidence isn't. If it is not a criminal case, then a court decides whether it is more likely that the identical work was created by copying or by coincidence. Creating an identical work through a random process isn't going to happen, claiming this would be an awful defense. On the other hand, it is quite possible that two software developers using very stylized code adhering to struct coding conventions can produce quite large bits of identical code. Your links titled "metadata" and "hash" don't actually link to a description of metadata, or the description of a hash, but to a description of torrent files, which is something totally different. Systematically distributing files whose only purpose is the illegal duplication of copyrighted works should not be done without consulting a lawyer, as has been said on other threads (whether posting links to copyrighted files is legal). The chances that a random process will generate a file identical to an existing copyrighted file of say over 100 bytes are virtually zero. If there is an illegal copy of a copyrighted file, and you claim that you created it through a random process and coincidence, you will lose, and deservedly so.
Swiss naturalization My crude understanding has been that one can become a citizen of Switzerland only by becoming a citizen of one of the cantons, and one can become a citizen of a canton only by becoming a citizen of a municipality, and the discretion at that level is so broad that it's a question of whether local officials or your neighbors like you. One person I know had his first application turned down because the mayor of the village thought he looked like a hippie. This article says "The case has now been transferred to the Cantonal government in Aargau, which can overrule the decision". I hadn't heard of that before. Is a short but accurate summary of Swiss naturalization laws possible?	I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down.	"Intention to relinquish" means you actually meant to stop being a US citizen. In practice, the US assumes that normal people doing normal things don't want that. As described on the page you linked, there's an "administrative presumption" that you don't mean to give up US citizenship when you: become a citizen of another country, declare your allegiance to another country, join the military of a country that isn't at war with the US, or take a non-policy-level job with a foreign government. That means the State Department will assume you wanted to keep your citizenship unless you "affirmatively, explicitly, and unequivocally" say that you did not. In practice, if the issue comes up then the State Department will just ask you what your intention was and take you at your word. Unless you actually go to a US embassy or consulate and fill out a form saying "I do not want to be a US citizen any more," you don't really have to worry about it.	switzerland "Gutgläubiger Erwerb gestohlener Dinge" (buying of stolen goods in good faith) is a big topic in law. Different jurisdictions handle it differently, but most European (civil law) systems have some kind of rule that accept the ownership of a buyer in such a case. Here is a good article that compares different jurisdictions on exactly such an issue. Luxury watches are a kind of art. According to Swiss law (Art 934 ZGB), the item must be returned when discovered within 5 years of the theft. However, the rightful owner must pay for any expenses you had. Since the theft was more than 5 years ago, the watch is, in my opinion, rightfully yours. Since Blancpain is in Switzerland, they are obviously bound to Swiss law. Also, they are not the police, so they cannot seize an item. They can only safekeep it and report to the authorities. I would also contact a lawyer for help. It seems to me like a case you should win.	Yes, it is possible. The requirements are (1) you are a citizen (the burden is on the prospective juror to pay attention to that requirement) and (2) the court knows that you exist and calls you up for jury duty. Apart from voter registrations, drivers license data is also used (and can be dangerous, because non-citizens can have licenses and may not know that you must be a citizen to serve on a jury). Another source in unemployment benefits lists. The correlation with voter registration is one way of avoiding that problem. In fact, Florida law states that the list of candidates "shall be taken from the male and female persons at least 18 years of age who are citizens of the United States and legal residents of this state and their respective counties and who possess a driver license or identification card issued by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles", and does not sanction using voter lists. The Holmes County Supervisor of Elections confirms that only federal courts use voter lists, and state and local courts only use driver / ID card lists.	The granting of citizenship is expressly recognized in multiple places in the US Constitution. It would be incoherent if the prohibition on titles of nobility meant that the US could not confer citizenship on people. It would also be totally out of sync with any public understanding of "titles of nobility" at the time of the framing or today. The US has conferred citizenship by parentage to children born abroad since 1790, which is further indication that the nobility clause was not understood to preclude citizenship by parentage. The concern behind the nobility clauses was the creation of "super-citizens." As Joseph Story wrote in his Commentaries on the Constitution at Vol. 3, p. 215: [the nobility clause] seems scarcely to require even a passing notice. As a perfect equality is the basis of all our institutions, state and national, the prohibition against the creation of any titles of nobility seems proper, if not indespensible, to keep perpetually alive a just sense of this important truth. Distinctions between citizens, in regard to rank, would soon lay the foundation of odious claims and privileges, and silently subvert the spirit of independence and personal dignity, which are so often proclaimed to be the best security of a republican government. He cited Federalist No. 84, in which Alexander Hamilton wrote: Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated the corner-stone of republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people. The worry was that titles of nobility would undermine the republican system of government. I also question your premise that citizenship is "clearly hereditary in the U.S." As you say, the 14th Amendment guarantees citizenship to those merely born in the US and subject to its jurisdiction. For the vast majority of U.S. citizens, citizenship is based on their place of birth being in the U.S. Knowing that somebody is a citizen tells you nothing about their heritage.	germany Visitors in hotels must be registered and the hotel must keep the paperwork for a certain duration. According to §29 Bundesmeldegesetz, foreigners who are required to be named in their registry need to show an identity document (groups might have summary listings for some). There are some optional simplifications. Paying by credit card may count as identity verification. From context where this law is placed, it is not about interpersonal issues in the hotel. Germany requires all residents to register with their municipality of residence, and registering hotel visitors closes loopholes. §28 immediately before this is about sailors on river barges, §32 is about hospitals.	Citizenship is essentially an imaginary label that sovereign states assign to people to say "this person is one of us". How those imaginary labels are granted, recorded, proved, maintained etc. is up to the sovereign state to decide. I assume that citizenship is any time period in which all officers of a given state would agree to issue identification documents for that human. Not accurate. Identification documents simply identify persons. They may or may not convey information about citizenship. Some (like driver's licences) do not. Other (like alien's passports) explicitly mean that the holder is not a citizen of the issuing sovereign state. Conversely, having troubles to get a passport does not necessarily mean that the person is not a citizen. In some circumstances it may be difficult to prove citizenship (e.g. emigrated as an infant with no birth record), and court proceedings may be needed to convince the authorities.	It is legal, unless the laws of that state say otherwise. Governments are allowed to charge different tuitions to residents vs. non-residents. They can also require proof of residence (not just your say-so). Being physically present in a state for a couple of years is not proof of being a resident. That doesn't mean that the interrogation that you are getting is allowed by law, but it's at least consistent with the general pattern of out of state tuition laws in the US. If you have contradictory elements of "proof" (voter registration in another state), they can demand more evidence. It really depends on what the state laws are, so you could name the state. Also, the full financial disclosure may in fact not be related to tuition rates but to financial aid, where they can demand all sorts of things by way of proof.
Can copyrighted work be distributed for free if it was done so by the owner previously? Once upon a time a UK music band put one of their songs on their website for free download. Time has passed, the website has changed drastically and the song is not available there anymore. Neither it is sold by anyone anywhere. Would it be illegal for those who downloaded the song when it was available, to put it now on file sharing resources for free download?	It would be copyright infringement. You had the copyright holders permission to make one copy of the song by downloading it. At that time, if you gave me a copy of that song, it could be argued that very, very little damage was caused because I just had downloaded that song myself with practically the same effect. Today, that argument is not valid anymore. So this is definitely copyright infringement. That's your question answered. I doubt that anyone would take action if you gave a copy to someone and it was found out. Making it available to the world for free download is another matter. That could easily get you into trouble; in the USA there could be a fine up to $150,000 without any proof of actual damages needed.	Well, actually, fair use is maximally relevant. Copyright means, put simply, DO NOT COPY. Citing or not is irrelevant (plagiarism is a whole other non-legal kettle of fish). Technically, what you describe is violation of copyright. However, under section 107 of Title 17 (the copyright law), you could attempt to defend yourself against an infringement suit on the basis that your action was "fair use". See this LSE q&a for the essentials of fair use.	No It says right on the page you linked: These downloads are not public domain, as they are parts of content that has already been licensed and distributed. Although using these downloads may be permissible as long as the project itself falls under the rule of "Fair Use," it is ill-advised to use these downloads for any project intended for profitable gain or commercial advertisement, unless otherwise stated by Kyutwo.com.	Easy. Don't put your name on it in the first place and state "The copyright owner grants a perpetual, non-exclusive, royalty-free licence to anyone provided that it is not attributed to the author."	Go to court and find out There is no doubt that humming a tune and recording it (or performing it in public) is a derivative work - a right reserved to the copyright owner. Whether it is fair use depends on the specifics of the case. From the tweet, we simply don’t have enough information, however, at a guess, it is probably not fair use. Fair use in law is Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include: the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Most people miss “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,” - if you aren’t doing one of those things then you start behind the 8-ball when yo move to the 4 factor test. Note that the “criticism, comment, news reporting,” etc. must be about the copyrighted work - I can’t use your copyrighted work to, for example, parody a politician unless you are that politician. Many people have completely the wrong idea about what copyright infringement and fair use actually are, in part because the use of music on YouTube is allowed, not because it’s fair use but, because YouTube was smart enough to negotiate and pay for a permissive licence with music producers. For a full explanation, see this video.	It is, in most jurisdictions, not a crime to download YouTube videos. For criminal law, the answer is that it is not illegal. In many jurisdictions, downloading music or video of any kind from the internet is not a crime. Thus, police has no power to punish you for downloading, and even less power to shutdown such "downloader" websites. YouTube's Terms of Service seem to disallow such downloads so YouTube has the right to terminate the agreement with the downloader. They may prevent you from viewing any more videos, for example. However, I think Google does not even have a technical measure in place to do that. Google is not interested in preventing you from using YouTube (its servers can handle that) and that is pretty much the only punishment it can use. Google could use the Terms of Services to say that the downloader-websites are breaking them and thus should not have access to YouTube. The websites could be sued for breaking the Terms of Services (and the court could order them to stop) and Google can block those websites from accessing YouTube by technical measures. It appears it did so in at least one case. Google could sue you (or the websites) for advertisement revenue loss, but it is unlikely. In theory, Google loses advertisement revenue from the video playbacks you would have done on YouTube but did not play because you downloaded the video and played it offline (contrary to the Terms of Service). Google might attempt to sue a downloader website on this basis and try to make it give it money. It would be difficult for Google to prove that it deserves such money, though. I cannot imagine how it would prove that "you would have played the video online, again, with advertisements, if you didn't download it. Note that when you replay a video from browser cache, advertisements do not replay. Why Google doesn't sue downloader-website more often? It's expensive. Google could pay a lot of money to shut down a website via court order but if it really wants to do so, they can apply a technical measure (such as IP block) instead. It is much cheaper and has the same effect. This may change in the near future. There's a some talk around about European court rulings and directives that may change this. It is quite possible that in the near future, even viewing illegally uploaded music on YouTube will be criminal. I find this doubtful because of the difficulty of proving knowledge ("How was I supposed to know that it wasn't an official clip?"). As for whether downloading to a file (as opposed to downloading to the browser cache) will become criminal, I really doubt that.	You can report it to the publisher(s) Protection of copyright is a matter for the individual rights holder: some (I’m looking at you Disney) are vigilant, thorough and draconian in protecting their rights, others don’t care at all. Unless you are the rights holder it’s none of your business. In much the same way that the guy charging your neighbour for 4 hours gardening but being long gone in 2 isn’t. If you like your neighbour or feel duty bound to do something, you tell them and then leave it to them what they do with it. This is not a matter for the authorities as it doesn’t rise to the level of criminal copyright infringement. Just like the gardener above, this isn’t a crime.	Generally, as the copyright holder, you can grant anyone a license to any or all of the copyright rights you have over your work (copying, distribution, derivative works, etc.). If you want to articulate unambiguously exactly what rights you are licensing, and optionally require attribution, you could use one of the Creative Commons licenses, which are designed for creative works. Some that would likely be a good fit for you are: Creative Commons Attribution license (CC BY) - Grants full rights to any recipient to use, modify, and distribute. Requires that all reuse mentions you somewhere in the work's credits. Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike license (CC BY-SA) - Grants the same full rights as the CC BY license except that any new derivative work made by a recipient must also be licensed under the CC BY-SA license. With the CC BY license, another person's modifications could be under a different license; under CC BY-SA, all modifications must be licensed under CC BY-SA when distributed, so the work and all its future transformations must be shared under the CC BY-SA license, forever (until your copyright expires, of course). This falls under the broad umbrella of copyleft licenses. CC0 - Functionally places your work in the public domain where it can be used by anyone with no restrictions (other than moral rights). CC0 allows you to renounce all claim to copyright on your work (to whatever extent possible in your jurisdiction), and/or freely license all the rights you hold in your work to the maximum extent possible (for jurisdictions where renouncing your copyright is not possible). There are also Creative Commons licenses that disallow commercial use and disallow the creation of derivative works, but you are probably not interested in those, since you want to grant full rights. One other factor to consider is whether you want to license the musical work itself or only the sound recording. By default, you might only be licensing the recording, which means other people cannot record a new cover of your music. (See Does a Creative Commons license allow me to record a cover of a song recording?) If you want to allow that, simply make a separate declaration when you license the work, saying something like, "In addition to the sound recording(s), I also license the underlying musical work under identical terms, to allow recipients to record their own covers based on this song."
How do I authenticate that a warrant and its bearers are authentic? Questions... How can I tell if the warrant is authentic and authorized by an authentic court? How can I identify that the persons approaching me with the warrant are indeed authorized law enforcement officers? Am I legally allowed to confirm the above before complying with the contents of the warrant? I live in Massachusetts.	Your attorney can help you answer those questions, if necessary. Generally, you cannot know for certain. Mass. criminal procedure rule 6 covers arrest warrants – the Superior court can issue an arrest warrant. That warrant must be "signed" by the issuing official, will have the name or other reasonable means of identifying the subject, and the offense charged. An electronic signature is a signature. If the arresting officer does not have the warrant at the time of arrest, the arrest may proceed anyhow, and if he has the warrant, he shall on request show it to the defendant as soon as possible. If the officer does not have the warrant on him, he shall inform the defendant that a warrant has been issued. There is no practical way to look at a warrant and determine that is is a real warrant as opposed to a fake document created by thugs. There is no statute under which a person can resist arrest until they are satisfied that the arrest is by a legitimate officer and that the document was properly issued by the court. If there was no proper warrant, the arrest will probably be found unlawful and you will be set free until a proper warrant is issued. It would be unlawful for thugs to take you (impersonating an officer is a crime), and that is as far as the law goes. Ch. 267 of Massachusetts General Laws lays out the law regarding warrants, and those laws focus on the conditions for legally issuing a warrant, not for convincing a person that a warrant, search or arrest is legitimate. You may certainly attempt to confirm that the warrant and officer are real, but you cannot resist the search or arrest if you are not satisfied.	Since you don't say which country you're in, it's likely that you're interested in United States law. You are probably in the clear here, though you're getting close enough to the edge of breaking the law that I wouldn't be confident about not being prosecuted and/or convicted. The relevant laws in this case appear to be 18 USC 471, 18 USC 472, and perhaps 18 USC 514. All three of them begin "Whoever, with the intent to defraud...". It's questionable whether creating counterfeit money as a burglar decoy counts as defrauding the burglar.	Try the phone or email contacts at Florida Department of Law Enforcement - Home. The state of Florida doesn't appear to maintain a statewide officer registry, but that department should be able to verify someone is or isn't a officer in conjunction with the police department closest to your location. If this neighbor is threatening or attempting to enforce the law while not showing ID that proves he/she is an officer, that's serious, and you should call the local police department. Talking about being a LEO while drinking beer at a BBQ is less serious, but still could be a third degree felony. See Statutes & Constitution - Florida State Statutes: 843.08 False personation.—A person who falsely assumes or pretends to be a firefighter, sheriff, officer of the Florida Highway Patrol, officer of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, fire or arson investigator of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Financial Services, officer of the Department of Corrections, correctional probation officer, deputy sheriff, state attorney or assistant state attorney, statewide prosecutor or assistant statewide prosecutor, state attorney investigator, coroner, police officer, lottery special agent or lottery investigator, beverage enforcement agent, or watchman, or any member of the Florida Commission on Offender Review and any administrative aide or supervisor employed by the commission, or any personnel or representative of the Department of Law Enforcement, or a federal law enforcement officer as defined in s. 901.1505, and takes upon himself or herself to act as such, or to require any other person to aid or assist him or her in a matter pertaining to the duty of any such officer, commits a felony of the third degree,	There is a good amount of case law addressing this question going back two centuries. Legally, as soon as you are subject to "excessive force," you are allowed to defend yourself as you would against any assault, even if that force is being used in the course of an otherwise lawful arrest. Furthermore, in some states you are still allowed to resist unlawful arrest. Unfortunately, the matter is no longer as clear as it used to be. (There is a lot of material on this subject; just search for resisting unlawful arrest.) For example, police reflexively invoke a virtual safe harbor by shouting, "Stop resisting!" while battering arrest subjects. Video evidence has uncovered a plethora of examples in which this was done to subjects who were not only not resisting, but even later determined to have been incapable of resisting. If you intend to defend yourself against police, even when justified by law, you need to realize that the system is stacked against you. Police carry the means of escalating to lethal force. So, for example, if you are being beaten but you are potentially able to physically overpower and restrain an officer, you will likely then be met with baton blows or tasers. Since a baton is a deadly weapon, you would be (in theory) justified in shooting an officer attacking you with one. But as soon as any officer shouts "gun!" you will be shot, and most likely killed. Police seem to be given the benefit of the doubt by prosecutors and grand juries when they claim, "I feared for my life." You (even if you survive) will likely have any such claim subject to a full criminal trial. So even though you can legally defend yourself against excessive police force, these days you will almost certainly be unable to in practice.	As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them.	Let's say you leave fake drugs in someone's yard. Eg, you expect the police to be dumb enough to believe it and arrest the other person Obstructing a public officer, specifically "deliberately hindering a public officer from carrying out official duties". Trespassing.	Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible.	I'm not aware of case law on point, other than Riley, which you mention (which doesn't mean that there isn't any - I'm not a specialist in this area). But, I think that the answer would be that you do have an expectation of privacy because the Riley holding that there was an expectation of privacy in a smart phone didn't really hinge in any meaningful way on the existence of a password. The linked summary of the Riley decision explains the court's reasoning as follows: Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonable. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the legislature enact laws that draw reasonable distinctions regarding when and what information within a phone can be reasonably searched following an arrest. The 4th Amendment expressly protects "papers" in your possession, which can't be password protected, and a smart phone file is analogous to a "paper" for 4th Amendment purposes. Your expectation of privacy in an unlocked smart phone flows from your exclusive possession of the phone as a piece of tangible personal property containing information, and not just from the password protection. In the same vein, I don't think that you would need to have a lock on a diary to have an expectation of privacy in it. This said, this is a cutting edge area of the law and password protection for a smart phone provides both more practical protection and potentially a less ambiguous cases of legal protection from search (since it brings you closer to the facts of Riley), and is therefore still a good idea.
Is it unlawful to receive a photocopied book? In the following, all parties live and all actions are taken entirely within the United States. Let us say that a person (Bob) has purchased a book from the book store. Bob likes the book enough to give one or more copies to friends. Bob does not want to part with his own copy, and Bob does not want to pay more than he already has, so Bob photocopies the book and gives the copy to Sue. Sue knows that the copy she is receiving is a copied book that Bob made for her and that copying an entire book is a copyright violation in the United States. Still, Sue accepts the book, reads it, and enjoys it enough that she passes it along to Alice. Alice knows that the copy she is receiving is a copied book and that copying an entire book is a copyright violation in the United States, though she is not aware of its origins. Still, Alice accepts the book, reads it, and enjoys it. In doing my research, I can easily see that Bob has violated the copyright. In trying to figure out whether Sue or Alice are also in violation, all the material I am finding is focusing entirely on the act of reproducing the work or of giving it away. I am having difficulty finding anything about receiving such a copied work. I understand that Sue and Alice could possibly be held accountable for being complicit if they requested the book, especially if Bob copied the book as a direct consequence of such a request. For the purposes of this question, I would like to ignore the "complicit in Bob's copying" aspect of this situation. Is accepting the book a violation of anything (except being complicit, as mentioned above)? Especially, does is it a violation of copyright? Does the answer change at all between Sue and Alice since Alice can see the book is copied, knows Sue herself did not copy it, but knows nothing of its origins? Since the receivers of copies are rarely targeted by the copyright holders (or publishers) and generally the illegal distributors are targeted instead, I realize that this may not have been pressed in court, and maybe never will be. If that is the case, "There is no precedent." could be an acceptable answer, and it would explain why I cannot find an answer. However, I expect that there are at least some cases where a precedent of some sort was set and that they are merely being drowned out by all the other information.	Under 17 USC 106 (3) one of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner is: to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; Distributing an entire book cannot plausibly be considered to be fair use. Nor does the library exception apply. The exception in sec 109 (first sale doctrine) applies only to: the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner... 17 USC 501 (a) says: (a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. Therefore both Bob and Sue have infringed the copyright, and could in theory be sued for doing so. However I cannot see anything in 17USC which makes receiving an unlawful copy an infringement, or any other crime or tort. It seems to me that Alice has no legal liability, whatever her moral position may be, unless perhaps she could be charged with conspiracy to infringe the copyright, which seems unlikely to me in practice, and perhaps not possible even in theory. If Bob has in fact done this only once, for one book, the chancre of the copyright owner learning of it, or filing suit even if the owner does learn, is perhaps not large. But that would be no defense if the owner chose to sue. Some copyright owners choose to explicitly permit actions similar to that of Bob (where e-books are involved), provided that Bob does not charge a fee, regarding it as good advertising. But that is the copyright owner's choice to make, and most commercial publishers do not take that position. Bob could have legally loaned his copy to Sue, and Sue could have legally passed it on to Alice, without anyone infringing the copyright. Making the copy without permission was infringing, and passing on the unlawful copy was also an act of infringement. Receiving one copy or many does not seem to be a violation, unless it is part of a plan to later distribute unlawful copies. Sue did not make a copy. She distributed an unlawful copy, which is also infringement, as the quoted part of Sec 106 says. While in theory the publisher could have authorized Bob to make the copy, this is not plausible and no reasonable person would believe this to be an authorized copy. So Sue has good reason to believe that the copy is unauthorized. So the distribution is infringement.	In fact, the first recognition of the First Sale doctrine came about precisely because a publisher attempted to do something of the nature of what you suggest. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. vs Straus, the Bobbs-Merrill Corporation attempted to enforce the following restriction, printed on the inside of a book it published: "The price of this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright." They made the mistake of attempting to enforce it against, among others, R.H. Macy and Co., who they then had to take to court - and lost. This established the First Sale Doctrine, which then later (in 1976) was codified (in 17 U.S. Code § 109. Textbooks recently tested another element of this; in the 2013 case, Kirtsaeng v John Wiley and Sons Inc., the Supreme Court held that the First Sale doctrine trumped a notice forbidding selling a book outside of a particular territory or region (Kirtsaeng imported textbooks from Thailand, where they were much cheaper than in the US, and resold them at a profit in the US).	Yes, except for the part where you say "thus". Copyright protection isn't limited to published works, though in the past this was the case with US law. Current US law defines publication as the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication. Web distribution is one way to distribute a protected work. The distinction between published and unpublished works matters in terms of registration requirements, it figures into the question of the nationality of the author, the duration of protection for a work for hire and (pseudo)anonymous works, as well as the duration of protection for works created before January 1, 1978 but first published between then and January 1, 2003, and so on. The US Copyright office provides guidance that derives from court cases, and they have this to say about published vs. unpublished. They give as an example of publication ("Offering to Distribute Copies or Phonorecords to a Group of Persons") Publication occurs when copies of a photograph are offered to clients, including but not limited to newspapers, magazines, agencies, wire services, and websites with a license permitting further distribution or display of the photograph. also An offer by the copyright owner on a public website to purchase and download an app that they developed and made accessible on that website constitutes publication of that app. German copyright law makes mention of "publication" as well, for instance The right of publication and of exploitation of the work accrues jointly to the joint authors; alterations to the work shall be permissible only with the consent of the joint authors. However, a joint author may not refuse his consent to publication, exploitation or alteration contrary to the principles of good faith. Each joint author shall be entitled to assert claims arising from violations of the joint copyright; he may, however, demand performance only to all of the joint authors. §6 says that (1) A work shall be deemed to have been published when it has been made available to the public with the consent of the rightholder. (2) A work shall be deemed to have been released when copies of the work have been offered, with the rightholder’s consent, to the public or brought to the market after their production in sufficient quantity. An artistic work shall also be deemed to have been released when the original or a copy of the work has been made permanently available to the public with the consent of the rightholder. One would have to inquire into the specifics of German law to know if "putting one copy on a website" constitutes being brought to the market after production in sufficient quantity.	If you're in the USA, this almost certainly falls under fair use, or if you are in another jurisdiction, it almost certainly falls under an analogous exception for educational use. The fact that the excerpt is short contributes to this conclusion. You can also avoid having to rely even on these exceptions by choosing sources that are in the public domain. The specific date before which a work is guaranteed to be in the public domain depends, again, on your jurisdiction, but it's probably sometime in the early 20th century. For example, you're certainly on solid ground if you use Dickens.	Summary Downloading from the internet constitutes an act of reproduction according to EU law, however The EU allows Member States to implement an exception permitting personal-use copies from lawful sources, and Germany implements such an exception, but Germany's personal-use exception is narrower than the base EU exception and doesn't generally apply in this case. Note: My answer concerns whether or not the private copying exception applies to the download specified in the question. There could be other avenues to explore, such as Section 60c mentioned in the question and phoog's answer. Downloading as an act of reproduction As a literary work, a scientific monograph is given protection against unauthorized acts of reproduction by the EU's Copyright Directive in Article 2. This includes an end user downloading from the internet. While it was surprisingly difficult to find an authoritative direct statement to that effect (most sources just assume this to be true), the Filmspeler ruling contains such language in paragraph 22 and paragraphs 69-72. The EU's private copy exception Despite the protection given by Article 2, Article 5(2)(b), henceforth the private copy exception, is one way to legally create copies without authorization. It allows Member States to enact exceptions: (b) in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, [...1] While this provides a baseline for private copy, in order to fully understand its scope, we must examine the landmark ACI Adam ruling. In it, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the private copy exception cannot apply when the source of the reproduction is unlawful (paragraphs 56-58). Additionally, according to analysis by Eleonora Rosati on the the IPKat blog, ACI Adam clarified that Member States cannot expand on the allowed copyright exceptions, they can only make them more narrow. Following just the baseline EU private copy exception, the download specified in the question is legal provided that the source is lawful2. Germany's private copy exception Germany transposes the baseline EU private copy exception into section 53(1) of its copyright act (German link, footnotes are mine): (1) It shall be permissible for a natural person to make single copies of a work for private use on any medium, insofar as they neither directly nor indirectly serve commercial purposes, as long as no obviously unlawfully-produced model3 or a model which has been unlawfully made available to the public4 is used for copying. [...] While private copying is therefore generally allowed in Germany, it implements a limiting exception to the private copy exception in section 53(4) as allowed by ACI Adam. The clause prevents unauthorized non-manual copies in the case of sheet music, periodicals, and books, unless they've been out of print for 2 years. Therefore in Germany, the download in question is only legal under the private copying exception if the source is not obviously unlawful and the book has been out of print for at least 2 years. Footnotes Two other restrictions on private copy not particularly relevant to this question. One is not circumventing technological locks, the other is that the rightholder must receive "fair compensation." In practice, this isn't handled by the private copier, but by collection societies which get funds from levies on storage media then redistributes them to rightholders. However, while I've not found a reference for it, I highly suspect the downloading of an entire in-commerce book would be found to violate the Berne three-step test, implemented in the EU in Article 5(5), which requires that copyright exceptions only apply in "certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder." The edges of "obviously unlawful" are a little fuzzy. In ACI Adam, it was determined at the EU level that the private copying exception must only apply to lawful sources, and so the German law might be inconsistent with EU law. Reading through the decision, however, the logic could also apply to sources which appear to be lawful so there's still hope for the German law. This is (debatably) the approach that was taken in Filmspeler. However, that ruling didn't address Article 5(2)(b), but Article 5(1), the temporary reproduction exception. If you're interested, I have a lengthy answer discussing the Filmspeler ruling. The translation here is poor and perhaps that's because it's not 100% clear in German either (I'm not fluent, I'd rate myself weak intermediate). Online sources conflict as to the exact meaning of this clause. Some say this clause prevents download from any public source, others only if it was made publicly available in an obviously illegal manner. I would lean towards the latter because that's closer to what the Justice Ministry thinks (German link). Editing note: This answer has changed significantly since its original posting. This is partly because I failed to notice section 53(4) the first time around, but mostly because of the incredible amount of intelligent comments and chat the original posting generated.	Canada In Canada, "the author of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein" (Copyright Act § 13(1)). Also, "[w]here the author of a work was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service or apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person, the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright" (Copyright Act § 13(3)). Nothing in your description of the situation describes to me an employer/employee relationship, so in my opinion, § 13(3) is not implicated. Even if there were an agreement or contract to transfer copyright to an LLC or assign it to the other individuals, absent an actual writen assignment, the original owner still owns the copyright. "[N]o assignment or grant is valid unless it is in writing signed by the owner of the right..." (Copyright Act § 13(4)). In University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd, there was a contract that required assignment of copyright. "The examiner was the first owner, and he has not assigned the copyright in writing signed by him or his agent. The copyright therefore remains in the examiners, subject to the obligation under the contract of employment to assign it to the University or as it may direct." Even though copyright was owed to the University, it didn't become theirs until the written assignment took place. United States Similarly, in the US, "Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work.", and "in the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author" (17 U.S.C § 201). "A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent." (17 U.S.C § 204) Conclusion In both Canada and the US, transfer of copyright requires an affirmative act (a written, signed document, or a note or memorandum, etc.) Since nothing in your description indicates that the author has prepared a signed, written, instrument of conveyance or note or memorandum of the transfer of copyright, the copyright still belongs to the original author.	US copyright law does not distinguish "personal use" from "non-personal use", though it does distinguish commercial from non-commercial, where stronger sanctions can arise from commercial infringement – which can include "private financial gain". Copying a whole book which you own is copying which is what define infringement, and because of the extent of copying, it is unlikely to be found to be fair use. There is a special provision for software in 17 USC 117 that allows for making backup copies, which is not applicable to physical books. You are not a statutory archive, which is another escape hatch.	Unless the work has entered the public domain (after the copyright expires, or if a copyright notice or renewal was omitted when these were required, or in other ways) there is always an owner of the copyright. If the copyright was retained by the author, who has died, than the author's heir(s) own it. (If there are no other heirs, it becomes the property of the state. This is known as escheating.) If the author has sold or assigned the copyright (say to a publisher) then the buyer or assignee owns it. If the owner is a business that has ceased to operate, but has not sold the copyright, then the shareholders or proprietor has the right to sell or license it (technically the business still owns it). If the business goes through legal bankruptcy, the copyright would be sold, possibly as a part of "and all its other assets and good will", or else would escheat to the state. It can be hard to find the copyright to a work long unpublished. The original author may have died, and the author's heirs may be hard to track. The copyright may have been sold, and the sale may not have been properly recorded. In the US, the Copyright Office maintains records that try to identify the copyright owner of all registered copyrights. The office will search these, for a fee, but there is not always a correct or useful answer. Under current US law, if one cannot find the correct owner of a copyright, and secure permission to use it, one is simply out of luck (except for musing, where a compulsory license is available for some uses at a government-specified fee). Any use is then infringement (unless it is a fair use) and the owner could always turn up and sue. The term "orphan works" has been applied to works whose copyright owner is unknown and hard to find. The same term is also applied to works whose copyright holder is known, but which are long out of print and unlikely to be reprinted, particularly when there is no paying market for them. In the US, there have been several proposals for dealing with "orphan works" by granting a compulsory licensee for them, or by declaring them to be in the public domain, or by taxing them and declaring them to be PD if he tax goes unpaid. None of these have been passed into law in the US, nor have similar proposals been made law in any other country that I know of. (declaring Orphan works PD might cause a problem under the Berne Convention.) To be honest, as there is little economic value in orphan works, no one will spend much money or energy in lobbying for such a law, and the industries that make their money via copyright (music and film in particular) are often suspicious of and automatically oppose anything that weakens copyright in any way, or seems to. In any case, no such law has yet passed. (Edit I now learn that Canada and the EU have laws giving access to orphan works under some circumstances, and other countries may have such laws.) It is true that the owner of the copyright on an orphan work may well be unlikely to sue for infringement of that copyright. The owner may not even know that s/he owns the copyright. But a user could never by fully safe, because the owner (or a new owner after a transfer) could always choose to sue for any continuing infringement, and any past one if the statute of limitations has not run out. This answer is largely based on knowledge of US law, but I believe that this situation is basically the same in most countries.
On what grounds can Instagram contest the use of the domain name slutsofinstagram.com? A Reddit user registered the domain name slutsofinstagram.com, and has created a kind of parody cover story (Reddit; Imgur): Welcome to Slütsof In Stagrâm an online fantasy series about a Princess duck named Slütsof and her adventurous journey across the mystical lands of Stâgram. Instagram allegedly sent this user a letter (image) asking them to which alludes to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). As a lay person, I cannot determine how the ACPA would apply in this specific case (if at all), and in particular it seems to fail the condition: ... has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark ... 15 U.S. Code § 1125 - False designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden Question: On what grounds can Instagram contest the use of the domain name slutsofinstagram.com? I found Trademarked name in domain name, but the answer there seems practical: they can just bully to get their way with expensive lawsuits. I'm interested in the theoretical here: if they have actual grounds.	The theoretical is that the domain slutsofinstagram.com does dilute or harm Instagram's mark because of the use of "Instagram" in the domain and because of the unwanted association of the parody story; that's the theory and "grounds" that Instagram would use in their lawsuit. Instagram would have to prove their theory of dilution or harm to the jury or judge, and convince either that the harm is not theoretical but real and financially damaging in order to win their case. The owners of slutsofinstagram.com would have to defend themselves and argue that they are not damaging Instagram's mark and their parody is a parody and is protected as such. Any actual court outcome is also theoretical. If Instagram won their case, one of the legal remedies could be the court ordering the owner of slutsofinstagram.com to transfer ownership of the domain to Instagram so they could simply park the domain and effectively take down the parody story. Or, the owner of slutsofinstagram.com could prevail because they argued the fact - and the court agreed - that the domain name and creative contents of the site is a parody and is protected speech and doesn't dilute Instagram's mark because any reasonable person could see that the site is a parody and not related to Instagram. In the US, a possible example of a parody not diluting a mark is L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987), where Imitation may be the highest form of flattery, but plaintiff-appellee L.L. Bean, Inc., was neither flattered nor amused when High Society magazine published a prurient parody of Bean's famous catalog. The reality is that Instagram can contest the use of slutsofinstagram.com because they can; they have deep pockets and can take the owner of slutsofinstagram.com to court, like any other trademark holder can contest another's trademark. The owner of slutsofinstagram.com would have to defend themselves in court, or settle - possibly for monetary damages or the ownership of the domain or use of slutsofinstagram - and not go to court. It's possible that the SLAPP (Strategic lawsuit against public participation - Wikipedia) California law could help the plaintiff defend themselves against a deep pocket lawsuit designed to kill the parody site - as the suit would be "intended to censor, intimidate, and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon their criticism or opposition" - which could happen because Instagram is part of Facebook and is incorporated in California. But basically, in the legal world, one man's litigation bully is another man's trademark protection hero. This concerns the US. As always, your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction and national/international laws and agreements concerning trademarks.	Quoting content may or may not constitute copyright infringement, depending on the various factors that go into the fair use defense. Short quotes which are made for the purpose of discussion, research and commentary and not for copy would be squarely in the domain of "fair use" under US law. That means that the copyright owner would not succeed in suing you for quoting them: under the statutory mechanism for recognizing his right to his intellectual product, there is a limit on how much control he can exert over your behavior (since the two of you have not worked out some kind of agreement -- copyright law creates rights even when there is no contract). As for Facebook, you have a contract with them, embodied in the terms of service. You have been given permission to access material that they host (permission is required, under copyright law), and their permission is conditional. It says "you may access stuff on our platform only as long as you do X": if that includes a clause "don't be nasty", then that limits your right to speak freely and be as nasty as you'd like. If it says "don't quote even a little", that means you cannot quote even a little, even when you would have the statutory right to quote a little (or, to be nasty). Fair use would mean that you can't be sued for copyright infringement of the stuff that you quoted a little of. You can, however, be expelled from Facebook. You probably cannot be sued for "accessing Facebook without permission". There is a federal law against unauthorized access of computer networks, and there was a failed attempt to construe violation of a TOS as "unauthorized access" – it isn't. But accessing Facebook necessarily involves copying (that's how computers work), and there is no "fair use" defense whereby everybody has a fair use right to access Facebook. Theoretically you could be sued for copyright infringement, for accessing Facebook's intellectual property without permission. Also, Facebook can rescind your permission to access their content (see this case), and once you have been banned, it is a crime to further access their network. This assumes that there is no overriding limit on contracts that would nullify a no-quoting condition. There is no such limit on contracts in the US, so such a contract would be enforceable. There is also nothing illegal (unenforceable) about a TOS which prohibits automated methods of access.	To examine this further and answer your question, we need to look at Copyright (and fair use) as well as Defamation. Alas, I am unsure as to how taking legitimate headlines from around the world and attributing their source is 'fake news' - but I'll accept that it's 'fake news' for the purposes of exploring this topic. A lot of the potential (or motive) for a person or company to litigate against you will be context specific and detailed to how you have used their work and portray their journalists and characters - misquotes etc. As an exception to British copyright law, fair dealing is governed by Sections 29 and 30 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, which outlines three instance where fair dealing is a legitimate defence: If the use is for the purposes of research or private study; If it is used for the purposes of criticism, review or quotation; Where it is utilised for the purposes of reporting current events (this does not apply to photographs) However, where you may come into problems is: A statutory definition for fair dealing does not exist; it will always be a matter of fact, degree and interpretation in every fair use case. Nor is there a percentage or quantitative measure to determine fair dealing. The Intellectual Property Office lists the key factors used to determine the validity of whether a particular dealing with a work is fair as follows: Has the use of the work impacted negatively on the market for the original work? If the creator or owner has lost potential revenue through the re-use of their work, it is not likely to be fair. Was it reasonable and necessary to use the amount of work that was taken? Also: Fair use for parody, caricature or pastiche The UK copyright law on fair use of works for the purposes of creating a parody or pastiche is also listed in Section 30A, Schedule 2 (2A) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. References to all here. Guidance from the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) states that fair use needs to be “fair and proportionate” and does not protect an individual from any other rights an author may have. Those other rights may involve claiming defamation if this material creates fake news and uses the names of real journalists or companies etc - and if they allege that your AI fake news has caused serious harm in any way to their reputation - they could sue you for breach of the Defamation Act 2013. All of this is entirely contextual however as to how your AI might display or make fake news and how Google caches it and displays it - and if it could be portrayed as 'real' or believable for example. You are also doing this at a time where 'anti fake news' law is evolving... and even though you say it's fake news for AI experiment purposes - it's a growing field of concern for many. (see here) Copyright law is a vast and evolving area - and nothing is clear cut. It really depends if a major news company didn't like what you were doing and took exception to it and issued challenges on many areas of law based on that.	In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost.	I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies.	It may not be libel, but it may violate other statutes and may support a judgement against the person publishing this information as long as there is an injury-in-fact ("an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"). A recent case, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins 578 U.S. ___ (2016) considered the case where a company created a profile for a person. That profile stated "that he is married, has children, is in his 50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent, and holds a graduate degree". The plaintiff asserted that all of this was incorrect. The plaintiff made a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act because the information was false. However, mere violation of statute is not sufficient to meet the "injury-in-fact" requirement for standing. Congress can't create standing via statute. Injury-in-fact still requires a "concrete" injury. This does not need to be a physical, tangible injury. But, it does need to be concrete. On its own, publication of false information, even when statute prohibits it, does not create standing. There must be an injury-in-fact.	The purpose of that disclaimer is not to prevent reprimands or legal action. It's really as simple as it appears -- it's to inform the readers that the tweets in fact contain the opinion of the person who wrote them and are not intended to be understood as the official position as that person's employer. This is especially important for people who occasionally or frequently convey their employer's official position. It's not supposed to be some kind of magic word that causes something to happen. It's just an attempt to convey accurate information and avoid misunderstandings.	Impersonation Giving a false name, or impersonating someone, is not in all cases illegal. However, doing so in order to obtain a financial or other benefit, or in order to unfairly deprive someone else of advantages might well constitute fraud. This is usually grounds for a civil lawsuit, but in some cases may be a criminal offense, depending on the jurisdiction and the detailed facts. Trademark The names of businesses, products, and services are often protected as trademarks. Using a trademark, or a confusingly similar word, phrase, or graphic, in order to create confusion or induce a consumer to falsely believe that ones is affiliated with or endorsed by the trademark holder is normally trademark infringement, and can subject the infringer to a lawsuit. However if such unauthorized use of a trademark is not done "in commerce", that is not identifying or promoting a product or service, it may not be trademark infringement. In any case, trademark infringement is a tort, not a crime. This means that the trademark holder may sue an infringer if the holder so chooses. But the police will not normally arrest someone for trademark infringement, nor does a third party who is not the holder have a right to bring a legal action for trademark infringement. Crime If the impersonation is part of a scam intended to gain financial benefits improperly, that may well be a crime. As such it can be reported to law enforcement. It is generally up to the law enforcement agencies or government prosecutors which crimes to prosecute, and which ones to leave alone. There authorities have limited resources of money and personnel. Attempted scams where no money or value was gained by the scammers are often not of high priority. The victim cannot force the authorities to take action in most jurisdictions.
Is "If it's not forbidden, it's permitted" codified somewhere? "If something is not forbidden by law, then it is allowed" is a principle that is usually taken for granted in everyday life. For example, there is no law explicitly permitting me to wear a top hat, but there is no law against it either, so wearing a top hat is permitted "by default". Does this principle actually have a formal foundation in law?	Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal).	Leonard's law says that the school can restrict speech if it is against the religious tenets of the organization. Now I don't think school uniforms fall are part of the tenets of Catholicism, so why can private schools enforce dress codes? I see there's a misunderstanding of the Leonard's law. But I fault the California legislators (not you) for that confusion, since the statutory language is ambiguous and leads to the reasonable interpretation your inquiry reflects. The statute reads: (c) This section does not apply to a private postsecondary educational institution that is controlled by a religious organization, to the extent that the application of this section would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the organization. It is not that a religious school is allowed to restrict speech if it contravenes the tenets of that religion, but that the statute altogether is inapplicable to religious schools because it is considered an infringement of fundamental liberties to which religious institutions are entitled in the US. The [religious] school would prevail on the basis of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. See Dermody v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 530 S.W.3d 467, 474 (2017): The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine prohibits courts from deciding cases "dependent on the question of doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical law, rule, or custom, or church government[.]". (Please note that I strongly disagree with the application of that doctrine in the Dermody case and I consider it impermissibly outdated for the controversy litigated therein, but that is a separate issue). A religious school could convincingly argue that the judicial review of its uniforms policy infringes matters of ecclesiastical discipline/rule/custom, aspects which ultimately "involve an internal church dispute over religious authority or dogma" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 220 (2005). Infringements of ecclesiastical abstention and akin doctrines would be outweighed only in "compelling" [cases] because "the duty to prosecute persons who commit serious crimes is part and parcel of the government's `paramount responsibility for the general safety and welfare of all its citizens'" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct. at 225 (brackets added in this answer). A free speech controversy such as the school's uniform policy simply does not meet that threshold.	§1 states what the design of the flag shall be (§2 mandates addition of stars when a new state is added). In essence, 4 USC 1-2 define what the flag is, and the rest of that chapter addresses what you can do with it. These are laws (passed by Congress), not rules or customs. That is, it's not a custom that the flag is 50 starts and 13 stripes, it's the law. POTUS cannot unilaterally change the law. (4 USC 3 also specifies punishments for certain kinds of flag abuse, and this too is outside the scope of that the president can do by declaration). 4 USC 5 in fact states that "The flag of the United States for the purpose of this chapter shall be defined according to sections 1 and 2 of this title", and that The following codification of existing rules and customs pertaining to the display and use of the flag of the United States of America is established for the use of such civilians or civilian groups or organizations as may not be required to conform with regulations promulgated by one or more executive departments of the Government of the United States. §§6-9 specify standard flag etiquette (violation of which incurs no legal punishment), and those are the rules that the president can rewrite.	The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.	There isn't enough information to give a reliable answer in the abstract. It is a hard concept for lots of people to understand, but words don't have the same meaning in every context. Law is not physics or chemistry. Words that mean one thing in a particular instrument or statute could mean another thing somewhere else, even if exactly the same words are used. More context would be helpful in determining a meaning. It could be a reference to a type of use, like AirBnB or other short term rentals (e.g. use as a hotel or hostel). It could also be a reference to a type of building that is not permanent such as tents, RVs, or other non-permanent structures intended for residential occupancy. Usually, a look at what the adjacent and framing language of the covenants say would clarify the intent as would some sense of the kind of structures built or intended to be built in the vicinity. It also isn't clear from context if the emphasis is on "residential" (e.g. in a property with a storage facility included), or on "temporary" (e.g. in a posh suburb).	The First Amendment essentially prohibits the establishment of a list of approved vs. not-approved religions. There is a large body of First Amendment case law that relates to claimed religious beliefs, and the restriction that the government cannot prohibit a person from exercising their religious beliefs. The courts therefore avoid bright-line answers to the question. You can look at Friedman v. Southern Cal. Permanente for an example where a court found that a belief is not a religious belief, finding that veganism is not a "religious creed" within the meaning of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. Plaintiff was told to get a mumps vaccination (which involves chicken embryo) as a condition of employment, refused, and the offer of employment was refused. The law, §12940a makes it unlawful "because of the religious creed of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person...". Subdivision (l) says that Religious belief or observance, as used in this section, includes, but is not limited to, observance of a Sabbath or other religious holy day or days, reasonable time necessary for travel prior and subsequent to a religious observance, and religious dress practice and religious grooming practice as described in subdivision (q) of Section 12926. §12296(q) further contributes a definition of religious terms: “Religious creed,” “religion,” “religious observance,” “religious belief,” and “creed” include all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice, including religious dress and grooming practices. “Religious dress practice” shall be construed broadly to include the wearing or carrying of religious clothing, head or face coverings, jewelry, artifacts, and any other item that is part of an individual observing a religious creed. “Religious grooming practice” shall be construed broadly to include all forms of head, facial, and body hair that are part of an individual observing a religious creed. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission then created a regulation California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 7293.1 that defines "religious creed" ‘Religious creed’ includes any traditionally recognized religion as well as beliefs, observations, or practices which an individual sincerely holds and which occupy in his or her life a place of importance parallel to that of traditionally recognized religions. The court notes that religious creed extends beyond traditionally recognized religions to encompass beliefs, observations, or practices occupying a parallel place of importance “to that of traditionally recognized religions” in an individual's life. The court then points to the leading cases from the Supreme Court related to deciding what a religion is: US v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 and Welsh v. US, 398 U.S. 333. And the court points out that government agencies are granted wide latitude in interpreting enabling legislation (under which the government might allow or disallow an action). It us noted that as of 2002, there were no California cases deciding what constitutes a religious creed w.r.t. FEHA and that regulation. The court then recited various statements from other California cases regarding the characterization of a religion – the main relevant point is that a religion does not have to be theistic to be a "religion". The court also reviews federal employment discrimination laws, and again considers the difference between traditional and non-traditional religions. There are many snippets in the review of the law section saying things such as that the court should find beliefs to be a religion if they ‘occupy the same place in the life of the [individual] as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified.’ We can now move to the question in §6, Is Veganism a Religious Creed For Purposes of the FEHA. This court states that The test we apply is that set forth in Judge Adams's concurring opinion in Malnak which has been adopted by the Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits which they say presents the best objective method for answering the question whether a belief plays the role of a religion and functions as such in an individual's life At this point, we can't reasonably guess how some individual would object on religious grounds to the vaccination mandate, but we do at least know what aspects of the law would be relevant and where the "rules" are laid down. Until someone actually alleges that they have a religious belief that prohibits vaccination, we can't analyze those arguments. The gist of the "veganism is not a religion" is it is too narrow a belief to constitute a religious belief. The court found that did not find that it is a "belief system (which) addresses fundamental or ultimate questions", and that it does not a address fundamental questions such as "the meaning of human existence; the purpose of life; theories of humankind's nature or its place in the universe; matters of human life and death; or the exercise of faith".	Another possible answer: The legal profession is a cartel, protected by laws. "Unlicensed/Unauthorized Practice of Law" is a big enough issue that its acronym (UPL) is well known among people who discuss law. Non-lawyers may decline to provide legal advice because they don't want to be charged with UPL. Likewise, as a matter of policy (at least in the U.S.) most government agencies and many employers in businesses that frequently receive requests for legal information instruct their employees to avoid giving anything that could be construed as legal advice. Which policy employees might cite to avoid helping with requests for even the most basic legal information.	Law, as such, is not a moral or a philosophical construct. It can be based on moral constructs and often it is. And, of course, the process of writing laws is often informed by philosophy. But law as such is neither one of those. Law is a set of behaviors which are known to be acceptable to the powers "that be." This maybe an unsettling idea. But it is true nonetheless. The phrase that summarizes this is "any law is only as good as its enforcement mechanism." What makes it seem untrue is that in the modern tradition laws are written down. And, when there is a need to resolve doubt as to whether something is illegal or not, they are carefully considered through a deductive process. Within countries, there is little question who "the powers that be" happen to be. But when it comes to laws governing actions between nations, it is more complicated. Yes, treaties make it clear, ahead of time, what types of expectations exist. Predictability (even in war) allows for long-term planning. And even laws of war are usually followed because wars are fought with the expectation that at some point they will end. And predictability allows to set end-goal conditions. Notably, entities which have no clear end-goals in sight are the ones least likely to follow any laws. The idea of any group of countries sitting in court of another group of countries is mostly a political theater. There is no possibility of predictable outcomes from entities which have not made commitments to those outcomes. So whether some countries have to follow "laws" set out for them by other countries (or non-government entities) is largely a result of those countries or entities being in positions of power to dictate their will. This is not the same as international laws being strictly de facto. Agreed-upon restrictions and restrictions which have been dictated from the top-down, by those with more power, are de jure because they create predictable boundaries on behavior. De facto restrictions are the ones which have come to be the case without any prior agreement or fiat.
Simple techniques to take away from police officer's credibility Are there any simple and easy methods to try to detract from a police officer's credibility? I'm interested in the US legal system. Example When challenging a traffic ticket, you can take notes or an official report of the weather to court. Then you can examine the citing officer in front of the judge to see whether he remembers the weather. If you can get him to answer inaccurately, then you have cast doubt on his ability to remember the other facts relevant to the traffic charge. Keep it simple In traffic court (infraction of the law) you only have to be found 2 percent more accurate than the officer (who the judge thinks is 51 percent credible). Are there other simple ideas for achieving this?	I have beaten all but one of my traffic tickets just by going to court. In one case, the judge threw out the charge because he couldn't read the officer's handwriting on the ticket. In another, the officer charged that I was parked in a "no parking" zone on a particular street (at night), but gave a cross street where parking was, in fact, allowed.	No. The police cannot determine if you have a lawful reason to know the details. Not their job. You can file your civil case using fictitious defendant name and then just apply for a court order to disclose who the guy actually is as part of the disclosure process. Provided that the court is satisfied you have a case, it will grant such order and the police will have to obey it.	A lawyer for either party can claim, during argument, that an adverse witness is not credible, for any reason or none. Often the lawyer will point to matters disclosed during cross-examination, claiming that they are contradictions, show bias, or otherwise indicate lack of credibility. Or the lawyer could point to elements of the primary testimony which the lawyer claims are implausible. If there has be evidence of a prior conviction, the lawyer could refer to this. A lawyer may in general ask a witness about prior convictions. Criminal convictions are generally matters of public record, and can be researched. It is not usual to present reputation or credibility witnesses for any person except the defendant, and failure to do so, even for the defendant, does not lead to any automatic assumption of lack of credibility. Not does the appearance of such a witness grant an automatic assumption of credibility. But a lawyer may point out reasons for thinking a witness not credible. Ultimately it is up to the finder of fact, often a jury, to decide what weight to give the testimony of each and every witness, based on the impression that testimony made, as well as any argument from the lawyer. This is one reason why courts are reluctant to overturn factual assessments by a jury: the reviewing court does not see and hear the manner of a witness and what it may indicate about credibility.	Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect.	2201.4 Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated at all or such times as shall be indicated by official traffic control devices. I'm failing to see the "... except when pulling over for the police" subclause. Equally there is no "... unless you think you should" subclause. If you choose to have a hearing the evidence will show unambiguously that you drove the wrong way in a one way street and you will testify as to your reasons for doing so. For you to avoid the violation you would need to convince the examiner that a) you are telling the truth and b) that your mindset is in any way relevant. Unless the officer clearly directed you to pull into that spot, the decision to do so appears to be yours. I'd pay the fine if it was me.	You don't have to talk to the police. All taking a lawyer with you will do is have someone to remind you not to talk to the police, and short your bank account a couple hundred dollars. Tell the detective you're busy. The detective saying you "are not going to be arrested" means absolutely nothing. When they show up to talk to you, don't go to the door unless they have a warrant.	Is mere accusation without evidence other than testimony of the accuser, grounds for arrest in the UK? It depends on the circumstances, especially when dealing with non-recent allegations where independent and corroborative evidence may be difficult to locate and/or recover, but in my experience it is very rarely an option to arrest soley on the say-so of one complainant unless there is a compelling reason to do so. It's also fraught with potential risks - Operation Midland being a prime example of when it can go horribly wrong. Also, no-one can "call the police and have someone arrested" in the united-kingdom - the police are under a duty to carry out a "proportionate investigation" in to allegations of crime and then make their own minds up on how to proceed based on the available intelligence and evidence. Focussing on england-and-wales, the most commonly used power of arrest* is at s.24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which, along with PACE Code G, requires an officer to: Reasonably suspect that an offence is being, has been or will be committed. On a scale of 0 to 10 - with 10 being total knowledge and 0 being no opinion at all - suspicion may be as low as 2 or 3 whereas belief starts at 7 or 8. And reasonably believe an arrest is necessary. One commonly used mnemonic for the Necessity Test under s.24 is: ID COP PLAN: Investigation - prompt and effective investigation of offence or conduct Disappearance - prevent prosecution being hindered by disappearance of a person Child / Vulnerable person - protection of Obstruction of highway Physical injury to themselves or someone else Public (in)decency Loss or damage to property Address not know Name not known I cannot say why the officer did not make an arrest in the OP's case. I surmise that he did not deem it necessary based on the above mandatory criteria but rather considered that a voluntary attendance interview would be the most appropriate course of action given the circumstances and information available to him at the time. *There are other statutory and common-law powers of arrest, but they all follow the same procedures as above	It seems like the officer should have to present at least some kind of evidence that the alleged crime occurred. Testimony is evidence. Officers can and do abuse this, but courts tend to give them the benefit of the doubt, so they typically attribute greater weight and credibility to a police officer's testimony than to that of a defendant.
Do the HIPAA regulations in the United States prevent medical providers from disclosing relevant health information on patient A to patient B? If a medical provider is aware of some health information on patient A that can affect patient B, do the HIPAA regulations still prevent the medical provider from conveying that information to patient B? For example, if patient A is patient B's father, and patient A has some genetic disorder that may impact patient B and that is known to the medical provider, do the HIPAA regulations prevent the medical provider from disclosing that information to patient B? This issue has recently been raised in the United Kingdom: Legal action over non-disclosure of father’s Huntington’s disease could lead to huge changes in patient confidentiality (mirror)	HIPAA does not legally protect physicians from disclosing PHI to another party, although there are a few exceptions: HHS provides an excellent resource on these, but the regulation most relevant to your question is Permitted Uses and Disclosures (5) Public Interest and Benefit Activities, which includes "Required by Law. Covered entities may use and disclose protected health information without individual authorization as required by law (including by statute, regulation, or court orders)." These statues, regulations, and court orders vary from state, but almost all of them refer to STDs and not genetic conditions (in some states, physicians are required to disclose positive STD test results to known sexual partners, but I can't find similar legislation for genetic tests). Here's an example of a voluntary patient information disclosure form – you'll notice that an individual has to specify the parties to whom they're willing to have PHI disclosed. The example you provided is still a violation of the Privacy Rule in the U.S., but this is a very curious grey area in bioethics and law. Disclosure of Genetic Information Within Families: How nurses can facilitate family communication. Gallo et al. Am J Nurs. 2009 Apr; 109(4): 65–69. (Emphasis mine.) HIPAA and Genetic Disclosure Does the law affect families? The privacy rule of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) went into effect on April 14, 2003. The rule created new requirements for health care providers, third-party payers, and health care clearinghouses to protect the privacy and security of health information, including genetic information, that could identify a person. A person's decision not to disclose her or his risk of developing a genetic condition to a family member may pose a dilemma for the health care professional, who has to choose between ethical obligations to inform the at-risk party and legal requirements to respect and protect the patient's privacy. The potential for harm to family members often plays a large role in the decision. For example, in rare cases, the use of a certain surgical anesthesia can cause death in people with the mutation that disposes them to malignant hyperthermia. Likewise, strenuous exercise can bring on sudden death in people with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. In such cases, clinicians should carefully explain the reasons for sharing information with family members, strongly encourage patients to notify at-risk relatives, and offer to help develop a plan for notifying them. When patients choose not to notify family members, clinicians typically respect the decision. There are situations, however, in which the clinician may consider overriding the patient's preferences because the family member is judged to be in danger of serious or immediate harm or there is a high likelihood that a dangerous condition will occur that can be either prevented or adequately treated with early recognition. Clinicians who believe it is necessary to override a patient's wish regarding the notification of family members, should consider consulting an ethics committee or legal council. In most situations, though, the risk of serious harm associated with nondisclosure is not clearly immediate. For instance, if a woman has tested positive for the BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation but doesn't want to upset her two sisters by sharing that information with them, the need for disclosure isn't clearly urgent. Each sister has a one in two chance of carrying the same mutation. It would be understandable for the patient to try to learn more about what the mutation means for her and her children and to give careful thought to whether and how she'll share her test results with her sisters. Clinicians can best help family members by clearly informing patients who test positive for genetic conditions or the mutations that cause them about the risks faced by their family members, discussing the value of disclosure and offering assistance with it. The "Duty to Warn" a Patient's Family Members About Hereditary Disease Risks. Offit et al. JAMA. 2004;292(12): 1469–1473. (I can send you the full-text of this if you want it; it contains an excellent overview of cases and their outcomes relating to disclosing genetic information in the U.S. under HIPAA.) In general, the special nature of genetic tests has been viewed as a barrier to physicians' breaching the confidentiality of personal genetic information. However, the failure to warn family members about hereditary disease risks has already resulted in 3 lawsuits against physicians in the United States. While the findings of case law and the state and federal statutes that bear on the issue of "duty to warn" of inherited health risk are still being defined, we believe that health care professionals have a responsibility to encourage but not to coerce the sharing of genetic information in families, while respecting the boundaries imposed by the law and by the ethical practice of medicine. ...in considering whether to breach patient confidentiality to warn of risks of a genetic disease, clinicians need to balance the actual risk of that disease, the efficacy of potential preventive interventions, as well as emerging legal considerations and potential liabilities. Overriding patient confidentiality and genetic privacy might very well mean violation of HIPAA and certain state regulations, with attendant civil or criminal liability. At the same time, in one state appellate court decision that has not been overturned, the estate of a physician was held liable for his failure to warn relatives of hereditary disease risk.	Yes in general Generally, almost all western jurisdictions (be they civil law or common law) have some way to get medical records into evidence, be that via subpoenaing, or by discovery requests or court orders. In most cases, the party that brings the suit is also the patient or their legal representative, and they give (or imply) consent to the use of the records. And in cases where the defendant's medical records are required, usually, the defense wants those in too to prove some condition. And then there are cases where the state or their representatives brings the charge. They usually can bring a warrant or court order to obtain the documents. Then there are Medical records that had been made specifically on the behest of the state. Here, the warrant is usually filed to obtain the samples or access to the body to be investigated, the record itself forms the basis for the investigators to proceed - and is not under client-doctor confidentially in the first place. It had been made specifically for the state and it is a state-owned medical record, be they made on request of the executive power (police) with a warrant signed by a judge or on behalf of the judicative after a court order to evaluate capacity (see below). However, medical records can generally only be obtained if the records are relevant to the case at hand and only to the degree necessary: You can't request the medical records about a person's fertility status in a case that discusses damages for his broken arm. As a result, the medical record available in court might be only an extract from the original, with irrelevant passages sealed or redacted. Unlike many people think, it's quite common to get some medical records into court in some way or another: As the basis of injury cases If you have a case of physical injury, the injuries themselves need to be proven in court. This is done generally by getting the medical records - thus they can be subpoenaed by a party, usually the injured party here. Then a medical expert can discuss them, be they a court-appointed one or paid by either of the parties. In this category also fall mandatory reports of certain types of wounds or situations. As such, the treating doctor has to provide a medical report with enumerated types of injuries, like bullet wounds or where child abuse might be the reason. Very necessarily in malpractice cases Malpractice is pretty much injury on steroids: the injuring party made the records and would never want to give them up to the one suing them - if they could. Alice shall remove Appendix. It goes haywire and the day after Charly needs to cut Bob open again. Now Bob sues Alice for malpractice. Bob needs medical records from both Alice, the doctor who botched it, and Charly, who was fixing Alice's error. Generally, both records are subpoena-able to the degree relevant and necessary, and indeed the opposing medical opinions on the operation and records form the very basis of the case for either side. Without the ability to subpoena the - in this case unmodified - records from the injuring doctor, proving - or defending - a case of malpractice would be impossible: the very truth of the allegation should be in the medical records. It's routine in cases around death What is the very last medical record a person can ever get? An autopsy record! That's a very sensitive medical record, but they routinely are used in homicide cases. Oftentimes, the investigators also subpoena the medical records of the victim from their doctors to corroborate the autopsy record, while the defense might subpoena them to try and disprove it. Even in civil cases, like the OJ-Simpson civil damages case, autopsy and medical records from an accompanying criminal case can and will be "pulled" (copied over) from the other trial's docket. Regularly in child protection cases Whenever child protection is on the line, be them protective orders or who a child will live with after the child protection service (whatever its name is) is in on a case, then medical records are often required to bolster one side. Those records could be medical records from quite many doctors, be they physicals or psychological evaluations... Sometimes the medical records required here are only created due to court-ordered medical or psychological evaluation by a doctor. Whenever incompetence defense is called When the lawyer claims temporary incompetence or insanity, courts generally order a psychological evaluation. These medical records are evidence, but usually don't need to be subpoenaed: they have a waiver form to be disclosed to the court almost built-in. Are they available to the public? Medical records are part of truth-finding, but they are also quite sensitive. As a result, most medical records can not be gotten from the court and enter the dockets under seal. Another option is, that they enter the docket partially or even mostly redacted, with passages blackened.	The issue is more one of what an attorney is ethically authorized to disclose pursuant to professional ethics rules (Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 as enacted locally) more than one of attorney-client privilege. Attorney-client privilege governs what someone can or cannot be compelled to disclose without their consent (usually by subpoena). Attorney confidentiality, in contrast, governs what an attorney can disclosed when not compelled to do so by something like a subpoena. Generally, disclosure of confidential client information is allowed if it is in furtherance of the representation or authorized by the client (there are also other exceptions but those aren't really any different in a two lawyer v. one lawyer situation). Often when two attorneys represent the same person (and the disclosure won't waive the privileged nature of the information vis-a-vis third-parties under a joint defense theory), disclosures from one attorney for a person to another attorney for a person will do that. In practice, however, the analysis could be quite fact specific and there isn't really a bright line rule governing when it would or would not be allowed.	You can refuse to pay. The doctor can either accept your refusal or pursue the debt in court. If he pursues the debt you will probably lose. The Common Law position Your contract with the doctor was for him to do whatever he did and you to pay for it. Your contract with your insurer is for you to pay the premium and them to reimburse you for whatever they cover. The fundamental question is why you were taking the doctor's (via his secretary) advice on your contract with your insurer? The advice was wrong, however, it is difficult to see that there is a case for negligent misstatement; you would have difficulty showing there was a duty of care and even if you did showing what damage flowed from it since it is quite likely that you would have had the procedure notwithstanding the absence of cover, unless it was purely cosmetic. The Consumer Law position California probably has consumer protection laws regarding misleading and deceptive conduct - I have no idea what they are. If this is so then your doctor's statement was misleading - consequences may flow from this.	I'm not a lawyer or a medical professional, but on Wikipedia's page about DNR, we see the following quote: In the United States the documentation is especially complicated in that each state accepts different forms, and advance directives and living wills are not accepted by EMS as legally valid forms. If a patient has a living will that states the patient wishes to be DNR but does not have an appropriately filled out state sponsored form that is co-signed by a physician, EMS will attempt resuscitation. Based on this, I would hazard the guess that you can't treat anything other than those forms as legally binding, as they even ignore a living will without that state's form.	If you are worried that some secret will become public, you should find and meet with an attorney, not a financial adviser or other nonlawyer. Your attorney is able to shield your secret information from disclosure in ways other professionals cannot. Raise any credit score issues you're concerned about. In general, the public has a right to access judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 US 589, 597 (1978) (noting that the right is rarely litigated and not clearly defined). That right is not absolute; some records can be sealed, which means that the public can't read them. Local rules govern when that happens. I don't think the existence of a civil lawsuit could be made secretly except in special circumstances. Likewise, the plaintiff usually must identify herself, except in special circumstances. A plaintiff should assume that everything about the lawsuit--who filed it, against whom, what evidence arises, the trial, and who wins and loses--will be public.	There aren't any specific laws or regulations about medical charges. Instead, this is a matter of general contract law, where you have to agree. You have to consent to be treated, and a signature is taken to be evidence of consent. The law does not say that they have to ask permission for absolutely everything they do, the action just as to be in accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice among members of the medical profession with similar training and experience in the same or similar medical community as that of the person treating, examining, or operating on the patient for whom the consent is obtained This law insulates doctors from getting sued. In a situation where treatment is provided against a patient's instructions, you may have a cause of action for e.g. battery. In general, a doctor can't poke you, draw blood, make "offensive contact" etc. without consent, and consenting to one procedure does not "open the floodgates" of consent for any othre procedure. Of course, if the procedure was not performed, you obviously are not liable for the cost (and they are not liable for a non-occurring battery). This may in fact constitute gross negligence. During trial, the primary issue is likely to be whether there is proof that the procedure was expressly rejected. The doctor would probably provide the consent form, and that form may or may not indicate that the test would be conducted. It would not be surprising if the patient never saw an actual form and instead just electro-signed, having been told that this is authorization to treat. Corroborating witnesses would be helpful. From a practical perspective, especially if the billing department is being recalcitrant, this is probably a matter best handled by an attorney who would start with a formal letter summarizing the consequences of unauthorized medical treatment.	Attorneys are universally required to tell the truth at all times and generally, they do. They are not allowed to lie on behalf of their clients or themselves. This doesn't mean that someone else's attorney necessarily has your best interests at heart. And, attorneys can, for example, fail to mention options that exist, but might not be the best for the attorney's client. Also, if an attorney's client lies to him or her about the facts, the attorney could conceivably say something inaccurate while believing it to be true. In the kind of meeting you are describing, however, most likely, the attorneys are simply going to explain your parents' estate plan, over which you have no control or say in any case, and there is no reason for suspicion or paranoia.
Can people distribute trademarked/copyright products if they aren't monetized? If I made a bunch of Winnie the Pooh stuffed animals or screen printed a bunch of t-shirts with pictures from Godzilla films or something, would I be infringing on copyrights/trademarks if I distributed them for free (or "sold" them for $0.00) over etsy or ebay. Furthermore, assuming I would be legally safe to send free non-official merchandise out, would customer's shipping payments count as me "profiting" off of another brand's work, even the payment goes directly to shipping company itself?	This would be infringement. It generally doesn't matter that you're giving things away for free. Keep in mind that the point of these laws is not only to prevent third parties from making money off the creator's ideas, but also to protect the creator's ability to make money. If you're providing free knock-off Winnie the Pooh products, that cuts into the market for the creator's legitimate products.	...due to the international registration of multiple domains to generate ad revenue by recycling stories across sock puppet networks, giving the impression of multiple, independent companies. None of that is illegal on its face. Internet domains are freely registerable by anyone, anywhere (with the exception of some laws in some nations that restrict such Internet-related activity), and registered privately or publicly, and websites can be hosted anywhere. Writing articles and "spinning" and copying articles (even if that writing is sales gibberish in broken English) among the same copyright owner is legal, and using the same design and layout for a network of sites is legal. The formation of multiple, related companies and shell companies to give the impression that companies are separate and independent is legal (again, with the exception of some business and corporate laws in some nations that restrict such activity). These are all common business practices. Some business practices may appear to be unethical - trying to fool customers in order to make money and get clicks and sell ads. And what you may be feeling is that such activity is unethical. And that's OK. But feeling that they are unethical doesn't make the practices illegal. Many common activities that are considered to be unethical are illegal; but not all. Buyer beware. One way some of that activity may be illegal is if those articles are factually incorrect and promote quack medical treatments, are financial scams requiring payments, are gambling sites or promote other clearly illegal things. But then you get into the complexity of exactly how they are illegal, which jurisdictions are involved, and on and on.	Generally, no, this will not violate copyright. Your end user might violate copyright, but that is their problem not yours. Your program is a tool, just like a word processor is. If I copy a Harry Potter book into a word processor that does not make the word processor maker liable. There is a concept of "contributory infringement", which I think is what you are concerned about. I don't know about Danish law in particular, but most countries would require evidence that you had reasonable knowledge that actual copyright violation was occuring, rather than just being aware that it might happen in theory. This is normally applied to file sharing services who have to have "notice and takedown" measures, file filters and the like. This isn't your concern as you never have any access to the files created by your users. You can also be found liable if you induce anyone to commit copyright violations. Don't draw your customers attention to the custom monster feature as a workaround for those copyrighted monsters, as that could be considered to be inducement. Also don't provide any "wizards" or similar tools which make it noticeably easier to duplicate the custom monsters (e.g. if you notice that the copyrighted custom dragon stats are all on a linear scale with dragon size, don't create a "dragon creation wizard" embodying that fact.) This assumes that your program runs entirely on the end user computer. Its different if you provide any kind of cloud storage for generated characters.	Each episode of the show as a whole, and all the individual images in it, are protected by copyright, but the idea of a holophonor, or indeed any idea, is not. The more closely anyone else's drawing of a gadget resembles one from the show, the more likely it would be to be found to infringe copyright. The same is true of a character image. The more distinctive and original the image, and the more closely someone copies it, the more likely a finding of infringement would be.	It would not be a copyright. Names and short phrases are not subject to copyright, but it could be a trademark under common law ( e.g. state law in the U.S.) or could be registered. Some people think a trademark defines a product. That is not the case, a trademark identifies the source of a product or service.	No. You may not do this. As your post points out this is a blatant copyright violation. It isn't remotely in the realm of fair use.	They don't actually claim to have a patent. Lots of people license a patent, and then they are using "patented technology". The only effect of this statement is: If you want to copy their product, you better find out what patent they are licensing, otherwise you might be in legal trouble. And their statement means you should have known that your copy of their product is covered by some patent, so you lose some defenses if you are accused of using a patent without license. And of course many customers think if something is patented then it must be good. Which is not true obviously. But logically who owns the patent doesn't make a difference to that, so their statement isn't misleading IMHO.	For works released after 1989, Copyright notices don't have any legal consequences in the United States. They are just a friendly reminder of who created the work and that they take their copyrights seriously. But those notices are not required anymore to enforce your copyrights on the works you created. If you have proof that you own the copyright on something and when it was created, and if it's still within the term limits, then you can take legal actions against people who violate your copyright. Disney has a history of repeated worldwide lobbying for extending the expiration durations in copyright laws in order to avoid any of their classic cartoons from falling out of copyright protection. So it could be that they try to intentionally muddy the waters and make it harder to find out which of their works expire when. That way people are less sure about what Disney works are and are not in the public domain, making it more risky to use them. But that's just my theory.
Mandatory Lunch in UK - Really? My employer has recently said that I MUST take lunch, at 30 minutes minimum. Is there anything I can do to fight this without losing my job? They cite "burnout" as the reason. I smoke (please avoid the hate comments), and I have 10 minute breaks three times a day for a total of 30 minutes unpaid already, does their argument still stand? I've been working as a programmer for six years now, and I've been a hobbyist for well over 10 years. I "work" constantly, I work on home projects as I do professional projects, I spend sometimes 14 hours a day programming for weeks on end. This has been my "natural state" for that entire time. I do not "burnout". Indeed, I've been given pay rises on a frequent basis based on performance. I feel the extra time I would have to give to the company is totally unjust and doesn't take into account the kind of worker I am. The law says they can basically do what they want to me, if they enforced it, I'm effectively working through lunch because I don't want to be in the place the work place is, so it's not "free time" then is it. I'm still at their disposal. Indeed, I'm pretty much forced to stay in the same chair because there's nothing else to do. Is there any action I can take where I assert I don't need a lunch break? AND be able to do that without offending the HR department? EDIT: I'm not looking to get into an argument about "You should just take the break ffs", I want a real suggestion of how I can handle this situation to achieve the result I'm after. EDIT 2: I understand that people with my "work through lunch" ethic are not the norm. If I was really to pursue this, it could in fact damage the other members of my team by highlighting that they could also skip lunch, which for them could be very detrimental if they were to choose to do so. For the purposes of this question only, I'm going to take the selfish route and insist I want the time back. EDIT 3: I'd like to try and explain why I feel so strongly about this measly 30minutes a day. I'm awake for 16 hours a day and I value every second. I believe I'm a slave and have done for years, work is a means to survive, not a means to feel fulfilled. You're working for other people's causes, which may even directly against your own personal beliefs. My own time is the only place I can be myself, and I feel like I'm having my life taken from me while I sit there and watch it happen. I know this won't chime with a lot of you, but this is what I believe. Every second they "expect" from me feels like they've taken a part of my soul, not to mention if they say "Oh, and we're not going to compensate you for this portion of your time, either" it's going to really make me want to fight it. I'm sure in ten or more years time when I've got the wisdom to start my own business I'll see this massively differently, but right now, I want to give the time I signed up for, 37.5 hours a week. No more!	Long story short, your employer can tell you when and how to take breaks, as long as they meet very simple conditions that don't help you. From the government's information website, Workers have the right to one uninterrupted 20 minute rest break during their working day, if they work more than 6 hours a day. This could be a tea or lunch break. The break doesn’t have to be paid - it depends on their employment contract. Employers can say when employees take rest breaks during work time as long as: the break is taken in one go somewhere in the middle of the day (not at the beginning or end) workers are allowed to spend it away from their desk or workstation (ie away from where they actually work) It doesn’t count as a rest break if an employer says an employee should go back to work before their break is finished. Unless a worker’s employment contract says so, they don’t have the right to: take smoking breaks get paid for rest breaks	could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)".	How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.	Overtime pay in Ontario is required by the Employment Standards Act (ESA). Most employees are entitled to "time and a half" if they work more than 44 hours in a single week. According to this Ontario Government web page For most employees, whether they work full-time, part-time, are students, temporary help agency assignment employees, or casual workers, overtime begins after they have worked 44 hours in a work week. Their hours after 44 must be paid at the overtime pay rate. Managers and supervisors do not qualify for overtime if the work they do is managerial or supervisory. Even if they perform other kinds of tasks that are not managerial or supervisory, they are not entitled to get overtime pay if these tasks are performed only on an irregular or exceptional basis. ... A fixed salary compensates an employee for all non-overtime hours up to and including 44 hours a week. After 44 hours, the employee is entitled to overtime pay. ... An employer and an employee cannot agree that the employee will give up their right to overtime pay under the ESA. Agreements such as these are not allowed and would be deemed void. However, an employee can make an agreement to take paid time off in lieu of overtime pay or to average hours of work for overtime pay purposes. An employer cannot lower an employee’s regular wage to avoid paying time and a half after 44 hours (or another overtime threshold that applies) in a work week. For example, if Josée’s regular pay is $17.00 an hour, her employer cannot drop her regular rate in a week when overtime was worked to $15.00 an hour and then pay her $22.50 (1½ × $15.00) for overtime hours worked instead of $25.50 (1 ½ × $17.00). There are various industries that are subject to special rules that modify the usual rules for overtime. There are particular kinds of jobs that are exempt from the ESA. These are listed on this page. Conclusion The situation described in the question sounds like a violation of the ESA. But it might come under an Averaging Agreement, which is permitted. Under such an agreement weeks with longer hours are averaged with weeks that have shorter hours. There are rules governing such agreements. Note that the hours listed in the question amount to 35 hours per week. An additional nine hours could be worked in any given week before getting to the 44 hours of work which usually triggers overtime pay. The linked pages include official contact information for ESA information and enforcement.	tl;dr: If you are not satisfied with the service provided by the restaurant, you should take your business elsewhere and write negative, but honest reviews of the establishment. That will over time solve the problem as well without legal intervention. To answer your question if the restaurant can refuse service if you don't tip is actually a much more difficult question than it might sound. I can't find any case law on this subject, such practice is however perhaps more widespread than commonly expected and my interpretation of the law is that they in most cases actually can, at least if they demand payment up front as take-away services often do. It is for example a 'well known fact' that if you don't tip the waiters at the Oktoberfest, they will usually ignore you and don't take any further orders. It is a dirty and unfair way to conduct business, but not necessarily a violation of law. Even if a tip indeed is legally defined as a voluntary donation by the customer, there is in German law also the concept of 'freedom of contract'. Contrary to popular belief, restaurants and other businesses in Germany are not obligated to serve or accept a customer as long as they don't violate other laws, e.g. anti-discrimantory laws and they don't even need any particular reason for doing so. If you want to enter a club or fancy establishment and the bouncer doesn't like your face, he will make use of this right, refuse you entry and be fully within his legal rights to do so. When you order food for take-away, your order must first be interpreted as a contract offer and the restaurant can, albeit with some restrictions, in most cases freely decide to accept your offer and enter a contract which binds them to deliver food, or they can simply refuse your offer and return any payment you may have done in advance.	(IANAL, of course) My employer tells me that EVERY professional activity belongs to the company and for EVERY activity I mentioned before I need to get written permission, That's true for software (and inventions) that may be relevant for them, but not for other professional activities. which could be withdrawn at any moment. No, not in that very general sense. they can give the permission to publish possibly relevant pieces of code on SX, and they can withdraw that permission for the future. But they cannot take it back for the past. Once they tell you they don't want your invention, there's no way back from that decision (and there are legal deadlines for claiming relevance). Even if they require written permission for you to take a side job, they must give it unless they can show a valid reason against you taking the side job in question. And that would be a per-side-job decision. And it doesn't matter if I do it on my free time on my computer at home or not. That is indeed the case for copyright of software and for inventions. clause is to protect your employer from you helping anyone who is their competitor/you being their competitor while the employment lasts. This is pretty standard and, I believe, not only legal but would be the case also if they had not spelled out this to you. The lines between what is and what is not competition are sometimes a bit complicated* So, if your employer specializes in subway station surveillance systems and you work on face recognition and then help out your local pigeon breeder's association by implementing automatic door opening by camera + automated face recognition of the [unwinged] members that's close enough to touching the interests of your employer that I'd consider it off-limits unless you had talked to your employer and they are happy with this project (after all, they could be preparing similar products unknown to you). OTOH, overhauling the crappy Excel macros for the regional annual breeder's competition would be fine. And in general, the lower your position there and the further from the actual focus of the company, the more normal it is to have another job (think janitors, canteen staff of a software company as opposed to a janitor in a hire-a-janitor-service company) The general duty not be in competition with your employer also in general prevents you from being involved in a competitor business to the extent that you have noticable influence over that competitor. So the second part of clause 1 shouldn't be too surprising, neither. (update) OTOH, what may make this particular clause invalid is the requirement also for publicly traded shares that they cannot come with voting rights. I somehow suspect that thus prohibiting you from "normal person small scale ownership" of publicly traded stocks (not all of them even have non-voting shares) is undue and invalid (too broad a restriction). However, if that clause is invalid the legal default of "no competition to employer" still applies. Here's a (German language) web site of a lawyer that discusses these questions See also here https://www.hensche.de/Rechtsanwalt_Arbeitsrecht_Handbuch_Wettbewerbsverbot.html Unlike the 1st clause, this is AFAIK not a spelled out default of German employment law, but it may be a spelled out version of a Tarifvertrag (unionized group contract). In any case it is probably legal to have this clause in the contract. The point is that the employer can only forbid the side job if it is against their reasonable interests, a general "no side jobs whatsoever" would be invalid. Side note: they may even be of the opinion that employment law forces them to have some such clause: the employer has a legal responsibility to ensure that you are not working more than the number of hours allowed by law. I've had such a permission that stated the constraint that the permission is valid only as long as I ensure that I stay within those legal limits and my working ability for employer is not compromised. https://www.hensche.de/Rechtsanwalt_Arbeitsrecht_Handbuch_Nebentaetigkeit.html https://www.fachanwalt.de/ratgeber/nebentaetigkeit-als-arbeitnehmer-anmelden-zustimmung-und-muster-antrag https://www.haufe.de/personal/arbeitsrecht/top-thema-nebenbeschaeftigung/nebentaetigkeit-und-arbeitsrecht-was-erlaubt-ist_76_418602.html Copyright law for employees in Germany is somewhat difficult. the one exception is copyright of software where §69b UrhG transfers the transferrable rights automatically to the employer. Whether the software is written out of office and outside working hours is irrelevant, as long as it is done in "fulfillment of the employee's role or the employer's orders" (famous court case) so again, if at work you code facial recognition systems and in the evening the pigeon breeders accounting system, the latter is not related to your work. Your open source game is also OK unless you are employed as game developer. Also that not all code is subject to copyright. An obvious explanation on SX explaining a typical pattern would not be a creative work (though the full answer may very well be) in the first place. But for creative works other than software such as plans how to implement features, technical drawings, etc. working hours or not seems to be more important for assigning the rights and the rules seem to be more similar to employee invention law ArbnErfG): if it is outside working hours and possibly relevant for the employer, the employee has to offer it to the employer before trying to sell to someone else. The clause that employer must give permission to publication of content that is possibly relevant for them seems to me to be in line with these general rules. https://www.zeit.de/karriere/beruf/2011-06/arbeitsrecht-urheberrecht https://eventfaq.de/25510-urheberrechte-im-arbeitsverhaeltnis/ http://www.urheberrecht-leipzig.de/urheberrecht-nutzungsrechte-des-arbeitgebers-an-kreativen-leistungen-der-mitarbeiter.html * I've been advised in a situation where I still believe I was not competing, and even had a written permission, that this is the stuff that makes lawyers rich, and both employee and employer poor.... Take home message: even if you believe to legally have the right to publish on SX/contribute to an open source project, think again whether you'd want this to be the source of a conflict with your employer - or whether there isn't a win-win possibility that makes everyone happy instead. What is the most legal way to participate in public activities in such situation? I'd advise to be open about what public activities you'd like follow. Whatever the contract says, your employer can always give your more permissions. In the past, I've found the majority of employers being happy to see me contributing (some had similar clauses to yours and just wanted to know, some was happy about an open source project I brought, some like to be able to say where their employees volounteer, etc.). Although there was one who wasn't (and that did contribute to my decision to leave there). From that experience, I'd personally discuss this early on now: in case the employer turns out to be too intrusive (speak to Betriebsrat or lawyer or your union if you have one to make sure they really overstep their rights) for my liking, for me that would be a reason to cancel the contract which is easier & faster during probation period.	Probably not. The impediment is the claim that you have a genuinely held religious belief. Changing the context a tiny bit, your employer is statutorily required to make an accommodation for the requirements of your religion, therefore they cannot fire you for refusing to work on the Sabbath, unless it would impose an unreasonable burden on them. If they fire you, you complain to the EOC and the EOC sanctions them. The employer's defense would be that you did not request a reasonable religion-based accommodation (you failed to explain that this was about Sabbath). The employer does not scrutinize the validity of your claim (does not demand proof of what your religion requires). In your planned announcement, you are not requesting a statutory accommodation from the government, analogous to requesting an accommodation from an employer, you are offering a defense in the case the government takes action against you for violating the law. There is a statutory exception to the prohibition against employment discrimination based on religion, that (roughly speaking) a church is not required to hire a rabbi instead of a mullah to deliver sermons. There is no statutory exception w.r.t. public accommodations and religious discrimination. Therefore, to implement your plan, you would have to have the law or the EOC's interpretation of it overturned as unconstitutional. To succeed in your argument, you would have to show that the law unconstitutionally restricts your free exercise of your religion. One part would be a demonstration that your religion prohibits... The least likely scenario is that your religion prohibits doing business with a person outside of your religion. I don't of any religion that maintains a requirement of absolute religious segregation, but that is hypothetically a path to argue – that you will burn in hell forever if you do business with a Christian, or a Muslim. I am maximally skeptical that the courts would ever take such a claim seriously. A more likely possibility would involve "compelled speech" as well, where you are forced under the law to express a viewpoint that contradicts your fundamental religious beliefs. You cannot be compelled by law to express a viewpoint. What is less clear is what constitutes expressing a viewpoint, see this. For example, there is a federal law withholding federal funds from schools which discriminate against military recruiters. Some law schools argued in Rumsfield v Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights that allowing military recruiters amounts to forcing the schools to express a viewpoint, but the court held that "the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech". The upshot of 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis is that "The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs speaking messages with which the designer disagrees". A proposal to refuse to service Christians plainly does not fall within the penumbra of that ruling. Nor does a refusal to print books containing religious material (which you already created). You have to cater to Christians, but you do not have to create Christian messages. You could draw a line between a simple ISP who you pay to make available your religious website (you create it), versus hiring a company to design the website, which clearly involves "expression". The issue is simplified if you don't make a claim based on a specific belief system, instead rely on simple "compelled speech" doctrine. General beliefs do not enjoy the same "Free Exercise" protections that religions enjoy. What matters is what you are "expressing", not what you are doing (like, printing).	Possibly I am Australian so I am not familiar with Albertan labour law but I have done a little research and the underlying common law principles are similar. I will assume that you are covered by Albertan law and not the Canada Labour Code. The next part of the answer is based on A Guide to Rights and Responsibilities in Alberta Workplaces. First, if you lost it they would need to ask you to pay for it, they could not deduct it from your pay without a garnishee order (p. 10). Second, if the device is safety equipment, and it is certainly arguable that it is, then it is the employee's responsibility to use it and the employer's responsibility to keep it in safe working order; this would include replacing it if it were lost (p. 12). The common law position depends on a) the contract and b) if any negligence were involved. Contract What does your current employment contract say about your use of the employer's equipment generally and this item in particular? If it says something then, unless it is an illegal term, that is what happens. If it is silent, then it turns on the particular circumstances. Also, a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, if they are trying to introduce a new term then you have to agree to it; remembering that there may be consequences to taking a stand against your employer, you should say that you do not agree - this removes the risk that the employer could argue that there was tacit agreement. Negligence In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of torts, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: had a duty to the plaintiff, as an employee this is virtually a given; breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), this would depend on the circumstances of the loss or damage. You have to take reasonable care of the equipment - this is not a subjective standard, you need to do everything that a person in your position can do to protect the equipment from loss or damage; the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of the harm to the plaintiff. This has to do with the "proximity" of the harm, if for example the device needed a battery change and you took it to a technician who damaged the item in changing the battery then your actions are not proximate to the loss; and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. Well, if it is lost or damaged this is pretty unarguable. So, if you take reasonable care of the device and, notwithstanding, it is lost or damaged then you would not be liable for negligence ... probably. Talk to your union rep; this is exactly the sort of stuff that they are there to sort out.
Difference between felony assault of an adult vs felony assault of a minor? I recently asked this question describing a hypothetical grievous assault scenario. I thank those who answered for their specific / accurate info. I want to further understand how it affects the scenario if the person is not an adult, but under the age of 18. Possibly you can see where I'm going with this ... Scenario adjustment #1: The victim is a minor Scenario adjustment #2: The victim is an infant, and the suspect is a parent Scenario adjustment #3: The victim is an infant, and the suspect is a non-medical person commissioned by the parent to do this Scenario adjustment #4: The victim is an infant, and the suspect is a medical person commissioned by the parent to do this UPDATE: So my previous question had 3 answers after 6 hours. Somehow I feel this is going to be a tumbleweed question. I am seeking to understand: Why is such an action a felony crime or GBH on an adult, but not a crime on a minor? What is the legal basis for that? FURTHER UPDATE I'm looking for a specific legal framework or document or law, which provides for / accounts for the difference in handling this scenarios, please.	In the US, there are no laws against surgical circumcision with informed consent (and I don't know of any such laws in any other country). Parents are generally allowed to grant surrogate informed consent. There is no requirement that circumcision be carried out by a licensed physician or other approved practitioner. A person can be held civilly liable for damage done by the procedure. There are no criminal prohibitions in the cases that you describe, but there could be civil interventions. In particular, the court could override parental consent – for instance, if a parent ordered circumcision of their 17 year old. If some person does the circumcision without parental consent, that could be a crime. The key distinction is parental consent. The law grants parents the power to act on behalf of the child, under the premise that children do not have the capacity to act in their own best interest, and cannot reasonably be forced to bear the full consequences of their actions. These are long-standing pre-common law premises, which even predate the promulgation of English common law. "Best interest" is not a technical term requiring definition, but it is a factual matter that is very difficult to judge. Judges use solomonic wisdom to determine whether a surgery is in the best interest of a child when it is medically advantageous but psychologically detrimental. Just as an adult can consent to a circumcision thereby negating any accusation of assault, so too can a parent consent on behalf of their child.	He does not need to be mirandized unless he is being arrested and the officers want to use things he will say as evidence. The officers in your situation seemed content to let the matter be handled through the school. If they had wanted to arrest him, they could easily have done so as soon as he pulled out the joint and handed it to the director. The "write a confession or you will leave in handcuffs" pretty much invalidates it in a court of law. Even if it weren't excluded, his testimony as to why he wrote it looks pretty bad in front of a jury. That said, I doubt that's where this case is headed. My understanding is this: The school director and two police officers caught your son smoking marijuana on school property. The punishment they sought is that he admit culpability and that he continue school online, and (presumably) on probation. In the grand scheme of how these cases could go, this isn't that bad. There are some procedural irregularities you could press, but there's enough evidence without the irregularities that work against your son. Having said that, sign nothing without consulting a lawyer. But it could be worse.	As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them.	There is no crime of "police misconduct" in the US, but murder or theft are certainly crimes which would qualify as "police misconduct". To take a real case, an officer in Georgia was convicted of aggravated assault, violating oath of office, and making a false statement (not murder, though he did kill the victim). In principle, he would also be liable in a lawsuit by the victim's family. However, these would be separate legal processes, the criminal prosecution being conducted by and at the discretion of the government prosecutor, and the monetary lawsuit being conducted by and at the discretion of the victim's family (on behalf of the victim). It is possible that an officer will be convicted yet not found civilly liable, or vice versa; or both, or neither. The victim (or family) doesn't necessarily have any connection to the criminal case, although they typically can testify during the sentencing phase. In some jurisdictions (e.g. California), the victim has a right to testify at a sentencing hearing. The result of a lawsuit can never be imprisonment – that has to come from criminal prosecution, and criminal prosecution does not result in a monetary reward to the victim (any criminal fine goes to the government).	Technically, yes: Whoever willfully or maliciously injures, tears down or destroys any letter box or other receptacle intended or used for the receipt or delivery of mail on any mail route, or breaks open the same or willfully or maliciously injures, defaces or destroys any mail deposited therein, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. That said, just because it's technically a felony punishable by up to 3 years in federal prison, doesn't mean you'll actually be punished that way. The Department of Justice's Criminal Resource Manual has a section on misdemeanor offenses that apply to postal crime: Among the misdemeanor dispositions available are: 18 U.S.C. § 1701 (obstruction of mails generally); 18 U.S.C. § 1703(b) (opening,destroying, or detaining mail without authority); 18 U.S.C. § 1707 (theft of property used by postal service); and 18 U.S.C. § 1711 (misappropriation of postal funds). When the charge might best lie under 18 U.S.C. § 1705 (destruction of letter boxes or mail) or 18 U.S.C. § 1706 (injury to mail bags) and in other appropriate circumstances, an applicable misdemeanor may be found in 18 U.S.C. § 641 (theft of government property); or 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (destruction of government property). That suggests (at least to me) that federal prosecutors are supposed to at least consider misdemeanor instead of felony charges for minor cases of mailbox destruction. Under normal circumstances, destruction of federal property only becomes a felony if the damage (or attempted damage) is more than $1,000. This is a pretty good example of how US laws are written with prosecutorial discretion in mind. In other systems, the law about destruction of mail or mailboxes would lay out when it's a serious crime and when it's minor. In the US, it's always considered a serious crime because the assumption is that prosecutors won't charge it in minor cases (in fact, official guidance to prosecutors lays out ways they can charge it without charging the felony). It's also possible to be prosecuted at the state level for this, and if you're actually a juvenile that's much more likely than federal prosecution. The feds don't really like handling juvenile cases; they normally leave those up to the states unless there's some good reason not to. Even if you're an adult, the feds may well leave the issue up to the state for prosecution. At the state level, the threshold for felony vs. misdemeanor vandalism would depend on the state. Whether you're prosecuted at the state or federal levels, there's a decent chance you wind up with at least a misdemeanor on your record. Vandalism is illegal, after all.	It would depend on your intent, among other things If the prosecution stand a reasonable chance of proving you intended to kill that person by infecting them with coronavirus, they may choose to charge you with attempted murder. Obviously, it would be highly fact-specific. In the alternative (and the far more likely prospect) they could charge you with assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s47 of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861 (OAPA) or inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to s20 OAPA. The exact alternative charge would depend on the effects suffered by the victim and whether it could be proven that you were responsible. If so, and the infection was particularly severe, it could be an s20 offence (GBH). If not, it would probably be an s47 offence (ABH). Of course, if the person caught it and died, and the causation test was passed, etc. then you'd be looking at a murder charge. The same with attempted murder if they didn't die but the causation test was proven and your intent was also proven. However, realistically the most likely charge is ABH or GBH.	If A reasonably suspects that B committed a felony, A may arrest B, which means that A may also use reasonable force to detain B. They can also arrest for a misdemeanor committed in their presence, if it constituted a breach of peace. It is, of course, up to A to be correct that the act is a felony or a breach of peace, and to know what is reasonable force. If your arrest is in fact not lawful, you may be sued (battery or false imprisonment) or prosecuted (battery or unlawful imprisonment). Punching a person in the shoulder is the felony of battery, and direct observation creates highly reasonable suspicion. In such circumstances, anyone could have arrested the child. Unlike a police arrest, a citizen is not required to Mirandize an arrested suspect. This memo summarizes citizens arrest law including case law for Washington state. The right to perform citizen's arrest is statutorily recognized as a defense under RCW 9A.16.020 The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases: ...(2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him or her to a public officer competent to receive him or her into custody	The statute in question (which is unusual and not part of the law in most U.S. states) is as follows: (a) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) observes the commission of a felony under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that an offense had been committed in which serious bodily injury or death may have resulted; and (2) fails to immediately report the commission of the offense to a peace officer or law enforcement agency under circumstances in which: (A) a reasonable person would believe that the commission of the offense had not been reported; and (B) the person could immediately report the commission of the offense without placing himself or herself in danger of suffering serious bodily injury or death. (b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. There is no indication that violation of this section gives rise to civil liability. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez came to its conclusion that there was no civil liability of a police department or police officers for failure to enforce a restraining order in the face of language in a state statute whose plain language fairly clearly created a mandatory duty to that effect. The offense of unlawful restraint Texas Penal Code § 20.02 is as follows: (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly restrains another person. (b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person restrained was a child younger than 14 years of age; (2) the actor was a relative of the child; and (3) the actor's sole intent was to assume lawful control of the child. (c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is: (1) a state jail felony if the person restrained was a child younger than 17 years of age; or (2) a felony of the third degree if: (A) the actor recklessly exposes the victim to a substantial risk of serious bodily injury; (B) the actor restrains an individual the actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty or in retaliation or on account of an exercise of official power or performance of an official duty as a public servant; or (C) the actor while in custody restrains any other person. (d) It is no offense to detain or move another under this section when it is for the purpose of effecting a lawful arrest or detaining an individual lawfully arrested. (e) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person restrained was a child who is 14 years of age or older and younger than 17 years of age; (2) the actor does not restrain the child by force, intimidation, or deception; and (3) the actor is not more than three years older than the child. In practice, almost any restraint by a police officer would not obviously be outside the immunity for a lawful arrest sufficient to give rise to the duty to report a felony. Also, the person who decides whether to press charges is the prosecuting attorney who has a strong long term strategic interest in maintain a positive relationship with law enforcement and who often subjectively views law enforcement as his client even though this is the correct as a matter of legal doctrine. Question 1: Are any police on the scene responsible for reporting the crime of unlawful restraint which has become a felony in their presence? In general law enforcement may have a duty under department policy as a matter of employment law, but there is no general legal duty for a police officer to report a crime committed in their presence. Law enforcement officers, like prosecutors have wide discretion over whether they will choose to enforce crimes in the U.S. But, since Texas has a mandatory reporting law, this comes down more to a matter of interpretation and a restraint by an officer would almost never never give rise to a felony due to the privilege for an arrest. Also, it isn't at all obvious that a law enforcement officer has to report the crime to anyone but him or herself to satisfy the requirements of the law, and there is no duty for a law enforcement officer to act upon a report of a felony. Question 2: Would the police in not reporting the crime be implicating more involvement than mere presence and thereby threaten their immunity stance? Generally not. To have liability personally, the law enforcement officer would have to be a co-conspirator. Usually conspiracy liability would require an affirmative action in support of the illegal action and not merely inaction in the form of failing to report a crime. Police have qualified immunity from civil liability for any act that is not a clearly established violation of a constitutional right. If the police do not owe a duty to protect the person being unlawfully restrained, it would seem they still owe a duty to uphold the laws of the state like they would for the crimes of jaywalking, driving without a seat belt, or rape. This is mistaken. Law enforcement officers have no legally enforceable duty to uphold any laws. They may have a moral duty to do so, and they may have a strong employment relationship pressure to do so, but a law enforcement officer faces neither civil nor criminal liability for merely failing to enforce a criminal law when they know a crime has been committed. If the police do not owe a duty to the citizen to arrest another officer for violating the law do they at least owe a duty to the law to make a criminal complaint regarding the violation they witnessed? Arguably, there is a criminal law duty to report a clear felony, but since the duty is only to report the matter to a law enforcement officer and they are a law enforcement officer, it isn't clear that this statute applies at all. A report of a suspected felony is not a criminal complaint. And if so, and if they do not, would they be more accountable than the populace who are required by law to report felonies? No. As noted above, they are arguably less accountable than members of the general public.
What to expect when getting (free) legal aid? I want to sue my old landlord. The amount wouldn't be too much so I could do it in small claims court. I had searched the internet and found some free legal advice from the Legal Service Society. I booked a meeting with them and got a bad feeling and abruptly told them I wasn't interested and left. I don't mean to sound prejudice but the girl in the meeting was very young (early 20s) and emphasized how she couldn't give me legal advice so I was a bit confused as to why I was there. I think her job was to collect information and then give it to the actual lawyer. Is this normal? Also she had me sign something saying I expressly waive any right to legal action I may have against the people advising me and their organization. Is this normal? She had asked me if I wanted to communicate through mail or e-mail and I thought that was and I had been under the impression this was a one time visit. I'm having trouble finding the right words, but how can I find out what to expect from working with them? I feel really bad as I basically told the girl I didn't want to work with her and she almost started crying. Did I over react?	Legal Services Society is a non-profit organization created by the BC Legislative Assembly through this act, created in order to serve the legal needs of certain classes of society, defined vaguely with reference to "a reasonable person of modest means". Accordingly, they have rules regarding who they can and cannot serve. and they are constrained financially. With vast demands on their resources and little by way of resources, prudent triage is called for. That is, when you show up, you shouldn't expect to talk to a senior attorney (or an attorney). From what I can determine, you cannot expect to get your problem solved right away. It is also not clear that your problem is within the scope of what they do (criminal, incarceration, serious family matters, immigration). "Giving legal advice" is something that only a few people are legally allowed to do – lawyers, who have you as their client. If the person were an attorney, they still couldn't give you legal advice until the appropriate relationship is created (and they have the relevant facts). The person you met with may be a paralegal or a law student. Under the law (sect. 8 of the act), you cannot sue them for damages because of their actions, except if carried out in bad faith. The waiver might be a bit redundant, but it is a wise idea to tell people that you can't sue them. If you want to know what you can expect from the lawyer, this publication will be helpful, though it is generic and not specific as to your particular issue.	No. An engagement letter is a written confirmation that you have hired a lawyer which also sets forth the contractual obligations of the parties (i.e. the basis upon which attorneys' fees will be charged in the case). Instead of serving as an "estimate" or "approximate quote" of the fees to be charged, it is evidence that there is an attorney-client relationship and it sets forth the contractual terms of that relationship. Unless the engagement letter is for a fixed fee (which is uncommon but not unheard of), it only sets forth a method for determining what legal fees are owed and does not predict in advance what those fees will be. An engagement letter often does set forth a "retainer" amount that must be paid when the lawyer is hired, but a "retainer" is more akin to a security deposit on a lease than an estimate of what the total charges for the representation will be. Lawyers are required as a matter of professional ethics to put these things in writing. Of course, it wouldn't be improper for an engagement letter to include an estimate of the fees that will be charged in a representation as well as the other matters described above. But, that would be rather unusual. Firstly, since these people didn't even type my mobile number correctly, I'm uneasy about them drafting a legal agreement for me, where I wanted each and every clause to be thoroughly checked. I'm not confident of them being thorough. This certainly doesn't make a great first impression, although it reflects more on the quality of the office staff than on the legal acumen of the lawyers. I wouldn't blow a simple typo in writing a phone number out of proportion. How do I tell them that I do not need their services? Advise them by telephone, or better yet by letter, email or text, that you have decided not to retain their services. Does their sending of an engagement letter mean that I pay them for their time of drafting the letter? The firm probably could charge you, but it is customary not to charge for drafting an engagement letter. I wasn't expecting an engagement letter. I was expecting something like an ordinary email which said something like "this is our approximate hourly fee". Lawyers, as you might expect from their line of work, need to be more formal as a result of their legal ethics requirements, so this is very normal. The engagement letter constitutes a contract between the parties if the engagement is commenced. An informal communication, followed by a formal one, could lead to confusion over which one applies and could lead to mistakes where someone given an informal communication never received the required formal engagement letter. their hourly fees (which does not look reasonable to me) Lawyers are expensive, and good lawyers are worth it. The supply and demand issues are particularly intense in India because there are fewer lawyers there capita than in many other countries.	There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court.	You don't need to have an existing relationship with a lawyer to refuse to talk to the police. You can tell the police you want a lawyer before answering questions. Generally speaking, this should result in the police leaving you alone, giving you time to reach out to an attorney on your own timeline. This is of course a bit more complicated if you've already been arrested, but in most cases, you'll still be able to make calls out of jail to try to find a lawyer. If you have serious concerns about this kind of situation, having an attorney on retainer would be a good idea. The business end of the transaction is fairly simple. You would likely sign an engagement agreement with the lawyer in which you agree to pay a modest sum -- $500 or $1,000, imagine, and the lawyer would agree to take your calls when they come in and swoop in to deal with the police as necessary. The lawyer would be required to place your money in a trust account and not touch it until you call him to use his services. If you're expecting the lawyer to go further by actually appearing in court for you, filing motions, defending you at trial, etc., the retainer would likely be substantially higher.	Usual disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer. If you are serious about proceeding with this, talk to a lawyer who specialises in this kind of thing. I imagine that you will need to provide proof of the above incidents in order for any legal action to succeed. Accessing a tenant's room without notice or permission, and without a very good reason (e.g. a gas leak) is likely to be classed as harassment; specifically, "acts calculated to interfere with the peace or comfort of the residential occupier". Renting out your room and removing your belongings before the end of a tenancy is likely to be illegal eviction. Both of these are criminal offences under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. Shelter mentions that it's normally local authorities, rather than the police or individuals, who carry out prosecutions under this act (see also: Shelter articles, Landlord Law Blog articles), so you might want to start there. There is also the matter of civil action, including for breach of contract. For that, consider speaking to a lawyer.	A settlement is fundamentally a contract where parties A and B promise to do certain things (one of them being "stop litigating"). A court order is an enforceable order to do something. A contract cannot be directly enforced (where force is used to make a person comply), it requires a court order for actual enforcement. The conditions of a contract might be enforceable, but you can't get the sheriff to come out based just on a contract. It appears that you got to the "facilitation" phase where the parties talk about the issue and the CRT case manager talks to the parties in neutral terms, aiming for an agreement. If you don't reach an agreement, the Tribunal Decision Process escalates the matter. Under the decision process, the CRT member makes a decision, and it can be enforced in court. They state that "For a $25 fee, the CRT can turn your agreement into an order, if both parties agree that an order should be issued. This is called a “consent resolution order”." I suppose that you did not go through that step, and you only have an agreement. So you would need a separate court process to get a court order. Because everything that you did in this negotiation phase is confidential, if you want CRT to give you something that is enforceable, you have to present the case from the beginning, since they don't have access to what has happened before. The problem in your account is that a settlement has to be reached by yourselves – possibly with the assistance of the CRT case manager. I assume you did actually get a settlement (agreement) with the landlord, but have not filed for a consent resolution order. It may be that the case is too old for you to just pay the $25, and it does require agreement by the other party. Read their FAQ about how cases end.	This is an increasingly common practice in the UK for dismissals, especially for reasons of redundancy. What is going on here is that they are attempting to enter into what until recently was known as a compromise agreement, and is now termed settlement agreement. Normally, when you are made redundant, you are entitled to statutory redundancy pay (amount depends on age and length of service; see https://www.gov.uk/redundant-your-rights/redundancy-pay). You can take this and do not need to sign anything. However, sometimes companies make slightly more generous offers in exchange for you agreeing not to take them to tribunal/court or discuss/disclose certain matters. This would often involve more money and an agreed reference. These agreements only have legal standing if you have taken legal advice from a person qualified to give it. The UK's national conciliation and arbitration service ACAS has information on settlement agreements at http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=4395 Therefore the employer is offering to pay legal fees because they need you to get advice before you sign a document which protects them. They are suggesting solicitors because they know of solicitors willing to do this work for the price they are willing to pay. Some companies will do this for every dismissal and have a have a standard package for enhanced redundancy. Other companies decide for each case. Before you proceed to arrange a solicitor, you should check: That you are free to choose another solicitor who will do the same for £500. That this will be paid whether or not you agree to the terms. What your length of service is, what your statutory entitlement is and what the difference is between that and what you are being offered. You should also think carefully about whether you have any potential claims against the employer - for instance, if you think you are not being made redundant because the employer is doing less of a particular type of work but because you have raised issues of discrimination. You are probably being asked to give up your right to pursue this. In terms of choice of solicitor, a solicitor which gets work from employer recommendations probably won't be too forthright in encouraging you to challenge unfavourable terms (even if they do not work for employers). If you are a member of a trade union, they will be able to suggest lawyers who do settlement agreements for employees on a regular basis. If not (and I assume not as otherwise they would be helping you through this), I would suggest finding a firm that specialises in representing employees - some solicitors' firms like Thompsons and Morrish are pretty open about their focus.	If you're in the United States, another lawyer in a firm you've hired may or may not be your attorney, but it would not be uncommon for him to have some involvement in the case, and he would be expected to treat you as a client in terms of privilege and conflicts of interest. Just the same, this is something you need to be very direct on. "Are you my attorney?" or "Have we established an attorney-client relationship?" are going to be your best options.
For a politician, is a lunch outing with Warren Buffet considered a $650,000 gift? There is a story in the news about Nikki Haley (now former US ambassador to the UN) taking trips in a friend's (and political supporter's) private jet. See story: Watchdog wants investigation of Nikki Haley’s private jet flights to SC According to the article, Haley declared these trips, but rather than declaring the true market value of a private plane ride from New York to South Carolina (~$24,000), she declared the value to be that of a first class flight on a commercial airline (~$3200). This actually makes perfect sense to me. She didn't receive $24,000 of value. She can't sell the flight she got on eBay. All she got was a free trip, which saved her about $3200. So it seems reasonable to argue that the value of what she got was indeed about $3200. So if we start valuing things in the way this watchdog group is demanding, then what happens if a politician meets Warren Buffet? The market value for eating lunch with Warren Buffet is $650,000. If Buffet would have invited Halley out for lunch, would Halley have to declare a $650,000 gift?	I think you're working off some false premises here. Whatever FMV is in the context of a meeting with Warren Buffet purchased by investors, it's probably different in the context of the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Buffett has little to gain from a meeting with people whose job he's been doing more successfully for half a century. He has more to gain from meeting with high-ranking government officials; this is why political donors frequently drop thousands of dollars to attend a dinner where such officials are speaking, even when there's only an off chance of so much as a handshake. Assuming that a campaign-finance calculation of fair market value is roughly equivalent to that in the tax context, FMV for a lunch with Warren Buffett probably isn't $650,000. Because the Buffet lunch was purchased at a charitable auction, tax law would generally recognize that the price paid was not necessarily an accurate reflection of FMV. Instead, it would acknowledge that some portion of the price -- the amount in excess of FMV -- was actually a charitable gift. That of course still leaves the question of what FMV actually is for a lunch with Warren Buffet.	It's essentially a legally enshrined incentive for high net worth investors to supply capital, which is consistent with the other entities that qualify in § 230.501. It tends to come with increased access to riskier offerings, where the risk ensues from exempted registration. While nominal dollar thresholds typically get eroded away by inflation, they needed a line in the sand to represent financial sophistication. Speculation: I suspect the initial number was a ballpark attempt to approximate the point at which individuals (at that time) tended to be involved in more complex projects (e.g. certain hedges and ventures).	Are the monetary donations collected by the recipient subject to federal taxation according to IRS law? Yes. Usually, money received from an activity from third-parties with no personal relationship to you (assuming that "you" are not a tax exempt organization), are taxable income under Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code as interpreted by case law, as a form of "compensation for services", under I.R.C. § 61(a)(1), or as "gross income derived from business", under I.R.C. § 61(a)(2) (exactly which prong of I.R.C. § 61(a) it comes under isn't legally relevant for tax purposes in this situation). This is also informed by I.R.C. § 83(a) (which is a general rule even though the balance of the Code section applies mostly to equity compensation in entities), which states in the pertinent parts (material in brackets inserted for clarity): If, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom such services are performed, the excess of the fair market value of such property . . . over the amount (if any) paid for such property [by the person who receives the property], shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services[.] But, gifts are expressly excluded from income under Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code as interpreted by case law. One point which the case law makes clear, however, is that an obligation to pay doesn't need to be a legally binding obligation to make a payment something that counts as income rather than a gift. The tax law instead looks at the substance of the interaction and the reality of how decent, well mannered people would act under circumstances in which they receive an uncompensated benefit. Ultimately, whether are voluntary payment made through a private individual or business's website is taxable income or is not taxable because it is a gift is a case by case determination to be made in light of all of the relevant facts. For example, if your mother donates $7,500 to your website on your birthday, even though all of your other "donations" are from third-parties whom you have never met in person in amounts from $5 to $100 and you have provided all of those other third-parties with some kind of service or benefit through your website (e.g. they were allowed to read free webcomics or listen to music you wrote and recorded without charge over the website), the donation from your mother probably counts as a gift, even though the other donations probably count as income taxable income. But, in the absence for any reason for the donation other than gratitude for the performance of the services provided by the website, or for the conduct of the business that the website belongs to, the donation will generally be treated as income under Sections 61 and 83, rather than as a gift under Section 102. The notion of a gift is normally limited by case law and suggestive related section of the Internal Revenue Code that illustrate its intended meaning in the case of gift loans and bargain sales made for donative purposes, to circumstances in which the person making the gift has received nothing in return for it. A donation to a website usually wouldn't meet this test to show a transfer's character as a gift. The most familiar example, upon which there is a great deal of case law and authoritative guidance, is that tips paid to restaurant and hospitality industry workers are income rather than gifts, and are subject not only to income taxation but also to FICA payroll taxation. These tipping situations are closely analogous to voluntary payments made through a website. There are a great many tax regulations, court cases interpreting tax law, and authoritative guidances from the IRS (such a revenue rulings) that address the basic concepts that I've set forth above. And, the income tax law authorities are further informed by the statutes and case law governing gift taxation, which is, as intended, interpreted to define a gift in a matter that dovetails more or less perfectly with the definition of a gift for purposes of Internal Revenue Code Section 102. As the IRS explains at its website discussing the gift tax for which the concept of a gift is defined consistently with the income tax concept of a gift: The gift tax is a tax on the transfer of property by one individual to another while receiving nothing, or less than full value, in return. The tax applies whether or not the donor intends the transfer to be a gift. The gift tax applies to the transfer by gift of any type of property. You make a gift if you give property (including money), or the use of or income from property, without expecting to receive something of at least equal value in return. If you sell something at less than its full value or if you make an interest-free or reduced-interest loan, you may be making a gift. Donations which are not income are gifts and there is a tax on gifts given (paid by the donor rather than the person receiving the gift). But, there is a $15,000 per donor per donee exception per year from gift taxation for gifts under the Internal Revenue Code, in addition to more than $12 million per lifetime per person exemption from gift and estate taxation for gifts in excess of this $15,000 amount (called the annual exclusion) and inheritances left at death. So, usually, if a transfer is treated as a gift rather than as income, no tax will be due. But this part of this answer's short summary of the law is the top level conceptual framework for all of those other subordinate tax law authorities. Also, this income is also subject to self-employment taxation, which is imposed in lieu of FICA on income which is not a wage, salary or employment-related tip. Often self-employment taxes are due on self-employment income even when no federal income tax is owed upon it. if there is a clear answer, do states with personal income taxes do the same regarding website donations? Most states and localities with a personal income tax start from the federal definition of income and modify that definition in ways that the taxing jurisdiction deems fit either to make sense (limiting the tax to income related to the state, for example, at least for non-residents), or to fit local policy preferences (e.g. exempting from income taxation, capital gains made in an investment in the state favored by state lawmakers). Almost no states or localities have chosen to deviate from the federal definition of income for income tax purposes with respect to donations made to websites that are not non-profit entities.	This would be a violation of 18 USC 1361, which prohibits destruction of federal property. See also the DoJ legal notes on this crime. The act does have to be willful, so dropping a cup accidentally is not a crime. If for example the act is mustaching Obama's portrait, the damage would probably rise to the quarter-million dollar fine and 10 years in prison level. It would of course be at the discretion of the (new) DoJ whether to press charges.	Discriminatory pricing is a real thing. See this BuzzFeed video on discriminatory pricing as an example on how men's and women's products cost differently, even if the men's product consumes more raw material yet still costs less. However, it's illegal for hotels to charge different rates for their rooms, or for restaurants to charge unfairly or give preferential treatment; they are "public accommodations" protected under the various Civil Rights Acts. However, colleges are exempt from current laws, and it's not just tech colleges; even traditional colleges require different SAT scores for entry based on race and/or gender, and also charge different tuition. They are private accommodations and are therefore generally allowed to do this. For example, you'll have a much harder time getting in to Harvard if you're of a particular race, even if you can afford the tuition, simply because you'll be expected to have a higher SAT score. There was a class action lawsuit in California over this (the students were above 4.0 GPA, yet denied entry based on race), and as a result of law changes afterwards, California institutions can no longer do this. This is not the situation in the rest of the country, as no Federal law yet exists that protects minorities, gender, sexual orientation, etc, in regards to higher education. Also, sometimes merely proving a gap exists might not be noticeable, as companies are also starting to display pages on their websites based on data-mined information about visitors, possibly including information that would otherwise be discriminatory if it were done in person, and hiding the information from the general public. Discrimination is a difficult beast to tame, and until the law is introduced that all products and services must be offered to all consumers at the same price regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, etc, businesses will continue to find ways to discriminate in legal ways.	It would be a violation of 18 USC 1001, which is the law against making false statements to the federal government. Paul Mozer, who was a Salomon Brothers trader, received a four month sentence for doing something along those lines in 1994. Bidding on something implies an intent to pay for the thing, which in this case is a falsehood: in so doing, one "falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact" (that you don't intend to pay for the thing).	The official judgements do not reveal the funding for these lawyers; so where can I find this information? Nowhere. The commercial arrangements between lawyers and their clients are private and confidential like any other business transactions. You have no more right to know this then you do to know how your neighbour pays their mortgage. how could she have funded litigation in the EWHC and then EWCA before the UKSC? She may have rich parents or another benefactor who has in interest in her or the outcome of the case. She may have won the lottery. She may be the heiress of a dead rich uncle. By the way, "having" student loans does not mean you "need" student loans. Interest rates on student loans are cheap - if I need to pay $10,000 for a course and have $10,000 earning 5%, I would be nuts to use that if I could take out a loan at 3%.	There appears to be no specific number of hours. This article touches on the matter, presenting a slew of cases where e.g. the prisoner was on a hunger strike (self-imposed starvation is not cruel and unusual punishment). Gardener v. Beale upheld a 2-meal plan with 18 hours between dinner and brunch to be allowed. This was, however a temporary exception rather than a long term policy which was to provide 3 meals not spaced further apart than 12 hours. There does not seem to be any period deemed to be legally too long, however a prison system may have (probably does) have a policy, which cannot simply be ignored.
What are some remedies for a poor person if a petty rich guy buries him with frivolous lawsuits? A poor, jobless person made a careless remark about a rich and petty person. The rich person gets to know about it and sues the poor person for defamation. Does the poor person need to hire a lawyer to defend himself against the lawsuit? Lawyers charge by the hour. The poor person can hardly afford lawyers. What are some cost-effective remedies a poor person can take if a petty rich person buries his poor victim with frivolous lawsuits? Answers in the context of U.K, U.S, Australia are welcomed.	Such a lawsuit is known as a strategic lawsuit against public participation, or SLAPP. In the United States, several states have enacted laws that penalize those whose file SLAPPs. The provisions of these laws vary from state to state, but they usually allow a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the grounds that their statements were constitutionally protected free speech about a public figure. These laws may allow discovery to be halted until the motion to dismiss is decided; they may also require a plaintiff who files a SLAPP to reimburse the defendant's attorney's fees, possibly also with punitive damages. Some state's laws require the speech to be before a government forum (as opposed to, say, on Twitter), or to be aimed at procuring government action. And several states have no such laws at all. A summary of various US states' anti-SLAPP laws can be found on the website of the Public Participation Project, an organization advocating the establishment of such laws. Note that these motions to dismiss are not always brought by "the little guy" against "the big guy". A notable recent case was Stormy Daniels's libel suit against Donald Trump, which was dismissed earlier this year. Daniels had filed suit against Trump claiming that one of Trump's tweets about her was defamatory. Trump moved to dismiss under Texas's anti-SLAPP law, on the grounds that his tweet was protected political speech about a public figure (namely Daniels); and the judge agreed.	Alice files a lawsuit against Bob This is a civil suit, it will not lead to any court punishing Alice, or anyone else. If facts come out showing that Alice violated the law, the local prosecutor could, but need not, file a criminal case against Alice. If the prosecutor does not file such a case, Alice's worst possible outcome is to get no damages, with costs and fees awarded to Bob (or his estate). If Bob dies and Alice wishes to drop the case, there is no obvious reason not to permit it, unless Bob or his estate has counter-sued. Bob (or his estate) might ask for costs and legal fees, and perhaps sanctions for a frivolous suit. The court might well asses whether to grand such a costs order before or as it dismisses the case. ; The question seems to confuse the idea of a civil lawsuit and that of a criminal prosecution. In an Civil lawsuit, one person (or company) (the plaintiff) claims that another (or several others) (the defendant) have violated an agreement, or have in some other way caused legal injury. For example, if Alice claims that she had a contract with Bob and Bob violated the terms that would be a civil suit. Or if Alice claims that Bob infringed her copyright, or slandered her, or falsely advertised something or any of many other possible situations. The case would be Alice C vs Bob D. However, if Alice accuses Bob of having stolen from her, or punched her, or raped her, that woulds be a criminal accusation. The police would investigate, and if they found evidence to support the accusation, the local prosecutor could (but need not) file a case, which would be something like State of Franklin vs Bob D IN THE CRIMINAL COURT. Alice would be a witness, but not the plaintiff. If the investigation found that Alice committed a crime also, the prosecutor might file, State of Franklin vs Alice C Or the prosecutor might file both cases, or neither. The prosecutor has wide discretion whether or not to prosecute in any particular case, even when the evidence is clear. Neither Alice nor Bob could insist that either criminal case be dropped. Only the prosecutor, or the Judge, could do that. A criminal court is a different court from a civil court, and in many places a given judge hears only one or the other type of case. In many other places a judge may hear both kinds, but any one case is still either civil or criminal.	https://www.mwl-law.com/how-to-sue-yourself-and-win/ Yes, and there can be cases this is profitable. You negligently killed someone in a car accident. You need to sue yourself to use your insurance. The victim is dead so their estate goes to you. So you sue yourself on the estates behalf, the estate wins, and you get the estate. Directly suing yourself is impossible however.	What happens when a person dies intestate is that the court appoints someone to be the executor. That person is supposed to settle the decedent's debts, and divide the remainder equally among the siblings. It is virtually guaranteed that the mortgage-holder will get their share – you can't just sell a house with a mortgage and run. In the meantime, the estate has to keep paying the mortgage and property taxes. The executor has wide latitude to dispose of the estate, and clearing out personal possessions is a necessary part of liquidating the estate. Those possessions being part of the estate, they "count", therefore that mink coat worth $10,000 can't just be "taken" by the executor in order to tidy things up. But that broken weed-eater worth $1 can just be thrown away and not stored for some months, waiting for the final reckoning. The executor is entitled to compensation for his work and reimbursement for his expenses, so nickle and diming the small possessions is probably economically counterproductive. The executor has the legal power to determine how the legally required distribution is carried out, that is, the law doesn't require a majority vote of the heirs in order to dispose of each and every item of property. If there is an actual legal dispute, if you believe that the executor is improperly carrying out the job, you can hire a lawyer to have him removed, or otherwise put pressure on him to get a change in how things are. This will probably cost you more than you might get from the estate. It is possible that the real estate market will not support the current sale price and therefore a lower asking price is necessary (i.e. the executor needs a reality check). A combination real estate agent + lawyer could help you figure out what to do with the house to make it sell.	That's a sad story. The answer to your question is: Yes. If your case is attractive enough then a lawyer might agree to represent it on a contingency basis. Contact lawyers in the jurisdiction where the fraudster has a physical, business, or legal presence. In the U.S. you can ask for referrals to lawyers from the state bar association, or you can call or email them or their firms directly. However, if the amount of potential damages is too small, or the prospects of collecting them too low, then you will probably not find any lawyer interested in taking the case on contingency. If the fraudster has left many victims then you might try to pool your cases to make legal action more attractive. You also might contact the state attorneys in his jurisdictions, as they will sometimes pursue cases against serial scofflaws.	Your belief in the truth of a statement is of only limited value in a defamation suit. Saying that a person is incompetent in that person's profession can certainly be defamation, and may even be defamation per se, depending on the jurisdiction. If the person sues and the speaker asserts truth as a defense, the speaker may have to prove that the statement is true. Why would one need to say anything at all in such a situation? Whether such a statement was a factual statement or a statement of opinion would depend very much on the detailed circumstances. But it is at least possible that a suit might be filed and won on this fact pattern. See this answer for more on defamation under US law.	This is called a qui tam action. It's a concept that's been around a long time in the English legal system (predating the US), to encourage people to help the government enforce its laws. The more contemporary system is to give private parties the right to sue on their own behalf for some wrong (known as a "private attorney general" system), which is how things like civil rights claims tend to work; the difference with qui tam is that the government is the plaintiff (source) It's possible when the law says that a claim under some section may be filed by a private person on behalf of the government; at the time the article was written, the false marking statute (35 USC 292) stated that "Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event one-half shall go to the person suing and the other to the use of the United States." In a qui tam action, the government is the plaintiff; it's just that instead of a public attorney handling the case, it's handled by a private party. There were three active qui tam statutes in US federal law as of 2009 (source: CRS): the False Claims Act (31 USC 3730), the patent marking claim, and an Indian protection statute (25 USC 201). The patent marking qui tam provision has been repealed, leaving just the two. For the Indian protection statute, I can't find any reference to any special procedure; for the False Claims Act, there is a special procedure included in the law. In the False Claims Act, when an action is submitted, the government is notified and the complaint kept sealed for 60 days while the US government decides what to do. If the government wants to take over the case itself, it can do that; if it wants the private party to run the case, it can do that too; if it wants to dismiss or settle the case it can do that as well. It can also ask for the time to be extended, or for discovery to be delayed to gather evidence or prosecute a separate criminal or civil case. If the government lets the private party run the case, they can still intervene later if they have a good reason. After the case finishes, the private party gets 15-25% of the judgment or settlement (if the government took over the case) or 25-30% (if the private party ran the case), plus attorney fees. If the facts the case was brought under were publicly known when it was filed, the amount shrinks to 0-10% if the person supplied information to the government that wasn't publicly known when it was supplied, and the case is dismissed if the person just learned about it from public sources. For the false marking statute, a district court actually found it unconstitutional in part because of the lack of the extensive procedure found in the False Claims Act. There, the procedure was just to file the case like normal; the clerk had to tell the Patent Office that a claim had been filed within a month, but one issue was that a settlement could have happened in that time and bound the government. It's possible higher courts would have ruled had that section not been repealed later that year. As for other countries, the idea came to the US from England, but the Common Informers Act 1951 eliminated it there. However, private prosecutions (which do exist in England) are similar in that the case is on behalf of the Crown, but handled by a private party; they're different in that the private party doesn't get any part of the judgment. While it's hard to prove a negative, I can't find any evidence of qui tam provisions outside the US.	In general, you cannot neither change contracts nor restrict/nullify other people's rights by your acts alone. The people who hired you personally have a contract with you, not with your LLC. So, if someone has a claim against you, then their claim should not be contingent of your LLC going bankrupt or not; they have a right to have their damages restored by you (who was the entity they hired). Otherwise, fraud/liability delinquency would be trivial: get debts on your name and, when the things get difficult, create a shell LLC and let it go bankrupt.
Is it illegal to sell a breast pump that I got for free from insurance? This question is referring to United States law. If I get a breast pump from insurance and I don't use it, is it considered insurance fraud to sell it for cash?	It is not insurance fraud to sell medical equipment which was paid for by an insurance company. Unless it was obtained fraudulently of course. Two warnings that probably do not apply to breast pumps: Make sure that you actually own it. Sometimes equipment is leased; the patient does not own it. Make sure that it is not a prescription item. You can't sell items which require a prescription.	No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.	I emailed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in the USA asking this and received the reply: "There is nothing to prevent you from marketing antiques in the UK while present in the US." I also contacted a relevant US attorney and received: "There’s nothing in your question which would implicate Colorado or US law. If you're a UK citizen, and the sale is happening in the UK while you're in the US, then the US has anything to do with it. So as long as the UK doesn’t have any problem with it, the US will not." So I would conclude this question fairly answered.	In general it is illegal to gamble on life. However, you might not even need to go to a bookmaker: A contract that pays money upon the death of a specific person is known commercially as "life insurance." In order to avoid the moral hazard (or reality) of creating a contract killing market, it has long been illegal to trade life insurance with any person or entity who does not have an "insurable interest" in the insured. (See also: The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance, by Peter Swisher, who also has a good review of laws and regulations surrounding exceptions to the rule like viaticals and STOLI. Further reading on the subject here.) I don't know if it has been tested, but I think anyone could argue that they would face a significant financial loss if the U.S. President were killed or died in office: the stock markets plunged on JFK's assassination. Therefore, it could be both legal and possible for anyone to buy life insurance on the U.S. President. (Note that, in the U.S., the disputes about third-party life insurance have revolved for generations around the tax benefits associated with insurance premiums and benefits. See corporate-owned life insurance (COLI), a.k.a. "janitor's insurance.")	At the federal level, gift cards seem to be treated as a special case of electronic fund transfer. 15 U.S. Code § 1693l–1 and the corresponding regulations presently regulate disclosure of fees and expiration, and do not directly say anything about sale of such a card. There might be relevant state laws, though Washington state laws mostly mirror the federal law (also allowing issuing a card with an expiration date if given for no value to a charitable organization). You can actually get your last $5 back in cash in Washington per RCW 19.240.020. A gift card / certificate isn't a "thing" in the way that an apple, hammer or table is, it's a contractual relationship. If you own a thing, you can freely re-sell it to whoever you want (assuming there isn't an express statutory prohibition against the sale of the thing). You cannot universally sell (assign) a contract right – there is a default preference that you should be able to, but Amazon has in this case said "No, you can't".	Many products can be used for illegal purposes, so selling something that could be used for illegal purposes won't generally result in liability for the producer. Think of software used for computer system and network security testing; it's both useful for legitimate testing and securing systems, but of course it can be used by hackers to find and exploit security holes. Clorox can be used to clean the bathroom or poison someone. If you look at the Terms of Service for https://donotpay.com/learn/terms-of-service-and-privacy-policy/ , you'll see DoNotPay is Not a Law Firm DoNotPay provides a platform for legal information and self-help. The information provided by DoNotPay along with the content on our website related to legal matters ("Legal Information") is provided for your private use and does not constitute advice. We do not review any information you provide us for legal accuracy or sufficiency, draw legal conclusions, provide opinions about your selection of forms, or apply the law to the facts of your situation. If you need advice for a specific problem, you should consult with a licensed attorney. As DoNotPay is not a law firm, please note that any communications between you and DoNotPay may not be protected under the attorney-client privilege doctrine. and Your use of the Service is subject to all applicable federal, state and local laws and regulations. Unauthorized use of the Service is prohibited, and violators can be prosecuted under federal and state laws. Virginia law and Federal law will govern the interpretation and enforcement of these Terms. That's for the web service, but it's useful to point out the distinction between a user using DoNotPay for themselves and getting a script to read in court, and the DoNotPay service actually participating in a court appearance representing the user. The reason DoNotPay pulled the plug on the court appearance, as pointed out in the article https://www.businessinsider.com/donotpay-ceo-says-risks-jail-ai-robot-lawyer-used-court-2023-1 is that DoNotPay's AI "robot" lawyer was going to actively argue in court, and the state bar objected, because that's what only lawyers are licensed to do. If the DoNotPay source code was released and someone used it on their own computer to analyze a legal situation and give themselves options and offer decisions, this could probably be seen as little different than someone reading books that analyze the law and strategies and offer options of how to go about representing oneself in a court. The software would be used to make decisions before and after court; the software is not actively arguing and making decisions for the user in court. Of course, in this brand new world of AI, the final assessment of whether or not AI software can be used to give others (or oneself) legal advice - either in court and/or prep for court - will likely have to be finally determined by litigation and courts. The idea of open source or closed source could possibly come into play to determine exactly how the software works, but would not be the sole criteria to determine if the use of the software is legal or not. The software could be simply a "decision tree" (little different than textbooks) that follows a hard-coded if/else script, such as If you get a ticket, go to court; if you plead guilty, this is what happens; if you plead not guilty, these are your options. Or, the software could have true AI aspects, i.e. it develops arguments for being not guilty from your past legal history, and develops and responds to the court's actions with counter arguments, and actually gives opinions to the user on what they should do. If the software is open source, we all see how it works and if it is a decision tree or real AI (and the software can also be modified by users and other developers.) If the software is closed source, we can't see how it works, and we don't know if it is a decision tree or AI, unless it it is opened, possibly through court order during possible litigation to determine if it is giving legal advice. Again, AI is a brand new thing in the legal world.	Are online stores supposed to state the true “order cost”/value of an order on the package/envelope for the customs? Yes Is it common practice to slash 10x off of the price for the customs to not add various fees? Common? Probably no. Uncommon? Also, probably no. Isn't that illegal? Yes Of course, they can claim it was a mistake if ever found out, but if they do it consistently, that seems difficult... Not to mention there must be electronic proof of how much each order actually cost the customer? Yes Look, robbing banks is illegal but people still rob banks. Similarly, ripping off HM Revenue & Customs is illegal but people still do that too. In fact, far more people do that than rob banks.	The FDA approved the device as requiring a prescription (not OTC). FDA regulations govern the manufacture or distribution of devices and drugs, not the consumption. An overview of FDA regulation is here. They say they they are "responsible for regulating firms who manufacture, repackage, relabel, and/or import medical devices sold in the United States". The entire pile of regulations (21 CFR) is here. There has to be an underlying statute that authorizes the FDA to impose restrictions: that would be in Title 21 of the US Code. The specific law regulating medical devices is 21 USC 360. Congress can easily pass laws that restrict what businesses do (a consequence of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution), but they (theoretically) have a more limited ability to restrict what an individual does. Since there is no federal law prohibiting the use of a prescription device, it is not a crime to possess or use such a device.
Is the proposed Brexit agreement contrary to the Human Rights Act? Is the proposed Brexit agreement contrary to the Human Rights Act? May's Brexit Deal as it is currently tabled, sees EU laws continue to apply in the UK, enforced by the Commission and Adjudicated by the ECJ. However under Article 7 the UK is excluded from the nomination, appointment or election of members of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, as well as the participation in the decision-making and the attendance in the meetings of the institutions Theresa May envisages the transition period continuing up to 2022, but it could go on for any length of time. Moreover, the EU would have right of veto over the UK's exit from the Northern Ireland protocol. Immediately there would appear to be problems with the UK's Human Rights Act 1998: No discrimination: everyone’s rights are equal. Yet clearly, an EU citizen living in the UK will enjoy superior rights of determination in respect of having democratic rights to determine the UK laws which govern them while UK subjects would not. Then we have the right: The right to free elections: elections must be free and fair. Again, if we take as given what goes to election and who may participate, this is not threatened. But if we take as a premise that fairness as aright extends to the right to participate in elections, surely the deal is starting to look illegal, is it not? Is a right to democratic determination of ones own laws a human right per se? And if not, is it lawful to reduce the democratic rights of some subset of the polulation in favour of others?	This is more a political question than a legal one, so the answer is more political than legal. Countries are sovereign, and thus can decide which treaties affect them. The UK does not need to agree to any treaty with the EU. It can just refuse to sign the agreement, and just go on its own. Of course, this works both ways. In the same way the EU cannot impose a treaty on the UK about movement of people or the North Ireland borders, the UK cannot impose a treaty on the EU allowing it trade without tariffs. If the UK does not want the deal, the path is straightforward: the Parliament1 rejects the treaty proposal. Of course, then probably the EU will be way less amenable to a free trade pact. Someone being free to do something does not exempt that someone from the consequences of doing that something. If the treaty is put into effect, then at any moment the UK (either from action by the Executive1 or the Parliament1, that is to be internally decided by the UK) can just decide that EU trade is not worth following EU regulations and just withdraw from the treaty. Happens all the time. That the UK cannot unilaterally withdraw from the treaty means is that, should the UK unilaterally decide to leave the "backstop", the UK will be in breach of the treaty and so the EU can ask in international courts for compensation3. In contrast, in many treaties there are explicit clauses explaining the conditions (e.g. notification in advance to the other parties) that allow for a signatory to "lawfully" withdraw from the treaty. But certainly the EU cannot impose its laws on the UK against the decision of the Parliament (again, this is pretty much what "the UK is a sovereign country" means). 1 Elected by British citizens2. So much for "political discrimination". 2Actually it is something more complicated but not because of the EU but of the Empire, as there are some rules allowing citizens of British Overseas Territories or Commonwealth to vote. But that is a question completely internal to the UK. 3And of course, cancel the tariff-free part of the treaty and the agreements for after the backstop ends.	It's hard to prove a negative, and I'm not sure which specific part of the quoted Terms you object, to, but it specifically states that content access may be done to: Comply with the law Protect its customers; and Protect the security of its business; and Protect its business interests. It's unlikely that access of information to comply with the law is illegal. At least one EU directive, Directive 95/46/EC, sets limits on the collection and use of personal information. We're concerned with the first condition for lawful data processing, and the second principle of data quality. Data processing is only lawful if the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party; or processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; or processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party; or processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interest pursued by the controller or by the third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection. The principles of data quality, which must be implemented for all lawful data processing activities, are the following: personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully, and collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes. They must also be adequate, relevant and not excessive, accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date, must not be stored for longer than necessary and solely for the purposes for which they were collected; special categories of processing: it is forbidden to process personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. This provision comes with certain qualifications concerning, for example, cases where processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or for the purposes of preventive medicine and medical diagnosis. So, let's say that someone has given their consent. It'd be at least a little questionable whether the inspection of private information could mean that they access personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. I'm a bit less clear on US laws, but you'd probably look for laws around Personal Identifying Information, as that's where a lot of focus has been.	I'm very sorry to hear about your situation. Unfortunately, this is too important to trust advice from strangers over the Internet. You should talk to an attorney familiar with Bulgarian immigration law. @jwh20 is correct; entering another country is not a human right. If they are not allowing you to return to your home country despite your following all laws, that is likely a human rights issue. This does not necessarily mean you won't be able to get into Bulgaria; if one person is preventing you from entering, an attorney may be able to get that person's decision overturned.	Its difficult to tell without seeing the exact paperwork, and the exact meaning of without prejudice varies by jurisdiction (I think UK is the same as here in NZ though). If an agreement is reached through communications marked "without prejudice" it should be valid in court to the extent that it shows an agreement was reached and what the agreement was (but the court will not generally look at the documents marked without prejudice for other reasons – e.g. admissions made – if no agreement is reached). There are a couple of other relevant things to mention – although not strictly part of your question: Lawyers are officers of the court, and have duties to the court, which include acting ethically. So, provided it's a reputable law firm, it is reasonable to (somewhat) trust their solicitors in procedural matters. My understanding is that courts encourage anything that will help settle a matter out of court – hence the whole idea of "without prejudice" letters being valid. I believe that the court will uphold an agreement reached through communication of without prejudice emails as it's in their interests. If you have these kinds of concerns, you can raise them with their solicitor, suggesting that you would prefer the final document to not be without prejudice, even if it only refers to the matter and agreement, without sensitive stuff. I imagine they would be only to happy to oblige, as they can bill their client for another letter!	You have to distinguish between the Tory party and the UK parliament. The UK parliament just had a vote of no confidence against Theresa May and lost. Had they won, parliament would have had to come up with a different government (for example the same government except for a different PM, or a government formed by the current opposition) that would have a majority to rule, or there would be new elections. The Tory party could legally do lots of things, but they are bound by their party rules. They had a vote of no confidence against Theresa May maybe a month or so ago, and she won. According to the Tory party rules, there cannot be another such vote for one year, so right now and for the next eleven months, they can't replace her. If that vote a month ago had not happened, they could. But that is all not because of some law, but because of the rules this party set for itself.	It seems to me that some commentators/articles have inadvertently conflated different legislation and a recent event involving the seizure of equipment from protester Steve Bray in Parliament Square. Some articles about Steve Bray have named or otherwise referred to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 without an explanation of any link between that person and this law - to me there is no link in the context of Bray's equipment seizure (the police may have mentioned other newer powers to Bray). Among other things, section 143 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (as amended) explicitly prohibits the unauthorised use of "amplified noise equipment" (including but not limited to loudspeakers and loudhailers) within Parliament Square and (the amendment) "the Palace of Westminster controlled area". Westminster Council provides a map in pdf format of the respective areas: Appendix to Protocol for enforcement of provisions in relation to noise nuisance in the vicinity of Parliament. Before the PRSRA 2011, sections 137 and 138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 gave the Home Secretary the power to prohibit the unauthorised use of "loudspeakers" in "designated areas" no more than one kilometre around Parliament Square. Part 3 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 amends the Public Order Act 1986 in relation to "public processions and public assemblies", including clauses related to "noise". Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 abolished the common law offence of public nuisance and created the statutory offence of "intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance". This more recent legislation has been criticised in relation to protests generally (not solely those that involve megaphones), e.g. by the Joint Committee on Human Rights its witnesses in their scrutiny of the-then Bill. Quote: The Bill introduces a new statutory offence of “intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance” which was previously an offence at common law. There is a wide range of non-violent conduct that may be caught by the statutory offence, which potentially criminalises some forms of peaceful protest. The offence carries a maximum sentence of 12 months if tried summarily and 10 years if tried on indictment. A person can also be issued with a fine.77 A number of our witnesses raised concerns about the impact of these changes and its compatibility with Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. We share some of those concerns. In summary the explicit prohibition of "amplified noise equipment" is limited to Parliament Square and "the Palace of Westminster controlled area" but one can easily imagine the police claiming that a protester's use of a megaphone is a public nuisance.	You've asked a two part question. [Is this a violation of] the international policy that a country should never refuse entry to verified citizens of their own? In considering that question, the US example may be illuminative. The US requires US citizens to have a "passport book" when flying into the US, even though the US issues "passport cards" that serve as proof of nationality. If you can get to the border and prove your US nationality (by passport card or otherwise), they'll let you in, but airlines won't board you unless you have a passport book. If you don't have a passport book, you're supposed to get to the nearest consulate and apply for a passport before flying to the US. But note that the US obligation to admit its own citizens is principally a feature of US law. CBP does not waive 8 USC 1185 because of some international body; there is no body that enforces international "policies" of this nature. Rather, they do so because they know that the federal courts would require them to admit US citizens based on the right of free movement implicit in US law. If someone were unable to get into their country of citizenship and unable to gain legal residence elsewhere then unless they could remain on the run for the rest of their life they would eventually end up as the subject of negotiation between whatever country is trying to deport them and their country of citizenship. In other words, in the worst case, such people become a bilateral diplomatic matter between two countries. Therefore, any challenge to the restriction would have to go through the Italian or EU legal system. Is this a violation of the EU freedom of movement directive, whereby a verified EU/EFTA national cannot normally be refused entry to any EU/EFTA state? It certainly seems to be, but without a decision from an EU court, we can't be certain. From Article 5 of the freedom of movement directive (2004/38/EC): Article 5 Right of entry 1. Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border controls, Member States shall grant Union citizens leave to enter their territory with a valid identity card or passport and shall grant family members who are not nationals of a Member State leave to enter their territory with a valid passport. No entry visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on Union citizens. This doesn't say anything about allowing EU citizens to board aircraft from non-EU destinations without their EU passports. So if Italy makes a rule that EU citizens need a passport to board a flight to Italy from outside the EU and Schengen area, that doesn't seem to violate Article 5 except by implication. It would be for a court to decide whether that implication is in fact present. Because Article 5 doesn't say anything about where the passenger has flown from, we can also consider the case of a dual citizen of an EU member state and a "third country," who might fly to Italy using the third-country passport, and then present a national ID card at the immigration counter. If such a traveler were denied entry, that would appear to violate Article 5. If that traveler's other nationality were one that required a visa in the non-EU passport, the traveler might have a stronger case that Italy's rule infringes on the right of free movement. EU or EFTA citizens could also challenge the restriction more generally as an infringement on the right of free movement that is established in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), even if the directive itself does not prohibit the restriction. For example, one might argue that free movement is restricted because there are countries to which EU citizens can travel with only an ID card, but from which they cannot return to Italy with only that card. In addition, non-Italian EU or EFTA citizens could challenge the more restrictive regime applied to them on the argument that it violates the principle of non-discrimination articulated in Article 9 of the TEU: Article 9 In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.... Furthermore, non-Italians residing in Italy could challenge the more restrictive regime on the basis of Article 24 of the directive: Article 24 Equal treatment 1. Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty. The benefit of this right shall be extended to family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who have the right of residence or permanent residence.	First, there are many versions of Robert's Rules of Order: here is an early free version. §26(c) suggests a procedure for creation of a committee to draft resolutions, and §53 contemplates other (standing) committees. Nothing therein suggests that there are restrictions on the right of a member to vote, in terms of a mandatory adjournment. However, RRO is not a Universal Organizational Bylaws, so in order to have any force, it must be adopted as part of the bylaws (in whole or part). It especially cannot dictate who is eligible to vote – that is a detail that has to be in the organization's bylaws.
Why shouldn't a bank robbery without threats be legal? So say a bank robber walks into a bank and hands the teller a note saying simply "please give me $1,000" (or maybe even just verbally saying "I need $1,000 please") and if the teller accepts, which they probably would because they're supposed to comply with the robber, he takes the money, otherwise if they refuse, he leaves. How is this different than say people asking for charity donations in the street? He just politely requested money without making any threats.	As a concrete example, consider Missouri v. Coleman, where Coleman handed a teller a plastic bag and said "I need you to do me a favor. Put the money in this bag", and later as the manager approached, said "Ma'am, stop where you are and don't move any farther". Coleman was convicted of second degree robbery: but the appeals court found that he had not acted forcibly, so his conviction was overturned. Instead, the court entered a conviction for the lesser offense of stealing which is when one Appropriates property or services of another with the purpose to deprive him or her thereof, either without his or her consent or by means of deceit or coercion The act may also be termed "theft", as in Washington state. The thief is acting deceptively and thereby gaining control over property.	None First, only cash transactions are reportable: electronic and cheque transactions aren't. The only ones that will be reported are your single withdrawal and deposit. As you say $10,000 is not a lot of money. What law enforcement is looking for a people who frequently have large cash transactions: they use data matching algorithms to identify these people. Your single transaction will not be noticed.	There are a couple of indications that a bouncer may not confiscate an ID. This policy document adopting licensing policies to Require licensees with fake ID violations to temporarily or permanently hire on-site law enforcement or certified security guards who are properly trained to check IDs during regular or peak hours to deter the use of fake IDs and give gatekeepers the opportunity to pass suspected fakes to an officer or guard for a second opinion and potential confiscation. Where appropriate, jurisdictions could empower the gatekeeper to confiscate fake IDs so they are not returned to the underage drinker and sent back into circulation. To ensure compliance with legal issues (e.g., property rights, bailment issues), arrange for the on-call or on-site presence of local law enforcement. Local bar and restaurant associations, especially those in concentrated entertainment zones, can join together to share the expense of law enforcement resources. That implies that the bouncer does not already have that authority, and also indicates that the confiscation should be performed by the police. This bouncer training manual says that Even though you may consider the ID to be fake, it is not considered the server's property. Therefore servers and sellers should not confiscate IDs they suspect to be fake. Rather... follow up with a call to the police to verify suspected false IDs. However, a jurisdiction may grant servers that power, as in the case of Colorado. Washington doesn't do that, so bouncers would need to call the police (not that they always do, since passing a fake ID is somewhere between a misdemeanor and a felony). The general principle is that you may not confiscate another person's property, but the police can seize property if it is reasonable to do so. A state may pass a law authorizing a licensee to do likewise (though it does raise questions about the bouncer's understanding of "reasonable cause to believe"). The Colorado statute is restricted to licensee and their employees, and does not apply to "anyone who suspects an ID", nor does it allow civilian confiscation of other property such as an automobile that is suspected of being stolen.	The Bank of England actually makes this pretty clear with the following line: Legal tender has a very narrow and technical meaning, which relates to settling debts. It means that if you are in debt to someone then you can’t be sued for non-payment if you offer full payment of your debts in legal tender. Essentially, if you are in debt (frequent examples are a taxi ride or a meal at a sit-down restaurant) then you can use legal tender to pay off that debt. But that doesn't necessarily mean they have to accept it. It only means that they cannot sue you if they do refuse to accept it. But the refusal wouldn't itself alleviate the debt either. They could technically return to you at some point and say "ok, fine, we'll take the cash" and you'd still be obligated to provide it to pay off your debt. It's also worth emphasizing that this only applies to situations where the payment is to alleviate a debt, for services that have already been provided before you are billed. It would not apply while buying groceries at the supermarket. Even restaurants where you pay for your food up-front and then receive it afterwards can refuse cash payment. In those situations the services are prepaid and you are not ever alleviating a debt.	Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.	The above is not quite accurate. First, assault. The correct definition is "a threat or physical act that creates a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact." Therefore, no attempt at a battery is necessary. Rather, simply making someone subjectively believe that you are about to commit a battery against them is enough for an assault charge. Please note the following two points. One, that apprehension does not mean fear. Apprehension means that the victim has to believe that the actor's conduct will result in imminent harmful or offensive contact. Two, it's not necessary that the victim believes such conduct will actually be effective - rather, he only has to believe the conduct is "capable" of making the contact. I can't tell if by "other security personnel" you mean, in addition to bouncers, say, security at concerts or if you mean private security guards, such as ones who guard warehouses or other businesses. Nonetheless, for the warehouse/business "guards," they do not have a special privilege above or beyond what any random person may do. That is, you may use force to the extent you reasonably believe necessary to prevent a felony, riot, or serious breach of the peace. You may use deadly force only if it appears reasonably necessary to prevent a "dangerous felony" involving risk to human life, including, for example, robbery, arson, burglary. However, if the private security personnel are operating under authority vested to them by local ordinance or the state legislature, then their rights (and also any attendant restrictions, such as those provided to citizens under the Fourth Amendment) would apply instead. So where's the difference? It comes about at the standard a situation must meet to allow use of deadly force. A police officer can use deadly force to effectuate an arrest based on a reasonable belief that a suspect has committed a felony involving the risk of physical harm or death to others (murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape or burglary) or if there is substantial risk that the suspect was dangerous to the point that he may cause serious physical harm or death to someone if the arrest were delayed. On the other hand, as a private citizen, you may only use deadly force when attempting to effectuate an arrest if the suspect did indeed commit such a felony. Police can base their action on a reasonable belief and even if that belief is wrong, they will be safe from prosecution. A private citizen actually must be right about the suspect having committed the requisite crime. No matter how reasonable the belief was of a private citizen regarding a suspect, if that suspect did not actually commit the crime, the private citizen who used such force will be subject to prosecution. Bouncers are afforded no more rights than private citizens. They can issue verbal warnings, ask a patron to leave the establishment, check identification, refuse entry, call the cops, protect bystanders from violence, break up fights, and respond with equal force if necessary. They may not strike an individual with a punch or kick, push or physically toss someone out of the establishment, restrain them using chokeholds or other submission techniques, or use weapons or pepper spray.	My recollection is there's a big difference between money and property. I found a 1929 law journal article that supports my recollection. The owner of stolen property is entitled to have it returned. If the person who obtained it from the thief didn't know it was stolen, the person didn't commit a crime, but must give up the property and is not entitled to any compensation (unless the person can get compensation from the thief). A person who innocently receives money is the holder in due course, and gets to keep it. The victim's only recourse is to get compensation from the thief.	If we cut through all the entertaining colour commentary around Bob's experience then all that happened is TfL refused him permission to carry a specific item and according to the TfL Conditions of Carriage: 9.2 Staff can refuse permission for you to take any item onto our services. For example, you may be prevented from taking a bicycle on DLR services during the London Marathon. So the rules around the times when non-folding bikes are permitted on the Overground not withstanding there's a catch-all rule which allows them to refuse specific items on specific occasions for whatever reason they want. What remedies does Bob have available for his wasted time, his refusal of carriage, the supervisor's concealment of his identity, general rude treatment, Realistically - none. The refusal may be harsh - but there's plenty of room in the conditions of carriage to allow it. A supervisor concealing his identity may be annoying but it's not illegal, nor is being rude. the BTP's shockingly insulting accusation of his "wasting police time" by simply trying to explain the situation to reason with them upon their arrival, either against TfL, or against BTP? Probably nothing doing here either - the BTP aren't for what Bob's trying to use them for. I doubt they'd actually pursue Bob for wasting police time unless he makes a habit of doing it, but they've got a point. They're not the complaints department for TfL! It's like calling the police because McDonalds won't serve you at the drive through.
GDPR Requiring consent to give up privacy A website that I visited posted the following: “YOUR PRIVACY IS IMPORTANT TO US. New regulations in your country require you to agree to our terms of use agreement and privacy policy before you can continue using this website” The first sentence is an obvious lie (they only care about my data, not my privacy). But I would have thought GDPR required them to respect my privacy, not deny access. Is what they are doing (only allowing access in exchange for giving up privacy rights) legal under GDPR?	No, it is not legal. Regardless of their location, the only legal options for companies serving to EU residents are to either deny access altogether or to make consent truly optional1 Recital 42 states (emphasis mine): Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement[...] Recital 43 states: Consent is presumed not to be freely given [...] or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. 1 Of course, remember that consent is only one of several means that allow them to process data. For example, if you were getting a trial account for a limited time, it would be considered a legitimate business need to ensure that you are not just opening new trial accounts when the old ones expire. So, if they wanted some data from you to ensure that you are not a previous user and you refused to provide it, then they could deny giving you that trial account without breaking the GDPR.	b. the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based [...] That refers to Article 6(1)(a): Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: a. the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; Article 7 contains the conditions for consent. As far as I know, Facebook has never requested consent as specified in Article 7. You have accepted the Terms of Service, but that does not count as also explained in recital 43 Consent is presumed not to be freely given [...] if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. So because you have not given consent as defined in the GDPR, you cannot withdraw consent. But even if you can withdraw consent, it would only apply to data processing based on Article 6(1)(a). Facebook would not base the processing of data regarding friendships on Article 6.1a, because it looks to me that is a key feature of Facebook. Even regarding the past friendship with John Doe, processing would probably be based on Article 6.1f, for example because John Doe has interests in keeping that data. Only if for example the knowledge of that past friendship is used to display an ad, it would be possible to withdraw consent of that data processing, but that would not lead to deleting any data. Facebook would still know about that friendship, you would still see an ad, but which ad is shown, would not be based on that past friendship.	Does GDPR apply if my web app stores personal data on the user's phone only? No. If you are not processing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) then the GDPR does not apply to you. This is what a web browser does when it asks to remember your username and password for this web site. You are providing a tool, the user is using that tool to process their own data. I do offer to back up the user's personal data At this point you are processing the users PII, and the GDPR does apply to you. Even though you do not have enough information to identify an individual, as it can be used with other information to identify an individual it is PII. From the ICO: Can we identify an individual indirectly from the information we have (together with other available information)? Even if you may need additional information to be able to identify someone, they may still be identifiable. That additional information may be information you already hold, or it may be information that you need to obtain from another source. When considering whether individuals can be identified, you may have to assess the means that could be used by an interested and sufficiently determined person.	The point of privacy laws is to set basic standards that apply to everyone, whether or not they have a privacy policy. A privacy policy that is inconsistent with privacy laws cannot be enforced. Breaches of privacy law can be punished even if the conduct is permitted by a privacy policy. Article 7 of the GDPR illustrates this by making special provision for the nature of "consent" to the processing of personal data. Consent must be freely given, and a "written declaration" as to consent, like the acceptance of a privacy policy, "shall not be binding" to the extent that it infringes the GDPR. The $5 billion penalty obtained by the FTC in United States v. Facebook, Inc (19-cv-2184) demonstrates that privacy laws can have a practical impact when a service provider "subvert[s] users’ privacy choices to serve its own business interests." Facebook was penalised even though its users agreed to Facebook sharing "information about the App User and the App User’s Facebook Friends" with third-party developers. Whether a service provider has breached privacy law is a complex, fact-specific question, but if the service is "pretty much part of people's lives," that will generally affect both the application of privacy law and the likelihood of an investigation by the regulators.	You could, but how should the companies that want to handle your data know this? If they have no affirmation from you that you allow them to process your data in any way, other than those they are already allowed to because of the exceptions, they have to - under GDPR - assume you don't want them to process your data, and thus have to ask you.	The GDPR does not prescribe how exactly consent must be managed, as long as consent was obtained in line with the GDPR's principles. Similarly, the EDPB does not provide concrete recommendations in its guidelines on consent, mainly noting that Controllers are free to develop methods to comply with this provision in a way that is fitting in their daily operations. I would not be too concerned with edge cases like failing HTTP requests, at least not any more than for other HTTP endpoints. If the user indicated consent, and you act on that indication of consent in good faith, that's probably fine. However, remember that you must provide a equally easy way for the user to revoke consent later. If the user changes their mind, they can use the mechanism that you offer to inspect their consent status, and revoke it if they want. But again, how to do that is largely up to you.	You clearly cannot provide data that you haven't stored – and not storing data is a good thing under the Art 5(1)(c) Data Minimization Principle. Despite the Art 20 data portability right being conditional on that the data subject has provided data and not on that data has been stored, I think responding to such a request with “sorry, as per our privacy policy we do not store this data” would be perfectly fine. It is also curious that you are using consent as the legal basis for the purpose of selecting the website language. How do you obtain consent from visitors? How can you prove that you got consent? In many ways, consent is the legal basis of last resort, and I'd think that legitimate interest would be a much more straightforward approach in your case.	I think that one cannot answer a question such as "Will the personal use exception in the GDPR apply to personal blogs?", because it is unclear if you refer to: personal information published on the blog pages personal information collected from the Website, by way of forms, cookies, server logs, strictly collected and processed for the purpose of operating the Website for your own personal purposes as a blogger (by yourself of through a subcontractor in the sense of GDPR) and not personal information collected from the Website's operation, transferred or provided to third parties for their own purposes (this would include cookies used to identify and track users across multiple domains) Regarding 1., a personal blog wanting to benefit from the exemption should not publish third party's personal information without their consent or another legal basis, and C-101/01 certainly applies here. About 2., if the information is strictly collected and used for the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog, I would tend to agree that it should benefit from the exemption. I feel that C-212/13 would not necessarily be an indication that because the blog is publicly accessible it is then "directed outwards from the private setting" in the sense of this ruling, and should not be considered as "purely ‘personal or household’ activity". C-212/13 case was relating to a camera installed by an individual on his family home for its own security purposes which was also monitoring a public space. The persons filmed on this public space had absolutely no direct connexion with the person collecting their images. In case of a blog, the visitors of the blog interact with the blog for fulfilling the own personal purpose of the operation of the blog of the publisher of the blog. Another argument is given by the Recital 18 which you quote: a personal blog can be viewed as a type of social networking or related online activity. Finally, about 3., there is no doubt for me that, in this case, the publisher of the blog is engaged in an activity which is not personal, since it willingly provides personal information to third parties which they use for their own purposes (and not as subcontractors in the sense of GDPR). There may be other approaches apart from these 3, but that's a start for your considerations.
Can a celebrity sue someone who takes obnoxious pictures/videos of him in public and uploads onto internet without his permission? Suppose a celebrity digs his nose or scratches his private part because of sudden itch or performs some unsightly act in public. Someone takes his picture/video and uploads onto internet without his permission. The celebrity is shamed in public. By depicting the celebrity in an unflattering light, his value as a celebrity is diminished. Can the celebrity sue for damages since the pictures/video were taken without his permission? His privacy has also been violated. Assume celebrity is American.	As per this question & answer, in the US there is no expectation of privacy in public places (not to be confused with private places where public is allowed e.g. supermarkets). Photos taken in public belong to the photo taker and he/she is free to use them in whatever way. No privacy is violated here. The fact that the person whose photo was taken was a celebrity does not change anything. It would have been completely their fault to expect privacy in a public place and behave rashly.	The question is not one of copyright law or trademark law, neither of which apply. Instead, it is a question of a common law right of publicity, which in India is recognized in some circumstances, but is not well developed and has many gaps that courts will have to resolve as cases are presented to them. The right of publicity is largely a right to sue if another person without permission profits commercially from someone's likeness without their consent and it is unclear to what extent, if any, it encompasses a right to control the use of one's own image otherwise. It is not in and of itself a crime, even though it is a tort which is the basis for a civil lawsuit for money damages and perhaps injunctive relief. As explained here: In India, the right of publicity is governed by common law and accrues to the celebrity’s individual persona. It is a right to a celebrity’s particular distinguishing and identifying characteristics, features, behavior, likeness, image or other unequivocal aspects. These rights are transferable and are generally used as an individual’s right to control and profit from the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, and persona. . . . The Indian Courts scrutinize the law governing publicity as a right in which an individual’s identity suffers the loss of commercial purpose. Some courts refer to the unauthorized appropriation of an individual’s identity as an invasion of the right of privacy. However, the two bodies of law can be distinguished as follows: while the right of publicity provides the individual with a property right in his or her identity, the right of privacy protects an individual from the publication of private facts that are embarrassing or intimate, or that portrayal of him or her in a false light is offensive. The right of publicity claims usually arise from the publication of information of which the public is already aware; the celebrities thrive on being known and talked about. In Sourav Ganguly v. Tata Tea ltd., Sourav Ganguly returned from an extremely successful tour of England and Tata Tea Ltd., where he was then employed to promote a tea packet, offered the consumers a chance to congratulate Sourav through a postcard which was inside each packet. The company intended to profit from his popularity and his latest success. Sourav could successfully challenge it in the Court before settling the dispute amicably. The right of publicity protects all persons’ rights from birth to death and beyond. When the right of publicity extends after death, it is called the post-mortem right of publicity. However, whether the right of publicity extends beyond life is jurisdiction specific. For example, the post mortem right of publicity has only been recently recognized in the US in California and will soon be recognized other American states too. Legal recognition of post mortem rights of publicity usually permits the deceased’s beneficiaries or heirs to control and financially benefit from the use of a deceased’s image and likeness. The news about the movie Dirty Picture having been challenged by the kin of the deceased actress Silk Smita, claiming that the movie does not depict her personality in the right spirits, is first of its kind in India. The linked examples, showing satirical portrays of a famous U.S. politician, hinge on the issue of what constitutes commercial use, as opposed to other uses. The right of publicity doctrine arose at common law when images of models were used to market consumer goods, when the models for the painting and photographs weren't paid. It has not generally been used to prohibit political cartoons or their 3D equivalent, the basic thrust of which is political commentary or satire that does not suggest endorsement by the subject of the image. In the U.S., such a broad reading of the right of publicity would probably be overcome by the very strong First Amendment protections of free speech. But while India also protects the right to free speech, it, like most former British colonies, tends to be less extreme in the extent to which other generally applicable laws and protections of other individual rights yield to free speech protections than the United States. I doubt that a right of publicity lawsuit by the individual depicted in the linked materials which appear to be basically satirical political depiction would be recognized in India, and it is likely the some of the same considerations that apply to fair use of copyrights or nominative use of trademarks without permission would inform its judgment on the scope of this common law right. But because India's common law in this area isn't very well developed it isn't possible to know with certainty how a case like this one would be evaluated by an Indian court. This said, there are a couple of caveats that should be added. First, it is easy to imagine that the 3D image is obtained by some illegal means which could be tortious (i.e. the basis for an invasion of privacy lawsuit) or criminal. The illegality in obtaining the information could arise not just from common law protections but also, for example, for statutory or contractual non-disclosure requirements. For example, if this was obtained obtained from records maintained for health or educational purposes it could violate laws providing privacy protections in those areas. Obtaining the 3D image surreptitiously and without the knowledge of the person whose image is obtained (e.g. through a secret camera in a changing room) would probably be both a crime and a tort. Second, if the 3D model were used to defraud someone, e.g., by impersonating them on a Zoom call, this would likely be both a crime and a tort under the general principles that apply to fraud in general, as a form of affirmative misrepresentation, even though it is visual rather than verbal.	In the United States, You have no expectation of privacy in public. Anything you can see from a public place, you can take a picture of, even if the "victim" is in their own home but has the blinds open. If you are standing on a public sidewalk or street, you would legally be able to take a picture with certain exceptions. An exception to this would be: if with just your eyes you can see into a private home, you can take a picture of that, but if you require a telescopic lense with some sort of IR adapter to "see through" blinds. That MAY be considered illegal. For real world examples of this question, check out PINAC. Another example is "Creepy Camara Guy", https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vs6iLtl0BAw. This guy basically goes around recording videos of people in public in a VERY obnoxious way. But he is within his legal right. (Note: Video unavailable: "This video is no longer available because the YouTube account associated with this video has been terminated.")	In general, there are few laws in the US that restrict a person's freedom to disclose a fact known about another person. Examples of such limits are HIPAA which restricts health-professionals disclosure of medical information, and FERPA which restricts an educational institution's disclosure of student records. There are laws that restrict government disclosure of information about individuals. Confidentiality might be guaranteed via a contract, if there is a non-disclosure clause in the contract. A number of (major) businesses do have privacy policies where they promise not to disclose your information, or do so only in a specified way: such things generally exist for internet businesses. Some states like California have mandatory privacy policy laws. In New Jersey, there is simply the traditional tort claims of intrusion upon solitude, unreasonable publicity of private life, false light, and appropriation of name or likeness. Passing along general information about a person or a way to contact them would not be seen as an unreasonable intrusion.	Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A.	You have the copyright on all your pictures. He had no permission to copy any of them, so he has committed copyright infringement on a massive scale. You can just get a solicitor who will happily take him to court for you. You shouldn't be overdoing it, $750 per infringed work (per picture) as statutory damages should be fine. If you want it cheaper, the solicitor will write a letter for you that asks him to destroy all the pictures, sign that he has destroyed all the pictures, pay the solicitor's fees, or otherwise be taken to court for copyright infringement (see above). Now I am not a lawyer, so you go to a lawyer which will correct whatever I got wrong here. Just forgot: In addition to having the copyright, if he publishes pictures of people (like you and your family), he needs permission of these people. So if anything gets published, that goes on top of the copyright infringement.	This is relatively uncharted legal territory, so until multiple cases establish some sort of precedent, we can only guess. I know of no legal requirement that a Browser or User has to submit cookies or referrer data or other meta-information accurately. In that regard, a user is unlikely to be prosecuted just for submitting HTTP headers. It is likely closely related to Free Speech issues. The DMCA spells out that it is illegal to circumvent copyright protection measures. While this law is typically used to make it illegal to copy DVDs, video-games or streaming movies, it is possible that the "3-free articles" policy could be interpreted as a copyright protection mechanism, and defeating it by changing HTTP headers is a circumvention. A good summary is here. A specific site's TOS (Terms of Service) probably contains language that spells out it is a violation to use the site in a manner other than as it is intended. This is a typical anti-hacking, anti-screen-scraping provision. Altering a browser session to circumvent their services is probably a violation of the license to access the site, and may open a user to a civil lawsuit for damages or even criminal hacking charges (the details of which are different state-to-state)	If a website takes down something that infringes on your copyright because of a DMCA request, the legal effect is that you can’t sue the website, only the person who put the content on the website. If a website doesn’t respond to a DMCA request, then you can sue the person responsible AND the website. And that’s what you would have to do: Sue them. And in extreme cases copyright infringement can be criminal; in that case the police might go after the website.
If a driver thinks their car has been wrongfully towed, is it up to the company to sue the driver, or up to the driver to sue for their money back? This is just something that I've been wondering. If you think that your car has been wrongfully towed, do you need to pay the company and then sue them for your money back, or do they need to let you take your car back and then sue you for the money?	If you can persuade them to release the car without paying – but with a promise to pay – they could sue you to recover what you owe them for towing and storage (breech of contract). If not, you would have to sue them to recover the money you paid (which is the damage that they did to you). I cannot imagine a towing company releasing a vehicle without first being paid. There is no state which requires a towing company to release a towed vehicle just because the owner asks.	Is it legal in the US for a company that rents out car parking spaces, to bundle the renting of a parking space to buying insurance for the content of the parked car? Yes. Honestly, I'm a little surprised that I've never see this practice in real life. All things not prohibited are allowed, and there is nothing, per se illegal about bundling services and requiring them to be purchased as a package deal (there may be some licensing issues for insurance sales involved, but those would probably be easily overcome). Sometimes bundling gives rise to an anti-trust violation, but neither the parking lot operation business nor the car insurance business are so consolidated that this would fairly be viewed as some kind of anti-competitive practice.	[if] the other driver is at fault then you can sue the other driver for the loss incurred. If the other driver was employed by a company [...] then that company is likely to pick up the bill... Not necessarily. I would say that losses are usually covered by the at-fault driver's insurance (or the MIB if uninsured). Either way, according to the OP's link "the shuttle is insured by Aviva" so they would seem to be liable under section 2 of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018: Liability of insurers etc where accident caused by automated vehicle (1) Where— (a) an accident is caused by an automated vehicle when driving itself on a road or other public place in Great Britain, (b) the vehicle is insured at the time of the accident, and (c) an insured person or any other person suffers damage as a result of the accident, the insurer is liable for that damage.	Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer.	Yes, company A is liable for that; ignorance is not a defence. For this reason, a prudent company A would put an indemnification clause in their contract with company B so that if A is sues then company B pays. This is, of course, completely useless if company B is out of business at the time of the suit.	Your personal liability depends on your state law regarding the family car doctrine, so the answer there is "maybe" (Texas is not a state with that doctrine, so simple ownership of the car does not confer liability). You would be liable if your supervision of the child was negligent, which means approximately that you knew or should have known that she was a bad driver and would cause damage. Still, the insurance company is suppose to indemnify you (plural) against such loses, as long as they are legally required to do so. That would include many considerations, such as whether the driver was covered under the policy, whether the car was being used contrary to the terms of the policy (being used commercially), and so on. The insurance company is entitled to make a reasonable determination of whether they are responsible for the loss (and if so, to what extent). If they actually decline to cover the loss, you would need to sue them to make them comply with the terms of the policy (and your lawyer would give you a detailed explanation of why they are not liable, in case they aren't). The plaintiff works with his insurance company to recover his insured losses, and with his lawyer to recover any uninsured losses. His insurance company works with your insurance company, up to a point, and then the lawyers get involved. Your daughter does not work with his insurance company, and your insurance company probably has said something along the line "only talk to us". The insurance that a driver typically has may cover some of their own medical costs, but does not provide a payment for "pain and suffering": that is an uninsured loss. It is not generally required that drivers carry insurance to cover their own medical expenses – it is required that they insure against damages, in general, suffered by other parties (if the defendant is at fault). So there is probably nothing for the plaintiff to work out with his insurance company. In Texas, if the defendant is entirely at fault, defendant will be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 90% at fault, defendant will be liable for 90% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 49% at fault, defendant is not liable. Defendant can, in any event, also sue for damages, so if defendant is 49% at fault, defendant can recover 49% of her damages. The insurance companies might be able to talk it out and reach a clear resolution of the matter, but it could be more in their interest to throw the dice and work it out in court. One can always sue at the very start, and drop the suit if it becomes advantageous.	Your description of the facts is vague enough that we can't offer an informed judgment, but to remedy this, I will paraphrase your account of the facts (you can decide whether this is what you were trying to say). I was sitting outside of the Sprint store today waiting for my step daughter to come out. While waiting, two police officers walked up to my car and asked me to turn off my vehicle and come inside. When I voluntarily went inside, the store staff said that they called the police because they had had some sort of problems with people applying for service and absconding with the phone to resell on the black market, and they thought that was part of some such criminal plan. Because of that, they refused to give her a phone or service contract. But then they also told us to never come back, threatening arrest for trespassing. I have never been in that store before. Were my rights violated? No, neither by the police nor by the manager. The police, or the store manager, can legally request you to come in for a conversation: what matters most is whether you were forced to come in against your will. By your report, you were not, so your rights were not violated. The police are irrelevant to the remainder of the question. What remains is whether your rights were violated because the manager told you to go away and never come back under pain of prosecution. The store is private property, meaning that the owner has wide latitude to grant or deny permission to enter. If they hate pink hair and your hair is pink, they can legally "ban" you. If they suspect you of involvement in a criminal activity, that can most certainly legally ban you. That does not mean that it was a righteous or justified decision on their part, or a good business choice, but it is their legal right. So, no, your rights were not violated.	You always run some legal risk when you drive. As long as you are insured (you have a card in your hand) and you have permission to drive the car, it does not matter who owns the car. There is a difference between the legal minimum insurance coverage and actually adequate coverage, and since you are not getting separate insurance where control the insurance levels, you theoretically run some liability risk if you have an accident and the coverage is less than the damages (insurance doesn't mean that the other guy can't take you to court for the rest of the amount). There is also a risk that the housemate will do something crazy like cancel the insurance coverage for you, or report the car stolen, so you have to decide how worried you are about that possibility.
Can a judge question me about facts of my case? I'm the defendant in a Maryland traffic case. It's an automated traffic enforcement ticket (red-light camera). I'm pleading not-guilty and have requested a trial. I'm not a lawyer but I have spent a lot of time in court successfully fighting traffic tickets and I have some legal background. In my observation these red-light camera trials are usually perfunctory open-and-shut affairs where the defendant stands little chance of winning. Most of the time, they don't even have a good legal argument. There is little formality and the defendants hardly ever insist on asserting their full legal rights. Sometimes when they do, the prosecution and judge are caught unprepared. I hope to exploit this unpreparedness to win my case. In a normal trial, the prosecution gives it opening statements, then the defendant gives their opening statement, then they cross examine each others' witnesses then they give closing statements. If one side fails to ask a question during the cross-examination, they cannot return to the cross-examination after the closing statements have started. Right? But I have frequently seen traffic judges asking important questions about facts right before issuing their verdict. "How fast were you going?", "Did you have your turn signal on"? These seem to be questions that should have been asked by cross-examiners -- not the judge. If the prosecution failed to make their case when they had the chance, the judge should not help them by asking questions they failed to ask, right? If -- after my closing statement -- the judge asks me factual questions that the prosecution forgot to ask, is it legitimate for me to raise an objection about it? Do you think its likely to be upheld? Would a good objection be something like "Your honor the prosecution has to make its case without this court cross-examining on its behalf"?	While you have correctly stated the usual order of events in a trial, the judge has wide discretion to modify the order if it seems that justice will be served. Even in a serious criminal case, the judge can reopen testimony after closing arguments have started if the judge finds that there is good reason to do so. Traffic cases are generally less formal, and the judge will more freely modify procedure to bring out the facts of the case. I have often seen judges at traffic court ask significant relevant questions, and if they are in fact relevant, i don't think you will get far objecting to their begin asked. I am not a lawyewr, but I also have observed several traffic cases in Maryland and in NJ.	So I found information from a law firm in Florida about Hit and Run Cases. You definitely want a lawyer as it is a $500 fine and/or 60 days in jail for your case (property damage, no injury or loss of life). The good news is that if you can argue the case correctly, it's very easy to get a Not Guilty verdict. Under Florida Law, a Hit and Run must meet the following criteria to legally find someone guilty: Disputes as to the identity of the driver; Lack of knowledge that a crash occurred; Lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property; The failure to stop was not willful, but was dictated by circumstances; The defendant stopped as close as possible to the site of the accident; The other driver refused to receive identifying information The other driver became belligerent, necessitating that the defendant leave the scene to call police; The assistance rendered was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the statute. Given that you had no lack of knowledge that a crash occurred (2) AND lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property (3.) AND you would have stopped but for the circumstances of the event prevented you from recieiving knowledge of that the crash had occured (4) you already fail to meet 3 of the 8 criteria. This should be easy to argue in and of itself, but where you need a lawyer to assist is in criteria 7. While you were never fearing the other driver to such a degree that you needed to call the police, his behavior was interpreted by you as "road rage" and you had a reasonable fear to not wish to engage him. It's not rules as written, but it could be that the rules allow for leaving the scene because of the plaintiff's behavior and could be valid in other forms. I'll admit, this will vary wildly on the judge's own interpretation of that rule, BUT it's worth a try. Keep in mind with all of these, the Prosecution will be required to prove all 8 facts against you, while you only have to disprove one, to some level of doubt. As an armchair jury, I have no facts to support your story, but I have no facts to doubt it either. And when doubt happens, you must assume innocence. It would help if you had any hint of the officers attitude at the time. Was he friendly? Dismissive? Distracted? What was the guy who hit you's attitude towards the situation? Was he constantly yelling at you and the officer? Was he quiet and separated? Either way, get a lawyer because 60 days of jail time and a $500 fine is not something you want to fight by yourself. Make calls (the ticketing officer should have a work number or other contact information on the ticket.). Notify the insurance company of the fact that it was cited as hit and run but not proven... it could make the difference of who's company is to pay (It will be his if there was no Hit and Run).	An "inquisitorial" system is one where the Judge or Magistrate actively questions the accused and witnesses to attempt to determine the facts. The Judge may also determine, at least in part, what witnesses to call in what order. An "adversarial" system is one in which each side presents its case, and the judge acts as an umpire deciding on procedure, and possibly makes the final ruling (or directs a jury to do so) but is not actively involved in questioning witnesses or deciding what witnesses to call. I don't see anything which would prevent a common-law jurisdiction from establishing an "inquisitorial" system by statute except longstanding tradition, but as far as i know no such jurisdiction has ever had such a system in place for dealing with criminal matters. The informal procedures in some small claims courts do have judges more actively involved than in other courts. I think this is also true in some family courts as well. I think I have heard of some civil-law jurisdictions which use something like an adversary system, but i am not sure of that. Certainly a civil-law country could pass a law setting up such a system if it chose to.	The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact.	You're going to an administrative hearing overseen by an "Impartial Hearing Officer" (IHO). Your goal should be to present your case in as clear, concise, and compelling a manner as possible. If there are guidelines for the hearing then abide by those. Ideally, the IHO will be a real lawyer or judge, in which case they will likely be concerned with giving everyone a chance to advance their position and then efficiently achieving a resolution of the issue that appears most impartial and is least upsetting to everyone involved. Often, however, you will find the IHO is a bureaucrat who enjoys making up and enforcing procedural rules. In which case all you can do is ask, "What are the rules?" and do your best to follow them (or just start working on your appeal now). For example, if the IHO wants to make the hearing "court-like," then you could read your state's Code of Civil Procedure. But if you bring a copy and when the IHO says X point out the CCP says Y, then all you will have accomplished is to irritate the IHO: He'll either grudgingly allow Y, or declare that in his hearing it's X. That will not help you achieve your goal. Re-reading your question: It sounds like you're trying to make up rules for yourself. Remember that you are not a lawyer, and the hearing is not a court of law. If you assert evidence it should be accepted based on what a "reasonable person" would believe. You don't have to establish a forensic chain of custody. So tell your story, and if there's an email that documents it more compellingly – e.g., because you're recounting events from two years ago – then note that you're reading what you wrote two years ago as opposed to stating what you remember now, because that bolsters the credibility of your testimony. If there's evidence in an Email from B, and A knows something about those matters, you should be allowed to ask A about the substance informed by the Email, even if A can't address the writing or sending of that particular message. (But remember: Never ask a hostile party a question if you don't already know what their answer should be!) If you really want to prepare, find someone to play devil's advocate, and present your case to them. That's a good way to find and correct things that hurt or distract from your case.	In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded.	There is no hard and fast rule to determine what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the first instance, the judge (or jury, when there is a jury trial) decides this on a case by case basis. If the officer testifies that the matters recorded in the ticket are true because it was the officer's practice to always record accurately what happened in a ticket, this would ordinarily not be grounds for reversal of a conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence, unless other evidence somehow put the officer's testimony in serious doubt (e.g. a social media post clearly putting the officer in another location at the time that the ticket was allegedly issued). Normally, the only kind of evidence that would not result in a ticket being upheld on appeal would be the failure of the officer to testify at all.	Courts, particularly traffic courts, tend to take a police officer's word over that of an accused person. While legally the limit is 70, the driver has very little recourse if the officer claims falsely that the actual speed was over 70. But the deterant effect of a posted limit is lost, since drivers in general have no way to know that Officer O will ticket anyone going over 60. I suppose that driver D, or D's lawyer, could subpoena calibration records of any radar gun or other measuring devise used, and could insist on its being tested. However, unless they had reason to think there was an issue, I wonder if D and D's lawyer would go through that process. Some speed measuring devices print a paper slip showing the date and time along with the reading. If such a device was used that record would be harder to alter. Some cars are now equipped with devices provided by insurance companies that record speeds and other driving info in a secure way to help judge a driver's safety and allow individual rate setting. It might be that the record from such a device would be admissible to show the speed was under the posted limit. But there is a sense in which the law is what the police and the courts enforce. If anyone who drives the road over 60 is cited and must pay, one could say the effective limit there is 60.
Can disabling Windows 10 updates be considered a crime? There's a pretty (in)famous post on Russian Microsoft Answers site (just search by UID to see it referenced in many news stories) where user asks how he can disable Windows Update through registry due to space constraints on his notebook. There are two responses from two different MVP/Moderators to it, both stating that doing so is illegal and thus question will be locked and OP will be banned from site for discussing illegal use of MS products. Grand_Ross's response states that OP presumably breaks Articles 1229 "Exclusive Right" and 1235 "The Licence Contract" of Russian Civil Code (in English) and sternly recommends OP to brush up his knowledge of law because "ignorance is no excuse!" Geks52 cites Windows 10 EULA's 6. Updates, and highlights this part: "By accepting this agreement, you agree to receive these types of automatic updates without any additional notice." This looks very very wrong to me. 1229 has absolutely nothing to do with usage of legally obtained product. EULA clearly only require you to agree with updates without notice, but nowhere does it forbid you to disable them. Thus 1235 is not applicable. Additionally, when you can disable WU through registry or policy, it obviously means that Microsoft explicitly programmed handling of those settings and thus activating them is intended use. So, do those accusations and threats have any weight or is it some kind of little man syndrome, considering that MVP/Moderator is really just a glorified user himself and not an official Microsoft representative? I'm interested in both answers according to Russian law and international practice - can such reasoning stand in US, EU, or pretty much anywhere?	I don't know anything about Russian law, but from a U.S. perspective I'd say your analysis -- of both EULA interpretation and tiny-dick syndrome -- would be spot-on.	As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum).	Not on its own, no Overview A ToS can be of some value, but will not fully protect the site operator (host). For one thing, a ToS is probably not binding on the user based on a contract of adhesion such as "by using this site you agree to...". A specific act, such as clicking a checkbox that defaults to clicked or activating an "I accept the terms" button is probably required to make a ToS binding on the user. But a host must do more that obtain an agreement to its ToS. Once it has actual knowledge of illegal content, a host must take action to remove or disable it, or else it may be liable as if it had posted the content itself. It also depends what kind of "something illegal" is involved. The most common form is perhaps content that allegedly infringes copyright. Safe Harbor In the EU Article 14 of the EU Directive on electronic commerce (Directive 2000/31/EC) will apply (note that being a directive, rather than a regulation, 2000/31/EC) depends on implementation in national law, which may vary from one country to another. Article 14 reads: Hosting Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information. Article 14 means that when a host obtains actual knowledge of infringing or otherwise illegal content, the host must promptly delete that content or disable access to it. Such knowledge could come via a takedown notice. According to the page "Copyright infringement and remedies in Germany": One of the main situations refers to platform operators. Once they have been informed about a specific infringement on their platform, they are required to remove the specific infringing content and to implement measures in order to prevent future violations. See also the Wikipedia article "Notice and Take down" which discusses Article 14, and points out that it does not define a specific notice and take down procedure, unlike the US provisions of 17 USC 512 (which includes the DMCA notice and take down procedure, and the related Safe Harbor provisions). Since Article 14 clearly envisages some sort of notice procedure, but not specific procedure has been defined in the laws of most EU member states, including Germany, some people use the US DMCA notice format, as describesd in this article. Such a notice may serve to give a German host "actual knowledge" and impose liability if the host fails to respond promptly. There have been recent legal cases which affect the procedures in such cases, as reported in "Copyright 'safe harbours' for service providers need to be consistent" from Pinsent Masons and "Germany: Time To Hit Pause: Copyright Infringement On User Generated Platforms – When Is The Platform Provider Liable For Damages?" from Morrison & Foerster LLP. The Morrison & Foerster article reads: Previous rulings by the CJEU have addressed both the application of the safe harbor principle set out in the EU E-Commerce Directive1 that shields hosting providers from liability for hosted unlawful third-party content of which they have no actual knowledge and, separately, the extent of infringement of copyright by hosting of, or linking to, copyright infringing third-party content under the EU Copyright Directive. But it is still unclear under which conditions the providers of the various online platforms that store and make available user-generated content, can rely on the safe harbor privilege applying to hosting providers to avoid liability, or whether they must not only take down the infringing content when they obtain knowledge of such content but also compensate the rightsholders of such content for damages for copyright infringement. The Pinsent Masons article reads: [A] ruling last year by a German court has highlighted an anomaly in the way 'safe harbour' protections ISPs enjoy under EU law apply in the case of copyright enforcement. It has confirmed that applications for blocking orders and injunctive relief are treated differently, despite the economic effect of those measures being the same. The safe harbour protections stem from the EU's E-Commerce Directive. That legislation prohibits service providers from being put under any general obligation to monitor for illegal activity by users of their service. In addition, where the service providers are mere conduits to infringing activity by others, they cannot be held liable for that activity unless and until they obtain 'actual knowledge' of the activity. At that stage, a service provider must act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information if they are not to be held liable themselves for infringement. However, EU copyright law cuts into these 'safe harbour' protections. It makes clear that rights holders can apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe copyright. In Germany, however, changes made to the Telemedia Act in October 2017 have spurred debate over the admissibility and the requirements of blocking injunctions. Other unlawful content Other sorts of illegal content are possible, such as neo-Nazi propaganda and Child Pornography, which are criminal under German law. In theory Article 14 applies to such content as well as to alleged copyright infringements. But since these are serious crimes, the degree of promptness expected from a host will probably be greater. Conclusion A hosting provider will need, at the least, to respond to notices alleging copyright infringement or other illegal content, and provide an address to which such notices can be sent. A host might do well to implement the full DMCA takedown procedure. ToS provisions will not provide a shield against liability after a notice is sent to the host. A host may be required to block future access by those whose previous uploads have been found to be unlawful. This may require soem sort of log-in procedure. Thus a simple ToS provision, as described in the question, particularly in the absence of any log-in mechanism, and of any enforcement of the ToS provisions, will not be enough to shield the host from liability for unlawful content posted by users.	In such a case the person who bypasses the terms knows that use of the site is conditioned on agreement to the terms, and has taken an explicit action to continue past the terms and use the site. I suspect that if a dispute were to arise where this is relevant, it would be held that taking such action was legally equivalent to clicking "I agree". But I don't know of any court case on this point, and i can't be sure what a court would do. If having intentionally bypassed the terms, such a person tried to raise his or her lack of consent to the terms as a defense to some obligation imposed by those terms, such equitable concepts as "unclean hands" and estoppel might be raised, since such a person, in effect, leads the other party, the site owner, to believe that s/he has accepted the terms, I suspect that such a person will be treated as having accepted them. If this becomes at all common, I suppose that the designers of such sites will in future store a record of such consent being given, and not allow the user to proceed unless it has been.	The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.	You are granted the free trial as part of a trial, not to permanently use the program. When the user downloaded the trial version of the program, he probably had to accept T&C granting a one-time only say 3‑month trial period. It is a mere breach of contract if you’re circumventing this, but you might still be liable to damages. Circumventing technological protection measures is forbidden, § 95a UrhG. However, these protection measures must be considered effective. Now, lawyers are usually no computer gurus, so they might arrive at completely different conclusions, but I guess/hope editing a plain text file, substituting a plaintext ISO 8601 date, will not be deemed “effective”. (I presume the same effect could be achieved by resetting the computer’s RTC.) Having said that, since you intend to “publish a guide […] detailing how to use this exploit” I suspect it might not be that trivial and thus, from a lawyer’s POV, be considered an “effective” technological protection measure. If it is considered an effective technological protection measure, you might be punishable via § 108b UrhG, but I’m not sure about that. The wording is terribly complex.	Generally, such sanctions prevent certain sorts of transactions in goods and services with nationals or entities of the nation under sanction. The exact list of transactions prohibited or restricted varies. If Open source software were being provided as a service, so that the recipient paid directly for a license, or for customization or configuration work, or for some sort of consulting or assistance, such transactions could be banned or restricted by a sanctions regime, but might not be. (If the sanctions included that particular class of transactions.) However, if it is merely a matter of an open source product being published, for anyone to download, install, and use, I don't see how that would be barred or restricted by any sanctions of the sort recently in use.	To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.
Impartiality of the law Why is it harder to complain against a police officer (let alone prosecute) than it is to complain against a civilian (for the same crime)? If a civilian so much as yells at me, I can call 911 and an officer (or more) will wake him up and question him. If a police officer does the same (yelling or using foul language) or detains/arrests me for no justifiable reason, there is no one that I can call that would look at the body cam and do something about it. The only option I'd have is a lenghty complicated process that is bound to put many obstacles in front of me along the way. The complaint would have to be filed with the same people I am complaining against (someone within the PD) which is counter intuitive. (and gives rise to conflicts of interest). The complaint has to be in writing with my physical address (which is not very easy when you are away from home, if you don't have an address or if you want to keep it hidden from the accused officer ). I received the following from a PD in Texas. ... I am sending you a complaint from attached to this email. This from has to be filled out if you want an investigation conducted on a police officer as required by Texas Govt. Code as listed below. Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 507, Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2005. ... Sec. 614.022. COMPLAINT TO BE IN WRITING AND SIGNED BY COMPLAINANT. To be considered by the head of a state agency or by the head of a fire department or local law enforcement agency, the complaint must be: (1) in writing; and (2) signed by the person making the complaint. " Is there really a difference between classes? If there is, can we still talk about an impartial legal system?	Any society that makes rules will make rules that generally favor the people in power. Police are an essential component of a system that is built to maintain power for the people who are powerful, and there are few incentives for politicians, prosecutors or judges to punish them for maintaining order, even when they do so in ways that most people would think are not civil. Anyone involved in creating the law therefore builds systems to protect themselves -- and each other -- from accountability. The police fail to meaningfully investigate themselves, the legislature erects barriers to accountability (Sec. 614.022, for instance), and the courts routinely provide them immunity for their wrongdoing. So yes, there is a difference in how our legal system treats law enforcement and how it treats everyone else. I don't know anyone with any experience in the law who would even try to pretend otherwise.	Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest.	I want to file a Federal criminal (not civil) complaint You can't. Only the US government can do that. https://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-filing-case Individuals do not file criminal charges in U.S. district courts. A criminal proceeding is initiated by the government, usually through the U.S. attorney's office in coordination with a law enforcement agency. Allegations of criminal behavior should be brought to local police, the FBI, or other appropriate law enforcement agency. There is an analysis of the relevant law in the case of Smith v. Krieger, No. 09-1503 (10th Cir. 2010). In his second claim, [Smith] sought to prosecute crimes allegedly committed by the defendant judges against the United States. Mr. Smith claimed he had “inherent authority” to raise his first claim under “the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 51, ¶ 255. With respect to his second claim, he contended he was “authorized to prosecute crimes committed against the United States by virtue of his inherent authority as co-sovereign, pursuant to powers reserved under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and crimes committed against his person and/or property in particular.” [p.13-14] [...] Mr. Smith’s second claim fares no better than his first. Congress has by statute conferred the power to prosecute crimes in the name of the United States on the United States Attorney General and his delegates. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519. The long-standing view of the Supreme Court is that such power is exclusive. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”) (emphasis added); id. at 694 (“Under the authority of Art. II, [§] 2, Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government. 28 U.S.C. [§] 516.”); The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868) (“Public prosecutions, until they come before the court to which they are returnable, are within the exclusive direction of the district attorney . . . .”) (emphasis added). Therefore, as the district court concluded, Mr. Smith has no right to initiate a criminal prosecution in the name of the United States under the Ninth or Tenth Amendments, or otherwise. [p.19] Smith was fined $3000 for bringing this frivolous and "abusive" case (which included several other claims besides this one.) Also of note is the 1973 US Supreme Court case Linda R. S. v. Richard D.. Here, Linda R. S. took a slightly different route: in effect, she sought a court order requiring her local district attorney to prosecute Richard D. for a state crime. (Or rather, she sought to enjoin the district attorney from declining to prosecute him.) The Supreme Court ruled: The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961). Although these cases arose in a somewhat different context, they demonstrate that, in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.	A police officer (or any other random person) would not be guilty of a crime or subject to civil liability for standing by and watching a suicide occur when it could be prevented, unless the person attempting to commit suicide was in his custody and he failed to take reasonable care to prevent a suicide in which case the officer could be subject to civil liability. It would not be a violation of the law, however, for a police officer (or in most cases, even a private citizen) to intervene to attempt to stop an attempted suicide. Likewise, prisons and prison guards can have civil liability for failing to prevent the suicide of someone in their custody. Of course, a police officer might still receive a negative employment evaluation from his supervisor for such conduct, or might even be fired for it depending on the rules of a particular department, as it would reflect poorly on the police department and show bad judgment on the officers part. In general, an affirmative duty enforceable by a lawsuit to take reasonable efforts to prevent someone from committing suicide applies in circumstances where the person attempting to commit suicide is in someone else's care and custody and has their liberty constrained. So, there could be liability on the part of a hospital or treating medical personnel (I've actually brought such a case that was dismissed due to malpractice in missing a deadline by local co-counsel who was then disciplined for ethical violations by the State of Illinois for his conduct.) In the absence of such a relationship, a legal duty to take affirmative action to prevent a suicide generally does not arise. Certain medical facilities and providers are required to make anonymized incident reports for the purpose of creating national public health statistics on a periodic basis. In certain extreme circumstances, there are duties to report someone who is a threat to others which may also include a risk of suicide, to authorities, but those are quite narrowly interpreted, and actual legal consequences from failing to warn are very rare. There may be other reporting requirements in educational institutions and for mental health professionals, but I am not personally aware of them and I do not believe that they are national in scope. Usually, for criminal liability, there would have to be actual affirmative acts to aid or to attempt to cause a suicide.	Everyone physically present in the US is protected by the US Federal constitution. (In some cases persons not physically in the US also have protection from the US constitution. When that applies is too complex for this answer.) Most of the rights protected by that constitution are available to anyone present, whether citizen, lawful immigrant, lawful visitor, or a person in the US without lawful authority. A few rights, such as the right to vote and to run for public office, are limited to citizens. If a person was arrested but not informed of his or her Miranda rights, then statements made to the arresting officers (or later interrogating officers) would not be admissible in court, unless an exception to the Miranda rules applies, which is unlikely. I can't say if this happened in the particular case mentioned in the question. In general, in the area of criminal procedure, there is no difference between citizens and others subject to US jurisdiction (accredited foreign diplomats normally have immunity). A few crimes can only be committed by citizens (or others owing allegiance to the US) such as treason. A few crimes, such as unlawful entry to the US, can't be committed by citizens, as citizens automatically have a right to enter. But criminal procedure and constitutional rights affecting criminal procedure, are the same for all in the US, citizen or not. (Oh, there are special laws for minors, but that isn't a matter of citizenship.)	The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law."	None No law requires police to keep people apart when making statements. Doing so is good police practice. In some police organizations internal regulations or procedures may specify that officers should do so. But those are not laws. In some cases witnesses may have had a chance to confer and agree on a story before police arrive, the police cannot prevent that. The trier of fact can take into account that witnesses had a chanc to agree on a false story.	In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded.
Religious exemption to vaccines that relies on preservation of life Almost every US state allows a religious exemption to vaccination requirements in schools. Some religions are opposed to vaccination as a basic principle (maybe because healing is reserved for God or something like that), and those obviously fall under the religious exemption. Judaism is not one of those religions. If someone claims that it is and requests a religious exemption on those grounds, I understand that the government is not going to dig any deeper and deal with questions of religious law. But as far as I understand, the more usual claim is along the lines of "mumble mumble dangerous mumble autism mumble mumble and Judaism requires me to keep my kids out of danger, so therefore religiously I'm not allowed to vaccinate them." (See the deservedly downvoted answers to the linked question.) Does that really support a religious exemption? It's not even a religious argument! Or to put it another way, comparing these four claims: vaccination My religion says that healing is reserved for God so I can't vaccinate My religion puts a high value on human life and Dr. Quack says vaccines are dangerous so I can't vaccinate accomodations at work I'm Sabbath observant. I'll have to miss the Friday afternoon meetings during the winter My religion says I should use my time wisely. The Wednesday 2PM meeting is a waste of time, we never do anything productive, so therefore I can't come to it. 1.2 and 2.2 look basically the same to me. Is there a difference between them? Does 1.2 work? (Apparently it does, because people use it.) Does 2.2 work? (That would be really useful!)	The legal question is whether there is a religion-specific exception to mandatory vaccination laws, and if so where does it come from? These are state-specific laws, so one would have to look at a specific state to answer the question. In Washington, this is implemented in the exemptions section, RCW 28A.210.090 (1)(b) A written certification signed by any parent or legal guardian of the child or any adult in loco parentis to the child that the religious beliefs of the signator are contrary to the required immunization measures; or (c) A written certification signed by any parent or legal guardian of the child or any adult in loco parentis to the child that the signator has either a philosophical or personal objection to the immunization of the child.... (2)(c) Any parent or legal guardian of the child or any adult in loco parentis to the child who exempts the child due to religious beliefs pursuant to subsection (1)(b) of this section is not required to have the form provided for in (a) of this subsection signed by a health care practitioner if the parent or legal guardian demonstrates membership in a religious body or a church in which the religious beliefs or teachings of the church preclude a health care practitioner from providing medical treatment to the child. In other words, you have to just say you object for one of these reasons, or you have to show that you are a member of a sect that is known to object. The law does not, however, provide a central registry of churches whose teachings preclude immunization, not is there any investigation of the claim allowed under the law. In Nevada, NRS 392.437 does not expressly include the personal-or-philosophical exception contained in Washington law: A public school shall not refuse to enroll a child as a pupil because the child has not been immunized pursuant to NRS 392.435 if the parents or guardian of the child has submitted to the board of trustees of the school district or the governing body of a charter school in which the child has been accepted for enrollment a written statement indicating that their religious belief prohibits immunization of such child. However, there is, likewise, no further vetting of the claim for exemption where the state determines if the religion claim is real. Nevertheless, under a Nevada-type law, one would have to make the claim that the belief was religious in nature, in order to claim the Free-Exercise exemption. California has no such exemptions – they eliminated an existing exemption – and predictable they were sued (Brown v. Smith). The state district court rejected a free exercise argument, though one based on the California constitution (the court however cited various free exercise rulings in the US). That court points to case law saying that "the state’s wish to prevent the spread of communicable diseases clearly constitutes a compelling interest", suggesting that such a law might pass strict scrutiny (the First Amendment has limited exceptions). The ultimate legal source of such exceptions is the First Amendment, specifically the "Free Exercise Clause". In a nutshell, that says that the government cannot prohibit a person from exercising their religious beliefs. If that means you must pray at noon, you must be allowed to pray at noon; if that means that you cannot eat lettuce, you cannot be forced to eat lettuce. Because "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion", the government also may not get into the business of approving or disapproving religions. The courts have indicated that a personal or subjective belief does not enjoy Free Exercise protection. In Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 the court commented that Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal, rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses. Somewhat contradictorily, in US v. Seeger, the court held that "The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption", but "The exemption does not cover those who oppose war from a merely personal moral code, nor those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations, rather than religious belief", and "There is no issue here of atheistic beliefs, and, accordingly, the decision does not deal with that question" (that is, the court did not rule on atheistic religious beliefs). Under the premise that one claims a religious exemption, there is no further investigation as to how compelling the claim is. On the other hand, if one makes a claim that merely looks like slapping the religion label on a personal objection, one might well run afoul of the state law, and then the courts might be forced to judge that very delicate question. This could arise, for instance, in the context of the Islamic distinction between haram and makruh acts, where the former are absolutely forbidden and the latter are "recommended against".	As edited, this asks two different questions: Is it legal to have a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? Is it legal to preach a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? The answer to the first question is pretty clearly yes. Your right to think whatever you want is essentially ironclad under the First Amendment, under both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech clauses. The answer to the second question is more nuanced. Although it can be tricky to actually apply, there's little question that merely advocating for murder is generally protected under the First Amendment: The teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961) Over time, the courts have developed a two-part test for evaluating whether the advocacy of crime can itself be criminalized. We now assume that speech advocating for the commission of a crime as protected under the First Amendment, unless and until that speech is: (1) intended to cause imminent lawless action; and (2) likely to actually result in imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969). So if Rev. Stryker meets Charles Xavier for a televised debate on the merits of killing all mutants, that speech would likely be protected by the First Amendment. Although he may sincerely hope his words will inspire others to kill mutants, the time between speaking them and any resulting murder is too great to say they are either intended or likely to cause imminent lawless action. But if the X-Men confront Rev. Stryker on television, and Rev. Stryker urges his studio audience to storm the stage and kill them all, that's more likely to result in immediate violence, and therefore more likely to be considered unprotected incitement. There's of course a lot of middle ground between those two options, so the tough part for judges and juries is figuring out the speaker's actual intent and how imminent is too imminent.	(For a definitive answer, consult an employment attorney). According to the federal Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, in general, An employee cannot be forced to participate (or not participate) in a religious activity as a condition of employment. This requirement comes from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Answer 14 on this page elaborates: Some private employers choose to express their own religious beliefs or practices in the workplace, and they are entitled to do so. However, if an employer holds religious services or programs or includes prayer in business meetings, Title VII requires that the employer accommodate an employee who asks to be excused for religious reasons, absent a showing of undue hardship. Similarly, an employer is required to excuse an employee from compulsory personal or professional development training that conflicts with the employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would pose an undue hardship. It would be an undue hardship to excuse an employee from training, for example, where the training provides information on how to perform the job, or how to comply with equal employment opportunity obligations, or on other workplace policies, procedures, or legal requirements. So the questions would be: Is the activity in question a "religious service or program"? This might be ambiguous, and you might have to consult an employment attorney for a more informed opinion. Does it "conflict with your sincerely held religious beliefs or practices"? Would it be an "undue hardship" for the employer to excuse you? Note that this law might not apply to employers with fewer than 15 employees. It also doesn't apply if you work for an employer such as a church, or a religiously affiliated hospital or educational institution, or the like.	The relevant passage from the opinion in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) is: We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, [Footnote 10] and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs. [Footnote 11] The text of the footnote is: Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others. See Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 249 F.2d 127; Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal.App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 394; II Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 293; 4 Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957 ed.) 325-327; 21 id. at 797; Archer, Faiths Men Live By (2d ed. revised by Purinton), 120-138, 254-313; 1961 World Almanac 695, 712; Year Book of American Churches for 1961, at 29, 47. This was a case where a man was appointed to the office of Notery Public, but Maryland law required him to declare a belief in God to assume the office. The US Supreme court held that this violated the man's rights under the First Amendment's establishment clause, which had been incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth. The man was not, as far as I can tell, himself a Secular Humanist, and Secular Humanism was mentioned in the footnote merely as an example of a belief system that did not include a belief in God. Why Justice Black used the term "religion" to refer to it, I cannot say, some of the other groups listed in the footnote are clearly religions, and others are belief systems that for First Amendment purposes are often treated similarly to religions. What might better describe the Court's rulings here than the linked site does is that believers in Secular Humanism, Ethical Culture, and other similar belief systems will have their beliefs protected in just the same way that believers in any religion will. Freedom of Religion includes the right not to have a religion. By the way, the passage from Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1 which is quoted in Torcaso v. Watkins and to which the linked web site probably refers is: The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.' By the way, any site which proclaims that Hugo Black was a "Marxist agent" has lost much credibility in my opinion. Read the linked article and other easily available sources and judge for yourself.	See Holt v. Hobbs 574 U.S. ____ (2015) and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U.S. ____ (2014): Under RLUIPA, the challenging party bears the initial burden of proving that his religious exercise is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief The test is ignorant as to whether the person's belief happens to match an "expected" profile of a particular religion, although if it did, that would go some way to establishing that the belief is a sincerely held religious belief. In Holt v. Hobbs, Gregory Holt requested that he be allowed to grow a 1/2 inch beard in prison. In oral argument, Justice Scalia noted that the religious requirement is to grow a full beard [...] I mean, you're still violating your religion Counsel for Holt responded: Well, the religious teaching is a full beard. He testified that religiously half an inch is better than nothing. [...] A partial beard is better than none. And that's not just in secular terms. That's also in religious terms. The court ruled in favour of Holt. That his belief differed from the strictest interpretation of the religious text was not relevant.	This is known as the "ministerial exception". Because the Free Exercise and Estalishment clauses of the First Amendment prohibit the government from interfering with religion, the government cannot override a doctrine that contradicts the teachings of a religion (so women and gays cannot sue the Catholic church for not being hirable as priests). In Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, an individual taught classes and led prayer at a religous school, but was fired ultimately due to a disability (narcolepsy). The Lutheran church does not have any known doctrine condemning narcolepsy: but it was unanimously ruled that "the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own". Thus the church was legally permitted to fire the individual due to her disability.	There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law.	Since you asked, and it's a perfectly legitimate question, here's why it doesn't violate the Fifth Amendment (from Garner v. US): The Fifth Amendment doesn't say "you can't be made to say anything that hurts you." It says "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The only time Fifth Amendment protection applies is if you are being forced by the government to make a statement that could open you up to an accusation or conviction of a criminal offense. It's fairly broad (if it would help prove any aspect of the charge, you can claim immunity), but it's also restricted (you can't claim it unless it really would tend to incriminate you). That means that you could only argue the Fifth Amendment if your tax return might help prove a criminal case against you (the fact that disclosing income leads to you needing to pay tax does not qualify as "self-incrimination"). But the amount of income is not one of those things that might incriminate you -- you can get income through all sorts of ways. The thing that is incriminating is revealing the source of the income, and you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that. So: The only time you could possibly claim privilege is if you were being forced into a statement that might tend to incriminate you in a criminal proceeding. A statement that makes you liable for tax doesn't mean it might incriminate you. Filing an income tax return isn't inherently incriminating. The fact that you have income not included in any other part of the return (illegal income goes under "other income") doesn't imply you've committed a crime -- lots of people have other income. The amount of income can't be incriminating. The source can be, but you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that if it might incriminate you. And lawful income under "other income" still might give rise to a reasonable fear of prosecution, so the fact that you're justified in claiming Fifth Amendment privilege in source of income doesn't mean you're guilty of a crime. Note that there are cases where you are flat-out exempt from filing tax returns under the Fifth Amendment: Marchetti v. US and Grosso v. US found that registration and tax on gambling could be blocked by a Fifth Amendment claim, which didn't even have to be asserted at time of filing, because merely filing the special return would establish you as a gambler (heavily regulated/often criminalized at the state level). The difference with the normal income tax form is that everyone (just about) files one, and so filing it doesn't mean you're a criminal. If there was a separate line along the lines of "Income from Illegal Drug Sales," that might be one thing (anything other than $0 is inherently incriminating). But all the questions are broad, and have many legal sources of income associated with them.
Can an ex-employer sue ex-employees for using work experience gained for future endeavours? In this bloomberg article, 5 ex-employees of a hedge fund were sued by their ex-employer for starting a trading outfit. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-11-19/the-triple-jeopardy-of-ke-xu-a-chinese-hedge-fund-quant At around that time, de Putron got involved in another legal dispute that foreshadowed his companies’ campaign against Xu. The year before, a group of five programmers and managers had left G-Research, then known as GR Software & Research Ltd., to start their own trading outfit. The company responded by first threatening a lawsuit, then, in 2011, by filing one. None of the filings suggested anything had been stolen, but G-Research argued that the five had developed their quant-trading skills at the company, and so any new platform would have to be similar and an infringement of its intellectual property. As a layman, I find it extremely unreasonable. Which ex-employee will not use his past knowledge and experience gained from working for a past employer in his future endeavours? Is using knowledge gained from working for an ex-employer for future profit considered stealing from the ex-employer ??!!! Is this reasonable legal argument from an ex-employer? There was no stealing of physical property or technological design documents. Any lawyers here can enlighten me? This is a risk that all employees should be aware in case they encounter an employer as depicted in the Bloomberg article.	I'm not familiar with the case you're citing, but it sounds like this may be an application of the doctrine of "inevitable disclosure" or "inevitable use." A classic case would go something like this. WonderWidgets has discovered that by treating its widget molds with a teaspoon of ground cinnamon, it can create a superpowerful widget that is impervious to normal wear and tear, and will last forever, with very little additional expense. To protect its competitive advantage, WonderWidget takes all sorts of measures to ensure that AAA Widgets never learns about the benefits of the cinnamon additive. WonderWidgets hires Jane, an engineer with a PhD in cinnamonology to make improvements to the additive. She signs a confidentiality agreement promising to protet the company's trade secrets. After a year with WonderWidgets, Jane is recruited by AAA Widgets. WonderWidgets sues them both to prevent them from consummating an employment relationship. Assuming that the information Jane acquired from WonderWidgets is a protected trade secret, the idea here is that everyone knows exactly why AAA is hiring Jane, and that it would basically be impossible for Jane to work for them without applying the knowledge she acquired from WonderWidgets, i.e., there her employment would lead to an inevitable disclosure of WonderWidgets' trade secrets. I think most people would agree that there's at least a reasonable argument to be made in favor of WonderWidgets, there are also efforts to apply this doctrine in much shakier circumstances. For instance, WonderWidgets might try to prevent its janitor from going to work for AAA because it taught him how to mop floors, and it has cleaner floors than AAA, and therefore its cleaning techniques must be superior, and therefore those techniques must be protected. There are some states in which WonderWidgets would win the cinnamon case, and some where Jane would win, because the state doesn't recognize inevitable-disclosure at all. I don't know of any states where WonderWidgets would win the janitor case. Of course, most cases are not as clean-cut as either of these hypotheticals, but I'd say the one you're asking about is closer to the second one than the first.	You don't say what jurisdiction's patent laws you're interested in, and priority dates can differ in different schemes. I'm answering as to U.S. law only. In the United States, under the current hybrid "first-inventor-to-file" system, the priority date--the date that determines who "wins" if there are multiple claims to a specific invention--is, with some exceptions that I won't go into, the date of your first application. In other words, the date that the PTO got it in the mail. Once your application is submitted, it is--again, with some limitations I won't get into--prior art for the purposes of any later-submitted application. They can't get another application later, grant it first, and then deny your application based on the later-submitted application. Your application date would still win out. Could someone in the USPTO slip your application out of the stack, fudge the dates, and convince some other company to submit a similar application to get priority over you? Not as a practical matter, no. The USPTO isn't one guy in a room; it's a large organization, and the person who opens the mail, types in your application details, and sends you a receipt, isn't the same guy who knows whether your invention is any good or not. And, frankly, very few patentable inventions are going to be worth someone risking their job and/or jail time over--especially when there would be significant evidence of the misconduct--for example, your patent agent's files. So what are the chances that the examiner on your patent: 1) Is a nefarious character who has lived a life of public service long enough and wants to go rogue; 2) Has a friend in the mailroom who is also an expert in the field of your invention; and 3) Has a conduct in industry who is willing to break the law for the rights to your invention? Slim to none. And if you have an invention that is really so revolutionary that it's going to be worth so many people risking so much to steal it, odds are there will be other evidence that you were the inventor.	At least in theory an end user could be sued for infringing on a patent, especially a method claim. Given the cost of a patent lawsuit, this strikes me as extremely unlikely to happen though, unless the user in question were an extremely large company, or something on that order. Theoretically, the only difference between open-source software and proprietary software would be that availability of the source code makes it easier to prove use of a patent in open-source software. Releasing the software as open-source doesn't confer any immunity from patent law or anything like that though. Realistically, however, the chances of being sued for infringement if you're basically giving away the software in question are fairly remote. It rarely makes sense for a patent holder to spend millions of dollars on a lawsuit where they stand no chance of even recovering their cost (but no, that certainly should not be taken as legal advice that you're free to infringe on patents, or anything similar--in fact, none of this should be taken as legal advice at all). If you can actually prove that a technique was published or publicly known and used (e.g., in a product that was offered for sale) well before the patent was applied for, the patent is probably invalid (and if proven so in court, the case would normally be dismissed with prejudice, which basically means the patent holder wouldn't be able to sue anybody else for infringement of that patent). I'd note, however, that in my experience this is much less common than most people imagine--many look at (for example) the title of a patent, and assume it lacks originality because it refers to some well-known technique, and ignore the claims where it details the precise differences between the previously known technique and what the patent really covers. Just for example, the EFF used to have a web page talking about a (now long-since expired) patent on how to draw a cursor on screen. In an apparent attempt at scaring the unwary, they showed code they claimed infringed in the patent--despite the fact that the patent's "background of the invention" specifically cited the technique they showed as being previously known, and not covered by the patent.	It may be useful to draw a distinction between the NFT and the Art referenced by this NFT. There is no intellectual property in an NFT itself because an NFT is not a creative work, invention, or trade secret. Ownership of the NFT. As far as I'm aware, no laws recognize the Ethereum blockchain as an arbiter of ownership. However, NFTs and other “crypto” assets seem to be recognized as property. Thus, it can be the case that lawful ownership diverges from the ownership records on the blockchain. In the referenced scenario, someone gained control over an NFT but likely did not receive the property rights in that NFT (i.e. stole it). License to use the Art. The “Bored Ape Yacht Club” terms define ownership of the NFT purely in terms of the Ethereum blockchain, and ignore legal ownership: Ownership of the NFT is mediated entirely by the Smart Contract and the Ethereum Network The blockchain-owner of the NFT is then granted a license to use the Art via these terms. This leads to the following conclusions: There are no intellectual property rights in the NFT. Any intellectual property rights in the Art are held by Yuga Labs LLC, the company behind the “Bored Ape Yacht Club”. Nothing in the terms transfers ownership in the Art. Yuga Labs LLC grants the blockchain-owner of the NFT a license to use the Art. Here, this means that the thief held the license, then after the sale the subsequent buyer. Yuga Labs LLC does not grant the legal owner of the NFT any rights, in case the legal owner and the blockchain-owner are distinct. Of course, nothing would prevent Yuga Labs LLC from also granting a license to the legal owner of the LLC. They can still do so retroactively, as their license grant to the blockchain-owner is probably not exclusive. But I would be surprised if they would do so, since it would shatter the “NFT = Art” and “Blockchain = Ownership” illusion that their business model relies on.	On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.	Yes I would reach the same conclusion as DaleM, i.e. that the arbitration clause still applies to the dispute in the question, but for a different reason.<1> While the severability principle is indeed a concept in arbitration law, I don't believe that is the relevant doctrine here.<2> Termination Of Employment v. Termination Of An Employment Contract What terminates when a period of employment ends is the employment itself, not the contract of employment. The contract remains effective as to rights and obligations arising during the course of the employment covered by the contract. (This concept would also sometimes be described in terms along the lines of "the right to a remedy for the workplace injury and the right to have disputes related to that resolved in arbitration are vested rights" that are not modified when the contract term of employment ends.) This concept isn't particular to the arbitration obligation. For example, if contract of employment that did not contain an arbitration clause provided that the employee was paid $200 an hour for the first six months and $220 an hour for the second six months of a one year fixed term employment agreement, but the employer failed to adjust paychecks according after the first six months and continued paying the employee at $200 an hour instead (assume to avoid the issue of waiver that this wasn't readily apparent on the face of the paystubs provided to the employee), the employee could bring suit thirteen months after the employee's employment terminated for the $20 an hour not paid as agreed during the last six months of the contract even though the employment period had ended. The contract still remains in force to govern the rights and obligations of the parties arising during the period of employment. Examples Of Termination Of The Contract Itself In contrast, sometimes one contract is replaced, even retroactively, with another contract, in what is called a "novation" of the original contract. This truly does terminate the old contract, so that only the replacement contract remains. So, if, for example, the original employment contract contained an arbitration clause, but this was replaced by a new employment contract without an arbitration clause three months later (in the sample case, before the worker was injured<3>), then the arbitration clause would not apply because the contract, and not just the employment was terminated. Similarly, support that the workplace injury was the second dispute between the employer and employee that had come up. The first was a dispute over the rate of pay received which was resolved by a settlement agreement negotiated by lawyers for the parties before either arbitration or litigation in court was commenced, which expressly terminated all rights, known and unknown, of the parties arising under the contract, and the second was the workplace injury for which the relationship of the injury to work was only discovered later on. In this case, the contract and not just the employment had been expressly terminated, and so the arbitration clause would not apply to the workplace injury dispute (which would be barred by the settlement agreement and which may or may not have had an arbitration clause of its own). End Notes <1> At least assuming that the dispute would have been subject to arbitration if a dispute were litigated while the employee was still employed. There can be circumstances when a workplace injury is not subject to arbitration even if the employer and employee undoubtedly agreed to an arbitration clause that applies to the dispute in question. For example, workplace injuries arising from sexual assault are not subject to arbitration in the United States. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402. <2> The severability principle usually concerns a determination of the enforceability of an arbitration clause in the face of certain kinds of arguments that the entire contract as a whole is voidable. It also does not apply in cases where there is a dispute over whether any contract of any kind was formed in the first place. For example, if someone presented the court with a contract containing an arbitration clause and sought to compel arbitration, and the defense to a motion to compel arbitration was that the defendant had never met or had any connection with or communication with the defendant or anyone related to the alleged contract. <3> The hard case, where the novation takes place after the injury, is complicated by legal doctrines regarding the conditions under which a vested legal right can be waived, which may or may not be met depending upon the circumstances under which the novation was entered into by the parties and presents conceptually distinct legal questions in addition to the legal questions already present in the simple case where the injury takes place after the novation.	The UK Government released an article last year that explains some of the issues relating to ownership of copyright This article is informative. The headline point: Ownership of literary, dramatic, musical, artistic and film works created by an employee during the course of their employment, automatically vests in their employer by virtue of section 11(2) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The meaning of during the course of their employment has been interpreted by the courts to mean during the course of normal or specifically assigned duties, and that these duties include the creation of intellectual property for the employer. Patents are similarly affected - if the role does not specify or would not imply the creation of patents and other IP, it may not vest in the company automatically. This is a standard clause and is designed to protect the interests of the company, in the event that you create intellectual property as part of your role. Bear in mind here that there's no real need for this property to be created during work hours. That is, if part of your role is to design new software, ownership of that software vests in the company, whether you spent substantial amounts of work hours making it or not. Conversely, if your role does not include, or would be expected to include, the creation of intellectual property, then if you do so - even if it is during work hours - ownership may not necessarily vest in the company. IP you create in the course of your employment will vest in the company in the course of your employment will probably mean: if you are employed to create IP generally, all any IP resulting from your work, or; if you are employed to create a specific work, that work and possibly related works. This is a fairly standard clause, for most companies - I have had several jobs (though none of them technology-related) and they all include some clause to this effect	First of all, this is not insider trading: insider trading is using non-public information to trade a publicly tradable security. What this could be is misuse of confidential information - a civil tort. The disclaimer does not create a legally binding contract for a number of reasons but it does alert the recipient that the information is confidential: if they use it then they can be sued for damages (probably successfully). However, given the nature of the information, it is almost impossible for your friend not to act on it and Company B should realise this. Legally he is doing the right thing, consulting a lawyer and informing Company B of its colossally massive stuff up. Ethically he may need to withdraw from the negotiations.
Is it legal to buy/sell a property through power of attorney? Is there a legal way to buy/sell a property(apartment) in a locality where registration is paused? Heard about power-of-attorney way but not sure if its valid in this scenario! Any advice on this would be highly appreciated!	A power of attorney (POA) is a legal document giving one person (the agent or attorney-in-fact) the power to act for another person (the principal). The agent can have the broad legal authority or limited authority to make legal decisions about the principal's property, finances or medical care. The power of attorney is frequently used in the event of a principal's illness or disability, or when the principal can't be present to sign necessary legal documents for financial transactions. A person appointed as power of attorney is not necessarily an attorney. The person could just be a trusted family member, friend or acquaintance. Power of Attorney can have Partial or Full Power depending on the terms satisfied between two parties. Example: Mr. A made a deal of selling his land to Mr. B and all the formalities were completed except Registry Transfer (all includes contract, money, etc). The registration was not done due to an absence of Specified Government Officer, that time Mr. B has a legal right to create Power of Attorney if Mr. A is satisfied with it. Mr. A can give Mr. B all powers (Just like registry was transferred) or can give partial power as discussed between the two parties. When Full power is given there will be no need of Mr. A at the time of transfer of regisitry in future. Not a lawyer but one who suffered the same problem two months ago...	I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed.	Am I required to help purchase this property for the HOA? Your HOA (homeowner's association) can do what it governing documents permit it to do. It is highly unlikely that there is a statutory prohibition against it doing so. It is quite common, for example, for an HOA to temporary take ownership of units. when the owner of the units had defaulted on their HOA assessment payment obligation, and the HOA forecloses on its lien for unpaid assessments (especially when the units is low in value, like a separately owned parking space or storage unit). Typically, an HOA might want to own vacant lots so that it can control how that vacant lots are developed to prevent an undesirable use of those lots, or to reserve space for the construction of common areas such as community gardens or lawns or HOA facilities, in the future. Normally, such a power would be expressly stated, or would be expressly prohibited, in the governing documents. If the HOA governing documents are silent, typically one would look to the general statutes governing organizations of its type (e.g. non-profit corporations, if that is how the HOA is organized). Most general statutes of this type would permit such a purchase (and a subsequent sale of the lots) if the vote required by the governing documents to purchase (or sell as the case may be) of real property have been complied with by the board. If so do I have any land and title rights to said property? This would normally be spelled out prominently in the governing documents of the HOA. As a practical matter, the HOA would be in exclusive control of the property and would have exclusive responsibility for maintaining and paying for obligations arising from the property, all of which would be paid out of HOA assessments along with any revenue that the land generates. In some HOAs land and title of common areas and other real estate and property of an LLC is legally vested in the HOA entity as a corporate owner of it, and you own membership interests in the HOA. This usually increases the economic value of your membership interest, but has little other direct impact. In some HOAs (which are called "condominiums" when using that term in the strict rather than in the colloquial or broad sense) land and title of common areas and other real estate of an LLC is held as an undivided tenancy in common interest of all HOA members in proportion to their assessment percentage, with the HOA having an irrevocable power of attorney to manage it on behalf of its members, although, in practice, the differences between these and corporate ownership of common areas and other HOA real estate is almost nil. Sometimes, rather than an irrevocable power of attorney, the HOA is a trustee over the common areas and other real estate which are beneficially owned by the members as tenants in common, instead.	The primary question is why the trustee is disposing of the asset at all. The trustee has a particular fiduciary duty (we haven't seen the document so we have no idea what that duty is). It could be justified because, for example, the grantor needs cash for a brain operation. Self-dealing (acting in one's own interest, which is a conflict of interest), is prohibited for a trustee. With real estate, "fair market value" is a fluid concept, but within limits one can determine that a sale (to self) at $900,000 undervalued the house and that a sale to another would have garnered $1,100,000, therefore this would be an illegal self-dealing. However, the simple act of a trustees purchasing an asset from a trust that he is the trustee of is not categorially prohibited.	Disclosures are prescribed by state law. Fair housing, which is a federal concept, pertains to issues such as using prohibited personal facts to determine whether to accept an offer. (Hazardous materials disclosures are also mandated at the federal level, but are are included in state requirements which can get pretty broad). If you are buying in Washington state, RCW 64.06.020 says what and how you must disclose. The list of disclosures is very detailed, covering title and covenants, water, sewer, structure, systems and fixtures, environment, and mobile home related. The only one of the 86 questions about smoke is whether smoke alarms are present. Thus smell of smoke is not a legally material fact that must be disclosed, in this state. The California disclosures, even longer, are here, and there is likewise no "smells bad" disclosure. It is unlikely that any state in the US mandates such a disclosure, since it is somewhere between a subjective evaluation and a self-evident fact. Some people are very sensitive to certain smells while others do not care. The burden is on the buyer to pursue matters of personal concern (in writing!), such as whether any dog has been present in the house in the past 5 years (some people care). You have to look carefully at the response. "Don't know" is usually a safe bet, unless you actually have factual knowledge. From what I can determine, Massachussetts is on the opposite end of the spectrum from California. There are some requirements imposed on real estate agents, and there is the federal lead paint disclosure, but otherwise it appears that nothing is mandated by law. This form seems to be used by the real estate association, and there is a question about "history of smoke/fire damage to structure". The reasonable interpretation of that is "has the house caught fire and suffered damage", so "no" from a cigar-smoker would not be fraudulent. If the intent of the question were to reveal if someone has smoked frequently in the house, that would he the question they'd ask. You can check whether you have this form and see what it says, but "smoke damage" would not normally be interpreted as meaning "smells a bit funny".	Michigan law say nothing about landlord entry, so whatever it says in the lease is what is allowed. Various sources like this comment on the lack of such statutory regulations. There does not appear to be any relevant case law for Michigan which impose restrictions on a landlord's right to access a rental. Since there is no statutory or case law restriction on landlord's right to access his property, landlord's agent would have the same right to access. That would mean that if the listing agent were authorized by the landlord to enter, then the agent could enter, and it would not be necessary for the landlord to accompany this agent whenever entry was needed. That does not mean that a "listing agent" that happens to work with a landlord has an independent right to enter the landlord's property. The same would go for repairmen. It is actually not clear to me whether there could be blanket permission for any and all with access to the lock box to enter, since pretty much any realtor can enter a house for sale, subject to whatever the stated limitations are, and they don't call the owner for each entry. I suspect that one would not have legal grounds for imposing a particular additional restriction on a landlord's right to access and permit access to the property, since there's no overriding statute, and restrictions on landlord access mainly derive from statutes.	You certainly can't legally steal anything, ever. If it is legal, it is not stealing. In particular, if it is your property, it isn't stealing. The question is really, "is it your property"? This will be jurisdiction dependant. I am familiar with England and Wales, and other common law jurisdictions may be similar. The fact you co-signed for the car definitely does not make it your property. It just means that out of the goodness of your heart, you agreed to reduce the finance company's risk by promising to pay if your ex-friend didn't. In E&W, I don't think it is possible to register a car jointly, but there is a long page explaining that the registered keeper is not necessarily the owner of the car. My guess is that the car probably does not belong to you, so if you take it you will probably end up with a conviction for theft.	In the lease agreement we stipulated that rent would be 50% off until the building received full services and then the full rent payment would be due. Ouch. I bet the lease agreement also says something like "no other agreements verbal or otherwise are in effect for this agreement." So what you did was release the landlord from the responsibility to make the building habitable. Pretty sure you will need a lawyer to unwind this.
Blumenthal v. Trump Do Senators have standing to bring suit? In the Complaint filed today Blumenthal v. Trump (for text see [https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/11/19/senate-democrats-sue-trump-challenging-whitakers-appointment-at-main-justice/?slreturn=20181019194158 ] ), three US Senators , members of the judiciary committee allege that the Presidential appointment of Whittaker violates the Appointments Clause of the US Constitution. Some 'TV Lawyers' have opined that the compliant will not be argued on it's merits because the Court will rule that the Senators have no standing to bring the action. Rather than getting into the discussion about Mr. Whittaker's past statements and involvements, let me pose a hypothetical: If the President were to fire the Secretary of the Treasury and appoint Oprah to exercise that role without the benefit of Senate confirmation, Who would have standing to present a complaint?	Maybe, probably not. The leading case would appear to be Raines v. Byrd, 521 US 811, where 6 congressmen sued over a line-item veto law (later held to be unconstitutional). The court notes the established legal fact that To meet the standing requirements of Article III, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief". where that court added the italics; and the alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizable. This requires, among other things, that the plaintiff have suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized" In this case, the court find that "appellees have not been singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members of their respective bodies", and they are claiming institutional injury, arising "solely because they are Members of Congress...If one of the Members were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his successor instead". The court did, however, uphold standing in one legislative case, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, where there was an issue over whether the legislature had ratified a constitutional amendment when the Lt. Governor of Kansas cast a tie-breaking vote on the question (the allegation was that this was improper). The court held that the legislators "have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes", finding that their votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for naught although if they are right in their contentions their votes would have been sufficient to de- feat ratification. We think that these senators have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes. The Raines court finds that legislators "have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified" – but that was not the case in Raines (the line-item veto act had clearly passed). Applied to the Oprah hypothetical, senatorial vote would arguably have been completely nullified by the proposed process: that is the argument made in the present complaint, para 33-34. The end of sect. III of the Raines opinion gives extensive historical analysis of the fact that branches of government do not generally have standing to sue each other, closing with the note that Our regime contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts, well expressed by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974): "The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall [in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),] lies in the protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action. It is this role, not some amorphous general supervision of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests. There is a very narrow window through which the Senate might have standing to sue POTUS and otherwise, the answer is "no". The Oprah case is distinguished from Raines in that there is no political recourse to simply ignoring the appointments clause, except impeachment, and the courts might see such an action as equivalent to vote-nullification.	We can only guess at what argument he has in mind, but one possible argument is that the standard is unconstitutionally vague, similar to the argument by McDonnell in the recent McDonnell v US (admittedly about a different statute). The vagueness argument was developed in several of the briefs: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/ The unconstitutional vagueness argument has also been made specifically about 18 USC 793 (e). US v Hitselberger 1:12-cr-00231-RC D.D.C. (2014). The defendant made a motion to dismiss based on constitutional vagueness, but this motion was denied. Private Manning raised the same defence, also unsuccessfully: http://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/051012-vague.pdf	Different people have suggested different things as to what constitutes, "the unitary executive theory". The US Supreme Court is not likely to simply adopt such a theory in general terms. It will, instead, rule on a specific case that comes before it, and state the principles behind that ruling. There are a number of Supreme Court rulings saying that a President must abide by laws limiting presidential authority, perhaps the most famous is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) in which the Court rules that the President did not have authority to seize steel mills to put a stop to a labor dispute that was allegedly endangering national security during the Korean War. Congress had passed a law providing a different method of dealing with such situations, and President Truman did not follow the method established by that law. The President has broad power over the operations of executive branch agencies, possibly including the right to order an investigation halted for whatever reasons seem good to the president. If such a case came before the courts and they supported the President, presumably they would hold that the President's actions did not constitute obstruction of justice or any other crime. I find it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule that the President may "act against the rule of law", but they might rule that in particular cases the law implicitly grants the President power to take certain actions that others may not take.	The alternative is the same whether just one lower court or many lower courts ignore SCOTUS precedent. An aggrieved parts will appeal the lower court ruling, and the matter will work its way up the ladder until SCOTUS directly rules on this application of the law. This sort of happens all the time, when lower courts don't apply the ostensive "final ruling" because they find that there is some other overriding consideration ("that rule only applies to businesses employing more than 50 people"). Where the case to be remanded to lower courts for further proceedings consistent with SCOTUS opinion and still the lower courts refuse to comply, i.e open rebellion, SCOTUS could rule that non-compliance by lower courts constitutes contempt, and an order could be issued for the removal (in some form) of offending parties (we may presume, the justices of the lower court). The statute outlining court power allows on order of imprisonment for "disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command". Federal marshals would then arrest non-compliant judges, unless the marshals too are in open rebellion. If the judges in question were federal judges, the marshals would have to decide whether to obey the order of SCOTUS vs. the order of the district or circuit court. Since under the US Constitution states that "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish", it is objectively established that SCOTUS rulings are superior, so provided that the marshals elect to uphold their oath of office, they will enforce the SCOTUS ruling. However, citizen action becomes irrelevant once SCOTUS has made its ruling, and the matter has moved from legal determination of fact to enforcement of established fact.	There is no law governing the 'number' of the president. Common sense suggests that a person can't be 45th and 46th; there must be someone in between having the presidency and they will become the 46th president. In the extremely unlikely scenario that a foreign power occupies the United States this year, eliminates the office of President, and a few years later the US is liberated and Donald Trump is re-elected, I guess people could name him the 45th and 46th President, but it makes no sense to speculate about this.	There are several possible ways to get there, but the answer is "there is no such position." Acting President vs. President Under the Constitution: In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. When William Henry Harrison died, there was some question as to what "the same" that devolved on Tyler (his VP) meant. Some thought it meant that Tyler was Acting President; others thought the office itself went to Tyler. Tyler was in the latter group, and set a precedent that the VP became the President (finishing out the President's term) if the President died; the VP wasn't just acting. The 25th Amendment later clarified that presidential death, removal, or resignation made the VP the President; if the President was unable to exercise the powers and duties of the office, the VP was Acting President. Further down the line, the Constitution explicitly says Congress decides "who shall act as President." Congress only talks about succession further down the line in terms of the Acting President and the officer acting as President. So, if that interpretation is correct, the answer is "the VP is the only officer who can assume the office of President in the event of the President's death." Of course, a new precedent could potentially be set if this situation ever arises; if someone will definitely act as President until the end of the term, then it makes a certain amount of sense to say they just assume the office itself. Eligibility for office The Constitution doesn't say "you can't be elected President unless over 35, natural-born citizen, and 14 years a resident." It says you are not eligible for the office unless you meet those requirements. That would include any way of assuming the office, including succession. You can't become President if you are not eligible to hold the office, period (that's what eligibility for an office means); the only requirements you'd get around are those covering eligibility to be elected. Succession It's unclear whether the Constitution's eligibility requirements apply to a person acting as President who does not assume the office. However, Congress has decided that they should. 3 USC §19, which sets out who acts as President if both President and VP are unable to, says: (e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section [i.e. the ones listing people who can act as President] shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution.	Note the following argument: the landmark 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland, which ruled that state officials cannot obstruct “the measures of a government [the federal government] created by others as well as themselves.” “In other words,” Kalt and Amar summarize, “a single state cannot use its power to derail the functioning of the United States.” (Amar is a Yale constitutional law professor, Kalt, his student) On the other hand, you have the argument by a Hofstra constitutional law professor that the 25th amendment can be applied when the President is occupied with a criminal case, ergo, the functioning of the United States can be carried on unimpared. At the end-of-the-day there is no absolute answer as it is still being argued academically and has never been specifically settled by the courts.	You are correct that the existence of a lawsuit -- on First Amendment or Fifth Amendment grounds -- is not a strong basis for believing that Acosta will have his pass reinstated. People file losing lawsuits all the time. But that doesn't really tell us anything about the merits of his case, which I discuss below. Temporary restraining order: The standard for TROs is well-established: This court may issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction only when the movant demonstrates that: there is a substantial likelihood plaintiff will succeed on the merits; plaintiff will be irreparably injured if an injunction is not granted; an injunction will not substantially injure the other party; and the public interest will be furthered by an injunction. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Rothe, 150 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2001). I'd normally expect the court to be pretty speech-protective in a First Amendment TRO case, but because this is the White House, they'll probably give a fair amount of extra weight when figuring out how to balance everything here. I would not, however, expect either of the factors that you mentioned -- that this is a Fifth Amendment case and that few people have press passes -- to do much to change the court's analysis. I suspect it's going to come down to who is more credible about what happened and why. Fifth Amendment: The Constitution does not promise us much at all in terms of outcomes. What it does promise is that the government will go through reasonable procedures to arrive at those outcomes. As you seem to have identified, that's exactly what Sherrill was about. Sherrill does not say that everyone has the First Amendment right to a White House press pass; it says that that everyone has the Fifth Amendment right to due process when the White House decides whether to grant or deny a press pass -- especially because of the First Amendment interests implicated in those decisions. The basics ingredients of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision-maker, and that's all that Sherrill calls for: a publicly disclosed procedure by which the journalists can apply for credentials and appeal adverse decisions. Here, it's unclear whether the White House has provided Acosta with any notice or any opportunity to appeal his decision. If that's the case, they've almost certainly run afoul of Sherrill. But again, you are correct that this does not mean he gets his press pass back. If they find that the White House violated the Fifth Amendment as explained in Sherrill, the remedy will simply be to force it to go through the prescribed procedure. First Amendment: If it turns out that they use that procedure as a pretext to punish Acosta for protected speech, we would be out of Fifth Amendment territory and into First Amendment territory. If a court found that the White House had revoked his pass because he was from CNN, because they didn't like the questions he was asking, or because he didn't provide fawning coverage of the president, it is virtually certain that the White House would be forced to restore his credentials. But if they determine in a fair way that Acosta should have his pass revoked because he was violent, because he was infringing on other people's ability to do their job, or because he was otherwise violating established rules, a court would probably say that any of those was an acceptable justification. In that case, CNN would need a new White House correspondent.
Is it Illegal to own operate a hoverboard in New York State? Some states have strict laws on hoverboards. Is anyone familiar with how this is handled in New York State? Is it illegal to ride a hoverboard in the public parks or on bike lanes of public roads where many people ride skateboards?	While it is not illegal to own, it may still be illegal to ride on public property. Private property owners can ban them even if they were legal and need to be consulted individually. I have been unable to find out if new laws spoken about have been passed in New York since the beginning of the year. Based on what I have found (as of the end of 2015), it would be best to consider that they are illegal to use on public areas just as any other unlicensed motor vehicle. As of November 2015 Some property owners have banned them for liability reasons, as it is easy to see how a rider could trip on a bump or unexpected curb. And although they have taken the Upper East Side and other parts of New York City by storm, the state classifies them as motorized vehicles that cannot be registered, so riding them in public can incur a steep fine. Earlier this week, the NYPD's 26th Precinct tweeted: "Be advised that the electric hoverboard is illegal as per NYC Admin. Code 19-176.2*." and December 2015 some lawmakers were talking about making them legal. Truth or Fiction Collected on: 12/28/2015 gives the following summary A spokesperson for the New York City Department of Transportation has explained that the law’s definition of “electronic personal assist mobility device” was broad enough to include hoverboards, and that they would be regulated as such. In NYC, because the population is above 1 million people, electronic personal assist device riders must be licensed, and the devices must be registered with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. Hoverboards are illegal, the spokesperson said, because the NYSDMV would refuse to register them for legal use: NYSDMV’s position is that these vehicles are likely “Electric personal assist mobility devices.” NYS Vehicle and Traffic Law 114-d defines “Electric personal assist mobility device” as “Every self-balancing, two non-tandem wheeled device designed to transport one person by means of an electric propulsion system with an average output of not more than seven hundred fifty watts (one horsepower), and the maximum speed of which on a paved level surface, when propelled solely by its electric propulsion system while ridden by an operator weighing one hundred seventy pounds, is less than twelve and one-half miles per hour.” NYS VTL 125 generally defines “motor vehicles” as “Every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power.” However, VTL 125 specifically excludes some classes of vehicles from the definition of “motor vehicles.” Under VTL 126(a-1), “electrical personal assistive mobility devices operated outside a city with a population of one million or more” are not considered motor vehicles. However, in NYC, because the city population is greater than one million, NYSDMV considers “hoverboards” that meet the definition of “electric personal assist mobility devices” the same as motor vehicles. Based on that interpretation, it would be illegal to operate a hoverboard in NYC without a valid license to drive a motor vehicle. Beyond that, the motor vehicle would need to be registered by NYSDMV (which NYSDMV will not do), inspected, insured, and otherwise treated as, and subject to regulation like, any other motor vehicle. A person who operates a hoverboard in NYC (or any other NYS city with a population greater than a million) would be subject to arrest and prosecution for myriad NYS VTL violations, including, but not limited to, driving a motor vehicle without valid registration or insurance.	united-states Speed limits can be enforced by any means (except photo-radar) in most U.S. jurisdictions without notice that it is being used. Those laws are close to being uniform in the U.S. due to federal coordination on federally funded roads, even though state and local laws are what governs them directly. Some U.S. jurisdictions prohibit the issuance of photo-radar speeding tickets without notice before entering the photo-radar picture taking zone. I'd have to research further to see if New York City does. The purpose of the language on the sign is to make drivers more fearful of being caught in circumstances where they don't see someone trying to enforce the law, not to have greater legal effect.	You're forgetting city and county health codes, business permits, zoning regulations, fire and occupation regulations, business and property insurance, labor laws, etc. These can differ between the city and the county, and depending on if you own or lease the building. Best thing to do is start with your city/county business permit office; they can provide information. Call the fire department and ask. Ask the county health department. Find out if a business incubator exists in your city/county and ask them: https://esd.ny.gov/certified-business-incubator	No It's your device, you can do what you like with it (subject to the law - you can't hit people with it. Unless they want to be hit: whatever turns you on, turns you on). However, if you do operate it outside their instructions then they would not be legally liable if it failed and injured you or someone else or set fire to the cat or whatever. The "prohibition" would limit their legal liability.	TITLE XXI Section 263:1-a 263:1-a Allowing an Improper Person. – No person shall knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned or controlled by him to be driven by a person who is not properly licensed or otherwise entitled to drive. Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of a violation, and if the license or driving privilege of the person allowed to drive is under suspension or revocation, the owner or person in control of the vehicle, notwithstanding title LXII, shall be fined not less than $100. I would also hazard that allowing someone to use your vehicle knowing they intend to commit a crime would make you an accessory but I don’t think that’s the answer they’re looking for here.	Is receiving intimate stimulation while driving illegal? Under Michigan law, it seems illegal. What you describe is one particular case of a general family of scenarios where recklessness or negligence are elements of a driver-related offense. Thus, it would be inefficient and redundant to enact a statute to prohibit that specific hypothetical situation. MCL 257.626(2) sanctions the operation of a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, and as you mention It's pretty obvious to me why this is a dangerous practice MCL 257.626b sanctions the operation of a vehicle in a careless or negligent manner likely to endanger any person or property, but without wantonness or recklessness. A prosecutor might try to file charges also on the basis of MCL 750.335, which sanctions "open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior".	Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.	Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.
Is there any federal law in the US that protects its citizens from police harassment? Or is it up to the states Can police officers legally stop and ask you for your id (not driving, but cycling cross country) or question you about your travels (where are you going, why.. etc) if they cannot articulate any resonable suspicion ? If the above mentioned practice is illegal, and they make up funny excuses like "what if you fall into the ditch and die.. we need to know who to send the body to", would that be considered =mocking the law= ? Is it up to the states to decide what constitutes harassment? Or is there a federal law that protects regular mortals from cops? Thank you	You're looking for the Fourth Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. This prohibits the police from harassing you and stopping you without cause. It is not self-enforcing, though, so you can sue for a violation under 42 USC 1983: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. This is the normal means of enforcing your rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as the First, Second, and so on.	The problem is that the law enforcement authorities could easily contend that the simple fact of a police car on the road projects the power and authority of law enforcement, and if a car was built and driven by someone who is not an officer, that would constitute impersonation because people would assume only a police officer would be driving a police car. The police could cite the driver for impersonation; the merits of the case could be decided in court, but it's speculation on what conclusion would be made. There's always the fact that Oregon law could be quickly amended to outlaw personal or custom vehicles which simply appear to be law enforcement vehicles, if the legislature saw the need in response to police requests or requests from the public. Current Oregon law can already interpreted to include those who impersonate the police in a vehicle. There are several recent news articles: One from ktvl.com: Anyone caught impersonating an officer is facing a Class C felony charge, with potentially up to three years in prison. And another: Police impersonator pulls over Oregon driver, turns himself in - oregonlive.com: ...turned himself in to police on Friday evening, OSP said in a release. He was cited and released for criminal impersonation of a public servant and disorderly conduct.	There is a lot of confusion over the difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause. They are not the same thing. Reasonable suspicion is any justifiable belief that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Probable cause requires an officer to have actual, tangible evidence that you have committed a crime. Only after probable cause has been established can an officer arrest you (with limited ability to search your immediate person and effects). Reasonable suspicion only requires some articulatable justification that you did something wrong. The police can detain you on reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you why. This is called a Terry stop (after Terry v. Ohio where the Supreme Court ruled this was legal). However, they can only detain you long enough to ascertain whether or not they have probable cause to arrest you. If after conducting a preliminary investigation they can't find probable cause to make an arrest, they have to let you go. In that video, we have a guy walking around in Texas with a shotgun and some shells. We never see what this guy looks like or how he's carrying himself, but he appears to be a troll. The cops received a call, so they investigated. They had all the reasonable suspicion they needed to detain him. Texas is an open carry state (a person can walk around openly with a gun), and it is not a stop-and-identify state (the police cannot demand that you ID yourself). Therefore the man did not break any laws. But neither did the police officers. They were doing their job by asking questions, and after failing to find any evidence, they let him go. If he had run before the officers had cleared him to leave, they could have chased him down and arrested him. That is, after all, what a detention is. You don't get to run away because you don't recognize a cop's authority to stop you. And fleeing a law enforcement officer is a crime. But you do have the right not to answer any questions, including (in some states) what your name is.	The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.	A police officer (or any other random person) would not be guilty of a crime or subject to civil liability for standing by and watching a suicide occur when it could be prevented, unless the person attempting to commit suicide was in his custody and he failed to take reasonable care to prevent a suicide in which case the officer could be subject to civil liability. It would not be a violation of the law, however, for a police officer (or in most cases, even a private citizen) to intervene to attempt to stop an attempted suicide. Likewise, prisons and prison guards can have civil liability for failing to prevent the suicide of someone in their custody. Of course, a police officer might still receive a negative employment evaluation from his supervisor for such conduct, or might even be fired for it depending on the rules of a particular department, as it would reflect poorly on the police department and show bad judgment on the officers part. In general, an affirmative duty enforceable by a lawsuit to take reasonable efforts to prevent someone from committing suicide applies in circumstances where the person attempting to commit suicide is in someone else's care and custody and has their liberty constrained. So, there could be liability on the part of a hospital or treating medical personnel (I've actually brought such a case that was dismissed due to malpractice in missing a deadline by local co-counsel who was then disciplined for ethical violations by the State of Illinois for his conduct.) In the absence of such a relationship, a legal duty to take affirmative action to prevent a suicide generally does not arise. Certain medical facilities and providers are required to make anonymized incident reports for the purpose of creating national public health statistics on a periodic basis. In certain extreme circumstances, there are duties to report someone who is a threat to others which may also include a risk of suicide, to authorities, but those are quite narrowly interpreted, and actual legal consequences from failing to warn are very rare. There may be other reporting requirements in educational institutions and for mental health professionals, but I am not personally aware of them and I do not believe that they are national in scope. Usually, for criminal liability, there would have to be actual affirmative acts to aid or to attempt to cause a suicide.	There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense.	The answer provided by Dale M is half right, but there are a few things that I think are wrong. Firstly, the actual reality of the situation doesn't matter. What matters is that you act in a reasonable manner, performing assessments of the situation as a reasonable person would do. If you misread the situation, and end up killing a police officer that was acting in a lawful manner, it doesn't necessarily mean you were acting unlawfully yourself. Because police officers are generally exposed to situations where they would be forced to use their firearm, that obviously would impact how a reasonable person would see the situation, but the test for reasonableness would not go out the window. In addition, even if you were found to not be acting in a reasonable manner, there is certainly a question if you would be found guilty of a lesser charge of manslaughter rather than murder. It's possible the self-defence claim would be upheld as an imperfect defence.	It's not an interrogation Nothing makes Mr. Hansen a police investigator. He is a private person talking with another private person. His testimony or the recording of the interview might or might not be admissible in trial, that's for the court to decide. But Miranda warnings are only needed when you are under arrest or when you are in a custodial interrogation. Hansen, agent of the police? There's arguments that Hansen might or might not have acted as an agent of the police, and in one case he was deputized. However, that does not change that for Miranda you need an arrest or custodial interrogation (e.g. where one is not free to leave). As far as I am aware, none of the people interviewed was in such a situation and technically free to go at any time - making Miranda not required.
What is the difference between civil fraud and criminal fraud? Is it due to the severity of the fraud.that is to say the amount of money lost? Is it measured by the depth of the deception? Is it defined by the frequency of fraudulent actions? Or is the test, the burden of proof, that a situation is tried as civil fraud (preponderance of evidence) because it is too hard to prove criminally ("guilty beyond a reasonable doubt")? Is there an analogy between this and OJ Simpon's acquittal for criminal murder and a conviction on a civil charge?	A civil fraud is one pursued by a private plaintiff against the defendant and must be proved on the balance of probabilities. Success by the plaintiff results in restitution in the form of damages being payable from the defendant to the plaintiff. A criminal fraud is one pursued by the state against the defendant and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Success by the state results in punishment of the defendant by fine, community service, imprisonment etc. The same fraud may result in a civil case, a criminal case, both or neither.	The question to be answered is "did the state prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt", the answer to which should have no reasonable doubt. The interests of the defendant are sufficiently protected by the basic burden of proof requirement. The alternative that a single vote of not guilty exonerates the defendant would seriously hobble the interests of the people, and the alternative of automatic mistrial would make trials prohibitively expensive. The unanimity requirement does mean that in case of initial disagreement, parties have to re-think their positions, which is not a bad thing. The question of whethar a supermajority of guilty votes suffices for conviction was decided in a recent case, Ramos v. Louisiana, allowing conviction with a 10-2 vote. The court takes unanimity to be a basic common law right from the 14th century. Louisiana and Oregon had unconventional schemes allowing less than unanimous decisions: the reasoning behind the unanimity requirement is discussed extensively in that opinion. Since Alito, Roberts and Kagan dissented in part, the rationale for the other view is also spelled out.	In new-jersey, the offence of perjury is defined at 2C:28-1 of the Code of Criminal Justice A person is guilty of perjury, a crime of the third degree, if in any official proceeding he makes a false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of a statement previously made, when the statement is material and he does not believe it to be true. The Code also provides an opportunity for retraction. Assuming that the statement is material, whether answering "no" is perjury will depend on the witness's understanding of the question and his belief about the truth of the answer. If we assume that the witness understands the question to be about parentage in general, including by adoption, and if we assume that they know they have an adopted child, the answer "no" would be perjury. If instead we assume that the witness understood the question to be narrowly about biological parentage, or if they had forgotten at the time of their answer that they had an adopted child, then the answer "no" would not be perjury.	The phrase "reasonable doubt" was formed hundreds of years ago, and does not hold any mathematical or probabilistic meaning. It is for each individual juror to decide for themselves what constitutes "reasonable doubt", and whether the evidence presented to them has crossed that threshold. EDIT for extra clarity: As stated above, the definition of "reasonable doubt" is intentionally vague, and left to be decided by each juror for themselves on a case by case basis; as such there is no single rule that can be applied to jurors (also note barring accepting a bribe, a juror cannot be legally sanctioned for their conduct as a juror, nor their vote, regardless of the evidence before them). So one juror might judge by P(A\|B), another might judge by the defendant's appearance, another might judge by the majority of their peers (so that they can go to a ball game that evening, such as in the film 12 Angry Men), another might disagree with the law (see: jury nullification) and so vote not guilty on that basis, and another might bow to social pressure and convict despite overwhelming evidence that the defendant is not guilty (for example, at the end of To Kill A Mockingbird). A prosecutor cares about convincing the entire jury that the defendant is guilty(outside of Oregon and Louisiana, where only 10/12 vote is needed to convict, so the prosecutor only cares convincing 10 jurors). The defense only cares about convincing a single juror (or three in LA or OR), although more can be useful to prevent a mistrial. The defense (in theory) should not care whether or not the defendant is guilty. The origin of reasonable doubt was in Britain, where certain jurors would refuse to convict, despite any evidence, due to religious prohibitions of "Judge not, less ye be judged".	Falsification of evidence, forgery of documents, destruction of evidence (which is called "spoliation"), giving false testimony under oath or otherwise, and all manner of other similar conduct can make it hard to impose civil liability in the court system (or to prevent its imposition when it isn't called for), and does happen from time to time. Sometimes it is more blatant and verifiable. Other times it involves testimony that you know is clearly false but proving that is difficult or impossible. In my experience, medical malpractice defendants who are medical doctors routinely lie in testimony in ways that are non-verifiable, but very rarely falsify documents or provide false testimony regarding verifiable facts, frequently setting up a credibility fight for a finder of fact (i.e. judge in bench trial or jury in a jury trial). Medical doctors tend to be more honest and use fewer fraudulent litigation tactics than law enforcement officers sued in civil rights actions, but are less honest on average than business managers who are in commercial litigation who aren't in sales, and also less honest on average than professionals in mechanical and engineering fields. Fraudulent litigation conduct tends to be more common when the alleged wrongdoing is emotionally charged and personal. Judges usually take great pains to refrain from calling any witness out for lying, unless there is unequivocal evidence that an intentional lie, rather than a situation where a failure of memory or misperception led to a disputed issue of fact. This kind of conduct almost never gives rise to criminal charges when it does happen in civil litigation. It often leads to sanctions against the litigant who uses this tactic in the context of the court case (often quite draconian ones) and it sometimes leads to ethical complaints against an attorney for someone who does this (or who does this personally) knowing that it is being done in the case, often resulting in a lengthy suspension of a license to practice law or disbarment. The consequences of this kind of conduct can be career ending and economically unsurvivable when a court feels that someone has done so. I've seen awards in excess of $1 billion in lawsuits involving large publicly held companies where this has been documented. Identifying cases where this happens is more art than science, and often involves a healthy amount of good luck. There is no one strategy involved in identifying it, but seeking the same information from multiple sources and finding inconsistent results, noticing subtle irregularities in documents, understanding the context of the situation and what usually happens when people are honest, are among the methods used. It is very difficult to defeat this fraudulent efforts to present false evidence, and even when falsification is discovered it is often discovered at such a late stage that it may be difficult or impossible to remedy the harm done. It is always more expensive to deal with these kinds of tactics, although the magnitude of the extra costs varies wildly. Most of the time, it is never discovered at all unless the stakes in the case are so high that extraordinary efforts to leave no stone unturned are justified economically in the litigation. There are tactics that can be taken to reduce the likelihood of misconduct (like securing access to documentation and taking witness statements as soon as possible and ideally before a records custodian realizes its significance), but none are foolproof. A fairly typical example of this was in a securities fraud case that I once represented plaintiffs in, in which the defendant submitted one set of bank statements in response to discovery requests from us, and the same bank statements obtained by subpoena directly from the bank revealed that the defendant had photoshopped years of bank statements in an effort to deceive the plaintiffs. Generally speaking, the larger the bureaucracies involved in the case, and the more people who were involved in the situation, the harder it is to get away with something along these lines. For example, in a medical malpractice case, an instance of malpractice that happens in the office of a doctor who practices alone with only one staff person who is also her husband, demonstrated by a single in house document is much easier to cover up with fraud than a pattern of conduct in a large health care provider network involving encounters with dozens of professionals at multiple large hospitals generating thousands of pages of documentation, and managed by third-party administrators. Ultimately, there is only so much you can do to hedge against the risk that parties to lawsuits will engage in fraudulent conduct. But, because of the dire consequences that arise when someone is caught red handed doing so, this kind of litigation conduct is very rare. While false or misleading testimony on "squishy" issues of motive or opinion, or on impossible to verify points like recollections of unrecorded conversations, happens in perhaps one in five or so actively litigated cases, outright fraudulent tactics of the kinds discussed in the OP probably happens in significantly less than one case in twenty actively litigated cases, but probably does happen in at least one actually actively litigated case in two hundred cases. In the absence of omniscience, or Wonder Woman's lasso of truth, this is the best that lawyers and the judicial system can do. This kind of conduct is sufficiently rare that it doesn't materially upset the usefulness of the legal system for seeking recourse in civil actions. There are backstops like bankruptcy that exist, in part, in recognition of the fact that courts sometimes reach unjust results. Far more cases are wrongly decided due to attorney or judicial incompetence in cases with a complete absence of fraudulent litigation conduct, or from the misguided whims and misunderstandings of juries in cases with a complete absence of fraudulent litigation misconduct, than are wrongly decided as a result of successful fraudulent litigation misconduct. Also, even when fraudulent tactics are used in litigation and aren't caught, these tactics don't always turn the tide in favor of the party using them in litigation, because the people who use those kinds of tactics often don't have a good understanding of what facts are and are not legally important in their cases. It also isn't uncommon for fraudulent litigation tactics to be used in cases where the person employing them is actually in the right on the merits in the absence of these tactics, even though they are unscrupulous when it comes to their responses to accusations of wrongdoing. So, fraudulent litigation conduct doesn't always do substantive harm in the sense of producing a wrong judicial outcome, even when it is successful.	Barela was convicted of robbery affecting interstate commerce and faces a sentence of up to 20 years and $250,000 in fines. I assume your issue is that you think this is too high (although I don't see what it has to do with the 14th or 6th Amendments). Fortunately, it's also almost completely unrelated to the actual sentence. The number that was quoted is the statutory maximum for robbery or extortion affecting interstate commerce. It represents the maximum amount that any defendant under any circumstances could receive for one count of that crime. A career criminal who threatened to kill an armored car guard in order to steal $10,000,000 would face the same 20-year statutory maximum as someone with no record who threatened to give COVID to a store clerk in order to steal $90. In some situations, things like the amount stolen or the defendant's criminal record affect the actual crime the defendant is convicted of. At the federal level, that's mostly not the case. Robbery affecting interstate commerce doesn't have degrees or statutory enhancements. Instead, a judge decides what sentence is appropriate. The judge can, in theory, pick anything between the statutory minimum (here there is none) and the statutory maximum (here it's 20 years). 18 U.S. Code § 3553 lays out the factors for the court to consider. In practice, federal courts generally sentence within the range given in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. While the statute itself doesn't distinguish between stealing $90 by threatening to cough and stealing millions by threatening to shoot, the Guidelines do. Courts don't have to follow the Guidelines range but typically do. If they don't, it's much more likely their sentence will be overturned as unreasonable on appeal. Popehat has a good blog post on the Guidelines, how they work, and why press releases quoting statutory maximums are basically straight-up lies. Sentencing.us has an unofficial calculator you can use to estimate the Guidelines range for a particular crime. If you plug in 18 U.S. Code § 1951 (which translates to the "Robbery" guideline) and enter in $90 stolen, no weapon used, no threat of death, and no criminal record, then you get a range of 33-41 months and/or a fine of $7,500 to $75,000. This is basically the lowest Guidelines range possible for robbery. For comparison, under California state law robbery is punishable by two, three, or five years in state prison. Robbery is a serious and violent crime, so a sentence of multiple years would not be considered unreasonable. But it takes a lot for the Guidelines range to approach the statutory maximum of 20 years.	It obviously varies by jurisdiction, but most jurisdictions I am familiar with have something like a "Statute of Limitations" where crimes cannot be prosecuted after a certain length of time because it was "too long ago". The logic is firstly that if you prosecute a pensioner for stealing a bottle of beer from a shop when they were 18, the person you are prosecuting is very different from the person that committed the crime. Secondly, it is very hard to obtain a fair trial after the passing of a long period of time. As far as I know, all jurisdictions vary the length of time depending on the severity of the crime, and the most serious crimes are never time-limited. Rape usually falls into the category of "never time-limited". Of course, although murder and rape can be prosecuted after 15+ years, the difficulty of obtaining a fair trial, and of producing evidence from that long ago, means that they may not be. Finally note that "prosecution" of the accused is often not the primary aim of accusers. They just want to say "this was wrong". Abused individuals often find it very hard to speak out about the abuse; the current scandals have made it that bit easier, by reassuring them that it isn't just them (see the #metoo campaign for example).	Fraud is fraud From what you say, the US company has had no revenue, no expenses, and no profit/loss. To say otherwise is what is colloquially known as a “lie”. A lie is also the term for it legally. To lie in order to receive a benefit like, say, a good credit rating, is called fraud. That’s illegal in the USA; I’m not familiar with Dutch law but I suspect it’s illegal there too.
Are the people who sell pre-owned copyrighted media on sites such as Amazon breaking a law? Say you buy a pre-owned (second-hand) copy of a movie on a website like, say, Amazon. AFAIK, no one who made the film or distributed it will ever see the color of your money, therefore, the prejudice and losses are comparable, if not worse (because they are a much larger scale system) to piracy. But Amazon, on the other hand, will make a profit. Now, when you bought it brand new, there might even have been a message telling you to not resell it on the box or as a roll-up before the film. I understand that you shouldn't be able to resell, and that the user who would buy it would have to buy it new, which would make the distributors and the rights holders make profit (not sure what you should do with your copy though, trash it?). And yet thousands of dollars (probably more) are made everyday by people and by amazon through the sale of second hand media (also books, audio tapes, etc). (And sometimes second-hand media sells for as little as 1 cent of a dollar on sites like these, which makes its price value even smaller for the sellers and the website, and the price difference for the buyer versus "buying new" impossible to fight.) Yet, no one talks about this when people mention online piracy and circulation of copyrighted media that doesn't profit the copyright holders. So, is there an understanding between Amazon and copyright holders that no one is aware of? Are second-hand physical goods not concerned by copyright laws? Is it impossible to enforce, and on what grounds? (every transaction has been recorded on a server and includes people's addresses, etc). Or is Amazon (and the likes, such as eBay, etc) such a giant and powerful company, that big media companies find it easier to target piracy websites "first" than these kinds of distribution websites?	Generally not. There is a notion in copyright law called the first-sale doctrine in which after a particular copy of a copyrighted work is legitimately sold, the purchaser can sell, lend, lease, give away, or otherwise dispose of the copy as he sees fit. Copyright does not give the copyright holder exclusive rights to authorize resales. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 for the relevant US law; in other countries the same principle is sometimes called exhaustion of rights. There are limits to the doctrine. In the US, it does not allow for for-profit software rental (for most software) or musical record rentals. Moreover, software companies noticed the part where the doctrine applies to a transfer of title (i.e. an actual sale). If you read a typical software EULA, it is generally quite explicit that the software was licensed to you instead of sold; this is why. Courts in the US have often enforced these provisions (particularly if the license imposes limits like "you can't resell it"); European courts have, as far as I know, been far less willing to accept that argument. However, as a general rule resale is specifically not forbidden by copyright.	The commentators are just making stuff up when they say that you can freely infringe on copyright as long as it is for personal use. It is true that "personal infringers" are less likely to suffer the legal consequences of any infringement (partly because it's easier to avoid detection and partly because the hassle to award ratio involved in suing a personal infringer is too high). It's a misunderstanding of "fair use", based on the legally erroneous assumption that anything is okay until you make a business out of it.	Any adapted work derived from a work used under a CC-BY-SA licnese must be distributed, if at all, under a compatible license. The question is whether a large work incorporating a much smaller work is said to be "based on" that work. The CC-BY-SA 4.0 legal text does not use "include" or "incorporate" or any similar term to define an adapted work, instead it says: Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image. If including a single work makes your book Adapted Materiel, than you must either release the book under the same license, or else not rely on the CC license. I am not at all sure if such use would make the book Adapted Materiel. If the content could be quoted (perhaps only in part) based on fair use or fair dealing or a similar theory, you would not be relaying on the license. But whether such use is legitimate is always a very fact-bound question, which will depend on various specific facts. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for a summary of US fair use principles. If the materiel you want to use would not qualify under fair use (or whatever similar principle applies in your jurisdiction), and the book would be considered Adapted Material, then you would have to omit it or put the book under the CC license. I see in The CC case law page the statement that: The atlas was a compilation not a derivative work, so did not need to be licensed under the SA term, Which might apply to your book. If it does, you would not need to place the book under a CC license. Update: On reading CC's detailed wiki page on Drauglis v. Kappa Map Group, LLC I find the statement that Use of a whole work is suggestive of a "compilation" rather than a derivative work subject to the ND/SA terms. attributed to the US District court (DC district) that decided this case in 2014. If that decision were followed, it would seem that the book would not be considered a derivative work and while proper attribution must be provided, and the applicable license must be indicated, the book itself need not be released under CC-BY-SA.	A frequent distinction between the two situations is that usually, you buy the actual physical thing (DVD, VHS, CD, book, etc.), but for a purely digital asset, you may be only buying a restricted licence to the asset (on iTunes, for example). In the case where you did buy the digital asset (not simply a restricted licence to it), another difference is that the transfer of a physical item does not implicate the reproduction right1 that is given exclusively to copyright owners. However, transfer of a digital asset often does implicate that reproduction right. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc.: It is also undisputed that Capitol did not approve the reproduction or distribution of its copyrighted recordings on ReDigi’s website. Thus, if digital music files are “reproduce[d]” and “distribute[d]” on ReDigi’s website within the meaning of the Copyright Act, Capitol’s copyrights have been infringed. It is a different situation if you transfer the actual medium onto which you downloaded the digital content (ibid.): Section 109(a) still protects a lawful owner’s sale of her “particular” phonorecord, be it a computer hard disk, iPod, or other memory device onto which the file was originally downloaded. Notes 1. 17 USC §106 (1) "the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to [...] reproduce the copyrighted work..." This answer assumes US jurisdiction, but Canada's Copyright Act is fairly similar to 17 USC and similar holdings have been made in Canada.	Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing.	It is not possible to say that this is generally fair use, although sometimes it would be. A copy for personal use is still a copyright right violation on its face, and fair use does not categorically exclude non-commercial or personal use of copyrighted works. It is a highly fact specific inquiry. The likelihood of anyone discovering that you have done so and deciding to sue over it is slight, but that doesn't mean that there isn't potential copyright infringement liability. Compare this to speeding. People do it all the time, and even driving one mile per hour above the speed limit is still a traffic violation. But it is rare for less serious violations to be ticketed.	The IP was licensed to a company to allow people to put it on their shirts as part of a hobby. It did not license anyone to sell shirts with those prints already applied on them, least of all a third party. That is, Disney licensed a company to sell prints for sewing on shirts, not shirts. When you moved into the shirt market, you are competing with Disney for a different licensed product. Disney may offer a shirt with the same image of Mickey Mouse on it (or may wish to in the future) and you are competing and with copyrighted characters to boot. This wouldn't happen if you were to walk into a Disney Store, buy a shirt, and later sell it on a second hand market as you have legally purchased a shirt with a print on it (as opposed to selling a shirtless print with a shirt on it for profit). Even if the shirt fetches a higher bidding price on EBay because it is a collector's item as Disney is in the market of selling brand new never worn Disney shirts and does not want to be in the market of second hand Disney shirts that some guy may have sweated in. Furthermore, if you are posting the picture wearing the new shirt with the sewing print applied, but not with the intention to sell the shirt, but say, discuss the consumer experience of using Disney's product, then it also wouldn't count as here you are giving an opinion on the quality of Disney's merchandise, which may affect sales, but is not competitively selling a similar product. For example, if I have a blog that reviews movies and I say "Avengers: Infinity War was better than Avengers: Endgame", I'm not selling Endgame, but stating my subjective opinion on the film and that it wasn't the best foot forward compared to a similarly offered product. Product Reviews (in the United States) fall under a specific subset of protection against IP rights claims called Fair Use, which allows for a new product to be produced using copyrighted property so long as the product is material changed (for example, I'm if it was IP theft, I would have to sell the Endgame film in full. But since Disney is selling a movie and I am selling a review of the movie, we are not competing in the same market space). Fair Use is considered an affirmative defense, which means that the defense must meet a burden of proof in its claim. Affirmative Defenses essentially are Defenses where you in part agree with the claim, but the dispute is on the context in which the action took place. Without showing evidence that the circumstances of the action are not such that make it unlawful, such defense would basically be pleading guilty. Suppose then you are accused of taking a cookie for the cookie jar. Ordinarily, the person making the claim would have to show it's not you and could never be someone else, thus your defense would be that maybe Jane stole them. Or the evidence hinges on proving "WHO unlawfully took the Cookies From the Cookie Jar?" In an Affirmative Defense, you would answer the charge by questioning by saying that both you and the complaint against you agree to a statement "You TOOK the cookies from the cookie jar" but have disagreements on his statement that "You UNLAWFULLY took the cookies from the cookie jar." because your mother gave you permission to have a cookie and have evidence to support that. In many copyright cases that could be Fair Use, there is nothing stopping Disney from making the claim, so Disney can still file a suit and hope that their army of lawyers scares people into stopping even if you could have a valid fair use, as that is a burden you must prove. Of the three possible outcomes for the suit, either the matter is settled quietly outside of the courts and does not make case law, Or the courts find in favor of Disney OR Find against Disney. Disney wins in two of these outcomes, including the settlement of complying with a cease and desist notice (which is not a lawsuit, but a threat of a lawsuit should the practice continue) as you are doing what they want and a settlement will still show Disney will sue to other potential violators where as a losing case will create binding law (in common law systems, like the U.S.) that could limit Disney, but even then the victory is Pyrrhic at best as Disney can usually afford legal fees incurred where as you are less likely to be able to afford to see a case all the way through to a favorable outcome. Thus Disney will sue in cases it would likely loses as they gamble that the threat of the financial impact of reaching a decision in a court is something that will scare you into stopping. This is especially true on some websites like Youtube which would be threatened with suits for hosting a third party video and until very recently (2016 or 17) Youtube would give into the copyright holders despite a valid Fair Use claim existing. These practices can be defeated if one can argue in a court that Disney is doing this unfavorable fair use (called and anti-SLAPP) but this relies on the defense having knowledge of the law and the time to press the matter... ceasing is much easier and cost effective.	In the United States, making a copy without permission is generally going to be a copyright violation, unless the copying is a fair use. Fair-use defenses look at four questions, and the answers to the questions can tip the scales in favor of or against a finding of fair use: Does your kind of copying affect the market for the original? To what extent can your copy fulfill the demand for the original? What if there were widespread copying of the kind you're considering? The more potential there is for the copies to replace the original, the less likely it is to be fair use. (This is the most important factor in the analysis.) Why did you make the copy? If you made the copy for purposes of news reporting, criticism, or commentary, it's more likely to be fair use. If you made a copy just so you could emjoy the work again whenever you felt like it, that may still be fair use, but it is somewhat less likely. If you made a copy just so you could sell it for profit, that's almost certainly not fair use. How much did you copy? Did you copy the whole thing, or did you copy only as much as you needed to achieve your purpose under Question 2? If you copy "too much" – either in the raw amount or as a fraction of the whole work – it's less likely to be fair use. What did you copy? Highly creative works, such as poems, music, and movies, are at the "core" of copyright principles. A fair use analysis will be more stringent in these cases than when dealing with a copy of a purely factual work, such as a phone book, biography, or list of statistics. Such works are still protected by copyright, but that protection is not as strong. So take all of those and imagine the answer to each on a spectrum. If you see things generally tipping in the direction of fair use, that's a good indication that you're going to be safe. If you see things tipping in the other direction, you may want to reconsider. These questions can be trickier than you might think. If you're dealing with a real situation, you should consult an attorney to get an answer specific to your situation. But what if I don't make any money? This fact tips the scales in your favor, but only on Question 2; you still need to consider the other factors. Whether you make money is less important than whether your copying deprives the copyright owner of the opportunity to make money, but then you have to balance that consideration against the First Amendment principles embedded in fair-use analysis. So if you're ripping Star Wars DVDs to hand them out as Christmas presents, your lack of a profit motive will not save you. But a freelance broadcast journalist who includes short snippets of "Kick Out The Jams" and "Whip It" in a piece on this year's Rock & Roll Hall of Fame nominations would probably be fine, even though she's planning to make some money off her piece.
Cash only inheritance process My father passed away with no will. He had no property and a smattering of random stuff my sibling and I are sorting through. The only thing of real value is a checking account of about $100k. No beneficiary was named on the account. However, I have his online access to his bank account. In theory I could transfer the money out as per the agreement between my sibling and I, there is no disagreement between us. As far as I can tell there is no inheritance tax on sums of this size, especially since it’s all cash. Am I allowed to transfer the money out of his account using his online bank access?	You should really investigate the legally correct way to deal with the estate and the transfers of the assets; if not, you could have considerable legal and tax liability in the future with the bank (if they flag and investigate the transfers due to the death of the account holder and the size of the transfers) and the IRS (inheritance taxes), as well as other possible heirs who are not yet identified or notified of the death. Probate laws differ greatly according to jurisdiction, so either find a lawyer or Google for free or low cost legal help in your city/county/state in order to learn how to administer the estate in a legally sufficient way to protect everyone involved. Or go to the local county courthouse and inquire. It may not take much effort or cost much in legal fees, and it's a good investment of research and time to prevent legal and tax issues in the future.	Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.	What can I do to prevent someone from leaving me something in their will? Nothing. Allowing other people to legally change someone's will defeats the purpose of a will: To express the writer's last wishes. (That is why the full title is a "Last Will & Testament"). Do I have to take responsibility for things left to me in a will or are there other options? No! You do not have to accept an inheritance. The legal process for rejecting an inheritance is called "disclaiming." It happens often enough that there are plenty of nice summaries of the process on-line. Your next step should probably be to read one of them.	You seem to have a fundamental (though not uncommon) misunderstanding of how companies and shares work. A company has its own finances. When a company purchases something it doesn't have a whip-round from its shareholders- it uses company money. You certainly could create a company to manage the domain name and charge the family to use it, along with all the paperwork and costs that entails. The company would pay for the domain name. This would accomplish absolutely nothing. In the bus scenario the company would be passed according to your will (or to your next of kin) and you would have the same problem. If nobody knows the password, nobody can access it.	united-states Meet the word "clawback". The general rule is that anything you do simply for asset protection can be undone by the government or courts. See the excellent book by Adkisson and Riser titled Asset Protection. First, the creditor is going to ask about all your assets including transfers. You have to answer truthfully, or else you open a whole other can of worms. The creditor and court will look at the character of these transactions. Suppose you sell a Ferrari worth $200,000 appraised value, to your brother for $155,000. However, it was an open eBay auction. Plaintiffs review it, hoping to find it was a "vest pocket" sale rigged to be unappealing to anyone but family. Wrong: it was a competent and earnest listing, which did attract 12 stranger bidders, and 3 bidders took up your offer to let them inspect the car. And according to Ferrari brokers that price was realistic given the soft market. Your brother simply outbid them, for nostalgia reasons. You did get the money and did use it to settle with creditors. That sale will be considered legitimate, because there's extensive provenance held in reliable third party hands (eBay). You sell the Ferrari for $100 to your brother. The court will presume that you intend to buy the car back for $100 after your legal troubles have cleared. This sale will be declared invalid, the Ferrari clawed back, and the creditor will be able to target that asset. The same thing can happen if you are insolvent, expect to enter bankruptcy, and pay a creditor "out of turn". E.G. you settle your debt with the country club (so you can keep attending) before you pay your tax bill. The creditors, IRS or court can "claw back" that payment. That happened to my family's business once. Meet the word "Penalties". OK, so what does a dumb crook do? They lie about their assets. They testify "I crashed the Ferrari on the property, it was a basket case. I parted it out and chopped up the rest, threw it in the weekly trash week by week". And they can produce no documentation of any part sales. Meanwhile, plaintiff had already pulled DMV records and found it's currently registered... to the brother, with a DMV sale price of $100. They sent over a detective, who has pictures of it sitting in the brother's garage. And plaintiff gleefully maneuvered the dumb crook into a lie under oath. And now they face judicial punishment - including harsh fines, and jail for contempt of court or refusal to disclose. This bypasses the Fourth Amendment, so there is no trial for proof of guilt. But it's a government agency, not a private party All the moreso, then. Government has the right to bypass some of the rules for private parties - such as being able to do asset search, subpoena, or attach assets without filing a lawsuit. The IRS is probably the most experienced at pursuing asset hiders. They have "their own" Tax Court which does exclusively tax cases.	This is going to depend very much on exactly what is in writing. Note that your father could, if he chose, directly leave both the house and the IRA to his partner. If you become the homeowner after your father's death, and the "3-year right to use" and the cost sharing provisions are not in writing, then neither is legally binding. You and the partner may choose to honor your father's wishes, but if he does not put them in the will or another legal document, neither of you is bound. The question says: I cannot evict her if needed, as she is a senior citizen, living in my home, with no lease. I do not know of any jurisdiction in which there is a general ban on evicting a senior citizen in all cases. There will be some restrictions no doubt, but they will depend on the local laws. And of course you may not wish to exercise all the legal rights you may have. You would ultimately, have the right as homeowner to evict the partner. I don't what procedures would need to be followed legally -- that will depend on the specific jurisdiction, which the question does not list. As the homeowner, you would be legally responsible for maintaining and paying taxes and other expenses on the house. The partner would be either your tenant or your guest. Once you have title (and that will take some time after your father's death, in all probability) if the "right to use" was never put in writing, you could ask the partner to sign a lease. The terms could be whatever the two of you choose to agree on. If she becomes a tenant under such a lease, she has both legal rights and legal responsibilities, and each of you has the protection of a clear agreement. You would be wise to consult a lawyer to learn exactly what the local law does and does not permit. Your father might well be wise to put his wishes more clearly in writing while he still can.	When a person dies intestate, California law (or the law of any other state) does not allow a presumed heir to unilaterally legally take over the estate, or part of the estate. This most likely involves a court procedure to decide who gets what. However, if all parties agree, it would be possible for one or more heirs to occupy the house without them owning it – this creates a legal mess that can be difficult and costly to untangle, so presumed-heir squatting is not a good idea. Ultimately, the property will have to go through probate in order for it to be sold to someone else. Obviously, property taxes and other assessments must be paid, but the state does not care who writes the check. There are also liability issues, if the property damages other property (example: the underground oil tank ruptures and pollutes the neighbors' property). If one of the heirs disputes the arrangement, they can sue to force proper disposition of the estate. Creditors may also have a legal claim against the estate. A person can petition the court (here is the form) to be appointed as the personal representative of the deceased. If someone else has "taken" the property, this petition triggers questioning as to who is entitled to a share of the estate, and the court will assure that it is distributed according to law, and if this is an adversarial process, each interested party may need to hire their own attorney (thus it is best to reach an agreement beforehand).	It has to take at least 6 months because that is how long creditors have to file claims. This gives one opinion that "A typical probate process will take up to 24 months from the date of the decedent's death". It really depends on the circumstances (e.g. is there real estate that needs to be sold: is there a title snafu that you didn't know about? Is someone contesting the will?). The bar association won't help you, so it you want to get legal on the executor, you will have to hire an attorney. An inventory of debts and assets is supposed to be files within 90 days of appointment by law, but it also has an exception "or such longer period as may be allowed by the probate court". You can petition the court to order an interim accounting, and if the court things the executor is delaying, it can require an interim accounting. You should assume that the executor will respond with a good reason for the delay. Here is a form in case you are interested. You can always hire an attorney to write a letter asking what the delay is, but this is not a shocking delay.
Is there a fair use exception for trademarks? The copyright law has the famous fair-use exception, where you can legally use some parts of copyrighted works without having to pay any royalties to, or ask any permission from, the copyright holder. What about trademarks? For example, Oracle owns the trademarks for the ZFS filesystem created by Sun Microsystems, which they've acquired. (Not sure when and who filed which trademarks.) Does it imply that the OpenZFS / Open ZFS project is technically a trademark violation? Or is the trademark being shared by means of the CCDL the licence? Or do they actually have some kind of a special agreement? What if I want to register a personal domain name like zfs.example. (either in a global TLD or a country-code TLD) to blog about my use of ZFS; would that be a violation of the trademark? What if I sell ads for products unrelated to filesystems (but related to computers)? What if I let anyone buy any kind of ad, which may include ads for computer products and filesystems? (If you come from the assumption that ZFS trademark is invalid, what would be the case if it was not?) P.S. The was a similar case in regards to the ssh graphic trademark and OpenSSH, however, in that instance the consensus was that the trademark was simply invalid due to a whole combination of reasons. Is the ZFS trademark, perhaps, also invalid?	Just assuming for the sake of this particular answer that everything happens in the U.S.: I'm not sure about the particular example of Open ZFS. The registration in the USPTO Records is in Oracle's name. Using OpenZFS for distributing the same kind of software as the now closed-source ZFS would seem to be infringing to me absent a license. Maybe Oracle just tolerates the use of the "ZFS" component by third-parties since they decided at some point to license the software under an open source license. In that case, they may have a dilution (http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/TrademarkDilution.aspx) problem and the mark may be invalid. If the mark is invalid, anybody can pretty much do whatever they want with it. That said, assuming for sake of discussion that the mark is valid, there is indeed such a thing that is similar to the copyright fair use in trademarks (in the U.S. at least). It's called "nominative fair use". You can read more about it here: http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/FairUse.aspx Bottom line is that under the nominative fair use doctrine it's generally ok for party A to use party B's trademark to refer to whatever party B is doing, even to sell products and services related to whatever party B is doing. As per the INTA document I just linked above, its for example ok to "use “iPhone” in non-stylized form on packaging for phone cases to indicate that it is usable with iPhone 6." Having a website (even with third-party ads) that discuss ZFS-related matters is similar to the iPhone example in my mind. Having a domain name that contains the mark seems riskier, but it's not necessarily downright forbidden. See: http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Toyota_Motor_Sales,_U.S.A._v._Tabari	It is unclear whether WINE is infringing copyright or if it can rely on a fair use defense. The CAFC held that: that the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of the API packages are entitled to copyright protection In that light, if WINE had original content in the structure, sequence, and organization of its API, the CAFC would likely also find that it is entitled to copyright protection. However, because this issue is outside the scope of the CAFC's exclusive jurisdiction (this is a copyright issue, not a patent issue), the holdings are not binding in any other circuit. Each circuit is free to review anew the copyrightability of APIs when such a case comes up. My guess is that this is the reason the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal on CAFC's Oracle v. Google opinion. To address your fair use question would be simply speculation, because fair use is always assessed case-by-case, and even in WINE's closest analogy (Oracle v. Google), the CAFC remanded the fair use question back to the trial court, and that question hasn't been decided yet: we remand for further consideration of Google’s fair use defense in light of this decision	You're not going to find an OSI-approved or FSF-approved license that meets your needs because these licenses comply with the OSI definition or FSF definition of open-source software, and your requirements don't. Looking at your requirements, it looks like you want a license where users can modify the software and use it for private use, but cannot use it for commercial use. I ran a search on TL;DR Legal to see what licenses match. There are some one-off licenses that appear to be written by individuals or groups or written by companies that explicitly call out a particular software package. One appears to be a modification of the Apache License. I wouldn't recommend simply using one of these without not only reading them thoroughly yourself, but also consulting a lawyer - just because they started with a license that is trusted doesn't mean that a change they made didn't cause problems if it were to be challenged. For a project hosted on GitHub, it doesn't need to be open-source. You can upload a project that is all rights reserved, but by using GitHub, you do need to allow others to view and fork your repository. However, I wouldn't expect many outside contributors. Why should I give you my hard work if you're just going to turn around and make money on it? That's essentially free labor. I'm not aware of any listing of vetted licenses that are designed for commercial use of software, like how the OSI and FSF maintain lists of licenses. There is a Binpress license generator, but again, it's not a vetted license. How much stake you put into license generator or some random license you find on the Internet is up to you and the level of risk that you find acceptable. If you want to make money on your open-source software, you may want to rethink your approach. In my experience, I've usually seen dual licensing achieve this. One license is a custom written commercial license while the other is a very strong copyleft license, like GPL or AGPL (depending on how you intend your software to be used), which forces companies to also open-source their software if they use yours. It doesn't explicitly prevent commercial usage, but many companies will either look for an alternative that has a more permissive license or purchase the commercial license to prevent their software from being required to be open-source as well. You may also be interested in questions on Open Source about how to monetize open-source projects. There are options out there - selling support and maintenance or related services or selling additional documentation or examples. Under this model, all of your software is free and open source under any of the well-known open-source software licenses, but you make money supporting users of the software.	First, copyright does not apply to "brands". Copyright exists in literary works which includes art - a picture (any picture) usually has a copyright belonging to the creator of the picture. Brands are protected by Trade Marks. To be clear: A picture of you is protected by copyright belonging to the creator The phrase "Mickey Mouse" is protected by trade mark belonging to the Disney corporation A picture of Micky Mouse is protected by copyright and trade mark. (when) would it be legally OK for me to do so without the copyright owner's permission? You can use copyright material without permission if you meet the fair use criteria in your jurisdiction. You can use trade marks if there is no risk of people confusing your goods and services with the trade mark holder's and you do not cause damage (including loss of potential income) to the trade mark holder or it is fair use (e.g. you are writing a review of a Micky Mouse cartoon). Is it legal if I do not distribute them to others at all? No, this would be OK as copyright fair use, but not as trade mark fair use. Is it legal if I give them to my family/relatives for free, e.g. as a gift? No, not fair use for either copyright or trade mark. Is it legal if I give them away to others for free (meaning I'm losing my own money on them)? No, see above. Is it legal if I sell them to others at-cost (i.e. for the same price I obtained them, meaning I'm not making any money from them)? No, see above. If the answer is "yes" to any of the above, can the copyright holder explicitly prohibit me from doing so, or would such a prohibition be unenforceable (e.g. if this would be fair use)? It isn't allowed. Yes they can stop you. No, it isn't fair use; there is no "fair use" defence for trade mark infringement here - you are depriving them of income because you are not buying their T-shirt! Any other factors that are relevant but which I'm forgetting? Will they sue you for doing these things? Probably not.	It's not fair use. Fair use is when you do something that normally only the copyright holder can do. Playing a video game is the ordinary, intended use of the work. In the United States, ordinary use is not protected by copyright. 17 USC 106 sets out the rights protected by copyright. The include copying the work, producing derivative works, distributing the work, and so on. None of these are ordinary use. Someone could perhaps argue that you are creating a derivative work. I doubt that argument would work because you are not taking any protectable elements from the work. But if anyone did argue that, it would make sense to also argue that if that's so, your use would still be covered under fair use because it's transformative, does not substitute for the original work in any way, and takes very little of the work.	This is not (necessarily) copyright violation It's possible that Quora's usage falls within Fair Use. At the very least, the argument could be made. If it does, then there is nothing that Stack Exchange or the OP can do. Stack Exchange can choose not to protect their copyright Unlike trademarks, which lapse if not protected, copyright endures. Therefore Stack Exchange can pick and choose the copyright fights they want to get involved in and those they don't. If you have brought it to the attention of the copyright owner (or, in this case, licensee) and the copyright owner chooses not to act then you have done all you can and significantly more than you have to do. The OP has copyright I note that one of the examples is your question. As the copyright holder, you are free to issue a DCMA takedown notice on Quora if you feel your copyright has been violated.	What SE can do is controlled primarily by the Terms of Service. What most matters is the section on Subscriber Content, which says: You agree that any and all content, including without limitation any and all text, graphics, logos, tools, photographs, images, illustrations, software or source code, audio and video, animations, and product feedback (collectively, “Content”) that you provide to the public Network (collectively, “Subscriber Content”), is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC-BY-SA), and you grant Stack Overflow the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to access, use, process, copy, distribute, export, display and to commercially exploit such Subscriber Content, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by you... This means that you cannot revoke permission for Stack Overflow to publish, distribute, store and use such content and to allow others to have derivative rights to publish, distribute, store and use such content. The CC-BY-SA Creative Commons license terms are explained in further detail by Creative Commons, but you should be aware that all Public Content you contribute is available for public copy and redistribution, and all such Public Content must have appropriate attribution. This part has not changed: the purported license is still "CC-BY-SA", and the TOS does not explicitly specify a version. What apparently has changed in the relevant section is one "helpful information" link, which now points to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. So the interesting question arises whether that would constitute an unpermitted post-hoc change in the terms by which SE has license to my older stuff. This matter came up in a reviled Meta question; as I pointed out, the TOS also included a merger clause that This Agreement (including the Privacy Policy), as modified from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between You, the Network and Stack Exchange with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement replaces all prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements, written or oral, regarding the subject matter hereof. Because of that, the TOS is self-contained and stuff found on other web pages are not part of the agreement. This in itself is a bit of a problem because you can't both say "we're not bound by stuff outside of this page" and say "the specific terms of the license are outside this page". That particular clause is gone, but there is an analog in the current TOS: These Public Network Terms represent the entire agreement between you and Stack Overflow and supersede all prior or contemporaneous oral or written communications, proposals, and representations with respect to the public Network or Services or Products contemplated hereunder. Furthermore, the TOS contains the following "we can change it" clause: Stack Overflow reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to modify or replace these Public Network Terms, as our business evolves over time and to better provide Services and Products to the Stack Overflow community, or to change, suspend, or discontinue the public Network and/or any Services or Products at any time by posting a notice on the public Network or by sending you notice via e-mail or by another appropriate means of electronic communication. I assume but do not know for a fact that a similar clause existed in prior versions of the TOS. So I conclude that the change is legal.	If you are utilizing the name of the characters just so users can rate them (by rate - I mean rank, review, critique) you should be fine. Copyrights are subject to "fair use" by the public. For purposes such as review, criticism, and comment - this is generally considered to be fair use. Is the site commercial or for-profit? That could impact the analysis, but only if you are making money flowing from the use of the actual copyrighted material(s), rather than advertising (like Adsense) or something similar (this should not suggest that those type sites cannot violate copyright, but it's part of the analysis). If it is something you are investing money into creating, you may want to get a formal legal opinion. But if the site if for fun, or hobby, you are likely fine if what's described is the only use. http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/copyright-fair-use-and-how-it-works-for-online-images/ This link is to a great, easy to read and understand article on fair use, what it is and what it allows. Keep in mind each case is fact intensive, however, from what you are describing this seems fine.
What is the difference between "tamper," "alter," and "mutilate" For example the words given here Whoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or alters any passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, with intent that the same may be used; or here knowingly removes, obliterates, tampers with, or alters an identification number for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part;	"Tamper" implies action taken with intend to improperly change the meaning. "Alter" simply means "change". "Mutilate" simply means "damage" but in this context implies "Make unreadable". "Obliterates" here means 'make unreadable" or "remove". As a practical matter, there is not much if any difference between these words in this context, and no authority will spend any time at all considering whether some action is 'tampering" or "mutilation". The word "or" is used precisely to avoid such arguments. Any of these shades of meaning is equally forbidden. English-language laws and regulations often specify multiple synonyms or near-synonyms , connecting them with "or" so that anything within the more general scope of the concept is included. Charles Rembar, in his book The Law of the Land, asserted that this dated to the period in England shortly after the Norman Conquest, and that lawyers tended to include equivalent terms from Latin, Norman French, and English. He mentions such combinations as "Give, devise, and bequeath" and "Promise, covenant, and agree" as typical and often-used examples of this tendency. When this sort of multiple terminology is used, it is generally only useful to try to understand what is covered by the combined phrase, and of no value to try to determine which term covers which part of the concept. In the cited cases, anyone who tries to change a passport to say something that the government didn't intend, or who tries to damage or destroy a passport, or anything similar, would be guilty of the forbidden act. And similarly, anyone who tries to make an MVID read differently, or to make it unreadable, would be guilty.	Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.	You cannot In a conflict between written and oral terms of a contract, the written terms prevail. In any event, by you utterance you have not accepted the contract; you have made a counter-offer which the other party has not accepted and have then gone on to accept their original offer. You would need the written agreement of the other party that they accept your terms and that they understand that clicking the “I accept” is not an acceptance of their terms but merely a means of completing the technical procedure.	There isn't a meaningful difference; they just renamed it for version 2.0. Comparing CC-BY-ND-NC 1.0 and CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 side-by-side, one can easily see that their scope is the same--there is some rewording, but that rewording is common to all CC-1.0 vs. CC-2.0 licenses, and not indicative of any change in the fundamental scope or purpose of CC-BY-ND-NC vs. CC-BY-NC-ND.	It depends partly on where you are. If you're in the foreign country and they have a law compelling you to answer any questions asked by their government or some company, they you have to answer the question. Whether lying has any legal repercussions depends on the laws of the country, so you'd have to narrow it down a bit. If you're in the US, the only context where you can be compelled to answer a question is when ordered to do so in court (giving testimony), and you have 5th Amendment immunity from being forced to testify against yourself. If you are granted immunity from prosecution, then they can compel you to testify (answer the question). If a foreign entity asks you whether you are a US citizen, you can decline to answer. You can also make up any answer you want, and generally not run afoul of US law (though you could run into problems in that country). There are state and federal laws about making false statements in official investigations, which would not be applicable to what you describe. There is no general law that says you must always tell the truth. However, making a false statement could be part of the crime of fraud, so it would depend on the context of your statement, i.e. are you misrepresenting your citizenship in order to get something of value. In light of the topical update, again there may be country-specific penalties in country for lying about citizenship, and tax evasion is against the law here, which is true whether or not you lie. FATCA specifies a duty to disclose (sect. 6038d), which is not tied to truthful reporting of citizenship (in other words, there is no point in lying to the bank because non-reporting is still a crime). But: this law probably brings the lie with the scope of 18 USC 1001 ("Martha's Law"), which makes it a crime to conceal a material fact "in any matter within the jurisdiction of ...the United States". This means and has been held to mean not just that you can't lie to federal officers, you can't lie to anyone who reports your information to the federal government. FATCA also says "we don't care if it's a crime to report being an American in that country", so inconveniences certainly are not a defense.	Yes, the SFC doesn't allow the usage of the term "git" for third-party products unless they have their permisison. From the Git Trademark Policy, 2.3 Prohibited usages of the Marks: In addition, you may not use any of the Marks as a syllable in a new word or as part of a portmanteau (e.g., "Gitalicious", "Gitpedia") used as a mark for a third-party product or service without Conservancy's written permission. For the avoidance of doubt, this provision applies even to third-party marks that use the Marks as a syllable or as part of a portmanteau to refer to a product or service's use of Git code.	Most of your examples don't seem to be so much self-contradictory, as limited to a subset of the obvious meaning for purposes of a particular law. When a term has a specific meaning within a particular field or context, it is often called a "term of art". For example "Fair use" is a term of art in US Copyright law, and "Under color of law" is a term of art in US civil rights law. "Standing" is a term of art in most common-law jurisdictions. But a term of art is usually somewhat broadly understood, and is not limited to one particular law or section of law. I would just call such a thing a "specially defined term" or just say "Q as defined for purposes of the XYZ law".	Any answer is somewhat speculative, because there are no significant legal precedents. That said, you are probably not in breach of counterfeiting laws, as they typically protect physical currencies. However, due to the way that laws are written, their scope may be somewhat fuzzy in areas that were not foreseen, so you may find that a law unintentionally does cover your act. However, even if the act would fall under the law as written, jurisdiction remains an issue. Where would this counterfeiting happen, legally? Again, as this was not foreseen by lawmakers, it's possible that you may fall under foreign jurisdictions, e.g. because you spend the fake BitCoin and the the recipient lives in a country that assumes jurisdiction because their citizen was defrauded.
How can felons be denied Constitutional rights? The 2nd Amendment grant all people a right to bear arms: A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. However felons are somehow denied that right. Ignoring whether it would be desirable to have armed felons, then why would that not be unconstitutional?	District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), majority opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia: Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited ... Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. (emphasis mine)	The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.	There is no constitutional provision which grants the President such power. I am not aware of any provision of federal law which grants such power, nor of any case where a real president has exercised such a power. Of course, the President is a citizen, and any citizen may make a Citizen's arrest Particularly for a felony. (See also this FindLaw page on the subject.) And of course, as the head of the executive department, the President could order someone who clearly has powers of arrest to make an arrest, although such an order would not be valid in the absence of legal cause to make an arrest. A comment called atention to 10 USC §252 which provides: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The history for this section dates from 1861. A note indicates that a prior version was the basis of Executive order 10730, sending federal forces into Little Rock, AK in 1957 to enforce school integration there. However, this section does not explicitly increase the arrest powers of anyone, and does not grant the President personally any power of arrest.	Your argument is: The 21st amendment repealed the prohibition of alcohol. Alcoholic drinks deliver one type of drug (alcohol) Therefore, the 21st amendment repealed the prohibition of all drugs. That is an logically invalid argument. It is equivalent to: If A then B If A then C Therefore, if C then B. Further, the court has never held that the government lacks the power to regulate and prohibit drugs. It is hard to prove a negative, but see Gonzales v. Raich 545 U.S. 1 (2005): Congress’ Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law. As this was a constitutional question, had the 21st amendment prevented Congress's prohibition, that would have likely come up in this case.	There isn't one simple answer. The case prohibited a showing of a "special need" for a concealed weapon to allow one to have a permit. Many California concealed carry laws have similar requirements. But, California doesn't have just one concealed carry law. There is a default rule that applies in small, rural counties, but most larger cities and counties in California have their own specific concealed carry laws and the precise grounds for denying a concealed carry permit would matter. In all likelihood, many provisions of existing California concealed carry laws would remain grounds to deny permission to concealed carry (e.g. age, history of drug abuse, criminal record, restraining orders in place, etc.), while others provisions would no longer constitute valid grounds for a denial. This particular decision is about denying permits based upon lack of a particularized need for one different from other members of the general public, rather than about any possible reason that the permit applicant could be deemed untrustworthy to have a permit. The decision discusses the idea that it is problematic to have unfettered discretion in issuing permits, but doesn't really base its ultimate conclusion on that ground. So, something like a general residual "good character" requirement, while vague, wouldn't be squarely within the scope of the most recent decision. The case also doesn't itself prohibit (nor does the case law) some reasonable fee for issuance of a concealed carry permit. Thus, the new case does not require uniform law with "constitutional carry" for everyone permitted by federal law to own a gun. But, it does prohibit limitations related to a requirement to show a need to have a concealed carry permit.	This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas).	Firstly, because there isn't an explicit Constitutional "right to privacy", per se, and even if there was (and there are arguments that several constitutional provisions amount, in aggregate, to a right to privacy), that it wouldn't be absolute, in the same way that freedom of speech and of the press are not absolutes. Indeed, the closest thing to a right to privacy, the 4th Amendment, has explicit caveats: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (emphasis mine). Thus reasonable searches and seizures, especially those authorized by a warrant, are constitutional. Furthermore, even in light of a constitutional right of privacy derived from this statue, depending on how the "search history" is compiled, the 4th Amendment might not even apply, due to the Katz doctrine, also known as the "open fields" doctrine. Basically, the 4th amendment (as far as searches goes) does not apply to things that are publicly observable; while this would protect a literal "search history" compilation (baring a reasonable search), the searches themselves are public queries, broadcasted over the internet. Anyone watching could compile them into a "search history" themselves.	No. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a criminal defendant's right "to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." The U.S. Supreme Court interprets this to mean that the government cannot interfere with "the individual's right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of ... counsel.” Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989). For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(2) allowed the federal government to freeze assets of "equivalent value" to that which a person is accused of obtaining through health-care or bank fraud. When the government tried to use that law to stop a defendant from using the money to hire an attorney, the Supreme Court said it was unconstitutional, holding that "The constitutional right at issue here is fundamental: 'The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire.'" Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016).
How does Akinator not violate copyright law? Akinator, the app and website, both display images of what I assume is copyrighted material. How do they manage to get around copyright law? Is this considered fair use?	There are several things going on with Akinator and their use of trademarked names and characters. If you look at akinator.com Legal Notices it says: 2 – Copyright – Reproduction rights All the content of this site falls under French and international legislation on copyright and intellectual property. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part of this website, in any form or by any means is strictly prohibited without prior authorisation of the publications director. All products and trademarks mentioned are property of their respective owners. (emphasis mine) The fact that they mention that all trademarks belong to their respective owners is good, but it's a formality. What it appears the site really relies on for use of trademarked characters is what's called Nominative Use, which is a type of "trademark fair use." The product or service cannot be readily identified without using the trademark (e.g. trademark is descriptive of a person, place, or product attribute). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nominative_use Akinator has to use the names and trademarks to identify those names and trademarks. Akinator could possibly be sued to establish their type of fair use is not valid in their case, but it's probably not worth it for the companies to pursue. And, most companies would rather people use and see their trademarks in a marketing and money-making fair use sense rather than sue to stop their use. See In the US, when is fair use a defense to copyright infringement? for a full description of Fair Use. Now, when you get to the "answer" part of the game, you will see a "copyright" link. Part of that resulting page says Displayed pictures are accessible from the web. It is Elokence's policy to respond to notices of alleged copyright infringement that comply with applicable international intellectual property law and make the necessary changes. In respect of Elokence's Intellectual Property Policy, Elokence operates a complaints procedure accessible via the form below. So the company has given itself a further bit of protection by only using images on the web they can link to (at least in the web browser game; I don't know about the App), so that means the image is already "out there", uploaded by someone else, and Akinator can claim they didn't upload it. And, further, there is a contact form for trademark holders to send DMCA takedown notices for their work. It's a belt and suspenders approach to the use of trademarks in their game.	No. The images are copyrighted, and you are using them in a way that would leave you with virtually no argument for fair use. The factors for fair use are set out in 17 USC 107, and they indicate that the courts would reject your use: The purpose and character of the use, including whether it is of a commercial nature or for nonprofit educational purposes: There's no indication that your use would be for nonprofit or educational purposes. The nature of the copyrighted work: Works of fiction and art are highly creative works at the heart of the policy for copyright protection. The amount of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole: You are apparently copying entire images, though I suppose you could argue that each image is just one small portion of a larger book or website. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: You are trying to create a board game, putting yourselves basically in direct competition with the makers of D&D. I generally prefer a pretty liberal interpretation of what constitutes fair use, but this just has virtually nothing that would make me comfortable arguing in your favor.	Any use of the song snippets in your App can be copyright infringement (in the US), Fair Use (U.S. Copyright Office) not withstanding. Not distributing the App and/or using the App only in a limited group for the study, or not making money from the App doesn't usually matter when it comes to copyright infringement. Fair Use does have some educational exceptions; read the link above and see if your case may fit. But the final assessment of educational use would be made by a court if you were sued for infringement. If the use in your App doesn't fall under the education exception, you still probably run little risk of the copyright holders finding out if the App use is private and within a small group, but that's your choice to make. You can always Google the name of the music/recording company; most provide ways online to request licensing of samples, but the cost may be prohibitive, or permission may simply not be available for popular songs.	I believe the author has published it online. I agree. It is posted at his publisher's website. However, I am unsure if I'm allowed to read it. This answer assumes you are in jurisdiction whose copyright laws is based upon the Berne convention (i.e. the civilized world + USA). Assuming it was the author published it online, it is perfectly legal to read it. Technically, the author is performing his work by putting it online, and by reading it, you are just enjoying his performance. Also, if you are in a jurisdiction with an explicit exception from copyright for personal use, or where fair use allows making copies for personal use, it would also be legal to download it, or to print it on paper (but for personal use only). As for downloading and printing for non-personal use - that is not legal in Berne jurisdictions.	You are in general correct, KBurchfiel. A code snippet such as import math; or For i := 1 to 10 print i; has no originality, and is not protected by copyright. A post eplaining the meaning an usage of such a snippet might well be original enough to be protected by US copyright, indeed it probably would. But the code on its own would not be. Anyone could read such a post, and if s/he understood it, use the code snippet and not be in violation of copyright, not compelled to place the entire program in which such a snippet was used under a CC-=BY-SA license. The creative commons people would prefer that a CC license not be applied to a publication that is not protected by copyright, and if it is so applied it is legally meaningless. But they have no legal way to enforce such a preference. A stack exchange post that consisted of nothing but such an uncopyrightable code snippet, with no explanation r discussion, might well be downvoted or even deleted. But that is a matter of site policy on what is a useful answer, not a matter of copyright. Using an excerpt from a copyrighted work so small that the excerpt alone would be uncopyrightable, would probably be fair use under US law, and might well be fair dealing in UK law. Something that is fair use does not compel the reuser to abide by the terms of a CC license, because those terms apply only when the content could not be reused without the CC license's permission. However, a code snippet does not need to be very much more original than the above examples before it becomes copyrightable. Whether it can be used via fair use rather than via the CC-BY-SA license is a very fact-based decision (the usual four-factor analysis is spelled out in 17 USC 107).. But if the snippet can be rewritten to express the same concepts but in a different expression, then there is no copyright issue, and again the CC license will not apply. If the snippet is complex and original enough to be copyrightable (a fairly low bar) and it is re-used unchanged, under conditions where fair use does not apply, then the CC-BY-SA license's terms must be complied with for the use to be legal. That is several "IFs" however. The exact details of a specific case will matter in such cases, there is not one rule for all snippets, all posts, or all programs.	The only real recourse you have is to contact the webhost and try to convince them your content is really yours and file a DMCA Takedown request. How you convince them might be an issue; do you have any old screenshots? Original photos? Any proof that the content and photos are yours? The webhost appears to be https://datacamp.co.uk/ , unless the DNS is being proxied, since DNS points to CloudDNS https://mxtoolbox.com/SuperTool.aspx?action=dns:marksmayo.com NZ and UK are members of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, so there don't appear to be any arguments about not applying copyright law. You willingly gave up the domain, so you have no recourse or valid reason to try and regain ownership of the domain. You could try and contact the new owner of the domain by filing a complaint via the abuse email listed by the domain registar at https://www.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx?&domain=marksmayo.com But they may not do anything, even if you can prove a copyright violation, since they only handle the domain registration and not the webhosting. How they got the content is another question: who was your webhost when you owned the site? Datacamp? Did they not delete it when you closed your account? How did the new owner come to get it?	Both. The user made an infringing copy with the upload, the developer did with the download. Further the ToS between the app owner and the user will not protect them from being sued by the owner of the copyright. They don't have any ToS with them.	What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation.
Can I recreate the Risk board game for personal use? My friend wants to make a 'risk table', which would have the risk board carved into it, as part of a larger game board challenge. He would be making all the pieces and the board himself. I'm wondering if he can do this legally, assuming he stops using the word Risk? The game mechanics can not be patented, so in that regard he is safe. He would, however, be remaking the board itself which I assume is copyrighted. Since the board is just the world map divided into specific countries I don't know if this counts as 'recreating' the board? Is the fact that he is using the same countries that the original risk board used enough to count as recreating the board/game?	The board is more complicated than you describe. It is a somewhat stylized world map, broken up into regions that do not necessarily correspond to countries. They have names that don't necessarily express what the region is geographically (particularly Ukraine, which extends far to the north of real-world Ukraine). There are defined water routes between certain regions that do not touch. Someone else starting from a world map would be very unlikely to duplicate the Risk board. I believe your friend's board would count as a derivative work. Now, the copyright holder is highly unlikely to come after your friend. I've seen stories of people who made their own X boards, publicized them, and the game company did nothing about it. The company (Hasbro? they own most of those games) would likely consider it as an extra bit of publicity.	You can’t use pictures You can’t use any of these, nor can you make your own art that is derived from these. That’s copyright infringement and there is no fair use defence because you are specifically trying to do something Nintendo already does. You can reproduce that stats of the Pokémon because stats are facts (even if they are facts about fictional things) and facts are not protected by copyright.	Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation.	The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed.	First, copyright does not apply to "brands". Copyright exists in literary works which includes art - a picture (any picture) usually has a copyright belonging to the creator of the picture. Brands are protected by Trade Marks. To be clear: A picture of you is protected by copyright belonging to the creator The phrase "Mickey Mouse" is protected by trade mark belonging to the Disney corporation A picture of Micky Mouse is protected by copyright and trade mark. (when) would it be legally OK for me to do so without the copyright owner's permission? You can use copyright material without permission if you meet the fair use criteria in your jurisdiction. You can use trade marks if there is no risk of people confusing your goods and services with the trade mark holder's and you do not cause damage (including loss of potential income) to the trade mark holder or it is fair use (e.g. you are writing a review of a Micky Mouse cartoon). Is it legal if I do not distribute them to others at all? No, this would be OK as copyright fair use, but not as trade mark fair use. Is it legal if I give them to my family/relatives for free, e.g. as a gift? No, not fair use for either copyright or trade mark. Is it legal if I give them away to others for free (meaning I'm losing my own money on them)? No, see above. Is it legal if I sell them to others at-cost (i.e. for the same price I obtained them, meaning I'm not making any money from them)? No, see above. If the answer is "yes" to any of the above, can the copyright holder explicitly prohibit me from doing so, or would such a prohibition be unenforceable (e.g. if this would be fair use)? It isn't allowed. Yes they can stop you. No, it isn't fair use; there is no "fair use" defence for trade mark infringement here - you are depriving them of income because you are not buying their T-shirt! Any other factors that are relevant but which I'm forgetting? Will they sue you for doing these things? Probably not.	While the 12th century original is in the public domain, that translation was, if I am correct, published in 1996 and is protected by copyright. You will not be able to use extensive quotations without permission from the copyright holders. If you are in the US, you could probably use limited quotations under Fair Use. Exactly how much could be used depends on the specific facts -- there is no general rule. If your use would be likely to harm the market for the translation or to replace it, that would weigh against a finding of Fair Use, but there are four factors and they must all be considered. Note that fair use is a very specifically US concept, and will not apply elsewhere.	You should probably look up the Open Gaming Liscense (OGL) and what you can or cannot do with respect to it. Generally, classic fantasy monsters (Dragons, Manticores, Sasquatch, Vampires). Are fair use. OGL also allows for creatures that are similar to D&D exclusive monsters to exist so long as the name is changed sufficently. Most "monsters" are in what's called Public Domain and are free to use and modify. Additionally "powers" of a monster (or superhero) aren't generally copyrighted but the totatllity of their use in a work can be (does your superhero fly? Is super-strong? Is invulerable? Can be fine. Is he named Clark Kent? That's a problem). Fair Use also allows for some parody but again, it's a defense to copyright infringment and not a liscenses to take someone elses work wholesale. It also doesn't stop them from suing you, as you have to claim fair use as your defense if and when each suit arises. I'd recomend looking at National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc. for an example of an intellectual property dispute that is close to yours. Note that Fawcett won at trial but lost on appeal and rather than take the matter before SCOTUS decided to settle out of court.	Can a moderation team in a game extend a ban that you have just because they want to TL;DR Yes and no. It's their platform and you broke the rules that you agreed to. Therefore, you forfeited your right to use the service for as long as they deem appropriate up to and including forever. In exercising this power they must act reasonably which, in the absence of anything in the contract (and I can't see anything) means that their response must be proportionate and offer you procedural fairness. It's possible that they haven't done this - it may even be likely. However, in order to have this overturned, clause 24 of the EULA requires you to take the dispute to arbitration. Clause 24.4 sets out how to initiate this.
What is the Mississippi Law and Federal Law against incest? What is incest legally and what punishment applies?	The Mississippi general prohibition against incest is that Persons being within the degrees within which marriages are prohibited by law to be incestuous and void, or persons who are prohibited from marrying by reason of blood and between whom marriage is declared to be unlawful and void, who shall cohabit, or live together as husband and wife, or be guilty of a single act of adultery or fornication, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding ten (10) years. The degree of relationship declared to prohibit marriage is defined as (1) The son shall not marry his grandmother, his mother, or his stepmother; the brother his sister; the father his daughter, or his legally adopted daughter, or his grand-daughter; the son shall not marry the daughter of his father begotten of his stepmother, or his aunt, being his father's or mother's sister, nor shall the children of brother or sister, or brothers and sisters intermarry being first cousins by blood. The father shall not marry his son's widow; a man shall not marry his wife's daughter, or his wife's daughter's daughter, or his wife's son's daughter, or the daughter of his brother or sister; and the like prohibition shall extend to females in the same degrees. All marriages prohibited by this subsection are incestuous and void. In the US, incest laws are at the state level, not the federal level.	There is a federal law, 18 USC 2252, which criminalized distribution and receiving of child porn. One part of the law addresses a person who (1) knowingly transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; The next part addresses one who (2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; The word "knowingly" is crucial here: it may mean that if you don't know, it's not a crime. The wording is not completely clear, in that maybe the law only says that you have to know that you received and don't have to know anything about the item that you received. So it is up the the Supreme Court to say exactly what that means. In US v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, they did. The court held that "knowingly" does not just mean that you know you are receiving or distributing, because that would yield absurd results such as that a retail druggist who returned a roll of film unprocessed would be guilty of distributing child porn, just in case the film contains child porn. As the court says, "We do not assume that Congress, in passing laws, intended such results". There is a general constitutional presumption that any crime has a scienter requirement (Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600): "the standard presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct". The court rejects the narrow interpretation that "knowingly" just applies to the verb, and "This interpretation is supported by the canon that a statute is to be construed where fairly possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions". There are also state laws which are untouched by X-Citement, which may make possession of child porn a strict liability offense. Washington state law is written so that you have to know or intend ("Knowingly develops, duplicates, publishes, prints, disseminates, exchanges, finances, attempts to finance, or sells a visual or printed matter that depicts a minor engaged in an act of sexually explicit conduct as defined in RCW 9.68A.011(4) (a) through (e)" or "Possesses with intent to develop, duplicate, publish, print, disseminate, exchange, or sell any visual or printed matter that depicts a minor engaged in an act of sexually explicit conduct as defined in RCW 9.68A.011(4) (a) through (e)".) The statutory rape law on the other hand has no requirement pertaining to knowledge or intent (1) A person is guilty of rape of a child in the third degree when the person has sexual intercourse with another who is at least fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old and not married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least forty-eight months older than the victim. I don't know whether some state's statute was written without a "knowingly" requirement.	Against Bob: yes; Against Cindy: no I'm going to borrow @Trish's example because it's a good one although the conclusions they reach are wrong. Alice made a green box. Bob signs an NDA never to tell anyone that Alice made a green box, and there is a clause in it that if the NDA is breached, the box is red. Bob tells Cindy that Alice made a green box. Cindy has a patent on making green boxes. Cindy sues Alice and in the lawsuit puts Bob on the stand. Situation 1 So, the box is objectively green and objectively a breach of Cindy's patent on green boxes. Bob is on the stand and is required to answer questions honestly and no contract can prevent him from doing so. He testifies that the box is green. This would be a breach of contract except that a clause that requires a breach of the law (perjury in this case) is void for public policy reasons so Bob cannot be sued for this. However, he can be sued for the initial breach - he may have a public policy defense here because Alice was breaking the law, however, it’s easy enough to construct a scenario where Alice was innocent but suffered loss from Bob’s disclosure. Cindy can say what she likes because she is not bound by the NDA. Cindy wins, Alice loses. Situation 2 Cindy dies - after a long and happy life so we won't grieve too much. To Bob's surprise, he inherits Cindy's green box patent of which he was previously in complete ignorance of. Bob sues Alice for breaching Cindy's now his, patent. So, the box is objectively green and objectively a breach of Cindy's patent on green boxes. However, Bob agreed with Alice in the contract that the box is red and so, legally for matters between Alice and Bob the box is legally red (notwithstanding that everyone knows it's green) and is not in breach of Bob's patent. This sort of stuff has a name - a legal fiction. Adoption is a legal fiction - adoptive parents are (legally) parents; biological parents of adopted children are (legally) strangers. Alice wins, Bob loses.	Under 18 U.S.C. § 2423, transporting a minor across state lines is a crime when done with the purpose to engage in illegal sex or child pornography: (a) Transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. --A person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. (b) Travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. --A person who travels in interstate commerce or travels into the United States, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. (c) Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. --Any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce or resides, either temporarily or permanently, in a foreign country, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. I can't find anything suggesting that the intent to obtain an abortion would implicate this or any other law, though there have been attempts, such as the perennially introduced, but never-passed Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act.	Firstly, there is no jurisdiction in the US where rape is a potentially capital crime, and murder is not - so you are discussing a hypothetical (and rather implausible) jurisdiction. Given your jurisdiction is hypothetical, you can make the law be what you would like. Secondly, duress is accepted in almost all jurisdictions as a defence to a charge of anything except homicide (and some jurisdictions allow it to reduce the severity of a homicide charge). Courts can be reluctant to accept a charge of duress, but a bullet wound would probably be persuasive. I don't know if someone who had just been shot would be physically able to perform though. The precise crimes the perpetrator is guilty of would depend on your specific jurisdiction, but I would expect at least: rape (because they organized it) kidnap shooting the brother	I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!).	The law does not criminalize "having more than 1 legal spouse", it criminalizes specific behavior. The polygamy statute is here. It says Every one who (a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or enter into (i) any form of polygamy, or (ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage, or (b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony, contract or consent that purports to sanction a relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. That is, if you behave like you're married to multiple women, you've committed a crime.	This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.
If I don't live in a school zone, I shouldn't have to pay for that school's property taxes, correct? My wife and I bought a house this year. We live just outside of my cities municipal school zone. We don't have any kids so we didn't think much of looking into the school zone maps when we moved. However, this election we had a ballot measure about the school getting a very large bond. To pay for it, they announced they would raise the levy for schools on property. My wife and I didn't like the reasons for why they wanted the bond so we were eager to vote no. However, we didn't see the measure on our choices when we voted. We later looked up the school zone map and found we were just outside of it. From that, we concluded that we must not have been able to vote on the matter because we don't live in the zone. One would then reasonably believe that we don't pay specific property taxes that go towards the school district.. wrong answer. We got a property tax assessment in the mail today from our county clerk. There is a line item specifically showing the amount that we pay that goes towards the school district. Not only are we paying for the local school, but we didn't get to vote on it while others did. Obviously the bond passed as pretty much all of them do. So now we have to pay more in taxes. Am I missing something or is this the very definition of taxation without representation?	People make mistakes. My assessments come with information on how to dispute them, and if yours don't you should be able to get that information. File a dispute or whatever it is you do to challenge the assessment. Include the information about you being outside the district and not having he measure on your ballot. If you're just outside the district, you might have been mistakenly included. You'll either get a revised assessment or you'll be told that you have to pay the tax. You don't have a reasonable complaint unless and until your challenge is denied.	There seems to be no current applicable prohibition state law in Iowa in Iowa Code 39A, the Election Misconduct and Penalties Act. It is also not at all clear that precinct caucuses count as "elections" as applicable to the sections with criminal prohibitions (the precinct caucus does not appear to constitute a "primary election" under Iowa law).	I wouldn't be surprised to see other states and jurisdictions with similar statutes. Fortunately, in the United States, there is a safe harbor against demands for state income taxes: For every dollar of taxable income, you can only be taxed by one state. (This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne.) Therefore, if you show that the LLC (or its members if it's a pass-through) paid taxes to another state on the income in question (e.g., by sending a copy of the tax return), that's legally the end of the matter.	No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation.	Martinez v. Bynum 461 US 321 involves a US citizen child living with his parents in Mexico traveled to Texas in order to attend free public school. Under Texas Education Code 21.031(d), the district is allowed to deny tuition-free admission if the child lives apart from the parent or legal guardian and is present in the district "for the primary purpose of attending the public free schools". The court upheld such a residence requirement because it "furthers the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for the State's residents are enjoyed only by residents", and "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor burden the constitutional right of interstate travel". Plaintiffs argued various constitional violations, including Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities, but not Full Faith and Credit. We may assume that if there were any hope of such an argument, it would have been made. In Vlandis v. Kline 412 US 441, it was held that a state cannot permanently relegate an applicant to non-resident status for having a legal address for any time within a year of applying for admission. But the court also explicitly states: Our holding today should in no wise be taken to mean that Connecticut must classify the students in its university system as residents, for purposes of tuition and fees, just because they go to school there. Nor should our decision be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement, which can be met while in student status. We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis. The Full Faith and Credit Clause states: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. This pertains to recognizing the status of evidence and rulings, between states. If New York finds that Smith is liable for a sum of money, that finding is a legal fact in all states, and Connecticut cannot say "We do not recognize the judgment of New York". The only connection between Full Faith and Credit and non-resident tuition is that both include the concept "other states".	It would largely depend on their "or else" leverage, and whether this is a government vs. private school. A government school has more limited ability to tell you what to do (being an agent of the government), and there has to be some statutory underpinning for any restrictions they would impose on your liberty. They may require you to have some form of medical insurance and may require you to seek treatment under certain circumstances: depending on the nature of the incident that this is a response to (in particular, what kind of disruption may have arisen). A private school can require pretty much whatever it wants, as long as the act is generally legal (they cannot compel you to steal). They cannot unilaterally change the terms of their contract with you, but you'd have to do some digging to figure out what contract if any you have with them. In either event, if they can legally expel you, they can impose conditions on what you have to do in order for them to not expel you.	They are not considered public places in the way you mean, and in fact, the Ohio revised code specifically prohibits the kind of behavior you're referencing. Bottom line, any kind of party at the polling place itself is out of the question due to the possibility of limiting access or intimidating potential voters.	Until the estate is settled and the interest in the house is definitively resolved, the estate has to pay property taxes. There is no requirement for the house to be insured, unless there is a mortgage and insurance is mandated by the lender. The duties of the personal representative generally include taking reasonable steps to protect the assets of the estate, which would include reasonable insurance coverage -- which the estate would pay for. Necessary maintenance would also be included in the things that are to covered by the estate, for example the cost of repairing a broken water pipe (which can cause serious loss, if not repaired). Freshening up the paint in preparation for selling the house, assuming that the house is to be sold and the assets divided, would also be covered by the estate. Utilities, on the other hand, are not within the realm of things that need to be done to protect the interests of the beneficiaries: that is a benefit to whoever lives there, making it their responsibility. The question is foot-dragging is a separate issue, one that should be resolved with the aid of your lawyer. I do not understand why he would maintain that the estate is responsible for paying the utilities.
Why are envelopes allowed for registered letters? A registered letter ensures that once someone signed it off, they cannot claim that they are not aware of the content (generally speaking). Why someone would not bring to court the empty envelope claiming that this is what they received? This is easily countered by sending a letter which has the address directly printed on it and accordingly folded. One of the possible limitations is the number of pages (it works best with one) but I can imagine that one can put more pages and it is less credible to claim "we just received page one" than "the envelope was empty". But even limiting the question to one page and since the act of providing paperwork to the adversary is so important in legal proceedings (and often requires registered letters, at least in France and generally EU) I am wondering why empty envelopes (and how to counter them) is not an issue.	As I understand it, legal procedure in Common Law jurisdictions (e.g. the UK) is primarily based on evidence given by a person. Paperwork exists to verify that someone has not misremembered something, but even when you have paperwork you need to have someone testify that this is the right paperwork and it hasn't been forged. A piece of paper on its own means nothing. In practice of course the two sides will agree to accept routine matters rather than dragging lots of third parties (e.g. the post office employees) into court to no point. In the case of a letter where you need to prove it was received, the sender will testify that they sent the letter and that the copy they have introduced into evidence is a true copy. The proof of delivery merely shows that the item wasn't lost in the post. If one party testifies that they sent a letter and the other testifies that they merely received an empty envelope then someone is lying, which is a crime meriting further investigation.	I'm not sure if you are asking for each of the countries listed, but I am assuming that they are there merely for example. In the US, the are a variety of different rules for its different court systems. As a rule, each State can make its own rules for its court system, and the overarching Federal system has its own rules as well, although they run off of the same principles. As such, the answer varies on which state the court is located in and possibly the type of document. In California, for example, different documents have different retention times for different documents. For example, documents for civil cases default to 10 years of retention, while adoption paperwork is retained permanently. For a criminal matter, the judgement (the final product that says if the accused is found guilty or innocent, and for what crimes) is retained permanently, while all other documents are retained for the greater of 50 years or the maximum length of sentence imposed. When the retention period for a document is over, the document is not automatically destroyed(at least in California). Instead, the appropriate official sends an official notice to all the parties in the case that the document is to be destroyed, and if no response is received to transfer the documents, the documents can be destroyed. (Source:http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNum=68152) Note: I have said "document" throughout, which originally meant a piece of paper. However, recently, documents have been submitted electronically, and sometimes older documents are electronically scanned.	I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.	The picture shown is not fraudulent or problematic. Fraud involves using a false representation (or concealing a fact) in order to obtain a result that would not have been possible to secure without the misstatement or concealment. No one is using the photograph of the exterior of a passport (which is identical for all U.S. passports) to obtain any immigration benefit or for a non-U.S. citizen to obtain citizenship. All that is being done is visually associating international travel (which would usually be done using a passport) with a credit card that can be used internationally. Since a passport is a federal government document, it is also not protected by trademark or copyright laws -- the exterior, generic design of a passport is in the public domain. It can't be used for a purpose to mislead someone about citizenship or immigration benefits, but otherwise, it can be used for any purpose. I suppose that you could be interpreting the photograph (on a Spanish language speaker's facebook feed) as implying that by getting this credit card you will also get a U.S. passport and cool sunglasses, but that would be a patently unreasonable assumption in this context, particularly in light of the clarifying caption at the bottom, and, of course, many people who speak Spanish as a primary language have legitimate U.S. passports (including more or less all passport holders in Puerto Rico). You could also, I suppose, be interpreting the appearance of the passport as some sort of implicit government endorsement of the product when the government does not, in fact, endorse the product, but again, nothing in the advertisement that I can see that can be reasonably interpreted as conveying that message.	Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc.	1) I saw that no where during registration you actually tell what your work does, you only fill up details, how exactly is it protecting you if you don't specify? For example I have a computer program/website that do something, how exactly the copyright protects you if you did not specify about it? A copyright protects a particular single expression of an idea and versions that are derived from that particular expression. When you copyright software you have to provide approximately 50 pages of printed code so as to make it possible to distinguish your code from someone else's and you generally deposit a full copy with the Library of Congress. The ideas in the computer program are not protected. You only protect the exact language of the code in the computer program and other programs that use that exact language as a starting point. If someone reverse engineers a way to achieve the same process or outcome with different code language (or even comes up with exactly the same code language without ever looking at the language used in your code) then their software does not infringe on your copyright. To protect the ideas in a computer program you need a patent. 2) If I am a non-us citizen, do I need to select in State "Non-US", or leave it blank on "Select"? Because it allows me to complete registration with either. State "Non-US" refers to where you are located, not to your citizenship. If you are located outside the U.S., then you select "Non-US" and if you are located in a U.S. state, but are a non-citizen, you select the state where you are located. The answer does not affect the validity of your copyright. It is used for economic statistics and to determine where the copyright office should locate its own offices to be maximally useful to the public.	To "reserve one's rights" is to make it clear that some other action is not intended to give the rights up. Typically, it has no legal effect but is used out of caution, to avoid misunderstanding. For example, an author who publishes their writing for free online might add "all rights reserved" to the copyright notice. This makes it clear that by making the work freely accessible, they did not intend to give others permission to republish it, or release it into the public domain. Similarly, at an early stage of a legal dispute, a lawyer might write a letter of demand that outlines some of the client's strongest points, without wishing to imply that the case has been fully investigated and pleaded. Such a letter might "reserve our client's rights" to add to or amend the claim later. In both cases, the legal situation would probably be the same if the rights were not expressly "reserved." They are, after all, rights. However, the phrase can potentially become significant when considering whether a party is estopped from asserting a claim that should have been raised earlier, or has made an unfavourable admission.	First of all, the USA's legal system is not here to be referee to every single little "gotcha" mistake, and every little mistake doesn't mean a payday for someone. The employee at the tax preparer screwed up. They mixed up your folder with the other guy's folder. It was an honest mistake, which is another way of saying "nobody stands to gain from this." The best LEGAL action you can take is to either destroy the copy in your possession, or mail it back to the tax preparer, and call it a good day, done well. The law of torts exists to adjudicate sincere and structural divergences of interests, not to fix silly mistakes. As a point of law, what was the damage of this "event?" Some random person (you) saw a 1099 belonging to someone else. In good faith, you attempt to find and reinstate the rightful owner with their document. All good. As it is, you have zero "standing" in a case of inadvertent clerical error between two other parties.
Writing play based on translated poem I am currently writing a short 10 minute play adaptation of Layla and Majnun, a poem written in the 12th century by Nizami. To do this I am making use of an English translation of the Persian poem by Rudolph Gelpke with Zia Inayat Khan and Omad Safi. Throughout the play, I wish to use direct quotations or slightly altered quotations from the translated text. Is this allowed?	While the 12th century original is in the public domain, that translation was, if I am correct, published in 1996 and is protected by copyright. You will not be able to use extensive quotations without permission from the copyright holders. If you are in the US, you could probably use limited quotations under Fair Use. Exactly how much could be used depends on the specific facts -- there is no general rule. If your use would be likely to harm the market for the translation or to replace it, that would weigh against a finding of Fair Use, but there are four factors and they must all be considered. Note that fair use is a very specifically US concept, and will not apply elsewhere.	Not very novel What you are talking about is a derivative work. This is arguably the most famous example: It's an interesting example because Leonardo da Vinci did not have copyright in the original but Marcel Duchamp and Francis Picabia do have copyright in the derivative. Even though the changes are physically small, they are enough. A crucial factor in current legal analysis of derivative works is transformativeness, largely as a result of the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. The Court's opinion emphasized the importance of transformativeness in its fair use analysis of the parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" involved in the Campbell case. In parody, as the Court explained, the transformativeness is the new insight that readers, listeners, or viewers gain from the parodic treatment of the original work. As the Court pointed out, the words of the parody "derisively demonstrat[e] how bland and banal the Orbison [Pretty Woman] song" is. For an author to have copyright in the derivative they must: Meet the (low) threshold of originality for copyright to exist. Make their derivative lawfully - either because they have permission or because their use falls under an exception to copyright like fair use or fair dealing. However, they do not have copyright in the original elements. For example, I could take the Mona Lisa and give her different clothes, a different background or a hat I will not be infringing their copyright. If I give her a different style of moustache? However, there is an issue with "I have copyright on the contents of the post" when you don't. Even if your work is derivative, you do not have copyright in the original parts and do not have the right to licence them. So, for example, this post is a derivative work of the Wikipedia page linked to above and I have copyright in my original contributions because: They meet the threshold of originality I have permission to make the derivative either through the Wikipedia licence or because my use is fair use. I can give Stack Exchange a licence for my work but I cannot give them a licence for the original work including, for example, the image and quote above. So, someone could quote my entire answer subject to the licence or fair work, but they couldn't copy just the image or quote.	It's still under copyright, so you'd need to contact the publisher for permission, although if the artist (or in this case the executor of the estate Lynn Caponera) still retains the rights to the work sometimes going straight to the them can be a better option, especially in this case as it's for a non-profit and for a library in particular. The library also might have certain rights for reproduction, they generally pay a bulk fee to publishers but outside lending I'm not sure what that covers, so I'd check with the library manager (either branch or regional depending on who handles legal and licensing) as well.	This almost certainly falls under fair use. In fact, there are numerous examples of such books already. You are using a small portion of the work, and it is for a transformative purpose- teaching about it.	The English language does not have the equivalent of the French Academy to officially regulate questions of spelling, grammar, punctuation and word meaning. Jurists don't control how the language is used and for the most point don't bother to try to do so. Also, context almost always clarifies this particular ambiguity.	Probably not. It sounds like you've copied the complete work without any meaningful transformation. You've reduced the market for the original work by hosting your own copy. The fact that your purpose "is to share the information" doesn't really do you any good, as that is also the purpose of the original work. You're almost certainly outside fair-use territory. If you're looking for a "kosher" way to do this, the generally accepted practice is to link to the article and either paraphrase or excerpt the most relevant portions. That said, the fact that this piece came from a university may help you out. If it's a public university, it may be that its "news" articles are actually public records and not protected by copyright. For more information on how to run a fair-use analysis, see the answer here.	U.S. law defines a derivative work in 17 USC §101: A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, [...] abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. Similarly, the Copyright Act of Canada reserves exclusively for the copyright holder the right to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any translation of the work... Finally, in any of the 171 nations that are signatories to the Berne Convention treaty, Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall enjoy the exclusive right of making and of authorizing the translation of their works throughout the term of protection of their rights in the original works. Therefore, if it highly likely that you need authorization from the copyright holder to produce a translation of a copyrighted work in your jurisdiction. In nations that are Berne signatories, copyright is automatic, so there is no need for a copyright holder to display a copyright notice in order to receive exclusive rights under copyright law.	It says They shall not confer the right [[to attend any meeting of members] and [to exercise one vote for every share held]]. The elements joined by a conjunction such as "and" should be grammatically parallel. Since the part after the conjunction is an infinitive verb phrase, the thing to which is it joined by the conjunction should also be an infinitive verb phrase. However, it is normal in English to use "or" when joining elements in a negative statement. For example, if it is forbidden to sing and it is forbidden to dance, one could post a sign saying "no singing or dancing." If the sign said "no singing and dancing" it could be interpreted as a prohibition only on doing both at once. So the sentence should read They shall not confer the right to attend any meeting of members or to exercise one vote for every share held. Perhaps less ambiguous: They shall not confer the right to attend any meeting of members or the right to exercise one vote for every share held. But the drafting error is unlikely to change the meaning of the text, since it is fairly easy to identify it as a drafting error.
Who owns the logo of a company after the company declares bankruptcy? Who owns the logo of a company after the company declares bankruptcy? For example who owns the logo for toys R'us after they declare bankrupt?	Whoever buys it. When a company declares bankruptcy then its assets are owned by its creditors, as compensation for the standing debts. Since usually there are multiple creditors, what happens is that its assets are sold/auctioned, as money is easier to divide between the different creditors1. A logo or a trademark is an asset like any other and can be sold separately. If nobody did come forward for the logo, then one of the creditors could accept it as part of its repayment. 1 If a company is in bankruptcy it means that its assets cannot cover all of its debts, so creditors are usually paid only a part of their debts.	Copyright is irrelevant, because names are not protected by copyright. Trademark is relevant: a name can be protected by a trademark. "Yoda" is a registered trademark owned by Lucasfilms, a subsidiary of Disney. There is a list of goods and services where the property right is asserted, so for example you could get sued for peddling art books under this name. It just depends on what your business does. For instance, a plumbing business isn't competing with Lucasfilms w.r.t. that class of goods and services.	The owner of IP owns the abstract thing that is protected by law (the intellectual property), and not the concrete product that relied on (illegally) using that abstraction. The person who made the thing, or to whom he sold it, owns the object. If you buy a disk with pirated or non-pirated software, you own the disk, and if you bought it legally, you probably bought a license to use the software. Using "pirated" to refer to the class of things legally manufactured (not stolen, not using stolen components) but in violation of IP law, pirated goods might be subject to seizure by the government (it would be slated for destruction), but the goods would not be the subject of a prosecution for theft. While infringement of IP rights is often called "theft", it doesn't have all of the elements of theft: you do not deprive the owner of the thing that they own.	It depends How good is your (legal) English? For example, do you know the legal difference between "will", "shall" and "must"? Or, the difference between "employee", "subcontractor" and "worker"? Or the difference between "bankruptcy", "insolvency" and an "act of bankruptcy"? Contingency What are you going to put in your dispute resolution clause? Do you prefer mediation, arbitration or litigation? Will it be a one size fits all or will it be escalating? What happens if one of you dies? Or emigrates? Or divorces? Or is convicted of a crime? A financial crime? A violent crime? A sexual crime? Or what if such is just alleged but not proven? What happens if the company ceases to exist? Or is sued? Or is acquired by someone else? Or by one of you? Who is responsible for insuring the subject matter of the contract (if anyone)? To what value? If the person who should doesn't can the other person effect the insurance and claim the premium as a debt due and payable? Not all of these will be relevant to your contract. Familiarity How familiar are you with this sort of contract? Is this something you do all the time or is this a one off? For example, I am happy to enter a construction contract without legal advice because that's my business and has been for many years - I know my risks and how to manage them, inside and outside the contract. However, when I set up shareholder's agreements, wills and business continuation insurance with my partners, we went to a lawyer. What is your relationship with the other person i.e. how much do you know and trust them? Stakes If the contract is not very important (which is something that varies with the participants, for some people a million dollar contract is not important for others a $5 one is), so that if, by screwing up, you are OK if you lose everything you've staked then write it yourself. Alternatively, if the contract is vitally important to you and your heirs and assignees unto the 6th generation, I'd get a lawyer to write it - its pretty cheap insurance. How long the contract lasts will be a factor in this - a contract that exposes you to risk for 3 months is different than one that does so for 25 years. Basically, its a risk reward calculation. TL;DR Contracts only matter when relationships break down. If you reach for the contract then you can expect that the other party will be playing for keeps and that contract is your only defense against the worst they can do. If you are happy with your skills in mitigating against a cashed-up opponent who wants to see you go down no matter the cost then draft it yourself.	No An actual price is merely descriptive, amd cannot be a trademark, any more that "computer" can be for a PC. A phrase including a price could be a trademark. Once upon a time, Pepsi used the slogan "Twice as much for a nickel too" which ws, or may have been, a trademark. They hypothetical Christopher Columbus Pizza could use a phrase such as 'A new world of flavor for only $14.92", but not, I think, the price alone.	The board rules. Companies usually go to great lengths to be sure the company owns the IP developed within and for the company. But the company is governed by its board of directors and that board can decide to take the company in a new direction where some IP that the company owns would no longer be a key asset for ongoing business. Selling that IP to another organization might, then, be logical. Boards are elected by, and represent, the owners of the company.	It is certainly possible to incorporate companies with the same name in two different states. If neither company does business in the other person's state under that name, it isn't actionable for either company. If one company was already doing business under its name in a state where another company is formed under that name, it would usually be possible to force the new company to cease and desist from using that name, either with an action directed at the infringer and the Secretary of State (or other official charged with business incorporations in a state) of that state, or in an action directly against the infringer alone. Also, even if a trademark isn't formally registered, it can arise at common law simply through use of a name in a particular market in a particular place. This is harder to prove and the remedies for violating a common law trademark a more limited, but it is not entirely unenforceable.	The company continues to own all its assets australia The appointment of a liquidator to does not change what the company owns - it just changes who is in control (the liquidator rather than the directors) and the purpose for which it is being run (realisation of assets for the benefit of creditors rather than as a going concern for the benefit of shareholders). The laptop still belongs to the company. The liquidator's job is to sell all commercially realisable assets and distribute the proceeds to the creditors. When they have done that (which can take years), they get a release from the court, and the company is deregistered 3 months later. Any assets of a deregistered company belong to the shareholders. A 3-year-old laptop is not a commercially realisable asset, so it's not something a liquidator would be interested in. You could tell the liquidator you have it, and they are welcome to collect it at any reasonable time. They will probably say, "keep it."
Does collateral estoppel apply in a criminal case? Can a criminal defendant rely on collateral estoppel to preclude the government from proving an element of the crime in a criminal case? Two hypotheticals: A woman sues the police for violating the Fourth Amendment because of a warrantless search of an apartment she was staying in for a week. She loses because the government proves that she didn't actually live in the apartment and therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy. It turns out she was convicted of a sex offense in college for peeing in public sex offender and required to register whenever she moves. Since she claimed to live at that apartment, the police charge her with failing to register at that address. Assuming the registration statute applies only to a residence that would be protected under the Fourth Amendment, can the woman use the first case to preclude the government from claiming in the criminal case that she lived at the apartment? Or: A doctor submitted a FOIA request to the Department of Health and Human Services for records of all the claims for Medicaid reimbursements he had submitted in the last five years. HHS says no such records exist, so the doctor sues. The court finds that no such records exist and rules for the government. After that case ends, HHS discovers not only that it was mistaken -- the doctor had submitted reimbursements -- but some of them were fraudulent. It charges the doctor with Medicaid fraud, which requires proof that he submitted a claim. Can the doctor rely on collateral estoppel to defeat this charge? To be clear, I'm not really interested in answers arguing that the hypotheticals don't meet the elements for collateral estoppel; I'm just wondering whether a civil case can give rise to collateral estoppel in a criminal case, assuming all the criteria are met.	Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).	Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible.	I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.	I'm not aware of case law on point, other than Riley, which you mention (which doesn't mean that there isn't any - I'm not a specialist in this area). But, I think that the answer would be that you do have an expectation of privacy because the Riley holding that there was an expectation of privacy in a smart phone didn't really hinge in any meaningful way on the existence of a password. The linked summary of the Riley decision explains the court's reasoning as follows: Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonable. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the legislature enact laws that draw reasonable distinctions regarding when and what information within a phone can be reasonably searched following an arrest. The 4th Amendment expressly protects "papers" in your possession, which can't be password protected, and a smart phone file is analogous to a "paper" for 4th Amendment purposes. Your expectation of privacy in an unlocked smart phone flows from your exclusive possession of the phone as a piece of tangible personal property containing information, and not just from the password protection. In the same vein, I don't think that you would need to have a lock on a diary to have an expectation of privacy in it. This said, this is a cutting edge area of the law and password protection for a smart phone provides both more practical protection and potentially a less ambiguous cases of legal protection from search (since it brings you closer to the facts of Riley), and is therefore still a good idea.	The general rule is that a warrant is required to enter private property (absent constitutional case law exceptions to the warrant requirement such as exigent circumstances and consent), and that a warrant is available only when there is probable cause that a crime has been committed. Whether the neglect or abuse of an animal constitutes a crime within the meaning of this 4th Amendment requirement could potentially be seen as a gray area, since historically, in the absence of statutory authority in early common law, an owner of an animal had absolute authority to deal with his or her property (the animal) as the owner of the animal saw fit. The purpose of the statute is to clarify that this conduct by an animal owner constitutes a crime for 4th Amendment search and seizure purposes by making a state law determination that it is a crime, which states can do, even though they can't change the constitutional requirement under the 4th Amendment. Also, just because a state can authorize law enforcement to get a warrant for any search authorized by the U.S. Constitution, that doesn't mean it has to allow law enforcement to do so in every case where it is constitutional for the state to do so. The duty to get a warrant for law enforcement to enter onto private property at all arises not only from other state statutes, but also from the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (as incorporated to apply against state and local governments though the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). But, the constitutional requirement has case law exceptions, so it isn't required in all circumstances. In particular, exigent circumstances, and the consent to entry exceptions, which are allowed by constitutional criminal procedure case law, could apply to the requirement to get a warrant in the first place. But, law enforcement needs to have the authority to search at all with a warrant under state law, for an exception to the warrant requirement to be relevant. This statute appears to carry out that purpose by authorizing searches for this particular purpose. For what it is worth, it is not the best drafted possible statute to achieve this objective, and it could have been written to be more clear, but it still gets the job done. So, in answer to the top-line question, no, I wouldn't read this statute as requiring a warrant in every possible circumstance in order to go onto private property to check on an animal, although a warrant would be required in every case where an exception to the warrant requirement under 4th Amendment case law does not apply. Section 578. Is an animal related statute rather than people. The people involved are the property owners. The property owner's rights in their real property are potentially infringed if there is a warrantless entry. The human beings owning the animals are potentially violating a law which the State of Missouri wants law enforcement officers to be able to enforce (the relevant laws are the state animal cruelty and agricultural laws expressly referenced in the statute, so, it is irrelevant that "Barry County Missouri has no animal control laws or leash laws"). Among other things these statutes make it a crime if a person "Has custody or ownership of an animal and fails to provide adequate care[.]" As the question claims that: "The definition "Adequate care" is vague as well." But the question also notes that: "The 578 statute has been challenged for being unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary which was overruled but that was serious abuse case." The state has a right to decide what is and is not illegal. It is not prohibited from banning treatment of animals that is not serious abuse. The state has every right to make it a crime to fail to provide adequate care for an animal, even if that failure to provide adequate car does not constitute severe abuse. Also, keep in mind that a lawful search requires only probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and a good faith belief that an exception to the warrant requirement is present. If the law enforcement officer has a good faith belief that the animal will die or seriously suffer or be hidden by the owner in the time that the law enforcement officer reasonably thinks that it will take to get a warrant, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies. The fact that the lawful search later reveals that a crime was no committed does not mean that the search was improper. A mere belief that an animal was abused or neglected and that exigent circumstance were present with a reasonable factual basis (e.g. a tip from a neighbor who seems credible and claims to have personal knowledge of the facts) will usually suffice to establish probable cause. So warrant needed or not? and if so, what legal action can be taken for trespass, rights violations under color of law etc. if any? If there is a search without a warrant or probable cause was not present, and an exception to the warrant requirement does not apply, and the property owner believes that their 4th Amendment rights were intentionally violated by law enforcement in the warrantless search in violation of clearly established law to the contrary, a civil lawsuit against the law enforcement officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be brought in state or federal court. The employer of the law enforcement officer can be sued as well, under the same statute, if the warrantless search in violation of the clearly established constitutional right was made pursuant to an express policy of the law enforcement officer's employer. But the fact that the law enforcement officer violated someone's rights does not automatically make the law enforcement officer's employer civilly liable for the wrong. In most U.S. states, law enforcement officers are protected by state law governmental immunity from common law trespass lawsuits for their conduct while carrying out their official duties, but I haven't checked specifically to see if that is the case in Missouri. A claim of a 4th Amendment violation can also be a ground for suppressing evidence obtained with an unlawful search when defending a prosecution under some ordinance or statute that relies upon that evidence.	In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split"	There is no public place to “file” that. When privilege is claimed and the other side challenges it then the person claiming privilege needs to establish somehow that the attorney client relationship exists and is pertinent to the question. In the normal course of things there would be an engagement agreement in the attorneys files. And not everything communicated between a client and attorney is protected by the privilege. It only covers legal advice and specifically does not cover discussions planning criminal activity.	Under Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) in such a case the police may not lawfully enter without a warrant, and if they do enter, any evidence found will not be admissible. The court in Georgia v. Randolph said: [N]othing in social custom or its reflection in private law argues for placing a higher value on delving into private premises to search for evidence in the face of disputed consent, than on requiring clear justification before the government searches private living quarters over a resident’s objection. We therefore hold that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident. However, the police may talk to either or both occupants at the door, and this may provide sufficient reason to obtain a warrant. If police determine that someone in the residence is in danger, they can enter on that basis, and anything in plain view may be treated as evidence. Further consider Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. ___ (2014) In that case one occupant of an apartment denied consent for police to enter. But the police had probable cause to arrest him, and did so. An hour later police returned and got consent from the other occupant, who may also have been a victim of domestic assault by the first occupant. The consent search was upheld, as the objector was no longer present (being then detained) when the police asked to search. So the holding about divided consent applies ONLY if the objector is physically present. If only one occupant is present, that occupant may consent to a search, even if the police know very well that the other lawful occupant would have objected. Interestingly, in Fernandez it appears that police had ample probable cause and could easily have secured a warrant, but chose to proceed on the basis of consent instead.
Requirement of attribution when reusing Wikipedia articles licensed under CC BY-SA All of Wikipedia's content is licensed under the CC BY-SA, and Wikipedia encourages fulfilling the attribution requirement for CC BY-SA by linking to the original Wikipedia article, which contains a page history with all authors attributed. However, Wikipedia deletes articles on occasion, causing page history to become inaccessible. If I am a (partial) author of a Wikipedia article that was reused under the CC BY-SA by someone else, but then Wikipedia deleted that article (and with it, the attribution), do I have the right to send DMCA takedowns to websites that attributed that work simply by linking to the original (now deleted) article?	No. The Creative Commons license seeks to promote recognition of the original author's work through attribution, but does not provide the same framework for enforcement that the DMCA would. The proper approach in cases such as the deleted Wikipedia article and subsequent reuse would be to provide a courteous notice to Wikipedia of your original publication and ask to be listed as the original author or be provided attribution. In the absence of relief there, then what rights you have would be determined by the Wikipedia Terms of Service. Since, and I am assuming here, that you are not generating billions of dollars on the original publication in royalties, seeking to bring a DMCA type enforcement on a Wikipedia article dispute would be like trying to swat a fly with a sledgehammer. (or more commonly in divorce, two people having hearing and spending thousands of dollars on attorney's fees fighting over a blender -- they are free to do it, but they would have been much better off buying 500 new blenders...) Keeping perspective and providing a courteous letter is probably your most cost efficient first step in situations like this. And in all areas of law, just remember, you catch more flies with honey than you do with salt. (meaning taking the courteous approach usually affords better results than a scalding letter breathing hell-fire and brimstone) In followup to earlier comment: Presuming you would be covered by the World Intellectual Property Organization Treaty on Copyright of 1996 (as a U.S. Citizen you would be), and your copyright is on file with the United States Copyright Offices (same presumption) as prerequisite to suit, then there is nothing that prevents you from invoking the protections under general copyright law and under the DMCA (inlcuding the Takedown provisions). Note: these are not the only prerequisites to taking action, but instead the minimum critera to qualify, and note this does not pass on the wisdom of doing so (there are often significant consequences to improperly invoking previsions of certain acts).	Yes, that’s allowed. Under the Stack Exchange terms of service, content you upload is licensed to Stack Exchange Inc. on a non-exclusive basis under CC-BY-SA 4.0. The terms of service do not give Stack Exchange the copyright to your contributions, and a non-exclusive license means you are not promising Stack Exchange that “only Stack Exchange will be allowed to use this content.” That means you can continue to do whatever you want with your own content and do not need to mention Stack Exchange at all. The only restriction is that you can’t stop Stack Exchange from continuing to use your Stack Exchange content under CC-BY-SA 4.0, and since it’s a Creative Commons license you also can’t stop anyone else from using your Stack Exchange content under that license.	Is an article licensed under an Open Access license equivalent to a public domain work? No. Intellectual property practitioners and professors often describe copyright as "a bundle of sticks." This means that intellectual property laws grant the creator of a copyrightable work a large number of rights, and the creator can grant or deny others each of those rights individually. So, for instance, an author can grant a publisher the right to publish his or her book in one country, but not in another, or to copy it verbatim but not to alter it. The purpose of a license, any license, is to specify which of those rights pass to the licensee (the end user) and which stay with the licensor (the creator). This is true of creative commons just as it is for any other license. For example, many open access publishers publish under the Creative Commons CC-BY journal. This is an attribution license; it requires as a term of the license that you give credit to the original creator. This is something you would not have to do with a public domain work. In addition, under CC-BY, you have to include a copy of the license with each copy you distribute, and you cannot add your own copy protection to any copies you distribute. Again, these sort of restrictions do not apply to a public domain work. In short: the purpose of a license--any license--is to define the ways in which you can, or can not, use the licensed materials. Any license that contains any provisions restricting the licensee's use is going to be more restrictive, by definition, than the use of something in the public domain.	One big hole in any scheme that relies on copyright is that it could not preclude people talking about the previous content or talking about you. This is well established First Amendment law. For example, see Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931), which holds that except in rare judicially established exceptions (relating to military information, obscenity, and inciting acts of violence), government censorship is unconstitutional. Thus, no statutory scheme could be used to prevent third parties who happened to have seen the material while it was freely available from re-iterating what they had seen, or talking about it, or talking about the author (you). People could even reproduce portions of the published content. Some types of reproduction would be protected as fair use in the US, especially if the reproduction is for the purpose of criticism. (17 USC 107, and this previous Law.SE answer) The closest approach would be to protect your work as trade secret, making sure that anyone that you share it with agrees to non-disclosure. But, if you "publish unique content under this pseudonym" there is no way to "arbitrarily or wholly revoke discussion about that content". If the cat gets out of the bag, while you may have remedies against the person who violated the non-disclosure agreement, you would not be able to prevent third-party discussion or reproduction.	If your app is published under US law, then the DMCA would apply, just as if it was a web site. The DMCA doesn't say anything about what particular technology the distributor is using. TO be protected by by the DMCA's "safe harbor" provision, you will need to include a notice in your app that you accept takedowns, and provide an address or method by which they can be sent, and an agent who will receive them. (You can be your own agent if you choose.) When and if you recieve a take down notice, you must check if it is valid in form. According to this Wikipedia article, a takedown notice must include: (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site. (iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (See the actual text of the relevant section of the law.) If you receive (through your designated agent) a valid takedown notice, you must promptly remove the content and notify the poster (or you can instruct to poster to remove it, but you must do so yourself if the poster does not). If the poster then files a valid counter notice (see the linked sources above) with your agent, you must notify the sender of the original notice, and if the sender does not notify you of a copyright suit filed within 10-14 days, you must restore the content. Provided that these rules are complied with, the host gets a 'safe harbor" and cannot be sued for copyright infringement, nor for the act of taking down the content. I believe that the agent must be registered with the US copyright office. The courts have not ruled on just how quickly an ISP or other host must react to the takedown notice. It must be "expeditious". Moreover, Under the DMCA (i) 1) (a) The host must have, post, and enforce a policy denying access to repeat infringers, or lose safe harbor protection. The text of the provision is: (i) Conditions for Eligibility. -(1)Accommodation of technology. —The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider— --(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers;	In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost.	There aren't bright line rules in the area of fair use (which is the core issue - you are clearly copying a work that has copyright protected portions, at least - the question is whether fair use provides a defense and whether some portions are not copyright protected). This inquiry is fact specific and driven by general standards. Context such as whether the use would be free or commercial matter as well. For your own notes, anything goes pretty much. This generally wouldn't constitute "publication" of the work and would be for personal educational used by someone who paid for the book anyway. For shared notes - it depends. Also not all kinds of copying is created equal. Some parts of textbooks are themselves in the public domain or not protectable by copyright. For example, even a lengthy quote from a scientific journal article would probably be allowed with attribution. It would also be easier to evaluate based upon the type of textbook. A history textbook can have protection similar to trade non-fiction and can have very original exposition. An algebra textbook, less so. Your question also points to an end run. If the professor is the author of the textbook (many of mine were in something of a racket), you could get permission from the author.	Online file converters are legal: there is no law that prohibits a person from making a program available and executing online, including creating output in the form of a file. It is possible that some person may illegally copy copyright-protected material then use a website to modify that material, in which case the question of vicarious liability for copyright infringement could arise, so we appeal to the DMCA safe harbor provisions to see what the website must do. First, the owner of copyright must submit a properly constructed takedown notice to the website. Crucially, the notice must contain sufficient information that the website operator can find and take down the item(s) in question. Assuming that the complainant can supply the "where is it" information, then there is a notice and counter-notice routine where the uploader is informed and can deny the accusation – the website operator doesn't evaluate the merits of the claim, he only sees that the formalities were observed. If the operator follows the rules, he cannot be held vicariously liable. If the link does not expire and if it is somehow promulgated, the technical potential for being a contributor to copyright infringement becomes very real, but it puts the operator in no worse a legal position than Youtube. So the question is not just related to OCILLA, it is entirely covered by that law. Questions of how users or website owners are "supposed to" act don't figure into this. If the website owner does not comply with those provisions, they have no access to the safe harbor provisions, and they can be sued. However, the website itself remains legally "permitted" (there never was a prohibition of such a website).
Has the First Amendment been held to include the right to film jurors? When (in what case) has the First Amendment been held to include the right to film jurors in a court room? I also leave open the possibility that there has been no such holding or even an opposite holding.	I don't think there would be such a case. The Supreme Court itself does not allow cameras in its courtroom. Also, when Florida wanted to bring cameras into Florida courtrooms, the Supreme Court said in the 1981 case Chandler v. Florida: Absent a showing of prejudice of constitutional dimensions to these defendants, there is no reason for this Court either to endorse or to invalidate Florida's experiment. It's also worth noting that "the jury may not be filmed" and "The Florida Supreme Court has the right to revise these rules as experience dictates, or indeed to bar all broadcast coverage or photography in courtrooms" were two of the specific rules that the Supreme Court noted Florida had implemented. Although those particular rules were not at issue in this case, the Court made no further mention of them, and thus perhaps tacitly approved of their constitutionality. Given that there does not seem to be a general right to film in a courtroom, it seems unlikely that there would be a right to film jurors in particular. Furthermore, this page lists the courtroom camera rules for several states. In many of them, filming jurors is prohibited. Presumably, if there was a ruling that this was unconstitutional, they wouldn't have those rules.	No. Congress could establish some sort of review board to address First Amendment violations, but it could not do so in such a biased way as to ensure there are no consequences for those violations, for at least two reasons: First, due process would require that any commission Congress established provide not only an opportunity to be heard by the commission, but also an impartial tribunal. The tribunal would not need to be perfectly unbiased, but setting up an "extremely biased" panel would be insufficient. Second, even if Congress established a commission that satisfied due process, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) would only prevent the courts from awarding monetary damages against the federal government; the courts would still be free to grant equitable and extraordinary relief to address First Amendment violations. So under Schweiker, if Congress established a commission to pre-screen all Facebook activity, you probably could not get money damages based on sales you might have expected to make if the commission had approved your Facebook ads faster, but you could get an injunction (or perhaps a writ of mandamus or prohibition) to stop the commission from screening your ads in the first place. The court's handling of First Amendment violations can often be different because free-speech rights are such a fundamental requirement of our form of government, but the analysis would be roughly the same for violations of Second Amendment or Third Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights.	Denver lawyer David Lane has said, “The First Amendment lives in a rough neighborhood and if you can’t stand the neighborhood move to China … or somewhere the First Amendment does not exist.” "One man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Cohen v. Cali. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) At this point, we need to define illegal as used in your question. For instance, do you mean "you can face any form of punishment"? If so, this question is extremely broad and governed by multiple sets of laws. Additionally, one should note that this is a Federal Question. The First Amendment, through the Due Process clause applies to states as well. Therefore, there will be extremely little discrepancy (if any - first impression issues being the main differences probably) between the States,. The FCC can limit profanity on air. Additionally, Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1464, (Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. ) prohibits the utterance of any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio communication. The USPTO can limit Trademarks with "vulgar" meaning. (See EDIT below for update.) In School: High school student's First Amendment rights were not violated in suspension for uttering obscenity, regardless of whether she was merely repeating and returning words originally directed at her, particularly where words were clearly disruptive as they were heard by 90 students in cafeteria and, in opinion of assistant principal, were “fighting words.” Heller v. Hodgin, S.D.Ind.1996, 928 F.Supp. 789. Fighting Words: These seem to be words that would invoke, or are likely to invoke a fight. Fighting words claim upheld: Arrestee's speech when crowd gathered near fallen tree that had blocked traffic constituted unprotected fighting words, so that his arrest under city disorderly conduct ordinance did not violate his First Amendment free speech rights; arrestee's repeated use of the word “bitch,” his accusation of matricide directed toward his sister, his use of the phrase “fucking queer,” his pushing of third party and his raised voice all tended to show that his conduct, under the circumstances, had tendency to provoke physical altercation. Fighting words claim not upheld: Detainee's profane words to police officer as officer conducted Terry stop, “son of a bitch,” while unpleasant and insulting, were not “fighting words,” given officer's confirmation of fact that words did not cause anyone to fight or become angry; thus, words could not constitute violation of disorderly conduct statute and in turn could not supply probable cause for disorderly conduct arrest. In addition to fighting words, true threats and incitement to imminent lawless action are not protected under the First Amendment. Additionally, the government can regulate free speech in public schools (hence Free Speech Zones) and while in their employ (no yelling at your boss if you want to keep your job). It is not part of the main question, but free speech inside the court room. Well, the Judge is pretty much king in a courtroom. What he says goes. (more or less, like nothing toooooo crazy). In a courtroom, if you do something a Judge doesn't like, he can hold you in contempt of court. (You get no jury for contempt cases.) EDIT: Since I wrote this answer, new law came out from the Supreme Court in Matel v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___ (2017). The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the Federal Circuit that the disparagement clause [is] facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Simon Tam, lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this moniker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons. Tam sought federal registration of the mark “THE SLANTS.” The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application under a Lanham Act provision prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam contested the denial of registration through the administrative appeals process, to no avail. He then took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The decision aptly concludes with: "If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social “volatility,” free speech would be endangered."	TV shows like COPS will have the arrestees/suspects/bystanders/victims sign a waiver to appear on the show, along with anybody else that they film in the process, otherwise the faces will be blurred, or removed from the show entirely. Additionally you can tell the camera crews that they are not allowed in your home. If they do enter your home without permission, you can sue them for trespassing. It should be noted that those shows are often edited for drama, and as such seem much more dramatic than it is. The film crews may spend weeks or more (400 hours of video) just to get enough "good stuff" for a 22 minute episode, and then make it look like it all happens over the course of an evening. As for the moral/social acceptance of a lack of privacy, that question really isn't on-topic here. This should be the same for any other "COPS-like" TV/youtube show, but there are some shows out there that don't take the rules as seriously as others. Those usually operate under the "who we are filming probably can't afford a lawyer" mentality so they keep going until they get sued.	The right to trial by jury under the Washington State Constitution does not attach to mere regulatory infractions: City of Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wn. 2d 87 (Wash. 1982) (still being cited as of 2019). While not at issue in that case, the Court listed "traffic offenses" and the corresponding "uniform and expeditious system for the disposition of these 'infractions'" as an example where a jury is not required by the state Constitution. At the same time, the Legislature has shown itself cognizant of the distinction between offenses which are criminal in nature and those to which such a stigma is not attached. This awareness is reflected in RCW 46.63, decriminalizing certain traffic offenses and providing a uniform and expeditious system for the disposition of these "infractions". As long as the offender commits only an infraction, no prison sentence can be imposed. RCW 46.63.060(2)(b). If it is thought that our conclusions here today will unduly burden the courts of limited jurisdiction, that situation can undoubtedly be ameliorated by legislative "decriminalization" of those offenses which are in fact regulatory, rather than criminal in nature, and limiting the penalty accordingly. As for those offenses which carry a criminal stigma and particularly those for which a possible term of imprisonment is prescribed, the constitution requires that a jury trial be afforded unless waived.	In New South Wales it is entirely legal to film police (or anyone else). However, as discussed (What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?) audio recording is more restricted: you must either have the permission of all the participants in a conversation or be a party to the conversation. I do not imagine the law is any different in Victoria.	Jury trials in common law jurisdictions are simply a fact, and don't need or get justification. Jury trials are ancient. In England the Scandinavians had an assembly, the þing ("thing") for deciding matters, such as guilt. Under Norman rule this became systematized, to the point that the Magna Carta Art. 39 states the law that No free man shall be captured, and or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, and or of his liberties, or of his free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed against him by force or proceed against him by arms, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, and or by the law of the land There was a period subsequently where the King gained more power and trials were more arbitrary and oppressive through the Star Chamber, leading to various reforms such as the birth of the US. The right to a jury trial is for reasons of historical precedent part of the US constitution. Because of the legal right to a jury (especially in criminal cases), the only question that can reasonably come up is for a defendant to ask if they will have better chances with a bench trial versus a jury trial. All it takes is one person on a jury to not be convinced to avoid a conviction, so superficially you'd think an accused person would prefer a jury trial to increase their odds of not being convicted. This is encouraged by a mind-set "the state versus the citizen", where the prosecution and the judge are both agents of the government. On the other hand, the average citizen is more likely to misunderstand the import of evidence, and be less able to disregard statements made during the trial that were held inadmissible.	Why does the one country that promotes constitutional democracies above all others not have a judicial branch specifically for those matters? I know SCOTUS will hear these matters . . . I have had it mention that SCOTUS hears less than a hundred cases a year. Something which sounds incredibly low. A constitutional court profoundly limits the extent to which relief for violations of the constitution are judicially reviewable relative to the U.S. status quo. All courts from traffic court on up hear these matters and adjudicate constitutional issue in the status quo. It is also helpful to recognize that the U.S. Constitution regulates government conduct, not necessarily only though the device of determining that legislation is or is not constitutional. If a police officer stops you without having reasonable suspicion to do so, he has violated the U.S. Constitution, without regard to what the statutes of the state in question say. If evidence is seized without probable cause and this evidence is introduced in court over your objection in a criminal case, the government has violated the constitution and you are entitled (unless it was harmless error) to have your conviction vacated. If a tax collector seizes your property for unpaid taxes without first affording you due process to dispute their right to do so, the government has violated one of your constitutional rights. The Constitution imposes affirmative duties and obligations on the government, it does not merely invalidate laws enacted as unconstitutional. Most instances of constitutional adjudication involve government conduct and not the validity of government enacted statutes.
Suspending White House hard pass & preliminary injunction Jim Acosta was asked by the Secret Service to surrender a White House hard pass as the result of an altercation in a press event. The White House press secretary explained that it being suspended until further notice and gave a preliminary indication that the reason for this was related to Mr. Acosta's behavior while at the White House. The lawsuit filed by CNN and Acosta is reported to be on 1st and 5th amendment grounds, and they are seeking a temporary restraining order to force the White House to restore the hard pass it suspended. 1st amendment issues seem obvious, but reference to the 5th amendment seem less so. I'm guessing that the due process clause of the 5th amendment is involved, the key provision of which consists of: No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... It doesn't seem like Acosta has been deprived of life or property. The concept that a hard pass involves 1st amendment liberties is supported, but it's up to a court to determine what due process is required for suspending an existing press pass. I'm not sure I see how a temporary restraining order to restore his access immediately is critical. Q: Does suspension of a privilege few people get justify a temporary restraining order on 5th amendment grounds? The Sherrill v Knight case some sources compare as precedent seems relevant, but it's important to recognize that Sherrill was never grated the relief he requested of restoring his press pass. In discovery, it came out that one reason for Sherrill's denial of a press pass was that that Sherrill had been arrested and fined for physical assault. Acosta aggressive behavior was demonstrated in front of the President, the Secret Service and members of the White House press corps. In the above case, footnote 23 said: We have no occasion to consider what procedures must be employed in the revocation, for security reasons, of an already-issued White House press pass. As such it seems that while Sherrill is reasonable basis for asserting there is a 1st Amendment Interest involved, it is not clear to me it forms a strong reason to believe the outcome will be to restore his hard pass clearance. Added Notes In DC its well known that you don't need a hard pass to cover the White House. Saying you are making a YouTube videos is apparently enough to get persistent people into briefings repeatedly, but don't expect to sit down or get called on to ask a question. There are three ways to get in: the much coveted hard pass, with no explicit expiration date, a renewable two-year permit, or a Day Pass which must be applied for each time you want to get in. Nothing so far says that Acosta has been denied admittance, but what it probably does mean he no longer has line-jumping privilege and probably won't get a front row seat to heckle from. The first amendment doesn't seem to guarantee anyone a front-row ticket, or even that they get recognized at a press conference, and the relevant freedoms to speak and publish are still subject to reasonable restrictions, e.g. disturbing the peace.	You are correct that the existence of a lawsuit -- on First Amendment or Fifth Amendment grounds -- is not a strong basis for believing that Acosta will have his pass reinstated. People file losing lawsuits all the time. But that doesn't really tell us anything about the merits of his case, which I discuss below. Temporary restraining order: The standard for TROs is well-established: This court may issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction only when the movant demonstrates that: there is a substantial likelihood plaintiff will succeed on the merits; plaintiff will be irreparably injured if an injunction is not granted; an injunction will not substantially injure the other party; and the public interest will be furthered by an injunction. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Rothe, 150 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2001). I'd normally expect the court to be pretty speech-protective in a First Amendment TRO case, but because this is the White House, they'll probably give a fair amount of extra weight when figuring out how to balance everything here. I would not, however, expect either of the factors that you mentioned -- that this is a Fifth Amendment case and that few people have press passes -- to do much to change the court's analysis. I suspect it's going to come down to who is more credible about what happened and why. Fifth Amendment: The Constitution does not promise us much at all in terms of outcomes. What it does promise is that the government will go through reasonable procedures to arrive at those outcomes. As you seem to have identified, that's exactly what Sherrill was about. Sherrill does not say that everyone has the First Amendment right to a White House press pass; it says that that everyone has the Fifth Amendment right to due process when the White House decides whether to grant or deny a press pass -- especially because of the First Amendment interests implicated in those decisions. The basics ingredients of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision-maker, and that's all that Sherrill calls for: a publicly disclosed procedure by which the journalists can apply for credentials and appeal adverse decisions. Here, it's unclear whether the White House has provided Acosta with any notice or any opportunity to appeal his decision. If that's the case, they've almost certainly run afoul of Sherrill. But again, you are correct that this does not mean he gets his press pass back. If they find that the White House violated the Fifth Amendment as explained in Sherrill, the remedy will simply be to force it to go through the prescribed procedure. First Amendment: If it turns out that they use that procedure as a pretext to punish Acosta for protected speech, we would be out of Fifth Amendment territory and into First Amendment territory. If a court found that the White House had revoked his pass because he was from CNN, because they didn't like the questions he was asking, or because he didn't provide fawning coverage of the president, it is virtually certain that the White House would be forced to restore his credentials. But if they determine in a fair way that Acosta should have his pass revoked because he was violent, because he was infringing on other people's ability to do their job, or because he was otherwise violating established rules, a court would probably say that any of those was an acceptable justification. In that case, CNN would need a new White House correspondent.	As an example, POTUS does not undertake the entire pardon process on his own, instead they are preliminarily processed by the Department of Justice, which makes a recommendation. Only POTUS can "grant" the pardon, and we lack substantive information on how deeply he gets involved (does he just sign documents based on staff recommendations? does he do his own research?). I don't know what physical form Clinton's 450 pardons on January 20, 2001 took, but a president might use an autopen (Obama did use such a device). Questions have been raised and definitive answers from SCOTUS are lacking as to whether hand-to-paper signatures are demanded by the Constitution. DoJ at one point thought it was okay. This article lists the Constitutional functions which cannot be delegated: reporting to the Congress on the state of the Union; convening either or both Houses of Congress and adjourning Congress; signing and vetoing bills; receiving ambassadors and public ministers (recognition); appointing and removing ambassadors, ministers, and certain other public officers; nominating federal judges; and making recess appointments However, the Constitutional function of negotiating treaties or numerous functions as commander in chief of the armed forces is generally delegated, within the executive branch. Numerous statutory functions can be delegated (and Congress may say explicitly that some function can be delegated, in passing the law). The matter of implied power to delegate statutory function is the topic of a couple of centuries of litigation, but as an example in Williams v. United States, 42 U.S. 290 SCOTUS held that a law prohibiting the advance of public money in any case whatsoever to the disbursing officers of government except under the special direction of the President does not require the personal and ministerial performance of this duty, to be exercised in every instance by the President under his own hand. SCOTUS has not established bright lines regarding the extent of permissible delegation.	Firstly, because there isn't an explicit Constitutional "right to privacy", per se, and even if there was (and there are arguments that several constitutional provisions amount, in aggregate, to a right to privacy), that it wouldn't be absolute, in the same way that freedom of speech and of the press are not absolutes. Indeed, the closest thing to a right to privacy, the 4th Amendment, has explicit caveats: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (emphasis mine). Thus reasonable searches and seizures, especially those authorized by a warrant, are constitutional. Furthermore, even in light of a constitutional right of privacy derived from this statue, depending on how the "search history" is compiled, the 4th Amendment might not even apply, due to the Katz doctrine, also known as the "open fields" doctrine. Basically, the 4th amendment (as far as searches goes) does not apply to things that are publicly observable; while this would protect a literal "search history" compilation (baring a reasonable search), the searches themselves are public queries, broadcasted over the internet. Anyone watching could compile them into a "search history" themselves.	The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies only in criminal trials, but it permits a witness to refuse to answer a question in either criminal or civil cases, including in a deposition. If he had committed crimes or thought that his answers might have incriminated him, he should have declined to answer. I'm not terribly familiar with this case, but it occurs to me that a lot of the allegations against Cosby go pretty far back; it could be that he was talking about something so far back that he wasn't exposed to any criminal liability. In a case like that, it may even be that a judge had already ordered him to answer the question. Assuming that he voluntarily answered the question, he has waived his right against self-incrimination and the testimony is generally admissible.	A good starting point would be the SCOTUS opinion, or everything on SCOTUSblog, especially the application for injunctive relief filed on Aug. 30. There is a long sequence of petitions and orders which ask the courts either to issue an injunction preventing the law from taking force, or to vacate an administrative stay of proceedings by the lower court regarding petitioner's challenge. The lower court denied the petitions, therefore petitioners turn to SCOTUS to get an injunction against the law. Then you can turn to the SCOTUS opinion to see what the reasons were, for and against the petition. The majority position is that an applicant must carry the burden of making a “strong showing” that it is “likely to succeed on the merits,” that it will be “irreparably injured absent a stay,” that the balance of the equities favors it, and that a stay is consistent with the public interest. The majority concludes that The applicants now before us have raised serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the Texas law at issue. But their application also presents complex and novel antecedent procedural questions on which they have not carried their burden. Immediately after this the court comments that federal courts enjoy the power to enjoin individuals tasked with enforcing laws, not the laws themselves. However, it is unclear whether the named defendants in this lawsuit can or will seek to enforce the Texas law against the applicants in a manner that might permit our intervention The law states that Any person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any person who and the named respondents (government workers of various sorts) all appear to be precluded from filing an action – thus an injunction against the judge is superfluous since he cannot file a lawsuit anyhow. It is also unclear whether SCOTUS can issue an injunction against state judges asked to decide a lawsuit under Texas’s law. When SCOTUS say "it is unclear" in this context, they mean that petitions did not adequately demonstrate that the court can in fact issue such an injunction. It's not that SCOTUS cannot decide such matters after extensive consideration of the facts / arguments and discussion, it's that the standards for an emergency action require something that the court found lacking in the petition: we cannot say the applicants have met their burden to prevail in an injunction or stay application. In reaching this conclusion, we stress that we do not purport to resolve definitively any jurisdictional or substantive claim in the applicants’ lawsuit.	The only relevant case heard by SCOTUS is Nixon v. US, 506 U.S. 224, where a federal judge was tried and convicted for actual crimes, but would not resign his position so continued to draw his salary. The key legal question was whether the matter is "justiciable" (meaning, not a political matter but a legal matter). Nixon's argument was that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, and the court held that the question (more specifically what it means to "try") is nonjusticiable. White & Blackmun, and Souter, wrote concurring opinions (which might be called on in a subsequent impeachment case) that reminds the reader (and future court) what was not part of the holding of the court, and what might therefore allow future impeachment review. White writes The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us even to consider his contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore reach the merits of the claim. I concur in the judgment because the Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" petitioner. He observes that the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed a trial by reasonable judges. But, I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to "try" impeachment cases. When asked at oral argument whether that direction would be satisfied if, after a House vote to impeach, the Senate, without any procedure whatsoever, unanimously found the accused guilty of being "a bad guy," counsel for the United States answered that the Government's theory "leads me to answer that question yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. Especially in light of this advice from the Solicitor General, I would not issue an invitation to the Senate to find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business, to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment process. Souter in his opinion states that One can, nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply" 'a bad guy,'", judicial interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. In other words, review of an impeachment is largely but not entirely off the table, at least until SCOTUS declares that impeachments are completely unreviewable, no matter what, period (unlikely to ever happen).	The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal.	The example that you have given in your question regarding the travel ban does not actually constitute contradiction since one federal judge chose to issue an order but the other does not, thus the actions taken does not contradict. However, what you described actually happened before with the first travel ban (EO 13769). A federal judge in Boston, Judge Nathaniel Gorton, refused to extend a temporary injunction against the travel ban. However, another federal judge in Seattle then granted a temporary restraining order Friday that’s effective nationwide. As this CBS article states: Meanwhile, in a seemingly contradictory ruling, a federal judge in Boston refused to extend a temporary injunction against Mr. Trump’s travel ban. U.S. District Judge Nathaniel Gorton late Friday declined to renew an order prohibiting the detention or removal of persons as part of Trump’s executive order on refugees and immigrants. In this case, Judge Gorton declined to extend a temporary injunction against the travel ban. So, legally, nothing changes since he did not issue any new order or temporary injunction; the EO (travel ban) will stay as it is and when the existing temporary injunction expires, the EO will be back in force. Even yesterday, the federal judge in Hawaii issued a temporary restraining order which blocked the travel ban from being enforced. However, the federal judge in Maryland only blocked part of the travel ban, ruling that the most important section — banning travel from half a dozen countries — could not be enforced. The Hawaii court ruling would still "take precedence" since the temporary restraining order blocked the whole EO. Thus, it can be seen that there are mainly three ways for federal judges to rule: Grant a temporary restraining order for the travel ban. Block part of the order. Decline to issue any order; the travel ban will remain as is. To conclude, whenever a federal judge issues a temporary restraining order, it will always be in force as it would "overwrite" the other federal rulings in which the judges blocks part of the order or do not issue any order.
Can a private chat conversation about someone be considered defamation? I recently commented on a Facebook post of a friend and suddenly got messaged by someone who was involved in the post. This person is in fact part of my social circle, however we are not close, we just share friends. This person stated that, one of the person's involved in that post, was a "disgusting pedophile"(this was not out of the blue however, we talked about other subjects before that). I, personally don't know the other person, however when I asked why didn't he go to the police to report, he promptly changed the subject, then, I kept asking on why that person in particular was a pedophile, since this is a concern to me(I have a small sister who could be endangered, since the accused is part of the same social circle), after that, he blocked me. Afterwards when talking with some friends, I learned that on several occasions he has made the same accusations about that person, to different people. Later on, I found out that those two actually don't get along and have a very strong hatred for each other due to political views. I'm not close to the accuser, and I don't know the accused person. He could in fact, be a pedophile, but, given the lack of evidence and the fact that this person keeps spreading those accusations, could those messages he sent me (and to others) be used as proof of defamation? I'm heavily considering on sending those to the accused, since this feels the right thing to do.	Yes, a statement made to only a single other person can be defamation, at least in the US (you don't mention the jurisdiction that you or the accused person are in, and it may matter). Only the accused person can normally sue, and that person would need to establish that the statement was made, and that it was false. In most cases actual damage to reputation also needs to be established. However, a few limited categories are considered defamatory per se. these include an accusation that a person is guilty of a serious crime. (The exact line for defamation per se will depend on the jurisdiction.) If a statemant is defamatory per se actual damage need not be proved. Strictly speaking saying that someone "is a pedophile" only says that that person is sexually attracted to children, but it is usually taken to mean that the person has in fact sexually abused children, which is a crime, and would I am sure be considered defamatory per se. Even so, proof of actual damage to the reputation of the person defamed might be important to the measure of damages to be awarded. often the number of people to whom an accusation is made is relevant to the degree of damage to the reputation, and thus to the damages to be awarded, but the relation is not always 1-to-1. Particularly with a very serious accusation, the damage to reputation could be significant, even if only one or a few people heard the false statement. By the way, the word is spelled "pedophile" (or paedophile in UK English), it is from two Greek words meaning literally "lover of the young". A now obsolete related term is "pederast", with much the same meaning.	I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.	What kind of recourse can OP pursue to swiftly clear their name? The OP's "recourse" is to prove the truth - that he is not a convicted or accused (by a prosecutor) sex offender - to those who defamed him, who are presumably the bar owner(s), who instructed the bouncer to remove the OP because he was a sex offender; and possibly the bouncer, who may have told Anne that the OP was a sex offender; and possibly others who later on social media said the OP is a sex offender, such as Anne herself. The facts of who may be a sex offender and who may have falsely asserted someone is must be sorted out, and that's usually done by lawyers before a lawsuit (with a possible settlement from "We're going to sue" threat letter by the OP's lawyer); or in the discovery process of an actual lawsuit; or in court by a jury. It's entirely up to the OP to take legal action, hopefully under the advice of a lawyer; and it's not a good idea for the OP to confront the bouncer, Anne or others and possibly complicate his own situation. As for anything happening "swiftly", that's another point entirely. The OP could sue for damages to his reputation and/or to require the defamers to retract their statements, or for other compensations. Many personal injury lawyers give free initial consultations. See Defamation \| Legal Information Institute for definitions and the laws regarding defamation, libel and slander (which can vary due to jurisdiction; in some areas, defamation is criminal as well as civil). Libel is published defamation, as in defaming someone in messages on social media; slander is spoken defamation, such as what the bar bouncer may have done. Do they have a strong case for egregious defamation? The likelihood of "a strong case" is for the OP's legal counsel to determine; they will look at the evidence of defamatory statements, the likelihood of getting monetary damages from the bar and/or the individuals involved, and other factors.	That's an old idea that has been tried several times before (such as the first, being Unvarnished: Website Lets You Review People (And Trash Them) \| HuffPost, which no longer exists); and one of the latest incarnations is Peeple (mobile application - Wikipedia). There are lots of legal liabilities, including defamation and harassment/stalking, even with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act \| Electronic Frontier Foundation which (mostly) protects the website owner from others' speech posted on the site (your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction). The only way such a site would survive is to do what Peeple and other sites have done: greatly limit the speech allowed, such as limiting to only positive reviews, giving the subject complete control over what does appear on their profile, only allowing "opt-in" profiles, verify identities, etc. You would have to implement full GDPR compliance; but various lawsuits will either shut you down before you get far enough to launch or soon after and force you to greatly limit the scope of the site. Most lawyers would advise you to find something else to do with your time and money.	I do not believe this would be a violation of freedom of thought. The person being asked is free to leave, and free not to answer despite the repeated requests for an answer. Extended following and asking might run afoul of stalking/harassment laws, but that's jurisdiction-dependent and probably not a human rights violation.	At what point is unsolicited explicit material considered harassment? How do the advertisers have the right to broadcast something that I would definitely bring up to HR if I heard a coworker say? The contexts are too different. One cannot expect much similarity on how the unsolicited explicit communications are addressed. On platforms such as Youtube the unsolicited explicit material is not sent specifically to you, but to a set of users who at best have some characteristics in common. By contrast, akin communications in a work environment are much likelier to constitute harassment insofar as they usually are intended for a specific person. Your own use of the term "broadcast" reflects your acknowledgment of that difference. Another difference relates to the recipient's dependency on the environment where the unpleasant communications occur. Implicit in the anti-harassment protections in a work environment is the acknowledgment that the recipient's livelihood depends on that person's continued employment. That dependency renders such communications a form of coercion. By contrast, dependency is much lower or non-existent when it comes to entertainment platforms: the recipient can leave the platform without any consequences that might threaten that person's livelihood. Have I entered into an agreement with the service provider than I consent to receiving these advertisements by using their services? That is hard to tell. You will need to read the terms of service of these platforms and post another question if some clause(s) is(are) unclear.	Probably not Now, some US constitutional rights do get interpreted very broadly, and it's possible this might be the case here too. But fundamentally, this situation is not equivalent to the security contractors example you mentioned. The crux is that Facebook already has every right to delete your posts for whatever reason they want. A security contractor does not have any intrinsic right to conduct searches (warrantless or otherwise) on your person, residence or effects. Facebook can choose, at their sole discretion, to delete all your posts, delete none of your posts, or delete some of your posts according to whatever metric they came up with. In this case, the metric is 'did the government flag this as misinformation'. The government isn't censoring you - Facebook is, and Facebook is allowed to do that (they happen in this case to be following the government's advice on what specifically needs censoring, but where they choose to get their advice is also purely their business). A security contractor, by contrast, can't do much of anything to you, except when they have been specifically deputized by the government to do so by some legal process. If this happens, then they are said to be acting 'under color of law', and suddenly First (and Eighth, etc) Amendment restrictions do begin to constrain their actions. Facebook is not getting any kind of state power delegated to them, and thus they aren't considered to be acting 'under color of law'. They aren't doing anything they were not already allowed to do.	I don't believe Canada uses the public official/figure distinction. American defamation law uses the distinction to determine whether to require proof of actual malice, but Canada does not require proof of actual malice. Canadian defamation law has a lot of other parallels to American defamation law, though, especially in terms of privilege. I'd expect the University could claim any of several available privileges, including truth, qualified privilege, and fair comment. And because it's a government institution, it's conceivable that it might even claim absolute privilege, though I definitely don't know enough about their interpretations of the privilege to say one way or another. For a broad primer on defamation law in Ontario, you can check out this report from the Law Commission of Ontario.
Can a USA governor pardon a felon who was convicted in another state? Bill was convicted and imprisoned in a state (East Sconsin). He then moves to West Sconsin and wants to join the police. Felons are not allowed to serve as policemen. Can the governor of West Sconsin pardon Bill, removing his felon status? Must this be respected by the federal government or the other states?	No. A governor has no authority under the law of another state. The governor of West Sconsin can no more pardon a conviction under the laws of East Sconsin than can the president of Mexico pardon a conviction under the laws of the United States.	Yes Presidential pardons only deal with breaches of Federal law. So, if the punishment is a fine then that penalty is waived. However, if the fine is punishment for breach of state law, the pardon does not touch it - he would need a pardon from the relevant state Governor(s). But Anthony Levandowski is not being punished with a fine, he was punished with a jail term. What he owes Google is damages for breach of contract or a tort, both civil matters and almost certainly under California law, not a punishment for an offence. This is not something he can be pardoned for by a President (if under Federal law which is unlikely) or a Governor (if under state law). His actions constituted both an offence against the state, which can be pardoned, and caused damage to another person (Google) which can’t. He owes this money as a debt just as if he had bought something from them or borrowed money from them.	As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them.	There is a saying that you can't sue city hall: that is applicable here. Governments enjoy sovereign immunity, and cannot be sued for their errors of judgment unless they specifically allow it. Safety regulations are an example of a situation where the government hold all of the power and shoulders none of the responsibility. If a government forbids sale or use of a substance on some grounds (could be safety, could be economic impact, could be something about preventing the moral decay of society), and the grounds later turns to be false, you cannot sue the government because of lost business opportunities. Generally speaking, that which is not prohibited is allowed, so there would have to be an affirmative duty for the government to prevent all forms of harm. If there were such a legal duty, there is a miniscule legal foundation for suing the government for shirking its duty. That is not a completely hypothetical possibility, in that the state of Washington imposes a constitutional duty on the legislature to provide public education, and the Supreme Court has done things to enforce this duty (the contempt of court fines are up in the realm of $80 million). Since there is no jurisdiction that imposes a duty on the government to absolutely prevent all harm, you won't be able to sue the government if they fail to outlaw a thing that is eventually proven to harm someone.	I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario.	There are several elements working in your friend's favor. The first is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." In an entrapment case, the police have recordings or documents claiming that the "girl" was underaged. If there is no such smoking gun from the (real) girl, the case (probably) would not be prosecuted in the U.S. He doesn't have to prove that she told him she was 18; "she" (or the police) has to prove that she told him she was "not." The second factor is "remoteness" in time, and distance. Two years after a U.S. state sent me a "nasty letter," I asked my lawyer if the state would ever come after me. He answered, "If they were going to do this, you would have heard further by now." The other factor, distance and cross border, (three countries: Turkey, the U.S., his home country) further militates against prosecution except for highly aggravating circumstances such as drug dealing, gambling, or sex for pay. A third factor is that your friend would not come close to qualifying as a "serious offender." This would be someone like a drug dealer, or the head of a "call girl" ring. The cops concentrate their effects on big "busts" like this that make their careers, not "small fry" like your friend. But of course they use the publicity from the big catches to scare everyone else. While there is no "guarantee" against "the worst possible consequences," the chances of them happening are similar to his getting hit by lightening, and less than his chances of being hit by a car crossing the street. No one stresses out about those chances. He shouldn't either. I am not a lawyer but I have done paralegal work in a law office.	Generally, no. The party to the action will be the State (commonwealth). The prosecutor acts as the agent of the state. The sheriff is not a party and cannot appeal.	Many states have laws providing for a residence for their governors, but I know of no state that mandates the use of those homes. Oregon's previous governor, for instance, lived in Portland rather than the governor's mansion, Mahonia Hall. Some cities do the same. In New York City, Mayor Bill De Blasio lives at Gracie Mansion, but Mike Bloomberg never did. Although we don't always think of them as government officials, some government schools provide their presidents with state-funded residences, as well. At the University of Virginia, the president lives at Carr's Hill.
Is the removal of Jim Acosta's White House press pass a violation of the 1st Amendment? Jim Acosta of CNN asked President Trump a question. Trump ordered him to put the mike down, and a young intern tried to take it off him. Acosta's press pass was subsequently revoked. Let's assume the for the sake of argument that the White House justification (he "laid hands" on the intern) is false and Acosta's pass was revoked because he insisted on asking a question that the President didn't want asked. As I understand it, in a lawsuit those would be questions of fact to be determined by the court. I'm asking about the law. This question looks at a closely related incident when Trump barred selected media outlets from presidential press conferences. The consensus in that case was the White House has wide discretion in deciding who to admit to press briefings, and hence allowing one newspaper rather than another is not a violation. However a comment to that answer noted that: viewpoint-based restrictions on privileges extended by the government are not permissible [...] Does banning a reporter in response to an unwelcome question constitute a "viewpoint-based restriction"? If so, is this a violation of the 1st Amendment?	Yes. Operating under those assumptions, this would be a First Amendment violation under controlling law in D.C. The starting point is Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977), which held that "denial of a pass potentially infringes upon first amendment guarantees." In that case, the Nixon White House refused to issue a press pass to a reporter for a liberal magazine, but refused to explain why beyond citing "reasons of security." The D.C. Circuit said that if the White House intended to open itself to the press, it needed to do so in ways that did not offend the First Amendment. White House press facilities having been made publicly available as a source of information for newsmen, the protection afforded newsgathering under the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press requires that this access not be denied arbitrarily or for less than compelling reasons. Not only newsmen and the publications for which they write, but also the public at large have an interest protected by the first amendment in assuring that restrictions on newsgathering be no more arduous than necessary, and that individual newsmen not be arbitrarily excluded from sources of information. Given these important first amendment rights implicated by refusal to grant White House press passes to bona fide Washington journalists, such refusal must be based on a compelling governmental interest. Clearly, protection of the President is a compelling, “even an overwhelming,” interest... However, this standard for denial of a press pass has never been formally articulated or published. Merely informing individual rejected applicants that rejection was for “reasons of security” does not inform the public or other potential applicants of the basis for exclusion of journalists from White House press facilities. Moreover, we think that the phrase “reasons of security” is unnecessarily vague and subject to ambiguous interpretation. Therefore, we are of the opinion that appellants must publish or otherwise make publicly known the actual standard employed in determining whether an otherwise eligible journalist will obtain a White House press pass. Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129–30 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In a nutshell, Sherrill is saying that when the government is granting press credentials to some and denying them to others, First Amendment principles require it to meet basic due-process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, those denied with an explanation for the denial and an opportunity to contest that denial. In this case, it's not clear whether the White House has provided Acosta with a hearing and notice at all, which would itself be a violation if that situation continues for too long. But even if it does, the White House could not use the procedure to punish Acosta for exercising the First Amendment principles that the procedure is designed to protect. If the opposite were true, i.e., Acosta "laid hands" on the intern, I'd guess that that would be enough to revoke his credentials, assuming the White House went through the appropriate procedure. Sherrill explicitly recognizes protecting the President and his family as a valid basis for denying access, and I assume the courts would extend that protection to White House staff, especially if the White House were to argue that an assault on staff suggests that the person can't be trusted around the president himself.	Basically, the author is saying that if the First Amendment were interpreted in the way described, as an all-purpose shield -- and therefore, journalists were not subject to libel laws, and could not be searched or deposed -- then journalists, being all but above the law at that point, would have a tremendous amount of power. There would need to be checks and balances to that power for the sake of justice, personal privacy, etc, lest we end up ruled by the press. The implication, and the point of the bolded part, is that these checks and balances must inherently weaken the protection offered by the First Amendment. So the Amendment can be seen as either an all-but-inviolable protection of the specific freedoms enumerated within, or as a general get-out-of-jail-free card that can be voided as community interests demand. It can not reasonably be both strong and overly broad.	The NYT article implies that she has used social media in the past to get her victims to believe her fake back story. She is being released from detention, and the restriction on her using social media is not tied to her expressing a particular viewpoint. Courts have repeatedly held that the Government can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest ( U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 US 367 - Supreme Court 1968). One such compelling interest is the effective administration of criminal justice (U.S. v. Spilotro, 786 F. 2d 808 - Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit 1986). For instance, speech restrictions can be tied to the purpose of preventing a defendant from committing further crimes while released.	There is currently no law requiring a candidate for US President to release tax records to appear on the ballot. Nor is there any law requiring the President to release such records after taking office. There are laws requiring members of congress, and other Federal officials, to make public some limited information about their finances. This is much less than the information that would be included in an income tax return. Congress could pass a law requiring candidates to release their returns, but it seems unlikely that the current Congress will do so. States have broad authority over Federal elections. A state could pass a law requiring a candidate to release his or her returns as a condition of appearing on the ballot. Such a law might be challenged on Due process grounds. This would be an untested legal area, so there is no telling how a court would rule on such a challenge to such a law. Congress, or an individual house of Congress, may subpoena almost any information in pursuit of its investigation function. Investigations must be related to possible legislation, meaning it must be related to a subject about which Congress has power to pass a law. But the relation can be rather remote, as long as the information might inform the judgement of members of congress in considering a possible law. There does not have to be an actual law under consideration. Investigations have been challenged, and in a few cases there have been court rulings that an investigation was not related to possible legislation, and so Congress was not allowed to enforce subpoenas on that subject, nor to compel testimony. But such rulings have been rare. Previous Presidents have asserted, under the name of "Executive privilege", a right not to disclose information, such as internal discussions within the executive branch. This is not explicitly specified by the US Constitution, nor by any law, but has been generally accepted, and in some cases supported by court rulings. No court has ever clearly defined the extent or limits of Executive privilege. A House committee issued a subpoena this year for President Trump's tax records, or some of them. I forget whether this was addressed to the IRS or to the Treasury Dept. This has been challenged in court, and the matter is still in court. I be3live that one of the grounds asserted against the subpoena was that it was not to look into tax issues, as specified in the law authorizing the subpoena. No one yet knows how that case will proceed. The NY State Attorney General is investigating allegations that the Trump Organization, and various individuals, violated NY law, including by falsely reporting campaign expenses and contributions. In pursuit of that investigation, he issued a subpoena for various records which he claims will reveal possible evidence of those illegal actions. He pretty learly has the authority to subpoena records which might be evidence in a criminal case. This subpoena has also been challenged, but seems pretty likely to be upheld. However the subpoena was as part of a Grand Jury investigation, and Grand Jury proceedings, including evidence obtained by subpoena, are by law secret unless an indictment and trial results. So even if the subpoena is upheld, this should not lead to the public release of the records, unless someone is put on trial for some crime, and the records are evidence in that case. Even then the judge can order the records not to be released to the public.	The constitution does not actually forbid "abusing a position for financial gain", and thus it is left to the political process to address any such actions (voting for a different candidate), or the legislative process (defining certain acts as forbidden) – or, the impeachment process. The court system in the US does not have the power to decide on their own what politicians can and can't do, if there is no underlying law. It is within congressional power to define limits on the act of any politician, for example Congress could pass a law requiring the President and Vice-President to have no business interests or stocks during their term of office; they could require that of cabinet members or members of Congress. Such a law would, of course, either require presidential approval or else sufficient support in the houses of congress to override a veto. There are various limits on what government folks can do. 18 USC 202(c) is an example of a limit on the limits: Except as otherwise provided in such sections, the terms “officer” and “employee” in sections 203, 205, 207 through 209, and 218 of this title shall not include the President, the Vice President, a Member of Congress, or a Federal judge It is possible that a president could engage in a criminal act such as theft, and that is not permitted and would be grounds for impeachment. The president does not, however, have the power to e.g. unilaterally send all government hotel business to a certain hotel company, nor can he declare that 10% of all government expenditures must be deposited in his personal bank account, so the mechanisms whereby corrupt rules of certain other nations can get away with that is that those executives have vastly more power in their countries than POTUS does. With congressional support, though, such acts could come about. If it did, it would not be too surprising if SCOTUS ruled based on common law and considerations of justice that such a law / act was illegal, but it would not be a textualist argument.	Relying on this version, proof of truth is only allowed in order to establish a "public interest" defense or for a "necessary defense"; but also "if an official is charged with the commission of an act in the exercise of his office". Good luck with "necessary defense". It is not a defense to say "But what I said is true". However, if the defamed person has been convicted in court of said act (the defamatory statement) then there can be no punishment.	No. They could be, but the "nullification" wouldn't be automatic. That is because, as the Congressional Research Service says in its excellent "Executive Orders: An Introduction": "Once issued, a valid executive order has the force and effect of law. Executive orders do not, by default, expire when the issuing President leaves office. Instead, an issued executive order remains in effect until it is either struck down in court, modified, or revoked." Because executive orders persist but can be easily changed, one of the first orders of business of a new administration is to revoke, modify or re-issue inherited executive orders. As far as your hypothetical, most commenters agree that when the President is expected to return to office quickly, the Acting President's job is simply to "keep shop." However, in extreme cases, such as the one you outline, they also agree the Acting President can exercise the full-range of Presidential powers. Thus, the Acting President could revoke the problematic orders. (This is discussed in Yale Law School's in the Yale Law School's "Reader's Guide" to the 25th Amendment.) If you want to know more, the Wikipedia page on Executive Orders gives a short (and harmless) summary. For more detail, see either the CRS pamphlet cited above, or their earlier pamphlet,"Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation."	In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another.
A student slipped a drug into my coffee — what are the legal ramifications of this situation? I am a high school Chemistry teacher. This morning, while my back was turned to write on the board, one of my students (age 17) slipped a pill into my coffee mug. This is a thermos-style mug that has a screw-on lid with a small opening; it was obviously a deliberate act). About 30 minutes later, when the bell rang to change classes, another student stayed behind to tell me NOT to drink anymore coffee "because [student name] put a white pill in it". Apparently, all 22 of my other students had witnessed this and even clapped and laughed as the perp ran back to her seat when I turned around. I had no idea what had happened and continued drinking my coffee as usual until the 2nd student warned me to stop. I quickly went to be checked out by the school nurse who checked my vitals and found an irregular, rapid heartbeat and high blood pressure (both unusual for me). I was sent to the urgent care / occupational med clinic and underwent 3 hours of testing (x-rays, ekg, drug screening, etc). Luckily, no residual problems. While I was gone, the student was searched and "Herbal Viagra" was found. She admitted to putting it into my coffee. She was suspended for 5 days. I told the school resource officer that I wanted to file charges against her and he said all she'll get is a "citation" because it isn't actually "criminal". Maybe it's because it wasn't a controlled substance. I can't believe that it's NOT A CRIME to drug someone without their knowledge or consent. Herbal supplements can interact with other meds wreaking havoc on a body. She doesn't know what meds I already take or what allergies I have. I was lucky... this could have turned out far worse than it did. What are the legal ramifications of this situation? Is it a criminal act? What about the other 21 students who saw what happened and did/said nothing; just watched me ingest the medicine? Are they not accessories? I live in Louisiana, by the way. Not sure if that matters.	If the pill contained a harmful or noxious substance, this is battery, which is a crime in Lousiana ("the intentional administration of a poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another"). There is a specific crime in LA, battery of a teacher, which is dealt with somewhat more severely than non-teacher battery. It is not a crime to observe a crime being committed and not warn the victim, but it is a crime to aid the commission of the crime (for example to help the perp remove the lid, to supply the drug). Under section Title 17, a teacher battered by a student can file a school-system internal complaint which may lead to the student being expelled (this is ultimately covered by district-specific procedure). This is independent of criminal charges.	The Fifth Amendment would not apply, because nothing in the testimony would incriminate the doctor. Indeed nothing would be at all likely to incriminate the President either, it is not a crime to be unable to carry out Presidential duties. It is likely in such a case that the President would waive confidentiality. In that case the doctor could testify freely. If the President insisted on confidentiality, and attempted to prevent the doctor from testifying to Congress, there would be a conflict between the power of Congress to compel testimony, in this case on what is clearly a vital national issue within the scope of the needs of Congress, and traditional doctor-patient confidentiality, let alone the requirements of HIPAA. I am not sure how this conflict would be resolved. There might be an emergency application to the Supreme Court, but the SC does not usually do very well with truly urgent issues. The Pentagon Papers case and Bush V. Gore indicate some of the problems that can arise. If the doctor was prevented from testifying, that might incline members of congress to think the testimony would not be favorable to the President, and thus tend to suggest that they should not approve the President resuming or continuing his or her powers and duties. But that is rather speculative. The 25th has never been invoked, and the detailed procedure that would be followed if it were is not very clear. I am not aware of any similar situation in which medical testimony has been demanded to deal with an urgent issue, but the patient has attempted to block it. I think this case must be considered to be undecided until it actually arises and a court rules.	The officers could incur liability under 28 U.S.C. 2680 (h) with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1346 (b). This would probably be considered "loss of property" or a "wrongful act". It is very rare for cases to go forward for this because of the costs of litigation against an officer. "[I]t is well recognized that ‘officers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order to perform their duty.’" Cody v. Mello, 59 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979)). “Before any due process liability can be imposed for property damage occurring in a lawful search, it must be established that the police acted unreasonably or maliciously in bringing about the damage.” Cody, 59 F.3d at 16. That actually means that the burden of proof is on the victim to show unreasonableness / maliciousness. It would probably be easier if the thing destroyed could not possibly have contained the item looked for. For instance, if they are looking for a 65" LED TV, they can't even look in a 64" dresser (or something smaller than the object that could not physically hold the object). This issue becomes moot when dealing with drugs.	In lay terms, the Raich case cites authority pursuant to the "Commerce Clause" of the Constitution of the United States; specifically, that the government has the power to regulate interstate commerce, to the degree that crops of individuals (whether directly or indirectly, or not at all, in commercial circulation) can be regulated by Congress, citing the Filburn case, which had nothing to do with "marijuana" or "cannabis", or "THC" or "CBD"; in essence, the government has the power to tell a private individual which crops they can cultivate or not, depending on the intent of Congress in enacting the law. The premise being that since the intent of Congress in regulating "marijuana" within the scope of the CSA was for the express purpose of maintaining higher prices (including so-called "black market" prices) for "marijuana", an individual cultivating "marijuana" which was not intended to enter the "stream of commerce" nonetheless impacted the price of the crop (or commodity) by cultivating the crop at all (i.e.g., greater supply of available product reduces the price of the product in any market, whether "black market" or not; having access to the product by means of private cultivation reduces the resources necessary to acquire the crop) - thus resulting in the overall price of the crop not being higher, thwarting the intent of Congress in regulating that specific crop or commodity. Of importance, Congress has concluded that "marijuana" had (and still does not have) any medical purpose (various bills have been written over the years to exempt "marijuana" from Schedule I classification in the CSA; "medical marijuana" exemptions, etc.), or at least no medical purpose recognized by Congress (save for specific research done by Dr. ElSohly, and a very limited number of private individuals (patients) to consume the crops produced by Dr. ElSohly, et al. pursuant to licenses issued by a federal administrative agency). It is interesting to note that the United States holds a (potentially defensive) patent (and has so for several years as of 2018) on various medical applications of CBD via the National Institutes of Health. The "property rights" aspect of your inquiry can be categorized into two parts which are independent of each other, that is both actions can be ongoing simultaneously The government has the power to regulate the cultivation of any crop or commodity on private property pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the intent of Congress, irrespective of if that crop enters the stream of commerce proper or not The government can pursue medical research, apply for and be granted patents (intellectual property), by the government itself, for technologies relating to the medical use of crops or commodities defined by Congress as not having any recognized medical application (e.g., the identical crop or commodity at 1.), potentially for defensive purposes, investment in a potential future market (i.e.g., licensing of patented technologies to pharmaceutical or private equity concerns) for profit, or other undisclosed purposes	The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing	Given a large database of email addresses that you can't prove have given consent to receive email, the only legal thing to do with it, is to (securely) delete it. (I am going to switch your question about a larger company to a bank: in the UK, big pharma is forbidden from advertising to individuals.) In principle the rules are the same for a huge bank and everything down to a self-employed plumber. In practice the plumber will be told "don't do that again" rather than fined. This case was treated under the Data Protection Act, which has a maximum fine of £500,000 – so a big bank would probably have been fined more, but not necessarily much more. Under GDPR, fines are related to turnover, so the fine would be a lot bigger for a large bank. The incident is a year old now. Details here.	The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions "based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'", which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute.	We don't have a lot of details, but if you're in the United States, the answer is probably yes. There are rarely any meaningful rules of evidence in student misconduct cases, so pretty much anything can come in. There may be some small difference in the answer depending n whether you're dealing with a public university or private, but in either case, I can't think of any reason why they would not be able to introduce the evidence if they had it. If there's a question about its authenticity, I imagine that would just be up to the misconduct board to decide. If Person X says "Person Y sent this to me," and Person X seems credible, that's probably going to be enough.
Advice about being secretly taped I need to know if you can sue someone for pain and suffering after being secretly audio taped in North Carolina.	No. Causing someone "pain and suffering" is not against the law; it is merely one kind of damages that can be awarded when someone has done something that is against the law. You may, for instance, endure pain and suffering from a car accident or shooting, in which case you could collect damages for your pain and suffering after proving that the other party committed the torts of negligence or battery, which are illegal. But if you were enduring pain and suffering from the last episode of Lost, you could not collect damages for your pain and suffering because it is not against the law to write a crappy finale. So in your case, cannot sue for pain and suffering based simply on the existence of a secret audio recording. North Carolina allows secret audio recordings, and it does not make exceptions for audio recordings that hurt someone's feelings. But to go beyond your explicit question, there still remains the possibility that you could pursue a legal action. If the other party used that recording in a way that violated the law, that might give rise to a tort that would support an award of damages for pain and suffering. If they publicly distributed a recording of themselves having sex with someone, that might constitute the tort of public disclosure of private facts. If they edited the recording to make it sound like someone had said something that they had not and then gave it to someone else, that might be grounds for a libel action.	Hacking into a computer owned by someone else and accessing the data stored on it without permission is a misdemeanor according to StGB 202a (de\|en). But only if it's successful. So a failed attempt isn't a misdemeanor yet. When you notice that someone might have committed a criminal offence (regardless of whether you are a victim or just a witness), then the usual procedure is to report it to the police. If they consider the crime serious enough to investigate, then they will request the identity from the ISP. But the copyright lawsuits which are filed in bulk by law firms working with media companies are not crime reports. They are civil lawsuits. A civil lawsuit is when someone had a tangible damage because of something someone else did, and now they want money in compensation. When there is no damage, then there is nothing to sue for. So when you want a judge to file an injunction to force an ISP to give them the identity of one of their users, then you would first have to explain to them how much financial damage you had because of that person and that this is enough damage to make it worth everyone's time. That might be quite challenging for nothing but a failed SSH login attempt. But it might be possible if a single person made so many login attempts that it incurred you non-negligible bandwidth cost or even caused a denial-of-service.	As an example, under the laws of Colorado, USA, deleting the footage would be a crime. See CRS 18-8-610: A person commits tampering with physical evidence if, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted and acting without legal right or authority, he: (a) Destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes, or alters physical evidence with intent to impair its verity or availability in the pending or prospective official proceeding; If you cause a crash, you should certainly believe that you are going to be sued, and a lawsuit is definitely an official proceeding. And it sounds like your purpose in deleting the footage is to prevent it from being used in that lawsuit. So you'd be clearly guilty under this law. It is a class 6 felony, carrying a sentence of 12-18 months in prison and a fine of $1,000 to $100,000. It may be counterintuitive, but according to a law firm, a digital video would be considered physical evidence: Physical evidence may include electronic records, videos, or audio recordings. This includes emails, text messages, social media messages, image files, video files, and computer files. If you don't delete the video, it is likely to be demanded by the plaintiff during the discovery process so that it can be entered into evidence. Rule 37 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure lists the sanctions that can be imposed if you refuse, such as: charging you for legal fees incurred by the plaintiffs in trying to obtain it assuming that the video proves whatever the plantiffs say it would show (e.g. that you were speeding, driving recklessly, etc) entering a default judgment against you (the plaintiffs automatically win the suit, as if you had refused to show up in court) holding you in contempt of court, which can lead to you being put in jail until you choose to comply, as well as fined.	Because you are on their premises and they get to decide what people can or can't do while on their property. This has nothing to do with if recording is legal or not, it has to do with basic property rights and trespass. Let's assume that recording is perfectly legal: so is eating ice cream. However, if its my shop, I can require that you do not make recordings just as I can require that you do not eat ice cream. If I make this requirement known you have three options: you can comply, you can leave or you can stay and do the thing I have prohibited. The first two are legal, the last one isn't; its trespass which is both a tort for which I can sue you and a crime for which you can be arrested and prosecuted.	In theory, a store can ban you or anyone else for any reason except those protected by law against discrimination. As a practical matter, you potentially have various forms of recourse. The first thing to do is to write the the CEO of the chain, with a long detailed letter describing the incidents, and naming names. Most CEO's don't want to deal with this kind of bad publicity, and will at least order an investigation, and make amends, if the internal investigation is in your favor. This would apply even to the late Sam Walton, if the chain is WalMart, or whoever the current CEO is. If you are a member of a protected minority, or even have dark skin, you can sue the chain on those grounds. There will be a presumption that they barred you on grounds of race or color. Then the burden of proof will be on them to show that they didn't bar you for those causes. As a form of "entrapment," you should take a witness, basically the most influential person you can get hold of that's not a family member, to the store with you to ask them why you were barred. The mayor of your town would be ideal, more llkely it would be a boss, teacher, or clergyman, but in any event, someone who knows you well. If you can get them to accuse you of stealing in front of this third party, you have the makings of a defamation case. And even if you aren't a minority, you can sue them anyway. You can demand "discovery" of all internal documents, videos, etc. relating to your case. Your lawyer will also the right to "depose" (cross examine) all offending managers.There's a good chance that something embarrassing will turn up in the process. (Many defendants settle in connection with discovery.) You might want to hire a second (libel) lawyer to teach you how to publicize the case without running into libel laws. If all this fails, the store can probably bar you, but you want to make it prohibitively expensive for them to do so, meaning that most rational people wouldn't bar you after the above. If they do, they're not rational and you're better off not using the store.	The simplest solution is to hire an attorney to do this for you. If you want to do it the hard way, you need to try to figure out why your motions were denied. For example, did you file proper motions, or did you just write on a piece of paper "I need all of Walmart's records"? Why do you think that a court will / should supply you with an Open Record (of what)? A real lawsuit is not like Judge Judy where you tell your story and hope the judge has sympathy on your plight. Did the judge say / write anything about why he is denying your requests?	Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol.	You will still have to pay A ticket can be ammended if the state so chooses (they can look up what color and model your car is). The car is probably on video. The officer can testify if they wrote your car info down somewhere else. And if they identified you inside the car as the violator, the car's color hardly matters. The idea that minor mistakes or omissions on tickets can get you off is a myth. From an actual lawyer
What if somebody copies your signature on a contract that says you can't sue them? What can the person do in such cases? And further more, what can the judge do to stop this paradox?	What if somebody copies your signature on a contract that says you can't sue them? what can the judge do to stop this paradox? I will assume that by "copying the signature" you mean "without the person's consent". In that case, the contract is void and consequently unenforceable. However, it would need to be proved that the person whose signature was unlawfully used did not intend to be a party to that contract. For a contract to be valid, the parties must have knowingly and willfully entered it, whether it is via a document or through their subsequent conduct/actions. False pretenses, identity theft, and akin offenses preclude these two essential requirements of any contract. Moreover, if the person who forged the signature is a party to the contract, then that unlawful act clearly contradicts the prerequisite "covenant of good faith and fair dealing" that is presumed in contracts. The remedies or actionability available to a person whose signature has been forged depend on the laws of each jurisdiction.	Does this amount to the employer potentially paying the employee to lie to them, to no ultimate legal effect? Or will the employee have a problem if they end up with an obligation to sign a statement that is not in agreement with reality? Neither. Contract law contemplates a party's subsequent inability to comply with the terms that were established at the formation of the contract. In the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, this is referred to as supervening impracticability. See, for instance, the Restatement at § 261. In the hypothetical scenario you outline, the loss of a company laptop renders the employee's promise (namely, "to return any company-issued computers or devices") impracticable. Instead, the circumstances may entitle the employer to restitution (by the employee) for what the employee now is literally unable to return. That would be cognizable as compliance in substance.	I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must.	If you want to take legal action, hire a lawyer. If you want to puff your chest and see if they flinch here is what you do: First let's deal with this arbitration agreement. (There is probably also a jurisdiction agreement in there, ignore that for now.) First you need to find someone to to arbitrate and a place to hold the arbitration. I suggest a babysitter, dog-walker, friend, whatever... just make sure it is a real person. You write them a letter saying that you are exercising the dispute resolution set forth in the terms and that you propose an arbitration by [insert person's name here] to take place at [location] on [date and time]. You are going to mail this to a physical address and should include a sentence asking them to let you know within 30 days if this schedule works for them. Also tell them that you prefer to communicate via email and provide an email address. Mail this letter. Just mail it plain old snail mail. In two weeks write another letter opening with a statement indicating two weeks ago you sent a letter and asked for confirmation of receipt, that you did not get receipt and would they please acknowledge. You have now puffed your chest. Pretty soon 30 days will run and you will go to the courthouse. Hopefully this will have gotten them talking to you and you can get this resolved. What I describe next is an absolute interbreeding and then slaughter of various states' court rules. I hope that more-informed stack participants edit with gusto. If you can't resolve things go to the courthouse and tell the clerk that you want to file a claim in small claims court against [company] for [dollar amount] based on breach of contract. She will give you paperwork to fill out. You will pay her the filing fee. One of the things you will fill out is a complaint, one is a summons. It might be two in one. Here is an random example. It should be a simple form. Keep it all as simple as possible but be sure to describe the facts that support your claim. You might include the fact that they ignored your requests to arbitrate. Take this complaint and summons and serve them on your defendant. To do this you will need to get someone in the company's city to serve it. There are professionals who do this, mail or email them (if possible) the summons and complaint and pay them. They will you with provide proof of service. Now you have moved past chest-puffing and you've thrown a punch. Now you have initiated a law suit. They must file an answer. This means that they must get lawyers involved. You've gotten their attention and it only cost you filing fees. They must now file an answer to your complaint. They will also likely file a motion to dismiss and do one of a few things: 1. complain that you need to arbitrate 2. It will complain that the contract requires legal action in a certain state or county 3. It will complain that regardless of the contract this is the wrong court for any host of reasons 4. they will claim that you haven't stated a valid complaint 5. some other boilerplate stuff. You might have a hearing scheduled to deal with these things, you might deal with them all on a trial date. Now go back to the clerk at the court and ask for a subpoena form. You will have this served on the defendant also - it must name a person. This is a document that requires them to come to court at a time and place. Again, lawyers get involved to quash this. Lawyers = $ so you probably got their attention. Oh yeah, you need to pay a witness fee and travel costs. You can also serve a subpoena duces tecum which requires them to bring documents that you ask for. This needs to be served on the person in change of keeping records. You will probably pay the costs of the documents. The clerk will have forms for you and will describe the process in ambiguous terms while repeating "we cannot give legal advice." You've got your documents, you have a witness coming, you are ready for trial. If you haven't had some sort of hearing already to deal with defendant's motions to get this thing dismissed, you will need to deal with that stuff now. They will claim that arbitration is required. You tell the judge that you invited them to an arbitration that you set up and they refused to come. You show all the paperwork, including your contract with the arbiter. They will argue about jurisdiction, good luck with this one but it's a whole other problem that I can't touch here! If you survive these objections you will tell the story to the judge, you will call the witness and question her, you will present your documents as evidence. In small claims court the judge (or magistrate or referee) might ask the lawyer some questions about facts. Then the judge will bang his gavel and you wait for his decision. If you win come back here and ask how to get your money.	If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible.	If you do not get anything from this "contract", and all it says is that you will pay someone a sum of money "on demand", it does not meet the basic requirements to form a contract, and in particular, there is no consideration being received by you. It would therefore not be a contract and would have zero legal force. If you do receive consideration, demonstrating that you signed the contract under duress will require specific legal advice, and you need a practicing lawyer in your jurisdiction.	It seems that you have a valid contract and he has breached it. You could sue for the value of a year's hosting in a small claims court. Whether this is worth the effort ...	No The general common law rule is that a lawsuit requires an actual dispute. This is a contrived dispute with no real-world relevance. With apparent (or even actual) authority to act on behalf of A, you assisted B with making copies. The moment you contrived this scheme and set it into motion, you consented on behalf of A to allow B to use the materials. It is like paying someone to slip and "fall" on your sidewalk so they can sue you. There is no actual dispute, and volunti fit non injuria.
Are new editions of public domain works with minor edits copyrighted? Let's say I want to copy/use a book published 200 years ago. It's definitely in the public domain. Someone publishes a new version of the book (the original copyright holder, if that matters). The new edition is exactly the same but with some grammatical corrections. Can I use a copy of this new edition - or do the grammatical changes and updates make it a new copyrighted work? I know if I could obtain a copy of the old version it would be in the public domain.	The creator of the derivative work has copyright in the derivative work. The copyright would protect only the new elements of the derivative work. Wikipedia is a good place to start. In the case of a book with updated grammar, depending on the extent of the changes, it would probably be easier to copy the original directly than to eliminate the updates from a copy of the derivative work.	If the author died in 1946 then copyright in his works expired at the end of 2016. The work is in the public domain. The relevant section of the Copyright Designs & Patents Act 1988 extends to the whole of the United Kingdom, but not Crown Dependencies or colonies. You need to be sure that the work is the author's own work. If someone else has contributed then the copyright endures until it expires 70 years after the death of the last of the authors. The same applies to art. If you want to reproduce artwork, say for a cover/sleeve design, that would also have the artist's copyright, which lasts for 70 years after that person's death. The typography of a book has copyright which lasts for 25 years from publication.	This would be considered a derivative work, which is not peritted without permission. Copyright duration varies by country but is at least the lifetime of the author plus 50 years. In France, it is 70 so Giraud's work becomes public domain in 2082. The second piece is public domain and therefore fine.	No It says right on the page you linked: These downloads are not public domain, as they are parts of content that has already been licensed and distributed. Although using these downloads may be permissible as long as the project itself falls under the rule of "Fair Use," it is ill-advised to use these downloads for any project intended for profitable gain or commercial advertisement, unless otherwise stated by Kyutwo.com.	Stack Exchange questions are not public domain, they are protected by copyright. Authors have granted a license under Subscriber Content, specifically content is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC BY-SA 4.0) As long as you comply with the terms of the CC BY-SA 4.0 license, you may copy user content.	Beethoven's Piano Sonata is public domain There will be copyright in the performance but as you are specifically hiring the musician to perform the piece for you to record, you would own the copyright in that as a work for hire provided this is stated in the contract.	Yes. This is infringement. This infringement might be excused by a "fair use" defense but it probably isn't. At a very small scale tailor to a very specific educational program, for example, for just members of a thirty person English class that they are currently taking, it might qualify as educational fair use. But I get the impression that the contemplated translation project is far more ambitious than that. The underlying content of the events reported in the news are not protected by copyright, but the language used to report those events and any translations of that language, is protected. The only reliable way to solve it is to get permission to do so from the holder of the copyright of the source of the new reports you are translating.	US copyright law does not distinguish "personal use" from "non-personal use", though it does distinguish commercial from non-commercial, where stronger sanctions can arise from commercial infringement – which can include "private financial gain". Copying a whole book which you own is copying which is what define infringement, and because of the extent of copying, it is unlikely to be found to be fair use. There is a special provision for software in 17 USC 117 that allows for making backup copies, which is not applicable to physical books. You are not a statutory archive, which is another escape hatch.
What are "non-union states"? I'm watching a lecture by Robert B Reich. He's talking about a hypothetical case in which Bob, a CEO of some corporation, wants to "move the US plant to a non-union state" to reduce wages. I understand that the benefit, for employers, is that since employees aren't organized in a union, they have less bargaining power over their employers. My question is: What are "non-union states"? Are these states (in the US) that don't allow workers to unionize? But I've read that there's a "National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)" that guarantees the right of workers to unionize, so this can't be...	You may want to ask Reich what he personally was talking about. There is a distinction within the US between states which prohibit mandatory union membership versus allow mandatory union membership. In about half of the states, a union cannot force an employer to accept a contract which obligates that a person join the union. These are known as right-to-work laws. No state requires all workers to join a union, and no state forbids the formation of unions.	It is not illegal to treat the employees differently. As long as nobody is being paid for less than the time worked, this is legal. Treating employees differently because of protected characteristics is unlawful discrimination. However, the duration you have worked there is not a protected characteristic. It is perfectly legal for the employer not to mandate new employees clock in and out. It would even be legal (if not a great idea) to hire new employees for twice as much.	See Article VI of the Constitution: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. This seems to me that it pretty clearly establishes the Constitution as taking the place of any previous laws. In particular, Article XI of the Articles is in conflict with Article IV Section 3 of the Constitution ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union"). The Constitution says that Congress's action is required to create a new state, and doesn't mention any exceptions. The Constitution's terms presumably take precedence. If Canada wanted to become a state, it would have to be admitted by Congress under Article IV Section 3.	It would not be valid in California. see California Labor Code § 2870(a). This will be state-specific and complicated.	You are probably an employee Answer these questions: Can you say “no” when the University offers you work? Or vice-versa, can they say “no” when you want to work? Can you subcontract the work? That is, can you hire someone to do what the University hired you to do? Do you control how and when you work? For example, when you break University rules are you subject to University discipline or is this treated as a breach of contract? Do you provide your own tools and equipment? Can you make a profit or loss (if you get paid by the hour the answer is “no”)? Do you take out your own public liability and/or professional indemnity insurance? If the answers to most of these questions are “no”, you’re an employee.	If you are employed at an office in Massachusetts, you are covered by Massachusetts labor law. When an Ohio company wants to operate in Massachusetts, it cannot just come in and unilaterally decide to use the labor law of another state.	There appears to be no "oppressive child labor" occurring and therefore no breach of labor laws. The definition of oppressive child labor expressly excludes employment by "a parent or a person standing in place of a parent" except in identified hazardous occupations; gardening not being one of those. Notwithstanding, schooling in California is compulsory between the ages of 6 and 18 subject to a number of exemptions which the person concerned may or may not have. If you are concerned about this you should contact the Department of Education.	This law regulates employers, and New York City only has jurisdiction over employers in New York City, so this law would not protect residents of New York City seeking employment outside of New York City. Generally speaking, the law of a jurisdiction can only apply to someone who has "personally availed themselves" of the benefits of operating in that jurisdiction such that it is foreseeable that they would be subject to the laws of that jurisdiction. An employer not operating in New York City seeking employees at large wouldn't meet that requirement. While this concept is usually applied in the context of the personal jurisdiction of a court, it is also not irrelevant to choice of law questions. As with any law, there are edge cases that could be challenging in which the applicability of the law could be unclear. For example, it isn't clear whether this rule would or would not apply to an employer looking for an employee in its Chicago office (e.g. working for the Chicago Mercantile Exchange) that conducts interviews and makes hiring decisions for the job at a job fair intended for NYU Alumni that is conducted at its New York City campus, even though it doesn't have offices for the conduct of its primary business in New York City and the staff conducting the job fair are based in Chicago. It might. But, suppose that the law did apply to the conduct of the employer at the job fair. Would it also apply to a follow up interview in Chicago, or to employees interviewing for the same job at a similar job fair on the Stanford University campus? In these cases, probably not.
Who owns an un-documented cellar/bunker? (UK Law) A relative of mine purchased a house about 35 years ago. After a few years he discovered a bricked-up doorway leading to what was probably started as a WW2 bunker. It was abandoned and empty, and judging by some of the detritus (old papers, liter and sweet wrappers) it was last used in the 1950's Over the years this cellar/bunker has been water-proofed, painted, ventilated and converted (to a high standard) into a workshop, playroom, gym, office and utility room and generally become part of the house. Here's the problem. The rooms are quite substantial, they extend under two neighbors houses, three gardens, and even under a public road. There's no documentation on the bunker/cellar, they're not mentioned in the deeds or shown on any plans. The rooms make up more than half of the living area of the entire house. My relative is likely to have to sell up and move into an old-peoples home. Here's the question, who own these rooms? The only access is through the house, but there's evidence of a 2nd bricked up doorway which probably leads to the cellar of the house house two doors down (the houses are of a similar layout). The house is in an area that's rocketed in value since it was purchased, and if the underground rooms are deemed part of my relatives house then that more than doubles the living space and probably doubles the value of the house. After having lived in and maintained these rooms for over 30 years can he claim any sort of squatters rights? Whats to stop the person who lives two doors down knocking through the wall into his entrance and claiming ownership of the parts of the rooms under his house? Update - back when the bunkers were first found my relative did attempt to research the bunkers, but didn't find anything about who/why they were built.	Who Owns The Bunker? Your relative obviously owns the cellar up to their land property boundary. The people who own the other land would have originally been the owners of that portion of the bunker, assuming that it was not permissive (if it was permissive, an easement by estoppel probably would have arisen). So, then the question is, whether the people in the chain of title to the relative acquired ownership of that portion of the bunker by adverse possession. Normally, adverse possession is acquired when someone occupies land under a claim of right that is open, notorious and hostile. While the use of the bunker would be "hostile" in this case (because the other property owners didn't have access to the bunker), it is not at all clear that it was "open and notorious". Indeed, apparently, the other land owners weren't aware that it existed. So, there would probably not be "squatter's rights" in this situation. Also, adverse possession can't run against the sovereign, so to the extent that the bunker goes under public land (e.g. a public street), that also can't be adversely possessed and that portion of the bunker remains the property of the sovereign land owner. @PaulJohnson in a comment to another post notes that: It sounds like your relative has one of the secret bunkers built for the "Auxiliary Units" who were to wage guerilla war from behind the lines after a successful German invasion. bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-37947840/… If this were the case, and the government authorized its construction, there would probably be an implied easement that would allow the bunker to be the property of the person owning the entry to it, rather than the other property owners. But, as you note, proving that case would be difficult. It might be possible to scour declassified civil defense records from the WWII era to determine if this was the case, but you might need to employ an archivists or historian to get to the bottom of this question. What if they sell it? Suppose that they do sell it. What happens? Since title is certificated in Britain, there would be no title insurance company to compensate the buyer if someone later claimed to own the property. Your relative would have a warranty of title inherent in the deed to the portion of the property that is legally described in the deed (unless the property were sold by a quitclaim deed specifically disavowing any promise that what was sold was owned by the seller), but that warranty would probably not include the portions of the bunker outside the boundaries of their lot because that is not included in the legal description of the property on the property certificate or the deed. So, if it was sold, the buyer might not have any claim against the seller if the buyer did not get good title to the entire bunker, and would have no one to sue at all, if your relatives died before litigation over ownership of the bunker arose. The buyer might sue your relatives for common law fraud if the bunker were described in the marketing materials for the sale, but if they were told that some of the bunker went outside the lot and that its legal status was unknown, or if the property was sold by a quitclaim deed, that suit would probably not be successful. Other Options Depending upon whether the owner is on good terms with his neighbors, the owner could probably buy the subsurface rights or some sort of easement to that property from the neighbors under whose land it runs, and might even be able to purchase such rights from the local council where it runs under a street. Negotiating the price would be tricky. On one hand, it doesn't hurt the other owners at all. On the other hand, they have the power to deprive your relatives of all use of the property. Often deals like this are done for nominal consideration between people on good terms with each other, but for extortionate prices when people are not on good terms with each other.	There are multiple kinds of joint ownership, centered around the question of survivorship. One possible outcome is that the deceased willed their property to some other person Smith, therefore Smith will not have A's interest in the account. Let's assume that the accounts and house are both joint tenants with right of survivorship. Then the survivor simply is the only person who has the right to access the account. However, the account probably cannot be closed, because as far as the bank knows, the deceased spouse still has an interest in the account, and will require the spouse to sign the paperwork. Therefore the surviving spouse will have to bring in paperwork to establish that the deceased spouse is deceased. Similarly, a deceased spouse can remain on the deed, but when it comes time to sell the house, it will be necessary to legally "extinguish" the deceased spouse's interest in the house. It can also complicate mortgage-refinancing or using the house as security for a loan to leave the paperwork unresolved.	Let's deal with the somewhat misguided notion of "public space": what it means and what it doesn't: "publicly owned" is not equivalent to "public space" - Camp David is "publicly owned"; it is not "public space". "privately owned" can be "public space" - the publically accessible parts of shopping malls are privately owned public spaces. "public space" does not mean you have unconditional access. Access may be limited or subject to restrictions placed on it by whoever has lawful authority over it. For example, the aforementioned shopping mall is not public when the mall is closed, roads may be closed for maintenance, street festivities or emergencies etc. So: if you are in a place where you have permission of the lawful authority to be (public spaces give you this implicitly, private spaces require explicit permission), and the lawful authority has not placed restrictions on photography, and the subject does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy (like they would in a public toilet), and the subject matter is legal (e.g. considering restrictions on sexual or commercial activities), then you can take photographs.	Close family members can stay as long as the tenant wants The tenant is entitled to "quiet enjoyment" of the property which includes living with their close relatives - spouse, de facto and children would all qualify; parents and siblings might as well. It doesn't matter if these people are children or adults. You cannot contract out of this as you are not allowed to discriminate in housing based on family situation. The tenant is also entitled to have non-relative house guests stay for as long as is reasonable. A month or so would be reasonable; longer than that and it starts to look like a sub-lease for which they would need your permission. There is generally a limit under texas law of 3 adults per bedroom but that doesn't seem to be an issue here. I also can't see where having a non-resident's mail delivered to the property is something you have a say about. I'd be very careful if I were you because it seems like you are on the wrong side of the law here.	This would not be terribly unusual and would probably be enforceable. An NDA's restrictions would almost always survive the term of the agreement and keeping what you promised not to disclose secret forever would be a pretty common default. If you inherit nuclear missile designs in an old trunk from your grandfather from when he worked for a defense contractor, you can't give them to a terrorist group either. There is not "standard" NDA, but there are provisions which are more common to include in some form and those that are less common. If it was breached, there would be a statute of limitations running from the discovery of the breach to file suit, however. Also, damages would be minimal if the confidential information became outdated, for example, because the business in question ceased to exist a couple of decades ago, and no one would spend the money to enforce it.	If it looks like a gift and sounds like a gift and there is no evidence that it should not be considered a gift, well, what else could it be? Given the value of a house and depending on jurisdiction, there may be a gift tax involved. This is normally an obligation placed on the giver, not the receiver. It is unlikely to be a concern to you but a separate check would be wise for your own sake. If all ownership documents are clear that you and you alone own (and pay regular costs of, and maintain) the house, it is extremely unlikely that any private individual can take it away from you, regardless of their relationship to you. There doesn't appear to be any legal basis for their claims; they are hoping you will bow to social and emotional pressure. Your best course of action is to call their bluff. Request a written statement (ideally through their lawyer) that identifies the reason for their claims of ownership or otherwise why the property should be transferred to them (ideally checked by your lawyer) and proceed from your lawyer's advice.	You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them.	Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A & B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A.
What law forces cookie dialogs on websites? The Web is now covered with poorly designed, intrusive and ineffective dialogs warning about cookies. Presumably this is as a result of an EU directive. Which UK law enacts this directive?	As SJuan76 mentions in a comment, the first cookie-related EU law was: Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws This being an EU Directive, it required transcription into UK law to be valid in the UK. This was effected by: The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) (Amendment) Regulations 2011 This is a statutory instrument made under the European Communities Act 1972, and came into force on 26 May 2011.	Each directives page on eur-lex has a "national transposition" page. For example, directive 2009/65/EC, concerning UCITS, is available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:32009L0065. There is a navigation box at the top left with several relevant pages: Text Document information Procedure National transposition Summary of legislation (Before the recent site redesign, these were shown as tabs across the top of the page, so for the lack of a better term, I will call these "tabs.") The Document information tab shows, among other metadata, relationships with other EU acts. One useful section on this page is the All consolidated versions section, which is a set of links to consolidated versions of the document, indicated by date. The answer to your question is the National transposition tab, which shows "National transposition measures communicated by the Member States." It is worth noting the disclaimer: The member states bear sole responsibility for all information on this site provided by them on the transposition of EU law into national law. This does not, however, prejudice the results of the verification by the Commission of the completeness and correctness of the transposition of EU law into national law as formally notified to it by the member states. The collection National transposition measures is updated weekly. The list of national acts is in the form of links, which lead to pages that seem designed to present the text of the national legislation, but in the examples I have checked say nothing more than "Text is not available." Perhaps there are some instances, or will be in the future, where these contain links to national legal information sites. As it is, there is enough information to enable one to search the national sites to find the relevant legislation.	Not all cookies require consent. The current answers are in WP 29 Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption - 00879/12/EN WP 194. This WP29 Opinion is based upon Directive 2002/58/EC ("ePrivacy Directive"), and not GDPR, which is current law for this matter until other guidelines are adopted pursuant to GDPR or until the awaited "ePrivacy Regulation" is finally adopted. 1. General rules This Opinion states 2 critera for cookie consent exemption: (...) exempted from the requirement of informed consent, if they satisfy one of the following criteria: CRITERION A: the cookie is used “for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network”. CRITERION B: the cookie is “strictly necessary in order for the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide the service”. 2. User preferences The first two types of cookies would be, as I understand, for the purpose of remembering user preference in how it interacts with the Website. Such types of cookies can fall under criterion B, under certain conditions. Section 3.6 "UI customization cookies" explains the conditions that such type of cookies have to meet so that the consent exemption can apply, in particular: User interface customization cookies are used to store a user’s preference regarding a service across web pages and not linked to other persistent identifiers such as a username. They are only set if the user has explicitly requested the service to remember a certain piece of information, for example, by clicking on a button or ticking a box. They may be session cookies or have a lifespan counted in weeks or months, depending on their purpose. (...) These customization functionalities are thus explicitly enabled by the user of an information society service (e.g. by clicking on button or ticking a box) although in the absence of additional information the intention of the user could not be interpreted as a preference to remember that choice for longer than a browser session (or no more than a few additional hours). As such only session (or short term) cookies storing such information are exempted (...). The addition of additional information in a prominent location (e.g. “uses cookies” written next to the flag) would constitute sufficient information for valid consent to remember the user’s preference for a longer duration, negating the requirement to apply an exemption in this case If you need to request consent, then WP 29 Working Document 02/2013 providing guidance on obtaining consent for cookies - 1676/13/EN WP 208 contains guidance. 3. Cookie Preference cookie The last type of cookie you mention, being the Cookie Preference cookie, would be, as I understand, only used as a purely technical mean to store and retrieve (transmit) the user's explicit choices preferences, and would most probably fall clearly under criterion A and/or B.	Generally speaking, British courts, when making judgments on constitutional matters regard themselves as interpreting existing law, rather than creating new law. But technically speaking, any legal precedent established by a court can be interpreted as "creation of new law". For the avoidance of doubt, the sources of law in the law of England and Wales include: statute law, constitutional convention, prerogative powers, common law, and legal commentary. I may have missed some out and may edit those in later. Common law refers to the judgments of courts. So here we come to your question: Several legal principles and precedents were established by this judgment, and you may consider this new "law": The court held that prerogative powers are justiciable - courts can limit the scope of these powers The prerogative power in question had limits. It can be limited when its use has an extreme detrimental effect on the democracy of the UK and parliamentary sovereignty. What is important with point one is that the court recognised that this power has always existed, stemming as far back as the bill of rights in the 17th century. As such, the court is implying that it is creating nothing new, but recognising a law that has always existed. You will see a LOT of this when studying constitutional law.	Are UK Tier 4 rules law? Yes. The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (All Tiers) (England) Regulations 2020 (SI 2020/1374) has been amended by SI 2020/1611. Unfortunately, the amendment is only available as pdf at the moment and I can't copy-and-paste it on my phone for you. SI 2020/1374 and all subsequent amendments may be found here... https://www.legislation.gov.uk/primary+secondary?title=Coronavirus%20all%20tiers ETA: The Introductory Text to SI 2020/1374 states: The Secretary of State makes the following Regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 45C(1), (3)(c), (4)(b), (4)(d), 45F(2) and 45P of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/22/contents	Specific laws or regulations relating to metadata are unnecessary, and possibly counter-productive. UK data protection law is centered around the GDPR, which is largely principle-based – instead of providing a checklist of very concrete compliance measures, it is the data controller's responsibility to determine appropriate measures in order to achieve the data protection principles. For example, this obligation is expressed in Art 24 GDPR: Taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure and to be able to demonstrate that processing is performed in accordance with this Regulation. […] What risks exist for what activities is extremely contextual. Leaking information through metadata is a potential risk, but it's not a risk in every context. Thus, data controllers should consider whether metadata could pose a privacy problem in their workflows, but they are not necessarily required to redact such metadata. This provision of the UK GDPR is already enforceable, but it would need a case by case analysis to determine whether the risk analysis and selection of technical and organizational measures have been conducted incorrectly. The documents you linked are a HMRC internal manual. These are not normative – they do not bind other organizations. Instead, the existence of these manuals is an expression of HRMC's own obligation to consider various risks and implement appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs). Of course, other organizations could use such manuals as a starting point for their own analysis.	See this working paper by Silvia Ferreri for an excellent write-up of this issue. The key point is that because each linguistic version of legislation is equally authentic, none can be taken as the authentic version. The court then resolves this by applying two principles: comparing the linguistic versions and giving deference to legislative intent. This is necessarily a case-by-case analysis. The paper calls attention to Case C‑445/09 arising from the Netherlands, where 9 different linguistic versions are compared and shows that the straightforward Dutch reading of the legislation in question isn't compatible with the other linguistic versions or legislative intent. In paragraph 25, the decision also contains a concise summary of the general principle of interpreting laws in multiple languages: According to settled case-law, the need for uniform application and, accordingly, for uniform interpretation of an EU measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim which the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see, inter alia, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Joined Cases C‑261/08 and C‑348/08 Zurita García and Choque Cabrera [2009] ECR I‑10143, paragraph 54; and Case C‑473/08 Eulitz [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).	While German law indeed requires providing correct contact information it does not require the recipient to answer queries. It is there so that you can submit legal notifications. In your case I wouldn't be so sure that the information is not correct. However, even if the contact information is incorrect, there is not much you can do about it. This is reserved to the following groups by § 8 Abs. 3 UWG: every competitor; associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51); Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. Unless you are a competitor you are out of luck. The hoster or other providers can't do anything and don't need to, as they are not required to check legality of their user's websites. It doesn't really matter where you are by the way for these laws.
Why should tech firms get away with publishing child pornography and facilitating child sex grooming rings? I read a recent newspaper report that the UK police force were dealing with roughly 80,000 cases of online child sex grooming. If newspapers, or publishing firms published child pornography there were be a massive uproar. Likewise with tv stations and film studios. However tech firms it seems can get away with publishing child pornography and facilitating such grooming rings almost with impunity. Their argument is generally that they provide a resource and can't be held responsible for the behaviour of users. They say that they facilitate 'sharing' whilst eliding over the very visible fact that bad practises can be shared too. Surely that is an argument that is wearing very thin now. If it takes more man-power than they have readily to hand - well surely they should hire more people. They make enough money as it is. I'll believe Mark Zuckerbergs catchism on 'sharing' when he substantially shares out his massive fortune. Is there any kind of legal pressure that can be applied on tech firms so that they take a much more proactive line in moderation rather than simply relying on the unpaid and untrained labour of thousands of people? If not, does this mean that the legal profession needs to start looking at how such laws can be framed?	Social media platforms are not publishers under UK law (at present), as such, they are not legally responsible for the content they host providing that there is a mechanism for alerting them to infringing material and that, when alerted, they remove it. As to "why", that is a political question.	In the UK, no offence is committed, however many public locations cite the Data Protection Act 1998 as a reason to stop people taking pictures. DPA does not mention this topic at all, and is a red herring (however informing the location of this is unlikely to help, I have discovered) In fact, in the UK, the only laws that appear to exist cover either specific locations and properties (eg military installations) or using photography to take pictures of individuals in areas where they have an expectation of privacy. The Photographer's Rights Guide published by digitalcameraworld in 2012 is still current as far as I can see. It has this specific guidance: Photographers Rights: Taking Pictures of People in Public Are you breaking any law when you’re taking pictures of people in public? Probably not, but the position under UK law is uncertain. There are currently no general privacy laws under UK law, but the UK courts must take into account the European Convention on Human Rights, which gives everyone the right to respect for their private and family life. As this is an area of law that has been developing rapidly over the last few years, it is hard to be certain what will constitute an infringement. The key issue is whether the place the image is taken is one where a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, it has been suggested that the right of privacy of a child could be infringed by publishing a photo of them with their parents in a public street. It is therefore advisable to be careful when taking photos intended for publication, even where the subject matter is in a public place. Failure to obtain a model release for the use of an image will certainly make it harder to sell the picture to stock libraries. Photographing children The same laws apply to adult and child subjects, but a child does not have the legal capacity to consent and a parent or guardian must therefore do so on their behalf. Be aware that schools, leisure centres and places where children and adults gather usually have their own photography restrictions. Although decent photos of children (see our tips for better pictures of babies, children and teenagers) taken in a public place may be fine for non-commercial use, seek permission from the child’s parents or guardians and don’t shoot covertly with a long lens. For commercial images, you’ll need to get a model release signed by the parents. Also read the section on the powers of police and security guards.	We can start by looking at the text of the law. US federal law 18 USC § 2252A(a)(3)(B) says: Any person who... knowingly... advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the material or purported material is, or contains— (i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct... shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). I'm not sure how much posting the name without the link would protect you, given that you posted it with the explicit intent that someone would go and look at it. On the other hand, your intent was not to "advertise" or "promote" it, and you didn't actually "distribute" the material.	There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.	It's hard to prove a negative, and I'm not sure which specific part of the quoted Terms you object, to, but it specifically states that content access may be done to: Comply with the law Protect its customers; and Protect the security of its business; and Protect its business interests. It's unlikely that access of information to comply with the law is illegal. At least one EU directive, Directive 95/46/EC, sets limits on the collection and use of personal information. We're concerned with the first condition for lawful data processing, and the second principle of data quality. Data processing is only lawful if the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party; or processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; or processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party; or processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interest pursued by the controller or by the third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection. The principles of data quality, which must be implemented for all lawful data processing activities, are the following: personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully, and collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes. They must also be adequate, relevant and not excessive, accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date, must not be stored for longer than necessary and solely for the purposes for which they were collected; special categories of processing: it is forbidden to process personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. This provision comes with certain qualifications concerning, for example, cases where processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or for the purposes of preventive medicine and medical diagnosis. So, let's say that someone has given their consent. It'd be at least a little questionable whether the inspection of private information could mean that they access personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. I'm a bit less clear on US laws, but you'd probably look for laws around Personal Identifying Information, as that's where a lot of focus has been.	To answer the last part of the question: Jurisdiction would be where the copied media is being producted and where it is being consumed/sold. Moving media from one jurisdiction with ineffectual protections to another jurisdiction is part of product piracy. The scheme you suggest might shield the company producing the counterfeit goods, leaving the importers holding the bag. If the importers and manufacturers are controlled by the same person, courts in jurisdictions with strong protection might hold that person liable for the whole criminal enterprise. There is a widespread assumption that the internet is 'beyond national laws.' That is wrong. Enforcement may be difficult in some cases, but the laws apply. If you try to make profits by skirting the edges of law, you need really good, really professional legal advice.	The words "proprietary format" are important. Are you sure the format is proprietary? If it is, then it's likely protected in which case they might have grounds to sue (but that does not mean they would definetly win). If the format is not proprietary, and so long as you don't share data which is proprietary then I believe you fine. I'm not a lawyer - but I cite GIF files as an example. They were still protected by the US and some other countries until at least the late 90s and there were various threats to open source linux companies who shared code that used the file format. I'm not aware of anything other than threats and never heard of any company being sued, let alone winning or losing. Another example that comes to mind is the RedHat ISO format. My understanding is RedHat could not stop anyone from sharing open source, but they could prevent folks from sharing the format they assembled and shared the open source. Again, I am not sure if it was ever tested in any court of law anywhere.	18 U.S. Code § 2252 defines a crime and punishment for knowingly transporting, or reproducing for distribution by any means, visual depictions involving the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Here are some sample jury instructions that rephrase this and give definitions for each of these terms. Here are some others (at p. 469). This law review article discusses the knowledge requirement of this statute. It would be an easy argument that the operators of the intermediary nodes do not have the requisite knowledge of the material flowing over their networks and computers to be implicated by section 2252, especially when they are broken down into chunks that can only be re-assembled at the destination. United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006) is an example of a case where a defendant was found to not have the requisite knowledge of child pornography that was found in his browser's cache folders. These were complete files, no assembly required. However, the court said: where a defendant lacks knowledge about the cache files, and concomitantly lacks access to and control over those files, it is not proper to charge him with possession and control of the child pornography images located in those files An IPFS user has no more knowledge of the pieces being passed through their computer than this defendant did of his cache (unless of course they are the source or destination).
Do short quiz questions on copyrighed material need permission? If I make a question and answer game based on a mix of popular licences such as Harry Potter, Marvel, Lord Of The Rings and so on, do I need rightsholder permission?	In the United States, you almost certainly do. The most on-point case is Castle Rock Entertainment Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2nd Cir. 1998). That was a case dealing with Seinfeld, where a publisher printed and sold The Seinfeld Aptitude Test, a book of Seinfeld trivia. The publisher argued that the questions and answers were simply unprotected facts about the show, not copyrightable expression, but the court concluded that the facts were merely restatements of the expressive works of the show's creators. Although the book was in some senses transformative, the court found that the transformation was "slight to non-existent": [T]he fact that The SAT so minimally alters Seinfeld's original expression in this case is further evidence of The SAT's lack of transformative purpose. To be sure, the act of testing trivia about a creative work, in question and answer form, involves some creative expression... However, the work as a whole, drawn directly from the Seinfeld episodes without substantial alteration, is far less transformative than other works we have held not to constitute fair use. A major part of the problem in that case was that the facts suggested that the publisher was not looking to create an educational or critical work revolving around Seinfeld, but rather to provide Seinfeldesque entertainment to Seinfeld fans. There is some discussion in Castle Rock suggesting that certain behind-the-scenes facts might change the analysis, but from what you're saying, it seems doubtful that you'd have a different outcome.	The notice has a lot to do with legacy requirements in the United States to claim the copyright to a work. Up until 1989, the copyright notice was required. Today, the statements are mainly maintained to protect against "innocent infringement" which might reduce what a content owner can get in court. What exactly do those terms entail? That the owner stated owns all rights and you may do nothing with the content. My biggest concern is this: by writing that, is the company claiming to own everything on the website, even potentially copyrighted user-submitted material? That's exactly what they are doing. Depending on the terms of the specific site, content contributors generally either assign copyright to the site owner or license the content in a way that allows the site owner to do exactly what they want with it. Site creators with the smarts or money to do it right/get someone to do it right usually state something like: Copyright [Site Owner] and contributors. Other sites (like this one) state specifically what they hold the copyright to: site design / logo © 2015 Stack Exchange Inc THIS IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE. CONSULT AN ATTORNEY REGARDING YOUR SPECIFIC SITUATION.	It depends on what information you are sharing, how you got it, and what rights the business asserts over the information. For example, if it is content created by the business and they claim copyright protection you can only use it without their permission in accordance with Fair use exceptions. If you obtain the information through some limited/conditional access agreement you would be subject to the terms of that agreement. As always: If you want a legal opinion specific to your use case you need to consult a lawyer in your jurisdiction.	Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing.	Yes. For example, corporations can own copyright. They may own copyright after assignment (this is true across much of the commonwealth and in the U.S.). In some jurisdictions, when a work is made for hire, the employer may be deemed the author and initial owner (e.g. U.S.) or just the initial owner (e.g. Canada).	The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.	This is going to depend on several things. First of all, do you have a lawful, licensed copy of the SDK? My understanding is that Nintendo only licensed the SDK to selected game companies. If what you have is an unauthorized copy, you do not have the legal right even to use it. If what you have is properly licensed, then you do. Or is what you have an unofficial SDK created by someone other than Nintendo? Secondly, what does the license agreement that comes with the SDK provide? Does it require developers to register with Nintendo? If it does, you will need to comply. Nintendo cannot prevent others from writing programs designed to run on their hardware. But they can control who uses their development software, if they choose to. You cannot reproduce in your game any of Nintendo's copyrighted software (or anyone else's) without permission. That applies even more strongly if you intend to sell the software. But you can use any development software for which you have a valid license in whatever ways its license permits. I would expect this includes creating games. It would include selling games that you create that do not use any of Nintendo's code, unless there is a specific provision forbidding that in the license agreement.	Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...).
In Florida, can a 24 year old have relationship with a 17 year old if their relationship started a year earlier? In Florida, the age of consent is 18, but there is an exception that allows for people up to the age of 23 to have a relationship with someone 16 years and older. (1) A person 24 years of age or older who engages in sexual activity with a person 16 or 17 years of age commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. As used in this section, “sexual activity” means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another; however, sexual activity does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose. (2) The provisions of this section do not apply to a person 16 or 17 years of age who has had the disabilities of nonage removed under chapter 743. See the law here What happens if during such a legal relationship, one of the parties turns 24. For example, a 23 year old dating a 16 year old. When the 23 year old turns 24, do they suddenly by law have to break up an existing relationship? If that is the case, this would be a very strange law.	Just below the section you quoted it says: (3) The victim’s prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a prosecution under this section. There is no stated provision for the case you mention. I suspect that the law would apply. Whether the authorities would choose to prosecute in such a case is a very different question. There might be caselaw of this subject. I wouldn't know. If this is more than hypothetical, i would urge consulting a lawyer with local knowledge of criminal practice.	No. According to the Section 18 of the U.S. Code, § 2251: (a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct,shall be punished as provided under subsection (e) [...] and a minor is defined (Section 18 of the U.S. Code, § 2256) as "any person under the age of eighteen years". As such, you cannot be considered a pedophile. However, if you have sexual intercourses with animals, depending on the State laws on the matter, you might be charged with bestiality or similar offences.	As Tom says and these guys reiterate (I'm quoting those guys), "Employment relationships are presumed to be “at-will” in all U.S. states except Montana. The U.S. is one of a handful of countries where employment is predominantly at-will". Montana (Dept. of Labor and Industry) also states that they are the only ones in the US like that. Montana Code 39-2-904(1)(b) states that a discharge is unlawful if "the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of employment". (2)(a) then states that "During a probationary period of employment, the employment may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the employee on notice to the other for any reason or for no reason". There is a presumptive 6 month probationary period in case an employer say nothing, but it could be longer or shorter (it can be 7 years for university professors, and I don't find anything in the code preventing an employer from setting the probationary period at 50 years).	First of all, Sally can't charge Bob, or anyone else. She can file a complaint with the police, or with the District Attorney. It may or may not be investigated, and if it is, charges may or may not be brought, and she has no control over any of that, although she may be able to use persuasion or political pressure to influence the decision. In New York, persuading a child to make pornography is a class C felony. Possessing child pornography is a class E felony. Promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child is a class D felony. Disseminating obscene material to a minor is a class E felony, unless the defendant solicits the child to engage in sexual activity, in which case it's a class D felony. All of these have 5-year statutes of limitation. (N.Y. Pen. Law § § 70.00, 80.00, 235.21, 235.22, 263.05, 263.10, 263.11, 263.16.) I can't find any NY law that makes it a crime to ask for a naked image of a child and be refused, although there may well be one. Note that it is not a crime in NY to posses sexual or nude pictures of a person 16 or older, although it is a crime to create them. There are also federal laws against child pornography, but federal policy is not to bring federal cases where the accused are under 18 and a state case could be brought. In fact, the federal authorities generally do not bring cases except against major producers when a state case can be brought instead. But that is a matter of policy, not law. NY has a pre-trial diversion program for teen-ages involved in "sexting". They can agree to take special classes, and avoid a criminal conviction or any jail time. The court must approve candidates individually for this program, but it is widely used. In the given scenario, the statute of limitations would not have expired (if the law I couldn't find makes this a felony, misdemeanor SoL is 2 years). In theory bob could be charged and tried for his solicitation. If charges were levied, the prosecution would need to prove at trial that Bob had made the request, and that it was serious, not a joke. It would also need to persuade a jury to convict when no sexual image had ever been transmitted. In practice I doubt that a case would be pursued after several years. That would depend entirely on the DA, or the relevant assistant DA who handled the case. Nothing would legally prevent such a case that I know of.	In 1945? Not a chance. Basically, the only sexual crime that existed then was rape. In 2019? In New York, it appears the answer is still no. All sexual crimes require “sexual contact”: 3. “Sexual contact” means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. It includes the touching of the actor by the victim, as well as the touching of the victim by the actor, whether directly or through clothing, as well as the emission of ejaculate by the actor upon any part of the victim, clothed or unclothed. While lips may be considered “intimate parts”, there would appear to be no intention “of gratifying sexual desire”.	So, in England and Wales your son assaulted Mario. (From Wikipedia: "Assault is committed if one intentionally or recklessly causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence". I expect Mario expected your son was going to thump him, and that would certainly be unlawful.) You were both trespassers on the property; however it sounds like there was nobody there who could require you to leave, so that probably doesn't matter. Both of these would be true whatever the age of your daughter. Finally, in England and Wales, if you had forced your 16-year old daughter to come with you against her will, you would both have been guilty of kidnapping. (16 is the age at which children become independent in terms of deciding where to go.) She can choose to leave home and live with her boyfriend, and there is nothing you can do to stop her. Edit: The question did not originally mention a jurisdiction. This is an area where the legal situation is likely to be very jurisdiction dependent.	This policy would appear to have a disparate impact on workers age 40 and older, given that most workers obtain degrees in their 20s and few obtain a second degree later. Workers age 40 and older are protected from employment discrimination under the ADEA. Policies with a disparate impact may be considered discriminatory, but not necessarily. The EEOC rule as of 2012 is that such a policy is not illegal if it is based on a "reasonable factor other than age". It is not clear to me whether the 10-year degree policy would pass this test, and it might depend on how the employer justified the rule. Here is the discussion from the EEOC's FAQ: 8.What determines whether an employment practice is based on Reasonable Factors Other than Age? An employment practice is based on an RFOA when it was reasonably designed and administered to achieve a legitimate business purpose in light of the circumstances, including its potential harm to older workers. Example 1: If a police department decided to require applicants for patrol positions to pass a physical fitness test to be sure that the officers were physically able to pursue and apprehend suspects, it should know that such a test might exclude older workers more than younger ones. Nevertheless, the department's actions would likely be based on an RFOA if it reasonably believed that the test measured the speed and strength appropriate to the job, and if it did not know, or should not have known, of steps that it could have taken to reduce harm to older workers without unduly burdening the department. The rule emphasizes the need for an individualized consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular situation. It includes the following list of considerations relevant to assessing reasonableness: The extent to which the factor is related to the employer's stated business purpose; The extent to which the employer defined the factor accurately and applied the factor fairly and accurately, including the extent to which managers and supervisors were given guidance or training about how to apply the factor and avoid discrimination; The extent to which the employer limited supervisors' discretion to assess employees subjectively, particularly where the criteria that the supervisors were asked to evaluate are known to be subject to negative age-based stereotypes; The extent to which the employer assessed the adverse impact of its employment practice on older workers; and The degree of the harm to individuals within the protected age group, in terms of both the extent of injury and the numbers of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the employer took steps to reduce the harm, in light of the burden of undertaking such steps. Here is the full text of the rule, 77 FR 19080.	In California, you can get a driver's license at age 16, as well as a motorcycle license. This is similar to the minimum age in most other states. According to this article, California law generally permits minors to own property. There is a restriction for motor vehicles: Vehicle Code section 15500 says that a minor can only own a motor vehicle if they have a valid driver's license. But Lewis certainly could have satisfied this. So it would have been entirely possible and legal for Lewis to own, and ride, a motorcycle at age 16, provided that he had satisfied all the requirements (driver training, etc) and been issued a license.
What has been the largest class suit action in the USA by payout? What has been the largest payout in a class suit action against a corporation in the USA due to deliberate corporate malfeasance of whatever kind?	At $206 billion, the largest ever was the Tobacco Master Settlement in 1998.	The complaint is available online. In fact, it asks for more than 1.6 billion, because it doesn't suggest any amounts for certain categories. The amounts that are specified include things such as the cost of providing security in the wake of death threats they received. Starting on page 136, they ask for General compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial, Damages of not less than $600,000,000 for lost profits, not less than $1,000,000,000 for lost enterprise value, not less than $600,000 for security expenses, and not less than $700,000 for expenses to fight the disinformation campaign waged against them, Punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial, Pre- and post-judgment interest, and Expenses and attorneys' fees. Justification for the amounts in the second item is found in the complaint.	Civil lawsuits seeking damages for torture or similar grave misconduct by corporations outside the United States are often brought under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act (a.k.a. ATS) in U.S. federal courts. Multiple cases brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act have involved claims that U.S. corporations, through their agents carrying out company policy, tortured people outside the U.S., or were complicit in conduct that caused someone to be tortured by a government. One example is the case of Wang Xiaoning v. Yahoo! In 2007, the World Organization for Human Rights USA filed a lawsuit against Yahoo! on behalf of Chinese dissidents Wang Xiaoning and Shi Tao (Guao Quingsheng), claiming jurisdiction under the ATS. According to the complaint, Wang and Shi Tao used Yahoo! accounts to share pro-democracy material, and a Chinese subsidiary of Yahoo! gave the Chinese government identifying information that allowed authorities to identify and arrest them. The Complaint alleges that the plaintiffs were subjected to "torture, cruel, inhuman, or other degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, and forced labor." Yahoo! settled the case in November 2007 for an undisclosed amount of money, and it agreed to cover the plaintiff's legal costs as a part of the settlement. In a statement released after the settlement was made public, Yahoo! said that it would "provide 'financial, humanitarian and legal support to these families' and create a separate 'humanitarian relief fund' for other dissidents and their families." Corporations can also be prosecuted criminally for crimes. Pacific Gas & Electric was recently convicted of manslaughter in a California State Court related to deaths caused by wildfires that were caused by reckless disregard to maintenance and safety by the corporation. The fines were largely waived in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings with the permission of the prosecution, in order to free up funds to pay compensatory damages to parties prevailing in civil lawsuits and funds to comply with orders from utility industry regulators in the state. Arthur Anderson, then one of the "Big Six" accounting firms in the United States was convicted of fraud related criminal charges in relation to the collapse of Enron, an oil company for which it was an accountant, that resulted in the demise of the firm, even though the conviction was ultimately reversed on appeal by the U.S. Supreme Court. I am not aware of a case in which a U.S. corporation has been prosecuted criminally for authorizing its agents to torture someone or being complicit in torture, but it certainly could be done (and probably has been done). The federal Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and parallel state statutes, are specifically designed to authorize both criminal and civil actions against corporation or de facto entities engaged in criminal activity. The statute was designed to target organized crime activities, particularly those involving corporations used as fronts for criminal activity, and in the criminal context, the focus of prosecutions has largely continued to be on old school mafia type organized crime gangs and cartels. But private civil actions authorized by RICO against companies engaged in a pattern of criminal activity usually involve allegations of a pattern of fraud and other forms of white collar crime. This would be a likely statute to invoke in a criminal case alleging that a company had engaged in a pattern and practice of torturing people. In practice, the difference between a civil lawsuit in which compensatory and punitive damages may be imposed, and a criminal prosecution of a corporation, in which fines and restitution may be imposed, is subtle indeed when it comes to the remedies available in each case, even though procedurally, the two kinds of legal proceedings are very different, which is why usually a civil lawsuit, rather than a criminal conviction, would be the legal tool of choice when a corporation engaged in conduct, through its agents, which is criminal in nature. Also, it is possible, but harder, to prosecute officers, employees and agents of corporations in addition to the corporations themselves, for criminal conduct. Indeed, this is the usual approach. But it is harder to convict an individual because you have to show that the individual had the requisite intent and was personally involved in the criminal conduct. This typically requires access to internal communications in a firm which can be difficult to obtain in a criminal proceeding that doesn't have as much pre-trial discovery, and can be difficult to establish because responsibility within a large corporation is often diffuse. Generally speaking, prosecutors have seen the Arthur Anderson case as an unjust one and a cautionary tale that encourages them to think twice before prosecuting a major U.S. corporation criminally, rather than merely bringing a civil lawsuit against it.	In contract law in the United States, this is a "liquidated damages" clause. It provides that when one side breaches the contract, it has to pay a certain amount of money to make up for it. Normally this is done where it is difficult to calculate the actual damages in the event of a breach, or where the parties would rather avoid calculating the actual damages--a common example is where you put in an earnest money deposit on a house and then forfeit the earnest money if you do not buy. However, there are restrictions on what kind of damages are permitted. Notably, a "penalty" usually refers to an unreasonable amount that is unenforceable as against public policy. It would ordinarily be unreasonable to make someone pay a hundred million dollar penalty for breaking a ten thousand dollar contract, for example. Liquidated damages clauses frequently say "this is not a penalty" and "the parties agree this is reasonable" to make it harder to invalidate them on public policy grounds. Instead, if the liquidated damage payment is a payment meant to reflect actual damages that are just hard to calculate, it is much more likely to be enforceable. You would need to research liquidated damages and penalties in the state whose law governs the contract to determine whether the particular clause is permissible under state law. See https://www.google.com/search?q=restatement+of+contracts+penalty&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8	I reported this to my bank as soon as I found out, and Chase said that the money would be reimbursed once they completed their investigation (within 10 business days). Chase was likely indicating that the money will be reimbursed within 10 business days of completing their investigation; not 10 business days from the date you told the that someone forged checks on your account. This would make sense when you think about it, as they need to make sure that you were not complicit in the crime (you would be surprised how many people have had someone cash multiple checks from their account only to split the money with them and file a claim for fraudulent transfer/forgery). Further, checks are a negotiable instrument, unlike a credit/debit card, where specific protections exist pursuant to its terms and conditions of use. You have a duty to keep a negotiable instrument safe, and while most banks will reimburse you if it can be established that you had no involvement and you were not grossly negligent in the keeping of the instruments, it is a different animal in and of itself. It has now been 13 business days, and I have checked on the status twice and was told both times that there had been no status update, and they were unable to provide an updated ETA. Unless your bank indicated in the disclosures of the checking account application and acceptance documentation that in the event of a stolen check you will be reimbursed in X amount of days, they have the absolute right to complete their investigation before reimbursing any funds to your account. It's a fairly large amount of money, and I need to get it back as soon as possible. I'm trying to figure out if I have legal footing here. Does the law protect me from this type of fraud? And if so, does it require the bank to respond within any particular timeframe? Federal banking regulations provide broad protections to consumers when it comes to fraud involving credit/debit cards, as these are easily stolen from all sorts of means. That said, checks do not carry the same protections, although oftentimes some. National banks may be required to reimburse customers for forged checks. However, based on individual circumstances, the bank can investigate to determine if the customer is entitled to a reimbursement. There is not duty to reimburse until the investigation is complete. This is why I think you've potentially misconstrued what they said about how long it would take. They cannot promise a time certain when they don't know how long the investigation will take. Whether the bank is liable for the customer's loss depends on the specific circumstances of the case. Generally, a bank is liable for accepting a check that has been forged, altered, or improperly endorsed. However, if the bank can prove two things — that it accepted the check in good faith and exercised ordinary care and diligence in handling the transaction — it may not be liable. If your actions — the way the check or checkbook was handled, issued, completed, or made payable — contributed to the making of the forgery, you may be at least partially liable. Generally, the bank will require you to complete an affidavit. It may also request that you file a police report. ** Addition: I forgot to mention that if the checks were not "cashed" (i.e. filled out to cash or cashed in person), but rather were presented to a 3rd party for payment in receipt of goods or services, you are also going to need to contact those individuals or businesses (their name is on the check) and alert them to the fraud, and allow them to contact their banks, lest you will be assessed fees by them for insufficient funds if your bank later takes the money back as a result of the investigation. Also, in the event the checks were recreated rather than stolen, or if you don't know exactly how many were stolen, you are going to need to close your account while you wait for the investigation to bear fruit (hopefully), and open a new account, as you now have a duty to account for any and all checks stolen at that event (so, if you know a book is out there and 10 checks have cleared you know there are 15 remaining that the bank is not going to cover if you don't take steps to protect yourself). One would think they've asked you this and have already done something to prevent further checks from coming in, but if not, you need to get on it. Also, you may want to hire your own investigator if you have the funds to do so. While stolen cards are often strangers, stolen checks (unless it's one washed check) is nearly always someone you know.	It has to be 'liquidated damages', since a penalty clause is unenforceable. It has to have a reasonable relation to the party's legitimate interest. The point is that it has to represent a good faith estimate of the actual damage.	You didn't consent to being ripped off. You did however fail to grasp the terms under which you were permitted to park on their property, and you failed to pursue an alternative (such as looking for change; using a credit card). It is possible that you should have known that this was a no-change-given machine, since one can often see that there is no mechanism on these machines whereby you can actually get change. However, if you have clear proof that you owed $6 and you paid $10, then 4 of those dollars are properly yours, and there is a reasonable chance that you could prevail in a suit against them. There is even a greater chance that they would refund the difference, just as a sensible business practice. "Exact change" is legal and can even be the law, especially in government-run transportation systems.	Go to know that you live in Washington. Per RCW 49.48.210, They must give you written notice with their evidence. Per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, you can (and should) request a review of the employer findings. Since the employer gave you the money, and you nor they saw any error until now, you may be protected under estoppel (WAC 388-02-0495). In the response letter, I would write something along the lines of " [Company Name] has paid IAW my expected rate and acted correctly when I received my money. I have also spent the money in good faith. Indeed, I still cannot see that any overpayment has actually happened. Please send me exact details why you believe that I have been overpaid, and why you believe that estoppel does not apply. Until this manner has been resolved per RCW 49.48.210, section 3, I request that you continue to pay my wages at normal rate for my time. I do not accept liability for the actions or inactions of [company name] and the claimed overpayment." Get receipt that the employer received the notice. Because it is in review, they don't have the right to garnish your wages. Challenge everything at the review. If something was changed or edited, challenge that. I would open up a new thread if they did that much. Best of luck
Did Ms. Mapp have a right to take the search warrant? In Mapp v. Ohio: She demanded to see the search warrant. A paper, claimed to be a warrant, was held up by one of the officers. She grabbed the "warrant" and placed it in her bosom. A struggle ensued in which the officers recovered the piece of paper and as a result of which they handcuffed appellant because she had been "belligerent" [p645] in resisting their official rescue of the "warrant" from her person. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/367/643 If you read on in the opinion, the police were obviously very brutal in their effort to get the "warrant" back, but were they right in doing so? Did Ms. Mapp have a right to hold the search warrant, or only to see it?	She's supposed to get her own copy of the warrant. Ohio Criminal Rule 41(D)(1): Search warrant. The officer taking property under the warrant shall give to the person from whom or from whose premises the property was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken, or shall leave the copy and receipt at the place from which the property was taken. Similar language is used in the federal rules and probably in most other state Similar language is used in the federal rules and probably in most other states. Obviously, it's not ideal to snatch the paperwork out of an officer's hands, but she was entitled to a copy.	Police can lie However, in the United States they have to read you your Miranda warning (most other democratic countries have similar warnings): You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time. They have told you everything they are required to tell you - effectively “we are not on your side.” After that, they can lie their asses off. Of course, they wouldn’t ask you for a DNA sample - they’d ask you if you’d like a glass of water. Then they’ll take the DNA from that.	There are three kinds of restraining orders in Minnesota, but what they have in common is that a person petitions the court to order a person to e.g. stop the harassment and have no further contact. This order if granted by the court will be served on the respondent, and all actual restraining orders are valid. A forgery which was not actually ordered by the court is not a restraining order, and of course it is not legally valid. But you don't seem to be claiming that this is a forgery. In principle, a person can obtain a copy of a restraining order under The Minnesota Data Practices Act. However, there are limits on access to certain records. Minnesota Court Rule 4 restricts access to domestic abuse and harassment records, blocking disclosure until the respondent has been served with the order. If someone fails to obtain a record in such a case, it could be because the request was made before the order was served. Even if the request was improperly denied, that does not invalidate the court order. Subsequent comments by OP indicate the possibility that he was not given the restraining order, as required by law, which would substantially impact the validity of the arrest. This handbook from the courts spells out the rules for handling these orders. If it is impossible to personally serve the notice on respondent (he can't be found), then it is possible for the court to order notice by publication, where an item is placed in the newspaper (legal notices, which nobody reads). In other words, you can be "served" in the legal sense, but not know it (however, the police will know it, so if BCA is saying "we can't find any restraining order", this would be a plainly improper arrest).	This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate."	I have not read the news report so cannot comment on the alleged offences and police conduct, but what I can say is that the information to given on arrest may be found at section 28 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): (1) Subject to subsection (5) below, where a person is arrested, otherwise than by being informed that he is under arrest, the arrest is not lawful unless the person arrested is informed that he is under arrest as soon as is practicable after his arrest. (2) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (1) above applies regardless of whether the fact of the arrest is obvious. (3) Subject to subsection (5) below, no arrest is lawful unless the person arrested is informed of the ground for the arrest at the time of, or as soon as is practicable after, the arrest. (4) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (3) above applies regardless of whether the ground for the arrest is obvious. (5) Nothing in this section is to be taken to require a person to be informed— (a) that he is under arrest; or (b) of the ground for the arrest,if it was not reasonably practicable for him to be so informed by reason of his having escaped from arrest before the information could be given. Note the provisions at subsection (3) do not require anyone else to be told the grounds (reasons) at the time of arrest - including members of the public, protesters, bloggers or the press. Kerb-side debates can seriously or significantly distract the officer from ensuring e.g. public safety or preventing e.g. an escape from custody. Also, depending on what else is going on e.g. say in a dynamic and volatile crowd control or public order situation, the person under arrest does not need to told immediately if it would be impractical to do so. The operative phrase being as soon as is practicable, which is not defined by statute as each case needs to be considered individually according to its own set of circumstances. The relevant case law is DPP v Hawkins [1988] 1 WLR 1166, but the only detailed commentary I can find online is behind the PNLD paywall1. Succinctly, the magistrates initially dismissed the case against Hawkins for assaulting four police officers who kept him under arrest without giving the grounds as required by s.28(3) PACE. The DPP appealed, and the Court of Appeal sent the case back to the magistrates saying, inter alia, although there is an obligation under s.28(3) to tell a prisoner of the reason for his arrest as soon as possible (sic) after his arrest, a constable was also under an obligation to maintain that arrest until it was practicable to do so. 1Or free to law enforcement officers	No If she has probable cause, yes. The question is whether "a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts [Bob is a thief] are probably true"? Its likely that the answer to this question is yes. None No Charlotte listens to Alice, Charlotte asks Bob questions which Bob may or may not answer. Charlotte can ask Bob to produce the receipt, Bob doesn't have to. Charlotte can ask to search Bob, Bob doesn't have to consent. If Bob tries to leave, if Charlotte has reasonable suspicion the Bob has committed a crime (which she could certainly justify) she may detain him temporarily without arrest. If Charlotte has probable cause to believe that Bob has committed a crime (which she could probably justify) then she can arrest him.	The problem was that the arresting officer and the investigating officer were two different people. After American airlines misidentified Mr Lowe as the suspect a warrant was issued for an arrest, and it wasn't until about a year later when officers in New Mexico ran his name and found that he had a warrant that they detained him. So their actions were perfectly proper. The length of his detention was primarily because the USA functions as separate legal jurisdictions, so you can be held for some time on a warrant for another state. Possibly the investigating officer should not have relied on American Airlines identification of the suspect. However, Mr. Lowe would have to overcome the qualified immunity bar to sue the PD. The case against the airline is that of negligence: they had no duty to single out Mr. Lowe; they could just have turned over all the data, as requested. Having chosen effectively to carry out their own investigation, the claim is that they owed a common law duty of care to Mr. Lowe to do it competently. It's clear that misidentifying Mr. Lowe as the suspect was likely to do him harm, so it's a reasonable foundation for a claim. More than that, we will have to see.	There is no search analog to the Miranda requirement. The Supreme Court in Miranda didn't just decide that people had to be told their rights, for all rights in all contexts. Miranda applies just to 5th and 6th Amendment rights, in case a person is being held coercively. If you are free to go, you need not be apprised of your rights: so, if the police are just asking questions when you are not being held, they are not required to give a rights warning. Likewise, they are allowed to request permission to conduct a search. It is true than many people do not understand that a request is distinct from an order. A useful phrase to remember is "Am I free to go?". If the answer is no, you are busted and they can search you. If the answer is yes, you don't have to let them search you (to avoid the ambiguity of silence, refusing permission to search is not a bad strategy, unless you want then to search you – e.g. if you want to get on the plane).
If someone steals from me do I need a lawyer? Someone took my bank card while at a party. Somehow he got my PIN number and took $400 from my account. I filed a complaint with the local police. They asked me if I wanted to charge him. (Of course I would.) But talking with the local police they made it sound like I needed a lawyer. Why might I need a lawyer in a scenario like this? Doesn't the state/prosecutor pursue criminal charges?	My best guess would be that they're recommending that you get a lawyer if you're trying to get your money back from the thief. A criminal prosecution may not be able to do that.	user6726's answer about civil action is good, as you appear to have lots of evidence that document-based in terms of bank records, etc. And media shaming would work; but you could be sued in retaliation, even if you're right. But try calling a prosecutor - such as a county attorney - rather than an arm of law enforcement. The police are always overworked and can be reluctant to try and put a case together for the local prosecutor. Contacting a county attorney is free and doesn't require you to get a lawyer, and it can be a surprisingly effective tactic against a criminal. A phone call or a detailed letter to the county attorney for the person's county of residence that explains the criminal activity may be the key to getting some movement in the situation. You have lots of hard evidence to hand the attorney about an individual who is committing fraud, and that evidence may make simply make the case for the attorney, as it is documented evidence they can immediately verify and use, either at the county level, or be passed to the district (state) prosecutor. A loss of $4000 is significant, and may be a felony in that state. But the "$6,000 in products that were not shipped" is intent on the criminals' part and is not a loss to you. If it is a county with a large population, the attorney will have many assistants who may have time to pursue the case. An attorney for a small county may be looking for an easy case. And who knows? The attorney's office may already know the person - if it's a county with a small population, or if that person already has a criminal history (which you could research yourself in that county's records) - and that makes the case even easier for the attorney.	You may contact a towing company; they will ask who you are, and will politely inform you that since you aren't the property owner, they aren't authorized to take someone else's car that is trespassing on the property. [Addendum] The first step in unraveling the legalities of the situation is seeing that only the property owner can give permission to enter (park) on the property. That permission can be rescinded, but only by the owner. The owner seems to have given permission and has stated in advance some conditions under which permission might be rescinded. The towing company could be called (by the owner) to act as the agent for the owner and remove the offending vehicle; but the towing company cannot just up an do this on their own. If they were to spontaneously tow a vehicle without officially acting on behalf of the owner, they would be liable for damages, owing to their having torted some guy's chattels. So the company will want to know that they are protected, in acting as the agent of the property owner. One way to do that is to verify that the person calling the towing company is the owner. Another would be to get the caller to swear that they are the owner and indemnify them against damages, in case they get sued. That pound of cure is more costly and annoying than the ounce of prevention of making sure that you're towing a car with proper authorization, so it's unlikely that they would just tow the car on your say-so. You might try suing the complex owner for some kind of breach of contract, if you think you have a contractual right to a parking space and they are negligent in doing what's necessary to meet your contractual right. The lease says "we may...", not "we will", so they haven't promised to absolutely enforce this rule. Or, of course, you could call the manager and mention that there's still a problem.	No If you break the law you are legally responsible. Can you make it more difficult for law enforcement to find and prosecute you? Of course, that's why bank robbers wear masks.	Legal Services Society is a non-profit organization created by the BC Legislative Assembly through this act, created in order to serve the legal needs of certain classes of society, defined vaguely with reference to "a reasonable person of modest means". Accordingly, they have rules regarding who they can and cannot serve. and they are constrained financially. With vast demands on their resources and little by way of resources, prudent triage is called for. That is, when you show up, you shouldn't expect to talk to a senior attorney (or an attorney). From what I can determine, you cannot expect to get your problem solved right away. It is also not clear that your problem is within the scope of what they do (criminal, incarceration, serious family matters, immigration). "Giving legal advice" is something that only a few people are legally allowed to do – lawyers, who have you as their client. If the person were an attorney, they still couldn't give you legal advice until the appropriate relationship is created (and they have the relevant facts). The person you met with may be a paralegal or a law student. Under the law (sect. 8 of the act), you cannot sue them for damages because of their actions, except if carried out in bad faith. The waiver might be a bit redundant, but it is a wise idea to tell people that you can't sue them. If you want to know what you can expect from the lawyer, this publication will be helpful, though it is generic and not specific as to your particular issue.	But lately he has had his friend use my PayPal account. Someone will send me money and then I transfer it to where he tells me. To cash app or venmo. That's money laundering. Definitely illegal. He said it's money owed for cellphones. People in jail aren't supposed to have cellphones. You are helping him break the law, which means you are helping him break the law.	Police can lie However, in the United States they have to read you your Miranda warning (most other democratic countries have similar warnings): You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time. They have told you everything they are required to tell you - effectively “we are not on your side.” After that, they can lie their asses off. Of course, they wouldn’t ask you for a DNA sample - they’d ask you if you’d like a glass of water. Then they’ll take the DNA from that.	"Fraud" is a broad term. In the first 9 months of Fiscal Year 2015, the US Government prosecuted 5173 white collar crimes, according to Syracuse University's Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. This includes mail fraud, bank fraud, conspiracy to defraud the US, identity theft, health care fraud, wire fraud, and others (listed in the link). Federal prosecutors have a large amount of discretion in when to bring charges. See The Department of Justice Policy on Charging and Sentencing and Title 9 of US Attorney's Manual, Section 27 (Principles of Federal Prosecution). These are not laws, but internal department guidance to prosecutors that outline the factors they should consider when making charging decisions. There is quite a lot of detail in these guidelines, but at the highest level, they are summed up by this paragraph from the Attorney General's memo: Accordingly, decisions regarding charging, plea agreements, and advocacy at sentencing must be made on the merits of each case, taking into account an individualized assessment of the defendant's conduct and criminal history and the circumstances relating to commission of the offense (including the impact of the crime on victims), the needs of the communities we serve, and federal resources and priorities. The US Attorney's Manual gives very specific guidance regarding the prosecution of various forms of fraud. For example, Title 9, Section 43 covers mail and wire fraud. Here is an excerpt: Prosecutions of fraud ordinarily should not be undertaken if the scheme employed consists of some isolated transactions between individuals, involving minor loss to the victims, in which case the parties should be left to settle their differences by civil or criminal litigation in the state courts.
How can universities legally discriminate against a sex when filling dorms? Landlords are not allowed to discrimate against a sex when renting to tenants as this is one of the protected classes. How do universities get away with discriminating against a sex when filling dorms though? Public universities declare a specific dorm 'all male' or 'all female'.	From what I can determine, there has not been a legal challenge to the practice that reached a high enough level to get on my radar, so it's not clearly prohibited or allowed. Turning to the relevant federal regulations, the implementation of the Fair Housing Act, the law hinges in part on an Aggrieved person includes any person who— (a) Claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (b) Believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur. In order to sue a university because they offer sex-separated halls, floors or rooms, a plaintiff would have to show that they have been harmed by being given such a choice. Reading the prohibitions in §100.50, there is no obvious "Discriminat[ion] in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities", and it does not "otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings". Cases like McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (a case putting an end to the "separate but equal" doctrine) include reference to the fact that appellant was harmed ("The restrictions imposed upon appellant impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession"). Analogously, the relatively rare black-only residences of UC Davis and Cal State LA might be targeted in a discrimination suit, if plaintiffs can make the required legal argument that there is harm.	Businesses can discriminate against their customers on any basis they like provided that such discrimination is not on an illegal basis like race, sex or age. They do not have to serve you if they don't want to.	Yes Businesses (and consumers) can choose who to do business with and what information they ask for and disclose and when they do that. If you’re uncomfortable with how they do business, don’t deal with them. If they don’t like how you do business, they are free not to deal with you. This is called discrimination. However, it is not unlawful because only discrimination against a person due to membership of a protected classes is unlawful. This person “won’t answer my questions” is not discrimination based on a protected class (unless they are a monk who has taken a vow of silence).	Here I assume from your cases that you are interested in the regulation of private activities (with human rights code etc.) instead of constitutional restraints on the government (under the Charter). The constitution only prohibits discrimination in law (or government policies) based on enumerated or analogous grounds. Which acts apply? To my understanding the Human Rights Act always apply, then more specialized acts (such as the Residential Tenancy Act, Labour law) apply depending on the context. Canada is a federal country with 10 provinces and three territories each having the powers to legislate under the constitution (for the provinces) or under federal devolution acts (for the territories). They all have different laws. And in constrast to the United States which is often thought to be less "centralized", in the domain of properties and civil rights (including human rights, employment and housing etc.), the federal government in Canada cannot legislate over these areas generally but it can regulate these things in domains where otherwise belong to the federal jurisdiction (e.g. airlines, interprovincial railways, banks but not credit unions, telecoms, the postal service, the armed forces). Federal laws regulating human rights and employment like the Canadian Human Rights Code and Canada Labour Code apply only to those under federal jurisdiction. In most situations, provincial laws apply and are different for each province, including the list of protected characteristics (e.g. citizenship or suspended criminal records are not protected, at least not directly, in all provinces). So you will have to look at the law in your province of interest. Generally the human rights Code or Act should be comprehensive, but exceptions may arise in other special laws (e.g. union memberships are often protected in the Labour Code; disability accommodations may have separate laws). In general does something .... count as illegal discrimination? Another point is that discrimination is not generally illegal; you are free to buy Pepsi instead of Coca Cola. Discrimination based on protected characteristics is not necessarily illegal; a gay man can choose to have a man instead of a woman for his partner. In Canada, both federally and in each province, what is generally illegal is when individuals are adversely differentiated due to a protected characteristic in the course of providing a good, service, facility or accommodation available to the general public, or in relation to housing and employment. Even then, discrimination based on protected characteristics can be legal if certain requirements are met. These usually include employment or service requirements in good faith, programs designed to improve the circumstances of socially disadvantaged individuals and groups ("affirmative action"), and "traditional" exceptions (e.g. age-based discounts). Religious organizations can also discriminate based on their sincerely held religious beliefs, at least when they are not carrying out commercial provision of goods and services available to the general public. For example, it is not against the law for an employer to provide gender-separated bathrooms (it may even be a requirement). In many if not all provinces, it is not illegal for businesses to give child or seniors discounts. In some provinces, a landlord who will be living on the same premises with shared bathrooms and kitchens is not subject to human rights laws or have reduced burden to accommodate. Insurance companies also often have greater leeway in their business decisions, since their business model is usually and inherently built on discrimination (of risks which can correlate with protected characteristics). There are also social expectations and conditions that "rank" a hierarchy of grounds and circumstances (justifiably or not) which may lead to more or less scrutiny over different grounds of protection and areas of service (e.g. an insurance policy discriminating on race is socially absolutely not acceptable where discrimination due to age in insurances are acceptable and discrimination due to gender is controversial; addiction-based disability claims may also attract more scrutiny; employment and housing are considered much more important and in detail compared to retail discounts). Public policy overwhelmingly favours or at least more carefully consider claims from the traditionally socially disadvantaged groups. that applies to everyone but negatively affects a protected class more In Canada, the discrimination you are thinking of are often referred to as "adverse effect discrimination", sometimes also called "indirect" discriminations, where a practice neutral on its face adversely impact individuals based on a protected characteristics. It is not necessarily separately or explicitly spelled out, but results from the purpose of human rights legislations. The Code aims at the removal of discrimination. This is to state the obvious. Its main approach, however, is not to punish the discriminator, but rather to provide relief for the victims of discrimination. It is the result or the effect of the action complained of which is significant. If it does, in fact, cause discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one person or group of persons obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the community, it is discriminatory. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 536 But not all policies that cause disproportionate impacts are necessarily illegal. Insurance rates based on postal codes may discriminate against areas where a racial, ethnic, religious, age etc. group concentrates. But it can be justifiable as a reasonable good faith business requirements if the discrimination is based on an objective, reasonable criteria (e.g. flood risks or claim rates). The extent that a protected characteristic is relevant to the impacts must be considered. An arbitrary, artificial, stereotypical policy are more likely to be illegal than a considered, reasoned, well-founded one. Does intent matter? A discriminatory practice is "objective" and a good or neutral intent does not prevent a practice from being illegal discrimination. However, evidences of intent of discrimination are often illegal discrimination in itself and in any case, they can be used as evidences to prove discrimination cases and undermine the on-the-face neutrality of an action in question. Malicious intent or lack of can also be relevant in determining appropriate damages awarded to the complainant. Newfoundland and Labrador for example makes this explicit in their human rights law: Discrimination in contravention of this Act does not require an intention to discriminate. Human Rights Act, 2010, SNL 2010, c H-13.1 But the reasoning has been established by the Supreme Court going back at least to 1985 and apply to the interpretation of all human rights codes in Canada (unless an intent is specifically required): The intent to discriminate is not a governing factor in construing human rights legislation aimed at eliminating discrimination. Rather, it is the result or effect of the alleged discriminatory action that is significant. The aim of the Ontario Human Rights Code is to remove discrimination ‑‑ its main approach is not to punish the discriminator but to provide relief to the victim of discrimination. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 536 However, intent or reasons also matter for the proper course of remedy. If a policy that is neutral on its face causes adverse effects on individuals due to protected grounds, it must be eliminated if there is no rational reason for the policy to exist. A neutral policy that are genuinely established for proper business reasons is also not illegal if upon request reasonable accommodations to the requirements are provided or attempted to the point of undue hardship. In general, human rights laws impose a duty to accommodate upon persons subject to them like service provides, employers or landlords so that actions are taken, if possible, reasonable and not posing an undue hardship to the provider, to to eliminate or reduce the negative impact an individual suffers due to a protected characteristic. I heard some residential leases prohibit any open flames including candles. Since many religions use candles, wouldn't this be an illegal form of discrimination of a protected class? Or does that not apply because the rule is applied to everyone equally. The first step is to determine whether using candles are in fact part of a sincere religious practice, the hindering of which would violate the rights of the believer. Simply liking the scent of candles when they read the Book is likely not enough to establish that the freedom of religion would be violated. Lighting Shabbat candles on the other hand is much more likely to be recognized as a religious practice. If a discrimination practice is established at first view, the landlord would need to justify its decision, e.g. fire safety. It is not exempt just because "the rule is applied to everyone equally". If the reason for the discrimination is justifiable and reasonable accommodation is not possible, it is not illegal. Conformation to e.g. legal requirements like fire or health and safety codes is often a defence for private individuals (though the complainant may raise claims against the government). However, a duty to accommodate (to a reasonable extent) still exists, e.g. the landlord may need to consider the tenant in priority for similar properties under its constrol that allow open flames (if available). IIRC they came out with a gaming console that had a video camera to monitor the user's movement. It didn't register well for people with dark skin (e.g. black). Like said above, adverse effects based on protected grounds can be illegal discrimination and can give rise to a duty of accommodation. But this case is more tricky and I didn't find any clear case law on similar situations. It would depend on if the company did all it commercially reasonably could do to eliminate or reduce the impacts. A physical limitation caused by hardware (e.g. filter lenses) may be more easily justified than a lack of darker-skinned training samples in their statistical learning algorithm. Even if a successful discrimination claim is established, the damages may also be limited in this context (but an automatic system that decides on home mortgages and are discriminatory unjustifiably can lead to significantly more damages).	renting a single room with three other guys each renting their own rooms means exactly what it says. What you are paying for is that room, plus shared access to the common areas. Without knowing exactly what your lease says, especially with respect to the common areas, it's difficult to give a proper answer. I suspect that the lease for your room says nothing about who can live in the other rooms. Unless the lease says otherwise, the landlord has full control of the common areas. (Compare with a large apartment building, with hallways, stairwells, lobbies, etc., which must be maintained by the landlord.) This isn't an unusual arrangement, but I've never understood why anyone, landlord or tenant, would want it. There's far too much potential for conflict. You, yourself, could be a totally obnoxious person that the other three guys can't stand, but they'd have to put up with you. Their only alternatives are to move out or to ask the landlord to evict you. Moving out would be a lot of trouble for everyone. But, depending upon jurisdiction, as long as you're paying the rent on time and not causing damage to the property, eviction could be a very difficult and long process. And eviction is hardly in the landlord's interest. It costs a lot of money and time, and might not be granted even if she did apply. Why might a landlord spend so much time at the house they're renting? I'd be concerned about the implications of a woman going out of her way to do yoga in an area rented to four men. That is the part that sounds most strange in this situation. How do I resolve this? I'd start looking for a room somewhere else.	Joint tenancy means that you both have equal (full) rights to the entire property, so just as you don't his permission to live there or to invite guests, he doesn't either. Unless they threaten you in some way (and you get a court order barring them from entering), there is no legal means to deprive an owner of their property rights, while they are still an owner.	My answer would be different if either Alice or Bob was the landlord, or the landlord had a separate agreement with Alice and Bob. If a single lease is written, per the comment, that Alice and Bob are components of "the tenants", and "the tenants" have rented the named premises, then they all have equal rights to occupy the whole premises under the lease. If the landlord is professional I will further presume they all have joint and several liability for the whole rent; it would be inequitable to alienate Alice with joint and several liability from any part of the premises without her consent. If there is a separate roommate agreement that allocates rooms and expected share of rent or controls behaviors, then that is a contract that can form as a meeting of the minds of the roommates where they each trade something of value, such as exclusive use of a room. The narrative suggests an original verbal agreement that Bob would like to change. That's nice but Alice doesn't have to agree; or can agree with other changes of value to her such as the ratio of expected rent reflecting the ratio of use and access to the space Alice would have.	From TransEquality.org: People who were assigned female at birth are not required to register with the Selective Service regardless of their current gender or transition status. When applying for federal financial aid, grants, and loans as a man, however, you may be asked to prove that you are exempt. To request a Status Information Letter (SIL) that shows you are exempt, you can either download an SIL request form from the Selective Service website (http://www.sss.gov/PDFs/SilForm_Instructions.pdf) or call them at 1-888-655-1825. This service is free and the exemption letter you will receive does not specify why you are exempt so it will not force you to out yourself in any other application process. The Selective Service does, however, require a copy of your birth certificate showing your birth-assigned sex. If the sex on your birth certificate has been changed, attach any documentation you have to that affect. Once you receive your Status Information Letter, keep it in your files. For those FTM people who transition before their eighteenth birthdays and change their birth certificates, it is also possible to register with the service. However, no one may register after their twenty-sixth birthday. Also, please note that although Selective Service materials refer to transgender people as “people who have had a sex change,” their policies apply to those who have transitioned regardless of surgical history. The referenced form has a section where you can declare your gender assigned at birth, and you must attach a copy of your birth certificate. It would appear that having your gender assigned as female at birth does in fact exempt you from the requirement to register with selective service, and as a result you should not be penalized for any purpose related to your not having registered.
Creative commons for erotic purpose I am a young writer and I need free photos of girls's body ( so with faces covered ) for the cover of my erotic book similar to 50 shades of grey. Can I use the photos of flickr under this licence https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/ for my erotic book ? Or are there some restrictions for erotic purpose?	Assuming that the images are in fact released by the copyright holder under the CC_BY 2.0 license, and not under the CC_BY_NC or CC_BY_SA license, you are free to use the image on a book cover. That the book is erotic makes no difference. You must attribute the cover image to the original creator, as specified in the license, unless the creator has indicated that no attribution should be provided. You must not state or imply that the original creator has in any way endorsed your book or you. Be careful to check that the person releasing the image is in fact the copyright holder. It is not unknown for someone to upload someone else's image and claim to release it under a CC license. Obviously a "license" from someone who had no rights does not give you or anyone any rights. Just as buying stolen goods from a thief does not give you title to them. It is your responsibility to confirm that the person who released the image had the right to do so.	What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation.	What SE can do is controlled primarily by the Terms of Service. What most matters is the section on Subscriber Content, which says: You agree that any and all content, including without limitation any and all text, graphics, logos, tools, photographs, images, illustrations, software or source code, audio and video, animations, and product feedback (collectively, “Content”) that you provide to the public Network (collectively, “Subscriber Content”), is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC-BY-SA), and you grant Stack Overflow the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to access, use, process, copy, distribute, export, display and to commercially exploit such Subscriber Content, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by you... This means that you cannot revoke permission for Stack Overflow to publish, distribute, store and use such content and to allow others to have derivative rights to publish, distribute, store and use such content. The CC-BY-SA Creative Commons license terms are explained in further detail by Creative Commons, but you should be aware that all Public Content you contribute is available for public copy and redistribution, and all such Public Content must have appropriate attribution. This part has not changed: the purported license is still "CC-BY-SA", and the TOS does not explicitly specify a version. What apparently has changed in the relevant section is one "helpful information" link, which now points to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. So the interesting question arises whether that would constitute an unpermitted post-hoc change in the terms by which SE has license to my older stuff. This matter came up in a reviled Meta question; as I pointed out, the TOS also included a merger clause that This Agreement (including the Privacy Policy), as modified from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between You, the Network and Stack Exchange with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement replaces all prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements, written or oral, regarding the subject matter hereof. Because of that, the TOS is self-contained and stuff found on other web pages are not part of the agreement. This in itself is a bit of a problem because you can't both say "we're not bound by stuff outside of this page" and say "the specific terms of the license are outside this page". That particular clause is gone, but there is an analog in the current TOS: These Public Network Terms represent the entire agreement between you and Stack Overflow and supersede all prior or contemporaneous oral or written communications, proposals, and representations with respect to the public Network or Services or Products contemplated hereunder. Furthermore, the TOS contains the following "we can change it" clause: Stack Overflow reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to modify or replace these Public Network Terms, as our business evolves over time and to better provide Services and Products to the Stack Overflow community, or to change, suspend, or discontinue the public Network and/or any Services or Products at any time by posting a notice on the public Network or by sending you notice via e-mail or by another appropriate means of electronic communication. I assume but do not know for a fact that a similar clause existed in prior versions of the TOS. So I conclude that the change is legal.	You are asking the wrong question. It should be: When you have downloaded the content and metadata, what are you allowed to do with it and what is forbidden? Somebody owns the copyright to the text and images in the thumbnail. This could be the operator of the third party website, or that site has licensed the content from yet another party. You haven't licensed it from anybody. So you can watch the content in accordance with the TOS, and your computer can evaluate the metadata to do it, but you cannot display it on your own site. Details will differ between jurisdictions, of course. You might also be held responsible for illegal content in the thumb you generate. Follow-up: There seems to be some question of what 'thumbnail' and 'card' mean in this context. This answer assumes a somewhat scaled-down representation of the content of the entire page, not just a collection of actual metadata like content length and expiry.	Context is important. There is no law against taking a picture of a child who is entirely naked or exposing certain body parts. The laws in question such as 18 USC 2251 refer to the fact that the minor "engage[s] in, any sexually explicit conduct". Sexually explicit conduct is defined in 18 USC 2256, and would include "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" (which does not include nipples of anyone). Federal law does not define "lascivious", but the ordinary meaning of the word does not include the situation that you describe. The Justice Department, which goes after child pornographers, provides this guide to federal child porn laws. Georgia's child porn law is only marginally different, referring to "Lewd exhibition" rather than "Lascivious exhibition" , and including the "Condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise physically restrained on the part of a person who is nude" (so a picture of a person holding a naked baby would technically qualify, but is highly unlikely to be prosecuted as production of child porn). These laws pertain to any form of child porn, including "private use only". Dissemination would be an added charge.	You are in breach of Copyright. Plain and simple. Certain websites allow you to use the website content as long as a link is made, but the website must clearly state that. You may also use a tiny portion of the content if it falls under Fair Use, where "Fair Use" does not mean "I want to". The best thing to do is not to do it. You can't copy anybody's work without consent. If you're thinking about Google specifically then they offer multiple APIs so that you can use their content in a wide variety of ways.	If you own the copyright (because you wrote the book), you can do whatever you want with it. If someone else has the copyright, you have to get their permission to do what you propose. That could be the author, the author's estate, or some other party. It then depends on what the interest of the rights-holder is: they could say "No way!", "Sure, for a payment of $100,000", "At $1 per copy, here is how you must keep track of copies", "Okay, as long as you include this notice that prevents further re-distribution" or "Huh, I never thought of that. Sure, I grant you complete license to do whatever you want". A publisher is relevant only when the publisher requires a transfer of copyright to the publishing company, or if the rights-holder has granted them a certain type of license (e.g. an exclusive license). If the author has granted someone else an exclusive perpetual right to distribute, then they cannot also grant you a license to distribute for free. That is really the author's problem, though, since the publisher doesn't hold the copyright so can't sue you, instead the publisher would sue the author for breach of contract.	Generally, it's illegal. You are creating a derivative work and you are not allowed to do that without the permission of the copyright holder. Some jurisdictions may have exceptions, such as fair use under US law. However, this generally protects uses that are intended to comment on or parody the work. It doesn't sound like that is the purpose of your image modification. NOT including: faceswaps, modifications that would shame or affect negatively the reputation of the actors on the image. That doesn't make it legal. I share it in a way that I don't make any economic profit out of it, and clearly stating that it is a modified image (not sure if inside the image, or in the caption under it) and state who is the legal owner of the original image. That doesn't make it legal, either.
Is it illegal to carry a foam baseball bat as a prop on Halloween in the UK? I am thinking of doing a 'Jacket' from Hotline Miami cosplay/dress up perhaps for Halloween or a convention. I am trying to think about props, but I am worried about the laws against having anything appearing realistic and potentially getting into any trouble or harm. I would not be holding a fake gun, I am aware of that law, and also did some research on real baseball bats and the legality of being in possession of one. Would a foam baseball bat like this one used as a prop still be okay to carry? If I read on their company's site correctly, it is lightweight, and the plastic rod is inside in the middle and the foam surrounds it to make the look of the bat and there is a wood print on it. I was going to apply a couple bandages and potentially use a bit of brushed on fake blood to complete the look, but I am uncertain if I can get in trouble out on Halloween night for this even though it isn't real. I would also be wearing a rooster mask over my head. I do not intend to cause distress to the public at all, and it would simply be used as a prop. I will most likely be with a couple uni friends going straight to another friend's party a few streets away if it was for Halloween. For a convention such as MCM Comic Con, however, I will search the rules and ask them about this also if necessary.	It is almost certainly fine as long has you have a "good reason". The police website give a list of examples when carrying a knife would have a "good reason" (like a chef getting a set of knives out of her car, for example). Likewise, a plastic knife isn't considered a weapon as long as you don't start threatening people with it. As long as you don't start swinging it around, you should be fine.	Assuming the USA, since that's where they appear to be located. Spreading misinformation is not illegal- it is protected by the first amendment. There are exceptions but I can't see how any would apply here. You haven't mentioned any that you think apply. If some of the videos on the site guaranteed results or made medical claims, maybe that could be considered false advertising. However, I see no evidence of this. Users are advertised that paying for access to a bunch of hocum videos will get them access to a bunch of snake oil and this appears to be the case.	If the "Pokeball" image is copyrighted and/or a trademark of Nintendo/whoever makes the Pokemon games, then whoever put that image out there under CC 3.0 BY is in violation and can be sued and will probably lose, and you would be in violation and can be sued and will probably lose. Your penalty would almost certainly be less since your violation was "innocent", that is, you had no way of knowing that the "Pokeball" imagery was somebody's protected intellectual property. ... Except you kind of maybe should know that, unless whoever made the Pokemon games (Nintendo or other) put the image out there and you can verify that, that maybe this license could be bogus and you should consult with who you imagine the owner of that IP may be or an impartial professional who could tell you for sure. I'm thinking if it were me I would do a little more research - and maybe get a paid opinion - if I was really thinking about using this for any but private purposes.	Even if the authorities aren't injured, the homeowner may well face criminal charges. Many states make it illegal to set booby traps; for instance, California makes it a felony in section 20110 of the Penal Code. The definition of "boobytrap" in the code is "any concealed or camouflaged device designed to cause great bodily injury when triggered by an action of any unsuspecting person coming across the device;" on the face of it, it is definitely not clear that a generic "there are traps" sign makes it not a boobytrap (whereas a sign on the trap announcing its presence probably would). If a trespasser falls victim to a trap, that can be grounds for a successful lawsuit against the homeowner; see Katko v. Briney (an Iowa civil case). The duty of care to trespassers is low; there's no general duty to mitigate hazards. However, one part of the duty is generally that one may not lay a trap for trespassers (example: report from Connecticut Office of Legal Research).	This is a reasonable summary of knife law although it omits the national costume as a 'good reason' (aka reasonable excuse or defence) for carrying a knife in public: https://www.gov.uk/buying-carrying-knives It is illegal to ... carry a knife in public without good reason, unless it has a folding blade with a cutting edge 3 inches long or less .. Examples of good reasons to carry a knife or weapon in public can include: taking knives you use at work to and from work taking it to a gallery or museum to be exhibited if it’ll be used for theatre, film, television, historical reenactment or religious purposes, for example the kirpan some Sikhs carry if it’ll be used in a demonstration or to teach someone how to use it Legislation s49 Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 Offence of having in public place article with blade or point (as amended) ... (4) It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) above to show that the person had a reasonable excuse or lawful authority for having the article with him in the public place. - http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/39/part/VI/crossheading/offensive-weapons s139 Criminal Justice Act 1988 Offence of having article with blade or point in public place ... Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) above, it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had the article with him— (a) for use at work; (b) for religious reasons; or (c) as part of any national costume.	20th Century Fox have a trademark on "Simpsons." They have trademarks on "Bart Simpson", on "D'oh", on "Duff Beer". I would assume that they take their trademarks seriously. What you can't do is to use someone else's trademark to make people believe your commercial product is related to theirs. It's quite reasonable to assume that someone seeing your book in a store would think it is written by the makers of The Simpsons show and therefore buy it. Even if you say that isn't your intention, it is what would happen. I'd try coming up with some different titles, maybe "How to write animated TV shows" with "Example: The Simpsons" (well, you are the writer so you should come up with something better), and take them to a lawyer. And then contact the makers of the show (again asking the lawyer for advice how to do this) because even if your lawyer says the title is fine, that doesn't mean you can't be sued.	I can't comment on what the legal situation would be in your home country, but as a matter of U.S. law, the hypothetical scenario you've described is not illegal. First, because you aren't a U.S. citizen and because you aren't operating in the United States, the U.S. government probably has no jurisdiction over you, your website, or your conduct. Even if it did, the most relevant statute, 18 U.S. Code § 1017, would not apply. The statute prohibits the "fraudulent or wrongful" use of the FBI's seal. But "fraudulent" and "wrongful" generally refer only to conduct where one uses deception or other means to obtain money, property, etc. to which they have no lawful entitlement. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399 (1973). Because you aren't using the seal to obtain anyone's property through deception, this use would not fall within the statute's proscriptions. Even if the government sought to prosecute you, you would have a valid First Amendment defense. The First Amendment protects the right to free speech, and it does not allow statements to be criminalized merely because they are false. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). This outcome should be unsurprising to most U.S. observers. I think most people would agree that the U.S. obviously cannot prosecute a Hollywood producer for making a movie dramatizing the FBI's efforts to shut down the Pirate Bay, even if it displayed the FBI's seizure message on a monitor in the course of the movie, and even if it showed the seal being used on a completely fictional website. The hypothetical you're describing is not materially different. In both cases, the seal is being used to falsely create the impression -- for entertainment purposes -- that the FBI has shut down a website. Saying false things for entertainment purposes is not a crime in the United States.	There sort of is a law, this one. It does not absolutely forbid owning a possum, but it is required that you have a license to take or keep a wild fur-bearing animal including a possum. There is no existing "license to take and possess as a pet", but you could try under trapping licenses. However, they warn that the Fur-bearing Propagation Permit does not authorize individuals to possess live fur-bearing animals as pets.This IS NOT a “pet permit.” Ultimately, what would happen is you apply for a license, but they would deny the application because you don't plan to propagate the animal, or skin it. Although the statute does not specifically prohibit keeping a fur-bearing animal as a pet, it does authorize Parks and Wildlife to promulgate and enforce regulations. Another approach would be to seek a wild animal rehabilitation permit, pursuant to PWD regulations (here). This is also not a general pet permit, but in case your program of possum rehabilitation fails, you are not required to kill it or release it into the wild to die. There is a test required, to be sure you know how to rehabilitate wild animals, plus a requirement for letters of support from conservationists, veterinarians or rehabilitators.
Why would a corporation waive its legal costs in a lawsuit against a poorer litigant? Referring to Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi (Rev 3) [2015] UKSC 67, this website alleges (The judgment itself doesn't reveal this): Moloney did however allow the decision to be appealed and arranged for the case to be fast tracked to the Court of Appeal. Of the two defendents, Barry Beavis decided to appeal, Wardley settled. ParkingEye agreed to waive their legal costs allowing Beavis to appeal without fear of huge costs should he lose. [I bolded.] Sa’ad Hossain QC agreed to represent Beavis the case on a pro-bono basis. In Delta Air Lines Inc. v. Lukács, 2018 SCC 2, Abella J. wrote: [67] I would allow the appeal and restore the Agency’s decision. Delta is not seeking costs. In both cases, waiving their legal costs disadvantages the (corporate) appellants, because legal costs can deter a litigant. So why disadvantage themselves? Please see the question in title.	Two reasons that spring to mind: The Respondent wanted the appeal to proceed so that they would have definitive case law from a higher court. That is they thought they would win and, quite possibly, the appellant thought they would win too. Rolling the dice on a losing proposition is not so bad if you have no skin in the game so the Respondent is encouraging the appeal. Its a commercial PR decision - it looks bad in the press if you use your money and power to prevent someone from pursuing their legal rights. This way, they can put their hand on their hearts and say "we gave them every opportunity to prove us wrong".	It isn't explicitly prohibited so long as the amount claimed is in the aggregate less than $20,000. But, it would probably be better to file separately. First, very simple single party, single transaction cases are what small claims court is designed to do, and going against the flow often creates unforeseen confusion for the judge in the Justice Court who isn't a sophisticated civil litigation expert. The Justices of the Peace who preside over Justice Courts that handle small claims cases in Texas often aren't and don't have to be lawyers or even high school graduates. Second, if you sue as a group, and one of your group is the lead person handling the case (and that person isn't a lawyer), the lead person is at grave risk of being found to be practicing law without a license by taking actions in a lawsuit on behalf of your fellow plaintiffs.	Most class action litigation involves a whole mass of people who suffered minute injury, whereby it wouldn't be cost effective to bring individual suit. There are exceptions, as with every rule. So, for instance, (I'll use one I was involved in): BARBRI, who established the curriculum, study aids, and taught nearly all of the prep courses for the bar exams in every state, illegally colluded with Kaplan, who ran nearly all of the prep courses for the LSAT (the law school entrance aptitude test) to create unfair trade advantage by price fixing and agreeing not to offer each others' service, thereby creating a monopoly. Because of this, there was no way to cheaply prep for either of these major events – it was use BARBRI or Kaplan, respectively, or study without these invaluable classes/aids. They were expensive but necessary to excelling on these very important tests. It wasn't that they weren't great test prep courses, it was that they created an environment free of any competition where you were forced to pay whatever they were asking. I got notice of class action, didn't opt out, and about 3 years later got a check for nearly $300. Perfect from my perspective. They taught me a ton, I did good on the LSAT and the Bar Exam and the money came at a perfect time. For those exceptions to the rule, opting out may be the best course of action, but as @nomen agentis noted, it does bar you from recovery as part of the class (although that is usually nominal) if you fail to bring private action, miss the statute of limitations, or fail to recover via settlement or trial award. As a further example based on my experience with BARBRI/Kaplan: say you were a person who couldn't afford to take the bar prep course, and because of the price fixing and limit on competition (monopoly) couldn't find any other alternative review course. If you studied on your own, looked for alternative study aides/courses to no avail (there were literally no others) and then failed the bar exam, and you could show that because of this, it was more likely than not that it was the reason you failed, you might have a case individually, arguing that your quarter-million-dollar education was functionally meaningless without a license to practice, and you couldn't get a job that paid enough to repay the loans because you couldn't get a job, etc. This would be the type person to consider opting out. Typically, these (the more injured person) are the people the attorneys search for who end up named as the representing party to the class, but not everyone can be a named plaintiff that suffered more than the nominal injury. Because of this, not everyone who had a more serious injury will be adequately compensated by the class action. These suits are meant to get a lot of people a little justice and to teach a lesson, not to get a few people largely compensated for substantial injury. They are also quite nice for the lawyers who make millions, because they get a percentage of the entire pie. But, if you suffer a serious injury for which a class action suit exists, then it would probably behoove you to opt out, after consulting with a lawyer. It's important to understand that for most people it's more beneficial to be in the class. These are typically the type injuries that on the aggregate equal substantial injury, but individually, no lawyer would take on a contingency and it wouldn't be worth while to pay to litigate, as the recovery would be nowhere near the cost of the litigation/attorneys' fees. If you are (like the example above) the odd individual who suffered a much greater injury than the remainder of the class, then opting out would not be wise. However, you don't automatically get more just because you sue individually, and there is no collateral estoppel or issue preclusion because you are suing on a different theory of damage. If you opt out, you start over. If you waited, you may benefit from any admissions in court, which can be used against them, but not any findings. However, a class suit will typically run much longer than an individual, so you would probably finish your suit before the class action concluded. If you are the person who suffered substantial injury, when you get the class notice you should consult an attorney right away, to see if you have a provable case and if opting out is the right choice for you. Statute of limitations need to be examined, as well as other procedural things. Generally speaking, those other reasons for potentially opting out that are in the question are not typical considerations.	Ohwilleke's answer (i.e. 'there isn't a simple answer') covers the general principles clearly. But for your specific situation (England and Wales, appeal to the High Court Chancery Division or Court of Appeal), the answer is "Do nothing irrevocable if possible; if necessary, apply for interim directions to the Court". The Chancery Masters are used to this sort of application, and though somebody will presumably be diappointed by the decision, the trustees have no liability.	Probably not. This condition is what's known as a penalty clause, which is not universally allowed. This article discusses penalty clauses in EU law. In the English-Belgian variety, the clause is simply not enforceable. In the Dutch-French and German-Swiss models, such a clause might be enforceable, but the judge can adjust disproportionately high amounts – 250 times the normal price strikes me as disproportionately high. It isn't clear what amount the courts would deem to be reasonable and fair: but the infringer would have to request a reduction in the amount.	I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly.	This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.	It is done to prevent or at least provide a defence against a latter argument based on Estoppel; which at the risk of trivialising something that is very complex means that if you indicate to someone that you will or won't do something and they act on that indication then they may have a claim if you don't do what you indicated. When lawyers say this they are usually outlining a client's possible future actions so estoppel is in play. If they include this they are specifically saying "... But we might not do that."
What to do after an employee leaked our algorithm? One of my company's internally developed algorithms was published online. It's a complex algorithm that took years to develop, I have a pretty good idea of which employee leaked it based on the team who worked on it and personal information on the blog, but I want confirmation. The algorithm is covered in detail but without any code from our codebase, so my employee might have thought it was okay to share this information publicly when it is absolutely not. It looks like the algorithm has been online for at least a month. What can we do to mitigate damage from competition? Should we go ahead and license it? Should we even talk about this on our company blog? (Related management question asked here.)	Whether this is considered a trade secret (at least in the US) depends partly on whether you've taken reasonable action to keep it secret. If an employee thought it was OK to publish the algorithm, that's evidence that you didn't try very hard to keep it from getting out. Even if nobody's noticed it yet, getting the blog post taken down in't going to get it off the internet. You may as well try to do it anyway. If nobody has noticed the algorithm by now, you want to make it harder for them to find. You need an IP lawyer pronto. Depending on where you are, you might be able to get a patent on the algorithm still, but patents are hard to enforce, and it appears to be getting harder in the US to patent algorithms. (There's a Stack Exchange site so people can look at patent applications and see if they can invalidate the application with prior art.) You can't license out the algorithm without having some legal way of stopping other places from just using it. If you have more proprietary algorithms or things that aren't generally known that give you a competitive advantage, it would be a good idea to inform employees that they aren't supposed to reveal them. Check with your IP lawyer to see what you should do.	If it's patented then it doesn't matter that you independently came up with it. Most software is not patented, though. Most developers do not even think about patents when writing code. In theory you could spend your time keeping up to date on software patents so that you avoid infringing. But this probably only makes sense for specialists who would want to read the latest patents in their field anyway. All software is protected by literary copyright, though. In this case they will try to prove that you did not independently created it, and did copy it. Whelan v. Jaslow in 1986 ruled that structure, sequence and organization of a computer program were protected by copyright. So you could be liable even if you did not just copy and paste sections of code. But even if you're worried the court would get things wrong and think you copied a program when you never even saw it in the first place, there is really nothing you can do about it.	Can Hacker Corp. claim that they acted in good faith, believing that the Permission to Attack was granted by someone from within the company who was allowed to grant such a permission? Unless ACME proves that Hacker knew or should have known that ACME's low-level employee had no authority to make the decision on behalf of ACME, Hacker ought to prevail on the basis that it performed the contract. There is no indication in your description that Hacker targeted other system(s) than the one(s) specified or that it departed from the agreed conditions. Therefore, there is no sign of Hacker breaching the implied covenant of good faith. ACME's evidently poor management (i.e., the turmoil, the delay for signing or denying permission, its low-level employee's opportunity to make sensitive decisions, the company's failure to withdraw the authorization or to take precautions) is not Hacker's fault.	GDPR forces companies and employees to keep personal data confidential and to use it only for its allowed uses. That obligation continues after the work contract ends. If the employee breaches confidentiality, it does not matter if he provides the data as a file in an USB-drive or if he provides it from memory; it is a breach of confidentiality. Access logs will help to determine which employees have had access to your data, in case a leak is suspected. The part of the question about human memory seems to come from a deep misunderstanding of how human memory works1. I can remember tomorrow something that I have totally forgotten now. Even worse, there is no telling of what can make me remember you; your name might not ring a bell but I may remember you by seeing someone walking a dog. And nobody will ever be able to tell if I have complied with any of your requests or if I am just lying. And of course, there is only one proven way to erase memories, and I am pretty sure the GDPR does not allow for the execution of employees (Disclaimer: IANAL and IANYL, check with a lawyer before murdering anyone if you have doubts). 1 The classical example: You can certainly delete a file from a disk. But just try to stop thinking about white bears	If it’s relevant, yes However, Twitter’s position is that they have disclosed all the data that the contract requires them to disclose. It is likely that case will turn on whether they have or not. Data they haven’t disclosed is not relevant to answering that question.	Firstly: that depends on the jurisdiction. It might not even be possible at all for employers to attempt to sue their own employees for damages caused by negligence. Even terminating an employment contract for reasons of negligence is quite difficult in many jurisdictions. Second, if it is possible, the question is wether such legal proceedings could be expected to be successful. Employees making mistakes is part of the risk of doing business, and distinguishing a "mistake" from "negligence", "gross negligence" , or "intentional wrongdoing" by the employee ought to place quite a burden of proof on the employer. To be held negligent in the first place, the employer will have to to prove that the employee was aware of the fact that the password they used was common, well-known and extremely insecure. Knowledge of which passwords are common and well-known is, unless you are considered a skilled IT security professional, not something that a typical employee can reasonably be expected to know. Before there can be a case for negligence by the employee, the employer needs to make a strong case that: either the employee is that skilled IT security professional that really should have know better or the company can demonstrate that they provide all employees with adequate instruction and security training that includes how to select good passwords and which bad ones to avoid and that they seriously ensure both awareness of their password and security policies and compliance. even then, not enforcing a good password policy in your IT systems and assigning or allowing users to select weak passwords is in itself already negligent...	IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics.	I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must.
Is the Acting Attorney General in the Presidential Line of Succession? The Attorney-General is seventh in the line of succession to the Presidency of the United States. Does an Acting Attorney-General replace the former Attorney-General in the line of succession?	The presidential line of succession is governed by the U.S. Constitution, specifically Article II section 1: In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. The 25th amendment reinforces this and says "Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress." So, after the vice president, the constitution lets Congress pass laws governing the rest of the succession. This is governed by the Presidential Succession Act. 3 U.S. Code Chapter 1, Section 19 lays out the rest of the line of succession: Next come the Speaker of the House of Representatives (subsection a) and the President pro tempore of the Senate (subsection b) and "then the officer of the United States who is highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security" (subsection d). So you have the Attorney General at number 7. However, the next subsection says the following (emphasis mine). (e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of President devolve upon them. I think the bolded text answers your question. The Acting Attorney General has not been confirmed by the Senate, so is not in the presidential line of succession. Now there is potentially room to argue that, if the Acting Attorney General has been confirmed by the Senate for some other office (most likely Deputy Attorney General), then they qualify. Of course, there is no case law to clarify this, since the presidential succession has never gone beyond what is listed in the constitution. However, I don't think it's a very compelling argument, particularly for the current Acting Attorney General who was not appointed on the basis of his previous confirmation. (Interestingly, a Bill was introduced to the House in 2003 that would have explicitly removed acting officers from the line of succession. Ultimately, that Bill did not progress.)	In the US, the resignation of the office of President or Vice-President must be in writing to the Secretary of State. In India, the constitution provides (Art. 65) that In the event of the occurrence of any vacancy in the office of the President by reason of his death, resignation or removal, or otherwise, the Vice-President shall act as President until the date on which a new President elected in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter to fill such vacancy enters upon his office and (Art 67) a Vice-President may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office; It does not require that the president be named, nor does it require that the resignation actually be delivered to the president. The VP a.k.a. acting President can notify himself of his resignation, since he functions completely as the president. The houses of parliament might elect a new vice president between resignations.	It is not a crime in the US. It may be a firing offense depending on the nature of the appointment (that is, what exactly do you mean by "diplomat"?) or at least cause for demotion / reassignment. A diplomat from another country could be declared persona non grata, but again it is not a crime to act contrary to a governmental boycott call, in the US. This follows from the First Amendment.	I would argue the Constitutional basis of these actions would be the Constitution itself, namely Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. and Article I, Section 3, Clause 7: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Note also, that as Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers, the Impeachment process was a check brought over from England (it predated the formation of Britain by several centuries) as a check on Executive (read Monarchal) power of royal appointments, including Judges. So, to answer your questions directly: Serving out one's term or resigning is not a shield to impeachment, otherwise one could simply play "whack-a-mole", appointing the same individual repeatedly (which is also why future barring of the individual from governmental office is an option). The purpose of impeachment is, per Hamilton, to react to "political crimes"; "mundane" crimes are to be handle by the normal judicial system. Nixon did famously resign rather than be impeached, but he was barred from running again anyway, having served two terms as President. Congress at that time chose not to continue the impeachment process after his resignation (note that disqualification is an option, but not required, punishment that can be levied by Congress in the event of impeachment). See Article I, Section 3, Clause 7, quoted above.	What exactly would a prosecutor charge? State? Federal? It depends on whether it is a state or federal prosecutor. It appears that the president has at least flirted with violating both federal and state law, in which case he may be charged by both the federal and state prosecutors, each one laying charges under the relevant body of law. Would Trump be vulnerable to Federal prosecution of the phone call after he leaves office? Yes, if the facts support such a prosecution. It's not clear to me that the conversation constituted an unambiguous violation of the federal statute, but I have no knowledge of any precedent that might inform such a determination.	where does the prosecution occur? Prosecutions generally occur where a crime is committed. The area where a crime or other wrongdoing is committed is considered the proper "forum" for adjudicating the case. With respect to the law you cited, you should take note of the statutory limitations imposed upon the Attorney General in pursuing such a case (called a § 1119 prosecution). When considering the limitations, it is unlikely a trial of an American who killed an American in Canada would be tried in the United States. Those limitations begin with a prosecutor seeking written permission by the AG. This permission cannot be granted if the other country has already prosecuted the individual for the same conduct. Also, the AG can only give that permission if, after consulting the Secretary of State, he or she determines that the killing occurred in a jurisdiction where the suspect is "no longer present" and that the country is unable to "lawfully secure the person's return." and I'm wondering what that process actually looks like. This would be a consultation between Justice Department attorneys and the Assistant Secretary(ies) of State whose portfolio contains the foreign country in question. From the DOJ in particular, the Assistant AG for the Criminal Division is in charge of considering the above criteria and granting approvals. The Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section handles these issues within the Criminal Division. Does the Attorney General have to petition the other government for permission to prosecute them in the home country? No. The statutory limitations listed above necessitate that the suspect has already left that country and part of the AG's determination must be that it is unlikely that country will be able to secure the person's return. That said, might that country petition the United States that it wants the suspect to be returned to stand trial there? Potentially. Does it make a difference if the key witnesses are also all Americans, therefore arguing that chances of conviction are more likely if tried within the U.S. where all participants reside and are available to testify? This is, of course, a general consideration when determining which jurisdiction should handle a matter. It isn't clear to what degree it comes into consideration in this type of prosecution. does anyone know any famous/well known examples of this happening? Famous/well-known? I can't be sure, but see, e.g., United States v White, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Cal. 1997), United States v. Nipper, 198 F. Supp. 2d 818 (W.D. La. 2002), United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Brimager, 123 F.Supp.3d 1246 (S.D. Cal 2015). Interestingly, the statute gets substantial discussion and review in this Department of Justice White Paper entitled, Legality of a Lethal Operation by the Central Intelligene Agency Against a U.S. Citizen, in the context of whether the CIA could kill an American citizen in Yemen who has been reasonably determined to be a senior leader of al-Qaida.	"Seila Law" is a law firm, not a law. They were a party in a recent SCOTUS decision, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S ___, which involved the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created by Congress, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The court held that the structure of that law (regarding appoinntment and firing of the director) is unconstitutional: The CFPB’s leadership by a single individual removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers. More specifically, Article II vests the entire “executive Power” in the President alone, but the Constitution presumes that lesser executive officers will assist the President in discharging his duties. The President’s executive power generally includes the power to supervise — and, if necessary, remove — those who exercise the President’s authority on his behalf. The President’s removal power has long been confirmed by history and precedent. The law in question addresses a single position, director of CFPB, not all government agencies. "Agency" is defined in 18 USC 6 as includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense. "Department" is then defined as one of the executive departments enumerated in section 1 of Title 5, unless the context shows that such term was intended to describe the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the government. POTUS firing power is about the executive branch, not the judicial or legislative branches, so it depends on what you mean by "agency". You can infer possible outcomes based on this ruling, but what they literally said is that particular law is unconstitutional.	The US has kept the original meaning More or less. The word entered English from Old French around the turn of the 14th century and meant a person appointed to handle the financial or legal affairs of another. Two branches developed, a common attorney which leads to the modern concept of an attorney under a power of attorney, and an attorney at law. These were qualified people who prepared briefs for barristers in the Common Law courts. The attorneys equivalents in the Chancellery courts were called solicitors. When the courts were merged in the UK in the late 19th century, the term solicitor was kept and attorney was abolished. At about the same time, the courts in the US merged but the Americans kept attorney and abandoned solicitor. Solicitor is still used in some parts of the US to refer to a government lawyer, particularly in the office of solicitor general. The US as well as Commonwealth countries have both an Attorney General and a Solicitor General. The AG is usually a politician and the chief law officer of the government. The SG is usually a civil servant and represents the government in court; for example, when the USA needs to appear in SCOTUS it’s the SG that does it.
Can I sue the government because a minor on probation committed homicide? My father was killed by a teenager last year in TN, USA. We are still in the one year statue of limitation for wrongful death civil suit. The suspect has been transferred to adult court and the criminal case is pending. The suspect has numerous charges prior committing the murder (aggravated assault, domestic violence, obstruction of emergency service, illegal handgun posession, etc). She was also in the probation period when she killed my father. With her long history of violence, the court still allow her to be on the street and commit more crime, do we have a claim to sue the court or the government for 'state created danger' or other claims for government negligence? Thanks.	State governments (and state courts, employees, etc., as part of that government) are generally immune from lawsuits for all liability. See Governmental Tort Liability : 2017 Tennessee Code : Justia. You're really not going to be able to sue the state, the court, the prosecutor or parole officer over what you see as a negligent decision, considering the individuals' previous record or freedom while on parole, and/or whether they are charged as an adult or a minor. Most any lawyer will advise you of this. You could contact a local legal aid clinic Legal Aid/Legal Services \| Tennessee Bar Association for more of an explanation and explore the possibilities.	It depends... It could be an offence under section 5 Public Order Act 1986: (1) A person is guilty of an offence if he— (a) uses [...] disorderly behaviour ... [...] within the hearing or sight of a person1 likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby. Then there's Causation to consider, which is: whether the defendant's conduct (or omission) caused ... harm or damage. And also recklessness, which can be described as: unjustified risk-taking. In R v G [2004] 1 A.C. 1034 two boys set a fire which caused significant damage. They were charged, and convicted, for reckless arson contrary to section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971: (1) A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence. ... (3) An offence committed under this section by destroying or damaging property by fire shall be charged as arson. This conviction was quashed by the House of Lords who determined that test of recklessness for criminal damage is subjective and should take account of, for example the defendant's age (in R v G they were 11 and 12). The court determination was: A person acts recklessly within the meaning of section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 with respect to - (i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; (ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk. But compare this with DPP v Newbury and Jones [1976] AC 500 if someone were to die as a result of being hit by a brick: The defendants, both teenage boys, had thrown a piece of paving stone from a railway bridge onto a train which had been passing beneath them. The object struck and killed the guard who had been sitting in the driver’s compartment. The defendants were convicted of manslaughter, and unsuccessfully appealed, on the ground that they had not foreseen that their actions might cause harm to any other person. Lord Salmon explained that a defendant was guilty of manslaughter if it was proved that he intentionally did an act which was unlawful and dangerous and that act caused death, and that it was unnecessary that the defendant had known that the act in question was unlawful or dangerous. 1Note that there has to be such a person, not a hypothetical one, to be guilty of this offence.	The law regarding proof of service allows service of summons by publication in case a defendant "is not a resident of the state, but has property therein and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action". Plaintiff must file an affidavit saying that he believes that you are not a resident, and he either mailed the summons to you or states that your residence is unknown. Knowing how to contact a person is not exactly the same as knowing their residence, so the statement in the affidavit might be true. There is a one year limit on your right to defend and reopen if not served personally. The statute of limitations tolls after the cause of action has accrued (which I suppose would be defective service of the summons, viz. perjury in the affadavit). For recovery of real property, the time would be ten years. The court rules allow that "At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued". (This is clearly a matter that your attorney needs to address).	Charged? Of course, the police can charge you with anything at any time Could you be convicted? Maybe. Their best shot is charging you with “Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act” also called constructive manslaughter. The Crown must prove your act: was intentional, was unlawful, leads the reasonable person to realise that some other person is at risk of physical harm, and caused the death. The first two are uncontestable: the protesters are deliberately engaging in an illegal act. No 3 would be up to the jury. No 4 is also up to the jury and would turn on the evidence that the delay to the ambulance caused the death.	This assumes there is a difference under the law between reckless and negligent homicide (which does not exist everywhere). In Washington state there is a distinction between 1st and 2nd degree manslaughter, per RCW 9A.32.060 and .070. What could be called reckless homicide is when (a) He or she recklessly causes the death of another person; or (b) He or she intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child. and 'negligent homicide' would be A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person. The distinction is laid out in RCW 9A.08.010, compare A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. and A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. However, it is important to know what "knows" means: (i) he or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense; or (ii) he or she has information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense. The fact that X has manufactured a nutty belief that killing a person doesn't lead to death does not override the fact that a reasonable person would know that stabbing a person in the heart will in fact kill them, and is murder. You could put that in contrast to the situation where he has a belief that stabbing a victim in the butt will cure him, and he is unaware that the victim's heart is freakishly in the wrong place, near his wallet – that would be negligence (being unaware). In general, you aren't given legal credit for having bizarre beliefs about how the universe works, unless it can be turned into an insanity defense.	There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense.	There is a saying that you can't sue city hall: that is applicable here. Governments enjoy sovereign immunity, and cannot be sued for their errors of judgment unless they specifically allow it. Safety regulations are an example of a situation where the government hold all of the power and shoulders none of the responsibility. If a government forbids sale or use of a substance on some grounds (could be safety, could be economic impact, could be something about preventing the moral decay of society), and the grounds later turns to be false, you cannot sue the government because of lost business opportunities. Generally speaking, that which is not prohibited is allowed, so there would have to be an affirmative duty for the government to prevent all forms of harm. If there were such a legal duty, there is a miniscule legal foundation for suing the government for shirking its duty. That is not a completely hypothetical possibility, in that the state of Washington imposes a constitutional duty on the legislature to provide public education, and the Supreme Court has done things to enforce this duty (the contempt of court fines are up in the realm of $80 million). Since there is no jurisdiction that imposes a duty on the government to absolutely prevent all harm, you won't be able to sue the government if they fail to outlaw a thing that is eventually proven to harm someone.	As Mark's answer indicates, you are evidently thinking of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. "Public acts" being laws, it may seem at first glance that states must fully respect the laws of other states. But the interpretation of this clause by the courts is rather different, and has evolved a bit over time. The short of the (modern) matter is that it mostly applies to matters concerning the judiciary. SCOTUS has recognized a "public policy exception" to the clause, which limits the ability of the clause to force a state to abide by laws which are in conflict with their own (for the most part: they don't have to). Driving privileges, and more generally who is licensed to do what (doctors, hunting, concealed carry, etc.), within a state falls under that public policy exception. So Texas does not have to obey New Hampshire's laws concerning the legal privilege to drive. As a basic sanity test, if this were not the case, then why wouldn't everybody in Texas not simply bounce off to New Hampshire for a summer to get their license there and then return to Texas and never bother with insurance? It entirely undercuts the state's sovereignty and ability to set their own laws if any other state can so easily create loopholes around them. Moreover, despite what the name might suggest, a "driver's license" is more a certification that you have the requisite skills, physical performance (passing an eye test), and knowledge to drive safely and in accordance with that state's traffic laws. It certainly makes sense for a state to require you to demonstrate at least that much, but they may also impose additional requirements. A requirement for insurance demonstrates your ability to handle financial liabilities that may reasonably result from your driving. All states currently accept a valid out-of-state license in the above sense: that you are certified to have the requisite skills, that it is valid proof of age, etc. Though if you become a permanent resident there they may require you to take new tests. However to legally drive in any particular state you must not only have such certification (a driver's license) but also satisfy any other conditions, such as age requirements and insurance requirements. As an aside, such state-by-state variations as to who is licensed to do what are in fact quite common, especially across history, even on very prominent issues. But even nationwide resolutions of those issues via SCOTUS have never, to my knowledge, utilized the Full Faith and Credit clause to do so. And, really, how could they? By saying since some state could force all other states to do X via the clause, then X must be a constitutional requirement? Or that any one state could unilaterally dictate laws in all other states? Madness! For one example, anti-miscegenation laws, which outlawed (certain) interracial marriages, were quite common until 1967, when SCOTUS struck them all down using the 14th amendment. More recently, gay marriage was forced to be recognized in all states, also via the 14th amendment. In both cases, before those SCOTUS rulings, the courts had generally recognized that the Full Faith and Credit clause did not compel the state to recognize (out-of-state) marriages it did not want to recognize. These both fell under the public policy exception.
Can one turn down a settlement offer if it's for more than the amount being claimed? Suppose Joe is suing Acme Corp for $1000 over damages to his property. After some time, Acme Corp offers a settlement to Joe for $1500, on condition he signs a non-disclosure agreement. Is Joe allowed to refuse this offer and go to court anyway? I wonder if this is legal since it may seem as though Joe is not interested in the actual amount but simply is interested in the fight and/or defaming the corporation.	Based on other questions you have posted, I will assume you refer to some jurisdiction in the U.S. Is Joe allowed to refuse this offer and go to court anyway? I wonder if this is legal since it may seem as though Joe is not interested in the actual amount but simply is interested in the fight and/or defaming the corporation. Yes, it is legal, especially if Joe prevails in his claim of damages to his property. For instance, Michigan MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(i) awards attorney fees and other costs to the prevailing party if the primary purpose in the lawsuit is "to harass, embarass, or injure that prevailing party". But with Joe being the prevailing party, MCL 600.2591 is a moot point (that is, devoid of relevance). Even if Joe did not prevail in the claim, it would be hard for Acme to prove that Joe's primary purpose was to harass or unlawfully injure Acme if Joe's position has some legal merit (see the statute at (3)(a)(ii)). Acme Corp offers a settlement to Joe for $1500, on condition he signs a non-disclosure agreement. This portrays that Acme's settlement offer to Joe is not merely devised to make him whole. Instead, Acme is trying to obtain a very different benefit: Joe's silence. As such, Joe is entitled to refuse Acme's bid for non-disclosure, and commence proceedings in court. If Acme removed from its settlement offer the condition of Joe's non-disclosure, Acme would have more merit in arguing that Joe's lawsuit was frivolous. Lastly, to clarify concepts, the veracity of Joe's claim implies that he is not defaming Acme. And even if Joe's claim were knowingly false, his judicial proceedings in and of themselves cannot lead to a viable defamation lawsuit because judicial proceedings are (unfortunately) protected by absolute privilege.	A clause states "If the contract is breached you accept that you must pay for damages. We shall determine the amount." Will this hold up in court? A court is going to want to look for context and an interpretation that would make this provision make sense before invalidating it (which it might). For example, if there was a schedule of the amount of damages for various violations attached to the contract, a court might interpret this language to mean that the drafting, non-breaching party will invoice you for damages in amount that it determines in good faith to be the correct amount with reference to the schedule or some formula set forth in the contract (e.g. an interest rate on an open account loan), in much the same way that a landlord might dock your security deposit and send you a letter telling you what was deducted in what amounts and why, or that a credit card company might charge you interest and late fees on a monthly basis. A court would, of course, be unlikely to interpret the clause as affording final and binding legal authority to decide what is owed. In the face of a clause like this one, the other party could bring a lawsuit to dispute the amount determined to be owed by the drafting, non-breaching party (unless the contract is a third-party arbitration clause and simply doesn't read like one because it is out of context).	As a lawsuit, it doesn't make sense in U.S. law unless you have suffered significant injuries. Your damages are likely to be, at most, nominal ($1) if you discovered it before you were hurt, so you'd only lose the money spent replacing the jar of peanut butter with a non-defective one and the nominal $1 damages. You would not generally have a right to any of your attorneys' fees and personal time spent on a lawsuit like that which would likely cost tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars on an hourly basis (no attorney would take a case like that on a contingency basis), and would take hundreds of hours of your own personal time.	No If the price advertised is not honoured by the business and you are asked to pay a higher price, you do not have an automatic right to buy the item at the special offer or sale price. As long as the shop or business tells you before you pay that the higher price applies, you have the option to either buy it at the higher price or decide not to. However, the shop or business may be in breach of consumer law in relation to misleading advertising. The prosecution (or not) of the misleading advertising is the government’s task, not yours. This is a common formulation across Common Law jurisdictions as it a codification of the historic common law position. An advertised price is not an offer capable of acceptance, it is an invitation to treat. That is, it is an invitation for you to make them an offer and the price that is likely to be accepted. It is overlaid with later developments in consumer protection surrounding false advertising and misleading and deceptive conduct.	The mortgage company cannot grant you title. The basic logic of your relationship to the mortgage company is that you borrowed a bunch of money, using the hose as collateral, and you owe them that money so you have to pay. If you don't pay, they can take you to court, and normally they would get the court to make them the owners of the house, which they can then sell to recover their losses. Not paying the debt is not a good idea. You can always ask them to put the payments in escrow, but I doubt they would agree since ultimately you owe them that money. What is supposed to happen is that the title insurance company pays for their mistake, whatever it was. It is possible though that the error was the county's, in which case the news is all bad (ask your attorney about a case I believe in Columbus, around 2010, where the county screwed up the paperwork and the buyer ended up with no recourse – as I recall, the buyer had no title insurance). Ohio law does not require recording title transfers, therefore it is quite possible that the transaction was not properly vetted through attorneys. I'd give the standard admonition "ask your attorney", but all I can suggest is to try a better attorney.	Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, there has to be an agreement for there to be price fixing. If the parties do not agree to engage in price-fixing or other anti-competitive behavior, there is no violation. There does not needed to be a written, explicit contract memorializing the agreement, but there does need to be more than just encouragement to change prices. Telling one person to charge more isn't price-fixing, because the person making the suggestion could then just leave his own prices in place and enjoy the competitive advantage. But if that person were to say, "We should raise our prices," and then they both did, you'd probably have a pretty good Sherman Act case.	Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.)	There is no general law making it illegal to lie about debts, or anything else. It is illegal to lie to a law enforcement officer in the course of an investigation. (And of course it is illegal to lie in court testimony or when otherwise under oath.) But it is in no way unlawful to decline to answer, unless a proper court order has been obtained, or other lawful means of compelling an answer. I would expect any law office to respond to such a question with something like "Am I/we being investigated? If so, send the appropriate notice and our lawyer will consider what we should tell you. If not, tell us what information you want, and we will consider and provide a written response in due course." If a taxpayer has been found to be delinquent in paying taxes, in some cases a court order may be obtained seizing assets, including unpaid debts. But no IRS agent can make such a claim on the spot, and indeed for a client to make such a payment without such a court order, or the order of an IRS tribunal (or the creditor's written consent) would itself be unlawful and would subject the lawyer to a suit by the PI (Private Investigator). When the lawyer pays a service provider, a 1099 must be filed with the IRS. If the PI is a corporation, a different form is used, but a record of payment is still required. As failure to timely file such a form is a violation of the tax code, an accusation of paying without filing would permit the lawyer to decline to answer under the Fifth amendment. If the lawyer did pay and did file a 1099 or other documentation, the IRS would know what had been payed, and would not need to confront the PI. Also, as the comment by Hilmar points out, a PI would be likely to use the cash accounting method, and so would own no tax on work performed but unpaid (as yet). So unless the IRS agent thinks the PI was paid "off-the books" and is intentionally failing to report the payment, there would be no point to such a question. And if that were he case, the lawyer would be very likely to decline to answer. I find the story quite implausible.
Why did the DA choose to prosecute the mother instead of the bully? https://nypost.com/2017/11/28/mom-faces-jail-for-secretly-recording-daughters-bullies/ In this case, some kid bully another. I am not sure if bullying is a crime or not. It seems that some violence is involved. I think we have a crime for that, called battery or something. Yet, despite the complain of the mom, nothing was done. So the mom collect evidences for bullying. And she got charged instead. To me, the result is not "intuitive". To me, what should have happened is that the Mom shouldn't even bother doing the recording. She reports to school. School reports to cops. Cops do investigating and do the recording. We have evidence. The bully sent to jail. I think that "should have been" what happened. It's not. It's as if the society as a whole "approve" and "promote" the bullying by making sure there is no way the bully faced justice. The cops don't get involved. And the only way to get evidence is criminalized. If I were a DA, and say I want to get elected, I would throw the bully in jail. And if a bully is thrown in jail, then the "recording" event wouldn't have happened in the first place. I understand that DA does not have obligation to prosecute any crime. However, repeated battery seems like a reasonably obvious crime. If that's not crime, what is? Now, usually, if people have a few legal options, they pick the one that's the most profitable. What "profit" does DA have in prosecuting the mom instead of the bullies. As someone beaten up when I was a kid, I am wondering about this for a long time. Why do society more interested in protecting something I perceive as more trivial, like recording, compared to something far more substantial, like beating.	This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.	Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing".	So, as you say, these witnesses who try to help their buddy out may be committing perjury. Also, D himself, by lining this up, is probably on the hook for conspiracy to commit perjury and being complicit in perjury. Aside from that, I think your question is: would getting people to testify in a way that implies they did the crime lead to an acquittal for the murderer? The answer is: maybe. The jury will either vote to acquit or to convict. If the jury votes to acquit, then it's over. Double jeopardy protects D from being tried for murder again. But, if the jury votes to convict, the fact that D had his friends testifying in the way you suggest isn't going to get the conviction overturned on appeal because "a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts." People v. Young, 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 (Cal. 2005). I haven't done a trial yet, but it strikes me that that might not be the greatest trial strategy. I think generally defense lawyers would prefer to make their client look the furthest thing from gang affiliated as possible. Don't lie to a court or ask anyone to lie to a court for you.	This depends entirely on STATE law, and you need to list the state(s) you are interested in in the question. Thus, the usual legal statement "it depends." POLICE ARE NOT ATTORNEYS Don't accept legal advice from the police at face value. Police frequently don't actually know the minutiae of the law, and/or often misunderstand it. Their job is not to provide legal advice nor legal judgement, their job is to enforce the law based on certain priorities. Thus the area of enforcement is usually narrowed to specific categories so they can be experts in that area. (I.e vice cops, bunko squad, homicide division, etc.) But police are not lawyers, so don't expect them to understand the law. They did not attend 3 years of law school after attaining a college degree, which lawyers DO. Police get as little as 3 months training (in some states like Arkansas they can be put on duty without ANY training for up to a year (!) before attending the academy). THAT SAID, REGARDING CALL RECORDINGS: There are single and two party states. In single party states, any single person who is part of a call or communication can record it. In "two party" states, everyone that is part of the call must be informed. There are numerous exceptions and stipulations however. GREAT EXPECTATIONS First off, is there an "expectation of privacy." Again this varies by state and case law. Generally, if there is no expectation of privacy, then there is a clear exception to record. For instance, if you are in a busy restaurant, and people around you can hear or eavesdrop, you have no expectation of privacy. Courts have also ruled that if you are in the presence of a police officer performing official duties, there is also no expectation of privacy (not for either of you). IS IT LIVE OR IS IT MEMOREX Are you being recorded? If you are in a two/all party state, and you have an expectation of privacy (a phone call made in your home) then one of the following must occur: If the police are recording you without your knowledge, they must have a court order permitting them to do so as part of an investigation. Otherwise you must be notified with a statement at the beginning of the call that the call is being recorded. (Typically your option is to hang up or continue. Continuing the call implies your consent.) In some states the notification can be in the form of a "duck" or a beep every 15 seconds (time period varies, this is also different per state). OPINION NOT ADVICE BELOW I would think that being notified that a call is being recorded ends any expectation of privacy for any involved party. Assuming the state law and related case law supports recording when there is no expectation of privacy, this circumstance would seem to permit recording legally. Doubly so if your were talking to police in official capacity (did you notice a beep every xx seconds?) CAUTION: Because this varies so much by state, and because even the various Federal District Courts are not in unanimous agreement on the minutiae, there may be other factors to consider.	No. As the defendant's lawyer, they will have been privy to privileged communications. As such, it would be unfair to the defendant if they now started prosecuting. Also note that a victim very rarely has their own lawyer in a criminal case. The prosecution lawyer is acting for "the Crown" (essentially, "society as a whole"). (There are exceptions, if the victim is bringing a private prosecution - but this is very rare for serious cases such as rape).	"If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining.	Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? This is a hard question to answer that doesn't have a neat resolution. Very little pertaining to the authority of a parent over a child is codified in statutory law and there is not a clear cut age at which a child has "freedom of conscience" vis-a-vis a parent. Most of the law related to children concerns allocation of parenting time and parental decision making between divorced, separated or unmarried parents; abuse and neglect; and juvenile delinquency. There is also usually a snippet of criminal law stating that certain kinds of uses of force to discipline children do not constitute crimes. But, part of why it doesn't come up very much is that older children are usually socialized in a manner that causes them to show a certain amount of respect for the wishes of their parents. It also doesn't come up much for children who aren't in their late teens, because the complete economic dependence of children on their parents or guardians gives the parents considerable power of their children that doesn't require the exercise of physical force. Also, it is quite dependent upon how the issue presents itself. No law enforcement agency is going to aid a parent in forcibly dragging a kid to church against their will. But, no social services agency is going to remove a kid from a home because his birthday party will be cancelled if he doesn't go to the church of his parents' choice the Sunday before his birthday. There are also some subtle but important distinctions between states on the issue of emancipation. In Colorado, emancipation is a statement about the empirical reality. If a child is self-supporting and lives apart from parents or guardians then the child is an emancipated minor. It is not a status granted by a court, it is a status acknowledged by courts when evaluating other issues. In California, a child is not emancipated unless a court grants a child that status and a child who is de facto emancipated without the leave of a court is guilty of a "status offense" (the New York State term for someone in this state is PINS for "person in need of supervision"). Basically, if a parent can force a child to go to church by means that don't constitute abuse or neglect and don't exceed the level of force authorize for child discipline in the criminal code, then they can do it, and if they can't manage that, then they can't do it. Many states have a "status offense" that allows government intervention with the cooperation of a parent or guardian in cases where an "uncontrollable" child is defiant and simply will not give any heed to the parent or guardian's instructions. In practice, the older a child is, the less likely someone viewing a parent's conduct forcing a child to do something is to be viewed as acceptable or legally justified. The legal rights of children in a school setting are also age dependent under the case law, although not always in a really well defined way. Controls on student expression that would be uncontroversial for elementary school students may be looked upon by the law with disfavor for high school students and clearly prohibited for adults. Perhaps one useful way to conceptualize it is that trying to make a child attend a particular kind of religious service is not considered an improper purposes for a parent of any minor to utilize the resources available to the parent to do so, but the range of resources available to a parent with regard to an adult child is much narrower.	There is no absolute rule in such cases. It is often a matter of negotiation between the state and federal authorities, and failing agreement, a matter of which authority has the prisoner in custody. Often the question of which crime is more serious or carries a longer sentence is an issue in such negotiations.
Who enjoys freedom of the press? In the 18th century it was decided that in the U.S.A. "freedom of the press" would prevail. "The press" is the printing press, a technology for mass-producing copies on paper. Thus freedom of the press would appear to mean freedom to use that technology, a freedom belonging equally to those whose job is to do that and those who do it only once. But sometimes people use the phrase "the press" to mean those whose occupation is to make and distribute copies of their writings, or else those who report the news (via the web as well as the old-fashioned way?). It seems some people construe "freedom of the press" to be a freedom belonging only to that class of people, perhaps even according them special rights that others don't have. Which is it?	This is an important question that affects consumer advocacy, blog-based-journalism, political speech and spending, and probably other things. People disagree about what the answer is. This podcast episode features both sides of the argument. Professor Volokh holds the view that the freedom of the press is "freedom to print", "freedom to use the printing press". Freedom of the press is the freedom of everybody to use the printing press. Assessing the grammar of the clause, he argues that this points in the same direction. The text says "freedom of speech or of the press". He points out that speech is not a group of people. It would be odd to treat "speech" as an activity, but to treat "press" as a group of people given the parallel construction. This side of the argument is described more in this article by Prof. Volokh. Professor West argues that there is a defined group of people called "the press" that deserves protection under this clause. This article explains Prof. West's position in detail. The main point is that "An expansive definition of the press means virtually complete overlap between press and speech and thus no meaningful way to interpret the Press Clause." If "press" means simply the right to publish speech, then it becomes redundant because courts have held the right to publish speech is given under that "speech" portion of the clause. Justice Stevens's concurrence in Citizens United also argued for "some kinds of identity-based distinctions" regarding whether a person is a member of the press. Each side can give examples of the term "the press" being used at the time of the First Amendment that is consistent with their favored interpretation. I think to get the best idea of the two sides to this question, you should read Citizens United (including all dissents and concurrences), read the two articles linked above, and listen to the podcast episode.	The Constitution said people have the Rights to Properties. No it doesn't. There is no such provision. The closest I am aware of is the so-called "takings clause" in the Fifth Amendment, which reads: Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. There has been a good deal of litigation over just when when a "taking" occurs under this provision. The classic and most obvious case is the use of eminent domain to aquire actual title to the property by a government (Federal, State, or local). This is always a takign, and compensation nis required. The more questionable cases have occurred when some law or regulation leaves the owner with title, but significantly restricts the uses to which the property may be put, particularly when the existing use becomes unlawful. Courts have ruled in different ways in such cases, but I think the current standard is that when a regulation removes all, or almost all, economic value from the property there has been a "regulatory taking" and compensation must be paid. But as far as I know, a tax on the property has never been considered to be a taking inn this sense.	No Any such law would violate the US First Amendment as an improper restriction of speech and of the press. If done by the court rather thiygh a law, it would also conflict with 17 USC 105 which says that: Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government Courts have restricted video and still photography of court proceedings, on the ground that the presence of cameras would disturb court sessions and distract witnesses and jurors. But that would not apply to the proceedings of an appellate court.	It's hard to say, under the Twitter TOS. They do not claim that copyright is transferred to them: "You retain your rights to any Content you submit, post or display on or through the Services. What’s yours is yours — you own your Content (and your photos and videos are part of the Content)". But you do license the content: By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same. You agree that this license includes the right for Twitter to provide, promote, and improve the Services and to make Content submitted to or through the Services available to other companies, organizations or individuals for the syndication, broadcast, distribution, promotion or publication of such Content on other media and services, subject to our terms and conditions for such Content use. Such additional uses by Twitter, or other companies, organizations or individuals, may be made with no compensation paid to you with respect to the Content that you submit, post, transmit or otherwise make available through the Services. The totality of conditions, including the Twitter Rules, is ever-evolving and not apparently contained in a single link. From what I can tell, there is no condition that prohibits a user from copying tweets into a book. There are numerous statements about "respecting copyright" which refer to taking material that is not licensed to Twitter and redistributing: nothing about redistributing licensed material.A plain reading of the first bold sentence says that you can make your content available to the world, not restricted to "retweeting".	You've identified exactly the right question: whether the person's subjective expectation of privacy, when viewed objectively, is the "justifiable under the circumstances". (Smith v. Maryland) The Supreme Court hasn't addressed how this test applies to ISPs and website requests. However, this question has been addressed by several circuit courts of appeal. I'll build a list of example cases. Many find that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in this information, but there are some cases that go the other way, and there is some nuance regarding exactly what information is being given away. US v. Beckett (11th Cir. 2010): the information consisted of the identifying information transmitted during internet usage and phone calls that is necessary for the ISPs and phone companies to perform their services. It is unreasonable for Beckett to have been unaware that such information was being transmitted to the ISPs and phone companies and so he “assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the [information].” United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007): Analogously, e-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information. Like telephone numbers, which provide instructions to the "switching equipment that processed those numbers," e-mail to/from addresses and IP addresses are not merely passively conveyed through third party equipment, but rather are voluntarily turned over in order to direct the third party's servers. Regarding your secondary question about a "secret machine" that the government develops to get access to contents of an envelope without opening it, that is very similar to the situation in Kyllo v US 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (internal quotations removed): [...] obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the home's interior that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. [...] Reversing that approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology-including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home.	This could be a violation of 18 USC 1030 (and a crime). A number of things go into requirements for conviction under this law. First, it has to be a computer, which is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device Any printer that I have encountered in the past 40 years counts as "a computer". Second, (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—...(C) information from any protected computer; It is highly likely that the person printing has to receive some information from the printer, and respond accordingly so you have your "obtains information" element. Maybe not useful information, but information nevertheless. It also has to be a protected computer, (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States Well, a computer connected to the internet is a protected computer, see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918. Also, the access must be "without authorization or exceeds authorized access". The law doesn't explain with "without authorization" means, but the latter is defined as to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter If the law were stated in terms of "prohibited access", meaning "express denial of permission", and if the computer owner had set the computer to "prohibited access" by default (password protected), there would be no issue -- accessing the computer is prohibited. "Unauthorized" can also mean "has not been explicitly authorized", i.e. lacking any indication one way or the other. Every computer access is initially unauthorized, until authorization is granted; and re-trying a login after mis-typing a user name (and being denied access) is not a violation of this law. There does not appear to be case law that addresses the status of computers just left open to the public, and whether using a computer that is so exposed constitutes "unauthorized access". Also, it is not clear that the defendant in this case has "obtained information", since with printing, information flows into the computer. There is also a clause about recklessly causing damage, but I don't see what damage would result ("damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information"), and how printing would be "reckless". It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be deemed to be a crime, though if you experiment, you could be on the cutting edge of new case law.	Law The origin of the phrase is from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). It specifically rules on the limitation of freedom of speech (first amendment): The original ruling is this: The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. As pointed out by @phoog, this does not saying anything about the lawfullness of shouting "fire", it says that if your speech creates a clear and present danger, the first amendment will not protect you, even if the danger does not result in actual harm. Commentary If these instances are correct then it would seem clear that Freedom of Speech is being honored as it's the result of speech, not the speech itself, that could be an offense. You seem to think that it should be illegal, but only if it results in a panic that endangers people. If people ignore you, you think it should be protected by your first amendment rights. That's not how the law works. The law tries, among other things. To establish norms for human behaviour. For example, you will be punished for driving an automobile while intoxicated, even of this does not result in you running over somebody. In the words of the supreme court: If your actions "are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger", the congress has the right to prevent you from doing so, despite the first amendment.	Generally, no matter where you are, the answer to your question(s) is largely going to be a fact dependent analysis. Just so we're clear, I want to be sure you're using the term pseudonym in the way that it's generally accepted or understood to mean, being a fictitious name typically used by an author (this could be book, blog, a paper – whatever); but not as an alias or a false identity used to mislead people about your qualifications or official position. Assuming you are using a pseudonym in the way it would typically be used: as a mechanism to write and publish under a name other than your own so as not to have credit, or discredit be given to your actual identity, than I cannot see this being a problem anywhere, nor could I find any laws that pertain to this. (You've not asked about copyright/trademark, which poses different legal issues but is also not insurmountable if done correctly.) Generally, if you are publishing something, you have the right to publish anonymously or use a nom de plume (aka:a pseudonym or pen name)...this has been done throughout history and throughout the world by many famous authors. Reasons differ and the examples for such are endless. I have heard of a famous "pulp" fiction writer having used one when writing a children's books; people do it to overcome biases and exposure associated with their name (both positive and negative); during WWII Jewish authors used them to avoid being discounted or arrested based on their name and lineage. In the 1700's (when the U.S. was coming into its infancy) many writers and journalists used pseudonyms, and while the use itself wasn't illegal, they did so to write controversial and often illegal articles, papers, and even letters to the editor, that criticized governments or monarchies and their practices. Some of the most famous pseudonyms were for that purpose. Ben Franklin used to almost exclusively write under a pen name and create elaborate characters to go along with them. Famous authors like Dean Koontz and Stephen King, both used pen names when trying out new genre's or to avoid over-exposure – especially when releasing at the same time. Many famous women authors, throughout history, used to write under male pen names because women couldn't be published or at least not as easily. Most famously was probably the Federalist (Federalist Papers), written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay (under the pseudonym Publius), who published 80 or so papers calling for the ratification of the United States Constitution. These were very dangerous writings for their time. When I read your question, however, I worry that you seem to be suggesting something other than simply a pseudonym for these various typical purposes. Maybe I'm wrong, but when you say hide behind, and you are talking about using Ph.D., or Dr., or some other title that would denote special education or training, you are treading into different territory if the purpose is to mislead or misinform people: not about who you are, but about what you know based on who you are. There is a big difference. So, for instance, Dr. Seuss (who actually began his career writing and drawing political parodies and cartoons) wrote children's books using Dr. as part of his nom du plume, which was his prerogative as nobody was mislead or harmed by the fact that he chose to put Dr. in front of his name. He was not posing as a doctor or giving advice about medical issues, so nobody detrimentally relied on his writings based on that fact. However, if someone wrote a non-fiction book about life saving holistic cures for cancer (I'm just pulling topics out of my head), and the author called himself Dr. Doe, or you write a book about prevention of suicide and you put Ph.D. after your name, and people who read the books detrimentally rely on the information because you've mislead them about your expertise – that is not just a pseudonym and it could definitely leave you vulnerable to legal problems. You cannot hide behind a title to exploit people by suggesting you're qualified to proffer information in which you have no training or expertise; this is not a nom du plume, it is a fraudulent misrepresentation. With regard to whether or not you have a right to hide behind a pseudonym on the internet? E.g., assuming I don't break any laws, can an internet host/provider publish my real name? that really depends on the site you post on. It is your responsibility to read their privacy disclosures to find out. Facebook, for example, has a "real name" policy, which disallows this practice. Other sites may allow you to create any screen name you want, but require a real name for registration purposes for a variety of reasons, one being if they need to have it for law enforcement purposes. Regardless of the policy of the web host, if you do break the law, or end up getting sued based on your writings, all it would take to reveal your identity is a subpoena arising out of a lawsuit. While using a pen name is seemingly legal in and of itself, pretty much anywhere, whether or not doing so could lead to criminal or civil liability, or whether your real identity could be exposed, is largely dependent on how you undertake to use your fake identity. Impersonating certain licensed professionals, or government officials can be a very slippery slope, and could be illegal or lead to liability, in an of itself. Personally, I would stay away from using any.
Copyright When Using Works in CC0/Public Domain If I use works in the public domain or with a CC0 license (sound effects, images, 3d materials) and alter them (give a 3d model I've created a CC0 material, alter a sound effect in audacity) can I claim copyright on the altered work or does it stay in the public domain?	You cannot claim copyright protection of the underlying work, but you can claim protection for your contribution. Under 17 USC 101, the resulting work is a derivative work: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. As an "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression", the work is protected by copyright law: but that only applies to the modifications that you added.	Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing.	As the question says the "Fugue in A Major" by Shostakovich is not in the public domain. The work was published in 1950, and so would not be PD under US law, and Shostakovich died in 1975, and so his works would not be PD in countries using a life+50, life+70, or longer term. Therefore, simply "making some changes" would be the creation of a derivative work and would be copyright infringement in and of itself, even if that work was not published or distributed. If a relatively short segment of the fuge was used, it might be considered a "fair use" under US copyright law, or perhaps a "fair dealing " in the laws of those countries that recognize this exception to copyright. But that is a very fact-intensive determination; it depends on the amount used, the manner and purpose for which it is used, and the harm, if any, to the market for the original work. One can never be absolutely sure that a use is a fair use until a court rules that it is. A two minute excerpt is fairly substantial, and might well not be held to be a fair use. Of course, you could seek permission from the Shostakovich estate (or whoever owns the copyright on the fugue). They might or might not grant it, and might or might not demand a fee. (As another answers mentions, there may be some question if the works of Shostakovich are protected by copyright under US law.)	The Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license (and all versions) is explicitly "non-sublicensable". If you receive a copy of the work under that license, you cannot place the work under a new license. The license grants you only the rights to A. reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and B. produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material. When you give copies of someone else's CC-licensed work to downstream recipients, they do not receive a license grant for the original work from you; they receive it from the original author/licensor: Downstream recipients. A. Offer from the Licensor – Licensed Material. Every recipient of the Licensed Material automatically receives an offer from the Licensor to exercise the Licensed Rights under the terms and conditions of this Public License. When you include someone else's CC-licensed work in an adaptation, you may license the adaptation under other terms, but the underlying CC-licensed work remains under its CC license. From the CC FAQ: If I derive or adapt material offered under a Creative Commons license, which CC license(s) can I use? If you make adaptations of material under a CC license (i.e. "remix"), the original CC license always applies to the material you are adapting even once adapted. The license you may choose for your own contribution (called your "adapter's license") depends on which license applies to the original material. Recipients of the adaptation must comply with both the CC license on the original and your adapter’s license. When sharing someone else's work, the original CC-licensed work always remains under its original license. By contrast, the "ShareAlike" condition means that your own work used in an adaptation of a CC-BY-SA work must be placed under CC-BY-SA terms as well. ShakeAlike does not refer to the requirement to preserve the license on existing CC-licensed material (which is always present), but rather it refers to the requirement to include it on new material.	Generally, no, this will not violate copyright. Your end user might violate copyright, but that is their problem not yours. Your program is a tool, just like a word processor is. If I copy a Harry Potter book into a word processor that does not make the word processor maker liable. There is a concept of "contributory infringement", which I think is what you are concerned about. I don't know about Danish law in particular, but most countries would require evidence that you had reasonable knowledge that actual copyright violation was occuring, rather than just being aware that it might happen in theory. This is normally applied to file sharing services who have to have "notice and takedown" measures, file filters and the like. This isn't your concern as you never have any access to the files created by your users. You can also be found liable if you induce anyone to commit copyright violations. Don't draw your customers attention to the custom monster feature as a workaround for those copyrighted monsters, as that could be considered to be inducement. Also don't provide any "wizards" or similar tools which make it noticeably easier to duplicate the custom monsters (e.g. if you notice that the copyrighted custom dragon stats are all on a linear scale with dragon size, don't create a "dragon creation wizard" embodying that fact.) This assumes that your program runs entirely on the end user computer. Its different if you provide any kind of cloud storage for generated characters.	I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must.	Recording the original work and editing that record is a breach of copyright. You are taking unauthorised copies of the original music and lyrics when you make the notes, and creating derivative works when you alter the notes of the song to match what you think they should be. Performing the songs is a breach of copyright in countries that don't provide for it explicitly (the USA is notably strange on this point). You cannot simply just take a piece of music and perform it this way everywhere, even for church service. In sum, what you're doing is at least partly and could be fully illegal.	Copyright requires originality Your infinity hard drive appears to be a machine designed to violate copyright by immediately copying anything presented to it. Damien Riehl and Noah Rubin were creating original melodies. These do not have copyright until they are fixed in a tangible medium. That's what the hard drive is for. This is insurance against them being sued if they release a song and someone claims it violates that person's copyright - they can produce in court the melody with a date stamp of 2015 (or whatever). GitHub or similar would be even better evidence. In this context there is a specific allegation that melody X infringes copyright. Riehl & Rubin can then go to their records (including metadata) and say no, here is melody X version 1 through n and they all predate your release so we didn’t violate your copyright.
Lawyer forgot to file the paperwork and now has no case: what to do? A close friend of mine had a legitimate suit against a large business. He was directly harmed, the business was caught and punished (for harming him and many other clients), and my friend joined a group lawsuit against this business. The lawyer running the lawsuit met with my friend and told him, "Sorry but I forgot to file your case in time. There's nothing I can do. The statute of limitations is up for you." It's a little more involved in that but I don't understand legalese. That is the gist. The lawyer was nice and apologized but this seems like a real bad deal for my friend. Everyone else in the case still moves forward, only my friend is out. Is my friend completely out of luck?	This is a fairly general answer, as much of the nature of what could happen depends on what the first lawyer did or didn't do, state of Missouri laws, and rules of the Missouri State Bar. The friend could find another lawyer so they both can determine exactly what happened with the forgotten filing by the first lawyer. Your friend will need to find a lawyer who has no conflicts of interest with the first lawyer, which could be difficult. The first lawyer will realize they need to be truthful about what happened. The new lawyer could advise your friend if the forgotten filing was negligence, an "honest mistake" according to the lawyer, or somewhere in between, and if it might be possible to recover damages for not being part of the original suit, or for breach of contract, etc. With that evidence, your friend, with the advice and/or help of the new lawyer, could either 1) file a ethics or disciplinary complaint with the Missouri office that disciplines lawyers for ethics and other violations Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. 2) sue the first lawyer for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty or for breach of contract. Your friend could file an ethics complaint with the OCDC - and without the aid of a lawyer - with whatever information he/she already has from their work with the first forgetful lawyer. The OCDC complaint process is geared towards non-lawyers. But if your friend gets help from others (non-lawyers) with filing a complaint, check with the OCDC first as to if that is allowed and to what degree.	The reality is that it is almost never an acceptable tactic to use in any jurisdiction where I ever have/or currently do practice. The bar is relatively small no matter where you are; even in bigger cities. Your reputation is your most valuable asset and it would be crippled if this became your M.O., or was used in anything but the most rare and egregious situations (e.g. withholding evidence, lying to the judge, tampering with jury). Small violations (which are seemingly big in the heat of trial) happen every day and if you even suggested this it would come back on you more times than not. This is exponentially true in the criminal arena where the Judges and prosecutors interact on a daily basis and have formed collegial relationships. If you practice criminal law you often need to form good working relationships with the ADAs or AAGs since most cases get disposed of through negotiations with these very individuals. I have been in situations where my colleagues and I discussed it, opined on how it would be appropriate, but in the end have never gone that far. One time things were so bad with opposing counsel on so many levels, I considered it; however, I was a newish lawyer and my mentor at the time told me that he had never seen anyone but a federal court judge issue a sanction and aside from that, had never even seen it requested by a lawyer in the local bar. And these were horribly bad violations of the rules of procedure, conduct unbecoming, etc. So, I would suggest avoiding this practice. My rule of thumb is that unless the offending practice is so egregious that one would be technically duty bound to report the conduct to the bar, it is not appropriate to ask for sanctions.	He is mistaken. The statute of limitations for suing someone for a car accident, and for enforcing an oral promise, are both far longer than 3-4 months. You could get an estimate of the damages, report it to his insurance company, and, if the insurance company does not cooperate promptly, bring suit in a court of limited jurisdiction or a small claims court. Even if you don't retain a lawyer to take on the case for you fully, if you need to sue, you should hire a lawyer to coach you on the high points of how to represent yourself in this case, particularly with regard to how to fill out the Complaint, how to serve the other driver with process, and what evidence you need to present in what manner a trial.	If you're in the United States, another lawyer in a firm you've hired may or may not be your attorney, but it would not be uncommon for him to have some involvement in the case, and he would be expected to treat you as a client in terms of privilege and conflicts of interest. Just the same, this is something you need to be very direct on. "Are you my attorney?" or "Have we established an attorney-client relationship?" are going to be your best options.	This is for educational (and fun!) purposes and is not and should not be thought of as legal advice and, if you're planning on doing something with respect to your situation described above, you should seek the counsel of an attorney in your jurisdiction. The question: Well, it's wrong regardless of whether it is a class action lawsuit. Now, it is not a class action because a class action is created by the determination of a judge. So, you need to know if this situation would qualify to become a class action. Certifying the class: The most important part is having the "class" certified. The "class" is the group of people with similar injuries sues the same person or company or several people or companies. Prior to this, a plaintiff must fill out a standard complaint filing and check the appropriate box to indicate the intention to file a class action. State level requirements: Requirements to become certified as a class vary by state. Most states, in general, follow broad requirements which require the plaintiff to prove: the representative plaintiff has suffered the same alleged injuries as the proposed class. The allegations are assumed to be true for the purposes of certification (since the trial has not started) the class can be defined clearly enough to determine who is and is not a member the number of class members makes joining all of them to the lawsuit impractical (40 or more is almost always enough, 21 or less is almost always not enough) a common set of facts or legal interest underlies all of the members’ alleged injuries the representative plaintiff’s claims are so similar to the class members that litigating the representative plaintiff’s case will adequately decide the absent class members’ cases, and a class action is the best and most efficient way of resolving the claims, either for the plaintiffs or for the defendants. Federal level requirements: Similarly, there can be class actions at the federal court level, too. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 covers Class Actions. Rule 23(a) establishes four "threshold requirements" for certification. They all must be met. They are: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of class members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the class representatives are typical of those of the class (typicality); and (4) the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy). Additionally, the court then must find that at least one out of three more possible conditions are met. Under Rule 23(b), those requirements are: (1) that prosecution of separate actions risks either inconsistent adjudications which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant or would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of others; (2) that defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class; or (3) that there are common questions of law or fact that predominate over any individual class member’s questions and that a class action is superior to other methods of adjudication. Burden of proof: The burden is wholly on the plaintiff to not only plead each element that must be met, but also to prove those conditions exist. The standard of proof here is a "preponderance of the evidence," which is the one used in civil cases and is less than "beyond a reasonable doubt" required of a criminal case. Misc. items of note: If a class is certified, then one plaintiff participates in the litigation, while the others essentially await adjudication. There are more complexities than appropriate to delve into here. For example, you'll notice there is no number requirement; rather, numerosity with respect to the practicality of joinder of all members of the class. FYI: However, generally, 20 and less is considered "insufficiently numerous," while 40 or more will often "satisfy the numerosity requirement."	This would be virtually impossible to do from scratch. If you had the guidance of someone who successfully pursued a similar legal action it might be possible. In theory you should be able to pursue grievances in court by becoming well versed in the applicable laws and rules, having impeccable attention to detail, exceptional deductive and writing skills, and getting lucky enough to run your filings through patient clerks who will tell you every time you're missing something or doing something wrong. New York Courts even offer this encouraging CourtHelp website for pro se guidance on common actions. But if you really want to attempt a pro se civil action, especially against a government entity, or other entity with essentially unlimited legal funds, you not only need all of the above but also some sort of assistance from somebody who knows the system. I would spend as much time looking for sympathetic advocacy groups and lawyers offering pro bono service as I would reading relevant law and procedure. (One more thing: The word "quick" is never used in conjunction with formal legal actions, except in jest ;)	Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints.	This is not a place for specific legal advice, but you shouldn't be afraid of the small claims court; I'm doing that myself and it really is a low-risk and straightforward way to get money that is owed to you. Step 1: Get the boiler repaired or replaced as necessary. Keep the receipts. Don't be tempted to get an upgrade or anything else to push expenses that are legitimately yours on to the other party; find out what the cheapest thing is that you can reasonably do to fix the problem and then do that. Step 2: Write a letter to the seller in which you set out the facts of the case and demand the cost of the repairs. Also include any other expenses you have had to incur, like money for your time off work while the repair is done. End it with "If you do not agree to pay this money within one month then I will take action in the county court to recover the money". Send it by recorded delivery and include a copy of the repair receipt (NOT the original). Step 3: If you do not get your money then go here and follow the instructions. You have to pay an up-front fee to the court which gets added on to the amount you are claiming. That is the only money you are putting at risk if you lose. The whole thing is as informal and straightforward as possible, and is purposely designed so that you don't need a lawyer, nor can you or the other side claim for the cost of a lawyer if you win. This is why your lawyer is pushing you to do this by yourself: he knows that his fees would be out of proportion to the amount in question, and you wouldn't be able to get that money back even if you won. The only other wrinkle is if the other party has moved far away: in general if a hearing is needed then it will be held near them rather than near you, so you might have to travel.
What is the value in learning a dead gunman's motives? Last night a gunman shot and killed 12 people in a California tavern. The gunman was also killed. Interviews with law enforcement have stressed that they will work very hard to understand the gunman's motives. As the gunman is dead (hence unable to be prosecuted), what is the value in understanding his motives? It is reasonable the LE would want to determine that the gunman "acted alone", but why is it important to understand a dead gunman's motives. ( not your typical Law/se board question, but it surely doesn't belong in Politics/se)	As the gunman is dead (hence unable to be prosecuted), what is the value in understanding his motives? It is reasonable the LE would want to determine that the gunman "acted alone", but why is it important to understand a dead gunman's motives. Your point on ascertaining whether he acted alone is one good reason. Other reasons are to identify: whether the crime involved enticement or undue influence by others who ought to be prosecuted; patterns of action or of context, upon which intelligence agencies and Law Enforcement can be more effective in preventing similar tragedies; if gunman was mentally ill, whether an entity acted negligently or wantonly in allowing the release of this person; further statistical evidence for the legislator to improve the relevant statutes (or enact new ones if necessary) pursuant to the punishment and prevention of similar conduct. There might be other law-related reasons, but these are the ones I can think of right now.	I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty").	It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common.	You may be interested in a recent New York Times article, "The Lonely Death of George Bell", which described in detail the case of a man who was found dead in his apartment (of natural causes). It took a long time for him to be positively identified, and no near relatives could be located. Affairs were handled by a city official called a "public administrator". Bell's valuable possessions were sold at public auction and the funds added to his estate. Items of no significant value were discarded (a junk removal business was hired to clean out his apartment; a few items were kept by the workers). They did eventually find his will, and at least some of his heirs, so his estate went to them. The public administrator had Bell cremated by a local crematorium, with the ashes stored permanently in their columbarium. The cost was paid out of Bell's estate. If he hadn't had any assets, or hadn't been positively identified, the article mentions that he would have been buried in a "potter's field" at the city's expense.	You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right.	This is manslaughter of the vehicular variety Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:... (c) Vehicular— (1) ... driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. This is what they call a wobbler, and could be charged as a felony or a misdemeanor. In the latter case, the maximum penalty is a year in county jail and in the former it is six years in state prison. If the cause was ordinary negligence, it is just a misdemeanor. The details of gross negligence are set forth in the jury instruction CALCRIM 592 A person acts with gross negligence when: He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury; AND A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act. The "absent-mindedness" defense seems a bit far fetched, but still not everybody who drives inattentively is prosecuted for a felony, or even a misdemeanor. However, it is really hard to imagine not being acutely aware of the fact that people drive on the right side of the road here. Without a more-detailed story, I don't see a basis for deciding what level of negligence a prosecutor is likely to argue for, and what the prosecutor's agenda is: somewhere between no prosecution, and (most likely) misdemeanor manslaughter.	A problem with the question is that it uses the loaded term "victim". If you change the question to "Are there actions that you can perform involving another person, which are crimes even if the other person consents to participating in the action", then there are very many. Selling alcohol to a minor; selling heroin to anyone; selling sex in most US jurisdictions; selling firearms to a convicted felon. Also, for a physician to assist a person in suicide, in most states. Formerly in the US, various forms of sexual intercourse were acts that consent did not make legal. Whether or not the person is a "victim" in these cases is open to debate. In the case of physician-assisted suicide in Washington, the doctor is allowed to prescribe (oral) drugs that the person ingests: only a doctor is permitted to do this, both under the DWD Act and as a consequence that only a doctor can prescribe the drugs. There seems to be a belief that it is a crime to assist a person in committing suicide, which is probably correct if the assistance is shooting the person in the head, or in general directly causing the death (thus, "I give you permission to shoot me in the head" doesn't cut it). But from what I can tell, it is not generally against the law in Washington to help a person who commits suicide (e.g. supplying the means of self-dispatching). In some countries, suicide and helping with suicide is illegal, e.g. in Kenya Penal Code 225 says Any person who (a) procures another to kill himself; or (b) counsels another to kill himself and thereby induces him to do so; or (c) aids another in killing himself, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for life. No exception is created if the person consents to being aided to kill himself.	united-states "I know is it illegal for authorities to question a suspect when their lawyer isn’t present" This is not really true, at least in the US. The suspect must explicitly ask for a lawyer. Even saying "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" (ie Davis v. U.S. (512 U.S. 453 (1994)) isn't enough, they have to say "I want a lawyer". Until they invoke the right, an officer can question all they want (provided they were informed of these rights, except for certain situations which are relatively complicated. See Miranda Rights). So no, an officer questioning you without a lawyer is neither a crime nor illegal. Once you invoke your Miranda right though, they have to respect that. With or without your lawyer, this is called interrogation. You can filter your responses through a lawyer, or waive your right to a lawyer and answer directly.
Is a shop that prints your photos on cakes allowed to print photos including people wearing (licensed) brand t-shirts? A large supermarket chain in the UK allows you to have photos printed on to cakes (they print it onto a layer of icing, then stick that on a cake). It's someone's special birthday and my wife took in a photo of the family (11 of us) to have it printed. The store refused because I was wearing an (officially licensed, and maybe even bought from that store!) Mario t-shirt. It's clearly visible, but it's just a t-shirt on one person out of eleven on a photo. I tweeted them about how ridiculous this is (surely it falls under fair dealing - photo shops don't refuse to print all photos of people wearing licensed t-shirts, or with company names/logos in them?) and got back essentially the same response: I'm very sorry to hear about this. Unfortunately we are unable to do this for you, I know it is a frustration but we do not own the rights to this image and branding. I'm sorry for the inconvenience caused. To what extent is the shop right about being able to print this photo on my cake? They're right and this is not allowed It's probably allowed but they're just being cautious It's ridiculous nonsense	The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture.	Whether this is considered a trade secret (at least in the US) depends partly on whether you've taken reasonable action to keep it secret. If an employee thought it was OK to publish the algorithm, that's evidence that you didn't try very hard to keep it from getting out. Even if nobody's noticed it yet, getting the blog post taken down in't going to get it off the internet. You may as well try to do it anyway. If nobody has noticed the algorithm by now, you want to make it harder for them to find. You need an IP lawyer pronto. Depending on where you are, you might be able to get a patent on the algorithm still, but patents are hard to enforce, and it appears to be getting harder in the US to patent algorithms. (There's a Stack Exchange site so people can look at patent applications and see if they can invalidate the application with prior art.) You can't license out the algorithm without having some legal way of stopping other places from just using it. If you have more proprietary algorithms or things that aren't generally known that give you a competitive advantage, it would be a good idea to inform employees that they aren't supposed to reveal them. Check with your IP lawyer to see what you should do.	You might be able to use a site like the Internet Archive to preserve the TOC even after the site is shut down. The real liability trap here is if the site does not have the authority to give you this license. If a user uploads a photo that they do not own, and you use it, you are infringing the copyright of the original owner. Innocent infringement is not a defense to liability (although it may reduce damages in some cases.)	If we cut through all the entertaining colour commentary around Bob's experience then all that happened is TfL refused him permission to carry a specific item and according to the TfL Conditions of Carriage: 9.2 Staff can refuse permission for you to take any item onto our services. For example, you may be prevented from taking a bicycle on DLR services during the London Marathon. So the rules around the times when non-folding bikes are permitted on the Overground not withstanding there's a catch-all rule which allows them to refuse specific items on specific occasions for whatever reason they want. What remedies does Bob have available for his wasted time, his refusal of carriage, the supervisor's concealment of his identity, general rude treatment, Realistically - none. The refusal may be harsh - but there's plenty of room in the conditions of carriage to allow it. A supervisor concealing his identity may be annoying but it's not illegal, nor is being rude. the BTP's shockingly insulting accusation of his "wasting police time" by simply trying to explain the situation to reason with them upon their arrival, either against TfL, or against BTP? Probably nothing doing here either - the BTP aren't for what Bob's trying to use them for. I doubt they'd actually pursue Bob for wasting police time unless he makes a habit of doing it, but they've got a point. They're not the complaints department for TfL! It's like calling the police because McDonalds won't serve you at the drive through.	In theory, a store can ban you or anyone else for any reason except those protected by law against discrimination. As a practical matter, you potentially have various forms of recourse. The first thing to do is to write the the CEO of the chain, with a long detailed letter describing the incidents, and naming names. Most CEO's don't want to deal with this kind of bad publicity, and will at least order an investigation, and make amends, if the internal investigation is in your favor. This would apply even to the late Sam Walton, if the chain is WalMart, or whoever the current CEO is. If you are a member of a protected minority, or even have dark skin, you can sue the chain on those grounds. There will be a presumption that they barred you on grounds of race or color. Then the burden of proof will be on them to show that they didn't bar you for those causes. As a form of "entrapment," you should take a witness, basically the most influential person you can get hold of that's not a family member, to the store with you to ask them why you were barred. The mayor of your town would be ideal, more llkely it would be a boss, teacher, or clergyman, but in any event, someone who knows you well. If you can get them to accuse you of stealing in front of this third party, you have the makings of a defamation case. And even if you aren't a minority, you can sue them anyway. You can demand "discovery" of all internal documents, videos, etc. relating to your case. Your lawyer will also the right to "depose" (cross examine) all offending managers.There's a good chance that something embarrassing will turn up in the process. (Many defendants settle in connection with discovery.) You might want to hire a second (libel) lawyer to teach you how to publicize the case without running into libel laws. If all this fails, the store can probably bar you, but you want to make it prohibitively expensive for them to do so, meaning that most rational people wouldn't bar you after the above. If they do, they're not rational and you're better off not using the store.	The mall is a privately owned public space At least while it’s open to the public. A photograph of architecture taken from within it would not violate copyright. However, photographs of other things (like art) do not have the public space exemption. Additionally, the owner can limit or restrict photography. This has nothing to do with copyright, just that an owner has the right to control what happens on their property (within legal limits).	The most important fact to bear in mind is that there's no way to predict whether a given individual will decide to file a suit against you, though we might say on what basis he might, if he so chooses. There are two basic grounds for a suit, one pertaining to trademarks and the other pertaining to use of names – misappropriation and violating the right of publicity. A word can be a trademark, but the scope of protection is somewhat narrow because the protection is in terms of use within a given business. So calling your computer company "Apple" is out, but calling you roofing service the same is okay (assuming that somebody didn't previously register "Apple Roofing"). The main consideration is the likelihood of confusion. Supposing your business were selling landline telephones and I don't think Apple computer company sells such phones, you might still be in trouble if you called your company "Apple Phone", since they certainly do sell phones. There are thousands of trademarks that include "Puff", including Cocopuffs and various pizza and cheese puffs. Since "Puff" is such a generic word, there is a higher bar to proving infringement (there are thousands of trademarks including "Puff"). "Puff Daddy" is, however, a registered trademark covering perfume, jewelry, clothing and certain online services, so there is a non-negligible chance of confusion. In the case of names (or apparent names), an additional concern is whether this is commercial exploitation without consent of a person's name (which causes harm to the subject). The underpinning of this tort is that such a use falsely implies an endorsement of the product. Again, with a fairly generic word like Puff, there isn't a clear implication that Sean Combs has endorsed a product that is called "Puff Communications", but "Puff Daddy Communications" would almost certainly cross that line. The main issues, then, are the extent to which the name is generic vs. unique, and whether it is likely that a person would interpret the product or service as being the same as another, or would constitute an endorsement.	This may well be infringement, but I agree that you should start by reaching out to the instructor. You don't want to pay a lawyer if the matter can be be adjusted peacefully. In the US there is a special limited exemption to copyright for "use in classroom instruction" which might apply in such a case. I am not sure if there is a similar provision in Canadian copyright law. But the instructor is likely to change his practice if you notify him of your objection, even if he has the technical right to use the photo. At least it is worth finding out. If he won't, then you can always consult a lawyer.
What happens if you commit two murders in two different countries (not your own) and is apprehended in a third country? What happens if you commit two murders in two different countries (not your own) and is apprehended in a third country? How will the countries most likely come to an agreement, and how long might the total duration of sentencing become? More specifically referring to the Makaveli Linden case, where the apprehended, a citizen from Sweden, killed a person in Norway, then maybe in Belgium (ongoing investigation), then fled to France. I believe all the countries in question have extradition treaties. Three of the countries are in the EU. Norway is in the EEA.	The country where the accused person was arrested would extradite that person to one of the countries where the crimes had been committed. The extradition treaties or the law of the arresting country might have a rule to define how to choose which country took precedence. (Perhaps the earlier crime, or the more serious crime if they were different, or the closer ally might get priority.) Once the accused was extradited, s/he would be tried, and if convicted, sentenced. Once the sentence was completed, that person would be turned over to the second country for trial and possible sentence there. Sometimes, particularly if the sentence is long, an accused will be turned over to the second country for trial soon after conviction in the first country, under an agreement that the person would be returned to serve the sentence in the first country after the trial was over, whatever the outcome, and then sent back to the second country to serve any sentence imposed there. Or the second country could choose to count time served in the first country against its sentence, but I believe that this is not usual. Consider the case of Frank Abagnale who was sought by some 12 different countries when he was arrested in France. He was convicted and served time in France, then extradited to Sweden, where he was also tried, convicted and served time. Italy had requested his extradition, but he was deported to the US, where he was also tried, convicted, and served time.	Murder Which is the unlawful taking of a life with intent to do so. However, the doctrine of self-defence can make killing lawful: A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. if the prosecutor is of the opinion that the force used "is reasonable in the circumstances" they may not lay charges. If they do lay charges the judge may decide that there is no case to answer before going to trial if self-defence applies. If there is a trial this will probably be the strategy the defence employs and they may or may not be successful. If convicted the penalty is life imprisonment. Also, there is no UK law: there is the law of England and Wales, the law of Scotland and the law of Northern Ireland.	DUI is a crime under Massachusetts law so Kurt would be prosecuted there by that state. Germany would offer consular assistance but this would not extend to preparing or paying for his defence. If convicted, and after serving his sentence, Germany and the USA would coordinate his deportation. The UK would offer consular assistance for the repatriation of Alice's body and for the participation of her family in the trial, again this would not extend to paying for it. They would not assist in any civil action Alice's family might take against Kurt in a Massachusetts court. While DUI is a crime in both Germany and the UK AFAIK they are not extraterritorial: that is the crime must be committed on their territory for them to prosecute it. Some crimes do have extraterritoriality but not DUI. Similarly, their courts would probably not hear a civil case because the correct venue is Massachusetts and they would probably entertain a motion to dismiss on that basis. Even if they did hear it, it would be heard under Massachusetts law.	This is an interesting hypothetical. In this scenario, Country Z does not have jurisdiction to enforce such a law on foreign nationals, unless Country Z has an extradition treaty with Country A. Generally, however, these types of laws would never be enforced as they are egregious abuses of government, and could possibly be elevated to the International Court of Justice if Country Z actually charges any individuals with such a crime. In these instances, however, war is a very unlikely scenario, since this would often be expensive and any escalation would most likely be small skirmishes that would lead to an eventual ceasefire, with the encouragement of the international community, without the involvement of UN Peacekeeping troops.	I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!).	From what I can gather, a US citizen could literally commit first-degree murder in another country, and not be held liable in US courts. Yes. From looking at the decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., it seems a corporation could go so far as to commit genocide in another country and not be held accountable in US courts. Yes. Why is US law set up in this way, and why has nothing been done to change it? Extraterritorality The modern nation-state is part of the Westphalian tradition of sovereignty which takes as a core value that the internal laws of each nation-state are a matter for it and it alone. This is baked into international law as part of the UN charter: "nothing ... shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." The basic assumption of criminal law is that it is, by default, territorial. If a US national commits a crime in the Ivory Coast, then that is primarily the Ivory Coast's problem to deal with. There are both practical and political reasons why this is a good idea. The practical matters are that law enforcement and the courts in the Ivory Coast have the on-the-ground resources and knowledge to investigate and prosecute the crime and the US doesn't. US police forces can't collect evidence and interview witnesses in the Ivory Coast unless the Ivory Coast allows it. US courts can't subpoena witnesses. On the flip side, foreign jurisdictions don't have to follow the US Constitution when conducting searches and beating up, I mean, interrogating, suspects. That may make a lot of the evidence collected in foreign jurisdictions inadmissible in US courts. The political reasons are the US (and anyone else) should stay the f&^% out of the internal operations of other countries. The treaty of Westphalia ended 30 years of the most brutal warfare in history, which killed an estimated one-third of Europe's population, which was largely fought because the ruler of country X wanted to tell the ruler of country Y what religion they should have. Extraterritorality in US law Constitutional restrictions can limit exterritoriality. First, the statute must be within Congress' power to enact. Second, neither the statute nor its application may violate due process or any other constitutional right (see above). The presumption is that Federal laws only apply within US territory. To be extraterritorial, Congress must make this clear, ideally explicitly, but the courts can find that some laws are implicitly extraterritorial based on their language. Other nation's approach is different. For example, a French citizen is subject to French as well as local law everywhere in the world.	Serbia is not in the EU nor internal market, so when importing products you would have to follow specific product requirements, pay eventual import duties and internal taxes (VAT). I would recommend checking out the European Trade Helpdesk for more information about this. As both Hungary and Sweden are in the internal market it should be the exact same procedure to import into either of the countries. Neither of them should be "easier" than the other as the rules are the same. Once the products are inside the internal market area you can freely transfer them anywhere.	Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.

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